Manchester Studies in Religion, Culture and Gender Manchester Studies in Religion, Culture and Gender

This series was edited by the late Grace M. Jantzen

The subj ect of love

Héléne Cixous and the feminine divine

Sal Renshaw
A)reocly published

Religion and culture

Michel Foucault
selected ond edited by Jererny R. Carrette

Representations of the post/human

Monsters, aliens and others in popular culture
Elaine L. Graham

Becoming divine
Towards a feminist philosophy of religion
Groce M. Jcntzen

Divine love
Luce Irigaray, women, gender, and religion
Momy loy

Literatllre, theologF arld feminism

Heather Wokon

M¿lnchester University Press

M,ln( llr,sler alrcl New York
,re subject of love
Thus, I found myself captivated by the idea that Cixous' work was and still
is all about questions of divinity, and that these questions are a reflection of a
very different understanding of the place of religion in contemporary theory. In
this respect, then, her work on subjectivity and writing, or love and death, or
even her more recent work on the tragedies of history, are all different faces of
the same question. Put another way, the gift that Cixous is most interested in is
the gift of love. If any single theme can be thought to dominate her work, it is
thethemeof love'swork.C¡*yslgygl_C:gy9_lSyS*gg'gü*l¿gS:_*lglglz
What would it take to love the other as other, neither to refuse nor to embrace
brrl !o create a spacg in which the other is m9t, is brus,hed ag+,r-l!"(r,.il.*
1[q__".th_el,:"
perheps felq. as wel! a: leerr? Car we live our subjectivities in a way in which love
emerges in the in-betwegn not as somqthing an 'I' doa or hos, brt-t*ather aS-nnme-
thing that"h,appgns to an us, that emerges, in the very space of.meeting? What
kind of being does it take to love the other in their otherness and not to sacrifice
oneself in doing so? Wb"*k*g: to and between s-ubiegtivities make
.
"9_{.'19]ltigps
possible this notion of a divine meeting in differenóó?
ffi-tffi'"üfiiri¿ ói*onri thinking about a just love of the other that involves
an encounter with the otherness of difference does have a certain presence in
thg bt*gry_gilqfg. In a qualified sense, I find it tantalisingly evocative of the
CñTñdan *"."pt óf igope, which has been understood as a universally oriented,
other-regarding, selfl.ess love. In theological terms, God's love is ogopic, and it is
characterised as a universal bestowal that arises not in response to the specificity
of the object of love but rather out of a fundamental nature that is loving. God
is the paradigmatic self/less loverwho in the radical absence of a self that is'doing'
the loving is therefore nothing but the becoming of pure love. While the trans-
lation of this theological conception of idealised selfless love has in practice been
very problematic, particularly for women around the question of selflessness,u
there is, nonetheless, something radically egalitarian about a conception of love
that is universally expressed regardless of the specificity of the obfect of that
Iove. Indeed, I would argue that this egalitarian aspect of Christian love, to the
extent that it bears on an ethics of intersubjective relations, has potentially been
Christianity's most unique, radical and indeed provocative contribution to ethics.
However, the other-regarding aspect of cgcpic love, when applied to humans, and
not to God, has, in the practice of much theological interpretation, often been
twinned with an equally defining feature. Other-regard is dependent firstly upon
the selflessness or self-denial of the subject who loves. AgoF, then, is .selfles.s other-
rcgarding love, and in this sense, it can be foturd to be pnrftlundly irn¡rlicatcd in
sacrificial klgic. Lovc of the other that is gcnuine, aud tlttrs tlivitte , irt thc rlrtltodox
rt'¡rlirr¡¡ of 'a¡¡cpc, is ¡rrc.dicatt:d ulx)n a self'tlrat, ()n tlte tttost t'r)nlnl()tt itttt'r¡)rt'ta*
llorr ,lf'lllr. nroclt.l of'ft.sus, is .r¡r¡r.rrt.ntly *illirrI lo s¡t'rifit'e itself'to tltc ulntost
lntroduction
for the sake of the other.t In this respect, it is a kind of love that is peculiarly
inimical to human subjectivity. It is considerably léss gift than it is duty, and this
aspect of ogcpe displaces any obvious connection between Héléne Cixous' under-
standing of an ethic of love and that of orthodox Christian theologies. As awriter
who has embraced and indeed inspired many of the insights of contemporary
feminism, Cixous is clear that women have traditionally borne the brunt of
sacrificial logic in a patriarchal world. The demand for self-sacrifice has been a
rnasculine ideal, but a peculiarly feminine practice.s So in that sense Cixous' love,
while clearly understandable as other-regarding, is strictly speaking not ogapic, for
Cixous is typic.lly no advocate of sacrificial logic.e
Furthermore, the challenges that the concept of cgope ñced in the twentieth
century have turned out to be almost insurmountable even within the province
t>f mainstream Christian Protestant theology. From the 1930s, with the Protestant
theologian Bishop Anders Nygren's publication of his controversial Agope and Eros
(1982 [1932/t938]), and in the subsequenr work of Reinhold Niebuhr, 0g0pe
¿;:::!rr
lgain became the subject of serious theological controversy.'o The very conser-
vative, largely Pauline, readings of the conditions of ogopic love that characterised
the work of both these men seemingly emphasised the notion of self-denial to
t The crucifixion has long been interpreted as the archetypal example of sacrificial love. While
there is much to be said about this interpretation, it is not the primary focus of this work.
Nonetheless, it is important to note that the sacrificial interpretation of Jesus is highly contested
within the field of religious studies. The work of René Girard, to which I will refer in more detail
shortly, is but one place where a non-sacrificial interpretation of Jesus and the Gospels can be
filund.
' The sarne insight informs a landmark essay by the feminist theologian Valerie Saiving. Saiving's
.rrticle 'The Human Situation: A Feminine View' was published in The Journol of Religious Studia
in 1960 and is now considered to be a key text marking the emergence of the new discipline of
fi'nrinist theology. In this piece Saiving particularly challenged the theologians Anders Nygren
¡nd Reinhold Niebuhr, both of whose work emphasised the sacrificial aspect of cgopic love. Saiving
¡rroposed that the theological understanding of the human/divine relation on which Nygren and
N ictruhr relied in turning to self-sacrifrce as the proper character of cgcpic love * namely that the
Irunran situation is characterised by anxiety, estrangement, and the conflict between necessity
,r¡rd freedom; that sin is directly related to the seeming incorrigibility of human pride, the will-
t( )-power and exploitation; and the treatment of others as objects rather than as persons - could
lrt, sufficiently understood only by recognising that these concerns do not in fact reflect human
t'x¡lcrience, tout court, but male experience, quite specifically. Female experience, Saiving felt, was
t'lr¡r¡ctcrised by the opposite of self-interest, that is, by an abandonment of self in the face of
tlrt'otlrer, and self-sacrifice could hardly then be offered as a corrective.
'' While nry interest in Cixous' work has consistently been grounded in the way I read her as
,h'vt'kr¡rirrg a ¡rotior¡ of'lovc that is cthical primarily to the extent that it is abundant, excessive,
rrrrl gerrer()us a¡ld tltrts that nrns ('()rultcr to sacrificial versions of love, in some of her very recent
nr(.nroir writi¡rg wlrit:lr inc'lrrrlt:s rcflection on hcr animals, there is thc disturbing trace of sacrificial
hrglt'. See fi,r r.xan¡l)lt"stigtrtata, or folr thc l)og'fiont Slignloto; E.scrrping Text,s (1998) whcre shc
nár'r'¿t('s tlre traglt'story of'her t'l¡lkllurorl tkrg, lli¡ls. See ¡lso MCIsie (1996), wlrt're her rt'flectir¡ns
lunr lo lter lrloverl t'ats,
The subject of love
the extent to which both the Judaic and Christian traditions, in having been so
deeply woven through the abominations of Leviticus, have reviled and made the
basis of sin the very exigencies of human corporeality. For many contempor-
ary feminist theologians, then, any conception of love that is unable to fully
embrace all aspects of what it means to be human, including embodied sexuality,
cannot be considered to be a jut love, and, in that sense, it cannot have the redemp-
tive qualities necessary for it to be truly Christian. Traditional cgcpe has fallen
well short of these criteria; firstly in typically being interpreted as self-denying,
secondly'in being so thoroughly abstracted from the world, and thirdly in being
humanly impossible.
Nonetheless, I would argue that to a great extent it is the pre-Christian, classical
divinity of eros that is re-membered and then Christianised through a feminist
theology that has not deeply taken into consideration the ways in which sexual
difference is implicated at the level of subjectivity. With their attention sharply
focussed on the problem of selflessness, and by extension the self of the already
taken-for-granted ontological subiect, woman, much of feminist theology seems
to be marked by * unconscious allegiance to the notoriously masculine, Enlighten-
ment ideals of what a subf ect is in the first place. Eros fits well into this story of
both love and subiectivity. But I want to suggest that in Cixous' detachment
from many of the formal questions concerning orthodox religions, and in her
recognition of subfectivity as an ongoing process of becoming rather than being,
fragmentation rather than unity, her work permits the emergence of a concep-
tion of love that is divine yet is not predicated upon sacrificial logic. Alison Weir,
in her extensive study of the relationship between sacrificial logic and identity,
exposes a similar challenge to a project of rethinking identity beyond patriarchal
Enlightenment ideologies. She insists that any model of subiectivity must retain
some notion of coherence at the level of social participation while simultane-
ously rejecting an essentialist ontology of authentic selfhood (1996: 185). To
whatever extent the notion of authentic selfhood might apply to Cixous' subiect,
it does so by contrast with the Enlightenment subiect. The 'authentic' self is not
the self that pre-exists the moment. On the contrary the authentic self emerges
in opening on to an endless process of becoming, thus can never be thought of
as unified or stable. In this vision of the subject as emergent in its relations to
and with the world and others, I will suggest that Cixous' subject gives rise
to the possibility of a love that generates a certain divinity that might not be
equally possible, even in a re-membered eros. The love of which Cixclus speaks
is thrlnxrghly human: it is not inimical to the questi()ns r¡f er¡tbclclitltent or
scxrrality firr it is uot l<lst in an encounter with eitlter. Its tlivinity lies itt its
willirrg errrllracc of'thc linrits r-rf'htrnran bcirtg, its recogltitiott tlnt divilte lovtt is
Irr¡t tlrt. ¡tosst.ssio¡r of'a srrhjer:t to givt', rlr tr¡ reccivc. Rather tllvinlty is sottl('thirrg
tlr¿r enlergrs, like t{rrt('(., irr.r sl)3lrl('wlriclr is in lnrllty resl)et'ts heyotttl tlte srtlliet't/
lntroduction
Héléne Cixous' work is undoubtedly an unlikely place to find a love that
resembles agcpe. And perhaps it would be fair to say that the ways in which it is
not o¡ope are so significant as to render this a very long bow to have drawn. Yet,
I want to return to the spirit of things. In a sense, it is in the spirit of the way
in which Cixous invokes a kind of other-regarding 'selfless' love, in the spirit
of a selflessness that derives from generosity and excess that I find the most
compelling invitation to return to agope. In the spirit of a love that is'truly' other-
regarding, meaning that it is the other that is loved in and for their otherness,
love is positioned from a place of self-generosity rather than anxiety. In a most
meaningful sense is this not the spirit of agapic love?'t And is it not also this aspect
of agapic love that is most mysterious and elusive yet most ethically important
and challenging? Cixous' recognition of the fragmentary yet dynamic nature of
subiectivities, which is informed by difflerent relation to alterity, a feminine
"
relation, provides a way of reconsidering the very real problem of selflessness or
self-denial that has plagued interpretations of ogape as an ethical basis of love.
So it is in the spirit of considering f ust what the conditions of such a divine and
other-regarding, non-sacrificial love might be, that this project can be located.
Cixous' theorisation of a subiectivity lived differently in and through a love which
'truly' recognises otherness throws an intriguing backlight on the Christian notion
of cgopic love and invites us to continue thinking about the place of divine love
beyond Nietzsche's tendentious and perhaps premature declaration of the death
of God.
Other love
might it mean to 'truly' love
What..M..".r'*'*". tlt --g.[h-.-+_:,!-o*l--o'-rr.g*gk¡*"-t-1r-jk:l*^kgilXr&t
their inagtgggp-]g_"_-{i.,H_"*SSs? Assuming that it is even a possibility, why might
we want to, and should we think of this loving in other ways than as a sublime
¡ffection of the heart? Is rhir ri"tptygg*"9:k gjt_y. g*ig"*-1}*l:gX$S_
r he ideal is one in wtr:sh- self-interest is entfg!y*"S"l*nr+*Lq$? These questions
raise the issue of whether we can do anything that benefits another without
simultaneously benefiting ourselves? Or do we find our 'selves' necessarily implic-
,rrcd in any and all acts of giving? C."_y_:_, a; Hélé*" _9*:::,p"_{"_9nrq;._e,;:_.S"1_c.3pe
*!gJ :be.und-"eppnds to be the magcpllllg*gp."o"nelniep."gf.deb*..qh*q glp-*dj*1"g..lgg
/
tlcfirr.e
IhS m_g:""-{.j|..g_rltydepx/nou¡,.and.make of the
giftnf love- somsthing th,at
rkrcs not inevitably rgtUrn lA, U$? And who might it be that is the subject of a
¡¡iving and receiving, I loving and being loved, which has indeed escaped this
r rrascrrline econonry7
'' lrl,) n()t nl(.¡ln ltere to glve tlre lrrr¡rressiolr th¡t I anl (.x('¡vatirrg a llrt'ologit'al tra<litiolt rt'¡qarrl
llrg tlre srrtrllnrc gent.roslty of'a¡¡c¡r tlr,rt o¡¡t'e lrekl sw¿y, To ttty k¡towlt'rlge no sttclt tr¡rllliolt exists.
l¡ln, ¡¡orretl¡elnss, srrggtrtlrrg tl¡¡t tlrrorrglt tlrr g,t¡rs llr tlrr tr¡rlltlr¡lt llr¡t rloes ('xlst we t'¡lt llltleerl
The subject of love
other-regarding love in a Christian context with very different investments from
thgse of many feminist theologians. In being inseparable from the hegemonic
structures of patriarchal logocentrism, Christianity in all its complex guises
and permutarions has long exceeded the influence afforded it simply by the
faithful. Moreover, and perhaps as a result of the fruitful union benveen the
concepts of God, marr, and reason, Christianity has found itself implicated in a
complex labyrinth of contradictions where its theologies often bear little or no
resemblance to its instirudonalised practices. Wtrile this project will, to some extent,
engage with the more orthodox theological discourses on other-regarding love,
it nonetheless does so from a position of some distance. Through the concept
of opope Christianity primarily provides me with a compelling interrogative
for thinking about the ways in which an other-regarding love that opens on to
divinity, one that is or can be sourced in generosity and abundance, has been
and might be imagined and, perhaps more importantly still, has been and might
be lived.
In Chaprer I , I explicitly consider 0g0pe against the background of what is per-
haps philosophy's most distinguished discourse on love, Plato's Symposium. I reflect
on the tension between Plato's eros, both *tlg* and üvine, and Christianity's divine
Iove, and inquire into who might be the subiects of these loves. However, it is
from the wrirings of the French feminist philosopher Héléne Cixous that this pro-
iect principalty draws its inspiration. In Cixous'
work
generous other-regarding love that is ind,eed other-regarding, but that also *iqtÜ
escapes the problem of self-sacrifice that attaches to o1ope.
Through the discourses of feminism,tt post-structuralism and deconstruction,
and especialy itl"5 g{:pS".i,4e.]i1 mgqt-
ff,
"l*yl1:
ing berween r.rU¡..s i* rro-"nt of love that esgP-g: *: Hegelian impulse either
t ;t**"lq;hS-1b;tá¿téd unitv of thé más-
t""!" in posleslio.n of lqelf, she. pro-
cqli1rgly-r"Eg:|1n:gi'ryrl$-1i3¡,üirss
p;'.;$;lffi;ffii-".subie.c.|1ityüatisdispeT.dand¡hifti'g,always
rathgr ¡han bgpg. Thus, with a
open rl;_lnarrg._," F".;"pf"-_.S: gf feg-gming
.ll*"yj
view t" |álorñg, Ci"ous' own writing privileges the domain of experience via
an atrention ro the embodied, phenomenal life of the subject in the very imme-
diacy of living. Pushing the literary into the closest possible relation to the pre-
sent, Cixous' writing frequently traces the incessant movements of an embodied
strbjectivity as it comes into life or living with the other.
For Héléne Cixous, whose focus is on 'life' and what it means t<l move towards
living, love is possible onlv Ir mov9Jg9lllbqnc.c-$-SflbtS"gg.t-firr trtovetnent
', ('ixr¡rrs rkx.s u(¡t i¡r l,rr.t irlt.rrlify wirh tlre tcn¡r'lcrttit¡lst'. llt,lcetl slte lr¡¡ dlst¡ltt't'tl
li.r¡rrr tlrls telrr, st.eirr¡¡ it ¡s ¡ s¡x.t'lfit'sigrrllier ol'Atrglo Altterlt'¿t¡ ¡llftl'o¡t lte¡ lo
rt(letrl tllet ll rlrrs riqrrlly lrel'llttcrerl llr r¡ttrrll¡llt¡ nl'¡r'xttel rllllr"rrltrr, ¡lttl lrr
lntroduction
iEslf presunes.difftrcnqs,'' alqys*f,q-"qhe.Mieh
selflessness
-,-..-
is reconstitutqdAs-"pther.tha¡ ]oss "or sacrifice p.pe-hasJo*tq3&t*g"a
---.P¡+#,.,@
subje*c1ry1y;lg^$_^o5:3"o1pnulege the notion of the self :ytrg pltes.gd*-"sJh_emgnent
of love,..FS.":glf"Wlp.üSgdy- is, In this respect, Cixous' selfless lover can be thought
of as finding her self, such as this self is, rather than losing her self in her encounter
with the other in the present. Thus, in Cixous'theorisation of what some might
argue are truly ethical love relations, but what I am here suggesting are in fact
<livine love relations, any possessive attachments to self are seen as precluding
the possibility of the subject approaching the other in his or her alterity and thus
t ¡ccluding the horizon of divinity. Such self-possessive relations are more char-
.rcteristic of what she takes to be a masculine relation to subjectivity, and they
signal the impossibility of a genuine meeting between subjects who can truly
tttcet in and through their differences. The self th"t it i" p"_rr"ttrg"
*"lf !!_*::1!_*gbiqqg-gle '"t-19l' "f
sFJgLn-qFI hkt t-ej-upd9ts.tpqd, ac*Eord-
i'.q-9ji::y":.*-9:ly-'o-..t9-P9rth.Ls,,lp'o..I*9.g[.pf.subieEtiyity,@'
¡xrt qq9*rqn!-t-o_.*rs"Jotality _oJi-qpglf,.is npJgr.in the e¡rd, fully plesgnt !9 ilself, despite
thc fact.q!g¡_Xgh_g"gglr_c_ep!9p"--o-f id-eF_ti.tJ fras been.privileged !l patnarchal Western
t'rrltures, and deqpite the fbe¡ tha! w_e can indeed identify a certain social mask
of' subjecliyi{y yith
the ,appea-ranqe .of self:pres-qnt upity. Cixous would likely
lrc in agreement with Alison Weir on this point that'to rise above the interior
I find a conception of a t'ltaosmos each one of us gives ourselves a spokesperson I, the social I who votes,
wlt<r represents me' (Cixous, I994a: xviii). But identity and subjectivity cannot
ln'reduced to that spokesperson: 'I ask myself, but I do not answer' (Cixous, 1994a:
xviii). For Cixous the subiects that we ore invoke all the ages that we have been
9i""..y"i "X*:9:,:.5*
,ts well as those we will be; so too then, are we all the characters of our dreams,
li¡r which one of them can we say is not, in some sense, us? '.lure I, ide,ntical to
I lrlld-g.l+glsrl:tJsshril{:-i1-gi{fttg*s:.1 s*,h:-*-o-ps+..qst"ef.!}s-t"{a,,c--e-:*er
,ur I by definition changing, moblle, b_e_ca"use
living-spg*ipg-thinking CtSe-tltg,
(('ix<rtts, 1994a: xviii). Differences, then, are the ground of whatever unity is
Irrr.rginable and expressible. Through difference we baome and as such only through
,lilli'rcnce can we come to truly love with grace, if only momentarily.
I will ¡tcvcr say often enough that the difference is not one, that there is never one with-
,rrt tlrc other, and that the charm of difference (beginning with sexual difference) is that
ll l).tsscs. It crosses through us, like a goddess. We cannot capture it. It makes us teeter
witlr t'¡rroticln. It is in this living agitation that there is always room for you in me, your
Irr.s('rrt't' .lltd yollr place. t n Itgl.t ." i4di"i
Irr¡r ,rrrything, an I-klvc-you. (1994a: xviii)
rn l)t'rrirla's r('('('nt r¡¡t'rr¡oir ol'his fiiendshi¡l and l<lngstanding intellccttral c()n-
f,tt'r¡rrt's
vcrs¡llot¡ witllllélCrre ('lxous, ll, ('. lirr l.if'e, That ls lo.Say...(¿006), rcfltt'ts i¡l its very litlt.
l¡erself'
texll¿l ¡lllli'rrlrt'e, tltlr ettt¡rlr¡sls ¡rrr llfb,urrl llvlrrg thet lr.rs clr¡r,rclt'rist'rl ('ixous'work fiorrr tlrt. outst.l. IJerrirld
rortstruclerl tlte lxrol ¡rr-rtulrl tlre nr¡tkrr ol'teklng skles,'l¡e tlre skle of'rle,rtlr, slre tlre sklr
 Speaking of love
C HAPTE R 1

¿nd she laments that, historically, our thinking has been mired in the dialectical
Speaking of love: philosophy, theology, and structures of a patriarchal logos. Wherever dialectical relations govern the patterns
of exchilge, difference is subordinated to sameness in a'battle for mastery that
French feminism rages between classes, peoples etc.' (Cixous, 1986a:78). The history of patriarchal
ideals of love centres on the subject, and the otherness of the other is routinely
rlcnied in and by the privileging of subjectivity. For Cixous, the history of Western
culture is 'his story' and 'the same masters dominate history from the beginning,
i¡rscribing on it the marks of their appropriating economy' ( I 98 6a: 7 9). The sub-
icct of love igWsrtsm--fucourse is predi-ctably.rnasculine,,and the economy
. --4b#d' 9f
rt:latiorsJy_l$l*yhd ,h"' operates has been defined by reversal, by the negatio+
of'the (f"_Rf.**llg)",:*::. Ar Cixous says, 'The paradox of oüerness is that, of course,
,tt no moment in History is it tolerated or possible as such. The other is üere
,rrtly to be reappropriated, recaptured, and destroyed as other' (1986a: 7l). L"".
Love of self raises a question for language, a question for the subiect, for the world, for the
other, for the god(s).
,,f'!]]_e otherlyithin thi _!q_o*Le ügry.
Love of self represents an enigma, an impossibility, sometimes
a taboo. Often in this era rr.rrcissisti_c__l*o._y:_"_l*:_:*f It$ a kind-gfjg:g$glryfl-e9rl!_..k on the sqbjssr,
of sexual subjectivism, all that remains of self is a kind of masturbation, certain modes ( )nc that ]g-"Sl.only.that which returns.*. pf9.fit to thr |over. Ar ,h.61@)-plies,
of pleasure and. jouissance. But love? This question seems to be much more difficult and llre net effect of the subordination of difference leads to the 'Empire olT6selfsame'
is not necessarily to be confused with questions of pleasure or of iouissance. Love of self ( 1986a: 78), and other-regarding love is effectively a contradiction in terms.
is a question of eros, of agape, of eroticism, of death. (Irigaray,l993a: 60)
Yet within this ver g*""lgJe runs a deep vein
'
of concern particularly about the role of the self in relations of love. In many
The body and soul of üvine love rt's¡lects the question of the self has become paradigmatic in thinking about love.
Whcther the story begins with the Symposium's various proposals on the nature
Throughout history theorists and philosophers of love have been preoccupied '
, rf love, or whether one looks to more contemporary theological apologists like
with the relationship berween the subiects and oblects of loyg. From Plato's ( ', S. Lewisza
reflecti Tr *t;ü-**t" the christian - who began with wanting to oppose 'need-love' to generous love,
the ¿rrcl then found himself caught in a labyrinth of theological implications in
ideal of loving our enemies, there is a recurring concern with understanding
of kinds of exchanges that ttrgating the role of the self in 'need-love' - the story invariably returns to the
mediating aspecrs of love. How should we think the
r¡ttt'stion of self. Always at stake seems to be an implicit assumption that the self
Iove brings about? Whether thinking about love concerns relations between
Ir,ut obstacle to loving the other and especially to a generous love of the other.
human beings, of relations between humans and the divine, F:.--".:tI.39i* "f
while Alrrl contemporary secular discourses are no less vulnerable to measuring the
love as developed in Wesrern thought pr_9_Lup?o.ses that something is loved,
"i'1
"n; Fcn('rosity of love against an assumption that the self represents a problem. In
,ffi üü ;r * ¡.1gi;*, f !ili" I -r'gy'tg ffi
:j llé i;ó i tuiL ty 9 f cip ro car
s

,llscttssions of altruism, for example,it is often the teleology of the gift as it relates
l.á,l"¿it'.onewhoisññdi;;houndéistoodtolove,the ln tltc srtbject who gives that defines whether or not the gift is given with gen-
norion óf i&é itseTf óiió.rtáté, ,rorrrrá "'rrrbiect/oblect dighotomy that Presuttt"t
rrusity. If there is symmetry ben¡¡een intentions and outcome, i.e., if someone
;ñ;ifr. üüffi, oi i"i.ti"g g""¿;;ing ih. .*.hange between sameness and dif- lf rlcnrlcd to give generously, and, in the end, apparently derived no personal gain
feiánce,'-r.lf othei. Rs iuch, if and when there is a presumption to ¡.9,.9ak
"l¿love, .rrd ilü;ü tlñ concept of love is necessarily implic3ted lr rrr r r tlrc gift, one can condude that the gift was alnrristic. The question of the other,
meaningfully of
ur tlr('r('ceipt of the gift, is very often submerged to the point of invisibility, as
in concerns about subjectivitY.
tlre srrlrjcct's awareness of itself in üe act of giving is constituted as the yardstick
For the feminist thinker Héléne Cixous, the sexual politics of'ltow love has
traclitig¡ally been trnderstoocl to negotiate a srrtriect/<lhiec't relatiotr has been a
,
'l loV(. irrcl of'gcncrosity.
Wlrilt'irt the realm of'the philosophy of love Plato is understood as the first
(0¡rstAnt pr(.()ccllpati()n ()f'lrr.r w<lrk, wlri(.lr is ilrfirrntt'rl by, atttl ctltttrillrltt's to,
l¡rnlogist of'rational lovc, il lovc that lends itsclf to bt'ing thought of in tenns of'
t,rrtt.¡rlx )rary ¡llriloso¡llrir'¡l rt fle.t'tirxrs orr rlif li'rt'nt't' atttl srrlliet:tivlty, Tltrtlttgltottt
()ll('e¡rlit)tls (lf' lovt' ll.lvt'
Ircr wririlrg slt(. (.x¡lkrres lllt. w,rys ilr wltlt'lt tlif lbrerrl (
 !.Qb*!

Speaking of love
The subject of love

The inter- constructiell o-f love in r . Believing that 'the loleq]s. b.pqd' heq
union of man and woman does provoke the issue of procreation.
mediary nature of love is displaced by a telos that is outside of loving itself' b"gl-s-* ":ogi3l-P.-9*$,
couple, thL context of a world tB:.T peIP (Gubermall, 1996:68).She
Initially this is symbolically represented in the child of the pro_crelting
binary struc- also nores tffii discourr.id has historicaltv bee+ insepa{tFte froln
who becomes the object of love, and, in so doing, inaugurates the
account of the gen-
ture of lover and beloved that was absent in Diotima's initial
erative union of lovers. Secondly, as the discourse returns
to the abstract account ""*]1&'"gj3
j*"s9'llsli'rstgy*Msss.etLgf -tb--t-gY-9"rlk# rt

ñis been broken.tt 'There is no more religion, whtch

which once served as a lover s
9nc-e-.S-e.gLqü3[-e*l9y9i
of the ascent of the soul, the telos of procreation transforms into the
bringing .ú.-t*#É*-'g'-'*i*xn@4*ñN&
!;d'ra s*F**f, n@&@rtffi

in Irigaray, 1993a: Kristeva in Guberman, 1996: 68).

forth of wisdom, along wirh every other spiritual value (Plato
insight is lost For Kristeva, psychoanalysis offers a 'ne\M' model of love in this contem-
29).The embodied, immediacy that characterised Diotima's initial
of abstract spiritual values over the porary climate of diversity, for it offers a space in which the lover's discourse
as the binary logos affirms the superiority
can be spoken in the context of a relationship that she understands to itself be
spiritual and corporeal affinities of lovers. n &/.\r'
( , tr)l
predicated on love. 'lty.g,tt:t.33.1l:iq h+l g-i":g. :hgp*" fe +..!eYs.r-F *diqqgy{f,e"stff- ,QA
\aj' ) e- )
To fall in love, to become divine, or immortal, is no longer left to
the intermediary
dies as a result. In the uni- T-s
to be nery; il + -e"slslpllsi"t-lJ*i**t1'ffgslslss*g39lFat .P:(.4('('
current but qualified, hierarchized, and in the worst case, love ;fualstospeakaboutthe5}-o-Y-i(KristevainGuberman,I996:69). \.I:o..,J
and loving duties, the beloved
verse of determinations, there will be goals, competitions,
Moreov"r, ,héli;aru mfirió ege of embodied knowing breals
disappear. (Irigaray, 1993a: 36)
or love being the goal. The lovers with the hisrory of the dichotomous split between mind and body, and therein
For Irigaray, the economy of desire that is ultimately represented
in Diotima's offers a challenge to the history of constructing love on a model of binary opposi-
in which dualities are constituted in and tions. Psychoanalysis, as practice as well as theory, has a particularly significant
speech conforms to a logic of exclusion
won at the cost of the place in Kristeva's work, and this distinguishes her from both Cixous and Irigaray.
through binary relations of opposition wherein identity is
the gendered to engage with
a practising psychoanalyst, she has tended
other. However, from the outset of her writing, she has explored While Irigaray is also
of the meta- psychoanalytic theory as opposed to psychoanalytic practice. Her more recent work,
affinities of this economy of desire. Her now infamous invocation
tips - which is actually part of yet another however, does draw considerably more on her experience as a practitioner.
phor of women's lips, i.e., their vaginal
tf t ig.ray's rexrs on love - way of theorising a different relation to difference,
as a In reflecting on an ethical couple relation Kristeva implicitly draws on a Marxist
still stands, over fwenty years later, as a powerful exemplar of
feminist criticism model of social relations, noting that I
of this masculine logic.ae In the invocation of a female body that
simultaneously which once formed the unifying link is less apparent in the contemPorary con- I
invokes and resists binary division - for the two lips are in constant connection * .f,ñglo-¿rr-ü il I
with each other -we have an image of a very different way of negotiating the tffico-ññlifrfiEffi:oricaliy occupieci. ns sñia I
'-
nPuc- I
boundaries befween sameness and difference. where in the
constant enfolding certain osvchic autonomv' now -^-" pervades
!-::-::=-=-:-:--- - - ,_--
the form6 space of urrlry aud-cqr I

of flesh end does one begin and another end? From the female body
Irigaray the ñlation berween ¡vvo individlals who arg now cb4laglgrised more fúlly I
----.:-..-.;;. ----+
"6; -
builds a new logic of difference in which the fully embodied experience of as travins differentinterests thatreflect sexual difference (Guberman, 1986: 70).

sexual difference is the paramount value, a value

of the other.
that cannot be won at the cost
fu":_;=¡ffi¡¡iiii*rl"¡ñeJ.l
.ont"mooriñEñóüiJJ
._.-.-*k#
-r

"
g. gse$e et.terg I \l (

Kristeva
^-ji- believes that. in
-:--==: üis contemporary climate
:--i=l-
of 'psychic autonqrll:,
JULIA KRISTEVA the lmatory relationslrip;g¡¡-s¡[qgreg!!9g6e.d-p,g -*rs"ressseitiessfu[s freedom
For Julia Kristeva, whose affinities,with Lacanian-P,:y.*9ggü:-t;-,g:-":.t-?:.""t"i1S" ur'a-ird-ep*eñl*"ngS-S{-qhgog.*t.
- otl¡g-gbg-c12¡r.rex1 glar-r- 1c!r-r9wl9-d-g-gry-1gf'
l' trls'9g+-c'-egt9[]'gys ü tü key to
_'.ii.ionsbgtwe9nmenandwomelitrast>cialandlris- the oüer's freedom can üfference be adequately preserved 4r-rd a n9g4iv-9.Sl5t,.d
oygcanng!-!9-:gl"itg:=d*'"-t:g!"rd'"
""'i-@o:q$üitl's-g-!i'-:19f f
r"1". iiilil,ñing f,,r rtiÑrU¡ect. 'Eiitr individual must frnd his or her ow¡t t¡totifl,
ari..llgr¡tegt. Drawing extensively on üre lústory of writitrg on l<lve, slte ha's
writtc¡r a sttbstantial work, Talgs nf !.olq 02p73)t Wbtqhl3ltges fiorrt reflcctions Ir
"" Krisl('vt's ust: r¡l'rl¡is t'ont't.¡rt ol'¿ krvt'r's rlist'r)ursc rcvt'als ltt'r ¿flillitit's witll tl¡t' wr¡rk rll
.ñ;t.;"ii;-reprcsc¡tt¡titltttlf.lrlveinlitt.r.rttlr(.,ltltltt. llot¡rrrl ll,trtltt.s, St't' Ilarlllcs, A l,ovfr'r l)il'otlrrc l97tl ll1977l.
"' S"" als¡ Krlstrv.r'r ln lhc llel¡lnnlng Wr¡r l,ove: Itrycltrrunolysir ottrl Fr¡ilh ( lt)tl7t') firr,r tlellllcrl ellHAgr
EI
 ./ The subiect of love Speaking of love
/
causes, and objectsof gratiflcation and satisfaction while establishing a modicum haveillustratedhereistheeXtenttowhichthis"
of consensus and communication with a steady partner' (Ikisteva in Guberman, tlq and that this has reflé.t.á
1996:70-7 1.). While üe th¡eat of dependency in relations of love cannot be t ile the concept of a1opeholds our the
avoided altogether, Kristeva privileges üe idea that there is a type of dependency Promise of a generous, other-regarding love, in the hands of even relatively con-
which can be chosen, one which does not inevitably signal submission or sur- tcmporary thinkers like Anders Nygren the anxiety about self-love leads
to the
render to the other. tn other words, there are Food and bad dependencies'. loss of the other as other, as well as to the sacrifice of self. And in
the work of
hradditiontothequestionsofloveinthecouplerelation,tbe-tror.jf ftrlia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, and Héléne Cixous, jb:l gf.thS_glhg-l:J|g3lly
l"X
mal-"g!v.E:b99q-P3l$.sgirJrsrys-d-t-o'&lsv19-99Jrgp-gtionto$blesjn s gf_t¡e &g¡1$ps etbe;, ,h. f;_
sexualdif ferengg-r.?14,.t9-.il*9t!*s gfu sgerpf ¡-bjesgy-lly-"!¡1S,9-"qb*=@9" ilúne other who instead of embodying generosity and abundance becomes
instead
rt."a,ii.{ioa..a,9.9ntr1the-hf l"Vof OO**9-{g"IS¡4i!i+ea4"1svs'ei$Lva lhe paradigmatic sacrificial object. In attending, then, to the otherness
of woman
believes üat it is the imaginary p-l$gmStitS.I thal""üo:ry",s".fa¡son¡inuilyj!.rc1a- within the masculine logos, we can see even in the all too brief engagement with
*h',th
,io.+lSpr-'**tr -t' *s l+el.Mgedglfu-+f""* some of their thought here that each of them works instead towards initially
rhere is ú",h r;p;,ón 14{.99pllSSti,n. While she undoubtedly acknowledges rcvealing and then offering an alternative to the binary logic that has
managed
trriiffi;;t;ffiiü;d ian reflect a negative dependency in which the auto- the lover's discourse seemingly for as long as it has been one. Each of them,
nomy of the oüer fails to be recognised, she nonetheless proposes that the ideal irr different ways, reopens the space of love with a view to the possibility
of a
mother-child bond is one in which üe subject is constituted in a relation to generous love of the other.
than
and wiü üe other. This is a relation üat is marked by continuity rather
the cut of separation üat has historically defined the Freudian model of achiev-

ing subjectivity. To this extent, Kristeva refutes the logic of Enlightenment ideo-
logy wherein the subject precedes itself in its relations with others. Rather the
subject is continuallY becoming.
are significant affinities bj¡{een 5ryt-t-"1'@*
.There
construction of love as a 'üird uiffi¡ltcts' Kristeva's
"4tl'lrt-;thtió"s
. p*¡tt* *"t.Á¡ love that allows the birth of the other in free-
É*pfr""r
""
dom resonates wiü lrigaray's notion of love as an agent of baoming rather üan
being. As we will shortly see, Cixous' construction of love is similarly oriented
towards üe notion of baoming, and she bases üis possibility on a feminine rela-
tion to difference üat has similar debts to the matemal model, as does Kristeva.
For each of these writers üe nope of üfference permits a reconstruction of
the

masculine logic of sameness üat has dominated üscussions on human life, and

üat has excluded a recognition of üe significance üat sexual difference makes

to all knowledges. In different ways, each of these writers has seen woman and
the feminine as the sacrificial object on which man has constiruted himself as
subject, and it is in opposition to this sacrificial logic that each of üem ProPoses
a new concePtion oflove.

Concluding remarks

I bcgan t¡is chapter with the assertion that the histr:ry of love has clcarly beur
rleñ¡e¿ hy a disctrrsivc priviltging of the hinary strllcltlre of krve' Lr¡ver atld
lx.l6vt.rl, cr¡s ¡rul ofl(pc, g(.¡¡(.r()rrs and at'r¡trisitive lovc tl¡csr'¡rc thc oPlxrsitiotlal