1 Spouses Morata v.
Spouses Go binding upon them with the force and effect of a
(Damay CFI)
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in
sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon has the
authority to settle amicably all types of disputes
involving parties who actually reside in the same
city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no
distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes
of civil disputes that should be compromised at the
barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation
imposed upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section
2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal
cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority,
Section 2 of said law employed the universal and
comprehensive term "all", to which usage We
should neither add nor subtract in consonance with
the rudimentary precept in statutory construction
that "where the law does not distinguish, We
should not distinguish.  falling within the authority of the Lupon may be
It must be borne in mind that the conciliation
process at the barangay level is likewise designed
to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court
in order to decongest its clogged dockets and, in
the process, enhance the quality of justice
dispensed by it.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict
its coverage only to cases cognizable by the
inferior courts, then it would not have provided in
Section 3 thereof the following rule on Venue, to
wit:
Section 3. Venue. ... However, all
disputes which involve real
property or any interest therein
shall be brought in the Barangay
where the real property or and
part thereof is situated.
for it should be noted that, traditionally and
historically, jurisdiction over cases involving real
property or any interest therein, except forcible
entry and detainer cases, has always been vested
in the courts of first instance [now regional trial
court].
2 Pang-et v. Manacnes-Dao-As
(Voluntary Submission; Personal
Confrontation)
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object
of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the
amicable settlement of disputes through
conciliation proceedings voluntarily and freely
entered into by the parties.
The key in achieving the objectives of an
effective amicable settlement under
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free
and voluntary agreement of the parties to submit
the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or
the Pangkat, whose award or decision shall be
final judgment of a court. [17] Absent this voluntary
submission by the parties to submit their dispute to
arbitration under
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot
be a binding settlement arrived at effectively
resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the
MCTC further remanded the case to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa and insisted that the arbitration
proceedings continue, despite the clear showing
that the spouses Manacnes refused to submit the
controversy for arbitration.
What is compulsory under
the Katarungang Pambarangay Law is that there
be a confrontation between the parties before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and that a
certification be issued that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached, as attested to by
the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, before a case
instituted in court or any other government office
for adjudication. [18] In other words, the only
necessary pre-condition before any case falling
within the authority of the Lupon or
the Pangkat may be filed before a court is that
there has been personal confrontation between the
parties but despite earnest efforts to conciliate,
there was a failure to amicably settle the dispute
3 Pascual v. Pascual
(Actual residents dapat)
SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement;
Exception Thereto. The lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the
parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes
In the 1982 case of Tavora v. Veloso,[11] this Court
held that where the parties are not actual
residents in the same city or municipality or
adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for
them to submit their dispute to the lupon as
provided for in Section 6 vis a vis  Sections 2 and 3
of P.D. 1508 (Katarungang Pambarangay Law).
[B]y express statutory inclusion
and exclusion, the Lupon shall
have no jurisdiction over disputes
where the parties are
not actual residentsof the same
city or municipality, except where
the barangays in which they
actually reside adjoin each other.
(Underscoring supplied)
4 Magno v. Velasco-Jacoba
(Unassisted by counsel; ok lang na sa
punong barangay siya di naman
chairman nung lupon))
The above-quoted provision clearly
requires the personal appearance of the
parties in katarungan
pambarangayconciliation proceedings,
unassisted by counsel or representative.  sued without joining the party for whose
The rationale behind the personal
appearance requirement is to enable
the lupon  to secure first hand and direct
information about the facts and issues,
[8]
 the exception being in cases where
minors or incompetents are parties.
That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay
captain is really of little moment since the latter
chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.[10] 
5 Zamora v. Heirs of Izquierdo
We cannot sustain petitioners' contention that the
Lupon conciliation alone, without the proceeding
before the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo,
contravenes the law on Katarungang
Pambarangay. Section 412(a) of R.A. No. 7160,
quoted earlier, clearly provides that, as a
precondition to filing a complaint in court, the
parties shall go through the conciliation process
either before the Lupon Chairman (as what
happened in the present case), or the Pangkat.
Moreover, in Diu vs. Court of Appeals,21 we held
that "notwithstanding the mandate in Section
410(b) of R.A. No. 7160 that the Barangay
Chairman shall constitute a Pangkat if he fails in
his mediation efforts," the same "Section 410(b)
should be construed together with Section 412(a)
of the same law (quoted earlier), as well as the
circumstances obtaining in and peculiar to the
case." Here, while the Pangkat was not
constituted, however, the parties met nine (9) times
at the Office of the Barangay Chairman for
conciliation wherein not only the issue of water
installation was discussed but also petitioners'
violation of the lease contract. It is thus manifest
that there was substantial compliance with the law
which does not require strict adherence thereto.22
6 Vda De Borromeo v. Pogoy
(Dapat individual)
Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508,
referral of a dispute to the Barangay Lupon
is required only where the parties thereto
are "individuals." An "individual" means "a
single human being as contrasted with a
social group or institution." 5 Obviously,
the law applies only to cases involving
natural persons, and not where any of the
parties is a juridical person such as a
corporation, partnership, corporation sole,
testate or intestate, estate, etc.
In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo
Reyes is a mere nominal party who is
suing in behalf of the Intestate Estate of
Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section
3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the
administrator of an estate to sue or be
benefit the action is presented or
defended, it is indisputable that the real
party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915
is the intestate estate under
administration. Since the said estate is a
juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator
may file the complaint directly in court,
without the same being coursed to the
Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
7 Gegare v. CA
True it is that the Board is a government
instrumentality but the petitioner and private
respondent who are also contending parties in the
case are residents of the same barangay so
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 should
apply to them as it provides---
Section 6. Conciliation, pre-
condition to filing of complaint. No
complaint, petition, action or
proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of
the Lupon as provided in Section
2 hereof shall be filed or instituted
in court or any other government
office for adjudication unless
there has been a cTronfrontation
of the parties before
the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as
certified by the Lupon Secretary
or the Pangkat Secretary attested
by the Lupon or
Pangkat Chairman, or unless the
settlement has been repudiated.
The purpose of this confrontation is to enable the
parties to settle their differences amicably. If the
other only contending party is the government or
its instrumentality or subdivision the case falls
within the exception but when it is only one of the
contending parties, a confrontation should still be
undertaken among the other parties.
8 Tribiana v. Tribiana
The barangay conciliation requirement in
Section 412 of the LGC does not apply
to habeas corpus proceedings where a
person is deprived of personal liberty. In
such a case, Section 412 expressly
authorizes the parties to go directly to
court without need of any conciliation
proceedings
9 Berba v. Pablo *
The amicable settlement which is not repudiated
within the period therefor may be enforced by
execution by the Lupon through the Punong
Barangay within a time line of six months, and if
the settlement is not so enforced by
the Lupon after the lapse of said period, it may be
enforced only by an action in the proper city or
municipal court as provided for in Section 417 of
the LGC of 1991, as amended, which reads:
SEC. 417. Execution.  – The amicable settlement
or arbitration award may be enforced by execution
by the Lupon within six (6) months from the date of
the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the
settlement may be enforced by action in the proper
city or municipal court.  (Italics supplied).
Section 417 of the Local Government Code
provides a mechanism for the enforcement of a
settlement of the parties before the Lupon. It
provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement of
an amicable settlement executed by the parties
before the Lupon,  namely, (a) by execution of
the Punong Barangay  which is quasi-judicial and
summary in nature on mere motion of the
party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by an action
in regular form, which remedy is judicial. Under the
first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the
LGC and the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and
Regulations. The Punong Barangay  is called upon
during the hearing to determine solely the fact of
non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and
to give the defaulting party another chance at
voluntarily complying with his obligation under the
settlement. Under the second remedy, the
proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court,
as amended. The cause of action is the amicable
settlement itself, which, by operation of law, has
the force and effect of a final judgment.
Section 417 of the LGC grants a period of six
months to enforce the amicable settlement by
the Lupon through the Punong Barangay  before
such party may resort to filing an action with the
MTC to enforce the settlement. The raison d’etre  of
the law is to afford the parties during the six-month
time line, a simple, speedy and less expensive
enforcement of their settlement before the Lupon.31
In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo
failed to comply with her obligation of repaying the
back rentals of ₱81,818.00 and the current rentals
for the house. Hence, the petitioner had the right to
enforce the Agreement against her and move for
her eviction from the premises. However, instead
of filing a motion before the Lupon for the
enforcement of the agreement, or (after six
months), an action in the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC) for the enforcement of the settlement, the
petitioner filed an action against respondent
Josephine Pablo for unlawful detainer and the
collection of unpaid rentals, inclusive of those
already due before the June 5, 1999 Agreement
was executed. The action of the petitioner against
respondent Pablo was barred by the Agreement of
June 5, 1999.
10 Miguel v. Montanez*
It is true that an amicable settlement reached at
the barangay conciliation proceedings, like the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding
between the contracting parties and, upon its
perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is
not contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public order and public policy.16 This is in accord
with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil
Code, viz:
A compromise has upon the parties the effect and
authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
It must be emphasized, however, that
enforcement by execution of the amicable
settlement, either under the first or the
second remedy, is only applicable if the
contracting parties have not repudiated
such settlement within ten (10) days from
the date thereof in accordance with
Section 416 of the Local Government
Code. If the amicable settlement is
repudiated by one party, either expressly
or impliedly, the other party has two
options, namely, to enforce the
compromise in accordance with the Local
Government Code or Rules of Court as the
case may be, or to consider it rescinded
and insist upon his original demand.
As so well stated in the case of Chavez v.
Court of Appeals,23 a party's non-
compliance with the amicable settlement
paved the way for the application of Article
2041 under which the other party may
either enforce the compromise, following
the procedure laid out in the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, or
consider it as rescinded and insist upon
his original demand.
74 Singapore Airlines v. CA*
GR No. 107356 March 31, 1995
The petitioner correctly pointed out that the case
of Firestone  squarely applies to the case at bench.
In said case, the Court expounded on the nature of
a third-party complaint and the effect of a judgment
in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant and in
favor of such defendant as third-party plaintiff
against, ultimately, the third-party defendant.
Speaking through then Justice and later Chief
Justice Claudio Teehankee, the Court stated:
The third-party complaint is,
therefore, a procedural device
whereby a "third party" who is
neither a party nor privy to the act
or deed complained of by the
plaintiff, may be brought into the
case with leave of court, by the
defendant, who acts as third-party
plaintiff to enforce against such
third-party defendant a right for
contribution, indemnity,
 subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of the plaintiff's claim. The
third-party complaint is actually
independent of and separate and
distinct from the plaintiff's
complaint. . . . When leave to file
the third-party complaint is
properly granted, the Court
renders in effect two judgments in
the same case, one on the
plaintiff's complaint and the other
on the third-party complaint.
When he finds favorably on both
complaints, as in this case, he
renders judgment on the principal
complaint in favor of plaintiff
against defendant and renders
another judgment on the third-
party complaint in favor of
defendant as third-party plaintiff,
ordering the third-party defendant
to reimburse the defendant
whatever amount said defendant
is ordered to pay plaintiff in the
case. Failure of any of said
parties in such a case to appeal
the judgment as against him
makes such judgment final and
executory. By the same token, an
appeal by one party from such
judgment does not inure to the
benefit of the other party who has
not appealed nor can it be
deemed to be an appeal of such
other party from the judgment
against him.
There is no question that a third-party defendant is
allowed to set up in his answer the defenses which
the third-party plaintiff (original defendant) has or
may have to the plaintiff's claim. There are,
however, special circumstances present in this
case which preclude third-party defendant PAL
from benefiting from the said principle.
Here, the defendant and third-party defendant had
no common defense against the plaintiffs'
complaint, and they were even blaming each other
for the fiasco.
75 Alday v. FGU Insurance*
GR No. 138822 January 23, 2001
A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being
cognizable by the regular courts of justice, arises
out of or is connected with the transaction or
occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party's claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.19
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals,20 this Court
capsulized the criteria or tests that may be used in
determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory
or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by
the claim and counterclaim largely the
same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent
suit on defendant's claim absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same
evidence support or refute plaintiff's claim
as well s defendant's counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the
claim and the counterclaim?
Another test, applied in the more recent case
of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals,21 is the
"compelling test of compulsoriness" which requires
"a logical relationship between the claim and
counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would
entail a substantial duplication of effort and time by
the parties and the court."
76 Lafarge Cement v. Continental Cement*
GR No. 155173 November 23, 2004
Unlike permissive counterclaims, compulsory
counterclaims should be set up in the same action;
otherwise, they would be barred forever.
"Compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages, allegedly suffered by the
creditor in consequence of the debtor's
action, are also compulsory counterclaim
barred by the dismissal of the debtor's
action. They cannot be claimed in a
subsequent action by the creditor against
the debtor."
"Aside from the fact that petitioners'
counterclaim for damages cannot be the
subject of an independent action, it is the
same evidence that sustains petitioners'
counterclaim that will refute private
respondent's own claim for damages. This
is an additional factor that characterizes
petitioners' counterclaim as compulsory."18
Moreover, using the "compelling test of
compulsoriness," we find that, clearly, the recovery
of petitioners' counterclaims is contingent upon the
case filed by respondents; thus, conducting
separate trials thereon will result in a substantial
duplication of the time and effort of the court and
the parties.
Since the counterclaim for damages is compulsory,
it must be set up in the same action; otherwise, it
would be barred forever. If it is filed concurrently
with the main action but in a different proceeding, it
would be abated on the ground of litis pendentia; if
filed subsequently, it would meet the same fate on
the ground of res judicata.19
77 Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla*
GR No. 129718 August 17, 1998
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94
requiring that a complaint and other initiatory
pleadings, such as a counterclaim, cross-claim,
third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, be accompanied
with a certificate of non-forum shopping.
- yung sa counterclaim referring only to a
permissive counterclaim. So hindi na
kailangan kapag compulsory counterclaim
It should not be too difficult, the foregoing rationale
of the circular aptly taken, to sustain the view that
the circular in question has not, in fact, been
contemplated to include a kind of claim which, by
its very nature as being auxiliary to the
proceedings in the suit and as deriving its
substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom,
can only be appropriately pleaded in the answer
and not remain outstanding for independent
resolution except by the court where the main case
pends.
78 Novelty v. CA
GR No. 146125 September 17, 2003
Based on the second assailed Resolution, the
alleged lack of authority of petitioners personnel
officer to sign the Verification and Certificate of
Non-Forum Shopping became the CAs sole basis
for dismissing the certiorari action.
The policy of our judicial system is to encourage
full adjudication of the merits of an appeal. In the
exercise of its equity jurisdiction, this Court may
reverse the dismissal of appeals that are grounded
merely on technicalities.
The foregoing judicial policy acquires greater
significance where there has been subsequent
compliance with the requirements of the rules, as
in this case in which petitioner has submitted the
Special Power of Attorney together with its Motion
for Reconsideration.
There is ample jurisprudence holding that the
subsequent and substantial compliance of an
appellant may call for the relaxation of the rules of
procedure.
The authority of the general manager to sue on
behalf of the corporation and to sign the requisite
verification and certification of non-forum shopping
may be delegated to any other officer of the
company through a board resolution or a special
power of attorney.
This was a logical and practical decision of
management, considering that the person who was
in the best position to ascertain the truthfulness
and the correctness of the allegations in the
Petition was its personnel officer, who knew the
status of any personnel and any labor-related suit
of the company.
Verification is intended to assure that the
allegations in the pleading have been prepared in
good faith or are true and correct, not mere
speculations.
79 Wee v. Galvez
GR No. 147394 August 11, 2004
We find for the respondent. Noteworthy,
respondent in the instant case is already a resident
of the United States, and not of the Philippines.
Hence, it was proper for her to appoint her
daughter, Grace Galvez, to act as her attorney-in-
fact in the Philippines. The Special Power of
Attorney granted by the respondent to her
attorney-in-fact, Grace Galvez, categorically and
clearly authorizes the latter to do the following:
4. To sign all papers, documents and
pleadings necessary for the
accomplishment of the above purposes.19
From the foregoing, it is indisputable that Grace
Galvez, as attorney-in-fact of the respondent, was
duly authorized and empowered not just to initiate
complaints, whether criminal or civil, to enforce and
protect the respondent's rights, claims, and
interests in this jurisdiction, but is specifically
authorized to sign all "papers, documents, and
pleadings" necessarily connected with the filing of
a complaint. Pursuant to Administrative Circular
No. 04-94,20which extended the requirement of a
certification on non-forum shopping to all initiatory
pleadings filed in all courts and quasi-judicial
agencies,21 as well as Rule 7, Section 5 of the 1997
Rules of Civil procedure, the aforementioned
papers and documents, which Grace Galvez was
authorized and empowered to sign, must
necessarily include the certification on non-forum
shopping. To conclude otherwise would render
nugatory the Special Power of Attorney and also
render respondent's constitution of an attorney-in-
fact inutile.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, requires
that the certification should be signed by the
"petitioner or principal party" himself. The rationale
behind this is "because only the petitioner himself
has actual knowledge of whether or not he has
initiated similar actions or proceedings in different
courts or agencies."29 However, the rationale does
not apply where, as in this case, it is the attorney-
in-fact who instituted the action.
80 Heirs of Francisco Retuya v. CA
GR No. 163039 April 6, 2011
As correctly observed by the CA, while we have in
a number of cases32 applied the substantial
compliance rule on the filing of the certification of
non-forum shopping, specially when majority of the
principal parties had signed the same and who
shared a common interest, We agree with the CA
that such leniency finds no applicability in this case
because of petitioners’ dishonesty committed
against the appellate court. – may pirma kasi nung
patay na. patay na siya pero pumirma siya.
81 Jabalde v. PNB
GR No. L-18401 April 27, 1963
The first legal issue is whether the bank's failure to
deny under oath the entries in the passbook as
"copied" in the complaint constitutes an admission
of the genuineness and due execution of the
document. Ordinarily, such failure is an admission.
However, this rule cannot apply in the present case
because the plaintiff introduced evidence
purporting to support his allegations of deposit on
the dates he wanted the court to believe, and
offered no objection during the trial to the
testimonies of defendant's witnesses and
documentary evidence showing different dates of
deposit.1 By these acts, the plaintiff waived the
defendant's technical admission through failure to
deny under oath the genuineness and due
execution of the document
82 Central Surety v. C.N Hodges*
GR NO. L-28633 March 30, 1971
It is true that, pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 8 of the
Rules of Court: "When an action or defense is
founded upon a written instrument, copied in or
attached to the corresponding pleading as
provided in the preceding section the genuineness
and due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under
oath specifically denies them, and sets forth what
he claims to be the facts; but this provision does
not apply when the adverse party does not appear
to be a partly to the instrument or when compliance
with an order for an inspection of the original
instrument is refused." We have however, held
that: ". . . where a case has been tried in complete
disregard of the rule and the plaintiff having
pleaded a document by copy, presents oral
evidence to prove the due execution of the
document as well as the agent’s authority and no
objections are made to the defendant’s evidence in
refutation, the rule will be considered waived." In
the case at bar, the parties acted in complete
disregard of or wholly overlooked the rule above-
quoted. Hodges had neither objected to the
evidence introduced by petitioner herein in order to
prove that Mrs. Mesa had no authority to issue a
surety bond, much less one in excess of
P8,000.00, and took no exception to the admission
of said evidence. Hence, Hodges must be deemed
to have waived the benefits of said rule and
petitioner herein cannot be held liable in excess of
the sum of P8,000.00
83 Capitol Motors Corp v. Yabut
GR No. L-28140 March 19, 1970
On April 27, 1966, and within the reglementary
period, the defendant, through his counsel, filed an
answer which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"DEFENDANT through counsel
alleges:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Paragraph 1 of the complaint is admitted.
"2. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the complaint
are specifically denied for lack of knowledge
sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof.
…..
This Court said that the rule authorizing an answer
to the effect that the defendant has no knowledge
or information sufficient to form a belief as to the
truth of an averment and giving such answer the
effect of a denial, does not apply where the fact as
to which want of knowledge is asserted, is so
plainly and necessarily within the defendant’s
knowledge that his averment of ignorance must be
palpably untrue.
"With regard to the plea of lack of knowledge or
information set up in paragraph 3 of the answer,
this Court’s decision in Warner Barnes v. Reyes,
103 Phil. 662, 665, is authority for the proposition
that this form of denial must be availed of with
sincerity and good faith, not for the purpose of
confusing the other party, nor for purposes of
delay.
the defendant must aver positively or state how it is
that he is ignorant of the facts so alleged.
There are two other reasons why the present
appeal must fail. First. The present action is
founded upon a written instrument attached to the
complaint, but defendant-appellant failed to deny
under oath the genuineness and due execution of
the instrument; hence, the same are deemed
admitted. (Section 8, Rule 8 of the Revised Rules
of Court; Songo v. Sellner, 37 Phil. 254; Philippine
Commercial & Industrial Bank v. ELRO
Development Corporation, Et Al., G.R. No. L-
30830, August 22, 1969 [29 SCRA 38]; J. P. Juan
& Sons, Inc. v. Lianga Industries, Inc., supra.)
Second. Defendant-appellant did not oppose the
motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by
plaintiff-appellee; neither has he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of September 13,
1966, which deemed the case submitted for
decision on the pleadings, or of the decision
rendered on January 9, 1967. In Santiago v.
Basilan Lumber Company, G.R. No. L-15532,
October 31, 1963 (9 SCRA 349), this Court
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It appears that when the plaintiff moved to have
the case decided on the pleadings, the defendant
interposed no objection and has practically
assented thereto. The defendant therefore, is
deemed to have admitted the allegations of the
complaint, so that there was no necessity for the
plaintiff to submit evidence of his claim."
84 Flour Daniel v. E.B Villarosa
GR No. 159648 July 27, 2007
Principle:
We have ruled that a complaint should not be
dismissed for insufficiency of cause of action if it
appears clearly from the complaint and its
attachments that the plaintiff is entitled to
relief.16 The converse is also true. The complaint
may be dismissed for lack of cause of action if it is
obvious from the complaint and its annexes that
the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief.
The Case:
In this case, we note that annexed to the subject
complaint are the three contracts governing the
rights and obligations between petitioner and
respondent, namely the contract for civil structure
and architecture, the contract for plumbing and fire
protection, and the contract for millworks. Records
show that recurring in each of the said contracts is
the provision that payment by petitioner shall be
subject to its timely receipt of similar payments
from Fil-Estate. The said provision, found in each
of the aforesaid contracts, is quoted below:
2.0 PRICING BASIS
The Contract Price set forth herein is firm for the
duration of the Work and includes all Contractor’s
costs, expenses, overhead and profit for complete
performance of the Work.
xxxx
…Payment of the billings shall be subject to the
timely receipt of similar payments from the
client by Fluor Daniel. Any prolonged delay in
payment by Fluor Daniel is subject to a suspension
of activities by EBV within five (5) work days after
proper written notice is provided by contractor to
Fluor Daniel.17 (Emphasis supplied.)
On their face, the said attached contracts, which
define and delimit the rights and obligations of the
parties, clearly require a specific condition before
petitioner may be held liable for payment. The
complaint, however, failed to state that the said
condition had been fulfilled. Without the said
condition having taken place, petitioner cannot be
said to have breached its obligation to pay.
We thus hold that respondent’s complaint, taken
with the contracts annexed to it, failed to pass the
test of sufficiency of cause of action. Thus, the said
complaint should have been dismissed on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action.
85 Wrong Case (ito ata yung mali ni sir na
nailagay sa list)
86 Cavili v. Florendo
GR No. 73039 October 9, 1987
Loss of standing in court is the consequence of an
order of default. Thus, a party declared in default is
considered out of court and cannot appear therein,
adduce evidence, and be heard and for that reason
he is not entitled to notice. (Rule 18, Rules of
Court; Lim Toco v. Go Fay, 80 Phil. 166) However,
"loss of pending" must be understood to mean only
the forfeiture of one's rights as a party litigant,
contestant or legal adversary. A party in default
loses his right to present his defense, control the
proceedings, and examine or cross-examine
witnesses. He has no right to expect that his
pleadings would be acted upon by the court nor
may he object to or refute evidence or motions filed
against him. There is nothing in the rule, however,
which contemplates a disqualification to be a
witness or a opponent in a case. Default does not
make him an incompetent.
87 Pacete v. Cariaga
GR No. L-53880 March 17, 1994
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for
annulments of marriage or for
legal separation. — If the
defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal
separation fails to answer, the
court shall order the prosecuting
attorney to investigate whether or
not a collusion between the
parties exists, and if there is no
collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the
evidence submitted is not
fabricated.
88 Ramnani v. CA
GR No. 101789 April 28, 1993
As held in Lina v. Court of Appeals, 10 the
remedies available to a defendant in the regional
trial court who has been declared in default
are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after
discovery thereof and before judgment, file a
motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default
on the ground that his failure to answer was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and
that he has a meritorious defense; (Sec. 3, Rule
18)
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when
the defendant discovered the default, but before
the same has become final and executory, he may
file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of
Rule 37;

c) If the defendant discovered the default after the
judgment has become final and executory, he may
file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38;
and
d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered
against him as contrary to the evidence or to the
law, even if no petition to set aside the order of
default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule
41)
The first remedy was adopted by the petitioner but
his motion to lift the order of default was denied.
A satisfactory showing by the movant of the
existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect is an indispensable requirement for the
setting aside of a judgment of default or the order
of default. After going over the pleadings of the
parties and the decision of the respondent court,
we find that the motion to lift the order of default
was properly denied for non-compliance with this
requirement. The defendants were less than
conscientious in defending themselves and
protecting their rights before the trial court. They
did not pay proper attention and respect to its
directive. The petitioner has not shown that his and
his wife’s failure to attend the pre-trial hearing as
required was due to excusable neglect, much less
to fraud, accident or mistake. A meritorious
defense is only one of the two conditions. Even if it
be assumed for the sake of argument that the
private respondents did owe Josephine Ramnani
P900,000, as alleged in the counterclaim, that
circumstance alone is not sufficient to justify the
lifting of the order of default and the default
judgment. The obvious reason is that a meritorious
defense must concur with the satisfactory reason
for the non-appearance of the defaulted party.
There is no such reason in this case.
89 Manchester v. CA*
GR No. 75919 May 7, 1987
As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-
settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon
payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court . 12 Thus, in the present case
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case by the payment of only P410.00 as docket
fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint
thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For an
legal purposes there is no such original complaint
that was duly filed which could be amended.
Consequently, the order admitting the amended
complaint and all subsequent proceedings and
actions taken by the trial court are null and void.
The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the
present case that the basis of assessment of the
docket fee should be the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint and not in the
amended complaint.
The Court cannot close this case without making
the observation that it frowns at the practice of
counsel who filed the original complaint in this case
of omitting any specification of the amount of
damages in the prayer although the amount of over
P78 million is alleged in the body of the complaint.
This is clearly intended for no other purpose than
to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not
to mislead the docket clerk in the assessment of
the filing fee.
To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all
complaints, petitions, answers and other similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply
with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor
admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the
record.
90 Sun Insurance Office v. Asuncion*
GR Nos. 79937-38 February 13, 1989
The contention that Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage.
Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and
to that extent. 
The principle in Manchester  could very well be
applied in the present case. The pattern and the
intent to defraud the government of the docket fee
due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original
complaint but also in the filing of the second
amended complaint.
However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any
additional docket fee until] the case was decided
by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in Manchester,
due to the fraud committed on the government, this
Court held that the court a quo  did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case and that the amended
complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch
as the original complaint was null and void.
In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of
the rules is called for considering that, unlike
Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees as required.
Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket
fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the
total amount of the claim. This is a matter which
the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly
authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should
determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found
due, he must require the private respondent to pay
the same.
Thus, the Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading
is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee,
the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive
counterclaims, third party claims and similar
pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid.
The court may also allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a
claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.
91 Tacay v. RTC*
GR No. 88075-77 December 20, 1989
Circular No. 7 was aimed at the practice of certain
parties who omit from the prayer of their complaints
"any specification of the amount of damages," the
omission being "clearly intended for no other
purposes than to evade the payment of the correct
filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk, in the
assessment of the filing fee." The following rules
were therefore set down:
1. All complaints, petitions, answers, and similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages
shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case.
2. Any pleading that fails to comply with this
requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or
shall otherwise be expunged from the record.
3. The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket
fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the
Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading.
The clarificatory and additional rules laid down
in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,
supra,  (yung tatlo earlier quoted in case 90)
As will be noted, the requirement in Circular No. 7
that complaints, petitions, answers, and similar
pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the
pleading but also in the prayer, has not been
altered. What has been revised is the rule that
subsequent "amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in
the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee
based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading," the trial court now being authorized to
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time
but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period. Moreover, a new rule has
been added, governing awards of claims not
specified in the pleading - i.e., damages arising
after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading-
as to which the additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment.
Now, under the Rules of Court, docket or filing fees
are assessed on the basis of the "sum claimed," on
the one hand, or the "value of the property in
litigation or the value of the estate," on the
other. 18 There are, in other words, as already
above intimated, actions or proceedings involving
real property, in which the value of the property is
immaterial to the court's jurisdiction, account
thereof being taken merely for assessment of the
legal fees; and there are actions or proceedings,
involving personal property or the recovery of
money and/or damages, in which the value of the
property or the amount of the demand is decisive
of the trial court's competence (aside from being
the basis for fixing the corresponding docket
fees). 19
Where the action is purely for the recovery of
money or damages, the docket fees are assessed
on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed,
exclusive only of interests and costs.
Where the action involves real property and a
related claim for damages as well, the legal fees
shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the
value of the property and (b) the total amount of
related damages sought. The Court acquires
jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the
initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment
of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at
the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time
of full payment of the fees within such reasonable
time as the court may grant, unless, of course,
prescription has set in the meantime.
What should be done is simply to expunge those
claims for damages as to which no amounts are
stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or
allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the
amendment of the complaints so as to allege the
precise amount of each item of damages and
accept payment of the requisite fees therefor within
the relevant prescriptive period.
92 Maersk-Tabacalera Shipping Agency v. CA
GR No. 89747 July 20, 1990
(Illustration only)
93 Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor
GR No. 140954 April 12, 2005
Plainly, while the payment of the prescribed docket
fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-
payment at the time of filing does not automatically
cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee
is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, more so when the party
involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by
the rules prescribing such payment.46 Thus, when
insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the
plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the
government, the Manchester rule does not apply.47
Under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the
reinstatement of the complaint was just and proper
considering that the cause of action of private
respondents, being a real action, prescribes in
thirty years,48 and private respondents did not really
intend to evade the payment of the prescribed
docket fee but simply contend that they could not
be faulted for inadequate assessment because the
clerk of court made no notice of demand or
reassessment.49 They were in good faith and
simply relied on the assessment of the clerk of
court.
Furthermore, the fact that private respondents
prayed for payment of damages "in amounts
justified by the evidence" does not call for the
dismissal of the complaint for violation of SC
Circular No. 7, dated March 24, 1988 which
required that all complaints must specify the
amount of damages sought not only in the body of
the pleadings but also in the prayer in order to be
accepted and admitted for filing. Sun
Insurance effectively modified SC Circular No. 7 by
providing that filing fees for damages and awards
that cannot be estimated constitute liens on the
awards finally granted by the trial court.50
Thus, while the docket fees were based only on
the real property valuation, the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the action, and judgment awards
which were left for determination by the court or as
may be proven during trial would still be subject to
additional filing fees which shall constitute a lien on
the judgment. It would then be the responsibility of
the Clerk of Court of the trial court or his duly
authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fees.51
94 Serrano v. Delica
GR No. 136325 July 29, 2005
Thus, the rule is that "upon the filing of the
pleading or other application which initiates an
action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor
shall be paid in full." 4 However, a litigant who is a
pauper is exempt from the payment of the docket
fees. But the fees shall be a lien on the judgment
rendered in favor of said pauper litigant, unless the
court otherwise provides.5
It is not simply the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fees that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of
the action.6
Considering that respondent’s complaint is a real
action, the Rule requires that "the assessed
value of the property, or if there is none,
the estimated value thereof shall be alleged by
the claimant and shall be the basis in
computing the fees."10
95 Philippine First Insurance v. Pyramid
Logistics and Trucking Corporation
GR No. 165147 July 9, 2008
Petitioners invoke the doctrine in Manchester
Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals38 that a pleading which does not specify in
the prayer the amount sought shall not be admitted
or shall otherwise be expunged, and that the court
acquires jurisdiction only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee.39
Pyramid, on the other hand, insists, in its Comment
on the Petition,40 on the application of Sun
Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion41 and
subsequent rulings relaxing the Manchester ruling
by allowing payment of the docket fee within a
reasonable time, in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the
payment of the prescribed docket fee.42
SC: Pyramid mali pa rin. Indeed, Pyramid
captioned its complaint as one for "specific
performance and damages" even if it was, as the
allegations in its body showed, seeking in the main
the collection of its claims-sums of money
representing losses the amount of which it, by its
own admission, "knew." 46 And, indeed, it failed to
specify in its prayer in the complaint the amount of
its claims/damages.
When Pyramid amended its complaint, it still did
not specify, in its prayer, the amount of
claims/damages it was seeking.
Assuming arguendo that Pyramid has other claims
the amounts of which are yet to be determined by
the trial court, the rule established
in Manchester which was embodied in this Court’s
Circular No. 7-88 issued on March 24, 1988, as
modified by the Sun Insurance ruling, still applies.
Consider this Court’s pronouncement bearing on
the matter in Ayala Corporation v. Madayag:50
x x x While it is true that the determination of
certain damages x x x is left to the sound discretion
of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming
such damages to specify the amount sought on
the basis of which the court may make a proper
determination, and for the proper assessment of
the appropriate docket fees.
The exceptioncontemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for
determination of the court is limited only to any
damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be
possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate
as to the amount thereof. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
96 Metrobank v. Perez
GR No. 181842 February 5, 2010
Plainly, while the payment of prescribed docket fee
is a jurisdictional requirement, even its non-
payment at the time of filing does not automatically
cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee
is paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, more so when the party
involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by
the rules prescribing such payment. Thus, when
insufficient filing fees were initially paid by the
plaintiffs and there was no intention to defraud the
government, the Manchester rule does not
apply.11 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. – Where the court in its final
judgment awards a claim not alleged, or a relief
different from, or more than that claimed in the
pleading, the party concerned shall pay
the additional fees which shall constitute a lien on
the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk
of court shall assess and collect the corresponding
fee (underscoring supplied),
and jurisprudence, viz:
The exception contemplated as to claims not
specified or to claims although specified are left for
determination of the court is limited only to
any damages that may arise after the filing of the
complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be
possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate
as to the amount thereof.14 (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
97 Benguet v. NLRC
GR No. 89070 May 18, 1992
Respondent Board member's contention runs
counter to the established rule that transmission
through a private carrier or letter-forwarder ––
instead of the Philippine Post Office –– is not a
recognized mode of filing pleadings. 5The
established rule is that the date of delivery of
pleadings to a private letter-forwarding agency is
not to be considered as the date of filing thereof in
court, and that in such cases, the date of actual
receipt by the court, and not the date of delivery to
the private carrier, is deemed the date of filing of
that pleading. 6
98 Magno v. CA
GR No. L-58781 July 31, 1987
It is well-settled that when a party is represented by
counsel, notice should be made upon the counsel
of record at his given address to which notices of
all kinds emanating from the court should be sent
in the absence of a proper and adequate notice to
the court of a change of address. (Cubar vs.
Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768).lawph!1
In the case now before Us, the records show that
the notice and copy of the decision of respondent
Court of Appeals were sent to petitioners's counsel
of record Atty. Atinidoro E. Sison at his given
mailing address which is 33 B.M.A. Avenue,
Tatalon, Quezon City. The first notice to him by the
Postmaster to claim his mail was on July 9, 1981.
The rule is that service of notice becomes effective
at the expiration of the five-day period upon failure
of the addresse to claim his mail within five (5)
days from the date of first notice Sec. 8, Rule 13
Rules of Court (Feraren vs. Santos, 113 SCRA
707). Therefore in this case the service became
effective five days after July 9, 1981 which is July
14, 1981. The decision became final on August 13,
1981. A xerox copy of the said envelope properly
addressed appears on page 52 of the Rollo. This
fact is further shown by the certification issued by
the then Acting Clerk of the Court of Appeals, Atty.
Cesar M. Marzan. (p. 51, Rollo). If Atty. Sison
moved to another address without informing the
respondent of his change of address the omission
or neglect will not stay the finality of the decision.
99 Solar Team Entertainment v. Rica-Fort
GR No. 132007 August 5, 1998
Service and filing of pleadings and other papers
must, whenever practicable, be done personally;
and if made through other modes, the party
concerned must provide a written explanation as to
why the service or filing was not done personally.
100 Valenzuela v. CA
GR No. 131175 August 28, 2011
The amendment may now substantially alter the
cause of action or defense. This should only be
true, however, when despite a substantial change
or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the
amendments sought to be made shall serve the
higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent
delay and equally promote the laudable objective
of the rules which is to secure a “just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
101 Valmonte v. CA
GR No. 108538 January 22, 1996
(Illustration)
In an action in personam, personal service of
summons or, if this is not possible and he cannot
be personally served, substituted service, as
provided in Rule 14, §§7-8 2 is essential for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
person of a defendant who does not voluntarily
submit himself to the authority of the court. 3 If
defendant cannot be served with summons
because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he
is a Philippine resident, service of summons may,
by leave of court, be made by
publication.4 Otherwise stated, a resident defendant
in an action in personam, who cannot be
personally served with summons, may be
summoned either by means of substituted service
in accordance with Rule 14, §8 or by publication as
provided in §§ 17 and 18 of the same Rule.5
In all of these cases, it should be noted, defendant
must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an
action in personam cannot be brought because
jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a
binding decision.
On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi
in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not essential for giving the court
jurisdiction so long as the court acquires
jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a
nonresident and he is not found in the country,
summons may be served exterritorially in
accordance with Rule 14, §17, which provides:
§17. Extraterritorial service. - When the
defendant does not reside and is not
found in the Philippines and the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiff
or relates to, or the subject of which is,
property within the Philippines, in which
the defendant has or claims a lien or
interest, actual or contingent, or in which
the relief demanded consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any
interest therein, or the property of the
defendant has been attached within the
Philippines, service may, by leave of court,
be effected out of the Philippines by
personal service as under section 7; or by
publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such
time as the court may order, in which case
a copy of the summons and order of the
court shall be sent by registered mail to
the last known address of the defendant,
or in any other manner the court may
deem sufficient. Any order granting such
leave shall specify a reasonable time,
which shall not be less than sixty (60)
days after notice, within which the
defendant must answer..
In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in
an action in rem or quasi in rem is that it has
jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of
the plaintiff who is domiciled in the Philippines or
the property litigated or attached.
Service of summons in the manner provided in §17
is not for the purpose of vesting it with jurisdiction
but for complying with the requirements of fair play
or due process, so that he will be informed of the
pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that property in the Philippines belonging
to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and
he can thereby take steps to protect his interest if
he is so minded
As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident
who is not found in the Philippines, service of
summons on her must be in accordance with Rule
14, §17. Such service, to be effective outside the
Philippines, must be made either (1) by personal
service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in such places and for such time
as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by
registered mail to the last known address of the
defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the
court may deem sufficient.
Since in the case at bar, the service of summons
upon petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was not done
by means of any of the first two modes, the
question is whether the service on her attorney,
petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be justified
under the third mode, namely, "in any . . . manner
the court may deem sufficient."
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the
first two, must be made outside the Philippines,
such as through the Philippine Embassy in the
foreign country where the defendant
resides.8 Moreover, there are several reasons why
the service of summons on Atty. Alfredo D.
Valmonte cannot be considered a valid service of
summons on petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. In
the first place, service of summons on petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order
of the court as required by Rule 14, §17 and
certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the
court which in fact refused to consider the service
to be valid and on that basis declare petitioner
Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file
an answer.
In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte did not appoint her husband as her
attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private res-
pondent's attorney that "all communications"
intended for her should be addressed to her
husband who is also her lawyer at the latter's
address in Manila, no power of attorney to receive
summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact
the letter was written seven months before the
filing of this case below, and it appears that it was
written in connection with the negotiations between
her and her sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta,
concerning the partition of the property in question.
As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the
exchange of correspondence was carried on by
counsel for the parties. But the authority given to
petitioner's husband in these negotiations certainly
cannot be construed as also including an authority
to represent her in any litigation.
102 La Naval Drug v. CA
GR No. 103200 August 31, 1994
(not related to topic)
103 E.B. Villarosa v. Benito
GR No. 136426 August 6, 1999
Sec. 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that:
When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized
under the laws of the Philippines with a
juridical personality, service may be made
on the president, managing
partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
(emphasis supplied).
Earlier cases have uphold service of summons
upon a construction project manager 15; a
corporation's assistant manager 16; ordinary clerk of
a corporation17; private secretary of corporate
executives18; retained counsel19; officials who had
charge or control of the operations of the
corporation, like the assistant general manager 20;
or the corporation's Chief Finance and
Administrative Officer21. In these cases, these
persons were considered as "agent" within the
contemplation of the old rule.22 Notably, under the
new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of
the corporation is no longer authorized.
The rule now states "general manager" instead of
only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of
"secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier."
The phrase "agent, or any of its directors" is
conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
The purpose is to render it reasonably certain that
the corporation will receive prompt and proper
notice in an action against it or to insure that the
summons be served on a representative so
integrated with the corporation that such person
will know what to do with the legal papers served
on him.
104 Pinlac v. CA
GR No. 91486 January 19, 2001
While the service of summons by publication may
have been done with the approval of the trial court,
it does not cure the fatal defect that the
"Metropolitan Newsweek" is not a newspaper of
general circulation in Quezon City .The Rules
strictly require that publication must be "in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such
places and for such time as the court may
order."18 The court orders relied upon by petitioners
did not specify the place and the length of time that
the summons was to be published. In the absence
of such specification, publication in just any
periodical does not satisfy the strict requirements
of the rules. The incomplete directive of the court a
quo coupled with the defective publication of the
summons rendered the service by publication
ineffective.
105 Oaminal v. Castillo
(Illustration)
In civil cases, the trial court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant either by the
service of summons or by the latter's voluntary
appearance and submission to the authority of the
former. Where the action is in personam and the
defendant is in the Philippines, the service of
summons may be made through personal or
substituted service in the manner provided for by
Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules
of Court, which read:
"Section 6. Service in person on
defendant. - Whenever practicable, the
summons shall be served by handing a
copy thereof to the defendant in person,
or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it,
by tendering it to him.
"Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for
justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of
the summons at the defendant's residence
with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by
leaving the copies at defendant's office or
regular place of business with some
competent person in charge thereof."
Personal service of summons is preferred over
substituted service. Resort to the latter is permitted
when the summons cannot be promptly served on
the defendant in person and after stringent formal
and substantive requirements have been complied
with.7
For substituted service of summons to be valid, it is
necessary to establish the following circumstances:
(a) personal service of summons within a
reasonable time was impossible; (b) efforts were
exerted to locate the party; and (c) the summons
was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion residing at the party's residence or upon
a competent person in charge of the party's office
or regular place of business.8 It is likewise required
that the pertinent facts proving these
circumstances are stated in the proof of service or
officer's return.
106 Mason v. CA
GR No. 144662 October 13, 2003
The designation of persons or officers who are
authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more
clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states
"general manager" instead of only "manager";
"corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and
"treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent,
or any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in
the new rule.14
107 HSBC v. Catalan
GR No. 159590 October 18, 2004
We find that both lower courts overlooked Section
20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides that "the inclusion in a motion to
dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall
not be deemed a voluntary appearance."
Nonetheless, such omission does not aid
HSBANK’s case.
It must be noted that HSBANK initially filed a
Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer or
Motion to Dismiss.35HSBANK already invoked the
RTC’s jurisdiction over it by praying that its motion
for extension of time to file answer or a motion to
dismiss be granted. The Court has held that the
filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as,
to admit answer, for additional time to file answer,
for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift
order of default with motion for reconsideration, are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court.36  110 Phil., 409; Pascual vs. Secretary of Public
In contrast, the filing by HSBC TRUSTEE of a
motion to dismiss cannot be considered a voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It was a
conditional appearance, entered precisely to
question the regularity of the service of summons.
It is settled that a party who makes a special
appearance in court challenging the jurisdiction of
said court, e.g., invalidity of the service of
summons, cannot be considered to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court.38 HSBC
TRUSTEE has been consistent in all its pleadings
in assailing the service of summons and the
jurisdiction of the RTC over it. Thus, HSBC
TRUSTEE cannot be declared in estoppel when it
filed an Answer ad cautelam before the RTC while
its petition for certiorari was pending before the CA
Admittedly, HSBC TRUSTEE is a foreign
corporation, organized and existing under the laws
of the British Virgin Islands. For proper service of
summons on foreign corporations, Section 12 of
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 12. Service upon foreign private
juridical entity. – When the defendant is a
foreign private juridical entity which has
transacted business in the Philippines,
service may be made on its resident agent
designated in accordance with law for that
purpose, or if there be no such agent, on
the government official designated by law
to that effect, or on any of its officers or
agents within the Philippines.
In French Oil Mill Machinery Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals,39 we had occasion to rule that it is not
enough to merely allege in the complaint that a
defendant foreign corporation is doing business.
For purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of
doing business must first be "established by
appropriate allegations in the complaint" and the
court in determining such fact need not go beyond
the allegations therein.40
The allegations in the amended complaint subject
of the present cases did not sufficiently show the
fact of HSBC TRUSTEE’s doing business in the
Philippines.
Besides, there is no allegation in the amended
complaint that HSBANK is the domestic agent of
HSBC TRUSTEE to warrant service of summons
upon it. Thus, the summons tendered to the In
House Counsel of HSBANK (Makati Branch) for
HSBC TRUSTEE was clearly improper.
123 PNB v. Hipolito*
GR No. L-16463 January 30, 1965
We are of the opinion that the dismissal of the
complaint is erroneous. In a motion to dismiss
defendant hypotheticaly admits the truth of the
allegations of fact contained in the complaint.
(Pangan vs. Evening News Publishing Co., Inc.
Works and Communications, 110 Phil., 331;
Republic vs. Ramos, G.R. No. L-15484, Jan. 31,
1963).
An examination of the complaint herein does not
indicate clearly that prescription has set in. On the
contrary, it is belied by the allegation concerning
defendant's offer of payment made on May 7,
1957. Such offer hypothetically admitted in the
motion, worked as a renewal of the obligation.
It is true that defendants attached to the motion a
joint affidavit of merit wherein they deny having
made an offer of a plan of payment. Such denial,
however, being a contrary averment of fact, would
be proper in the answer to the complaint but not in
a motion for dismissal, for the contradictory
allegations would require presentation of evidence
(Alquigue vs. De Leon, G.R. No. L-15059, March
30, 1963). The same is true of the other allegations
in the complaint concerning the demands for
payment sent by plaintiff upon defendants and the
partial payments made by them, all or some of
which may have a material bearing on the question
of prescription. In other words, the ground for
dismissal not being indubitable, the lower court
should have deferred determination of the issue
until after trial of the case on the merits. (Sec. 3,
Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court; Geganto vs.
Katalbas, G.R. L-17105, July 31, 1963).
124 Guerrero v. RTC
GR No. 109068 January 10, 1994
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from
the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but
that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact made, the case must be
dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be
the subject of compromise under the Civil Code.
Further, Art. 151 is complemented by Sec. 1, par.
(j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court which provides
as a ground for a motion to dismiss "(t)hat the suit
is between members of the same family and no
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been
made."
As early as two decades ago, we already ruled
in Gayon v. Gayon[6]that the enumeration of
"brothers and sisters" as members of the same
family does not comprehend "sisters-in-law." In that
case, then Chief Justice Concepcion emphasized
that "sisters-in-law" (hence, also "brothers-in-law")
are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil Code
as members of the same family.
As regards the second issue, we need only
reiterate our ruling in O'Laco v. Co Cho Chit,
[9]
 citing Mendoza v. Court of Appeals,[10] that the
attempt to compromise as well as the inability to
succeed is a condition precedent to the filing of a
suit between members of the same family, the
absence of such allegation in the complaint being
assailable at any stage of the proceeding, even on
appeal, for lack of cause of action.
125 Continental Cement v. CA*
GR No. 88586 April 27, 1990
The default order was clearly erroneous and
should not have been sustained on appeal.  There
is no question that the motion to dismiss was filed
seasonably, within the period of the second
extension granted by the trial court.  It is true that
such a motion could not be considered a
responsive pleading as we have held in many
cases.[2] Nevertheless, it is also true that in Section
1 of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, it is provided
that "within the time for pleading, a motion to
dismiss the action may be made" on the grounds
therein enumerated, including the grounds invoked
by the petitioner.
Sec. 4.  Time to plead.  - If the motion to dismiss is
denied or if determination thereof is deferred,
the movant shall file his answer within the period
prescribed by Rule 11, computed from the time he
received notice of the denial or deferment, unless
the court provides a different period.
A motion to dismiss under any of the grounds
enumerated in Section 1, Rule 8 (now Section 1,
Rule 16) of the Rules of Court, must be filed within
the time for pleading, that is, within the time to
answer.  
The above ruling was a reiteration
of Mandac v. Gumarad,[4] where we also set aside
a default order upon a showing that the motion to
dismiss was filed before the expiration of the
extension granted by the trial court for the filing of
the answer.
x x x the period for filing
a responsive pleading commences to run all over
again from the time the defendant receives notice
of the denial of his motion to dismiss.
On the basis of the above doctrines, the Court
recapitulates the rules as follows:
1.     The trial court may in its discretion and on
proper motion extend the 15-
day reglementary period for the filing of responsive
pleadings.
2.     During the original reglementary 15-day
period, or any extension of such period, the
defendant may file a motion to dismiss the
complaint.
3.     If the motion to dismiss is denied, the
defendant is allowed another fifteen days from
notice of the denial to file the responsive
pleading.  The full 15-day reglementary period
starts all over again.
Accordingly, we hold that in issuing the order of
default before the expiration of the period for the
filing of its answer, the trial court deprived the
petitioner of the opportunity to be heard in its
defense.  The judgment by default thereafter
rendered, on the basis only of the evidence of the
plaintiff, was therefore also invalid.
126 Borje v. CFI*
GR No. L-48315 February 27, 1979
Indeed, respondent Court acted with grave abuse
of discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in
dismissing the case. Firstly, the said order of
dismissal dated March 9, 1978 is not premised on
lack of jurisdiction or on the pendency of another
case between the same parties for the same cause
- the grounds alleged by private respondents in
their motion to dismiss. On this score, it has been
held in the case of Malig, et al. vs. Bush,[5] that
dismissal of actions on grounds not alleged in the
motion to dismiss is improper for in so doing, a
court in effect dismisses an
action motu proprio without giving the plaintiffs a
chance to argue the point and without receiving
any arguments or evidence on the question.
To all intents and purposes, respondent Court
decreed the dismissal on its own initiative as in the
case of Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs.
Ramos, et al.[6]where neither a motion to dismiss
nor an answer had been made when the decision
was handed down. In granting the writ of certiorari,
this Court ruled therein that: "Section 1 of Rule 8
(now Section 1 of Rule 16) enumerates the
grounds upon which an action may be dismissed,
and it specifically ordains that a motion to this end
be filed. In the light of this express requirement we
do not believe that the court had power to dismiss
the case without the requisite motion duly
presented. x x x The only instance in which,
according to said Rules, the court may dismiss
upon the court's own motion an action is, when the
'plaintiff fails to appear at the time of the trial or to
prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time or to comply with the Rules or any order of the
court'."
. In view of the doubtful question of facts presented
herein, respondent court, in the exercise of sound
discretion, should have refused to consider and
decide in a summary manner and should have
allowed the parties to present proof in support of
their respective stand. This is because the right to
a hearing, which is the right of the parties
interested or affected to present their respective
cases and submit evidence in support thereof, is
one of the primary cardinal rights of litigants.
The importance of this right has been underscored
in several cases of this nature decided by this
Court. In one of such cases, De Leon vs. Henson,
[12]
 this Court ruled that the dismissal of an action
upon a motion to dismiss constitutes a denial of
due process, if, from a consideration of the
pleadings, it appears that there are issues of fact
which cannot be decided without a trial of the case
on the merits. Similarly, in Constantino vs.
Estenzo,[13] citing Garanciang, et al. vs.
Garanciang, et al.[14] and Boñaga vs. Soler,[15] it is
Court held as follows:
"x x x Summary or outright dismissals of actions
are not proper where there are factual matters in
dispute which need presentation and appreciation
of evidence. The demands of a fair, impartial and
wise administration of justice call for a faithful
adherence to legal precepts on procedure which
ensure to litigants the opportunity to present their
evidence and secure a ruling on all the issues
presented in their respective pleadings. 'Short cuts'
in judicial processes are to be avoided where they
impede rather than promote a judicious
dispensation of justice."
127 Danfoss v. Continental Cement
GR No. 143788
Section 1 (g), Rule 16 of the 1997 Revised Rules
on Civil Procedure provides that: 
Section 1. Grounds – Within the time for but before
filing the answer to the complaint or pleading
asserting a claim, a motion to dismiss may be
made on any of the following grounds:
xxx     xxx     xxx
(g) That the pleading asserting the claim states no
cause of action;
A cause of action is defined under Section 2, Rule
2 of the same Rules as:
Sec. 2. Cause of action, defined. – A cause of
action is the act or omission by which a party
violates a right of another.
It is the delict or wrongful act or omission
committed by the defendant in violation of the
primary right of the plaintiff.[6]
In order to sustain a dismissal on the ground of
lack of cause of action, the insufficiency must
appear on the face of the complaint.  And the test
of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the
complaint to constitute a cause of action is whether
or not, admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment thereon in accordance with
the prayer of the complaint. For this purpose, the
motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.[7]
128 Lu Ym v. Nabua*
GR No. 161309 February 23, 2005
An order denying a motion to dismiss is an
interlocutory order which neither terminates nor
finally disposes of a case, as it leaves something to
be done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. As such, the general rule is
that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be
questioned in a special civil action for certiorari
which is a remedy designed to correct errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can
a denial of a motion to dismiss be the subject of an
appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is
rendered. In order to justify the grant of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the denial of the
motion to dismiss must have been tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[19]
At the core of the present petition is the question of
whether the trial court’s denial of petitioner’s
motion to dismiss on the ground that “[T]here are
justiciable questions raised in the pleadings of the
herein parties which are proper subject of a full
blown trial”[20] contravenes Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the
Rules and constitutes grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court.
Sec. 3, Rule 16 of the Rules provides:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion.—After the hearing,
the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny the
motion or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the
motion for the reason that the ground relied upon is
not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and
distinctly the reasons therefor.
Under this provision, there are three (3) courses of
action which the trial court may take in resolving a
motion to dismiss, i.e., to grant, to deny, or to allow
amendment of the pleading. Deferment of the
resolution of a motion to dismiss if the ground
relied upon is not indubitable is now disallowed in
view of the provision[21] requiring presentation of all
available arguments and evidence. Thus, there is
no longer any need to defer action until the trial as
the evidence presented, and such additional
evidence as the trial court may require, would
already enable the trial court to rule upon the
dubitability of the ground alleged.[22]
Further, it is now specifically required that the
resolution on the motion shall clearly and distinctly
state the reasons therefor. This proscribes the
common practice of perfunctorily dismissing the
motion for “lack of merit.” Such cavalier
dispositions can often pose difficulty and
misunderstanding on the part of the aggrieved
party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on
the higher court called upon to resolve the same,
usually on certiorari.[23]
The questioned order of the trial court denying the
motion to dismiss with a mere statement that there
are justiciable questions which require a full blown
trial falls short of the requirement of Rule 16 set
forth above.
129 Aquino v. Aure
GR No. 153567 February 18, 2008
The only issue to be resolved is whether non-
recourse to the barangay conciliation process is a
jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the
ejectment suit filed with the MeTC.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure
to comply with the requirement of Section 412 of
the Local Government Code
on barangay conciliation (previously contained in
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much
the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes
afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial
determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable
to a motion to dismiss.[22] Nevertheless, the
conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, so that non-compliance therewith
cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court
has otherwise acquired over the subject matter
or over the person of the defendant.[23]
As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v.
Intermediate Appellate Court[24]:
Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition
precedent prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the
sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and
make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
ground of lack of cause of action or
prematurity; but the same would not prevent a
court of competent jurisdiction from exercising
its power of adjudication over the case before
it, where the defendants, as in this case, failed
to object to such exercise of jurisdiction in
their answer and even during the entire
proceedings a quo.
While petitioners could have prevented the trial
court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by
seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead
invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What
is more, they participated in the trial of the case by
cross-examining respondent Planas. Upon this
premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by
attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which
they had submitted themselves voluntarily. x x
x (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino
cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the
MeTC over Civil Case No. 17450 after having
submitted herself voluntarily thereto.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only
three instances when the court may motu
proprio dismiss the claim, and that is when the
pleadings or evidence on the record show that (1)
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (2) there is another cause of action pending
between the same parties for the same cause; or
(3) where the action is barred by a prior judgment
or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear that a
court may not motu proprio dismiss a case on the
ground of failure to comply with the requirement
for barangay conciliation, this ground not being
among those mentioned for the dismissal by the
trial court of a case on its own initiative.
130 Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis v. Gonzales
GR No. 185922 January 15, 2014
The base issue is whether or not the appellate
court may dismiss the order of dismissal of the
complaint for failure to allege therein that earnest
efforts towards a compromise have been made.
The appellate court’s reliance on this provision is
misplaced.  Rule 16 treats of the grounds for a
motion to dismiss the complaint.  It must be
distinguished from the grounds provided under
Section 1, Rule 9 which specifically deals with
dismissal of the claim by the court motu proprio.
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
Section 1.  Defenses and objections not pleaded. -
Defenses and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, that
there is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or that the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations, the court shall dismiss the claim.
Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances
when the court may  motu proprio dismiss the
claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata;
and (d) prescription of action.[10]  Specifically
in Gumabon v. Larin,[11] cited in Katon v. Palanca,
Jr.,[12] the Court held:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was
traditionally limited to instances when the court
clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial,
failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable
length of time or neglected to comply with the rules
or with any order of the court.  Outside of these
instances, any motu proprio dismissal would
amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to
be heard.  Except for qualifying and expanding
Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the
Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical
change.  Under the new rules, a court may motu
proprio  dismiss a claim when it appears from the
pleadings or evidence on record that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the same
parties for the same cause, or where the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations.  x x x. [13]
The error of the Court of Appeals is evident even if
the consideration of the issue is kept within the
confines of the language of Section 1(j) of Rule 16
and Section 1 of Rule 9.  That a condition
precedent for filing the claim has not been
complied with, a ground for a motion to dismiss
emanating from the law that no suit between
members from the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made but had failed, is, as the Rule so
words, a ground for a motion to dismiss. 
Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion
should be filed “within the time for but before filing
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim.”  The time frame indicates that thereafter,
the motion to dismiss based on the absence of the
condition precedent is barred.  It is so inferable
from the opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9
stating that defense and objections not pleaded
either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived.  There are, as just noted, only
four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter;  litis pendentia;
res judicata; and prescription of action.  Failure to
allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a
compromise has been made but had failed is not
one of the exceptions.  Upon such failure, the
defense is deemed waived.
Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege
earnest but failed efforts at a compromise in a
complaint among members of the same family, is
not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the
statement of a cause of action. 
144 Fortune Corp v. CA
G.R. No. 108119 January 19, 1994
All motions under these subparagraphs of the rule
must be supported by "good cause" and a strong
showing is required before a party will be denied
entirely the right to take a deposition. A mere
allegation, without proof, that the deposition is
being taken in bad faith is not a sufficient ground
for such an order. Neither is an allegation that it will
subject the party to a penalty or forfeiture. The
mere fact that the information sought by deposition
has already been obtained through a bill of
particulars, interrogatories, or other depositions will
not suffice, although if it is entirely repetitious a
deposition may be forbidden.
As a general rule, the scope of discovery is to be
liberally construed so as to provide the litigants
with information essential to the expenditious and
proper litigation of each of the facts in dispute.
Moreover, it cannot be disputed that the various
methods of discovery as provided for in the Rules
are clearly intended to be cumulative, as opposed
to alternative or mutually exclusive. 19
It is quite clear, therefore, and we so hold that
under the present Rules the fact that a party has
resorted to a particular method of discovery will not
bar subsequent use of other discovery devices, as
long as the party is not attempting to circumvent a
ruling of the court, or to harass or oppress the
other party.
On the other hand, interrogatories may well be
used as a preliminary to the taking of depositions,
in order to ascertain what individuals have the
information sought
2. The availability of the proposed deponent to
testify in court does not constitute "good cause" to
justify the court's order that his deposition shall not
be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or
testify is one of the grounds when the deposition of
a witness may be used in court during the
trial. 25 But the same reason cannot be successfully
invoked to prohibit the taking of his deposition.
3. We are also in conformity with petitioner's
submission that the mere fact that the court could
not thereby observe the behavior of the deponent
does not justify the denial of the right to take
deposition. As we have already explained:
The main reason given in support
of the contested order is that, if
the deposition were taken, the
court could not observe the
behavior of the deponents. The
insufficiency of this circumstance
to justify the interdiction of the
taking of the deposition becomes
apparent when we consider that,
otherwise, no deposition could
ever be taken, said objection or
handicap being common to all
depositions alike. In other words,
the order of respondent Judge
cannot be sustained without
nullifying the right to take
depositions, and therefore,
without, in effect repealing section
1 of Rule 18 (now Rule 24) of the
Rules of Court, which, clearly,
was not intended by the framers
of section 16 of the same rule. 28
4. Finally, in the absence of proof, the allegation
that petitioner merely intended to annoy, harass or
oppress the proposed deponent cannot ably
support the setting aside of a notice to take
deposition.
145 Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp v. Ley
Construction
G.R. No. 147143 March 10, 2006
Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court which
provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when
may be taken.--- By leave of court after
jurisdiction has been obtained over any
defendant or over property which is the subject
of the action, or without such leave after an
answer has been served, the testimony of any
person, whether a party or not, may be taken, at
the instance of any party, by deposition upon
oral examination or written interrogatories. The
attendance of witnesses may be compelled by the
use of a subpoena as provided in Rule 21.
Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with
these Rules. The deposition of a person confined
in prison may be taken only by leave of court on
such terms as the court prescribes. (Emphasis
supplied).
While it is true that depositions may be disallowed
by trial courts if the examination is conducted in
bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass, or oppress the person who is the
subject of the inquiry, or when the inquiry touches
upon the irrelevant or encroaches upon the
recognized domains of privilege,44 such
circumstances, however are absent in the case at
bar.
Petitioner also argues that LCDC has no evidence
to support its claims and that it was only after the
filing of its Complaint that it started looking for
evidence through the modes of discovery.
On this point, it is well to reiterate the Court’s
pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan48:
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of
every bit of information which may be useful in the
preparation for trial, such as the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of relevant
facts; those relevant facts themselves; and the
existence, description, nature, custody, condition,
and location of any books, documents, or other
tangible things. Hence, "the deposition-discovery
rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal
treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of
‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from
inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s
case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts
gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the
other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession. The deposition-discovery procedure
simply advances the stage at which the disclosure
can be compelled from the time of trial to the
period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility, of
surprise.
146 Ong v. Mazo
GR No. 145542 June 4, 2004
This Court finds that the orders disallowing
petitioner’s written interrogatories are patently
erroneous, hence, the resort to certiorari is
warranted. In denying petitioner’s availment of
interrogatories, the trial court was of the view that
—
. . . in as much that the written
interrogatories is (sic) a sort of fishing
expedition, said questions and answer
would be properly ventilated in a pre-trial
conference for which this court direct the
defendant Elena Ong to file her answer to
the amended complaint anent thereto,
both parties are required to file their
respective pre-trial briefs after which this
case will be calendared for pre-trial
conference.30
This Court has long espoused the policy of
encouraging the availment of the various modes or
instruments of discovery as embodied in Rules 24
to 29 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The thrust of the Rules is to even make the
availment of the modes of discovery – depositions,
interrogatories and requests for admissions –
without much court intervention since leave of court
is not necessary to put into motion such modes
after an answer to the complaint has been
served.32 The rationale behind the recognition
accorded the modes of discovery is that they
enable a party to discover the evidence of the
adverse party and thus facilitate an amicable
settlement or expedite the trial of the case.33
Thus, to deny a party the liberty to have his written
interrogatories answered by his opponent, as what
the trial court did, on the premise that the
interrogatories were a "fishing expedition," is to
disregard the categorical pronouncement in
aforementioned case of Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan that the time-honored cry of
‘fishing expedition’ can no longer provide a reason
to prevent a party from inquiring into the facts
underlying the opposing party’s case through the
discovery procedures.
147 Briboneria v. CA
GR No. 101682 December 14, 1992
To begin with, a cursory reading of the petitioner's
complaint and his request for admission clearly
shows, as found by respondent appellate court,
that "the material matters and documents set forth
in the request for admission are the same as those
set forth in the complaint which private
respondents either admitted or denied in their
answer." 16The respondent court therefore correctly
held that this case falls under the rule laid down
in Po vs. Court of Appeals. 17 wherein this Court
held:
A party should not be compelled
to admit matters of fact already
admitted by his pleading and
concerning which there is no
issue (Sherr vs. East, 71 A2d,
752, terry 260, cited in 27 C.J.S.
91), nor should he be required to
make a second denial of those
already denied in his answer to
the complaint. A request for
admission is not intended to
merely reproduce or reiterate the
allegations of the requesting
party's pleading but should set
forth relevant evidentiary matters
of fact, or documents described in
and exhibited with the request,
whose purpose is to establish
said party's cause of action or
defense. . . .
Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court, 18 the request for admission must be served
directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to
whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to
have admitted the genuineness of any relevant
document in and exhibited with the request or
relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on
account of failure to answer the request for
admission. 19
The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of
Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of
Court is that all notices must be served upon
counsel and not upon party. This is so because the
attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is
the one responsible for the conduct of the case in
all its procedural aspects; hence, notice to counsel
is notice to party. The purpose of the rule is
obviously to maintain a uniform procedure
calculated to place in competent hands the orderly
prosecution of a party's case (Chainani v. Judge
Tancinco, G.R. No. L-4782, Feb. 29, 1952; Capili v.
Badelles, G.R. No. L-17786, Sept. 29, 1962).
However, the general rule cannot apply where the
law expressly provides that notice must be served
upon a definite person. (Dito kasi direct lang sabi)
148 Koh v. IAC
GR No. 71388 September 23, 1986
True it is that respondent Bank's counsel should
have taken the precaution of complying with the
instructions contained in the "NOTICE OF CASE
STATUS" if only to avoid the consequent delay
resulting from non-compliance; that respondent
Bank's counsel was negligent in not seeking a
reconsideration or clarification of the order of
dismissal or appealing therefrom. But, fortunately
for respondent Bank, the omissions of its counsel
are not fatal to its cause in view of the defective
procedure which culminated in the dismissal of the
first complaint.
The rules on discovery (Rules 24, 25, 26, 27, 28
and 29 of the Revised Rules of Court) are intended
to enable a party to obtain knowledge of material
facts within the knowledge of the adverse party or
of third parties through depositions to obtain
knowledge of material facts or admissions from the
adverse party through written interrogatories; to
obtain admissions from the adverse party
regarding the genuineness of relevant documents
or relevant matters of fact through requests for
admission; to inspect relevant documents or
objects and lands or other property in the
possession or control of the adverse party; and to
determine the physical or mental condition of a
party when such is in controversy. This mutual
discovery enables a party to discover the evidence
of the adverse party and thus facilitates an
amicable settlement or expedites the trial of the
case. All the parties are required to lay their cards
on the table so that justice can be rendered on the
merits of the case.
Trial judges should, therefore, encourage the
proper utilization of the rules on discovery.
However, recourse to discovery procedures is not
mandatory. If the parties do not choose to resort to
such procedures, the pre-trial conference should
be set pursuant to the mandatory provisions of
Section 1 of Rule 20.

Petitioner invokes the provisions of Section 3 of
Rule 17 which reads as follows:
Failure to prosecute.-If plaintiff fails to appear at
the time of the trial, or to prosecute his action for
an unreasonable length of time, or to comply with
these rules or any order of the court, the action
may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion. This dismissal shall
have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits,
unless otherwise provided by court.
This provision is not applicable to the case at bar.
As the appellate court correctly held, the "notice of
case status" was not an order of the court. It was
signed by Mr. E.R. Belen, officer-in-charge
149 Yu v. Magpayo
GR No. L-29742 March 29, 1972
We find for plaintiff-appellant. Since the answer
admitted defendant's obligation as stated in the
complaint, albeit special defenses were pleaded,
plaintiff had every right to insist that it was for
defendant to come forward with evidence in
support of his special defenses. Section 2 of
Revised Rule of Court 129 plainly supports
appellant:
Sec. 2. Judicial admissions.—
Admissions made by the parties
in the pleadings, or in the course
of the trial or other proceedings
do not require proof and can not
be contradicted unless previously
shown to have been made
through palpable mistake.
150 Wassmer v. Velez
Defendant, however, would contend that the
affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a
mere surplusage, because the judgment sought to
be set aside was null and void, it having been
based on evidence adduced before the clerk of
court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-
16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out
that the procedure of designating the clerk of court
as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned
by Rule 34 (now Rule 33) of the Rules of Court.
Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure,
the same did not have to be obtained for he was
declared in default and thus had no standing in
court.
183 Anama v. CA
GR No. 187021 January 25, 2012
As can be gleaned therefrom, under Paragraph 1
of Section 1 of Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, the Spouses Co can have their
motion for execution executed as a matter of right
without the needed notice and hearing requirement
to petitioner. This is in contrast to the provision of
Paragraph 2 of Section 1 and Section 2 where
there must be notice to the adverse party. In the
case of Far Eastern Surety and Insurance
Company, Inc. v. Virginia D. Vda. De Hernandez,
[5]
 it was written:
In Pamintuan v. Muñoz, We ruled that once a
judgment becomes final and executory, the
prevailing party can have it executed as a
matter of right, and the judgment debtor need
not be given advance notice of the application
for execution.
184 Associated Bank v. Gonong
G.R. No. 77353 July 30, 1987
The filing of an appeal by a losing party does not
automatically divest the party favored by a decision
of the right to move for a more favorable decision
or to ask for execution pending appeal.  It is only
after all the parties' respective periods to appeal
have lapsed that the court loses its jurisdiction over
the case.
“x x x Furthermore, such a view would place it
within the power of one of the parties, by the
simple expedient of immediately perfecting his
appeal, to deprive the other party of the right to ask
for a reconsideration of the decision, let alone to
have the court approve his own appeal if such a
motion is denied. 
185 Engineering Construction v. NPC
GR No. L-34589 June 29, 1988
we are constrained to sustain the order of
execution pending appeal by the trial court but only
as far as the award for actual or compensatory
damages is concerned. We are not prepared to
disagree with the lower court on this point since it
was not sufficiently shown that it abused or
exceeded its authority.
With respect to the consequential and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees, however, we
concur with the Appellate Court in holding that the
lower court had exceeded the limits of its
discretion. Execution should have been postponed
until such time as the merits of the case have been
finally determined in the regular appeal.
In the fairly recent case of RCPI, et al. vs. Lantin,
Nos. 59311 and 59320, January 31, 1985, 134
SCRA 395, 400-401, the Court said:
"The execution of any award for moral and
exemplary damages is dependent on the outcome
of the main case.
186 Ong v. CA
GR No. 92241 October 17, 1991
Where the reason given is that an appeal is
frivolous and dilatory, execution pending appeal
cannot be justified.  It is not proper for the trial
court to find that an appeal is frivolous and
consequently to disapprove it since the
disallowance of an appeal by said court constitutes
a deprivation of the right to appeal.  The authority
to disapprove an appeal rightfully pertains to the
appellate court (Heirs of Gavino Sabenal v. Hon.
Benjamin Gorospe, G.R. No. 50168,
September 30, 1988, 166 SCRA 145).
"x x x to consider the mere posting of a bond a
‘good reason’ would precisely make immediate
execution of a judgment pending appeal routinary,
the rule rather than the exception.  guards is useless.
187 Aranda v. CA
GR No. L-63188 June 30, 1990
When a judgment is executed pending appeal and
subsequently overturned in the appellate court, the
party who moved for immediate execution should,
upon return of the case to the lower court, be
required to make specific restitution of such
property of the prevailing party as he or any person
acting in his behalf may have acquired at the
execution sale.  If specific restitution becomes
impracticable, the losing party in the execution
becomes liable for the full value of the property at
the time of its seizure, with interest.[18]
188 Maceda Jr v. Development Bank of the
Philippines
GR No. 135128 August 26, 1999
Movants have the burden of showing why the trial
court decision should be executed without awaiting
the result of the appeal. Absent such justification,
its execution pending appeal cannot be granted.
Moreover, "the reasons allowing execution must
constitute superior circumstances demanding
urgency which will outweigh the injury or damages
should the losing party secure a reversal of the
judgment.”
189 Pentagon Security v. Jimenez
GR No. 88114 December 20, 1990
"Sec. 12.  Property exempt from execution.  -
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt
from execution:
'(b) Tools and implements neces-
sarily used by him in his trade
or employment;’"
The term "tools and implements" refers to
instruments of husbandry or manual labor needed
by an artisan craftsman or laborer to obtain his
living.  Here petitioner is a business enterprise.  It
does not use the firearms personally, but they are
used by its employees.  Not being a natural
person, petitioner cannot claim that the firearms
are necessary for its livelihood.  Private respondent
invites the Court to take judicial notice of the fact
that there are security guards rendering service
without firearms.
There is no question, in our mind, that a
security agency without firearms to equip its
However, it would appear that the exemption
contemplated by the provision involved is personal,
available only to a natural person, such as a
dentist's dental chair and electric fan 
190 Macias v. Lim
GR No. 139284 June 4, 2004
Section 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent
action. – A final and executory judgment or order
may be executed on motion within five (5) years
from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such
time, and before it is barred by the statute of
limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action.
The revived judgment may also be enforced by
motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by
the statute of limitations.
The purpose of the law in prescribing time
limitations for enforcing judgments by action is to
prevent obligors from sleeping on their rights. [48]
Generally, once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the execution thereof becomes a
ministerial duty of the court.[49] The prevailing party
can have it executed as a matter of right by mere
motion within five years from date of entry of the
judgment. If the prevailing party fails to have the
decision enforced by a mere motion after the lapse
of five (5) years from the date of its entry, the said
judgment is reduced to a mere right of action in
favor of the person whom it favors which must be
enforced, as are all ordinary actions, by the
institution of a complaint in a regular form.[50] Thus,
the recourse left for the petitioners is to revive the
judgment through an independent action which
must be filed within ten (10) years from the time the
judgment became final.[51] The ten-year period
within which an action for revival of a judgment
should be brought, commences to run from the
date of finality of the judgment, and not from the
expiration of the five-year period within which the
judgment may be enforced by mere motion.[52]
That the delay in the execution of the judgment
was due to the financial difficulties of the
defendants in Civil Case No. 4823 is irrelevant. It is
the prevailing party who is entitled, as a matter of
right, to a writ of execution in its favor. It is not an
option of the losing party to file a motion for the
execution of the judgment to compel the winning
party to take the judgment.[54] The petitioners, as
the prevailing parties in the judgment sought to be
enforced, can file their motion or independent
action within the periods therefor notwithstanding
any financial difficulties of the losing party. They
should only concern themselves with the execution
of the judgment. Otherwise, their inaction may be
construed as a waiver. The petitioners slept on
their rights for thirteen years; perforce, they must
suffer the consequences of their gross inaction.
We have ruled that the running of the five-year
period may be interrupted should there be an
agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the
enforcement of the judgment.[55] However, the
petitioners failed to prove in the court a quo that
the original parties in Civil Case No. 4823 had any
agreement to enforce the IAC decision and that
they had already implemented the same. They
failed to adduce in evidence any written agreement
executed by the parties in the court a quo. Bare
allegations, without more, do not meet the
quantum of evidence needed to establish the same
as a fact.
191 Central Surety v. Planters Products
GR No. 149053 March 7, 2007
The only relevant issue for our resolution is
whether the execution of a final judgment may be
made by mere motion despite the lapse of five
years.
In this case, we answer in the affirmative.
Under Rule 39, Section 6,[15] the rule is that a final
judgment may be executed by mere motion within
five years from the date of entry of judgment.
However, the rule is not absolute and admits one
notable exception and that is when the delay in
enforcing the judgment is caused by the party
assailing the filing of the motion.
192 Ting v. Heirs of Diego Lirio
GR No. 168913 March 14, 2007
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al.[13] enunciates the raison
d'etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not apply in
land registration proceedings, viz:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
ORDERING THAT THE DECISION RENDERED
IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON
NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR TWENTY SIX YEARS
AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND
UNENFORCEABLE.
We fail to understand the arguments of the
appellant in support of the above assignment,
except in so far as it supports his theory that after a
decision in a land registration case has become
final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of a
period of 10 years, except by another proceeding
to enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for
this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to
the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5
years by motion, and after five years but within 10
years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This
provision of the Rules refers to civil actions
and is not applicable to special proceedings,
such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured
as against the adverse party, and his failure to
act to enforce the same within a reasonable
time as provided in the Rules makes the
decision unenforceable against the losing
party. In special proceedings the purpose is to
establish a status, condition or fact; in land
registration proceedings, the ownership by a
person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration,
no further proceeding to enforce said
ownership is necessary, except when the
adverse or losing party had been in possession
of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land
Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil
action, except the proceedings to place the winner
in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The
decision in a land registration case, unless the
adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes
final without any further action, upon the expiration
of the period for perfecting an appeal.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
193 Arabay v. Salvador
GR No. L-31077 March 17, 1978
We hold that the Caloocan court can stop the
execution of the Manila court's judgment against
properties not belonging to the judgment debtor.
The injunction in that case would not constitute an
interference with the process of a court of
coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction.
As a third-party claimant, Pascual has the right to
vindicate his claim to the properties levied upon by
means of a proper action. That right is recognized
in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, sec17
The third-party claimant is not obligated to file an
action for damages against the sheriff in case an
indemnity bond was filed by the judgment creditor.
The third-party claimant may file a separate and
independent action to establish ownership to the
property levied upon by the sheriff. In that action,
he may secure an injunction to restrain the sale of
the attached property.
When the sheriff acting beyond the bounds of his
authority, seizes a stranger's property, the writ of
injunction, which is issued to stop the auction sale
of that property, is not an interference with the writ
of execution issued by another court because the
writ of execution was improperly implemented by
the sheriff. Under that writ, he could attach the
property of the judgment debtor. He is not
authorized to levy upon the property of the third-
party claimant
194 Escovilla v. CA
GR No. 84497 November 6, 1989
Extent of the power of the court in execution of
judgments - the power of the court in the execution
of judgments extends only over properties
unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor.  enforced (Ong v. Tating, 149 SCRA 265 [1987]).
 Sheriff not bound to proceed with levy of property
if a third party claim is filed; unless an indemnity
bond has been given - If a third-party claim is filed,
the sheriff is not bound to proceed with the levy of
the property unless he is given by the judgment
creditor an indemnity bond against the claim. The
judgment creditor, by giving an indemnity bond,
assumes the direction and control of the sheriffs
action; so far as it might constitute a trespass and
thus he becomes, to that extent, the principal and
the sheriff, his agent. This makes him responsible
for the continuance of the wrongful possession and
for the sale and conversion of the goods and for all
real damages which the owner might sustain.
Auction sale does not extinguish liability of
judgment of creditor to real owners of property
levied and executed - even if the auction sale has
been conducted and the sheriffs certificate of sale
was issued in favor of the winning bidder, the
liability of the judgment creditor and consequently,
the purchaser to the real owners of the properties
levied and executed is not extinguished. We also
take note of the trial court's finding that Sheriffs
Escovilla and Meris misled the Davao court as to
the ownership of the properties they had seized
knowing quite well that the petitioners in Special
Civil Case No..454, the prohibition case, were the
actual owners of the property. 
Court is not to interfere by injunction with orders of
co-equal court; rule applies when there is no third
party claimant - "Generally, the rule that no court
has the power to interfere by injunction with the
judgments or decrees of a concurrent or coordinate
jurisdiction having equal power to grant the
injunctive relief sought by injunction, is applied in
cases where no third-party claimant is involved, in
order to prevent one court from nullifying the
judgment or process of another court of the same
rank or category, a power which devolves upon the
proper appellate court (Arabay, Inc. v. Salvadro, 82
SCRA 138).
195 Evangelista v. Penserga
AM No. P-92-766 March 27, 1995
Another remedy which the third person may avail
of is the remedy known as terceria as provided in
Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. This is
done by serving on the officer making the levy an
affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the
judgment creditor. According to the said rule, the
officer shall not be bound to keep the property,
unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on
demand of the officer, indemnifies the officer
against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater
than the value of the property levied on. An action
for damages may be later on brought against the
sheriff.
The above mentioned remedies are without
prejudice to any proper action that a third-party
claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate his claim
to the property. This proper action is distinct and
separate from that in which the judgment is being
Hence, a person other than the judgment debtor
who claims ownership or right over levied
properties is not precluded from taking other legal
remedies to prosecute his claim (Consolidated
Bank and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 193
SCRA 158 [1991]).
It is well settled that the sheriffs duty in the
execution of a writ issued by a court is purely
ministerial. As stated in the Manual for Clerks of
Court, when a writ is placed in the hands of a
sheriff, it is his duty in the absence of instructions,
to proceed with reasonable celerity and
promptness to execute it according to its mandate.
He has no discretion whether to execute it or not
(Young v. Momblan, 205 SCRA 33 [1992]).
In the present case, respondent's duty was to
implement the Writ of Execution. His claim that
third persons happen to claim the subject property
does not justify his partial enforcement of the writ.
196 Lorenzana v. Cayetano
GR No. L-37051 August 31, 1977
This case hinges on the legal effects of the writs of
demolition issued in the ejectment cases wherein
the respondent was not a party thereto.  The writs
were issued by virtue of the judgment rendered by
the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch I),
the dispositive portion of which states, as
follows:  "WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered
condemning the defendants xxx to vacate the
premises; ordering herein defendants xxx to pay
rent to plaintiff xxx plus attorney's fees and costs."
Respondent, not being bound thereby, may avail
herself of the proper action afforded by Section 17,
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides the proceedings where property levied
upon is claimed by a third person, stating as
follows:
"x x x The officer is not liable for damages, for the
taking or keeping of the property, to any third-party
claimant unless a claim is made by the latter and
unless an action for damages is brought by him
against the officer within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of the filing of the bond.  But
nothing herein contained shall prevent
such cIaimant or any third person from vindicating
his claim to the property by any proper
action.  x x x” (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent acted within and exercised her right
when she filed the proper action to vindicate her
claim afforded to her by Sec. 17, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court, against the intruders or
trespassers before the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XVII, in Civil Case No. 42001 for
damages with mandatory injunction.  If she did not
insist on her motion for contempt which the court
held in abeyance and was later withdrawn by her, if
she did not appeal from the order of the court
denying her motion to suspend the writ of
demolition, such failure did not amount to a waiver
of her right to pursue the proper action or remedy
provided to her by the Rules of Court.  It is of no
moment that the respondent did not file a motion to
quash the writ of execution or file a petition for
relief under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court
or file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a
higher court after her petition to suspend the writ of
demolition had been denied as suggested by
petitioner.  The law has specifically given her the
remedies to vindicate her claim to the pro-
perty.  When the property of one person is
unlawfully taken by another, the former has a right
of action against the latter for the recovery of the
property or for damages for the taking or retention,
and he is entitled to his choice of these two
remedies.[7]
We find no legal compulsion for respondent to
pursue the remedies suggested by the petitioner,
for the rights of a third-party claimant should not be
decided in the action where the third-party claim
has been presented, but in a separate action to be
instituted by the third person.[8]
"No court has power to interfere by injunction with
the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent
or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to
grant the relief sought by injunction.
For this doctrine to apply, the injunction issued by
one court must interfere with the judgment or
decree issued by another court of equal or
coordinate jurisdiction and the relief sought by
such injunction must be one which could be
granted by the court which rendered the judgment
or issued the decree.
Under Section 17 of Rule 39 a third person who
claims property levied upon on execution may
vindicate such claim by action.  A judgment
rendered in his favor - declaring him to be the
owner of the property -- would not constitute
interference with the powers or processes of the
court which rendered the judgment to enforce
which the execution was levied.  If that be so -- and
it is so because the property, being that of a
stranger, is not subject to levy -- then an
interlocutory order, such as injunction, upon a
claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the
claimant, cannot be considered as such
interference either.
The right of a person who claims to be the owner
of property levied upon on execution to file a third-
party claim with the sheriff is not exclusive, and he
may file an action to vindicate his claim even if the
judgment creditor files an indemnity bond in favor
of the sheriff to answer for any damages that may
be suffered by the third-party claimant.  By "action,"
as stated in the Rule, what is meant is a separate
and independent action.
197 Cenas v. Santos
GR No. 49576 November 21, 1991
Execution of judgment; judgment debtor; may
transfer his right of redemption over the property
sold by virtue of a writ of execution - The judgment
debtor, whose property was levied on execution,
may transfer his right of redemption to anyone
whom he may desire.  The term "successor in
interest" includes, among others, one to whom the
debtor has conveyed his interest in the property for
the purpose of redemption (Magno v.
Viola de Soto, 61 Phil. 80).  It is not disputed
that Dra. Rosario M. Santos as an assignee of her
sister Iluminada M. Pulido's right of redemption,
redeemed the questioned property as "successor
in interest" of said judgment debtor.  The latter
interposed no objection thereto while petitioner
Josefina Cenas acceded unconditionally to the
redemption of the property sold on execution.
 Rule if the purchaser is also a creditor having a
prior lient to that of the redemptioner; amounts
payable - if the purchaser is also a creditor having
a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than
the judgment under which such purchase was
made, the redemptioner has to pay, in addition to
the prescribed amounts, such other prior lien of the
creditor-purchaser with interest.
Redemption of property sold by virtue of writ of
execution; does not wipe out and extinguish the
pre-existing obligation of the judgment debtor – in
the instant case, it will be recalled that on May 3,
1976, the Pulidos mortgaged the subject property
to Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
who, in turn, on January 8, 1977, assigned the
same to petitioner Cenas.  Meanwhile, on July 19,
1976, pursuant to the writ of execution issued in
Civil Case No. Q-2029 (Petitioner Cenas is not a
party in this case No. Q-2029), the subject property
was sold to petitioner Cenas, being the highest
bidder in the execution sale.  On July 19, 1977;
private respondent Dra. Rosario M. Santos
redeemed the subject property.  Therefore, there is
no question that petitioner Cenas as assignee of
the mortgage constituted over the subject property,
is also a creditor having a priof (mortgage) lien to
that of Dra. Rosario M. Santos.  Accordingly, the
acceptance of the redemption amount by
petitioner Cenas, without demanding payment of
her prior lien - the mortgage obligation of
the Pulidos - cannot wipe out and extinguish said
mortgage obligation.  The mortgage directly and
immediately subjects the property upon which it is
imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted (Art. 2126, Civil Code).  Otherwise
stated, a mortgage creates a real right which is
enforceable against the whole world.  Hence, even
if the mortgaged property is sold (Art. 2128) or its
possession transferred to another (Art. 2129), the
property remains subject to the fulfillment of the
obligation for whose security it was constituted
(Padilla, Civil Code annotated, Vol. VII. p. 207,
1975 ed.).

Redemptioner as successor in interest of the

judgment debtor; deemed subrogated to the rights
and obligations of the latter - Moreover, it must be
stressed that private respondents redeemed the
property in question as "successor in interest" of
the judgment debtor, and as such are deemed
subrogated to the rights and obligations of the
judgment debtor and are bound by exactly the
same condition relative to the redemption of the
subject property that bound the latter as debtor and
mortgagor (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA
125 [1989]; citing the case of Gorospe vs. Santos,
G.R. No. L-30079, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA
191).  Private respondents, by stepping in the
judgment debtor's shoes, had the obligation to pay
the mortgage debt, otherwise, the debt would and
could be enforced against the property mortgaged
(Tambunting vs. Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation, 176 SCRA 493 [1989]).