BAC-14 - Rasmussen - Genesis and Cosmos. Basil and Origen On Genesis 1 and Cosmology

Genesis and Cosmos
The Bible in Ancient Christianity
General Editor
D. Jeffrey Bingham
Editorial Board
Lewis Ayres
Brian E. Daley
Robin M. Jensen
Christoph Markschies
Peter Martens
VOLUME 14
The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bac

Genesis and Cosmos
Basil and Origen on Genesis 1 and Cosmology
By
Adam Rasmussen
LEIDEN | BOSTON
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Rasmussen, Adam, author.

Title: Genesis and cosmos : Basil and Origen on Genesis 1 and cosmology / by
Adam Rasmussen.
Description: Boston : Brill, 2019. | Series: The Bible in ancient
Christianity, ISSN 1542-1295 ; VOLUME 14 | Includes bibliographical
references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2019005537 (print) | LCCN 2019011009 (ebook) |
ISBN 9789004396937 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004396920 (hardback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Basil, Saint, Bishop of Caesarea, approximately 329–379. |
Origen.—Influence. | Bible. Genesis, I—Criticism, interpretation, etc. |
Cosmology, Ancient. | Cosmogony. | Religion and science.
Classification: LCC BR65.B36 (ebook) | LCC BR65.B36 R37 2019 (print) |
DDC 261.5/509—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2019005537
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ISSN 1542-1295
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τῇ γυναικί μου
∵
Contents
Introduction: Scripture and Science 1
1 Origen, Basil, and Secular Education 13

1 Origen of Alexandria 14
2 Basil 27
3 Conclusion 40
2 The Interpretation of Scripture 42

1 Origen 44
2 Basil: Disciple of Origen 66
3 Conclusion 78
3 “The earth was invisible and unformed”: Prime Matter and Creatio
ex Nihilo 81
1 Hylomorphism 83
2 Pre-existent Matter and Creatio ex Nihilo before Origen 86
3 Origen 90
4 Basil 101
5 Interpretation and Analysis 112
4 “A separator between water and water”: Cosmology and Water

above the Sky 118
1 Origen 120
2 Basil 134
5 “Let them be for signs”: Astrology 148

1 Greco-Roman Astrology 151
2 Origen 156
3 Basil 172
Conclusion: Basil and the Legacy of Origen 186

1 Basil and the Anti-Origenist Movement 188
2 Origen and Basil as Models for the Modern Science–Religion Debate 189
Bibliography 195
Index 210
Introduction
Scripture and Science
The question of the relationship between the Bible and science is current but
not new. There are many aspects to the question, but then as now Genesis 1,
which describes the origin and nature of the cosmos, plays an outsized role.
The earliest interpreters of Scripture, such as Philo, grappled with the problem
of cosmology. Two of these interpreters were Origen of Alexandria and Basil of
Ceasarea (also known as St. Basil the Great), Greek theologians of the third and
fourth centuries, respectively. They are a natural pair: each received a secular
education, studying the writings of the Greek philosophers and scholars, but
eventually left their secular studies behind in order to pursue a life dedicated
to theological controversy and preaching. Both experienced the problem of the
relationship between the Bible and secular knowledge personally, not just the-
oretically. This personal aspect of the question makes them excellent subjects
for study, as they engaged questions of cosmology with interest and knowl-
edge. Basil’s writings show clear signs that he took inspiration from Origen,
whom he studied and admired. It is my belief, which has motivated this study,
that their approach to the problem of Scripture and science has something to
teach those of us today who still try to answer it.
The horns of the Bible–science dilemma are well known and well worn:
one gives way to the other. Christian fundamentalists reject science, while
atheistic scientists (and scientistic atheists)1 reject the Bible. A saying of the
third-century Latin theologian Tertullian has become, rightly or wrongly, the
textbook slogan for the fundamentalist rejection of secular knowledge: “What
has Athens to do with Jerusalem?”2 The rejection of religion on the basis of
science has seen something of a resurgence this century, as illustrated by the
massive success of The God Delusion by Oxford biologist Richard Dawkins.3
Although the masses gravitate toward either of these two extremes (science vs.
Scripture), it is possible to find a middle ground. Many Christians today seek
a mediation or conciliation between science and their faith.4 The same was
1 “Scientism” is the idea that everything can theoretically be explained by scientific, material
causes. Other types of explanation, such as those offered by religion, are ipso facto invalid.
2 Tertullian, De praesriptione haereticorum 7,9 (553,26–27 Oehler): Quid ergo Athenis et
Hierosolymis?
3 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2006).
4 For example, from an astrophysicist, Stephen M. Barr, Modern Physics and Ancient Faith
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003); from a physicist, Ian G. Barbour,
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396937_002

2 Introduction
true of Christians of the past. Some scholars of early Christianity have already
examined the question of how some notable early Christian theologians dealt
with the problem of the Bible and cosmology.5 It is within this field of inquiry
that this book belongs.
For Basil’s thoughts on cosmology, one must especially study his nine ser-
mons called the Hexaemeron, which means “six days,” i.e., Genesis 1. They are
a fertile field for cosmology and theology because Basil sprinkled them with
numerous references to the physics, cosmology, and biology of his day. In them,
Basil drew upon his own education in Greek philosophy and science, discuss-
ing a number of different theories and hypotheses, usually weighing in with
his own opinion. Although a bishop, he was well versed in secular studies. He
also used, without saying so, writings of Origen. The vast majority of Origen’s
works, unfortunately, have been lost. Thankfully, some crucial excerpts of his
commentary on the book of Genesis have survived, as well as a sermon on
Genesis 1. In these and other works of his he, no less than Basil, displayed his
profound erudition, both secular and scriptural.
In the hexaemeral sermons Basil encountered three specific cosmologi-
cal problems that Origen also encountered, namely, the nature of matter
(Gen 1:2), the water above the sky (Gen 1:6–7), and astrology (Gen 1:14). These
three problems are the focus of this book, and make up its third, fourth, and
fifth chapters. They do not, of course, exhaust every statement Origen and Basil
ever made about cosmology, let alone ancient science generally.6 In addressing
these three problems, Basil drew upon his knowledge of Origen, though he did
not always agree with him. The method of this study is to specify how Basil’s
Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues (rev. ed.; NY: HarperCollins: 1997);
and from a theologian, James A. Wiseman, Theology and Modern Science: Quest for Coherence
(NY: Continuum, 2002).
5 For example, Richard A. Norris, Jr., God and World in Early Christian Theology (NY: The
Seabury Press, 1965), which covers Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian, and Origen (129–56); and Peter
Bouteneff, Beginnings: Ancient Christian Readings of the Biblical Creation Narratives (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2008), which discusses both Origen’s (94–118) and Basil’s inter-
pretations (124–40).
6 Mark DelCogliano, for example, has shown how Basil used his knowledge about ancient
conceptions of time to refute his theological opponent Eunomius in their debate about the
divine nature of the Son of God. DelCogliano opens his article with an affirmation of what is
the central thesis of this work: “It is said that philosophy is the handmaiden of theology. This
is certainly true for Basil of Caesarea” (“Basil of Caesarea versus Eunomius of Cyzicus on the
Nature of Time: A Patristic Reception of the Critique of Plato,” Vigiliae Christianae 68, no. 5
(2014): (498–532) 498.
Scripture and Science 3
responses to the questions compare and contrast with the ones Origen gave to
the same questions.
In the first chapter, I will look at Origen and Basil’s upbringings and early
career decisions. They had much in common: both received a classical, secu-
lar education while also being instructed in the Bible by their Christian fami-
lies. Basil even had a familial connection to Origen. He says that his religious
formation came primarily from his grandmother, Macrina. She, in turn, was
converted to Christianity during the evangelization of Pontus by St. Gregory
the Wonderworker. Basil believed (and many still do) that this Gregory was the
same Gregory who wrote a panegyric to Origen, and to whom Origen wrote a
letter advising him to pursue theology rather than law. This connection helps
explain why Basil drew so heavily upon Origen’s theology, even while main-
taining a guarded distance due to the brewing controversies over “Origenism.”
The life trajectories of the two theologians were similar. Upon attaining adult-
hood, each embarked upon a secular career: Origen as a “grammarian” (litera-
ture teacher) and Basil as a rhetor, who for a time pursued advanced studies in
Athens. Later, they abandoned their secular careers in favor of theology, and
both men were ordained presbyters (and in Basil’s case bishop).
Their shared attitude toward the secular education they received was am-
bivalent. It is best expressed through a metaphor coined by Origen: secular
studies (especially philosophy) are the “servants” of Christianity. As a ser-
vant, education helps the interpreter to discover the correct interpretation of
Scripture. Nevertheless, also as a servant, it always remains subject to its mis-
tress, Christianity. Each theologian worked out the details from this common,
theoretical starting point. Basil, a bishop and polemicist, had a more conserva-
tive mindset than Origen. He placed the accent on the subordination of secular
knowledge to divine revelation. In his rhetoric, Basil often excoriated philoso-
phers for their convoluted and mutually exclusive opinions, which fell short of
simple biblical truth. Despite this rhetoric, he often used secular knowledge
in his sermons and treatises. Origen, a speculative thinker, placed the accent
upon the usefulness of secular knowledge. He was freer and bolder than Basil,
though by no means captured by philosophy (as has sometimes been claimed
about him). In fact, he was just as willing as Basil to reject a philosophical idea
if it contradicted Christian doctrine.
The second chapter is an examination of both authors’ scriptural herme-
neutics: how do they interpret the Bible? This is a necessary prelude to looking
at the particular interpretations they give of Genesis 1. We cannot understand
specific biblical exegeses without first understanding an exegete’s methodol-
ogy. Basil adopted the same system that Origen developed. Origen drew upon
4 Introduction
the thought of Philo, a Jewish contemporary of St. Paul whose views were re-
jected by rabbinic Judaism at the same time they were being taken up by some
Christian theologians. Origen divided the Bible into three parts, which he
likened to the three components of humanity: body, soul, and spirit.
The “body” is the plain, literal meaning of a passage. This meaning is ex-
pressed to the general, “simple” reader. Origen adds a major caveat, which has
led to much controversy: according to him, some passages do not have a “body.”
That is, they should not be taken literally. For example, Gen 3:21 says that God
made garments of skin for Adam and Eve. Origen thought this and similar pas-
sages to be absurd or impossible if taken literally. God put such absurdities and
falsehoods into the Bible in order to alert the discerning, spiritual reader to
search for a higher meaning. This kind of allegorical approach had precedent
in some interpreters of Homer, who also struggled with difficult and offensive
passages.
The “soul” of Scripture, according to Origen, is a nonliteral (figurative, alle-
gorical) interpretation that speaks about virtue and vice. It is a way of reading
the Bible designed to provide moral instruction. Rather than being just history
lessons and ancient Israelite legislation, the stories and laws in the Bible tell us
how to live, if only we can decode them properly. Origen’s classic example of this
kind of “psychic” exegesis is Paul’s interpretation of Deut 25:4 in 1 Cor 9:9–10.
Paul took a statute about not muzzling oxen and turned it into a moral in-
struction about paying missionaries for their labor. According to Origen, every
passage of the Bible contains such a hidden, psychic meaning, though these
meanings can only be discovered by readers who have begun to progress in the
spiritual (ascetic) lifestyle.
Finally, the highest (or deepest) level of Scripture is its “spirit.” This is a sec-
ond, distinct allegorical interpretation, concerned not with morality but with
theology. Deep truths about God and Christ are hidden beneath every bibli-
cal passage. Such spiritual messages can be puzzled out only by the “perfect,”
that is, those (like Origen) fully practicing the ascetic lifestyle. Although this
sounds very esoteric, in reality Origen often delivered these spiritual interpre-
tations in his sermons preached in church, right alongside literal and moral
interpretations. Since his congregations must have been made up of ordinary,
married people, they at least had access to the spiritual meaning of the Bible
through him.
In his various sermons, particularly those on the Psalms, Basil uses Origen’s
threefold system. His friend St. Gregory Nazianzen also confirms that this was
Basil’s hermeneutic. Yet in Basil’s nine sermons on Genesis 1, Basil eschewed al-
legorical readings in favor of a literal approach. In the final homily, he responds
to criticism by deriding allegorical exegesis, likening it to the interpretation of
dreams! Did he turn his back on Origenian exegesis after so many years? No.
Although his rhetoric does give that misleading impression, the issue is one
of biblical genre. In his struggle against dualistic theologies and cosmologies
(associated with Gnosticism), Basil insisted that Genesis 1 should be taken lit-
erally. The reason was that dualists supported their worldview by appealing
to allegorical readings of the “darkness” and “abyss” of Genesis 1, which they
interpreted to be the cosmic principle of Evil, locked in an eternal struggle
with Good (God). Against this, Basil maintained that Genesis 1 means what
it says: everything God made, including the darkness, the abyss, and the sea
creatures that live in it, is intrinsically good. There is no cosmic Evil. The scrip-
tural cosmogony is not a cryptic myth in need of allegorical deciphering. It is
a straightforward, true account of the origin of the universe. Basil’s insistence
upon a literal reading brings him into conflict with Origen, for whom the first
three chapters of Genesis were quintessential examples of texts not meant to
be taken literally.
In chapter 3, I will look at the first issue Origen and Basil encountered
in reading Genesis 1, which is the “unformed earth” of v. 2. The word un-
formed (ἀκατασκεύαστος) suggested to Christians as early as St. Justin the
Platonic-Aristotelian concept of “formless matter.” The idea was that everything
in the universe is constituted from some undifferentiated, shapeless stuff. This
“prime matter” was the passive principle that, when it encountered the active
principle (God), became everything we see—the physical cosmos. This matter
became perceptible only when it took particular “forms,” like a rock, a tree, or
an animal. (This theory is called “hylomorphism.”) Interpreting Gen 1:1–2 in the
light of this scientific theory made for a neat harmony of science and Scripture.
The danger of this neat idea, first perceived by Theophilus of Antioch in the
late second century, was that such a view of matter, if not carefully qualified,
would make matter equal to God. The universe would draw its beginning, not
from one eternal principle, but two: God and matter. Indeed, Plato compared
God to a father and the “receptacle” (which ancient philosophers assimilated
to Aristotle’s “matter”) to a mother. It was necessary for Christians to state, as
Theophilus did, that prime matter itself must first have been made by God
out of nothing (ex nihilo). By the standards of philosophy, this qualification
seemed absurd, since nothing can come from nothing.
We know from Origen that some educated Christians took this objection
seriously. In order to get around the problem of having nothing come from
nothing (it can’t come from God, since God is one and uncompounded), they
rejected the theory of hylomorphism. According to them, only the “forms”
exist: there is no such thing as “matter.” This allowed them to postulate a single
principle of being (God) without having to argue that nothing could come from
6 Introduction
nothing. Origen acknowledged the cleverness of this point of view but rejected
it. Hylomorphism was just too useful a theory to be thrust aside. Without it,
how can we understand how one thing becomes another (for example, sand
becoming glass)? It is the matter that remains constant throughout all changes
of “form.” (Hylomorphism is the ancient equivalent to the law of conservation
of energy.) Hylomorphism was a useful “servant.” Nevertheless, the “apostol-
ic preaching” (Christian dogma) was clear that God made the universe from
nothing—there are not two first principles of existence.
Origen’s solution was to argue that prime matter was not eternal and really
did come from nothing. His argument essentially depended upon two con-
cepts: God’s power and God’s providence. If prime matter could exist without
God having made it, then, he argues, the “forms,” too, should be able to come
into existence without God—in which case God is not Creator! Furthermore,
it is rather lucky that God happened to find all this prime matter just lying
around, ready to be made into a good universe. Had he not, he would have
been powerless to make it, if matter is uncreated. If we entertain this hypoth-
esis, then God’s providence is meaningless. God did not provide the matter
needed, but simply got lucky. Either that, Origen says, or there is a providence
higher than God that made the matter available to him—which is ridiculous
blasphemy. The bottom-line for Origen was that philosophers failed to grasp
the scope of God’s unlimited power. God can do what seems impossible: to
make matter out of nothing.
Basil tackles this same problem in his second homily on Genesis. Unlike
Origen, he divorces the scriptural text from the theory of hylomorphism. It’s
not a question of explaining how God made prime matter but of showing that
the text is not talking about that at all. “Unformed” means that God first made
the earth in an incomplete state, because it was not yet furnished with all the
plants and animals that would later make it complete. Only after clearing that
up could Basil refute the idea that matter is eternal. Here he clearly shows his
dependence upon Origen. He uses the same arguments, although in a more
compact and rhetorical form. His goal was not to write a philosophical argu-
ment as Origen did, but to inform and entertain his hearers. By focusing on
the false analogy people make between God and human craftsmen, who must
make from a pre-existing material (an analogy Origen mentions), Basil effec-
tively derides the view of the philosophers as foolish. They should have lis-
tened to the plain teaching of Scripture instead of trying to reason about God
based on human analogies.
In his exuberance to refute the idea of uncreated, eternal matter, Basil nev-
ertheless maintained the theory of hylomorphism. Like Origen, he had no in-
terest in attacking philosophical theories as such. In fact, he at one point even
uses hylomorphism to help explain what we can and cannot know of God. Just
as we cannot in any way perceive prime matter itself, but only the particular
“forms” it takes, neither can we know God is—his essence. We can perceive
only God’s attributes as revealed through his works, which are thus analogous
to the “forms” that matter takes. Not only does Basil not reject the philosophi-
cal theory of hylomorphism, he uses it, like a servant, to help in theological
disputation.
In chapter 4, I will examine Gen 1:6–7 and the perennial problem of the
water above the sky. The Hebrew cosmology imagined water above the sky,
from which comes rain. The standard Aristotelian cosmology of the Greeks
was incompatible with this. According to it, each of the four elements had a
natural position, and thus they settle into four concentric spheres, which taken
together constitute the cosmos. At the bottom, the “heaviest” element is the
earth, which naturally forms a sphere (a point Basil makes). Just above that
is the sphere of water (the oceans). Next is the sphere of the air (the atmo-
sphere), above which is the sphere of fire. According to most (including Basil
himself), the sphere of fire is heaven. Within this physical system, it makes no
sense for there to be water above the air, let alone above heaven.
Origen was aware of this problem, and it helped guide his entire interpre-
tation of the opening verses of Genesis 1. On this matter, he closely followed
Philo. According to Philo, there were actually two creations: first a spiritual,
eternal creation, and then a physical, temporal creation. The first five verses
of Genesis refer to this spiritual creation: the “heaven” of verse 1 is the spiritual
realm where God and the angels live. The “earth” of verse 2 is the spiritual ar-
chetype (Platonic “idea”) of the physical earth God will make later in vv. 9–10.
The “abyss” of verse 3 is hell. The “waters” of v. 3 are spiritual powers (angels
and demons). Since Origen’s system included room for two distinct allegorical
readings, he adds a psychic interpretation of these “waters”: the spiritual per-
son, who spends their time contemplating heaven, partakes of these waters,
as Jesus himself says (John 4:14; 7:38). The wicked person, in contrast, partakes
of the waters of the abyss: they are plagued by demons. The light of vv. 4–5 is
the divine light, perceptible to the mind alone, not the eyes. Naturally, Origen
connects the divine light to Jesus Christ (John 1:4–5,8–9; 8:12; 9:5). The “day
one” of v. 5 refers to eternity. Everything changes with v. 6. Now God makes a
physical earth and sky—the cosmos. These are patterned after the aforemen-
tioned spiritual heaven and earth. Because the physical sky is the boundary
(ὅρος) between the worlds, it is also given the name “heaven” (οὐρανός), even
though it is only a copy.
If we possessed Origen’s commentary on Genesis, we would be able to say
more about how Origen took all this. But it is clear from what we do possess
8 Introduction
that he accepted Philo’s general framework. When the physical sky was cre-
ated, the spiritual “water” (the angels) remained above. For Origen, the lower
“water” here does not refer to physical water at all, but to the “water” of the un-
derworld (the demons). Those are the two “waters” kept separate by the physi-
cal cosmos made in vv. 6–7. Actual, physical water is not mentioned until v. 9,
when it is gathered into the seas, right where it belongs above the earth.
In a major departure from Origen, Basil rejected the whole idea of a twofold
creation in Genesis 1. Consistent with his view that it should be taken liter-
ally, he defended the scriptural cosmology and cosmogony at face-value. Basil
did not interpret the opening verses of Genesis as being about spiritual things.
There is, however, one exception: he refers to a traditional interpretation of
“day one” as meaning eternity. This is the only instance in all nine homilies of
him allowing for a more-than-literal interpretation of Genesis 1. He permitted
it only because it was traditional. It stood alongside his own literal interpreta-
tion of “day one,” which was that it was simply the first day. One day, by itself,
is a symbol of eternity, Basil concedes.
Basil distinguishes the heaven of v. 1 from the later “firmament” that God
makes in vv. 6–7, but in a different way than Philo and Origen. The former
heaven is the actual, physical sky, which Basil says has a smoke-like substance.
The second “heaven” is called the “firmament” only because it is firm compared
to the proper heaven. Rejecting the Philonian-Origenian etymology that de-
rived heaven (οὐρανός) from boundary (ὅρος), Basil says it came from see (ὁράω).
This “firmament” or “heaven” is nothing more than the clouds that we see when
we look up! The water above this “heaven” is not liquid but gaseous (“aerial
water”), which explains how it stays aloft. Since water on the Greek view was
inherently cold, this massive body of “aerial” water keeps the earth from being
burned up by the sun. This global cooling system will eventually run out of
water, which is when the earth will be dissolved by fire, just as Scripture says.
Basil’s solution to the problem is ingenious. It is unclear how he thought it fit
with ancient physics: if the water were actually air, all would be well, but air
was defined as hot, not cold like water. As water, it is out of place above air. In
any case, Basil did not reject the standard physics and tried to make the scrip-
tural account work with it. If he had been a fundamentalist, he would have
rejected physics.
Basil was aware of Origen’s view: he says that he has a bone to pick with
“some from the Church” who allegorize the waters of Genesis. He means ei-
ther Origen himself or perhaps fourth-century Origenists, who in any case only
built upon what he already had written. Here Basil mentions that they con-
nect the physical oceans to the demons by saying that the turbulent waves of
the ocean are an image of the chaotic madness of the demons. It is probable,
though uncertain, that Origen made this connection in his lost commen-
tary. Even though Basil criticizes Origen here, he omits his name—a sign of
respect for his master. Basil distinguishes Origen’s interpretation, which he
personally rejects, from the heretical interpretations of the Gnostics. This is
an inter-Church dispute in which Basil’s literal exegesis conflicted with the
Philonian-Origenian tradition. By no means did Basil associate Origen with
heretics. Nevertheless, Basil’s peculiar view of Genesis 1 as a literal cosmology
required him to reject Origen’s view on principle.
In chapter 5, I will examine the third and final scientific problem that
Origen and Basil confronted in their exegeses of Genesis 1: the role of the
stars—astrology. Verse 14 says that they were made “for signs.” To Origen (again
following Philo), this suggested astrology: the regular but complex movements
of the stars and planets contain information about the future. In the ancient
world, astrology was considered a legitimate science, indistinguishable from
what in modernity has come to be called “astronomy.” As one of the four basic
sciences, it, too, was a servant of Christianity. Consequently, Origen accepted
astrology on a basic level. However, he radically qualified its nature in the light
of Christianity, to make the servant submit to its mistress.
For Origen, there were two problems with astrology: fatalism and genethlial-
ogy (the casting of nativities, today called “horoscopes”). Fatalism is incompat-
ible with free will, which Origen considered part of the “apostolic preaching.”
After all, if people do not have free will, there is no possibility for moral respon-
sibility and divine judgment. And yet do not biblical prophecies prove that
the future is pre-determined? Origen argues that, paradoxical as it may seem,
God’s foreknowledge does not cause the future, but rather the event (future to
us) is the cause of God’s foreknowledge. The fact that information about the
future may occasionally be revealed to some people changes nothing. It is the
same way with the stars: the information they contain about the future does
not cause that future, but only signifies it.
The second problem is the casting of nativities, which Christians rejected
as a forbidden form of divination. Rather than just condemning it as taboo
magic, as a fundamentalist would do, Origen disproved its practicability by
drawing upon arguments made by philosophers, notably Sextus Empiricus.
The bottom-line of the refutation is that the sky rotates much too quickly to be
measured accurately. Origen makes several points, all of which he had read in
philosophers before him. For example, how does an astrologer explain cultural
customs, such as circumcision, that occur to all people of a given race, regard-
less of when each individual is born? Or, on the other hand, why of all the peo-
ple born at a certain time does one become a king and another a pauper? Upon
intellectual scrutiny, the practice of genethlialogy is shown to be impossible.
10 Introduction
Nevertheless, Origen accepted the idea that the stars contain information
about the future. This is proof of the high esteem that he accorded secular
studies. The idea that the two worlds—heavenly and earthly—were inter-
connected was an intellectual commonplace prior to modern science. Even
though astrologers were incapable of making accurate horoscopes, Origen
believed that the angels were able to read the stars in order to learn about
God’s plans. In addition, God gave this angelic power to certain extraordinary
spiritual individuals, such as the patriarch Jacob. This example Origen took
from a lost apocryphal work called the “Prayer of Jacob.” In this way, he main-
tained the theory of astrology in an intellectualized, spiritualized form that
bore no resemblance to the popular practices Christians condemned and that
eschewed fatalistic implications.
Basil launches into a polemic against astrology when he encounters
Gen 1:14 in his hexaemeral sermons. First, though, he deconstructs the connec-
tion between the biblical verse and astrology. The “signs” that the Bible refers to
have nothing to do with astrology and future events, but only with the weather.
People experienced with the sky, like sailors and farmers, make predictions
about the weather based on its appearance as well as that of the sun and moon.
The way he separates the biblical text from the problem of astrology is exactly
the same thing he did when he dealt with the “unformed earth,” which he be-
lieved had nothing to do with prime matter. As for astrology itself, he recycles
Origen’s arguments, much as he did when refuting the eternity of prime mat-
ter. In explaining how the sky moves too quickly to be measured accurately,
Basil reproduces two sentences from Origen’s commentary almost verbatim, a
clear sign of dependence upon his Genesis commentary fragment preserved in
the Philocalia. Since he also makes some points not found in Origen, we know
that he had other sources of information as well, similar to Sextus Empiricus.
Basil had no new arguments but deployed the standard ones he learned from
his studies with his usual rhetorical skill.
On the basic theory of astrology—the correspondence between heaven and
earth—Basil is conspicuously silent. We cannot infer from his separation of
Gen 1:14 from astrology, nor from his rejection of genethlialogy and fatalism,
that he rejected it. In fact, Basil mentions astrological questions specifically
when giving examples of the legitimacy of secular studies. This, combined with
his general esteem for Origen, make it likely that he accepted the view that the
movements of the stars have significance for life on earth. Furthermore, he
says nothing of Origen’s theory of angelic astrology. If he rejected it, he never
says so. Admittedly, this is an argument from silence.
There is, however, one astrological idea of Origen’s that Basil explicitly re-
jected: that the stars are alive. Like other aspects of astrology, this was a notion
widely accepted by ancient thinkers (though not Aristotle). For Philo, Origen,
and many others, the beauty of the stars and their perfectly-regular movements
indicated that they, too, possessed spirit like us: they are alive. The cosmic fall
caused all spirits to become embodied: the better ones became the heavenly
bodies, superior to human, earthly bodies. This was not a punishment, but a
form of service, since the rest of the physical cosmos needed their light, as
well as their movements to mark time. To Origen, it was “beyond all stupidity”
to doubt that these astral bodies are alive. Basil rejected this notion. In fact,
he seems to turn Origen’s own words against him: to imagine that the stars
are alive, Basil says, is “more than madness.” (Since Origen’s words here are
today preserved only in Latin translation, we do not know if this was an exact
quotation.) Basil was not alone among Christians in rejecting this concept. It
was one of several points of “Origenism,” already becoming controversial in
the 370’s, that were eventually condemned by the authorities of the fifth cen-
tury. That Basil chose to speak out against this view (albeit in passing) shows
again that he was aware of and agreed with the growing criticism of Origen on
this point. That he, at the same time, chose not to name Origen shows he still
admired the great theologian.
My study of these three problems proves that the theory of secular educa-
tion as “servant” held true for both Origen and Basil in practice. In each case,
both accepted secular theories and even used them to promote their theology:
hylomorphism, elemental physics and cosmology, and astrology. The limits to
which they both held were imposed by Christianity. Prime matter, while real,
was made by God and not eternal. Astrological fatalism is contrary to free will,
moral responsibility, and divine judgment. Casting horoscopes was shown to
be impossible (rather than simply condemned as a form of demonic magic).
Where the two really disagreed was on the super-heavenly water and, more
broadly, the nature of Genesis 1 as a text. Here we see Basil’s more conservative
bent: for him, Genesis 1 had to be taken literally, which meant there really must
be a body of water in the sky. Even here, though, Basil labored to make sense of
such a notion through an explanation that, while still literal, strayed far from
what seems to be the text’s plain meaning. Basil ruled out Origen’s allegorical
solution to the problem, but not as though it were heretical. Basil’s reason is
not so much that it lacked plausibility but that he was determined to maintain
the literal validity of Genesis over against dualisms. The best way to do that
was to insist on the literal reasonableness of Genesis 1. That the two disagreed
on this point is a salutary reminder that the “servant” metaphor is not a system
that provides ready-made answers to difficult questions. It is a way of thinking
intended to integrate two different spheres of knowledge: scientific and divine.
How one actually squares them in particular cases can vary widely.
12 Introduction
I conclude this introduction by stating that, like all historical theologians,

I undertake my study in the belief that what we can learn from the Fathers of
the Church has something useful to say to Christians today. This is not a work
of purely antiquarian interest (as if any work of history ever were). Richard
Norris has noted the profound impact modern science and technology have
made on Christians and turned to the Fathers for answers. He writes:
The question of the Christian appropriation of secular scientific and phil-

osophical ideas [has] been canvassed before, most notably perhaps in the
early centuries of the Church’s existence, and not without constructive
result. It may be, therefore, that some light can be shed on the modern
problem by study of its ancient analogue.7
Likewise, Peter Bouteneff, referring to the perennial debate about whether

Genesis 1 should be taken literally, writes: “The evolution of the early Christian
interpretation of Genesis 1–3 is of more than antiquarian interest: like all good
history, it has the potential to illuminate the present.”8 Their sentiments are
my own.
7 Norris, God and World, 5.

8 Bouteneff, Beginnings, ix.
Chapter 1
Origen, Basil, and Secular Education
Basil and Origen are a natural pair who had much in common. In this chapter,
I look at their upbringings and early career decisions. Intellectually, the two
are united by their shared experience and opinion of the secular education
(παιδεία) in which they were educated as children. Basil is connected to Origen
through his own grandmother, Macrina, who converted to the Christian faith
through the evangelistic efforts of Gregory the Wonderworker. Basil believed
that this Gregory was the same Gregory who wrote a thanksgiving address to
Origen, and to whom Origen wrote a letter advising him to pursue theology
rather than law. This faith she passed on to her grandson. This connection helps
explain why Basil drew so heavily upon Origen’s theology, even while main-
taining a guarded distance due to the brewing controversies over “Origenism.”
The life trajectories of the two theologians were similar. Upon attaining adult-
hood, each embarked upon a secular career: Origen as a “grammarian” (litera-
ture teacher) and Basil as a rhetor, who for a time pursued advanced studies in
Athens. Later, they abandoned their secular careers in favor of theology, and
both men were ordained presbyters (and in Basil’s case bishop).
As theologians, they came to believe that that same learning, despite its
shortcomings and dangers, could be made to serve the Christian religion. From
their similar experience of secular education, as well as Basil’s direct study-
ing of Origen, arose similar attitudes. Their shared attitude is well expressed
through a metaphor coined by Origen: secular studies (especially philosophy)
are the “servants” of Christianity. As a servant, education helps the interpreter
to discover the correct interpretation of Scripture. Nevertheless, also as a ser-
vant, it always remains subject to its mistress, Christianity. Each theologian
worked out the details from this common, theoretical starting point. Although
Basil admired and followed Origen, as a bishop and polemicist he displayed
a more conservative mindset than his teacher. Basil placed the accent on the
subordination of secular knowledge to divine revelation. In his rhetoric, he
often excoriated philosophers for their convoluted and mutually-exclusive
opinions, which fell short of simple biblical truth. Despite this rhetoric, he
often used secular knowledge in his sermons and treatises. Origen, a specula-
tive thinker, placed the accent upon the usefulness of secular knowledge. He
was freer and bolder than Basil, though by no means captured by philosophy
(as has sometimes been claimed about him). In fact, he was just as willing as
Basil to reject a philosophical idea if it contradicted Christian doctrine.

14 Chapter 1
1 Origen of Alexandria
Born in 185/86, Origen, according to the church historian Eusebius of Caesarea,1

“was devoted to the word of God from the start.”2 He was raised as a Christian
by his father, who is traditionally identified with the martyr, St. Leonides.3 He
insisted that his son study both the traditional, secular curriculum and the
scriptures.4 The boy Origen, we are told, was so inquisitive about the Bible that
his father scolded him for asking too many questions.5 In secret, however, he
was so glad about his son’s interest in the Bible that it is said he would kiss his
chest while sleeping, regarding it as “the temple of a divine spirit.”6 Origen’s
zeal for Scripture was matched only by his zeal for martyrdom, both his father’s
and his own, the latter supposedly thwarted by his mother hiding his clothes so
he could not leave the house!7
Jean Daniélou cautions against uncritically accepting Eusebius’s account of
Origen’s youth, since “allowances must be made for the element of exaggera-
tion that went into the hagiographical style […]. Eusebius saw the six-year-old
Origen as he was in his maturity.”8 Nevertheless, as Henri Crouzel says, “It does
not follow from this hagiographical tone that we should brand as fabrication
everything that Eusebius tells us.”9 Though historical details about Origen’s
childhood and parents can be neither proved nor disproved, the fact that such
stories existed at least testifies to the high reputation he enjoyed in the fourth
century. Eusebius did not invent such tales but passed them on as a testa-
ment to Origen’s character. What is most important in the account of Origen’s
1 This Caesarea (in Palestine) is not to be confused with Basil’s Caesarea (in Cappadocia).
2 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,1 (GCS 9.2, 518,8–9 Schwartz/Mommsen): ὁποίας ἐξ έκείνου
περὶ τὸν θεῖον λόγον προαιρέσεως ἦν. English translation by G. A. Williamson, Eusebius: The
History of the Church: From Christ to Constantine (ed. Andrew Louth; London: Penguin Books,
1989), 179.
3 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,1. Leonides was martyred under Septimius Severus in
202/03. New Catholic Encyclopedia, 2nd ed. (ed. Berard Marthaler et al.; Detroit: Gale, 2003),
s.v. “St. Leonides.” From this is derived the year of Origen’s birth. Cf. Henri Crouzel, SJ, Origen
(trans. A. S. Worrall; San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 2.
4 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,2,7 (520,23–26): οὐ μετρίως γοῦν καὶ περὶ ταύτας [i.e., τὰς θείας
γραφὰς] πεπόνητο, τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῷ πρὸς τῇ τῶν ἐγκυκλίων παιδείᾳ καὶ τούτων οὐ κατὰ πάρεργον
τὴν φροντίδα πεποιημένον.
5 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,2,11.
6 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,2,11 (522,11–12; trans. 181): θείου πνεύματος ἔνδον ἐν αύτοῖς [i.e.,
τοῖς στέρνοις] ἀφιερωμένου.
8 Jean Daniélou, Origen (trans. Walter Mitchell; NY: Sheed and Ward, 1955), 5.
9 Crouzel, Origen, 5.
Origen, Basil, and Secular Education 15
childhood is that he was educated in both the Greco-Roman curriculum and

in Scripture.
Although Eusebius reports that Origen received catechetical instruction
from Clement of Alexandria,10 scholars doubt this. It is now known that
Clement’s school was not catechetical, but a private philosophical school.11
Moreover, “Origen does not quote Clement by name and […] seems to have
reacted against some features of his teaching and language.”12 Nevertheless,
it seems certain that “Clement exercised a formative influence on him,” since
they both lived in Alexandria and Origen could scarcely have been unaware of
such an important theologian and philosopher.13 Ronald Heine sees specific
traces of Clement in Origen’s Genesis commentary.14 Though Clement was a
crucial link in the chain of Alexandrian Christian theology,15 Origen was not
Clement’s student, nor did he “succeed” him in any formal sense.
The subjects Origen would have studied as a boy are known even from his
own writings. In a letter to a former student by the name of Gregory, Origen
lists several subjects of the Greco-Roman curriculum: geometry, music, gram-
mar, rhetoric, and astronomy.16 Origen’s list includes three of the four “mathe-
matical disciplines,” which later came to be called the quadrivium: arithmetic,
geometry, music, and astronomy/astrology.17 Origen also mentions grammar,
which was considered more fundamental than the quadrivium.18 Although
10 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,6.

11 Crouzel, Origen, 7; New Catholic Encyclopedia, s.v. “Alexandria, School of”; Daniélou,
Origen, 9–10; John A. McGuckin, “The Life of Origen (ca. 186–255),” in The Westminster
Handbook to Origen (ed. idem; Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004),
(1–23) 4; Ronald Heine, Origen: Scholarship in the Service of the Church (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2010), 49, note 101.
13 Joseph W. Trigg, Origen (The Early Church Fathers; London: Routledge, 1998), 9–10.
14 Heine, Origen, 109. Clement’s allegorical exegesis will be discussed in the next chapter.
15 Heine gives an excellent summary of the various Alexandrian authors and texts that con-
tributed to Origen’s theological formation (Origen, 26–82).
16 This letter (Epistula ad Gregorium) is preserved as the thirteenth chapter of the Philocalia
(1, quoted below). Eusebius says that Origen taught his students “geometry, arithmetic,
and the other preparatory subjects” (Historia ecclesiastica 6,18,3 [556,19]): γεωμετρίαν καὶ
ἀριθμητικὴν καὶ τἄλλα προπαιδεύματα.
17 Stanley F. Bonner, Education in Ancient Rome: From the Elder Cato to the Younger Pliny
(London: Methuen & Co., 1977), 77. Origen and Basil’s views on astrology/astronomy are
the topic of chapter 5.
18 Specialist teachers other than the grammarian had to be sought out, if one wished to
learn these subjects (Bonner, Education in Rome, 77).
16 Chapter 1
Origen does not mention arithmetic explicitly, that is incidental; he surely “has
a full range of academic disciplines in mind.”19
After his father’s martyrdom, Origen began a lucrative career as a “gram-
marian” (γραμματικός).20 The study of grammar and the other subjects would
begin only after a child had learned to read, write, and do basic arithmetic.21
There was no set age at which this secondary education always began, but
it seems to have been around eleven or twelve, depending on ability.22 This
level of education was reserved for the privileged few who could afford and
benefit from it.23 The grammarian did more than teach what we today call
grammar (e.g., parts of speech), though that was part of it.24 It was the task of
the grammarian to instruct children in classical literature, specifically poetry,
such that “literature teacher” is a better description of the role of the ancient
grammarian.25 Just as American children today read and study modern classic
novels like The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, The Great Gatsby, and Treasure
Island, educated children in antiquity studied the Greek myths, in particular
the Iliad, Odyssey, and Aeneid (in that order).26 An ancient grammarian like
Origen was roughly analogous to a contemporary middle- or high-school lit-
erature teacher.
The grammarian would lead the students in the process of reading, inter-
preting, and evaluating the classical texts.27 These texts were read aloud, an
arduous task in its own right since they were written as a continuous string of
19 Peter W. Martens, Origen and Scripture: The Contours of the Exegetical Life (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), 29.
20 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,2,15 (524,1–6).
21 The contemporary expression “grammar school” is a false cognate when discussing an-
cient education. Basic arithmetic, including multiplication tables, was learned alongside
reading and writing (Bonner, Education in Rome, 180–88). The arithmetic of the quadriv-
ium must have been more advanced, although it is hard strictly to delimit the different
gradations of ancient education (ibid., 178–79).
22 Bonner, Education in Rome, 136–37.
23 Parents paid the teacher directly, either monthly or annually (Bonner, Education in Rome,
146–47).
24 For a description of how grammar was understood and taught in antiquity, see Bonner,
Education in Rome, 189–211.
25 Bonner, Education in Rome, 49. Not every grammarian actually taught (ibid., 56), just as
today there are researchers who do not teach.
27 See Henri-Irénée Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity (trans. George Lamb; NY:
Sheed and Ward, 1956), 165–70. Cf. Joseph Wilson Trigg, Origen: The Bible and Philosophy
in the Third-century Church (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1983), 32; Heine, Origen, 61; Frances
M. Young, Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 77–81.
letters without spaces or punctuation.28 This reading and recitation occurred

concurrently with the grammarian’s exposition of the text’s meaning.29 He
would probably also draw some moral lessons out of the text’s content, though
this was formally the domain of philosophers.30
In the absence of other catechists, who apparently had fled the city to
avoid persecution, Origen became a catechist: a teacher of Christian doc-
trine.31 Eusebius says that the bishop of Alexandria, Demetrius, appointed the
seventeen-year-old Origen as the principal of the catechetical school.32 Trigg
interprets this act as retroactive episcopal approval of the only qualified man
available.33 This seems to have been the case, since Eusebius says that it was
some interested pagans, not the bishop, who first approached Origen.34
Holding two different teaching positions, one secular and the other ecclesi-
astical, created a conflict in Origen. Here is how Eusebius explains it:
He decided, however, that the teaching of literature did not harmonize

with training in theology, and promptly broke off his lectures on litera-
ture, as useless and a hindrance to sacred studies. Then, with the worthy
object of making himself independent of other people’s assistance, he
parted with all the volumes of ancient literature which had hitherto been
his most cherished possessions, and if the purchaser brought him four
obels a day35 he was satisfied.36
28 See Bonner, Education in Rome, 220–222. He argues that textual criticism played little role
in grammatical instruction (ibid., 249).
33 Trigg, Origen: The Bible and Philosophy, 53.
34 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,3,1. Cf. Heine: “The point at which Eusebius introduces
this remark into the story implies that Origen had been teaching for some time before
Demetrius made this decision” (Origen, 62).
35 A modest stipend: “Six obols were the equivalent of one denarius, which represented a
very low daily wage” (Crouzel, Origen, 8). “Less than the regular wage of a poor laborer”
(McGuckin, “Life of Origen,” 5, note 29).
36 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,3,8–9 (526,15–23): ἀσύμφωνον ἡγησάμενος τὴν τῶν
γραμματικῶν λόγων διδασκαλίαν τῇ πρὸς τὰ θεῖα παιδεύματα ἀσκήσει, μὴ μελλήσας
ἀπορρήγνυσιν ἅτε ἀνωφελῆ καὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς μαθήμασιν ἐναντίαν τὴν τῶν γραμματικῶν λόγων
διατριβήν, εἶτα λογισμῷ καθήκοντι, ὡς ἂν μὴ γένοιτο τῆς παρ’ ἑτέρων ἐπικουρίας ἐνδεής, ὅσαπερ
ἦν αὐτῷ πρότερον λόγων ἀρχαίων συγγράμματα φιλοκάλως ἐσπουδασμένα, μεταδούς, ὑπὸ τοῦ
ταῦτα ἐωνημένου φερομένοις αὐτῷ τέτταρσιν ὀβολοῖς τῆς ἡμέρας ἠρκεῖτο.
18 Chapter 1
How should this pivotal act of Origen selling his secular books be interpret-
ed? René Cadiou sees it as an enthusiastic “abjuration of pagan literature.”37
Similarly Crouzel argues: “This gesture of selling his library marks a complete
renunciation of secular studies.”38 Eusebius’s account does give that impres-
sion. If this was the case, however, Origen soon must have changed his mind,
as his theological works are replete with references to secular sources that he
uses to help construct his theology.39
Pierre Nautin skeptically reads Eusebius’s account as serving his apolo-
getic interest of defending Origen,40 arguing instead that Origen’s motivation
was purely practical and that he did not disparage Greek literature.41 Henry
Chadwick offers a similar interpretation: Origen sold his books at a low price
in order to live a life of poverty from the proceeds.42 This interpretation is plau-
sible because Eusebius says that Origen sold his books in order to gain modest
financial independence.43 Moreover, if this was a true renunciation of pagan
learning, as Crouzel and Cadiou think, why not burn the books, or sell them
and donate the proceeds?
Origen had a financial motivation for selling his books, but was he glad to
be rid of them? Rather than take Eusebius’s explanation uncritically at face
value, we should look to Origen’s own writings to discover his opinion of secu-
lar learning. When we do so, we see that it is ambivalent. We must evaluate
his various, sometimes discrepant statements in order to formulate a coherent
viewpoint, insofar as possible. This leads to the conclusion that he held a posi-
tive view of secular learning, seeing it as useful for Christians. He rejected only
the myths he had taught as a grammarian.
Often Origen speaks positively of secular education. Rather than see-
ing it as a hindrance to theology, he sees it as useful. His most famous—and
important—statement in this regard is found in his letter to Gregory:
37 René Cadiou, Origen: His Life at Alexandria (trans. John A. Southwell; St. Louis, MO:
B. Herder Book Co., 1944), 25–28.
38 Crouzel, Origen, 8. However, he also argues that Origen soon changed his mind on this
point and re-embraced the value of secular education.
39 “He would soon return to what he had intended to abandon” (Crouzel, Origen, 8).
Cf. Cadiou: “A radical elimination of Greek culture from the storehouse of his mind was
impossible” (Origen, 27).
40 See Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,19, for an obvious example.
41 Pierre Nautin, Origène: Sa vie et son œuvre (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977), 40.
42 Henry Chadwick, Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin,
Clement, and Origen (NY: Oxford University Press, 1966), 68.
43 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,3,8–9 (quoted above).
Just as the servants of philosophers say concerning geometry, music,

grammar, rhetoric and astronomy, that they are like philosophy’s servants,
we say this very thing about philosophy itself with regard to Christianity.44
This metaphor of the “servant” requires explanation. The Greek word is

συνέριθος, which refers to a domestic worker or servant.45 It is conventionally
translated into English with the archaic-sounding handmaid or handmaiden.
Its oldest extant usage is in Homer’s Odyssey 6,32, where it refers to someone
helping in the washing of clothes. Robert Fagles translates it as “lend a hand.”46
This is apropos: philosophy, according to Origen, lends Christianity a hand. By
extension, so do the other disciplines.
Origen took this notion directly from the Jewish exegete and philoso-
pher, Philo, for whom the mistress was not Christianity (or Judaism as the
case may be) but virtue. Philo explains his understanding of the relationship
between virtue and education through an allegorical reading of Sarah and
Hagar (Genesis 16): “Virtue will employ no minor kind of introduction, but
grammar, geometry, astronomy, rhetoric, music, and all the other branches of
intellectual study. These are symbolized by Hagar, the handmaid of Sarah.”47 In
this case the Greek word translated as “handmaid” is θεραπαινίς, which in this
context indicates a female slave (namely Hagar). The Septuagint calls Hagar
παιδίσκη, meaning “slave-girl.” By changing it to the synonymous θεραπαινίς
Philo emphasizes the useful service (θεραπεία) she provides rather than her
social status as property (παίς).48 The allegory is not intended to denigrate
education, which Philo took seriously. It is a servant in that it serves virtue:
education is useful precisely as a means to this end, not just knowledge for
44 Origen, Philocalia 13,1 (64,25–65,2 Robinson): ἵν’, ὅπερ φασὶ φιλοσόφων παῖδες περὶ
γεωμετρίας καὶ μουσικῆς, γραμματικῆς τε καὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ἀστρονομίας, ὡς συνερίθων φιλο-
σοφίᾳ, τοῦθ’ ἡμεῖς εἴπωμεν καὶ περὶ αὐτῆς φιλοσοφίας πρὸς χριστιανισμὸν. English translation
by Trigg, Origen (op. cit.), 211. An unfortunate typographical error has “geometry” a sec-
ond time where it should read “astronomy.” Trigg translates συνέριθος as “adjunct,” but
throughout this book I always use the word servant.
45 Henry G. Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry S. Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon (9th ed.;
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), s.v. “συνέριθος”.
46 Homer, The Odyssey (trans. Robert Fagles; NY: Penguin Books, 1999), 169.
47 Philo, De congressu eruditionis gratia 3,11 (Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Supersunt 3,
74,11–14 Wendland): εἰκότως οὖν οὐ βραχέσι χρήσεται προοιμίοις, ἀλλὰ γραμματικῇ, γεωμε-
τρίᾳ, ἀστρονομίᾳ, ῥητορικῇ, μουσικῇ, τῇ ἄλλῃ λογικῇ θεωρίᾳ πάσῃ, ὧν ἐστι σύμβολον ἡ Σάρας
θεραπαινὶς Ἄγαρ, ὡς ἐπιδείξομεν. English translation by Francis Henry Colson, “On Mating
with the Preliminary Studies,” in Philo (12 vols.; LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1929–62), (4:458–551) 463.
48 Of course, the Greek word for education is παιδεία. This is because one receives it as a
child (παῖς), not because of any connotation of slavery.
20 Chapter 1
the sake of knowledge. Philo’s overall project was the integration of secular
(Greek) knowledge and biblical (Hebrew) knowledge.49
The value judgment implied by this metaphor of secular learning as “servant”
is inherently ambivalent. On the positive side, it lends Christianity assistance,
so it must have something good to offer. Indeed, Origen thought, as reported
by one of his former students, that the assistance philosophy provided was
essential for Christianity: “No true piety at all, properly speaking, was possible
to anyone who did not lead a philosophic life.”50 There was a natural sequence
from various subjects to philosophy, and finally to theology.51 On the negative
side, however, secular knowledge is in the subordinate role, as the worker must
follow the instructions of the one who hired her. Origen did not study philoso-
phy or other subjects for their own sake but only for the sake of Christianity. He
considered secular knowledge, considered independently in its own right, to
be foreign to Christianity since it does not derive from the Bible. As such, it can
be dangerous. In an analogy Augustine would later make famous in the West,52
Origen says that Christians should use secular learning the way the ancient
Israelites used the goods they took from the Egyptians (Exod 12:35–36).53 These
intellectual goods can be dangerous: if not used wisely, Origen says, they may
lead to heresy, as happened to many Christians who failed to use them rightly.54
In spite of this danger, Origen embraced secular knowledge, even after be-
coming a theologian. In response to the pagan Celsus’s claim that Christians
were “totally uneducated rustics,”55 Origen states that he encouraged young
people to study the standard secular curriculum and philosophy before study-
ing Christian doctrine:
49 See Marco Rizzi, “The Bible in Alexandria: Clement between Philo and Origen,” in
Clement’s Biblical Exegesis: Proceedings of the Second Colloquium on Clement of Alexandria
(Olomouc, May 29–31, 2014) (ed. Veronika Černušková et al.; VCS 139; Leiden: Brill, 2014),
(111–126) 114–115; cf. David T. Runia, Philo and Early Christian Literature: A Survey (Jewish
Traditions in Early Christian Literature 3; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 42–43.
50 Gregory Thaumaturgus, In Originem panegyrica oratio 6 (Sammlung ausgewählter kirch-
en- und dogmengeschichtlicher Quellenschriften 9, 16,10–11 Koetschau): οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ
εὐσεβεῖν ὅλως δυνατὸν εἶναι ἔφασκεν, ὀρθῶς λέγων, μὴ φιλοσοφήσαντι. English translation
by Michael Slusser, St. Gregory Thaumaturgus: Life and Works (FOTC 98; Washington, DC:
CUA Press, 1998), 103.
51 Gregory Thaumaturgus, In Originem panegyrica oratio 8 (22,16–25).
52 Augustine, De doctrina christiana 2,40,60.
53 Origen, Philocalia 13,2.
55 Origen, Contra Celsum 3,58 (GCS 2,252,25 Koetschau; my trans.): ἀπαιδευτοτάτοις ἀγροίκοις.
If you were to show me teachers who give preparatory teaching in phi-

losophy and train people in philosophical study, I would not dissuade the
young from listening to these; but after they had first been trained in a
general education and in philosophical thought I would try to lead them
on to the exalted height, unknown to the multitude, of the profoundest
doctrines of the Christians.56
However, again there is a caveat: while encouraging secular studies, he also

warns against young people reading the comedies and poems due to the sexual
immorality they depict.57
Eusebius says that Origen eventually handed over the basic work of cateche-
sis to someone named Heraclas, so that he could devote himself to teaching
the advanced students.58 Both Origen’s former student and Eusebius say that
Origen taught them, in addition to theology, secular subjects such as dialec-
tic, physics and physiology, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and philosophy.59
Geometry, arithmetic, and astronomy are three of the four “mathematical
disciplines.”60 Origen’s teaching was not unique, as such specialist teachers
were the ordinary means by which students could go beyond the study of
grammar.61 It seems, then, that Origen’s decision to sell his books cannot be
interpreted as a complete renunciation of secular education. The data rather
indicate that he viewed it in a positive light.
56 Origen, Contra Celsum 3,58 (253,13–18): εἰ δὲ παραστήσεις μοι διδασκάλους πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν
προπαιδεύοντας καὶ ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γυμνάζοντας, οὐκ ἀποτρέψω μὲν ἀπὸ τούτων τούς νέους, πει-
ράσομαι δὲ προγυμνασαμένους αὐτοὺς ὡς ἐν ἐγκυκλίοις μαθήμασι καὶ τοῖς φιλοσοφουμένοις
ἀναβιβάσαι ἐπὶ τὸ σεσμὸν καὶ ὑψηλὸν τῆς λεληθυίας τοὺς πολλοὺς Χριστιανῶν μεγαλοφωνίας.
English translation by Henry Chadwick, Origen: Contra Celsum (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1953), 168.
Chadwick translates τούς νέους as “young men.” While the word is grammatically mas-
culine, it is used generally to include both boys and girls. Speaking of the Latin/Roman
equivalent, Bonner notes: “In educational contexts, the use of the word pueri is so ubiqui-
tous that one might naturally assume that all Roman classes were composed exclusively
of boys. […] But the most exactly contemporary evidence of Martial shows that, at the pri-
mary stage at least, both boys and girls might be present in the same school” (Education in
Rome, 135).
57 Origen, Contra Celsum 3,58.
58 Eusebius, Historica ecclesiastica 6,15.
59 Gregory Thaumaturgus, In Originem panegyrica oratio 8 (21,30–22,25); Eusebius, Historia
ecclesiastica 6,18,3.
60 It may be doubted whether Origen also taught the fourth, music, which Gregory omits.
Nevertheless, Origen shows elementary knowledge of musical terminology: see James
McKinnon, Music in Early Christian Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1993), 37.
61 Bonner, Education, 77.
22 Chapter 1
At other times, however, in his homilies, Origen seems to denigrate secular

learning. For example, speaking of the entire spectrum of subjects, naming phi-
losophy and six of the seven liberal arts,62 he proclaims: “And thus the learned,
through all these very diverse and varied disciplines, in which they learn
nothing about God’s will, have collected great riches indeed, but of sinners.”63
A similar ambivalence is felt here: secular learning may be “great riches,” but
because it does not involve the study of God’s word, it is foreign to Christianity.
It remains the property of the pagan “sinners” from whom it originated. While
he does not actually deny its value, his statement would scarcely encourage
his hearers to pursue it. Likewise, in his homily on Noah, he disparagingly con-
trasts secular books with the books of Scripture:
He does not construct this library [of God’s word] from planks which
are unhewn and rough, but from planks which have been “squared”
(Gen 6:14) and arranged in a uniform line, that is, not from the volumes
of secular authors, but from the prophetic and apostolic volumes […].
For the authors of secular books can indeed be called “high trees” and
“shady trees”—for Israel is accused of having fornicated “under every
high and shady tree” (cf. Jer 2:20)—because they speak indeed in a high
manner and use flowery eloquence; they have not, however, acted as they
have spoken.64
Here Origen’s only praise for secular books is that they are rhetorically so-
phisticated, a positive quality ultimately rendered moot by the ugly actions
they narrate.
Since Origen saw secular subjects as “servants” to Christian theology, how
could he also disparage them? It is not a coincidence that his more negative
comments are found in his homilies, while his positive appraisals appear in
62 That is, the quadrivium plus grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic (trivium). He omits arith-
metic, though, again, this may be incidental.
63 Origen, Homilia in Psalmum xxxvi 3,6 (Biblioteca Patristica 18, Prinzivalli; my trans.): et sic
per omnes istas eruditi tam diuersas et uarias disciplinas, in quibus nihil de dei uoluntate
cognouerunt, multas quidem, sed peccatorum diuitias congregauerunt.
64 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 2,6 (GCS 29, 37,21–30 Baehrens): sed hanc bibliothecam non
ex agrestibus et impolitis, sed ex quadratis et secundum aequitatis lineam directis con-
struit lignis, id est non ex saecularium auctorum, sed ex propheticis atque Apostolicis uo-
luminibus. […] nam auctores saecularium librorurm possunt quidem dici “ligna excelsa”
et “ligna umbrosa”—“sub omni” enim “ligno excelso et nemoroso” accusatur fornicatus
esse Istrahel—, quia illi loquuntur quidem excelsa et florida utuntur eloquentia, non
tamen ita egerunt ut locuti sunt. English translation by Ronald E. Heine, Origen: Homilies
on Genesis and Exodus (FOTC 71; Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2002), 86–87.
scholarly contexts. This rhetorical context matters. We must consider both the
audience to whom he spoke and the rhetorical goal he had in mind. When
preaching, Origen emphasized morality and Christian doctrine, which are the
focuses of the two allegorical senses of Scripture.65 In Origen’s view, secular
education did little to advance these causes, and for this reason he discouraged
them. A Christian made moral progress by reading and studying the Bible, not
Greek literature with its many immoral deeds and false gods. Christian doc-
trine is based on God’s revelation in Scripture, not secular learning.
In contrast, the benefit provided by secular books was available only to
those few Christians (like himself) engaged in the scholarly study of Scripture.
In his letter, he specifically wanted Gregory to devote himself to this rather
than becoming a lawyer.66 He hoped he would press his secular education
into the service of Christian theology. The context in which he says that he
encouraged the young to study the general, secular curriculum is the same:
he speaks of students already studying philosophy. Moreover, he says this in a
massive work that is an intellectual defense of Christianity, not a sermon. Thus,
whether Origen seems more positive or negative toward secular knowledge
depends directly upon the addressee and subject matter. He did not preach
basic faith and morals to his students, nor did he try to teach his congregation
philosophy through his sermons.
The appreciation of Origen’s rhetoric largely resolves this apparent contra-
diction. Still, I think that it was the Greek myths and comedies specifically, as
opposed to books of mathematics, philosophy, and other subjects, which he
held in contempt. Eusebius’s exact statement is that Origen believed that the
teaching of literature was a hindrance to theology.67 Since he was not at that
time teaching math, music, philosophy, or any other secular subjects,68 there is
no reason to assume that he viewed them also as hindrances. On the contrary,
those other subjects, which he later taught to Gregory, were its servants. It is
even less plausible that Origen meant to indict the ancient methods of gram-
matical analysis. In his letter to Gregory, he included grammar as one of phi-
losophy’s servants.69 In fact, Origen skillfully used his expertise in textual and
literary criticism in his theological works.70
65 These will be discussed in chapter 2.

67 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiasatica 6,3,8–9 (quoted above).
68 This was the task of specialists (Bonner, Education, 77).
69 Origen, Philocalia 13,1 (quoted above).
70 “When he stopped teaching classical Greek literature and began teaching Biblical liter-
ature he would have continued the same basic steps in the teaching syllabus” (Heine,
Origen, 74). “Literary studies were one of the most significant factors shaping Origen’s
24 Chapter 1
In his polemic Against Celsus, Origen unleashed powerful rhetorical attacks

against the Greek myths. He calls them “very foolish and ungodly,”71 “foul” and
“shameful.”72 Celsus had criticized the Bible for containing stories of immoral-
ity, and Origen threw this criticism right back at him. What stories, he argued,
could be more immoral than those of the Greeks, in which gods castrate one
another and commit infanticide and incest?73 It is not surprising, nor uniquely
Christian, that he complained about immorality in literature. He explicitly
aligned himself with Plato’s rejection of the myths as mostly lies that often
teach the opposite of what children should learn.74
Origen manifested the same conservative attitude when it came to philo-
sophical books: he is said to have had his students study the writings of all the
schools of philosophy except the “atheists” (Epicureans).75 This is why Origen
considered teaching the Greek myths a hindrance to theology: he no longer
wished to expend his intellectual energy on silly fables. As he launched his
theological career, it was time to divert that same energy, the same grammati-
cal tools, and the same body of secular knowledge to the Christian scriptures.
For Origen, as for many of the Fathers of the Church who followed him, the
Greek myths were to be replaced by the Bible as humanity’s foundational
literature.76
According to Eusebius, at the same time Origen became a theologian, he also
embraced an ascetic lifestyle. The Fathers of the Church called this the “philo-
sophic life,” and it was characterized by the study of Scripture and bodily mor-
tifications, such as sleep deprivation, sleeping on the floor, fasting, abstinence
thought and his legacy” (Trigg, Origen, 5). See also John McGuckin, “Origen as Literary
Critic in the Alexandrian Tradition,” in Origeniana Octava: Origen and the Alexandrian
Tradition (ed. Lorenzo Perrone; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 1:120–35.
71 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,50 (324,1; my trans.): εὐηθέστατα ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσεβέστατα.
72 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,48 (321,4; my trans.): ἀτόπους Ἑλλήνων ἱστορίας, αἰσχύνης.
74 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,36 and 50. See Plato, Respublica 2,377a–c.
75 Gregory Thaumaturgus, In Origenem oratio panegyrica 13 (29,5–20). It was a common-
place in the ancient world for critics to call Epicurus an atheist for rejecting divine provi-
dence, even though he affirmed the existence of divinity. See Dirk Obbink, “The Atheism
of Epicurus,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 30, no. 2 (1989): (187–223) 187–88.
76 Young persuasively argues this thesis. “Origen marks the advent of properly scholarly ex-
egesis, and this presupposes a body of approved literature to be used for Christian pai-
deia. For Origen as for Philo, Greek culture is subordinated to the Scriptures” (Biblical
Exegesis, 68). She summarizes her conclusions about Origen on pp. 292–95. Her thesis
builds upon the work of Werner Jaeger, who believed that Origen “saved what we might
call the Christian paideia and its foundation in the Bible” (Early Christianity and Greek
Paideia [Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1961], 49).
from wine, and not wearing shoes.77 The timing was not a coincidence. Peter
Martens has shown that for Origen the vocation of theology was intrinsi-
cally bound up with the ascetic life.78 Origen was, from a technical point of
view, well accomplished in reading ancient texts through his secular learning.
However, he believed that to understand the Bible’s spiritual meanings, one
had to be well trained in the spiritual life, which in late-antique Christianity
meant practicing asceticism. For those Christians who had given themselves
over completely to asceticism, the study of the New Testament was the pre-
mier pursuit: “What more excellent activity ought there be, after our physical
separation from one another, than the careful examination of the gospel?”79
Origen’s former student reports the same ascetical attitude even with re-
spect to philosophy: he believed that many philosophers taught philosophy
in a purely theoretical way, while failing to live out the true “love of wisdom”
(which is what the word philosophy means).80 This stood in contrast to Origen
himself: “And not by words alone but by deeds as well he found a way to bring
our impulses under control, by the very process of beholding and coming to
understand the soul’s impulses and desires.”81 The author of the thanksgiving
address is so critical of the moral failings of philosophers other than Origen
that he hesitantly declares: “I would well-nigh rather be utterly unlearned than
learned in anything professed by them, whom I have settled not so much as go
to hear for the rest of my days—perhaps I do not think rightly.”82
Origen is said by Eusebius to have castrated himself because he took
Matt 19:12 (“There are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the
sake of the kingdom of heaven”) literally.83 Similarly, St. Epiphanius records
77 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,3,9 and 12.

78 Martens, Origen and Scripture, 89–94.
79 Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 1,2(12) (GCS 10, 6,3–5 Preuschen): ποίαν ἐχρῆν εἶναι
μετὰ τὸ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα κεχωρίσθαι ἡμᾶς ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσαν ἢ τὴν περὶ εὐαγγελίου ἐξέτασιν;
English translation by Ronald Heine, Origen: Commentary on the Gospel according to John
(FOTC 80 & 89; CUA Press, 1989 & 1993), 1:34. Origen says the word gospel (εὐαγγέλιον)
includes the whole New Testament (ibid. 1,3[17–26]). He wrote commentaries on the
Old Testament as well, which he says are not “gospel” but nevertheless fore-proclaim
(προκηρύσσουσα) Jesus (ibid. 1,3[17] [7,2–3]).
80 Gregory Thaumaturgus, In Originem panegyrica oratio 9.
81 Gregory Thaumaturgus, In Originem panegyrica oratio 9 (23,7–10; trans. 110): καὶ οὐ λόγοις
μόνον, ἀλλ’ ἤδη καὶ ἔργοις τρόπον τινὰ διεκυβερνᾶτο παρ’ ἡμῶν τὰς ὁρμάς, αὐτῇ τῇ τῶν ὁρμῶν
καὶ παθῶν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς θεωρίᾳ καὶ κατανοήσει.
82 Gregory Thaumaturgus, In Originem panegyrica oratio 10 (25,5–8; trans. 70): ἐμὲ δὲ μικροῦ
δεῖν ἰδιωτεύειν ἑλέσθαι πάντη, ἥπερ τι μαθεῖν ὧν οὗτοι ἀπαγγέλλουσιν, οἷς διὰ τὸν λοιπὸν βίον
οὐδὲ προσιέναι ἄξιον εἶναι ἐδόκουν, ἴσως οὐκ ὀρθῶς τοῦτο φρονῶν.
83 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,8,1–4.
26 Chapter 1
that he either severed a nerve in his genitals or chemically castrated himself.84

However, Epiphanius qualifies these reports by saying, “I have no faith in the
exaggerated stories about him.”85 Origen in his extant writings never mentions
having castrated himself, and indeed he explicitly rejects the literal interpreta-
tion of Matt 19:12.86 It is possible that Origen had been guilty of such a literal
misreading in his youth. If so, regret over his alleged autocastration could even
have played a role in the development of his belief that some passages of the
Bible should not be taken literally.87 Perhaps he learned the dangers of literal-
ism the hard way! Scholars are divided about whether to follow Epiphanius
and disbelieve this “exaggerated story.” John McGuckin sees it as one of many
lies told about Origen to discredit him.88 Blossom Stefaniw has shown how the
story serves Epiphanius’s larger effort at discrediting Origen and his allegorical
exegesis (though the same cannot be said for Eusebius).89 Chadwick regards it
as nothing more than ancient gossip.90 Trigg, on the other hand, accepts it for
two reasons: because it “would not have seemed as morbidly pathological in
Origen’s time as it does now,” and because “Eusebius had no motive for pass-
ing on a piece of information to Origen’s discredit.”91 Crouzel holds the same
opinion.92 It goes without saying that we can speak only of historical probabil-
ity on a question such as this. I do not think we should trust the report, and it
certainly should not be repeated without including Epiphanius’s disclaimer.
84 Epiphanius, Panarion 64,3,11 (GCS 31, 409,10–13 Holl).

85 Epiphanius, Panarion 64,3,13 (409,16–17): καὶ τὰ μὲν ὑπέρογκα περὶ αὐτοῦ λεγόμενα οὐ πάνυ
πεπιστεύκαμεν. English translation by Frank Williams, The Panarion of Epiphanius of
Salamis (rev. ed.; Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 63 and 79; Leiden: Brill, 2008
and 2012) 2:137.
86 Origen, Commentarius in Matthaeum 14,1–5.
87 Origen’s approach to literal interpretation will be discussed in chapter 2.
88 McGuckin, “Life of Origen,” 6–7.
89 Blossom Stefaniw, “Straight Reading: Shame and the Normal in Epiphanius’s Polemic
against Origen,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 21, no. 3 (2013): (413–35) 421–27.
90 Chadwick, Early Christian Thought, 67–68.
91 Trigg, Origen: The Bible and Philosophy, 53–54. However, the motivation, according to
McGuckin, was to make Demetrius look bad (“Life of Origen,” 6).
92 Crouzel, Origen, 9, note 32.
2 Basil
Born in 329/30,93 Basil, too, was raised as a Christian. His grandmother played
an important role in his religious upbringing: “The concept of God that I re-
ceived as a child from my blessed mother and my grandmother Macrina,
though it has grown, I have held within myself.”94 According to Basil, Macrina
raised him and taught him the Christian religion.95 In contrast, his friend,
St. Gregory of Nazianzus, reports in his funeral oration for Basil that his “earli-
est years were spent under the direction of his illustrious father,” also named
Basil,96 along with his mother Emmelia.97 This education Basil received
included religious instruction.98 Gregory plays up the importance of Basil’s fa-
ther, whom Basil does not mention in this context, because he was famous in
Cappadocia. One’s glorious ancestry was a standard element in Greco-Roman
encomium, of which Gregory’s funeral oration is an exemplary instance.99
The importance of Macrina in Basil’s religious upbringing connects him
to Origen through a kind of evangelical genealogy. Basil says that his grand-
mother taught him “the words of the most blessed Gregory,” referring to the
Wonderworker.100 Gregory first introduced Christianity to Pontus (north-
ern Turkey today). Basil says: “He brought the whole people, both urban and
rural, to God through knowledge.”101 It is sometimes claimed on this basis
that Macrina was converted and baptized by Gregory himself,102 but this goes
93 Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, Basil of Caesarea: A Guide to His Life and Doctrine (Cascade
Companions 16; Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2012), 21; Philip Rousseau, Basil of Caesarea
(Transformation of the Classical Heritage 20; Berkeley: University of California Press,
1998), 1.
94 Basil, Epistulae 223,3 (3:12,35–38 Courtonne; my trans.): ἀλλ’ ἣν ἐκ παιδὸς ἔλαβον ἔννοιαν
περὶ θεοῦ παρὰ τῆς μακαρίας μητρός μου καὶ τῆς μάμμης Μακρίνης, ταύτην αὐξηθεῖσαν ἔσχον
ἐν ἐμαυτῷ.
95 Basil, Epistulae 204,6 (2:178,1–7) and 210,1 (2:190,15).
96 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii [= Orationes 43] 12 (Textes et documents
pour l’étude historique de Christianisme 6, 80,23–24 Boulenger): τὰ μὲν δὴ πρῶτα τῆς
ἡλικίας ὑπὸ τῷ μεγάλῳ πατρί. English translation by Leo P. McCauley, SJ, “On St. Basil the
Great,” in Funeral Orations (FOTC 22; NY: Fathers of the Church, 2004), (27–99) 36.
97 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 10.
99 See McCauley, Funeral Orations, vii–xxii.
100 Basil, Epistulae 204,6 (2:178,4–5; my trans.): τὰ τοῦ μακαριωτάτου Γρηγορίου ῥήματα.
101 Basil, De Spiritu Sancto 29,74 (SC 17, 510,13–14 Pruche; my trans.): ὅλον τὸν λαὸν τόν τε
ἀστικὸν καὶ τὸν χωριτικὸν διὰ τῆς ἐπιγνώσεως προσήγαγε τῷ θεῷ.
102 For example, Anthony Meredith, SJ, The Cappadocians (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s
Seminary Press, 1995), 4; Crouzel, ed., Remerciement à Origène suivi de la Lettre d’Origène à
Grégoire (SC 148; Paris: Cerf, 1969), 23.
28 Chapter 1
beyond the evidence. Rousseau affirms only that Macrina “had known disci-
ples of the great ‘apostle’ of Pontus.”103 This more modest affirmation is con-
sistent with Basil’s own statement that Gregory’s sayings were “preserved for
her through the succession of memory.”104 This was no random anecdote: Basil
used his familial connection to Gregory to defend himself when he was sus-
pected of heterodoxy during the dogmatic controversy over the divinity of the
Holy Spirit.105
As we saw, Origen wrote a letter to a former student of his named Gregory.
Although Gregory was a common name, Eusebius identified this Gregory
with the Wonderworker,106 who became the first bishop of Neocaesarea in
Pontus before the emperor Decian began persecuting Christians in 250.107
Saint Gregory of Nyssa, in his biography of the Wonderworker, also iden-
tifies the two.108 Not all scholars have agreed with Eusebius and Gregory of
Nyssa that Origen’s Gregory was the Wonderworker.109 It is an interesting ques-
tion, the answer to which will remain uncertain unless new evidence is dis-
covered. In any case, it is certain that Basil, like his brother Gregory, believed
that Gregory the Wonderworker had studied under Origen.110 This is signifi-
cant because it helps explain why Basil often looked to Origen for theological
inspiration. Although he could not have relied on a connection to Origen to de-
fend himself against accusations of heterodoxy, he knew that his Christianity
descended from Origen. After all, had it not been for Origen, Gregory prob-
ably would have become a lawyer instead of a missionary, he would not have
preached in Pontus, and thus Basil’s grandparents would have never converted
to Christianity! In a sense, by following in Origen’s theological footsteps, Basil
repaid an old family debt.
103 Rousseau, Basil, 4.

104 Basil, Epistulae 204,6 (2:178,5–6; my trans.): πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀκολουθίᾳ μνήμης διασωθέντα.
105 See Rousseau, Basil, 23–26, and Jean Gribomont, OSB, “L’Origénisme de Saint Basile,”
L’Homme devant Dieu: Mélanges offerts au Père Henri de Lubac (vol. 1; Paris: Aubier, 1963),
(281–94) 281.
107 Crouzel, Remerciement à Origène, 24.
108 Gregory Nyssen, De vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi 22.
109 Nautin rejects the identification, arguing that Eusebius based it solely on the coincidences
of names (Origène, 84–85). Crouzel has argued against him: “Faut-il voir trois personages
en Grégoire le Thaumaturge?” Gregorianum 60 (1979): 287–320. He argues that Nautin ig-
nores the evidence of Gregory of Nyssa’s biography of Gregory the Wonderworker (Origen,
2, note 3). Michael Slusser, the recent translator of works by and about Gregory, takes
it for granted that he was Origen’s student and the author of the thanksgiving address
(St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, 2). However, Philip Rousseau shares Nautin’s doubt (Basil,
12–13, note 35).
110 Cf. Rousseau, Basil, 11.
Like Origen, Basil received a secular education under the guidance of his
father.111 Unlike Origen, however, he continued his studies into adulthood rath-
er than launching into his career straightaway. Gregory of Nazianzus tells us
that, “when he was sufficiently instructed at home,”112 he went to study in the
nearby city of Caesarea (modern Kayseri, Turkey). His higher education pro-
ceeded to take him to Byzantium and finally Athens, where he studied along-
side Gregory, who was already there.113 He studied in Athens from 349–55.114
We might compare this analogously to entering a graduate program today.
Late in his life,115 Basil looked back negatively on the years he spent in
Athens:
After I had wasted much time in vanity and had spent nearly all my youth
in the vain labor in which I was engaged, occupying myself in acquiring
a knowledge made foolish by God [cf. 1 Cor 1:20], when at length, as if
aroused from a deep sleep, I looked upon the wondrous light of the truth
of the gospel and saw the futility of the wisdom “of the rulers of this age
who are passing away” [1 Cor 2:6], having mourned deeply my piteous
life, I prayed that guidance be given me for my introduction to the doc-
trines of religion.116
Basil identifies his years of higher education with the wisdom made foolish by
God of 1 Cor 1:20. This passage is replete with negative words that describe his
higher education: wasted, vanity, vain labor, foolish, futility, mourned, piteous,
amend, indifferent, perverted. A rhetorically-loaded passage like this demands
careful interpretation. Basil makes it sound as though he underwent a sudden

112 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 13 (84,6): Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἱκανῶς εἶχε τῆς ἐνταῦθα
παιδεύσις.
113 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 14–15.
115 In 375 according to Paul Jonathan Fedwick. “A Chronology of the Life and Works of Basil
of Caesarea,” in Basil of Caesarea: Christian, Humanist, Ascetic—A Sixteen-Hundredth
Anniversary Symposium (ed. idem; vol. 1; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1981), (3–19) 16.
116 Basil, Epistulae 223,3 (3:10,1–10): Ἐγὼ πολὺν χρόνον προσαναλώσας τῇ ματαιότητι, καὶ πᾶσαν
σχεδὸν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ νεότητα ἐναφανίσας τῇ ματαιοπονίᾳ ἣν εἶχον προσδιατρίβων τῇ ἀναλήψει
τῶν μαθημάτων τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μωρανθείσης σοφίας, ἐπειδή ποτε, ὥσπερ ἐξ ὕπνου βαθέος
διαναστὰς, ἀπέβλεψα μὲν πρὸς τὸ θαυμαστὸν φῶς τῆς ἀληθείας τοῦ εὐαγγελίου, κατεῖδον δὲ τὸ
ἄχρηστον τῆς σοφίας “τῶν ἀρχόντων τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου τῶν καταργουμένων,” πολλὰ τὴν ἐλεεινήν
μου ζωὴν ἀποκλαύσας, ηὐχόμην δοθῆναί μοι χειραγωγίαν πρὸς τὴν εἰσαγωγὴν τῶν δογμάτων τῆς
εὐσεβείας. English translation by Agnes Clare Way, CDP, Saint Basil: Letters (FOTC 13 & 28;
NY: Fathers of the Church, 1951 & 1955), 2:127.
30 Chapter 1
conversion from paganism to Christianity, which was clearly not the case since
he was raised a Christian. In the same letter Basil refers to following Christ’s
command to sell all one’s possessions (e.g., Matt 19:21), as in the archetypal
story of the conversion of St. Antony.117 In fact, Basil is speaking of a conversion
to the “philosophic life,” that is, the practice of asceticism. During a time when
Christianity began to enjoy the privileges of empire, and people converted in
droves to align themselves with the new status quo, simply joining the Church
was no longer enough for the most devout. The real turning-point in the life
of a saint was the moment of “conversion” to asceticism. That is how Basil can
simultaneously say that he was raised a Christian and that, as a man in his 20’s,
he still required “introduction to the doctrines of religion.”118 By “religion” he
means the ascetic lifestyle.119 To receive this introduction, Basil went to Egypt
to learn firsthand from the ascetics living there.120
The way he disdains his secular studies as vanity reminds one of Origen
selling his books when he, too, began to practice asceticism. Basil fits into the
larger pattern of Fathers of the Church undergoing ascetical conversions that
moved them away from secular studies and into a life devoted to Christ and
the Church. One thinks, for instance, of St. Jerome’s famous vision of Christ
telling him that he was not a Christian but a Ciceronian.121 Episodes like this,
recounted with great rhetorical flourish, disparage the old way of life with its
“pagan” learning. Indeed, many Christians of the time did disparage secular
education. Gregory of Nazianzus censures the attitude of “many Christians,”
who, he says, “by an error of judgment scorn [pagan learning] as treacherous
and dangerous and as turning us away from God.”122 In his view, they rejected
education so “that their own deficiencies might be hidden in the general mass,
and their want of culture escape reproach.”123
117 Athanasius, Vita Antonii 2–3.

118 Basil, Epistulae 223,3 (quoted above).
119 See Rousseau, Basil, 14–23.
120 Rebecca Stephens Falcasantos has made the case that Basil’s ascetic trip, contrary to the
gendered categories of earlier scholarship, should be considered within the rubric of an-
cient Christian pilgrimage: “Wandering Wombs, Inspired Intellects: Christian Religious
Travel in Late Antiquity,” Journal of Early Christian Studies 25, no. 1 (2017): (88–117) 99–109.
121 Jerome, Epistulae 22,30.
122 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 11 (78,20–22; trans. 35): ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἔξωθεν
[παίδευσιν], ἣν οἱ πολλοὶ Χριστιανῶν διαπτύουσιν, ὡς ἐπίβουλον καὶ σφαλερὰν καὶ θεοῦ πόρρω
βάλλουσαν, κακῶς εἰδότες.
123 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 11 (80,19–20; trans. 36): ἵν’ ἐν τῷ κοινῷ τὸ κατ’
αὐτοὺς κρύπτηται, καὶ τοὺς τῆς ἀπαιδευσίας ἐλέγχους διαδιδράσκωσιν.
Was Basil one of these “many Christians,” or did he agree with his friend
Gregory?124 We should not over-generalize his negative reaction to studying
in Athens, as though he condemned all secular education. Basil was there to
study rhetoric, and it seems his taste for this study soured. He came to regard it
as the “art of lying.”125 It was “the traditional rhetorical education” with which
he became disgusted, not all secular education.126 This aversion to rhetoric,
however, did not stop him from frequently using classical rhetorical devices
and tropes in his sermons and writings! To assess Basil’s real attitude toward
secular learning as a whole we must, just as with Origen, see how he used it in
his written works and sermons. Stephen Hildebrand puts it well when he says:
“The Fathers’ appropriation of paideia must be studied as a matter of practice
rather than theory.”127 We can no more conclude that Basil rejected secular
knowledge on the basis of this episode than we could conclude that Origen did
the same when he sold his books.
Basil’s brother, Gregory of Nyssa, confirms this important moment in Basil’s
life in his hagiography of their sister, St. Macrina.128 On his telling, Basil re-
turned from Athens an arrogant man, “excessively puffed up by his rhetori-
cal abilities”129 and “considering himself better than the leading men in the
district.”130 Gregory of Nazianzus says much the same thing, albeit with a
very different tone: rather than chiding Basil, he boasts about him, declar-
ing that they both “became famous not only in the sight of our own masters
124 Neil McLynn argues the former in “Gregory Nazianzen’s Basil: The Literary Construction
of a Christian Friendship,” Studia Patristica 37 (2001), (178–93) 180.
125 Basil, [Ad adolescentes] De legendis gentilium libris 4 (45,30–31 Boulenger): καὶ ῥητόρων δὲ
τὴν περὶ τὸ ψεύδεσθαι τέχνην οὐ μιμησόμεθα. English translation by Roy Joseph Deferrari and
Martin Rawson Patrick McGuire, “To Young Men, On How They Mighty Derive Profit from
Pagan Literature,” in Saint Basil: The Letters (LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1926–34), (4:363–435) 4:391.
126 Nigel Guy Wilson, ed., Saint Basil on the Value of Greek Literature (London: Duckworth,
1975), 10.
127 Stephen M. Hildebrand, The Trinitarian Theology of Basil of Caesarea: A Synthesis of Greek
Thought and Biblical Truth (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2007), 10.
128 On Macrina, see Lynn H. Cohick and Amy Brown Hughes, Christian Women in the Patristic
World: Their Influence, Authority, and Legacy in the Second through Fifth Centuries (Grand
Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2017), chapter 7.
129 Gregory Nyssen, Vita Macrinae (GNO 8,1, 377,11–12 Callahan): ὑπερφυῶς ἐπηρμένον τῷ περὶ
τοὺς λόγους φρονήματι. English translation by Virginia Woods Callahan, Gregory of Nyssa:
Ascetical Works (FOTC 58; Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1967), 167.
130 Gregory Nyssen, Vita Macrinae (377,13–14; trans. 167): ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ δυναστείᾳ λαμπροὺς
ἐπηρμένον τῷ ὄγκῳ.
32 Chapter 1
and companions, but even throughout Greece and especially among the most
illustrious men.”131 There can be no doubt: Basil left Athens a skilled orator.
What happened? Basil’s account of simply waking up, as it were, leaves
much to the imagination. According to Gregory of Nyssa, it was Macrina who
convinced Basil to give up his career and become an ascetic like she was.132
Perhaps this is the case. On the other hand, Gregory may have exaggerated her
influence on Basil because he was writing a hagiography of her life. Placing
her as the cause of Basil’s “conversion” would redound to her glory. Given that
Basil had become disillusioned by academic life in Athens and his eventual
decision to become an ascetic, Macrina’s own asceticism must have had an
effect on him.
Gregory of Nazianzen’s funeral oration paints a different picture of what
happened. Without mentioning any conversion on Basil’s part, Gregory says
that they both, while still in Athens, had already decided to embrace the
ascetic lifestyle: “The sole object of us both was virtue and living for future
hopes, having detached ourselves from this world before departing from it.”133
For Gregory, this ascetical detachment did not require giving up the study of
rhetoric. They focused their studies on the texts they considered excellent for
instructing young people in virtuous living.134 Gregory was fond of Athens,
calling it “to me, if to anyone, truly golden, patroness of all that is excellent.”135
However, he was willing to concede that it was not an ideal place for Christians:
“Athens is harmful, in general, to the things of the soul.”136 This was all right,
though, because he believed that their asceticism allowed them to study
there with their souls intact. He says that they were completely immune to its
corrupting influence because their minds were “closed and secured.”137 In a
powerful metaphor, he compares himself and Basil to salamanders dancing in
the fire.138
131 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 22 (104,24–106,2; trans. 46): ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρχεν
ἡμῖν ἐπισήμοις μὲν εἶναι παρὰ τοῖς ἡμετέροις παιδευταῖς καὶ συμπράκτορσιν, ἐπισήμοις δὲ παρὰ
τῇ Ἑλλάδι πάσῃ καὶ ταύτης μάλιστα τοῖς γνωριμωτάτοις.
132 Gregory Nyssen, Vita Macrinae (377,14–19).
133 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 20 (102,1–3; trans. 44): Ἓν δ’ ἀμφοτέροις ἔργον
ἡ ἀρετή, καὶ τὸ ζῆν πρὸς τὰς μελλούσας ἐλπίδας, πρὶν ἐνθένδε ἀπελθεῖν ἐνθένδε μεθισταμένοις.
135 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 14 (86,19–21; trans. 38): Ἀθήνας τὰς χρυσᾶς
ὄντως ἐμοὶ καὶ τῶν καλῶν προξένους εἴπερ τινί.
136 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 21 (104,7–8; trans. 45): βλαβεραὶ μὲν τοῖς
ἄλλοις Ἀθῆναι τὰ εἰς ψυχήν.
137 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 21 (104,13; my trans.): πεπυκνωμένοις καὶ
πεφραγμένοις.
While Gregory spoke for himself and his own experience, he misjudged his
friend. He noted that Basil became disillusioned by Athens shortly after his
arrival because of the jealousy of their fellow students.139 To Basil the city was
nothing more than “an empty happiness.”140 Nevertheless, Gregory urged him
not to make a hasty judgment and so, he claims, “restored his good spirits.”141
This is doubtful, or in any case the consolation was short lived: when Basil
later left Athens, Gregory felt devastated and abandoned by his best friend.142
Though he says they were like a single soul with two bodies,143 Gregory failed
to appreciate Basil’s true feelings. To him, Basil’s decision to leave Athens was
nothing less than “betrayal.”144 When we look at Basil’s own words, it is clear
that he struggled with academic life in Athens in a way Gregory never did: its
fire did burn him. Through the grandiose rhetoric of the funeral oration, he
offers a tendentious reinterpretation of Basil’s time in Athens that cannot be
taken at face value. As Neil McLynn has said, “Gregory was rewriting the his-
tory of Basil’s religious development […]. His was a version of Basil designed
to appeal to the city’s cultural elite […] and at the same time to enhance his
own credit.”145 It would not do to present Basil as having stormed out of Athens
in a fit of religious fervor, disdaining its reputation.
In spite of this, there is more to Basil’s opinion of secular education than his
experience of Athens. One of Basil’s most famous works is a letter on Greek
literature he wrote to some teenagers,146 presumably his nephews (and maybe
nieces).147 Basil’s thesis in this letter is that “pagan learning is not without
usefulness for the soul.”148 However, he cautions, secular works must be read
with discernment: “Accepting from them only that which is useful, you should
know that which ought to be overlooked.”149 This is reminiscent of how Origen

140 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 18 (98,5; trans. 43): κενὴν μακαρίαν.
141 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 18 (98,11–12; trans. 43): ὅθεν ἐπανῆγον αὐτὸν
εἰς τὸ εὔθυμον.
144 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 24 (112,6; trans. 48: τὸ δὲ τι προδοθείς παρ’
ἐκείνου.
145 McLynn, “Gregory Nazianzen’s Basil,” 180.
146 Basil, De legendis gentilium libris.
147 Basil, De legendis gentilium libris 1. Regarding the intended audience, see Wilson, Value of
Greek Literature, 7–8.
148 Basil, De legendis gentilium libris 4 (44,1–2; trans. 4:387): οὐκ ἄχρηστον ψυχαῖς μαθήματα τὰ
ἔξωθεν.
149 Basil, De legendis gentilium libris 1 (42,27–28; trans. 4:381): ἀλλ’ ὅσον ἐστὶ χρήσιμον αὐτῶν
δεχομένους, εἰδέναι τί χρὴ καὶ παριδεῖν. Cf. ibid. 4 (44,5–6; trans. 387): “You ought not to give
your attention to all they write without exception”: μὴ πᾶσιν ἐφεξῆς προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν.
34 Chapter 1
introduced his students to all the sects of philosophy except the Epicureans.
What is to be held onto, according to Basil, is whatever instructs young people
in virtue.150 His attitude toward secular literature comports with Gregory’s
statement that they studied those texts that promote virtue.151 No type of
writing is excluded, since virtue may be praised in any genre.152 However, phi-
losophy is the highest expression of secular learning.153 Basil’s virtue-focused
approach is not uniquely Christian: it is consistent with the ancient literary
approach of making ethical judgments about classical texts.154
Basil presupposes the moral formation of Christian readers of the classics,
as Christian morals are obviously the criteria by which this ethical judgment
will be made. He sees secular literature as appropriate for young people in par-
ticular since they are, in his view, not yet mature enough to read the Bible for
themselves.155 For Christian readers, secular literature is not merely anterior
to the Bible in the educational curriculum, but subordinate to Christianity.
The Christian reader must decide what to reject and what to keep on the basis
of Christian doctrine and morals.156 For example, sinful deeds and talk of the
pagan gods were to be rejected.157 Curiously, Basil concludes his letter with a
remark that undermines the purpose of reading secular works when one could
just read the Bible instead: “We shall doubtless learn these things more thor-
oughly in our own literature.”158 For all the good secular education has to offer,
it is subordinate and inferior to Scripture. In theory it could be dispensed with
completely, except that Basil thinks the Bible is not suitable for young people.
150 Basil, De legendis gentilium libris 2.

152 Basil, De legendis gentilium libris 2 and 5.
154 See Young, Biblical Exegesis, 172–73 and 204.
156 Cf. Rousseau: “The acceptability of the classics […] depended upon an altogether prior
sense of what ‘virtue’ might mean” (Basil, 53).
158 Basil, De legendis gentilium libris 10 (59,1–2; trans. 4:429–31): Ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν που κἀν τοῖς
ἡμετέροις λόγοις τελειότερον μαθησόμεθα. Deferrari and McGuire add “Christians” after
“we,” which I have removed.
This qualification is one reason Rousseau sees the work as ultimately “inconclusive,”
and even “disorganized,” in working out the exact relationship between Christianity and
secular education (Basil, 56). Wilson notes that “Some modern scholars, not entirely with-
out justification, have complained of the weakness of the argument. This weakness can
hardly be denied, but it can perhaps be partly explained as the result of an attempt to
combine two themes [i.e., the encouragement to the virtuous life and the means of deriv-
ing benefit from pagan literature] within too short a space” (Value of Greek Literature, 9).
Because of the ambiguity of Basil’s rhetoric, scholars have differed in evalu-

ating his opinion of secular education. Henri Marrou thinks that Basil accept-
ed it only as a kind of necessary evil.159 N. D. Wilson takes a more positive view:
Despite the suggestion that some parts of pagan literature are to be

avoided, the general tone of the essay does not suggest that B[asil] is re-
luctantly accepting the place of the pagan authors in the school curricu-
lum and making the best of a bad situation.160
After all, the thesis of the essay is that “pagan learning is not without usefulness
for the soul.”161 This is more than toleration of an evil. Warner Jaeger also takes a
positive view, calling this letter “the charter of all Christian higher education.”162
Robert Winn, too, adopts a positive interpretation, yet sees a contradiction be-
tween Basil’s opinion expressed here and his ascetic renunciation of education
in Athens.163 On this basis, he argues that this letter reflects Basil’s immature
thought from before he left Athens.164 To support his contention, Winn notes
that Basil, in an ascetical work, thanks God for having “liberated [him] from the
error of pagan tradition.”165 However, Basil couples this statement with the as-
sertion that he was raised by Christian parents from the beginning.166 Since his
parents were the ones who had him instructed in both secular literature and
the Bible, he cannot possibly mean that he, as an adult, was liberated from the
pagan literature his parents taught him! He means that he is thankful that he
was born to Christian parents rather than pagan ones. This declaration, then, is
no proof that Basil eventually spurned secular education. In fact, I agree with
Ellen Muehlberger that it is more likely Basil wrote the letter late in life in order
to advocate “a liberal reading program” over against those who sought a strict
delimitation between pagan and Christian literature.167
159 Marrou, History of Education, 321–22.

160 Wilson, Value of Greek Literature, 10.
161 Basil, De legendis gentilium libris 4 (quoted above).
162 Jaeger, Christianity and Paideia, 81.
163 Robert E. Winn, “Revisiting the Date of Authorship of Basil of Caesarea’s Ad adolescentes,”
The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 44 (1999): 291–307.
164 Winn, “Date of Authorship,” 301–302.
165 Basil, De iudicio dei 1 (PG 31, 653a): τῆς μὲν κατὰ παράδοσιν τῶν ἔξωθεν πλάνης ῥυσθείς.
English translation by M. Monica Wagner, CSC, Saint Basil: Ascetical Works (FOTC 9;
Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1962), 37.
166 Basil, De iudicio dei 1.
167 Ellen Muehlberger, “Salvage: Macrina and the Christian Project of Cultural Reclamation,”
Church History 18, no. 2 (2012): (273–97) 291.
36 Chapter 1
In his monastic rule, Basil states that children “should employ a vocabu-
lary derived from the Scriptures and, in place of myths, historical accounts of
admirable deeds should be told to them.”168 He wants Scripture to replace
secular literature in the education of children in the monasteries. This clearly
differs from Basil telling his nephews (and nieces) to study pagan books before
studying the Bible. It makes sense, though, since Basil thought the Bible taught
virtue even better than the Greek stories. I doubt that he had a change of heart,
for the difference is explained by the differing contexts. In the monastic rule,
Basil gives instructions about how to educate the children in the burgeoning
monastic schools.169 In his letter, in contrast, he addresses Christian children
being educated in secular schools. He wanted them to understand how to make
the best of what they were studying, even if studying Scripture would be better.
In his first sermon on the six days of creation (the Hexaemeron), Basil re-
marks upon the relative value of the classical curriculum. He says that arith-
metic, geometry, astrology or astronomy, and the study of the five regular
“solids”170 are “very laborious vanity.”171 If he had included music, we would
have the complete quadrivium. What does this criticism mean? He does
not mean that that these subjects are useless in themselves, but what good
are they, he asks rhetorically, if their practitioners fail to grasp that this universe
they study will one day come to an end?172 They should have realized that the
universe is not eternal from the fact that all of its parts are corruptible.173 Many
ancient people believed that the ceaseless revolutions of the stars and planets
implied that that the universe was eternal.174 For this reason, some Christians
denied that the cosmos was circular at all, completing rejecting secular
168 Basil, Regulae fusius tractatae 15,3 (PG 31, 953c): ὥστε καὶ ὀνόμασιν αὐτοὺς τοῖς ἐκ τῶν γραφῶν
κεχρῆσθαι, καὶ ἀντὶ μύθων τὰς τῶν παραδόξων ἔργων ἱστορίας αὐτοῖς διηγεῖσθαι. English trans-
lation by Wagner, Ascetical Works (op. cit.), 266.
169 Basil, Regulae fusius tractatae 15,1–3 (PG 31, 952b–956a).
170 See William C. Waterhouse, “The Discovery of the Regular Solids,” Archive for History of
Exact Sciences 9, no. 3 (1972): 212–21.
171 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,3 (GCS n.s. 2, 6,15–18, Amand de Mendieta/Rudberg; my
trans.): ἡ πολυάσχολος ματαιότης.
172 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,3.
174 “From their main discovery, that of the invariability of astronomical laws, the Chaldeans
had deduced another important conclusion, namely, the eternity of the world. […] The
stars, in fact, perform their revolutions according to ever invariable cycles of years, which,
as experience proves, succeed each other to infinity” (Franz Cumont, Astrology and
Religion among the Greeks and Romans [NY: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1912], 30).
cosmology.175 Because of his respect for scientific knowledge, Basil would not
do that. Instead, he rebutting the eternity of the world by noting that you have
to start drawing a circle from some point.176 In other words, the heavens may
rotate continuously, but God put them into motion from a starting point when
he made them. Studying this world is not as important as preparing for the
world to come.
We face the danger of misreading Basil as a fundamentalist here, but his
remarks in another sermon help clarify his perspective. There are two kinds
of truth, he tells us, which we might call secular and spiritual. Secular truth is
“the sound understanding of whatever pertains to this life,”177 such as astrol-
ogy or astronomy178 and geography.179 Spiritual truth, in contrast, is “the com-
prehension of the realities conducive to the blessed life.”180 Only the latter is
necessary for salvation. Secular truth, such as the study of the stars, is still true
and thus not worthless, but it does not help with what really matters, namely
eternal salvation. It would be a big mistake to infer from this, as some have,
that Basil considered science bad and worthless.181
175 See Pablo de Felipe, “Curiosity in the Early Christian Era—Philoponus’s Defence of
Ancient Astronomy against Christian Critics,” Science & Christian Belief 30, no. 1 (2018):
(38–56) 42–45.
177 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xiv A 3 (PG 29, 256b): τὴν περὶ οἱουδήποτε τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον
εἴδησιν ὑγιῆ. English translation by Mark DelCogliano, St. Basil: On Christian Doctrine and
Practice (PPS 47; NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2012), 96.
178 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xiv A 3 (PG 29, 256c; trans. 96): “How many stars move? By how
much does one speed ahead of the other?”: πόσοι κινοῦνται τῶν ἀστέρων, καὶ πόσον ἕτερος
τοῦ ἑτέρου προέχει τῷ τάχει.
179 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xiv A 3 (PG 29,256c; trans. 96): “For how many miles are there
of land or sea?”: πόσοι γὰρ στάδιοι γῆς ἢ θαλάσσης.
180 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xiv A 3 (PG 29,256b; trans. 96): τὴν περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τῶν ἐπὶ
τὸν μακάριον βίον φερόντων κατάληψιν.
181 As, for example, Daniel Špelda has done. Looking at Sts. Basil and Ambrose’s views on
astronomy, he sums up: “The astronomical investigation of the structure of the cosmos
neither contributes to salvation nor brings reverence to the Creator. Therefore, such activ-
ity ought to be considered an illegitimate transgression […]. According to the authors of
hexamerons, astronomy does not meet the criteria for knowledge that a Christian should
be interested in” (“The Importance of the Church Fathers for Early Modern Astronomy,”
Science & Christian Belief 26, no. 1 [2014]: [25–51] 33). He gets the distinction between sa-
cred and secular knowledge correct, but then wrongly claims that Basil considered secu-
lar knowledge unacceptable for Christians. Nevertheless, he concludes his article with
some salutary remarks I would like to repeat: “Classical patristic sources and period theo-
logical tractates should be re-read in accordance with the recent methodological trends
38 Chapter 1
Basil’s overall attitude is that secular truth is useful. This is confirmed by his
sermons on the six days. They are packed with scientific references, which he
uses to impress, edify, and amuse his congregation.182 If he had renounced sec-
ular education, and simply wished to replace it with Scripture, why would he
draw upon secular works so heavily in interpreting Genesis 1? The Hexaemeron
is proof that Basil’s view of secular knowledge was fundamentally positive.
He sought a synthesis between secular and religious knowledge, a synthesis
in which, however, the Bible retained unequivocal primacy.183 It was not a
case of two independent systems of knowledge, side by side like partners, but
the integration of secular knowledge into Christianity. In the words of Philip
Rousseau: “Basil came to view the classics […] as part and parcel of a Christian’s
formation.”184 “For him, the whole educational edifice had already been dis-
mantled, like a neglected temple, and was to be recycled within the fabric of
a Christian building.”185 Though he may not have been a humanist as such,
neither was Basil one of Gregory’s “many Christians” who mistakenly spurned
secular education. Rather, he saw all the good in it, which he wanted to re-
tain for the benefit of Christianity. We must qualify his repeated declaration
that secular learning is “vanity” unrelated to salvation. Though Basil’s rhetoric
prevents him from coming out and saying this explicitly, these sermons show
that secular truth could be used critically, as a servant, to defend and explain
Scripture. In this sense, it has an indirect connection to salvation.
It is easy to see how Basil’s attitude here built upon that of Origen. In fact,
his was the more positive since he, unlike Origen, recommended that Christian
children (at least in secular schools) study the Greek myths for their moral
value, while ignoring the bad. Origen, who as a young man had taught these
myths to children, saw little or no value in them for Christians. This personal
experience was crucial in their differing attitudes, but we must also consid-
er the different times in which they lived. Origen lived in the third century,
when some Christians, including himself,186 still experienced sporadic per-
secution by Roman officials. The hostility and fear created by such a climate
surely made it harder for Christians to appreciate stories of the pagan gods
they renounced! Although Origen was erudite, he saw no use for those stories
in the historiography of science which have abandoned positivistic and simplistic polar-
ised models of the relationship between science and religion” (ibid., 51).
182 I will probe many of these references, and what they say about science and the Bible,
throughout chapters 3–5.
183 See Hildebrand, Trinitarian Theology, 11–14.
anymore, which were to be replaced by the stories of the Bible. The old meth-
ods of grammatical analysis and interpretation would work just as well, if not
better, on biblical stories.
By Basil’s time persecution was a fading memory. Christianity had gained
the upper hand in the Roman empire, with Christian emperors, prompting
mass conversions. Origen’s project of replacing the pagan myths with the
Bible was well under way in monastic schools. In such a climate the classical
myths were not threatening. On the contrary, like the rest of secular knowl-
edge, they could be studied by Christians, so long as they were pressed into the
service of Christian morals. Perhaps they would vanish someday, since they
had nothing to offer that the Bible did not offer without admixture of sin, but
for the time being there was no reason to condemn them wholesale. If any-
thing, their appropriation by Christianity only helped it on its march toward
cultural hegemony.
How deep did Basil’s interest in Origen go? It is traditionally believed that
Basil and his friend Gregory early in their careers compiled an anthology of
Origen’s writings called the Philocalia.187 While many scholars accept this at-
tribution, it has been called into question by its critical editors.188 For this rea-
son it is illegitimate to continue to base arguments on the assumption that
Basil made it. What we can say with certainty is that Basil had at least read the
anthology, since Gregory says that it can serve “as a reminder” of himself “and
of Saint Basil.”189 As such the Philocalia remains a useful lens through which
one may examine Basil’s theology, even if he may not have played a part in its
compilation.
Since the traditional understanding assumes that Basil made the Philocalia
while still young, it can be argued that he distanced himself from Origen later
in life. This is a difficult question. Basil’s only explicit reference to Origen is
found in his dogmatic treatise on the Holy Spirit.190 Here Basil cites him only
as a witness to the liturgical practice of praising the Holy Spirit “with” (σὺν) the
Father and the Son. He does not praise Origen, and even offers a disclaimer
about his alleged heterodoxy regarding the Holy Spirit.191 Elsewhere, more
187 One of the book’s prefaces, dated to the sixth century, says that they wrote it.
188 See my article “Basil’s Uses of Origen in His Polemic against Astrology,” Zeitschrift für
Antikes Christentum/Journal of Ancient Christianity 18, no. 3 (2014): (471–85) 475–76.
189 Origen, Philocalia, pref. (= Gregory Nazianzen, Epistulae 115) (1,10–11 Robinson): ἵνα δέ τι
καὶ ὑπόμνημα παρ’ ἡμῶν ἔχῃς, τὸ δ’ ἀυτὸ καὶ τοῦ ἁγίου Βασιλείου.
190 Basil, De Spiritu sancto, 29,73. This treatise is dated to 375, shortly before Basil’s death
(Fedwick, “Chronology,” 17; Rousseau, Basil, 12).
191 Origen says that it was a debated question whether the Holy Spirit was a creature or not
(De Principiis 1, pref. 4). In Rufinus’s Latin translation, it says that the debate was over
40 Chapter 1
subtly, Basil criticizes some of Origen’s positions, as I shall show where appro-
priate. He does this in the midst of heavy, unacknowledged borrowing from
Origen. Basil’s continued use of Origen, even in the Hexaemeron, his final theo-
logical work, proves that he never renounced or denounced Origen. He could
easily have done so, as many others did. The fact that Basil was not an unre-
served admirer or slavish imitator of Origen’s only proves that he was both a
disciple and an independent thinker. Much of the rest of this book will specific
the relationship between the two.
3 Conclusion
This examination of Origen’s and Basil’s early years has highlighted some strik-
ing similarities between them. First of all, the two were connected through
Gregory the Wonderworker, Origen’s former student (ostensibly), who evan-
gelized Basil’s homeland of Pontus in the third century. Basil’s grandmother
Macrina, who knew some words from the revered saint, ensured that Basil
learned the Christian faith, while his father had him receive the standard
secular education. This harks back to Origen, whose own father insisted he
be taught both the Bible and the secular curriculum. This twofold immer-
sion in secular and biblical knowledge is crucial to understanding both au-
thors and their shared viewpoint. Although both undertook promising secular
careers—Origen as a grammarian (teacher of literature) and Basil as a rhetor,
who even studied in Athens—they soon abandoned these in favor of a life of
service in the Church. When persecution created a need for more catechists,
Origen answered the call, selling his copies of the Greek myths he taught. Later
he became a theological teacher, handing over the task of basic instruction to
another. We know from Basil and his friend Gregory that Basil became disen-
chanted with worldly knowledge while in Athens. Going back home and falling
under the influence of his sister Macrina, he began, like Origen, to practice
the “philosophic life” (asceticism). It was during this time in his life that he
and Gregory studied the anthology of Origen’s writings called the Philocalia
(according to tradition, they themselves made it).
whether or not the Spirit was “begotten” (natus). This is an attempt by Rufinus to bring
Origen into line with fourth-century orthodoxy. It is Origen’s talk of the Spirit possibly
being a “creature” than gives Basil pause, because in the fourth century calling any person
of the Trinity a “creature” is Arian heresy (see G. W. Butterworth, trans., Origen on First
Principles [NY: Harper and Row, 1966], 3, note 4).
Critical remarks from both authors can give the impression that, when
they left their secular careers, they also renounced all secular learning. This
is not so. The examination I made in this chapter shows that Origen indeed
rejected the pagan myths but by no means all the branches of secular learn-
ing (e.g., geometry, arithmetic, music, and astrology). On the contrary, the
thanksgiving address from Gregory, as well as his own letter to him, prove
that he viewed every field of knowledge, especially philosophy, as a potential
“servant” of Christianity. As a “servant,” secular knowledge was subordinate to
Christianity, and even foreign to it, but it was useful all the same. It was like the
“spoils of Egypt” that the Israelites took with them when they escaped slavery.
There was a danger of Christians being misled by it, yes, but the wise know
how to use it profitably. We are told in the thanksgiving address that Origen
even taught some of these disciplines, such as physics, as part of his advanced
theological teaching.
Although Basil can be quite harsh in his rhetoric, he held the same “ser-
vant” view as Origen. At one point, he helped clarify the relationship between
sacred and secular learning by distinguishing the two based on their subject
matter. There was nothing wrong with secular knowledge as such, but to Basil
it seemed relatively unimportant compared to the sacred. In at least one way,
Basil took a more liberal approach than Origen: he encouraged his nephews to
study even the pagan myths, which Origen derided for being stupid and impi-
ous. The reason Basil gives is that these stories contain many valuable lessons
in good conduct (albeit mixed in with some bad ones that Christians should
avoid). As the age of persecution had passed, it was possible for Basil to ad-
vocate “recycling” pagan texts, so to speak, into the new Christian regime: a
synthesis of secular and sacred learning.
Now that this connection between the two has been established and I have
set out their shared theory of the relationship between secular education and
Scripture, the rest of this book will look in detail at the many different ways in
which that theory played out in their interpretations of Genesis 1 specifically.
Chapter 2
The Interpretation of Scripture
It is impossible to understand particular interpretations of the Bible with-

out first understanding the interpreter’s methodology. Therefore, if we want
to know how Origen and Basil solved cosmological problems in Genesis 1,
we must first examine how each theologian understood the interpretation of
Scripture in general—their hermeneutics. How did they interpret the Bible?
As it turns out, they had much in common; in fact, they belonged to the same
hermeneutical school of thought, which makes their divergences in reading
Genesis all the more significant.
Drawing upon the thought of Philo—a contemporary of Paul whose views
were being rejected by his fellow Jews right as they were being taken up by
some Christians—Origen formulated a threefold method of exegesis. He di-
vided the Bible into three parts, which he likened to the three parts of a human
being: body, soul, and spirit. The “body” is the literal meaning of a passage. This
meaning is primarily intended for the “simple,” uneducated reader. It is all that
the vast majority comprehend when they hear Scripture. Origen adds a major
caveat: some passages do not have a “body.” This means that they should not
be taken literally. For example, Gen 3:21 says that God made garments of skin
for Adam and Eve. Origen thought this and similar passages to be absurd or
impossible if taken literally. God put these absurdities and falsehoods into the
Bible to alert the discerning, spiritual reader to search for a higher meaning.
Origen was strict about what constituted the “literal” level: even to interpret a
simple metaphor in the Bible means going beyond its “body.” This kind of al-
legorical hermeneutic had precedent in some interpreters of Homer, who also
struggled with difficult or offensive passages.
The “soul” of Scripture, according to Origen, is a nonliteral, allegorical in-
terpretation that speaks about virtue and vice. It is a way of reading the Bible
designed to provide moral instruction. Rather than just history lessons and ar-
chaic legal codes, the stories and laws in the Bible tell us how to live, if only we
can decode them properly. Origen’s classic example of this kind of “psychic”
(soul) exegesis is Paul’s interpretation of Deut 25:4. Paul took a statute about
not muzzling oxen and made it into a moral point about paying missionaries
(1 Cor 9:9–10). According to Origen, every passage of the Bible contains such a

The Interpretation of Scripture 43
hidden, “psychic” meaning. These meanings can be uncovered only by readers

who have at least begun to make progress in the spiritual (ascetic) lifestyle.
The highest (or deepest) level of Scripture is its “spirit.” This is a second al-
legorical interpretation, distinct from the “psychic.” It is not about morality but
theology. Deep truths about God and Christ are hidden beneath every biblical
passage. These spiritual messages can be puzzled out only by the “perfect,” that
is, those who (like Origen) were fully proficient in asceticism. In theory, this
sounds esoteric and elitist. In practice, however, Origen’s extant sermons are
replete with spiritual interpretations as well as literal and moral ones. Although
ordinary, married Christians could not become ascetic exegetes themselves,
they were able to learn some of the Bible’s spiritual secrets by listening to ser-
mons from preachers who were.
My analysis of Basil’s sermons will show that he adopted Origen’s threefold
system as his own. This is apparent especially in his homilies on the Psalms
and is confirmed in Gregory’s eulogy for Basil. However, when it came to
Genesis 1 specifically, Basil, unlike Origen, stuck with the literal interpretation.
In the ninth and final homily on Genesis 1, he responds to criticism of his lit-
eral exegesis by deriding allegorical exegesis, likening it to the interpretation of
dreams! Had he turned his back on Origen after so many years? Scholars have
struggled to understand this, some arguing that he underwent some kind of
hermeneutical conversion late in life, perhaps under the influence of exegetes
in Antioch. This, however, is very unlikely.
Although his rhetoric can make it seem like he had turned against Origenian
interpretation, I will argue that the determining factor was how he understood
the unique nature of Genesis 1 as a revelatory text. Because of his struggle
against heretical, dualistic theology and cosmology, Basil was convinced that
Genesis 1 must be taken literally. Dualists supported their worldview by con-
cocting allegorical readings of the “darkness” and “abyss” of Genesis 1. These
they interpreted as a cosmic principle of self-existent Evil, locked in an eternal
struggle with the principle of Good (God). Against this, Basil maintained that
Genesis 1 means what it says: everything God made, including the darkness, the
abyss, and the sea creatures that live in it, is good. There is no cosmic Evil. The
scriptural cosmogony is not a cryptic myth in need of allegorical deciphering.
It is a straightforward, literal account of how the cosmos came to be. This insis-
tence upon a literal reading of Genesis 1 brought Basil into conflict with Origen,
for whom the first three chapters of Genesis were quintessential examples of
texts that have no “body.” These myths hide deep truths beneath the surface.
44 Chapter 2
1 Origen
Origen was the first Christian theologian to lay out a method of scriptural
hermeneutics in a systematic way.1 He did this in his celebrated but contro-
versial work On First Principles.2 His central hermeneutical theory was that
every passage of the Bible has three meanings, which correspond to what he
believed were the three parts of a human being: the flesh (or body), the soul,
and the spirit.3 Once again Origen shows the profound influence of Philo, who
declared: “We should look on all these outward observances [e.g., circumci-
sion] as resembling the body, and their inner meanings as resembling the
soul.”4 Philo says nothing of a third, spiritual meaning. From Origen’s point of
view, this makes sense, as the highest meaning speaks of Christ and his myster-
ies, which were unknown to Jews. By transferring Philo’s twofold method into
a Christian framework, Origen also transformed it through the addition of a
third sense.
The most fundamental meaning of a scriptural passage is its “body.” Origen
defines this as its “ordinary interpretation.”5 Origen’s Latin translator, Rufinus,6
clarifies what he means by this: he translates it periphrastically as the “com-
mon and historical interpretation.”7 What Origen meant by this “ordinary
interpretation” is the usual, common, obvious meanings that words have: in
other words, a literal interpretation. Since the word literal can be ambiguous,
what Origen means is best illustrated by an example. He says that the com-
mand in Exod 16:29, “Sit, each person, in your houses; let no one go out from
1 “No earlier Christian had attempted anything like the On First Principles. It was a new genre
for Christian literature, so far as we can tell” (Heine, Origen, 131).
2 Origen, De principiis 4,1–3. This passage has been preserved in its original Greek as the first
chapter of the Philocalia, as well as in Rufinus’s Latin translation. There are some minor
discrepancies between the two versions. For example, Rufinus omits passages in 3,5 and
6–7, while the Philocalia omits passages in 3.9 and 10, and ends at section 11, omitting 12–15
completely.
3 Origen, De principiis 4,2,4 (GCS 22, 312,8–313,2 Koetschau). The Greek terms are σάρξ (or
σώμα), ψυχή, and πνεύμα, respectively.
4 Philo, De migratione Abrahami 16,93 (Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Supersunt 2, 286,93–
94 Wendland): ἀλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα μὲν σώματι ἐοικέναι νομίζειν, ψυχῇ δὲ ἐκεῖνα. English transla-
tion by F. H. Colson and George Herbert Whitaker, “On the Migration of Abraham,” in Philo
(op. cit.), (4:132–267) 4:185.
5 Origen, De principiis 4,2,4 (312,9–10; my trans.): τὴν πρόχειρον ἐκδοχήν.
6 Rufinus was Origen’s great champion in the fourth-century West. See Elizabeth Ann Clark,
The Origenist Controversy: The Cultural Construction of an Early Christian Debate (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1992), 159–193.
7 Origen, De principiis 4,2,4 (312,25–26; my trans.): communem istum et historialem intellectum.
his place on the seventh day,”8 “is an impossible one to observe literally, for
no living creature could sit for a whole day.”9 Another prime example is any
reference to God’s “soul” or body parts in Scripture. These, Origen says, figura-
tively signify God’s powers,10 since God has no body.11 In instances like these,
Origen’s “ordinary” interpretation may seem more literalistic than literal, but
his literalism is a direct and logical consequence of his threefold system of in-
terpretation. For Origen, to interpret any figure of speech, such as a metaphor,
hyperbole, allegory, or parable, even if its intended meaning is clear, is already
to move beyond the body of Scripture to its soul or spirit. If a verse of Scripture
said, “It was raining cats and dogs,” Origen would say that the literal meaning
of that verse is that feline and canine quadrupeds were falling from the sky. A
nonliteral interpretation would be that it was raining hard. For Origen, there
was no such thing as a dead metaphor!
Far from making him a fundamentalist, Origen’s literalism was the start-
ing point for his figurative interpretations. As seen in the example above, he
believed that there are many passages of the Bible that should not be taken
literally.12 In his terminology, such passages have no body, but only a soul and
spirit (which can never be lacking). He does not mean that they cannot be
interpreted literally, only that they should not be.13 Such nonliteral passages
include but also go well beyond simple figures of speech. According to Origen,
any biblical passage that, if taken “in a literal sense,”14 says something “absurd”
or “impossible,” should be considered as lacking a body.15 Of course, he did not
want to reject such passages and tear them out of the Bible, but only to inter-
pret them figuratively.
8 Origen and Basil both read the Septuagint (LXX). Therefore, I take all quotations of the
Old Testament from the New English Translation of the Septuagint (http://ccat.sas.upenn
.edu/nets/edition). Since the LXX often differs considerably from the Hebrew, I have
made no attempt to align them.
9 Origen, De principiis 4,3,2 (326,5–7): ἀδύνατόν ἐστι φυλαχθῆναι κατὰ τὴν λέξιν, οὐδενὸς
ζώου δυναμένου δι’ ὅλης καθέζεσθαι τῆς ἡμέρας. English translation by George William
Butterworth, Origen: On First Principles (NY: Harper & Row, 1966), 291.
10 Origen, De principiis 2,8,5.
11 Origen, De principiis 1,1,6; Contra Celsum 4,37.
13 Cf. Elizabeth Ann Dively Lauro, The Soul and Spirit of Scripture within Origen’s Exegesis
(Bible in Ancient Christianity 3; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2010), 52. Her view-
point on Origen’s threefold hermeneutic is explained below.
14 Origen, De principiis 4,3,4 (328,14; trans. 294): ἐπὶ τῷ ῥητῷ. This expression is synonymous
with κατὰ τὴν λέξιν and κατὰ τὸ ῥητὸν.
15 Origen, De principiis 4,3,4 (328,14; trans. 294): καὶ ἀλόγων καὶ ἀδυνάτων.
46 Chapter 2
The fact that Origen believed some passages lacked a body does not mean
that he never took the Bible literally. In fact, he emphasizes that bodiless pas-
sages within the Bible are the exception rather than the rule. He explicitly
defends himself against the perennial accusation that his hermeneutic under-
mines the Bible’s divine authority:
[Someone] may suspect us of saying that because some of the history did
not happen, therefore none of it happened; and because a certain law
is irrational or impossible when taken literally, therefore no laws ought
to be kept to the letter […]. We must assert, therefore, that in regard to
some things we are clearly aware that the historical fact is true; as that
Abraham was buried in the double cave at Hebron […] and thousands of
other facts. For the passages which are historically true are far more nu-
merous than those which are composed with purely spiritual meanings.16
Like Philo before him,17 Origen practiced a form of figural interpretation that
(for the most part) maintained the literal sense. The literal validity of most of
the Bible was not limited to questions of historicity. Origen also affirms that
many scriptural passages, even when taken literally, are morally and spiritually
useful: “The bodily part of the scriptures [is] in many respects not unprofitable
but capable of improving the multitude in so far as they receive it.”18 This point
is important because it shows that Scripture’s moral and spiritual value is not
limited to the moral and spiritual levels of interpretation. Scripture teaches
Christian faith and morality even at the literal level (of those passages that
have a body, that is). This is why Elizabeth Ann Dively Lauro defines the bodily
16 Origen, De principiis 4,3,4 (329,1–4, 6–8, and 11–13; trans. 294–95): ἵνα δὲ μὴ ὑπολάβη τις
ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ πάντων τοῦτο λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδεμία ἱστορία γέγονεν, ἐπεί τις οὐ γέγονε, καὶ οὐδεμία
νομοθεσία κατὰ τὸ ῥητὸν τηρητέα ἐστίν, ἐπεί τις κατὰ τὴν λέξιν ἄλογος τυχάνει ἢ ἀδύνατος […]·
λεκτέον ὅτι σαφῶς ἡμῖν παρίσταται περί τινων τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας εἶναι ἀληθές, ὡς ὅτι Ἀβραὰμ ἐν
τῷ διπλῷ σπηλαίῳ ἐτάφη ἐν Χεβρὼν […], καὶ ἄλλα μυρία. πολλῷ γὰρ πλείονά ἐστι τὰ κατὰ τὴν
ἱστορίαν ἀληθευόμενα τῶν προσυφανθέντων γυμνῶν πνευματικῶν.
17 “Exactly as we have thought to the body, because it is the abode of the soul, so we must
pay heed to the letter of the laws” (Philo, De migratione Abrahami 16,93 [286,94–95; trans.
185]): ὥσπερ οὖν σώματος, ἐπειδὴ ψυχῆς ἐστιν οἶκος, προνοητέον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν ῥητῶν νόμων
ἐπιμελητέον. If Philo was more attached to the literal meaning than Origen, that is no
surprise, given the radical difference between Jewish and Christian attitudes toward the
Law.
18 Origen, De principiis 4,2,8 (321,1–2; trans. 285): λέγω δὲ τὸ σωματικὸν τῶν γραφῶν, ἐν πολλοῖς
ποιῆσαι οὐκ ἀνωφελὲς δυνάμενόν τε τοὺς πολλούς, ὡς χωροῦσι, βελτιοῦν.
sense of Scripture for Origen as “the literal reading that spiritually benefits
the hearer.”19
According to Origen, even those passages that lack a body serve a
God-ordained purpose. He compares them to “stumbling-blocks,”20 no doubt
because they have tripped up many an educated reader who has faltered at the
Bible’s seeming absurdities. Though it may seem counter-intuitive, Origen says
God deliberately put absurd and irrational things into the Bible as a signal to
the attentive reader to eschew the literal meaning and look deeper:
But if the usefulness of the law and the sequence and ease of the narrative
were at first sight clearly discernible throughout, we should be unaware
that there was anything beyond the ordinary meaning for us to under-
stand in the scriptures. Consequently the Word of God has arranged for
certain stumbling-blocks, as it were, and hindrances and impossibilities
to be inserted in the midst of the law and the history.21
In other words, if a literal reading of the Bible always made perfect sense, no
one would ever suspect it contained deeper meanings, and thus they would
never find them. The apparent absurdities, contradictions, and impossibilities
in the Bible force the reader to look deeper.22 This will hopefully lead to the
realization that every passage, even the ones that make literal sense, contains
hidden meanings.
The second layer of meaning, which is hidden under the flesh of Scripture’s
words, so to speak, Origen called its “soul.” Just as a human being has an out-
ward, visible body and also an inner, invisible soul, so too the Bible. Although
Origen does not define the soul, his meaning is clear enough. The soul of
Scripture I will call the “psychic” interpretation.23 It traditionally has been
19 Dively Lauro, Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 53.

20 Origen, De principiis 4,2,9 (321,6; trans. 285): σκάνδαλα.
21 Origen, De principiis 4,2,9 (321,3–8; trans. 285): Ἀλλ’ ἐπείπερ, εἰ δι’ ὅλων σαφῶς τὸ τῆς
νομοθεσίας χρήσιμον αὐτόθεν ἐφαίνετο καὶ τὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ἀκόλουθον καὶ γλαφυρόν, ἠπιστήσαμεν
ἂν ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ πρόχειρον νοεῖσθαι δύνασθαι ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς, ᾠκονόμησέ τινα οἱνεὶ σκάνδαλα
καὶ προσκόμματα καὶ ἀδύνατα διὰ μέσου ἐγκαταταχθῆναι τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ
λόγος. I have replaced Butterworth’s “obvious” with “ordinary” (πρόχειρον) to be consistent.
22 J. Albert Harrill has recently demonstrated how Origen frequently uses the metaphor of
“testing” the biblical text to force it to reveal the truth, as if it were a slave being tortured in
a judicial setting: “‘Exegetical Torture’ in Early Christian Biblical Interpretation: The Case
of Origen of Alexandria,” Biblical Interpretation 25, no. 1 (2017): 39–57.
23 Since there is no adjectival form of the English word soul, one must resort either to ani-
mal (from the Latin anima) or psychic (from ψυχή). Neither has the right connotation in
English, but psychic is preferable to animal.
48 Chapter 2
designated “moral” because it edifies the hearer. While this is accurate in terms
of intent, it obscures Origen’s anthropological terminology that reflects his
view of Scripture and could wrongly imply that the literal meaning lacks moral
value.24 The psychic interpretation is so designated because it speaks to the
soul. Dively Lauro defines it well as a “nonliteral, figurative reading of the text
that more generally calls the hearer to shun vice and grow in virtue.”25 It is figu-
rative in that words are taken to refer to things other than those to which they
usually refer. Here, words are not taken in their ordinary sense. Once again,
an example will be illustrative, and what better example than the one Origen
himself offers,26 namely Deut 25:4 as interpreted by the apostle Paul:
For it is written in the law of Moses, “You shall not muzzle an ox when it
is treading out the grain.” Is it for oxen that God is concerned? Does he
not speak entirely for our sake? It was written for our sake, because the
plowman should plow in hope and the thresher thresh in hope of a share
in the crop.
1 Cor 9:9–1027
Here the word ox refers not to the animal ordinarily signified by that name but
to the Christian missionary, and the word grain refers not to seeds but to the
gospel of Christ. So while the body of Deut 25:4 forbids Jews to muzzle their
oxen, its soul requires Christians to provide material support to their mission-
aries. It encourages the virtue of generosity while shunning the vice of miserli-
ness. In this way, the psychic reading of Scripture makes relevant for Christians
biblical passages that would otherwise be obsolete. This does not mean that it
is a way of reading Old Testament laws only. That is one of its uses, but Origen
believes every passage of the Bible, including the New Testament, has deeper
meanings hidden beneath the literal.28
Finally, the third layer of the interpretation of Scripture is the “spirit.” This
level is the deepest and indicates a figurative interpretation that discloses a
theological meaning. The central point of reference is Christ. Dively Lauro de-
fines Origen’s spiritual sense as a “nonliteral sense that enlightens the reader
24 See Dively Lauro, Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 62–63.

27 Quotations from the New Testament contained herein are taken from the Revised
Standard Version (RSV).
concerning God’s plan of salvation through Christ.”29 Again Origen cites Paul
for an example.30 Referring to the events of Exodus 13–17, Paul writes:
I want you to know, brethren, that our fathers were all under the cloud,
and all passed through the sea, and all were baptized into Moses in the
cloud and in the sea, and all ate the same spiritual food and all drank
the same spiritual drink. For they drank from the spiritual Rock which
followed them, and the Rock was Christ. […] Now these things are τύποι
for us.
1 Cor 10:1–4 and 6
Usually translated as “examples” here, the word τύποι is technical for Origen.
A τύπος was an image or figure (like a model or sketch).31 In the context of the
interpretation of Scripture, it refers to a kind of spiritual “figure of speech.” In
the case of the Exodus, the Israelites went down into the waters of the Red Sea,
which is an image of the immersion of Christians into the waters of baptism.
Between the soul and the spirit of Scripture, there is not a difference in meth-
od, but only a difference in content and purpose. While Scripture’s soul speaks
to the human soul of virtue and vice, its spirit speaks to the human spirit about
Christ and salvation.
A word should be said about terminology here. Following Paul in
Gal 4:21–24, Origen uses the word allegory to describe his figurative interpre-
tations: “There are allegories in the Scriptures,” he says.32 The word allegory
comes from ἀλληγορέω, which literally means “to say something else,” i.e., to
say one thing but mean another. Because of its long history of controversy in
biblical interpretation, the word has become loaded with misleading baggage.
Stefaniw begins her study of figural interpretation with an excellent statement
of the problem:
The term ‘allegorical exegesis’ is even more misleading [than ‘Origenist’],

because what a modern English speaker would understand as allegori-
cal interpretation, namely an extended metaphor in which the charac-
ters and events represent often abstract entities and their interactions
(standard examples being Pilgrim’s Progress, Dante, medieval courtly
love allegory) is very different from what persons with some degree of

31 See Liddell et al., Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. “τύπος”.
32 Origen, De principiis 4,2,6 (316,14–15; trans. 280): ἀλληγορίας εἶναι ἐν τοῖς γεγραμμένοις.
50 Chapter 2
literary education between the 2nd and 6th centuries included in the cat-
egory ‘allegorical.’ In late antique terms, allegory included a wide range
of figurative and non-literal interpretations including analogy, symbol-
ism, typology, metonymy, synecdoche and metaphor. One finds a sparsity
of allegory in the strict sense, with an abstract entity corresponding to
each concrete element or action in the text, which is in complete dispro-
portion to the reputation of these patristic commentators as allegorists.
This reputation is thus more plausibly attributed to a polemical habit on
the part of other exegetes, whether Antiochenes in the fifth century or
Protestant modernists in the twentieth, for whom this characterization
was more a term of abuse than a careful description of the content of
particular commentaries.33
I agree. Where I do use the words allegory and allegorical in this work, I mean
“nonliteral” or “figural” in this broad, late-antique sense, as Origen himself
used it. Traditionally, Origen’s highest or deepest sense has been called the
“allegorical” sense, after the “literal” and “moral.” But the psychic sense is also
“allegorical.” Therefore, I call this the “spiritual” sense in accord with Origen’s
own terminology.
This distinction between the soul and spirit of Scripture raises the question
what Origen means by these terms with respect to human beings. Answering
this question requires a brief examination of his controversial hypothesis of
the preexistence of souls. It is not entirely clear how Origen himself under-
stood this concept.34 He took care to offer his own opinions as speculation, to
33 Blossom Stefaniw, Mind, Text, and Commentary: Noetic Exegesis in Origen of Alexandria,
Didymus the Blind, and Evagrius Ponticus (Early Christianity in the Context of Antiquity
6; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010), 30–31. Cf. Morwenna Ludlow, “Theology
and Allegory: Origen and Gregory of Nyssa on the Unity and Diversity of Scripture,”
International Journal of Systematic Theology 4, no. 1 (2002): (45–66) 60–61.
34 Two excellent analyses of the major points of Origen’s view of pre-existence have been
made by Peter W. Martens: “Embodiment, Heresy, and the Hellenization of Christianity:
The Descent of the Soul in Plato and Origen,” Harvard Theological Review 108, no. 4 (2015):
594–620; “Origen’s Doctrine of Pre-Existence and the Opening Chapters of Genesis,”
Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum / Journal of Ancient Christianity 16, no. 3 (2012): 516–
49. Tom Greggs well summarizes Origen’s entire concept, from pre-existence to final
restoration, in Barth, Origen, and Universal Salvation: Restoring Particularity (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 54–84. See also Ellen Muehlberger, Angels in Late Ancient
Christianity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 33–34; Mark S. M. Scott, Journey
Back to God: Origen on the Problem of Evil (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 53–66.
Mark Julian Edwards has argued that, contrary to the consensus of scholars both ancient
and modern, Origen did not believe in the pre-existence of souls: Origen against Plato
(Ashgate Studies in Philosophy and Theology in Late Antiquity; Aldershot, England:
be distinguished from doctrine.35 He says that God originally created a great

many “intellectual beings” or incorporeal minds.36 These minds contemplated
God, but many through negligence and fatigue began to fall away from God.37
Since “God is a consuming fire” (Heb 12:29), these minds cooled off and be-
came “souls.”38 This idea is based on an etymology of the word ψυχή (soul),
according to which it derives from the word ψύχεσθαι (to grow cool).39 As souls,
they sort of fell into different kinds of bodies.40 Those that fell moderately be-
came human beings, but others fell “into such great vileness and evil” that they
became demons that oppose human beings.41 The minds that remained de-
voted to God were rewarded by becoming ruling angels.42 There are also the
“super-heavenly” (supercaelestia) bodies, meaning the sun, moon, and stars,
Ashgate Publishing, 2002), 89–114. For a brief rebuttal of Edwards, see Martens, “Descent
of the Soul,” 614, note 73.
35 Origen, De principiis 1, praef. 5–7; 2,8,5. Martens, “Descent of the Soul,” 603–04.
36 The original Greek of this passage has been preserved as a quotation in the sixth-century
Emperor Justinian’s work against Origen (Liber adversus Origenem), in which Origen calls
them “intellectual beings”: νοερῶν ουσιῶν (PG 86, 947c). Rufinus struggles to translate
this, giving the expansive: “rational or intellectual creatures, or whatever the minds we
mentioned above should be called”: rationabilium creaturarum uel intellectualium, uel
quoquomodo appellandae sunt quas mentes superius diximus (Origen, De principiis 2,9,1
[164,10–11], my trans.).
37 Origen, De principiis 2,9,2 (165,27–28): “But sloth and weariness of taking trouble to pre-
serve the good, coupled with disregard and neglect of better things, began the process of
withdrawal from the good”: sed desidia et laboris taedium in seruando bono et auersio ac
neglegentia meliorum initium dedit recedendi a bono. Cf. ibid. 1,4,1.
Origen bases this idea of a cosmic fall preceding the creation of the visible universe in
part on Eph 1:4 using the word καταβολή to mean the creation of the world (ibid. 3,5,4–5).
This word has the sense of “foundation” but literally means “throwing down.”
39 This etymology is found in both Plato (Cratylus 399e [OCT/Platonis Opera 1, l. 1 Burnet]:
δύναμιν […] ἀναψῦχον) and Aristotle (De anima 1,2,405b [Aristotelis Opera 1, ll. 28–29
Bekker]: τὴν κατάψυξιν).
40 The idea is that the soul sort of grows heavy and sinks into flesh. The soul becomes
“weighed down” (oppressa, Origen, De principiis 3,4,5 [270,12]) and “wearied out” by the
“very heaven burdens of luxury and lust”: grauissimis oneribus luxuriae ac libidinis fati-
gata (ibid. 3,4,3 [268,3–4]).
41 Origen, De principiis 1,6,3 (82,21; my trans.): in tantam indignitatem ac malitiam; cf.
Commentarii in Iohannem 1,17(96–98) (GCS 10, 21,7–17 Preuschen), where he describes the
fall of the “dragon” (i.e., the devil) into a body. Even angels and demons have ethereal
bodies, as only God is bodiless (De principiis 1,6,4). Origen’s discussion of the nature of
the “spiritual body” (1 Cor 15:44) disproves any claim that he denied the resurrection of
the body (ibid. 3,6,4–6). However, he also entertained the idea that even spiritual bodies
would eventually become entirely spiritual and divine, such that all materiality would
cease (ibid. 2,3,3; 3,6,9).
42 Origen, De principiis 1,5,3 and 6,2.
52 Chapter 2
who were forced into that form by God in order to serve the newly-created
material world.43 Among human beings, people are born into different circum-
stances depending on what they did in this prior existence.44 This bodily life is
a punishment, not in the punitive sense but in the rehabilitative sense: the goal
of bodily life is to gradually return the fallen souls to God through discipline
and punishments “over many ages.”45 Some accused Origen of entertaining the
possibility of reincarnation into animal bodies in these ages.46 At the final end
of all ages, everything will at last be subjected to God (see 1 Cor 15:24–27).47 The
ultimate salvation of all rational minds, including the devil, is clearly implied,
though Origen says it is for the readers to judge this idea for themselves.48 This
43 Origen, De principiis 2,9,3; 3,5,4.

44 Origen, De principiis 2,9,5–7. This is how Origen defends the Creator against the Gnostic
charge of injustice for making some people be born in poor circumstances.
45 Origen, De principiis 1,6,3 (84,11–12): multis, ut ita dicam, saeculis; cf. 2,3,1–5; 3,5,3 and 6,6.
The nature of this spiritual progress over many ages is not entirely clear here. According
to Jerome, Origen believed that in successive ages, a demon or angel could become a
human being and vice versa, depending on whether they had made progress or fallen
further during the previous age (Jerome, Epistulae 124,3). This seems to be the logical
implication of what Origen says.
46 Did Origen also believe that a soul, in a future age, could incarnate even into an ani-
mal body? Jerome says that he did (Epistulae 124,4), and a quotation alleged to be from
De principiis 2, in Justinian’s book against Origen, says as much (Justinian, Liber adver-
sus Originem [PG 86, 985cd]). However, De principiis 1,8,4 explicitly rejects this view!
Furthermore, in Against Celsus Origen repeatedly and unequivocally rejects the Platonic
belief that a human being could reincarnate as an animal (Contra Celsum 1,20; 3,75; 4,83;
5,49; 8,30). It should be mentioned that Origen rejected any kind of reincarnation at all
within the same age (ibid. 8,30). This contradiction is best explained, in my opinion, by the
hypothesis that Origen considered the possibility of animal reincarnation (across ages)
in De principiis, but later rejected it. Rufinus removes the offending passage from De prin-
cipiis and adds material reflecting Origen’s mature view, as found in Contra Celsum, in
accord with Rufinus’s stated methodology (De principiis, praef. 2).
47 Origen, De principiis 1,6,2; 3,5,7 and 6,9.
48 Origen, De principiis 1,6,3. According to Jerome, this was Origen’s belief (Epistulae 84,7).
Origen says that when Scripture says that death will be destroyed, it means that death
will cease to be an enemy, but that its substance shall remain (De principiis 3,6,5–6).
Butterworth observes that Origen is talking about the devil here, but that Rufinus has
obscured it (On First Principles, 251, note 1). See Ilaria Ramelli, The Christian Doctrine
of Apokatastasis: A Critical Assessment from the New Testament to Eriugena (Vigiliae
Christianae, Supplements 120; Leiden: Brill, 2013), 144–51. Heine has argued that Origen,
in his later biblical commentaries, may have come to entertain the possibility of final
impenitence and eternal damnation (Origen, 242–56). Ramelli rejects this view (ibid.,
151–56).
theory of universal salvation, which Gregory of Nyssa also held,49 has come to
be called apocatastasis (ἀποκατάστασις, from Acts 3:21), which means “restora-
tion” or “restitution.”50
Body and soul are the central components of humanity in Origen’s theory,
so what of the spirit? Origen’s threefold reference to body, soul, and spirit is
taken from 1 Thess 5:23b: “May your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and
blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ.” Although a great deal of ink
has been spent discussing what Paul may have meant by such terms, answering
that question would not shed much light on how Origen understood them two
centuries later in his own Greco-Roman philosophical context. Fortunately
for us, Origen speaks directly of the difference between the soul and spirit in
his interpretation of the saying, found in the Parable of the Faithful Servant
(Matt 24:54; Luke 12:46), that the master of the house will take the unfaithful
servant and “cut him in twain” (διχοτομήσει).51 According to the second of the
three interpretations Origen gives it, this means that the spirit and soul will
be separated.52 The word spirit, Origen says, refers to “the nature of the soul
itself,”53 but one can distinguish here between the portion that is “better” be-
cause it was made in God’s image and likeness (Gen 1:26),54 and the portion
that “through the misuse of free will was received in a condition contrary to
the nature of its original purity.”55 In other words, “spirit” is not a second entity
that exists alongside the soul,56 but is a way of referring to the original purity
of the mind before it fell away from God, cooled off, and became a “soul.”57 The
soul, in its present embodied state, can be directed either to spiritual things (in
49 See Morwenna Ludlow, Universal Salvation: Eschatology in the Thought of Gregory of
Nyssa and Karl Rahner (Oxford Theological Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000), 77–85.
50 See Ramelli, Doctrine of Apokatastasis, 13–24.
53 Origen, De principiis 2,10,7 (181,14; my trans.): natura ipsius animae.
54 Origen, De principiis 2,10,7 (181,15): melior.
55 Origen, De principiis 2,10,7 (181,16–17; my trans.): quae postmodum per liberi arbitrii
lapsum contra naturam primae conditionis et puritatis adsumpta est.
56 Origen entertained the idea that there were two souls, one fleshly and another spiritu-
al, but said that the statements in Paul that led some to adopt this view were not to be
taken literally but rather were spoken “not in the proper sense but through catechresis”
(De principiis 3,4,4 [269:29–30]; my trans.): non proprie sed abusiue. As he often does, he
leaves it to the readers to decide which view they prefer (ibid. 3,4,5).
57 Riemer Roukema thus defines it as “the better part of the soul (that is, the nous)” (“Souls,”
in Handbook to Origen, [201–02] 202). My analysis here is in agreement with that of Dively
Lauro (Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 86–91).
54 Chapter 2
accord with its origin and goal) or toward bodily, carnal things; it becomes one
with whichever it joins.58 It is like “a kind of medium between the weak flesh
and the willing spirit.”59 This is how he interprets the Pauline war between
“flesh” and “spirit,” which is waged within the soul.60 Thus, despite the tripar-
tite terminology and conceptualization, Origen remains within the Western
tradition of body-soul dualism. The psychic reading of Scripture speaks to the
soul of virtue and vice, because this is the soul’s struggle. Caught between good
and evil, between “spirit” and “flesh,” it finds in the psychic reading encourage-
ment toward the good. The spiritual reading, in contrast, as the highest form
of interpretation, speaks directly to the “spirit,” that is, to the soul’s better part.
It tells of God, whom it once enjoyed, has forgotten, and now seeks to regain.
This dual terminology may even be applied to the body. In its present state, the
body is “psychic” (in this case the word animal is appropriate) subject to death
and temptation, but through resurrection it will become “spiritual.”61 This ter-
minology is taken from Paul (1 Cor 2:14–15; 15:45–49).
In addition to corresponding to the parts of the human being, Origen says
the three parts of Scripture correspond to three types of Christians. The body
of Scripture is the only part known by “the simple.”62 These simple Christians
do not know how to interpret the Bible figuratively and take everything liter-
ally. As a result of this fundamental error, most Christians, as well as Jews, hold
“false opinions” about God.63 They make “impious or ignorant assertions about
God,”64 and “believe such things about him as would not be believed of the
most savage and unjust of men.”65 Origen is thinking of the many passages of
Scripture that speak of God anthropomorphically, for example by assigning
him body parts.66 Likewise, any reader of the Old Testament will be familiar
with passages in which God behaves in ways that some, such as the Gnostics,
consider unjust.67 For Origen, talk of God’s wrath or anger is pedagogical and
not to be taken literally: “God should be thought of as completely impassible
58 Origen, Commentarii in Romanos 1,18,5.

59 Origen, De principiis 2,8,4 (162,20–21; my trans.): unde uidetur quasi medium quiddam
esse anima inter carnem infirmam et spiritum promptum.
60 Origen, De principiis 3,4,2–4.
61 Origen, De principiis 2,8,2; 3,6,6.
62 Origen, De principiis 4,2,4: ὁ ἁπλούστερος (312,8). He also calls them οἱ ἀκεραιότεροι (4,2,1
[308,4]). Rufinus translates both terms as simpliciores.
63 Origen, De principiis 4,2,2 (308,8; trans. 271): ψευδοδοξιῶν.
64 Origen, De principiis 4,2,2 (308,8–9; trans. 271): ἀσεβειῶν ἢ ἰδιωτικῶν περὶ θεοῦ λόγων.
65 Origen, De principiis 4,2,1 (308,6–7; trans. 271): τοιαῦτα δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσι περὶ ἀυτοῦ, ὁποῖα
οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ὠμοτάτου καὶ ἀδικωτάτου ἀνθρώπου.
and lacking all these emotions.”68 To get us to obey his laws, like a scolding par-
ent, God puts on a stern facial expression and acts angry,69 even issuing false
threats that will not come to pass.70
Origen accused Jews of being such literal-minded readers. This is why, he
says, they rejected Jesus, because he did not fulfill the prophecies about the
Messiah according to the letter.71 Although many Christians also suffered from
this hermeneutical defect, they at least believed the doctrine of the Church
that there are “images of divine things” hidden in the Old Testament,72 though
they did not know exactly what or where these were.73 In other words: it is one
thing to confess, as a matter of faith, that the Old Testament prefigures Jesus;
it is quite another to know how and in which passages it does so! Origen ap-
plies his threefold hermeneutic to the entire Bible, not just the Old Testament:
he adduces examples of absurdities from the New Testament in exactly the
same way as he does from the Old.74 While interpreting the Old Testament
nonliterally was an official Christian practice, validated by the New Testament,
interpreting the New Testament itself nonliterally was a bolder undertaking.
The second kind of biblical reader Origen describes somewhat vaguely as
“the one who has somewhat ascended,” that is, increased in knowledge.75 Such
readers had gone up a level, so to speak; they were no longer simple, unlearned
beginners like the majority. They had made some progress in the spiritual life
and could now determine how the Bible may be interpreted psychically, and
they benefit from such interpretations. They understood some of the hidden
meanings of Scripture. They were already on the path toward joining the final
type: “the perfect.”76
68 Origen, De principiis 2,4,4 (131,26–28; my trans.): adfirmantes deum penitus inpassibilem
atque his omnibus carentem affectibus sentiendum. Cf. Contra Celsum 4,72; Homiliae in
Numeros 23,2; Homiliae in Ieremiam 18,7. Interestingly, in a sermon on Ezekiel (Homiliae
in Ezechielem 6,6 [GCS 33, 384,31 Baehrens], my trans.), Origen contradicts himself and
uses scripture passages to argue that God suffers out of love for us: “The Father himself
is not impassible”: ipse Pater non est impassibilis. On this remarkable contradiction,
see Joseph M. Hallman, “Divine Suffering and Change in Origen and Ad Theopompum,”
Second Century 7, no. 2 (1989): (85–98) 92–94.
69 Origen, Homiliae in Ieremiam 18,7.
70 Origen, Homiliae in Ieremiah 19,15. God telling Jonah to prophesy that Nineveh will be
destroyed in three days (Jon 3:44) is cited as an example of such a false threat.
72 Origen, De principiis 1, praef., 8 (14,8–9; my trans.): formae enim sunt haec quae descripta
sunt sacramentorum quorundam et diuinarum rerum imagines.
75 Origen, De principiis 4,2,4 (312,10; my trans.): ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ ποσὸν ἀναβεβηκὼς.
76 Origen, De principiis 4,2,4 (312,11; my trans.): ὁ δὲ τέλειος.
56 Chapter 2
These so-called perfect Christians were able to access Scripture’s spirit and
understand how it speaks figuratively of Christ and salvation in every passage.
Origen must have considered himself to be one of these perfect Christians, as
he frequently gave spiritual interpretations of Scripture. The English word per-
fect is an imperfect word for translating τέλειος. In English, perfect has the con-
notation of being flawless, impeccable, or infallible, which is clearly not what
Origen meant. This is the negative meaning of perfect, that is, having no flaws
or defects. Origen meant perfect in the positive sense, that is, to be complete,
lacking nothing. The word complete would arguably be a better translation.
However, this did not mean that they had a complete or perfect understanding
of everything in the Bible, either, but only that they knew how to read the Bible
at all three levels.77
Origen’s systemization of Christians was not a caste system.78 In fact, Origen
specifically opposed Gnostics for thinking of certain people as being innately
psychic or spiritual.79 In his sermons and other works, Origen freely expound-
ed all three types of interpretation. The spiritual meaning could not be limited
only to the perfect, nor did the perfect lose interest in the psychic and bodily
meanings. The spiritual reading was the very thing the middle group were pro-
gressing towards, and they did not get there all at once, as though flipping a
switch. They had to work their way to it through practice, which meant they
had to at least try to understand spiritual realities. By expounding both psychic
and spiritual interpretations in his public sermons, Origen drew all his listeners
upward. Nevertheless, the spiritual meaning is higher than the psychic. Union
with God through Christ—not only the prerequisite and concomitant moral
rectitude—was the goal.80 Furthermore, spiritual concepts, because they were
mysteries, were harder to understand than right and wrong. For Origen, the
spiritual interpretation of Scripture was part and parcel of the ascetic, “per-
fect” Christian’s pursuit of union with Christ.81
77 “The ‘perfect,’ then, are not ‘completed,’ but are the more advanced spiritual journeyers.
They have become able to receive edification from all three senses” (Dively Lauro, Soul
and Spirit of Scripture, 85).
78 I concur with Dively Lauro’s assessment of the threefold system (Soul and Spirit of
Scripture, 83–85).
80 I am reminded of the oft-quoted saying with which Pope Benedict XVI began his first
encyclical: “Being Christian is not the result of an ethical choice or a lofty idea, but the en-
counter with an event, a person, which gives life a new horizon and a decisive direction”
(Deus Caritas Est [2005] 1).
81 See Amy Brown Hughes, “The Legacy of the Feminine in the Christology of Origen of
Alexandria, Methodius of Olympus, and Gregory of Nyssa,” Vigiliae Christianae 70, no. 1
(2016): (51–76) 52–60.
Origen was not the first person to interpret the Bible nonliterally. He did
not present himself as the creator of a new method of interpretation; on the
contrary, he came to the scriptures already recognizing the allegorical reading
of sacred texts as a traditional principle of exegesis. Origen makes this clear in
his polemic against the pagan writer Celsus. Origen charges Celsus with both
ignorance and arrogance for having boasted that he knew all Christian beliefs:
He is like a man who went to stay in Egypt, where the Egyptian wise men
who have studied the traditional writings give profound philosophical
interpretations of what they regard as divine, while the common people
hear certain myths of which they are proud, although they do not under-
stand the meaning.82
In other words, Celsus was like an arrogant traveler who, after living a while
in a foreign country and hearing their traditional myths, claimed to be an au-
thority on their religion. It is not enough, Origen explains, just to hear their
stories; one must consult the expert interpreters of that culture, who know
how to interpret the myths and sacred texts allegorically. Thus, for Origen, alle-
gorical exegesis was a principle that logically preceded any given religious text.
Because religion concerns the divine, its myths and texts must be read in a way
fitting to the divine, that is, allegorically. The common people, of course, like
those Christians Origen calls “simple,” are ignorant of these deeper meanings
in which only the religious experts are trained. Celsus was just such a reader,
too ignorant and arrogant to recognize the limits of his knowledge.
The third-century philosopher Porphyry, not unreasonably, said that Origen
simply took the Stoic hermeneutic and applied it to the Bible.83 Origen ac-
knowledged that the principle of allegorical interpretation was applied to the
Greek myths by the Stoics.84 He mentions the third-century bce philosopher
82 Origen, Contra Celsum 1,12 (65,5–8; trans. 15): ὡς εἴ τις τῇ Αἰγύπτῳ ἐπιδημήσας, ἔνθα οἱ
μὲν Αἰγυπτίων σοφοὶ κατὰ τὰ πάτρια γράμματα πολλὰ φιλοσοφοῦσι περὶ τῶν παρ’ αὐτοῖς
νενομισμένων θείων, οἱ δὲ ἰδιῶται μύθους τινὰς ἀκούοντες, ὧν τοὺς λόγους οὐκ ἐπίστανται.
83 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,19,8. But Origen’s method differs significantly from the
Stoics in that he usually preserves the literal sense; see Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “Origen and
the Stoic Allegorical Tradition: Continuity and Innovation,” Invigilata Lucernis 18 (2006):
195–226.
84 The only extant, complete treatise on allegory from a Stoic author is that of Heraclitus
(ca. 100 ce) called Quaestiones Homericae. On the Stoic practice, see David Konstan’s in-
troduction to Heraclitus: Homeric Problems (ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell and David
Konstan; Writings from the Greco-Roman World 14; Atlanta: SBL, 2005), xi–xxx; David
Dawson, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1992), 38–52; George R. Boys-Stones, “The Stoics’ Two Types
58 Chapter 2
Chrysippus specifically, relating how he discerned in lurid scenes about the

gods ciphers for philosophical notions.85 Origen did not criticize Stoic allego-
resis as such. Instead, he attacked the Greek myths themselves for offering im-
moral examples to impressionable young people:
If any stories of myths and legends may be said to be shameful on the

ground of their literal meaning, whether they were composed with a hid-
den interpretation or in any other way, what stories deserve to be so re-
garded more than those of the Greeks? […] We do not accept any myth
which might harm the young even if it is to be understood allegorically.86
The myths attributed to the gods immoral acts, like incest, and were therefore
morally and theologically unacceptable.87 Origen’s critique was not without
precedent. He approvingly cites Plato banning “myths and poems of this char-
acter” from his ideal republic.88 Origen flipped Celsus’s criticism of the Old
Testament back against himself: it was not the Old Testament that contained
immoral stories, but the Greek myths.89
That Origen rejected the Greek myths on account of the immorality found
in them—even though they may be allegorized—confirms that for him the
literal sense of a text was its foundation. The difference between the Bible and
the Greek stories was that, in his view, even the Bible’s literal text was edifying
and morally good:
of Allegory,” in Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition: Ancient Thoughts and
Modern Revisions (ed. idem; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 189–216.
86 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,48 (320,25–28 and 321,21–22; trans. 223 and 224): εἴπερ αἰσχύνης
ἄξια τὰ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἐκδοχὴν χρὴ λέγειν μύθων καὶ ἀναπλασμάτων, εἴτε δι’ ὑπονοίας
γεγραμμένων εἴτε ἄλλως ὁπωσοῦν· ἐπὶ τίνων τοῦτο ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν χρὴ λέγειν ἱστοριῶν;
[…] ὡς μηδὲ προφάσει τροπολογίας μῦθόν τινα παραδέξασθαι ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν νέων.
88 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,50 (324,4–5; trans. 225): τοὺς τοιουσδὶ μύθους καὶ τὰ τοιαδὶ
ποιήματα. Plato writes: “These stories are not pious, not advantageous to us, and not
consistent with one another” (Plato, Respublica 2,380c [OCT/Platonis Opera 4, ll. 2–3
Burnet]): μυθολογοῦντα, ὡς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε σύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα
αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς. English translation by George Maximilian Antony Grube and C. D. C. Reeve,
“Republic,” in Plato: The Complete Works, ed. John Madison Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), (971–1223) 1019. In this context, Plato’s complaint was that
the poets said that the gods, who are good, cause bad things: κακῶν δὲ αἴτιον φάναι θεόν τινι
γίγνεσθαι ἀγαθὸν ὄντα (ibid. 2,380b [ll. 6–7]).
89 Origen responds to many of Celsus’s specific critiques of Genesis (Contra Celsum 4,36–47).
But the truth is much rather that it is the legends of the Greeks which
are not only “very stupid,” but also very impious. For our scriptures have
been written to suit exactly the multitude of the simple, a consideration
to which no attention was paid by those who made up the fictitious sto-
ries of the Greeks.90
The books of Scripture were composed with the moral and religious needs of
the uneducated majority in mind.91 If the Bible encouraged immorality, then it
would be no better than the Greek myths. The test, so to speak, is not whether
a story can be allegorized (which for Origen is a given), but how valuable it is
when read literally.
At this point, a suspicion of inconsistency on Origen’s part may appear.
After all, he explicitly admits that the book of Genesis, at least, contains im-
moral examples. Such stories, of course, have hidden meanings, but as we just
saw he was unwilling to allow such an excuse to the Stoics. Origen writes:
If, for instance, an inquirer were to be in a difficulty, about the intercourse

of Lot with his daughters, or the two wives of Abraham, or the two sisters
married to Jacob, or the two hand-maids who bore children by him, they
[the simple] can say nothing except that these things are mysteries not
understood by us.92
Although Origen here describes the viewpoint of the “simple,” he does not
deny their premise that these things are “mysteries,” not necessarily to be taken
literally. Furthermore, as we saw, he admits that anthropomorphic passages
about God mislead most believers into thinking him savage and angry, con-
trary to the nature of divinity. At root, this is the same problem with the Greek
myths that depict the gods unworthily. Origen’s attack on them thus seems
hypocritical.
90 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,50 (323,29–324,3; trans. 225): πολλῷ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὰ Ἑλλήνων οὐ
μόνον εὐηθέστατα ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀσεβέστατα μεμυθολόγηται. τὰ γὰρ ἡμέτερα ἐστόχασται καὶ τοῦ
πλήθους τῶν ἁπλουστέρων, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ πλάσματα ποιήσαντες οὐκ ἐφυλάξαντο.
Chadwick translates ἁπλουστέρων as “simple-minded,” but I have changed it to “simple” for
the sake of consistency.
91 This principle of Origen’s exegesis is emphasized by modern scholars who have defended
him against earlier critics, e.g., Dively Lauro, Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 53–55; Heine,
Origen, 134–35; Martens, Origen and Scripture, 193.
92 Origen, De principiis 4,2,2 (309,4–7; trans. 272): εἰ γοῦν ἐπαπορήσαι τις περὶ τῆς τοῦ Λὼτ
θυγατρομιξίας καὶ τῶν δύο γυναικῶν τοῦ Ἀβραὰμ δύο τε ἀδελφῶν γεγαμημένων τῷ Ἰακὼβ καὶ
δύο παιδισκῶν τετεκνωκυιῶν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, [ἁπλούστεροι] οὐδὲν ἄλλο φήσουσιν ἢ μυστήρια ταῦτα
τυγχάνειν ὑφ’ ἡμῶν μὴ νοούμενα.
60 Chapter 2
How might he defend himself? First, I think he would probably say that in
the Greek myths the impious stories were the rule, whereas in the Bible they
were the exception. After all, he was adamant that “bodiless” passages were far
outnumbered by those that could be taken literally.93 In contrast, from Origen’s
view, the immoral acts of the gods were endemic to the myths. Nevertheless,
by sometimes using allegoresis to avoid moral and theological problems in the
scriptures, Origen made the same interpretive move the Stoics did. Second,
allegoresis was not the only tool in Origen’s exegetical toolbox. He simply ac-
knowledges that some stories record “the deeds of the just and the sins that
these same people, being human, sometimes committed.”94 While such stories
may have scandalized naïve readers, their presence in the Bible actually proved
its truth, since it did not hide that truth when it was ugly.95 Origen was able to
rationalize immorality in the text, as when he says Lot’s daughters were justi-
fied in their incest because they believed that the entire human race had been
destroyed, and that it was up to them to repopulate the earth.96 Alternately, he
admits that this may have been an evil act, but that is all right since “the divine
Scripture is not to be found giving clear approval of this act and indicating that
they did right; nor does it criticize and find fault with it.”97 Whenever possible
Origen would defend the text of Scripture “as it stands,” that is, literally, rather
than immediately say a passage has only a figurative meaning.98
Ancient Alexandria was for Origen the formative milieu in which he learned
how to interpret the Bible. I will not attempt to define its complex fabric of in-
terconnections.99 Origen’s immediate “predecessor,” so to speak, was Clement,
though as I noted in the previous chapter Origen did not depend upon nor
even mention him. Nevertheless, Clement’s allegorical biblical interpretation,
which itself was influenced by Stoic allegoresis,100 was similar to Origen’s.101
Like Origen, he considered allegorical interpretation to be a transcultural
93 Origen, De principiis 4,3,4 (quoted above).

94 Origen, De principiis 4,2,8 (320,8–9; my trans.): ἀπαγγελλούσαις δικαίων πράξεις καὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν τούτων ποτὲ γενόμενα ἁμαρτήματα ὡς ἀνθρώπων.
96 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,45; Homiliae in Genesim 5,4.
97 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,45 (318,28–30; trans. 221): καὶ ἀληθῶς οὐχ εὑρίσκεται ἡ θεία γραφὴ
σαφῶς παραδεξαμένη ὡς καλῶς γεγενημένον τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ αἰτιασαμένη καὶ μεμψαμένη.
98 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,45 (319,1–2; trans. 221): καθ’ αὑτὸ.
99 Heine helpfully summarizes it in Origen, 26–64.
100 See Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “The Mysteries of Scripture: Allegorical Exegesis and the Heritage
of Stoicism, Philo, and Pantaenus,” in Clement’s Exegesis, (80–110) 100–06.
101 See Rizzi, “Bible in Alexandria,” 116–26. Heine concludes that Origen’s Genesis commen-
tary shows “the influence of the Platonizing interpretation seen in Philo and Clement of
Alexandria” (Origen, 115).
method of reading sacred texts, since the wise hid their sublime knowledge
under enigmatic sayings that the simple could not understand.102 References
to God’s body parts and throne were strictly allegories.103
Prior to Clement was the Jewish interpreter Philo, whom Origen approv-
ingly mentions more than once.104 He engaged with Philo’s interpretations
frequently by making reference to an anonymous predecessor of his.105 Origen
was probably responsible for bringing Philo’s works to (Palestinian) Caesarea
when he moved there from Alexandria.106 He defended Philo against the criti-
cisms of Celsus, remarking that he (along with the earlier Jewish interpreter,
Aristobolus) was a skilled exegete: “It appears to me that in many passages
they have so successfully hit the meaning.”107 It is not surprising, then, that
Origen’s interpretations of the Old Testament sometimes overlapped with
those of Philo.108 For example, Philo held that the garments of skin that God
made Adam and Eve (Gen 3:21) indicated “symbolically the natural skin of the
body,”109 meaning that God gave the disembodied spirits of Adam and Eve
bodies. Origen seems to have favored this controversial interpretation.110 In the
102 Clement, Stromateis 5,4,19–10,66.

103 Clement, Stromateis 5,11,71,3–4.
104 Heine, Origen, 31.
105 See Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “Philo as Origen’s Declared Model: Allegorical and Historical
Exegesis of Scripture,” Studies in Christian-Jewish Relations 7 (2012): (1–17) 4–8.
106 Runia, Philo, 22.
107 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,51 (324,14; my trans.): ἐπεὶ πολλαχοῦ οὕτως ἐπιτετεῦχθαί μοι
φαίνεται.
108 Runia has helpfully summed up previous scholarship on this subject (Philo, 157–83).
109 Philo, Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesin et Exodum 1,53. Excepting some fragments, this
work survives only in the ancient Armenian translation, edited by Johannes B. Aucher,
ed., Philonis Judaei paralipomena Armena (Venice: Lazarus, 1826). English translation
by Ralph Marcus, Philo: Supplement I—Questions and Answers in Genesis (LCL 380;
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 31.
110 Origen seems to agree with Philo when he says that the garments of skin hold “a certain
secret and mysterious meaning, superior to the Platonic doctrine of the descent of the
soul”: ἀπόρρητόν τινα καὶ μυστικὸν ἔχει λόγον, ὑπὲρ τὴν κατὰ Πλάτωνα κάθοδον τῆς ψυχῆς
(Contra Celsum 4,40 [313,28–314,1; trans. 216–17]). He means his theory of the preexistence
of the soul, which I described above. For a comparison of this with Plato’s doctrine, see
Martens, “Descent of the Soul,” 617–20. There is some doubt as to how Origen interpret-
ed Gen 3:21. In a sermon, he says only that they indicate the mortality and frailty that
Adam and Eve assumed because of their sin (Homiliae in Leviticum 6,2). See Anders Lund
Jacobsen, “Genesis 1–3 as Source for the Anthropology of Origen,” Vigiliae Christianae
62, no. 3 (2008): (213–32) 223–31; Heine, Origen, 113–15; Martens, “Origen’s Doctrine of
Pre-Existence,” 539–41.
62 Chapter 2
words of Ilaria Ramelli, “Philo of Alexandria exerted an incalculable influence

on Origen’s exegesis and theology.”111
Another important influence upon Origen was an anonymous Jewish
Christian, whom he called “the Hebrew.”112 He taught Origen that the six-
winged Seraphim of Isa 6:2–3 indicated the Son and the Spirit, among other
things.113 In spite of all these significant Greek, Jewish, and Christian influ-
ences, Origen himself considered his fundamental exegetical model to be the
apostle Paul, an indisputable authority for Christians.114 After all, it was Paul
who taught the Church that the story of Sarah and Hagar in Genesis 16 “is an
allegory” (Gal 4:28). Philo and Paul were contemporary Jewish interpreters of
the Bible, who despite their differences shared some exegetical and theologi-
cal affinities.115 David Runia sums up Philo’s influence upon the Fathers of the
Church (including Origen): “Paul’s fanciful and rather obscure interpretation
could encourage creative efforts of their own, often with reference to Philonic
example.”116
The lasting value of Origen’s hermeneutic has been controversial. Older
scholarship can be divided into two schools of thought, one more negative and
the other more positive.117 Eugène de Faye, voicing the criticism of many, saw
it as nothing other than a way to exploit the Bible by reading own’s own ideas
into it.118 At mid-century Richard Hanson basically restated de Faye’s judg-
ment, calling Origen’s method “largely a façade or a rationalization whereby
he was able to read into the Bible what he wanted to find there.”119 Along the
same lines, Trigg says that Origen’s allegorical method, as that of the Stoics
before him, was sometimes “a desperate effort to avoid the plain meaning of
111 Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, “Prophecy in Origen: Between Scripture and Philosophy,” Journal of
Early Christian History 7, no. 2 (2017): (17–39) 23.
112 Origen, De principiis 1,3,4 (53,5): Hebraeus magister. But the underlying Greek is sim-
ply ὁ Ἑβραῖος (Justinian, Liber adversus Origenem [PG 86, 983c]). Heine points out that
Butterworth’s translation “my Hebrew master” baselessly implies that Origen was taught
directly by this Jewish Christian (Origen, 56, note 134).
113 Origen, De principiis 1,3,4; 4,3,14. See Heine, Origen, 56–57.
115 See Runia, Philo, 66–74.
116 Runia, Philo, 86.
117 Cf. Joseph W. Trigg in his introduction to the reprint of Richard Patrick Crosland Hanson,
Allegory and Event: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Origen’s Interpretation of
Scripture (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2002), (i–xxv) ix.
118 Eugène de Faye, Origen and His Work (trans. Fred Rothwell; NY: Columbia University
Press, 1929), 33–52.
119 Hanson, Allegory, 258.
the text.”120 In the modern era of historical consciousness, such a criticism of al-
legoresis can scarcely be denied, except perhaps by an extreme postmodernist.
Hans Urs von Balthasar began the Catholic re-appreciation of Origen. He ar-
gued that Origen’s spiritual interpretation of Scripture was a logically-necessary
consequence of believing that Scripture is the word of God.121 Daniélou fol-
lowed in von Balthasar’s footsteps. He distinguished in Origen what he con-
sidered two competing systems: the threefold system that Daniélou claimed
Origen borrowed from Philo, and the historical Christian tradition that dis-
tinguished between the literal and the “typological” meaning of Scripture.122
The former Origen “tries to impose” on Scripture; it was “an artificial proceed-
ing […] destined to be a great drag on exegesis in later times.”123 In contrast,
Daniélou argued, the latter system is “the authentic tradition of the Church.”124
By typology he meant a correspondence between a historical sign or “type”
and the spiritual reality to which it allegedly pointed, such as the ancient city
Jerusalem signifying the kingdom of God. Daniélou was followed by his fellow
Jesuit, Henri de Lubac, who also espoused a twofold hermeneutic.125 However,
de Lubac criticized Daniélou’s attempt to distinguish sharply between allegory
as something foreign to Christianity and a narrowly-defined typology as the
“authentic” Christian tradition.126 Any distinction between the two is blurry:
“It is not certain […] that typology always succeeds, as it wishes, to distinguish
itself from the allegory it condemns.”127 Daniélou and de Lubac were joined by
another Jesuit, Henri Crouzel, who also criticized Origen’s threefold system as
artificial:
This classification does little to clarify Origen’s exegesis: developed by

starting from a different reality, anthropology, it gives the impression that
it is imposed from without. […] His vocabulary […] does not permit a
simple distinction between the second and third meanings.128
120 Trigg, Bible and Philosophy, 121–22.

121 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Parole et Mystère chez Origène (Paris: Cerf, 1957), 54 and 57. This is
a reprint of his two-part article “Le Mysterion d’Origène,” Recherches de science religieuse
26 (1936): 513–62 and 27 (1937): 38–64.
122 Daniélou, Origen, 188–89.
123 Daniélou, Origen, 191.
124 Daniélou, Origen, 187.
125 His major work on Origen was History and Spirit: The Understanding of Scripture accord-
ing to Origen (trans. Anne Englund Nash; San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007).
126 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 442.
127 De Lubac, History and Spirit, 442, note 34.
64 Chapter 2
Like de Lubac, Crouzel rejected Daniélou’s sharp distinction between allegory

and typology.129 Nevertheless, his overall judgment of Origen’s exegesis, albe-
it stripped of its threefold framework, was positive.130 More recently, Karen
Torjesen also emphasized the twofold division.131
A crucial work in the scholarly evaluation of patristic exegesis, including
Origen’s, is Young’s Biblical Exegesis and the Formation of Christian Culture.
She departed from the dominant paradigm of literal vs. spiritual and in-
stead emphasized the multivalence of scriptural texts. She argued that the
Fathers found more than two meanings in biblical texts because they read
them “intertextually.”132 Intertextuality refers to the relationships that differ-
ent texts within a corpus, such as the Bible, have with one another. In other
words, Origen and other Fathers used Scripture synchronically to interpret
Scripture. Intertextual reading was common both within the Bible itself (as
New Testament interprets Old, for example) and within the ancient Greek
scholarly tradition that sought to interpret Homer by Homer.133 The theologi-
cal assumption that grounded such a reading was that Scripture is a single,
unified corpus.
Young persuasively argues that appreciating the intertextual nature
of Origen’s exegesis requires us to qualify what we mean when we call it
“allegorical”:
The fundamental question for understanding meaning was discerning

the reference. This did not mean a simplistic literalism. […] Language
was symbolic, and its meaning lay in that to which it referred. The differ-
ence between ‘literal’ and ‘allegorical’ references was not absolute, but lay

131 Karen Jo Torjesen, Hermeneutical Procedure and Theological Method in Origen’s Exegesis
(Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 13.
132 “For such people [i.e., upper-class literati] what we now call ‘intertextuality’ was an im-
portant feature of literature, one text achieving its status by its allusive and mimetic rela-
tionship with others that had the status of classics” (Young, Biblical Exegesis, 11).
133 This is the main principle of Porphyry’s work Quaestiones Homericae, which he at-
tributed to Aristarchus of Samothrace. For numerous examples from Porphyry, see
John A. MacPhail, Jr., Porphyry’s Homeric Questions on the Iliad: Text, Translation, and
Commentary (Texte und Kommentare: Eine Altertumswissenschaftliche Reihe 36; Berlin:
De Gruyter, 2010), 3, note 23, and 4, note 27. On Porphyry as an interpreter of Homer, see
Robert Lamberton, Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the Growth
of the Epic Tradition (Transformation of the Classical Heritage 9; Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1986), 108–33. Lamerton briefly discusses Origen’s view of Homer, reach-
ing the same basic conclusion that I gave in the previous chapter (ibid. 80–82).
on a spectrum. […] Often to interpret something allegorically was simply

to recognize metaphor rather than taking something very woodenly ac-
cording to the letter. All language signified, and as sign was symbolic. The
crucial question was what it symbolised or referred to.134
In other words, Origen’s goal was not to make allegories out of the biblical sto-
ries. Rather, he sought to discover what the words of Scripture refer to. To do
this, he searched the scriptures for verbal clues. For example, it is not so much
that he wanted to make an allegory out of Genesis 3, in which a snake repre-
sents the devil. Rather, he encountered the word snake in the text and sought
to discover its reference. Scripture itself (Rev 12:9) suggests that it is the devil.
While this may seem a fine, typically-academic distinction, the term “intertex-
tuality” more accurately describes what Origen thought he was doing when
he read the Bible. It is intertextual allegoresis rather than strictly imaginative
or intellectual allegoresis. Because a given word may be used many different
ways in different parts of the Bible, its referent in a given passage need not
be pinned down to a single meaning. Origen fit all possible meanings, more
or less successfully, into a threefold system. Unlike nearly all scholars before
her, Young refuses to collapse his psychic and spiritual readings into one. She
regards them as “secondary and tertiary levels” in “a complete educational
system.”135 Young’s approach paved the way for the work of Dively Lauro. She
defends Origen’s theoretical distinction as crucial to the correct understanding
of his exegesis: “The nonliteral, moral sense, and more specifically its practical
distinction from and relationship with the other nonliteral, spiritual sense, is
the key to his exegetical effort.”136 Most recently, Ronald Heine has defined in-
tertextuality as one of Origen’s key hermeneutical principles.137
The drift of recent Origenian scholarship has been to appreciate Origen’s
hermeneutic on its own terms without trying to defend it as a valid hermeneu-
tical technique for modern exegetes to imitate.138 Paul Boles sums up well this
shift in approach:
134 Young, Biblical Exegesis, 120.

135 Young, Biblical Exegesis, 292.
137 Heine, Origen, 135–36.
138 “I certainly do not pretend to have defended his view of, or approach to, scriptural inter-
pretation in this study” (Martens, Origen and Scripture, 244). The aforementioned Jesuit
theologians tried to distinguish in Origen between what was obsolete and what was pe-
rennially Christian.
66 Chapter 2
The newer generation of scholars has not focused on whether Origen’s

exegetical conclusions are agreeable to them. Instead, they have asked
what Origen’s method does to the recipient of the interpretation (what-
ever the particularities of his conclusions are).139
I situate myself in this trajectory. I believe that Origen’s and Basil’s hermeneu-
tics, especially as they relate to scientific cosmology, have something to offer
modern readers of the Bible. That does not mean that theirs is the definitive
Christian approach to Scripture. It should go without saying that Basil and
Origen are not to be imitated slavishly. Nevertheless, like von Balthasar and,
more recently, Morwenna Ludlow, I think there are underlying, fundamental
principles that can still be fruitful.140 Whatever its demerits, postmodernism
has allowed us to escape the narrow confines of modernistic exegesis, which
excluded on principle all figural interpretation. Sacred texts, including the
Bible, are ambiguous and multivalent. If they are to remain living texts for a
living community of faith, then there must be room for the more-than-literal,
even if it be sharply distinguished in both method and goal from historical-
critical exegesis.
2 Basil: Disciple of Origen
Although Basil never wrote a treatise on hermeneutics, he followed in Origen’s

footsteps. One clue to Basil’s hermeneutical debt to Origen is the anthology of
Origen’s writings called the Philocalia. It contains the section of the work On
First Principles in which Origen explains his threefold approach to Scripture.141
Early in his career, Basil and his friend Gregory of Nazianzus studied this work.
It was so influential upon Basil that Gregory, when donating a copy of it, said it
would serve as “a reminder” of him.142 Although, as I explained in the previous
chapter, Basil and Gregory probably did not compile it themselves, their early
study of it nevertheless establishes the possibility of direct influence of Origen
upon Basil. That such influence actually occurred is confirmed in Gregory’s
eulogy for Basil. He says that Basil inscribed the words of the Bible in his heart
139 Paul C. Boles, “Allegory as Embodiment: The Function of History in Origen’s Genesis
Homily,” Journal of Theological Interpretation 10, no. 1 (2016): (87–101) 90.
140 Ludlow, “Theology and Allegory,” 60–66. She thinks that Gregory Nyssen’s more restrained
approach to Origenian hermeneutics is better suited to the 21st century than Origen’s.
141 Namely, De principiis 4,1,1–3,11.
142 Origen, Philocalia, pref. (= Gregory Nazianzen, Epistulae 115) (1,10): ὑπόμνημα.
three times.143 He thus persuaded Gregory “not to be content with the literal
interpretation, or to fix my attention on things merely on the surface, but to
advance further and to proceed from depth to depth.”144 Unquestionably, this
refers to Origen’s three-tiered hermeneutic.145
This influence comes through noticeably when Basil uses this hermeneu-
tic in his sermons on the Psalms. At the beginning of his sermon on the first
Psalm, Basil explains what a Psalm is. He calls it “the elementary exposition
of beginners, the improvement of those advancing, [and] the solid support of
the perfect.”146 “Beginners” is the equivalent of Origen’s “simple,” followed by
“those advancing,” and finally “the perfect.”147 Again, preaching on Psalm 44,
Basil says that “The teachings are not simple, but varied and manifold, and em-
brace words moral and natural and the so-called supersensible.”148 Here Basil
took this threefold division directly from Origen’s commentary on the Song of
Songs, where he says that the three books of Solomon teach three sciences:
the Book of Proverbs the moral, the Book of Ecclesiastes the natural, and the
Song of Songs the supersensible.149 This threefold division corresponds with
the hermeneutical division of Scripture into body, soul, and spirit, where the
body is the natural, the soul the moral, and the spirit the supersensible. Basil
adopted Origen’s tripartite framework, just as he found it in the Philocalia.

144 Gregory of Nazianzus, Funebris in laudem Basilii 67 (200,12–14; trans. 85): πείθομαι μὴ μέχρι
τοῦ γράμματος ἵστασθαι, μηδὲ βλέπειν τὰ ἄνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ περαιτέρω διαβαίνειν καὶ εἰς
βάθος ἔτι χωρεῖν ἐκ βάθους.
145 It is beyond the scope of this work to examine Basil’s specifically theological-dogmatic
exegesis of controverted biblical passages pertaining to the Persons of the Trinity. On
this see, for example, Seamus Macdonald, “Contested Ground: Basil’s Use of Scripture in
Against Eunomius,” Studia Patristica 95 (2017): 225–35.
146 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum i 2 (PG 29, 213a): εἰσαγομένοις στοιχείωσις, προκοπτόντων αὔξησις,
τελειουμένων στήριγμα. English translation by Agnes Clare Way, Saint Basil: Exegetic
Homilies (FOTC 46; Washington, DC: CUA Press, 1963), 153.
148 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xliv 9 (PG 29, 408c; trans. 291): οὐ μoνοειδῆ τὰ δόγματα, ἀλλὰ
ποικίλα καὶ πολύτροπα, ἠθικούς τε καὶ φυσικοὺς καὶ ἐποπτικοὺς λεγομένους περιέχοντα λόγους.
I have replaced Way’s “esoteric” as a translation for ἐποπτικοὺς with the more descrip-
tive and accurate “supersensible.” This is the spiritual or pneumatic. The term had previ-
ously been used in its verb form by Clement (Stromateis 5,11,71,1 [GCS 15, 374,3 Stählin]).
He took it from the pagan mystery cults; see the second meaning in Greek English Lexicon,
s.v. ἐποπτεύω. Clement said the cults were right to practice gradations of knowledge,
whereby only those initiated could achieve the highest contemplation (ἐποπτεύειν). See
Ramelli, “Mysteries of Scripture,” 80–82.
149 Origen, Commentarium in Canticum Canticorum, prol. 3.1. This work is preserved only
in Latin translation, but Rufinus merely transliterates these Greek terms into Latin
characters.
68 Chapter 2
Basil put theory into practice throughout his homilies, even though, like
Origen himself, he did not clearly label his interpretations as “spiritual, “psy-
chic,” and “bodily.” Although like Origen he did not always give three readings,
he often did. For example, Basil gives a threefold interpretation to the phrase
found in the superscription of Psalm 44: “over those that will be changed.”150
First, the literal meaning refers, albeit obscurely, to human beings.151 The spiri-
tual meaning is detected through the use of the future tense and refers to the
general resurrection (cf. 1 Cor 15:51).152 Finally, the psychic or moral meaning,
apprehended by “those who have ears in their inner person,”153 indicates “those
who are careful of themselves and are always advancing through their exer-
cises of piety toward something better.”154 All three meanings refer to human
beings but in different ways: the literal to all human beings, the psychic to the
pious, and the spiritual to all human beings at the resurrection.
Another example: interpreting Ps 28:3a (“The Lord’s voice is over the wa-
ters”), he first says it refers, “in regard to the sensible,” to thunder.155 But “in
a more mystic manner” it means the Father’s voice heard at Jesus’ baptism.156
Lastly, “according to ecclesiastical diction,”157 the word thunder refers to “the
postbaptismal tradition that enters the souls of those already made perfect
by the lofty speech of the Gospel.”158 This metaphor is based on the apostles
James and John being named the Sons of Thunder (Mark 3:17).
A final example: the dedication of the house of David mentioned in the su-
perscription of Psalm 29 refers, “according to the bodily [sense],” to the build-
ing of the temple by Solomon.159 However, “according to the mental [sense],” it
is the creation of Jesus’ humanity in the Incarnation of the Word.160 Lastly, the
house is the Church, the dedication of which is “the renewal of the mind” of
150 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xliv 1 (PG 29, 388a; my trans.): ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀλλοιωθησομένοις.
151 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xliv 1 (PG 29, 388a).
152 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xliv 2 (PG 29, 389a).
153 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xliv 2 (PG 29, 389b; my trans.): τοῖς ἔχουσιν ῷτα κατὰ τὸν ἔσω
ἄνθρωπον.
154 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xliv 2 (PG 29, 389b; trans. 277): τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἐπιμελομένοις καὶ ἀεὶ
διὰ τῶν γυμνασίων τῆς εὐσεβείας ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον προκόπτουσιν.
155 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxviii 3 (PG 29, 289b; my trans.): πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν.
156 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxviii 3 (PG 29, 289c; trans. 200): μυστικώτερον.
157 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxviii 3 (PG 29, 292b; trans. 201): κατὰ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν λόγον.
158 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxviii 3 (PG 29, 292b; my trans.): τὴν μετὰ τὸ βάπτισμα γινομένη
ἐκ τῆς μεγαλοφωνίας τοῦ Εὐαγγελίου ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἤδη τελειουμένων παράδοσιν. This
refers to doctrinal instruction given after baptism during the Easter season, sometimes
known as mystagogy.
159 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxix 1 (PG 29, 305c; my trans.): κατὰ μὲν τὸ σωματικὸν.
160 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxix 1 (PG 29, 305c; my trans.): κατὰ δὲ τὸ νοητὸν.
each member.161 In all these examples, Basil followed the order literal-spiritual-
moral, rather than the theoretical order of literal-moral-spiritual. This only
confirms the Origenian nature of his exegesis, since Origen frequently followed
this order in his own sermons.162 The most important thing is that the literal
comes first, as the foundation. William Tieck puts it well: “Generally his [i.e.,
Basil’s] method is first to ascertain the literal sense in its grammatical and/or
historical reference, and then, if a higher sense is developed at all, to base it
upon this.”163
Basil used an array of interpretive terms, some of which were anthropologi-
cal and Origenian. In his sermon on Psalm 32 he praises “the one who does not
receive the law in a bodily way.”164 Nevertheless, in the same sermon he says
“the bodily sense” is often valuable to the reader.165 In his sermon on Psalm 29
he also calls the literal sense “the bodily [sense].”166 In his sermon on Psalm 28,
though, he calls the literal sense “the history,”167 and then later “the sensible
[sense].”168 His terminology for the allegorical senses was fluid and seem-
ingly interchangeable. In a passage that seems to describe a moral reading,
he says: “According to our mind, which contemplates the sublime and makes
the Law familiar to us through a meaning which is noble and fitted to the di-
vine Scripture, this occurs to us.”169 Mind here may indicate his own mind or
the “mind” of the text, that is, its meaning (in this case, its psychic meaning).170
Given Origen’s anthropological perspective on the Bible, there may not be a
difference. Basil also speaks of “the inner person” (Paul’s term also used by
161 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxix 1 (PG 29, 308a; my trans.): τῆν ἀνακαίνωσιν τοῦ νοὸς.
162 “Origen tends in practice to offer the pneumatic reading before the psychic in order to
facilitate the continuing cyclical effect of reinforcement that these two senses have on each
other’s messages for the hearer who already has begun to grasp all three senses” (Dively
Lauro, Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 95, emphasis in original).
163 William Arthur Tieck, Basil of Caesarea and the Bible (PhD diss.; NY: Columbia University,
1953), 174.
164 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxxii 2 (PG 29, 328b; my trans.): ὁ μὴ σωματικῶς ἐκλαμβάνων τὸν
νόμον.
165 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxxii 6 (PG 29, 340c; my trans.): τὸν σωματικὸν νοῦν. Way mis-
translates this as “our corporeal intelligence” (an Anglicization of the Migne’s corporalem
intelligentiam), when in fact it refers to the “mind” of the text, that is, its sense, not to the
human mind (Exegetic Homilies, 239).
166 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxix 1 (PG 29, 305c; my trans.): τὸ σωματικὸν.
167 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxviii 1 (PG 29, 281a; my trans.): τὴν ἱστορίαν.
168 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxviii 3 (PG 29, 289b; my trans.): τὸ αἰσθητὸν.
169 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxviii 1 (PG 29, 281a; my trans.): πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἡμέτεραν νοῦν τὸν τὰ
ὑψηλὰ θεωροῦντα, καὶ διὰ τῆς μεγαλοφυοῦς καὶ πρεπούσης τῇ θείᾳ γραφῇ διανοίας οἰκειοῦντα
ἡμῖν τὸν νόμον, ἐκεῖνα ἡμῖν ὑποπίπτει.
170 See definition III in Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. “νόος”.
70 Chapter 2
Origen).171 But he also uses the word mental to refer to what is clearly a spiri-
tual reading,172 as well as the word spiritual to refer to what seems to be a moral
reading.173 The spiritual interpretation may also be called “mystical.”174 It is not
surprising that Basil, especially in preaching, did not use rigid terminology, or
that in some cases the two allegorical senses may be hard to distinguish, or
only one present. In this, too, he followed Origen!175
Like Origen, Basil explicitly rejected the literal interpretation of some scrip-
tures. For instance, Ps 33:16–17 speaks of God’s “eyes,” “ears,” and “face,” but
these words are not meant literally, he says, as a literal interpretation would
make the text “seem to be unreasonable.”176 As with Origen, absurdity was a
criterion for determining when the literal meaning must be rejected. This ap-
plied not only to passages in which God is described anthropomorphically but
to references to the parts of human beings. Origen explains it this way: “You
will find the names of the members of the body transferred to those of the
soul.”177 Basil quotes eight specific examples from Scripture that illustrate this
principle.178 Three of these are also quoted by Origen: Prov 3:23b; Eccl 2:14a;
and Luke 8:8.179 This is no coincidence: Basil adopted not just the anthropo-
morphic principle itself, but even some of Origen’s specific examples.
171 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xliv 2 (PG 29, 389b; my trans.): τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον.
172 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxix 1 (PG 29, 305c; my trans.): τὸ νοητὸν.
173 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxxii 2 (PG 29, 328b; my trans.): τὸ πνευματικὸν.
174 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxviii 3 (PG 29, 289c; my trans.): μυστικώτερον.
175 Dively Lauro, speaking of Origen, makes the crucial point that what matters is “whether
he sometimes extracts both a psychic and a pneumatic meaning from the same biblical
text, not whether he always does so” (Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 60). As for terminology,
Origen rarely used the term “psychic” in his preaching (ibid., 67–70).
176 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxxiii 11 (PG 29, 377b; my trans.): ἄλογον εἶναι δόξει. Cf. ibid. 13
(PG 29, 381c).
177 Origen, Commentarium in Canticum Canticorum, prol. (GCS 33, 65,17–18 Baehrens): ita
inuenies etiam membrorum nomina corporalium transferri ad animae membra. English
translation by R. P. Lawson, Origen: The Song of Songs, Commentary and Homilies (Ancient
Christian Writers 26; NY: The Newman Press, 1957), 27.
178 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxxiii 13 (PG 29, 384b). They are Pss 3:8d (“The teeth of sin-
ners you shattered”); 18:9cd (“The commandment of the Lord is radiant, enlightening the
eyes”); 118:131a (“I opened my mouth and drew breath”); Prov 3:23b (“And that your foot
will not stumble”); Eccl 2:14a (“As for the wise, their eyes are in their head”); Isa 42:18
(“Hear, you that are deaf, and you that are blind, look up to see!”); Jer 4:19a (“My belly, I feel
pain in my belly”); and Luke 8:8 (“The one who has ears to hear, let them hear,” my trans.).
179 Origen, Commentarium in canticum canticorum, prol. (65,19–24).
Although Basil’s Origenian hermeneutic is clear, a serious difficulty arises

when one reads Basil’s Hexaemeron,180 in which he consistently and explicitly
eschewed figural interpretations.181 Basil declares at the beginning of the ninth
homily, “But as for me, when I hear ‘grass,’ I think of grass.”182 His use of the
first-person pronoun (ἐγώ) emphasizes how his own method of literal exegesis
stood in opposition to that of “those who do not allow the common meanings
of the scriptures.”183 Basil compares allegorical interpretations to “dream inter-
pretations and old wives’ tales.”184 He thinks that, at best, allegorical interpre-
tations are “neatly made” by the interpreter though “not at all true.”185 These
interpreters read into the text, perhaps cleverly, an allegorical meaning they
falsely imagined to be native to the text itself. In contrast, Basil believed that
a good exegete must always remain faithful to Scripture’s ordinary meaning:
“Passing over in silence, at least for now, every figurative and allegorical ex-
planation, let us receive the concept of ‘darkness’ simply and without curios-
ity, following the meaning of Scripture.”186 The phrase “at least for now” is a
big clue that Basil’s rejection of allegory was not as absolute as he sometimes
makes it sound in the Hexaemeron.
In any case, to depart from the plain meaning of Scripture could lead to
heresy,187 which is why he was so fierce in his criticism. In his opposition to al-
legorical reading, Basil was primarily concerned with it being used for heresy,
180 In the following paragraphs, I give an expanded treatment of what I discuss in my ar-
ticle, “Defending Moses: Understanding Basil’s Apparent Rejection of Allegory in the
Hexaemeron,” Studia Patristica 95 (2017): 175–81.
181 Both Tieck (Basil and the Bible, 174) and Rousseau (Basil, 323, note 25) argue that traces
of allegorizing may still be found within the Hexaemeron. There are many analogies, as
Rousseau also points out (Basil, 323, note 22), and a couple strained attempts to find the
Son in Genesis (e.g., Homilia in Hexaemeron 3,2 and 9,6), but I can find no allegories as
such.
182 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1 (147,1–2; my trans.): ἐγὼ δὲ χόρτον ἀκούσας χόρτον νοῶ. Cf.
ibid. 3,9: “Let us consider water as water”: τὸ ὕδωρ ὕδωρ νοήσωμεν (54,10; my trans.).
183 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1 (146,12–13; my trans.): οἱ μὴ καταδεχόμενοι τὰς κοινὰς τῶν
γεγραμμένων ἐννοίας.
184 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,9 (54,9–10; my trans.): ὀνειράτων συνκρίσεις καὶ γραώδεις
μύθους.
185 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,9 (54,18–19; my trans.): ὡς κεκομψευμένον μὲν τὸν λόγον
ἀποδεχόμεθα, ἀληθῆ δὲ εἶναι οὐ πάνυ τι δώσομεν.
186 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,5 (29,16–19; my trans.): πᾶσαν οὖν τροπικὴν καὶ δι’ ὑπονοίας
ἐξήγησιν ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι κατασιγάσαντες, τοῦ σκότους τὴν ἔννοιαν ἁπλῶς καὶ ἀπεριεργάστως,
ἑπόμενοι τῷ βουλήματι τῆς γραφῆς, ἐκδεξώμεθα. Cf. ibid. 4,5 (64,8–9; my trans.): “Attend to
the meaning of the scriptures”: ἐπίστησον δὲ τῇ ἐννοίᾳ τῶν γεγραμμένων. In this context, he
means the literal meaning.
72 Chapter 2
specifically Gnostic dualism.188 He names the Marcionites, Valentinians, and

Manichaeans specifically,189 all of which were known for their dualistic the-
ologies that pitted a principle of Good against a principle of Evil. According to
Basil, instead of following the plain meaning of Scripture the Gnostic heretics
did the opposite, twisting passages to fit their own teaching. They made the
Bible support their false doctrine: “The counterfeiters of the truth,” he says,
“do not at all thoroughly teach their minds to follow Scripture, but pervert the
meaning of the scriptures according to their own understanding.”190 One of
the ways in which heretics twisted the meaning of the Bible was by finding
deeper senses behind ordinary words. For example, they take a passage like
Gen 1:2 (“And darkness was over the abyss”) and “pervert the words accord-
ing to their own meanings” to make “myths and very impious fabrications.”191
Instead of taking the word darkness (σκότος) literally, they claimed it indicated
“Evil itself, having its beginning from itself.”192 In other words, they used it to
support their belief that Evil was a principle in eternal warfare with Good.
Basil also accused heretics of inappropriately allegorizing the word abyss
(ἄβυσσος), as though it meant “a mass of opposing powers” (the term powers
is from Eph 6:12).193 This complements their interpretation of darkness as self-
existent Evil. The editors of the Hexaemeron, Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta
and Stig Rudberg, think this may be a veiled attack on Origen. This was the
position of the French classicist Jean Pépin.194 In his first sermon on Genesis,
188 The somewhat amorphous concept of “Gnosticism” has been problematized by mod-
ern scholars, who have pointed out that it is a polemical, orthodox construct that does
not reflect the self-understanding of the various sects to which it is applied. See David
Brakke, The Gnostics: Myth, Ritual, and Diversity in Early Christianity (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2010), 19–28. “What often passes as the primary characteristics
of ‘Gnosticism’—dualism, alienation, esotericism, and the like—do not appear nearly as
central as the Gnostics’ conviction that God acted to save people from the machinations
of the evil forces that surrounded them” (ibid., 53).
190 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (23,6–8; my trans.): Ἀλλ’ οἱ παραχαράκται τῆς ἀληθείας,
οἱ οὐχὶ τῇ γραφῇ τὸν ἑαυτῶν νοῦν ἀκολουθεῖν ἐκδιδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον βούλημα τὴν
διάνοιαν τῶν γραφῶν διαστέφοντες […].
191 Basil, Homilia in hexaemeron 2,4 (26,20–22; my trans.): πάλιν ἄλλαι μύθων ἀφορμαὶ καὶ
πλασμάτων δυσσεβεστέρων ἀρχαὶ πρὸς τὰς ἰδίας ὑπονοίας παρατρεπόντων τὰ ῥήματα. Cf. ibid.
9,1 (146,15; my trans.): “Perverting it after their own meanings”: ἐπὶ τὰς οἰκείας ὑπονοίας
παρατρέψαντες.
192 Basil, Homilia in hexaemeron 2,4 (26,25; my trans.): μᾶλλον δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ κακόν, παρ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν
ἀρχὴν ἔχον.
193 Basil, Homilia in hexaemeron 2,4 (27,22; trans. 27): Οὔτε οὖν δυνάμεων πλῆθος ἀντικειμένων.
194 Jean Pépin, Théologie cosmique et théologie Chrétienne (Ambroise, Exam. I 1, 1–4)
(Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1964), 401, note 2. His truncated quotation of Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,4 (27,23)—πονηρὰ
Origen says that the abyss is where the devil and his angels will one day
be confined.195 Unless Rufinus has omitted some heterodox material here, this
is not the same thing.196 In point of fact, Origen rejected the heretical concept
of self-existent Evil: he specifically says that the idea that the “opposing pow-
ers” are evil in essence is “absurd.”197 Basil also opposed this doctrine, which
he argued had no basis in Gen 1:2. Origen’s intertextual interpretation of the
“abyss” has no bearing here.
Basil’s apparent rejection of allegory in the Hexaemeron has long puzzled
scholars. Until recently, the prevailing opinion was that he changed his mind
some time before preaching the Hexaemeron.198 The 19th-century French
scholar, Eugène Fialon, believed he gradually moved away from allegori-
cal exegesis as he “matured.”199 Likewise, Amand de Mendieta regarded his
anti-allegorical statements in the Hexaemeron as an absolute rejection of the
Origenian hermeneutic he once espoused.200 Several modern scholars have
suggested that Basil switched sides from the allegorical “Alexandrian” school
of exegesis to the supposedly-literal “Antiochene.”201 A major difficulty with
this theory is that Gregory, in his eulogy of Basil, says that he used Origen’s
δύναμις—is misleading. The full phrase is “some kind of primal and evil power opposed to
the good”: ἀρχική τις καὶ πονηρὰ δύναμις ἀντεξαγομένη τῷ ἀγαθῷ (27,23–24; my trans.). This
is Gnostic dualism, which Origen flatly rejected when interpreting the devil.
195 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,1.
196 This possibility cannot be ruled out a priori, as Rufinus admits to such censorship in his
preface to his translation of De principiis (praef. 2).
197 Origen, De principiis 1,5,3 (72,19–20): Quodsi haec ita de malis contrariisque uirtutibus
intellegi uidetur absurdum, sicut certe absurdum est.
198 Jean Gribomont took the opposite track and minimized Basil’s use of allegory from the
beginning. He says, puzzlingly, that the Philocalia contained “bien peu des séductions de
l’allégorie” (“L’Origénisme,” 283). In fact the Philocalia contains the theoretical basis for
allegoresis, and Basil’s sermons are replete with Origenian allegorical interpretations.
199 Eugène Fialon, Étude historique et littéraire sur saint Basile, suivi de l’Hexaméron (Paris:
E. Thorin, 1869), 294–95.
200 Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta, “La Préparation et la composition des neuf ‘Homélies
sur l’Hexaéméron’ de Basile de Césarée: Le problème des sources littéraires immédiates,”
Studia Patristica 18 (1986): (349–67) 352. Cf. his review of Giet Stanislas, ed., Basile de
Césarée: Homélies sur l’Hexaéméron, published in Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique 47 (1952):
(222–28) 223.
201 For example, Tieck, Basil and the Bible, 157; Joseph W. Trigg, Biblical Interpretation
(Message of the Fathers of the Church 9; Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier Books, 1988),
35; and Rousseau, Basil, 323, note 21. The artificiality of a too-neat distinction between
Alexandria and Antioch has been much criticized of late, e.g., by Young, Biblical Exegesis,
161–212.
74 Chapter 2
threefold interpretation.202 If Basil underwent a hermeneutical conversion

late in life, Gregory was either ignorant of it or wished to hide it, neither of
which is at all likely.
In an oft-cited article, Richard Lim sought to debunk this older theory.203
He doubts there was any significant Antiochene influence upon Basil.204
Although he concedes that Basil may have been entirely uncritical of allegoriz-
ing earlier in his career,205 he argues that Basil’s condemnation of allegory was
not absolute. Basil only wanted to reject what Lim calls “translational” allegory,
that is, figural interpretations that deny the literal meaning entirely and see
only an allegory to be deciphered.206 Lim correctly identifies Basil’s main op-
ponents as heretics, not Origen.207 Nevertheless, I do not find his argument that
the problem is “translation” convincing.208 It is true that, when disputing with
the heretics over the meaning of the words darkness and abyss, and even when
disputing with Origen himself about the super-heavenly waters (Gen 1:6–7),209
he opposed viewpoints that saw these passages as strictly allegorical. However,
Basil’s complaint was not merely that they had lost the literal meaning, but
that they found an allegorical meaning that was false. “Darkness” does not
mean a primal principle of Evil, nor “abyss” demonic powers. In other words,
the problem was not that they “translated” the Bible, but that they found he-
retical meanings in it. Furthermore, Lim denies that Origen and Basil practiced
“translational” allegoresis,210 but this is misleading. While it is true that Origen
and Basil did not treat the words of the Bible as mere ciphers, they neverthe-
less explicitly insisted that there were passages in Scripture that should not be
taken literally, lest absurdity result. “Translational” allegoresis was sometimes
legitimate, according to them.
Lim has a second solution to the puzzle, though I think it equally problem-
atic. He argues that Basil’s criticism of allegorical interpretation simply put into
practice the Origenian threefold systematization of Christians: “Basil was lead-
ing his humble congregation by the hand in a gradual anagogy, using the literal
202 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 67 (quoted above).

203 Richard Lim, “The Politics of Interpretation in Basil of Caesaera’s ‘Hexaemeron,’” Vigiliae
Christianae 44, no. 4 (1990): 351–70.
204 Lim, “Politics of Interpretation,” 363.
207 Lim, “Politics of Interpretation,” 358–60.
208 Pace Paul Blowers, who registers his “thorough agreement with Lim” (Drama of the Divine
Economy, 128, note 154).
209 This is the topic of chapter 4.
hermeneutics which he considered to be most appropriate to his audience.”211

Since Basil’s audience in the Hexaemeron was made up of ordinary, “simple”
people, such as tradesmen,212 it makes sense, Lim argues, that he stuck to
the literal sense only. Thus, “Basil is not categorically rejecting the allegorical
method per se, but […] warning his specific, and largely unsophisticated, audi-
ence not to abandon the literal meaning of scriptures in favor of more arcane
spiritual meanings.”213 So, Lim concludes, “we should revise the notion that he
was converted late in life to the literalist school from the Origenist allegorical
method.”214 This thesis finds the solution in the makeup of Basil’s audience
rather than in Basil himself, and it may indeed be preferable to the older view.
However, Stephen Hildebrand has convincingly disproved even this. In
Basil’s homilies on the Psalms, Hildebrand observes, in which he uses allegori-
cal readings freely, there is no indication that the audience consisted only of
perfect, or even somewhat advanced, Christians.215 Hildebrand quotes Jean
Bernardi, who argued that most, if not all, of the homilies were addressed to
the general public.216 Bernardi based this judgment partly on disparaging re-
marks Basil makes about his audience’s sins.217 The sermon on Psalm 114 was
explicitly given on the occasion of a vigil for a feast of martyrs, not a private
setting.218 If Basil felt free, as Origen did, to give all three layers of interpreta-
tion in his other public sermons, he should have felt equally free in the ser-
mons on Genesis 1, unless he himself had changed. I would add to Hildebrand’s
argument that the hexaemeral sermons contain too many scientific allusions,
which would be lost on the “simple” Christians, to imagine that his congre-
gation was so unsophisticated that they could not understand allegories. In
fact, when Basil responds, in the final sermon, to criticisms from his own audi-
ence that his exegesis was too literal, it was probably the educated ones com-
plaining. He does not respond that it was their own fault—that they were not

212 For example, Basil, Homiliae in Hexaemeron 3,1. See Lim for further examples (“Politics of
Interpretation,” 361).
215 Hildebrand, Trinitarian Theology, 137–38.
216 Jean Bernardi, La prédication des Pères cappadociens: le prédicateur et son auditoire
(Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines de l’Université de Montpellier
30; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 33–34; Hildebrand, Trinitarian Theology,
137, note 177.
217 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xxix 3 (PG 29, 312c); Homilia in Psalmum xxxii 2 (PG 29,
325c–328a).
218 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum cxiv 1 (PG 29, 484ab).
76 Chapter 2
yet advanced enough for allegories, still needing only “milk, not solid food”
(1 Cor. 3:2)—instead, he criticizes “the laws of allegory” themselves!219
The most recent trend in Basil scholarship is to downplay the contradic-
tion and emphasize Basil’s continuity with both himself and Origen. Thus
Hildebrand: “Basil had become more mindful of the dangers of allegory with-
out substantially changing his method.”220 This is not an adequate response, in
my opinion, as Hildebrand downplays the striking contradiction by conflating
Basil’s use of analogies in the Hexaemeron with his Origenian allegorizing in his
earlier sermons.221 Basil’s copious analogies offered moral interpretations of
natural phenomena, like the behavior of animals. His Origenian allegoresis, in
marked contrast, found hidden in the words of Scripture allusions to morality
and Christian teaching. Basil explicitly refused to do this in the Hexaemeron.222
We do not see the same method grown more “sober, mature, and critical” (as
Hildebrand puts it):223 we see two different methods.
John McGuckin argues that Basil’s criticism of allegory is “highly rhetorical”
and not to be taken “too literally.”224 What Basil opposed, according to him, was
only the “excessive allegorization of [secondary] details” at the expense of a
text’s main purpose (σκοπός).225 Timothy McConnell reaches a similar conclu-
sion: “Basil practiced a tempered Origenist hermeneutic of Scripture, preferring
the literal but allowing the spiritual.”226 When he attacked allegory, McConnell
219 Basil, Homilia in hexaemeron 9,1 (146,11; trans. 135): νόμους ἀλληγορίας.
220 Stephen Hildebrand, Basil of Caesarea (Foundations of Theological Exegesis and Christian
Spirituality; Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2014), 56.
221 Hildebrand cites, for instance, Basil calling the moon’s phases an image of human incon-
stancy (Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,10; Hildebrand, Trinitarian Theology, 139). But this is
an analogy, not an allegory. Basil does not mean that the words in Genesis narrating the
moon’s creation have a hidden referent to humanity (allegory). Rather, he draws a parallel
between the moon and human nature (analogy). Rousseau rightly points out that in the
Hexaemeron analogy “is preferred” to allegory (Basil, 323, note 22).
222 Cf. Rousseau, Basil, 323, note 2. The one exception, if it may be called that, is the nonlit-
eral interpretation of “day one” of creation (Gen 1:3) as a symbol of eternity. Basil calls
this interpretation “traditional” (παραδιδόμενος), and it is distinct from (albeit more au-
thoritative than) his own literal explanation (Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,8 [35,18;
my trans.]). His exegetical literalism did not imply a rejection of traditional Christian
readings.
223 Hildebrand, Basil, 55.
224 John A. McGuckin, “Patterns of Biblical Exegesis in the Cappadocian Fathers: Basil
the Great, Gregory the Theologian, and Gregory of Nyssa,” in Orthodox and Wesleyan
Scriptural Understanding and Practice (ed. S. T. Kimbrough, Jr.; Crestwood, NJ:
St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2002), (37–54) 46.
225 McGuckin, “Patterns of Biblical Exegesis,” 45.
226 Timothy P. McConnell, Illumination in Basil of Caesarea’s Doctrine of the Holy Spirit
(Emerging Scholars; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2014), 201.
says, he meant Gnostic interpretation specifically, not Origen.227 McGuckin is

right that Basil’s attack on allegoresis was rhetorical, and McConnell is right
that Basil’s target here was the Gnostics. Nevertheless, they both effectively
wave aside what Basil actually says against allegory. Basil did not condemn “ex-
cessive” allegorizing, but—seemingly—the method itself. He did not merely
“prefer” the literal; he insisted upon it over against the fantasies of allegory.
Must we, then, return to the older theory that Basil at some point late in
life did an about-face and rejected Origenian exegesis in favor of a literalist
“Antiochene” approach? I think not. The best explanation lies in Basil’s under-
standing of the nature of Genesis 1 itself and how it was interpreted by heretics.
Hildebrand suggests this very thing when he says that Basil considered Genesis
to be “unusually subject to perverse allegorical interpretations, especially in
the hands of the Gnostics.”228 Basil allegorized most freely in his sermons on
the Psalms because he considered the Psalms “especially open to christological
readings.”229 Genesis 1, however, is a special case among Old Testament texts.
For starters, it does not contain any references to Jewish practices and laws
that are the typical fodder for Christian allegory. More importantly, though,
Basil considered it a privileged, inspired source of cosmological information,
given by Moses, the “servant of God.”230 God “spoke to him in person and with-
out riddles.”231 Thus, Genesis is not a cryptic text of esoteric mythology, but a
straightforward description of the cosmos. Heretics set this data aside in favor
of their own dualistic cosmology and theology. In order to refute this dualism
and at the same time uphold the true cosmology, Basil insisted that the literal
text of Genesis 1 is reasonable. Lim, Hildebrand, and McDonnell all agree that
the Gnostic interpretation is the crucial context for making sense of Basil’s dis-
paraging remarks about allegory in the Hexaemeron. By positing a principle of
Evil and a principle of Good in eternal opposition to each other, heretics de-
stroyed the theological affirmation at the heart of the orthodox interpretation
of Genesis 1: “God saw that it was very good” (v. 31). This dualism is precisely
what prompted Basil’s initial salvo against allegory in the second sermon.232 If
he suddenly seemed to despise allegoresis, which he had used so effectively in
other sermons, it is not because he underwent an improbable conversion or
adapted to an obtuse audience of ignoramuses. It was because Genesis 1 had
227 McConnell, Illumination in Basil, 182–84.

230 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1 (147,10; trans. 136): ὁ θεράπων τοῦ θεοῦ.
231 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,1 (87,16; trans. 83, my emphasis): ἐν εἴδει λαλήσας πρὸς
αὐτόν, καὶ οὐ δι’ αἰνιγμάτων.
232 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2–5.
78 Chapter 2
become a battleground between orthodoxy and heresy. Unlike other scriptural

texts, it had to be defended against dangerous allegorizing.
Although his rhetoric gives the impression of a total rejection of allegore-
sis, I believe Basil rejected it only as a way of reading Genesis 1 specifically.
Because of the cosmological value of the literal text and the need to refute
heretical dualism, Genesis 1 was not suited to allegorizing.233 Basil may well
have reached this conclusion precisely because of the Gnostic misinterpreta-
tion. In any case, he considered Genesis 1 unsuitable for any kind of allego-
rizing at all, heretical or otherwise. Scientific allegoresis attempted to find in
Genesis 1 cosmographical details about the size and shape of the universe, but
in so doing failed to respect the text for what it was.234 Such details are ab-
sent from the text because they would be spiritually “useless.”235 What the text
does affirm, such as that there is water above the sky, should be accepted “as
written.”236 Although Origen’s allegorical interpretation of this super-heavenly
water was not heretical, it too misunderstood the nature of the text.237 As we
have seen, one of the purposes of Origenian allegoresis was to encourage the
soul to virtue. Since Basil could not use it here, he achieved the same purpose
by a different means: analogy. Genesis 1 tells the reader about all the animals
God created. Basil, drawing upon his own repertoire of zoological information,
found analogues for human virtues and vices in the various behaviors of the
different animals.238
3 Conclusion
Origen was the first Christian theologian to lay out a systemic account of how
to interpret the Bible. He interpreted the scriptures using a threefold herme-
neutic of literal (bodily), moral (psychic), and allegorical (spiritual) readings.
He took the basic concept of Scripture having a “body” that hides a “soul” be-
neath from the Jewish exegete Philo. To this he added a third, “spiritual” layer
233 This, however, does not undo the Origenian principle of interpreting anthropomorphic
God-talk nonliterally. Basil still does not take God’s speaking in Genesis 1 to imply a literal
voice (Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,2). His interpretation of God’s “voice” is taken straight
from Origen (Contra Celsum 6,62).
234 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1. This is the Stoic practice of reading the myths philo-
sophically (see Konstans, Heraclitus, xv–xvi), applied to the Bible.
235 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1 (147,14; trans. 136): ἄχρηστα.
236 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1 (147,22; my trans.): ὡς γέγραπται.
237 This is the topic of chapter 4.
238 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 7–9, passim.
that concerns God, Christ, and salvation. As far as Origen was concerned, this
was the same way that the apostle Paul interpreted the Bible. It was also con-
sistent with the general principle, seen even among the pagan experts, that
sacred texts contain mysteries that must be decrypted by the wise.
According to Origen, the literal meaning of the Bible is aimed primarily at
“simple,” ordinary Christians. However, if a literal interpretation of a passage
would result in absurdities, such as imagining (as many did) that God has a
body or gets angry, Origen insisted that that interpretation be rejected. Such
passages, according to him, only had two senses, both figurative. Nevertheless,
he assured his readers that the vast majority of biblical passages did have a
useful and rational literal meaning. The reason that a few do not is that God
wanted to leave signposts that would point the discerning reader towards the
deeper meanings. After all, if everything made sense literally, no one would
ever suspect that there were also hidden meanings!
The Bible’s first figurative meaning is its “soul,” which is concerned with vir-
tue. All the texts of Scripture can be interpreted as hiding moral lessons, in
the same manner that Philo interpreted them. Such meanings could be de-
tected only by those who had already begun to make at least some progress
in the spiritual, ascetic life. The final and highest level was equally allegorical,
but concerned about theology, not morality. Only “perfect” Christians, that is,
those fully practicing asceticism, were able to read the Bible spiritually and
discover the secrets of God’s plan for salvation, including the origin and end
of the cosmos. Although Origen’s system seems elitist, in his sermons he con-
stantly gave his congregants both psychic and spiritual interpretations. Some
scholars have conflated Origen’s two allegorical meanings, as if the distinction
were artificial. Dively Lauro, however, showed that they are distinct, even if
Origen was in practice not always systematic in giving all three.
Basil adopted Origen’s system as his own. It is seen, even with the same
threefold terminology, throughout his sermons, especially those on the Psalms,
as I have shown. For Basil, the Psalms were a rich source of allegorical mean-
ings. Like Origen, he rejected literal interpretations of biblical passages if they
would produce absurdities, such as an anthropomorphic God. The influence
that reading Origen (through the Philocalia) had on Basil early in his career
is apparent.
This is what makes Basil’s anti-allegorical remarks in the Hexaemeron so
baffling. Whereas previous scholarship postulated an improbable change
of opinion on Basil’s part, I have argued that his literalism is limited only to
Genesis 1. It was not a disavowal of Origenian hermeneutics. Rather, Basil saw
Genesis as a privileged text for cosmology. The problem was that the Gnostics
and other dualists used allegorical readings of Genesis 1 in order to support
80 Chapter 2
their worldview. The “darkness” and “abyss” were code for a self-existence prin-
ciple of eternal Evil. In order to refute this view, Basil insisted that Genesis 1 be
taken literally. It presents a straightforward, true account of how God made the
universe. This is what led him to attack allegory in his ninth sermon.
This major departure from Origen’s hermeneutics will be thrown into sharp
relief in chapter 4, where I will examine Basil’s rejection of Origen’s nonliteral
interpretation of the water above the sky (Gen 1:6–7). The problems of the cre-
ation of matter ex nihilo (chapter 3) and astrology and concerned the text’s
literal meaning and had nothing to do with allegorical interpretations.
Therefore, we will see that Origen and Basil remained in essential agreement
on both. Nevertheless, Basil rejected Origen’s belief that the stars are alive.239
This was a cosmological, not an exegetical, dispute. While hermeneutical
agreement tends to lead to theological agreement, disagreements are still pos-
sible insofar as theology is a bigger enterprise than just the interpretation of
the Bible. Though a disciple of Origen, Basil remained an independent thinker
in his own right. For now, though, we will turn to the question of creatio ex
nihilo, where we will see how closely Basil followed Origen.
239 See chapter 5.

Chapter 3
“The earth was invisible and unformed”: Prime

Matter and Creatio ex Nihilo
An early point of conflict between Christianity and the prevailing cosmology

of philosophers was the origin and nature of matter: was it eternal and uncre-
ated, or did God make it from nothing? The philosophical background for this
dispute was a widely-held understanding of matter called “hylomorphism,”
which went back to Aristotle (and to some extent Plato). According to hylo-
morphism, all things that exist are composed of both “form” and matter, the
latter being the underlying “stuff” of which everything that exists is formed.
The idea was that everything in the universe is constituted from some undif-
ferentiated, shapeless stuff. What does this have to do with the Bible? The word
unformed (ἀκατασκεύαστος) is used to describe the primal earth in Gen 1:2. This
suggested to Justin Martyr this concept of “formless matter.” He thought that
the unformed earth at that time was what philosophers called “prime matter.”
That is, it was the passive principle of existence that, when it encountered the
active principle (namely God), became the physical cosmos. The matter be-
came perceptible only when it took particular “forms.” Justin was thus able to
harmonize the science of his day with Gen 1:1–2.
Theophilus of Antioch, however, saw a danger in this approach: it seemed to
put prime matter on the same level as God, such that the universe came to be,
not from one principle but two. God was like the father and matter the mother.
Theophilus therefore argued that prime matter itself was created by God out
of nothing (ex nihilo). This, however, introduced a new problem: according to
philosophy, nothing can come from nothing, so how could matter have come
from nothing?
This brings us to Origen. He mentions that some educated Christians
took the objection that nothing could come from nothing seriously. To solve
the problem, they simply rejected the theory of hylomorphism altogether.
According to them, only “forms” actually exist: there is no such thing as mat-
ter. God made these forms in the beginning, and thus God is the one and only
principle of existence. Origen did not take this route. He accepted the theory
of hylomorphism, while rejecting the implication that matter must therefore
be uncreated and eternal, only the forms coming and ceasing to be. He rejected
it because he regarded creatio ex nihilo as apostolic doctrine: God made the
universe from nothing, not from uncreated matter.

82 Chapter 3
Origen’s engagement on this point took on a philosophical bent, as he ar-

gued that prime matter was not eternal but made by God from nothing. He
argued not so much against philosophers themselves as against some of his
fellow Christians, like Hermogenes, who accepted the philosophical view. He
founds his argument on God’s power and God’s providence. Firstly, if prime
matter exists without having been created, then why postulate a Creator at all?
Why not simply say that the forms themselves are also uncreated? Christians,
of course, believe that God is the Creator and thus, Origen argues, should admit
that if he made the forms, then he also made the matter. Secondly, if matter
is eternal, then God sure was lucky to find exactly the matter he needed to
make the universe! But if we accept this hypothesis, then God’s providence is
eliminated. Either God got lucky or received the matter he needed from some
higher providence. Again, the argument works against Christians, who cannot
accept a providence above God’s providence. It would be like saying that God
was made by a higher God. The correct idea, Origen says, is that matter was
made by God out of nothing. The philosophers, in their limited understanding,
simply failed to understand that God can even make something out of nothing.
Basil tackled this problem as well. Unlike Origen, he divorces the scriptural
text from the theory of hylomorphism: that is simply not what Gen 1:2 is talk-
ing about. The “unformed” earth is not matter, but the earth in its initial, in-
complete state. It would not be completed until God made plants and animals
upon it. On the question whether matter was eternal, Basil shows his depen-
dence upon Origen. He used the same arguments as Origen, but his treatment
is polemical and apologetical rather than philosophical. He makes each of
Origen’s points very succinctly. His goal was not to philosophize but to inform
and entertain his congregation. Rather than carefully laying out why they were
wrong, Basil glories in mocking the philosophers for being duped by a false
analogy: they should not have thought that God made the universe in the same
way that human beings make things from pre-existent material. Origen had
mentioned this as well, but only in passing.
Like Origen, Basil maintained the theory of hylomorphism. The only prob-
lem was thinking that matter must be eternal rather than created. Basil even
used the theory to explain what we can and cannot know of God. Just as we
cannot perceive prime matter, since it is formless and shapeless, but per-
ceive only the “forms” it actually takes, neither can we know God’s essence.
According to Basil, we know God only through his works, which are sort of
like the forms that matter takes. Not only did Basil accept hylomorphism, he
showed the usefulness of philosophy by putting the theory to work for him. By
maintaining hylomorphism, both he and Origen avoided the mistake of throw-
ing the baby out with the bathwater, so to speak. Hylomorphism was good, but
PRIME MATTER AND CREATIO EX NIHILO 83
it needed first to submit to Christianity and be taught that prime matter was
created by God. In this way the dualism of the servant metaphor—useful yet
subordinate—is perfectly illustrated.
1 Hylomorphism
Since both Origen’s and Basil’s discussions of matter presuppose a hylomor-

phic understanding of the universe, we must begin by examining Aristotle’s
hylomorphism.1 According to this theory, everything in the universe is made of
both “form” (μορφή) and “matter” (ὕλη). Matter in this sense may also be called
“prime” (πρώτη) in order to distinguish it from the ordinary meaning of ὕλη
as just “material” or “stuff.” Here is how Aristotle defines prime matter in a clas-
sic passage:2
By matter I mean what is not said to be in its own right any thing, or
any quantity, or anything else by which being is determined. For there
is something of which each of these is predicated, and which itself has a
being different from that of each of the predicates—for while others are
predicated of substance, substance is predicated of matter—and so the
last thing will not be in its own right either a something, or of any quan-
tity, or anything else at all. Nor will it be in its own right the negations of
these, for they too will belong to it only coincidentally.3
In other words, prime matter may be defined as the underlying substance

of which all things are made, considered apart from all their qualities. Thus,
prime matter is neither hot, nor cold, nor wet, nor dry, nor anything else at all.
1 Helpful summaries of Aristotle’s theory may be found in David C. Lindberg, The Beginnings of
Western Science: The European Scientific Tradition in Philosophical, Religious, and Institutional
Context, Prehistory to A.D. 1450, 2nd ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007),
287–88; and David Bostock, trans., Aristotle: Metaphysics: Books Z and H (Clarendon Aristotle
Series; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 72–74.
2 Heinz Happ cites this as one of three “classic” definitions of prime matter from Aristotle’s
own works (Hyle: Studien zum Aristotelischen Materie-Begriff [Berlin: Walter de Gruyter,
1971], 296–97).
3 Aristotle, Metaphysica 7,3,1029a (OCT, ll. 20–25 Jaeger): λέγω δ’ ὕλην ἣ καθ’ αὑτὴν μήτε τὶ μήτε
ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν. ἔστι γάρ τι καθ’ οὗ κατηγορεῖται τούτων ἕκαστον,
ᾧ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἑκάστῃ (τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τῆς οὐσίας κατηγορεῖται, αὕτη δὲ τής
ὕλης), ὥστε τὸ ἔσχατον καθ’ αὑτὸ οὔτε τὶ οὔτε ποσὸν οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν ἐστιν· οὐδὲ δὴ αἱ ἀποφάσεις,
καὶ γὰρ αὗται ὑπάρξουσι κατὰ συμβεβηκός. English translation by Bostock, Metaphysics
(op. cit.), 3.
84 Chapter 3
“Form,” on the other hand, is the totality of the qualities a thing has, considered
apart from the matter itself. Since prime matter has no qualities, it has the po-
tential to become anything and everything.
This distinction may be grasped by analogy with the way a work of art, such
as a statue, is made of a particular material, such as bronze.4 Aristotle writes:
As for the underlying nature, it must be grasped by analogy. As bronze

stands to a statue, or wood to a bed, or [the matter and] the formless be-
fore it acquires a form to anything else which has a definite form, so this
stands to a substance.5
It must be remembered that this is, as he says, an analogy: a material like

bronze is not matter in the technical sense, i.e., it is not prime matter. After all,
bronze itself is made of both prime matter and form, for bronze has particu-
lar qualities, such as its weight, durability, color, etc., which can be abstracted
from the prime matter itself. But the point is that, compared to the formed
statue of which it is made, bronze is like formless prime matter: it has the po-
tential to be formed into any shape. Four qualities are of particular importance
for Aristotle, because they are the four that combine to constitute the four ele-
ments (fire, air, earth, and water), which are simple substances that combine
to create all the complex substances that we see in the world. Thus, fire is hot
and dry, air is hot and wet, earth is cold and dry, and water is cold and wet.6
Aristotle came up with this theory of prime matter to understand how
change occurs: how does one thing become another? According to him, al-
though things come and cease to be, the underlying matter always remains the
same, with only the forms changing. Thus, water can turn into air and so forth.
In this theory, then, the underlying matter of things stands outside the realm
of becoming.
4 This analogy of a craftsman does not imply that Aristotle believed in a divine Creator that
shaped prime matter into the forms that exist. See David Sedley, Creationism and Its Critics in
Antiquity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 173–81.
5 Aristotle, Physica 1,7,191a (OCT, ll. 7–11 Ross): ἡ δὲ ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν. ὡς
γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸς ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον ἢ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφὴν [ἡ ὕλη
καὶ] τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν, οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει. English translation
by William Charlton, Aristotle: Physics: Books I and II (Clarendon Aristotle Series; Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1970), 18. He translates οὐσίαν as “reality,” but I always use “substance” for
consistency and clarity.
Considered, however, as possible, it [i.e., matter] does not in itself [pass

away], but is necessarily incorruptible and uncreated. If it came to be,
there would have to be something underlying, out of which, as a constitu-
ent, it came to be; that, however, is the material nature itself […], so it
would have to be before it had come to be.7
In other words, Aristotle says that one cannot say that matter itself came to
exist, for then the matter itself would have to come into existence from some-
thing else underlying it, since nothing comes from nothing. But that is what
matter itself is: that which underlies all things. Consequently, prime matter
must be uncreated and eternal. Philosophers like Plutarch explicitly applied
this understanding to discussions of the creation of the universe:
The universe has been brought into being by god whereas the substance
or matter out of which it has come into being did not come to be but was
always available to the artificer […], for the source of generation is not
what is non-existent but, as in the case of a house and a garment and a
statue, what is not in good and sufficient condition.8
The world was made from pre-existent matter in the same way a human crafts-
man makes something. The line of reasoning is logical (if not inevitable), once
hylomorphism is accepted.
Although hylomorphism may be called “Aristotelian” in the sense that
Aristotle was the first to formulate it clearly, it held wide appeal in ancient
philosophy. It gained currency among the Stoics, who traced the idea back to
7 Aristotle, Physica 1,9,192a (ll. 27–31; trans. 21): ὡς δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν, [ἡ ὕλη] οὐ [φθείρεται] καθ’
αὑτό, ἀλλ’ ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν εἶναι. ἔιτε γὰρ ἐγίγνετο, ὑποκεῖσθαί τι δεῖ πρῶτον
ἐξ οὗ ἐνυπάρχοντος· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις, ὥστ’ ἔσται πρὶν γενέσθαι. Charlton translates
ἄφθαρτον καὶ ἀγένητον ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν εἶναι as “can neither be brought to be nor destroyed.”
Although this is a fine translation, for consistency and clarity in this discussion, I will always
translate ἀγένητον as “uncreated.”
8 Plutarch, De animae procreatione in Timaeo 5,1014ab (Plutarchi Chaeronensis Moralia 6,
159,10–19 Bernardakis): βέλτιον οὖν Πλάτωνι πειθομένους τὸν μὲν κόσμον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι
λέγειν καὶ ᾄδειν: ‘ὁ μὲν γὰρ κάλλιστος τῶν γεγονότων ὁ δ᾽ ἄριστος τῶν αἰτίων:’ τὴν δ᾽ οὐσίαν καὶ
ὕλην, ἐξ ἡ γέγονεν, οὐ γενομένην ἀλλ᾽ ὑποκειμένην ἀεὶ τῷ δημιουργῷ εἰς διάθεσιν καὶ τάξιν αὑτῆς καὶ
πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐξομοίωσιν ὡς δυνατὸν ἦν ἐμπαρασχεῖν. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ γένεσις ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ
καλῶς μηδ᾽ ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος, ὡς οἰκίας καὶ ἱματίου καὶ ἀνδριάντος. English translation by Harold
Cherniss, “On the Generation of the Soul in the Timaeus,” in Plutarch: Moralia (16 vols.; LCL;
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1927–2004), (13a:158–345) 13a:181.
86 Chapter 3
his teacher, Plato.9 They found support for this in an idea of Plato’s that resem-
bles Aristotle’s later theory of matter. Plato speaks of a somewhat mysterious
“mother and receptacle of every created thing, of all that is visible or otherwise
perceptible,”10 defining it as “an invisible, formless receptacle of everything.”11
Although Plato did not actually call this “receptacle” matter, it seems to be mat-
ter and also space.12 Because of its widespread acceptance, hylomorphism may
be regarded as a kind of standard theory of ancient physics, comparable, muta-
tis mutandis, to atomic theory today.
2 Pre-existent Matter and Creatio ex Nihilo before Origen
Many theological authorities before Origen harmonized this philosophical

view of prime matter with the text of Genesis 1. Justin is representative: “We
have also been instructed that God, in the beginning, created in his goodness
everything out of formless matter for the sake of human beings.”13 At the root
of the tradition lies the Hellenistic-Jewish book, the Wisdom of Solomon 11:17b,
which says that God made the universe out of “formless matter” (ἀμόρφου ὕλης:
the same words Justin uses), and, perhaps, the LXX translation of Gen 1:2 itself:
“Yet the earth was invisible and unformed.”14
First among theologians was Philo, who says that, to make the universe, God
took “the passive object, which of itself was without soul and unmoved”—by
which he surely means matter—which God then “set in motion and shaped
9 See David Sedley, “Hellenistic Physics and Metaphysics,” in The Cambridge History of
Hellenistic Philosophy (ed. Keimpe Algra et al.; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), (355–411) 385.
10 Plato, Timaeus 51a (OCT/Platonis Opera 4, ll. 4–5 Burnet): τὴν τοῦ γεγονότος ὁρατοῦ καὶ
πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μητέρα καὶ ὑποδοχὴν. English translation by Robin Waterfield, Plato:
Timaeus and Critias (Oxford World’s Classics; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 43.
11 Plato, Timaeus 51a (l. 7; trans. 43): ἀνόρατον εἶδός τι καὶ ἄμορφον, πανδεχές.
12 “So the receptacle seems to be space and also to be matter: it provides the space in which
perceptible phenomena can occur, and also is the substrate from which phenomena
are generated” (Andrew Gregory, introduction to Waterfield, trans., Timaeus and Critias,
[ix–lvii] xlix).
13 Justin, Apologia prima 10,2 (Cambridge Patristic Texts, 14,4–6 Blunt): καὶ πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν
ἀγαθὸν ὄντα δημιουργῆσαι αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης δι’ ἀνθρώπους δεδιδάγμεθα. English transla-
tion by Thomas B. Falls, “The First Apology,” in Saint Justin Martyr (FOTC 6; Washington,
DC: CUA Press, 1948), (23–112) 42. He translates ἀμόρφου as “shapeless,” but I will use
“formless” for consistency. I have also updated his “men” (ἀνθρώπους) to “human beings.”
14 ἡ δὲ γῆ ἦν ἀόρατος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος. See Gerhard Johannes Friedrich May, Creatio ex
Nihilo: The Doctrine of ‘Creation out of Nothing’ in Early Christian Thought (trans. Alfred
Stanley Worrall; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 6–7, particularly note 24.
and ensouled by the intellect.”15 Throughout his works, Philo seems to assume
the uncreated, eternal nature of this matter.16 However, in an extract of his
work On Providence quoted by Eusebius, he says that God created the exact
amount of prime matter he needed.17 Even here, though, there is ambiguity
about his position since he makes the statement conditional: “if it [i.e., matter]
has indeed been created.”18 In the same work, Philo associates Gen 1:2’s refer-
ence to the water, darkness, and abyss that preceded the world with Plato’s and
the pre-Socratics’ speculations about the fundamental elements.19 However, in
On the Creation of the Cosmos he interprets the invisible earth as an incorpo-
real, ideal form, not matter.20
Justin says: “Plato plagiarized from our teachers when he affirmed that God
changed formless matter and created the world.”21 Justin quotes Gen 1:1–3 to
support this view, indicating that the invisible earth refers to prime matter.22
Within the framework of hylomorphism, this is a logical interpretive move:
by its very definition, prime matter is unformed, and it may be said to be in-
visible because for something to be seen it must have color and shape, i.e.,
form. Like Philo, Justin does not explicitly say that God made the prime matter
itself. However, that seems to be the implication since Gen 1:1–2 says that God
15 Philo, De opificio mundi 9 (Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Supersunt 1, 3,1–4 Cohn):
τὸ δὲ παθητὸν ἄψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ, κινηθὲν δὲ καὶ σχηματισθὲν καὶ ψυχωθὲν ὑπὸ
τοῦ νοῦ μετέβαλεν εἰς τὸ τελειότατον ἔργον, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον. English translation by David
T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria: On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses (Philo of
Alexandria Commentary Series 1; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 48.
16 See May, Creatio ex Nihilo, 9–21. Likewise, Runia says that creatio ex nihilo “is conspicuous
by its absence” in De opificio mundi (Philo, 114); cf. idem, Creation of the Cosmos, 152–53.
On the scholarly debate about how to interpret Philo on the eternity of matter, see Paul
M. Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy: Creator and Creation in Early Christian Theology
and Piety (Oxford Early Christian Studies; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 58–61.
17 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,21,1.
18 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,21,1 (GCS 43,1, 403,20 Mras): εἰ δὴ γέγονεν ὄντως. English
translation by Edwin Hamilton Gifford, Eusebii Pamphili: Evangelicae Praeparationis Libri
XV (vol. 3; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903), 365. May suggests either that Philo
means the universe itself, which is unlikely, since the immediate antecedent is οὐσία,
which is followed by ὕλη in the next sentence, or that he is only entertaining “a hypo-
thetical assumption which need by no means correspond with Philo’s own conception”
(Creatio ex Nihilo, 14, note 54).
19 Philo, De providentia 1,22.
20 Philo, De opificio mundi 29.
21 Justin, Apologia prima 59,1 (87,4–7; trans. 97): Ἵνα δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡμετέρων διδασκάλων,
λέγομεν δὲ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ διὰ τῶν προφητῶν, λαβόντα τὸν Πλάτωνα μάθητε τὸ εἰπεῖν, ὕλην
ἄμορφον οὖσαν στρέψαντα τὸν θεὸν κόσμον ποιῆσαι.
22 Justin, Apologia prima 59,2–5.
88 Chapter 3
made the unformed earth, which he interprets as prime matter.23 Elsewhere

Justin embraces the view, explicitly against Plato, that God alone is uncreated.24
The same view is given later by Clement, who quotes Timaeus 48c and
Gen 1:2 in succession, arguing that the “unformed earth” means “formless ma-
terial substance,” i.e., prime matter.25 Although he does not explicitly state that
God also made this matter, he affirms that “the first cause is really one,”26 i.e.,
God, not both God and matter, as the Timaeus has it.27
What remains undefined, obscure, or merely implicit in Justin and the
Alexandrians is made explicit by Justin’s disciple Tatian: namely, that when
the Word of God made the world, “he made for himself the matter.”28 He says
clearly that the creation of the world involved a two-step process:
The whole structure of the world, and the whole creation, has been pro-
duced from matter, and the matter itself brought into existence by God;
so that on the one hand it may be regarded as rude and unformed before
it was separated into parts, and on the other as arranged in beauty and
order after the separation was made.29
23 See Matthew C. Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation: The Cosmic Christ and the Saga of
Redemption (Vigiliae Christianae Supplements 91; Boston: Brill, 2008), 40–42; Eric Francis
Osborn, Justin Martyr (Beiträge zur Historischen Theologie 47; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr,
1973), 46–48.
24 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone 5. The context, however, is not whether matter is also un-
created, but whether souls are. Osborne thinks the implication is sufficient to deny that
Justin believed matter to be uncreated, though he acknowledges that many scholars, such
as Eugene de Faye, have thought otherwise (Justin Martyr, 48–49). Alfred Walter Frank
Blunt also denies that Justin held matter to be uncreated (The Apologies of Justin Martyr
[Cambridge Patristic Texts; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911], 14), as does
Falls (“First Apology,” 42, note 2). One of the scholars that thinks Justin did hold matter
to be uncreated is May, who, however, concedes: “No doubt the logical consequence of
his train of thought would be the thesis that matter could not be unoriginated either”
(Creatio ex Nihilo, 124).
25 Clement, Stromateis 5,4,90,1 (385,16; my trans.): ἀφορμὰς […] ὑλικῆς οὐσίας.
26 Clement, Stromateis 5,4,90,1 (385,10; my trans.): μίαν τὴν ὄντως οὖσαν ἀρχὴν.
27 Clement argues that that is what Timaeus 50d really meant. See Osborn, Justin Martyr, 50;
May, Creatio ex Nihilo, 147.
28 Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 5 (Corpus Apologetarum Christianorum Saeculi Secundi 6,
26,9–10 Otto; my trans.): αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ τὴν ὕλην δημιουργήσας. On Tatian’s view, see May,
Creatio ex Nihilo, 148–54.
29 Tatian, Oratio ad Graecos 12 (52,10–14): πᾶσαν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν τοῦ κόσμου τῆν κατασκευήν, σύμπασάν
τε τὴν ποίησιν, γεγονυῖαν ἐξ ὕλης, καὶ τὴν ὕλην δὲ αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ προβεβλημένην, ἵνα τὸ
μέν τι αὐτῆς ἄπορον καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον νοῆται πρὸ τοῦ διάκρισιν λαβεῖν, τὸ δὲ κεκοσμημένον
καὶ εὔτακτον μετὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ διαίρεσιν. English translation by Jonathan Edwards Ryland,
“Address of Tatian to the Greeks,” in Fathers of the Second Century: Hermas, Tatian,
There is the actual creation of formless matter ex nihilo, and then the forming
of that matter into the cosmos. This distinction is presented using temporal
language: before (πρό) and after (μετά).
At about the same time, Theophilus of Antioch maintained the view that
Gen 1:2 referred to formless matter, but added, specifically against the view
of the philosophers, that “the matter from which God made and fashioned
the world was in a way created, having been made by God.”30 He thus explic-
itly placed this tradition of interpreting Gen 1:1–3 into the arena of creatio
ex nihilo. He was also the first to speak with the clarity and precision typi-
cal of this dogma: “God made everything out of what did not exist, bringing it
into existence.”31
It remained only for Irenaeus to confirm and popularize what Theophilus
had already said.32 Being a bishop rather than a philosopher, he effectively
dumped the concept of formless matter altogether.33 The view that “the Creator
made the world out of existent matter” was a heresy drawn from Plato and the
philosophers.34 God, he says, “is far superior to humankind inasmuch as he
himself invented the matter of his work, since previously it did not exist.”35 In
context, Irenaeus was arguing against the Gnostics, many of whom held that
matter was made by Wisdom through a stray thought; that matter was then
shaped by the Demiurge.36 Nevertheless, by associating the philosophical view
with heresy and denouncing such speculation into the nature of “material
Athenagoras, Theophilus, and Clement of Alexandria (Entire) (ed. Alexander Roberts et al.;
ANF 2; NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913), (59–83) 70.
30 Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 2,10 (Oxford Early Christian Texts, 40,19–21 Grant).
Robert Grant’s critical edition includes his own English translation.
31 Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 1,4 (6,17–18): καὶ τὰ πάντα ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων
εἰς τὸ εἶναι.
32 Although May says that the doctrine “achieves its essentially permanent form” in Irenaeus
(Creatio ex Nihilo, 148), he also notes that “Irenaeus did not get any further in the philo-
sophical elucidation of the idea of creation than Theophilus of Antioch before him”
(ibid., 177).
33 See May, Creatio ex Nihilo, 170–71.
34 Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 2,14,4 (SC 294, 136,71–72 Rousseau/Doutreleau): quod ex
subiecta materia dicunt fabricatorem fecisse mundum. English translation by Dominic J.
Unger, OFM Cap., John J. Dillon, and Matthew C. Steenberg, St. Irenaeus of Lyons: Against
the Heresies (Ancient Christian Writers 55, 64, 65; NY: The Newman Press, 1992–2012),
2:49.
35 Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 2,10,4 (90,59–61; trans. 2:37): Deus autem quam homines hoc
primo melior eo quod materiam fabricationis suae cum ante non esset ipse adinuenit.
36 Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 2,10,3. David Brakke observes that not all Gnostic texts
see Wisdom’s creation of matter as the result of a stray thought (Gnostics, 58–59).
The Gnostics did not adopt the philosophical view of eternal matter (Gnostics, 62;
John Dillon, “Monotheism in the Gnostic Tradition,” in Pagan Monotheism in Late
90 Chapter 3
substance”—saying that only God knows such things37—the earlier Christian

intellectual tradition that held that God first made prime matter ex nihilo was
placed into suspicion of heresy.38 Such a strict standard definitively sets Justin
and Clement against the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, since they only speak
explicitly of creation from formless matter.39 It would be more accurate, in my
opinion, to speak of a single line of doctrinal development, which includes
Justin and Clement (and perhaps Philo), even if Irenaeus represents the cross-
ing of a certain threshold.40
3 Origen
In his lost commentary on Genesis, Origen argued that God created mat-
ter from nothing.41 Fortunately, his argument has been preserved for us by
Eusebius.42 Origen also made the same argument, though in a more compact
form, in the second book of his work On First Principles.43 In the commentary,
he finishes with a quotation of Gen 1:2a, indicating that it was originally made
by way of comment on that verse.44 Origen approached the problem within
the same context as Justin, Clement, and the rest. Now I will show how he
solved it.
Antiquity [ed. Polymnia Athanassiadi and Michael Frede; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999],
[69–79] 71).
37 Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 2,28,7.
38 See Matthew C. Steenberg, Irenaeus on Creation, 44, note 79, and 44–49. This fine dis-
tinction, however, plays no part in May’s study, who unambiguously places Theophilus
among the orthodox.
39 E.g., Alister McGrath, Christian Theology: An Introduction (3rd ed.; Oxford: Blackwell
Publishers, 2001), 297.
40 Even May, ultimately, seems to adopt such a perspective, notwithstanding his strict sepa-
ration between Philo/Justin/Clement on the one hand and Tatian/Theophilus/Irenaeus
on the other. In his final “recapitulation,” he argues that Justin is part of “the orthodox
line,” as the early tension between eternal matter and God as sole principle is finally re-
solved (Creatio ex Nihilo, 178).
41 On this lost commentary, see Ronald E. Heine, “Origen’s Alexandrian Commentary on
Genesis,” in Origeniana Octaua, 63–74. He speculates that it followed a Q&A format, cov-
ered only Genesis 1–4, and was concerned with refuting heterodox interpretations (ibid.,
64–65).
42 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,20,1–9.
Origen regarded creatio ex nihilo as a dogma of the Church, part of what

he calls the “apostolic preaching.”45 The Christian faith holds, as Origen puts
it, that God, “when nothing existed, caused the universe to be.”46 As support,
Origen cited 2 Macc 7:28: “Look at the heaven and the earth and see everything
that is in them and recognize that God did not make them out of things that
existed.”47 Regardless whether that text, considered in its own right, may be
considered as teaching creatio ex nihilo,48 Origen interpreted it in that way.
Origen’s use of the word nothing (nihil) here, combined with his lack of men-
tion of pre-existent matter, is in conformity with the “Irenaean standard” of or-
thodoxy. Nevertheless, when actually refuting the idea that matter was eternal
and uncreated, Origen entertained the idea that God made the universe from
formless matter that he first made. Thus, Origen remained within the intel-
lectual tradition of creation from formless (but not eternal) matter as under-
stood by Justin, Tatian, Theophilus, and Clement. Having a more positive view
of philosophy than Irenaeus did, he thought it possible to speculate on such
questions in spite of Scripture’s silence.49
In the context of explaining how change is possible (the same context for
Aristotle), Origen clearly adopted the hylomorphic theory of matter:
Now by matter we mean that which underlies bodies, namely, that from
which they take their existence when qualities have been applied to or
mingled with them. We speak of four qualities, heat, cold, dryness, wet-
ness. These qualities, when mingled with the ὕλῃ or matter (which mat-
ter is clearly seen to have an existence in its own right apart from these
qualities we have mentioned), produce the different kinds of bodies. But
although, as we have said, this matter has an existence in its own right
without qualities, yet it is never found actually existing apart from them.50
45 Origen, De principiis 1, praef. 4 (9,12; my trans.): praedicationem apostolicam.

46 Origen, De principiis 1, praef. 4 (9,14; trans. 2): cum nihil esset, esse fecit uniuersa.
47 Origen, De principiis 2,1,5; cf. Commentarius in Iohannem 1,103.
48 Modern biblical scholars and theologians tend to reject this interpretation. Young, relying
on May (Creatio ex Nihilo, 6–8), argues that this verse “impl[ies] no more than that the
world came into existence when it was previously not there” (“Creatio ex nihilo,” 143–44).
John Cochrane O’Neill, in contrast, argues that it presupposes creatio ex nihilo, though he
does this in part by amending the text to “God made them out of things that did not exist”
(οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων, instead of ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων) (“How Early Is the Doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo?”
Journal of Theological Studies 53, no. 2 [2002]: [449–65] 449–52).
50 Origen, De principiis 2,1,4 (109,22–110,6; trans. 79): materiam ergo intellegimus quae subi-
ecta est corporibus, id est ex qua inditis atque insertis qualitatibus corpora subsistunt.
qualitates autem quattuor dicimus: calidam, frigidam, aridam, humidam. quae quattuor
92 Chapter 3
Origen thought this philosophical theory useful for his overall cosmology.
Like other ancient philosophers, he took it as a given. In itself, this illustrates
well in practice how philosophy was beneficial to theologians, since Scripture
provided no theory of matter. Nevertheless, Origen’s summary of hylomor-
phism is followed immediately by a criticism of an integral part of that theory,
namely the idea that matter, unlike forms, is uncreated. He marvels: “I cannot
understand how so many distinguished men have supposed it [i.e., matter] to
be uncreated, that is, not made by God himself the Creator of all things, but
in its nature and power the result of chance.”51 This statement, of course, is
rhetorical, as he states precisely the reason why they erred: they took it as a
premise that “God could not make anything when nothing existed.”52 Thus, the
underlying reason for believing in the eternity of matter was the famous axiom
that nothing comes from nothing.53 The universe had to come into being from
something, and that something was uncreated matter, which Plato likened to
a mother that, with God, produces a child.54 Creatio ex nihilo simply denies
the premise, averring that God can in fact make something from nothing.55 By
rejecting these tenets of philosophy, Origen shows how it, as servant, must re-
main subordinate to Christianity.56 Insofar as it contradicts doctrine, it must
be rejected. The philosophers erred, he concludes, because they were “utterly
qualitates ὕλῃ, id est materiae, insertae (quae materia propria ratione extra has esse inu-
enitur quas supra diximus qualitates) diuersas corporum species efficient. haec tamen
materia quamuis, ut supra diximus, secundum suam propriam rationem sine qualitatibus
sit, numquam tamen subsistere extra qualitates inuenitur. He also approvingly mentions
hylomorphism in Contra Celsum 3,41; 4,56.
51 Origen, De principiis 2,1,4 (110,10–13; trans. 79): nescio quomodo tanti et tales uiri ingeni-
tam, id est non ab ipso deo factam conditore omnium putauerunt, sed fortuitam quon-
dam eius naturam uirtutemque dixerunt.
52 Origen, De principiis 2,1,4 (110,19–20; trans. 79): deus non potuerit aliquid facere, cum nihil
esset.
53 Young, “Creatio ex nihilo,” 139–40. Robert J. Roecklein says that this principle, usually traced
back to Parmenides, though in his opinion deriving from the Milesian physicists, was “a
center of gravity for the entire era of pre-Socratic philosophy” (Plato versus Parmenides:
The Debate over Coming-into-Being in Greek Philosophy [Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,
2011], 37).
54 Plato, Timaeus 50d.
55 Tertullian discusses and rejects the alternative posed (and also rejected) by Hermogenes,
that the universe was made out of God himself (Adversus Hermogenem 2,1). This can-
not be, Tertullian argues, because then it would be part of God, but God does not have
parts (ibid. 2,2) See Frances Young, “Creatio ex nihilo,” 142. Origen does not address this
possibility.
56 Young rightly cites this as proof that “Christian intellectuals were not ‘captured’ by Greek
philosophy” (“Creatio ex nihilo,” 139).
ignorant of the power and intelligence of an uncreated being.”57 Philosophy

needed to be taught this truth about God’s power by the scriptures. This does
not imply a per se methodological separation between philosophy and revela-
tion, for once the lesson is learned, it may be fully integrated into philosophical
thinking, as is clear from Origen’s own argument. Thus, in the case of hylomor-
phism, both aspects of the philosophy-as-servant metaphor are illustrated: its
usefulness and its subordination.
Origen believed creatio ex nihilo to be part of the apostolic doctrine, but,
as I said, he did not see a sharp distinction between what is taken on faith
and what may be probed through rational inquiry. Therefore, he tried to dem-
onstrate the doctrine’s credibility through rational, philosophical argument.
That he expressed puzzlement about how so many distinguished philosophers
could have embraced a falsehood shows that he considered his arguments
well founded. His argument is dense and philosophical, requiring a careful
exposition.58 The versions given in the Genesis commentary and in On First
Principles are in substance the same.59 The former is slightly more developed,
so I shall follow it, with reference to the latter.
In his commentary on Genesis, Origen defended creatio ex nihilo, not
against the philosophers, but against heretical Christians, like Hermogenes
and Marcion, who had adopted their hypothesis of eternal matter.60 The rea-
son they had done so, he says, is that it seemed to them to be suggested by
Gen 1:2a: “the earth was invisible and unformed.”61 As discussed, Justin,
57 Origen, De principiis 2,1,4 (110,26–111,1; trans. 80): uirtutem atque intellegentiam ingenitae
naturae penitus ignorent.
58 I have consulted two commentaries on it: Henri Crouzel, SJ, “Un fragment du Commentaire
sur la Genèse d’Origène et la création de la matière à partir du néant,” in Agathé elpìs:
Studi storico-religiosi in onore di Ugo Bianchi (ed. G. Sfameni Gasparro; Rome: L’‘Erma’
di Bretschneider, 1994), 417–26; and Holger Strutwolf, “Philosophia christiana: Beispiele
christlich-philosophischer Argumentation gegen die platonische Vorstellung von der
‘Ungewordenheit der Materie’ in der Preaparatio evangelica des Euseb von Caesarea,” in
Quaerite faciem eius semper: Studien zu den geistesgeschichtlichen Beziehungen zwisch-
en Antike und Christentum (Dankesgabe für Albrecht Dihle zum 85. Geburtstag aus dem
Heidelberger “Kirchenväterkolloquium”) (ed. Andrea Jördens et al.; Hamburg: Dr. Kovač,
2008), 360–64.
59 “Le raisonnement ne diffère pas essentiellement de celui du fragment: il est cependant
un peu moins compliqué. Cette coincidence n’a rien d’étonnant: selon Eusèbe les huit
premiers livres du Commentaire sur la Genèse et le Traité des Principes sont de la meme
période de la vie d’Origène” (Crouzel, “Fragment du Commentaire,” 423).
60 Cf. Crouzel: “La citation de Gn 1, 2, qu’Origène commente en cet endroit, semble montrer
qu’il ne s’addresse pas directement aux philosophes, mais à des chrétiens tentés par cet
enseignement philosophique” (“Fragment du Commentaire,” 419).
94 Chapter 3
Theophilus, and Clement all read Gen 1:1–3 this way. It is not clear whether
Origen agrees with that interpretation, as we lack the context for his
argument.62 In On First Principles he states that this interpretation is widely
held, but declines to give his own opinion.63 He quotes Wis 11:17, but also re-
marks that the canonical status of Wisdom is disputed.64 In general, Origen
interprets Gen 1:1–5 as referring to the spiritual creation that preceded the
physical universe, so he probably did not see prime matter in v. 2.65 In any
case, his argument that we are examining is dedicated to proving that matter
is created, the same thing for which Theophilus argued, and which Justin and
Clement seem to have taken for granted. For this reason, he cannot intend to
attack them.
His target is, rather, those Christians who fully embraced the philosophical
concept of uncreated matter. This view is best exemplified by a second-century
Christian painter named Hermogenes,66 against whom both Theophilus and
Tertullian wrote treatises arguing for creatio ex nihilo.67 Tertullian describes
Hermogenes’s interpretation of Gen 1:2 as follows:
To begin with, he refers the word earth to matter, “because,” so he says,

“it is the earth which was made out of it,” and he interprets was as indi-
cating that it has always existed in the past, being unborn and uncreated;
62 Tantalizingly, he tells us in Contra Celsum 6,49 that in his commentary on Genesis he
explained how to interpret the unformed, invisible earth.
63 Origen, De principiis 4,4,6 (357,6–10; trans. 321): “Very many, indeed, think that the actual
matter of which things are made is referred to in the passage written by Moses in the
beginning of Genesis: [here he quotes Gen 1:1–2a], for by the phrase ‘an earth invisible
and without form,’ it seems to them that Moses was alluding to nothing else but formless
matter”: quam plurimi sane putant ipsam rerum materiam significari in eo, quod in prin-
cipio Genesis scriptum est a Moyse: […] inuisibilem namque et incompositam terram
non aliud eis Moyses quam informem materiam uisus est indicare.
65 I explain this in the next chapter. Clement is able to quote the verse twice, first referring
to prime matter (Stromateis 5,90,1) and then to an ideal, incorporeal form of earth (ibid.
5,93,5). Origen may also have entertained such a dual interpretation.
66 Hermogenes is remembered only for his belief in the eternity of matter. Hippolytus
notes that he held orthodox views about Christ (Refutatio omnium haeresium 8,10,17). Jan
Hendrik Waszink tells us: “Hermogenes had first lived in the eastern part of the Empire,
perhaps at Antioch […]. Later Hermogenes settled in Carthage, where he exercised the
profession of painter. He was still living when Tertullian wrote the Adversus Hermogenem
[…]” (Tertullian: The Treatise against Hermogenes [ACW 24; Westminster, MD: The
Newman Press, 1956], 3).
67 Theophilus’s treatise is lost. See May, Creatio ex Nihilo, 140.
finally, invisible and unfinished because—so he will have it—matter was

formless, confused, and unordered.68
If Tatian represented the resolution of Justin’s ambiguity by submitting phi-

losophy to Christian doctrine, then Hermogenes represented the opposite.69
Tertullian, in his polemic against the infamous Marcion, records that he, too,
held this view.70 Origen mentions neither author by name, but it is their view
and that of those who thought similarly that he opposed.
According to Origen, the fundamental reason some Christians espoused the
philosophical hypothesis of uncreated matter was that they assumed an anal-
ogy between human craftsmen and the divine Craftsman:
Because of human craftsmen they cannot accept that God makes the
things that exist without underlying uncreated matter, since neither can
a sculptor make his proper work without bronze, nor a carpenter without
wood, nor an architect without stones.71
This is of course the same analogy Aristotle himself used to explain the distinc-
tion between form and matter.72 Those who argued that matter was uncreated
erred, Origen concludes, because they were “comparing dissimilar things.”73
One recalls Irenaeus’s argument that the ability to create ex nihilo is precisely
what makes God different from human beings.
Not content merely to decry, Origen endeavored to explain why Christians
should believe that God made matter. His argument is twofold. The first part
68 Tertullian, Adversus Hermogenem 23.1 (SC 439, 140,39–42,7 Chapot): nam et terrae nomen
redigit <in> materiam, quia terra sit quae facta est ex illa, et “erat” in hoc dirigit, quasi
quae semper retro fuerit, innata et infecta, “inuisibilis” autem et “rudis,” quia informem
et confusam et inconditam uult fuisse materiam. English translation by Waszink, Against
Hermogenes (op. cit.), 57–58. Waszink translates infecta as “unmade” and informem as
“shapeless.”
70 Tertullian, Adversus Marcionem 1,15,4. See May, Creatio ex Nihilo, 53–61, who speculates
that Marcion may have used Gen 1:2 to support his view (ibid., 58).
71 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,20,1 (402,7–10; my trans.): διὰ τοὺς ἀνθρωπίνους τεχνίτας
μὴ δύνασθαι παραδέξασθαι τὸν θεὸν χωρὶς ὕλης ἀγενήτου ὑποκειμένης κατασκευάζειν τὰ ὄντα,
ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς χωρὶς χαλκοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον ποιῆσαι δύναται μηδὲ τέκτων χωρὶς ξύλων
μηδὲ οἰκοδόμος χωρὶς λίθων. The subject is the hypothetical interlocutor “anyone,” which I
have rendered as “they.”
72 Aristotle, Physica 1,7,191a (quoted above).
73 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,20.9 (403,14; my trans.): ἀνομοίως παραβάλλουσι. The ar-
gument against drawing such an analogy was used by other theologians as well (see May,
Creatio ex Nihilo, 74, note 59).
96 Chapter 3
hinges on the concept of God’s power (δύναμις),74 and the second on his provi-
dence (πρόνοια).75 To believe that God did not make matter itself is to limit
God’s power, which Origen knows his Christian opponents will not wish to do.
He begins his argument: “We must question him about God’s power, whether
God, if he wills to establish whatever he chooses, there being no defect nor
weakness in his will, cannot establish that which he chooses.”76 The philo-
sophical point of view also removes the need for God’s providence: if “the
substance” (οὐσία), meaning matter,77 can exist without God having created
it, then, by the same reasoning, so can the “qualities” (ποιότητες).78 In other
words: if it is not necessary to think that God made prime matter, then neither
is it necessary to think he made the actual forms in which matter exists (i.e.,
the universe), in which case there is no reason to believe in a creator at all. If
matter can just exist f0rever, he thinks, then the formed universe itself can just
exist forever without the need to postulate any divine Craftsman.
I will now examine each half of his argument in fine, beginning, as he does,
with the argument from God’s power. It proceeds as follows: if matter is uncre-
ated, then, had it not existed, God would have been powerless to make the
universe and be its creator.79 So it was a stroke of good luck that G0d hap-
pened to find the very matter he needed,80 and in just the right quantity,81 and
having the potential to receive the exact qualities he wished to bestow on it.82
Or, if this was not the result of luck, then it must have come from “a provi-
dence older than God.”83 Origen does not pursue the concept of a providence

76 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,20,1 (402,10–12; trans. 363): ζητητέον πρὸς αὐτὸν περὶ
δυνάμεως θεοῦ, εἰ θελήσας ὑποστῆσαι ὅ τι βούλεται ὁ θεός, τῆς θελήσεως αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἀπορουμένης
οὐδὲ ἀτονοὐσης, οὐ δύναται ὑποστῆσαι ὃ βούλεται.
77 Aristotle says that the word substance (οὐσία) can refer to the matter, the form, or to the
actual thing the two together constitute (Metaphysica 8,1,1042b). Aristotle seems to have
espoused the latter definition; for something to really be substantial it needs both form
and matter (see Stanley Sfekas, “Ousia, Substratum, and Matter,” Philosophical Inquiry 13
[1991]: 38–47). Origen, unlike Aristotle, used it to refer to prime matter, which was the
Stoic usage (see David Sedley, “Matter in Hellenistic Philosophy,” in Materia [ed. Delfina
Giovannozzi and Marco Veneziani; Lessico intellettuale europeo 113; Florence: Leo S.
Olschki, 2011], [53–66] 60–63). We saw that Clement also used οὐσία this way (Stromateis
5,4,90,1, quoted above).
83 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,20,5 (402,22; my trans.): πρόνοιά τις πρεσβυτέρα θεοῦ.
above even God, nor did he need to: he knew that his Christian opponents
would reject such a concept as absurd blasphemy. Such a notion would be no
more rational than it would be pious. Even without positing such an absur-
dity, believing that matter is eternally uncreated amounts to a similar error by
placing a second principle alongside God, upon which he depended to create.
Origen’s argument that God was lucky is recapitulated in the second book of
On First Principles.84
After having explaining how the hypothesis of uncreated matter renders
God impotent,85 Origen proceeds to argue that it also effectively denies God’s
providence.86 He uses a reductio ad absurdum argument, and thus begins by
placing himself into the shoes of his opponents: “In any case, if we admit as a
hypothesis that matter is uncreated […].”87 He proposes a hypothetical ques-
tion: “if without any providence supplying the substance to God it has become
such as it is, what could providence, if it existed, have done more than their
spontaneous chance?”88 The implied answer, of course, is “nothing.” Therefore,
if the matter needed to form the universe already existed apart from God, then,
he argues, it should also be possible for the formed universe itself to exist with-
out God.89 Postulating an uncreated Craftsman to shape the uncreated mat-
ter multiplies entities unnecessarily (it violates Occam’s Razor, we may say).
This is the view of atheists. Origen knows that his Christian opponents are
not atheists and will judge it absurd to think the formed universe is uncre-
ated; they should concede, then, that it is equally absurd to think that prime
matter is uncreated.90 This argument is alluded to in On First Principles, when
Origen says that philosophers are hypocrites if they call impious those who
deny God’s providence, when they do the same thing by saying that prime mat-
ter is uncreated.91
Origen here ignores the logical possibility that this universe could be in-
ferior to a better universe that God could have made, had he been able to
make his own, better matter. I note this lacuna because Basil, as we shall see,

87 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,20,6 (403,2–3; my trans.): καθ’ ὑπόθεσιν γοῦν ἀποδεξάμενοι
τὸ ἀγένητον εἶναι τὴν ὕλην […].
88 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,20,6 (403,3–5; trans. 364): εἰ προνοίας οὐχ ὑποβαλλούσης
τὴν οὐσίαν τῷ θεῷ τοιαύτη γεγένηται, εἰ πρόνοια ἧν ὑφεστῶσα, τί ἂν πλέον πεποιήκει τοῦ
αὐτομάτου; Gifford adds the word material before substance.
98 Chapter 3
addressed it.92 In On First Principles, Origen did allude to the possibility of

God making better, greater, or altogether different matter than what he did in
fact make, but dismissed it without explanation.93 This is surprising because
it means he did not address the possibility that God wished to make a universe
better than this one, but, being unable, was forced to settle for this imperfect
one, which he was able to make from the poor matter that happened to be
available. Given that the presence of evil has often been explained as arising
precisely from such inherent limitations of matter (e.g., by Plato,94 Philo,95 the
Gnostics,96 Marcion,97 and Celsus98), this possibility merited a response. It was
suggested by the very tradition of philosophical reasoning about uncreated
matter that opened this discussion in the first place.
Here in On First Principles, Origen offers an additional argument for the
createdness of matter that is absent from the Genesis commentary. It is what
I would call an argument from piety: if God made matter, then that matter
would have to be “the same as that matter which these men call uncreated.”99
It is here that Origen dismisses, without explanation, the possibility of God
making a better, worse, or different world. Given the choice, then, between
thinking this matter to be created or uncreated, it is impious to think the latter.
In other words, it is more pious to believe that matter is created than that it is
uncreated. Of course, one can only believe this if one first accepts the theoreti-
cal possibility that God even could make matter ex nihilo, which was precisely
the question in dispute. This is why he begins this argument by saying: “Let
it be granted.”100 Otherwise, he would beg the question, since the possibility
of matter coming to be was precisely what was in dispute and not a premise.
Origen’s meaning seems to be that, once one accepts that God could make
matter ex nihilo, one should, for the sake of piety, believe that he actually did
so. It was like a scholastic argument from “fittingness”: it is fitting that God
should have made matter ex nihilo; therefore, he must have. This was clearly a

94 See Viktor Ilievski, Plato’s Theodicy and the Platonic Cause of Evil, PhD diss. (Budapest:
Central European University, 2014), 102–08.
98 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,65. Origen, of course, rejects this view, instead believing evil to
be the result of the free will of souls, including those called the devil and demons (ibid.,
4,66; cf. 3,42).
99 Origen, De principiis 2,1,4 (111,67; trans. 80): similem atque eandem ut est illa, quam isti
ingenitam dicunt.
100 Origen, De principiis 2,1,4 (111,2; trans. 80): concedatur.
second-level argument, not on the same plane as the first two. This is why he
placed it at the end, introduced it as an attempt to “look more carefully into
the plan of things,”101 and omitted it entirely from his Genesis commentary.102
In the fourth and final book of On First Principles,103 Origen returned again
to the question of matter and offered a new possibility. He says that there were
some Christians who, in order to defend creatio ex nihilo, denied the theory of
prime matter altogether. He explains their argument:
[They] have ventured to assert that bodily nature consists of nothing

else but qualities. For if hardness and softness, heat and cold, wetness
and dryness, are qualities, and when these and all the others like them
are taken away nothing is conceived to lie beneath, then the qualities
will appear to be everything. And so those who hold this opinion have
endeavored to establish the following argument, that since all who say
that matter is uncreated allow that its qualities were created by God, the
result is that even according to their view matter is not uncreated if quali-
ties are everything.104
These do not seem to have been apologists that just wanted to toss philoso-
phy in the dustbin. After all, Origen says they “were desirous of inquiring more
deeply into these questions.”105 They hold the view that matter does not really
exist, an idea that was part of Neoplatonic discussions contemporaneous with
Origen.106 Some Christian philosophers must have embraced this line of think-
ing as a way of preserving creatio ex nihilo without having to argue, as Origen
101 Origen, De principiis 2,1,4 (111,1; trans. 80): ut rationem rerum possimus diligentius intueri.
102 Alternately, it may be Eusebius who omitted it, precisely because of its secondary nature.
103 Origen, De principiis 4,4,6–8.
104 Origen, De principiis 4,4,7 (357,32–358,8; trans. 322): ausi sunt dicere nihil aliud esse
naturam corpoream quam qualitates. si enim duritia et mollities, calidum et frigidum,
humidum et aridum qualitas est, his autem uel ceteris huiusmodi amputatis nihil aliud
intellegitur subiacere, uidebuntur qualitates esse omnia. unde et hi, qui haec adserunt,
adseuerare conati sunt ut, quoniam omnes, qui materiam infectam dicunt, qualitates a
deo factas esse confitentur, inueniatur per hoc etiam secundum ipsos nec materia esse
infecta, si quidem qualitates sint omnia.
105 Origen, De principiis 4,4,7 (357,32; trans. 322): altius de his uolentes inquirere.
106 Plotinus argued against those who rejected the concept of prime matter, “perhaps the
only example in late Greek philosophy of a total rejection of the idea of ὕλη and an at-
tempt to conceive reality as constructed exclusively of forms (a position which Plotinus
himself sometimes comes very near)” (Arthur Hilary Armstrong, “The Theory of the
Non-existence of Matter in Plotinus and the Cappadocians,” Studia Patristica 5 [1962]:
[427–29] 427). Plotinus’s student, Porphyry, held that individuals are simply “bundles
of qualities,” rather than a combination of qualities and prime matter (Richard Sorabji,
100 Chapter 3
did, that prime matter was created by God. By reducing prime matter to the
status of non-being, the problem is solved, in a way, since creatio ex nihilo and
creatio ex materia then become the same thing, matter being nothing. While
this may sound strange, it has its roots in the philosophical tradition: Plato
said that the “receptacle” was scarcely comprehensible,107 while Aristotle, as
discussed above, did not think that matter should be called “substance,” for it
is pure potentiality. In any case, Origen makes it clear that he disagreed and
explains why one should not say that prime matter is nothing.108 The reason is
that our minds, “by a purely intellectual act,” are able to define things (e.g., the
apostle Paul) without reference to any particular, accidental qualities they may
happen to have at a given time (e.g., whether Paul happens to be speaking).109
If nothing lay beneath, we could not apprehend anything generally, and every
different condition of a thing would actually be a different thing! There would
be a multitude of Pauls: the speaking Paul, the silent Paul, the sleeping Paul,
the awake Paul, etc. This logic ultimately implies, Origen argues, that there is
an underlying substance beneath everything (formless matter), which we ap-
prehend only “by this somewhat artificial mode of thought.”110
That Origen considered this view worth mentioning, discussing, and finally
rejecting is a reminder of the important role that philosophy played for ancient
Christianity. If some (like Hermogenes) gave away too much to philosophy by
accepting the hypothesis of eternal matter, then those who reduced prime
matter to nothing at all committed the opposite error and gave philosophy too
little credit. While they had a good motivation, and apparently even took the
question seriously, the cost was for Origen too high. Hylomorphism was a solid
theory in its own right, defensible on intellectual grounds and through a ten-
dentious interpretation of biblical verses about “incompleteness.”111 It should
not be rejected for apologetical aims. Only the precisely mistaken corollary to
hylomorphism, viz., that matter is uncreated, must be rejected. One walks a
fine line here, clearly, and it is easy to sympathize with those who saw things a
little differently and decided to redefine prime matter as nothing.
Time, Creation and the Continuum: Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages [Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1983], 292).
107 Plato, Timaeus 52b.
108 Cf. Crouzel, “Fragment du Commentaire,” 423–24.
109 Origen, De principiis 4,4,7 (358,21; trans. 322): ab intellectu suo.
110 Origen, De principiis 4,4,7 (358,24; trans. 322–23): simulata quodammodo cogitatione.
111 Origen, De principiis 4,4,8 (358,28–29; trans. 323): imperfectum. He cites Ps 139:16a: “My
unwrought state your eyes beheld,” which in Rufinus’s Latin translation is quoted as im-
perfectum tuum uiderunt oculi mei (“my eyes have seen your incompleteness,” my trans.).
He also quotes from the pseudepigraphal book of Enoch.
4 Basil
Now let us turn to Basil. Before discussing his remarks against the philo-
sophical hypothesis of uncreated matter, those remarks should be placed in
context. Basil was preaching on Genesis 1 and had just reached the second
verse. His first move was to explain what he thought the verse, properly in-
terpreted, meant. The words in question are invisible (ἀόρατος) and unformed
(ἀκατασκεύαστος). As it turns out, Basil went a different direction here than any
of the authors examined so far. As for the word unformed, he says: “The com-
plete formation of the earth is its abundance,” meaning the plants created on
the third day (Gen 1:11–12).112 Since the earth did not yet have any vegetation,
“the Word rightly called it unformed.”113 The same is true of the sky, though the
text does not say so explicitly, because it did not yet possess its “proper adorn-
ment,” which is the moon, sun, and stars made on the fourth day (Gen 1:14–18).114
As for invisible, Basil gives two explanations for why the earth was said to be
invisible: either because human beings did not yet exist to see it, thus making it
“invisible” in the sense of “unseen” (ἀόρατος has both meanings),115 or because
it was covered with water and there was no light.116 Basil seemed to prefer the
latter interpretation, as he later restated it without the alternative.117 Basil’s
interpretations of this verse in no way assimilated it to philosophical notions
of matter. Instead, he read the verses in a literal way that found plain answers
in the context of the chapter. A modern biblical scholar would prefer Basil’s
reading! This fits with what I said in the previous chapter about how Basil ap-
proached Genesis 1 as a literal cosmogonical account.
Only after giving his own literal interpretation did Basil begin to criticize
those who said that Gen 1:2a was about uncreated matter,
by nature invisible and unformed, without quality on account of its con-

dition, and separated (in thought) from all form and shape. Taking hold
112 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,1 (22,4–5; my trans.): ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν τελεία κατασκευὴ γῆς ἡ
ἀπ’ αὐτῆς εὐθημία.
113 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,1 (22,9; my trans.): ἀκατάσκευον αὐτὴν εἰκότως ὁ λόγος
ὠνόμασεν.
114 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,1 (22,11; trans. 22): τὸν οἰκεῖον κόσμον.
115 See Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. “ἀόρατος.”
102 Chapter 3
of it, the Craftsman formed it by his wisdom and led it into order, and
thus through it gave visible things existence.118
Basil’s phraseology here is an unmistakable allusion to Plato’s Timaeus, which

says that God, “taking hold of everything that was visible, […] led it into order
from chaos.”119 Unquestionably he was attacking that same view that assimi-
lated the philosophical notion of uncreated matter into Christianity. His own
belief is a clear proclamation of creatio ex nihilo:
“God created the heavens and the earth” (Gen 1:1), not each one by halves,
but the entire heavens and the whole earth, including the substance itself
with the form. He is not the Inventor of the shapes, but the Creator of the
very nature of all that exists.120
For God merely to form the world from matter is not creation. Basil says
with equal clarity that God “created the appropriate matter together with its
form.”121
I shall examine the specific contours and ideas of Basil’s polemic against
uncreated matter in the light of Origen’s argument, which he clearly used. He
could have encountered Origen’s text directly from his lost Genesis commen-
tary. More likely, though, his direct source was (as for us) Eusebius’s Preparation
for the Gospel.122 Basil had four basic arguments against the idea that matter
is uncreated: 1) it makes matter equal to God in honor, 2) it denigrates God’s
power, 3) it cannot explain how matter came into contact with God’s power
apart from God’s own providence, and 4) it is based on a false analogy between
118 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (23,9–12; my trans.): Αὕτη γάρ, φησί, καὶ ἀόρατος τῇ
φύσει καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος, ἄποιος οὖσα τῷ ἑαυτῆς λόγῳ, καὶ παντὸς εἴδους καὶ σχήματος
κεχωρισμένη, ἣν παραλαβὼν ὁ τεχνίτης τῇ ἑαυτοῦ σοφίᾳ ἐμόρφωσε καὶ εἰς τάξιν ἤγαγε καὶ οὕτω
δι’ αὐτῆς οὐσίωσε τὰ ὁρώμενα.
119 Plato, Timaeus 30a (ll. 3–5; my trans.): οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν […], εἰς τάξιν
αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας. That Plato referred to the “receptacle” as visible is a reminder
that the later Aristotelian notion of prime matter was a refinement of Plato’s more enig-
matic view. Basil, like everyone else, went straight to the root, not distinguishing Plato
from later views.
120 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,3 (25,9–12; trans. 24–25): Ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς οὐρανὸν καὶ
γῆν· οὐκ ἐξ ἡμισείας ἑκάτερον ἀλλ’ ὅλον οὐρανὸν καὶ ὅλην γῆν, αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν τῷ εἴδει
συνειλημμένην. οὐχὶ γὰρ σχημάτων εὑρετὴς ἀλλ’ αὐτῆς τῆς φύσεως τῶν ὄντων δημιουργός.
121 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (24,25–26; trans. 24): καὶ τῷ εἴδει αὐτοῦ τὴν ἁρμόζουσαν
ὕλην συναπεγέννησεν.
122 He also seems to use Praeparatio evangelica 7,19,1–8, which is not from Origen. I discuss
this below in the appropriate place.
human beings and God. I will show that the fourth of these arguments was
taken directly from Origen. There are general, though not directly verbal, affin-
ities between Basil and Origen’s arguments from God’s power and from provi-
dence. Basil’s first argument that uncreated matter would be equal to God is
not found in Origen, though it is hardly a new idea. On the whole, Origen’s text
stands as Basil’s immediate source.
Although he used Origen’s text, Basil’s preaching had its own integrity and
style, owing to their different rhetorical contexts and aims. Origen’s argument
is found in a commentary and, as we saw, took the form of a tightly-reasoned
philosophical argument having two parts. Basil’s words, in contrast, were
preached in a sermon and less compact. For the most part, Origen’s densely-
logical arguments were unsuitable, as they stood, for a homily to a congrega-
tion. The hexaemeral sermons do contain philosophical discussions about
physics and may even seek “to present a complete cosmology.”123 Nevertheless,
they had to appeal to a much wider audience, which included the ordinary,
working-class people. Basil’s goal was not to educate his audience about physi-
cal theories of matter, but to edify, teach Christian doctrine, and, as he him-
self says, offer what “is most profitable for our hearers.”124 As Rousseau says,
for Basil “Scripture’s purpose was […] moral rather than ‘scientific.’ The very
reading of Scripture, therefore, was a moral rather than a merely intellectual
endeavor.”125 Many of the references to philosophical matters are brought in
only where the defense of doctrine is at stake, as is true here.126 There was,
however, another reason for Basil to discuss philosophical theories with his
congregation. Even philosophy could have a moral purpose, as learning about
the cosmos should increase one’s regard for its Creator. In the very first ser-
mon, Basil exhorts his listeners regarding the theories he discusses: “Should
any of these things which have been said seem to you to be plausible, transfer
your admiration to the wisdom of God which has ordered them so.”127 Origen’s

124 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,9 (17,9–10; trans. 16): ὠφέλιμον τοῖς ἀκούουσιν. Cf. ibid. 9,1.
125 Rousseau, Basil, 327. Cf. Amand de Mendieta: “Ces neuf homélies […] sont de fait des
‘homélies’ au sens chrétien et patristique du term: discours simple et familier, prononcé à
l’église, instruction catéchétique ou exégétique, où se mêle l’exhortation morale et spiri-
tuelle” (“Préparation des ‘Homélies sur l’Hexaéméron’,” 350).
126 As Amand de Mendieta says, “l’énorme proportion, vraiment massive, d’opinions philos-
ophiques et de données scientifiques” is offered “au service apologétique de la foi chré-
tienne et orthodoxe” (“Préparation des ‘Homélies sur l’Hexaéméron’,” 350).
127 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,10 (18,7–8; trans. 17): Τούτων ἄν σοι δοκῇ τι πιθανὸν εἶναι
τῶν εἰρημένων, ἐπὶ τὴν οὕτω ταῦτα διαταξαμένην τοῦ θεοῦ σοφίαν μετάθες τὸ θαῦμα. Cf. 1,11. As
Amand de Mendieta again puts it: “Le but principal (je ne dis pas l’unique) qu’il s’assigne
explicitement est donc d’inciter ses auditeurs et ses auditrices, et plus tard ses lecteurs, à
104 Chapter 3
arguments about matter, while they certainly defended doctrine, would not
so much edify the bulk of Basil’s listeners as baffle them. Basil defended creatio
ex nihilo, though not as thoroughly as Origen did, with some simpler explana-
tions drawn from the same wellspring of Origen’s thought.
Basil begins his refutation by arguing that the philosophical hypothesis
makes matter equal to God in honor: “If matter itself is uncreated, it is, in the
first place, of equal rank with God, worthy of the same honors.”128 It is fitting
to start here, as this is the most fundamental problem: if matter is eternal and
uncreated, it is a second principle alongside God. This was the problem that
the theologians before Theophilus did not resolve with an explicit declara-
tion of creatio ex nihilo. It was a philosophical problem of first principles; for
Christians, there could be only one: the divine monarchy. However, Basil did
not frame it in philosophical terms but rather in religious ones appropriate
to a sermon. To believe that matter is uncreated, like God, meant it should be
honored like one honors God. It was a form of idolatry! In itself, this would
seem to have been bad enough, but Basil took it a step further by quoting the
philosophers themselves who defined prime matter, he says, as “the ultimate
formlessness and unshapen ugliness.”129 It is not possible to say from whom ex-
actly Basil took these definitions, but they are consistent with the philosophy
of the time. For example, the philosopher Calcidius, a contemporary of Basil’s,130
defined Aristotle’s view of matter as follows: “We will say, not that matter is evil
or the source of evil, but that privation is, for it is the lack of form, the want of
order, the uncomeliness of matter, and for that very reason capacity for evil.”131
It is easy to see how blasphemous this sounded, if formless, evil, ugly matter (as
privation, anyway) were placed on par with the perfect, good, beautiful God.
élever leurs regards depuis les beautés du monde visible jusqu’à leur Auteur invisible et
paternel” (“Préparation des ‘Homélies sur l’Hexaéméron’,” 354–55).
128 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (23,13–14; trans. 23): Εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀγένητος αὕτη, πρῶτον μὲν
ὁμότιμος τῷ θεῷ, τῶν αὐτῶν πρεσβείων ἀξιουμένη.
129 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (23,15; my trans.): τὴν ἐσχάτην ἀμορφίαν, τὸ ἀδιατύπωτον
αἶσχος.
130 Calcidius was “an elusive and enigmatic figure” from the fourth century, who may not
have been a Christian as has usually been thought (John Magee, Calcidius: On Plato’s
Timaeus [Dumbarton Oaks Medieval Library; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2016], viii–xiv).
131 Calcidius, Commentarius in Platonis Timaeum 288 (Plato Latinus 4, 292,13–15 Waszink):
consequenter ergo dicemus malitiam esse atque initium malorum non siluam, sed caren-
tiam; haec est enim informitas et nullus cultus et turpitudo siluae, proptereaque etiam
maleficentia. English translation by Magee, On Plato’s Timaeus (op. cit.), 579. He has “its
capacity.”
Basil’s second argument has two prongs: on the one hand, if it is asserted
that uncreated matter has the potential “to take in entirely the intelligence of
God,” it is once again put on par with God himself, this time with respect to
his power.132 On the other hand, if it is asserted that “matter is inferior to the
activity of God,”133 then God’s power is denigrated by the implication that he
was incapable of making a better universe, given the poor material with which
he had to work. This argument is reminiscent of Origen’s that uncreated matter
would imply that God’s power was limited in what it could accomplish. Basil
specifically discusses the possibility that Origen cast aside without further
comment. Basil says that the supposition that uncreated matter was inferior
to God’s ability is “a more absurd blasphemy.”134 It would be better, though
still wrong, to believe that uncreated matter was at least equal to God’s power,
so that God could make the universe he desired—this universe—rather than
have to settle for an inferior universe “because of the deficiency in matter.”135
Such a view would necessarily imply that this universe is not very good, con-
trary to Gen 1:31a.
Basil concluded his discussion of matter with another argument in the form
of a rhetorical question: “Let them answer us as to how the active power of God
and the passive nature of matter came in contact with one another.”136 This is,
very succinctly, Origen’s argument from providence: what explanation other
than luck can be given for the fact that prime matter existed for God to use to
mold the world? The terminology of active power and passive nature, it will
be recalled, was already used by Philo.137 Here Basil probably drew on a differ-
ent text from Eusebius’s Preparation for the Gospel, namely the excerpt from
Dionysius, the third-century bishop of Alexandria, which immediately pre-
cedes the excerpt from Origen.138 Dionysius writes:
For let them tell us the cause for which, though both be uncreated,
God on the one hand is impassible, unchangeable, immovable, ac-
tively operative, while the other is on the contrary passive, changeable,
132 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (23,18–19; trans. 23): ὅλην ὑποδέχεσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν
ἐπιστήμην.
133 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (23,21; trans. 23): ἐλάττων ἡ ὕλη τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνεργείας.
134 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (23,22; trans. 23): ἀτοπωτέραν βλασφημίαν.
135 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (23,23; trans. 23): δι’ ἔνδειαν ὕλης.
136 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,1 (25,12–13; trans. 25): ἐπεὶ ἀποκρινάσθωσαν ἡμῖν πῶς
ἀλλήλοις συνέτυχον ἥ τε δραστικὴ τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμις καὶ ἡ παθητικὴ φύσις τῆς ὕλης.
137 Philo, De opifico mundi 2,9.
106 Chapter 3
unstable, transformable. How then could they harmonize and agree in

their course?139
He says that there must be some cause for the two different substances both
being uncreated, but such a cause would itself be “higher than each of them,”
which is blasphemy.140 This is, of course, the same thing Origen said about how
there would have to be a providence prior to God.141 Dionysius was a student of
Origen’s,142 so this only confirms the essentially Origenian character of Basil’s
arguments, probably made known to Basil through Eusebius.143
Each of these three arguments occupies only about six lines of text. Basil de-
ployed each argument in a few, well chosen and crafted words, and then moved
on. It was almost a “shotgun” approach to apologetics. This was a homily for his
congregation, neither the time nor the place for a careful philosophical disqui-
sition. Interestingly, though, he devoted a whole paragraph (22 lines) to draw-
ing out Origen’s remark that the notion of uncreated matter came about from a
bad analogy with human craftsmen.144 That Origen was the immediate source
here is proved by the fact that Basil used the exact same example Origen did.
Basil says: “Among us each art is definitely occupied with a certain material, as
the art of metalworking with iron, and of carpentry with wood.”145 Compare
this with what Origen writes: “Neither can a sculptor make his proper work
without bronze, nor a carpenter without wood.”146 In a vacuum that would not
be sufficient proof of borrowing, but combined with all the other evidences of
Origenian influence on Basil, it is.
139 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,19,5–6 (401,19–21; trans. 362): εἰπάτωσαν γὰρ τὴν αἰτίαν,
δι’ ἥν, ἀμφοτέρων ὄντων ἀγενήτων, ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἀπαθής, ἄτρεπτος, ἀκίνητος, ἐργαστικός, ἡ δὲ τὰ
ἐναντία παθητή, τρεπτή, ἄστατος, μεταποιουμένη. καὶ πῶς ἕρμοσαν καὶ συνέδραμον; Gifford
translates παθητή as “passible.”
140 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,19,2: ἑκατέρου κρείττονα. Strutwolf glosses this as “on-
tologisch höherstehend” (“Philosophia Christiana,” 362).
141 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,20,5 (quoted above).
142 On Dionysius, see John Anthony McGuckin, The Westminster Handbook to Patristic
Theology (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004), 103–04.
143 Interestingly, Dionysius also argues that matter cannot be uncreated because “uncreated-
ness is, so to speak, his [i.e., God’s] substance”: οὐσία ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι τις, ἡ ἀγενησία
(ibid. 7,19,3 [401,12–13]; my trans.). This is the very idea Basil strenuously opposed in
Contra Eunomium.
145 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (24,2–3; trans. 23): παρ’ ἡμῖν ἑκάστη τέχνη περί τινα ὕλην
ἀφωρισμένως ἠσχόληται, οἷον χαλκευτικὴ μὲν περὶ τὸν σίδηρον, τεκτονικὴ δὲ περὶ τὰ ξύλα.
146 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,20,1 (402,9–10; my trans.): μηδὲ ἀνδριαντοποιὸς χωρὶς
χαλκοῦ τὸ ἴδιον ἔργον ποιῆσαι δύναται μηδὲ τέκτων χωρὶς ξύλων.
Origen did not dwell on this point, speaking of it in only the first and penul-
timate sentences of the Genesis excerpt. He was more concerned with devel-
oping the two logical arguments (from power and from providence), whereas
Basil was interested in where the mistaken viewpoint came from. Origen knew
that it is not enough to explain how a mistaken idea arose—that would be the
genetic fallacy—one must explain how the view is mistaken. Thus, for Origen,
the analogy was offered only as an explanation, not a refutation. No doubt Basil
was aware of this as well, and thus he gave his three arguments. I think he also
knew that his audience might have a hard time following carefully-reasoned
philosophical arguments. However, a discourse about the origins of the error
would be easy to follow, and leave most listeners feeling satisfied and thinking
(albeit wrongly) that the idea had been refuted. The genetic argument, then,
actually amounts to the main rhetorical thrust of Basil’s assault on the idea of
uncreated matter.
Basil fleshed out Origen’s statement about the craftsman analogy, add-
ing that the adoption of this analogy by some Christians resulted from “the
poverty of human nature,”147 and, more specifically, “the baseness of their
thoughts.”148 The analogy was appealing because it fits with our experience.
However, human reasoning is unreliable when it comes to God, for his power
far transcends what the poor human mind can comprehend. Indeed, God can
create something from nothing. “Let those cease, therefore, from their mythi-
cal fictions, who attempt in the weakness of their own reasonings to measure
power incomprehensible to their understanding and wholly inexpressible in
human speech.”149 This command has the rhetorical effect of belittling his op-
ponents and making them seem arrogant, imagining that they can understand
God’s ways. It is almost sounds ad hominem, but his point was not that his
opponents specifically were too stupid to understand his argument: rather,
human nature itself is incapable of understanding God’s nature. After all, Basil
began the entire series of sermons with an assertion of “the weakness of our
intellect” compared to “the profound thoughts of the writer,” i.e., Moses.150 This
is reminiscent of Basil’s criticism of Eunomius for trying to define God’s es-
sence (impossible!). Whatever Basil’s arguments in this sermon may lack in
147 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (24,1; trans. 23): τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἡ πενία.
148 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (24,25; trans. 24): λογισμῶν ταπεινότητα.
149 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2 (25,6–8; trans. 24): παυσάθωσαν οὖν μυθικῶν πλασμάτων,
ἐν τῇ ἀσθενείᾳ τῶν οἰκείων λογισμῶν τὴν ἀκατάληπτον διανοίας καὶ ἄφατον παντελῶς ἀνθρωπίνῃ
φωνῇ δύναμιν ἐκμετροῦντες.
150 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,1 (2,6–7; trans. 3): κἂν τῆς βαθείας καρδίας τοῦ συγγραφέως
μὴ ἐφικώμενος διὰ τὸ τῆς διανοίας ἡμῶν ἀσθενές.
108 Chapter 3
philosophical precision, he more than makes up for with rhetorical force and
eloquence.
So much for Basil’s arguments in favor of creatio ex nihilo. Now I will ex-
amine what he thought about hylomorphism generally. In fact, he accepted
it, as is seen in the sixth hexaemeral sermon, where he says: “We divide all
composite bodies into the recipient substance and the supervenient quality.”151
The purpose of this statement is to defend Genesis when it says that God made
the stars after he made light (Gen 1:14–18). He says that what we can separate
only “in thought,” the Creator can separate “in actuality.”152 His use of the word
substance (οὐσία) to describe something that receives qualities is strongly sug-
gestive of matter, as that is how Origen and the Stoics also used it. Both Plato
and Origen said that we can conceive of prime matter without qualities only
through a strange kind of mental abstraction. But God, Basil says, really can
make substance without quality. This suggests the idea of the creation of mat-
ter ex nihilo prior to the imposition of qualities. That was not Basil’s point here,
as he was talking about the creation of the stars, not matter as such, but he as-
sumed hylomorphic theory all the same. In fact, he used it to defend Scripture,
which suggests that he assumed, reasonably, that others would take it for
granted as well.
However, there is another passage in the Hexaemeron that, at first blush,
appears to indicate that Basil did not believe that matter really exists. He says:
Let us make the same resolutions for ourselves concerning earth: not to
inquire meddlesomely what its substance might be, nor to spend time
investigating by reasoning its very substrate, nor to seek some nature de-
void of qualities, existing without qualification in its own account, but
rather to know well that all the things which are observed in connection
with it are set down in the formula of its being, being complements of its
substance. If you tried to remove by reason each of the qualities that exist
in it, you would end up with nothing. For if you take away blackness, cold-
ness, heaviness, solidity, the qualities that exist in it with respect to taste,
or any others which are observed in connection with it, the substrate will
be nothing.153
151 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,3 (91,14–15; trans. 86): Πρώτον μὲν οὖν ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σύνθετα
πάντα οὕτω παρ’ ἡμῶν διαιρεῖσθαι, εἴς τε τὴν δεκτικὴν οὐσίαν καὶ εἰς τὴν ἐπισυμβᾶσαν αὐτῇ
ποιότητα.
152 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,3 (91,20–92,1; trans. 86): ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἃ ἡμῖν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἐστὶ
χωριστά, ταῦτα δύναται καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ παρὰ τοῦ ποιητοῦ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν διαστῆναι.
153 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,8 (15,3–12): Τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ περὶ γῆς συμβουλεύωμεν
ἑαυτοῖς, μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν αὐτῆς τὴν οὐσίαν ἥτις ποτέ ἐστι, μηδὲ κατατρίβεσθαι τοῖς λογισμοῖς
Clearly the “nature devoid of qualities” is prime matter, which Basil says can-
not be discovered by the human mind. Twice Basil says that if you strip away
all the qualities from something, you will be left with nothing. Several scholars
have taken this to mean that Basil rejected the concept of prime matter.154 The
question is whether Basil was using the word nothing (οὐδέν) literally. We have
already seen how Origen argued against philosophically-minded Christians
who defended creatio ex nihilo by saying that matter did not really exist.
P. M. O’Cleirigh thinks Basil made this argument his own,155 which is an inter-
esting prospect since it would mean Basil directly contradicted Origen.
And yet, Johannes Zachhuber has observed that there is passage in Contra
Eunomium about substance that parallels this passage in the Hexaemeron and
thus clarifies its meaning.156 In it Basil uses an a fortiori argument: since human
beings cannot even say what the substance of the earth beneath their feet is,
how much less can they say what the substance of God is, who is far above
them!157 To show that Eunomius cannot say what the earth’s substance is,
Basil adverts to the hylomorphic conception of matter. To say what the earth’s
αὐτὸ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἐκζητοῦντας, μηδὲ ζητεῖν τινα φύσιν ἔρημον ποιοτήτων, ἄποιον ὑπάρχουσαν
τῷ ἑαυτῆς λόγῳ, ἀλλ’ εὖ εἰδέναι ὅτι πάντα τὰ περὶ αὐτὴν θεωρούμενα εἰς τὸν τοῦ εἶναι λόγον
συμπληρωτικὰ τῆς οὐσίας ὑπάρχοντα. εἰς οὐδὲν γὰρ καταλήξεις, ἑκάστην τῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν
αὐτῇ ποιοτήτων ὑπεξαιρεῖσθαι τῷ λόγῳ πειρώμενος. ἐὰν γὰρ ἀποστήσῃς τὸ μέλαν, τὸ
ψυχρόν, τὸ βαρύ, τὸ πυκνόν, τὰς κατὰ γεῦσιν ἐνυπαρχούσας αὐτῇ ποιότητας ἢ εἴ τινες ἄλλαι
περὶ αὐτὴν θεωροῦνται, οὐδὲν ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον. English translation of this passage by
Mark DelCogliano and Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, St. Basil of Caesarea: Against Eunomius
(FOTC 122; Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2011), 109, note 82.
154 Armstrong, “Theory of the Non-existence of Matter,” 427–29; John F. Callahan, “Greek
Philosophy and the Cappadocian Cosmology,” Dumbarton Oaks Papers 12 (1958): (29–57)
42. Markos A. Orphanos simply says that Basil’s “conception of matter is rather unclear
and inconsistent” (Creation and Salvation according to St. Basil of Caesarea [Athens: n.p.,
1975], 55). Sorabji takes this passage to mean that “the substratum [i.e., matter] is not a
separately conceivable thing” (Time, Creation, and the Continuum, 292).
155 Padraigh M. O’Cleirigh, “Prime Matter in Origen’s World Picture,” Studia Patristica 16
(1985): (260–63) 263.
156 Johannes Zachhuber, “Stoic Substance, Non-Existent Matter? Some Passages in Basil of
Caesarea Reconsidered,” Studia Patristica 41 (2006): (425–30) 425–26.
157 Basil, Contra Eunomium 1,12–13. As an active participant in the fourth-century debates
about the Trinity, Basil’s views on divine “substance” and the relationship between the
“substance” of the Father and of the Son have been subject to much scholarly debate,
which is beyond the scope of this work. For a very recent entrée into this ongoing con-
versation, see Dragoş Andrei Giulea, “Basil of Caesarea’s Authorship of Epistle 361 and
His Relationship with the Homoiousians Reconsidered,” Vigiliae Christianae 72, no. 1
(2018): 41–70.
110 Chapter 3
substance is, Eunomius would have to rely on his senses,158 but the senses per-
ceive only qualities, such as color and heat; they cannot get to the underlying
matter itself, which lacks all qualities.159 Therefore, earth’s substance is un-
knowable. In an even greater way, God’s substance is unknowable, not only by
human beings but by all created “rational natures” (Origen’s phraseology for an-
gels and demons).160 So, when in the Hexaemeron Basil urged his listeners not
to try to discover the substance of the earth, he surely meant the same thing,
namely that it could not be known, not that it did not exist. As Zachhuber well
puts it, his point was “to reject speculative interest in usia” (ούσία).161 Instead of
“getting dizzy” trying to solve mind-bending philosophical problems like this,
Christians should be content with the simplicity of Scripture.162 Saying that
the underlying matter will be “nothing” is rhetorical, not philosophical.
Another passage in Contra Eunomium reinforces this interpretation:
Whenever we hear ‘Peter,’ the name does not cause us to think of his
substance—now by ‘substance’ I mean the underlying matter, which the
name itself cannot ever signify—but rather the notion of the distinguish-
ing marks that are considered in connection with him is impressed upon
our mind. For as soon as we hear the sound of this designation, we im-
mediately think of the son of Jonah […]. None of these is his substance,
understood as subsistence.163
Here Basil explicitly defines substance (οὐσία) as “the underlying matter.” He

specifically explains that he means by that word to indicate a thing’s “sub-
sistence” (ὑπόστασις).164 The context of this passage is Basil’s argument that
158 Alternately, he says he could rely on a rational account, but Basil easily dismisses such a
possibility, in characteristic fashion, with rhetorical questions (Contra Eunomium 1,12 [SC
299 and 305, 1:216,47–48 Sesboüé/Durand/Doutreleau]): “What sort of rational account
is this? Where is it located in the scriptures? Which of the saints handed it down?”: ποίῳ
τούτῳ [i.e., λόγῳ]; ποῦ τῆς γραφῆς κειμένῳ; ὑπὸ τίνος τῶν ἁγίων παραδοθέντι; English transla-
tion by DelCogliano and Radde-Gallwitz (op. cit.), 110.
159 Basil, Contra Eunomium 1,12.
160 Basil, Contra Eunomium 1,14.
161 Zachhuber, “Stoic Substance, Non-Existent Matter?” 427.
162 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,8 (15,14; my trans.): ἰλιγγιάσει.
163 Basil, Contra Eunomium 2,4 (2:20,9–18; trans. 134–35): ὅταν γοῦν ἀκούσωμεν Πέτρον, οὐ
τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτοῦ νοοῦμεν ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος—οὐσίαν δὲ λέγω νῦν τὸ ὑλικὸν ὑποκείμενον,
ὅπερ οὐδαμῶς σημαίνει τοὔνομα—, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων ἃ περὶ αὐτὸν θεωρεῖται τὴν ἔννοιαν
ἐντυπούμεθα. εὐθὺς γὰρ ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς ταύτης νοοῦμεν τὸν τοῦ Ἰωνα, […] ὧν οὐδέν ἐστιν οὐσία,
ἡ ὡς ὑπόστασις νοουμένη.
164 There is no proper English translation for this word, which is often left as hypostasis.
Even the Latins did not know what to do with it and had to invent the word subsistentia
God’s substance is unknowable. Since Basil used the word substance to refer to
matter, he cannot possibly have believed that it did not exist, since to exist is
what the word substance means.165 The whole point of Basil’s argument is that
God’s substance is unknowable, not that it does not exist! Granted, there is an
ontological chasm separating God’s immaterial substance from material sub-
stance (i.e., matter). Nevertheless, Basil clearly saw an analogy here, since the
whole point of his remarks about Peter’s name was to demonstrate that, just as
Peter’s name did not refer to his material substance but to his “distinguishing
marks” (ἰδιώματα), so God’s name did not designate his substance but rather
his attributes. So, Basil must have thought that prime matter really existed.
Because Basil used the word substance (οὐσία) to mean matter, it has been
argued that he espoused a specifically Stoic conception of matter.166 Indeed, he
sometimes used Stoic definitions in his sermons.167 However, David Robertson
cautions against using strict philosophical categories to describe Basil, as “a
sharp distinction between Aristotelian and Stoic logic […] by the fourth cen-
tury had partly broken down.”168 He concludes that “Basil is somewhere in
between Stoic and Aristotelian doctrines of substance, while his mind is also
guided on these matters by his theological predecessors and contemporaries.”169
Indeed, there is no reason to align Basil, who was not a philosopher, with a
particular school of philosophy. He was uninterested in abstruse philosophical
questions, as his remarks about not dizzying oneself with speculations about
substances, whether of God or of earth, indicate. He drew upon contemporane-
ous manuals of philosophy in composing these homilies, manuals that would
have included various philosophers and ideas.170 So, while we cannot say that
(whence the English subsistence) to translate it. The word substantia was already used to
translate οὐσία, and the words could no longer be used synonymously once the Trinity
came to be defined as one οὐσία in three ὑπόστασεις.
165 Cf. Zachhuber, “Stoic Substance, Non-Existent Matter?” 427.
166 R. M. Hübner, “Gregor von Nyssa als Verfasser der sog. ep. 38 des Basilius,” in Epektasis:
Mélanges patristique offerts au Cardinal Jean Daniélou (ed. Jacques Fontaine and Charles
Kannengiesser; Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 463–90.
167 For example, Basil, Homilia in principium Proverbiorum 3, 6, and 8.
168 David G. Robertson, “Stoic and Aristotelian Notions of Substance in Basil of Caesarea,”
Vigiliae Christianae 52, no. 4 (1998): (393–417) 416, note 88.
169 Robertson, “Notions of Substance in Basil,” 417.
170 Amand de Mendieta’s opinions seem sound: “Je suppose qu’en préparant ces homélies
l’évêque de Césarée a emprunté cette documentation [philosophique et meme scienti-
fique …] à un manuel philosophique […]. Ce recueil dont je postule l’existence, dans le
cas précis de Basile, devait être à la fois méthodique et doxographique, assez détaillé et
éclectique (Platon et Aristote n’y étaitent nullement négligées; bien au contraire!), mais
néanmoins de tendance nettement stoïcienne. Ce manuel philosophique devait conte-
nir beaucoup de données scientifiques; il devait être inspiré par un stoïcisme largement
112 Chapter 3
Basil espoused a specifically Stoic notion of matter, we can say on the basis of
his words that he, like Origen, accepted the generally-held hylomorphic view.
5 Interpretation and Analysis
To sum up, from the moment that early Christian thinkers began to engage
with questions of cosmology and physics, they encountered a difficulty with
the concept of prime matter. Although some, like Hermogenes, were content
to accept the standard, secular account that matter was the uncreated “stuff”
from which the universe was constituted, thinkers like Theophilus of Antioch
insisted that God first made the matter from which he formed the universe.
Earlier authors, like Philo and Justin, were somewhat unclear on the matter!
The expression “unformed earth” in Gen 1:2 was a handy point of contact be-
tween the scriptural account and the philosophical concept. It referred to
prime matter, which by definition was “unformed.”
Some educated Christians were wary of this approach since it was a philo-
sophical axiom that nothing could come from nothing. Therefore, they dis-
carded the concept of hylomorphism entirely and argued that only forms
really exist (which God made). Origen found this solution unacceptable be-
cause he thought hylomorphism too useful to give up. Basil can be interpreted
as having taking this route, too, if his words “the substrate will be nothing” are
taken literally.171 However, as I showed in this chapter, a literal interpretation
does not fit with what Basil says about substance (i.e., matter) elsewhere in the
Hexaemeron or in Contra Eunomium.
Instead of rejecting hylomorphism entirely, Origen argued that God made
matter from nothing. Otherwise, he said, God must not be powerful, since
he would be dependent upon pre-existing material to make the universe he
wanted. And in any case, if it is possible for matter just to exist, why not just
give up the idea of a Creator entirely and say that the forms just exist as well?
Furthermore, Origen argues, if matter always existed, God sure was lucky to
find just the matter he needed and in just the right amount to make the uni-
verse he had in mind. Or should we believe that prime matter was provided to
God by an even higher providence? Of course not! God is powerful: so powerful
that he was able to make something out of nothing.
ouvert et sympathique à d’autres formes de pensée” (“Préparation des ‘Homélies sur

l’Hexaéméron’,” 365).
171 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,8 (quoted above).
It is not clear whether Origen agreed with those before him who thought
that Gen 1:2 referred to prime matter. Basil, though, is clear that he did not
accept that interpretation. Consistent with his literal hermeneutic, Basil says
that the “unformed earth” only meant that when God first made the earth, he
made it in an incomplete state. The completion came later when God made
the plants and animals! The reason the earth was invisible was not because
it had no qualities, but because God there was no one yet to see it and, in any
case, it was covered in deep, dark water!
As for the eternity of matter, Basil recycled Origen’s arguments that he prob-
ably read from Eusebius’s extract. Where they differed was in the rhetorical
form those same arguments took. Origen, writing for an educated audience in
a biblical commentary (and in On First Principles, a systematic treatise), argued
with the philosophical Christians in a philosophical way, trying to prove that
their viewpoint was impious because it limited God’s power and providence.
He engaged the discussion about hylomorphism on its own terms, even if his
main purpose was to show where the fault lay in the conception of uncreated
matter. For this reason, it was important that he not reject the entire theory
without due cause, which, again, would have devalued philosophy. He rejected
that approach, not because it failed to defend Christian belief, but because it
did away with a useful theory. As Origen saw it, the reason the philosophers,
smart as they were, happened upon a mistaken idea (in the midst of a correct
theory) was because they were ignorant of the power of God, who can make
something from nothing. Here philosophy had to learn something profound
from its mistress (Christianity), and accordingly modify a long and widely-
held idea.
Basil redeployed Origen’s arguments in summary fashion with rhetorical
aplomb. His goal was to amuse his audience and discredit the heretics, rather
than to prove or disprove philosophical theses as such. For this reason, he fo-
cused most of his energy on explaining where the error came from, rather than
why exactly it is wrong. The problem was that the philosophers based their
ideas on a bad analogy between human craftsmen and the divine Craftsman.
Human beings need to make their artifacts from pre-existent materials, but
God is far beyond that limitation. God makes whatever he needs. If it were oth-
erwise, God may have had to settle for some poor universe instead of the “very
good” one that Genesis says this one is.
The similarities between Origen’s and Basil’s arguments are more significant
than their rhetorical differences. Both had the same goal: to defend the doc-
trine of creatio ex nihilo against those (like Hermogenes) who used Gen 1:2a
to support a philosophical understanding of matter as uncreated. Both took
114 Chapter 3
for granted a hylomorphic view of matter, and both claimed (Basil drawing
directly upon Origen here) that such people had been misled by a false anal-
ogy. Their arguments illustrate their shared viewpoint, namely that philoso-
phy (along with other elements of secular learning) should be appropriated by
Christian thinkers into the defense and elaboration of Christian teaching. I ad-
vert again to Origen’s metaphor, taken over from Philo, of secular learning, and
philosophy in particular, as a servant. Neither Origen nor Basil was afraid to use
hylomorphism to aid in theological talk about the cosmos. For Basil, in fact, the
philosophical concept of quality-less and therefore unknowable matter helped
him to argue against Eunomius that God’s substance was unknowable. If we
cannot even imagine what matter as such is, stripped of all the forms it takes,
how much less can we imagine what God’s substance is!
Both theologians upheld the Christian doctrine, handed down to them, that
the universe was created, not from uncreated matter, but from nothing at all.
Although the idea of uncreated matter made good sense within the context
of hylomorphism—since the whole point of thinking in terms of form and
matter is to explain how things come into being—it could not be accepted
by orthodox Christians. Those Christians, like Hermogenes, who did accept
it were considered heretics by the Fathers. On this point, philosophy had to
submit to the truth revealed in Scripture. Origen and Basil were like surgeons,
excising the one unacceptable part of hylomorphic theory and leaving the rest
untouched. To discard the entire theory would have been to disrespect phi-
losophy’s role as servant. When a servant brings her mistress an apple, she does
not cast it on the ground, though she may have to slice off a bad part.
Basil’s rejection of the hypothesis of uncreated matter came, not from a phi-
losopher trying to advance the discussion, who could, theoretically, conclude
that the theory itself was unsound, but from a bishop who had to refute a het-
erodox reading of Gen 1:2a. I agree with the opinion offered by Doru Costache,
who emphasizes the pastoral nature of Basil’s interactions with science: “In
his approach to science St. Basil was concerned neither with remediating the
inconsistencies of the various pagan worldviews nor with producing a suppos-
edly more reliable scientific cosmography.”172 His adjustment to ancient phys-
ics was not philosophically motivated, nor can it be considered a contribution;
it was an act of apologetics. He sought neither to reject hylomorphism nor to
break new ground. If anything, he displayed a lack of interest in such ques-
tions, which to him were a waste of time that would just make your head hurt:
172 Doru Costache, “Christian Worldview: Understandings from St. Basil the Great,” Phronema
25 (2010): (21–56) 26.
Therefore, I urge you to abandon these questions and not to inquire upon
what foundation it [i.e., the earth] stands. […] Set a limit, then, to your
thoughts, lest the words of Job [38:6] should ever censure your curiosity
as you scrutinize things incomprehensible.173
Remarks like these led Amand de Mendieta to upbraid Basil as anti-scientific.174

There may be some truth to that criticism; after all, Basil was a bishop, not
a scientist. However, I do not think it is fair or accurate to label Basil anti-
scientific as such. The rhetorical context for his seemingly anti-philosophical
remarks must be taken into account. Basil did not give an absolute judgment
upon natural philosophy (science). Rather, he discouraged his congregation
from becoming bothered about a particular physical question (what the sub-
stance of the earth was), which they would never be able to answer and which
would not bring them closer to God. But even in this very homily, immediately
after saying that they would become dizzy thinking about the question if they
tried, Basil went on to discuss differing philosophical opinions about that very
question!175 Furthermore, his comment that a detailed inquiry into the prob-
lem would take too long and not leave time left for other topics, implies that he
thought such an inquiry would be worthwhile in another context.176 So in fact
he cannot have thought that science was wicked and worthless. Like all sharp
rhetoric, his critical words must not be taken too literally.
Moreover, in seeing Basil as anti-science, there is a danger of anachronism.
Basil’s dismissive remarks were directed against a sectarian natural philosophy
173 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,8–9 (15,13–14 and 16,14–15): Ταῦτά τε οὖν καταλιπόντα σε,
μηδὲ ἐκεῖνο ζητεῖν παραινῶ, ἐπὶ τίνος [ἡ γῆ] ἕστηκεν. […] Διὰ τοῦτο ὅρους ἐπίθες τῇ διανοίᾳ,
μήποτέ σου τῆς πολυπραγμοσύνης ὁ τοῦ Ἰὼβ λόγος καθάψηται περισκοποῦντος τὰ ἀκατάληπτα.
174 Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta, “The Official Attitude of Basil of Caesarea as a Christian
Bishop towards Greek Philosophy and Science,” in Orthodox Churches and the West (ed.
Derek Baker; Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1976), (25–49) 40–44. He labels this text “The
frivolous and useless curiosity of the Greek philosophers about the essence of heaven and
earth.” In regard to Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,8, he says: “Basil renewed for his hearers, in
a childish and even insulting manner, the traditional Christian attack against the errors
or the lies of the philosophers who contradict each other. […] It must be said that some-
times the Cappadocian bishop did not shrink from intolerable rhetorical exaggeration.
[…] We may regret that Basil […] publicly pronounced such unjust and offensive words
against the Greek philosophers. In this passage, his irony is very heavy and unpleasant”
(32). Špelda uses the same passage from Basil to reach the same basic conclusion, albeit
without the scorn of Mendieta (“Church Fathers for Early Modern Astronomy,” 31–32).
116 Chapter 3
that lacked the empirical means to adjudicate disputes about concepts like
prime matter. Basil says:
The wise men of the Greeks wrote many works about nature, but not
one account among them remained unaltered and firmly established, for
the later account always overthrew the preceding one. As a consequence,
there is no need for us to refute their words; they avail mutually for their
own undoing.177
This complaint about the inconclusive, sectarian nature of philosophy he

borrowed from philosophers themselves, and it was a commonplace among
the Fathers.178 Though it may sound anti-scientific, if modern scientists were
asked to weigh in on ancient debates about theories of matter, they, too, would
probably find them of little use! Christopher Kaiser, who holds doctorates in
both astrophysics and theology, has compared ancient Christian “agnosticism”
about ancient science, “hopelessly divided into opposing schools,” to modern
scientific agnosticism about theology!179 Such agnosticism, he says, “was quite
in keeping with general trends in the science of late antiquity. […] Some histo-
rians have regarded this pragmatic tendency to be harmful. Others, however,
have seen it as necessary, at least for that particular period.”180 For Basil, the
disunity and uncertainty of philosophical ideas stood in sharp contrast to the
unity and certainty of the Christian faith proclaimed in the Bible. A related
complaint against natural philosophy was that it was not practically useful.181
As Basil says: “A concern about these things [i.e., substance] is not at all useful
for the edification of the Church.”182 The two complaints were connected, for
177 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,2 (3,17–4,3; trans. 5): πολλὰ περὶ φύσεως ἐπραγματεύσαντο
οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφοί, καὶ οὐδὲ εἷς παρ’ αὐτοῖς λόγος ἕστηκεν ἀκίνητος καὶ ἀσάλευτος, ἀεὶ
τοῦ δευτέρου τὸν πρὸ αὐτοῦ καταβάλλοντος· ὥστε ἡμῖν μηδὲν ἔργον εἶναι τὰ ἐκείνων ἐλέγχειν·
ἀκροῦσι γὰρ ἀλλήλοις πρὸς τὴν οἰκείαν ἀνατροπήν. Cf. ibid. 1,11; 3,8.
178 Amand de Mendieta labels these three texts “The traditional argument of the early
Christian theologians against Greek philosophy” (“Attitude of Basil towards Philosophy,”
29–32). See also Christopher B. Kaiser, Creational Theology and the History of Physical
Science: The Creationist Tradition from Basil to Bohr (Studies in the History of Christian
Thought 78; Leiden: Brill, 1997), 15–17; idem, “The Early Christian Critique of Greek
Science,” Patristic and Byzantine Review 1 (1982), (211–16) 211–12.
179 Kaiser, “Christian Critique of Science,” 211–12.
180 Kasier, Creational Theology and Physical Science, 22.
181 Cf. Kaiser, “Christian Critique of Science,” 212.
182 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,8 (14,17–18; trans. 14): πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ προὔργου τι εἶναι εἰς τὴν
τῆς ἐκκλησίας οἰκοδομὴν τὸ περὶ ταῦτα κατασχολεῖσθαι.
inquiry on such questions about nature might be useful if they could be con-
clusively answered, but they could not. Therefore, in place of vain speculation
(for example, about what holds the earth up), Christians should rest content in
the non-philosophical, but certain answers provided by the Bible (such as that
“In his hand are the ends of the earth” [Ps 94:4a]).183

Chapter 4
“A separator between water and water”:

Cosmology and Water above the Sky
From ancient times until the present, Gen 1:6–7 has posed a problem for edu-
cated people. It reads (in the LXX version):
And God said: “Let a firmament come into being in the midst of the water,
and let it be a separator between water and water.” And it became so. And
God made the firmament, and God separated between the water that was
under the firmament and the water that was above the firmament.
Taken literally, these words say that there is a body of water above the sky that
is the complement of the body of water God names the sea (v. 10). The stan-
dard, ancient-scientific cosmology was incompatible with this. The scientific
view was that each of the four elements (earth, fire, air, and water) had a natu-
ral position in the cosmos. As such, they automatically settled into four con-
centric spheres, which taken together constitute the cosmos. At the bottom,
being the heaviest, was the earth. Above the earth was the sphere of water, fol-
lowed by the sphere of air, and finally the sphere of fire, which Basil and many
others believed was heaven. The statement in Genesis that there was a body of
water above heaven thus seemed like nonsense.
This problem affected Origen’s interpretation of the opening verses of
Genesis 1. He closely followed Philo. According to Philo, there were two cre-
ations: first a spiritual, eternal creation, then a physical, temporal creation.1
The first five verses of Genesis referred to this spiritual creation: the “heaven”
of verse 1 was the spiritual, incorporeal realm where God and the angels lived.
The “earth” of verse 2 was the spiritual archetype of the physical earth God
later makes in vv. 9–10. The water above the sky represented angels and heaven
itself, while the water below represented the demons and their infernal abode.
Since Origen’s system, unlike Philo’s, also had a second allegorical reading, he
added a psychic interpretation of these “waters”: the super-heavenly water
represented Christians’ contemplation of super-heavenly realities, while the
1 See Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy, 54–57. Philo also proposed that all of Genesis 1
may be spiritual and that the physical creation is only narrated in the second creation ac-
count of Genesis 2 (ibid., 57–58).

COSMOLOGY AND WATER ABOVE THE SKY 119
water below represented demonic temptations. The “day one” of v. 5 referred

to eternity. The physical earth and sky—the cosmos—were only created in v. 6.
These were patterned after the spiritual heaven and earth. Because the physi-
cal sky was the boundary (ὅρος) between the worlds, it was given the same
name of “heaven” (οὐρανός). Physical water did not enter into the creation until
v. 9. For Origen, this was one of those passages that had no bodily meaning: the
literal sense was to be rejected.
Basil rejected this whole Philonic-Origenian idea of a twofold creation. As
I discussed in chapter 2, he believed Genesis 1 should be interpreted literally.
Therefore, he did not interpret the opening verses of Genesis as referring to
spiritual beings. Instead, he distinguished the heaven of v. 1 from the “firma-
ment” of vv. 6–7. The original heaven is the actual, physical sky. The second
“heaven” is the so-called firmament, which was given that name only because
it was firm compared to the first heaven. Rejecting the etymology that derived
“heaven” from “boundary,” he says instead that it came from see (ὁράω). This
“heaven” is essentially the clouds! The water above it is not liquid water, but
“aerial water.” The reason it is up above this “heaven” is that it acts as a kind
of global cooling system, to keep the heat of the sun in check until it finally
runs out and the universe is destroyed by fire, in accord with biblical prophecy.
This was Basil’s ingenious solution to the physical problem presented by Gen
1:6–7. It allowed him to somewhat integrate the scientific and scriptural sys-
tems without compromising either (though it’s debatable how convincing any
ancient, secular thinker would have found his idea).
Basil knew Origen’s spiritual interpretation of the waters and denounced it
as being on par with “old wives’ tales.”2 He preferred his literal interpretation:
“Let us consider water as water”3—aerial water, at any rate! Even though Basil
criticized Origen here, he left out his name. I believe this omission was a sign
of respect for his master. In any case, he distinguished Origen’s allegorical in-
terpretations, which he personally rejected, from heretical interpretations. His
opposition to Origen on the interpretation of Genesis 1 was a hermeneutical
dispute within the Church. Basil did not consider Origen to be a heretic.
This hermeneutical conflict between literal and allegorical readings of
the waters at first blush appears to unmask Basil as a kind of fundamental-
ist. Likewise, Origen may seem to subordinate Scripture to secular learning.
Against such an oversimplification, however, I will argue that even here Basil,
like Origen, held science to be a useful servant. What this conflict shows is the
different nuance each theologian gave to that model. Basil, on the one hand,
2 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,9 (54,9–10; my trans.): γραώδεις μύθους.

3 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,9 (54,10; trans. 52): τὸ ὕδωρ ὕδωρ νοήσωμεν.
120 Chapter 4
put the emphasize on the subordination of philosophy to Scripture, and thus

did not allow it to overturn the cosmology found in Genesis. Origen, on the
other hand, placed the accent on the usefulness of philosophy, and thus took
into account the knowledge gained from it when interpreting Scripture. This
also underscores the difference in how they viewed Genesis 1, which was the
greatest theological difference between them. Basil insisted upon taking it lit-
erally against alternative cosmologies, whereas for Origen it was a quintessen-
tial example of biblical allegory. Although he was not a fundamentalist, Basil’s
approach was more conservative than Origen’s. This is unsurprising, since Basil
was a bishop embroiled in the doctrinal controversies of the fourth century,
whereas Origen was a speculative, philosophical theologian who lived before
those controversies had narrowed the bounds of orthodoxy.
1 Origen
Since his Genesis commentary has been lost, our primary source for Origen’s
approach to Genesis 1 is his first homily on Genesis, which has survived in
Rufinus’s Latin translation.4 In it, he distinguishes between heaven (caelum,
οὐρανός), which God made before the first day (v. 1), and the firmament (firma-
mentum, στερέωμα) that he made on the third day (vv. 6–7).5 God named this
“heaven” as well (v. 8). Origen defines the first heaven as “all spiritual substance
upon which God rests as on a throne or seat.”6 This spiritual creation God made
before time, the word beginning (ἀρχή) referring not to a temporal beginning
but to the Logos (conventionally translated “Word”) of God (cf. John 1:1).7 God
made heaven in the Logos.8 Origen defines the firmament as “the corporeal
heaven.”9 This is the thing modern English-speakers normally call the “sky.”10
4 For an analysis of this homily that accords with what I will argue here, see Boles, “Function
of History in Origen’s Genesis Homily,” 94–100.
5 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,1. On this and what follows, see also Martens, “Origen’s
Doctrine of Pre-Existence,” 525–28.
6 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (3,7–8; trans. 49): omnis spiritalis substantia, super quam
uelut in throno quodam et sede deus requiescit.
7 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,1. On the tradition of interpreting “beginning” both tempo-
rally and non-temporally, see Blowers, Drama of the Divine Economy, 140–45.
8 See Martens, “Origen’s Doctrine of Pre-Existence,” 523–25.
9 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (3,2; trans. 49): corporale caelum.
10 Whereas Greek and Latin have only one word each, English has two: heaven and sky. The
former usually refers to “the abode of God and of the angels and persons who enjoy God’s
presence” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2nd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989],
s.v. “heaven”), and the latter to “the apparent arch of or vault of heaven” (ibid., s.v. “sky”).
Although they have the same name (“heaven”), heaven is spiritual and the sky
physical. Heaven is above the sky, as is shown by the fact that Origen inter-
prets the “water” above it spiritually, as I shall discuss shortly. Origen mentions
that the firmament was created after heaven and given its name because it di-
vides the waters above from the waters below.11 In other words, it is the bound-
ary between the physical and spiritual worlds. The Greek word for boundary
is ὅρος, which sounds like οὐρανός, meaning heaven or sky, though Origen does
not mention this.
This distinction between a spiritual creation made prior to the physical
cosmos was found also in Philo, who, as we have seen, exercised a major in-
fluence upon Origen. Philo also states that the “beginning” of Gen 1:1 is not a
temporal beginning, since “time is the extension of the cosmos’ movement,”
and therefore could not exist before the physical cosmos.12 Rather, God, be-
fore the physical world and time, “in the divine Logos,”13 made seven spiritual
realities: first “an incorporeal heaven and an invisible earth and a form of air
and of the void,”14 then “the incorporeal substance of water and of spirit, and
as seventh and last of all of light, which once again was incorporeal and was
also the intelligible model of the sun and of all other light-bearing stars.”15 The
language and thought here are unquestionably Platonic: Philo even uses the
word ἰδέα (Plato’s ideal form).16 The incorporeal forms were made first, and
then the physical universe was made after their pattern, just as an architect
(here the Logos of God) draws up plans for a city at the order of a king.17 This
incorporeal creation was virtually identified with the Logos of God.18 The first
physical creation was the sky, which was also called “firmament” in contradis-
tinction to “its intelligible and incorporeal counterpart.”19 Then God named it
This theological distinction has been incorporated into our very language, although the
two words are still somewhat interchangeable.
12 Philo, De opificio mundi 26 (8,8; trans. 52): διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεώς ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος.
On Philo’s interpretation of Gen 1:1–5 in this text, see Samuel D. Giere, A New Glimpse of
Day One: Intertextuality, History of Interpretation, and Genesis 1.1–5 (BZNW 172; Berlin: De
Gruyter, 2009), 217–20.
13 Philo, De opificio mundi 36 (11,5–6; trans. 54): ἐν τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ.
14 Philo, De opificio mundi 29 (9,4–5; trans. 53): οὐρανὸν ἀσώματον καὶ γῆν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀέρος
ἰδέαν καὶ κενοῦ.
15 Philo, De opificio mundi 29 (9,7–9; trans. 53): ὕδατος ἀσώματον οὐσίαν καὶ πνεύματος καὶ
ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἑβδόμου φωτός, ὃ πάλιν ἀσώματον ἦν καὶ νοητὸν ήλίου παράδειγμα καὶ πάντων ὅσα
φωσφόρα ἄστρα.
16 See Runia, Creation of the Cosmos, 164.
19 Philo, De opificio mundi 36 (11,11; trans. 54): ἀντιθεὶς τῷ νοητῷ καὶ ἀσωμάτῳ.
122 Chapter 4
“heaven” “either because it is the boundary of all things, or because it came into
existence as first of the visible things.”20 This etymology likens οὐρανός either to
ὅρος or to ὁράω (to see). Furthermore, Philo says that both the sky and heaven
are very pure and beautiful.21 Heaven is “composed of the purest substance,”22
and the sky is analogously “made of the purest part of bodily substance,”23
while its stars are “divine images of exceeding beauty.”24 This is how Philo in-
terpreted the making of the heaven and the sky and their common name.
Philo’s Platonic reading of the beginning of Genesis 1 is paralleled in a small
way by Theophilus of Antioch. Like Philo, Theophilus identifies the “beginning”
of Gen 1:1 with the Logos of God, adding an allusion to John 1:3: “through him
he made all things.”25 He says of v. 1: “the holy Scripture spoke not about this
firmament but another heaven which is invisible to us.”26 However, there is no
Platonic or Philonic content here, no ideal forms or spiritual patterns, nor even
any explanation for why the firmament was called heaven. In fact, Theophilus
took Genesis 1 literally,27 including when it says that there is water above the
sky: it is the source “for rains and showers and dews.”28 Since an explanation
for the creation of two heavens is required by the text of Genesis itself,29 we
need not suppose that he drew upon Philo, whose spiritual, Platonizing inter-
pretation of the opening verses of Genesis 1 stood in stark contrast to his own.
Clement did take up Philo’s exegesis, clearly distinguishing between the in-
telligible world (κόσμος νοητός) that serves as the archetype (ἀρχέτυπον) and
model (παραδείγμα) of the sensible world (κόσμος αἰσθητός), which is its image
(εἰκών).30 The Platonic vocabulary is identical with Philo’s. Clement specifical-
ly says that the heaven, invisible earth, and light of vv. 1–3 are intelligible, not
20 Philo, De opificio mundi 37 (11,13–14; trans. 54): ἤτοι διότι πάντων ὅρος ἢ διότι πρῶτος τῶν
ὁρατῶν ἐγένετο.
21 So similar are the descriptions that Runia cautions the reader against confusing them
(Creation of the Cosmos, 159).
22 Philo, De opificio mundi 27 (8,15–16; trans. 52): τοῦ καθρωτάτου τῆς οὐσίας παγέντα.
23 Philo, De opificio mundi 55 (18,13–14; trans. 60): καθαρωτάτῳ τῆς σωματικῆς οὐσίας.
24 Philo, De opificio mundi 55 (18,12–13; trans. 60): ἀγάλματα θεῖα καὶ περικαλλέστατα. I will
discuss the stars in the next chapter.
25 Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 2,10 (38,31): δι’ αὐτοῦ τὰ πάντα πεποίηκεν.
26 Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 2,13 (48,20–21): εἴρηκεν ή ἁγία γραφὴ οὐ περὶ τούτου
τοῦ στερεώματος ἀλλὰ περὶ ἑτέρου ούρανοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου ἡμῖν ὄντος.
27 Cf. Grant: “The creation story in Genesis is literally true except in so far as it ascribes to
God what must be meant in regard to God’s Logos” (Ad Autolycum, xiv).
28 Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 2,13 (48,23–24): εἰς ὑετοὺς καὶ ὄμβρους καὶ δρόσους.
29 The creation of two earths was explained by interpreting the first one as prime matter, as
we saw last chapter.
30 Clement, Stromateis 5,93,4 (387,21–23): Κόσμον τε αὖθις τὸν μὲν νοητὸν οἶδεν ἡ βάρβαρος
φιλοσοφία, τὸν δὲ αἰσθητόν, τὸν μὲν ἀρχέτυπον, τὸν δὲ εἰκόνα τοῦ καλουμένου παραδείγματος.
physical.31 His adoption of Philo’s interpretation of the invisible earth (which

he sneakily quotes here without the word unformed) rests somewhat awkward-
ly with his earlier use of the same verse (quoted with the word unformed) to
talk about prime matter.32 He states that Genesis 1 is where Plato got his theory
of the ideal forms from, just as the philosophers got all their best ideas from
the Old Testament.33
Were Philo and Clement, then, the source of Origen’s interpretation, or was
he rather taking Theophilus’s approach? How one answers this question is en-
tangled with how “Platonist” one thinks Origen was, a question beyond the
scope of this work. Suffice it to say, he has often been, and sometimes still is,
regarded as thoroughly Platonist. The first person to express this judgment was
Porphyry, who said of Origen: “In his life he behaved like a Christian, defying
the law: in his metaphysical and theological ideas he played the Greek, giving a
Greek twist to foreign tales.”34 He adds: “He associated himself at all times with
Plato,” mentioning the names of many other philosophers he read as well.35
This judgment has been contested by some recent scholars.36 Although Origen
obviously did not believe everything Plato believed, nor can his theology be re-
duced to Platonism, he nevertheless held a positive view of him.37 Pointing out
how Plato’s lofty eloquence made his doctrine inaccessible to nearly everyone
(unlike the plain speech of the Bible), Origen adds this qualification: “We do
31 Clement, Stromateis 5,93,5.

32 Clement, Stromateis 5,90,1 (quoted in the previous chapter).
33 Clement, Stromateis 5,94,2.
34 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,19,7 (560,8–11; trans. 196): κατὰ μὲν τὸν βίον Χριστιανῶς
ζῶν καὶ παρανόμως, κατὰ δὲ τὰς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ θείου δόξας ἑλληνίζων τε καὶ τὰ
Ἑλλήνων τοῖς ὀθνείοις ὑποβαλλόμενος μύθοις.
35 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,19,8 (560,11; trans. 196): συνήν τε γὰρ ἀεὶ τῷ Πλάτωνι.
36 Most notably by Edwards, Origen against Plato.
37 De Lubac makes an incisive distinction between two ways of viewing the relationship
between Origen and Platonism: some scholars focus upon his Platonic sources and thus
call him a Platonist, while others (e.g., de Lubac himself and Crouzel) focus upon the
“new synthesis” he created between Platonism and Scripture and thus call him “above all
a faithful interpreter of the Scriptures” (Theology in History [trans. Anne Englund Nash;
San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996], 35). It is the difference between a diachronic, source-
critical approach to Origen, which for de Lubac was “a historically indispensable pre-
amble,” but a preamble all the same, and a synchronic systematic-theological approach.
Martens’s view—that Origen’s belief-system (specifically the pre-existence of souls) “was
neither ‘Platonic’ nor ‘anti-Platonic,’ but rather a ‘Christianized Platonism’”—seems simi-
lar (“Descent of the Soul in Plato and Origen,” 618–19). I follow de Lubac and can scarcely
see how the alternative is defensible without either lapsing into reductionistic historical
rationalism or simply dismissing Origen as a hack. See also the helpful discussion of the
terms of this debate by Ilaria Ramelli, “Origen and the Platonic Tradition,” Religions 8,
no. 21 (2017): (1–20) 15–18.
124 Chapter 4
not say this in criticism of Plato (for the great world of humankind has derived
help from him also).”38 Origen’s attitude toward Plato’s doctrine of “ideas” (τὰς
ἰδέας) in particular was ambiguous. In On First Principles he rejects it:
We have already said that it is difficult for us to explain this other world;
and for this reason, that if we did so, there would be a risk of giving some
people the impression that we were affirming the existence of certain
imaginary forms which the Greeks call “ideas.” For it is certainly foreign to
our mode of reasoning to speak of an incorporeal world that exists solely
in the mind’s fancy or the unsubstantial region of thought; and how they
could affirm that the Savior came from thence or that the saints will go
thither I do not see.39
That sounds like a disavowal of the concept of “ideas.” However, in the com-
mentary on John he seems to accept it, saying that philosophers saw “the ‘in-
visible things of God’ and the ideas ‘from the creation of the world’ (Rom 1:20)
and the sensible universe, from which they ascend to the intelligible world,”
even though they fell short of that truth by sacrificing to the gods.40 Here he
integrates the concept of the “ideas” into a quotation of Rom 1:20–21. Indeed,
Origen thinks, like Philo and Clement, that Plato took this doctrine from
the Bible:
38 Origen, Contra Celsum 6,2 (71,21–22; trans. 317): καὶ ταῦτά γε οὐκ ἐγκαλοῦντες Πλάτωνι
φαμεν (ὁ γὰρ πολὺς τῶν ἀνθρώπων κόσμος χρησίμως καὶ τοῦτον ἤνεγκεν). I have changed
“mankind” to “humankind” for τῶν ἀνθρώπων.
39 Origen, De Principiis 2,3,6 (121,26–22,6; trans. 90): cuius mundi difficilem nobis esse expo-
sitionem idcirco praediximus, ne forte aliquibus praebeatur occasio illius intelligentiae,
qua putent nos imagines quasdam, quas Graeci ἰδέας nominant, adfirmare: quod utique
a nostris rationibus alienum est, mundum incorporeum dicere, in sola mentis fantasia
uel cogitationum lubrico consistentem; et quomodo uel saluatorem inde esse uel sanctos
quosque illuc ituros poterunt adfirmare, non uideo. I have changed “some men” to “some
people” for aliquibus and “men could” to “they could” for poterunt.
40 Origen, Contra Celsum 6,4 (73,21–23; trans. 318): καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὰς ἰδέας
φαντασθέντες ἀπὸ τοῦ κτίσεως τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἀφ’ ὧν ἀναβαίνουσιν ἐπὶ τὰ
νοούμενα.
In my opinion, Panayiotis Tzamalikos misreads the evidence when he claims that
Origen referred to the doctrine of ideas “with some derision” (Origen: Cosmology and
Ontology of Time [VCS 77; Leiden: Brill, 2006], 48, note 51). He cites the two passages in
which Origen mentions how Aristotelians call the doctrine “twitterings,” but the context
of those statements clearly shows he was on Plato’s side, not Aristotle’s. In response to
Celsus’s criticism that a real god would not have chosen Judas as a disciple, Origen likens
Plato to Jesus and Aristotle to Judas for deserting him (Contra Celsum 2,12). The way the
Aristotelians think Plato’s doctrine “foolishness” is like how the Gospel is perceived as
“foolishness” by the world (ibid. 1,13).
The very ancient doctrine of Moses and the prophets is aware that the
true things all have the same name as the earthly things which are more
generally given these names. For example, there is a “true light,” and a
“heaven” which is different from the firmament, and “the sun of righ-
teousness” is different from the sun perceived by the senses.41
This fits with how he describes the creation of the physical world as a “throw-
ing down” (καταβολή, John 17:24), that is, a fall from a prior incorporeal world.42
In his commentary on John, Origen speaks about “thoughts” (νοήματα) or “rea-
sons” (λόγοι) that existed in the Logos of God prior to the creation of the physi-
cal world.43 The Logos made the universe according to these “thoughts,” just
as an architect builds according to pre-existing plans.44 This, of course, is the
same thing Philo said,45 and, just like Philo, Origen says that the Word of God is
itself these “thoughts” (they do not exist independently).46 Origen’s “thoughts”
seem to be his version of the “ideas,” reinterpreted in the light of Scripture.47
I think Origen considered his theory of “thoughts” to be better than Plato’s
theory of “ideas” in the same way he says that his own interpretation of the fall
of the human race from spiritual to bodily life was better than Plato’s myth of
the soul’s descent.48 The problem with Plato’s understanding, as he says, is that
it is “unsubstantial” and thus cannot be the spiritual heaven the Bible reveals.
While Origen’s understanding is not strictly Platonist, it does follow certain
mental contours that, to later interpreters at least, still registered as “Platonist”
in the broad sense of describing a spiritual world that served as the pattern
of the physical world. All this evidence shows that Origen did read Genesis 1
against the Philonic-Platonic background (and not literally, as Theophilus did).
The fact that Origen in this sermon did not enumerate any spiritual realities
41 Origen, Contra Celsum 7,31 (182,9–13; trans. 419): οἶδε δὲ ὁ ἀρχαιότατος Μωϋσέως καὶ τῶν
προφητῶν λόγος τὰ ἀληθινὰ πάντα ὁμώνυμα τοῖς τῇδε καθολικωτέροις, οἷον ἀληθινὸν φῶς καὶ
οὐρανὸν ἕτερον παρὰ τὸ στερέωμα καὶ τὸν τῆς δικαιοσύνης ἥλιον ἄλλον παρὰ τὸν αἰσθητόν.
43 Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 1,19 (113–14) (23,32–24,7).
44 Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 1,19 (114) (24,3–7).
45 Philo, De opificio mundi 29 (quoted above).
46 Origen, Commentarius in Iohannem 1,19; Philo, De opificio mundi 24.
47 Tzamalikos strenuously resists equating Origen’s λόγοι with Plato’s “ideas” (Origen:
Cosmology and Ontology, 40–64). If his point is that Origen did not merely baptize Plato’s
doctrine with a few biblical synonyms, then I agree, for Origen did not mean the exact
same thing Plato did. However, if he means that the two notions are unrelated, then
I disagree.
48 Origen, Contra Celsum 4,40 (which I quoted in chapter 2, note 110).
126 Chapter 4
besides heaven (e.g., light and sun) was probably because a sermon was not
a speculative work, and, in any case, he still had a lot more text to preach on.
After explaining the literal sense, Origen moved to a psychic interpretation
of the creation of the two heavens. He preaches:
That first heaven indeed, which we said is spiritual, is our mind, which
is also itself spirit, that is, our spiritual person which sees and perceives
God. But that corporeal heaven, which is called the firmament, is our
outer person which looks at things in a corporeal way.49
The use of the verb is (est) should not mislead one into thinking he was further
defining his terms. Rather, he was moving to the next level of meaning. These
statements, if taken as literal definitions, would be incompatible with the previ-
ous ones: at the bodily level, heaven is “all spiritual substance” (not the human
mind), and the sky is a firm body that separates between the waters (not the
human body). Having briefly explained the bodily sense of the text, Origen has
begun to do the psychic sense: heaven represents our spirit, while the firma-
ment represents our body.50 His audience must have become accustomed to
abrupt, unannounced transitions in interpretation! Sometimes he did make it
clear that he was changing levels, as when he discusses the fructification of the
earth (vv. 10–11): “According to the letter, the fruits are clearly those which ‘the
earth,’ not ‘the dry land’ produces. But again let us also relate the meaning to
ourselves.”51 Origen’s psychic interpretation of the heavens continues:
Just as the firmament has been named “heaven” on account of the fact
that it divides between the waters above it and those under it, so it is with
49 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (3,9–11; trans. 49): et ideo illud quidem primum coelum,
quod spiritale diximus, mens nostra est, quae et ipsa spiritus est, id est spiritalis homo
noster qui uidet ac perspicit Deum. istud autem corporale coelum, quod firmamentum
dicitur, exterior homo noster est qui corporaliter intuetur. I have changed “man” to “per-
son” for homo.
50 Thus, Gerald Bostock translates est as “represents” in his article, “Origen’s Philosophy of
Creation,” in Origeniana Quinta (Papers of the 5th International Origen Congress—Boston
College, 14–18 August 1989) (ed. Robert J. Daly; Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992),
(253–69) 253.
51 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,3 (5,26–28; trans. 52): Secundum litteram manifesti sunt
fructus quos terra non arida producit. sed iterum referamus et ad nos. Cf. ibid. 1,11 (12,24–
13,2; trans. 60): “There is certainly no question about the literal meaning. […] But it is not
unprofitable to relate these words to those which we explained above in a spiritual sense”:
secundum litteram quidem nulla quaestio est. […] aptare autem haec his, quae supra
exposuimus, secundum spiritalem intellectum, non otiosa res est.
humanity, which has been placed in a body. If humanity can divide and
separate the waters—which are the upper waters above the firmament
and which the ones under the firmament—it too will be named “heaven,”
that is, heavenly humanity.52
In other words, the creation and naming of the sky parallels the human being:
it is by dividing waters that each merits the name “heaven” or “heavenly.” He
quotes v. 7, which as I said above he interprets to mean that God called the
firmament “heaven” because it was the dividing boundary between the waters.
Origen’s interest in this sermon is not in the sky but the human being. Human
beings must divide spiritual waters in order to become heavenly. This does not
mean that we become pure minds in heaven again, for we are talking about
the second, physical heaven (the sky). In other words: our spirits were at first
“heaven,” but because of the fall, we became embodied beings: “firmaments.”
Only if we correctly discern the two bodies of water will we, even while re-
maining in our bodies, once again be named “heavenly.” Though still physical,
we can enter into direct contact with the spiritual heaven above, just as the
physical sky is the boundary between the physical and the spiritual worlds.
As far as psychic interpretations go, this is a compelling one. After this, Origen
says nothing more about the sky and heaven.
Now we must ask what these waters are, which the heavenly person di-
vides. For the water above, Origen hints at an answer by combining John 4:14
and 7:38: “They may draw out of their own belly streams of living water leap-
ing into everlasting life.”53 The heavenly person does not simply divide the
super-heavenly water from the water below but understands and partakes
of it.54 Origen explains what he means:
By partaking of that upper water that is said to be above the heavens

every one of the faithful is made heavenly, that is, when they keep their
52 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (3,13–18; my trans.): sicut ergo firmamentum coelum ap-
pellatum est ex eo, quod diuidat inter eas aquas, quae super ipsum, et eas, quae sub ipso
sunt, ita et homo, qui in corpore positus est, si diuidere potuerit et discernere, quae sint
aquae, quae sunt superiores super firmamentum, et quae sint quae sunt sub firmamento,
etiam ipse coelum, id est coelestis homo, appellabitur. He then quotes Phil 3:20.
53 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (3,26–4,1; my trans.): flumina de uentre suo educat aquae
uiuae salientis in uitam aeternam.
128 Chapter 4
attention on high and lofty things, never thinking about the earth but
only about heavenly things.55
He then quotes Col 3:1: “seek the things that are above, where Christ is, seated at
the right hand of God.” To partake of the super-heavenly waters is a metaphor
for thinking about and seeking spiritual things instead of mundane things. It is
clear that this is a psychic interpretation, for it is about how a Christian ought
to conduct oneself.
What is the water below, from which the heavenly person must remain
aloof? It is not the sea gathered and named on the third day (vv. 9–10), as one
might logically but wrongly assume, but the primeval waters of the abyss. This
is explicit: “that water which is below, that is, the water of the abyss in which
darkness is said to be.”56 Origen refers back to the abyss of Gen 1:2b: “Darkness
was over the abyss, and a divine wind [or, Spirit of God] was being carried
along over the water.” What is this abyss? For an answer, he looks intertextu-
ally to the New Testament, which says that an angel “seized the dragon, that
ancient serpent, who is the Devil and Satan […] and threw him into the abyss”
(Rev 20:2–3). The abyss, Origen explains, quoting Rev 12:7, is where “the adver-
sary, ‘the dragon and his angels’ dwell.”57 Earlier in his homily, when he first
commented upon the abyss in Gen 1:2, he brought in Luke 8:31, which says the
demons “begged him not to command them to depart into the abyss.”58 The
waters from which the heavenly person must separate are spiritual waters, not
physical ones. It is okay for a heavenly person to take a swim in the physical
sea, so long as they stay away from the psychic and spiritual ones!
What is the psychic interpretation of these abyssal waters? Twice Origen
explicitly identifies the reference, first as “the sins and vices of our body,”59
and then as “the thoughts of demons.”60 Between human sins and demonic
thoughts there existed a relationship, which he discussed in the third book of
On First Principles. He rejected the opinion held by “the simpler sort of believ-
ers in Christ the Lord,” i.e., the vast majority of uneducated Christians, “that all
55 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (4,4–7; my trans.): illius ergo aquae supernae participio,
quae supra caelos esse dicitur, unusquisque fidelium caelestis efficitur, id est cum sensum
suum habet in arduis et excelsis, nihil de terra sed totum de caelestibus cogitans.
56 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (4,2–3; trans. 50): ea aqua, quae subtus est, id est aqua
abyssi, in qua tenebrae esse dicuntur.
57 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (4,3–4; trans. 50): aduersarius draco et angeli eius habitant.
59 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (4,18–19; trans. 50): peccata et uitia corporis nostri. He
defines vices as “the materials of sins” (ibid. [5,2–3; trans. 51]): materiae peccatorum.
60 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (5,19; trans. 51): daemonum sensus.
the sins that human beings have committed come from the persistent influ-
ence of the contrary powers on the sinners’ minds.”61 On the contrary, he says,
sins came from the overindulgence of our “natural desires” for things like food,
drink, and sex.62 One should keep in mind here that Origen did not believe
that natural things are automatically good, for the physical world itself was the
product of a fall. Nor did he exclude demonic influence entirely, for he adds:
When we indulge these to excess and offer no resistance to the first move-
ments towards intemperance, then the hostile power, seizing the oppor-
tunity of this first offence, incites and urges us on in every way, striving to
extend the sins over a larger field.63
In other words, while human beings did not need any outside influence to be-
have wickedly, demons egged them on, dragging them from bad to worse. They
acted as a kind of coefficient upon human evil. This is an important qualifica-
tion because it means that the heavenly person, who resisted the first tempta-
tions of human nature, would be immune to demonic influence. This, then, is
what the abyssal waters of Gen 1:2 indicate psychically. To succumb to natural,
and then demonic, temptation was the opposite of partaking in the super-
heavenly water, which meant setting aside natural desires to focus on the spiri-
tual. Origen’s interpretation very much calls to mind the ascetical lifestyle he
himself practiced.
His interpretation of these abyssal, sub-heavenly waters is a textbook exam-
ple of how his exegesis frequently worked, namely, by means of intertextuality.
Lim makes the point well: “What Origen does is to draw intertextually on other
parts of scriptures to throw light on the particular line in Genesis.”64 While
they were certainly allegorical, Origen’s spiritual and psychic interpretations
of the water below the sky were neither arbitrary nor fanciful. This, however,
does not mean that his exegesis was always intertextual, or that it never bore
traces of the arbitrariness we moderns usually associate with allegoresis. As
Origen continues to find psychic meanings for the various parts of creation
61 Origen, De principiis 3,2,1 (246,25–28; trans. 213): unde et simpliciores quique domino
Christo credentium existimant quod omnia peccata quaecumque commiserint homines,
ex istis contrariis uirtutibus mentem delinquentium perurgentibus fiant.
62 Origen, De principiis 3,2,2 (247,24; trans. 214): naturalibus desideriis.
63 Origen, De principiis 3,2,2 (247,33–48,2; trans. 214): cum uero indulserimus ultra quam
satis est, et non restiterimus aduersum primos intemperantiae motus, tunc primi huius
delicti accipiens locum uirtus inimica instigat et perurget omni modo studens profusius
dilatare peccata.
130 Chapter 4
(e.g., the dry land, earth, fruits, seed, luminaries, signs, sun, moon, creeping
things, birds, and sea monsters), some of his interpretations may perhaps be
judged arbitrary. Nevertheless, he provides the underlying rationale for why
things created before human beings should have an allegorical significance for
them: “It was being shown allegorically what things would be able to adorn the
microcosm, that is, humanity.”65 There is an analogy, expressed here through
allegory, between what adorns the cosmos (macrocosm) and what adorns the
human being (microcosm).66 The idea that there was an analogy between the
human being and the cosmos goes back to Aristotle: “Now if this [i.e., motion
and rest] can occur in an animal, why should not the same be true also of the
universe as a whole? If it can occur in a small world it could also occur in a
great one.”67 This, incidentally, is another example of Origen using a philo-
sophical concept in his biblical exegesis.
Origen’s allegorical reading of Genesis 1 did not so much tell a story (allego-
ry) as repeat the same moral lesson under different images, like variations on
a theme. For example, as I just explained, he interpreted the waters above and
below as indicating spiritual and demonic thoughts respectively. He makes
this same point again when he preaches about how God ordered the seas to
produce creeping things and birds (v. 20):
If our mind has been enlightened by Christ, our sun, it is ordered after-
wards to bring forth from these waters which are in it “creeping creatures”
and “flying birds,” that is, to bring out into the open good or evil thoughts.68
He says that the human mind, which he again likens to the firmament, brings
forth thoughts “from these waters which are in it,” i.e., the sea.69 The metaphor
is a bit odd because he jumps from the sea right back to the firmament, but this
must be justified by the fact that God gathered together the sea immediately
65 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,11 (13,20–22; my trans.): simul autem et per allegoriae
figuram ostenderetur, quae essent, quae exornare possent minorem mundum, id est
hominem.
66 Cf. Gerald Bostock, “Origen’s Doctrine of Creation,” The Expository Times 118, no. 5 (2007):
(222–27) 226.
67 Aristotle, Physica 8,2,252b (ll. 24–27): εἰ δ’ ἐν ζώῳ τούτο δυνατὸν γενέσθαι, τί κωλύει τὸ αύτὸ
συμβῆναι καὶ κατὰ τὸ πᾶν; εἰ γὰρ ἐν μικρῷ κόσμῳ γίγνεται, καὶ ἐν μεγάλῳ. English translation
by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, “Physica,” in The Works of Aristotle translated into English
(ed. William David Ross; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930) (2:184a–267b) 2:252b.
68 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,8 (10,11–14; trans. 57): arbitror quia, si mens nostra illumina-
ta fuerit a nostro sole Christo, iubetur postmodum ex his, quae in ea sunt, aquis producere
repentia et uolatilia uolantia, id est cogitationes bonas uel malas proferre in medium.
after making the sky, since it was the sky that separated out the waters beneath
it, which then needed to be gathered. In any case, the sea meant “the human
mind,” the waters being our thoughts.70 His interpretation of the sea was the
same as his interpretation of the sky, which was also the human mind, sepa-
rating spiritual thoughts from demonic. In other words, both the sky, which
separated the waters above and below, and the sea, which produced creep-
ing animals and birds, represented the human mind thinking good and evil
thoughts. He used different words to make the same point.
So much for Origen’s psychic interpretation of the waters: now what is the
spiritual interpretation? Origen did not offer a spiritual interpretation in this
homily (the psychic sense remained the focus of the sermon throughout), so
we must look elsewhere. He often refers to the super-heavenly water in the
context of Ps 148:4: “Praise him, you heavens of heavens and you water above
the heavens!”71 He consistently says that “The water above the heavens signi-
fies rational natures,” that is, angels.72 After all, what could be a more natural
interpretation of things above the sky that praise God than angels? Twice in
Against Celsus he explains this “water”: “We know that even some of the lesser
creatures of God have transcended the heavens and all sensible nature.”73 In a
sermon he quotes these same verses to show that Scripture sometimes refers
to “angels and invisible powers.”74 In his commentary on John, he associates
water with angels: “Every angel has within itself a source of water springing
into eternal life.”75 Here he quotes John 4:14, just as he did in the Genesis 1
70 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,12 (14,3; my trans.): mentem eius [i.e., hominis].
71 This and the following passages are drawn from Pépin (Théologie cosmique, 401–02) and
Bostock (“Origen’s Philosophy,” 254, notes 18–19). Cf. Jean Pépin, “Ex Platonicorum per-
sona”: Études sur les lectures philosophiques de Saint Augustin (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1977),
104–15.
72 Origen, Selecta in Psalmos 148 (PG 12, 1680a; my trans.): Ὕδωρ τὸ ἐπάνω τῶν οὐρανῶν
λογικὰς φύσεις σημαίνει.
These catena fragments are thought to derive from the second of Origen’s two lost
commentaries on the Psalms, written in Caesaera. See Nautin, Origène, 275–79; Ronald
Heine, “Restringing Origen’s Broken Harp: Some Suggestions concerning the Prologue
to the Caesarean Commentary on the Psalms,” in The Harp of Prophecy: Early Christian
Interpretation of the Psalms (ed. Brian E. Daley, SJ, and Paul R. Kolbet; Christianity
and Judaism in Antiquity 20; Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2015)
(47–74), 48.
73 Contra Celsum 5,44 (47,29–48,1; my trans.): οἵ γε ἐπιστάμεθα καί τινα τῶν ἡττόνων τοῦ θεοῦ
ὑπεραναβεβηκέναι τοὺς οὐρανοὺς καὶ πᾶσαν αἰσθητὴν φύσιν. Cf. ibid. 6,19.
74 Origen, Homiliae in Lucam 23,177 (GCS 35, 156,7–8 Rauer; my trans.): angelos et uirtutes
inuisibiles.
75 Origen, Commentarii in Iohannem 13,7(41) (231,34–232,1; my trans.): ἀλλ’ ἕκαστος [i.e.,
ἄγγελος] ἐν ἑαυτῷ πηγὴν ὕδατος ἁλλομένου εἰς ζωὴν αἰώνιον.
132 Chapter 4
homily.76 Unsurprisingly, he correspondingly interprets the abyssal waters

(Ps 76:17) as the “infernal powers,” i.e. demons, “which,” he says, “became trou-
bled in the presence of Christ.”77 They are the beings that, since their fall, live
in the underworld (the abyss). These are spiritual interpretations that disclose
information about the spiritual world: heaven above, full of angels that praise
God, and hell below, full of demons who fear Christ. The spiritual reading
complemented the psychic reading. The latter invited the listener to give all
their attention to spiritual things and forget the sensible, physical world. This
was the same activity in which these heavenly beings, which had risen above
the sensible world, were constantly engaged. Likewise, for the water below, the
psychic reading warned the reader of the tempting thoughts of demons, who
churned about in the underworld. Dively Lauro’s thesis about the importance
of not collapsing Origen’s two allegorical readings into one is confirmed: the
spiritual and psychic readings were distinct but closely interrelated. They com-
plemented one another.
Confirmation that this was Origen’s interpretation of the waters is pro-
vided by his famous critics of the fourth century, Jerome and Epiphanius.
Epiphanius, in a letter to the bishop of Jerusalem translated by Jerome, con-
demned Origen for saying both that the paradise from which Adam and Eve
were expelled was heavenly, and that the waters above the sky represented
“certain fortitudes of angelic power” while the waters below represented “hos-
tile virtues, that is, demons.”78 Jerome repeated this criticism in his polemic
against the same bishop, saying that Origen interpreted the super-heavenly
waters as “holy and higher virtues” and the abyssal waters as “hostile and de-
monic ones.”79 Clearly, their words line up with what Origen himself says.
They may even be exact quotations from lost works, such as the Genesis
76 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (quoted above).

77 Origen, Selecta in Psalmos 76 (PG 12, 1540c; my trans.): Αἱ ἄβυσσοι τὰς καταχθονίους δυνάμεις
δηλοῦσιν, αἵτινες ἐν τῇ παρουσίᾳ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐταράχθησαν. Cf. Homilia in Psalmum xxxvi B 5,
where he again quotes Ps 76:17 as meaning the demonic abyss.
78 Jerome, Epistulae 51,5 (CSEL 54, 405,13–17 Hilberg; my trans.): quae super firmamentum
sunt, non esse aquas, sed fortitudines quasdam angelicae potestatis, et rursum aquas,
quae super terram sunt, hoc est sub firmamento, esse uirtutes contrarias, id est daemones.
Cf. Epiphanius, Panarion 64,4,11 (413,2–4; trans. 2:138): “He gives an allegorical interpre-
tation of whatever he can—Paradise, its waters, the waters above the heavens, the water
under the earth”: ἀλληγορεῖ δὲ λοιπὸν ὅσαπερ δύναται, τόν τε παράδεισον τά τε τούτου ὕδατα
καὶ τὰ ἐπάνω τῶν οὐρανῶν καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ τὸ ὑποκάτω τῆς γῆς.
79 Jerome, Liber contra Ioannem Hierosolymitanum 7 (PL 23, 360c; my trans.): quod aquas,
quae super coelos in Scripturis esse dicuntur, sanctas supernasque uirtutes, quae super
terram et infra terram contrarias et daemoniacas esse arbitretur.
commentary. In spite of their hostility toward Origen, their witness in this case
confirms that this was his view.
At this point a crucial ambiguity remains: were the super-heavenly water
and the water of the abyss only spiritual, or was there a corresponding physical
reality as well? In other words, did these verses of Scripture also have a bodi-
ly sense? The verses describing what God creates (e.g., the sky, the earth, the
creeping things, the birds, the seas) certainly had a bodily meaning, as Origen
makes clear with statements like, “There is certainly no question about the
literal meaning. […] But it is not unprofitable to relate these words which we
explained above in a spiritual sense,”80 and, “These things have been said on
that question, which can be raised about the literal meaning. But let us see
also allegorically […].”81 Yet nowhere in the homily does he give any indication
of there being a physical reality to the waters. The evidence strongly suggests
that Origen did not believe there were physical waters above the sky; he only
ever talks about them spiritually and psychically. The reason is clear: the wa-
ters were part of the incorporeal creation that preceded the physical creation.
Origen says, following Philo, that time began on the second day, not the first,
because the first day was called “day one” (the LXX uses the cardinal number
μία instead of the ordinal πρώτη), indicating the divine timelessness (Gen 1:5).82
Timelessness and incorporeality are ontologically linked, since “time is the
extension of the cosmos’ movement.”83 The “second day” (i.e., the beginning of
time) was when God made the physical heaven (i.e., the cosmos), and thus the
“waters,” that is, the spiritual powers, were separated (vv. 6–7). In other words,
some of the “waters” fell away from God, becoming demons. This fall was pre-
cisely a fall into corporeality; it was actually the cause of the physical creation.84
Given this interpretive framework, according to which everything in the first
five verses of Genesis was incorporeal,85 Origen had no reason to posit any
80 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,11 (12,24–25 and 13,1–2; trans. 60): secundum litteram qui-
dem nulla quaestio est. […] aptare autem haec his, quae supra exposuimus, secundum
spiritalem intellectum, non otiosa res est.
81 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,14–15 (19,6–8; trans. 68): haec quidem ad eam quaestionem
dicta sunt, quae secundum litteram proferri potest. Videamus autem etiam per allego-
riam […].
82 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,1; Philo, De opificio mundi 26 and 35.
83 Philo, De opificio mundi 26 (8,29; trans. 52): ἐπεὶ γὰρ διάστημα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεώς ἐστιν
ὁ χρόνος.
84 I discussed Origen’s understanding of the fall in chapter 2.
85 The light of vv. 3–5 certainly must be spiritual light, although in this sermon Origen mere-
ly quotes the verses without interpreting them (Homiliae in Genesim 1,1). Later, when giv-
ing psychic interpretations of the sun, moon, and stars (vv. 14–18), he expounds at length
about spiritual light and darkness (ibid. 1,5–7).
134 Chapter 4
physical referent for these “waters,” which predated the physical creation. Thus,
we may safely conclude that Origen found no bodily meaning here, which is to
say that Scripture here described spiritual realities under the guise of physical
ones.86 He was confronted with an exegetical puzzle: “What are these waters?”
He turned to other parts of Scripture about waters (and Philo) to solve it. His
solution was that these were not physical waters at all, but a hidden reference
to spiritual powers and the fall of some of them from grace.
2 Basil
Basil’s framework for interpreting the first verses of Genesis was not that
of Origen and Philo, but rather a literal one. Now, he did confess, like all
Christians, that “before the birth of the world,” God first made “a certain condi-
tion proper to the supramundane powers, one beyond time, everlasting, with-
out beginning or end.”87 This creation included “a spiritual light.”88 However,
he did not believe that this creation was narrated by Gen 1:1–5; on the contrary,
the account of this spiritual creation “has been left unrecorded because it is
unfitted to those who are still being introduced and are infants with respect
to knowledge.”89 All of Genesis 1, then, refers to the creation of the physical
universe. Thus, the word beginning (ἀρχή) in v. 1 means “this beginning accord-
ing to time.”90 The heaven of the same verse is the sky, later to be adorned
with the stars and moon, not the eternal spiritual world.91 The earth is called
“invisible” (ἀόρατος) in v. 2 simply because it was covered in dark water.92 The
heavenly light already existed, but the sky, like a thick tent, prevented it from
illuminating the unfinished earth.93 The creation of physical light in v. 3 finally
banished the darkness, and this occurred without the sun.94 Only when he gets
to the fourth day does Basil explain that God made the sun later, together with
86 Crouzel cites “les premiers chapitres de là Genèse” as one of the few scriptural passages to
which Origen “donne un sens uniquement spiritual” (“Origène et le sens littéral dans ses
‘Homélies sur l’Hexateuque,’” Bulletin de Litérature Ecclésiastique 70 [1969]: [241–63] 245).
87 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,5 (8,19–9,2; trans. 9): ἦν τις πρεσβυτέρα τῆς τοῦ κόσμου
γενέσεως κατάστασις ταῖς ὑπερκοσμίοις δυνάμεσι πρέπουσα, ἡ ὑπερχρονος, ἡ αἰωνία, ἡ ἀΐδιος.
88 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,5 (9,3; trans. 9): φῶς νοητὸν.
89 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,5 (8,18–19; my trans.): ἀνιστόρητον δὲ κατελείφθη διὰ τὸ τοῖς
εἰσαγομένοις ἔτι καὶ νηπίοις κατὰ τὴν γνῶσιν ἀνεπιτήδειον.
90 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,5 (10,4–5; trans. 10): τουτέστιν ἐν ἀρχῇ ταύτῃ τῇ κατὰ χρόνον.
the moon and stars, “as a vehicle for that pure, clear, and immaterial light,”95 to
show people that God, not the sun, was the source of life and light.96 The first
day is called “one” because it first defined the length of a day.97
Basil says that, in addition to its temporal meaning, the “beginning” (ἀρχή)
of Gen 1:1 also refers to the “skillful Logos leading the orderly arrangement of
what is seen.”98 It is no surprise that Basil, like John 1:1, Philo, Theophilus, and
Origen, makes this connection. What is surprising, as Paul Blowers notes, is
that Basil does so little with this meaning, given its significance in ancient in-
terpretation of Gen 1:1.99 He mentions it, then immediately moves to say that
“beginning” also indicates that God’s act of creation is itself timeless (insofar as
the beginning of time must be outside time because otherwise it, too, could be
subdivided paradoxically into infinitely more “beginnings”).100 I believe that
the reason Basil does not develop this theme is that he wants to stay focused on
his interpretation of Genesis 1 as a straightforward account of what happened
(cosmogony). He has also altered the context for this interpretation by explic-
itly making it about the visible cosmos (τῶν ὀρωμένων). For Philo, Theophilus,
and Origen, Gen 1:1 referred to the creation of the spiritual realm through the
Logos. Perhaps this is why Basil does not wish to dwell on this interpretation
of “beginning,” lest it seem to lead back to the interpretation that Genesis 1 is
about an eternal, spiritual creation.
Basil did allow an alternate, nonliteral interpretation of “one day.” He calls
this “the ineffable doctrine handed down.”101 This is the language of esoteric or
secret doctrine, distinct from the public kerygma.102 Basil brings it in at the ap-
propriate place, that is, after exegeting the text, and even says it may be “more
authoritative” than his own (literal) exegesis.103 According to this esoteric tra-
dition, the first day of creation was called “one” because it was “an image of
95 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,2 (91,5–6; trans. 86): οὕτω καὶ τῷ καθαρωτάτῳ ἐκείνῳ καὶ
εἰλικρινεῖ καὶ ἀΰλῳ φωτὶ ὄχημα νῦν οἱ φωστῆρες κατεσκευάσθησαν.
96 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,1. As I mentioned in the last chapter, he uses the hylomor-
phic distinction between substance (matter) and quality (form) to prove that God can
separate the material sun from its immaterial light (ibid., 6,3).
98 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,6 (11,7–8; my trans.): τις τεχνικὸς λόγος ὁ καθηγησάμενος τῆς
τῶν ὀρωμένων διακοσμήσεως.
99 Paul M. Blowers, “Beauty, Tragedy and New Creation: Theology and Contemplation in
Cappadocian Cosmology,” International Journal of Systematic Theology 18, no. 1 (2016):
(7–29) 15.
100 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,6 (11,16–12,5).
101 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,8 (35,18; my trans.): ὁ ἐν ἀπορρήτοις παραδιδόμενος λόγος.
102 See Greek-English Lexicon, s.v. “ἀπόρρητος.”
103 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,8 (35,18; trans. 34): κυριώτερος.
136 Chapter 4
eternity” and the day of the Lord (Sunday).104 The connection to the theologi-
cal tradition of Philo and Origen is clear, but they as individual exegetes are not
the source: the tradition is the source. In any case, for Basil it was still a physical
day of creation, not eternity; it only symbolized eternity. Thus, Basil’s approach
to Gen 1:1–5 remained decisively literal and un-Origenian.105
Basil says that the creation of the sky in vv. 6–7 is different from the creation
of heaven in v. 1. He entertains but rejects the possibility (quite appealing to the
modern reader!) that v. 1 is a summary statement of what is then spelled out
in detail in the following verses.106 It would be a mistake to see a connection
to Origen here. For one, we already saw that Theophilus, who also interpreted
Genesis 1 literally, distinguished the two heavens, taking the first to be spiritual
and the second corporeal.107 More to the point, though, Basil did not think in
terms of a spiritual and a corporeal heaven at all. As I said, it was all physical
to him (the creation of the spiritual world is left unnarrated by the Bible). The
first sky, created in v. 1, is corporeal, albeit of a very fine substance, like smoke.108
Basil mentions different philosophical theories of what it is made of (some
combination of the elements, or perhaps a fifth element), but refuses to com-
mit to any, as that would require going beyond the testimony of Scripture.109
The second “sky,” on Basil’s reading, is actually a water filtration system
somewhere below the actual sky.110 It pushes the “rare and filtered part” of the
waters above the sky, while letting the “coarse and earthy part drop below.”111
The lighter portion of water above it, Basil calls “aerial water.”112 The purpose of
this water is to serve at once as both a global cooling-system and an eschato-
logical water-clock! It keeps the element of fire in check, although eventually
104 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,8 (36,20–37,1; trans. 35): τοῦ αἰῶνος τὴν εἰκόνα.
105 I mentioned this quasi-exception to Basil’s literalism in chapter 2, note 222.
107 Theophilus of Antioch, Ad Autolycum 2,13 (quoted above).
109 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,11; 3,4. However, at one point he says that the opening of
Genesis “enumerates the parts of the universe for you,” namely “heaven, earth, water, and
air,” seemingly equating heaven with the element of fire (ibid. 2,6 [31,2–4; my trans.]):
δέξαι τὰ μέρη τοῦ κόσμου καταριθμοῦντά σοι τὸν συγγραφέα, ὅτι έποίησεν ό θεὸς οὐρανόν, γῆν,
ὕδωρ, ἀέρα. Since fire is the lightest element, naturally resting above the air, it is the one
that should equate with heaven, unless one adopts the hypothesis of a fifth element.
110 “Basil does not give any clear indication as to where in the universe the actual firmament
is located, but from two notions he uses we can infer that he envisages this control-filter
quite close to the earth” (Thomas O’Loughlin, “Aquae Super Caelos (Gen 1:6–7): The First
Faith-Science Debate?” Milltown Studies 29 [1992]: [92–114] 99).
111 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,7 (49,18–19; trans. 47): τὸ μὲν λεπτὸν καὶ διηθούμενον ἐπὶ τὸ
ἄνω διιέντα, τὸ δὲ παχύτατον καὶ γεῶδες ἐναφιέντα τοῖς κάτω.
112 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,7 (50,7; trans. 48): ὕδωρ ἀέριον.
the fire will consume all the water, bringing the universe to its appointed end
by fire.113 This filtration-cooling system is a “firmament” only relatively (the
earth is a firmament absolutely, he says), because it is more solid than the
proper sky, which is “light and rare.”114 To explain why this “firmament” is also
called “heaven” (οὐρανός), which should refer to the proper sky, he adverts to
the etymology that comes from “to see” (ὁράω). We see this sky when we ob-
serve clouds and water vapor.115 The super-heavenly water, then, is above this
lower sky, not above the stars and planets (and certainly not above the spiritual
realm that Genesis omits to mention).116 Basil says nothing of the etymology
from “boundary” (ὅρος), upon which Philo and Origen drew. This confirms the
un-Origenian character of Basil’s approach. Basil’s solution to the problem of
the super-heavenly water, then, was to say that the water was actually aerial,
not liquid water, and that the “sky” in question was a relatively light body below
the actual sky.
Basil refuted the objection that any upper water would just flow off the sides
of the dome of the sky. For Basil, this was easy to answer: just because the sky
is concave does not imply that the surface above it must be concave; it could
be any shape.117 A logical reply, but it offers a strange cosmology in that it im-
plies a flat earth with a sky like a roof! In contrast, the scientific cosmology
of the time envisioned the universe as spherical.118 Basil, of course, did not
believe the earth was flat, nor did he even believe that the “firmament” was
the upper sky with liquid water above it! He specifically discusses how it stays
113 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,5. Callahan sees Stoic influence here, given their belief
that the world would be destroyed and reborn in fire (“Greek Philosophy and Cappadocian
Cosmology,” 47–48). However, Basil explicitly rejected the Stoic view of infinite cycles
(ibid. 3,8), and he did not need the Stoics to teach him that “the elements will be dissolved
with fire” (2 Pet 3:10). There may be further relevance here for faith and modern science
insofar as the Stoic model has been revived in some form by the ekpyrotic hypothesis (see
Paul J. Steinhardt, “A Brief Introduction to the Ekpyrotic Universe,” www.phy.princeton
.edu/~steinh/npr).
114 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,7 (49,15; trans. 47): λεπτὴν οὖσαν καὶ ἀραιὰν.
116 I mentioned above that English speakers on rare occasions use the word sky in reference
to the divine realm (heaven). Basil’s distinction between the lower and upper skies draws
attention to the fact that we also use the word, during the day, to refer to the atmosphere
and clouds (the lower sky), and, during the night, to refer to what is now called “space”
(the upper sky). Our post-Copernican knowledge that space is far beyond the sky has not
altered our language.
118 See the diagram of Plato’s and Aristotle’s cosmologies in Lindberg, Beginnings of Western
Science, 42 and 56, respectively.
138 Chapter 4
in place because it occupies the center place in the universe (geocentrism).119

Incidentally, this is another example of how Basil integrates uncontroversial
scientific knowledge into his sermons.120 So what was Basil saying? This was
nothing more than his response to a common-sense, non-scientific objection
that itself presupposed a flat earth. After all, only by first imagining the earth as
flat can one even object that super-heavenly water would just flow off the sides.
A round earth can be surrounded by water just as easily as it can be surrounded
by anything.121 Basil’s reply that a roof with a concave interior need not have a
concave exterior was a logical reply to what was a frivolous objection.
Although Basil’s creative solution to the problem of super-heavenly water
was a huge step up from thinking that liquid water flows above the sun, moon,
and stars, Basil failed to address a fundamental, scientific problem: his hypoth-
esis ran counter to the accepted understanding of the four elements. Aristotle
said that each of the four elements had different weights, giving each a distinc-
tive place in the cosmos: fire, being the lightest element, held the highest place,
followed by air, water, and finally earth.122 Furthermore, Basil himself actually
accepted this theory of the elements’ weights: in his first sermon he said that
earth naturally occupied the lowest place in the cosmos and heaven—whatever
elements it may be made of—the highest.123 Given this understanding, water
simply does not belong above the air. Basil offered no solution to this prob-
lem, which he did not even acknowledge. It is possible that saying it is “aerial
water” was supposed to solve this problem. However, since air was defined as
hot and water cold and the aerial water had to be cold, it must still have been
water and not air. Thomas O’Loughlin thinks Basil’s avoidance of this prob-
lem was deliberate, that he was “carefully avoiding the real problem of ‘proper
position.’”124 Although some scholars seem not to have noticed this problem,125

120 Way provides relevant cross-references to Aristotle’s De caelo for comparison (Exegetic
Homilies, 14–17, notes 24–32).
121 Basil notes that no physicist will ask him upon what the water that first surrounded the
earth rested (before God made the sky), because it would find a natural equilibrium
around the center of the cosmos just as the earth itself does (Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,5).
122 Aristotle, Meteorologica 2,2,354b (ll. 23–25 Fobes). Cf. Lindberg, Beginnings of Western
Science, 55.
123 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,7; cf. 1,9.
124 O’Loughlin, “Aquae Super Caelos,” 96.
125 We must thus qualify Costache’s assertion that Basil “never objected” to any “feature per-
taining to the Aristotelian-Ptolemaic cosmography” (“Christian Worldview,” 24). Callahan
helpfully analyses Basil’s various references to the four elements, demonstrating that
he accepted the standard account, but does not point out this contradiction (“Greek
Philosophy and Cappadocian Cosmology,” 40–48).
Christopher Kaiser actually regards Basil’s global cooling-system explanation

as “ingenious,” an achievement on his part in opposing the Aristotelian ele-
mental cosmology.126 Although Basil’s theory is fascinating, the fact that he
does not even acknowledge, let alone explain, the contradiction between it
and the theory of the elements that he himself accepted means that it cannot
be considered a scientific contribution. Rather, it was only his commitment to
a literal reading of Genesis that forced him into this dilemma. He contented
himself with offering a plausible explanation for why there should be water
above the “sky,” but failed to explain exactly how it could be there.
Basil, in his rhetoric, tended to set up an opposition between philosophy
and Christianity.127 The philosophers were heathens, he says, whose views had
little to do with the Church: “Leaving the accounts of outsiders to those out-
side, we are turning back to the explanation of the Church.”128 Philosophical
debates did not really concern the Church, whose beliefs were based on the
Bible, which was far superior to heathen philosophy: “As the beauty in chaste
women is far preferable to that of the prostitute, so is the excellence of our dis-
courses above that of the heathens.”129 Basil’s strong rhetoric here substitutes
a prostitute metaphor for the servant metaphor. This is one of those passages
that Amand de Mendieta quotes to classify Basil as a fundamentalist, and it is
not hard to understand why.130
Notwithstanding the rhetoric, Basil’s sentiment was no different than
Origen’s. He, too, said that Plato’s lofty eloquence made him useful to almost
no one, whereas the Bible taught the truth plainly to all.131 In calling philoso-
phy a prostitute, Basil was specifically responding to those who would unfavor-
ably compare the Bible’s simplicity to the complexity of all these philosophical
speculations. It was not a rejection of the idea of philosophy-as-servant, but
it shows how Basil accentuated the subordinate status of philosophy in a way
that Origen did not. Basil cannot have meant that philosophy should be re-
jected entirely; otherwise he would not have discussed, and at times even ad-
opted (as when he says the earth rests in the center of the cosmos), their views
126 Kaiser, Creational Theology, 18.

127 O’Loughlin concludes: “Sadly, the pattern of argument/response found in these clashes in
later centuries, is already present” (Aquae Super Caelos, 100).
128 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,3 (42,24–26; trans. 41): ἀλλὰ τὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν τοῖς ἔξω
καταλιπόντες, ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν ὑποστρέφομεν λόγον. Cf. ibid. 1,2.
129 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,8 (53,6–8; trans. 51): ὅσῳ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ταῖς σώφροσι κάλλος τοῦ
ἑταιρικοῦ προτιμέτερον, τοσοῦτον καὶ τῶν ἡμετέρων λόγων πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν τὸ διάφορον. Cf.
ibid. 1,1; 3,6.
130 Amand de Mendieta, “Official Attitude,” 35.
140 Chapter 4
at all. Rather, when Basil said that they had to turn back to the explanation of
the Church, he meant to rein himself in, not to condemn philosophy. The ordi-
nary working folk who came to hear him preach required an interpretation of
Scripture, not a time-consuming lesson in philosophy.132
In chapter 2 I discussed Basil’s attacks on those who interpreted the dark-
ness and abyss dualistically to indicate eternal Evil.133 Despite superficial re-
semblances, that attack had nothing to do with Origen, who was not a dualist.
In his third hexaemeral homily, however, Basil attacks those who allegorize the
waters. This time his criticism is directed, not against heretics, but his fellow
churchmen:
We have also some argument concerning the division of the waters with
those writers of the Church who, on a pretext of the spiritual sense and of
more sublime concepts, have recourse to allegories, saying that spiritual
and incorporeal powers are signified figuratively by the waters, that the
more excellent have remained up above the firmament, but the malig-
nant remain below in the terrestrial and material regions.134
Basil’s criticism of these anonymous Christians accords with that of Jerome

and Epiphanius against Origen. Thus, one cannot help but immediately think
that Origen is the intended target. Julien Garnier, who edited Basil’s works in
the 18th century, writes: “Conuenit inter eruditos Origenem indicari a Basilio
oratione tertia in Hexaem, num. 9.”135 This consensus among scholars has con-
tinued into the present.136
Pépin in particular found additional proof that Basil meant Origen.137 To
overturn the allegorical reading, Basil invokes Ps 148:7: “Praise the Lord from
the earth, / you dragons and all abysses.”138 Basil observes that the anonymous
132 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,11; 3,1.

134 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,9 (53,21–54,1; trans. 51–52): Ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς
ἐκκληςίας ἐστί τις λόγος περὶ τῶν διακριθέντων ὑδάτων, οἵ, προφάσει ἀναγωγῆς καὶ νοημάτων
ὑψηλοτέρων, εἰς ἀλληγορίας κατέφυγεν, δυνάμεις λέγοντες πνευματικὰς καὶ ἀσωμάτους
τροπικῶς ἐκ τῶν ὑδάτων σημαίνεσθαι· καὶ ἄνω μὲν ἐπὶ τοῦ στερεώματος μεμενηκέναι τὰς
κρείττονας, κάτω δὲ τοῖς περιγείοις καὶ ὑλικοῖς τόποις προσαπομεῖναι τὰς πονηράς.
135 “Scholars agree that Basil meant Origen in Hexaemeron 3,9” (PG 29, 187c; my trans.).
136 E.g., Fialon, Étude sur Basile, 294; Tieck, Basil, 172; McGuckin, “Patterns of Biblical
Exegesis,” 45, note 52.
137 Pépin, Théologie cosmique, 401–02. I think his analysis holds in this case, even though I
disagree with his claim that Basil also meant Origen when denouncing the aforemen-
tioned allegoresis of the darkness and abyss, as I discussed in chapter 2.
allegorists say that these dragons “are the spirits of evil” that fell into hell
(the abyss).139 Yet the abyss praises God! “Even the abyss, which those who
speak allegories relegated to the inferior position, was not itself judged deserv-
ing of rejection by the psalmist, since it was admitted to the general chorus
of creation.”140 Basil thinks the abyss here is the ocean (not hell), in which
sea serpents live, for “even it, with its own words, harmoniously completes
the hymn to the Creator.”141 Why not, since the weather, too, is commanded to
praise God in v. 8?142 The cosmos itself somehow “completes” the hymn sung
by the faithful. Origen’s interpretation of the super-heavenly waters, as we saw,
was informed by this same Psalm. By going back to it and showing that it, too, is
meant literally, Basil attacks Origen’s reading at the source. The fact that Basil,
unlike Jerome and Epiphanius, did not use Origen’s name is a further indica-
tion of the high esteem in which he held him. Basil lived before the smear
campaign against Origen really got going.
Lim seems to be the only scholar that rejects the consensus.143 This is in part
because he believes, as we saw in chapter 2, that Basil only opposed “trans-
lational” allegory, which Lim wrongly claims Origen did not practice. In fact,
it is precisely for passages like these that Origen rejected a literal interpreta-
tion. Nevertheless, Lim correctly observes that Basil’s explanation of the al-
legory goes beyond what we actually find in Origen’s extant writings.144 Basil
says that the demons are called “the sea” because like it they “are tumultuous
and factious and agitated by the uproar of the passions.”145 On this basis, then,
Lim argues that “Basil is not referring to Origen in particular, but to certain
later allegorists who might, or might not, have been specifically elaborating
on Origen’s exegesis.”146 Given that Basil lived nearly a century after Origen
and refers to churchmen in the plural, it is possible he was directly confront-
ing Origenian allegorists of his own time. However, it is also possible (though
139 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,9 (54,4–5; my trans.): τὰ πνευματικὰ εἶναι τῆς πονηρίας.
140 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,9 (55,2–5; trans. 53): ὥστε καὶ ἡ ἄβυσσος, ἣν εἰς τὴν χείρονα
μοῖραν οἱ ἀλληγοροῦντες ἀπέρριψαν, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἀπόβλητος ἐκρίθη τῷ ψαλμῳδῷ, εἰς τὴν κοινὴν
τῆς κτίσεως χοροστασίαν παραληφθεῖσα.
141 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,9 (55,5–6; my trans.): ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ κατὰ τοὺς ἐνυπάρχοντας
αὐτῇ λόγους ἁρμονίως συμπληροῖ τὴν ὑμνῳδίαν τῷ ποιητῇ.
145 Basil, Homiliae in Hexaemeron 3,9 (54,6–7; trans. 52): ὡς ταραχώδη ὄντα καὶ στασιαστικὰ καὶ
τοῖς θορύβοις τῶν παθῶν κυμαινόμενα.
146 Lim, “Politics of Interpretation,” 356. Cf. Giet Stanislas: “Basile ne nomme pas Origène;
[…] Mais ce sont bien des interprétations origénistes qu’il réprouve” (Basile de Césarée:
Homélies sur l’Hexaéméron [SC 26; Paris: Cerf, 1950], 235, note 3).
142 Chapter 4
unprovable) that Origen gave such an explanation in his lost Genesis commen-
tary, and that Basil had read it. Even Lim admits that “it is not possible to deny
wholeheartedly that many of [the] notions which Basil enumerates and con-
demns can be traced to Origen.”147 Even if Origen’s interpretation of the waters
was mediated to Basil through later authors who elaborated it, that does not
change the underlying fact that Basil’s literal interpretation of those waters
flatly opposes Origen’s allegorical interpretation. The scholarly consensus that
Basil was here criticizing Origen, at least indirectly, should be upheld.
I have shown that Origen took the reference to super-heavenly water in

Gen 1:6–7 in a spiritual rather than a material sense. His exegesis was a re-
sponse to an implied question he must have asked himself: “What are these
waters?” He found the answer through his adoption of Philo’s interpretation of
Genesis 1 and his own method of intertextual study.
For Philo, the first few verses of Genesis were about a spiritual, immate-
rial creation. The first “heaven” and “earth” were the spiritual archetypes of
the later ones, like Platonic ideal forms. The physical heaven made in vv. 6–7
was patterned after the original, spiritual heaven. Because it was the bound-
ary between the worlds, it was given the name “heaven.” On this view, then,
the primeval “waters” that were eventually split into those above heaven and
those in the abyss indicated noncorporeal beings: the ones above were with
God (angels), while the ones below were in hell (demons). The waters gathered
into what God names the sea were physical waters.
Origen adopted Philo’s view, although he distinguished his interpretation of
the spiritual archetypes from the Platonic “ideas.” The latter, being “unsubstan-
tial,” simply did not match with what the Bible tells us about heaven. Origen
was able to supplement Philo’s system by looking intertextually at references
to water in the Psalms and New Testament to show that these “waters” were
living beings. Since Origen, unlike Philo, used a threefold hermeneutic, he
also added a psychic level to the equation. The spiritual person participated
in the super-heavenly waters by shunning earthly things and focusing only on
spiritual things. Conversely, the wicked person was consumed by the turbulent
thoughts of the demons.
Origen says nothing about there being any physical, literal water above the
sky. That he denied such a possibility is confirmed by testimonies from Jerome

and Epiphanius (and Basil, for that matter). Why did Origen feel compelled to
interpret this aspect of Genesis only through figural interpretations? Why not
simply take the text at face value, as Basil did, and admit that there is water
above the sky? The answer is that Origen rejected a literal interpretation be-
cause such an interpretation would have contradicted the accepted philosoph-
ical cosmology of the day.148
Origen believed that if natural philosophers had shown something to be
true or at least probable, Scripture should not be interpreted in such a way as
to contradict that. We see Origen use this principle many times, as when he
interprets Phil 2:10 (“At the name of Jesus every knee should bow, in heaven
and on earth and under the earth”). He says:
It is not at all necessary to suppose that the bodies in heaven should be

formed in such a way as to have corporeal knees, since their bodies have
been demonstrated to be spherical by those who have investigated such
matters accurately.149
As I discussed in chapter 2, according to Origen there were impossibilities and

absurdities in the Bible, which the Holy Spirit placed there to draw the reader’s
attention to its hidden meanings.150 Origen explicitly endorsed the accepted
elemental cosmology that placed earth at the bottom and fire at the top, below
the heavens.151 Therefore, a reference to water above the heavens must be just
such an impossibility meriting a spiritual interpretation. He discovered the
passage’s hidden meaning by an intertextual study of Scripture, for the Psalms
commanded these waters to praise God, and Jesus spoke of living water in
the believer.
Origen’s interpretation had the effect of accommodating the biblical text
to philosophy, but—and this is crucial—this does not mean that he consid-
ered philosophy superior to the Bible. If it were, he would not have believed
148 Cf. Alan Scott: “A dictum of Origen’s scriptural interpretation […] was that if the literal
interpretation of a passage was impossible, an allegorical interpretation must be neces-
sary. One of the functions of pagan learning for Origen was to help determine what was
possible” (Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea [Oxford Early Christian
Studies; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994], 119).
149 Origen, De oratione 31.3 (GCS 3, 397,4–7 Koetschau): ἐσχηματίσθαι γὰρ τῶν ἐπουρανίων τὰ
σώματα, ὡς καὶ γόνατα σωματικὰ ἔχειν αὐτὰ, ὑπολαμβάνειν οὐ πάνυ τι χρὴ, σφαιροειδῶν παρὰ
τοῖς ἀκριβῶς περὶ τούτων διειληφόσιν ἀποδεδειγμένων αὐτῶν τῶν σωμάτων. English transla-
tion by Rowan Allen Greer, Origen: An Exhortation to Martyrdom, Prayer and Selected
Works (The Classics of Western Spirituality; NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 165.
151 Origen, Commentarius in Iohannem 13,40 (266) (266,15–18).
144 Chapter 4
in creatio ex nihilo. Rather, this hermeneutical principle must be understood

within the framework of philosophy as Christianity’s servant, not its mistress.
Cosmological knowledge obtained by “those who have investigated such mat-
ters accurately” opened up the possibility of seeing in the waters a hidden
reference to incorporeal powers. He acted upon this possibility, which was in
accord with other scriptural passages about water. He thus avoided an unnec-
essary conflict. He did not hesitate to go to intellectual battle to defend apos-
tolic doctrine against philosophical objections, if necessary, but he would not
do so for every passage in Scripture that, if taken literally, would contradict
secular knowledge. He believed in the synthesis of revelation and science.
Basil’s interpretation of the super-heavenly water is fascinating. Since he
took all of Genesis 1 literally, the Philonic system of a twofold creation was
ruled out, even though Basil acknowledged that there was a spiritual creation
prior to the physical one, when God made the angels. But that is not what
Genesis 1 is about, he says. Why, then, does Genesis 1 twice narrate God making
heaven both in v. 1 and in vv. 6–7? Although he mentions the possibility that
the first verse is merely a summary statement, Basil took the unusual position
that the second “heaven” was a cloudy water-filtration system below the proper
heaven. This was called the “firmament” because it was somewhat firm com-
pared to the first heaven, though not firm compared to the earth. God named
it “heaven” because it is what we “see” when we look up. The water above this
“firmament” was real water, but in a gaseous (“aerial”) state. Since water was
by definition cold (on the scientific view), it kept the heat of the sun in check.
In this way, this “firmament” acted as a cosmological water-clock: when it
eventually runs out, the cosmos will burn up in accord with biblical proph-
ecy. Although Basil did not explain exactly how this water stayed aloft when
it should naturally settle between the earth and air, he was somewhat able to
reconcile the scientific view with the biblical one without resorting to allegory.
In addition to giving his own more-or-less literal interpretation, Basil also
made a point to criticize Origen’s view, though not by name. Why did he do
this? After all, Basil accepted the same elemental cosmology that Origen did,
and like Origen he believed in the usefulness of philosophy for theology, as his
almost innumerable philosophical references in the Hexaemeron amply dem-
onstrate. The answer to this question will draw out the different inflections
Basil and Origen gave to the philosophy-as-servant framework. The context of
one of Basil’s anti-allegorical remarks helps us find that answer. In the midst
of denouncing an allegorical reading of Genesis 1, Basil speaks of the vanity of
the cosmologists:
Although those who have written about the world have argued much
about the shape of the earth […] I shall not be persuaded to say that our
version of the creation is of less value because the servant of God [Moses]
gave no discussion concerning the shape.152
He was responding to those who found the cosmology of Genesis, if taken lit-
erally, inadequate or embarrassing. The apparent poverty of the Genesis ac-
count, when compared to the cosmology of the philosophers, led people, like
Origen, to allegorize it. He opposed this, saying:
This is a thing of which they seem to me to be unaware, who have at-

tempted by false arguments and allegorical interpretations to bestow on
the Scripture a dignity of their own imagining. But theirs is the attitude
of one who considers himself wiser than the revelations of the Spirit and
introduces his own ideas in pretense of an explanation.153
In other words, people like Origen tried to make Genesis 1 operate on the level
of science by means of allegorical interpretations. To Basil, this was not its pur-
pose: it is concerned, not with information “useless for us,”154 such as the earth’s
shape, but with “the edification and guidance of our souls.”155 In fact, science
and Scripture came into conflict in their cosmologies, both concerning the ori-
gin and cause of the universe and concerning the two “heavens” and the aerial
water between them.156 Basil saw the conflict between what Scripture says
about the universe and what philosophers said, and he chose Scripture. After
all, it was superior to philosophy, as a mistress is superior to her handmaid.
152 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1 (147,4–10; trans. 135–36): Οὐδὲ ἐπειδὴ οἱ τὰ περὶ κόσμου
γράψαντες πολλὰ περὶ σχημάτων τῆς διελέχθησαν […] οὐ παρὰ τοῦτο προαχθήσομαι ἀτιμοτέραν
εἰπεῖν τὴν ἡμετέραν κοσμοποιίαν, ἐπειδὴ οὐδὲν περὶ σχημάτων ὁ θεράπων τοῦ θεοῦ [Μωυσης]
διελέχθη. Some MSS have Μωυσης, but it is likely a gloss.
153 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1 (147,18–22; trans. 136): ὅ μοι δοκοῦσι μὴ συνειδότες τινὲς
παραγωγαῖς τισι καὶ τροπολογίας σεμνότητά τινα ἐκ τῆς οἰκείας αὐτῶν διανοίας ἐπεχείρησαν
τοῖς γεγραμμένοις ἐπιφημίσαι. ἀλλὰ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἑαυτὸν σοφώτερον ποιοῦντος τῶν λογίων τοῦ
πνεῦματος, καὶ ἐν προσποιήσει ἐξηγήσεως τὰ ἑαυτοῦ παρεισάγοντος.
154 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1 (147,14; trans. 136): ἄχρηστα ἡμῖν.
155 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1 (147,17; trans. 136): εἰς οἰκοδομὴν καὶ καταρτισμὸν τῶν
ψυχῶν ἡμῶν.
156 In fact, Basil says there are at least three heavens, citing 2 Cor 12:2 and Ps 148:4, which in
his opinion is no less absurd than saying that there is one heaven made of seven concen-
tric spheres (one for each planet, the sun, and the moon) (Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,3).
146 Chapter 4
Although Basil’s view still had much in common with Origen, he showed
his intellectual independence of thought from him.157 Yet, even when criticiz-
ing him, he left his name unspoken, out of respect. Basil’s independence is in
full evidence when he declares: “I know the laws of allegory, although I did
not invent them of myself, but have met them in the works of others.”158 He
learned them from Origen, of course, but he had also learned how allegori-
cal interpretation, valid in itself, could be put to bad use. He believed that it
was misused both by heretics who overturned the fundamental worldview of
Genesis 1, and by those (like Origen) who sought to harmonize it with philo-
sophical cosmology. It is no coincidence that Basil’s criticism of Origen in the
third homily comes right after his criticism of the philosophers. Basil was un-
willing to disregard its literal meaning on the grounds that it seemed absurd to
cosmologists. If they thought that the idea of super-heavenly (or “aerial”) water
and multiple heavens was laughable, that was no problem for him. In taking
this stance, at least with respect to Genesis 1, Basil imposed a significant limit
on the Origenian hermeneutical principle that unreasonable interpretations
of the Bible should be avoided. As a result, Basil adopted a more adversarial
stance toward philosophy, at least when it came to Genesis 1.
Nevertheless, I remain convinced that both Basil’s and Origen’s approaches
are well grasped through their shared metaphor of philosophy as servant, even
if they do give it different accents. Origen’s approach emphasizes the useful-
ness of philosophy. One of its useful functions is to specify what is and is not
reasonable to believe. A well informed exegete should use secular knowledge
to avoid false interpretations. This will lead them to adopt strictly-figurative
readings of certain passages, such as this one. One may be surprised, then, that
Origen nevertheless accepted creatio ex nihilo. In that case, he was bound by
apostolic doctrine. Moreover, faith in God’s unlimited power, unknown to the
philosophers, implied that could make something from nothing.
In contrast, Basil’s approach emphasizes the subordination of philosophy
to Christian teaching. Philosophy was helpful in understanding the world and
even God, but it did not have the authority to determine that a biblical idea was
absurd. If the Bible says that there is water above the sky, then so be it, and any
theory that says otherwise will have to be emended, discarded, or ignored, in
the same way that the concept of prime matter had to be emended to account
157 Gribomont well describes Basil’s development with respect to Origen’s thought: “Je vou-
drais discerner divers moments, soit chronologiques, soit psychologiques, et reconnaître,
après l’assentiment du disciple, l’accord indépendant, la réaction aux périls doctrinaux,
enfin le jugement critique” (“L’Origènisme,” 282).
158 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 9,1 (146,11–12; trans. 135): Oἶδα νόμους ἀλληγορίας, εἰ καὶ μὴ
παρ’ ἐμαυτοῦ εξευρών, ἀλλὰ τοῖς παρ’ ἑτέρων πεπονημένοις περιτυχών.
for the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Although there may still be allegorical
passages in Scripture (such as talk of God’s body), secular knowledge was not
the criterion for deciding what was and was not reasonable. Basil’s version of
the servant principle is more conservative, and thus better suited to protect
the Church from heretical ideas. We should not be surprised to see Basil, the
bishop, give it this conservative nuance. Origen, the scholar and speculative
theologian, who lived before the defining of many boundaries of orthodoxy
in the fourth century, practiced a freer version. Of course, as we saw, he still
felt himself bound in faith by the orthodoxy he knew and warned that secular
ideas had led many to heresy.159
One of those burgeoning bounds of orthodoxy concerned the nature of the
stars. To that subject I shall now turn.

Chapter 5
“Let them be for signs”: Astrology
The final scientific issue I will examine is astrology, the study of the stars. In his
commentary on Genesis, Origen gave a Christian theological response to both
the theory and the practice of astrology. He saw in Gen 1:14 an astrological sig-
nificance: “And God said, ‘Let luminaries come into being […], and let them be
for signs and for seasons and for days and for years.’” The fundamental problem
with astrology, for Origen, was that it implied fatalism (also called determin-
ism) and thus destroyed free will, which Origen says was part of the “apos-
tolic preaching.” Although some Christians emphasized divine predestination,
which is a kind of fatalism, the freedom to choose between good and evil was
the crux of Origen’s theodicy and cosmogony.1 Without free will people cannot
be held morally responsible for their actions, and without responsibility God
cannot judge them as the Bible says he will. As for providence, Origen removes
its fatalistic implications by arguing that the prophecies in Scripture do not
cause the future.
As for the theory behind astrology, like other ancient thinkers, including
Philo, Origen believed that the movements of the stars and planets contained
information about the future. The reason ancient people thought that the
stars and planets predicted the future was that their predictable movements
manifestly affected life on earth, for example, the tides, night and day, and the
seasons. Gen 1:14 seemed to confirm this. Far from rejecting the theory of as-
trology, Origen explained how it could be compatible with Christian teach-
ing. To combat fatalism, he drew upon the works of philosophers to make the
case that astral movements merely displayed information about the future
without actually causing the signified events. The reason he took this nuanced
approach was that astrology was one of the four basic sciences, alongside ge-
ometry, arithmetic, and music.
A second problem with astrology was the practice of making astrological
predictions: the casting of nativities (today called “horoscopes”).2 This prac-
tice, known as genethlialogy, Christianity forbade as a form of divination.
Origen’s response to genethlialogy may seem surprising, for he did not
1 Origen, De principiis 2,8–9.

2 From ὡροσκόπος, which refers to the star of the zodiac rising over the horizon at a given time
(Auguste Bouché-Leclercq, L’Astrologie Grecque [Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1899], 257–75.

“ Let them be for signs ” : ASTROLOGY 149
condemn it as magic. Instead, he proved that it was impossible for human be-
ings to make measurements of the movements of the sky sufficiently accurate
to cast horoscopes. Here, again, he drew upon arguments made by philoso-
phers, such as Sextus Empiricus. The basic argument was that the sky rotated
far too quickly for astrologers to measure it with the needed level of precision.
All of Origen’s points are paralleled in philosophers, whom he had no doubt
read. For example, how could astrologers explain why every culture has its
own customs, such as circumcision, which affect everyone equally regardless
of when they were born? How is it possible that two people may be born at the
same time and yet end up leading completely different lives? In spite of this,
Origen did not reject genethlialogy completely. Instead he limited its practice
only to spiritual beings (i.e., angels) and a very few extraordinary human be-
ings, such as the biblical Jacob, who had been taught the art by God. Pagan
astrologers were frauds. The end-result of Origen’s many modifications of as-
trology, both in theory and practice, was a highly-intellectualized system far
removed from pagan practices.
Basil also attacked astrology in his exegesis of Gen 1:14. First, though,
he denied that there was any connection between that verse and astrology.
Consistent with his overall literal hermeneutic, he argued that Gen 1:14 only
meant that the sky could be used to predict the weather (cf. Matt 16:3). Farmers
and sailors were able to make meteorological forecasts from the appearance of
the sky, sun, and moon. Basil separated Gen 1:14 from astrology in the same way
he separated Gen 1:2 from prime matter.
Basil also criticized astrology and borrowed directly, sometimes verbatim,
from Origen’s Genesis commentary to do so. This was possible because the rel-
evant section was preserved in the Philocalia. Nevertheless, Basil’s goals were
different from Origen’s. Like Origen, he needed to show that it is impossible for
human beings to measure the sky with sufficient accuracy to make predictions
from it. But the arguments he used to do so are less developed than Origen’s.
Like his arguments against eternal matter, they tend towards mockery intended
to amuse his audience rather than philosophical proof. In explaining how the
sky moved too quickly to be measured accurately, Basil reproduced two sen-
tences from Origen’s commentary almost verbatim, a clear sign of dependence
upon his Genesis commentary fragment in the Philocalia. Since he also made
points not found in Origen, we know that he had other sources of information
as well, similar to Sextus Empiricus. Basil had no new arguments but deployed
the standard ones he learned from his studies with his usual rhetorical skill.
Unlike Origen, Basil made no attempt to construct an astrological theory
acceptable within Christianity. He says nothing about astrological theory,
150 Chapter 5
possibly because he thought doing so would have been dangerous for his con-
gregation, who might mistake any positive statement as legitimating forbidden
divination. Even on the fundamental theory of astrology—the correspondence
between heaven and earth—Basil was conspicuously silent. However, he listed
some specific astrological questions as examples of secular studies. Given this
and his esteem for Origen, it is probable that he did accept the standard view
that the movements of the stars had significance for life on earth.
Although we simply do not know what Basil thought of Origen’s idea of
angelic star-reading, he definitely rejected Origen’s belief that the stars and
planets were living, rational beings. Like other aspects of astrology, this was
widely accepted by ancient thinkers (except Aristotle). For Philo and Origen,
the stars’ beauty and regular movements were proof that they were alive. The
fall of the original spirits caused them to enter bodies, and some of the better
ones, who fell less far, became the heavenly bodies (stars and planets). This was
not to punish them, but so that they could serve the cosmos by providing light,
marking time, and showing the future to those who could interpret their move-
ments. Origen says that it would be “beyond all stupidity” to deny that the stars
live. Basil disagreed. He took Origen’s own words and reversed them: according
to Basil, believing that the stars were alive was “more than madness.” This point
of speculation was rapidly becoming a focus of controversy among Christian
theologians in the 370’s. By denouncing it, even if only in passing, Basil demon-
strated his awareness of the controversy over “Origenism.” And yet, once again,
he chose not to name him, a sign of his respect for Origen.
In attacking, or at least radically re-formulating, the practice of astrology
and astrological fatalism, both Origen and Basil drew upon the existing philo-
sophical tradition of anti-astrological treatises. In so doing they demonstrated,
once again, the dual nature of secular learning as a servant. On the one hand,
some ideas supported by noted philosophers, such as fatalism and the prac-
tice of astrological prediction, had to be rejected because they conflicted with
Christian doctrines about free will, moral responsibility, and divine judgment.
On the other hand, arguments offered by other philosophers helped Christian
theologians defend those doctrines and attack the offending doctrine of fatal-
ism and the casting of horoscopes. Thus, Origen and Basil proved that Christian
theologians could and should use philosophical works selectively to support
and defend Christianity. In the case of Origen, his careful preservation of much
of astrological theory is indicative of the rigorous care a theologian should ex-
ercise when engaging with science. By keeping the underlying theory of astrol-
ogy intact, Origen contributed much to a synthesis between Christianity and
secular knowledge.
1 Greco-Roman Astrology
Origen and Basil’s criticisms of astrology are best understood as they relate to
two aspects of ancient astrology, namely its theory and its practice. What were
these, and how did they differ? Lindberg offers a helpful distinction:
(1) astrology as a set of beliefs about physical influence within the cosmos
and (2) astrology as the art of casting horoscopes, determining propitious
moments, and the like. The former was a respectable branch of natural
philosophy, the conclusions of which were rarely called into question.
The latter, by contrast, was vulnerable to a variety of objections (empiri-
cal, philosophical, and theological).3
This description should be qualified for Origen in that he replaced the idea
of influence with the idea of prefiguration: that is, the stars did not actually
influence the human world, but only predicted it. Origen’s argument shows
that he was well versed in both the theoretical and practical sides of astrol-
ogy. In fact, he possessed a level of knowledge of astrology almost unparalleled
among Christians.4 Basil seems to have drawn most or all of his knowledge
from Origen, as I will show. Insofar as astrology was the scientific study of
the heavenly bodies, they saw it as a servant to philosophy, just like geometry
and music.5 Nowadays, of course, we distinguish between the superstition of
astrology (ἀστρολογία, the “study of the stars”) and the science of astronomy
(ἀστρονομία, the “law of the stars”).6 However, in antiquity, the two words were
used interchangeably, and the two concepts were intermixed.7 In any case,
3 Lindberg, Beginnings of Western Science, 271.

4 Scott, Life of the Stars, 118.
5 Origen, Philocalia 13,1 (quoted in chapter 2).
6 According to a different possible etymology, ἀστρονομία comes from νέμειν, meaning “to as-
sign.” On this view “an astronomer thus would be a meteorologist who ‘assigned’ (from the
Greek νέμω) either individual stars or entire constellations their ‘weather-making’ roles,
presumably of course on the basis of accumulated observational data” (Frederik H. Cramer,
Astrology in Roman Law and Politics [Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society 37;
Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1954], 3).
7 See Greek-English Lexicon, s.v., “ἀστρονομία” and “ἀστρολογία”. Scott explains: “Astronomy and
astrology are of course sharply distinguished in modern thought, but in antiquity the two
were used interchangeably. Most experts in one tended also to be experts in the other—
Ptolemy is the classic example” (Life of the Stars, 119). Although Basil and Origen distin-
guished between what they did and did not accept about astrology, it would be conveniently
anachronistic to call what they accepted “astronomy” and what they rejected “astrology,” as
152 Chapter 5
Origen and Basil were neither astronomers nor astrologers, and they opposed
the casting of nativities. In this practice Origen perceived the dangerous side
of secular learning:
Neither the love of secular literature nor the false conclusions of phi-
losophers nor the deceptions of astrologers and the feigned directions
of the stars nor the contrived predictions by the surreptitious trick of
the demons nor any love wholly of foreknowledge sought after by illicit
means “will be able to separate us from the love of God in Christ Jesus”
(Rom 8:39).8
He used his knowledge of astrology to attacks those aspects of it he considered

incompatible with Christianity, and Basil followed suit.
For them, the fundamental problem with astrology, as it was commonly un-
derstood, was that it replaced human free will with destiny or fate (εἱμαρμένη).
This was not just a problem for pagans, for Origen tell us:
Many presumed believers also fret themselves about the possibility that
human affairs are subject to necessity and must ineluctably turn out as
the stars, in their various configurations, direct. It follows from those who
assert these things that free will is eliminated and with it any possibility
though they somehow anticipated modern science. This would be especially misleading for
Origen, who, as we shall see, accepted much of what we would still call astrology.
It is interesting, however, that the sixth-century scholar, John Philoponus, claimed that
Basil made just such a distinction: “What Basil the Great called accurate were not astrologi-
cal observations but astronomical ones” (De opificio mundi 3,6 [Scriptores Sacri et Profani 1,
121,8–9 Reichardt]): ἀκριβεῖς οὖν τηρήσεις οὐ τὰς ἀστρολογικάς, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀστρονομικὰς ὁ μέγας
Βασίλειος εἴρηκεν. English translation by Pablo de Felipe, “Curiosity in the Early Christian Era”
(op. cit.), 46. Philoponus quotes Basil’s remarks about the circular shape and movement of
the heavens (in Homilia in hexaemeron 1,3) against fundamentalist theologians who argued
for a flat earth. Philoponus’s point was that the acceptance of sound scientific ideas did not
imply succumbing to pagan falsehoods like horoscopes. As I shall show, while Basil rejected
horoscopes, we cannot say that he rejected “astrology” in toto.
8 Origen, Homiliae in librum Iudicum 2,3 (GCS 30, 477,5–9 Baehrens): neque saecularis lit-
teraturae amor neque philosophorum sophismata neque mathematicorum deceptiones et
astrorum simulati cursus neque diuinationes subreptiua daemonum fallacia commentatae
neque ullus omnino praescientiae amor per ea quae non licet inquisitae poterit nos separare
a caritate dei quae est in Christo Iesu. English translation by Elizabeth Ann Dively Lauro,
Origen: Homilies on Judges (FOTC 119; Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2010), 57.
of praise and blame or any distinction between acceptable and blame-

worthy behavior.9
Astrological fatalism, he declares, undermined faith and hope in the judgment

of God; it even made God responsible for human sins, since we would then be
destined to commit them because of the stars, which God made.10 Origen was
not the first to point out this problem. As in so many areas, he was anticipated
by Philo, who wrote: “If everything is foreordained by moments of birth, then
law, duty, justice, and the sentences of judges will cease and fall silent; for by
no means would the human will be free to act as one chooses.”11 The problem,
then, was fatalism, not the idea that the stars predict the future per se. Because
the predictive nature of astrology seemed to imply fatalism, as I shall explain,
Origen’s treatment of free will and fatalism had profound consequences for
how he understood it.
Fatalism is the belief that everything that happens, happens necessarily. It
could not be differently. In the ancient world, this belief was associated with
Stoicism, though its roots went back much farther.12 Origen and Basil were
not the first people to argue against it in defense of free will and morality.
In fact, Stoics themselves, like Zeno, Cleanthes, Chrysippus, and Posidonius
tried to show that their own views on destiny still allowed for some measure of
free will.13 For the first Greek philosophers (as for many today), the necessity
of everything that happens was a logical consequence of the law of nature that
mechanically governs the universe. This natural law was best evidenced by the
9 Origen, Philocalia 23,1 (187,20–88,1): ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ πολλῶν τῶν πεπιστευκέναι ὑπολαμβανομένων
περισπωμένων μὴ ἄρα ἠνάγκασται τὰ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα, καὶ ἀμήχανον ἄλλως γενέσθαι ἢ ὡς
οἱ ἀστέρες κατὰ τοὺς διαφόρους σχηματισμοὺς ἐπιτελοῦσιν. ἕπεται δὲ τοῖς ταῦτα δογματίζουσιν
ἐξ ὅλων τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀναιρεῖν· διόπερ καὶ ἔπαινον καὶ ψόγον καὶ πράξεις ἀποδεκτὰς πάλιν τε αὖ
ψεκτάς. English translation by Trigg, Origen (op. cit.), 87. He translates τὸ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν literally
as “what is within in our power,” which I have changed to the standard translation of
“free will.”
11 Philo, De providentia 1,82 (Les Œuvres de Philon d’Alexandrie 35, 194,3–6 Hadas-Lebel;
my trans.): Quod si a natalitiis omnia disponuntur, cessabunt tacebuntque lex, ius, iusti-
tia, uidicum sententiae; haud enim libera est uoluntas hominum ad agendum, quod est
sibi propositum. The Latin is a reprint of Johannes B. Aucher’s translation of the extant
Armenian translation of the lost Greek original (Philonis Judaei Sermones tres hactenus
inedita [Venice: Lazarus, 1822]).
12 See David Amand, Fatalisme et liberté dans l’antiquité grecque: Recherches sur la surviv-
ance de l’argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez les philosophes grecs et
les théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles (Recueil de Travaux d’Histoire et de
Philologie 19,3; Leuven: Bibliothèque de l’Université, 1945), 1–4.
13 See Amand, Fatalisme et liberté, 7–13.
154 Chapter 5
uniform and predictable motion of the sun, moon, stars, and planets.14 Not
only were their movements predictable, but they demonstrably affected life
on earth. This may seem a surprising thing to say, insofar as astrology is now
widely recognized as superstition, at least by the educated. However, actually
disproving astrology is not so simple. David Lindberg explains:
There were compelling reasons for believing that the heavens and the
earth were physically connected. First, there were observational data
that made the connection obvious: nobody could doubt that the heavens
were the major source of light and heat in the terrestrial region; the sea-
sons were plainly connected with solar motion around the ecliptic; the
tides were apparently connected with lunar motion.15
This, then, was the bridge between fatalism and astrology: if the future un-
folds necessarily rather than because of unpredictable, free choices, and if the
movements of the heavenly bodies can be predicted accurately through care-
ful observation,16 and if these bodies affect life on earth, then it is possible
that other events, even human ones, can also be predicted through astrological
study. This line of reasoning is recorded by Cicero:
Since through the procession and retrogression of the stars the great
variety and change of the seasons and of temperature take place, and
since the power of the sun produces such results as are before our eyes,
they believe that it is not merely probable, but certain, that just as the
14 Franz Cumont describes the same worldview among the Babylonians: “From the lead-
ing fact established by them, namely, the invariability of the sidereal revolutions, the
Chaldeans had naturally been led to the idea of a Necessity. […] The divine stars were
subject to an inflexible law, which made it possible to calculate beforehand all that they
would bring to pass” (Astrology and Religion, 28–29).
15 Lindberg, Beginnings of Western Science, 271. This connection was assumed through-
out antiquity and the Middle Ages: “L’existence d’une telle correspondence [i.e., entre
les sphères planétaires et la terre] était et restera une évidence jusqu’à la Renaissance”
(Eric Junod, ed., Origène: Philocalie 21–27, Sur le libre arbitre [SC 226; Paris: Cerf, 1976], 46).
Cumont, writing of Babylonian astrology, says: “The influence which the stars exerted
upon our world seemed undeniable. Did not the rising and setting of the sun every day
bring heat and cold, as well as light and darkness? Did not the changes of the seasons
correspond to a certain state of the sky? What wonder, therefore, that by induction men
arrived at the conclusion that even the lesser stars and their conjunctions had a certain
connection with the phenomena of nature and the events of human life” (Astrology and
Religion, 17–18).
16 Most impressive among the ancients was astrologers’ ability to predict eclipses (Cramer,
Astrology in Law and Politics, 11).
temperature of the air is regulated by this celestial force, so also chil-

dren at their birth are influenced in soul and body and by this force their
minds, manners, disposition, physical condition, career in life and desti-
nies are determined.17
Given this understanding, Origen and Basil could not simply take it for granted
that the stars had nothing to do with what unfolds on earth.
Astrology was popular in the ancient world, as people sought to learn their
futures through the casting of nativities, better known today as horoscopes.
This popular form of astrology brought with it a popularized, unphilosophi-
cal version of fatalism.18 Although Stoic fatalism was in harmony with astrol-
ogy, the fatalism that came with popular astrology was quite different.19 Rather
than being a logical consequence of the ineluctable necessity of the natural
law, popular astrology saw the stars as good and evil forces that exercised con-
trol over human destinies. Ordinary people, including many Christians, sought
to escape their astral destiny, not through the reasoned argument of the Stoics
(which tried to demonstrate some kind of compatibility between fatalism and
free will), but through religious practices, such as prayers and sacrifices. If des-
tiny came from the law of nature, then such practices were obviously futile, as
Origen pointed out.20
Christians were not the only ancient people to reject fatalism. While it was
held by the Stoics, it was also widely rejected by other philosophers, such as
Aristotle, Plato, Epicurus, and Carneades.21 Likewise, astrology itself was not
immune from philosophical criticism. In opposing astrology because it denied
17 Cicero, De divinatione 2,42,89 (500,1–501,4 Pease): etenim cum tempore anni tempesta-
tumque caeli conuersiones commutationesque tantae fiant accessu stellarum et recessu,
cumque ea ui solis efficiantur quae uidemus, non ueri simile solum sed etiam uerum esse
consent perinde, utcumque temperatus sit aër, ita pueros orientis animari atque formari,
ex eoque ingenia, mores, animum, corpus, actionem uitae, casus cuiusque euentusque
fingi. English translation in Cramer, Astrology in Law and Politics (op. cit.), 19.
18 See Amand, Fatalisme et liberté, 14–16.
19 “The rise of Stoicism in the Greek world greatly facilitated the growth of Hellenistic faith
in the science of fatalist astrology” (Cramer, Astrology in Law and Politics, 13). Strict Stoic
fatalism appealed to the more “scientific-minded” astrologers, while the general masses
preferred to believe they could somehow “outsmart” their fate (ibid., 19).
20 Origen, Philicalia 23,2. See Amand, Fatalisme et liberté, 22–28; Cramer: “There was obvi-
ously a logical contradiction between the one type of astrology [i.e., fatalistic] and the
other [which he calls “catarchic”]. For either the stars and constellations exercised an
immutable, or merely an avoidable, influence on earthly affairs. To the ancients, however,
this distinction was by no means clearly apparent” (Astrology, 3). For “catarchic” astrology,
see Bouché-Leclercq, L’Astrologie, 458–86.
21 See Amand, Fatalisme et liberté, 31–33, 33–37, 37–39, and 62–68, respectively.
156 Chapter 5
free will, Origen (and Basil after him) drew deeply upon the anti-astrological
tradition, repeating criticisms that had become standard.22 His use of anti-
fatalistic arguments made by ancient philosophers is yet another illustration
of how philosophy was useful to the theologian: their arguments could be used
to argue against fatalism and astrology in the defense of the Christian doc-
trines of free will, moral responsibility, and divine judgment.23
2 Origen
Origen’s anti-astrological treatise, originally contained in his lost Genesis com-

mentary, has been preserved as the 23rd chapter of the Philocalia. It can be
divided into five parts: an introduction followed by four specific questions he
proposes to answer. In the introduction, he explains the overall problem, of-
fers an anti-Gnostic argument, and concludes with a summary of his whole
argument, complete with a lengthy scriptural demonstration of God’s fore-
knowledge. The four questions are: 1) how free will is compatible with God’s
foreknowledge,24 2) how the stars are only signs and not causes of future
events,25 3) that astrology is impracticable by human beings,26 and 4) why God
gave the stars as signs for the angels to read.27 That is to say, the four questions
cover the topics of 1) fatalism, 2) astrological theory, 3) astrological practice,
and 4) angelic astrology. The final point is also strictly theoretical, as Origen
had no idea how the angels read the stars. By means of these questions Origen
built his own version of astrology that respected its scientific basis in the mani-
fest correspondence between the movements of the stars and life on earth,
while expunging from it all fatalism, superstition, and divination.
After his introduction to the problem, Origen briefly attacks the dualistic
heretics (no doubt the “usual suspects” of Marcion, Valentinus, and Basilides),
who invoked the idea of a Demiurge (Artisan), who made the universe, in order
to absolve the true God from responsibility for the evil that the stars make us
perform. First of all, Origen observes, if the Demiurge made these stars, then
22 “Il répète simplement, comme tant d’autres l’ont fait avant lui, des τόποι scolaires, des
lieux communs apparetenant au patrimonie intellectuel de tout homme éclairé, auquel
la conscience du libre arbitre imposait une mentalité antifataliste” (Amand, Fatalisme et
liberté, 324).
23 Origen, De principiis, praef. 5.
24 Origen, Philocalia 23,7–13.
he, too, was unjust, contrary to their claim that, though he was not good, he
was still just.28 He then turns their own fatalism against them, saying that, if
they believe there is a God higher than the Demiurge, they must believe this
only because the stars made them believe it. But this would undermine their
own view, since it would mean they have the Demiurge and the stars to thank
for telling them about this alleged higher God!29 That is, unless they want to
claim that somehow “they are outside of the laws of the Artisan administered
by the stars.”30 Here he refers to the Gnostic schema of predestination, accord-
ing to which (as he interpreted them) they believed that they were born inher-
ently “spiritual” (and thus apparently free from the stars’ baleful influence),
whereas others were born either “material” or “psychic.”31 But this is merely
“an unproved assertion” that they cannot explain, he says.32 As we have seen,
Origen accepted the same threefold schema the Gnostics did, which divided
Christians into these three categories, but he reacted violently against their un-
derstanding of it, which he interpreted as a rigid class system.33 If the Gnostics
shared the pessimism of later Calvinism (basing itself on the later anti-
Pelagian writings of Augustine) with its doctrine of double predestination,
Origen always held out hope that anyone, perhaps even the devil—in spite of
their former misery—could move towards salvation. At the heart of this belief
was his unflagging defense of free will, which is what compelled him to attack
astrological fatalism.
After this digression against the Gnostics, Origen summarizes his entire ar-
gument. He begins with fatalism and explains that the many prophetic prog-
nostications in Scripture do not imply it.34 With an analogy he exposes the
specious reasoning that led some to think that prophets who foretold the fu-
ture thereby caused it, which is fatalism. The analogy is one of communica-
tion: if person A tells person B about an event that happened to person C, that
does not mean that person A caused the event.35 This is information about the

30 Origen, Philocalia 23,2 (189,11–12; trans. 88): ἔξω τυγχάνουσι τῶν νόμων τοῦ δημιουργοῦ τῶν
κατὰ τοὺς ἀστέρας.
31 Origen, On First Principles 2,9,5; 3,1,21; Irenaeus, Adversus haereses 1,6,1–2; Clement,
Excerpta ex Theodoto 56. See Junod, Philocalie, 138–39, note 2. David Brakke, however, is
skeptical that this is what the Gnostics really meant (Gnostics, 70–74); see Denise K. Buell,
Why This New Race: Ethnic Reasoning in Early Christianity (NY: Columbia University Press,
2005), 116–37.
32 Origen, Philocalia 23,2 (189,13; trans. 88): ἀπόφασις ἀναπόδεικτος.
158 Chapter 5
past, not the future, but Origen insists the principle is the same: don’t shoot
the messenger. This, then, leads him into a lengthy scriptural demonstration
(even though, as he says, “it is obvious from the notion of God itself, even apart
from Scripture”36) that God has total foreknowledge of the future.37 Origen’s
argument here is intended to reassure those many Christians who, due to
their ignorance, fell into fatalistic thinking simply because of the existence
of prophecy.
It what follows I will explain each of Origen’s four arguments in the same
order in which he presents them, because he arranged them in the most logi-
cal way. The first of the four problems Origen proposes to examine is how free
will is compatible with divine foreknowledge. His answer is the same as what
he already said in the summary introduction about prophecy not implying fa-
talism. He even reuses the example of Judas’s foretold betrayal of Jesus.38 His
opponents here are the “many Greeks,” i.e., philosophers, who in order to save
free will denied God’s foreknowledge.39 It is uncertain which philosophers he
has in mind.40 In any case, their argument is not hard to follow:
If God has known from eternity that a certain man would be unjust and
would do such unjust things, and if God’s foreknowledge is infallible, the
man foreseen to be such will be unjust in any case and could not possibly
be other than unjust.41
This is just the common-sense view put into philosophical terms. Its problem,
of course, as Origen makes abundantly clear, is that it eliminated the Christian
doctrines of free will and moral responsibility.
36 Origen, Philocalia 23,4 (191,1–2; trans. 89): καὶ χωρὶς μὲν γραφῆς αὐτόθεν ἐκ τῆς ἐννοίας τῆς
περὶ θεοῦ δῆλον.
39 Origen, Philocalia 23,7 (194,16; my trans.): πολλοί τινες τῶν Ἑλλήνων.
40 Junod: “Il n’est guère possible d’identifier absolument les tenants de cette doctrine, car
nous n’en trouvons aucune trace dans les traités connus sur le destin” (Philocalie, 152–53,
note 1). Hendrik Benjamins thinks that it is “sehr wahrscheinlich” that these were con-
temporary Middle Platonists, who, like Alexander of Aphrodisias, did not believe God’s
foreknowledge to be all-encompassing (Eingeordnete Freiheit: Freiheit und Vorsehung bei
Origenes [Leiden: Brill, 1994], 82, note 63).
41 Origen, Philocalia 23,7 (194,22–26; trans. 93): καὶ φασιν, εἰ ἐξ αἰῶνος ἔγνω ὁ θεὸς τόνδε τινὰ
ἀδικήσειν καὶ τάδε ποιήσειν τὰ ἀδικήματα, ἀψευδὴς δὲ ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ πάντως ἔσται
ἄδικος ποιήσων τάδε τὰ ἀδικήματα ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι προεωραμένος καὶ ἀμήχανον μὴ ἀδικήσειν
αὐτὸν.
Origen’s refutation of this logic is no different from what he already stated

in his introductory summary, though he offers a clearer analogy that involves
human foreknowledge. If someone sees someone else, for example, “walking
with reckless abandon on a slippery path,”42 they will know in advance that
that person will fall. Nevertheless, the observer does not cause them to fall.
God’s foreknowledge works the same way. When God made the world,
[God] surveyed with his mind everything that was going to happen, be-
cause, when one thing happened, something else was the result, a result
that brought on another consequence, which, in turn, caused something
else to happen.43
In other words, God foreknows the future because he has always known every
cause that will ever occur—not because he is himself the cause of everything.
Thus, “paradoxical as it may seem, the truth is that the future event is itself
the cause of such foreknowledge. It does not happen because it was known,
but it was known because it is going to happen.”44 God’s foreknowledge is not
identical to the case of someone knowing that another person walking reck-
lessly will fall. The latter is based, not on the factuality of the future event, but
on general knowledge about what happens when a person walks recklessly on
slippery ground. Nevertheless, Origen’s logic is unassailable and his analogy
apt: one knows an event by perceiving it, yet that perception and knowledge,
even if it somehow occurs beforehand, is not the cause of the event. By way of
hypothesis, if someone were somehow to actually observe someone falling in
the future, they would, by that future observation, know that the person will
fall, but the cause of the fall would still be the slipperiness, not the act of pre-
cognition. So it is with God, who is so great that he has foreknown all events
since before the creation of the universe.
This insight leads Origen to an important semantic clarification, which goes
a long way toward explaining why people wrongly think that foreknowledge
implies fatalism. Since God infallibly knows the future, Origen says, one can
logically say of anything that it is foreknown will happen that “it will happen
42 Origen, Philocalia 23,8 (195,12–13; trans. 93): διὰ δὲ τὴν προπετείαν ἀλογίστως ἐπιβαίνοντα
ὁδοῦ ὀλισθηρᾶς.
43 Origen, Philocalia 23,8 (195,6–9; trans. 93): ἐπιπορεύεται τῷ νῷ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐσομένων, ὁρῶν
ὅτι ἐπεὶ τόδε γέγονε τόδε ἕπεται, ἐὰν δὲ γένηται τόδε τὸ ἑπόμενον τόδε ἀκολουθεῖ, οὗ ὑποστάντος
τόδε ἔσται.
44 Origen, Philocalia 23,8 (195,20–23; trans. 93): ἀλλὰ παραδοξότερον μὲν ἀληθὲς δὲ ἐροῦμεν, τὸ
ἐσόμενον αἴτιον τοῦ τοιάνδε εἶναι τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ πρόγνωσιν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπεὶ ἔγνωσται γίνεται, ἀλλ’
ἐπεὶ ἔμελλεν γίνεσθαι ἔγνωσται.
160 Chapter 5
in any event.”45 However, this does not mean (as people wrongly think) that
therefore “what is foreknown will necessarily happen.”46 He proves this by ap-
pealing to a prophecy of Judas’s betrayal imputing blame to him (Ps 109:12,
16–17). Blame cannot be imputed where necessity is involved. Therefore, un-
less one believes that nothing is praiseworthy or blameworthy, future events,
even if foreknown, must not happen necessarily. To say that “it will happen
in any event,” correctly understood, only means that “these things will happen,
but it would be possible for them to happen otherwise.”47 In other words, one
should not say of things that are foreknown that they must happen but only
that they will happen. God knows how all events will actually turn out, but
the events could be otherwise since they depend on free, human choices. God
simply knows in advance which choices will be made and therefore which
events will transpire. This leads Origen to conclude with a rather curious re-
mark about God’s foreknowledge: “It is possible, concerning things that could
happen or not happen, for him to think that they happen and that they do not
happen.”48 Trigg captures Origen’s meaning here: “God knows what will hap-
pen in the future, but he knows contingent events as contingent.”49 For the
sake of clarity, Origen illustrates his argument with the example of Judas yet
again. It is an abuse of words to say of a foreknown event that it must happen
or that it will necessarily happen. One should say only that it will happen. To
say that everything that is foreknown to happen, will happen, is an empty tru-
ism that does not imply fatalism.
After this first section, the editors of the Philocalia have inserted a related
excerpt from Against Celsus on the same topic of the compatibility of fore-
knowledge and free will.50 Celsus’s argument was that God himself was to
blame for Judas’s betrayal, since Judas had to betray Jesus in order to fulfill
prophecy. Origen’s refutation of this fallacious accusation naturally follows the
same logic I just explained. He makes two of the same points nearly verbatim,
namely that the prophesied event is itself the cause of the prophecy rather
than the reverse (as Celsus imagined), and that to say that a prophecy must
45 Origen, Philocalia 23,8 (195,24; trans. 93): πάντως ἔσται.

46 Origen, Philocalia 23,8 (195,24–25; trans. 93): ὡς ἀνάγκην εἶναι γενέσθαι τὸ προεγνωσμένον.
47 Origen, Philocalia 23,8 (196,7–8; trans. 94, emphasis mine): ὅτι ἔσται μὲν τάδε τινὰ ἐνεδέχετο
δὲ καὶ ἑτέρως γενέσθαι.
48 Origen, Philocalia 23,8 (196,10–12; trans. 94): ἐνδέχεται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων γενέσθαι καὶ
μὴ γενέσθαι φρονῆσαι τὸ γενέσθαι αὐτὰ καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι.
49 Trigg, Origen, 94, note 8.
50 Origen, Contra Celsum 2,20 = Philocalia 23,12–13.
be fulfilled does not mean that it happens “in any event” (i.e., necessarily), but
only that it will happen, even though it could have potentially not happened.51
A useful illustration is provided, which Origen says is called the “idle
argument.”52 He acknowledges that it is a sophism, but the fact that it would
be true under Celsus’s line of reasoning shows that his thinking, namely that
prophecies cause their own fulfillment, was unsound. It goes as follows: if the
future must unfold “in any event,” (i.e., through absolute necessity), one should
say to a man: “If it is fated that you beget a child, whether you have sexual
intercourse with a woman or whether you do not, you will beget a child [and
likewise the contrary]; therefore it is futile to have intercourse with a woman.”53
This is plainly absurd. This specious reasoning was discussed before Origen.
Cicero, to name one example, described the idle argument and its name.54 He
also argued that it did not prove that the future was not fated, but only that
causes led to effects, both of which could be fated.55 In other words, destiny
does not mean you will be healed even without seeing a doctor; it only means
that you will both go to the doctor and also be healed by them. Nevertheless,
the idle argument draws attention to the fact that future events (such as hav-
ing a child), even if destined, only come to pass because of contingent causes
(such as having intercourse), and therefore one should not claim, according
to Origen, that the future will happen “in any event.” The future will certainly
happen, but all the same it would have happened differently if the contingent
causes that led to it had happened differently. This is yet another example of
the usefulness of philosophy, which, however, had to be used critically. One
argument (the idle argument) was used to overturn another idea (that fore-
known events happen necessarily) in the defense of Christian doctrine (free
will and responsibility).
Once Origen has established that foreknowledge does not imply fatalism, he
is able move on to the problem of astrology. That discussion was necessary first
because he argues that the movements of the stars may indicate future events.
What he must now refute is the belief that the stars’ movements cause events
51 Origen, Contra Celsum 2,20 = Philocalia 23,12.

52 Origen, Contra Celsum 2,20 (149,5; trans. 85) = Philocalia 23,12 (199,17): ἀργὸς λόγος.
53 Origen, Contra Celsum 2,20 (150,19–23; trans. 86) = Philocalia 23,13 (201,3–8): εἰ εἵμαρταί
σοι τεκνοποιῆσαι, ἐάν τε συνέλθῃς γυναικὶ ἐάν τε μὴ συνέλθῃς, τεκνοποιήσεις […]· μάτην ἄρα
συνέρχῃ γυναικί.
Origen offers this example after the example of a man being fated to recover from an
illness whether or not he sees a doctor. The procreation example is clearer since it is im-
possible to conceive a child without sexual intercourse, whereas it is possible to get better
without seeing a doctor.
54 Cicero, De fato 12,28–29.
55 Cicero, De fato 13,29–30. Seneca makes the same point (Naturales quaestiones 2,38,4).
162 Chapter 5
(fatalism), which they, in his opinion, only signify. He does not say with cer-
tainty that the stars reveal the future, but twice adds the qualifier “perhaps.”56
This is, then, only a tentative exegesis of Gen 1:14, interpreted in the light of
astrology. He cautiously accepts the theory because of its philosophical cre-
dentials (since celestial movements were known to be predictable and to af-
fect life on earth), but is not completely committed to it since it is unproven.
Origen does not specify exactly what sort of future events may be recorded in
the stars, but he clearly means things related to human life, such as what will
happen to people or what deeds they will do.
One of Origen’s sources for this reading of Gen 1:14 was very likely Philo, who
said plainly that Gen 1:14 meant that the stars “reveal in advance signs of fu-
ture events.”57 Philo listed some of these foretold events, many of which were
meteorological, but also “the births and deaths of animals”58 and “tremors and
earthquakes.”59 Like Origen, he denied that the stars were causes of events,60
though he nevertheless affirmed “their sympathetic affinity to things on earth.”61
Though it did not dictate what happened on earth, this connection (συμπάθεια)
between heaven and earth was somehow necessary for the preservation of the
whole universe.62 Unlike Origen, Philo here did not mention human events nor
the casting of horoscopes, forms of astrology that he must have rejected, where-
as Origen says nothing about the weather or earthquakes. A closer parallel to
Origen’s argument about astral signification vs. causality is found in Plotinus, as
I shall show.63 This is not a case of direct, literary dependence, for each author
deploys the arguments for a different purpose and in a different form, and they
use different words.64 Plotinus and Origen must have drawn upon a pre-existing
philosophical tradition. Junod speculates that they may have learned these ar-
guments from Plotinus’s teacher, Ammonius Saccas.65 This may be so, but the
hypothesis is complicated by the possibility that Origen may not be the same
person named Origen who studied under Ammonius Saccas.66
56 Origen, Philocalia 23,15 (203,24; trans. 97) and 16 (204,15; trans. 98): εἰ ἄρα.
57 Philo, De opificio mundi 58 (19,6–7; trans. 60): σημεῖα μελλόντων προφαίνωσιν.
58 Philo, De opificio mundi 58 (19,10; trans. 60): ζῴων τε γενέσεις καὶ φθοράς.
59 Philo, De opificio mundi 59 (19,14; trans. 60): καὶ κλόνον καὶ σεισμὸν γῆς.
60 Philo, De specialibus legibus 1,13–14.
61 Philo, De specialibus legibus 1,16 (Philonis Alexandrini Opera Quae Supersunt 5, 4,18
Cohn): τὴν πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια συμπάθειαν. English translation by F. H. Colson, “The Special
Laws,” in Philo (op. cit.), (7:98–607) 7:107.
62 Philo, De specialibus legibus 1,16.
63 Plotinus, Enneada 3,1,5–6.
64 See Junod, Philocalie, 56–57.
65 Junod, Philocalie, 57–58.
66 Eusebius, following Porphyry (Vita Plotini 3,14,20), says that Origen was a student of
Ammonius Saccas (Historia ecclesiastica 6,19). However, Porphyry’s description of Origen
To understand the arguments that follow, one must understand the basics of
Greco-Roman genethlialogy, which I shall now explain.67 Ancient astrologers
divided the star-filled sky into twelve segments of thirty degrees each, which
they called the “zodiac,” because most of the twelve segments were named after
animals (e.g., Leo [lion], Taurus [bull]).68 Each zodiac was defined by a particu-
lar constellation of stars within it.69 These segments then served as fixed loca-
tions through which the planets continuously moved, so that at one moment,
for example, Neptune would be in Taurus and later that same night in Gemini.
The practice of casting a “nativity” probably originated in Greek civilization in
the third or second century bce.70 A “nativity” is the recording at the moment
of one’s birth (hence the name) of the positions occupied by the seven “wan-
dering” stars (πλάνητες, planets), that is, the sun, the moon, Mercury, Venus,
Mars, Saturn, and Neptune. Positions could be general (one of the twelve
zodiacs) or precise (a degree). These seven bodies were wrongly called “wan-
dering” because they moved separately from the rest of the stars, although
even ancient astrologers/astronomers could chart their regular movements.71
In addition to the seven “planets,” they also recorded which star was ascend-
ing on the horizon at that moment, which they called the ὡροσκόπος (hence
“horoscope”).72 All this data together constituted the nativity.
Origen has three arguments to prove that the stars and planets do not
cause future events. First, effects cannot precede their causes: “Anything that
is so at variance with what we know of him (e.g., that he was raised a pagan [Historia eccle-
siastica 6,19,7] and wrote a book about daemons [Vita Plotini 3,20]), that the more likely
explanation may be that this was another Origen (and perhaps even another Ammonius)
whom Porphyry (and thus Eusebius) conflated with the Christian Origen. It is a matter
of interpretation, and scholars who tend to see Origen as a Platonist also tend to see one
Origen, whereas those who see him as primarily a preacher and biblical scholar tend
toward two Origens. For the secondary literature on this debate, see Junod, Philocalie,
57–58, note 2.
67 See Roger Beck, A Brief History of Ancient Astrology (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers,
2007), 20–25.
68 Cumont defines zodiac thus: “A geometrical division of the circle in which the planets
move, into twelve equal parts, each subdivided into three portions or decans, equivalent
to ten of our degrees” (Astrology and Religion, 12).
69 “In the age of Democritus and Anaxagoras, Mesopotamian scholars established the fixed
arrangement of constellations which we call the zodiac, whose earliest known appear-
ance occurred in a cuneiform text of 419 B.C.” (Cramer, Astrology in Law and Politics, 8).
70 Cramer, Astrology in Law and Politics, 27–28.
71 On this misnomer, see Plato, Leges 822a.
72 Manilius, Astronomica 3 (Bibliotheca Scriptorum Graecorum et Romanorum Teubneriana,
66,205 Goold): surgentem horoscopon. Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,5 (97,18): τὸν
ὡροσκοποῦντα ἀστέρα. See Beck, History of Astrology, 26–28.
164 Chapter 5
produces an effect must be earlier than the effect produced.”73 Yet astrologers
claimed to learn from a person’s horoscope even past events, such as “what
sort of person the father was, rich or poor [etc. …], and the same things con-
cerning the mother and any older brothers or sisters there may chance to be.”74
Thus, it must be conceded, Origen argues, that the stars are merely signs and
not causes of past events. But if they merely signify past events, why not say
the same of future events? What is the difference? “If they cannot supply this
difference, they ought reasonably to assent that nothing takes place in human
affairs because of the stars, but, as we have already said, they are, perhaps,
signified.”75 In other words, since the positions of the planets at the moment
of someone’s birth can’t be the cause of the events in the lives of that person’s
parents and older siblings, since those events have already happened, it should
be conceded that neither do they cause the events of that person’s life. They
may only signify events, past or future.
Plotinus shared Origen’s belief that the stars were merely signs and not
causes.76 Indeed, he used this same argument about parents: “How is it possi-
ble to make out the stars to be causes of a condition which existed in the father
and mother previously to that star pattern on which the prediction is based?”77
Origen returns to this point when he questions why augers claim only that
73 Origen, Philocalia 23,14 (202,9–10; trans. 96): πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ποιοῦν πρεσβύτερον τοῦ πεποιημένου.
Theophilus of Antioch used this same argument, also commenting on the creation of the
heavenly bodies, but to prove a different point, namely that the sun is not the source of
plant life (Ad Autolycum 2,15). This overlap is likely a coincidence.
Origen said earlier that God’s foreknowledge is caused by the future events them-
selves. Though this may seem to contradict this principle that causes must precede ef-
fects, God’s foreknowledge is not actually “before” anything, since God exists eternally
outside of created time. Talking about things “before” time and the universe begin is an
imperfect, but necessary, analogy because language is inherently temporal. As Panayiotis
Tzamalikos puts it, “The points where he seems to speak as if God had foreknowledge, not
timeless knowledge, are only loose and inaccurate expressions used inevitably, yet con-
sciously, because of the limited potential of language to express what is beyond language”
(The Concept of Time in Origen [Bern: Peter Lang, 1991], 18).
74 Origen, Philocalia 23,14 (202,25–29; trans. 97): περὶ πατρὸς, ποταπὸς ὢν τυγχάνει, πλούσιος
ἢ πένης [κτλ….]· τὰ δ’ αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς μητρὸς, καὶ περὶ πρεσβυτέρων ἀδελφῶν, ἐὰν τύχωσιν
ὄντες.
75 Origen, Philocalia 23,15 (203,21–24; trans. 97): μὴ ἔχοντες δὲ δοῦναι τὴν διαφορὰν εὐγνωμόνως
συγκαταθήσονται τῷ μηδὲν τῶν κατὰ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπὸ τῶν ἀστέρων γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ ὡς
προειρήκαμεν, εἰ ἄρα, σημαίνεσθαι.
76 Plotinus, Enneada 3,1,5.
77 Plotinus, Enneada 3,1,5 (Oxford Classical Texts/Plotini Opera 1, Henry/Schwyzer): πῶς
ἔνι ποιεῖσθαι λέγειν ταῦτα, ἃ προυπάρχει περὶ τοὺς γονεῖς πρὶν τὴν σχέσιν γενέσθαι ταύτην
τῶν ἄστρων ἀφ’ ἧς προλέγουσι; English translation by Stephen MacKenna, Plotinus: The
Enneads (2nd ed.; London: Faber and Faber, 1956), 157.
“auguries from birds and sacrifices, even auguries from shooting stars, do not
contain the efficient cause but only signify, while making horoscopes a special
case.”78 So also Plotinus:
If the stars are held to be causing principles on the ground of the pos-
sibility of foretelling individual fate or fortune from observation of their
positions, then the birds and all the other things which the soothsayer
observes for divination must equally be taken as causing what they
indicate.79
If they were willing to concede that some forms of divination were merely
indicative rather than causal, they should save themselves the philosophical
dilemma and say the same about horoscopes. What reason is there to think
that one form of divination is causal and another merely predictive? That is
Origen’s argument.
Origen’s second argument against a causal understanding of genethlialogy
is that, if stars are causes, then many different configurations of stars must be
the cause of one and the same event, since events often affect many people at
once. For example, if a man is destined to be murdered by robbers, this must be
caused not only by his own horoscope by also by “those of his father, mother,
wife, children, servants, and friends, and likewise from those of the murder-
ers themselves.”80 This is absurd because an event can have only one “effi-
cient cause” (an Aristotelian term).81 The alternative would be to say that only
the victim’s horoscope causes the murder, and that all the other horoscopes
merely signify it, but then one is right back to Origen’s previous argument: if
some horoscopes merely signify, why not simply concede that all horoscopes
merely signify?82 Yet again we find the same reasoning in Plotinus: “In the lot
of one brother they are foretelling the death of another.”83
78 Origen, Philocalia 23,16 (205,18–21; trans. 99): ἐπὶ τὸ τὴν μὲν οἰωνιστικὴν καὶ τὴν θυτικὴν μὴ
λέγειν περιέχειν τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ σημαίνειν μόνον, καὶ τὴν ἀστεροσκοπικὴν, οὐκ ἔτι δὲ
τὴν γενεθλιαλογικήν. Trigg translates σημαίνειν as “are indications,” but I use “signify” for
consistency and clarity.
79 Plotinus, Enneada 3,1,5 (trans. 157): εἰ δ’ ὅτι εἰς τὴν τῶν ἄστρων σχέσιν ὁρῶντες περὶ ἑκάστων
λέγουσιν τὰ γινόμενα, παρ’ ἐκείνων ποιεῖσθαι τεκμαίρονται, ὁμοίως ἂν καὶ οἱ ὄρνεις ποιητικοὶ ὧν
σημαίνουσιν εἶεν καὶ πάντα, εἰς ἃ βλέποντες οἱ μάντεις προλέγουσιν.
80 Origen, Philocalia 23,16 (204,24–27; trans. 98): ὁμοίως καὶ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ τὴν τῆς μητρὸς
καὶ τὴν τῆς γαμετῆς καὶ τῶν υἱῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν καὶ τῶν φιλτάτων, τάχα δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν
τῶν ἀναιρούντων.
81 Origen, Philocalia 23,16 (205,19; trans. 16): τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον.
83 Plotinus, Enneada 3,1,5 (trans. 157): λέγουσι καὶ ἐξ ἀδελφῶν ἀδελφῶν θανάτους.
166 Chapter 5
Finally, Origen’s third refutation: given the diversity of horoscopes, how is

it that they cause everyone of a given culture to undergo the same customary
rituals, such as circumcision for Jewish boys on the eighth day?84 This exact
argument from circumcision was previously used by Philo: “The spiritual law,
not genethlialogy, commands them.”85 This argument from “foreign customs”
(νόμιμα βαρβάρικα) was a philosophical commonplace.86 Origen, probably
under the direct influence of Philo again, draws upon this traditional argu-
ment. Philosophy again serves its useful purpose.87
Proving that the stars cannot cause human events, whether past or future,
is only part half of Origen’s argument. The second blow, more devastating, is
that genethlialogy is, at least for human beings, impracticable. His argument
is, once again, threefold. He purports to base it on what astrologers themselves
say rather than constructing a straw-man: “Those who concern themselves
with these things say […].”88 “They say” (φασι[ν], φασίν) appears five times,
along with “they themselves concede […].”89 Origen either drew upon some
astrological work he had read or he acquired this information indirectly from
the same anti-astrological work that included the statements of astrologers.90
His first point is that the precision required in noting the exact positions of
the stars and the planets exceeded the technical ability of astrologers.91 It is
not enough, Origen claims, to note in which zodiacs the planets are positioned
at the moment of someone’s birth (which is easily done). One must note the
exact degree, arcminute (1/60 of a degree, called a λέπτον), and, for the “more

85 Philo, De providentia 1,84 (195,32–33; my trans.): lex enim mentis imperat eis, non
genethlialogia.
86 Amand, Fatalisme et liberté, 55–60. “Il est tiré, d’une part, de l’identité des dispositions
physiques et psychiques, de la constance des lois et des mœurs chez les individus faisant
partie d’un peuple déterminé ou d’une tribu donné et, d’autre part, de l’incroyable diver-
sité qui règne, de peuple à peuple, de tribu à tribu, entre leurs habitudes physiques, intel-
lectuelles et morales et entre leurs us et coutumes. Cette constatation démontre que la
vie de l’homme n’est point régentée et produite par l’influence fatale d’une constellation,
mais qu’elle est au contraire grandement conditionnée par l’arbitraire des institutions
humaines” (ibid., 55–56).
87 Amand traces the entire anti-astrological tradition in philosophy back to Carneades, who
left behind no writings (Fatalisme et liberté, 41–43).
88 Origen, Philocalia 23,17 (206,1–2; trans. 99): φασὶ τοίνυν οἱ περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὶ […].
89 Origen, Philocalia 23,18 (207,11; my trans.): αὐτοὶ ὁμολογήσουσιν.
90 Cf. Scott: “It is true that most of his information probably comes from philosophical (es-
pecially Academic) attacks on astrology” (Life of the Stars, 119).
91 Although the planets were the main bodies of significance, some astrologers also noted
the positions of some stars (called παρανατέλλοντα) that rose at the same time as the zo-
diacal constellation (Cramer, Astrology in Law and Politics, 25).
rigorous astronomers,” arcsecond (1/60 of a minute, called a δευτερολέπτον) of

the positions of the planets.92 This exacting level of measurement is why twins,
born only minutes apart, have different destinies.93 That astrologers agreed
that such accuracy was important is confirmed by Manilius, who reports that
“the great differences [are] effected by small moments.”94 He mentions a dif-
ferent way of dividing up the sky: rather than dividing each zodiac into thir-
ty degrees, he divided them into twelve “dodecatemories” (δωδεκατημόρια).95
Such a system would require two and a half times less precision than using
arcminutes, let alone arcseconds.
Like the three prior arguments about causality, Origen drew this argument
about precision from the pre-existing tradition of criticism. Similar arguments
about the impracticability of astrology are found in the philosopher Sextus
Empiricus (late second and early third century ce).96 He gave many more rea-
sons than Origen for why it would be impossible to accurately measure the
positions of the planets at a given moment. One of these resembles Origen’s,
namely that the sky rotates much too quickly:
While the [astrologer] is gazing upward and looking round to discover in

which of the Signs the Moon lies and each of the other stars, the “dispo-
sition” of the stars changes, as the Universe in its motion revolves at an
incredible speed, before he had described after observation the things
seen in the heavens at the child’s natural hour.97
At best, the astrologer could note the correct position of a single body, such
as the moon, but would be unable to observe the other six planets before they
92 Origen, Philocalia 23,18. On the terminology, see Tim Hegedus, Early Christianity and
Ancient Astrology (Patristic Studies 6; NY: Peter Lang, 2007), 31.
94 Manilius, Astronomica 1 (2,57): quantaque quam parui facerent discrimina motus. English
translation by George Patrick Goold, Manilius: Astronomica (LCL 469; Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1977), 9. Cf. ibid. 2 (51,693–52,739).
95 Manilius, Astronomica 2 (51,693–99).
96 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos 5,50–88. Amand describes the same argument
in Carneades, though its details are unknown since it has not been preserved (Fatalisme
et liberté, 49–51, and 314, note 2).
97 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos 5,70 (740,18–24 Bekker): ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ᾧ οὗτος
ἀναβλέπει καὶ περισκοπῶν ἐξετάζει τὸ ἐν τίνι τῶν ζωδίων ἐστὶν ἡ σελήνη καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀστέρων
ἕκαστος, φθάνει ἀλλοῖον γενέσθαι τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας διάθεμα, τῆς τοῦ κόσμου κινήσεως
ἀλήπτῳ τάχει περιφερομένης, πρὶν τηρητικῶς παραπλάσασθαι τῇ τοῦ γεννηθέντος ὥρᾳ τὰ κατ’
οὐρανὸν βλεπόμενα. English translation by Robert Gregg Bury, Sextus Empiricus: Against
Professors (LCL 382; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1949), 353.
168 Chapter 5
moved from their former positions. This argument assumes that astrologers
needed a high level of accuracy and were not merely jotting down in which
zodiacs the planets lay. Like Origen, Sextus pointed out that people born at ap-
proximately the same time (e.g., twins) nevertheless could have different desti-
nies, proving that even a very brief span of time was astrologically significant.98
Philo also noted that the sky moved too quickly to measure it at the exact mo-
ment of birth.99
The scholar Auguste Bouché-Leclercq criticized this rebuttal and defended
the astrologers on two grounds.100 First, he says, they were able to accomplish
more than Sextus and Origen gave them credit for, since they did not have to
rely on on-the-spot measurements of each planet but could derive the posi-
tions of the rest from the observation of just one, by using astronomical tables
they had created.101 After all, their movements were perfectly regular. This cer-
tainly is a flaw in their argument since they show no awareness of the existence
of such tables. Yves Courtonne, however, came to their defense by arguing that
even the several seconds required to take even the one necessary measure-
ment would result in inaccuracy.102 That is, though Sextus and Origen were
wrong about how planetary measurements were made, their underlying point
that the sky moves too quickly to be measured precisely was valid. Secondly,
Bouché-Leclercq says that it is unfair to criticize ancient astrologers for inac-
curacy, since even modern astronomers must accept some level of error in
their measurements. Should they have just given up, then, or should they not
be praised for having tried their best?103 I would say that, if the inaccuracy
of those measurements was enough to produce mistaken results, as the twins
argument indicates, then one would have been well advised to consider horo-
scopes an unreliable source of information.
Origen’s second argument against genethlialogy is that, even if it were possi-
ble to measure the positions of planets with sufficient accuracy, the precession
of the equinoxes (as it is now known) makes it impossible to know the posi-
tions the zodiacs theoretically once held. As Origen relates it, the sky is rotating
98 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos 5,88.

99 Philo, De providentia 1,87 (198,16–17; my trans.): ita ut fugiat eruditissimos quoque certus
cursus: “The exact circuits fly past even the best of them.”
100 Bouché-Leclercq, L’Astrologie, 591–92.
101 Bouché-Leclercq, L’Astrologie, 591.
102 Yves Courtonne, Saint Basile et l’Hellenisme: Etude sur la rencontre de la pensee chretienne
avec la sagesse antique dans l’hexaemeron de Basile le grand (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1934),
193.
103 “S’evertuaient aussi de leur mieux” (Bouché-Leclercq, L’Astrologie, 591).
eastward by about one degree per century.104 Here he shows his knowledge of
astrology,105 for he accurately relates the discovery of Hipparchus, who “de-
termined that the tropical and equinoctial points move at least 1/100° a year
backward through the signs of the ecliptic.”106 Either he read of Hipparchus’s
discovery in his own study of astrology, or he again took the argument from
a pre-existing source. He says he relied upon the words of astrologers them-
selves, who “say that the results for human destiny are discovered not from the
form [i.e., actual position], but from the theoretical concept of the sign of the
zodiac.”107 It seems that the “theoretical concept” represented an ideal, original
state, and that the slow drifting of the sky was an aberration that needed to be
corrected for. The problem, of course, was that they could not calculate the
exact rate of precession, and thus another layer of inaccuracy was introduced.
The predictions of more ignorant astrologers who did not know about the pre-
cession would be hopelessly wrong.
Origen’s third and final argument is that, even if it were possible to compen-
sate for this drift, or simply to ignore it, astrology is impracticable because the
stars affect each other and cancel out one another’s influences. He explains:
Thus a demonstrably bad star can be impaired by its aspect with another
star, because that star is in an aspect that might or might not be impor-
tant with yet another star that is good. By the same token, the impair-
ment of a bad star that would have happened because it is in aspect with
a good star is prevented because yet another star, with bad indications,
occupies a certain position in the configuration.108

105 “Some of Origen’s astronomical knowledge is fairly sophisticated. For example, he is fa-
miliar with Hipparchus’ theory” (Scott, Life of the Stars, 118).
106 Charles Coulston Gillispie, ed., Dictionary of Scientific Biography (vol. 15; NY: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1978), s.v. “Hipparchus,” 218. “The Earth’s spin causes it to be slightly
flattened at the poles relative to the equator. Precession occurs because the Sun’s grav-
ity induces torque, or angular force, which pulls the Earth’s equatorial bulge toward the
ecliptic” (“Precession,” University of Michigan Astronomy Department, dept.astro.lsa.
umich.edu/ugactivities/Labs/precession).
107 Origen, Philocalia 23,18 (207,3–6; trans. 100): τὰ δὲ ἀποτελέσματά φασιν εὑρίσκεσθαι οὐκ ἐκ
τοῦ μορφώματος, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ νοητοῦ ζωδίου.
108 Origen, Philocalia 23,18 (207,12–17; trans. 100): ἀμαυρουμένου τοῦ δηλουμένου φέρε εἰπεῖν
χείρονος ἀπὸ τοῦδε, διὰ τὸ ἐπιβλέπεσθαι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ κρείττονος, καὶ ἐπὶ τοσόνδε ἢ
τοσόνδε ἀμαυρουμένου· πολλάκις πάλιν τῆς ἀμαυρώσεως τῆς τοῦ χείρονος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιβλέψεως
τῆς τοῦ κρείττονος ἐμποδιζομένης, ἐκ τοῦ ἕτερον οὑτωσὶ ἐσχηματίσθαι, χειρόνων ὄντα
σημαντικόν.
170 Chapter 5
Once again Origen draws his argument directly from the astrologers them-
selves, who, he says, “admit that it is impossible to account adequately for what
they call the ‘combination’ of stars in such configurations.”109 As with his previ-
ous two arguments, this boils down to the problem of technical accuracy. The
movements of the stars are simply too complex to be grasped. Therefore, the
attempt to make predictions based on them should be abandoned as hopeless.
Although Origen refutes genethlialogy as it was actually practiced, he also
develops his own alternative theory of astrology, which affirms the underly-
ing significance of planetary movements. He introduces his theory as a re-
sponse to a hypothetical objection: an apocryphal, but apparently influential,
book called the “Prayer of Joseph” (now lost), said that the biblical patriarch
Jacob “read in the tablet of heaven what will happen to you and to your sons.”110
This means that the source of Jacob’s prophecy in Genesis 49 was an astro-
logical reading. Origen accepts this and compares the sky to a book written
with “heavenly letters.”111 Besides Gen 1:14, he finds scriptural support for this
in Isa 34:4a (“Heaven shall roll up like a scroll”), Jer 10:2b (“Do not be afraid of
the signs of the sky”), and Wisdom 7:17–19 (“For it is he who gave me unerring
knowledge of what exists, to know the structure of the world and the activity
of the elements; […] the cycles of the year and the constellations of the stars”).
Once again, we see overlap with Plotinus, who says of the stars: “They furnish
the incidental service of being letters on which the augur, acquainted with
that alphabet, may look and read the future from their pattern.”112 However,
Plotinus did not limit this ability to extraordinary spiritual beings. He shared
Origen’s goal of attacking fatalism, but not his goal of debunking astrologers.
After all, Origen was a Christian, but Plotinus a pagan philosopher. For Origen,
this was not a vindication of pagan astrology, which he had just debunked,
because only a select few, like Jacob, had been taught this divine art that is
“exceeding human nature.”113 It should be said, though, that the idea that the
art of “reading the heavens” was revealed by heaven was also held by pagan
astrologers. Manilius says that the first astrologers were priests, whose “pure
109 Origen, Philocalia 23,18 (207,9–12; trans. 100): ἀλλὰ τήν γε σύγκρασιν παρ’ αὐτοῖς καλουμένην
τῶν ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς σχηματισμοῖς τυγχανόντων καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογήσουσιν οὐχ οἷοί τε σῶσαι κατ’
ἀξίαν. See Bouché-Leclercq, L’Astrologie, 158–255.
110 Origen, Philocalia 23,15 (204,2–3; trans. 97): ἀνέγνων γὰρ ἐν ταῖς πλαξὶ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὅσα
συμβήσεται ὑμῖν καὶ τοῖς υἱοῖς ὑμῶν.
111 Origen, Philocalia 23,20 (209,22–23; trans. 102): τὰ οὐράνια γράμματα.
112 Plotinus, Enneada 3,1,6 (trans. 158): παρέχεται δὲ καὶ ἄλλην χρείαν τὴν τοῦ εἰς αὐτὰ ὥσπερ
γράμματα βλέποντας τοὺς τὴν τοιαύτην γραμματικὴν εἰδότας ἀναγινώσκειν τὰ μέλλοντα ἐκ τῶν
σχημάτων.
113 Origen, Philocalia 23,19 (208,8–9; trans. 100): πνεύματι περισσοτέρῳ χρησάμενοι τῆς
ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως.
minds were kindled by the very presence of the powerful deity, and the God of
heaven brought his servants to a knowledge of heaven and disclosed its secrets
to them.”114 Thus, they likely would have assured Origen that they were pre-
cisely those God-taught people like Jacob. So, while he maintained the theory
of astrology, he tried to invalidate its practice: divine astrology was real, but the
pagan astrologers were shams.
If Origen is cautious about the idea of the stars being signs, he is even more
cautious when speculating about why God made them so. He uses expressions
like “I conjecture,”115 “it is possible,”116 and “it is probable.”117 First, he says that
the fact that the stars serve as signs proved the power of God, who not only
comprehends a nearly infinite number of events, but inscribes these events
into the heavens.118 Second, it may be that the heavens can be read by “the
powers that manage human affairs,” that is, angels.119 From this “book” they
learn about “Creation and certain other mysteries.”120 They even receive divine
instructions about how to manage the human realm, just as human beings
learn about these mysteries and receive God’s commandments in the book of
Scripture.121
It is worth mentioning that Origen also discusses astrology when interpret-
ing the story of the Magi, who have seemed to many readers, both ancient and
modern, like astrologers who predict the birth of Christ by means of a star
(Matt 2:1–12).122 He does not mention this in his Genesis commentary because
he does not consider the Magi to have been astrologers.123 Origen considers
them magicians “in communion with daemons, and by their formulas they in-
voke them for the ends which they desire.”124 This is a possible meaning of the
word μάγος (magus, magician).125 He also says that the “star” they saw was in
fact “a new star and not like any of the ordinary ones […. It] is to be classed
114 Manilius, Astronomica 1 (2,48–50; trans. 9): quibus ipsa potentis numinis accendit castam
praesentia mentem, inque deum deus ipse tulit patuitque ministris.
115 Origen, Philocalia 23,20 (209,16; trans. 101): στοχάζομαι.
116 Origen, Philocalia 23,20 (209,22; trans. 102): ἐνδέχεται.
117 Origen, Philocalia 23,21 (210,7; trans. 102): εἰκὸς.
119 Origen, Philocalia 23,20 (209,16–17; trans. 101): ταῖς τὰ ἀνθρώπινα οἰκονομούσαις δυνάμεσιν.
120 Origen, Philocalia 23,20 (209,20; trans. 102): κοσμοποιίας καὶ εἴτινα ἄλλα μυστηρία.
122 Origen, Contra Celsum 1,58–60.
123 Origen, Contra Celsum 1,58. Many would disagree with Origen (e.g, Cumont, Astrology and
Religion, 26).
124 Origen, Contra Celsum 1,60 (110,23–25; trans. 54): ὅτι μάγοι δαίμοσιν ὁμιλούντες καὶ τούτους
ἐφ’ ἃ μεμαθήκασι καὶ βούλονται καλοῦντες ποιοῦσι μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον.
125 See Greek-English Lexicon, s.v., “μάγος.”
172 Chapter 5
with the comets which occasionally occur.”126 Comets, he says, may presage
either bad or good events, and he cites the Stoic philosopher Chaeremon to
support this.127 The magi noticed this comet because they were trying to fig-
ure out why their magic had stopped working. Origen tentatively subscribed
(“it is probable,” he says) to the theory, common among early Christians, that
the birth of Jesus banished all magic: “the daemons lost their strength and be-
came weak; their sorcery was confuted and their power overthrown.”128 They
found their answer not through astrology but Scripture, specifically Num 24:17:
“A star shall dawn out of Jacob, and a person shall rise up out of Israel.” This
led them to look for the “star,” which they followed to Jesus. Thus, in Origen’s
tenuous account, the magi’s statement, “For we have seen his star in the East,
and have come to worship him” (Matt 2:2), refers to a comet predicted by the
Old Testament. Since this interpretation divests the story of any astrological
significance, Origen has no reason to mention it in his treatment of astrology.
3 Basil
Basil’s attack on astrology appears in the same context as Origen’s: the inter-
pretation of Gen 1:14.129 This fact, combined with close similarities in content,
some word-for-word correspondence, and the fact that Origen’s is found in the
Philocalia, makes it certain that Basil drew directly upon Origen’s.130 That is not
to say, of course, that there is nothing original in Basil’s treatment. Moreover,
126 Origen, Contra Celsum 1,58 (109,28–31; trans. 53): καινὸν [ἀστέρα] εἶναι νομίζομεν καὶ μηδενὶ
τῶν συνήθων παραπλήσιον, […] ἀλλὰ τῷ γένει τοιοῦτον γεγονέναι, ὁποῖοι κατὰ καιρὸν γινόμενοι
κομῆται.
128 Origen, Contra Celsum 1,60 (111,30–32; trans. 54): διὰ τοῦτο οἱ δαίμονες ἠτόνησαν καὶ
ἐξησθένησαν, ἐλεγχθείσης αὐτῶν τῆς γοητείας καὶ καταλυθείσης τῆς ἐνεργείας.
This theory was first expressed by Ignatius (Ad Ephesianos 19,2–3 [Patres Apostolici 2,
86,21–26 Funk]): “A star shone forth in heaven brighter than all the stars […]. There was
perplexity as to the origin of this novelty, so unlike the others. Thus all magic was dis-
solved”: ἀστὴρ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἔλαμψεν ὑπὲρ πάντας τοὺς ἀστέρας […]· ταραχή τε ἦν, πόθεν ἡ
καινότης ἡ ἀνόμοιος αὐτοῖς. ὅθεν ἐλύετο πᾶσα μαγεία. English translation by Robert McQueen
Grant, “Ephesians,” in Ignatius of Antioch (The Apostolic Fathers 4; Camden, NJ: Thomas
Nelson & Sons, 1966), (29–55) 50–51.
130 Cf. Amand: “Une seule chose me semble probable, c’est que l’element chretien, tout ad-
ventice, inséré dans une démonstration exclusivement philosophique, a grande chance
d’avoir été inspiré par Origène” (Fatalisme et liberté, 399). Cf. Utto Riedinger, OSB, Die
Heilige Schrift im Kampf der griechischen Kirche gegen die Astrologie: von Origenes bis
Johannes von Damaskos, Studien zur Dogmengeschichte und zur Geschichte der Astrologie
the rhetorical forms their arguments take are quite different: whereas Origen
offered a commentarial treatment structured around four specific questions,
Basil’s argument is a diatribe, replete with sarcasm and mockery, meant both
to entertain and to inform.131 Also noteworthy is what Basil does not say: he is
silent about astrological theory, neither affirming nor denying that the stars
may be signs of the future.132 The reason for his silence is probably that he was
conscious of his duty as bishop and preacher to guard his flock against pagan-
ism and heresy. It would have been dangerous to give astrology any foothold by
saying that certain spiritual people could use it to discern the future. After all,
what was to stop an astrologer from claiming to be just such a gifted person?
Before looking at his anti-astrological comments, we should consider how
Basil actually interprets Gen 1:14.133 Just as with vv. 1–2 (prime matter) and 6–7
(the water above the firmament), Basil begins with an interpretation of the
text’s proper meaning before countering misinterpretations. The planets are
signs of the future in only a very restricted sense: the sun and moon affect the
weather.
If anyone will investigate with ordinary care their signs, they will find
that the observations derived through long experience with them are
useful. Much information can be obtained about the heavy rains, much
about droughts and the blowing of the winds, either of particular winds
or winds in general, of violent or gentle ones.134
His interpretation is somewhat similar to Philo’s, though the range of predict-

able phenomena is much narrower in scope. He quotes Matt 16:3a (“It will be
stormy today, for the sky is red and threatening”) as scriptural evidence. The
(Innsbruck: Wagner, 1956), 48, note 2. Some of the arguments that follow I have made
previously in my article, “Basil’s Uses of Origen,” 477–84.
131 Cf. Amand: “Cet ‘excursus’ […] n’est autre qu’une violent sortie contre les ‘Chaldéens,’
une diatribe débitée sur un ton persifleur, une vive semonce corsée de mordantes plai-
santeries” (Fatalisme et liberté, 393). Cf. Riedinger: “[Basileios] weist dann mit über-
legener Ironie die verstiegenen Ansprüche der Sterndeuter zurück” (Kampf gegen die
Astrologie, 47).
132 Cf. Amand: “En dehors de cette sixième homélie de l’Hexaémeron, Basile n’attaque pas ex-
plicitement l’astrologie [i.e., astrological theory],” (Fatalisme et liberté, 398, note 1).
134 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,4 (94,8–11; trans. 89): ἐὰν μή τις πέρα τοῦ μέτρου τὰ ἀπ’
αὐτῶν σημεῖα περιεργάζηται, χρησίμους αὐτῶν τὰς ἐκ τῆς μακρᾶς ἐμπειρίας παρατηρήσεις
εὑρήσει. πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ περὶ ἐπομβρίας ἐστὶ μαθεῖν, πολλὰ δὲ περὶ αὐχμῶν καὶ πνευμάτων
κινήσεως ἢ μερικῶν ἢ καθόλου, βιαίων ἢ ἀνειμένων. I have changed “he will find” to “they will
find” for εὑρήσει.
174 Chapter 5
examples he gives consider the sun and moon only, not the planets or stars.
For example, whenever the sun looks red and misty, it is because the air is
dense with moisture, which means a storm will ensue.135 He has taken this and
other examples from Aristotle’s Meteorology or similar sources.136 Although it
is impossible to say his exact source, we see again how Basil drew upon his
natural-science education in the Hexaemeron. Secular learning, selectively
used, offered his hearers tidbits of information both about the world God
made and the meaning of Genesis 1. The scientific references are supplement-
ed by acknowledging how farmers and sailors read the sky.137 Finally, Basil says
that the sun and moon will serve as signs of the end of the world, a point he
makes by misquoting from memory Matt 24:29 (“The sun will be darkened, and
the moon will not give its light,” but Basil says the sun will turn into blood, a
confusion with Joel 2:31, which says the moon will turn into blood). As with the
problem of the water above the “firmament,” Basil has largely redirected the
Genesis account away from the cosmos to the lower sky (the atmosphere). He
does not give any examples of the stars serving as signs, as Gen 1:14 says. His
exegesis is frankly unconvincing, since the sun and moon are not created until
v. 16, and their purpose is not to serve as signs but to rule the day and the night.
Basil’s anti-astrological argument has four parts: 1) an explanation of geneth-
lialogy and its impossibility,138 2) an attack on popular ideas about the zodiac,139
3) a rejection of the theory of “aspects” because of its fatalistic implications,140
and 4) an argument against astrology based on the hereditary succession of
kings.141 The first and third arguments correspond closely to the text of Origen,
so I will treat them first.
Basil begins by explaining how genethlialogy is supposed to work with the
purpose of refuting it. Here he reveals his dependence upon Origen. As when
discussing prime matter, he purports to quote the words of the astrologers
themselves: “I shall use none of my own words, but I shall avail myself of theirs
in the proof against them.”142 While this gives the rhetorical impression that
Basil was a kind of expert on astrology, he actually drew this material direct-

136 Aristotle, Meteorologica 3,3,372b. See the cross-references in the critical edition (Amand
de Mendieta and Rudberg, eds. Hexaemeron, 94–95).
142 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,5 (96,13−14; trans. 91): ἐρῶ δὲ οὐδὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς
αυτῶν ἐκείνων πρὸς τὸν κατ’ αὐτῶν ἔλεγχον ἀποχρήσομαι.
ly from Origen. Astrologers, he reports, claim “that the combination of these

moving stars with the stars lying in the zodiac, when they come together in
a certain shape, forecasts certain nativities.”143 Compare this to how Origen
defined genethlialogy, in nearly identical words: “everything that occurs on
the Earth is due to the combination of the wandering stars with those in the
zodiac.”144 While it is not impossible that both Basil and Origen used the same
astrological text that contained this definition, given Basil’s documented fa-
miliarity with the Philocalia, the balance of probability strongly favors the ex-
planation that that text was his source, not only for this definition but perhaps
even his entire understanding of genethlialogy. Basil makes one minor change
to Origen’s definition: he replaces the technical word wandering (πλανωμένων)
with the non-technical word moving (κινουμένων), which is not very descrip-
tive since all the stars move (from the perspective of the earth). He does this,
I suppose, for the sake of audience comprehension, in case the less educated
are not familiar with even basic stellar terminology. However, he later uses the
usual term,145 as well as its opposite, not-wandering (ἀπλανεῖς), i.e., the stars.146
Basil explains how genethlialogy is supposed to work, once again borrowing
his explanation directly from Origen. Basil says:
The ascending star must be found, and not only in which twelfth [zo-
diac] it is, but also in what portion [degree] of the twelfth, and in which
sixtieth [arcminute] into which we have said the portion was divided,
or, to be precise, in which sixtieth [arcsecond] subdivided from the first
sixtieths. And they say that it is necessary that this investigation of time,
so fine and unattainable, be made for each of the planets, in order to as-
certain what position it had with respect to the not-wandering stars, and
what shape they formed with one another, at the moment of the birth of
the child.147
143 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,5 (96,7–10; my trans.): ὅτι τῶνδε μὲν τῶν κινουμένων ἄστρων
ἡ ἐπιπλοκὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῷ ζῳδιακῶ κειμένους ἀστέρας κατὰ τοιόνδε σχῆμα συνελθόντων
ἀλλήλοις, τὰς τοιάσδε γενέσεις ἀποτελεῖ.
144 Origen, Philocalia 23,1 (187,17–19; my trans.): τῇ τῶν πλανωμένων ἀστέρων ἐπιπλοκῇ πρὸς
τοὺς ἐν τῷ ζωδιακῷ πάντων αὐτοῖς νομιζομένων συμβαίνειν τῶν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.
145 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,5 (97,23) and 7 (99,12).
146 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,5 (97,24).
147 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,5 (97,18–26; my trans.): ἀνάγκη γὰρ εὑρεθῆναι τὸν
ὡροσκοποῦντα ἀστέρα οὐ μόνον κατὰ πόστου δωδεκατημορίου ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ποίας
μοίρας τοῦ δωδεκατημορίου, καὶ ἐν πόστῳ ἑξηκοστῷ, εἰς ἃ ἔφαμεν διαιρεῖσθαι τὴν μοῖραν, ἤ,
ἵνα τὸ ἀκριβὲς εὑρεθῇ, ἐν πόστῳ ἑξηκοστῷ τῶν ὑποδιῃρημένων ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ἑξηκοστῶν.
καὶ ταύτην τὴν οὕτω λεπτὴν καὶ ἀκατάληπτον εὕρεσιν τοῦ χρόνου ἐφ΄ ἑκάστου τῶν πλανητῶν
ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ποιεῖσθαι λέγουσιν, ὥστε εὑρεθῆναι ποταπὴν εἶχον σχέσιν πρὸς τοὺς ἀπλανεῖς,
176 Chapter 5
Here is how Origen explained the same thing:
Experts in these matters say that anyone who intends to understand ge-
nethlialogy accurately must know, not only in which twelfth [zodiac] the
star in question is, but also in what portion [degree] of the twelfth and
in which sixtieth [arcminute]. And the more accurate [will know] even
which sixtieth [arcsecond] of the sixtieth. And they say that it is neces-
sary to do this for each of the planets, scrutinizing its position with re-
spect to the non-wandering stars.148
Basil took his explanation, almost verbatim, from Origen’s.149 This is the most
striking example of Basil’s dependence upon Origen. He simply copied his ar-
gument as he found it.
He did not, however, rely on Origen exclusively. Other elements of his ar-
gument about the impossibility of obtaining accurate measurements were
inspired by Sextus Empiricus or another anti-astrological author. Rather than
invoking the case of twins, as Origen did, Basil notes how one person is born
with the destiny of a king and another, “in a moment, in the twinkling of an
eye” (1 Cor 15:52), that of a beggar.150 Notwithstanding the creative quoting of
Paul, this comes close to how Sextus Empiricus put it.151 Moreover, his colorful
account of the “swarm of seconds” that swiftly fly by (like bees) between the
birth of the child and its announcement to the astrologer standing by outside,152
differs from that of Sextus only in that the latter imagined two astrologers rath-
er than an astrologer and midwife.153 Basil says that the astral observations
must be made even during the day, another point lacking in Origen.154 He, like
καὶ ποταπὸν ἦν τὸ σχῆμα αὐτῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐν τῇ τότε γενέσει τοῦ τικτομένου. I have added
the modern astronomical terms in brackets for clarity.
148 Origen, Phiolocalia 23,17 (206,1–9; my trans.): φασὶ τοίνυν οἱ περὶ ταῦτα δεινοὶ τὸν μέλλοντα
τὰ κατὰ τὴν γενεθλιαλογίαν ἀκριβῶς καταλαμβάνειν <δεῖν> εἰδέναι οὐ μόνον τὸ κατὰ πόστου
δωδεκατημορίου ἐστὶν ὁ καλούμενος ἀστὴρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ ποίας μοίρας τοῦ δωδεκατημορίου
καὶ κατὰ ποίου ἑξηκοστοῦ· οἱ δὲ ἀκριβέστεροι καὶ κατὰ ποίου ἑξηκοστοῦ τοῦ ἑξηκοστοῦ. καὶ
τοῦτό φασι δεῖν ποιεῖν ἐφ’ ἑκάστου τῶν πλανωμένων, ἐξετάζοντα τὴν σχέσιν τὴν πρὸς τοὺς
ἀπλανεῖς.
149 Karl Friedrich Hermann Gronau noted Basil’s verbatim (“wörtlich”) use of Origen’s anti-
astrological treatise without specifying the exact passages (Poseidonios und die jüdisch-
christliche Genesisexegese [Leipzig: Teubner, 1914], 33–34).
151 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos 5,88.
152 Basil, Homiliae in hexameron 6,5 (97,17; trans. 92): ἑξηκοστῶν σμῆνος.
153 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos 5,27–28 and 68–71.
Origen and Sextus, did not know about astrological star-charts.155 While Basil
had no new arguments of his own to offer, he weaved his sources together with
rhetorical aplomb, no doubt to the delight of his hearers.
One may be tempted to see in Basil’s meteorological take on Gen 1:14, with
its subsequent criticism of astrology, an outright denial of any connection be-
tween the stars and planets and human events (“our lot in life”).156 That would
indeed be significant, and it is possible. However, at no point does he explicitly
deny the usually accepted correlation between the heavens and the earth, nor
does he even mention Origen’s understanding of the stars and planets as signs
for angels. He denies only that astrologers are capable of obtaining such infor-
mation, using Origen’s own arguments. Since Basil drew directly upon Origen’s
anti-astrological argument and was willing to criticize him, his silence here
seems telling. I am disinclined to think that Basil must have rejected Origen’s
understanding of the stars as signs just because he did not mention it. All we
know is that he did not want to present it to his listeners in this sermon. We
should not assume more than Basil says, which is that the stars and planets do
not cause human events, nor can astrologers use them to predict the future. If
Basil had wanted to make an even more radical critique of astrological theory,
or of Origen specifically, he could have. On the other hand, his narrowly me-
teorological interpretation of Gen 1:14 may indicate that Basil had no place for
Origen’s theory of astrology.
Like Origen, Basil decries astrology for its fatalistic implications. Astrology
wrongly transferred moral acts from human free will to the movements of the
stars and planets and thus, ultimately, to the Creator. “In such words, certainly,
the folly is great, but the impiety many times greater.”157 Basil explains how
astrologers commit blasphemy by saying that the stars take on good and bad
“aspects” (ἐπιβλέψεις) depending upon their positions.158 Again, he says he is
“constrained to borrow their own expression.”159 Without going into any de-
tail, he says that it is “of the greatest importance” whether the newborn child
“is seen” by a “beneficent” or “maleficent” planet.160 It is senseless, he says, to
155 “Il n’argumente pas contre les doctes généthliographes des observatoires, qui, pour
saisir le secret des astres, étudiaient longuement des tables complexes et dispendieuses”
(Amand, Fatalisme et liberté, 393).
156 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,5 (96,10–11; trans. 91): τῆς τῶν βίων ἀποκληρώσεως.
157 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,7 (99,20–21; trans. 94): Ἐν δὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις λόγοις πολὺ μὲν
τὸ ἀνόητον, πολλαπλάσιον δὲ τὸ ἀσεβές.
159 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,7 (99,18–19; trans. 94): τοῖς γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων συγχρήμασθαι
ῥήμασιν ἀναγκάζομαι.
160 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,7 (99,14–15; trans. 93): μεγίστην τε ἔχει δύναμιν ἐν ταῖς
γενέσι τὸ ἢ παρὰ ἀγαθοποιοῦ ἐφορᾶσθαι ἢ κακοποιοῦ.
178 Chapter 5
think that the planets become evil when they take on certain angles with one
another.161 The problem with this idea was that it attributed goodness and evil,
not to free human acts, but to the movements of the heavenly bodies. This was
blasphemous, for, as Genesis 1 teaches, God made everything good, including
the stars and planets. The only way free will could be preserved under such a
theory would be to say that the planets themselves chose to become good and
evil. Such an idea, however, would be “more than madness” since they are not
alive.162 The astrological theory of aspects was, for Basil, either blasphemous
or irrational.
In his explanation of aspects, Basil again follows Origen, who brought the
theory in as part of his argument that astrologers were unable to take into ac-
count all the significant factors needed to cast an accurate nativity.163 There is
a close verbal similarity in their descriptions: Basil says a star becomes malefi-
cent “since it is seen by a particular [star],”164 and Origen said it became im-
paired “because it is seen by a particular worse [star].”165 The two verbs for “see”
are different. Origen uses the technical ἐπιβλέπειν (Trigg thus translates the
whole expression as “impaired by its aspect”)166 Basil uses the non-technical,
ordinary word for seeing (ὁρᾶν). Once again, Basil shows his preference for non-
technical language his audience could easily understand. Though the wording
differs slightly, Basil and Origen’s meaning is identical. Given the other paral-
lels we have seen, it is very likely that Basil used Origen directly here again.
Nevertheless, Basil appropriated this definition into a different context: he
presented the theory as either stupid or blasphemous, whereas Origen used it
as another argument for impracticability. Basil simplified Origen’s argument
and took it in a different direction, though for the same general purpose of
debunking astrology. He also made a mistake: he says the planets change their
natures; in fact, as Origen correctly related it, their naturally good or ill effects
were merely “impaired” by various aspects with other planets.167
161 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,7 (100,3; trans. 94).

162 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,7 (100,1; my trans.): μανίας ἐπέκεινα. Cf. Homilia in Psalmum
xlviii 8.
164 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,7 (100,5; my trans.): ἐπειδὴ ὑπὸ τοῦδε ὁρᾶται.
165 Origen, Philocalia 23,18 (207,13–14; my trans.): δὶὰ τὸ ἐπιβλέπεσθαι αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦδε τοῦ
κρείττονος.
166 Trigg, Origen, 100.
167 Origen, Philocalia 23,18 (207,12; trans. 100): ἀμαυρουμένου.
Basil’s statement that it would be “more than madness” to believe the stars
are alive has an intriguing connection to Origen.168 Origen infamously believed
just that, and expressed this opinion in the following words:
Since the stars move with such great order and plan that their course at
no time seems to be hindered at all, how is it not beyond all stupidity
to say that such great order, with so much discipline and observance of
plan, is finished or completed by irrational things?169
Origen was on solid philosophical ground here, though not everyone agreed
since some, such as Aristotle, said that the precise regularity of their move-
ments argued against their being sentient.170 That seems to have been Basil’s
position as well. In a sermon he says: “They possess only inanimate and mate-
rial bodies that are clearly discernible, but in which nowhere there is a mind,
no voluntary motions, no free will.”171 Basil points to the fact that the stars
can be seen, which was a problem for those who considered them divine.172
Rather than seeing them as exalted beings, he deliberately contrasted them
with human beings, who, being made in God’s own image, are superior to the
stars.173 The stars are simply bodies that move along the courses set for them.
Basil contradicts Origen when he says about the belief that the stars are alive
exactly what Origen said about the belief that they are irrational: namely, that
it is utterly foolish. Unfortunately, this passage of Origen is extant only in Latin
translation, so we cannot know whether the underlying Greek words were the
same as Basil’s (μανίας ἐπέκεινα), though they may well have been. Either way,
given the similarity of expressions on the same topic, it seems that Basil’s re-
mark is another tacit criticism of Origen. He again proves that, as much as he
used Origen, he remained a critical disciple, going so far as to include a subtle
168 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,7 (quoted above).

169 Origen, De principiis 1,7,3 (89,3–6; my trans.): stellae uero cum tanto ordine ac tanta ratio-
ne moueantur, ut in nullo prorsus aliquando cursus earum uisus sit impeditus, quomodo
non ultra omnem stoliditatem est tantum ordinem tantamque disciplinae ac rationis ob-
seruantiam dicere ab inrationalibus exigi uel expleri?
170 Aristotle, De caelo 2,1,284a. See Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars, 24–25. Only Isaac
Newton’s discovery that their movements are caused by gravity finally proved Aristotle
correct.
171 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xlviii 8 (PG 28, 449c; trans. 325): ἄψυχα μὲν καὶ ὑλικὰ, διαφανῆ
δὲ μόνον τὰ σώματα κεκτημένοι, ἐν οἷς οὐδαμοῦ διάνοια, οὐ προαιρετικαὶ κινήσεις, οὐκ
αὐτεξουσιότητος ἐλευθερία.
172 Scott, Origen and the Life of the Stars, 57–58.
173 Basil, Homilia in Psalmum xlviii 8.
180 Chapter 5
repudiation of Origen’s view of the stars right in the middle of using his anti-
astrological text.
A second instance of Basil rejecting an opinion of Origen’s concerning the
stars occurs when Basil denies that the new star seen by the Magi at Christ’s
birth was a comet, as Origen argued.174 In Mark DelCogliano’s words: “This
is one of the rare cases in which Basil completely jettisons the tradition and
fundamentally disagrees with Origen.”175 That Basil twice contradicted Origen
on the subject of stars indicates that he was particularly troubled by Origen’s
views on the subject (and the subject of the super-heavenly water was not
far removed either). In both cases, the contradiction appears in the midst of
Basil’s heavy borrowing from Origen on same subject. Later in Christian his-
tory, Origen was condemned for allegedly holding heterodox opinions about
the stars. The bishop of Alexandria at the turn of the fifth century, Theophilus,
claimed that Origen said that Christ gained his foreknowledge through astrolo-
gy.176 Although a preposterous assertion, it must have been based on Origen’s
theory of the angels learning the future through reading the stars. In the sixth
century, the emperor Justinian condemned “Origenism,” including the propo-
sition, which Origen did hold, that the stars are rational beings.177 Basil was on
the forefront of this anxiety about Origen and the stars, even though he neither
condemned him as a heretic nor ceased to use his writings.
Returning to Basil’s diatribe against astrology, we see that he makes two argu-
ments not found in Origen. The first concerns the zodiac. Basil apparently had
access to a handbook of popular astrology called a “zodiologion” (ζῳδιολόγιον).178
These were similar to popular astrology today, according to which people have
character traits associated with the sign of the zodiac under which they were
born. For example, “That one, they say, will have curly hair and bright eyes, for
he has the sign of the Ram [Aries in Latin], and that animal has in a certain way
such an appearance.”179 He seems to take it for granted that people understood
what this meant, namely which zodiac the sun was in on the day a person was
born. Throughout the year (because of the earth’s revolution around the sun),
174 Basil, Homilia in sanctam Christi generationem 6.

175 Mark DelCogliano, “Tradition and Polemic in Basil of Caesarea’s Homily on the
Theophany,” Vigiliae Christianae 66, no. 1 (2012): (30–55) 53.
176 Clark, Origenist Controversy, 109, note 181.
177 Justinian, Edictum contra Origenem 23,6; cf. Second Council of Constantinople, Canones
xv contra Origenem sive Origenistas 3.
178 “Un manuel d’astrologie populaire […] qui indiquait le tempérament, les mœurs et le car-
actère des individus nés sous les divers signes zodiacaux” (Amand, Fatalisme et liberté,
396; idem, “Préparation,” 366).
179 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,6 (98,5–6; trans. 92): ὁ δεῖνα οὗλος, φησί, τὴν τρίχα, καὶ
καρωπός. κριῷ γὰρ ἔχει τὴν ὥραν· τοιοῦτον δέ πως ὀφθῆναι τὸ ζῷον.
the sun appears to move slowly along a line through the sky called the ecliptic,
thus traversing all twelve signs every year. In this viewpoint, the true causes of
human lives are not the stars, Basil says, but “the beasts of the field”180 from
which the zodiacs take their names. On this view, the sky would be subject
to animals, which is “ridiculous.”181 He does not even attempt to refute such
absurdity, because to try to refute nonsense would be “even more ridiculous.”182
Instead, he skillfully derides the whole affair with wordplay: what they say
about the Ram are “bleatings.”183 He uses sarcasm as well: these astrological
ideas are “wise sayings.”184 Although Basil presents this type of popular astrol-
ogy as though it were “the results” of the exacting measurements of the sky he
described,185 it is something else entirely. After all, if all one had to know was
where the sun was the day one was born, no measurements would be needed,
since the sun’s movement along the ecliptic is unvarying. No less today than
then, this type of popular astrology was completely superficial.186 There is no
parallel for this content in Origen, whose treatment is focused entirely on “sci-
entific” astrology. There is, however, a parallel in Sextus Empiricus.187 Although
one may reasonably judge Basil’s treatment of astrology to be less “intellectual”
than Origen’s, he succeeded in the rhetorical goals he set for himself. One can
imagine his audience smiling along.
Basil’s final argument, like the preceding one about aspects, is intended to
show up the demerits of fatalism. He says that kings are often made through
hereditary succession, even though each successor is born at a different time.188
Again, he mocks the astrologers: “Surely, each of the kings does not carefully fit
the birth of his own son to the royal figure of the stars, does he?”189 This could
be a reference to the legend that the father of Alexander the Great did just
this.190 This argument appears to be unique to Basil, though he may well have
taken it from some lost source. It is a variation on the traditional philosophi-
cal argument that people born at different times, thus having a multitude of
180 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,6 (98,25; trans. 92): τῶν βοσκημάτων.
181 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,6 (98,26; trans. 93): καταγέλαστον.
182 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,6 (98,26; my trans.): καταγελαστότερον.
183 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,6 (98,23; trans. 93): τῶν βληχημάτων.
184 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,6 (99,1; trans. 93): τὰ σοφὰ.
185 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,6 (98,5; trans. 92): τὰ ἀποτελεσματικά.
186 “Les prognostics fondés exclusivement sur les propriétés des signes ne représentent en
astrologie que les rudiments de l’art” (Bouché-Leclercq, L’Astrologie, 440).
187 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos 5,95–102.
189 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,7 (100,12–14; trans. 94): οὐ δήπου γὰρ ἕκαστος τῶν βασιλέων
παρατετηρημένως εὶς τὸ βασιλικὸν τῶν ἀστέρων σχῆμα τοῦ ἰδίου υἱοῦ τὴν γένεσιν ἐναρμόζει.
190 Cramer, Astrology in Law and Politics, 9–10, note 52.
182 Chapter 5
diverse horoscopes, sometimes have a common destiny, as when they die on

a shipwreck together.191 Basil’s version is weaker because different kings still
have different destinies, whereas everyone who dies in the same accident has
the same destiny. Basil follows this with a brief mention of the idle argument
(which Origen also used): “And the merchant will be exceedingly rich, whether
he wishes or not, since his destiny is gathering up wealth for him.”192 These
arguments point to the same truth: that destiny destroys moral responsibility
and free will. Using a chiasm, he echoes Origen, saying: “But the great hopes of
us Christians will vanish completely since neither justice will be honored nor
sin condemned because nothing is done by human beings through their free
will.”193 Compare this to Origen: “If things are as they say, the judgment of God
that we preach vanishes.”194 In his polemic against astrology, Basil both began
and ended with Origen.
To sum up, Origen had two basic problems with astrology: fatalism and genet-
hlialogy. In treating fatalism, he begins by focusing on prophecies in Scripture.
The pagan Celsus had argued that, since Judas’s betrayal was foretold in
Scripture, he should not be blamed for it, since he had no choice. Not so, argues
Origen: Scripture may tell us what will happen, but it does not cause the future
to happen. In fact, the paradoxical truth is that future events are the cause
of God’s knowledge of them and not the other way around. In other words:
God foreknows them because they will happen; they do not happen because
he foreknew them. Therefore, we should not say that prophesied events will
happen “necessarily” or that they must happen. We should say only that they
will happen. They could have happened otherwise if people had made differ-
ent choices (in which case the prophecy would have predicted those choices
instead). Next, he turns his attention to the fatalism implied by astrology. If the
stars and planets cause the events of human life, then once again human free
191 See Amand, Fatalisme et liberté, 53–55, and 397, note 5.

192 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,7 (101,3–4; trans. 95): ὑπερπλουτήσει δὲ ὁ ἔμπορος, κἂν
βούληται κἂν μή, τῆς εἱμαρμένης αὐτῷ συναθροιζούσης τὰ χρήματα.
193 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 6,7 (101,4–7; trans. 95): αἱ δὲ μέγαλαι τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἐλπίδες
φροῦδαι ἡμῖν οἰχήσονται οὔτε δικαιοσύνης τιμωμένης οὔτε κατακρινομένης τῆς ἁμαρτίας, διὰ
τὸ μηδὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιτελεῖσθαι. I have changed “men” to “human
beings” for ἀνθρώπων.
194 Origen, Philocalia 23,1 (188,1–2; my trans.): ἅπερ εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, τὰ τῆς κεκηρυγμένης τοῦ θεοῦ
κρίσεως οἴχεται.
will is eliminated. Origen uses arguments devised by people before him, such
as Philo and Plotinus, to argue that the heavenly bodies merely indicate what
will happen; they do not cause the future to happen. This is the same position
he took with respect to scriptural prophecies.
To disprove genethlialogy, Origen again reused old arguments. The basic
problem, he argued, was that the sky moved so quickly that, by the time
one measured one planet’s position, the others would have moved slightly.
That even tiny differences were significant was something astrologers, such
as Manilius, conceded, and was proven by the differing destinies that twins
often have, even if born only moments apart. In addition, Origen argued that
the precession of the equinoxes made all genethlialogical measurements im-
possible, since the stars had moved a long way from whatever original posi-
tions they once held. Finally, Origen says that even if both those difficulties
could somehow be overcome, astrologers would still be unable to account
for the complex relationships or “aspects” that they themselves say the plan-
ets produce with one another. Depending on what positions the planets had
relative to one another, their influences would change from good to bad and
vice versa.
Although he made these strong criticisms of astrology, Origen, perhaps
surprisingly, nevertheless maintained that the basic theory of astrology was
correct. In fact, he believed that the reason God encoded the stars with the
future was as a means of communicating with the angels. They are able to read
the stars like “heavenly letters.” Not only the angels, but the biblical patriarch
Jacob and other gifted spiritual figures had this ability as well! It is worth pon-
dering why, after discrediting astrologers, Origen would go on to offer his own
version of angelic astrology instead of rejecting it completely. Would it not be
simpler to reject the whole? After all, he could not prove his theory of angelic
astrology, as his repeated qualifications of “perhaps” make clear, and he was
able to offer only a quotation from an apocryphal book and some slight scrip-
tural references to the sky as evidence. Nevertheless, his maintenance of the
underlying theory of astrology is similar to his maintenance of the underly-
ing theory of hylomorphism. He could have rejected hylomorphism and the
idea of prime matter altogether in order to defend creatio ex nihilo, as some
Christians did, but he did not. Indeed, he criticized Christians who had taken
that route. His own positive estimation of secular education and philosophy in
particular prevented him in both cases. The problem with prime matter was
not hylomorphism, but only the supposition that it must be eternal and uncre-
ated. In a similar way, the problem with astrology was not the idea that the
stars could reveal the future, but only the supposition that they caused it in
a way that astrologers could actually interpret. Just as the eternity of matter
184 Chapter 5
undermined the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, so too did fatalism undermine

the doctrines of free will and judgment. There was no reason to reject astrol-
ogy, one of the basic sciences, as such. To do so would have been to disrespect
secular learning’s role as servant. In fact, far from being inimical to Christianity,
once properly understood in the light of revelation, astrology offered itself
to assist in the interpretation of Scripture, specifically those passages, like
Gen 1:14, which refer to the stars as signs. Where Origen criticized the impossi-
bility of genethlialogy in his Genesis commentary, he used philosophical argu-
ments, not religious ones. He did not say that to consult an astrologer was a sin,
nor did he cite any scriptural reasons.195 Rather, he followed in the footsteps
of philosophers who had already criticized both its fatalistic implications and
its impracticability. The basic theory of astrology, namely a sympathetic cor-
respondence between the terrestrial and celestial spheres, was valid. It only
needed to be understood correctly in non-fatalistic terms, just as prophecies in
Scripture needed to be.
Origen’s positive but critical appropriation of astrology demonstrates the
successful synthesis of secular knowledge, understood as both subordinate
and useful, and Christianity. Not all secular ideas were of equal value; many
philosophers and other thinkers erred, not having the benefit of Scripture. The
Christian theologian had to exercise discernment when reading them, select-
ing what was serviceable and true and discarding the rest. The good ideas and
arguments helped filter out and refute the bad, like fatalism. How did the theo-
logian identify what was of use, what useless, and what harmful? Of course,
there was no easy answer, and thus Basil and Origen, though sharing the
same broad desire for synthesis, were at odds over how to interpret the super-
heavenly water. The basic criterion was apostolic doctrine, as Origen makes
clear. On many philosophical questions, though, as he also observed, doctrine
was silent because Scripture was ambiguous.
Unlike Philo and Origen, Basil did not see a connection between Gen 1:14
and astrology. To him, it only meant that the sky could be used to predict the
weather (though Basil was unable to give any examples of how the stars specif-
ically do this). No doubt because of the popularity of the astrological interpre-
tation, Basil refuted astrology anyway. As I showed in this chapter, he recycled
Origen’s arguments on astrology. In fact, in this case, the evidence suggests that
he copied from Origen’s commentary directly, almost word for word at times.
The two problems Basil treated were the same that Origen treated: fatalism
and genethlialogy. Most of his attention went to genethlialogy and explaining
195 When preaching to a popular audience, however, he does associate it with demons
(Homiliae in librum Iudicum 2,3, quoted above).
how the sky moved too quickly to be measured. His description of an astrolo-
ger and midwife trying in vain to make quick measurement is closely paral-
leled by Sextus Empiricus, indicating that he had astrological sources besides
Origen as well. On fatalism, Basil had little to say. He pointed out that it was
incompatible with Christian teaching and would render God’s judgment null,
another echo of Origen. His quick and somewhat inaccurate treatment of “as-
pects” focuses on how it would transfer all praise and blame to the stars (and
ultimately to God). Basil also introduces a brief attack on a superficial, popular
astrology that persists even to this day, which placed all significance simply on
the zodiac under which one was born. He ridicules its absurdity, noting that it
would be even more absurd to bother to try and disprove it. This was a topic
that Origen did not address.
What about Origen’s argument that the stars only signified but did not cause
the future? Basil is silent. The basic concept of a correlation between the heav-
enly and terrestrial spheres was so widespread in antiquity, it is hard to believe
that Basil would have rejected it. Since he drew directly upon Origen’s anti-
astrological polemic and yet said nothing about the basic theory of astrology,
I assume that he accepted it. But what of Origen’s theory of angelic astrology
specifically? Again, Basil says nothing. Perhaps he considered it inappropri-
ate or too dangerous for his congregation. Any concession that the stars and
planets could be “read” by people taught the art by God would leave a seri-
ous “loophole” for the casters of horoscopes to slip into. Alternately, Basil may
have rejected Origen’s view but simply felt no need to criticize it at that time.
Granted, he criticized Origen’s interpretations of the waters, but Basil’s word-
ing seems to indicate that that was a live controversy in need of comment. If
no one was talking about Origen’s theory of the stars at that time, he may have
felt it best to “let sleeping dogs lie.” In any case, Basil did not think Gen 1:14
had anything to do with astrology, and his goal was to refute and ridicule the
practitioners of astrology. The force of his diatribe would have been blunted if,
at the end, he added that, actually, astrology is real!
Basil did reject at least two of Origen’s beliefs about the stars. On a minor
issue, he disagreed with Origen’s interpretation that the “new star” seen by the
Magi was a comet. More significantly, he strongly disagreed with Origen’s be-
lief that the stars were living beings. On this, he sided with Aristotle that their
regular movements indicated lifelessness, not sentience. In rejecting this idea
of living stars as “more than madness,” Basil showed himself to be at the fore-
front of the burgeoning Christian opposition to Origen’s speculations about
the stars. Yet even here, just as with the super-heavenly waters, Basil chose not
to name Origen, let alone call him a heretic. Origen remained a source and
inspiration for Basil, not an enemy.
Conclusion
Basil and the Legacy of Origen
Origen’s metaphor of secular knowledge as Christianity’s servant is a lens

through which we may interpret the various ways in which he and Basil used
that knowledge when interpreting Genesis 1. I have argued throughout this
book that this metaphor brought with it a dialectical tension between a ser-
vant as someone who helps and as someone who is subordinate. Thus, the rela-
tionship between secular knowledge and biblical interpretation in their works
was marked by a certain ambivalence.
On the one hand, its subordinate character was apparent when they force-
fully rejected the hypothesis that prime matter was eternal and uncreated.
Though it was coherent within the broader framework of hylomorphism and
widely accepted by philosophers of different schools (including Basil and
Origen themselves), both theologians unambiguously rejected it because it
contradicted the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. Matter, if uncreated, would be a
second principle alongside God, like a mother and father. Similarly, both Basil
and Origen rejected astrological fatalism as incompatible with Christian doc-
trine, which teaches that human beings are free, morally responsible, and sub-
ject to divine judgment, not the slaves of the stars and planets.
On the other hand, the useful character of secular knowledge was dem-
onstrated over and over again, every time either theologian invoked an in-
sight from philosophy or another secular subject to help interpret Scripture.
These uses were often uncontroversial and straightforward, as, for example,
when Basil relied on zoology to discuss the animals God creates in Genesis 1,
or meteorology to discuss how the sun and moon affect the earth. At other
times, secular knowledge was used in direct connection with the controversial
points: hylomorphism was accepted with the aforementioned modification.
Basil even used the theory to argue against Eunomius for the incomprehen-
sibility of God’s substance, which he likened to characterless prime matter,
which the mind can scarcely imagine. In a similar way, Origen maintained the
basic theory of astrology, only rejecting fatalism and genethlialogy. Even in
areas of controversy, Basil and Origen made careful distinctions, rejecting only
what could not be reconciled with Christianity (e.g., eternal matter and fatal-
ism), while maintaining whatever related ideas could be salvaged (e.g., hylo-
morphism, the natural positions of the four elements, and, for Origen at least,

Basil and the Legacy of Origen 187
astrology). In spite of some strong rhetoric from Basil (and sometimes even
Origen), neither desired to discredit secular knowledge itself. On the contrary,
they made great use of it whenever they could.
It is to be expected that, as individual theologians, Basil and Origen did not
always agree on exactly which secular ideas fell into which category. While
they had much in common, they disagreed about the super-heavenly water
and the nature of the stars. For Origen, the elemental cosmology that placed
water below air helped him to conclude that the reference to super-heavenly
water was not to be taken literally. Intertextual references to this “water” re-
vealed that it symbolized the angels. Basil, however, insisted upon the literal
character of Genesis 1 as a divinely-revealed cosmology and cosmogony, and
thus maintained the existence of this water in just the same way that he op-
posed the eternity of matter. Nevertheless, he recognized the conundrum this
created, since he did not reject the idea of the four elements and their natural
positions. His solution was to re-reinterpret this water as “aerial water” and the
“firmament” as some kind of filtration system, heat shield, and cosmic water-
clock counting down to the end of days! Although it was a different kind of
solution than Origen’s, resulting from the different ways in which they saw
Genesis 1 as a text, both interpretations emerged from the same science-as-
servant framework. Recognizing the danger that dualisms posed, Basil chided
Origen for failing to recognize the unique status of Genesis 1 and allegorizing
it. For Origen, the early chapters of Genesis were exactly the sort of texts that
called out for allegoresis. After all, Scripture is full of allegories, so why insist
that there is water above the sky when the physics of the day said that was im-
possible? To take everything in the Bible literally was, in Origen’s opinion, the
error of Jews and uneducated Christians. Thus, scriptural references to water
above the sky necessitated neither a literal interpretation nor a defense in the
way that doctrines like creatio ex nihilo did. Certainly, if he had considered the
physical existence of water above the sky as part of the “apostolic preaching,”
he would have accepted and defended it. In reality, though, Christian doctrine
was not about physical things but spiritual things.
My analysis has noted the rhetorical differences in how Basil treated these
issues compared to Origen, such as Basil’s emphasis on the mistaken origin
of the hypothesis of eternal matter (by analogy with a human artisan). These
differences were not hermeneutical, nor did they result from differing atti-
tudes about cosmology. Rather, they were differences of rhetorical form. Basil’s
thoughts on cosmology have been preserved for us in his homilies on the
six days. Their major goals were to delight, entertain, and edify. Most of what
188 Conclusion
Origen had to say on these topics came from his scholarly works, such as the
Genesis commentary and On First Principles. This scholarly context made a big
rhetorical difference compared to sermons.
1 Basil and the Anti-Origenist Movement
It is illuminating to analyze Basil’s criticisms of Origen within the larger his-

torical context of the anti-Origenist movement. The controversy over Origen
did not break out fully until the 390’s.1 Basil died in 379 at the latest.2 However,
Epiphanius first attacked Origen in the 370’s, while Basil was still living.3 Basil
engaged, at least in passing, three points of the later controversy. In chapter 4,
I showed how his opposition to Origen’s interpretation of the super-heavenly
water was shared by both Jerome and Epiphanius. In chapter 5, I showed how
his rejection of the idea that the stars were alive is paralleled in Theophilus of
Alexandria and the emperor Justinian. To these we may add the fact that Basil’s
only explicit reference to Origen in his entire corpus, although generally posi-
tive, criticizes him for calling the Holy Spirit a “creature.”4 The same reproach
was made by Epiphanius,5 Jerome,6 and Theophilus of Alexandria.7 In addition
to these three specific examples, there is a significant argument from silence:
nowhere does Basil ever endorse Origen’s doctrine of the fall of the soul from
the spiritual realm into the material, only to be restored after many ages.8 He
does, however, recast some of Origen’s fall language that associates flesh with
“heaviness” into an orthodox context.9
1 Clark, Origenist Controversy, 13.

2 The traditional date is January 1, 379 (Fedwick, “Chronology,” 19). See Rousseau regarding the
dating of Basil’s death (Basil, 360–62).
3 See Clark, Origenist Controversy, 85–86.
4 Basil, De Spiritu Sancto 29,73.
5 Epiphanius, Panarion 64,4–5.
6 Jerome, Apologia contra Rufinum 2,12.
7 Marcel Richard, “Nouveaux Fragments de Théophilus d’Alexandrie,” Nachrichten der
Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen 2 (1975): 57–65.
8 Cf. Gribomont: “Dans tout le livre, pas un mot des problèmes trinitaires; rien non plus de la
cosmologie, de la chute des anges, de la nature de l’âme” (“L’Origenisme,” 283).
9 Basil, Homilia quod Deus non est auctor malorum 6 (PG 31, 344c): ὅταν, κόρον λαβοῦσα τῆς
μακαρίας τέρψεως, καὶ οἷον νυσταγμῷ τινι βαρυνθεῖσα καὶ ἀπορρυεῖσα τῶν ἄνωθεν, τῇ σαρκὶ διὰ τὰς
αἰσχράς τῶν ἡδονῶν ἀπολαύσεις ἀναμιχθῇ; “When it [i.e., the soul] received a satiety of blessed
delights and was as it were weighed down by a kind of sleepiness and sank down from things
above, it became mixed with the flesh through the disgraceful enjoyment of pleasures.”
English translation adapted from Nonna Verna Harrison, St. Basil the Great: On the Human
The fact that Basil did not attack Origen for having held such views shows the
positive esteem in which he held him. By no means could Basil be considered
on a par with people like Epiphanius and Jerome, who waged a public campaign
against Origen’s theology. Rather the reverse: by drawing upon Origen’s works,
Basil continued his legacy. Even when he criticized him, he left his name un-
mentioned out of respect. Nevertheless, he did not follow Origen on the contro-
versial points. He knew and respected the bounds of fourth-century Christian
orthodoxy, and he was smart and critical enough to distinguish between what
was valuable in Origen and what was not. Basil preceded the anti-Origenist
controversy, but he seems to have sensed that the winds of theological change
were beginning to turn against Origen. He died before the controversy breaks
out in full force and thus never had to confront the problem the way Jerome
and Rufinus did. The former chose to renounce Origen, while the latter defend-
ed him by claiming that his works had been tampered with by sneaky heretics.
We do not know what Basil would have done, had he lived to that time. It is not
impossible that he would have, like Jerome, formally renounced the man he
previously admired. Still, even had he made such a renunciation, it would not
have erased the mark that Origen made upon Basil’s theology any more than it
did for Jerome. On the other hand, given Basil’s brother’s undiminished affec-
tion for Origen, perhaps he would have stayed the course, too.
2 Origen and Basil as Models for the Modern Science–Religion

Debate
I believe that Origen and Basil’s metaphor, or model, of philosophy as a ser-

vant to Christianity is of abiding value for the modern debate about religion
and science. On the one hand, this model carries with it all the positive value
of science as a helper, a discipline that can help advance our theological un-
derstanding of the universe God made. The servant model is comparable to
Ian Barbour’s “integration” model, in which science can both support theologi-
cal ideas and even “affect the reformulation of certain doctrines.”10 Under this
heading one may include interdisciplinary work that looks at theological ques-
tions in the light of modern science. For example, some theologians and scien-
tists see non-deterministic quantum mechanics as a possible medium through
which God may act in this universe without breaking the laws of nature that
Condition (PPS 30; Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2005), 74. Cf. ibid. 7
(344d): οἷον ἐξυβρίσας τῷ κόρῳ.
10 Barbour, Religion and Science, 98.
190 Conclusion
he made.11 In a similar way, the physicist Stephen Barr believes that quantum
mechanics may explain how the immaterial soul can affect, through our free
will, the material world.12
On the other hand, this model also states that modern scientific theories
may be rejected by Christians if they conflict with defined doctrine. In this re-
spect, it may seem more like Barbour’s undesirable “conflict” model.13 Several
modern scientific theories have been interpreted by some as conflicting with
Christian teaching. For instance, James Wiseman has examined no less than
four “real or apparent discrepancies between scientific findings and the tradi-
tional tenets of Christian faith.”14 These are creation, providence, the soul, and
eschatology. Although people will disagree with how real or apparent each of
these conflicts is, even a cursory look at them will reveal how Christian doc-
trines about creation and eschatology at least seem to be at odds with modern
cosmology. It is no less apparent that the traditional doctrines of providence
and of the soul are difficult to reconcile with evolution. As such they require
theological elaboration in dialogue with modern science. If we accept the ap-
proach of Origen and Basil, it is permissible for one to reject aspects of modern
physics and biology that contradict these doctrines. However, if their example
is to be followed authentically, any such rejections would have to be carried
out with maximum precision and nuance. It would not be acceptable to jet-
tison evolution and cosmology wholesale without examination: only those
specific ideas judged to be in irreconcilable conflict with doctrine could be
rejected. It is well known that many Christians today, whom Basil and Origen
would call “simple,” do reject evolution and cosmology without nuance. To re-
ject some aspects of modern science is not the exclusive purview of unedu-
cated fundamentalists.15 Barr, for instance, insists on the Catholic doctrine that
God created the universe “from the beginning of time” (ab initio temporis),16
a doctrine at odds with some cosmological hypotheses that posit an eter-
11 See, e.g., George L. Murphy, “The Nuts and Bolts of Creation,” Perspectives on Science and
Christian Faith 70, no. 1 (2018): (48–59) 57–58; Wiseman, Theology and Science, 118–20;
Barbour, Religion and Science, 187–88.
12 Barr, Physics and Faith, 178–84. Barbour, however, rejects this line of thinking as a form of
“mind/body dualism” (Religion and Science, 187).
13 Barbour, Religion and Science, 77–84.
14 Wiseman, Theology and Science, 9.
15 Barbour’s treatment of the “conflict” model unfortunately seems to imply this (Religion
and Science, 82–84).
16 Barr, Physics and Faith, 34. This doctrine was defined by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215,
and repeated by the First Vatican Council in 1870 (Heinrich Joseph Dominicus Denzinger
and Adolfus Schönmetzer, SJ, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum et Declarationum de
Rebus Fidei et Morum [32nd ed.; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1963], nos. 800 and 3002).
nal universe. He defends his position by arguing that it seems impossible

for science to disprove the doctrine because it will probably never be able
to determine what, if anything, happened prior to the Big Bang.17 Similarly,
Pope Pius XII insisted in his encyclical Humani Generis that evolution could
be accepted by Christians only if one maintained the literal existence of an
original pair of human beings (Adam and Eve), lest it run afoul of the doctrine
of the fall and original sin.18 It goes without saying that not even all Catholic
theologians today agree with Pius’s teaching, but it is a good example of faith-
science conflict outside the realm of Christian fundamentalism.
While rejecting certain scientific ideas is possible within this model, it is by
no means the only, let alone ideal, possible response to difficulties. The posi-
tive side of the model—science as helper—is as important as the negative, if
not more so. Consider how Origen and Basil accepted the cosmological theory
of elements and their natural places in the universe, even though it seemed to
conflict with Genesis 1. Or consider how Origen accepted a non-fatalistic ver-
sion of astrology, even while rationally refuting the practice of genethlialogy
forbidden in Christianity. The most striking example is how Origen—but not
Basil—gave a symbolic interpretation to the super-heavenly water in order to
avoid a scientific absurdity. Following this example, Christian interpretations
of the Bible and even doctrinal formulations may need to be modified by mod-
ern cosmology and evolution in order to avoid unscientific conclusions. For ex-
ample, Wiseman has proposed a new understanding of God’s providence in the
light of evolution.19 He is only one of many theologians who have undertaken
the difficult work of trying to re-examine theological questions in the light of
modern science. They also continue the tradition of seeing science as a use-
ful servant. Different theologians, of course, will reach different conclusions,
just as Basil and Origen disagreed about the super-heavenly water. The servant
model does not lead to an automatic resolution of every problem. It may be
that some narrow instances of conflict persist, while other reinterpretations
are offered. For Origen, the point of reference was “the apostolic preaching”
and not individual verses of Scripture. This was true for Basil as well, but he
also considered a literal interpretation of Genesis 1 a must, whereas Origen did
not. In this way, Basil may serve as a model for conservative Christians today
Both definitions are cited in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (NY: Doubleday, 1997),
no. 293, note 137.
17 See Barr’s lecture “Modern Physics, the Beginning and Creation” (Washington, DC,
November 12, 2011), http://vimeo.com/35972542.
18 Pius XII, Humani Generis (1950) 37.
19 Wiseman, Theology and Science, 68–71.
192 Conclusion
who also insist on a literal reading of Genesis 1, whereas Origen offers a freer
approach.20
One wishing to follow the servant model must also take into account the
difference between ancient and modern science. Basil, as we have seen, criti-
cized the natural philosophers for their inconsistency, inconclusiveness, and
sectarianism. These criticisms are not applicable to the modern scientific com-
munity. Modern science is empirical and verifiable in a way that was not true
of ancient philosophers like Aristotle. It is one thing to maintain a religious
doctrine against an unproven philosophical hypothesis. It is quite another to
do so against a theory substantiated over a long period of time by empirical
evidence from many different scientists.21 There is thus a limit to the strength
of the analogy between ancient philosophy and modern science. Theologians
today who wish to adopt the servant model would be well advised to be much
less bold in questioning a scientific theory supported by empirical evidence
than Origen and Basil were when they confronted the notion that prime mat-
ter was uncreated.
There are, of course, other ways to imagine the relationship between faith
and science. One can imagine different metaphors for their relationship, such
as colleagues or partners, neither subordinate to the other.22 Such a model
would give both disciplines autonomy. The possibility for conflict would re-
main, as scientists might insist on one thing while theologians insisted on an-
other, separately. With neither field in the superior position, there would be
no way to resolve disputed questions. There could only be ongoing dialogue
and research that might or might not lead to eventual reconciliation or har-
monization. The disadvantage of this model is that Christians would be left
in a state of perplexity and indecision on points where science and faith seem
at odds. The main advantage of this model is that it would prevent Christians
from setting themselves against scientific hypotheses that might eventually
be proven true. The classic case of such a disastrous occurrence is when the
Catholic Church opposed Galileo Galilei’s promotion of heliocentrism in the
20 Howard J. van Till has argued from Basil’s expressed views in the Hexaemeron that he
would accept evolution if alive today (“Basil, Augustine, and the Doctrine of Creation’s
Functional Integrity,” Science and Christian Belief 8, no. 1 [1996]: 21–38). While Till makes
some excellent points that should be considered in the modern debate, Basil explicitly ar-
gued that God made human beings in a direct way, with his own “hands,” not in the way he
made the other animals (Homiliae de creatione hominis 2,2). This was an important point
for Basil because it established the beauty, dignity, and excellence of the human body.
21 Cf. St. John Paul II, “Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences: On Evolution”
(October 22, 1996), www.ewtn.com/library/PAPALDOC/JP961022.HTM.
22 Thus Barbour’s “dialogue” model (Religion and Science, 90–98). This seems to be
Wiseman’s approach (Theology and Science, 103–04).
seventeenth century.23 If one feels uneasy about the idea of Christians oppos-
ing a scientific idea on the basis of faith, it is because the specter of Galileo
is still with us.
Another possibility for imagining the relationship between faith and sci-
ence is one of complete separation, as in Stephen Jay Gould’s proposal that
science and religion be regarded as “nonoverlapping magisteria.”24 The prob-
lem here is that, as we have seen, Christianity traditionally makes claims that
do overlap with science, as, for instance, with the Catholic doctrine that the
universe had a temporal beginning or the doctrine of the fall and original sin.
Such historical doctrines would first have to be abandoned in order to keep the
two domains truly separate. Christians would only be allowed to make claims
that could on principle never be evaluated by science. Thus, Christians might
be compelled to abandon their beliefs in free will, divine intervention, and
the soul, if a strictly deterministic physics were to return to dominance over
against quantum theory. Thus, the separation model is not far removed from
a model in which science is the mistress and Christianity the servant. Such a
model would no doubt appeal to many people today, if for no other reason
than that scientific claims are usually supported by empirical evidence, which
is not true of Christian doctrine. However, it goes without saying that most
Christians would judge this an unacceptable compromise of their faith, which
is based on divine revelation, not science. Furthermore, the nature of science
as a constantly self-correcting, progressive enterprise should prevent it from
holding epistemological superiority. Otherwise, one might feel compelled to
reject certain religious claims because of a scientific theory, only to find that
theory itself rejected by later science. Nor can one simply hold one’s beliefs
in perpetual abeyance (unless one decides that orthopraxy is the only thing
that matters). It took about two hundred years for Newtonian physics, which
tends toward fatalism and an eternal universe, to give way to the entirely-
unexpected discoveries of the Big Bang and non-deterministic quantum phys-
ics. A religious belief that seems hard to reconcile with science at one historical
moment may be easier to reconcile in the future, as we have seen. Of course,
new advances in science may also make existing difficulties more acute or even
give rise to new difficulties. The point is that we do not know. For all these rea-
sons, either the servant model or the colleague model is preferable to the nice-
sounding but problematic model of separation.
23 A handy summary of this case, with references to the secondary literature, may be found
in Barbour, Religion and Science, 13–15.
24 Stephen Jay Gould, “Nonoverlapping Magisteria,” Natural History 106, no. 2 (March 1997):
16–22. Barbour calls it the “independence” model (Religion and Science, 84–89).
194 Conclusion
The utility of the approach of Origen and Basil, which I have set forth and
explained, is that it simultaneously affirms science and upholds the integrity
of Christian teaching. Even for those who do not wish ever to rule out scien-
tific theories for doctrinal reasons (the colleague model), their examples are
valuable for how they attempted to harmonize, as best they could, the secu-
lar knowledge of their time with the Bible and Christian faith. For this reason
alone, they are still worth studying today.
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Index
Against Celsus 20, 24, 57–58, 61, 98, 131, Intertextuality 64–65, 129

160–61, 182 Irenaeus 89–91, 95
Aristotle 5, 11, 81, 83–86, 91, 95, 100, 104, 130,
138, 150, 155, 174, 179, 185, 192 Jerome 30, 132, 140–43, 188–89
Asceticism 4, 24–25, 30, 32, 40, 43, 56, 79, Justin the Martyr 5, 81, 86–88, 90–91, 94–95,
129 112
Athens 1, 3, 13, 29, 31–33, 35, 40
Logos of God 47, 88, 120–22, 125, 135
Christian doctrine 3, 14, 17, 20–21, 23, 34,
50–51, 55, 72–73, 81, 92–93, 95, 103, 135, Macrina the Elder 3, 13, 27–28, 40
144, 146, 150, 157, 161, 183–84, 186–87, Macrina the Younger 31–32, 40
189–93
Clement of Alexandria 15, 60–61, 88, 90–91, On First Principles 44, 66, 90, 93–94, 97–99,
94, 122–24 124, 128–29
Commentary on Genesis 90, 93, 98–99, 102, Origenism and Origenists 3, 8–9, 11, 13, 150,
132–33, 141–42, 148–49, 156, 184, 188 180, 188–89
Epiphanius 25–26, 14–43, 188–89 Philo 1, 4, 7–9, 61–63, 78–79, 86–87, 98, 105,
Eschatology 52–53, 68, 119, 136–37, 182 112, 114, 118–19, 121–25, 134–37, 142, 148,
Eusebius of Caesarea 14–15, 17–18, 21, 23–26, 150, 153, 162, 166, 168, 173, 183
28, 87, 90, 102, 106, 113 Philocalia 10, 39–40, 66–67, 149, 156, 160, 172,
175
Fall, the 10–11, 50–52, 61, 125, 127, 129, 132–34, Plato 5, 7, 24, 58, 81, 86–89, 92, 98, 100, 102,
150, 188, 191, 193 108, 121–25, 139, 142, 155
Plotinus 162, 164–65, 170, 183
Gnostics and Gnosticism 9, 54, 56, 71–72,
76–80, 89, 98, 156–57 Renunciation of pagan learning 1, 17–18, 21,
Gregory of Nazianzus 4, 27, 29–33, 39, 40, 29–31, 35, 38–39, 41
43, 66, 73–74
Gregory of Nyssa 28, 31–32, 53 Sextus Empiricus 9–10, 149, 167–68, 176–77,
Gregory the Wonderworker 3, 13, 15, 23, 181, 184–85
27–28, 40
Theophilus of Antioch 5, 81, 89, 91, 94, 104,
Heresy 20, 77–78, 89–90, 147, 173 112, 122–23, 135–36

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Genesis and Cosmos

The Bible in Ancient Christianity

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/bac

Names: Rasmussen, Adam, author.

Copyright 2019 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.

This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Introduction: Scripture and Science 1

1 Origen, Basil, and Secular Education 13

2 The Interpretation of Scripture 42

4 “A separator between water and water”: Cosmology and Water

5 “Let them be for signs”: Astrology 148

Conclusion: Basil and the Legacy of Origen 186

Scripture and Science

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396937_002

I conclude this introduction by stating that, like all historical theologians,

The question of the Christian appropriation of secular scientific and phil-

Likewise, Peter Bouteneff, referring to the perennial debate about whether

7 Norris, God and World, 5.

Origen, Basil, and Secular Education

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396937_003

Born in 185/86, Origen, according to the church historian Eusebius of Caesarea,1

childhood is that he was educated in both the Greco-Roman curriculum and

10 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,6.

letters without spaces or punctuation.28 This reading and recitation occurred

He decided, however, that the teaching of literature did not harmonize

Just as the servants of philosophers say concerning geometry, music,

This metaphor of the “servant” requires explanation. The Greek word is

If you were to show me teachers who give preparatory teaching in phi-

However, again there is a caveat: while encouraging secular studies, he also

At other times, however, in his homilies, Origen seems to denigrate secular

65 These will be discussed in chapter 2.

In his polemic Against Celsus, Origen unleashed powerful rhetorical attacks

77 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,3,9 and 12.

that he either severed a nerve in his genitals or chemically castrated himself.84

84 Epiphanius, Panarion 64,3,11 (GCS 31, 409,10–13 Holl).

103 Rousseau, Basil, 4.

111 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 12.

117 Athanasius, Vita Antonii 2–3.

139 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 18.

150 Basil, De legendis gentilium libris 2.

Because of the ambiguity of Basil’s rhetoric, scholars have differed in evalu-

Despite the suggestion that some parts of pagan literature are to be

159 Marrou, History of Education, 321–22.

The Interpretation of Scripture

It is impossible to understand particular interpretations of the Bible with-

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2019 | doi:10.1163/9789004396937_004

hidden, “psychic” meaning. These meanings can be uncovered only by readers

19 Dively Lauro, Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 53.

24 See Dively Lauro, Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 62–63.

The term ‘allegorical exegesis’ is even more misleading [than ‘Origenist’],

29 Dively Lauro, Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 2.

be distinguished from doctrine.35 He says that God originally created a great

43 Origen, De principiis 2,9,3; 3,5,4.

58 Origen, Commentarii in Romanos 1,18,5.

Chrysippus specifically, relating how he discerned in lurid scenes about the

If any stories of myths and legends may be said to be shameful on the

If, for instance, an inquirer were to be in a difficulty, about the intercourse

93 Origen, De principiis 4,3,4 (quoted above).

102 Clement, Stromateis 5,4,19–10,66.

words of Ilaria Ramelli, “Philo of Alexandria exerted an incalculable influence

This classification does little to clarify Origen’s exegesis: developed by

120 Trigg, Bible and Philosophy, 121–22.

Like de Lubac, Crouzel rejected Daniélou’s sharp distinction between allegory

7 Norris, God and World, 5.

10 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,6.

65 These will be discussed in chapter 2.

77 Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 6,3,9 and 12.

84 Epiphanius, Panarion 64,3,11 (GCS 31, 409,10–13 Holl).

103 Rousseau, Basil, 4.

111 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 12.

117 Athanasius, Vita Antonii 2–3.

139 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 18.

150 Basil, De legendis gentilium libris 2.

159 Marrou, History of Education, 321–22.

19 Dively Lauro, Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 53.

24 See Dively Lauro, Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 62–63.

29 Dively Lauro, Soul and Spirit of Scripture, 2.

43 Origen, De principiis 2,9,3; 3,5,4.

58 Origen, Commentarii in Romanos 1,18,5.

93 Origen, De principiis 4,3,4 (quoted above).

102 Clement, Stromateis 5,4,19–10,66.

120 Trigg, Bible and Philosophy, 121–22.

129 Crouzel, Origen, 82.

134 Young, Biblical Exegesis, 120.

143 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 67.

202 Gregory Nazianzen, Funebris in laudem Basilii 67 (quoted above).

211 Lim, “Politics of Interpretation,” 352.

227 McConnell, Illumination in Basil, 182–84.

239 See chapter 5.

45 Origen, De principiis 1, praef. 4 (9,12; my trans.): praedicationem apostolicam.

74 Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 7,20,3–5.

84 Origen, De principiis 2,1,4.

92 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 2,2.

123 Rousseau, Basil, 320.

183 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,9.

2 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,9 (54,9–10; my trans.): γραώδεις μύθους.

31 Clement, Stromateis 5,93,5.

76 Origen, Homiliae in Genesim 1,2 (quoted above).

119 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 3,10.

126 Kaiser, Creational Theology, 18.

132 Basil, Homiliae in hexaemeron 1,11; 3,1.