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NOTICE OF DOCKETING
Federal Circuit Short Title: Deckers Outdoor Corporation v. Australian Leather Pty
Ltd
Originating Tribunal: United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
A notice of appeal has been filed and assigned the above Federal Circuit case number.
The court's official caption is included as an attachment to this notice. Unless otherwise
noted in the court's rules, the assigned docket number and official caption or short title
must be included on all documents filed with this Court. It is the responsibility of all
parties to review the Rules for critical due dates. The assigned deputy clerk is noted
below and all case questions should be directed to the Case Management section at (202)
275-8055.
Unrepresented parties must submit documents intended for filing to the court in paper.
Unrepresented parties changing contact information must submit an amended Notice of
Unrepresented Person Appearance with the new contact information. Unrepresented
parties registered to receive notices of docket activity must also update their PACER
service center profile.
OFFICIAL CAPTION: The court's official caption is attached and reflects the lower
tribunal's caption pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 12(a), 15(a), and 21(a). Please review the
caption carefully and promptly advise this court in writing of any improper or inaccurate
designations.
Attachments:
• Official caption
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party's response brief)
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correctional institution)
o Statement Concerning Discrimination (only to petitioners in MSPB or
arbitrator case)
cc: United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
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Official Caption
v.
Short Caption
Date: 8/14/2020
Dear Clerk:
I am sending you herewith the short record on appeal consisting of the Notice of Appeal,
Federal Circuit Appeal Information Sheet, and copies of the FRAP 3(d) letter, docket sheet and
the appealed order.
Please acknowledge date of receipt of the above mentioned materials on the attached
copy of this letter.
Sincerely,
Thomas G. Bruton, Clerk
Rev. 09/23/2016
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Appeal Information
(List all parties. Use asterisk to indicate dismissed or withdrawn parties. Use separate sheet if needed. Explain
any discrepancy with caption used on judgment, order or opinion)
Plaintiff(s) Defendant(s)
FEES:
(List name, firm, address and telephone of lead counsel for each party. Indicate party represented. Use
separate sheet if necessary.)
Plaintiff: Defendant:
Paul G. Juettner Mark R Bagley
Greer, Burns & Crain, Ltd. Tolpin & Partners, PC
300 South Wacker Drive 100 North LaSalle Street
25th Floor Suite 501
Chicago, IL 60606 Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 360‐0080 (312) 698‐8971
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IMPORTANT: Attach copy of opinion or order appealed from. Forward together with copy of notice of
appeal and certified docket entries.
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Date: 8/14/2020
The attached copy of the Notice of Appeal is being mailed to all parties pursuant to
F.R.A.P. 3 (d). The record on appeal is being maintained in our office until it is requested by the
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
For your convenience pertinent information re: perfecting the appeal which is taken from
the Procedural Handbook for the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is listed
below:
The notice of appeal is filed with the clerk of the trial court (District Court) along with
the fee for filing the notice and the $505 appellate docket fee. CAFC 10 (a). Appeals will be
docketed upon receipt from the clerk of the trial court of (1) a copy of the notice of appeal, (2) a
certified copy of docket entries, and (3) a copy of the appeal information sheet. Appeals under
28USC 1292 (d) will be docketed on grant of the appeal by the Court and receipt of a certified
copy of docket entries and a copy of the appeal information sheet
The record on appeal shall consist of all papers named in FRCP 10(a) and 16. All papers
are normally retained by the tribunal from which the appeal is taken. When deemed necessary,
the court, on motion or sua sponte, may order filing of the original or certified copies of the trial
or administrative record or any portions thereof at any time during pendency of the appeal.
When a transcript is required, the appellant has the duty to order it from the reporter and
to give notice to appellee if a partial transcript is ordered as required by FRAP 10(b). Where no
report of the proceedings was made or the transcript is unavailable, the provisions of FRAP 10c
shall govern.
Telephone inquiries from counsel concerning rules and procedures are welcomed by the
Clerk's Office for the U.S. Court of Appeal for the Federal Circuit. This office is located in
Room 401 of the National Courts Building, 717 Madison Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20439
and is open from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Telephone (202) 275-8000.
Sincerely,
Thomas G. Bruton, Clerk
Rev. 10/14/2018
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NOTICE OF APPEAL
Notice is hereby given that Defendants Australian Leather Pty. Ltd. and Adnan " Eddie,,
Oygur appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit from the September
13, 2018 Order of the District Court regarding summary judgment, the December 19, 2019 Order
of the District Court, the February 6, 2020 Final Judgment of the District Court, the July 13,
2020 Order of the District Court regarding post-trial motions, and all orders and opinions merged
Respectfully submitted,
1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL was
served via the Northern District of Illinois electronic filing system to:
Paul G. Juettner
Justin R. Gaudio
Patrick Smith
RiKaleigh C. Johnson
GREER, BURNS & CRAIN, LTD.
300 South Wacker Drive, Suite 2500
Chicago, Illinois 60606
Kent Raygor
SHEPPARD MULLIN RICHTER & HAMPTON LLP
1901 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1600
Los Angeles, California 90067
2
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Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,
No. 16 CV 3676
v.
Judge Manish S. Shah
AUSTRALIAN LEATHER PTY. LTD. and
ADNAN 0YGUR a/k/a EDDIE 0YGUR,
Defendants/Counter-
Plaintiffs.
Deckers Outdoor Corp., the company that owns the popular UGG brand, filed
this lawsuit against Australian Leather Pty. Ltd., and its owner, Adnan Oygur,
asserting claims for trademark and design patent infringement, because Australian
Leather sells boots called "ugg boots." Defendants filed counterclaims and affirmative
defenses, asserting, among other things, that Deckers's trademarks containing the
word UGG should be canceled or that Deckers should be barred from enforcing them.
Defendants say that ugg is a generic term for a kind of sheepskin boot, one
popularized by Australian surfers in the 1970s, and therefore, Deckers cannot stop
counterclaims and affirmative defenses. For the reasons discussed below, Deckers's
motion is granted in part, denied in part, and Australian Leather's motion is denied.
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I. Legal Standards
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute as to any material fact exists
if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the
nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The
party seeking summary judgment has the burden of establishing that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
323 (1986). "The ordinary standards for summary judgment remain unchanged on
cross-motions for summary judgment: we construe all facts and inferences arising
from them in favor of the party against whom the motion under consideration is
made." Blow v. Bijora, Inc., 855 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 2017). "Cross-motions must
be evaluated together, and the court may not grant summary judgment for either side
material facts are in dispute." Bloodworth v. Vill. of Greendale, 475 F. App'x 92, 95
II. Analysis
Australian Leather's counterclaims for declaratory judgment that the mark UGG is
2
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Trade Practices Act, and a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Business Practices Act. Deckers also moves for summary judgment on four of
Australian Leather's 1 affirmative defenses that have overlapping issues with the
subject counterclaims: that ugg is a generic term in the U.S., that it is generic in
Australia, that it should be treated as generic in the U.S. pursuant to the foreign
registrations.
kind of good. Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., Inc., 561 F.2d 75, 79
(7th Cir. 1977) (citing William R. Warner & Co. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 528
(1924)). And a generic term "cannot become a trademark under any circumstances."
if at any time a "registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services,"
determining whether a mark has become generic, the "primary significance of the
registered mark to the relevant public rather than the purchaser motivation shall be
the test." Id. Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, one cannot obtain a trademark
over a foreign generic word if the trademark designation "would prevent competitors
1 Because, as relevant here, Australian Leather and Oygur's affirmative defenses are the
same, I refer to them collectively as Australian Leather.
3
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from designating a product as what it is in the foreign language their customers know
best." Otokoyama Co. Ltd. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d Cir.
1999). Australian Leather argues that the term ugg is generic in the United States
both because American surfers understood the term to refer to sheepskin boots
generally and because its generic status in Australia, combined with the foreign
1. The UGGBrand
Brian Smith, who was born in Australia and moved to the United States in
1978, founded the sheepskin-boot company known today as UGG. [189] ,r,r 5, 10. 3
2Both parties raise objections throughout that relate to the relevance of evidence presented.
Many of these objections stem from the parties' central disagreement about how to define the
relevant class of purchasers, which matters when considering consumer perceptions to
determine whether the term was generic. For reasons discussed below, I conclude that the
relevant consumer perceptions are those of American footwear consumers generally. For that
reason, evidence from non-surfer consumers is relevant. And though the test centers on
American perceptions, the Australian experience is not irrelevant to that determination. See
G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 1000 n. 15 (7th Cir. 1989).
Because many early players in the American sheepskin boot business had ties to Australia,
this information provides helpful context. As to the relevant time period, a trademark is
subject to cancellation at any time if it becomes generic. As a result, post-1979---the date
Deckers asserts it first used the UGG trademark-evidence is relevant as well.
3 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers
are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, except in the case of citations
to depositions, which use the deposition transcript's original page number. The facts are
largely taken from plaintiffs response to defendants' Local Rule 56.1 statement of facts,
[173], and defendants' response to plaintiffs LR 56.1 statement of additional facts, [189],
where the asserted fact and accompanying response are set forth in the same document. Any
document previously filed under seal and referenced in this opinion shall be unsealed; by
October 11, 2018, the parties shall file a joint statement identifying the docket entries for
unsealing or stating a basis for continued secrecy. See Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 297
F.3d 544, 546 (7th Cir. 2002) ("In civil litigation only trade secrets, information covered by a
recognized privilege (such as the attorney-client privilege), and information required by
statute to be maintained in confidence (such as the name of a minor victim of a sexual
assault), is entitled to be kept secret on appeal."). If any filing remains under seal, the filer
must ensure there is a public version of the document with appropriate redactions.
4
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Smith owned a pair of sheepskin boots while still living in Australia, and he and
others referred to them generally as ugg4 boots. [173] ,r 19. 5 Once he moved to the
United States, specifically in December 1979, Smith began purchasing boots from an
Australian company, Country Leather, and reselling them in the United States under
the name Country Leather America. [189] ,r 5; [141] ,r 7. 6 Smith bought six pairs of
sample boots, followed by an additional 500 pairs, which had a sewed-on label that
read, "Country Leather" and a hang tag with the phrase, "Ugg Boots keep you Warm
& Happy." [214] ,r 69. Smith knew that another individual had trademarked the term
"Ugh Boots" for sheepskin boots in Australia in the early 1970s. [189] ,r 12. In early
1980, Smith applied to register UGG as a trademark in the United States, listing
December 28, 1979, as the first-use date. [214] ,r 70; [189] ,r 6. The Trademark Office
rejected the application because the mark did not "serve to identify and distinguish
applicant's goods," and Smith did not reapply. Id. In April 1980, Smith-on behalf of
UGG Imports-agreed to be the sole agent and distributor for Country Leather's
4 I use all capital letters (UGG) when referring to the brand or companies Smith founded. I
use lowercase letters (ugg) when referring to sheepskin boots generally. I stray from this
convention when quoting from an advertisement or other written material to accurately
reflect the content of the cited source, and in those instances, I put the term in quotation
marks.
5The additional information in Deckers's response to Australian Leather's statement of facts
does not refute Australian Leather's assertion, in violation of LR 56.1, and I disregard it.
6 The parties dispute whether these boots were sold under the UGG brand or trademark. An
invoice refers to the items as "Short UGG Boot" and "Tall UGG Boot." [154-13] at 53. Viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to Australian Leather, as is necessary when considering
Deckers's motion for summary judgment, the word may have been used in the generic sense
on this invoice, despite the all-capitals.
5
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sheepskin products in the U.S. See [141-3] at 3. 7 A few years later, Smith made a
[189] ,r 9. In the first year of business, both Smith and Jensen attempted to sell UGG
footwear to surf and ski shops, as well as shoe stores. Id. Smith visited 50 surf shops
that year, and some shop owners referred to the boots as ugg boots without
prompting. Id. ,r 10. In a speech, Smith described his first two attempts at selling to
surf-shop owners as follows: "And the first store I walked into, I was super nervous
and really timid, and I open up the bag, and-and the guy goes, 'Ah, UGG boots, man.
They're fantastic .... I got a pair. Buddy brought them back for me.' And next store I
went to was, 'Oh UGG boots. Yeah my buddies have all got those. They swear by
them.'" Id. ,r 11. 8 Smith and Jensen had similar reactions from other shops as well.
[214] ,r 63. The parties disagree about the extent to which shop owners were familiar
with the term ugg and whether they used it in a generic sense. Viewing the facts in
light most favorable to Australian Leather, some shop owners were familiar with the
term and used it generically, to refer to the style of the boots, and not in reference to
Smith's company.
7 The parties dispute whether, as a result of this agreement, Ugg Imports acquired any rights
that Country Leather had in the trademark UGG in the United States by virtue of Country
Leather's 1979 advertisements in Surfer magazine. Because the letters themselves do not so
provide, see [141-3]; [141-4], I treat this fact as disputed and view it in Australian Leather's
favor, which is that Ugg Imports did not acquire any rights from those advertisements.
8When someone spoke of the term it was not clear whether that person was referencing the
spelling ugg, ugh, or ug. Id. , 12.
6
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In an interview, Smith said that surfers "all knew of UGG in some way before
I even started, and that's really why I did it. They already had a recognition in the
surf market." Id. ,r 64. Though some shop owners and surfers were familiar with the
term, customers generally were not. [189] ,r 12. In addition to targeting surf and ski
shops, Smith and Jensen sold their products at flea markets, swap meets, farmers
markets, and from Smith's van. Id. ,r 9. Smith also attended ski shows in Las Vegas,
where other companies selling sheepskin boots used the word ugg in their company
Surfer magazine and Action Sport Retailer, received inquiries from over 105 retail
stores, and made 384 separate invoice sales to retailers all over the United States.
[189] ,r 13. Deckers acquired UGG Holdings (the successor to UGG Imports) and its
UGG trademark in 1995. Id. ,r 18. After Deckers acquired the UGG brand, it
stores and through other third-party retailers, along with its own UGG concept stores
and online. Id. ,r 19. Deckers spent tens of millions of dollars in advertising
campaigns in fashion magazines during the early 2000s, and media outlets, movies,
and TV shows featured UGG products. Id. ,r,r 22-26. The brand became a favorite
among celebrities, received various awards, and had over $1 billion in global annual
9Smith did not recall seeing the specific company names that Australian Leather asserted,
and he could not recall the date of the ski show, but he did indicate that at the shows he
attended other companies used the word ugg in their names. [161] at 122:15-123:22; [173]
~ 51.
7
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sales every year since 2011. Id. ,r,r 24-26. The UGG product line came to include a
wide range of footwear and apparel for men, women, and children; handbags;
sheepskin boots to U.S. customers. Id. ,r 48. 10 John Arnold sold sheepskin boots
(which he referred to as ugg boots) in the U.S. in the 1960s and early 1970s, selling
thousands of pairs per week. Id. ,r 50; [204] ,r 55. Arnold used the boots as packing
material in his shipments of surfboards. [189] ,r 51. He sold mostly to surf shops and
did not sell to mainstream footwear shops. Id. Roger Bosley, an Australian who was
in the sheepskin business from 1973-84, traveled to the U.S. in 1979 in hopes of
selling boots, but found Americans were not interested. [189] ,r 53; [1 73] ,r 15; [136-
21] at 16:23-19:23. A year later, Bosley opened four retail shops in Los Angeles, which
he operated for a little under two years, where he sold sheepskin boots under a
cardboard sign that read "UGG BOOTS." [189] ,r,r 54-55; [173] ,r 50. 11 Bosley stated
that ugg had always been a generic term in Australia. [173] ,r 15; [136-21] at 25:7-
10 Deckers points out that none of these individuals provided any documentation of the sales
they made. See id. Nonetheless, their assertions are treated as true at the summary-
judgment stage.
11Deckers notes that Bosley's company catalog described the boots as "sheepskin footwear"
and did not refer to them as uggs. But Bosley testified that he sold them under a sign labeling
them uggs, and at this stage, because his testimony is favorable to Australian Leather, and
he has personal knowledge of the sign he used, I treat it as true.
8
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19. 12 An Australian sheep slaughterer and tanner, Peter Dorizzi, sold sheepskin boots
to visiting American sailors. [189] ,r 57. He first attempted selling his boots wholesale
to stores in the U.S. in 1980 but was unsuccessful. Id. In 1983, he sold "probably'' 800
pairs at the 1983 America's Cup and then sold 40-50 leftover pairs in California. Id.
,r 59. Dorizzi believed that ugg was a generic term and that all manufacturers used
it to describe sheepskin boots. [173] ,r 13; [136-19] at 40: 2-7. Robert Hayter also tried
to sell sheepskin boots at the 1983 America's Cup, but was unable to sell many pairs
and was disappointed in the response in America. [189] ,r 62. According to Hayter,
the term ugg boot "didn't mean much to [American customers] at all." Id. ,r 64. 13
Oygur-Australian Leather's owner-purchased a pair of sheepskin boots as an
eleven-year-old boy in Australia in 1971, and said that back then, everyone called
the late 1960s. Terry McKendree, who owned two surf shops in Jacksonville, Florida
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, imported sheepskin boots from Australia to sell in
his own shops. [189] ,r 65. McKendree also arranged sales for other U.S. shops. [173]
,r 49; [136-22] at 34:7-12. He first learned about sheepskin boots during a 1969 trip
to Australia, where surfers wore them to warm their feet after surfing in cold water.
12 Contrary to Deckers's objection, Australian Leather's assertion that Bosley testified that
ugg boots has always been a generic term in Australia is supported by cited testimony. See
[136-21] at 25:7-19.
13Australian Leather asserts that Hayter testified that the term ugg was generic in
Australia, but the cited testimony does not support this assertion. [173] ,r 14; [136-20] at
148:5-14. Hayter merely agreed that a document being presented to him stated that ugg was
generic; it does not show that he believed the term was generic. Id.
9
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[173], 16; [214], 53. At that time, people in Australia used the term ugg to describe
the type of boots. Id. The boots McKendree sold were marked "Made in Australia" and
sold out of a bin in his stores labeled "UGG boots." [189] , 66. At the time he sold the
Id.; [189] , 67. The ad displayed six pieces of footwear, one of which was a sheepskin
boot labeled "UGG BOOT." [189] , 67. Aside from the ad in Surfing magazine, two
other pre-1979 U.S. advertisements used the term "UGG" or "Ugg'' followed by ''boot":
one in a Santa Cruz newspaper (December 1972), 14 and one in Surfer magazine
Another surf-shop owner, Glen Kennedy, first became familiar with sheepskin
them as ugg boots. Id. , 70. In the early 1980s, Kennedy began selling them in his
California shop-selling around 80 pairs per year by 1986. Id. , 71. After 1986,
Kennedy bought sheepskin boots from Smith, and sold them under the UGG brand.
Id., 72. Kennedy had to explain to customers what the boots were for; only the few
customers who had traveled to Australia were familiar with them. Id. Four other
individuals, who worked in different capacities in the footwear industry, ranging from
14Deckers raises foundation and hearsay objections to the Santa Cruz newspaper. See [214]
,r 57. But Deckers asserts,
and Australian Leather agrees, that this issue of the newspaper
referenced ''UGG BOOTS." [189] ,r 4 7.
15In addition to the Santa Cruz newspaper, [184-3], Australian Leather also relies on an
Australian phonebook which uses ugg generically, [184-7]; an article which purports to quote
Smith, [184-8]; and a copy of UGG's webpage, [184-25]. But this evidence was not properly
authenticated, and I do not consider it. See Fed. R. Evid. 901.
10
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sales clerks to the former CEO of Deckers, consistently surveyed the market and
believed that UGG had always been a brand name. Id. ,r,r 73-77.
In 1971, Shane Stedman registered UGH-BOOTS as a trademark in Australia
for boots, shoes, and slippers, and in 1982 he registered the mark UGH for boots,
including sheepskin boots, shoes, and slippers. Id. ,r 79. A one-time professional
surfer from Southern California met Stedman in Australia and ordered a hundred
pairs of the boots from him but was unable to sell them in the U.S. Id. ,r,r 68--69.
Deckers purchased the UGH-BOOTS trademark in 1996, and both marks remained
on the Australian register until 2006 when they were removed for non-use. Id. ,r 79.
Defendant Australian Leather, an Australian corporation founded in the
1990s, also manufactured sheepskin boots and labeled them "UGG" boots. [189] ,r 2,
112; [204] ,r 23. Adnan Oygur was its sole owner and managing director. [189] ,r 2.
Australian Leather did not market to the U.S., though it made sales to American
consumers over the internet. Id. ,r 112. Australian Leather first sold footwear bearing
the UGG mark to the U.S. on October 27, 2014. Id. Its invoices reflected 33 internet
orders for 42 products from American individuals between 2014-16. Id. In addition
The predominant customers ofUGG boots were women between the ages 16 to
54. Id. ,r 20. In 2017, Deckers commissioned a nationwide survey of 600 women in
this age range who had purchased a pair of boots or casual shoes (not including
11
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athletic shoes) in the past 12 months or who thought they would in the next 12
months. Id. ,r,r 33-34. The survey included three brand-name controls and three
generic-name controls, and revealed that 98% of respondents viewed UGG as a brand
name:
Haven't
heard of it/ 1 7 23 26 21 2 0
don't know
Id. ,r 33. In addition to the 2017 survey, Deckers commissioned similar surveys in
2004 and 2011. Id. ,r 34. In 2004, 58% of all respondents understood UGG to be a
and the Newspaper Archive-for two relevant time periods (1970-80 and 2009-15)
for uses of the word ugg. Id. ,r,r 36-40. None of the sources she looked at revealed that
ugg, ug, or ugh was used generically in the footwear context. Id. 16 Another linguist
replicated some of these searches and similarly found no results referring to footwear.
16Australian Leather objects to the professor's methodology, pointing out that one of the
databases did not have entries for the 1970-79 timeframe and she did not know offhand the
amount of material some of the databases contained for the given timeframes. See [189] ,r 40.
These objections implicate the weight of the evidence and do not refute the underlying
asserted fact that those searches returned no relevant results.
12
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Id. ,i 41. A footwear historian was asked: from 1969-84, "what terminology was used
in the United States by the footwear trade and American public for footwear made in
whole or in part of sheepskin," and "what was the primary significance of the term
'UGG' in the American footwear trade and among the American public?" Id. ,i 43.
After conducting his own research and considering the catalogs and materials
provided to him, this historian concluded that neither the word ugg, nor any variation
of that spelling, was used "as a generic term by the general consuming public or the
footwear trade in the U.S." Id. The historian testified it was possible that a "tiny little
group of surfers in Southern California" knew about the term ugg apart from the
brand, but noted that "[t]his small group of surfers ... doesn't talk about the entire
country," which was the focus of his inquiry. [214] ,r 67; [184-10] at 108:3-12. Prior
to UGG-brand advertisements from 1979 and the early 1980s, he concluded, ugg had
been described as the "most widely used and authoritative general book on the subject
of footwear," does not mention uggs. Id. ,i 44. Other footwear companies and articles
published in the U.S. in the 1970s used terms like sheepskin, lambskin, lambswool,
shearling, and genuine shearling wool fleece, to describe similar boots. Id. ,r,r 45-46.
Deckers's competitors continued to use similar terms to describe their products into
2018. [204] ,r 6.
Australian Leather relies on a declaration and exhibits submitted during an
Australian Trade Marks Office proceeding called Deckers Outdoor Corp. v. B&B
13
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telephone books, advertisements, and dictionaries using the term ugg. But the
hearsay. As a result, the exhibits are not properly authenticated, and I do not consider
them. See Fed. R. Evid. 901. In any event, as discussed below, even assuming
Australian Leather established that ugg was generic in Australia, in part by offering
these phone books, ads, and dictionaries, it has not linked that finding in any way to
consumer perceptions in the U.S. and so considering this evidence would not change
4. Generic Status
Australian Leather has not shown that ugg is, or ever has been, generic among
footwear customers in the U.S-the relevant public. Australian Leather argues that
the word ugg was generic among American surfers in the 1970s, but there is no reason
to construe the relevant public so narrowly. Sheepskin boots are not a specialized
technology that appeals only to some limited consumer base. See Nartron Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc., 305 F.3d 397, 406 (6th Cir. 2002). Though many early
customers were surfers, anyone can purchase and wear boots (as evidenced by the
shift in UGG's consumer-base over time). To show that ugg is generic, Australian
Leather relies on the statements from a handful of American surfers and surf-shop
owners; testimony from Australian manufacturers who sold boots in the U.S.
14
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some individuals used ugg generically in the past. But this is not enough to justify
the conclusion that American footwear purchasers generally view ugg as a generic
generic uses of ugg in any dictionaries or databases and showed that 98% of
conclude that ugg is or ever was a generic word for sheepskin boots in the U.S.
Looking to the Australian experience does not alter this outcome. Although
evidence of how Australians used the word ugg could be relevant to consumer
perceptions in the U.S., generic usage in Australia is not enough on its own to infer
generic meaning in the United States. See G. Heileman Brewing, 873 F.2d at 1000 n.
15. The foreign-equivalents doctrine does not dictate a different analysis. See id.
(citing Duncan F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., Inc., 343 F.2d 655, 661-62
(7th Cir. 1965), and noting that the generic status of "yo-yo" in the Philippines was
not dispositive of trademark status in the United States). First, the doctrine is not a
perfect fit for English to English, and is generally used to analyze non-English terms
Competition § 12:41 (5th ed.) ("Under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, a word
imported into the United States and be transformed into a valid trademark. Generic
names in languages other than English have often been held to be generic for the
15
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American trade.") (emphasis added). 17 Second, as applied here, the doctrine is simply
term. Australian Leather has evidence that ugg is generic in Australia, but there is
no evidence that Americans familiar with Australian usage (or Australian visitors to
the United States) would be misled into thinking that there is only one brand of ugg-
style sheepskin boots available in this country. Australian Leather needed to come
forward with some evidence that would allow a jury to conclude that the term ugg
has a generic meaning to buyers in the United States; its Australian and surf-shop
regarding the legal status of ugg in Australia. Australian Leather retained the
professor to report on whether the word ugg (or minor variations of that term) is
generic in Australia for sheepskin footwear. Deckers argues that the report is
inadmissible because the legal status of ugg in Australia is irrelevant and that the
professor's testimony is inadmissible under Rule 702 and Daubert. Deckers also notes
that whether the term was generic in Australia in the past is outside of the scope of
the report; the professor focused his analysis on the current legal status of the term.
"In determining foreign law, the court may consider any relevant material or source,
17 See UGG Holdings, Inc. v. Severn, No. CV04-1137-JFW FMOX, 2005 WL 5887187,
at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2005).
16
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Federal Rules of Evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1. But the legal status of the term in
Australia is irrelevant, 18 and the legal expert is not qualified to testify about
motions.
its trademark in an UGG ram logo, asserting both a counterclaim seeking damages
caused by that fraud and an affirmative defense. 19 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1115(b)(l); 1120
("Any person who shall procure registration in the Patent and Trademark Office of a
civil action by any person injured thereby for any damages sustained in consequence
Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow Network, Inc., 104 F.3d 336, 340 (Fed. Cir.
1997). A plaintiff alleging that a trademark was obtained though fraudulent means
must demonstrate fraud with clear and convincing evidence. Money Store v.
18For this reason, I also disregard asserted facts about trademark law in Australia generally
and about the legal status of the word ugg in Australia. [173] ,r,r 18, 20-28; [204] ,r,r 3-4, 9-
12. See also footnote 2 above.
19In its response to Deckers's motion for summary judgment, Australian Leather waived any
fraud claims in connection with all trademark applications aside from the '992 application.
[181] at 27.
17
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Harriscorp Finance, Inc., 689 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1982). A mistake in an
application is insufficient. Id. at 678. Heightened burdens of proof, such as the clear-
In December 1985, UGG Imports applied to register the following logo with the
0 0
[189] ,r 88. In the application, Smith declared that he believed the corporation to be
the owner of the mark and that no other person had the right to use the mark. Id. He
initially listed the date of first use as December 28, 1979, but later amended that date
°
to June 1983. Id. ,r 89. 2 Carl Brown, the attorney for UGG Imports who prosecuted
application. Id. ,r 91. Jody Drake, a former trademark examining attorney testified
that an examiner would be required to ask the applicant "[d]oes the term 'UGG' have
that because the examining attorney reviewing UGG's application wrote "[t]here is
no significance," Brown must have answered that there was no meaning in the
20 Australian Leather notes that Deckers amended the first-use date after resolving a
trademark lawsuit and argues Smith lied to gain an advantage in that litigation. For reasons
discussed below, whether Smith lied in this application is irrelevant.
18
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relevant industry. Id. Brown testified that during that conversation, the examining
attorney asked him whether ugg ''had any meaning in the sheepskin business as a
grade or the like." Id. ,r 91; [154-16] at 13:19-24. According to Brown, he replied that
he didn't think so in the U.S., but that he thought ugg was used to identify sheepskin
boots in Australia. [189] ,r 91; [154-16] at 13:25-14:3. The UGG ram logo trademark
registered in 1987 as U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,460,992. [189] ,r 90; [173]
,r 30. Deckers did not renew the '992 registration, and it expired in 2008. [189] ,r 90.
Australian Leather alleges that both Smith and Brown made material
purposefully gave the wrong first-use date to gain an advantage in a separate lawsuit
and lied when saying his company had the exclusive right to the mark when he knew
the word ugg was generic. Brown lied to the examining attorney, Australian Leather
asserts, when saying ugg had no significance in the relevant industry. 21 But because
the '992 trademark expired in 2008---six years before Australian Leather's entry into
the U.S. market-Australian Leather has failed to establish that it sustained any
Australian Leather argues that had Brown (both parties focus on Brown's
statements) told the truth in the application, and disclosed that ugg was a generic
term in Australia, the examining attorney would have placed a disclaimer on the
21As evidence that Brown made this statement knowing it was false, Australian Leather
points to a supposedly contradictory statement Brown made in a deposition for the Severn
lawsuit and to Drake's expert testimony that Brown must have told the examining attorney
there was no relevant meaning to the term in the industry to have the trademark issued
without a disclaimer attached to the word UGG.
19
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word UGG in the mark, which would have signaled the mark's generic status in
future applications and prevented UGG from obtaining a trademark in the word
itself. Australian Leather's theory is inconsistent with the law. Even assuming that
with full disclosure, the examining attorney would have attached a disclaimer to
UGG in the ram logo, it does not follow that the word ugg is generic. And because it
is not generic to the relevant consumers in the U.S., Deckers may rightfully own its
suffered from Deckers's ownership rights to the '992 trademark as opposed to any
other. And even if all Deckers's trademark registrations were subject to cancellation
rights. See Specialized Seating, Inc. v. Greenwich Industries, 616 F.3d 722, 728 (7th
Cir. 2010) (holding that cancellation of a trademark's registration does not "affect the
attributed to any fraud associated with the '992 trademark, and without damages,
Deckers does not allege that Australian Leather violated the '992 trademark
(nor could it, since the mark has expired), so the alleged fraud would not be an
affirmative defense to the claims in this case. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(l) (providing
that a plaintiffs right to use a registered mark is subject to the defense that "the
registration or the incontestable right to use the mark was obtained fraudulently."
20
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 27 Filed: 08/18/2020
(emphasis added)). Any fraudulent procurement of the '992 mark had no impact on
Australian Leather, and so it cannot recover for that fraud or use it as a defense.
Australian Leather alleges that Deckers falsely represents that its boots are
made in Australia in violation of the Lanham Act, the Illinois Uniform Deceptive
Practices Act, and the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. To prevail on a claim under any
of these theories, a plaintiff must show that the defendant made a deceptive or
misleading statement. 15 U.S.C. § 1125; 815 ILCS 510/2; 815 ILCS 505/2.
From 1979-85, UGG Imports manufactured all its footwear in Australia. [189]
,r 99. It began sourcing some footwear through a New Zealand factory in the late
1980s, though most UGG footwear sold through 1995 was made in Australia. Id. As
the brand grew, UGG moved its manufacturing to China, Vietnam, and elsewhere,
though it continued to source most of its sheepskin from Australia. Id. While Deckers
has continually marketed its footwear reflecting the brand's Australian heritage, it
also expanded its product line to include non-heritage products, and in 2015, Deckers
Australian Leather argues that it is deceptive to use the slogan UGG Australia
when the boots are not manufactured in Australia, but Deckers accurately labels the
inside of each pair of boots with the country of manufacture. Id. ,i 98. And at least in
recent years, Deckers has displayed country of origin labeling on all footwear boxes
21
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 28 Filed: 08/18/2020
whole. See Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 653 F.3d 241, 250-51
(3rd Cir. 2011). The UGG Australia label does not state that the boots were made in
Australia. And because every pair of boots with that label also contains a more
specific country of origin label, no reasonable juror could conclude that Deckers
statements about Australian Leather on the UGG website in violation of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125. On its website, Deckers educated other retailers and consumers
about its rights in the UGG brand and trademark and maintained an anti-
counterfeiting education page. [189] ,r 32. The website also contained a search
function which allowed consumers to look-up online retailers to see if they were
authorized dealers ofUGG-brand products. Id. ,r 107. If the tool did not recognize the
searched term as an authorized dealer, it generated the message: "[the searched
term] isn't known to our database and cannot be verified as an authorized retailer.
This may be a site that deals in counterfeit products." Id. Deckers maintained another
webpage titled "UGG® is a Brand," which contained information about the UGH
trademark in Australia and stated that "[s]ome Australian companies ... otherwise
circulate misinformation regarding the UGG mark." See [214] ,r 83. None ofDeckers's
counterfeit-education webpages mentioned Australian Leather. [189] ,r 105.
Australian Leather argues that the search function results misrepresent that
it deals in counterfeit products. But when a customer types "Australian Leather" into
22
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 29 Filed: 08/18/2020
the site, the tracker generates the same form message that it would for any
unrecognized term. Australian Leather also asserts that the information explaining
Leather by name, and there is no reason that a consumer would conclude that those
statements were about Australian Leather. Further, for the reasons discussed, it is
not false or misleading for Deckers to say that the word ugg is not generic in the U.S.
Because the statements Australian Leather points to were not false, and because they
do not mention Australian Leather, Australian Leather cannot prevail on its fraud
claims.
E. Unclean Hands
unclean hands from enforcing its trademarks based on its predecessor's abuse of the
®symbol.Deckers owns eleven U.S. trademark registrations that contain the UGG
mark. [189] ,r 94. In May 1996, UGG (at that point UGG Holdings) received a U.S.
Trademark Registration for the text word UGG for footwear and other goods. [1 73]
,r 31. Though it did not own a trademark in the word UGG before 1996, id. ,r 32; [136-
1] ,r,r 123-26, Smith and his companies used the ® symbol next to the word UGG in
various advertisements and documents. [173] ,r,r 33-48. 22 Smith considered his
trademark to be for UGG and thought he was legally required to use the ® symbol
22Deckers raises objections about some of these examples, disputing whether the purported
publication date is accurate. It does not deny, however, that it used the® symbol before 1996.
See [173] 11 33, 36, 39, 41-47.
23
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 30 Filed: 08/18/2020
next to it. [204] ,r 26. To Smith's knowledge, none of his compames received a
complaint about improper use of the® symbol. Id. ,r 27. Based on this testimony,
Australian Leather uses the® symbol next to its name as well, and it has never
applied for a trademark registration. [204] ,r,r 28--29. Deckers argues that Australian
Leather's own misuse precludes it from relying on the unclean-hands doctrine. See
Leo Feist, Inc. v. Young, 138 F.2d 972, 975 (7th Cir. 1943) (discussing the doctrine of
unclean hands and noting that "if the defendant has been guilty of conduct more
unconscionable and unworthy than that of the plaintiff, the rule may be relaxed").
Because there are genuine disputes of material facts as to the requisite intent and
F. Damages
did not own or enforce its trademarks, Australian Leather would have sold 75,000
pairs of boots (60,000 short boots and 15,000 long boots) annually to wholesalers in
the United States from 2008--16. [189] ,r 111; [154-11] at 78. He also estimates the
wholesale prices for which Australian Leather could have sold those boots to
American retailers. Id. Oygur bases these estimates on his own experiences; he did
not do any test sales, studies, or surveys to determine the American demand for the
product. [189] ,r 113. While the accuracy and precision of Oygur's calculations may be
questioned, they are based on his personal knowledge of the industry and not so
24
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 31 Filed: 08/18/2020
III. Conclusion
Australian Leather's claims based on fraud, generic status, and the foreign
[130], is denied.
ENTER:
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: September 13, 2018
25
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 32 Filed: 08/18/2020
This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Thursday, December 19, 2019:
MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: Status hearing held. The
court makes it findings of facts and conclusions of law in open court. For the reasons
stated in open court, defendant's unclean hands defense and counterclaim is denied.
Plaintiff has leave to file its motion for entry of permanent injunction by 1/6/20.
Defendant's response is due 1/27/20. Continued status hearing is set for 2/6/20 at 9:30
a.m. Notices mailed. (psm, )
ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was
generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and
criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please
refer to it for additional information.
For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our
web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 33 Filed: 08/18/2020
This docket entry was made by the Clerk on Thursday, February 6, 2020:
MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: Status hearing held. The
motion for leave to file reply instanter [293] is granted. For the reasons stated in open
court, the motion for permanent injunction [288] is granted in part. Enter Permanent
Injunction as modified by the court. Enter judgment. Plaintiff's motion for a finding of
liability for attorneys' fees shall be filed by 2/20/20. Response is due 3/23/20; reply is due
4/6/20. Post−judgment motions are due 3/5/20. The parties shall meet and confer on a
proposed briefing schedule and then contact susan_mcclintic@ilnd.uscourts.gov. Notices
mailed. (psm, )
ATTENTION: This notice is being sent pursuant to Rule 77(d) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or Rule 49(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. It was
generated by CM/ECF, the automated docketing system used to maintain the civil and
criminal dockets of this District. If a minute order or other document is enclosed, please
refer to it for additional information.
For scheduled events, motion practices, recent opinions and other information, visit our
web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov.
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 34 Filed: 08/18/2020
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-cv-03676
v.
Judge Manish S. Shah
AUSTRALIAN LEATHER PTY LTD and
ADNAN OYGUR a/k/a EDDIE OYGUR,
Defendants.
registration No. 3,050,925 therefor (Deckers' federal and common law rights in and
common law CARDY™ trademark (the "CARDY Trademark"), and design patent
Trademark under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (Count I), unfair
Trademarks under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count II), infringement of
United States Design Patent No. D599,999 (Count III), infringement of United States
Design Patent No. D616,189 (Count IV), infringement of United States Design Patent
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 35 Filed: 08/18/2020
No. D582,650 (Count V), infringement of United States Design Patent No. D705,529
(Count VI), violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS
§§ 510, et seq. (Count VII), common law trademark infringement of Deckers' CARDY
Trademark (Count VIII), and common law trademark infringement Deckers' UGG
Trademark (Count IX). [26]. Defendants answered and asserted affirmative defenses
UGG and CARDY Trademarks and Design Patents. [28, 55]. Australian Leather
Deckers and Defendants have stipulated that each of Deckers' Design Patents
valid, enforceable, and infringed by Defendants and that Defendants' use of the
designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and (b) a violation of the Illinois
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS §§ 510, et seq. [237].
concerning the common law UGG trademark under Deckers' Amended Complaint
[26] Count II (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), Count VII (Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act), and Count IX (common law trademark infringement) stands or falls
On May 10, 2019, following a four-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Deckers finding that Defendants Australian Leather and Oygur each
willfully infringed Deckers' UGG and CARDY Trademarks and each willfully
Defendants' unclean hands defense ([28] and [55], 8th Affirmative Defense) and
May 10, 2019. On December 19, 2019, the Court entered an Order in favor of Deckers
against Defendants on all Counts I - IX of the Amended Complaint [26], and further
that judgment is entered in favor of Deckers and against Australian Leather on all
UGG Trademark, for which damages Defendants are jointly and severally liable.
attorneys, and all other persons who are in active concert or participation with any
or authorized by Deckers;
any manner, products or inventory that satisfy all three of the following
advertised, offered for sale, or sold in United States commerce, and (iii)
f. offering for sale or selling in, exporting to, and/or importing into United
patent(s); and
3. Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all
other persons who are in active concert or participation with any of them, shall
or spelling, as, or as part of, a trademark, service mark, trade name, label, or
its territories.
4. As the prevailing party, Deckers is awarded its costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(d)(l).
-6-
Case:
ILND 450 (Rev. Case: in a 20-2166
1:16-cv-03676
10/13) Judgment Document:
Document#:
Civil Action 2971-2
Filed: Page: 40
02/06/20 Filed:
Page 08/18/2020
1 of 1 PagelD #:11619
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-cv-03676
v. Judge Manish Shah
Defendants.
□ in favor of plaintiff(s)
and against defendant(s)
in the amount of $ ,
which
□ includes pre–judgment interest.
□ does not include pre–judgment interest.
Post-judgment interest accrues on that amount at the rate provided by law from the date of this judgment.
□ in favor of defendant(s)
and against plaintiff(s)
.
Defendant(s) shall recover costs from plaintiff(s).
other: in favor of plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation in the amount of $450,000 and the
attached permanent injunction, and against defendants Australian Leather Pty, Ltd. and Adnan Oygur.
tried by a jury with Judge Manish Shah presiding, and the jury has rendered a verdict.
tried by Judge Manish Shah without a jury and the above decision was reached.
decided by Judge Manish Shah on a motion.
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-cv-03676
V.
Defendants.
registration No. 3,050,925 therefor (Deckers' federal and common law rights in and
common law CARDY™ trademark (the "CARDY Trademark"), and design patent
Trademark under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (Count I), unfair
Trademarks under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Count II), infringement of
United States Design Patent No. D599,999 (Count III), infringement of United States
Design Patent No. D616,189 (Count IV), infringement of United States Design Patent
Case: 20-2166
Case: 1:16-cv-03676 Document:
Document#: 297-11-2
FiledPage: 42 Page
: 02/06/20 Filed:2 08/18/2020
of 6 PagelD #:11621
No. D582,650 (Count V), infringement of United States Design Patent No. D705,529
(Count VI), violation of the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS
§§ 510, et seq. (Count VII), common law trademark infringement of Deckers' CARDY
Trademark (Count VIII), and common law trademark infringement Deckers' UGG
Trademark (Count IX). [26]. Defendants answered and asserted affirmative defenses
UGG and CARDY Trademarks and Design Patents. [28, 55]. Australian Leather
Deckers and Defendants have stipulated that each of Deckers' Design Patents
valid, enforceable, and infringed by Defendants and that Defendants' use of the
designation of origin under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), and (b) a violation of the Illinois
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 815 ILCS §§ 510, et seq. [237].
concerning the common law UGG trademark under Deckers' Amended Complaint
[26] Count II (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)), Count VII (Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act), and Count IX (common law trademark infringement) stands or falls
On May 10, 2019, following a four-day jury trial, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Deckers finding that Defendants Australian Leather and Oygur each
willfully infringed Deckers' UGG and CARDY Trademarks and each willfully
Defendants' unclean hands defense ([28] and [55], 8th Affirmative Defense) and
only), and Deckers' claim of willful patent infringement were tried to the Court on
May 10, 2019. On December 19, 2019, the Court entered an Order in favor of Deckers
against Defendants on all Counts I - IX of the Amended Complaint [26], and further
that judgment is entered in favor of Deckers and against Australian Leather on all
UGG Trademark, for which damages Defendants are jointly and severally liable.
attorneys, and all other persons who are in active concert or participation with any
or authorized by Deckers;
any manner, products or inventory that satisfy all three of the following
advertised, offered for sale, or sold in United States commerce, and (iii)
f. offering for sale or selling in, exporting to, and/or importing into United
patent(s); and
3. Defendants and their officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and all
other persons who are in active concert or participation with any of them, shall
or spelling, as, or as part of, a trademark, service mark, trade name, label, or
its territories.
4. As the prevailing party, Deckers is awarded its costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(d)(l).
-6-
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 47 Filed: 08/18/2020
Plaintiff,
No. 16 CV 3676
v.
Judge Manish S. Shah
AUSTRALIAN LEATHER PTY. LTD. and
ADNAN OYGUR a/k/a EDDIE OYGUR,
Defendants.
ORDER
Defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law, [311], [312], are denied.
Defendants' motions to remit the jury award and waive the bond requirement to stay
execution of the money judgment pending appeal, [309], [320], are denied. Deckers's
motion for attorney's fees, [299], is granted; Deckers is awarded a reasonable
attorney's fee. Defendants' objections to Deckers's bill of costs, [316], [317], are
sustained in part. Defendants are taxed $33,304.26. Defendants' motion regarding
time to file a Notice of Appeal, [308], is denied.
STATEMENT
Background
The jury reasonably found that defendants willfully infringed the Cardy
trademark. Defendants stipulated to infringement, and although defendant Oygur
claimed not to care what Deckers was doing, that testimony supported rather than
detracted from the claim of willfulness. Based on Oygur's demeanor throughout his
testimony, a jury could view his statement as the rhetoric of someone who did care
what Deckers was doing, but feared revealing his own weakness by acknowledging
Deckers's dominance. Oygur came off as someone who was eager to hurt Deckers if
given the opportunity. A jury could credit Oygur's passion for his business as evidence
that he was attentive to the industry, while at the same time reasonably discredit his
claims of ignorance. The Cardy trademark and design-patent infringement (both
established by stipulation) demonstrated that defendants took the designs for the
Cardy boots. Even if the jury credited Oygur's claim that a customer presented
samples of the infringing boots to Oygur for manufacture, Trial Tr. 384-85, the
surrounding circumstances supported an inference that defendants knew or learned
that the boot and its Cardy name belonged to Deckers. The term Cardy appeared only
briefly on defendants' website, and defendants stopped selling the boots in the United
States after they were sued, but a jury could easily see defendants' use as not
coincidental. A jury was not required to accept Oygur's testimony that Cardy referred
to anything knitted, and it was not credible that defendants would use that word for
a boot independently of Deckers. The reasonable inference is that defendants
purposefully appropriated the term.
This is not a matter of Deckers failing to refute defendants' denials and failing
to present evidence to meet its burden. Deckers demonstrated that Cardy was one of
its hero brands (an internal term, but one based on outward success, Trial Tr. 74)-
supporting an inference that an industry professional like Oygur knew about it and
his claims that he didn't were false. Defendants' motive to willfully infringe was
apparent. Oygur repeatedly conveyed his disdain for the brand UGG 2 in the United
States, and it was entirely reasonable for a jury to find that he willfully targeted
1 Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers
are taken from the CM/ECF header placed at the top of filings, except for citations to the trial
transcript.
2 I use all capital letters (UGG) when referring to the brand. I use lowercase letters (ugg)
2
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 49 Filed: 08/18/2020
Deckers's marks, including Cardy. His attempt to shift responsibility onto his staff,
while at the same time boasting about his skill in the industry, was not persuasive
(or so a jury could reasonably conclude).
Defendants argue that the verdict is contrary to common sense. But when
comparing the two labels as used in the market, it is sensible to look at defendants'
and see a counterfeit. There was evidence that other Australian competitors used the
word ugg similarly on labels, [314-3], but the question here was whether defendants'
use in the United States amounted to counterfeiting of Deckers's mark. 3 Deckers's
ownership and use of the brand in the United States was well known, and to use a
similar font, size, and placement on a label shipped into the United States was an act
of counterfeiting. The verdict did not depend on an abstract comparison, but was fully
supported by the reality of the U.S. marketplace-where defendants introduced their
product using a word that was substantially indistinguishable from Deckers's mark
and where the U.S. consumer overwhelmingly understood the word to be a brand
name. See Trial Tr. 209-10, 228.
3Perhaps the other Australian manufacturers are also free riding on Deckers's brand and
using UGG as a mark to reach the lucrative international tourist business.
4The Committee on Pattern Civil Jury Instructions for the Seventh Circuit has not proposed
an instruction on trademark counterfeiting.
3
Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 50 Filed: 08/18/2020
Here, there was no dispute that defendants had no permission to use Deckers's
trademark (and defendants specifically advised against having the jury consider their
lack of authorization to use Deckers's mark). [245] at 115 (noting that the second and
third elements described in All Star Championship Racing, Inc. v. O'Reilly Auto.
Stores, Inc., 940 F.Supp.2d 850, 866 (C.D. Ill. 2013), are not in dispute and the jury
need not consider them). As I concluded at the pretrial conference, the word
"spurious" was not doing any work here. Defendants' objective, but not subjective,
deception requirement would have unnecessarily increased complexity in the jury
instructions. See [245] at 116 (conceding that defendants can be liable without proof
of "any particular level of intent"). Defendants' proposal was incomplete because it
would have required adding that they could be liable even if they did not intend to
deceive-all for an issue that wouldn't have been helpful to the jury. An admittedly
unauthorized mark that is a substantially indistinguishable copy of Deckers's mark
would necessarily be spurious-it is counterfeiting to take a mark without permission
and use it in a substantially indistinguishable way from Deckers's mark. Such
conduct objectively deceives the consumer. Defendants' instruction and the
introduction of a concept that required additional explication about mental states
would have added to already cumbersome jury instructions. ''Unless it is necessary
to give an instruction, it is necessary not to give it, so that the important instructions
stand out and are remembered." United States v. Hill, 252 F.3d 919, 923 (7th Cir.
2001). The issue for this jury was whether defendants' use of UGG was a mark-copy
at all-defendants had arguments that they were using UGG not as a source-
identifier or a reproduction of Deckers's mark, but as a description of the product
itself in Australian vernacular. The jury instructions captured that issue accurately,
see [256] at 74-75. "Spuriousness" was an immaterial concept for this trial.
Defendants object that the instructions did not require the jury to consider how
defendants used UGG in the marketplace, and allowed the jury to make an
inappropriately abstract side-by-side comparison. I phrased the instruction
permissively: ''You may consider how the Defendant used 'UGG' in the marketplace."
[262] at 28; see Trial Tr. 618--25. The choice of phrasing was not based on a need to
distinguish between the permissive and mandatory, but to address the defendants'
fear of an abstract versus marketplace comparison. Defendants' original proposal did
not use the word "must," but focused on avoiding abstract appearances, and my choice
of phrasing addressed that concern. [245] at 114. Like "spuriousness," this issue was
also far afield from the actual issue for the jury as to counterfeiting-namely, whether
defendants had copied a mark or simply described their product without reference to
Deckers's brand. The trial was not abstract. It was about actual boots in the
marketplace, Australian surfer history, and brand recognition in the United States
for Deckers's name. The counterfeiting instructions accurately stated the law, and
the language allowing the jury to consider use in the marketplace adequately
equipped it to evaluate defendants' arguments.
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Defendants' motion to remit the $450,000 jury award, or, alternatively, for a
new trial to determine damages, is denied.
I instructed the jury that, if it found that defendants' counterfeiting of the UGG
mark was willful, it could award statutory damages up to $2,000,000. [262] at 29; see
15 U.S.C. § 1117(c)(2). I told the jury that the purpose of statutory damages is to
"compensate the trademark owner, penalize the counterfeiter, and deter future
trademark counterfeiting." [262] at 29. Defendants did not object to that instruction,
either during the jury instruction conference or when I gave the instruction. Trial Tr.
608, 781. During closing arguments, Deckers asked the jury to award $500,000, and
defendants did not suggest an alternative amount of statutory damages. Trial Tr.
724, 725-59.
5I disagree with Deckers that defendants waived their right to ask for remittitur of the jury
award by not giving the jury an alternative amount to award. Deckers does not convincingly
point to any rule requiring a party to preserve a jury remittitur argument. See Smith v.
Altman, No. 12. C 4546, 2015 WL 5610670, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2015) ("[T]he court may
consider questions of remittitur sua sponte.").
5
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A properly instructed jury applied the relevant factors, and its award was not
monstrously excessive or irrational. Although defendants correctly observe that this
case was somewhat atypical because it involved a relatively low number of sales, a
reasonable jury could have emphasized the need to sanction and deter defendants
based on the sheer willfulness defendants displayed. As discussed above, Oygur's
demeanor and testimony suggested he harbored hostility toward Deckers and acted
deliberately to damage its brand. The jury could have rationally sought to punish and
deter that conduct. Moreover, while defendants had no obligation to give the jury an
exact number, they did have the opportunity to explain their theory of how the jury
should apply the statutory damages factors and chose not to. That defendants didn't
even comment on Deckers's suggested award of $500,000 during closing argument
suggests that a number below that amount could not have been irrational or
monstrously excessive.
Defendants argue that the jury award lacks a rational connection to the
evidence because they estimate Deckers's actual damages to be only about $1,200. To
be sure, "revenue lost is one factor to consider" in reviewing statutory damages.
Psihoyos v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 748 F.3d 120, 127 (2d Cir. 2014). But there need
not be a "direct correlation between statutory damages and actual damages." Id.
Congress created statutory damages in the Lanham Act because proving actual
damages in counterfeiting cases is "extremely difficult if not impossible." Louis
Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. LY USA, Inc., 676 F.3d 83, 110 n.27 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting
S. Rep. No. 104-177, at 10 (1995)). As I instructed the jury, statutory damages not
only compensate the injured party, but also "discourage wrongful conduct." F. W.
Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952). Here, a reasonable
jury could have been motivated by the need to punish and deter, rather than
compensate. See Psihoyos, 748 F.3d at 127 (in copyright case, denying remittitur
where "jury may have viewed [defendant] as a repeat infringer in need of
deterrence").
Finally, the award here falls within the reasonable range of counterfeiting
awards in similar cases. While jury awards in analogous cases provide a reference
point for assessing reasonableness, an award in another case "doesn't have to be" an
"exact match" to be roughly comparable. Vega v. Chi. Park Dist., 954 F.3d 996, 1008-
09 (7th Cir. 2020). Counterfeiting awards in other cases range from well below the
award here, to the statutory maximum of $2 million. See Deckers Outdoor Corp. v.
Ozwear Connection Pty Ltd., No. CV 14-2307, 2014 WL 4679001, at *12 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 18, 2014) (awarding $2 million for using UGG mark on footwear where
defendants "willfully and knowingly used the UGG counterfeit mark on counterfeit
footwear that was sold in the United States through Defendants' website"); see also
H-D U.S.A., LLC v. SunFrog, LLC, 311 F.Supp.3d 1000, 1049 (E.D. Wis. 2018)
(awarding $300,000 per mark); Philip Morris USA Inc. v. C.H. Rhodes, Inc., No. 08-
CV-0069, 2010 WL 1196124, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010) ($500,000 per mark),
adopted by 2010 WL 1633455 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2010); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v.
6
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Zeotec Diamonds, Inc., No. CV 02-01089, 2003 WL 23705746, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7,
2003) ($300,000 per mark); Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc. v. Jones, No. 99 CIV. 2359, 2002
WL 596354, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2002) (recommending $500,000 per mark).
The jury's award was rational, and defendants' motion to remit it is denied.
Any time after a money judgment is entered, a party may obtain a stay of that
judgment by providing "a bond or other security." Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b); Dillon v. City
of Chicago, 866 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir. 1988). 6 A court may waive the bond
requirement, but waiver is appropriate only "if the appellant has a clearly
demonstrated ability to satisfy the judgment in the event the appeal is unsuccessful"
and there is "no other concern that the appellee's rights will be compromised by a
failure adequately to secure the judgment." In re Carlson, 224 F.3d 716, 719 (7th Cir.
2000); see also 11 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2905 (3d ed.) (the burden is on the party seeking waiver "to demonstrate
that the judgment is not at risk").
District courts consider five factors to determine whether to waive the bond
requirement: (1) the complexity of the collection process; (2) the amount of time
required to obtain a judgment after it is affirmed on appeal; (3) the degree of
confidence that the district court has in the availability of funds to pay the judgment;
(4) whether the defendant's ability to pay the judgment is so plain that the cost of a
bond would be a waste of money; and (5) whether the defendant is in such a precarious
financial situation that the requirement to post a bond would place other creditors of
the defendant in an insecure position. Dillon, 866 F.2d at 904-05. The point of these
factors, and the rule itself, is to ensure recovery for the party who prevails on appeal
while protecting the judgment debtor from losing money if the decision is reversed.
In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 783 F.3d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 2015) (adopting the
Dillon factors). The bond requirement will not be waived "solely on the basis that it
will pose a severe financial hardship" on the appellant, unless "some other form of
security is offered." See Wright & Miller, supra,§ 2905.
Here, defendants have not shown that they will be able to satisfy the judgment
if their appeal is unsuccessful. Defendants do not provide any reassurance that the
judgment is not at risk-they do not address the first four factors of the Dillon test
at all. Defendants rely solely on the fifth factor, claiming that, if I do not waive the
6Rule 62 was amended in December 2018; Rule 62(b) used to be Rule 62(d), and, under the
new rule, a party may stay a money judgment by posting a bond or "other security." Fed. R.
Civ. P. 62 advisory committee's notes to 2018 amendment. See generally Deutsche Bank Nat'l
Tr. Co. v. Cornish, 759 Fed. App'x 503, 506 (7th Cir. 2019) (discussing 2018 amendments to
Rule 62).
7
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bond requirement, they will be forced into bankruptcy, their creditors will be put in
an insecure position, and they will be unable to pursue an appeal. There is some
tension between the first four factors of the Dillon test, which get at ensuring the
judgment is not at risk, and the fifth factor, on which defendants rely. But I am not
convinced that defendants have sufficiently met the fifth factor in any event. The only
creditor defendants identify is Westpac Bank, and defendants do not sufficiently
establish how the bank-a secured creditor-would be harmed if defendants had to
post a bond. [361] at 8. The Dillon factors, taken as a whole, weigh against waiving
the bond requirement. Defendants have failed to meet their burden, and their motion
to waive the bond requirement is denied. See In re Carlson, 224 F.3d at 719 (denying
waiver where there was "every reason to lack confidence" that the appellant would
"pay up eventually"); cf. In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 783 F.3d at 418
(waiving bond requirement where appellant had "demonstrated the existence of
appropriated funds" that would be available without substantial delay or difficulty);
Trading Techs. Int'l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., No. 04 C 5312, 2008 WL 4542725, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. July 24, 2008) (same, where it was "clear" that defendant "ha[d] more than enough
cash on hand" to satisfy the judgment).
Defendants need not meet this standard. As I read defendants' motion, they
seek a stay only of the money judgment, not the permanent injunction. See [321] at 1
(asking court to "stay execution of the jury award"). The test Deckers refers to applies
when a court is deciding whether to stay a judgment "other than a money judgment."
Venckiene v. United States, 929 F.3d 843, 853 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 379
(2019). Different standards apply to the stay of an injunction and a stay of a monetary
judgment pending appeal. See Wright & Miller, supra,§ 3954 (noting that Rule 62(b)
governs the stay of a money judgment, while Rule 62(d) and Appellate Rule 8 provide
the balancing test for a stay of injunctive relief pending appeal). That is, courts must
conduct a balancing test when evaluating a stay of an injunction pending appeal, but
a party "is entitled to a stay of a money judgment as a matter of right if he posts a
bond in accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(d)." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Broad.-
Paramount Theatres, Inc., 87 S. Ct. 1, 3 (1966) (Harlan, J., in chambers); see also
Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Cornish, 759 Fed. App'x 503, 507 (7th Cir. 2019) ("If
the bond was posted, then, there was no need for the court to inquire, at the very
outset of the appeal, into its potential merits.").
8
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Because defendants cannot satisfy the Dillon factors, their motion to waive the
bond requirement is denied. Defendants may stay execution of the monetary
judgment by posting a bond or other security.
Under both the trademark and patent statutes, attorney's fees can be awarded
to a prevailing party in an exceptional case. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); 35 U.S.C. § 285.
Deckers asks for an exceptional-case finding and an award of attorney's fees because
defendants acted willfully. The jury concluded that defendants' trademark violations
were willful, 7 and the issue of willfulness as to the patent-design claim was reserved
for the court.
9
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specifically because Deckers had created global demand for the word. See Trial Tr.
409, 422-23, 451. Oygur's explanation that he couldn't afford non-UGG labels, Trial
Tr. 435-39, was incredible. Defendants had the wherewithal to purchase labels in at
least two colors, id., and they shipped some products without any labels at all. See
Trial Tr. 496--97. When defendants' bank advised them to disclaim any connection to
Deckers, defendants refused, further demonstrating a specific intent to trade on
Deckers's intellectual property. See Trial Tr. 478. Using all of this evidence to infer
willfulness toward design-patent infringement is not based on a prohibited
propensity inference, Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(l), but on a direct inference of intent
toward this particular plaintiff. Across the board, defendants intended to infringe on
Deckers's intellectual property. When combined with the evidence of Oygur's
knowledge of the U.S. patent and the method of copying, the design-patent
infringement was no accident-it was willful.
An exceptional case is one that "stands out from others with respect to the
substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing
law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was
litigated." Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 554
(2014). District courts consider whether a case is exceptional on a case-by-case basis,
considering the totality of the circumstances. Id. (patent); see LHO Chicago River,
L.L.C. v. Perillo, 942 F.3d 384, 388-89 (7th Cir. 2019) (trademark). Courts consider
the frivolousness, motivation, and objective unreasonableness of the defendants'
position, along with deterrence. Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554 n.6; Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19 (1994). A case is exceptional if "the acts of
infringement are 'malicious, fraudulent, deliberate or willful."' BASF Corp. v. Old
World Trading Co., 41 F.3d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Roulo v. Russ Berrie
& Co., Inc., 886 F.2d 931, 942 (7th Cir. 1989)).
8 Defendants' earlier offers of judgment under Rule 68 would have simplified some issues,
but were not themselves reasonable compromises. The later withdrawal of claims,
stipulations of infringement, and the jury's verdict demonstrated the strength of Deckers's
position.
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Defendants sold a mere handful of infringing goods in the United States. The
jury's damages award and an additional fee award will (if successfully enforced in
Australia) likely affect defendants' ability to stay in business. These circumstances
raise a concern of over-deterrence. But the fee award will be checked by the court's
review for reasonableness, and ultimately, the defendants chose this path when they
willfully infringed with a specific motivation to undermine Deckers's brand.
Defendants could have sought to preserve and promote Australian heritage without
entering the U.S. market with a copy of Deckers's mark and stolen designs. On
balance, then, an exceptional-case finding is appropriate, and Deckers is awarded a
reasonable attorney's fee. 9
Bill of Costs
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) creates a "strong presumption" that the
prevailing party will recover the costs listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Montanez v. Simon,
755 F.3d 547, 557 (7th Cir. 2014). The cost must be both "reasonable and necessary
to the litigation" for the prevailing party to recover it. Little v. Mitsubishi Motors N.
Am., Inc., 514 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2008). The district court has discretion to
determine whether, and in what amount, costs are assigned to the losing party.
Rivera v. City of Chicago, 469 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2006).
9Although defendants' counterfeiting was intentional, I decline to award fees under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(b), because Deckers opted for statutory damages. See K & N Eng'g, Inc. v. Bulat, 510
F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2007); [256] at 75-79.
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Next, defendants argue that they made five offers of judgment under Rule 68.
Since Deckers rejected those offers, defendants say that Deckers must pay
defendants' post-offer costs. At least 14 days before trial, a defendant may serve "an
offer to allow judgment on specified terms" on an opposing party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a).
If the plaintiff rejects the offer, and the judgment that the plaintiff ultimately obtains
is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the plaintiff must pay the costs
incurred after the offer was made. Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d). Defendants bear the burden
of showing that the Rule 68 offer was more favorable than the judgment. Reiter v.
MTA NYC Transit Auth., 457 F.3d 224,231 (2d Cir. 2006).
10I arrived at this number by subtracting the costs of video recording the non-Oygur
depositions, as listed in defendants' objection to Deckers's bill of costs-$8140.07, [317] at 6-
7-from Deckers's revised bill of costs, which sought to tax defendants $41,444.33.
12
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The ultimate judgment was more favorable. After Deckers rejected the offers
to settle, defendants dismissed their counterclaims and stipulated to, among other
things, Cardy trademark infringement and patent-design infringement. The final
judgment and permanent injunction enjoined defendants (as well as their agents,
employees, attorneys, and anyone acting in concert with defendants) from using the
Cardy mark, or an imitation of the mark, "in connection with the sale, offer for sale,
distribution, or advertising of any product in the United States or its territories."
[296] at 4. It also barred defendants from passing off any product in the United States
as a Cardy product or a product originating from Deckers, and from "offering for sale
or selling in, exporting to, and/or importing into U.S. commerce any products not
authorized by Deckers" and products that "include any reproduction, copy or colorable
imitation of the designs claimed in Deckers' Design Patents," as well as assisting
others in infringing the design patents. [296] at 4-5. The injunction also stopped
defendants from marketing the Cardy mark in any format in the United States,
including on social media. [296] at 5. Finally, the permanent injunction awarded
Deckers-the prevailing party-costs under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(l).
That the offers of judgment included five $1,000 payments does not change the
analysis, as defendants argue. "[A] favorable judgment and an injunction can be more
valuable to a plaintiff than damages." Andretti v. Borla Performance Indus., Inc., 426
F.3d 824, 837-38 (6th Cir. 2005); see also Reiter, 457 F.3d at 231 ("Nothing in the
language of Rule 68 suggests that a final judgment that contains equitable relief is
inherently less favorable than a Rule 68 offer that contains monetary relief.").
Although it can be difficult to compare two forms of equitable relief (or equitable relief
and damages), courts typically find that when the ultimate judgment is more specific
or extensive than the offer, the ultimate judgment is more favorable. See, e.g., Garrity
v. Sununu, 752 F.2d 727, 732-33 (1st Cir. 1984) (permanent injunction containing
specific details was more favorable than "indefinite and ambiguous" offer of
settlement). Deckers ultimately received stipulations of infringement, a sweeping
permanent injunction, and attorney's fees. It was better off rejecting defendants'
offers to settle. Defendants are taxed $33,304.26.
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Defendants ask that any motion Deckers has filed or may file in the future
regarding attorney's fees function as a motion under Rule 59 such that it would toll
the time for filing a Notice of Appeal. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e). That motion is denied.
An order awarding attorney's fees, but not setting the amount to be awarded, is not
a final judgment and is not appealable. Cooke v. Jackson Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 919 F.3d
1024, 1026 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 134 (2019). But "a judgment on the
merits and an award of attorneys' fees are separately appealable." Id. So defendants
may appeal the judgment on the merits now, and then, once attorney's fees are
calculated, file a second Notice of Appeal from the fee award. A second appeal from
the calculation of attorney's fees will not unnecessarily complicate or prolong
resolution of the appeal, because I expect to resolve the fee petition with enough time
for the second appeal to be consolidated with the merits appeal. See Terket v. Lund,
623 F.2d 29, 34 (7th Cir. 1980) (district courts should decide fee petitions
"expeditiously" so that "[a]ny party dissatisifed with the court's ruling may then file
an appeal and apply to this court for consolidation with the pending appeal of the
merits"). Defendants have 30 days to file a Notice of Appeal on the judgment. Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).
ENTER:
Manish S. Shah
United States District Judge
Date: July 13, 2020
14
Case:
ILND 450 (Rev. 10/13) Judgment in a 20-2166
Civil Action Document: 1-2 Page: 61 Filed: 08/18/2020
Plaintiff,
Case No. 16-cv-03676
v. Judge Manish Shah
Defendants.
□ in favor of plaintiff(s)
and against defendant(s)
in the amount of $ ,
which
□ includes pre–judgment interest.
□ does not include pre–judgment interest.
Post-judgment interest accrues on that amount at the rate provided by law from the date of this judgment.
□ in favor of defendant(s)
and against plaintiff(s)
□ tried by a jury with Judge Manish Shah presiding, and the jury has rendered a verdict.
□ decided by Judge Manish Shah on a motion.
tried by Judge Manish Shah without a jury and the above decision was reached.
a
AO279,APPEAL,MASON,PROTO,TERMED
Deckers Outdoor Corporation v. Australian Leather Pty Ltd Date Filed: 03/28/2016
Assigned to: Honorable Manish S. Shah Date Terminated: 02/06/2020
Cause: 15:1125 Trademark Infringement (Lanham Act) Jury Demand: Both
Nature of Suit: 840 Trademark
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Plaintiff
Deckers Outdoor Corporation represented by Paul G. Juettner
Greer, Burns & Crain, Ltd.
300 South Wacker Drive
25th Floor
Chicago, IL 60606
(312) 360-0080
Email: pjuettner@gbc.law
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin R. Gaudio
Greer Burns & Crain Ltd
300 South Wacker Drive
Suite 2500
Chicago, IL 60606
312 360-0080
Email: jgaudio@gbc.law
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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Email: rjohnson@gbc.law
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
V.
Defendant
Australian Leather Pty Ltd represented by Mark R Bagley
Tolpin & Partners, PC
100 North LaSalle Street
Suite 501
Chicago, IL 60602
(312) 698-8971
Email: mark@tolpinlaw.com
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Defendant
Adnan Oygur represented by Mark R Bagley
doing business as (See above for address)
Eddie Oygur LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Counter Claimant
Australian Leather Pty Ltd represented by Mark R Bagley
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
V.
Counter Defendant
Deckers Outdoor Corporation represented by Paul G. Juettner
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin R. Gaudio
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kent Raygor
Sheppard Mulin Richter & Hampton LLP
1901 Avenue of the Stars
Suite 1600
Los Angeles, CA 90067
(310) 228-3700
Email: kraygor@sheppardmullin.com
PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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RiKaleigh C. Johnson
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Counter Claimant
Australian Leather Pty Ltd represented by Mark R Bagley
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
V.
Counter Defendant
Deckers Outdoor Corporation represented by Paul G. Juettner
(See above for address)
LEAD ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Justin R. Gaudio
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kent Raygor
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
RiKaleigh C. Johnson
(See above for address)
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
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01/05/2017 43 MOTION by Defendant Australian Leather Pty Ltd for protective order -
agreed motion to amend protective order (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 01/05/2017)
01/05/2017 44 NOTICE of Motion by Mark R Bagley for presentment of motion for
protective order 43 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 1/12/2017 at 09:45
AM. (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 01/05/2017)
01/06/2017 45 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: The motion for entry of
amended confidentiality order 43 is granted. Enter Amended Confidentiality
Order. No appearance on the motion is necessary. Notices mailed by Judicial
Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
01/06/2017 46 AMENDED Confidentiality Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah
on 1/6/2017. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 01/06/2017)
01/09/2017 47 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: The motion for leave to
file under seal 38 is granted. The court may revisit the seal at the status hearing
on 1/26/17. Notices mailed by Judicial Staff. (psm, ) (Entered: 01/09/2017)
01/18/2017 48 REPLY by Adnan Oygur to memorandum in opposition to motion 40 to dismiss
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 01/18/2017)
01/23/2017 49 MOTION by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd for leave to file
Amended Counterclaims (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bagley, Mark) (Entered:
01/23/2017)
01/23/2017 50 NOTICE of Motion by Mark R Bagley for presentment of motion for leave to
file 49 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 1/26/2017 at 09:30 AM. (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2017)
01/25/2017 51 MEMORANDUM Opinion and Order. Signed by the Honorable Manish S.
Shah on 1/25/2017: Oygur's motion to dismiss, 30 , is denied. [For further
detail see attached order.] Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 01/25/2017)
01/26/2017 52 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: Status hearing held.
Defendant Adnan Oygur must answer by 2/16/17. The parties are directed to
meet and confer on sealed exhibits, and shall filed redacted versions on the
public docket. Defendant's motion for leave to file amended counterclaims 49
is granted, with no objection. The amended counterclaims shall be filed as a
separate document on the court's docket. Plaintiff's response is due 2/16/17.
The discovery deadlines remain in place. Continued status hearing is set for
4/21/17 at 9:30 a.m. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 01/26/2017)
01/26/2017 53 Amended COUNTERCLAIM filed by Australian Leather Pty Ltd against
Deckers Outdoor Corporation .(Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 01/26/2017)
02/01/2017 54 EXHIBIT by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation Redacted Exhibit 6 -
PayPal Account Information Page regarding declaration, 41 (Gaudio, Justin)
(Entered: 02/01/2017)
02/16/2017 55 ANSWER to amended complaint by Adnan Oygur(Bagley, Mark) (Entered:
02/16/2017)
02/16/2017 56 ANSWER to counterclaim by Deckers Outdoor Corporation(Juettner, Paul)
(Entered: 02/16/2017)
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 70 Filed: 08/18/2020
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 71 Filed: 08/18/2020
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 72 Filed: 08/18/2020
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 73 Filed: 08/18/2020
05/09/2017 85 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: Hearing on 5/11/17 on
plaintiff's motion for protective order 80 is reset to 9:30 a.m. Please note, this is
only a change of time. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 05/09/2017)
05/09/2017 86 MOTION by Defendant Australian Leather Pty Ltd for hearing re MOTION by
Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation for protective order to Quash Notice of
Deposition and to Clarify Previous Order on Fact Discovery Cutoff Date 80 -
Motion to reschedule hearing (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bagley, Mark)
(Entered: 05/09/2017)
05/09/2017 87 NOTICE of Motion by Mark R Bagley for presentment of motion for hearing,
motion for relief,, 86 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 5/16/2017 at 09:45
AM. (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 05/09/2017)
05/10/2017 88 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah:Defendant's Motion to
reschedule the hearing on plaintiff's motion for a protective order 86 is granted
in part and denied in part. Defendant shall file a written response to plaintiff's
motion by 05/11/17, no reply is permitted, and the court will enter a ruling on
plaintiff's motion by cm/ecf. No appearance on 5/11/17 or 5/16/17 is necessary.
The court notes that when it struck the fact discovery deadline on 4/21/17, it
did not intend to authorize any discovery not previously noticed. The point was
to give the parties some scheduling flexibility for pre-noticed discovery, in light
of the mediation. (mss) (Entered: 05/10/2017)
05/11/2017 89 MEMORANDUM by Australian Leather Pty Ltd in Opposition to motion for
protective order 80 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bagley, Mark) (Entered:
05/11/2017)
05/12/2017 90 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: Plaintiff's motion for a
protective order 80 is granted. Putting aside whether the parties reached an
agreement about discovery, an issue the court does not resolve, no additional
discovery was intended to be authorized when the court struck the fact
discovery deadline on 4/21/17. The court has emphasized that all fact discovery
must have been noticed in time for completion by 4/26/17, and that defendant
in particular was not authorized to seek any extensions. See 75 at 3. The notice
of deposition of witness Eichenberg is quashed. As for supplemental document
productions, the court simply notes that the parties have an obligation to
supplement their productions if they are in possession of documents responsive
to previously issued document requests, but no additional fact discovery may
be propounded at this time. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 05/12/2017)
05/24/2017 91 STATUS Report Regarding Revised Case Schedule by Deckers Outdoor
Corporation (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 05/24/2017)
05/26/2017 92 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: The court adopts the
parties' proposed discovery schedule as set out in the status report 91 .
Identification of Experts that the Parties Might Use at Trial, Excluding Experts
Intended Solely to Contradict or Rebut must be made by 6/6/17. Expert Reports
from Party Bearing Burden of Proof on an Issue are due 7/18/17. Rebuttal
Expert Reports are due 9/18/17. Close of Expert Discovery on 10/18/17.
Dispositive Motions are due 1/18/18. No appearance on 5/30/17 is necessary.
Status hearing is reset to 9/27/17 at 9:30 a.m. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered:
05/26/2017)
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 74 Filed: 08/18/2020
07/18/2017 93 MOTION by Defendant Australian Leather Pty Ltd for extension of time -
Agreed motion for one expert report (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 07/18/2017)
07/18/2017 94 NOTICE of Motion by Mark R Bagley for presentment of extension of time 93
before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 8/1/2017 at 09:45 AM. (Bagley, Mark)
(Entered: 07/18/2017)
07/27/2017 95 MOTION by Defendant Australian Leather Pty Ltd to substitute expert witness
- Agreed motion (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Bagley, Mark) (Entered:
07/27/2017)
07/27/2017 96 NOTICE of Motion by Mark R Bagley for presentment of motion for
miscellaneous relief 95 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 8/1/2017 at 09:45
AM. (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 07/27/2017)
07/28/2017 97 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah:The motion to substitute
expert witness 95 is granted. The expert reports of Linda Poetsch for Australian
Leather and Caroline de Baere for Deckers are due on August 18, 2017. Any
rebuttal reports (to those two experts only) are due on September 27, 2017. The
motion for extension of time 93 is terminated as moot. No appearance on
8/1/17 is necessary. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 07/28/2017)
08/16/2017 98 MOTION by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporationin limine to Exclude
Inadmissible Opinion Testimony on Damages and to Allow Rebuttal Expert
Testimony on Damages (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
08/16/2017 99 MEMORANDUM by Deckers Outdoor Corporation in support of motion in
limine 98 (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
08/16/2017 100 DECLARATION of Paul G. Juettner regarding memorandum in support of
motion 99 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4
Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9
Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
08/16/2017 101 DECLARATION of Scott D. Phillips regarding memorandum in support of
motion 99 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
08/16/2017 102 NOTICE of Motion by Paul G. Juettner for presentment of motion in limine 98
before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 8/22/2017 at 09:45 AM. (Juettner, Paul)
(Entered: 08/16/2017)
08/16/2017 103 MOTION by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation for leave to file Under
Seal (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
08/16/2017 104 NOTICE of Motion by Paul G. Juettner for presentment of motion for leave to
file 103 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 8/22/2017 at 09:45 AM.
(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 08/16/2017)
08/18/2017 105 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: The motion for leave to
file under seal 103 is granted. Defendant's response to plaintiff's Motion to
Exclude Inadmissible Opinion Testimony on Damages and to Allow Rebuttal
Expert Testimony on Damages 98 is due 9/1/17. No reply permitted. No
appearance on 8/22/17 is necessary. Status hearing remains set for 9/27/17 at
9:30 a.m. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 08/18/2017)
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 75 Filed: 08/18/2020
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 76 Filed: 08/18/2020
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 77 Filed: 08/18/2020
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 78 Filed: 08/18/2020
01/18/2018 139 RULE 56.1(a)(3) Statement by Deckers Outdoor Corporation regarding motion
for partial summary judgment 137 (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
01/18/2018 140 DECLARATION of Kent Raygor regarding Rule 56 statement 139
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5
Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit
10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15
Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19,
# 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit
24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29
Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32)(Juettner, Paul)
(Entered: 01/18/2018)
01/18/2018 141 DECLARATION of Brian Smith regarding Rule 56 statement 139
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5
Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10
Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
01/18/2018 142 DECLARATION of Leah Larson regarding Rule 56 statement 139
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5
Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
01/18/2018 143 DECLARATION of John Kalinich regarding Rule 56 statement 139
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5
Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
01/18/2018 144 DECLARATION of Paul Juettner regarding Rule 56 statement 139
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5
Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit
10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15
Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered:
01/18/2018)
01/18/2018 145 DECLARATION of Justin R. Gaudio regarding Rule 56 statement 139
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Gaudio, Justin) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
01/18/2018 146 DECLARATION of RiKaleigh Johnson regarding memorandum in support of
motion 138 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Johnson, RiKaleigh) (Entered:
01/18/2018)
01/18/2018 147 MOTION by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation for leave to file Under
Seal (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
01/18/2018 148 NOTICE by Deckers Outdoor Corporation re MOTION by Plaintiff Deckers
Outdoor Corporation for partial summary judgment 137 , MOTION by Plaintiff
Deckers Outdoor Corporationto Exclude Expert Opinion Testimony Proffered
by Defendant From Australian Law School Professor Mark Davison 133
(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 01/18/2018)
01/19/2018 149 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: The motion for leave to
file documents under seal 147 is granted. Plaintiff is directed to file unredacted
versions as sealed documents on the court's docket. Notices mailed. (psm, )
(Entered: 01/19/2018)
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 79 Filed: 08/18/2020
01/19/2018 150 MOTION by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd for leave to file
documents under seal (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
01/19/2018 151 NOTICE of Motion by Mark R Bagley for presentment of motion for leave to
file 150 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 1/25/2018 at 09:45 AM. (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
01/19/2018 152 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation Unredacted
Memorandum in Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 138
(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
01/19/2018 153 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation Plaintiff's
Unredacted Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts in Support of Its
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 139 (Juettner, Paul) (Entered:
01/19/2018)
01/19/2018 154 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation Unredacted
Declaration of Kent R. Raygor Re Fact and Expert Witness Deposition
Testimony and Exhibits Submitted in Support of Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant
Deckers Outdoor Corporations Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 140
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5
Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit
10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13 Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15
Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit 17, # 18 Exhibit 18, # 19 Exhibit 19,
# 20 Exhibit 20, # 21 Exhibit 21, # 22 Exhibit 22, # 23 Exhibit 23, # 24 Exhibit
24, # 25 Exhibit 25, # 26 Exhibit 26, # 27 Exhibit 27, # 28 Exhibit 28, # 29
Exhibit 29, # 30 Exhibit 30, # 31 Exhibit 31, # 32 Exhibit 32)(Juettner, Paul)
(Entered: 01/19/2018)
01/19/2018 155 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation Unredacted
Declaration of Brian Smith 141 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3
Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8
Exhibit H, # 9 Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K)(Juettner, Paul)
(Entered: 01/19/2018)
01/19/2018 156 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation Unredacted
Declaration of John Kalinich 143 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, #
3 Exhibit C, # 4 Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G)(Juettner,
Paul) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
01/19/2018 157 SEALED DOCUMENT by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation Unredacted
Declaration of Paul Juettner 144 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, #
3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8
Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9, # 10 Exhibit 10, # 11 Exhibit 11, # 12 Exhibit 12, # 13
Exhibit 13, # 14 Exhibit 14, # 15 Exhibit 15, # 16 Exhibit 16, # 17 Exhibit
17)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 01/19/2018)
01/22/2018 158 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: The motion for leave to
file under seal 150 is granted. No appearance on the motion is necessary.
Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 01/22/2018)
01/23/2018 159 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted memorandum in support of motion for partial summary judgment
(Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 80 Filed: 08/18/2020
01/23/2018 160 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted statement of material facts in support of motion for partial
summary judgment (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
01/23/2018 161 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit K to January 18 Declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
01/23/2018 162 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit Q to January 18 Declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
01/23/2018 163 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit V to January 18 Declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
01/23/2018 164 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit W to January 18 Declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
01/23/2018 165 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit X to January 18 Declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
01/23/2018 166 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit Y to January 18 Declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
01/23/2018 167 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit EE to January 18 Declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
01/23/2018 168 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit FF to January 18 Declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 01/23/2018)
02/15/2018 169 MOTION by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor CorporationJoint Motion to Exceed the
Brief Page and Fact Limits on Parties Memoranda in Response to Motions for
Partial Summary Judgment (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
02/15/2018 170 NOTICE of Motion by Paul G. Juettner for presentment of motion for
miscellaneous relief 169 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 2/21/2018 at
09:45 AM. (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 02/15/2018)
02/20/2018 171 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: The motion to exceed
the brief page and fact limits 169 is granted. Deckers is allowed to file a
responsive memorandum of up to 30 pages. Australian Leather is allowed to
file a responsive memorandum of up to 40 pages and is permitted to file a Rule
56.1 statement with up to 60 facts. No appearance on the motion is necessary.
Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 02/20/2018)
02/22/2018 172 MEMORANDUM by Deckers Outdoor Corporation in Opposition to motion
for partial summary judgment 130 (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 81 Filed: 08/18/2020
02/22/2018 173 RULE 56.1(b)(3) Statement by Deckers Outdoor Corporation regarding motion
for partial summary judgment 130 (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 174 DECLARATION of Kent Raygor regarding Rule 56 statement 173
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5
Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 175 DECLARATION of Brian Smith regarding Rule 56 statement 173
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 176 DECLARATION of Edward Maeder regarding Rule 56 statement 173
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 177 DECLARATION of John Kalinich regarding Rule 56 statement 173
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5
Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8, # 9 Exhibit 9)(Juettner,
Paul) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 178 DECLARATION of Caroline de Baere regarding Rule 56 statement 173
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 179 DECLARATION of Justin R. Gaudio regarding Rule 56 statement 173
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3)(Gaudio, Justin)
(Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 180 DECLARATION of RiKaleigh Johnson regarding memorandum in opposition
to motion 172 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4
Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7)(Johnson, RiKaleigh)
(Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 181 MEMORANDUM by Australian Leather Pty Ltd in Opposition to motion for
partial summary judgment 137 (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 182 RULE 56 Local Rule 56.1b Statement by Australian Leather Pty Ltd regarding
motion for partial summary judgment 137 (Bagley, Mark) (Entered:
02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 183 MEMORANDUM by Australian Leather Pty Ltd in Opposition to motion for
miscellaneous relief 133 - motion to exclude Davison testimony (Bagley, Mark)
(Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/22/2018 184 DECLARATION of Mark R. Bagley regarding memorandum in opposition to
motion 181 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit C, # 4
Exhibit D, # 5 Exhibit E, # 6 Exhibit F, # 7 Exhibit G, # 8 Exhibit H, # 9
Exhibit I, # 10 Exhibit J, # 11 Exhibit K, # 12 Exhibit L, # 13 Exhibit M, # 14
Exhibit N, # 15 Exhibit O, # 16 Exhibit P, # 17 Exhibit Q, # 18 Exhibit R, # 19
Exhibit S, # 20 Exhibit T, # 21 Exhibit U, # 22 Exhibit V, # 23 Exhibit W, # 24
Exhibit X, # 25 Exhibit Y, # 26 Exhibit Z, # 27 Exhibit AA, # 28 Exhibit BB, #
29 Exhibit CC, # 30 Exhibit DD, # 31 Exhibit EE, # 32 Exhibit FF, # 33
Exhibit GG)(Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 02/22/2018)
02/23/2018 185 MOTION by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd for leave to file
documents under seal (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 02/23/2018)
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02/23/2018 186 NOTICE of Motion by Mark R Bagley for presentment of motion for leave to
file 185 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 3/6/2018 at 09:45 AM. (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 02/23/2018)
03/02/2018 187 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: The motion for leave to
file documents under seal 185 is granted. No appearance on the motion is
necessary. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 03/02/2018)
03/05/2018 188 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted memorandum in opposition to Deckers' motion for partial
summary judgment (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
03/05/2018 189 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted statement of material facts in opposition to Deckers' motion for
partial summary judgment (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
03/05/2018 190 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit F to February 22 declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
03/05/2018 191 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit Z to February 22 declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
03/05/2018 192 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit AA to February 22 declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
03/05/2018 193 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit DD to February 22 declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
03/05/2018 194 SEALED DOCUMENT by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd -
Unredacted Exhibit EE to February 22 declaration of Mark Bagley (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 03/05/2018)
03/09/2018 195 MOTION by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor CorporationAgreed Motion to Exceed
the Brief Page Limit on Parties Memoranda in Reply to Memoranda in
Opposition to Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (Juettner, Paul) (Entered:
03/09/2018)
03/09/2018 196 NOTICE of Motion by Paul G. Juettner for presentment of motion for
miscellaneous relief 195 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 3/14/2018 at
09:45 AM. (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 03/09/2018)
03/12/2018 197 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: The motion for leave to
file a brief in excess of 15 pages 195 is granted. No appearance on the motion
is necessary. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 03/12/2018)
03/15/2018 198 REPLY by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation to memorandum in
opposition to motion 183 to Exclude Opinion Testimony Proffered by
Defendant from Australian Law School Professor Mark Davison (Juettner,
Paul) (Entered: 03/15/2018)
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 83 Filed: 08/18/2020
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 84 Filed: 08/18/2020
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 85 Filed: 08/18/2020
10/15/2018 222 MOTION by Counter Claimant Australian Leather Pty Ltd for certificate of
appealability and for stay pending that appeal (Bagley, Mark) (Entered:
10/15/2018)
10/15/2018 223 MEMORANDUM by Australian Leather Pty Ltd in support of motion for
certificate of appealability 222 (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 10/15/2018)
10/24/2018 224 Joint STATEMENT by Deckers Outdoor Corporation Identifying Docket
Entries for Unsealing and Stating Basis for Continued Secrecy (Attachments: #
1 Exhibit A)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 10/24/2018)
10/29/2018 225 MEMORANDUM by Deckers Outdoor Corporation in Opposition to motion
for certificate of appealability 222 (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 10/29/2018)
11/05/2018 226 REPLY by Australian Leather Pty Ltd to memorandum in opposition to motion
225 (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 11/05/2018)
12/12/2018 228 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: Status hearing held. For
the reasons stated in open court, defendant's motion for certificate of
appealability 222 is denied. The Clerk shall unseal the following sealed filings
[154-11], [154-16], 161 , and 214 . Docket entry 189 shall remain sealed
because [224-1] is a publicly available replacement. The parties are directed to
meet and confer on plaintiff's forthcoming motion under FRCP 42(b). Notices
mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 12/17/2018)
12/13/2018 227 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 12/12/18 before the Honorable
Manish S. Shah. Order Number: 33160. Court Reporter Contact Information:
Colleen Conway, 312.435.5594 or colleen_conway@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 86 Filed: 08/18/2020
01/16/2019 232 AMENDED memorandum in support of motion 231 (corrections made to lines
13,14, and 16 on page 2) (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 01/16/2019)
01/29/2019 233 MEMORANDUM by Australian Leather Pty Ltd in Opposition to motion to
bifurcate, 230 (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 01/29/2019)
02/05/2019 234 REPLY by Deckers Outdoor Corporation to memorandum in opposition to
motion 233 (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 02/05/2019)
03/13/2019 235 STIPULATION Regarding Defendant/Counter-Claimant Australian Leather's
Fourth Counterclaim (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 03/13/2019)
03/15/2019 236 ORDER. Signed by the Honorable Manish S. Shah on 3/15/2019: Deckers's
motion to bifurcate the equitable issues of unclean hands, laches, and estoppel,
230 , is granted. [For further detail see attached order.] Notices mailed. (psm, )
(Entered: 03/15/2019)
03/19/2019 237 STIPULATION Regarding Deckers' Design Patents and Cardy Mark (Juettner,
Paul) (Entered: 03/19/2019)
04/08/2019 238 STIPULATION regarding certain of Plaintiff's unfair competition, state law,
and common law claims (Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 04/08/2019)
04/08/2019 239 MOTION by Counter Defendant Deckers Outdoor Corporation, Plaintiff
Deckers Outdoor CorporationUnopposed Motion to Exceed the Brief Page
Limit on its Motions in Limine (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 04/08/2019)
04/08/2019 240 NOTICE of Motion by Paul G. Juettner for presentment of motion for
miscellaneous relief 239 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 4/11/2019 at
09:45 AM. (Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 04/08/2019)
04/10/2019 241 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: The motion for leave to
exceed page limit 239 is granted. Plaintiff may use 30 pages in its motions in
limine brief. No appearance on the motion is necessary. Notices mailed. (psm, )
(Entered: 04/10/2019)
04/15/2019 242 STIPULATION Regarding Plaintiff's UGG Trademark (Juettner, Paul)
(Entered: 04/15/2019)
04/16/2019 243 MOTION by Plaintiff Deckers Outdoor Corporation, Counter Defendant
Deckers Outdoor Corporationin limine and Supporting Memoranda
(Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3 Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5
Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit 8)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered:
04/16/2019)
04/16/2019 244 MOTION by Defendants Australian Leather Pty Ltd, Adnan Oygurin limine
(Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
04/16/2019 245 PROPOSED Pretrial Order (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit 1, # 2 Exhibit 2, # 3
Exhibit 3, # 4 Exhibit 4, # 5 Exhibit 5, # 6 Exhibit 6, # 7 Exhibit 7, # 8 Exhibit
8)(Juettner, Paul) (Entered: 04/16/2019)
04/23/2019 246 RESPONSE by Deckers Outdoor Corporationin Opposition to MOTION by
Defendants Australian Leather Pty Ltd, Adnan Oygurin limine 244 (Juettner,
Paul) (Entered: 04/23/2019)
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04/23/2019 247 MEMORANDUM by Australian Leather Pty Ltd, Adnan Oygur in Opposition
to motion in limine, 243 - Motions Nos. 1-4 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A, # 2
Exhibit B)(Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 04/23/2019)
04/23/2019 248 MEMORANDUM by Australian Leather Pty Ltd, Adnan Oygur in Opposition
to motion in limine, 243 - Motions Nos. 5-10 (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit
A)(Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 04/23/2019)
04/23/2019 249 MOTION by Defendant Australian Leather Pty Ltd for leave to file under seal
(Bagley, Mark) (Entered: 04/23/2019)
04/23/2019 250 NOTICE of Motion by Mark R Bagley for presentment of motion for leave to
file 249 before Honorable Manish S. Shah on 4/30/2019 at 01:30 PM. (Bagley,
Mark) (Entered: 04/23/2019)
04/30/2019 252 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: Final pretrial conference
held. For the reasons stated on the record, plaintiff's motions in limine 243 are
granted in part, denied in part, as follows: No. 9 is granted, Nos. 4 and 8 are
denied, and Nos. 1-3, 5-7, and 10 are granted in part, denied in part.
Defendants' motion in limine 244 is denied. The court ruled on the
admissibility of certain exhibits and will post its proposed jury instructions on
the docket. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
05/01/2019 251 Entered in error. (Entered: 05/01/2019)
05/01/2019 253 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: the minute order dated
4/30/19 is amended to read that plaintiff's motions in limine 243 are granted in
part, denied in part, as follows: No. 9 is granted, Nos. 4 and 8 are denied, and
Nos. 1-3, 5-7, and 10 are granted in part, denied in part. This is just a correction
of a clerical error. The rest of the order remains in place. Notices mailed. (psm,
) (Entered: 05/01/2019)
05/02/2019 254 MINUTE entry before the Honorable Manish S. Shah: By 5pm on 5/3/19, the
parties shall file brief statements addressing whether the question of willfulness
for the patent infringement claims should be eliminated from the jury's
consideration. See AIA America, Inc. v. Avid Radiopharmaceuticals, 866 F.3d
1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (there is no 7th Amendment right to a jury trial on facts
forming the basis for an attorney's fee award under section 285 of the Patent
Act). The court generally does not use advisory juries for equitable issues, and
is considering eliminating the patent issues from the jury trial to simplify
matters for the jurors. Notices mailed. (psm, ) (Entered: 05/02/2019)
05/02/2019 255 COURT'S PROPOSED Jury Instructions and Verdict Form. (psm, ) (Entered:
05/02/2019)
05/03/2019 256 TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held on 04/30/19 before the Honorable
Manish S. Shah. Final Pretrial Conference. Order Number: 34622. Court
Reporter Contact Information: Colleen Conway, 312.435.5594 or
colleen_conway@ilnd.uscourts.gov.
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process, see the Court's web site at www.ilnd.uscourts.gov under Quick Links
select Policy Regarding the Availability of Transcripts of Court Proceedings.
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Case: 20-2166 Document: 1-2 Page: 93 Filed: 08/18/2020
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08/13/2020 374 Entered in Error (smm, ) Modified on 8/14/2020 (pj, ). (Entered: 08/13/2020)
08/13/2020 375 Entered in Error (smm, ) Modified on 8/14/2020 (pj, ). (Entered: 08/13/2020)
08/14/2020 376 NOTICE of Correction regarding entries 375 and 374 . (pj, ) (Entered:
08/14/2020)
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