INSTITUTIONAL MODELS OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE –

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Agnieszka Pawlowska1
Katarzyna Radzik2

Abstract: Three basic concepts are interrelated: institutions, governance and leadership. Two interpretations
of governance have been presented. Institutional interpretation of leadership has been referred to; leadership has
been introduced as an essential element of local governance. The role of strong leadership is emphasized as the
factor setting an order in the milieu of numerous social actors influencing local policy making. Local leadership
typologies based on institutional factors were presented. Authors elaborate their own typology of leadership and
governance. Technocratic, bureaucratic and transformative models were distinguished. Technocratic model is
described as oriented towards services delivery, with weaker political part. Bureaucratic model is characterized
by strong institutionalization of leadership and political relationships. Transformative model is described as
weak institutionalization of leadership but heading to its reinforcement. Models were illustrated with cases of
local government systems in Finland, France and United Kingdom. Authors try to find symptoms of predefined
models in the new EU member states: Hungary, Baltic States and Poland. Authors conclude that in spite of
features that differentiate local governments in the latter sates, in the context of local governance they still
correspond the best to the bureaucratic model. In couple of cases there are premises – mostly institutional – of
governance development. Still the absence of deeper citizens’ engagement in local affairs and lack of social
environment open for private and non-profit organizations and their involvement in public affairs constitute the
major hindrance of network policy making.

1. Introduction
Since 80-ties European welfare societies experience growing dominance of economy of local services
delivery over values of local democracy. Economic crisis in 90-ties and following shortages in public finances
forced even well-established, social-democratic regimes to undertake measures to curtail sphere of welfare
maintained by the state. As economic values are hardly argued and usually come before social values, public
debate turned out for many to be useless. Local communities – especially those traditionally very active –
experienced the “roll back” of public interest in local affairs3.
Shortage of legitimacy was noticed in 2001 by European Commission that in White Paper on “European
Governance” recommended better involvement of citizens in decision making on all policy levels: local,
regional, national and European 4. European Commission presented an issue of governance comprehensively,
however “governance” as a way of involving various actors in policy making had been elaborated in numerous
works since already mid-90-ties..
It seems that the term “local governance” successfully replaced traditional term “local government” and
describes entire subject of local decision making and administration. We still assume that this term denotes focus
on public services delivery rather than refers to democratic procedures. Local governance means adjusting local
democracy to local economy rather than vice versa. The drift towards better services delivery is clear, though
there are different ways of getting results in this process. We distinguish: a) “soft” measures of making services
better, as those referring to quality management, benchmarking, etc., and b) “hard” measures that step in the
number and size of municipalities and structure of their government.
We have called the latter measures “hard” as they influence political and social relationships inside local
communities, making them usually large, that means less “available” for citizens. As “soft” measures are
imbedded in the systems of the local services delivery, “hard” ones appear in waves. Last decade brought such a
wave of changes in territorial structure in Netherlands, where the number of municipalities has been decreasing
almost every year (in 1997 – 572, 2007 – 443); Finland, where the number of municipalities considerably
diminished (in 1997 – 452, 2007 – 416), Denmark, where entire structure of local government has been changed
January the 1st 2007 (271 municipalities and 13 counties were replaced by 98 municipalities and 5 regions), to
less extent – United Kingdom, where 46 unitary authorities were established by the Local Government Act of
1997, however since already 1986 one-level local government had existed in metropolitan areas.

1
Associate Professor, Political Science Faculty, Maria Curie-Sklodowska University, Lublin, Poland,
a.pawlowska@1gb.pl.
2
Research and Teaching Assistant, Political Science Faculty, Maria Curie-Sklodowska University, Lublin,
Poland katarzyna.radzik@yahoo.com.
3
See discussion on local democracy reform in Finland: Ministry of the Interior, Department for Municipal
Affairs, Project for developing local democracy. 2006. Local Democracy Development,
www.intermin.fi/demokratiahanke, 15.03.2007.
4
Commission of the European Communities. European Governance. The White Paper, Brussels, 25.7.2001,
COM(2001), 428 final.
 Those territorial changes coincide with efforts to improve the system of local public accountability. British
Local Government Act of 2000, where three options of local authorities structure were put forward, is aimed at
emergence of strong executive power in local communities. Introducing in 2002 direct elections of mayors in
Polish communities aspired to empowerment of local executive but also it was expected to mobilize voters and
improve election’s turnout. First politically elected mayor for the city of Tampere represents Finnish aspirations
to make municipal leadership of more political than technocratic nature; those aspirations found their
embodiment in legal amendment to Local Government Act of 1995, passed June 29, 2006, where council
manager can be replaced by mayor.
The statement that during last several years almost all countries located in Central and Eastern Europe
experienced the deep changes of the working system of their local governments is a truism. Undoubtedly, recent
years proved not only a transformation of local government, but furthermore, some countries of the region
experienced the first attempts of the shift from local government to local governance. Undoubtedly, for those
countries of the region that accessed European Union this very fact had significant impact on the implemented
solutions.
Coming back to governance issue, we believe that in present conditions of numerous actors in local policy
making leadership is especially important. Large and complex localities need influential and enabling leaders,
firmly placed in institutional, political and social structures. Therefore we put the role of political leader forward
and formulate the hypothesis that local leadership has regained its importance after more than decade of mostly
managerial attitude towards local issues that were basically understood as delivering services than developing
citizens’ connection with process of local decision-making. We basically analyze local leadership in its
institutional context, i.e. placing local leader in a whole structure of local institutions, functions and
competencies.
Leadership is placed in its governance context. We name three models of leadership and governance and
exemplify them with three cases from “experienced” local government systems (Finland, France and Great
Britain) and three from “learning” systems (Poland, Hungary and Baltic states that present close institutional
solutions).

2. Theoretical framework
There are three basic concepts that interrelate in this paper: governance, institutions and leadership.
C.J. Heinrich, L.E. Lynn, Jr. and C.J. Hill refer to governance as a practice of linking “the objectives of
various and diverse stakeholders (e.g., citizens expressing themselves as voters, respondents to polls, and
consumers; organized interest groups; and elected and appointed officials) with the activities that take place at
the operational levels of government” (Lynn, Heinrich, Hill: 4). The authors characterize governance as
“dynamic, interactive, and continuous process”. We can further estimate that local governance is complex and
fragmented. The network of public, private and voluntary sector organizations is frequently unclear, and
although they act collaboratively to solve problems and meet society’s needs, the basic hitch is that relations
between them are indistinct, often informal and not quite transparent. Number of actors in governance process is
not democratically elected and cannot be called to account by citizens (See: Sullivan et al.).
Citizens might however interpret invitation of those nonpublic bodies to policy making another way than it
is expected by public bodies. Usually, the latter, especially in “old Europe”, see engagement of private and
nongovernmental institutions as a way of improving public participation in local services delivery. But it might
be interpreted as a way of empowering executive bodies as well. Local administration might address important
issues directly to organized groups of customers (electorate) neglecting the representative role of the community
council.
In societies where the level of corruption is high and level of public trust is low, governance wins another
dimension – the one that reflects the “grey” sphere of public-private relations. In numerous societies of East-
Central Europe, any semi- or unofficial networks would be perceived as susceptible to corruption, therefore we
should reflect on this body of experience analyzing governance process in those societies. Furthermore, building
partnership needs time. Local communities in new EU member states are considerably “behind” their partners in
old EU member states. People want quick decisions and immediate results – the way they are accomplished – if
not against the law – is less important. Those are reasons why we believe institutions matter – they are legally
established, more and more transparent, and controlled by bodies (municipal councils, mayors) accountable to
citizens and courts. If we assume that governance is imperative way of contemporary policy making, it can work
through institutions.
Placing governance in the context of institutions assumes institutional perspective for further analysis. Being
aware of plurality of institutional approaches, we adopted only basic terms and definitions that would help us to
structure our further reflections. We particularly liked Peter Katzenstein’s definition of institutions as “a
normative context that constitutes actors and provides a set of norms in which the reputation of the actors acquire
meaning and value” (Katzenstein: 12-13). This definition narrows the notion of institution that is particularly
useful for our analysis mostly based on legal regulations that “provide a set of norms” that enable actors to
“acquire meaning and value”. However, having more in depth look at, for example, local government in Poland,
we would also like to refer to institutions as “the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms, and
conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity” (Hall, Taylor: 938).
 Summing up, we want to see institutions more in a way historical institutionalism does, as “bounded social
constructs of rules, roles, norms, and the expectations that constrain individual and group choice and behavior”
(Frederickson, Smith: 71). We also want to stress that institutional arrangements make opportunities more or less
available, depending on their “compatibility” with local economic and social conditions, as well as consistency
with social and financial policy of the state.
What is exceptionally important for this paper is that institutionalism assumes the centrality of leadership
and management. Institutional approach to leadership emphasizes its role as that of educator and stimulus for
commitments (March, Olsen: 739). We assume that this is a direction of contemporary change in institution of
local political leadership. The previous authority focus of local leaders is moving to “networks of organizations,
within which the local authority is merely one player, and not necessarily the dominant one” (Leach, Wilson:
20).
Leadership is the way in which leaders behave. There are several factors influencing this behavior:
psychological-personal; institutional; party organization and system; political culture. We obviously focus on
institutional factors that reflect “such formal mechanisms as legal powers (of the office holder), financial levers
that can be applied and the framework of organizations within which the leader has to operate” (Leach, Wilson:
8). Legal basis for strong leadership doesn’t necessarily develop strong leadership behavior, and conversely – the
latter might emerge without a wider range of formal powers.
Institutional factors were not a frequent criterion for local leadership typologies. The one was presented by
Paul E. Maurithzen and James H. Svara in their Leadership at the Apex: Politicians and Administrators in
Western Local Governments. They referred leadership to four models of local government (ideal types of
governmental form; Mauritzen, Svara: 55-66):
1. the strong-mayor form – the elected mayor is supported by majority of councilors, is fully responsible
for executive functions and controls local administration; political leadership is emphasized here. This
form of local leadership is practiced in South European countries
2. the committee-leader form – local leader doesn’t necessarily have strong formal position, for example
s/he can be a chairman/woman of the local council. Usually executive powers of a leader (if any) are
shared with collegiate bodies (council, committees, community board). This form of local leadership is
practiced in Denmark, Sweden and United Kingdom.
3. the collective form – collegiate leadership of executive body with a strong position of a mayor who can
build his own leadership position. It is practiced in Belgium and Netherlands.
4. the council-manager form – all executive functions are held by professional administrator (the city
manager) who is appointed by local council. Although s/he is not a political figure, s/he has
considerable influence on local policy making and its implementation. It is present in Ireland, Finland
and Norway.
Mauritzen’s and Svara’s forms of local leadership were based on the research held in mid-nineties of the
past century, therefore we believe – although recognizing its cognitive value – that it doesn’t entirely reflects
present trends in local institutions.
Another proposition, although not named typology, has been presented by Rikke Berg and Nirmala Rao who
referred to transformations of local leadership structures. They pointed at three groups of states (Berg, Rao: 9-
10):
1. those, where radical changes of local leadership towards empowerment of local executive took place
(Netherlands, Germany, United Kingdom)
2. those, where structural changes were restricted to few municipalities, usually big cities (Norway, Spain,
Denmark)
3. those, where no considerable changes in local leadership took place (Switzerland, Sweden, United
States, France, Belgium).
Considering reflections on local leadership of Mauritzen and Svara, as well as Berg’s and Rao’s idea to
analyze this phenomenon through the prism of leadership transformation, we have tried to elaborate our own
models of local leadership and governance, based on three criteria:
1. institutional and legal conditions of local leadership
2. raison d’être of local governance, i.e. is it basically brought to deliver services or express the will of
local community
3. adaptability of local structures to governance arrangements.
Those criteria allowed us to distinguish the following three models:
– technocratic
– bureaucratic
– transformative
Technocratic model is oriented towards services delivery, with weaker political part. Local policy making is
based on consensus searching and pragmatic activities. Consensus searching doesn’t preclude political shifts that
are manifested during elections, however neutralized afterwards by, for example, principle of proportionality in
appointing collegiate bodies, that prevents political trade. This form of leadership can be characterized as
“dynamic stabilization” – rules of leadership are general and allow considerable independence in institution
building. Endogenous factors dominate in transformation of local leadership. This model of local leadership is
distinctive for Nordic states.
Bureaucratic model is characterized by strong institutionalization of leadership and political relationships.
Local leader has stable political support of party majority in local council; furthermore, is secured by his/her
functions performed as state official. Local functions are mostly of administrative character, therefore we called
that form bureaucratic. Besides, institutional settlement of local leader is very conservative, i.e. immune for
factors of change. Both features prevent transformation of local leadership. Factors of change are exogenous.
Bureaucratic leadership is typical for South European states.
Transformative model is characterized by weak institutionalization of leadership but it heads to its
reinforcement by its clear separation and attributing considerable decisional and executive powers. Delivering
services is essential for local leader, still political discourse seems to be equally important. While in technocratic
leadership the dynamic of changes is stable, in transformative it is uneven. Alteration of leadership is not rooted
in existing legal and institutional order, but it is either an effect of dissatisfaction and pressure of citizens, or an
effect of national policy. This leadership can be found in the United Kingdom and Ireland.

3. Models of local leadership and governance in practice

In this section we want to exemplify models of local leadership and governance scheduled above. For each
model we tried to find one example from “old” EU member states and the one from “new” ones. Technocratic
model was illustrated by the local government in Finland and Hungary that, we believe, is closest to this model
among local governments in East-Central Europe. Bureaucratic model will be demonstrated by local government
in France and in Baltic states; transformative – by local government in Poland.

3.1. Technocratic
Local government in Finland has been always considered very technocratic. The position of municipal
manager was introduced already in 1927 and since the very beginning s/he was granted considerable executive
power. However, s/he wasn’t only the most important town clerk, but also the chairmen of an executive board,
and a head of local administration. Manager was employed for indefinite term and the law protected him/her
from dismissal. In effect, manager played double role in municipality – s/he was the highest official and
executive power, and in fact leader of local community. The situation that appointed figure – legally not
accountable to local citizens – plays political role had been criticized. The Local Government Act of 1977 was to
diminish political character of manager and deprived him of the chairmanship of an executive board (Leinonen,
Juntunen).
Since 1995, local council shell determine if manager is appointed for definite or fixed term, however not
exceeding the term of the council. Manager is elected by local council by majority vote 5. The council may
dismiss the municipal manager or transfer him to other duties if he no longer enjoys the confidence of the
council. The matter is instituted at the proposal of the municipal board or if at least one quarter of the councilors
submit an initiative to this effect. The decision must be supported by two thirds of all the councilors 6.
Manager is expected to be apolitical, though usually s/he is connected with political majority in the council
(Daemen, Van der Mer: 29). Political background, qualified majority of votes necessary for recall, the right to
speak for executive board and possibility of being appointed for its chairman (although not frequently exercised)
gave manager instruments to build own leadership position. Local governance in Finland is very much
management oriented, and reasons of effective services delivery frequently took over democratic values – that
furthermore gave advantage to executive authorities over representative ones (Ryynänen: 204).
An executive power in Finnish municipality belongs to executive board. It seems that neither legal
regulations provide the basis for collegiate leadership, nor executive boards themselves reveal such aspirations.
Executive board consists of 7 members and is elected by local council, from among councilors, for two-years
term. Municipal boards is responsible for the administration and financial management of local authorities, and
for preparing, executing and watching over the legality of council decisions 7. Manager could speak for executive
board and the latter could entrust him/her certain tasks. Executive board could also proceed under the
chairmanship of the chairman/woman of municipal council. Otherwise authority of the chairman/woman of
council referred only to the council.
A good deal of power granted to not directly elected official (manager) has been for a long time under the
public critic. Relations between local administration and politics were blurred, the scope of responsibilities
unbalanced, and citizens’ participation in local policy making not pleasing (Leinonen, Juntunen), although –
what we need to add – the system of local committees have been very well developed in Finnish communities.
Local committees were established either on the basis of legal regulations or by the decision of municipal
council. They usually dealt with social services education, health service, and consisted usually of members of
local parties. Introduction of explicit political leadership was expected to put an order in plural local institutions
and adjust them to the process of governance.

5
The Finnish Local Government Act No. 365 Issued in Helsinki, March 17, 1995, Section 24.
6
Ibidem, Section 25.
7
Ibidem, Section 23.
 Modified in 2006 local government act in Section 24 allows either manager or mayor to be elected by local
council (both of them are elected according to the same rules described above). The mayor directs local
administration, is responsible for financial management and other operations subordinate to the municipal board.
S/he is considered a municipal elected official. Furthermore the mayor acts as chairman of the municipal board.
The mayor can be assisted by deputy-mayors. In a situation of no confidence, local council can vote to dismiss
the mayor by a simple majority.
The first politically elected mayor in Finland took his office in the City of Tampere, January the 1 st, 2007. It
is expected that “the new model of mayor-led administration is to assert the political nature of municipal
leadership and strengthen the position of the City Council” 8. But this undoubtedly political shift in local
leadership is accompanied by significant reform in administrative model that will adopt purchaser/provider
model. Municipal administration is planned to be grouped into four: the purchaser group, the human resources
and administration group, the economy and strategy group, and the owner governance group. One aspect of such
organization is “the participation of residents in service planning”9.
Those two events in Tampere are very significant. From one side we observe emergence of a strong political
leadership, from the other – reconstruction of local institutions towards governance structures, where both
services delivery and participation are stressed. Legal provisions as well as Tampere’s experience might
considerably influence technocratic model of local leadership and governance in Finland.
We believe that Hungarian system of local government is close to technocratic model because of strong
position of the chief executive among local institutions. Executive functions in municipalities belong to the
mayor and the chief executive. The mayor is directly elected by the system of the majority vote. S/he is the
leader of the local government and also the chair of the council. The mayor is mainly responsible for local policy
implementation, though s/he carries also some of the state administrative tasks. On the suggestion of the mayor
the council may elected a deputy-mayor. The deputy mayor performs functions under the supervision of the
mayor. In the municipalities with more than three thousand inhabitants, this position must be a full-time
appointment. Temesi indicates that in practice, this institution serves the purpose of political concession to
representatives of political parties within the local government (Temesi: 359). In the situation when the mayor
represents a minority party, s/he may nominate a vice-mayor from the party that has a majority in the council.
Furthermore, in this “counterbalance situation”, the deputy mayor performs more significant tasks as economic,
social etc. However, if the mayor and the councils’ majority represent the same party alliance, the deputy mayors
functions are less important and focus on cultural or educational fields (Tamás:7).
It can be also indicated that in the relation council-mayor the collective body seems to be more powerful. It
can be proved by the facts that the mayor has no power to dissolve the council or even postpone its meeting,
though the council has right to initiate the process of her/his disqualification from the office if s/he does not carry
the functions properly.
The chief executive is a public administration professional, while mayor and deputy mayor represent a
political side. Thus, the chief executive (called also notary) is appointed by the council for an indefinite term on
the basis of the open competition. S/he manages the office of the representative body and its day-to-day
activities, while the mayor is responsible for the general strategy. The chief executive addresses tasks related to
the activities of the local government and prepares decisions on state administrative matters made by the mayor.
S/he performs powers delegated by the mayor. Moreover, the chief executive is mainly responsible for ensuring
the lawful activities of the local administration. S/he participates in the council’s sessions and its committees and
reviews the legality of the decisions of these bodies, as well as the mayor’s decisions. On the proposal of the
chief executive council may appoint a vice chief executive.
The foregoing description of Hungarian local government executive institutions shows that in case of
mayors’ elections and performance the party affiliation is one of the most important factors. Relatively strong
position of professional chief executive creates circumstances for less partisan local policy making.

3.2. Bureaucratic
The practice of bureaucratic model of local leadership and governance will be presented on an example of
French municipality. The central institution and, at the same time, figure in local public life is mayor. The
French Code of Municipalities of 1977 doesn’t leave any doubt about it. And although in last quarter of the
century, the system of local government in France went through essential changes, leadership of the mayor
remained untouched.
The mayor is in disposition of the number of attributes that allow him/her to play the principal role in
municipality. The most important are mayor’s competencies. S/he is the unique executive authority in
municipality, a head of local administration and executor of tasks entrusted by the local council 10. The mayor

8
New era in city leadership, http://www.tampere.fi/text/information/bulletin/2006/index/t061221_3.html,
12.03.2007.
9
Tampere pioneering a New administrational model,
http://www.tampere.fi/text/information/bulletin/2006/index/t061221_4.html, 12.03.2007.
10
Code General des Collectivites Territoriales (Partie Législative), Article L2122-18, L2122-21, L2122-22,
www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
presides over the meetings of the council, calls those meetings, organizes council’s work 11. Moreover, the mayor
executes the tasks of state official that makes him – in respect of those tasks – responsible to the prefect of the
department12.
Strong position of the mayor is also an effect of elections to the local council 13. We will not describe here
local electoral law, let us only mention that an en emergence of stable majority in local council is an imperative
of legal regulations passed in 1982 and in force till nowadays 14. This stable majority is to appoint a mayor and
support him/her with equally stable political background for his/her six-year term. As state official, mayor
cannot be dismissed from his/her office.
Mayor’s position is sometimes called “local presidency”. Indeed, candidates for this post must have large
support of their political party, usually they are well-known in municipality as they also might be deputies or
senators (Edwards, Hupe: 139).
In spite of decentralization process held in France since 1982 and considerable changes in services delivery,
local institutions prove amazing stability, including institutional leadership of the mayor. S/he has all attributes
to take decisions independently. However, this is not a good starting point to develop governance structures on
local level. The mayor must be able to share his/her responsibility with other actors. It looks as if existing legal
regulations and local institutions make this mission hard, but not impossible. That has been proved by activities
of the Mayor of Paris (since 2001), Bertrand Delanoë, the man who built his leadership position on
“redistribution” of leadership.
In all the Baltic States – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, as it was in other countries of East-Central Europe –
there were no real local governments from 1940 to 1989. In the first years of the independence the main
attention, as it also was in other countries of the region, was focused on building the democratic local
government and the process of decentralization. It was only later that care was given to institutional reforms and
also the efficiency and effectiveness in delivering public services. Furthermore, the beginning of the new century
brought concentration on cooperation between local government and private sector as also the interest in using
the modern methods of management (New Public Management, Reinventing Government, Total Quality
Management); (Vangas, Vilka: 625). As the Baltic States show far going similarities, we decided to characterize
them in one paragraph.
In Lithuania, the political leader of the local government is the mayor. The mayor is elected by the council,
than on her or his recommendation council elects also the deputy mayor. Both of them are elected by the secret
ballot from among the councilors by the simple majority of the total number of councilors. The mayor and
deputy mayor are mainly responsible for the implementation of the councils’ decisions, however they have also
some tasks delegated by the state. The third body of the local government, besides the council and mayor, is the
board. On the base of Law on Local Self-government, the council may decide to form a joint executive
institution from among the councilors. If the board is formed, the mayor and deputy mayor are ex officio
members of the board; the rest of the boards’ members are nominated by the mayor on the council approval. In
addition to her or his duties, in case in which the council does not create the board, the mayor is the person who
exercises its functions (Beksta, Petkevicius:183-184). It implies the significant role of the mayor in Lithuania’s
local government.
In Lithuania, for several years the idea of direct elections of mayors has been discussed among politicians
and society. In April 2005 the new model of local government was proposed. The main point of the model is the
following: the council of municipality is the representative and executive institution, which is governed by the
directly-elected mayor. The mayor simultaneously is the head of the municipality and the chairman of the
council; she or he also directly governs the municipality’s administration. The proposed solutions are very
similar to those implemented in 2002 in Poland (see following part of the paper). Nevertheless, the support for
the reform is weaker. The Lithuanian experts indicate that there are considerable risks in such mergers of
legislative and executive powers. They emphasize that the country is not ready for this reform, though it works
very well in many other states.
Similarly to Lithuania, local government system in Estonia consists of only one level. The executive power
in Estonian municipalities belongs to mayor and the municipal government (members and a municipal clerk
appointed by the mayor). Decisions of this body are passed by majority vote. Sessions are not public unless the
municipal government decides otherwise. The main tasks of the municipal government are: preparation of the
issues to be discussed by the municipal council based on the position of the government and council resolutions;
management of local issues that are assigned to the municipal government by the council resolutions or the local
law; management of local issues that do not fall within the sole competence of the council and finally
representation as s legal person the local authority in the court. The municipal government can also apply to the
council to review a regulation or resolution passed by this collective body.

11
Ibidem, Article L2121-9, L2121-10, L2121-14.
12
Ibidem, Article L2122-27 – 32.
13
Mayor is elected by the council In secret ballot, with majority of over half of votes. If in two elections no one
is elected with that majority, in the third one simple majority is enough to be elected a mayor.
14
Code Electoral (Partie Législative), Article L260-L262, http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr.
 Mayor is elected by the council for a term of three years. S/he cannot simultaneously be the chair of the
council. Nevertheless, from 1989 to 1993 when the local administration was being rebuilt after the communist
period, the principles of the administrative reform prescribed it as the one of the possible solutions.
The mayor in Estonia has an obligation to form the municipal government from the moment s/he is elected.
The mayor is conferred authority upon confirmation into office by the municipal government, and the municipal
government is conferred authority from the date of its appointment by the council. To the main mayor’s tasks
belong: organization of the work of the municipal government and preparation of its sessions; representation of
the municipality in accordance with the authority granted her or him by the law, municipal status and the
council; coordination of the internal activities of the municipal government and its agencies etc.
(Mäeltsemees:77-81).
Contrary to Lithuania and Estonia, local government in Latvia comprises of two levels. The first includes
486 rural municipalities, 70 towns and 7 city municipalities. The second one consists of 26 regional governments
and 7 republican cities. Thus, cities are simultaneously represented on both levels of local government. It should
be stressed also that local units, especially the municipalities are very small. Moreover, in Latvia there is a very
weak legal basis for local government as e.g. the constitution does not provide any regulations for it.
Sootla and Saarts stressed that in all Latvian municipalities standing committee and council-mayor system is
developed, where the standing committee prepares proposals for the final decisions of the council (Sootla,
Saarts). The council elects the members of the standing committees from among its deputies. These committees
prepare issues for the review at the council meetings, submit statements on the issues that are within their
competence, oversee the work of local government enterprisers and organizations, review budget drafts, etc.
The mayor (chair of the council) oversees its work, coordinates the review of the issues by committees,
represents local governments in all capacities, authorizes decisions of the council and signs agreements and other
legal documents on behalf of the local government. The mayor (chair) is the full time employee of the local
government. Upon the proposal of the mayor (the chair) the council appoints an executive director. S/he is
responsible for the activities of local government institutions, enterprises and organizations. The executive
director cannot be a deputy. In the situation when local government does not decide to nominate an executive
director, the mayor (chair of the council) exercises his/her duties (Vanagas, Vilka:135).
Analyzing local government system in Baltic states we can formulate several conclusions. First, each
country tried to elaborate its own system based more on its own traditions and contemporary conditions than
outside patterns. Second, local authorities are based on council-mayor pattern, where mayor is elected by the
council and if the latter decides to create collective body (local board or government), the mayor takes its chair.
Third, competencies of the mayor are significant enough to granted him/her institutional leadership, however,
electing mayor by local council makes this leadership considerably dependent on local party machines, that
might be treated as essential drawback. Furthermore, direct elections for mayor are considered as premature.

3.3. Transformative
The last decade developments in the British local government served as a foundation for constructing
transformational model of local leadership and governance. The traditional structure of British local authorities
was characterized by an absence of separate executive power. Preparing and implementing council decisions was
granted to council commissions. In traditional structure local leadership didn’t have its legal and institutional
dimension. The chairman of the council didn’t have other prerogatives than those referred to the council. S/he
also represented local community but only during ceremonies (Wilson, Game: 70-74). Traditionally, leadership
in local communities was – as Peter John puts it – invisible (John: 44).
For the first time an issue of strong local executive appeared in the beginning of 90-ties. The then Secretary
of the State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine suggested direct elections of mayors (Wilson, Game: 332,
334). At that time this proposal wasn’t accepted by majority in Parliament. The situation changed with the new
Labor government. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair had clear vision of local government led by strong-minded
and charismatic leaders as he himself. The Local Government Act of 1997 was an evidence of determination of
the Labor government in reforming local administration 15. Greater London Authority Act of 1999 introduced, for
the first time in London’s history, its directly elected mayor.
Further step has been made in 2000 in the Local Government Act aimed at clear separation of executive
power from other local authorities. The distinguishing feature of this law is that it gives local councils and
communities possibility of choice between three options of local authorities’ structure (Local Government
Association):
1. A directly elected mayor with a cabinet, where mayor is elected by whole electorate and holds
executive functions with cabinet, selected by mayor from among councilors. The mayor is the political
leader for the community. S/he proposes policy for approval by the council and controls its
implementation.
2. Leader and cabinet, where leader is elected by the council and the cabinet is made up of councilors,
either appointed by the leader or by the council. Leader has executive powers; however his/her
prerogatives might be weaker than in previous model as s/he has no direct mandate form the electorate.

15
Unitary authorities were introduced in some areas of England.
 3. Mayor and council manager, where mayor is directly elected and plays a role of political leader, while
manager is responsible for strategic planning and day to day management of the municipality.
First elections under the new law, held in 2002, brought new organization of local authorities. However,
change wasn’t as “revolutionary” as probably national government had expected. Model of leader and cabinet
was adopted in 83% of localities; a directly elected mayor with a cabinet was adopted in 3%, while the third
model was accepted by only 1 community16. Only 12 out of 389 English authorities decided to elect directly their
mayors (Hambleton, Sweeting: 479-480). Low interest in direct elections of mayor might be an effect of legal
demand to decide this issue in local referendum. Till mid-2004, 30 such referendums took place that is further
evidence of low “trust” of English citizens in strong leader. However we also need to mention that national
authorities were not sufficiently determined to accomplish their plan of strongly legitimized local leader.
Why strong leadership on local level was so important for Tony Blair and his government? The answer can
be found in years of Conservative government. Gerry Stoker puts it in this way:

“There was a shift in the institutional structure of governing with a range of local appointed
bodies or quangos gaining greater responsibility and prominence. Second, there was a change
in the pattern of governing, a blurring of responsibilities with appointed bodies and
partnerships, and organizations working alongside elected local authorities. Elected politicians
and full-time local government bureaucrats found themselves joined by range of other actors.
There were major roles for users, interested citizens and the private sector in this complex
interplay of local actors. In short, the Conservatives created the environment for a shift from
local government to local governance”(Stoker 2004: 28-29)

Local authorities, weaken by numerous quangos or other organizations admitted to local services delivery
needed reinforcement of their legitimacy and at the same time an instrument to control a variety of actors in local
policy making. Elected political leader looked like the right answer.
We dared, although with several reservations, to select Poland as an example of transformative model in
East-Central Europe. Since the turn of the XX and XXI centuries we witnessed clear and firm attempts towards
transformation of the local leadership from collective board to directly-elected mayor. Up to 2002, based on the
Act on Local Government of 1990, the organs of Polish municipality were: municipal council and board. The
board was an executive body which members – including the mayor, his/her deputies, and maximum of five
individuals – were elected by the council. The mayor and his/her deputies did not have to be councilors. The
council could have recalled the board during its term (Kowalczyk: 230).
In 2002 after the long debate, as the idea of direct elections of executive was picked up for the first time in
beginning of the 1990s, the system was changed and citizens were given an opportunity to elect their mayors.
Local leaders chosen in such a way make a one person board. They designate or dismiss their deputies. The
mayor became not only the most important person in the local government’s system but s/he took over all the
competencies of the former board. The implementation of the reform raised hopes for the improvement of the
quality of Polish local government. The supporters of the change claimed that local government should become,
thanks to this reform, more transparent, interesting and just simpler for an average citizen. Furthermore, what
distinguishes this reform from others implemented in Polish local government, is the fact that the idea of direct
elections was supported by the great majority of the citizens. The CBOS 17 surveys of 2002 showed that almost
two thirds (64%) of Poles opted for the direct elections of mayors 18. Only 10% of the respondents claimed that
they preferred the previous system where mayors were elected by the council. 20% of Poles were unconcerned
(Figure 1).
However the first and the second direct elections for the mayors proved some former existing tendencies.
First and foremost, the turnout did not prove the initial outburst of the society’s interest. In the local elections of
2002 the turnout was 44,23% and in the second one, carried out in 2006, was in the first turn 45,99% and in the
second - 39,69%. These figures show that though Polish citizens have accepted the change of executive
authority, they did not want to engage themselves more in local issues than before. Moreover, it indicates also
that in Poland, as well as in some “old” European countries e.g. England or Ireland, something more has to be
done than only the change of collective leadership into individual one to attract people to ballots. Secondly, 2002
and 2006 elections proved again that in Polish local government the most important are still candidates
supported by the political parties. That was noticeable in the big municipalities where almost all candidates for
the presidents had a party affiliation. The situation slightly changed in 2006, as some of them proved their
efficiency in the first tenure and did not need any party support (e.g. Wrocław and Rafał Dutkiewicz case).
Thirdly, the shift to direct elections of mayors caused, again notably in big cities, frequent situation where
council majority (by virtue of its party membership) was in opposition to the mayor. This situation, comparable

16
Remaining local authorities adopted so called alternative arrangements that actually meant keeping traditional
form of local institutions with omnipotent council.
17
CBOS (Public Opinion Research Center).
18
The surveys were made in January 2002 just before the reform was introduced.
to French cohabitation, showed how difficult was to maintain the effectiveness of decision-making in those units
where the party affiliation of the council and mayor was different.

Figure 1. How do you prefer to elect mayor in your municipality? (%)

Preffered the
previous system
6% 10%

20% Preffered the

directly-elected
mayors
Unconcerned

64%
It was hard to say

Source: http://www.cbos.com.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2002/KOM017/KOM017.HTM (16/06/05)

Describing the leadership in Poland, in the context of governance it should be stressed that though some of
the mayors have a clear willingness to create local policy in cooperation with NGOs, the third sector
organizations still have little to say in the local environment. Municipal authorities, especially rural, adhere to
bureaucratic style of local decision making and they rather administrate local affairs than manage public
services. Number of hindrances of local government are recently noticed and seem to initiate public debate over
the future of local government in Poland.

4. Conclusions
Local policy making evolves towards building partnership models of numerous – public, private and non-
governmental – actors. In several countries basics of governance were established already quarter of century ago
(United Kingdom) and regulated in local government acts (Finland, where network of local committees is
dense). Also in new EU member states, although recently, attempts have been made to prepare conditions for
broad participation of different entities in local policy making. For example, in Poland, legal acts regulating
activities of governments on municipal, provincial and regional levels require cooperation between public
institutions and NGO’s; the latter were also empowered with individual bill on organizations of public benefit
and voluntary activities that create conditions of their participation in services delivery. Public-private
partnership, although also legally regulated, as yet hasn’t found its broad acceptance, as relations between local
institutions and private entrepreneurs are frequently perceived as based on corruption.
Although we tried to find symptoms of any of predefined models in the new EU member states, we realize
that in the context of local governance they still correspond the best to the bureaucratic model. It is proved by the
fact that local functions have still mostly administrative character and the environment of local leaders is
“conservative”. As “conservative”, we see predominant role of political parties in local activities. Obviously
political parties are inherent feature of politics performed everywhere, on each level of social life. Party
affiliation counts first of all in local elections. The question is, if party politics dominates over policy making
between elections. We estimate that in cases of Finland, France and United Kingdom (although still to different
degree) political parties don’t play leading role, they rather complete the picture of numerous actors in local
politics. While in Baltic states, Poland and Hungary, they are still main architects of local policy.
As “conservative” we also perceive “a fear of strong leadership” accompanied by the lack of coherent vision
of local government structure. It is particularly visible in case of Baltic states: for certain, Lithuania with one of
the biggest local units in Europe needs different type of leadership, than a small municipalities in Latvia. And,
last but not least, “conservative” is everything that was inherited by local government from previously existing
(before 1990) local political structures: hierarchical, function-oriented bureaucracy, lack of innovative thinking,
waiting for decisions “from above”, faith in causative power of law not causative power of people.
We believe in institutions building and their importance for development of governance structures that
would enable various actors representing interests of local communities to participate in policy making and
delivering public services. Knowing conditions in Poland best, we can admit that as long as it concerns
institutions, governance can work – there are legal, organizational and financial instruments for this process.
There is also strong institutional leadership to control local network and take responsibility for local affairs. We
also assume that in Hungary institutional arrangements are “compatible” with governance. What is absent is
better engagement of the citizens in local affairs and social environment “friendly” for non-public (private and
non-profit) organizations and their involvement in public affairs.
To the end, we want to claim that comparing number of institutional systems is always a challenge; trying to
“cram” them into predefined models is “hazardous”. We took this challenge and took this risk, being aware of
imperfection of our work, which we treat as preliminary and developmental. We would also be grateful for any
remarks concerning the issues discussed in this paper.

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