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A Nation-in-Arms:State, Nation, and
Militarismin Israel's First Years
URI BEN-ELIEZER
Tel-AvivUniversity
Like many other states, Israel was forged throughthe struggle of a national
liberationmovementthat likely drew inspirationfrom an ethnic past and that
certainly worked to establish a political framework.1Once the state existed,
however, its leaders did not regardthe ethnie as an objective category that
would in large measuredeterminewhethera nation would emerge.2 Instead,
they viewed the ethnie as a subjectsusceptible,in varyingdegrees, to manipu-
lation, invention, domination, and mobilization.3As the prime minister of
Piedmont said, "We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians";or as
Israel's first prime minister, Ben-Gurion, put it in April 1951 during the
election campaign:"I see in these elections the shaping of a nation for the
state because there is a state but not a nation."4
This essay deals with the firstyearsafterthe foundingof the Israelistate. My
main concern is to examine the way in which the state constructedan ethnic
populationinto a fighting nation, a nation-in-arms.Usually, states construct
nationsthroughvariousmeans, such as the school system, the media, and the
army.In a speech to the Israeliparliament(Knesset),Ben- Gurionclaimedthat
efficiency was the reason, amongall the possibilities, for the reconstructionof
the Israeli nation, primarilyby the army:
I havebeen a Zionistall my life andI do not denythe existenceof Israel,heaven
forbid . . . but . . . even the English nation was not always that nation . . . but was
264
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS 265
9 Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, Out of Utopia (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989), 195-230;
Dan Horowitz, "The Israeli Defense Forces: A Civilianized Military in a Partially Militarized
Society," in RomanKolkowicz and AndreiKorbonski,Soldiers, Peasantsand Bureaucrats(Lon-
don: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), 77-106; EduardLuttwakand Dan Horowitz, The Israeli
Army (London:Allen Lane, 1975); YoramPeri, "Political-MilitaryPartnershipin Israel,"Inter-
national Political Science Review, 2:3 (1981), 303-15.
10 Vicky Randall and Robin Theobald, Political Change and Underdevelopment(Durham:
Duke University Press, 1985), 67-98.
11 Dan Horowitz, "StrategicLimitationsof A Nation in Arms," Armed Forces and Society,
13:2 (1987), 277-94.
12 On the
tendencyto ignore the Palestiniansin the IsraeliSociology, see BaruchKimmerling,
"Sociology, Ideology, and Nation-Building:The Palestiniansand their Meaning in Israeli Soci-
ety," AmericanSociological Review, 57:4 (1992), 446-60.
13 F. Gilbert, ed., The Historical
Essays of Otto Hintze (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1975), 159-77; Michael Howard, "Warand the Nation-State,"in his The Causes of Wars(Lon-
don: Unwin Paperbacks,1984), 23-35.
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS 267
Hall, 1975), 1-65; Meirion and Susie Harries, Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarizationof
Japan (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1987); J. B. Crowley, "FromClosed Door to Empire:The
Formationof the Meiji MilitaryEstablishment,"in BernardS. Silbermanand H. D. Harootunian,
eds., ModernJapaneseLeadership:Traditionand Change (Tucson:Universityof ArizonaPress,
1966).
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS 269
from society at large. For that reason, perhaps, the nation-in-armsdoes not
excel in military coups; but it is certainly not immune to militarism, which
makes wars a normativeand legitimate solution for political problems.21
Whatfollows is an analysis of how a nation-in-armswas formedas a way to
legitimize the solution of political problems by military means. The first
section deals with two causes, partypolitics on one side and nationalpolitics
on the other, that induced the state's leadershipto develop the new mode of
mobilization. The second section deals with the practices that have built the
nation-in-armsconstruct, and the third section illustrateshow this construct
was culturallylegitimized. The last section examines the relationsbetween a
fighting nation and the possibility of war.
A STATE ARMY CONSTRUCTS A NATION
A state is not a legal entity thatderives its existence solely from a declaration
(in this case, May 14, 1948). In the seminal period of Israel, variouspolitical
actions were carriedout in an attemptto constructthe state. One such action
involved the transition from a militia and an undergroundforce to a full-
fledged army fighting a war. Beginning in December 1947 and reaching a
peak the following summer,this change was markedalso by mobilizationon
the basis of order and duty.22Israel still did not resemble a nation-in-arms.
When that idea was first raised in a small forum by the acting chief of staff,
Yigael Yadin, it was rejected. "A nation-in-armscannot be trusted, we need
trainedpeople," Yadinwas told. And: "Youcannot make a commandoforce
out of vendors from the market."23
Statism (mamlakhtiut)was the principle of action that the state's leaders
invoked in orderto transferto the state the responsibilityand control of most
functions from the voluntarybodies usually attachedto political partiesin the
pre-state era. The state would thereby concentratethe bulk of power in its
hand. The process included, for example, the attemptto eliminate the differ-
ent educational tracks; the formation of an independentstate bureaucracy;
and, most crucial, the placementof a monopoly on the means of violence, so
cardinalto every state.24
The process of forming one army,however, encounteredserious obstacles.
21 On the
concept of militarism, see Volker R. Berghahn, Militarism: The History of an
InternationalDebate, 1861-1979 (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981), 31-36; Mi-
chael Mann, "The Roots and Contradictionsof Modem Militarism," in his States, War and
Capitalism (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 166-87; Kjell Skejelsbaek, "Militarism, its
Dimensions and Corollaries:An Attemptto ConceptualClarification,"in AsbjornEdie and Narek
Thee, eds., Problemsof ContemporaryMilitarism(New York:St. Martin'sPress, 1980), 77-105.
22 Yoav Gelber, "Ben-Gurionand the Establishmentof the IDF," Jerusalem
Quarterly, 50
(1989), 56-80.
23 Ben-Gurion's
Diary, March 17, 1948, Ben-GurionArchive.
24 PeterY.
Medding, TheFoundingof Israeli Democracy 1946-1967 (Oxford:OxfordUniver-
sity Press, 1990), 134-37; Charles Liebman and Eliezer Don-Yehiya, Civil Religion in Israel
(Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1983), 81-122.
270 URI BEN-ELIEZER
Many of those who had set the tone in the militaryinfrastructurebefore the
state's establishmentand during the war were identified not with the ruling
party, Mapai (Israel Labor party) but with the more left-wing opposition,
Mapam. Attemptsby Mapai, led by Ben-Gurion, to obtain influence in the
army before and duringthe war were not always successful. The army was
rife with partyfactionalism,even in the war's darkestdays, which often left it
unable to act.25Now, citing the creationof the state and his authorityas its
elected leader, Ben-Gurionaspiredto form a state armynot saddledby party
politics. Naturally,Mapamobjected. In August 1949, when the government
submittedto the Knesset a law on security,Mapamsaid it fearedthat such an
armywould producea militarist,technocraticelite estrangedfrom the nation's
needs. As an alternative,Mapamproposeda militia stronglyresembling the
forces of the pre-stateperiodthatwould drawits strengthfrom the people, not
the state bureaucraticapparatusthat operatedby law and fiat.26 Mapam, in
fact, had raisedthe idea of a people's armybased on the notionthatthe people
themselves, not the state, would determinethe use of arms. Unlike the nation-
in-arms, the people's army implies that the state's authorityis weakening or
being rejected.27Mapam'sunderlyingrationalewas obvious. If its proposals
were accepted, the party would gain a huge political advantageand would
dislodge Mapai's foothold in the army. But even many in the ruling party,
Mapai, could not understandwhy Ben-Gurionwas so eagerto tamperwith the
power centers in which their party wielded influence and to transfer full
political weight to the state. Ben-Gurion'spoliticalview was clear. The devel-
opmentof political partiesin public life had not necessarilyaccordedhis party
a superior position and during the pre-state period had often paralyzed its
ability to act. It was this inclusion of political parties in public life that
enabled Mapam to influence security forces. Statism, Ben-Gurion hoped,
would give a tremendouspower advantageto those who headed the state and
controlled its centralistand autonomousmechanisms. Thus, to the query of
Mapai activists-"Is it conceivable that the party will not be active in the
army?"-Ben-Gurion replied, "It is for the good of the state and not to the
detrimentof the party."28
The controversiessurroundingthe effortsby state'sleadersto form a supra-
party mass army recalled disputes generatedby the Junkers'attemptsto re-
form their army. They, too, ostensibly acted against their own interests by
demandingsuch reforms. But their calculationwas clear. A strong Prussian
25 Anita
Shapira,The ArmyControversy,1948, Ben-Gurion'sStrugglefor Control(Tel-Aviv:
HakibutzHameuchad,1985; YoavGelber, Whythe PalmachWasDissolved (Jerusalem:Shoken,
1986).
26 August 15, 1949, Kneset Protokol(Israel's parliament);Mapai Center, February2, 1950,
Mapai Archive.
27 Roberts, Nation in Arms, 37. 28 Mapai Secretariat,August 7, 1949, Mapai Archive.
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS 271
29
Vagts, The History of Militarism, 59-60.
30
Ibid, 138-9. As for the Frenchcase, Challener'sbook, TheFrenchTheoryof the Nation in
Arms, provides an excellent discussionof the connectionbetweenpartypolitics and the nation-in-
arms.
31 Benny Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian
Refugee Problem, 1947-1949 (Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversity Press, 1989); Ian Lustick, Arabs in a Jewish State (Texas:University of
Texas Press, 1980).
272 URI BEN-ELIEZER
32
July 5, 1949, KnesetProtokol;Tom Segev, TheFirst Israelis (New York:Free Press, 1986);
VardaPilovski, ed., TransitionFrom 'Yishuv'to State 1947-1949 (in Hebrew) (Haifa: Haifa
University, 1988); MordechaiNaor, ed., First Yearto Statehood, 1948-1949 (Hebrew) (Jerusa-
lem: Yad Ben-Zvi, 1988).
33 Mapai Secretariat,June 1, 1950, Mapai Archive.
34 Bamachane (IDF's Bulletin), November 23, 1950; Kneset Protokol, January29, 1951,
Bamachane, September20, 1951; Kneset Protokol, December 20, 1951.
35 Bamachane, November 23, 1950; Bamachane, April 5, 1951.
36 Bamachane,
September20, 1951.
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS 273
Now the army was involved in civilian tasks, just as the immigrantswould
soon take part in the military.Ben-Gurionleft no doubt about the purposeof
the institutionalaffiliationsforged between the new immigrantsand the army.
They would learn, he said, "not armyHebrewbut Hebrew soldiering."37The
army's involvement in educating the new immigrants was part of a vast
projectmeantto turnthe IsraeliJewish populationinto a fighting nation along
the lines of the classic Frenchexamplepresentedin the Frenchassembly in the
following terms:The young men were to go forth to battle;the marriedmen
would forge arms;the women were to make tents and clothing; and the aged
were "to preach hatredof kings and the unity of the Republic."38
Immediately after the end of the 1948 war, in reply to a question from the
army's journal, Ben-Guriondescribed the situation as a "temporarytruce."
During the Knesset debate on the militaryservice law he spoke of an "armed
peace." No one should harborillusions about the future, the prime minister
asserted, warning about the dangers of a "false peace."53On anotherocca-
sion, Ben-Gurionsaid that a "mini-war"was being conductedbetween Israel
and its neighbors, for which the blame lay with those states in the region that
were caught up in a maelstromof disturbances,coups, political chaos and
political assassinations-a volatile situation with unknowableconsequences
which could spreadanywhere. The Knesset listened in silence to the demoni-
49 Haaretz (daily newspaper),March 12, 1950. 50 Bamachane, July 20, 1950.
51 "Draft-Cardsfor Mules," Bamachane,
July 31, 1952.
52 Cook, "The JapaneseReserve
Experience,"271.
53 Bamachane, October 17, 1949; Kneset Protokol,
August 29, 1949.
276 URI BEN-ELIEZER
zation of Israel's neighboring countries, and only one member, from the
CommunistParty,called out: "This is a preludeto the order,it is preparation
for war."54
Ben-Gurionpresented a broad concept of security. Security, he had ex-
plained in 1949, meant more than the army.It entailed stepping up the birth
rate and populatingempty areas.55With the passing of time, Ben-Gurion's
definition of security would be broadenedstill further;and the civil sphere
would shrink correspondingly. Militarism became something universally
sharedwhen Ben-Guriondeclaredin 1955: "Securityis not possible without
immigration . . . security means settlements . . . the conquest of the sea and
air. Securityis economic independence,it meansfosteringresearchand scien-
tific ability . . . voluntarism of the population for difficult and dangerous
missions."56
One of the means resortedto by the leadershipto create a broaddefinition
of securitywas Nahal (the acronymfor FightingPioneerYouth).This special
unit combinedcivil missions like agricultureand land settlementwith combat
roles. The civil missions, however, were part of the broad definition of
security. Whenever a dispute arose between the Defense Ministry and the
kibbutzmovementsover settlementsites for the youth movements'graduates
who comprised Nahal, the ministryhad the last word. To prevent such fric-
tion, the he'ahzut, the security settlement, was created. Its purposes were
based entirelyon militaryconsiderations:The he'ahzutwas the most complete
expression of using settlementfor militarypurposes.57
Nahal, thus, reconstructedsettlementand army into Siamese twins, never
to be separated. If a certain civilian image was attached to Nahal in the
soldiers' dress, their lax discipline, their loose sexual mores, in the informal,
communal relations within their units-and if the army made no effort to
reverse such tendencies, the goal was clear. The statist professionalarmy in
uniform was likely to arouse opposition in a country in which the socialist
ethos prevailed, labor partiesruled, and ideology strove as much to create a
voluntaristicsociety as to form a new state. The special arrangementsand
practices that brought about the nation-in-armsconstitutedthe leadership's
formulafor reconciliationand effectively merged voluntaristicwith coercive
elements. The IDF was not to be a classic state armybased on coercion only
but was to display elements of voluntarism,emotion, pioneering, comrade-
ship, and a militia-like ethos, all imputed to the nation's needs. Ben-
54 KnesetProtokol,August 19, 1952;Davar (daily newspaper),August 19, 20, 1952. See also
Baruch Kimmerling's article about Israel's conception of peace ("ExchangingTerritoriesfor
Peace: A MacrosociologicalApproach,"TheJournalof AppliedBehavioralScience, 23:1 [1987],
13-33).
55 Mapai Center, January12, 1949, Mapai Archive.
56 Kneset Protokol, November 7, 1955.
57 Asnat Shiran, The Policy of SettlementDuring the IndependentWarand After (in Hebrew)
(Tel-Aviv:M. A. thesis, Tel-Aviv University, 1992), 197-98.
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS 277
58
Mapai Council, June 19, 1948, Mapai Archive.
59 Uri Ben-Eliezer, "Israel'sMyth of Pioneeringand the Elusive Distinction between Society
and State," in Megamot (forthcoming, 1995).
60 Haaretz,
September28, 1953.
61 Shabtai
Tevet, Moshe Dayan (Tel-Aviv:Shoken, 1971), 355.
278 URI BEN-ELIEZER
62
Haaretz, October7, 12, 15, 21, 1953.
63 Bamachane,
September18, 1956; October3, 1956.
64 Teveth, Moshe Dayan, 399; Uzi Benziman, Sharon, an Israeli Caesar (New York:Adama
Books, 1985), 50; Uri Milstein, By Blood and Fire (in Hebrew;Tel-Aviv:Levine-Epstein, 1975)
176-93.
65 Bamachane, October 5, 12, 1955.
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS 279
76
"Militarism,"in Kerning,Marxism, Communismand WesternSociety.
77 Berl Reptur,HistadrutCentralCommittee, November 10, 1955; HistadrutArchive.
78 Kneset
Protokol, November 2, 1955.
79 Bar-On, The Gates of Gaza, 59-67; Bar-On, Challenge and Quarrel, 47-50.
80 Bar-On,
Challenge and Quarrel, 82.
81 Albert Soboul, The French Revolution, 1787-1799 (New York: Vintage Books, 1974),
268-9.
82
Cook, "The JapaneseReserve Experience."
83 KnesetProtokol,June4, 1956; Bar-On,The Gates of Gaza, 103-4; Bar-On,Challenge and
Quarrel, 83-84.
282 URI BEN-ELIEZER
Solomon" and that the occupied areas would become part of Israel, part of
"the third Jewish kingdom." The message was replete with biblical expres-
sions and images, including a quotation from the Song of the Sea, which
warns other nations that Israel is strong and triumphantbecause the Lord is
with them.87Thus, the nation'spast, or its interpretationof thatpast, was also
mobilized in order to justify war and conquest.
In short order, however, Israel was forced to withdrawfrom Sinai under
pressurefrom the United Nations and an ultimatumof the superpowers.It is
possible that Ben-Gurionlearned a lesson from Sinai, as his views became
more moderateafterward.88But the mechanismof the nation-in-arms,to the
creation of which Ben-Gurioncontributedso powerfully, continued to func-
tion decades later.
CONCLUSION
Based on the literaturewhich emphasizes the centralityof the state and the
state's elite in the making of a nation, this essay dealt with the way in which
an ethnic populationwas constructedas a nation-in-arms.Following the his-
torical precedentsand the data on Israel, the nation-in-armsshould be seen as
a form of militaristicpolitics characterizedby the attemptto turnthe affairsof
the militaryand the imminenceof war into the business of the whole popula-
tion, making them the nation's occupationand concern.
In contrastto the 1948 war, which was characterizedby insufficientprepa-
rations and the lack of a plan for activating the entire population, the 1956
Sinai Campaignwas the resultof lengthy preparationsby the state. It included
not only the creationof a strongmass armybut also practicesthatblurredthe
distinction between civil and military,a broad definition of security, and the
inculcation of the ideas that war is not always the less-preferredchoice and
that peace is not always worth the price.
Scholarsof Israelimilitarysociology have tendedto cite the nation-in-arms
as a mechanismthat enables regularcivilian life to proceed underconditions
of war. It does not preventdemocracyand does not encouragemilitarycoups
because it provides a link between the needs of the nation and the interestsof
the army in a situation of war. These scholars continued the traditionthat
started perhaps with FrederickStern's famous, but politically biased 1957
book, The CitizenArmy,and continuedwith Janowitz,Rappoport,Luckham,
and others89;all can be labelled under the category of the "civil-military
paradigm."This article describes the Israeli nation-in-armsdifferently-as
one in which the populationwas constructedas a fighting nation, not for the
sake of a liberal democracybut for the purposeof war. Although the current
theory claims that since the modem state requiredthe population to under-
write its expendituresas taxpayersor to serve in the wars as conscript sol-
diers, it was forced to pay attention to the opinions of its subjects and,
therefore, gave them a voice-in the Swedish expression:"one soldier, one
rifle, one vote"-generally throughvarious kinds of elected bodies.90 I sug-
gest a different model. According to the nation-in-armsdescribed here, the
population'sthrustfor political participationand involvement,partof Israel's
political culture, is channeledto non-liberalcollectivistic patternsof serving
in the army for the sake of the nation.91
In analyzing Israel as a nation-in-arms,in historical and political, rather
than in functional terms, I intended not to demonstratea case of an excep-
tionally high degree of manpowermobilizationfor a possible war but, rather,
to presentthe nation-in-armsas a mechanismcomposed of both rationaland
emotionalelements, therebyblurringthe differencebetween civilian and mili-
tary institutionsand turningthem into one entity. Thus, the business of war
becomes something embedded within the spirit of the nation, a part of the
orderof things. In this respect, the Israelicase resemblesFrance,Prussia, and
Japanduringcertainhistoricalperiods. Anothersimilaritylies in the fact that
in these cases the nation-in-armsis the result of both party and national
politics. It is in fact the combinationof these two variables, the internaland
the external,which makesthe nation-in-armsan importantmodel, not perhaps
as an explanatoryvariablefor wars but certainlyas a variablefor describing
the culturalconditionsthatmake war a legitimate, even necessary,possibility.
Ever since the Sinai Campaign, Israel has been a nation-in-armsas the
resultof an institutionalprocess thatbegan with a deliberatepolicy and ended
with a mechanism that embodies "the will of the nation"no less than "the
power of the state."Israelis a nation-in-arms,not only because it continuesto
have a mass national army that is involved in wars but because its wars and
territorialoccupationsare not carriedout by the army alone. In practice, this
means that various organizationsthat are supposed to be civil-such as the
bus monopoly (Egged), the civilian armed settlers and the Civil Administra-
tion in the occupied territories,the Society for the Preservationof Nature-
are all engaged in security missions and tasks.
Israel, as a nation-in-arms,displays as well, social institutions that are
located on the seam between the civil and the militaryand functionto fuse the
two spheresinto one entity. To enumeratesome of them: Galei Zahal, a radio
station staffed by both civilians and soldiers;voluntaryassociations, like the
90 S. E. Finer, "StateBuilding, State Boundariesand BorderControl,"Social Science Infor-
mation, 13 (1974), 79-126; Hobsbawm,Nations and Nationalism, 80.
91 Uri Ben-Eliezer, "The Meaningof Political Participationin a Non-LiberalDemocracy:The
Israeli Example," ComparativePolitics, 25:4 (June 1983).
ISRAEL AS A NATION-IN-ARMS 285