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Jon Anson · Walter Bartl 

Andrzej Kulczycki   Editors

Studies in
the Sociology
of Population
International Perspectives
Studies in the Sociology of Population
Jon Anson Walter Bartl

Andrzej Kulczycki
Editors

Studies in the Sociology


of Population
International Perspectives

123
Editors
Jon Anson Andrzej Kulczycki
Department of Social Work School of Public Health
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev University of Alabama at Birmingham
Beersheba, Israel Birmingham, AL, USA

Walter Bartl
Institute of Sociology
Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg
Halle, Germany

ISBN 978-3-319-94868-3 ISBN 978-3-319-94869-0 (eBook)


https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018946676

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019


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Eight billion people
World of inequality
The bomb keeps ticking
Contents

1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth and Social Structures:


Demographic and Sociological Vistas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Jon Anson, Walter Bartl and Andrzej Kulczycki

Part I Demography and Social Structure


2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black
Populations of Northern Cauca (Colombia) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Fernando Urrea-Giraldo
3 Intermarriage and Assimilation Among Arabs in the United
States: Estimates, Causes, and Trends, 1990–2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Andrzej Kulczycki and Arun Peter Lobo
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants
in East Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Oliver Winkler
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Guillermo Julián González-Pérez and María Guadalupe Vega-López

Part II Population Structure


6 Sex Ratios in Old Age: Comparing Countries in Middle
Eastern Asia to East and Southeast Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
Sehar Ezdi and Harald Künemund
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth.
Subnational Population Trends in New Zealand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
Natalie Jackson, Lars Brabyn, Dave Maré, Michael Cameron
and Ian Pool

vii
viii Contents

8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations: County-Level


Analyses of Mexico and Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
Guadalupe Marquez-Velarde, Ceylan Engin and Dudley L. Poston Jr.
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms
of Constructing Demographic Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
Sven Kette

Part III Social Policy


10 Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education: School Segregation,
Between Reality and Official Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Brahim El-Habib Draoui, María Jiménez-Delgado
and Raúl Ruiz-Callado
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning
or the End of a Downward Spiral? Some Evidence
from Austria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Sigrid Kroismayr
12 Maternal Outcomes in the Context of Free Maternal Healthcare
Provisioning in North Central and South Western Nigeria . . . . . . . 301
Anthony Ajayi and Wilson Akpan
13 The Association Between Household and Community Single
Motherhood and Adolescent Pregnancy in South Africa . . . . . . . . . 319
Sibusiso Mkwananzi
14 Tobacco Use Among Men in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Does Family Structure Matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 343
Lorretta Favour C. Ntoimo, Clifford O. Odimegwu
and Christiana A. Alex-Ojei
Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 363
Subject Index. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
Contributors

Anthony Ajayi Sociology Department, University of Fort Hare, East London,


South Africa
Wilson Akpan Sociology Department, University of Fort Hare, East London,
South Africa
Christiana A. Alex-Ojei Schools of Social Sciences and Public Health, University
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa; Department of Demography and
Social Statistics, Federal University, Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria
Jon Anson Department of Social Work, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev,
Beer Sheva, Israel
Walter Bartl Institute of Sociology, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg,
Halle, Germany
Lars Brabyn School of Geography, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New
Zealand
Michael Cameron Department of Economics, National Institute of Demographic
and Economic Analysis, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand
Brahim El-Habib Draoui Department of Sociology I, University of Alicante,
Alicante, Spain
Ceylan Engin Universita degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy
Sehar Ezdi University of Turku, Turku, Finland
Guillermo Julián González-Pérez University of Guadalajara, Guadalajara,
Mexico
Natalie Jackson Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand; National
Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis, University of Waikato,
Hamilton, New Zealand

ix
x Contributors

María Jiménez-Delgado Department of Sociology I, University of Alicante,


Alicante, Spain
Sven Kette University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland
Sigrid Kroismayr Club of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Andrzej Kulczycki School of Public Health, University of Alabama at
Birmingham (UAB), Birmingham, AL, USA
Harald Künemund University of Vechta, Vechta, Germany
Arun Peter Lobo Population Division, New York City Department of City
Planning, New York City, USA
Dave Maré Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, Wellington, New
Zealand
Guadalupe Marquez-Velarde Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA
Sibusiso Mkwananzi Demography and Population Studies, University of the
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
Lorretta Favour C. Ntoimo Department of Demography and Social Statistics,
Federal University, Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria
Clifford O. Odimegwu Schools of Social Sciences and Public Health, University
of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
Ian Pool National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis, University of
Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand
Dudley L. Poston Jr. Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
Raúl Ruiz-Callado Department of Sociology I, University of Alicante, Alicante,
Spain
Fernando Urrea-Giraldo Department of Social Sciences, Faculty of Social
Sciences and Economics, Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia
María Guadalupe Vega-López University of Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Mexico
Oliver Winkler Institute of Sociology, Martin Luther University Halle-
Wittenberg, Halle-Wittenberg, Germany
Chapter 1
Roots and Fruits of Population Growth
and Social Structures: Demographic
and Sociological Vistas

Jon Anson, Walter Bartl and Andrzej Kulczycki

Abstract World population, currently approaching 7.5 billion, will probably


exceed 11 billion by the end of the century, almost double what it was at turn of the
present century. The growth is uneven, and the result is a redistribution of the
world’s population: at the end of this century Europe will have essentially no more
people than it had fifty years ago, whereas Africa’s population will have multiplied
20-fold, and will have gone up from under 10% to over 30% of the world’s
population. Thus, not only is population growing but it is currently growing in
those regions of the world that have the least resources at their disposal, and the
result is liable to be a dramatic rise in world inequality; increased conflict over
access to resources; and increased migratory pressure from the poor to the richer
regions of the world. In this introductory chapter, we discuss the history and sources
of growth in world population over the past two centuries (in particular mortality
and fertility) and its eventual stabilisation. We consider some of the major links
between population and social dynamics in the light of two basic approaches to
world population growth: The Malthusian approach, which views growth as a
catastrophe, and the Marxian approach, which sees both population growth and its
outcomes as contingent on social conditions and responses. We focus on the mutual
relationship between population and societal change at all levels, the micro-, the
meso- and the macro-levels, a relationship that is also reflected in the papers in this
collection. However, there is also agency in population growth and the introduction
concludes with a consideration of the options which humanity faces given the
anticipated growth of world population and its redistribution.


Keywords World population Population growth  Social inequality
 
Malthus Marx Social demography

J. Anson (&)
Department of Social Work, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel
e-mail: anson@bgu.ac.il
W. Bartl
Institute of Sociology, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, Halle, Germany
A. Kulczycki
School of Public Health, University of Alabama at Birmingham, Birmingham, USA

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 1


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_1
2 J. Anson et al.

1.1 The Sociology-Demography Gap

Population processes are social processes. The analysis of patterns of births; of


deaths; or of migration; even the age structure of the population, how many men
and women are alive, or married, or working, in each age group, these are all social
questions for it is social processes which create them. If we ignore the social
context, if we ignore the social structure and processes that coexist with the
demographic structure and processes, we will never understand the demography.
On the other hand, if we ignore population structure and growth, the processes of
union formation and fertility, of mortality and of migration, we will never under-
stand the society! Yet, by and large, sociologists take the population for granted as
they discuss their structures and processes, peopled by roles and statuses, with little
thought given to where the people who fulfil these slots come from, where they are
going, or how the turnover in personnel and the availability of suitable candidates
affects performance. Ethnographers, too, while carefully analysing personal inter-
actions between people fulfilling particular roles, take the people themselves as
given, and thus interchangeable.
From the side of demographers, the situation is no better. People may marry,
have children, they grow old, they die; they possibly migrate, over long or short
distances, and may even return. The pace at which they do all this, the rate or
number of events for every thousand in the population, depends on a number of
classificatory markers, by which they are identified. Demographers classify them by
their age, their sex (which is politely labelled gender as if the two terms were
synonymous), their “social class” or “socio-economic status”, and then, by a variety
of statistical acrobatics, simple or complex, they show that these classifications all
have an influence over the risk, or the likelihood that a certain event will happen.
However, demography has little to say about the mechanisms connecting the
classifications to action, the distribution of these classificatory labels, nor even what
their social meaning and importance are (except in so far as many of the scales are
ordered, and some people are higher on the scale than others).
The resulting divide, between sociologists and demographers, is more than just
unfortunate, it is crippling. The sociological model drifts over the heads of real live
people and asks us to imagine workers without families, women without children or
families without work. Demographers, on the other hand, can present esoteric
mathematical models of people (who could also be cats) or the social correlates of
fertility, mortality and migration, which they can document ad nauseam, but cannot
explain. As we slowly piece together the parts of the puzzle that will, one day, give
us the grand model of society, we are locked into a myriad “sociologies of…” and
“demographies of…” each of which can tell us much about very little, but very little
about much. The time has come to start bridging the gaps.
Demographic change is considered to be among the mega-trends of contem-
porary social change, as reflected in widespread public attention as well as in lively
scholarly debates. At the same time, demographic change is characterised by quite
heterogeneous processes in different regions of the world. World population is still
1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth … 3

growing, but most countries face an ageing population and some already have
declining population numbers. Even if population decline is still a limited phe-
nomenon on a national level, there are clear signs that its relevance will grow in the
future: In many developed countries fertility rates have fallen below replacement
level and many subnational regions have recorded quite durable population declines
during the last few decades. Immigration may be able to ameliorate natural pop-
ulation decline, but immigrants are not natives (Rogers 1990) and large scale
migration inevitably involves large scale social change (Coleman 2006) which may
have political ‘costs’ (Geddes 2014). In many developing regions, on the other
hand, population continues to grow rapidly, creating rapid urbanisation that far
outstrips absorptive capacity (Buhaug and Urdal 2013).
The present book, which has grown out of a series of papers presented at the
2016 Forum of the International Sociological Association, and in particular the
Research Committee on the Sociology of Population (RC41), is an attempt to
strengthen the dialogue between these two disciplines. Clearly, we are not the first
to make this attempt (see, e.g. Goldscheider 1971; Hirschman and Tolnay 2005;
Niephaus et al. 2016), but despite a number of university departments in which the
two disciplines coexist, mutual ignorance rather than dialogue and cooperation still
appears to be the rule. Following this introduction, the second section of this
chapter outlines the way in which world population has grown and continues to
grow, focusing on regional differences as they appear in the past and in current
projections. In the third section, we shall juxtapose this with a discussion of
growing social inequality and the manner in which over-population is defined in
terms of inadequate resources. Next, we shall contrast two opposing views of the
relation between population growth, social change and poverty, typified by the
writings of Thomas Malthus and Karl Marx. We shall use these perspectives to
draw out the differences between an approach that sees population growth as a
problem in and of itself, and one that embeds population processes and growth
within the broader context of social structures and the distribution of resources. The
fifth section previews the case studies presented in this volume and the final section
then draws out two major themes that are likely to continue to be on the agenda of
social demography.

1.2 The Growth of Population

We live in very special times. For most of human history, populations grew very
slowly and, effectively, within the lifetime of any one individual could be treated as
fixed. There were fluctuations, certainly, just as there were with the abundance of
game or with crop yields, but the cataclysmic was the exception and consistency the
rule. Until the mid-seventeenth century, population grew at an annual average of
less than 1/1000, doubling approximately every millennium or more. Since then,
population has grown phenomenally, with annual growth rates exceeding 5/1000,
and doubling almost every century. In the late 20th century, world population
4 J. Anson et al.

growth rates almost reached 20/1000, and population was doubling every 40 years
(Goldewijk et al. 2010, see Fig. 1.1). World population, which was less than half a
billion in 1500, reached a billion by 1800, doubled by 1930 to two billion (over the
next 130 years), and doubled yet again (within 44 years), to reach 4 billion by
1974. The pace has since slowed somewhat so that, by current projections, it will
probably reach 8 billion by about 2024 (50 years) and 11 billion by 2090, stabil-
ising at below 12 billion sometime in the next century (Fig. 1.2).
Of course, much can happen to upset such forecasts (Lutz and Samir 2010), but
in just 300 years, there has been a more-than ten-fold increase in population, a
change not seen before in human history and such as is unlikely to repeat itself.
Based on current trends in fertility and mortality, the United Nations projection
expects world population (7.6 billion in 2017) to reach 10 billion soon after the
middle of the current century and almost 11.2 billion by the end of the century.
Stupendous growth, certainly, but actually slower than the built-in trend of the
second half of the twentieth century which, had it continued, would have taken us to
well over 12 billion by the end of the twenty-first century (Fig. 1.2). The proportion
of the world’s population living in high-fertility countries continues to decline
steadily, but the considerable population momentum built into existing global
growth rates will ensure substantial increases in most national populations for the
foreseeable future.
Recent, more sophisticated, probabilistic population projections go beyond the
conventional age-and-sex approach of cohort-component modelling. They produce
a larger number of scenarios with a broader set of fertility, mortality and migration
assumptions. Additionally, they permit consideration of the influence of such
characteristics as levels of educational attainment and labour-force participation on
the changing size and composition of human populations over time. For instance,

Fig. 1.1 Two Millennia of world population growth. Source Adapted from Goldewijk et al.
(2010) with updated statistics from United Nations (2017)
1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth … 5

Fig. 1.2 Projected population growth. Source United Nations (2017)

by fully implementing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that were agreed
upon by the world under the umbrella of the UN in 2015, world population size
might stay between 8.2 and 8.7 billion in 2100 (Abel et al. 2016). Thus, social and
health policies can influence future population trajectories considerably, and there
are considerable, and valuable, synergies between population growth and the
educational and health goals that the world community has set for all countries. On
the other hand, for world population to stabilise at fewer than nine billion would
require an almost immediate halt to African population growth, predicated on a
social revolution that does not appear to be in the offing. In other words, realistic
population projections require an appreciation of both the demographic and the
social dynamics, and the relationship between them. Without these, they become no
more than wishful thinking on the one hand, catastrophe scenarios on the other.

1.2.1 A Demographic Transition

The unprecedented growth of the world’s population has occurred as the result of
two major processes: the decline in mortality and the decline in fertility. From a
situation in which up to half the children born died in their first five years, we have
one, in today’s developed countries, in which 995 out of every 1000 survive to
adulthood and over half the population survives to age 80, with a modal age at
death of over 85—and rising (MPIfDR and VID n.d.; UCB and MPIfDR n.d.).
Most people born thus live to, and through, adulthood and can expect to live many
years beyond the standard working age. Childbirth has declined from seven or more
live births per woman (not counting stillbirths and miscarriages) to an average of
two or fewer births.
6 J. Anson et al.

The pattern of change, at the global or the local level, is generally referred to as
the Demographic Transition (Chesnais 1992; Coale and Watkins 1986; Lee 2003):
a transition from a regime of high mortality, high fertility to one of low mortality,
low fertility. Accompanying it is an explosion in the size of the population and in
the number of migrants spreading out into other territories, and an inversion of the
age pyramid (Zelinsky 1971; Haas 2010; Skeldon 2012). The pyramid moves from
being a triangle, with many children at the bottom through an ever-declining pro-
portion in adulthood and a miniscule proportion in old age—to being a rectangle or
even an inverted triangle, with few people in low ages and a large proportion at the
end of the life-span.
As a very rough description of the process, Demographic Transition is, at first
sight, a remarkably convincing story. Looked at more carefully, it has a number of
drawbacks: it is not a theory, in that it does not explain why a particular cycle of
events occurred; nor is it even a proper description. Sometimes the mortality decline
begins before the fertility decline and sometimes the opposite occurs (Goldscheider
1971). Migration is, universally, a part of the transition, but it is not part of the
model. Rather, each particular case has to adjust for it in various ad hoc ways as
part of the local response (Davis 1963; Friedlander 1969). Sometimes the process is
short, taking less than two generations to regain a balance in the number of births
and deaths; sometimes it is long and drawn out, requiring over a century to
complete.
Undoubtedly, there has been a transition in developed and in many developing
countries. Mortality and fertility were high, today they are low, or will be very soon.
Individual migration has increased roughly proportional to the growth of global
population (Haas et al. 2018), though during the 20th century former countries of
origin have become today’s most important destination countries. Furthermore, in
post-transition societies, population is no more growing than it was before the
transition, and even with far fewer fluctuations. However, there is no universal
explanation for this transition, and every society (a state, a continent, a region
within a state) has its own story to tell. No transition has occurred in a vacuum, or
even as a simple “response” to social conditions, which have appeared like a Deus
ex machina.
The past 500 years, or less, have seen several transformations of the human
condition, quicker and no less far-reaching than the Neolithic revolution, and the
demographic transition has been part of these transformations. In this period,
Europeans and their (creole) offspring have moved to conquer and settle lands
imagined as being unsettled in the past; we have congregated to live in large cities,
at a level of (over)crowding unthinkable to previous generations; we have devel-
oped modes of transport and communication that bring the other end of the globe
almost as close as next door; and we have relegated the growth of food and the
extraction of mineral resources to just a small proportion of our productive activ-
ities. Instead, we now focus most of our productive efforts on what we call
industrial production, the transformation of primary products, and even
meta-production, the production of machines and codes that govern this production.
1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth … 7

Of course, none of this would have been possible without the demographic
transition, the almost certain guarantee that a life made is a life lived, the dramatic
reduction in the number of births per woman and the opening-up of possibilities for
migration. Yet population change and growth, as described through the demo-
graphic transition, are abstractions taken out of context. Demographers can (and do)
inject supposed explanations for their occurrence (see, for instance, the heated and,
at times, acrimonious, debate around the McKeown hypothesis, (McKeown 1976;
Johansson 1994; Colgrove 2002), which argues that the decline in mortality in
nineteenth century England derived from improvements in nutrition and not from
medical intervention). However, unless we frame the transition within the great
transformation which lies behind the growth of capitalism over the past half mil-
lennium, our understanding will always be localised and ahistorical. To talk merely
of a demographic transition is thus a misnomer. What we have is a Reproductive
Revolution no less important than the other great revolutions of this period—
urbanisation, industrialisation and globalisation—and intertwined with them
(MacInnes and Pérez Díaz 2009).
Social changes and demographic change thus operate in tandem, each makes the
other possible, or sometimes even inevitable. The dramatic declines in the pro-
portion of lives lost at young ages and in the number of children born reduced
dramatically the social cost of reproduction: the social effort required to bear and
raise the next generation. As a corollary, there is also a much greater return on this
investment, both in the labour power available and in the levels of skills (human
capital) possessed. For the first time in human history, most women’s lives are no
longer constrained by a perpetual cycle of pregnancy, childbirth and childcare, and
the inexorable link between sexuality and reproduction has been broken. The
meaning of sexuality, as well as the relation between men and women is no longer
demographically constrained. The result is a constant renegotiation not only of what
it means, socially, to be male or female, and of what the relations between them can
and should be (MacInnes 1998; Bourdieu 2001; Spade and Valentine 2008). We are
in the process reassessing and reinventing the meaning of partnership and inter-
personal relations, between men and women, certainly, but also between parents
and children, and even between workmates, chance acquaintances and strangers
(Goldscheider and Waite 1993; Marshall 2005).
For a population to grow over the long term required a steady decline in mor-
tality, which in turn required an increase in food quality and quantity, an
improvement in public health and the growth of medical technology. Each of these
has played its part in the transition, to different degrees at different times and at
different places, and there may have even been reversals, as in the British industrial
cities of the 19th century (Woods 2003). Yet none of this would have occurred had
it not been for the revolution in agriculture in the 18th century; the introduction of
new foodstuffs from the Americas in the 17th century; the great exploratory
expeditions of the 16th century and perhaps the social-quake brought about by the
Black Death in the middle of the 14th century which killed, within a few years, at
least a third of the European population, and drastically and irretrievably changed
the social structure of Europe (Ziegler 1998; Pamuk 2007).
8 J. Anson et al.

Of course, none of this is cost-free, or even problem free. The technological


advances which many of us enjoy today have been gained at the expense of
inhuman overcrowding, the living and working conditions of the nineteenth century
cities (Engels 2008 [1892]; O’Day and Englander 1993) and which exist in many
Less Developed Countries today (see, e.g. Robertson et al. 2016). Poverty has not
been eradicated in the More Developed Countries, either. It has been localised and
has taken on new forms from those described by Orwell (1962), but it is no less real
and continues to affect, directly, the lives of over a fifth of the population
(Harrington 1963; Armstrong 2017). In the re-creation of today’s world, more
people have died as the direct result of war in the past 120 years than in any
previous period of history, more even than in the Black Death (Livi-Bacci 2017)1.
The technological inventions that have reshaped our lives have also reshaped our
ability to kill (Kanner 2016), the bureaucracy that organises our lives can, and has,
industrialised mass murder (Bauman 1989) and the continuation of international
relations in a mode suited for a different era makes for an ever-present threat of
nuclear annihilation.

1.2.2 Distribution of World Population Growth

Population growth has not been even across the globe, any more than the devel-
opment of the market economy has been. Rather, it has taken the form of a wave, or
an epidemic, spreading out from its origins in France and Britain (which each
underwent very different transitions) to encompass the whole of the globe, but at
different periods (Fig. 1.3).
For convenience, we have divided the countries of the world into regional or
developmental groupings:
1. More Developed Countries: Europe (excluding the Russian Federation),
Canada, the United States of America, Japan, Australia, New Zealand.
2. BRICs: the countries of Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China.2
3. Latin America: the Americas and Caribbean countries, excluding United States,
Canada and Brazil.
4. Asia: including Oceania, excluding China, India, Japan and Western Asia.
5. Middle East: the countries of Western Asia and North Africa.
6. Sub-Saharan Africa: Africa excluding the countries of the North African littoral.

1
Some may take comfort in the fact that the proportion of lives lost was greater in the Black Death.
Small consolation, indeed!
2
A grouping suggested by Wilson and Purushothaman (2003), of countries with large and growing
economies and populations, and world suppliers of raw materials and manufactured goods. The
definition is not consistent, as others, (e.g. Vijayakumar et al. 2010) have also suggested including
South Africa, and not all are convinced of the value of the grouping, (e.g. Armijo 2007). We note
that following sustained fertility decline, the Russian population is already declining, and China,
Brazil and India are expected to follow suit shortly.
1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth … 9

Fig. 1.3 World population growth and projection, by region. Source Author calculations from
United Nations (2017)

In most of today’s More Developed Countries the transitions took place in the
19th and early 20th century. By the mid-20th century, population size had stabilised
and since 1950 there has been little to no growth, except for migration from the
Less Developed Countries of the world. Sustained declines in birth rates in
developed countries are projected to reduce the populations of nearly 40 countries
by mid-century, with many dependent on international migration for their future
demographic growth (United Nations 2017).
At the other end of the scale we find Africa South of the Sahara, which has been
growing steadily and continues to grow. From 1950 to 2010 its population
increased almost five fold, to reach, currently, about one billion people, with the UN
projecting it to quadruple by the end of the century to attain four billion people. In
other words, three quarters of the world’s population growth is expected to occur in
Sub-Saharan Africa, which by the end of the century will include over a third of the
world’s population.
By contrast, growth in the other fast growing regions over the past half century is
now slowing down as fertility declines and approaches, or, in places, even goes
below, two lifetime children per woman. In the Middle East and North Africa, a
region which has almost quintupled in population size, from 100 million in 1950 to
almost 500 million, population is only expected to double in size by the end of the
century. Latin America and Asia, both of which quadrupled in size since 1950, are
expected to grow by only another 25% by the end of the century. The BRICs group,
four countries which in 2015 made up almost half (45%) of the world’s population,
10 J. Anson et al.

tripled in size from one to over three billion between 1950 and 2015. However,
fertility in all four is now “post transitional”, and they are expected to actually
decline marginally by the end of the century.
Different social circumstances thus create different patterns of demographic
change, at different times. Today’s “More Developed Countries” accelerated
rapidly in the 19th century but are now demographically stable, or even declining. It
is the rest of the world which has created the stupendous increase in world popu-
lation which we have witnessed in the past half century, but as they modernise, so
too their population growth is decelerating. Growth is now concentrated in the least
industrialised sections of the world, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, and it is here
that rapid population growth meets an abject lack of resources, inadequate for the
population today and with no sign that they are going to grow to match the rate of
population growth.
However, even if the results appear similar, the demographic changes that
occurred in Western Europe over a century ago are very different from those that
have taken place in other parts of the world over the past half-century. Moreover, all
of these differ from those taking place in Africa today. The first were immanent
transitions, growing out of, and in interaction with, a great social transformation;
the transitions of the latter depend largely on imported technologies within the
context of social changes growing out of their unequal encounter with Western
exploitation. In the former, migration offered a safety valve, from the villages to the
industrialising cities, and beyond them, to the expanding new territories overseas. In
Africa, industrial development in the cities is limited, there are no colonies to
migrate to, and the doors to the developed countries are shutting ever tighter. Thus,
while in the former, economic growth matched, or outpaced, demographic growth,
the opposite is the case in Africa: In today’s developed countries, as the population
grew, it also grew richer; in Africa, as the population grows, it also grows poorer.

1.3 The Unresolved Problem of Inequality

As population has grown, so has wealth. However, just as population density, and
population growth, are not evenly distributed, so, too, wealth and resources are
unevenly distributed. All resources, whether mined, grown or manufactured, are
produced by human activity. However, access to these resources, either directly or
symbolically, through the possession of monetary tokens, is far from equal, and this
inequality derives from the way in which production is organised and the resulting
resources produced are allocated (Marx 1954, pp. 508–534). A recent study (Credit
Suisse 2017a, b) indicates that about one percent of the world’s population cur-
rently controls about a half of the world’s wealth. Furthermore, this inequality is not
only between people, it is also between regions. Africa, with more than one-tenth
the world’s adult population, controls under one percent of its wealth. North
America, with just half the adult population of Africa, controls 40 times as much
wealth, an 80-fold difference in wealth per adult (ibid., Databook, Table 6.1).
1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth … 11

Of course, wealth inequalities are not new. Data from 63 archaeological sites
across North America, Mesoamerica, Europe, Asia and Africa, encompassing a
range of socio-economic systems and spanning the past 11,000 years (Kohler et al.
2017), and looking at Gini coefficients of house-size distributions,3 indicate that
wealth inequality rose steadily with the shift to settled agriculture. This was par-
ticularly true in post-Neolithic Eurasia due to the domestication of plants and large
animals, and increased social organization.4 In time, richer farmers increased their
wealth and the holdings of the poor decreased, ultimately creating a class of
landless peasants. The Old World societies of Eurasia also witnessed the arrival of
bronze metallurgy and mounted warrior elites that enabled further extensions of
wealth and polities by acquiring larger houses and territories (Kohler et al. 2017;
Flannery and Marcus 2012). Looking at more recent times, Piketty (2014) has
argued that, in contrast with the situation following World War II, in the past
decades there has been a growing shift in returns, from labour to capital, and with it
a dramatic increase in levels of income and wealth inequalities in major developed
countries.
These findings on wealth distribution and social organization may have profound
implications for contemporary societies and the opportunities they afford for social
mobility, for societies with high inequality have low social mobility (Savoia et al.
2010). Of particular note, the United States currently has one of the highest levels of
inequality in its history, in contrast to the ‘American dream’ of high rates of
absolute mobility, whose revival would require economic growth that is shared
much more broadly across income and wealth distributions. The annual Allianz
Global Wealth Report (Brandmeir et al. 2017), which analyses the asset and debt
situation of households in over 50 countries, shows the recent increase in Gini
coefficients in nearly all industrialized countries where the middle class is on the
retreat. The U.S. Gini is now computed at 0.41 for income and 0.81 for wealth
(Brandmeir et al. 2017, Appendix B), the highest wealth inequality for any
developed country. Intergenerational upward income mobility rates have fallen
from 90% for U.S. children born in 1940 to 50% for children born in the 1980s
(Chetty et al. 2017).
Furthermore, in an increasingly globalised world it is questionable if economic
inequality can or even should only be analysed within the context of the nation state
alone. The time of ‘methodological nationalism’ (Boatcă 2016; Weiß 2017) is past,

3
Gini coefficients are a common measure of income or wealth inequality and range from zero to
one. A perfectly equal society would have a Gini coefficient of zero, whereas a country with all the
wealth concentrated in one household would score a one.
4
The Gini coefficient rose from a median of about 0.2 in hunter-gatherer societies (whose nomadic
lifestyle made it hard to accumulate wealth, let alone bequeath it), to 0.27 for horticulturalists
(small-scale, low-intensity farmers), 0.35 for larger-scale agricultural societies, and to 0.5 in
around 79 AD in Pompeii. Post-Neolithic Eurasia had a greater availability of large draft mammals
like horses, cattle, pigs and oxen that could be domesticated and which were largely absent in
North America. These livestock greatly increased farm productivity but were mainly owned by
richer farmers who could also rent them out as well as till more land and expand into new areas
(Kohler et al. 2017).
12 J. Anson et al.

as the country of birth has become more important for one’s life chances than one’s
economic position in a national income distribution. When global income
inequality is measured as the sum of income inequality between countries and
within countries, the former proves far more important for explaining the observed
variance: Income inequality between countries accounts for roughly two thirds of
global income inequality, while position in the social structure of a national society
accounts only for one third (Milanović 2016). However, since the 1970s
between-countries income inequality has been decreasing, mainly due to the growth
of China and India, that has, at least in part, offset national increases in inequality
such as in the US and elsewhere (ibid). In practical terms, these findings imply that
people living in a poor country could improve their income situation much more by
moving to a wealthier country than by advancing within the social structure of their
home country. Hence, social justice on a global scale would benefit considerably if
the emerging world society became more open to social mobility through appro-
priate policies (ibid). However, more innovative immigration and citizenship
policies will be difficult to realize in a world that remains primarily organized into
nation-states and that has recently seen the re-emergence of populist economic
policies and nationalism.

1.4 Two Approaches to Population and Society:


Malthus Versus Marx

Consider sub-Saharan Africa. For the most part, it is poor and the region’s popu-
lation is growing rapidly. But is there any necessary relation between the population
growth and poverty? Without directly answering this question—which perhaps
cannot be done definitively—we shall characterise two basic approaches to the
relation between population and social questions, those roughly summed up in the
writings of two giants in the history of social thought, Thomas Malthus and Karl
Marx. The critical difference between them concerns their view of population as an
independent factor in the creation of poverty, and hence, whether direct control of
population growth can offer a solution.
The Reverend Thomas Malthus (1766–1834) published the first edition of his
Essay on the Principle of Population in 1798, when world population was
approaching one billion (Malthus 1798). More importantly, this was a time when
the population of England was beginning to grow, there was a massive migration of
people from rural to urban areas and the negative social effects of urbanisation and
industrialisation were becoming apparent. Essentially, Malthus argued, overpopu-
lation, rather than the social and economic processes of the time, were the causes of
the misery to be observed in every industrial city, and the process could be reversed
by the wise actions of those most seriously affected.
Malthus presented data, mainly from North America, to show that, if uncon-
strained, populations grew geometrically, and that human populations could double
themselves every 25 years. However, as land use always used prime land before
1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth … 13

poorer land, expanding agricultural production would always face falling marginal
returns, as the new land cultivated would produce less than the old land already
cultivated. Consequently, agricultural production could only grow arithmetically,
adding, at most, a fixed amount each year, and at some point population growth
must outstrip food production. Faced with the resulting overpopulation, humanity
had to choose between two possible solutions:
a. Positive checks, increasing mortality to bring population levels in line with food
production;
b. Preventative checks, reducing fertility and the consequent growth in the popu-
lation to a rate that matched the increase in food production.
In the following thirty years, Malthus published five further editions of the Essay
as well as a final summary and response to his critics in 1830 (Malthus 1970). Over
time, he modified the thesis, its form became more academic and less of a political
tract, but the basic message remained: overpopulation was the root of social evils,
and the poor, through their indolence, were ultimately responsible for their own
condition. Public support could only encourage more idleness and increasing
poverty. The only sane solution, therefore, was the control of sexual appetites (he
was stridently opposed to any form of contraception),5 for otherwise we must face
the consequences of the positive checks.
The most forceful critique of the Malthusian thesis was that offered by Karl
Marx (1818–1883), who reserved for Malthus some of his most vituperative lan-
guage, accusing him of plagiarism and of being the voice of the old landed nobility
(see, in particular Marx 1951, especially Chap. IX). However, Marx rarely
addressed population as such,6 mainly attacking Malthus for his economic views.
A major part of this critique, however, is that Malthus has the population—poverty
question backwards: over-population is not the cause of poverty. Rather, poverty is
the result of the particular way in which resources are distributed in society. By
definition, where there is poverty there is apparent over-population, but even a
dramatic reduction in population size (e.g. by half) would not do away with pov-
erty. It is people in society who produce social resources, and if the form of that
production and distribution is inherently unequal, poverty will continue to exist.
Poverty existed even when the population was not growing and even when
growth was reduced (such as after the Black Plague), so that poverty cannot be
blamed on population growth as such. Marx argued instead that capitalism had a
built-in mechanism for generating a “surplus population,” people who were a part
of society, but not regularly employed and who thus existed below what was
generally considered an adequate standard of living (Marx 1954, Chap. XXV).

5
It is ironic that by the early 20th century Malthus’s name was so firmly associated with con-
traception that in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1932), in which casual sex was a way of
life, all non-sterile women wore a Malthusian belt in which they carried a ready supply of
contraceptives!
6
But see Meek et al. (1971) for a compilation of Marx and Engels on population-related issues;
Szreter (2018).
14 J. Anson et al.

By acting as a reserve army of labour, this surplus population plays a crucial role in
keeping wages down and production profitable, but their only compensation is the
handout (at the expense of a tax on other workers’ incomes) which is just enough to
keep them alive. The solution to poverty could only be a reorganisation of society
such that the distribution of resources was adequate for all, irrespective of their role
in the labour market. By focusing on population as the cause, and calling on the
poor to control their sexual appetites, Malthus was merely “blaming the victim”
(Ryan 1971), and playing into the hands of those who had most to gain from the
continued social inequalities, representing poverty as a fate which was disconnected
from the structure of social relations.
Malthus presents us with a very simple hypothesis, which we can match against
data, namely that population grows faster than food production. Figure 1.4 presents
data on world cereal production per head since 1960. Two hundred years after
Malthus, there is still no sign of diminishing returns in agricultural production:
whether in terms of cereal production per hectare or per head of population. Rather,
food production has clearly been increasing over the past 40 or 50 years, not only
per head of (growing) population, but also in relation to the amount of land cul-
tivated. Furthermore, yield differences between Europe (high) and much of the rest
of the world indicate that there is a considerable surplus capacity that has yet to be
exploited (details not shown). This does not mean there is no limit to the earth’s
carrying capacity and doomsday theories abound (Ehrlich 1968; Ehrlich and
Ehrlich 2009). It does indicate that it is not the total amount of food and other
resources that is at issue, but rather their distribution.

Fig. 1.4 World cereal yields, per hectare and per person. Source FAO (n.d.)
1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth … 15

At the same time, we cannot escape the apparent tautology in Malthus’ argu-
ment. If birth rates exceed mortality rates on a world level, population will grow,
and at some point it may exceed the earth’s carrying capacity. Increased food
production comes at the cost of deforestation, with attendant climatic affects
(Lawrence and Vandecar 2015; Bennett 2017), and production itself at the cost of
land degradation (IPBES 2018). The links, however, are not deterministic. Without
entering into a discussion of the “tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 1968), (or even
subscribing to Hardin’s moralistic conclusions), suffice it to say that a system of
production which ignores the costs of degradation is liable, eventually, to choke on
its own success. Here, too, the issue is not necessarily one of how much is pro-
duced, but how that production is organised.

1.5 The Structure and Contents of the Book

Implicitly or explicitly, these two approaches to population and society are still
visible in contemporary research and debates on questions of population dynamics,
and the contributions to this volume are no exception. We have divided the book
into three sections. In the first section, Population and Social Structure, we look at
ways in which recognition of social divisions enables us to understand population
processes better; the second section, on Population Structure, looks at important
divisions within the population itself, and the ways in which these change in
different social settings. Finally, the third section, on Social Policy, looks at the
interface between population processes and the broader issues that governments
seek to address under the rubric of social policy.
The first section, on Population and Social Structure, opens with the paper by
Fernando Urrea-Giraldo, “The Demographic Transition in the Nasa Indigenous
People and Black Populations of Northern Cauca (Colombia)”, in which he com-
pares the fertility patterns of Indigenous and Black ethno-racial minorities with
those of the White-Mestizo populations. He finds that while all groups show a
secular decline in fertility, reproductive patterns remain heterogeneous and continue
to reflect social inequalities. The second chapter, “Intermarriage and Assimilation
Among Arabs in the United States: Estimates, Causes, and Trends, 1990–2010”, by
Andrzej Kulczycki and Arun Peter Lobo, investigates recent intermarriage levels
and patterns for Arab Americans and evaluates how acculturation, cultural and
structural factors affect their marital choices. They find high levels of exogamy for
both sexes, suggesting that Arab Americans are assimilating quickly. In the third
paper in this section, “Occupational Classes of Immigrants and their Descendants in
East-Germany”, Oliver Winkler looks at the occupational integration of first and
second generation immigrants in the former GDR (East Germany) and finds that
they are more likely to be employed in lower grade occupations than are long-time
natives with similar skills. Finally, Guillermo Julián González-Pérez and María
Guadalupe Vega-López, “Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico”,
look at trends in firearm related mortality and its impact on life expectancy of
16 J. Anson et al.

Mexico and its 32 states in the 2001–2003 and 2011–2013 triennia. They find that
not only is the increase in the firearm related death rate, especially among young
people, impeding the rise in life expectancy in Mexico, in several states, particularly
Chihuahua and Guerrero, firearms appear to be the main reason for the decline in
life expectancy among males aged 0–85 years.
The second section, on population structure and population change, begins with
a paper by Sehar Ezdi and Harald Künemund, “Analysis of Sex Ratios in Old Age
in South, Southeast and West Asia”, in which they discuss possible causes for high
sex ratios, both at older and younger ages in countries of East, South East and West
Asia. They argue that it is imperative to change the focus of this issue from younger
to older age groups and to widen the geographic spread beyond East and South East
Asia. In the second paper, Natalie Jackson, Lars Brabyn, Dave Maré, Michael
Cameron and Ian Pool, “From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of
Growth: Subnational Population Trends in New Zealand”, consider whether New
Zealand’s towns and rural centres are showing a ‘new’ and increasingly intractable
form of population decline, where net migration loss is accompanied by natural
decrease. They find that, in the main, the old form of depopulation, net migration
loss, is still the major determinant of New Zealand’s subnational depopulation
across the period 1976–2013. In a similar vein, Guadalupe Marquez-Velarde,
Ceylan Engin and Dudley L. Poston Jr., “Natural Decrease in Semi-Peripheral
Nations: County-Level Analyses of Mexico and Turkey”, present two case studies
of local-level natural decrease. They analyse the birth/death ratios of the 2,457
municipios (counties) of Mexico in the 2005–2013 period, and the 81 subnational
units (counties) of Turkey in the 2007–2014 period. They show that natural
decrease is occurring at the subnational level in Mexico in over 16% of all the
counties. In Turkey, however, they do not find evidence of natural decrease in any
of its counties, although some of them are moving toward having more deaths than
births; in other words, they are “near natural decrease.” Finally, Sven Kette, “From
Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms of Constructing Demographic
Change”, looks at the mechanisms by which organisations problematize demo-
graphic change. He finds that organisations generally view demographic change
within the context of their established problems, rather than seeing it as an
important problem in itself. Organisations view population dynamics from their
own perspective, and we should not assume a ‘natural’ convergence towards a
professional demographic point of view!
The third section addresses issues of population and social policy. In the opening
paper, Brahim El-Habib Draoui, María Jiménez-Delgado and Raúl Ruiz-Callado,
“Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education: School Segregation, Between Reality
and Official Statistics”, look at ethnic segregation in public secondary schools in six
disadvantaged neighbourhoods in Alicante, Spain. They compare fieldwork find-
ings with official statistics and argue that the latter do not reflect accurately the
degree of ethnic non-diversity in these schools, nor the tendency of Roma pupils to
1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth … 17

drop out of school prematurely. This is followed by Sigrid Kroismayr, “Small


School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End of a Downward Spiral?
Some Evidence from Austria”, which examines the demographic, economic and
social trends in municipalities after the (last) elementary school has been closed
down. She finds that municipalities follow different coping strategies concerning
the former school building, and these are primarily related to whether there remains
another school in the municipality, or not. However, while outmigration seemed to
have increased after school closures, birth numbers have remained stable—proba-
bly due to the economically stabilising effect of agriculture in remote areas.
The final three papers look at policy issues in various African contexts. Anthony
Ajayi and Wilson Akpan, “Maternal Outcomes in the Context of Free Maternal
Healthcare Provisioning in North Central and South Western Nigeria”, examine the
effects of free maternal healthcare services on maternal healthcare utilisation,
inequality in access to maternal healthcare services, and health system function.
They argue that there are other barriers to service use, apart from financial ones, and
addressing issues related to culture and contextual differences are crucial for
reducing inequality in access to maternal healthcare. Sibusiso Mkwananzi, “The
Association Between Household and Community Single Motherhood and Teenage
Pregnancy in South Africa”, investigates the independent association of single
motherhood, at both household- and community-levels, with adolescent pregnancy.
She finds that single motherhood increases the average odds of adolescent preg-
nancy at the household level as did high levels of single motherhood within
communities, but there is a significant interaction of both household and commu-
nity single motherhood variables with education, poverty and household sex
composition. Finally, in “Tobacco Use Among Men in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does
Family Structure Matter?” Lorretta Favour C. Ntoimo, Clifford O. Odimegwu and
Christiana A. Alex-Ojei examine the role of family characteristics in predicting
tobacco use by men in union in this region. They find family characteristics such as
type of union, co-residence with wife, number of unions, duration of union, marital
status and household wealth index to be significantly associated with tobacco use.
They note that many sub-Saharan African countries are in the early stages of the
tobacco epidemic and have yet to implement preventive and control programmes.
Researchers need to give more attention to the rising prevalence of this harmful
behaviour in order to help understand the phenomenon and to guide programme
development.
18 J. Anson et al.

1.6 Two Contrasting Emerging Themes: Fertility Decline


in Africa and Regional Depopulation in Developed
Countries

Among themes highlighted in this volume, two themes are strongly represented in a
number of the book chapters and are the subject of much uncertainty and concern.
First, the ongoing fertility and epidemiological transitions in Africa and second,
population decline and in particular, regional depopulation in many developed
countries, including the need for sound coping strategies. We consider these themes
further below.

1.6.1 Africa’s Slow Fertility Decline and Evolving


Epidemiological Transition

Africa, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, is notable for having a considerably slower


pace of fertility decline than those that characterized Asian and Latin American
countries during the late twentieth century. Africa’s late fertility decline is attri-
butable to many factors, among the most prominent being the region’s slow pro-
gress in socioeconomic development and health services, comparatively limited
investment in family planning programmes, and the strong pronatalism of its social
and cultural systems (Casterline and Bongaarts 2017). Increased access to family
planning and other reproductive health services, as well as more optimal health
system functioning, educational and other human capital investment, could help
improve maternal outcomes and reduce high rates of maternal mortality and ado-
lescent pregnancy and childbearing (as discussed by Ajayi and Akpan, and
Mkwanazi in this volume). Such developments could also help accelerate fertility
decline, health outcomes and economic growth through opening up a demographic
dividend: the change in age structure brought on by a decline in fertility and
mortality rates that leads to an increase in the proportion of the working-age
population (Bloom and Williamson 1998; Bloom et al. 2017; Groth and May 2017).
Even the demographic dividend, however, can only be meaningful if there are
concurrent investments in work opportunities. Imported technology can reduce
mortality and even fertility, but if nothing else changes, the growth in the number of
young adults can be at best disruptive, at worst, disastrous (Nayab 2007). The
recent experience of such countries as Ethiopia, Malawi and Rwanda (U.S. Agency
for International Development et al. 2012) illustrates the potential gains to be
realized from scaling up family planning, maternal, new-born and childcare ser-
vices, and for facilitating women’s economic empowerment. Such policies need not
require major investment (Chola et al. 2015).
There is already an ongoing epidemiologic transition in sub-Saharan Africa,
such as started earlier in other major world regions. Non-communicable diseases
(NCDs) have become the world’s leading causes of death, accounting for over 70%
1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth … 19

of all deaths globally. They include cardiovascular diseases (CVDs), cancers,


diabetes, and chronic respiratory diseases. The four main NCDs share four risk
factors of tobacco use, excessive use of alcohol, physical inactivity and unhealthy
diet. Chronic respiratory diseases are rising in Africa as in many other regions,
reflecting the high use of smoked tobacco. In this book, Ntoimo et al. document
these trends for four African countries. Cancers and other NCDs are also attribu-
table to smoking and pose a significant threat to health and population well-being,
as well as to economic growth and sustainable development throughout the region.
NCD prevention efforts among young people align with recent targets set by the
World Health Organization (WHO) and with the UN’s Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) (WHO 2016). However, their implementation in Africa is severely
lacking and elsewhere, the experience and progress of countries in addressing risk
behaviours varies. Moreover, NCD prevention efforts are particularly important and
lacking among African youth, who offer a critical opportunity to curb the nascent
tobacco epidemic and to affect the likelihood of young people developing beha-
vioural risk factors associated with NCDs. Here, too, however, as with contra-
ceptive use, local responsiveness is predicated not on Western logic of living a long
life, but on the meaning these activities have within the context of African poverty.

1.6.2 Coping with Regional Depopulation in Many


Developed Countries

In many regions that have been experiencing low-fertility and out-migration for
some time, the population is not only greying it is also declining. Examples include
many parts of Europe, Russia and Japan. Declining populations are more pro-
nounced on a regional than on a national level and rural areas are more affected than
urban ones. Regions vary in the relative importance of net-migration and low
fertility producing negative population growth (Bucher and Mai 2005).
Since the 1980s it has been repeatedly argued that declines in human population
may carry some risks, including the possibility that there would be fewer entre-
preneurs, fewer pioneers, fewer problem-solvers, a view popularized by economist
Julian Simon (1996). His neo-conservative emphasis that no resource is more
valuable than the human mind has since transformed into the fear, particularly
amongst those leery of changing family, cultural, racial and ethnic structures, of a
‘demographic winter’ or calamitous population collapse. Essentially, the argument
is that as, historically, economic prosperity has tended to correlate with population
growth, depopulation will lead to falling prosperity. These arguments mirror
Malthus in the sense that they derive social consequences directly from demo-
graphic change, substituting causality for correlation, and ignoring the social and
economic processes that have generated unemployment and precarious employment
(Joyce 2008). They thus translate genuine economic insecurity into a demographic
problem and reflect, rather than challenge, the xenophobia against migrants who, no
20 J. Anson et al.

less than their counterparts in the More Developed Countries, are victims of global
processes of social degeneration and unequal opportunities.7
In practice, negative natural growth in Western Europe has not been associated
with an overall decline in living standards, although it has caused problems of
adjustment at the local level, particularly in rural areas when technical or admin-
istrative thresholds of size are undercut (Hummel and Lux 2007; Bartl and
Sackmann 2016). However, here too, the tendency to focus on the demographic
aspects can obfuscate the underlying economic reality: as fertility declines and life
expectancy increases, the proportion of the ageing population increases.
Nonetheless, before blaming age structure for threats to the pension system, we
need to consider the nuts and bolts of the pension system itself, the transition to low
paid precarious employment with minimum payments into pension funds, and the
ability of those with the highest incomes to avoid paying taxes and thus to privatise
socially generated resources.

1.7 Conclusions

This introductory chapter has outlined the deep and longstanding gaps between
sociological and demographic perspectives regarding the roots and fruits of pop-
ulation growth and social structures. It has highlighted the exemplars of global
population size and distribution, including some major sociological approaches to
understanding the drivers of such patterns and trends, and two major emerging
themes in global population dynamics that are partially illustrated in the chapters
that follow. In so doing, we hope that this volume may help underscore the need for
more effort to help redress the persistent gaps in linking sociological and demo-
graphic perspectives and thus to improve understanding of their complex and varied
underpinnings, manifestations, and outcomes.
This chapter has also highlighted that demography is not destiny. The varied
thoughts on population of two major political economists, Malthus and Marx,
remain significant sensitizers to the manner in which population issues should be
addressed. Even after two centuries, their respective clarion calls still warrant
attention if we wish to improve the prospects for more responsible stewardship of
both human and environmental resources. Malthus’s warnings about resource
limitations were simplistic but an awareness of these stresses and their management
still carry relevance as we attempt to move to an age of more sustainable devel-
opment. At the same time, Marx’s analysis of exploitative relations and economic
justice resonate in a time of increasing income and wealth inequality, and helps
explain why wishing for change is not enough.

7
The concept of demographisation captures such processes of a discoursive re-framing of social
problems as demographic ones (Barlösius 2007; Messerschmidt 2014; Sackmann et al. 2015).
A typical example is the neglect of political causes for an oversupply of housing in eastern
Germany (i.e. dysfunctional subsidies in the 1990s) by pointing exclusively to demographic
change (Sackmann 2015, p. 28).
1 Roots and Fruits of Population Growth … 21

Demographic developments present many challenges for societies and for


researchers seeking to improve comprehension of their determinants, including their
sociological roots, and more sustainable strategies for coping with the problems
posed. In the past and more recently, Malthus’ views have been widely challenged
and found wanting, but his principle of population helped give urgency to the need
to maintain a balanced relationship between population growth and means of
subsistence. Similarly, it would seem likely that human populations have strong
adaptive capacities to address new challenges that include depopulation, the
heterogeneity of health profiles, individual and community attitudes and beliefs,
and environmental stressors. Whatever our concern, however, we will never
understand either the causes (roots) or the outcomes (fruits) unless we appreciate
that population processes are social processes, and social processes involve real live
people, reproducing, migrating and dying. We trust that in putting together this
volume we have contributed to such an understanding.

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Part I
Demography and Social Structure
Chapter 2
The Demographic Transition
in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black
Populations of Northern Cauca
(Colombia)

Fernando Urrea-Giraldo

Abstract Northern Cauca in southwestern Colombia is a multi-ethnic-racial


Andean region, inhabited by Indigenous (Nasa-Indigenous), Black and
White-Mestizo populations. For the last three decades, this region has experienced a
rapid process of modernization associated with a strong agribusiness development
and an expansion of industrial maquila companies. Notwithstanding this trend, the
Andean Indigenous peasant economy continues to be pivotal in the mountainous
area of the region. This chapter presents a comparative analysis of fertility patterns
among ethnic-racial minorities (Indigenous and Black) and White-Mestizo popu-
lations. It utilizes data from the 1993 and 2005 Colombian population censuses; the
Colombian national register of households in poverty; Colombian demographic and
Cali household surveys from 2010 to 2015 and one Nasa-Indigenous household
survey. In addition, it uses national statistics records of several countries and some
data from specialized demographic studies of the World Bank and the United
Nations from 2000 to 2015. Accordingly, an international comparison of fertilities
among Colombian ethnic-racial minorities and their counterparts in other countries
is possible. Conceptually, the chapter draws on insights from Johnstone’s work on
Indigenous fertility transitions in developed countries and Caldwell’s transition
theory to examine how the increasing levels of schooling and the changes in the
occupational structure of this region are affecting the fertility transition of
Indigenous and Black minorities.

 
Keywords Fertility Ethnic-racial groups Nasa-Indigenous people
 
Black people White-Mestizo population Northern Cauca

F. Urrea-Giraldo (&)
Department of Social Sciences, Faculty of Social Sciences and Economics,
Universidad del Valle, Cali, Colombia
e-mail: furreagiraldo@yahoo.com; fernando.urrea@correounivalle.edu.co

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 27


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_2
28 F. Urrea-Giraldo

2.1 Introduction

This study seeks to describe and deepen the understanding of fertility patterns,
trends and differentials for the Nasa-Indigenous and Black populations in northern
Cauca, south-western Colombia. The findings are compared to the area’s
White-Mestizo population as well as to the broader region. With this purpose in
mind, the study applies a primarily social anthropological lens to conduct a mul-
ticultural demographic analysis of group differences in fertility, focusing on the
Indigenous fertility transition and the sociodemographic and socioeconomic dif-
ferences between such groups. In addition, to broaden the discussion, an interna-
tional perspective has been added to explain the dynamics of demographic
transition for these different populations worldwide.
The theoretical approach taken in this chapter resembles the one proposed by
Kim Johnstone, which is often used to study ethnic demography and variation
(Halli et al. 1990) as well as Indigenous fertility. Johnstone (2011) suggests that “an
indigenous theory for population change is needed. Such a theory should reflect the
political economy of fertility, enabling explanation of contemporary fertility pat-
terns among indigenous peoples that reflect social, economic, political, historical
and cultural realities” (…), and also, “colonisation history as an explicit and per-
vasive influence on all exogenous drivers of the proximate determinants of fertility”
(ibid., p. 117). In addition, the study uses insights from Caldwell’s demographic
transition theory (Caldwell et al. 2006) to understand the relationship between
changes in fertility patterns in the Nasa-Indigenous people and changes in the
Colombian Andean peasant economy of hegemonic Indigenous presence.
In this chapter the term ethnic-racial is used as a single category in reference to
both Indigenous and Black people, because the two groups are the result of colo-
nialist processes of long duration, as subordinate populations with respect to the
White-Mestizo elites (Wade 2010, pp. 13–17). Ethnic group makes more reference
to Indigenous populations in sociocultural terms while racial group to the Black
populations in terms of phenotype and skin color. Wade (2010, p. 15) contends that
“(…) the general consensus is that ethnicity refers to ‘cultural’ differences, whereas
(…) race is said to refer to phenotypical differences—although some draw no real
distinction between race and ethnicity (for example, Eriksen 1993, p. 5)”. However,
the use of the broader category ethnic-racial allows for comparisons of Indigenous
and Black populations in Latin America with Indigenous or Aboriginal peoples in
the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand as well as with Black
population groups in the United States and South Africa. This usage of the
ethnic-racial category as a single dimension of social inequality can be also found in
Telles and Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America (2014), who posit that
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 29

the ethnic-racial category includes the Indigenous, Black, and White-Mestizo


populations.1 In Colombia it is important to note that the two first mentioned
populations are minorities.
The results for the northern Cauca study region are compared to those obtained
for the southern Valle del Cauca2 region, as both regions or departments can be
considered as part of one larger multi-ethnic and multi-racial area. This combined
area comprises 28 municipalities. The city of Cali (located in the department of
Valle) constitutes the largest urban agglomeration in the Colombian southwest (see
Fig. 2.1) and its regional influence extends to other municipalities, including the
majority of urban and rural Black and rural Nasa-Indigenous population settlements
(Fig. 2.1)3 in northern Cauca. In this paper, five municipalities are taken as the base
for comparison: two where the majority of people are Black (Puerto Tejada and
Villa Rica) and three where most people are Nasa-Indigenous (Caldono, Jambaló
and Toribío). As these five municipalities are a good representation of the changes
occurring throughout the northern Cauca region, they can be used to observe the
profound differences between ethnic-racial populations, with the findings compared
further to populations of the same categories that are settled in the city of Cali.
According to the National Administrative Department of Statistics’ (DANE)
population projections, as of 30 June 2016, Cali had approximately 2.4 million
inhabitants and its hinterland about 4.2 million people (8.5% of the Colombian
population). Cali’s zone of influence is a typical Colombian Andean region, made
up of two mountain ranges between which the Cauca River valley is located, at
900–1100 m above sea level. The Indigenous population in northern Cauca is
mostly located in the mountainous area, in places over 1000 m above sea level and
with difficult agricultural conditions and strong demographic pressure. Black people
are mainly settled in the flat area of the valley, where a peasant economy struggles
to coexist with a growing, large-scale, agribusiness economy and where most
people work in sugar cane plantations or in maquila manufacturing plants.

1
For this chapter, the term “Mestizo” refers to those of mixed White European and South
American Indigenous ancestry. The term “White-Mestizo” or “non-ethnic” population refers to the
aggregate of people who in the Colombian case do not recognize themselves as Indigenous, or as
Afro-descendant/Black or Mulatto or under another ethnic category. In other countries of Latin
America, the “Mestizo” category exists separately from the White one. Unfortunately for
Colombia this differentiation is not possible in census categories.
2
To avoid possible confusion, from here on, the department of Valle del Cauca is referred to as
Valle.
3
The city of Cali has the highest concentration (in absolute terms) of Afro-descendants or Black
people in Colombia. Furthermore, if northern Cauca and southern Valle are considered as
belonging to the same area, this combined region would have the highest regional concentration of
Black people in the whole country, as well as the third largest rural-urban concentration of
Nasa-Indigenous people. At the 2005 Census, in this combined region of northern Cauca and
southern Valle, the Black population made up about 35.0% of the entire population, with the
Nasa-Indigenous another 6.0% and the White-Mestizo about 59.0%. At the national level, the
percentages of the Black and Indigenous populations were considerably lower: Black 10.6%,
Indigenous 3.3% and White-Mestizo 86.1%.
30 F. Urrea-Giraldo

Fig. 2.1 Map showing the city of Cali and municipalities with predominantly Black (Puerto
Tejada and Villa Rica) and Nasa-Indigenous populations (Toribío, Jambaló and Caldono) in the
Northern Cauca region of southwestern Colombia. Source Author’s elaboration based on IGAC
mapping. IGAC: Instituto Geográfico Agustín Codazzi

The latter have developed since the mid-1990s through the use of a Black labour
force, in particular the women, from the region of northern Cauca (Urrea-Giraldo
2010, pp. 111–112).

2.2 Methods and Data

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the patterns of fertility and other demo-
graphic and socioeconomic variables for ethnic-racial groups in the region of study
for the period ranging from 1993 to 2014/2015. It utilizes a descriptive demography
based on standardized indicators of fertility,4 children ever born, and other sociode-
mographic and socioeconomic indicators such as infant mortality,5 literacy, schooling
and health coverage, derived from census and household demographic survey data.
For Colombia, we used the 1993 and 2005 censuses of DANE; the 2010 and 2015
National Demographic and Health Surveys (NDHS) (Profamilia 2011, 2017);

4
For the estimations of Total Fertility and age-specific rates of the Indigenous and Black popu-
lations, the methods of Coale and Trussell (1996) and of Stover and Kirmeyer (2007) were
employed.
5
For the Indigenous and Black people, infant mortality rates were estimated using the procedures
indicated by Sullivan (1972), Trussell (1975), and also Coale and Trussell (1996).
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 31

the Colombian national register of households in poverty (SISBEN III) (DNP


2014); the 2014–2015 NSHP survey (Nasa-Indigenous Survey of Household and
Productive Units) (CIDSE 2016); and the 2012–2013 SEQL (Survey of
Employment and Quality of Life in Cali) (Ministerio de Trabajo 2013).
For comparison, the chapter employs institutional data from the World Bank as
well as national statistics on fertility for different years for the following countries:
Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. It utilizes
comparable information for several Latin American countries, namely: Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, taken
from CELADE (Latin American and the Caribbean Demographic Centre, which
belongs to ECLA) and the national statistics institutes.
Since 2010, SISBEN III allows us to estimate proxy indicators of fertility, such
as the Child-Woman Ratio (CWR),6 in municipalities that have a population of less
than 100,000 inhabitants. This register does not record ethnic or racial information,
but it is known that the Indigenous population does not participate in this national
system and that most of the SISBEN III population are Black or White-Mestizo
people. We thus use the CWR for the two mostly-Black municipalities (Puerto
Tejada and Villa Rica) as a measure of fertility for the northern Cauca Black
population.
In the next section, we compare the global fertility rates of the Indigenous and
the Black populations for the studied region in Colombia, and compare these with
other Latin American, North American and Caribbean countries (as well as South
Africa for Blacks) to analyse the dynamics of fertility transition at an international
level.

2.3 Comparison of National Fertility Patterns

In the first part of this section, Total Fertility (TF) for Indigenous populations is
compared across similar Latin American and Caribbean countries. In the second
part, Black TF is compared with some Latin American countries, the United States
and South Africa.

2.3.1 Indigenous Populations’ Total Fertility

According to the World Bank Development Indicators, fertility in Colombia


declined from an average of 6.8 live births per woman in 1960, to 1.875 children
per woman in 2015. Even the estimates from the NDHS 2015 of 2.0 (Profamilia
2017, p. 266) indicates a process of advanced fertility transition in Colombia.

6
Ratio of children under 5 years of age per 1000 women of childbearing age.
32 F. Urrea-Giraldo

Table 2.1 Total Fertility Countries TF


(TF) in 2015: Colombia and
selected world regions World 2.451
East Asia and Pacific 1.781
Latin America and Caribbean 2.095
European Union 1.577
North America 1.818
Middle East and North Africa 2.816
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.976
South Asia 2.523
Colombia 1.875
Source World Bank (2017)

However, there are still strong regional fertility variations within the country. In a
global context, Colombia today presents a fairly low overall fertility rate, as can be
seen in Table 2.1. It is well below the world average and that of Latin America and
the Caribbean, very close to North America (Canada and the United States), but still
above the world regions with the lowest fertility rates (the European Union, East
Asia and Pacific countries).
In Colombia, estimates of fertility indicators by ethnic-racial groups have only
been available since 1993 and reliable data became available about one decade
later. Early ethnic-racial indicators on fertility were estimated by Piñeres-Petersen
and Ruíz-Salguero (1998, pp. 324–329) using a national survey for the Indigenous
population (Piñeres-Petersen and Sabogal 1999) and 1993 census data. It was only
after the 2005 census that reliable data were available to study the three different
ethnic-racial groups (Blacks, Indigenous, and White-Mestizo populations), in all the
Colombian municipalities. In the case of Cali, fertility rates by ethnic-racial groups
can also be estimated from the 2012 to 2013 Survey of Employment and Quality of
Life, conducted by the Colombian Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2013),
as it has a robust statistical sample and includes an ethnic-racial question. For
Indigenous populations living in the Andean areas of Colombia, it is also possible
to estimate fertility indicators from the 2014 to 2015 Nasa-Indigenous Survey of
Household and Productive Units (NSHP), which was conducted for the three
Nasa-Indigenous municipalities of northern Cauca (Caldono, Jambaló and Toribío).
Colombia is one of the 12 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean with
sizeable Indigenous populations. These countries rank as follows: Bolivia (62.2%),
Guatemala (41.0%), Peru (15.9%), Panama (12.3%), Mexico and Colombia (3.4%),
Argentina (3.1%), and Brazil (0.4%). They represent about 95% of the Indigenous
population in Latin America and the Caribbean, according to ethnic
self-recognition,7 during the 2000 round of censuses.

7
See Urrea-Giraldo and Rodríguez-Sánchez (2014, pp. 13–14).
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 33

Table 2.2 Indigenous Total Fertility in countries with Indigenous populations in Latin America,
2000 and 2010 census round; and several NDHS years for seven countries
Country Census year TF NDHS year TF
Bolivia 2001 4.7 2008 3.6
Brazil 2000 4.0 2010 3.7
Chile 2002 2.0 – –
Colombia 2005 3.9* 2010 3.3
Ecuador 2001 5.3 2011 3.9
Guatemala 2002 6.5 2014/2015** 3.7
Honduras 2001 5.9 – –
Mexico 2000 4.2 2010 2.9
Panama 2000 5.9 2010 5.0
Peru 2007 7.7*** 2012 3.2
Source ECLAC and UNFPA (2007, p. 44), CEPAL (2014, p. 114), ECLAC (2014, p. 41)
*For Colombia, author’s estimates based on data from the 2005 census
**For Guatemala, 2014/2015 data is from the latest NDHS (p. 109)
***For Peru, the 2007 data refer to Peruvian Amazon groups only (INEI 2007)

According to the 2005 census, in Colombia the three major ethnic-racial groups8
had the following Total Fertility rates: 2.77 children on average for Black, 3.89 for
Indigenous, and 2.37 for the non-ethnic or White-Mestizo population. These figures
reveal important reproductive differentials among the three population groups.
Black and Indigenous populations had values higher than the national level of Total
Fertility, while the rate for White-Mestizo people was below it, which suggests the
presence of three reproductive regimes that also varied according to region,
women’s educational levels, access to health services, female labour force partic-
ipation, and living conditions (Urrea-Giraldo and Rodríguez 2012; Urrea-Giraldo
2012). By 2005, the Nasa-Indigenous group reached a national fertility of 4.1
children, which is above the total average rate for the Colombian Indigenous

8
The 2005 census question on ethnic-racial information was: “According to your culture, people or
physical features, do you recognize yourself as? 1. Indigenous 2. Rom 3. Raizal from the
Archipelago of San Andrés 4. Palenquero from San Basilio 5. Black, mulatto, Afro-Colombian or
Afro-descendant 6. None of the above.”
If an interviewee chose “Indigenous”, then there was another question: “To which indigenous
community do you belong?” Nowadays in Colombia, there are 102 Indigenous groups recognized
by the National Constitution.
The categories 3, 4 and 5 in Colombia are considered as Afro-descendants, generally accepted
as meaning Black people.
The category “None of the above” refers to people without ethnic or racial self-recognition
(non-ethnic-racial belonging). Nevertheless, in several empirical studies—for example
Urrea-Giraldo et al. (2014)—it has been demonstrated that more than 85% of people self-classified
in this category (“None of the above”) were at the same time self-recognized as White or Mestizo,
when the question was phrased in racial terms.
34 F. Urrea-Giraldo

population.9 The Indigenous population of Colombia had one of the most moderate
levels of Total Fertility—3.9 children per woman—among the 10 countries com-
pared in Table 2.2 in the early twenty-first century, after Chile. Of course, there are
considerable variations in TF among the Indigenous peoples in Colombia. For
example, the Embera people of Cristianía, in the department of Antioquia, had a TF
of 5.12 for 2000 (Arias-Valencia 2005, p. 1093), and Embera and Zenu, had even
higher TF, perhaps more than 5.3 children per woman.10 On the other hand, Wayuu
people had a TF of 4.6 and Nasa of 4.1, while other groups such as the Misak had
3.7 and Yanacona 3.5.11
A significant decline in Indigenous fertility can be observed in the first decade of
the twenty-first century (see Table 2.2). In the absence of more recent data for
Chile, Mexico appears as the country with the lowest Total Fertility for its
Indigenous population (2.9 children per woman of childbearing age), followed by
the Indigenous populations of Peru and Colombia with 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. In
third place are Bolivia (3.6), Brazil (3.7) and Ecuador (3.9). In the case of
Guatemala, until 2008 the Indigenous TF was 5.0 but after 2014/2015 the NDHS
estimate falls to 3.7. Finally, the Indigenous people of Panama still have a high rate
of fertility, with TF of 5.9 children per woman. Colombian Indigenous women
maintained their pattern of a moderate TF in 2010 when compared to Indigenous
women from other countries in the region. In general, as a trend throughout the
region, the decline in Indigenous fertility is significant.
ECLAC (2014, p. 238)12 reports on the Indigenous people of Latin American
countries and presents the prevalence of contraceptive use among women by ethnic
status, for eight countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Peru), and during several years, since 2000 until 2012,
using NDHS data. The prevalence of contraceptive use is increasing among

9
According to the 2005 census, this Indigenous community is the second largest Indigenous group
in Colombia, with a total population of 195,400 people, which represents about 13.4% of the
national Indigenous population (1,458,212 people in 102 Indigenous villages). Most of the
Nasa-Indigenous people are settled in the department or province of Cauca: 173,125 people or
88.6% of the total Nasa people in Colombia. Of these, around 66% live in northern Cauca, of
which 56.0% (63,987 people) are settled in the three municipalities with a predominantly Nasa
population: Caldono, Jambaló, and Toribío.
10
The Embera people, studied by Arias-Valencia (2005), is an Indigenous people who inhabit the
humid tropical rainforest of the Colombian Pacific region. It is an aboriginal group with very
different sociodemographic patterns from the groups of the Colombian Andean region, such as
Nasa, Misak, Coconuco, Yanacona, and Pasto. These five Andean groups have a peasant econ-
omy, based on small producers. On the other side, the same fertility differences can also be
observed for the Wayuu people, who mostly live in a semi-desert region at sea level in the north of
the country. According to the 2005 census, 78.6% of Colombian Aboriginal populations lived in
rural areas, and less than 8.0% lived in large cities.
11
Author’s estimates based on the 2005 census data.
12
ECLAC: The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. In
Spanish it is CEPAL.
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 35

Table 2.3 Latin America (12 countries): Total Fertility (TF) by ethnicity and educational level,
around 2010 using census and NDHS data
Country, year of Years of education
data collection Indigenous women Non-Indigenous women
0–3 4–6 7–12 13+ 0–3 4–6 7–12 13+
Bolivia, 2008 5.8 5.1 3.3 1.8 4.5 4.6 3.0 2.0
Brazil, 2010 4.6 3.9 1.9 1.3 2.5 2.4 1.5 1.0
Colombia, 2010 5.2 3.0 2.3 1.4 3.5 3.0 2.1 1.4
Ecuador, 2010 4.9 4.2 3.9 2.4 3.9 3.5 3.2 1.8
Guatemala, 2008 4.9 3.6 2.4 1.5 3.7 3.4 2.2 1.4
Mexico, 2010 4.5 3.7 2.7 1.5 3.5 3.1 2.6 1.5
Nicaragua, 2005 6.0 4.7 3.1 2.1 4.6 3.4 2.6 1.5
Nicaragua, 2006–2007 5.7 3.8 2.6 2.2 3.5 2.5 2.0 1.3
Panama, 2010 6.6 5.5 4.0 1.8 3.8 3.6 2.7 1.6
Paraguay, 2008 4.5 3.6 3.3 1.6 – 2.9 2.6 1.8
Peru, 2012 4.2 3.8 3.0 2.9 3.5 3.3 2.5 1.8
Uruguay, 2011 – 3.2 2.5 1.2 – 2.9 2.2 1.5
Source CEPAL (2014, p. 115), table II.7. This institution employs both sources, population
censuses and the national demographic and health surveys

Indigenous women in Latin America but the gap between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous women is closing, in some countries more than in others.
Recently, in 2014–2015, the TF of the Nasa population of northern Cauca (2.99,
see Table 2.8) has dropped below the national average for the Colombian
Indigenous population (3.3 in 2010, see Table 2.2). In 2005, the three Nasa
municipalities of northern Cauca still had TF levels above the national average,
attesting to the importance of sociodemographic and socioeconomic changes
among the Nasa-Indigenous population in northern Cauca.
For all the twelve Latin American countries compared in Table 2.3, the fertility
of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous women has declined. Furthermore, the
differences in TF are narrowing between Indigenous and non-Indigenous women.
This suggests that ethnic differences are changing and losing their importance, a
trend likely associated with educational expansion. In Colombia, too,
Indigenous TF is falling, especially amongst those with 13 years and more of
schooling.

2.3.2 Total Fertility of the Black Populations

The Colombian census of 2005 includes four categories of Black populations:


Afro-descendant, Negro, Mulatto, and Afro-Colombian. The main countries for
comparison with available data for Black populations are: Brazil, Ecuador, South
36 F. Urrea-Giraldo

Table 2.4 Total Fertility (TF) for Black people and other ethnic-racial groups in five countries:
2001, 2005, and 2006
Categories USA Brazil South Africa Colombia Ecuador
2005 2005 2006 2005 2001
Total 2.06 2.06 2.8 2.5 3.4
populationa
Whiteb 1.87 1.88 1.8 2.8
c
Black 2.03 2.25 2.9 2.77 3.9
Hispanic 2.79
Indigenous 1.59 3.8* 3.89 5.8
peopled
Mestizoe 2.37 3.3
Author’s table based on the following sources Brazil (Paixão et al. 2010); South Africa (Statistics
South Africa 2010; Lehohla 2015); Colombia (DANE 2007; and author’s estimates by
ethnic-racial groups based on 2005 census); Ecuador (SISPAE 2004); The United States
(Martin et al. 2011)
*Brazil, 2010 census
a
For the US, the equivalent to “Total population” is “All races”
b
For the US, the equivalent to “White” is “White (non-Hispanic)”
c
The equivalent to “Black,” for Brazil, is “Preto” and “Pardo.” For Colombia and Ecuador, it is
“Negro” and “Mulatto”; the “Black” category here contains also persons of a racial mixture
between White and Black people, which is called “Brown” or “multiracial” in the Anglo-Saxon
tradition. Also, in Colombia and Ecuador, census categories for “Black” include the terms
“Afro-descendant,” “Afro-Colombian” and “Afro-Ecuatorian.” In addition, in Colombia there are
another two specific Afro-descendant geographic groups which are included as “Black.”
d
The equivalent to “Indigenous people” for the US is “American Indian”
e
For Andean countries and Mexico, the category “Mestizo” accounts for the people of mixed
ancestry, from White European and Indigenous peoples. This applies also for Colombia, but it is
not a census category. For Colombia, “non-ethnic” or “White-Mestizo” population are the people
who self-identify in neither ethnic nor racial terms with “Indigenous,” “Negro,” “Mulatto,”
“Afro-descendant” and Afro-Colombian” categories, but also with other ethnic terms such as
“Gypsy” (“Romany”) and the two very specific Afro-descendant groups (Raizal and Palenquero)

Africa and the United States. In Colombia, in 2005, 10.6% of the total population
self-identified themselves as Black people, whereas in the 2000 census of Brazil
(“Preto” and “Pardo” categories) they made up 44.7% of the population and 51.0%
in 2010. In the U.S., in 2000, Blacks accounted for 12.9% and in 2010, 13.6% of
the population. In South Africa, the African Black population reached 78.4% in
2011, while in Ecuador, in the same year, 10.0%.
Table 2.4 shows TF of Black people or equivalent categories in population
censuses for these five countries, in the years 2001, 2005, and 2006. The data
indicate that Ecuadorian Black people have a higher TF (3.9) than equivalent
categories in the U.S. (2.03), Brazil (2.25), South Africa (2.9) or Colombia (2.77).
This reveals the different dynamic of demographic transition for Black populations
in the five countries. The relatively high TF of Black people in Ecuador results from
the higher proportion of the Black population in rural areas in this country.
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 37

2.3.3 A First Comparative Analysis of the Two Minority


Populations

In all five countries, Black people had a higher TF than the total population (and
obviously also higher than the White or equivalent—in Colombia non-ethnic—
population). In comparison with other ethnic-racial groups, the TF of Black people
in the U.S. is higher than that of Native Americans (1.59), but lower than the TF of
Hispanic or Latino people (2.79). In Colombia, Black people have an intermediate
TF between the non-ethnic (2.37) and Indigenous (3.89) populations; and this is
true also for Ecuadorian Black people (3.9) when compared, on the one hand, with
the TF of White (2.8) and Mestizo (3.3) populations and with the Indigenous TF
(5.8) on the other. The fertility pattern of Indigenous people in the U.S. thus appears
to be very different from that in South and Central America (Brazil, Colombia, and
Ecuador). In the former, the Indigenous people have the lowest TF (1.59) of any
group, whereas in the latter the Indigenous TF is the highest in the country (in
Brazil, 3.8; in Colombia, 3.89; and in Ecuador, 5.8). In South Africa, on the other
hand, the Indigenous Black population (which is the largest racial category) has the
highest fertility level among population groups.

2.3.4 Updated Fertility Estimates for Colombia

The 2015 Colombian NDHS yielded the following estimates for fertility, children
ever born by ages 40–49, and percentage of ever-pregnant women under 20 years
of age, for the provinces or departments of Cauca and Valle, in comparison to the
national total.
From Table 2.5, it is evident that the Cauca department has higher values of TF,
average live births of women aged 40–49 years, and percentage of women under
age 20 ever pregnant, than the department of Valle or the overall national popu-
lation. To interpret these results, we need to remember that Indigenous people are
over-represented in the department of Cauca. According to the 2005 census, about
21.8% of the population in this region were Indigenous and the proportion was even
greater (32.9%) in rural areas (Urrea-Giraldo 2010, p. 33). However, the author’s
estimates suggest that for northern Cauca at least two of these indicators are closer

Table 2.5 TF, children ever born and percentage of women under age 20 ever pregnant
Region TF (Total Average live births of women % of women under 20 years
Fertility) aged 40–49 years ever pregnant
Cauca 2.2 3.1 24.9
Valle 1.7 2.3 11.7
Total 2.0 2.7 17.4
national
Source Profamilia (2017, pp. 270–271, 290)
38 F. Urrea-Giraldo

to the department of Valle’s figures: 2.0 children TF, 2.8 in average live births of
women aged 40–49 years, and 20.5% of women under age 20 ever pregnant. This
last indicator is close to the Cauca value and still above the national value. In any
case, data for 2015 already reveal significant changes in the regional context.

2.4 Evolution of Socio-Demographic Indicators


of Black and Nasa-Indigenous Municipalities
in Northern Cauca

According to data from the 1993 and 2005 censuses, more than 90% of people
living in the northern Cauca municipalities are either Indigenous (in the munici-
palities of Caldono, Jambaló, Toribío) or Black (in the case of Puerto Tejada and
Villa Rica13). In the whole region, or province, of Cauca, the Indigenous and Black
people do not make up the majority of the population. In recent years there has been
an increase in the recorded percentage share of the Indigenous and Black popula-
tions—but this may also be due to better procedures for collecting ethnic-racial
information. A similar phenomenon can be observed in the city of Cali: since 2005,
more than a quarter of its population was self-classified as Black or Indigenous,
which was greater than the 1993 census figures (see Table 2.7).
The Indigenous municipalities are predominantly rural and the Black ones tend
to be more urban. At the 2005 census, the whole department of Cauca was still
considered a rural region: only 40.6% of its population resided in urban centres.
However, of the Black population in northern Cauca, 49.4% were urban, compared
with only 6.9% of Indigenous population. By contrast, the non-ethnic or
White-Mestizo population was the only one that exceeded 50% of people living in
municipal urban centres. In Cali, of course, effectively all the population is regis-
tered as urban.
Total Fertility declined between the two censuses, although this process was
different for northern Cauca Indigenous and Black people, as well as for Black,
Indigenous and non-ethnic urban Cali population (see Table 2.7). In all cases, the
decreases were significant. In northern Cauca, although they started with different
initial values in 1993, by 2005 both Indigenous and Black women had, on average,
one child less. This is the most prominent factor affecting the population structure.
However, it is noteworthy that for the Nasa-Indigenous population, there were
variations in the patterns of change in the age-specific rates. Between 1993 and 2005
there was only a small decline in the adolescent fertility rate (15–19 years), while
there was a relative increase of fertility rates in the age group of women 20–24 years,
and a decrease in other age groups. Thus, between the 1993 and 2005 censuses,

13
In 1993, Villa Rica was not yet a municipality, but this settlement has had, since its foundation, a
Black majority.
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 39

220.0
200.0
180.0
160.0
140.0
120.0
100.0
80.0
60.0
40.0
20.0
0.0
15 to 19 20 to 24 25 to 29 30 to 34 35 to 39 40 to 44 45 to 49
Nasa-Indigenous populaƟon of
northern Cauca (Jambaló, Caldono 168.0 207.6 167.3 128.4 112.0 60.6 11.6
and Toribío)
Afro-descendant municipaliƟes
113.8 133.8 101.2 66.8 34.1 17.1 1.9
(Villa Rica and Puerto Tejada)
Department of Cauca 119.3 144.6 111.3 84.0 55.3 24.3 3.8
Indigenous Cauca 145.9 196.3 144.8 106.0 89.6 49.6 6.8
Afro-descendant Cauca 125.0 147.8 111.7 78.7 47.3 17.1 2.2
Non-ethnic Cauca 107.7 124.8 99.0 78.8 48.1 20.2 3.6

Fig. 2.2 Age-specific fertility rates of the Nasa-Indigenous population of northern Cauca, the
Afro-descendant municipalities of Puerto Tejada and Villa Rica, and the Department of Cauca, by
ethnic-racial group. Source Author’s estimates based on the Colombian 2005 census (DANE
2005)

the biggest decline in the number of children born alive was observed among women
aged 25 years and older.
There was also a significant decline in the fertility rates of northern Cauca Black
women between the two censuses (see Table 2.7). In 2005, these rates were similar
to the ones estimated for the Black population in Cali (Urrea-Giraldo and Rodríguez
2012). This is consistent with the formation of a Black working class in the
metropolitan area of Cali, with nearby reproductive behaviour and age-specific
fertility rates close to those of the main urban centre (Fig. 2.2). Moreover, for
Indigenous women of all municipalities in the department of Cauca, the 2005
census shows that there has been a significant decrease in the age-specific fertility
rates for early ages (Fig. 2.2). This decline of age-specific fertility rates is observed
for all five-year age groups, and the rates were lower for the Nasa-Indigenous
women living in northern Cauca. However, fertility rates for Indigenous women are
still much higher than those for Black women in the same region and, as expected,
than those for the White-Mestizo (non-ethnic) women (see Fig. 2.2).
In the north-south corridor of Cali, where most middle and upper class
White-Mestizo people live, fertility rates are not only the most moderate, but their
peak occurs in the age group of 30–34 years. This phenomenon is similar to that
found in some developed countries that have higher human development indices.
On the other hand, the Indigenous population in Cali, mainly composed of
Nasa-Indigenous people, has a lower curve of age-specific fertility rates than the
40 F. Urrea-Giraldo

Fig. 2.3 Age-specific fertility rates of Afro-descendant municipalities of Puerto Tejada and Villa
Rica, and in Cali by ethnic-racial group. Source Author’s estimations based on the Colombian
2005 census (DANE 2005)

Black municipalities (see Fig. 2.3), which is consistent with the pattern of selective
Indigenous migration into urban areas, as suggested by Urrea-Giraldo and
Botero-Arias (2010).

2.4.1 Changes in Living Conditions and Sociodemographic


Variables: The Role of Education, the Increases
in Health Coverage, and the Reductions of Unsatisfied
Basic Needs (UBN)

Infant mortality rates declined considerably, for all ethnic-racial groups, between
1993 and 2005. However, infant mortality rates are still high for Indigenous and
Black people, in comparison with their level for White-Mestizo people (see
Table 2.7). These differential reductions in infant mortality rates for Indigenous,
Black, and White-Mestizo populations, in Cali and in the region of Cauca, are
consistent with the differential decline in fertility. Both developments seem to be
conditioned by strong inequalities according to ethnic-racial group, level of
urbanization, and social class.
Reductions in child mortality for both sexes and in Total Fertility are especially
associated with increases in educational attainment levels. Life expectancy at birth
follows a similar regional pattern. Both developments are attributable to differential
increases in health coverage (see Table 2.7). The considerable lag of health
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 41

coverage for the Nasa-Indigenous people in Cauca is evident when compared with
the total Indigenous populations, which have better health coverage and, as a
consequence, lower age-specific fertility rates.14
Furthermore, differentials in the Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN) indicator reflect
substantial changes in living conditions by 2005 for all Indigenous, Black, and
non-ethnic people in the regions of northern Cauca and Cauca (see Table 2.7). In
addition, there is a strong correlation between this synthetic indicator and progress
in other sociodemographic indicators. Poverty, as measured by UBN, declined
systematically in the period 1993–2005, although inequalities still persist.

2.4.2 Recent Changes in the Demographic


and Socio-Economic Indicators
of the Nasa-Indigenous Population,
in the Municipalities of Northern Cauca and Cali

More recent changes in living conditions and fertility patterns can be analysed by
ethnic-racial group for Cali and the three northern Cauca Nasa-Indigenous
municipalities using the 2012–2013 SEQL in Cali and the 2014–2015 NSHP for
the three Nasa-Indigenous municipalities. Although these surveys were collected in
different years, the gap is small and it allows us to identify some ethnic-racial
differentials. The 2005 census and the SEQL indicate that the Nasa-Indigenous
people make up about 95% of the population in the three municipalities (see
Table 2.8). In Cali, the share of the Indigenous and the Black populations has been
increasing, while the percentage of the White-Mestizo population has decreased.
Since 2005, Total Fertility has significantly declined in the three Nasa-
Indigenous municipalities. In all of them, the reduction was of around one child, as
they moved from 4.35 and 4.51 average children in 2005 to 3.15 and 2.99 children
in 2014–2015, respectively. As expected, Total Fertility in 2014–2015 was lower
than it had been a decade earlier because, as will be discussed in the next section,
there has been a significant decline in early fertility for Nasa women aged under
20 years and between ages 20 and 24 years (Fig. 2.4).
Infant mortality among the Nasa-Indigenous population of northern Cauca has
declined dramatically, too, moving from 73.5 deaths of children under 1 year per
1000 live births in 2005, to 47.5 deaths (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8). While the latter
figure is still very high, in relation to the national rates, it does show how living

14
An example is the Misak or Guambiano Indigenous community in Cauca. By 2005, Misak
women had a Total Fertility of 3.16 births per woman and a health coverage of 80.8%. This
contrasts with the TF of 4.51 and the 56.6% health coverage observed for the three
Nasa-Indigenous municipalities in northern Cauca for that year. Thus, important differences in
reproductive patterns and health coverage among Indigenous peoples in Cauca, as in other regions
of Colombia, can be observed.
42 F. Urrea-Giraldo

Fig. 2.4 Age-specific fertility rates of Nasa-Indigenous from northern Cauca (three Indigenous
municipalities) and for all Indigenous people in the Department of Cauca, 2005 and 2014/2015.
Source Author’s estimates based on the 2005 census (DANE 2005), and the Nasa household
survey, 2014/2015 (CIDSE 2016)

conditions have improved. This also explains why life expectancy has moved from
61.1 to 68.5 years, with Indigenous women gaining a few more years of life than
men (9 vs. 7.5 years).
Literacy for both sexes increased 6.1 percentage points, moving from 82.1% in
2005, to 88.2% in 2014–2015. Between 2005 and 2014–2015, for Nasa-Indigenous
women in these municipalities, literacy rates rose from 80.1 to 85.2% and for men
from 85.5 to 91.2%. Between 2005 and 2014–2015, the average number of years of
schooling increased, in the age group 18 to 25 years, from 5.0 to 8.5 years. Again,
inequality between men and women can still be observed: men in that age range
increased four years of schooling, on the average, and women only 2.7 years.
The biggest change in living conditions was observed in the extent of health
coverage. For Nasa-Indigenous people in these municipalities, health coverage
increased from 56.6 to 99.1% of coverage. This has been a remarkable achieve-
ment, which is echoed in improvements in other indicators of living conditions,
such as a sharp decrease of the poverty indicator based on Unsatisfied Basic Needs.
According to the 2005 census, 71.5% of the Nasa population in these municipalities
was classified as poor by the UBN index, but this value had fallen to 27.6% by
2014–2015.
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 43

2.4.3 A Comparison of Nasa-Indigenous and Black


People TF with Indigenous TF in Developed
Countries

It is important to compare teenage fertility in the Nasa municipalities with that of


Aboriginal peoples (First Nations) in developed countries. First, let us look at the
differences between TF in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States
and that of the Indigenous populations in Latin America. Table 2.6 shows that TF
values for Indigenous populations in the former group were well below those for the
Indigenous population in Latin American countries (see Table 2.2). Perhaps the
only exception is Chile, which for 2002 had a rate of only 2.2 children per
Indigenous woman.
In Canada, the total fertility rate for Aboriginal populations, has declined stea-
dily since the 1960s (Guimond and Robitaille 2013). Despite the general fall in
fertility, however, there is still a large difference between the age-specific fertility
rates for Indigenous women (First Nations) and other women between ages 15 and
19 years, with values of around 100 births per 1000 Indigenous women, between
five and seven times the fertility of other young Canadian women in the period
1986–2004. Age-specific fertility for Indigenous adolescents (under 20) was almost
twice as high in Canada as in the United States in 2010, with 94 per 1000 in Canada
and only 47 in the United States. Overall, Canada has one of the highest fertility
rates among the Aboriginal population in developed countries (ibid.).
In Colombia, data from the 2005 census showed that the under-20 fertility rate in
the three Nasa municipalities in northern Cauca was 168 per 1000 women, while in
the two predominantly Black municipalities it was 113.8. However, by 2014–2015,
there had been a significant fall to 85 per 1000 women among adolescent

Table 2.6 Indigenous Total Fertility (TF) in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United
States (Johnstone 2011, p. 111)
Country Year TF
Australia 2006 2.12
Canada 2006 2.84*
New Zealand 2006 2.64
United States 2006 1.83**
*Total Fertility for the Nunavut region of Canada, the population of which is predominantly Inuit
**The Indigenous TF for the U.S. is higher than that reported in Table 2.4 (1.59). This difference
is due to the aggregation methods of data sources on Aboriginal groups. Despite this difference, the
general trend remains similar for this minority population in the U.S., compared with other groups
(see Table 2.4)
44 F. Urrea-Giraldo

Indigenous women and 60 for Black women.15 This indicates a considerable


change in the pattern of early fertility, one that brings Indigenous and Black women
closer to the poorer White-Mestizo women in the same age group. Nevertheless,
these values remain high when compared with teenage rates of developed countries
and with those of middle and upper class White-Mestizo women in the city of Cali,
who had an ASFR of 20 births per 1000 women in 2005 (see Fig. 2.3).
Following on Johnstone’s (2011) discussion of Indigenous fertility transitions,
there are important similarities, but also differences, between what is happening in
Colombia (upper-middle-income economy, according to the World Bank, with
$3,956 to $12,235 per capita) and in the more developed countries. On the one
hand, there is a similar process of declining TF for the Indigenous Colombian
Andean groups, such as the Nasa population, and for aboriginal groups in the
developed countries discussed above, though fertility decline has been more
advanced in these high-income countries than in Latin America (with the exception
of Chile, compare Tables 2.2 and 2.7). On the other hand, among the Colombian
Nasa people, fertility has declined at both the younger ages—15–19 and 20–
24 years old—as well as at older ages—25–29 to 35–39 years old—between 2005
and 2014–2015 (Fig. 2.4). In the other countries, by contrast, fertility declined first
at older ages (30–49 years) and “it was generally assumed that these declines at
older ages would be followed by declines in fertility at the younger ages”
(Johnstone 2011, p. 115). It is very probable that the pattern of Nasa decline is
repeated among all Andean groups. These outcomes come from continuous
advances in schooling of the Nasa-Indigenous women under 25 years old, similar to
Black and White-Mestizo women in the northern rural and urban region of Cauca.
At the same time, there is a growing participation of the more educated Indigenous
women in the labour force, particularly in education, health services, and other
Indigenous programmes.

2.4.4 Changes in the Recent Reproductive Patterns,


Observed Through an Indirect Indicator
Comparing the Northern Cauca Municipalities
of Nasa-Indigenous and Black Populations

In the absence of Total Fertility data for the Black municipalities in 2014, we
constructed an indirect proxy indicator: The Child-Woman Ratio (CWR) of chil-
dren under 5-years by women in childbearing age, for 2005 and 2014. We use this

15
See Fig. 2.4, in the case of Nasa-Indigenous women in the three Indigenous municipalities. For
Black women living in the Black municipalities the value is estimated from data reported by public
health programmes of the department of Cauca.
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 45

Fig. 2.5 Evolution of the ratio of number of children under 5-years to number of women in
childbearing age, for Black people, Nasa-Indigenous and non-ethnic population of northern Cauca
between 2005 and 2014. Source Author’s estimates based on the 2005 census (DANE 2005),
SISBEN III (DNP 2014), and NSHP 2014/2015 (CIDSE 2016)

in order to compare results with those of the 2014/2015 NSHP. In the analysis of
northern Cauca, the non-ethnic and Black16 populations are analysed jointly. In this
way, combining SISBEN III, the 2005 census and NSHP data, Fig. 2.5 allows us to
see the evolution of the ratio of children under 5-years by women in childbearing
age, between 2005 and 2014, for the two Black municipalities and for the three
Nasa-Indigenous municipalities versus the non-ethnic and all Black people of
northern Cauca.
Figure 2.5 shows that between 2005 and 2014 CWR declined for all three
ethnic-racial groups: for the three Indigenous municipalities, this value moved from
62.6 to 36.5; in the Afro-descendant or Black municipalities, this figure moved
from 36.3 to 24.1, and for the whole of the White-Mestizo and Black population of
northern Cauca it went from 38.4 to 27.5. However, the greatest reduction occurred

16
SISBEN III’s register does not have a question of ethnic-racial self-recognition, as the
Colombian population census has. Therefore, it is not possible to differentiate Black from
White-Mestizo population. However, in the Black municipalities of Puerto Tejada and Villa Rica,
almost all the population are Black.
46 F. Urrea-Giraldo

for the Nasa-Indigenous people (41.7%), in comparison with the value for the two
Black municipalities (33.6%) and for the whole northern Cauca Black and
White-Mestizo population (28.4%). We thus see, on the one hand, a modelling
effect of the city of Cali on the demographic transition of both the Black popula-
tions in the townships of Puerto Tejada and Villa Rica, as well as on the
Nasa-Indigenous population in the mountain townships of Caldono, Jambaló and
Toribío. On the other hand, the Nasa-Indigenous people, who maintain a very
strong rural peasant economy, are maintaining a relative demographic gap that
distances them from the urban pattern of Cali.

2.5 Discussion

Colombia, in the context of Latin America and Caribbean countries and compared
also with other groups of countries in several parts of world, has a moderate TF.
Indeed, among Latin American and Caribbean countries, Indigenous TF for
Colombia is one of the lowest for the 2000 census round, through the 2005
census.17
Nevertheless, Colombia and other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean
region, with the exception of Chile, have higher Indigenous TF than aboriginal TF
in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States. While the fertility rates
for ethnic-racial minority women are related to their respective country-wide levels
of fertility, this correspondence does not erase the fertility inequalities due to the
sociocultural historical contexts of the different populations in each country. In
particular, in the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean such as Brazil,
Colombia, and Ecuador with Black and Indigenous populations (in Brazil the
former being the majority population, while in Colombia and Ecuador a minority),
the demographic patterns of Afro-descendants are closer to those of the
White-Mestizo than to the Indigenous populations. The Black population is more
urban than rural, whereas the Indigenous population is more rural. Ecuador, which
has the highest proportion of Black population in rural areas, also has the highest
TF for Black people of the three countries. Rural living helps to maintain socio-
cultural factors such as traditional kinship and patriarchy and to delay the demo-
graphic transition. This is particularly significant in the context of peasant
economies.

17
In Colombia, the 2005 census corresponds to the census round of the 2000s in Latin America.
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 47

Northern Cauca is a region which has undergone considerable demographic


changes, a process that has affected all ethnic-racial groups. In part, at least, this
process is related to improvements in living conditions of the Nasa-Indigenous
peoples, especially since the 2005 census. However, this dynamic can also be
observed in the previous period, 1993–2005. In other words, there has been a
long-term transformation of the whole region, and in Colombian society in general,
over the past half century, and this is reflected in the continuing decline in fertility
rates. In this paper we have highlighted, on one hand, the heterogeneous repro-
ductive patterns of the different ethnic-racial groups, in both rural and urban areas
of northern Cauca and the city of Cali, and on the other, the general trend of a
reduction in fertility in all groups.
This study corroborates Johnstone’s (2011) hypothesis about the influence of
colonization processes on the variations in fertility patterns. This applies to both the
Indigenous and the Black populations, whose levels of fertility are framed in a
political economy where heterogeneous reproductive patterns are expressions of
social inequalities. For the Colombian Andean Indigenous groups studied, two
different aspects are important. The first is the expansion of land availability,
through Indigenous resguardos18 and the growth of coffee culture over the past
20 years (Urrea-Giraldo et al. 2017). The second aspect is the improvement in
living conditions in Indigenous territories, even though they still lag behind the
nearby urban areas or other rural areas. These advancements have contributed to the
increase in women’s education and the expansion of health coverage. One
important reflection of this has been the changes Nasa-Indigenous women in
northern Cauca have experienced in their exposure to reproductive rights.
Contraceptive use has spread, for instance, through health care institutions managed
by Indigenous organizations and there has been an increase in the proportion of
hospital childbirths. At the same time, the figure of the traditional Indigenous
midwife has been preserved.
The context for these changes remains a peasant economy based largely on
non-market production for the family’s own consumption, and relying on family
labour, with wage-labour as a supplement for harvesting. Such a peasant economy
is generally supportive of high fertility (Caldwell et al. 2006). So far, the demo-
graphic changes have not threatened the Nasa-Indigenous peasant economy of the
region, because reproduction of the Indigenous family labour force is maintained at
the level of each family and of each small rural village. One reflection of this is the

18
Resguardos: these were the lands that the Spanish Crown gave to the Indigenous peoples, and
that lately several republican constitutions, particularly the one of 1991 (in Colombia), have
acknowledged.
48 F. Urrea-Giraldo

circulation of unpaid young adult labour, women and men, among the Indigenous
farms for harvesting. Also, self-consumption is still very important, but with par-
ticipation in the labour market of some household members and the sale of cash
crops, especially coffee. Perhaps for all these reasons, fertility remains high in
comparison with the White-Mestizo and Black populations of the region, who are
more integrated into the urban labour markets.
This study on Nasa-Indigenous and Black people versus White-Mestizo TF in
northern Cauca and the city of Cali has limitations due to the absence of new census
data after the 2005 census, for all ethnic-racial groups—the non-ethnic groups or
White-Mestizo populations, and the Black and Indigenous people. Colombia will
only have a new population census in 2018. These differences in primary sources on
fertility bring problems of comparability in the use of TF, and in one case we had to
use an indirect indicator of fertility, in the Black municipalities, using very different
sources. Finally, the study for Colombia using the most recent National
Demographic and Health Survey, 2015, does not allow disaggregated analysis for
the municipalities of the study developed here, much less by ethnic-racial group.
However, despite the methodological limitations due to the diversity of primary
sources, it has been possible to map interesting trends in the differentials in fertility
declines by ethnic-racial groups in the country and in the specific regional context.
This exercise has enabled us to observe and compare the changes that have occurred
amongst Indigenous minorities and Black populations with those in the local
White-Mestizo populations as well as in various countries of the American and
other continents. These observations encompassed the late twentieth and early
twenty-first century and allow us to foresee what might happen as the current
century progresses.

Acknowledgments I would like to thank Andrés Fernando Valencia for his insights and for
improving the text in English. Also, the valuable assistance of Andres Felipe Candelo Álvarez
whose expertise greatly assisted this research. Lastly, I appreciate the helpful discussions of the
work with Christian Mauricio Chacua, Luis Gabriel Quiroz, and Angela Melissa Guzmán.

Annex

See Tables 2.7 and 2.8.


Table 2.7 Sociodemographic and standard of living indicators for three Nasa-Indigenous municipalities and two Black municipalities of northern Cauca,
compared to the Department of Cauca and Cali, 1993 and 2005
Sociodemographic and some Northern Cauca area municipalities Department of Cauca
standard of living indicators Nasa-Indigenous Black Black Indigenous White-Mestizo Total
(Toribío, population population population population
Jambaló, (Puerto Tejada, (Nasa are the (non-ethnic
Caldono) Villa Rica) largest group) people)
1993 2005 1993 2005 1993 2005 1993 2005 1993 2005 1993 2005
% Ethnic-racial population 99.5 99.2 98.0 97.2 8.1 22.2 14.8 21.5 77.1 56.3 100.0 100.0
% Population in municipal seat 24.9 21.3 88.8 84.2 1.4 49.4 2.1 6.9 96.5 51.1 35.0 40.6
Total Fertility (TF) 5.71 4.51 3.25 2.34 4.15 2.65 5.15 3.70 3.65 2.41 3.98 2.71
Infant mortality rate 85.4 73.5 37.5 25.6 64.2 57.7 68.5 66.9 60.5 45.8 63.0 50.7
Life expectancy 56.2 61.1 68.4 72.4 66.9 69.2 67.7 68.6 68.3 72.0 67.1 70.4
Literacy (age 15+) 73.8 82.1 85.8 93.8 81.7 88.6 77.5 83.9 87.8 91.5 83.2 88.2
Average years of schooling 3.5 5.3 8.3 9.2 7.5 7.8 4.4 5.6 7.9 8.3 7.2 7.6
(age 18–25)
% Health coverage 3.5 56.6 9.0 66.6 5.5 63.9 4.5 60.8 7.5 73.6 6.5 68.7
% Unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) 85.9 71.5 31.1 22.6 60.4 42.5 75.5 68.9 50.4 39.2 56.4 46.6

(continued)
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black …
49
Table 2.7 (continued)
50

Sociodemographic and some Cali (the largest city, 2.3 millions, capital of Department
standard of living indicators of Valle, but bordering with Department of Cauca)
Black population Indigenous White-Mestizo Total
population (Nasa are population
the largest group) (non-ethnic people)
1993 2005 1993 2005 1993 2005 1993 2005
% Ethnic-racial population 23.5 26.2 0.5 0.5 76.0 73.3 100.0 100.0
% Population in municipal seat 97.7 98.7 97.6 97.6 97.7 98.1 97.7 98.3
Total Fertility (TF) 2.78 2.08 2.91 1.97 2.04 1.77 2.11 1.85
Infant mortality rate 22.4 14.8 33.4 17.3 15.9 9.5 18.1 12.6
Life expectancy 68.9 69.9 66.7 67.8 76.8 78.2 74.4 75.7
Literacy (age 15+) 85.5 95.9 75.5 95.3 92.7 97.2 90.4 96.8
Average years of schooling (age 18–25) 8.4 9.7 6.5 8.5 9.4 10.8 8.7 10.5
% Health coverage 9.5 77.8 3.1 73.9 17.5 82.4 15.0 81.1
% Unsatisfied basic needs (UBN) 28.7 15.9 22.5 12.0 17.3 9.2 20.6 11.0
Source Author’s estimations based on the Colombian 1993 and 2005 population censuses (DANE 1993, 2005)
F. Urrea-Giraldo
2 The Demographic Transition in the Nasa-Indigenous and Black … 51

Table 2.8 Sociodemographic and living standards indicators for Nasa-Indigenous people of three
northern Cauca municipalities by 2014/2015 versus Black, Indigenous and White-Mestizo
(non-ethnic) populations in Cali by 2012/2013
Sociodemographic Nasa-Indigenous Cali
and some standard municipalities of (the largest city, 2.3 millions, capital of Department
of living indicators northern Cauca of Valle, but bordering with Department of Cauca)
(Toribío, Jambaló 2012
and Caldono) Black Indigenous White-Mestizo Total
2014 population population (non-ethnic)
population
% Ethnic-racial population 95.3 27.5 6.5 66.0 100.0
Total Fertility (TF) 2.99 1.86 1.94 1.68 1.77
Infant mortality rate 47.5 11.1 13.0 7.1 9.5
Life expectancy 68.5 69.9 68.8 78.2 75.7
Literacy (age 15+) 88.2 96.1 95.9 98.5 97.4
Average years of 8.5 10.6 10.8 11.5 11.2
schooling (age 18–25)
% Health coverage 99.1 91.2 89.1 92.0 91.5
Unsatisfied % Poverty 27.6 9.4 8.3 8.3 8.7
basics needs % Misery 5.9 2.8 2.4 1.6 2.2
Sources Nasa-Indigenous survey of household and productive units, 2014–2015 (CIDSE 2016), Employment and
standard of living survey for Cali, 2012–2013 (Ministerio de Trabajo 2013)

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Chapter 3
Intermarriage and Assimilation Among
Arabs in the United States: Estimates,
Causes, and Trends, 1990–2010

Andrzej Kulczycki and Arun Peter Lobo

Abstract Intermarriage is indicative of an immigrant group’s assimilation into its


host society. This study investigates recent intermarriage levels and patterns for
Arab Americans; evaluates how acculturation, cultural and structural factors affect
their marital choices; and examines differences among Arab national-origin groups.
We employ logistic regression analysis and use data from the 2007 to 2011
American Community Survey that gives a sufficiently large sample. The relatively
strong socio-economic status of Arab Americans, especially the native-born, leads
us to expect high out-marriage rates. Results confirm earlier findings, based on 1990
census data, despite the doubling in size of this population and its disparagement
since 9/11. The overall high levels of exogamy suggest Arab Americans are
assimilating quickly. The predictors are largely similar for both sexes, but there are
also some significant ethnic effects.

Keywords Intermarriage  Arab Americans  Assimilation  Ethnicity

3.1 Introduction

The United States (U.S.) remains consumed by debate about immigration and the
resulting ethnic and racial diversification of the population. There is also an ongoing
debate, and much research, focussed on other social and economic impacts associated
with sustained high immigration from a broader set of source countries than had
occurred in the not so distant past (Lichter 2013; Frey 2015; Hall et al. 2017; Perez and
Hirschman 2009). This, in turn, has also sparked speculation and controversy about
immigrant assimilation to American society. Similar developments are occurring in

A. Kulczycki (&)
School of Public Health, University of Alabama at Birmingham (UAB),
Birmingham, AL, USA
e-mail: andrzej@uab.edu
A. P. Lobo
Population Division, New York City Department of City Planning, New York City, USA

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 55


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_3
56 A. Kulczycki and A. P. Lobo

other Western liberal democracies, which have all witnessed major increases of
foreign-born nationals in recent decades (Fargues 2004; Castles et al. 2014).
In the U.S., Arab immigrants, and American Muslims in particular, have
received growing attention as a result of ongoing global terrorism associated with
Islamic radical groups, continued U.S. military action in the Middle East, the 2011
uprisings that occurred in Arab North African countries and the political and civil
unrest in Iraq and Syria that has displaced several million people and created the
world’s largest refugee problem today. In light of the renewed interest in immi-
gration, and Arab immigration in particular, this paper examines assimilation
among the Arab American population, focusing on their levels and patterns of
intermarriage.
The Arab American population is relatively small, but according to our esti-
mates, its size increased from 1.01 million in 1990 to 1.84 million during the 2007–
2011 period. We focus on the marital choices of those Arab Americans who were
residing in the U.S. when the decision to marry was made. In-group marriage or
endogamy, including marriages occurring within a specific ethnic group such as
Arabs, is common across many cultures and ethnic groups. Out-marriage or
intermarriage, in this case marriage between Arabs and non-Arabs, would suggest a
weakening of preferences for in-group marriage. Such exogamous marriages reflect
frequent social interaction and acceptance between social groups, whereas endo-
gamy mirrors and reproduces group divisions, social distance, and unequal power
distributions in ethnically and racially diverse societies. Intermarriage is therefore
an important indicator of assimilation into the larger host society and is typically
viewed as the last stage of the assimilation process (Gordon 1964; Lieberson and
Waters 1988; Kalmijn 1998).
This paper describes patterns in Arab American intermarriage and attempts to
situate the experience of Arab Americans within the broad debate about immigrant
assimilation. We use the U.S. Census Bureau’s new American Community Survey
(ACS) data, an annual survey that provides current demographic and
socio-economic information about communities in the U.S. Analysis of the par-
ticular situation of Arab Americans may further inform discussion of intermarriage
more generally and facilitate cross-cultural testing of existing generalizations and
theories concerning ethnic intermarriage and assimilation.

3.2 Background

3.2.1 Arab Immigration to the United States in Historical


Perspective

Arab immigration to the United States has occurred in three waves dating back to
the late nineteenth century. The first wave comprised overwhelmingly of Christian
immigrants from what was then Palestine and Syria, including present-day
3 Intermarriage and Assimilation Among Arabs in the United States … 57

Lebanon. By 1920, the U.S. was home to at least 50,000 immigrants from this
region (Hooglund 1987; Naff 1985). These early immigrants shared the faith tra-
dition of most Americans, facilitating their acculturation into U.S. society, while
their affiliations with Eastern Rite and Orthodox churches helped strengthen their
ethnic identification. Some made lasting cultural contributions, including the
internationally renowned Lebanese-born poet and mystic, Khalil Gibran. However,
many were rural migrant labourers, poor and uneducated, and sought to blend into
what they perceived as mainstream U.S. culture. They shed many cultural tradi-
tions, “Americanized” their names, and became a largely invisible minority (Naff
1985; Haddad 2004). Sharply restrictive quota systems introduced after World
War I curtailed immigration from Arab source countries and also led to increased
assimilation. A second stream of Arab immigrants entered after World War II,
triggered by political unrest in the Middle East including the partition of Palestine
and the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, as well as revolutions in Egypt and Iraq in the
1950s. These immigrants came mostly from Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, and were
predominantly well educated, partly also as a result of the restrictive U.S. quota
system (Orfalea 2006; Kayyali 2006).
The third and by far the largest wave of Arab immigration followed the 1965
Immigration and Nationality Act, which removed the quota system and allowed all
countries an equal opportunity to send immigrants (Lobo and Salvo 1998; Blau and
Mackie 2016). This led to an increased number of Arab nationalities and back-
grounds and included migrants seeking education and employment opportunities,
family reunification, and safety from conflict such as the 1974–1989 Lebanese civil
war. Arab and Arab American identity were reinforced by continued chain
migration, increased Arab nationalism, and widespread concern among Arab
Americans about events in their former homelands and their adopted country’s
involvement in the region. However, the emergence of negative Arab stereotypes in
the 1970s attached a measure of stigma to this identity in American society, par-
ticularly for Muslims who have constituted a rising proportion of Arab immigrants
(Cainkar 2009; Orfalea 2006). The desire to avoid such prejudice doubtless
prompted a sizeable proportion of Arab Americans to blend in quietly into their new
homeland.

3.2.2 Current Status of Arab Americans

Arab immigrants and their descendants were the victims of numerous hate crimes,
ethnic and religious profiling following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Chishti et al.
2003; Murray 2004; Jamal and Naber 2008). Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments
increased significantly in the U.S. and more globally (Bleich 2011; Samari 2016),
with Islamophobia more openly aired during the 2016–2017 presidential campaign.
Shortly after taking office, President Trump suspended the U.S. refugee resettlement
58 A. Kulczycki and A. P. Lobo

programme, banned Syrian refugees indefinitely,1 and froze visa requests from a
number of Muslim-majority Arab countries. This move was immediately legally
challenged and occurred despite the U.S. Congress having long ago outlawed
discrimination based on national origin. However, the executive actions undoubt-
edly renewed the fears of many Arab Americans about their successful incorpo-
ration into mainstream American society.
A detailed description of the size, geographic distribution and socio-economic
characteristics of this population was published at the turn of the century, which
showed that Arab Americans have higher levels of educational attainment, higher
incomes, and lower age than the general U.S. adult population (Kulczycki and Lobo
2001). Several reports issued by the U.S. Census Bureau likewise found that Arab
Americans tend to be better educated and wealthier than other Americans (de la
Cruz and Brittingham 2003; Brittingham and de la Cruz 2005; Asi and Beaulieu
2013). In recent decades, substantial numbers of Egyptians, Iraqis, Palestinians, and
other ethnicities have augmented the more established presence of Syrians and
Lebanese, and based on data from the 2007 to 2011 ACS, we estimate the Arab
American population at 1.84 million. This figure includes Arab immigrants to the
U.S. (4-in-10 Arabs in the U.S. were born abroad), their U.S.-born children, and
U.S.-born descendants of earlier waves of Arab immigrants to the U.S. (Fig. 3.1).
Lebanese comprised the largest ethnic group, numbering 486,000 or over
one-quarter of the Arab population, while Egyptians (191,000) and Syrians
(190,000) each accounted for 10%. Given that the Lebanese and Syrian populations
have a long history in the U.S., it is not surprising that they have the lowest percent
foreign-born, 22 and 20% respectively. Iraqis (130,000) and Somalis (108,000)
rounded out the top five, each with over two-thirds foreign-born, testament to their
status as recent entrants. These top five ethnic groups together accounted for nearly
60% of all Arabs in the U.S.; every other group accounted for under 5%.
The presence of Muslims in the growing Arab population is substantial, though
it cannot be ascertained precisely because official statistical agencies do not collect
information on religion. Even estimates of the overall U.S. Muslim population vary
and are contested. The Pew Research Center (2015) estimated that there were
almost three million Muslims in the U.S. in 2014 (accounting for 0.9% of the total
population), with ethnic Arabs thought to account for at least one-third of all U.S.
Muslims and the rest mainly African Americans, Pakistanis and Indians, as well as
substantial numbers of Iranians and Turks. Arab American Muslims include Sunni,
Shi’ites and Druze, and are not as homogenous a group as is sometimes portrayed.

1
The U.S. resettled 18,007 Syrian refugees between October 1, 2011 (about six months after civil
war broke out in Syria) and December 31, 2016 (Zong and Batalova 2017). The Syrian conflict has
led to the world’s largest refugee crisis, resulting in the displacement of over 11 million people
within and beyond the country’s borders. Internationally, close to 5 million Syrians had been
registered as refugees as of early 2017. The vast majority face dim resettlement prospects and are
in first-asylum countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq, and with only a fraction likely
to ever be resettled permanently.
3 Intermarriage and Assimilation Among Arabs in the United States … 59

% Foreign-born
Lebanese
22.3%

Egyptian
60.5%

Syrian
30.4%
Iraqi
67.6%
Somali
68.2%
Palestinian
39.5%
Moroccan
56.4%
Jordanian
57.2%
Sudanese
66.7%
Yemeni
53.0%
Algerian
63.1%
All other Arabs
49.6%
- 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000

Fig. 3.1 Arab Americans by ancestry and nativity, U.S. 2007–2011

They do not necessarily adopt a self-consciously Islamic lifestyle, but their ability
to develop and retain their community identity is facilitated by their steady growth
in number.

3.3 Intermarriage in the U.S.

3.3.1 Assimilation Theory

Assimilation theory developed from the study of European immigration flows to the
US in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Gordon (1964) conceptu-
alized assimilation and acculturation as unidirectional, inevitable, and sequential,
whereby immigrants had to shed their ethnicity and its traits as they accommodated
to the dominant culture and social structure. They would thereby become assimi-
lated, although some racial and other minority groups could be acculturated but not
integrated. Each successive generation born in the U.S. was seen as having less
contact with immigrants, moderating the significance of ethnicity to its members
(Alba 1990; Waters 1990). Intermarriage with the dominant group was typically
seen as a final step in the assimilation process. Although the assumption of a
straightforward homogenization to the Anglo-American norm later fell under strong
criticism, many immigration researchers argue that the “traditional” model of
assimilation remains viable (Alba and Nee 2003; Bean and Stevens 2003; Blau and
Mackie 2016).
60 A. Kulczycki and A. P. Lobo

Pluralist views regarding the pattern of adjustment to American society became


more common as immigration from non-European countries increased significantly
after the mid-1960s. Pluralist perspectives are often couched in the language of
multiculturalism and allow for groups to seek to be somewhat separate from the
host society and to maintain their ethnic identity, permitting integration and equality
without extensive acculturation (Koopmans et al. 2005; Parekh 2006). Such situ-
ations include enclave communities, where ethnic groups set up their own neigh-
bourhoods and interconnected firms, some of which also serve the larger society;
and middleman minority groups, where reliance on small retail enterprises tends to
be more dispersed across a larger area (Bonacich and Modell 1980). At various
times and places, Jewish, Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Cuban Americans have
been enclave or middleman minorities. Other scholars argue that the experiences of
new immigrant groups differ markedly from those of earlier European immigrants
and that traditional perspectives on assimilation no longer apply. In particular,
segmented assimilation theory allows for more fragmented assimilation paths
leading to varied group outcomes that may preclude equality with and acceptance
into the middle class (Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001).

3.3.2 Ethnic and Racial Intermarriage Patterns Among


the U.S.-Born and Immigrants

During the twentieth century, ethnic intermarriage rates rose gradually among
ethnic Whites and helped break down the formerly rigid lines that separated
European-origin groups from each other (Alba 1990; Lieberson and Waters 1988;
Pagnini and Morgan 1990). The revisions made to U.S. immigration policy in 1965
fuelled dramatic increases in immigration flows from non-European sources and in
marriages between partners of different ethnic or racial groups (Alba and Nee 2003;
Lobo and Salvo 1998; Bean and Stevens 2003). Many recent studies have assessed
changing patterns and trends in migration and in the marital choices of Asian and
Latino Americans (National Research Council 2006; Qian and Lichter 2007),
groups that account for most recent immigration flows. On balance, these appear to
show that the economic incorporation and marital assimilation of non-European
ethnic and racial minorities has proceeded more slowly and less predictably than
would be suggested by classical assimilation theory.
While most Americans are still likely to choose marriage partners of a similar
background, American rates of interfaith and inter-denominational marriage have
risen steeply in the past half century. Also, acceptance of interracial marriage has
risen across most racial groups, though the level of Black-White intermarriage
remains low (12% in 2013), indicative of the social distance that persists between
these groups. Intermarriage rates between Latino and non-Latino whites, and
between Asians and Whites, declined slightly over 1990–2010 (Qian and Lichter
2007), though this is largely due to the growing supply of potential marriage
3 Intermarriage and Assimilation Among Arabs in the United States … 61

partners resulting from new immigration of co-ethnics. Compared to contemporary


European immigrants, Latino Americans and Southeast Asians demonstrate
within-region endogamy and only a slightly higher propensity to marry within their
nationality (Bohra-Mishra and Massey 2015). They therefore exhibit evidence of
following both a segmented assimilation path and ongoing assimilation along
classical lines. Debate and controversy continue as to the extent to which recent
waves of immigrants, who come mostly from non-European source regions and are
often viewed as racially or ethnically distinct, will follow a similar assimilation path
as earlier European ethnics. Arab Americans constitute one such case and their
determinants, patterns and rates of intermarriage have seen very little study. This
renders them an excellent case study of contemporary intermarriage and assimila-
tion in the U.S.

3.3.3 Theoretical Perspectives

People are often thought to select a spouse who is culturally similar, such as a
person with a similar ancestral or language background. Acculturation variables
that could influence endogamy rates include place of birth, full Arab ancestry, and
level of English-language proficiency. For example, foreign birth may be associated
with endogamy because recent immigrants in particular are more likely to ascribe to
the marriage ideals of their place of origin. Similarly, those reporting an Arab
ancestry only may have higher odds of having or seeking an Arab spouse than those
reporting both an Arab and a non-Arab ancestry. Weak English language skills are
likely to be predictive of lower out-marriage rates due to decreased social inter-
action with non-Arabs. Consequently, with respect to intermarriage, our first
hypothesis is that native-born Arab Americans, those with strong English language
skills, and those with part Arab ancestry, would be more likely to out-marry than
those who do not have such characteristics.
Prevailing research also tends to assume that most people search for potential
spouses who are attractive in terms of more socio-economic resources such as better
educational levels, occupational levels, and earnings (Hwang et al. 1997; Qian and
Lichter 2007). Higher educational attainment, for example, increases the opportu-
nities for ethnic minority individuals to meet members of other groups and for
immigrants to adapt more readily to host country conditions. Accordingly, it is
generally associated with weaker preference for a potential mate based on ascribed
characteristics such as ethnicity (Kulczycki and Lobo 2002). In assessing the effects
of structural assimilation on the odds of intermarriage, we expect that Arab
Americans with higher levels of education, occupations, and earnings will have a
higher probability of out-marriage than those with lower levels of human capital or
income.
The increasingly heterogeneous situation of ethnic subgroups in the Arab
American population leads us to consider the significance of ethnicity for inter-
marriage for two major ancestry groups, Lebanese and Syrians (both culturally
62 A. Kulczycki and A. P. Lobo

similar), who account for 37% of the total. We hypothesize that Lebanese and
Syrian Americans are more likely to be exogamous than other Arab groups given
that they are disproportionately Christian and have a long established presence in
the U.S., leading to fewer obstacles to social acceptance and assimilation. In con-
trast, other Arab ancestry groups tend to have higher shares of recent immigrants
and Muslims, a minority religious group in the U.S., which militates against easy
acculturation into mainstream society and may lead to less intermarriage.

3.4 Data and Methods

This analysis uses the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2007–2011 ACS Integrated Public Use
Microdata Sample (IPUMS) files (Ruggles et al. 2010). The ACS has an ancestry
question, which asks each individual his or her “ancestry or ethnic origin” and
allows a maximum of two responses. Respondents are defined as Arab Americans if
their ancestry or ethnic origin is in any member country of the Arab League, a
culturally and ethnically cohesive organization with 22 member states in and
around North Africa, the Fertile Crescent that stretches over Mesopotamia and the
Levant, Arabia and the Horn of Africa. Thus, Arab countries include Algeria,
Egypt, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco (and Western Sahara), Sudan and Tunisia in
North Africa; Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Sudan, and Syria in the Fertile
Crescent; Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates in Arabia; Djibouti and Somalia in the Horn of Africa; as well as the
small island state of the Comoros.
Arabs selected include individuals with an Arab ancestry only, as well as those
of part Arab ancestry (where the individual reports both an Arab and a non-Arab
ancestry). In addition to including a partner with Arab ancestry, couples selected
consisted of at least one partner who was either U.S.-born or had arrived in the U.S.
before age 18. Accordingly, we focus on the marital choices of currently married
couples where at least one partner was either native-born or had immigrated as a
child and was presumably living in the U.S. when the decision to marry was made.
This choice effectively excludes couples whose partners had married overseas and
who later both immigrated as adults, as these marital choices were made outside the
U.S. The terms foreign-born and immigrant are used interchangeably to refer to
those who were born in another country and later immigrated to the U.S.2
The unweighted sample size included 16,109 currently married couples (360,000
couples weighted) who were living together in the same household where at least

2
The U.S. Census Bureau defines the foreign-born as individuals who had no U.S. citizenship at
birth. They include naturalized citizens, lawful permanent residents, refugees and asylees, legal
non-immigrants (including those on student, work, or other temporary visas), and persons residing
in the country without authorization. (The latter category is likely to include very few, if any, Arab
Americans).
3 Intermarriage and Assimilation Among Arabs in the United States … 63

one partner was of Arab ancestry. This total comprised 10,153 Arab male spouses
and 8600 Arab female spouses, including 2644 couples where both spouses were
Arab.
This analysis includes in-married couples where both partners had the same Arab
ancestry, couples with partners of different Arab ancestries, and couples where only
one partner was of Arab ancestry (i.e., intermarried couples). We first explore
out-marriage rates for Arab men and women by ancestry, by acculturation variables
(including place of birth, part Arab ancestry, and English language proficiency),
and by structural assimilation characteristics (education, income and occupational
skill level). Logistic regression is then used to analyse the influences of accultur-
ation and structural assimilation variables, as well as ethnicity, on the likelihood of
out-marriage.

3.5 Results

3.5.1 Descriptive Findings

Arab Americans who were residing in the U.S. when the decision to marry was
made exhibit high rates of intermarriage. In 2007–2011, 74% of Arab men and 69%
of Arab women had non-Arab spouses, who were overwhelmingly Americans of
European descent. These high rates of intermarriage, however, mask some degree
of differentiation across different ancestries (Table 3.1). Among men, 87% of
Lebanese out-marry, with most of the rest having Lebanese spouses (12%) and only
a small minority (under 2%) having spouses of a different Arab ancestry. Algerian
and Moroccan men have comparable or even higher out-marriage rates (91 and 87%
respectively), with those not out-marrying twice as likely to marry someone within
the same ancestry than from another Arab group. Syrians also show high rates of
out-marriage (80%). The lowest rates of out-marriage are found among Somalis
(17%) and Yemenis (24%), and almost all of their peers marry within the same
ancestry. Iraqis and Palestinians constitute the only other groups with fewer than
half the men out-married.
Women exhibit comparable but slightly lower rates of intermarriage across
ancestries. The out-marriage rate stood at 85% for Lebanese women, and it was
only slightly lower for Algerians, Moroccans, and Syrians. Just over one-half of
Egyptians and Sudanese out-married, and out-marriage was lowest among Somali
(14%) and Yemeni (23%) women. Overall, 27% of Arab women have spouses of
the same Arab ancestry and 4% are married to men of a different Arab ancestry.
Nativity, English language proficiency, and part Arab ancestry, are all positively
associated with intermarriage for both men and women (Table 3.2). Among men,
for example, 87% of the native-born out-marry, compared to 58% of the
foreign-born, and the difference is even bigger among women (83% vs. 39%,
respectively). Among Arab women with limited English proficiency, just 22%
64

Table 3.1 Intermarriage rates for Arab Americans by ancestry and sex, U.S. 2007–2011
Arab men married to women of Arab women married to men of
Total Same Arab Different Arab Non-Arab Total Same Arab Different Arab Non-Arab
ancestry ancestry ancestry ancestry ancestry ancestry
Arab 10,153 2290 354 7509 Arab 8600 2290 354 5956
males females
100.0 22.6 3.5 74.0 100.0 26.6 4.1 69.3
Ancestry Ancestry
Lebanese 4135 11.6 1.7 86.7 Lebanese 3759 12.7 2.0 85.2
Syrian 1468 16.0 3.5 80.4 Syrian 1435 16.4 4.5 79.1
Egyptian 785 27.9 4.2 67.9 Egyptian 545 40.2 6.2 53.6
Palestinian 530 42.5 9.2 48.3 Palestinian 408 55.1 11.3 33.6
Iraqi 358 52.8 4.2 43.0 Iraqi 309 61.2 3.2 35.6
Moroccan 343 8.7 4.4 86.9 Moroccan 206 14.6 4.4 81.1
Jordanian 269 33.8 14.9 51.3 Jordanian 179 50.8 19.0 30.2
Yemeni 109 67.9 8.3 23.9 Yemeni 107 69.2 7.5 23.4
Somali 79 83.5 0.0 16.5 Somali 78 84.6 1.3 14.1
Algerian 69 5.8 2.9 91.3 Algerian 36 11.1 5.6 83.3
Sudanese 44 29.5 4.5 65.9 Sudanese 34 38.2 8.8 52.9
Other 1964 33.9 3.5 62.7 Other Arab 1504 44.2 4.3 51.5
Arab
A. Kulczycki and A. P. Lobo
Table 3.2 Arab American intermarriage rates by acculturation factors and sex, U.S. 2007–2011
Arab men married to women of Arab women married to men of
Total Same Arab Different Non-Arab Total Same Arab Different Non-Arab
ancestry Arab ancestry ancestry Arab ancestry
ancestry ancestry
Nativity Nativity
Native-born 5708 11.6 1.9 86.5 Native-born 5946 14.6 2.8 82.6
Foreign-born 4445 36.7 5.5 57.8 Foreign-born 2654 53.6 7.1 39.3
English proficiency English proficiency
English 9112 18.5 3.3 78.2 English 7720 21.5 3.9 74.7
proficient proficient
Limited English 1041 57.8 5.2 37.0 Limited English 880 71.9 6.4 21.7
proficiency proficiency
Arab ancestry Arab ancestry
Arab ancestry 7078 31.2 4.6 64.3 Arab ancestry 5355 40.9 5.9 53.2
only only
3 Intermarriage and Assimilation Among Arabs in the United States …

Part Arab 3075 2.8 1.0 96.3 Part Arab 3245 3.1 1.2 95.7
ancestry ancestry
65
66 A. Kulczycki and A. P. Lobo

intermarried, compared to 75% for those who were English proficient. Among both
men and women who were part Arab (i.e., those with both an Arab and non-Arab
ancestry), almost everyone (96%) had a non-Arab spouse and only 3% were
married within the same Arab group. By comparison, among those who have an
Arab ancestry only, 64% of men and 53% of women out-married, and 31% of men
and 41% of women had a spouse of the same Arab ancestry. These findings
underscore the importance of acculturation factors on Arab intermarriage rates.
In accordance with the assimilation hypothesis, measures of structural assimi-
lation, including educational attainment, income, and occupational skill level, were
positively associated with intermarriage for both men and women (Table 3.3).
Rates of out-marriage among Arab Americans with high educational attainment
were far higher than for those with less education. Among college graduates, for
example, 77% of Arab women had a non-Arab spouse, compared to 32% of those
with less than a high school education. Both men and women with high incomes
were more likely to marry non-Arab spouses, though the disparity was lower for
men. Among women, 48% of those with an income in the first quartile out-married,
compared to 84% of those with an income in the fourth quartile; the corresponding
percentages for men were 65 and 78%.3 Occupational skill was also positively
associated with intermarriage, although the difference between highly and less
skilled was around only 8% points for both Arab men and women. Out-marriage
rates also rose with age, increasing from 65% for men and 53% for women under
age 35, to around 80% for both sexes over the age of 45.

3.5.2 Multivariate Findings

Next, we perform a logistic regression to predict the odds of intermarriage based on the
acculturation variables (Arab ancestry only vs. part Arab ancestry, nativity, and
English-language proficiency) and structural variables. Due to the high level of corre-
lation between education, personal income, and occupational skill level, only education
was included in the model. To test the effects of Arab ethnicity, Lebanese and Syrians
were examined vis-à-vis all other Arab ethnic groups and age was included as a control.
Table 3.4 shows the partial effects of the above independent variables for men
and for women. All the variables were significant, with the exception of Syrian
ethnicity among men and high school education among women.
For both sexes, the multivariate results are consistent with the bivariate results
presented earlier. As assimilation theory would predict, those with part Arab
ancestry, the native-born, those with English proficiency, and the highly educated
were significantly more likely than their counterparts to out-marry. Indicators of

3
For men, the first quartile was under $28,561, the second quartile was up to $54,488, the third
quartile was up to $98,629, and the fourth quartile was above that. For women, the corresponding
figures were $2846, $19,701, and $46,088.
Table 3.3 Arab intermarriage rates by structural assimilation factors and sex, U.S. 2007–2011
Arab men married to women of Arab women married to men of
Total Same Arab Different Arab Non-Arab Total Same Arab Different Arab Non-Arab
ancestry ancestry ancestry ancestry ancestry ancestry
Education Education
Less than high 668 49.1 5.1 45.8 Less than high 545 62.0 6.4 31.6
school school
High school 1661 26.6 4.2 69.2 High school 1687 34.6 5.7 59.7
only only
Some college 2633 20.1 3.2 76.6 Some college 2393 24.3 3.6 72.1
College grad 5191 19.1 3.2 77.7 College grad 3975 19.8 3.4 76.8
Personal income Personal income
First quartile 2748 30.9 4.0 65.1 First quartile 2350 46.2 6.1 47.7
Second quartile 2417 22.1 2.9 75.0 Second quartile 2114 26.0 3.8 70.2
Third quartile 2433 18.1 3.3 78.6 Third quartile 2007 18.7 3.5 77.8
Fourth quartile 2555 18.2 3.7 78.1 Fourth quartile 2129 13.2 2.8 84.0
Occupational skill level Occupational skill level
Highly skilled 4983 19.2 3.3 77.5 Highly skilled 3255 17.2 3.0 79.8
Less skilled 4202 26.0 4.0 70.0 Less skilled 3128 24.2 4.3 71.4
3 Intermarriage and Assimilation Among Arabs in the United States …

Age Age
Less than 35 2001 31.6 3.9 64.5 Less than 35 2510 42.3 5.2 52.5
Ages 35–44 2642 25.6 4.0 70.4 Ages 35–44 2156 27.4 4.4 68.2
Ages 45+ 5510 17.8 3.1 79.1 Ages 45+ 3934 16.2 3.3 80.5
67
68 A. Kulczycki and A. P. Lobo

Table 3.4 Unstandardized logistic regression estimates of the effects of indicators of accultur-
ation and structural assimilation on the likelihood of Arab intermarriage
Arab husbands Arab wives
Independent variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Arab ancestry
Part Arab ancestry 2.136 * 0.103 2.394 * 0.096
(Arab ancestry only)
Nativity
Native-born 0.571 * 0.061 0.91 * 0.064
(Foreign-born)
English proficiency
English proficient 0.921 * 0.078 0.905 * 0.103
(Limited English proficiency)
Ethnicity
Lebanese 0.671 * 0.064 0.835 * 0.07
Syrians 0.178 0.085 0.477 * 0.091
(All other Arabs)
Education
High school only 0.584 * 0.109 0.277 0.138
Some college 0.932 * 0.105 0.826 * 0.136
College degree 0.891 * 0.1 1.086 * 0.133
(Less than high school)
Age 0.11 * 0.002 0.032 * 0.002
Constant −1.931 * 0.134 3.586 * 0.168
Model v2 2403.8 3594.4
Df 9 9
N 10,153 8600
Note Reference categories for independent variables are in parentheses
*p < 0.001

acculturation were very strong predictors of out-marriage, especially for women.


The odds of intermarriage among women with part Arab ancestry were 11 times
(e2.394) higher than for those with Arab ancestry only; among men the odds were 8
times higher. Similarly, the odds of intermarriage among the native-born were 2.5
times (e0.91) higher vis-à-vis those who were foreign-born, compared to 1.8 times
for men. English proficiency also had a significant effect for both men and women,
with the odds of intermarriage 2.5 times higher, compared to those with limited
English proficiency.
Ethnicity was a significant determinant of intermarriage. The odds of inter-
marriage for Lebanese and Syrian women were 2.3 and 1.6 times higher than those
for other Arab women; among men, while Lebanese men were nearly twice as
likely to intermarry, compared to other Arabs, there were no significant differences
between Syrian men and other Arab men. With respect to education, the odds of
3 Intermarriage and Assimilation Among Arabs in the United States … 69

intermarriage were 1.8 times higher for men with a high school diploma, compared
to men with less than a high school education, and roughly 2.5 times higher for
those with some college or a college degree. Among women, only those with some
college and a college degree had significantly higher odds of intermarriage than
those with less than a high school education.
Thus, with a few exceptions, men and women had similar predictors of inter-
marriage, but as noted earlier, acculturation variables were stronger predictors for
women. Controlling for other variables, the predicted probability of intermarriage
for an English proficient woman who was U.S.-born, with both an Arab and
non-Arab ancestry was 78% points higher than that for a woman who had limited
English proficiency, was of foreign birth, and with Arab ancestry only. Although
the above measures of acculturation were also highly significant for men, the dif-
ference in the predicted probability was lower, at 66% points.

3.6 Discussion and Conclusions

Assimilation theory posits that the acculturation and socioeconomic integration of


newly arrived groups can lead to further assimilation in the form of intermarriage
with the more established dominant group. The analysis presented here shows that
Arab Americans generally conform to the basic premise of this theory. Currently,
married Arab Americans of both sexes who were residing in the U.S. when the
decision to marry was made show high rates of out-marriage across all categories
for nearly all variables explored. In 2007–2011, 74% of Arab and 69% of Arab
women had non-Arab spouses, who were overwhelmingly Americans of European
descent. Arab Americans tend to be better educated and wealthier than other
Americans, suggesting that they are well-rooted and well-invested in the U.S. The
high proportion of exogamous marriages implies that Arab Americans are assimi-
lating quickly.
Our multivariate analysis shows that the predictors of intermarriage were largely
similar for both sexes. Acculturation factors had a strong effect on intermarriage,
notably through the influences of part Arab ancestry, native birth, and English
language proficiency. Structural assimilation, as measured by educational attain-
ment, was positively associated with intermarriage, as we had hypothesized.
Compared to other Arab ethnic groups, rates of intermarriage were significantly
higher for Lebanese men and for Lebanese and Syrian women, groups with a large
proportion of Christians among their members. Indeed, the majority of Arab
Americans are Christian, and display a less politicized ethnic identity compared
with Arab American Muslims and Jews (Ajrouch and Jamal 2007; Wald 2008).
Arab American Christians tend to be well-educated and comprise mainly third- and
fourth-generation descendants of voluntary migrants who have been incorporated
into the U.S. system of racial categorization as white and whose religious identity,
small population size and geographical dispersion helped ease their adjustment to
the host society.
70 A. Kulczycki and A. P. Lobo

Arab ethnic identity and Muslim religious affiliation are often conflated, in part
because the foreign-born segment of the Arab American population is predomi-
nantly Muslim. Arab American Muslims comprise more recent arrivals with more
distinct social, religious and political differences from the host society. Their
Muslim identification has been perceived by nativists as alien and threatening,
making it more likely that they would be assigned a subordinate social status (Naff
1985; Haddad 2004). The social patterns of prejudice, discrimination, and stereo-
typing were strengthened after 9/11. Arabs and particularly Muslims were now
essentialized as fundamentalists, patriarchal, extreme, and violent (Merskin 2004),
ushering in a climate that may have brought the earlier process of Arab assimilation
to a halt (Jamal and Naber 2008). Owing to their historical, cultural and transna-
tional connections to a perceived foreign enemy, the Arab world and Islam pre-
sently embody the marked “other” against which the American identity is
constructed, such that many Arab Americans feel pushed outside the national
consensus and marked as “the enemy within” (Cainkar 2009).
As with all research, several limitations to this study should be noted. ACS data
do not provide prior marital histories and, hence, our focus was on currently
married couples. We used nationally representative data on Arab Americans, but
these tell us little about generational status and nothing on cultural variables such as
religious affiliation or religiosity. However, we were still able to gauge the influence
of religion indirectly through studying the marital options of Lebanese and Syrians.
Future research could elaborate on some of our findings, including examining the
determinants of intermarriage for each Arab ancestry group separately. Also, it
would be of interest to compare intermarriage among Arabs living in other multi-
ethnic and multicultural societies, such as Australia and Canada, which now have
sizeable Arab immigrant populations.
To conclude, this study shows that intermarriage rates are high for most Arab
Americans. This population has grown in size and in ethnic diversity, and has had
to cope with some discrimination and the fall-out of the traumatic events of 9/11.
As assimilation theory would predict, the native-born and those with part Arab
ancestry, strong English-language ability, and the highly educated are more likely
to out-marry. These factors facilitate the overall assimilation of Arab Americans.
However, this is not a uniform process, with evidence that some subgroups appear
to follow a path of segmented assimilation, as exhibited by their intermarriage
patterns and a range of variables that contribute to differences in such rates.

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Chapter 4
Occupational Classes of Immigrants
and Their Descendants in East Germany

Oliver Winkler

Abstract The distinct pattern of East German labour migration is closer to the
pattern of other former communist countries than to that of West Germany.
Immigrants in East Germany were particularly affected by the collapse of the GDR.
While the labour market improved in 2005, little is known about the development
of the structural integration of immigrants and their descendants living in East
Germany. Cross-sectional survey data by the Federal Statistical Office (Mikrozensus
1991–2011) reveal that even after controlling for formal and vocational education,
immigrants from the first and second generation are consistently more likely to be
employed in lower status occupations than are non-migrants. Although the pro-
portion of Vietnamese in intermediate positions is similar to that of non-migrants,
higher occupations remain closed to the Vietnamese. On the other hand, differences
in the proportions of non-migrants and of immigrants from Poland in higher status
occupations have diminished over time. The study concludes that the structural
integration of immigrants in East Germany, and especially of their descendants,
remains problematic.

Keywords East Germany  Immigration  Occupation  Labour market


Structural integration

4.1 Introduction

Like other former communist countries, migration in East Germany [the former
German Democratic Republic (GDR)] is characterised by emigration rather than
immigration. Compared to West Germany, immigration to East Germany differs
sharply in its historical development and most notably in scale. It is, however, a
misconception that after 60 years of Fascist and Communist dictatorship, and

O. Winkler (&)
Institute of Sociology, Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg,
Halle-Wittenberg, Germany
e-mail: oliver.winkler@soziologie.uni-halle.de

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 73


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_4
74 O. Winkler

economic separation, there are no immigrants in East Germany. In fact, the East
German region has a long history of labour migration. After the collapse of the
GDR, economic structures in East Germany were mostly uncompetitive and
underwent a painful transformation process. Immigrants in East Germany faced
many difficulties, such as sudden unemployment and problems concerning their
legal residence status. These disadvantages certainly remained until the labour
market reforms of 2004–2005, but we still know very little about the development
of employment prospects for immigrants in East Germany.
The aim of this study is to examine the structural integration of immigrants and
their descendants into the labour market in an economically weak and demo-
graphically declining region. I want to investigate whether foreign workers who
were recruited in the 1980s, as well as immigrants from Eastern Europe, have
managed to achieve similar employment outcomes as the indigenous labour force.
Occupational integration is challenged by strong xenophobic attitudes towards
immigrants in East Germany. Recently, this has become apparent in large protests
in East Germany’s major cities against refugees, and the growth of xenophobic and
islamophobic initiatives.
Occupational positions are vertically ordered, and linked to different employ-
ment segments within the labour market. Lower status occupations, for instance, are
linked to the unskilled labour market segment. Most occupations are characterised
by a more closed structure, in the sense that occupation-specific vocational training
certificates are required in order to enter them. To investigate structural integration,
I looked at access to occupational classes for various groups. In particular, I
investigated whether immigrants and their descendants to have a different pattern of
access probabilities than non-migrants, that is, people who were born in Germany
and whose parents were born in Germany.
The study starts with an account of the development of immigration in East
Germany and continues with a description of the institutional framework, the
immigration and integration policies that contextualise this immigration. Next, I
discuss theoretical assumptions concerning labour market integration of first- and
second-generation immigrants and relevant findings in this field. In the empirical
part, I analyse secondary data from the German Mikrozensus (1991–2011) with
various multivariate techniques. Comparisons are drawn between different opera-
tionalisations of migrant background and observation periods.

4.2 Immigration in East Germany

West and East Germany have different immigration histories, deriving from the
different migration flows in Eastern and Western Europe. Before 1990, international
migration in Eastern Europe was a political issue, not an economic instrument. The
influx was extremely small and migration streams focused on emigration, although
this was restricted in most communist countries (Stalker 2002). Unlike Western
countries, the purpose of temporary immigration to the former GDR was to qualify
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants … 75

students from socialist “brother states” or from countries with socialist movements
such as Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Vietnam (Weiss 2009).
Between 1980 and 1989, the GDR recruited 90,000–94,000 contract labourers,
around two thirds of them from Vietnam (Müggenburg 1996). Although this was
due to labour shortages, the reasons behind labour migration were not discussed
publicly in the GDR. Contract labourers in the first recruitment wave (until the
mid-1980s) received qualifications and degrees as skilled professionals.
After reunification, except for some skilled migrants, labour immigration to East
Germany was almost non-existent as various economic segments collapsed.
Immigration involved three groups: ethnic German immigrants from Russia, Jewish
quota refugees from the successor states of the former Soviet Union, and asylum
seekers. Residential allocation is based on a distribution formula (known as the
“Königsteiner Schlüssel”) that assigns immigrants to locations according to the
regional distributions of the total German population. As immigrants cannot choose
where to take up residence, and labour market opportunities are disadvantageous in
the eastern states of Germany, there is a significant outflow of immigrants from East
to West Germany as soon as legal and financial restrictions allow for it. In the
course of European Union integration, transnational migration has also somewhat
increased in a few East German regions.
The laws concerning immigration and integration in reunified Germany have
changed over time, and we can identify three different phases since 1990. The first
period, between 1990 and 1999, was characterised by multiple regulations. These
were codified and reformulated into one coherent framework in the German
nationality law (“Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz”) in 2000. This phase started with the
amendment of the Law on Foreigners (“Ausländergesetz”) in 1990 that facilitated
naturalisation of German-born children with immigrant parents, and foreigners who
had lived in Germany for a long time (Stüwe 2016). In 1991, Jewish immigrants
from the former Soviet Union received permanent right of residence (Fassmann and
Munz 1994). Also in 1991, agreements between Poland and Germany facilitated
labour migration. The bilateral labour market policy was accompanied by declining
real wages and rising unemployment in Poland in the early 1990s, which increased
the push factors for migration (Kienast and Marburger 1996). In 1992, a law
enabled ethnic Germans born before 1993 to immigrate to Germany and coined the
term “Spätaussiedler”(repatriates) for this group. Also in 1992, an agreement
between Germany and Vietnam for the structural integration of former contract
workers from Vietnam helped the formation of small and medium-sized businesses
by providing financial support and further training (Schmiz 2011). As the number
of refugees increased in the early 1990s, the liberal-conservative government and
social-democratic opposition party passed an agreement that restricted access to
political asylum in Germany and led to a decline in the number of asylum seekers.
The reform of the German nationality law under the Social-Democratic-
Ecological government in 2000 marked the beginning of the second phase (2000–
2005). The law strengthened ius soli: Children born in Germany after 2000 to
immigrant parents received German citizenship automatically. Children who were
born before 2000 received German citizenship additionally via naturalisation
76 O. Winkler

(“multiple citizenship”): between the age of 18 and 23, they had to declare which
citizenship they wanted to keep (“Optionsmodell”). Both the first and second period
were accompanied by an increase in xenophobia (Heckmann 2015).
The passing of the Immigration Act (“Zuwanderungsgesetz”) and the reform of
welfare assistance (“Hartz IV”) in 2005 initiated the third phase. The Immigration
Act replaced the Law on Foreigners. For the first time, it aimed to control immi-
gration and incorporated legal measures for the integration of immigrants with
permanent residence in Germany. The law also implemented an EU directive about
the freedom of movement. Under the reform of labour market policy, those who
were capable of working, but who relied on welfare benefits or were inactive, were
defined as unemployed. This led to an increase in the number of unemployed and
strongly affected immigrants who received welfare benefits (Kalteborn and Wielage
2010). The reform emphasised “activation” of unemployed persons and an obli-
gation for cooperation by independently improving their job situation. In 2006,
28.6% of persons receiving welfare benefits had a migrant background (Brussig
et al. 2009). However, the effect of this reform on the integration of immigrants
through employment is disputed (Brussig 2010; Frings et al. 2009).
Since 1990, the proportion of people with foreign citizenship in East Germany
has been increasing steadily, with almost no interruptions (Fig. 4.1), and there was
a sharp jump in the number of non-citizens around 2005, at the beginning of the
third phase. Overall, however, the share of immigrants in East Germany has not
exceeded 4%. In the period 2005–2011, the share of foreign citizens in East
Germany remained relatively stable. Most of these were first generation migrants,
with the percentage of second-generation immigrants, i.e. those born in Germany to
immigrant parents, but who have no direct migration experience, remaining

Fig. 4.1 Proportion of immigrants with foreign citizenship within the total population in East
Germany (weighted percentages; without Berlin). Source Mikrozensus 1991–2011, own
calculations
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants … 77

Table 4.1 Persons with Direct (“First Indirect (“Second


direct or indirect migrant generation”) generation”)
background within the total
% N (in 1000) % N (in 1000)
population in East Germany
in 2005–2011 (weighted 2005 4.28 550 0.37 47
frequencies; without Berlin) 2006 4.51 401 0.33 29
2007 4.48 387 0.29 25
2008 4.40 372 0.34 29
2009 4.39 367 0.38 32
2010 4.42 363 0.34 28
2011 4.51 367 0.37 30
Source Mikrozensus 2005–2011, own calculations

consistently below 0.5%. In total numbers, this represents fewer than 50,000 per-
sons (Table 4.1). However, the distribution was uneven, and the States of
Brandenburg and Saxony, bordering on Poland and Czechia, registered a higher
proportion of foreign citizens than the States in Central and North–East Germany
(Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia).

4.3 Occupational Integration of Immigrants

A successful entry into employment, in an appropriate occupation, is a valuable


indicator of the structural assimilation of immigrants. The data come from various
sources. In 2014, in the whole of Germany, half of all persons with foreign citi-
zenship worked in the hotel and restaurant industry or in other occupations within
the service sector (Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2016). In 2009, the proportion of
immigrants in blue-collar work was twice as high as that of non-migrants while
their share within white-collar jobs was lower, though the two groups did not vary
in self-employment (Seebaß and Siegert 2011). In 2007, in East Germany, 41% of
foreign citizens were employed in low-wage work—a proportion that is twice as
high as that for German citizens. Around 34% of first-generation immigrants and
30% of second-generation immigrants were employed in low-wage work (but only
21.8% for non-migrants) (Lukas 2011). In the following section, I shall look at the
conditions that are expected to influence immigrants’ access to the different
occupational classes. In this, it is important to distinguish between first- and
second-generation migrants living in East Germany, as I expect them to differ in
their occupational outlooks.
78 O. Winkler

4.3.1 First-Generation Immigrants

As a country with an occupational labour market (Gangl 2003), Germany does not
rely on on-the-job-training but on standardised apprenticeships to access skilled
occupational positions. Therefore, the German labour market is characterised by a
strong connection between the training and the employment systems, resulting in an
insider/outsider structure that is based on the possession of formal training and
qualification certificates (Blossfeld and Mayer 1988). Institutionally, qualifications
granted by the German vocational training system are closely aligned with
requirements in the intermediate qualification segment. The emphasis on dual
vocational education and training (VET) and the requirement of specific human
capital endowments in Germany generate closure of the professional employment
segment. Proof of formal qualification is not necessary in unskilled occupations.
However, these generally involve low pay and prestige, few chances for promotion,
and poor job security.
First-generation immigrants are assumed to struggle to access skilled occupa-
tions, i.e. insider markets. A large part of occupational inequality results from the
devaluation of human capital: Since the value of specific human capital is bound to
national contexts, international migration decreases the value of human capital if
the migrant does not possess skills and knowledge that are relevant to the labour
market, or recognised, in the host country (Chiswick 1978). Thus, immigration can
lead to a devaluation of human capital acquired in the country of origin.
Furthermore, first-generation immigrants tend to lack skills in the majority language
of the host society and host-country specific knowledge about labour market
structures and institutions, which further diminishes expected productivity from
their human capital (Friedberg 2000). Indeed, a number of studies have argued that
most of the residual labour market disadvantages of first-generation immigrants can
be explained by the lack of German language skills (Constant and Massey 2005;
Kalter 2006; Koopmans 2016).
Formal recognition of certificates, even if they come from countries with VET
systems similar to Germany, may also not necessarily guarantee better labour
market opportunities. Foreign qualifications do not necessarily translate into proof
of skills and knowledge if employers do not understand the credentials or do not
accept them as equivalent to German certificates (Arrow 1972, 1973; Spence 1973).
Konietzka and Kreyenfeld (2001) found that ethnic Germans (immigrant repatri-
ates) had lower occupational positions than did West Germans, concluding that
foreign credentials do not have a profound effect on the German labour market.
Between West Germans and ethnic Germans who worked in jobs that matched their
vocational training, the latter group still received lower incomes. In their qualitative
interviews, Goldenberg and Sackmann (2014) found that East German entrepre-
neurs see immigrant employees as important for occupations in the unskilled labour
market segment not attractive to native employees. In this segment, only a mini-
mum of language skills is required, and immigrants are often employed by external
contractors. Therefore, accessing the company’s core staff is difficult for them. East
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants … 79

German entrepreneurs do not normally see themselves as recruiting foreign


employees for occupations demanding intermediate qualifications in the profes-
sional employment segment. They state this to be due to a lack of formal certificates
and language skills.
The structural integration of first-generation immigrants could be improved by
subsequent investments into host-country specific resources, such as language,
training, or interethnic relationships (Esser 2008). (Re-)investments into language
and training are particularly costly for first-generation immigrants when they
originate from selective migration, such as low-skilled labour migration, and have
lower educational levels that influence language proficiency negatively (Li 2013).
“Guest workers” in West Germany and “contract workers” in East Germany came
from predominantly rural backgrounds, had low educational levels, and entered
unqualified or semi-qualified manual industrial employment (Pries 2003). In
addition, for Vietnamese immigrants in East Germany, we can expect command of
the destination language to be lower, compared with immigrants from other
countries such as Poland or the former Soviet Union: language acquisition of
first-generation immigrants is negatively related with greater linguistic distance
between host country and country of origin (Chiswick and Miller 2005). Contextual
factors (Blau 1994), such as the relative size of an immigrant group and ethnic
boundary making, are expected to further influence investments. Smaller groups are
expected to have a higher likelihood for intergroup contacts and relations with the
host society, while the possibilities for intragroup interactions and relations increase
in larger groups. Acquisition of the dominant language in the host country is less
likely when co-ethnic concentration in the residential environment is high and
ethnic boundary making is strong (Alba 2008; Esser 2006).
Closure of relevant fields of the host society to immigrants on the one hand, and
ethnicisation of contexts on the other hand, can result in immigrants investing in
their own ethnic networks. The closure of occupational segments will lead to the
formation of niche economies that serve as compensational, or alternative, strate-
gies to access the labour market of the host society. Especially, reciprocity and
solidarity in (co-)ethnic networks promote successful ethnic entrepreneurship.
Specialisation of an ethnic group in one economic branch can boost careers within
the host society (Bonacich 1973) . However, it is also assumed that upward
mobility into higher occupational positions is blocked by niche economies because
they only offer internal careers. They are less risky and costly compared to external
careers, but have a lower “ceiling” (Light 1972; Wiley 1967).
A German study shows that self-employed persons with a migrant background
achieve 40% higher incomes than do workers with a similar migrant background
(Sachs et al. 2016). However, there is a large discrepancy between West and East
Germany. In 2014, in the North Rhine Palatinate alone, ethnic entrepreneurs created
300,000 jobs, while in the whole of East Germany only 31,000 jobs were created.
The number of jobs created by ethnic entrepreneurship has even decreased in East
Germany since 2005 (56,000). Since immigrant employees are assumed to have
difficulties entering middle class positions due to occupational closure, it is
expected that they predominantly access intermediate occupational positions
80 O. Winkler

through self-employment. For East Germany, I expect that the largest immigrant
group, former contract workers from Vietnam, has mainly pursued this line of
occupation. This is also related to changes in the right of residence in 1993 and
1997, which required immigrants to prove basic financial livelihood. Given the
poor structural and economic situation in East Germany at that time,
self-employment, by running a small business, provided an opportunity to meet the
financial demands for residency (Weiss and Dennis 2005).
Overall, I expect that the probability of holding an intermediate occupational
position is lower for first-generation immigrants in East Germany and has remained
relatively stable across time. However, the probability of having an intermediate
occupational position, especially for Vietnamese, is expected to be similar to that
for non-migrants.

4.3.2 Second-Generation Immigrants

While first-generation immigrants are more likely to enter lower occupational classes,
their children are expected to move up to positions requiring qualifications because
they pass the apprenticeship system in Germany. German-born children with
immigrant parents are structurally integrated through the education and vocational
training system. In school, native-born generations adopt the German language, and
obtain the formal degrees and certificates necessary to enter jobs in the intermediate or
higher qualification segment. However, youths with a migrant background are still
expected not to have equal occupational chances compared to native (non-migrant)
youths. This is mainly due to a combination of their social origin and the education
system, which affects educational opportunities (Boudon 1974; Breen and
Goldthorpe 1997; Erikson and Jonsson 1996) and may lead to (cumulative) disad-
vantages concerning returns to education (income and occupation).
Although first-generation immigrants in Germany have high educational aspi-
rations (Relikowski et al. 2012), their children have fewer chances to obtain upper
secondary education (Kristen and Granato 2007). Educational inequality between
non-migrant and migrant students in East Germany differs sharply across states. In
2004, students with foreign citizenship in Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt, and
Brandenburg were less likely to attend upper secondary education (“Gymnasium”)
than were children of non-migrants, while students in Saxony and
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania had higher or equal chances. In 2003, 43.8% of
youth with foreign citizenship attained higher education entrance qualifications in
Brandenburg, compared with 29.4% of youths with no migrant background. In
other East German states (Saxony and Thuringia), however, the proportion of
foreign students obtaining no school degree is twice as high as that for
non-migrants. Foreign students also have a higher risk of receiving a lower
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants … 81

secondary school degree and a lower chance of obtaining an upper secondary


school certificate (“Abitur”). The chances for intermediate qualifications are also
lower (except in Thuringia with more equal opportunities) (Weiss 2010).
Youth with a migrant background also face various difficulties finding an
apprenticeship in the German “dual system”.1 Access is dependent on demand and
supply of local/regional training markets as well as on the preferences of candidates
and employers (matching) (Hunkler 2016). Due to prior educational discrepancies,
youth with a migrant background tend to have lower formal qualifications and they
may have deficits in German language skills. In addition, searching resources that
are limited to social capital in co-ethnic networks are liable to provide less infor-
mation about favourable vocational training opportunities. However, ethnic capital
could provide alternative job opportunities in the case of occupational closure due
to discrimination (Kogan and Kalter 2006). Social origin may affect apprenticeship
choices when children “inherit” preferences for professional fields from their par-
ents, leading to self-selection into certain occupations. Disadvantages may also
arise as a result of discrimination by employers blocking vocational training
opportunities for candidates with a migrant background, due to ethnicised as-
sumptions about productivity (Kalter and Granato 2002). In 2009, about 44% of
candidates in Germany with a migrant background had no more than a general
school certificate, while only 33% of candidates with no migrant background had
the same certificate. For intermediate qualification, by contrast, the proportions
were 52% for non-migrant candidates, compared to 43% for those with a migrant
background. Although candidates with a migrant background search more actively
and make greater efforts to find an apprenticeship, they are less often invited to
interviews. Finally, only 28% of candidates with a migrant background and 42%
non-migrants receive a training place (Beicht 2011). The East German training
market faces persistent structural discrepancies such as a decreasing number of
companies, as well as demographic change leading to a lower number of applicants.
While the supply side of the training market has weakened due to economic dif-
ficulties, the decreasing demand has eased the pressure on the training market.
However, there has always been a gap between the supply of training places by
companies and the demand by youth since 1991, leading to the queuing of appli-
cants (Troltsch et al. 2009).
Although there is mixed empirical evidence on the educational success of
second-generation immigrants2 in East Germany, theory suggests that
second-generation immigrants face a greater risk of having lower human capital
endowments (i.e. lower school degrees and fewer training qualifications), which

1
After completing lower secondary education, graduates can choose whether to continue schooling
in upper secondary education, to start vocational training (or preparatory training measures), or to
enter the labour market without having formal certificates from the training system (Worbs 2003).
2
Furthermore, some of the presented studies used citizenship instead of direct and indirect
immigration experience to operationalise migrant background. Therefore, drawing conclusions
about educational success of second-generation immigrants is difficult.
82 O. Winkler

leads to their being in a less favourable occupational class. Even after controlling
for qualifications, however, differences between youth with and without a migrant
background could remain. Finally, I expect that youth from the second generation
will enter a higher occupational class than their parents, but they could still have
lower occupational chances compared with youth with no migrant background in
East Germany.

4.4 Data and Methods

For the empirical investigation, data from the German Mikrozensus are used. The
Mikrozensus is a representative household survey undertaken by the German
Statistical Office using a 1% sample of the residential population, around 830,000
persons. For the analysis, I used a pooled cross-sectional data set (Wooldridge
2010) consisting of the scientific use files (SUF) from 1991, 1993, 1995 to 2011,3
which are a 70% sample of the Mikrozensus. This provides a large data set, which
enables analysis of small groups such as immigrants and their descendants in East
Germany. The survey provides data about population structure as well as economic
and social characteristics of the population, information about marital status, labour
market and employment, occupation and training. I limited the sample to persons
aged 15–65 (labour force) who reside in East Germany (not including Berlin).
Occupational class was the dependent variable. For its operationalisation, numerous
concepts have been developed. I use a classification of occupations developed by
Blossfeld (1985) and its implementation for Mikrozensus data (Schimpl-Neimanns
2003). The categories are (1) managers, (2) engineers and professionals,
(3) semi-professionals, (4) technicians, (5) skilled manual or commercial profes-
sions or skilled services, (6) routine manual or commercial professions or routine
services, and (7) agriculture.4 Due to the small number of cases, the categories are
grouped to (I) Higher occupations: high-skilled and professionals (1–4),
(II) Intermediate occupations: skilled manual or commercial occupations and ser-
vices (5), and (III) Lower occupations: routine manual or commercial occupations
and services (6, 7).
In the Mikrozensus, migrant background is not fully captured in the SUF 1991–
2004. Before 2005, the Mikrozensus only provided citizenship as an indicator.
Beginning in 2008, a detailed variable about migration status, i.e. migrant back-
ground, was included into the Mikrozensus. Between 2005 and 2007, migrant
background can be reconstructed using a special routine (Jäger and

3
The Mikrozensus was not conducted in 1992 and 1994
4
As an alternative classification, the ESeC-scheme could be used (Rose et al. 2010). However,
required information such as ISCO-88 is not provided before 2008 and an approximation by using
KldB-1992 would be necessary. Then, further adjustments of the ESeC must be applied, as its
crude version would not sufficiently fit the German occupational structure (Herwig and Konietzka
2012).
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants … 83

Schimpl-Neimanns 2012). For the observation period 2005–2011, the conceptual-


isation of a migrant background is possible in terms of generation: (1) Persons with
no migrant background, either because they and their parents were born in
Germany, or they immigrated to Germany before 1950 as Germans without having
been naturalised. (2) Persons with a direct migrant background who have immi-
gration experience of their own. These are referred to as first-generation immi-
grants. Persons who immigrated to Germany after 1950 (Ethnic Germans
—“Spätaussiedler”) also belong to this group. (3) Persons with an indirect migrant
background who have no immigration experience of their own (second generation).
They were born in Germany while at least one parent was born abroad. Due to the
data structure, I compared occupational classes between persons with no migrant
background, the first and the second generation, using the SUF 2005–2011. For the
whole observation period 1991–2011, comparisons are drawn upon citizenship
(German or foreign).
In East Germany, immigrants mainly originate from successor states of the
former Soviet Union, Vietnam, or Poland (Statistisches Bundesamt 2015). In the
Mikrozensus, individuals were asked whether they or their parents were born in
Germany. Other countries of birth were not surveyed. However, country of origin
can be approximated by using respondents’ citizenship. Persons with a direct (first
generation) or indirect (second-generation) migrant background can possess either
German (through naturalisation) or foreign citizenship. First generation immigrants
who were naturalised report their former citizenship in the Mikrozensus. Thus,
comparisons for both first generation and country of origin are possible. The same
is true for persons with an indirect migrant background who report a foreign
citizenship. For persons with an indirect migrant background and German citi-
zenship, their parents’ country of origin cannot be retrieved adequately. Some of the
respondents from the second generation had foreign citizenship prior to naturali-
sation, which they reported in the Mikrozensus. However, due to the small number
of cases, I will limit the multivariate analysis to first-generation immigrants and
their country of origin. Table 4.2 summarises the comparisons that are made
between the different concepts of migrant background for the two observation
periods. Other control variables are highest educational level that was attained in
secondary education,5 vocational degree or higher education (university degree),
branch of industry, community size (“Gemeindegröße”), age and age squared (/
100), and gender.6

5
General (ISCED 2, leading into VET or extensive general education) Intermediate (ISCED 2,
extensive general education leading into VET or upper secondary education), Upper Secondary
(ISCED 3, general or subject-specific higher education entrance qualification).
6
East Germany is often characterised by a shrinking and aging population leading to a smaller
number of inhabitants of working age (Fuchs 2016). With a given demand for labour force, a small
number of non-migrant competitors could improve the economic situation of immigrants in East
Germany. In sensitivity analysis, estimates were robust after controlling for periodic GDP per
capita and periodic working-age population in East Germany.
84 O. Winkler

Table 4.2 Concepts of migrant background by observation period


SUF 1991– SUF 2005–2011
2011
Generation Non-migrant
First generation (direct migrant
background)
Second generation (indirect migrant
background)
Country of origin: citizenship Germany
Vietnam
Russia/
former SU
Poland
Other
Country of origin: (former) citizenship Non-migrant
by generation First generation: Vietnam
First generation: Russia/former SU
First generation: Poland
First generation: Other
Second generation: Poland*
Second generation: Russia/former
SU*
Second generation: Vietnam*
Second generation: Other*
* Due to small case numbers, occupational classes will not be estimated for children from the
second generation with ethnic background from Poland, Russia/former Soviet Union (SU), and
Vietnam or other

To estimate the probability of entering an occupational class, multinomial


logistic regression is used (Long and Freese 2014). I report estimates as (log) rel-
ative risk ratios and I use conditional effect plots based on predicted probabilities to
facilitate interpretation. To model differences in affiliation across time, interaction
effects between wave of the survey and a migrant background are estimated. Since
the number of persons with a migrant background in the scientific use files for East
Germany is small, I grouped the single survey waves to intervals within the
observation period 1991–2011. The intervals are 1991–2000, 2001–2005, and
2006–2011.7 For higher occupations, the total number of Vietnamese immigrants
within this category is very small. Therefore, I did not estimate an interaction effect
between time and this particular group. Instead, I used a logit model that estimates
the probabilities of employment in intermediate or lower occupational positions.

7
The intervals depict the three phases of the legal basis of immigration and integration in reunified
Germany.
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants … 85

For easier interpretation of interaction effects, graphs reporting average marginal


effects (AME) are used.

4.5 Results

Table 4.3 is a cross tabulation which reports frequencies of the main variables in the
sample by migrant background for the SUF 1991–2011. Migrant background is
based on citizenship. Compared to Germans, immigrants from Poland, Russian
Federation (or former SU), Vietnam, and immigrants with other foreign citizenship
are more often employed in lower occupations. Especially for Vietnamese, the
proportion of employees in lower occupations (57.7%) is 1.6 times larger than the
proportion of non-migrants (35.2%). For intermediate occupations, the share is also
smaller for immigrants from Poland and Russia. However, Vietnamese and
Germans have a similar ratio in this category. This finding is in line with theoretical
assumptions suggesting that Vietnamese in East Germany access intermediate
occupations mainly through ethnic entrepreneurship. This is also indicated by the
particularly high percentage of Vietnamese working in trade or commerce (86.6%).
Nevertheless, occupations in ethnic economies have a lower “ceiling”, as is
demonstrated by the extremely low proportion of Vietnamese in higher occupa-
tions. Surprisingly, the share of Polish and Russian immigrants in higher occupa-
tions is similar to that of non-migrants.
There are important differences between the educational attainments (level of
secondary education) of Germans and immigrant groups, but these do not neces-
sarily correlate with access to higher occupations in East Germany. Of the
Vietnamese, 31.1% hold an upper secondary degree compared to only 20.9% of
Germans. However, only 66% of Vietnamese compared to 97% of non-migrants
have a vocational degree or received higher education. Despite their high formal
education, the proportion of the workforce holding no vocational qualifications is
comparatively high among Vietnamese.
Immigrants from Poland and Russia are more likely to hold general educational
degrees than are Germans, and their share with an upper secondary education is
twice as large as that of Germans. This is mainly due to the large number of
immigrants from Poland and Russia who hold subject-specific higher education
entrance certificates. This qualification is required for various skilled professional
positions, as is confirmed by the high number of persons originating from these
countries who are employed in higher occupations. Furthermore, about 90% of
Polish and Russian immigrants have vocational training or higher education, which
enables them to access jobs in the professional employment segment. East Germans
mostly hold intermediate educational degrees (67.5%) which is mainly due to the
comprehensive structure of the education system of the former GDR, focusing on
extensive general education before entering vocational training.
The cross table (Table 4.4) is limited to the observation period 2005–2011 and
allows us to disentangle shares of occupational classes or educational level by
Table 4.3 Descriptive statistics of central variables by citizenship (Mikrozensus 1991–2011)
86

No IB Poland RF/fmr. SU Vietnam Other Total


% n % n % n % n % n % n
Occupational class
Higher 25.0 14,8160 22.0 83 27.9 190 3.2 19 26.9 948 25.0 149,400
Intermediate 39.8 23,5259 31.0 117 28.2 192 39.1 234 33.1 1167 39.7 236,969
Lower 35.2 20,8292 47.1 178 43.8 298 57.7 345 40.1 1415 35.3 210,528
Educational level
General 11.6 68,760 25.9 98 14.0 95 29.6 177 24.9 878 11.7 70,008
Intermediate 67.5 39,9457 33.3 126 40.6 276 39.3 235 31.0 1095 67.2 401,189
Upper secondary 20.9 12,3494 40.7 154 45.4 309 31.1 186 44.1 1557 21.1 125,700
Vocational degree/higher education
Yes 97.2 57,5071 91.0 344 91.3 621 65.7 393 85.0 3002 97.1 579,431
No 2.8 16,640 9.0 34 8.7 59 34.3 205 15.0 528 2.9 174,66
Branch of industry
Manufacturing 35.9 212,578 40.7 154 22.6 154 10.0 60 32.9 1160 35.9 214,106
Trade/commerce 34.7 205,100 35.2 133 43.1 293 86.6 518 42.6 1505 34.8 207,549
Public service 29.4 174,033 24.1 91 34.3 233 3.3 20 24.5 865 29.4 175,242
SUF
1991–1999 38.6 228,373 33.6 127 16.0 109 25.8 154 23.6 833 38.5 229,596
2000–2005 29.9 176,810 18.0 68 31.6 215 29.9 179 30.1 1061 29.9 178,333
2006–2011 31.5 186,528 48.4 183 52.4 356 44.3 265 46.3 1636 31.7 188,968
Community size
Rural/small town <5–20 K 56.1 331,862 39.4 149 23.8 162 29.1 174 31.5 1112 55.9 333,459
Medium-sized town >20–500 K 41.5 245,411 56.9 215 68.2 464 62.4 373 61.9 2185 41.7 248,648
Major city 2.4 14,438 3.7 14 7.9 54 8.5 51 6.6 233 2.5 14,790
(continued)
O. Winkler
Table 4.3 (continued)
No IB Poland RF/fmr. SU Vietnam Other Total
% n % n % n % n % n % n
Gender
Male 52.3 309,476 44.2 167 41.6 283 57.2 342 66.2 2338 52.4 312,606
Female 47.7 282,235 55.8 211 58.4 397 42.8 256 33.8 1192 47.6 284,291
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
Age 41.3 10.8 39.8 9.7 38.9 9.5 38.8 8.3 40.0 9.7 41.3 10.8
Total 100 591,711 100 378 100 680 100 598 100 3530 100 596,897
Source Mikrozensus 1991–2011, own calculations
IB immigrant background; M mean; SD standard deviation; Country of origin based on citizenship
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants …
87
Table 4.4 Descriptive statistics of central variables by generational status and country of origin (Mikrozensus 2005–2011)
88

No IB First generation Second Total


generation
Total Poland Former SU Vietnam Other Total Total
% n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n
Occupational class
Higher 25.7 54,791 26.0 129 24.9 233 3.4 11 28.0 751 25.3 1124 19.8 50 25.7 55,965
Intermediate 39.6 84,545 32.6 162 31.3 293 43.4 141 31.9 856 32.7 1452 36.9 93 39.5 86,090
Lower 34.7 74,099 41.4 206 43.7 409 53.2 173 40.1 1076 42.0 1864 43.3 109 34.9 76,072
Educational level
General 6.4 13,605 15.5 77 15.7 147 29.2 95 21.1 567 20.0 886 11.5 29 6.7 14,520
Intermediate 69.3 14,7989 50.7 252 45.3 424 41.2 134 35.6 956 39.8 1766 59.9 151 68.7 149,906
Upper secondary 24.3 51,841 33.8 168 38.9 364 29.5 96 43.2 1160 40.3 1788 28.6 72 24.6 53,701
Vocational higher education
Yes 96.4 205,691 92.8 461 87.7 820 57.2 186 84.6 2270 84.2 3737 84.5 213 96.1 209,641
No 3.6 7744 7.2 36 12.3 115 42.8 139 15.4 413 15.8 703 15.5 39 3.9 8486
Branch of industry
Manufacturing 31.5 67,235 32.2 160 26.6 249 4.0 13 27.3 733 26.0 1155 32.1 81 31.4 68,471
Trade/Commerce 37.0 79,021 39.0 194 42.4 396 92.9 302 43.1 1156 46.1 2048 40.1 101 37.2 81,170
Public service 31.5 67,179 28.8 143 31.0 290 3.1 10 29.6 794 27.9 1237 27.8 70 31.4 68,486
Community size
Rural/Small town <5–20 K 54.7 116,704 48.9 243 29.0 271 29.5 96 33.7 905 34.1 1515 50.4 127 54.3 118,346
Medium town >20–500 K 39.7 84,833 46.3 230 59.3 554 53.8 175 56.2 1508 55.6 2467 42.9 108 40.1 87,408
Major city 5.6 11,898 4.8 24 11.8 110 16.6 54 10.1 270 10.3 458 6.7 17 5.7 12,373
Gender
Male 50.9 108,582 45.1 224 44.6 417 53.2 173 59.6 1600 54.4 2414 65.1 164 51.0 111,160
Female 49.1 104,853 54.9 273 55.4 518 46.8 152 40.4 1083 45.6 2026 34.9 88 49.0 106,967
M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD
(continued)
O. Winkler
Table 4.4 (continued)
No IB First generation Second Total
generation
Total Poland Former SU Vietnam Other Total Total
% n % n % n % n % n % n % n % n
Age 43.1 11.0 44.7 10.0 40.7 10.5 41.8 8.1 41.7 10.5 41.9 10.3 32.3 11.3 43.1 11.0
Total 100 213,435 100 497 100 935 100 325 100 2683 100 4440 100 252 100 218,127
Source Mikrozensus 2005–2011, own calculations
IB immigrant background; M mean; SD standard deviation. Country of origin based on citizenship
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants …
89
90 O. Winkler

(immigrant) generation and country of origin. The first generation works more often
in lower occupations (42.0%) and less often in intermediate positions (32.7%)
compared to the group with no migrant background (34.7 and 39.6%). However,
the percentage of employees in higher occupations is similar in both groups.
Although I expected intergenerational upward mobility, the share of the second
generation in lower occupations is equal to that of the first generation (43.3%). The
proportion employed in higher occupations is even lower for the second generation
than for the first or for non-migrants. This could be due to an age effect, because the
second generation is younger (average 32 years in the sample) and entering higher
occupations requires seniority. The second generation is more likely to be in
intermediate positions than the parental generation, with a proportion similar to that
of non-migrants. First generation immigrants from Russia and Poland have similar
occupational distributions and similar percentages in higher occupations as
non-migrants. The Vietnamese, by contrast, have greater proportions in low and
intermediate positions and a very high proportion (92.9%) in trade and commerce,
which brings out the importance of the ethnic economy for these former contract
labourers from Vietnam.
Vietnamese, Polish, and Russian immigrants from the first generation most often
live in medium-sized towns, and these, generally, provide more advantageous
employment structures. The Vietnamese, in particular, are more likely to reside in
East Germany’s two major cities, Leipzig and Dresden, both of which have more
than 500,000 inhabitants. East Germany is characterised by rural areas and small
towns, which is where 54.7% of non-migrants reside. For first-generation immi-
grants from Vietnam, the medium-sized and larger cities provide more opportunities
and networks to facilitate access to intermediate occupations.
First-generation migrants (the parental generation) are more likely to have a
general education, and less likely to possess intermediate education, than their
offspring. First and second-generation immigrants have similar or even higher
shares in upper secondary education compared to the non-migrants. Surprisingly,
perhaps, first and second-generation migrants have similar proportions with com-
pleted vocational or higher education.
For the multivariate analysis of the observation period 1991–2011, I first esti-
mated a basic model with migrant background and control variables (Table 4.5). In
the second and third model, I included educational level and branch of industry as
independent variables. Due to the small number of cases, model 4 regroups the
variable “citizenship” by adding Vietnamese to persons with other foreign
citizenship. This is followed by model 5, which introduces interaction effects
between citizenship and time.
Model 1 shows that all foreign citizen groups have a significantly lower prob-
ability of being employed in higher or intermediate occupations than Germans.
After controlling for educational and vocational degree, the probability of being in
these occupations decreases even more for the foreign groups. This suggests that
immigrants’ human capital endowments are devalued in East Germany and are not
translated into intermediate or higher level occupations. In model 3, however, the
different access chances are explained by affiliation to different branches of
Table 4.5 Estimated occupational class of persons with foreign citizenship in East Germany (Multinomial logit model, log-odds. Mikrozensus 1991–2011)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed.
Citizenship
Poland −0.51*** −0.59*** −1.02*** −0.63*** −0.90*** −0.62*** −0.90*** −0.62*** −1.18*** −0.68**
(0.134) (0.119) (0.158) (0.125) (0.165) (0.126) (0.165) (0.126) (0.290) (0.210)
RF/fmr. SU −0.27** −0.66*** −0.84*** −0.77*** −0.85*** −0.77*** −0.85*** −0.77*** −0.63* −0.49*
(0.094) (0.093) (0.110) (0.097) (0.117) (0.098) (0.117) (0.098) (0.289) (0.248)
Vietnam −2.66*** −0.59*** −2.90*** −0.46*** −2.22*** −0.16+
(0.236) (0.085) (0.246) (0.090) (0.247) (0.092)
Other −0.06 −0.40*** −0.43*** −0.36*** −0.34*** −0.30*** −0.46*** −0.28*** −0.91*** −0.49***
(0.043) (0.040) (0.051) (0.042) (0.054) (0.043) (0.051) (0.039) (0.104) (0.076)
Educational level
Intermediate 1.15*** 0.49*** 1.15*** 0.51*** 1.15*** 0.51*** 1.15*** 0.51***
(0.015) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010) (0.016) (0.010)
Upper secondary 3.67*** 1.49*** 3.63*** 1.52*** 3.63*** 1.52*** 3.63*** 1.52***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014)
Vocational degree/higher 1.21*** 0.72*** 1.36*** 0.78*** 1.36*** 0.78*** 1.36*** 0.78***
education (0.029) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018) (0.030) (0.018)
Branch of industry
Trade/commerce −0.35*** −0.39*** −0.35*** −0.39*** −0.35*** −0.39***
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants …

(0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007)


Public service 1.89*** 0.71*** 1.89*** 0.71*** 1.89*** 0.71***
(0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009)
SUF
2000−2005 0.04*** 0.06*** −0.18*** −0.01 −0.32*** −0.05*** −0.32*** −0.05*** −0.32*** −0.05***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
2006−2011 −0.003 0.06*** −0.34*** −0.06*** −0.40*** −0.07*** −0.40*** −0.07*** −0.41*** −0.07***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Women 0.50*** 0.00 0.60*** 0.02** 0.20*** −0.06*** 0.20*** −0.06*** 0.20*** −0.06***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
91

(continued)
Table 4.5 (continued)
92

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5


Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed.
Age 0.04*** −0.03*** 0.01* −0.06*** 0.01*** −0.06*** 0.01*** −0.06*** 0.01*** −0.06***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Age squared (/100) −0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.06*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01 0.06*** 0.01 0.06***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Community size
Medium-sized town 0.39*** 0.18*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.21*** 0.15***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Major city 0.61*** 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.19*** 0.46*** 0.26*** 0.46*** 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.26***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.025) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026) (0.021)
Interactions
Poland* −0.28 −0.32
2000–2005 (0.507) (0.375)
Poland* 0.66+ 0.26
2006–2011 (0.372) (0.279)
RF/fmr. SU* 2000–2005 −0.67+ −0.69*
(0.357) (0.305)
RF/fmr. SU* 2006–2011 0.00 −0.11
(0.331) (0.283)
Other* 0.52*** 0.15
2000–2005 (0.139) (0.104)
Other* 0.64*** 0.37***
2006–2011 (0.128) (0.096)
Constant −1.93*** 0.85*** −3.98*** 0.15*** −4.32*** 0.11** −4.32*** 0.11** −4.32*** 0.11**
(0.049) (0.040) (0.060) (0.042) (0.062) (0.043) (0.062) (0.043) (0.062) (0.043)
(continued)
O. Winkler
Table 4.5 (continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed.
N 596,897 596,897 596,897 596,897 596,897
AIC 1,272,452.29 1,168,783.53 1,109,694.50 1,109,798.07 1,109,773.02
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.09 0.14 0.14 0.14
Log likelihood −636,202.14 −584,361.77 −554,813.25 −554,867.04 −554,842.51
Chi2 18,093.27 121,774.03 180,871.07 180,763.49 180,812.54
dF 22 28 32 30 42
Source Mikrozensus 1991–2011, own calculations
Base outcome: lower occupations
Ref.: No immigrant background; general education; no VET or higher education; manufacturing; 1991–1999; men; rural/small town
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants …
93
94 O. Winkler

Fig. 4.2 Estimated occupational class of persons with foreign citizenship in East Germany
(Predicted probability in %. Mikrozensus 1991–2011). Source Mikrozensus 1991–2011, own
calculations
IB immigrant background

industry. This is especially the case for Vietnamese compared to Germans: after
controlling for branch of industry, the relative risk of working in an intermediate
versus a lower scale occupation is strongly reduced (e−0.16 = 0.85) and is only
significant at the 10% level. In terms of probabilities, we get a more precise image.
Figure 4.2 illustrates predicted probabilities based on model 3. The probability of
being employed in an intermediate occupation is around 49% for Vietnamese and
40% for Germans. However, the probability for lower occupations is 45% for
Vietnamese and only 35% for Germans, who have a 25% probability of working in
higher-level occupations.
Polish and Russian immigrants have a similar, significantly lower, chance of
working in intermediate or higher occupations compared to Germans. Figure 4.2
shows that both foreign groups have a probability of 50% for lower occupations
while their probability is around 31 and 19% in intermediate and higher occupa-
tions. Although both shares are below those of Germans in higher occupations, the
difference between Germans and Polish as well as Russians is only 6% points.
To sum up, there is a high risk for persons with foreign citizenship of entering
lower occupational classes compared to Germans. Except for the Vietnamese,
intermediate occupational classes are relatively closed to immigrants. The Polish
and Russians are the foreign groups most likely to enter higher occupational
classes, but their chances are still smaller than are those of non-migrant Germans.
Controlling for education decreases the chances for intermediate and higher
occupations for immigrants. Thus, educational levels and human capital endow-
ments cannot overcome the disadvantages of immigrants on the East German labour
market. This could also be a sign that there are other characteristics than formal
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants … 95

Fig. 4.3 Estimated occupational class of persons with foreign citizenship in East Germany by
time (Average marginal effects. Mikrozensus 1991–2011). Source Mikrozensus 1991–2011, own
calculations
IB immigrant background

education which affect entry into higher level occupations, such as language skills
and holding local training qualifications.
Model 4 of Table 4.5 shows that the estimates are robust to the regrouping. After
including interaction effects with time in model 5, there are only a few significant
effects at the 10% level. This is mainly due to statistical power in the groups with
foreign citizenship. In general, then, the occupational status of immigrant groups is
stable across time (Fig. 4.3). Polish and Russian immigrants, however, had an
increased risk of being in lower occupations from the 1990s to the mid-2000s. After
2005, the risk decreased again.
Opportunities for Polish immigrants to be in higher-level occupations have
significantly increased over time. This might be due to the immigration of skilled
professionals to meet shortages of skilled labour in East Germany over the past ten
years. Formal recognition of qualifications is sometimes not necessary in these
positions. Nonetheless, over time there is a consistent stratification of occupations
along ethnic origin: immigrants always have a higher risk of being in lower-level
occupations, while Germans maintain the highest probabilities for intermediate and
higher-level occupations. Even at the end of the observation period, these differ-
ences were only slightly reduced. The structural integration of immigrants into the
East German labour market remains a slow process.
In the next step, I estimated occupational class using the SUF 2005–2011 of the
Mikrozensus (Table 4.6) and modelled the effect of generational status. For the first
96 O. Winkler

Table 4.6 Estimated occupational class by generational status and country of origin in East
Germany (Multinomial logit model, log-odds. Mikrozensus 2005–2011)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed. Higher Intermed.
a. Generation
First −0.25*** −0.42*** −0.48*** −0.36*** −0.40*** −0.31***
(0.039) (0.036) (0.046) (0.038) (0.049) (0.039)
Second −0.32+ −0.44** −0.36+ −0.44** −0.40* −0.47**
(0.173) (0.142) (0.194) (0.146) (0.205) (0.149)
b. Educational level
Intermediate 1.17*** 0.71*** 1.27*** 0.76***
(0.036) (0.020) (0.038) (0.021)
Upper secondary 3.66*** 1.78*** 3.78*** 1.86***
(0.038) (0.024) (0.040) (0.025)
c. Vocational degree/higher education
Yes 1.20*** 0.69*** 1.33*** 0.76***
(0.041) (0.026) (0.043) (0.027)
d. Branch of industry
Trade/commerce −0.53*** −0.35***
(0.018) (0.012)
Public service 2.15*** 0.91***
(0.019) (0.016)
Constant −1.54*** 0.82*** −4.30*** −0.06 −4.80*** −0.20**
(0.080) (0.066) (0.098) (0.069) (0.104) (0.071)
N 218,127 218,127 218,127
AIC 466,638.52 427,912.37 398,383.67
Pseudo R2 0.01 0.09 0.16
Log-likelihood −233,303.26 −213,934.19 −199,165.84
Chi2 5998.66 44,736.80 74,273.50
dF 14 20 24
Source Mikrozensus 2005–2011, own calculations
Base outcome: lower occupations
Controlled but not displayed: Gender, Age, Age squared, and Community Size
Ref.: (a) no immigrant background; (b) general education; (c) no vocational degree or no higher
education; (d) manufacturing
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

generation, there is a significantly lower probability of accessing higher- and


intermediate-level occupations compared to non-migrants. For intermediate occu-
pations, these differences are slightly reduced after controlling for educational level
and segmentation. For higher occupations, there is a similar effect concerning
education as in Table 4.5. After controlling for education, access chances further
decrease. When looking at the predicted probabilities in Fig. 4.4, the share of
first-generation immigrants working in lower occupations is 7% points higher than
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants … 97

Fig. 4.4 Estimated occupational class by generational status and country of origin in East
Germany (Predicted probabilities in percentages). Source Mikrozensus 2005–2011, own
calculations
IB immigrant background

the share of persons without a migrant background. For higher and intermediate
classes, the differences are in the opposite direction, but smaller.
The analysis does bring out clearly the stronger inequalities for the second
generation. After controlling for age, individual and occupational characteristics in
model 3, the second generation has significantly lower chances to access inter-
mediate positions than non-migrants do. Their chance is also lower compared to the
first generation; however, the difference between the coefficients of the first and
second generation is not significant (v2(1) = 1.10; p > 0.10). The predicted prob-
ability for persons from the second generation to enter intermediate occupations is
almost 10% points lower than that for people without a migrant background.
Theoretically, these groups were expected to be less disadvantaged, because the
second generation was educated and trained in Germany. However, although they
are equally likely to have an upper secondary education, people of the second
generation are less likely to have a vocational degree than are non-migrants, and
they are twice as likely to have only a general educational certificate (Table 4.4).
Controlling for education in model 2, and branch of industry in model 3, leads to
relatively stable coefficients for the second generation’s relative risk of being in an
intermediate position. This in turn leads to the conclusion that the inequality in
lower and intermediate educational levels for the second generation does not have a
great impact on explaining group specific differences in intermediate occupations.8

8
For the first generation, the risk of being excluded from higher occupational positions is con-
siderably increasing from −0.25 in model 1 to −0.48 in model 2 (Table 4.6) once educational level
and vocational degree were controlled. This could be due to a suppressor effect: In model 1, we see
98 O. Winkler

Table 4.7 Estimated occupational class (lower versus intermediate) by citizenship (1991–2011)
and country of origin (2005–2011) (Logit model, log-odds. Mikrozensus 1991–2011)
1991–2011 2005–2011
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Citizenship (1991–2011)
Country of origin (1st generation) (2005–2011)
Poland −0.59*** −0.65** −0.355*** −0.313** −0.296**
(0.126) (0.210) (0.106) (0.110) (0.113)
RF/fmr. SU −0.79*** −0.46+ −0.543*** −0.569*** −0.548***
(0.099) (0.251) (0.077) (0.081) (0.083)
Vietnam −0.17+ −1.02*** −0.386*** −0.105 0.266*
(0.092) (0.189) (0.114) (0.123) (0.125)
Other −0.29*** −0.40*** −0.386*** −0.318*** −0.266***
(0.043) (0.085) (0.046) (0.050) (0.051)
Educational level
Intermediate 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.713*** 0.761***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.020) (0.021)
Upper secondary 1.50*** 1.50*** 1.760*** 1.801***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.025)
Vocational 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.690*** 0.767***
degree/higher (0.018) (0.018) (0.026) (0.027)
education
Branch of industry
Trade/commerce −0.42*** −0.42*** −0.371***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
Public service 0.67*** 0.67*** 0.858***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.016)
SUF
2000–2005 −0.03*** −0.03***
(0.008) (0.008)
2006–2011 −0.04*** −0.05***
(0.008) (0.008)
Interactions
Poland * 2000– −0.37
2005 (0.378)
Poland * 2006– 0.25
2011 (0.279)
RF/fmr. SU * −0.75*
2000–2005 (0.308)
RF/fmr. SU * −0.15
2006–2011 (0.286)
Vietnam * 2000– 0.86***
2005 (0.251)
Vietnam * 2006– 1.34***
2011 (0.232)
(continued)
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants … 99

Table 4.7 (continued)


1991–2011 2005–2011
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Other * 2000– 0.03
2005 (0.115)
Other * 2006– 0.21*
2011 (0.106)
Constant 0.04 0.04 0.769*** −0.164* −0.223**
(0.043) (0.043) (0.066) (0.070) (0.072)
N 447,497 447,497 161,960 161,960 161,960
AIC 583,749.85 583,714.09 222,428.26 214,424.27 207,157.80
Pseudo R2 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.07
Log-likelihood −291,857.92 −291,832.04 −111,204.13 −107,199.13 −103,563.90
Chi2 35,083.51 35,135.27 1493.94 9503.93 16,774.39
dF 16 24 9 12 14
Source Mikrozensus 1991–2011, own calculations
Controlled but not displayed: Gender, Age, Age squared, and Community Size
Ref.: no immigrant background; general education; no VET or higher education; manufacturing;
1991–1999; men; rural/small town
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p< 0.001

Finally, I tested the probability of first generation Vietnamese immigrants


accessing intermediate versus lower occupations, relative to German non-migrants
(Table 4.7). In model 1 of the left panel, Vietnamese have the highest chance of
being employed in intermediate positions compared to the other foreign groups.
The small difference compared to non-migrants is only significant at the 10% level.
Vietnamese from the first generation have also the highest chance of being in
intermediate positions among immigrant groups (model 1, right panel). The
remaining differences in intermediate occupations between first-generation
Vietnamese and non-migrants are explained by branch of industry, controlling
for which gives the Vietnamese an advantage over non-migrants (model 3, right
panel). This confirms expectations that Vietnamese enter closed, intermediate,
occupations mostly through self-employment. The interaction effects show that the
Vietnamese are the only immigrant group who have significantly increased their
chances for intermediate positions across time (Fig. 4.5).

that the direct effect between migrant background and entering higher positions is negative but
relatively small. This was already indicated by the descriptive results (Table 4.4). Here, we have
also seen that the proportion with an upper secondary education is higher among people from the
first generation (especially for those from Poland and the former SU) in East Germany. In model 2
(Table 4.6), we see an expected positive effect between education and being in higher occupations.
While the direct effect is negative, the indirect effect is positive. This indicates suppression through
education: if the first generation and non-migrants would not differ in upper secondary education,
the first generation would enter higher occupational classes less often as they already do.
100 O. Winkler

Fig. 4.5 Estimated occupational class (lower versus intermediate) of persons with foreign
citizenship in East Germany by time (Average marginal effects). Source Mikrozensus 1991–2011,
own calculations
IB immigrant background

4.6 Conclusion

The aim of this study was to analyse structural integration into the labour market of
immigrants and their descendants in East Germany. East Germany has a very
distinct history of immigration, and has faced dramatic structural changes since
reunification. The number of immigrants residing in East Germany is extremely
small and the composition of countries of origin sharply different from that in West
Germany. In the past two decades, the structural integration of immigrants in East
Germany has been negatively affected by weak economic structures in a demo-
graphically shrinking region, as well as by strong xenophobic attitudes towards
immigrants. The employment chances of immigrants residing in this region of
Germany have been studied only to a rather limited extent. This contribution has
focused on occupational classes since it was assumed that the labour market has
both more closed and more open segments, and these are differently accessible to
persons with a migrant background, leading to possible ethnic inequality in occu-
pations. In reunified Germany, access to occupations is strongly dependent on
formal training certificates obtained in the dual training system, which most
first-generation immigrants do not hold. I therefore expected intermediate occu-
pational positions in East Germany to remain closed to most first-generation
immigrants. Due to certain policies during the 1990s, and greater ethnic networks in
East Germany, it was expected that first-generation immigrants from Vietnam
would have a greater chance to access intermediate positions through ethnic
entrepreneurship. For the second generation, I expected to find less representation
4 Occupational Classes of Immigrants and Their Descendants … 101

in lower occupational classes, compared to their parents, as they had passed edu-
cation and training in Germany. However, I expected disparities to remain in labour
market integration for the second generation, compared to non-migrants.
The empirical analysis used 19 cross-sectional data sets from the German
Mikrozensus (1991, 1993, 1995–2011) limited to the East German labour force. It
confirmed that there is generally more openness in lower positions, and more
closure in intermediate and higher occupations, for persons with a migrant back-
ground. This pattern remained relatively stable across time. Within the last survey
waves, immigrants from Poland, and non-migrants, had relatively similar proba-
bilities for entering higher occupations. I suggested that this might be due to the
immigration of skilled professionals to cover labour shortages in this higher seg-
ment. Although immigrants from the Russian Federation or former Soviet Union
report relatively high general educational degrees, they rank among the lowest in
intermediate occupations and the highest in lower occupations. Multivariate anal-
ysis demonstrated that differences in accessing intermediate or higher occupations
between all immigrant groups from the first-generation remained after controlling
for formal and vocational education. Different reasons for this result were dis-
cussed: (a) certificates of immigrants acquired abroad are either undervalued or not
recognised at all by employers; (b) unobserved individual characteristics (e.g.
lacking German language skills) or (c) unobserved discriminatory practices of
employers, decreasing immigrants’ employment chances. For first-generation
Vietnamese migrants, varying patterns in terms of intermediate level occupations
were found. Their share is the highest among the immigrant groups and relatively
similar to those without a migrant background. Furthermore, over time the
Vietnamese in East Germany experienced a sharp increase in intermediate-status
employment. On the other hand, higher level occupations are almost completely
closed to them. The results confirm the impact of the exceptional circumstances the
Vietnamese dealt with in East Germany after reunification. Sudden unemployment,
non-clarified residence status, and a diffuse return policy shaped the difficult living
conditions of the former contract workers. Especially, labourers from the second
recruitment wave in the late 1980s did not receive formal training, or just very little
language training, which worsened their employment prospects. The combination
of a restrictive right of residence, on the one hand, and the ethnic capital derived
from residence in larger East German cities on the other, encouraged the formation
of ethnic entrepreneurship. For the Vietnamese, these forms of employment served
as functional equivalents for entering intermediate positions. However, the results
show that occupations within ethnic economies do not create opportunities for
mobility into higher occupations.
For the second generation, the risk of lower occupational employment is similar
to that of the parental generation, even though they more often obtained interme-
diate education rather than general education. This result is also robust after con-
trolling for age effects. In the theoretical section, it was suggested that this might be
due to shortcomings in the supply of apprenticeships in East Germany.
Although the immigrant labour force has become a stable element of the East
German labour market within the last ten years, the structural integration of
102 O. Winkler

immigrants and their descendants in East Germany is unequally distributed between


groups and generations. On the one hand, strong improvements in their occupa-
tional position over time can only be found for the Vietnamese as they moved into
intermediate positions. Probabilities for intermediate positions are lower, especially
for first-generation immigrants from Poland and Russia. On the other hand, the
second generation seems to face greater difficulties integrating into the labour
market, even though they are expected to have had better starting conditions than
their parents did. For future investigations, unobserved structural factors such as
supply and demand in training in East German regions, as well as individual factors
such as language competencies, should be studied for further clarification.

Acknowledgements The study was developed within the research project “Regionale
Aufnahmekultur von Zuwanderern in Sachsen-Anhalt”. The project was led by Prof. Dr. Reinhold
Sackmann. The author would like to thank Reinhold Sackmann for his valuable remarks and
comments.

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Chapter 5
Violence, Firearms
and Life Expectancy in Mexico

Guillermo Julián González-Pérez and María Guadalupe Vega-López

Abstract Violence in Mexico has caused a large number of victims, mostly related
to the use of firearms (FA). This paper analyses the trend in FA-related mortality in
Mexico in the last 15 years and its impact on life expectancy in Mexico, and its 32
states, in the 2001–2003 and 2011–2013 triennia. Based on official reports of deaths
and population data, trends in FA-related death rates by age and sex between 2000
and 2013 were analysed; abridged life tables by both sex at national level and for
males by state were constructed for each triennium studied. Temporary life
expectancy (TLE) and years of life expectancy lost (YLEL) for population aged
0–85 were calculated—using Arriaga’s method—by age group and selected causes
(FA-related deaths, diabetes mellitus, malignant neoplasms and traffic accidents) in
each triennium. In the period analysed, the FA rate fell between 2000 and 2007,
increased markedly between 2007 and 2012 and then decreased slightly; and male
FA-related death rates are clearly higher than female rates. Between the 2001–2003
and 2011–2013 triennia, FA-related YLEL increased nationally (from 0.40 to
0.98 years in men, 0.04 to 0.08 in women) and in 30 states for men. In 11 states, the
FA-related YLEL in 2011–2013 exceeded one year among males. In 19 of 21 states
where TLE declined between the two triennia, the FA-related YLEL increased. In
2011–2013, injury by FA was the leading cause of male YLEL in age group 15–34.
YLEL due to firearms among males in 2011–2013 (0.98) was higher than YLEL by
traffic accidents (0.56). Variables like “hectares cultivated with marijuana and
opiates destroyed by the army”, “confiscated FA” and “index of impunity” play an
important role in explaining the inter-state variations in male FA-related YLEL and
the observed changes between both triennia. Thus, the increase in the FA-related
death rate, especially among young people, is impeding the rise in life expectancy
in Mexico. In several states, particularly Chihuahua and Guerrero, mortality caused
by FA seems to be the main reason for the decline in life expectancy among males
aged 0–85 years.

Keywords Violence  Firearms  Mortality  Life expectancy  Mexico


G. J. González-Pérez (&)  M. G. Vega-López
University of Guadalajara, Guadalajara, Mexico
e-mail: ggonzal@cencar.udg.mx

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 107


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_5
108 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

5.1 Introduction

Although violent behaviours are not an inevitable part of the human condition, they
have been present throughout history, associated at each moment with the specific
social, political, economic and cultural conditions existing in the everyday life of
each community. The efforts to control them—or even to prevent them—have been
numerous and constant, creating diverse systems or institutions that have not
always had the desired success (Dahlberg and Krug 2006). At present, violence—in
its various manifestations—produces millions of victims annually worldwide and
creates incalculable psychological, economic, physical and social damage, even in
those cases in which it does not cause death (Krug et al. 2003).
Depending on both the historical and social moment as well as the disciplinary
approach, there are several definitions of violence, which reflect the complexity of
circumstances and events covered by this concept. In particular, the World Health
Organization (WHO) has defined violence as the intentional use of force, or
physical power, to cause, or attempt to cause, harm, thus prioritizing in its definition
the effect of violence on the health and well-being of individuals (Krug et al. 2003).
Of the different “violent” causes of death that have an impact on the
health-illness-care process, homicides and suicides are among the most relevant,
although their aetiology is obviously different: the causality of self-inflicted vio-
lence is not the same as of interpersonal violence, although in both cases the final
consequence could be death and even the same instrument, such as a firearm (FA),
could have been used to provoke it.
This complexity implies that the study of mortality from these causes must go
beyond both traditional medical and demographic analysis, since other disciplines
are needed to understand the various dimensions that determine violent events.
Thus, investigating violent deaths requires an interdisciplinary approach: on the one
hand, the perspective of sociology of the population, whose object is not limited to
studying causal relations between the socio-cultural system and population facts,
but also to apprehend and define the demographic fact—in this case the violent
death—in its sociocultural dimension (Gérard 1996). On the other hand, the epi-
demiological approach, which allows the study of the frequency, distribution and
determinants of violent deaths viewed as a collective health problem and, based on
the results found, enables the design and implementation of policies aimed at
preventing or reducing its impact on the population. Both perspectives provide a
useful and necessary framework to address changes in mortality behaviour from
these causes in Mexico.
In recent years, in Mexico, the number of homicides, suicides and events of
undetermined intent involving FA has increased markedly. FA are much more
lethal than other weapons such as sharp weapons or blunt objects, which have
historically had a greater presence in society (Cook and Ludwig 2000). Although
Mexican law is strict with regard to the ownership and carrying of FA, it supports
the right to possess FA under certain restrictions (related to the type and calibre of
the weapon and whether or not it is for the exclusive use of the army) and after
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico 109

registering them with the Ministry of National Defence (DOF 2015). However, it is
the illegal entry of large amounts of FA into the country (especially through the
northern border) which has made FA, of increasing calibre, widely available in the
streets (Goodman and Michel 2010). This has been reflected in the increased
likelihood of dying as a result of criminal acts whose original purpose did not
involve killing, such as robberies and street fights (Cook and Ludwig 2000).
While some Latin American authors have analysed FA deaths from a
socio-epidemiological perspective (Spinelli et al. 2011, 2015; Zunino and de Souza
2012), in Mexico these studies are practically non-existent, as it has been assumed
that this is mainly a matter of public safety. There are relatively few studies on the
impact of violent deaths on life expectancy (Boleda and Arriaga 2000;
González-Pérez et al. 2012a; Dávila-Cervantes and Pardo-Montaño 2014) and even
fewer studies have focused on the effect on life expectancy of mortality by FA
(Lemaire 2005; González-Pérez et al. 2014), although everyone agrees that these
factors play an important role in the evolution of life expectancy.
Life expectancy at birth is an internationally recognised indicator of the health of
a population, as it summarizes the mortality patterns without being affected by the
age structure of the population. According to official figures, life expectancy at birth
increased relatively little in Mexico between 1995 and 2010 (from 73.2 to
74.0 years) (Pérez-Gómez 2013), evidencing a slowdown in the downward trend of
mortality observed in previous decades. Although population ageing and the con-
sequent increase in mortality from chronic-degenerative diseases can explain this
situation to some extent, the increase in violent deaths also seems to be contributing
to the lack of progress in life expectancy—and particularly to its decrease among
the male population—and should be considered a significant factor when looking
for an explanation of the slow growth in Mexican life expectancy in recent years.
Thus, given the importance and magnitude of violence in Mexico, it is necessary
to address this issue from a scientific point of view, and to assess the potential
impact of FA-related deaths on the relative stagnation of life expectancy in Mexico.
In this study, we analyse the recent evolution of FA mortality in Mexico, to identify
its impact on life expectancy in the country—compared with other causes of death
—between two three-year periods (2001–2003 and 2011–2013), and to determine
the distribution of the loss of years of life expectancy due to these causes among the
different age groups. We then analyse the variations in male FA mortality in the 32
Mexican states and its impact on life expectancy for both triennia.

5.2 Methodological Aspects

This study was based on secondary sources. The mortality data were obtained from
the National Health Information System of the Ministry of Health (DGIS 2014;
Ministry of Health 2016). The population data used to estimate national mortality
rates by FA between 2000 and 2013 were taken from the estimates and population
projections prepared by the National Population Council of Mexico for the period
110 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

from 1990 to 2030 (CONAPO 2014); the rates were standardised using the direct
method, using as standard the world population published by the WHO (Ahmad
et al. 2001).
The number of FA deaths was obtained by grouping all the codes referring to
deaths caused by an FA in the 10th revision of the International Classification of
Diseases (ICD): accidents by FA (W32-W34), suicides by FA (X72-X74), homi-
cides by FA (X93-X95) and events of undetermined intent involving an FA
(Y22-Y24, Y35.0). We also analysed some of the leading causes of death in the
country in recent years: ischemic heart disease (I20-I25), diabetes mellitus
(E10-E14), malignant neoplasms (C00-C97) and traffic accidents involving motor
vehicles (V02-V04 (0.1, 0.9), V09.2-V09.3, V09.9, V12-V14 (0.3–0.9),
V19.4-V19.6, V20-V28 (0.3–0.9), V29-V79 (0.4–0.9), V80.3-V80.5, V81.1,
V82.1, V83-V86 (0.0–0.3), V87.0-V87.8, V89.2, V89.9); the latter cause was
classified according to the criteria used in Mexico by the Ministry of Health
(Lozano-Ascencio et al. 2003).
From this information, we constructed abridged life tables by sex for the
three-year periods 2001–2003 and 2011–2013. To construct the life tables, we used
the model life tables (West pattern) developed by Coale and Demeny (1966), as
indicated for countries with mortality rates similar to Mexico (OPS 2003). The
construction of triennium life tables was meant to reduce the impact of random
changes on mortality that may distort its trend over time. In addition, the selected
three-year periods allowed us to work with data related to the same revision of the
ICD (the tenth), and to compare the current state of mortality with that of ten years
before. This allowed us to calculate the temporary life expectancy (TLE) between
ages 0 and 85 and the years of life expectancy lost (YLEL) between these ages
(overall, FA-related, and for other causes; and by five-year age groups in each
three-year period) according to the method developed by Arriaga (1996), as the
deviation from null mortality between the two ages. This method—recommended
by various authors (Arriaga 1996; Bocco 1996)—facilitates the interpretation of the
parameter: the YLEL is the difference between the maximum possible years that a
person can live between two ages and the TLE, which is the average of years lived
by the population between those ages (Arriaga 1996). For the construction of the
life tables and the calculation of YLEL, we used the Epidat software v.3.1 (Xunta
de Galicia and OPS 2006). The same methodology—but only for males, given the
evident over-mortality from violent deaths among men—was performed at the state
level (Mexico has 32 states) for the triennia under study, with the purpose of
offering more tangible results on changes in FA-related deaths over the decade at
the regional level. To this end, stepwise, multiple linear regression analysis was
performed to identify the model that could best predict interstate variations
observed in male FA-related YLEL in each three-year period studied, as well as the
observed change between the two triennia. The variables selected for the analysis
reflect socioeconomic conditions of each state around the dates of the study:
“percentage of the population living in poverty (2000 and 2010)” (CONEVAL
2014), “hectares cultivated with marijuana and opiates destroyed by the army (per
100,000 population)”, “confiscated firearms per 100,000 population” and “index of
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico 111

impunity”, the last three calculated for the two triennia studied (INEGI 2016).
These three variables can be considered as “proxies” for the magnitude of activities
related to drug trafficking, the availability of firearms and the functioning of the
judicial system, respectively. In particular, the index of impunity was constructed
by subtracting from 1 the result of dividing the number of individuals sentenced for
homicide by the number of registered homicides in each period studied and then
multiplying by 100.

5.3 Results

5.3.1 Firearms-Related Mortality and Life Expectancy


in Mexico: A National Level Analysis

Firearms caused 154,534 deaths between 2000 and 2013, which is equivalent to
2.1% of all deaths in Mexico during that period. Annual figures ranged from 6177
deaths in 2004 to 20,913 in 2011 (DGIS 2014).
After a sustained downward trend at the beginning of the century, the
age-adjusted death rate by FA increased from 2007, reaching, in 2011, its highest
value in recent decades (18.0 per 100,000; 34.9 per 100,000 for men and 2.6 per
100,000 for women). The FA mortality rate was at least 11 times greater for men
than for women over this period (Fig. 5.1). Although the standardised rate in 2013
was lower (13.8 per 100,000) compared with 2011, this figure is almost double the
FA mortality rate observed in 2000; however, the highest increase occurred

Male Female Both Sexes


40

35

30

25

20

15

10

0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Fig. 5.1 Age-adjusted death rate by firearms (per 100,000 population), by sex. Mexico, 2000–
2013. Source (of this and the rest of the figures and tables) Own analysis of data from the National
System of Health Information, of the Mexican Health Ministry
112 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

between 2007 and 2011, when the rate increased by 187% (188% increase for
males; 160% increase for females).
If death by FA in 2013 was considered a cause of death by itself, it would be the
eighth leading cause of death in Mexico for both sexes combined (16,178 deaths)
and the fifth leading cause of death among men (14,903 deaths). There were more
FA deaths than deaths from traffic accidents involving motor vehicles; more deaths
than any type of malignant neoplasm analysed independently (trachea, bronchus
and lung, breast, cervical or prostate) or than any of the other causes which receive
media attention, such as HIV/AIDS. In the case of men, firearms cause even more
deaths than chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (Figs. 5.2 and 5.3).
The distribution of FA deaths according to intentionality (Table 5.1) has varied
over the last decade: although homicides have been responsible for the vast
majority of these deaths since the year 2000, their importance has increased; in the
three-year period between 2011 and 2013, almost 9 out of ten FA deaths were
classified as homicides, for both sexes. By contrast, the proportion of accidents and
suicides by FA has decreased significantly (even though in absolute numbers, the
number of accidents in 2011–2013 was slightly higher than during the three
year-period 2001–2003). Finally, there was an increase in the proportion of deaths
resulting from events of undetermined intent: its growth in absolute numbers is
noteworthy, from 964 in 2001–2003 to 3367 in 2011–2013, which places it as the
second leading cause of death after homicides.

Diabetes mellitus

Ischaemic heart disease

Cerebrovascular Diseases

Cirrhosis and other chronic liver diseases

Chronic obstruc ve pulmonary disease

Hypertensive diseases

Acute lower respiratory infec ons

INJURY BY FIREARMS

Nephri s and nephrosis

Motor vehicle traffic accidents

20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 1,00,000

Fig. 5.2 Leading causes of death, both sexes. México, 2013


5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico 113

Ischaemic heart disease

Diabetes mellitus

Cirrhosis and other chronic liver diseases

Cerebrovascular Diseases

INJURY BY FIREARMS

Chronic obstruc ve pulmonary disease

Acute lower respiratory infec ons

Motor vehicle traffic accidents

Hypertensive diseases

Nephri s and nephrosis

5,000 10,00015,00020,00025,00030,00035,00040,00045,00050,000

Fig. 5.3 Leading causes of death, males. México, 2013

Table 5.1 Deaths by firearms according to intentionality. Mexico, 2001–2003 and 2011–2013
2001–2003 2011–2013
Deaths % Deaths %
Males
Assaults (Homicide) 14,477 78.9 45,528 88.5
Events of undetermined intents 853 4.7 3115 6.1
Suicide 1865 10.2 1554 3.0
Accidents 1148 6.2 1233 2.4
Total 18,343 100.0 51,430 100.0
Females
Assaults (Homicide) 1222 72.9 3764 88.5
Events of undetermined intents 111 6.6 252 5.9
Suicide 229 13.6 138 3.3
Accidents 115 6.9 97 2.3
Total 1677 100.0 4251 100.0
114 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

The male TLE between ages 0 and 85 decreased 0.4% between the two periods
studied, but the female temporary life expectancy increased by 0.6% during that
period (Table 5.2). The YLEL for men between ages 0 and 85 increased by about
2% between 2001–2003 and 2011–2013, while the YLEL for women decreased
4.7%.
The analysis of YLEL by cause (Table 5.2) shows that the FA-related YLEL for
men increased 144% (from 0.40 in 2001–2003 to 0.98 in 2011–2013), a much
higher growth than that of the rest of the studied causes (there was even a decrease
in the YLEL due to malignant neoplasms). Thus, FA mortality went from being the
least important cause of YLEL during 2001–2003, to surpass traffic accidents

Table 5.2 Years of life expectancy lost (YLEL) by selected causes of death, between 0 and
85 years old, by sex. Mexico, 2001–2003 and 2011–2013
2001– 2011– Relative change (%) YLEL (%) by YLEL (%) by
2003 2013 2001–2003/2011– cause, 2001– cause, 2011–
2013 2003 2013
Males
Injuries by 0.40 0.98 141.40 2.91 7.00
firearms
Diabetes 1.41 1.67 18.25 10.26 11.92
mellitus
Motor vehicles 0.46 0.56 20.83 3.35 4.00
traffic accidents
Ischaemic heart 1.23 1.34 8.66 8.95 9.56
diseases
Malignant 1.49 1.40 −6.06 10.84 10.00
neoplasms
Total of YLEL 13.74 14.01 1.96
Temporary life 71.26 70.99 −0.28
expectancy
Females
Injuries by 0.04 0.08 115.70 0.41 0.86
firearms
Diabetes 1.63 1.65 1.17 16.70 17.72
mellitus
Motor vehicles 0.13 0.14 7.05 1.33 1.50
traffic accidents
Ischaemic heart 0.76 0.75 −1.13 7.79 8.06
diseases
Malignant 1.72 1.58 −7.93 17.62 16.97
neoplasms
Total of YLEL 9.77 9.31 −4.65
Temporary life 75.23 75.69 0.46
expectancy
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico 115

involving motor vehicles as a cause of YLEL between ages 0 and 85 in 2011–2013,


and became one of the main causes of death in the country.
FA mortality was responsible for 7% of all YLEL in men in 2011–2013, not too
dissimilar from the percentage of YLEL caused by diabetes mellitus (12%),
malignant neoplasms (10%) and ischemic heart disease (9.6%). In the case of
women, FA mortality was the least important cause of YLEL in both three-year
periods. However, the FA-related YLEL increased by 116% between 2001–2003
and 2011–2013; during this period, there was a decrease in the YLEL due to other
causes (except diabetes mellitus and traffic accidents involving motor vehicles).
Despite this increase, the FA-related YLEL represented only about 0.9% of the total
YLEL for women during 2011–2013.
The analysis of the impact of mortality by FA on YLEL during each three-year
period according to age groups (Fig. 5.4) makes it evident that the YLEL was
higher in 2011–2013 than in 2001–2003 for all ages and both sexes. However, the
increase in YLEL between the two periods (in the case of men) was largely due to

0.2

0.18

2001-03 Female
0.16
2011-13 Female
2001-03 Male
0.14
2011-13 Male

0.12

0.1

0.08

0.06

0.04

0.02

Fig. 5.4 Mexico: years of life expectancy lost between 0 and 85 years old due to injury by
firearms, according to age groups and sex. 2001–2003 and 2011–2013
116 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

the observed increase in YLEL in the age group of 15–44 years. The YLEL in
2001–2003 among that age group was 0.30 and accounted for 73% of the total
FA-related YLEL; in 2011–2013, the YLEL was 0.81 and accounted for 83% of the
total FA-related YLEL between ages 0 and 85. In particular, in 2011–2013 the
YLEL between ages 20 and 39 was almost triple its value in 2001–2003. For
women, the biggest increase in YLEL was observed between ages 20 and 39, but
the figures are lower than those for men. For both sexes, the age group with the
greatest YLEL was that of 25–29 years.
Table 5.3 compares the influence of mortality by FA, diabetes mellitus, traffic
accidents involving motor vehicles, malignant neoplasms and ischemic heart dis-
eases on the YLEL by age and sex in 2011–2013. It can be seen that FA are
responsible for more YLEL in men between ages 15 and 44 than any other of the
causes analysed, while diabetes grows in importance in men over 45 years of age.
In particular, mortality by FA causes more YLEL between ages 15 and 34 than all
the other causes of death combined (Fig. 5.5). Among women, the FA-related
YLEL between ages 15 and 29 surpassed the YLEL due to diabetes mellitus and
ischemic heart disease, but was less than the YLEL due to malignant neoplasms and
traffic accidents involving motor vehicles. In women over 30 years old, the impact
of FA mortality declines substantially, and malignant neoplasms and diabetes
mellitus become the most important causes of YLEL (see Fig. 5.6).

5.3.2 Male Mortality by Firearms and Life Expectancy:


Socio-geographical Variations

In 30 of the 32 states of the country, the FA-related YLEL, for men aged 0–85,
increased between 2001–2003 and 2011–2013. In 11 of these states, the increase was
higher than the national average and in seven, the FA-related YLEL at least tripled
over this period. In 21 states TLE between 0 and 85 years actually declined, in 19 of
these there was an increase in YLEL by FA and in eight of these, the FA-related YLEL
accounted for more than 10% of the total YLEL (Tables 5.4 and 5.5).
Also, in 2011–2013 there were 12 states with FA-related YLEL > 1, that is,
above the national average (0.98), but only one in 2001–2003. Chihuahua,
Guerrero, Sinaloa and Durango were, in that order, the states with the highest
FA-related YLEL and also those that experienced the greatest decrease in TLE
between 0 and 85 years in the studied decade.
Chihuahua and Guerrero were the most striking cases. In both of them, FA-related
YLEL in 2011–2013 exceeded 3.5 years and the absolute increase between the tri-
ennia was greater than 2.5 years. In addition, these were the states that showed the
lowest male TLE between 0 and 85 years in the country (less than 70 years in both
cases) in 2011–2013. It was also in these states that FA-related mortality had the
greatest effect on life expectancy: more than 20% of the total YLEL between 0 and
85 years old was due to this cause, a situation shared with Sinaloa.
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico 117

Table 5.3 Years of life expectancy lost (YLEL) by selected causes of death between 0 and
85 years old, by sex and age group. Mexico, 2011–2013
Injuries by Diabetes Motor vehicles Ischaemic Malignant
firearms mellitus traffic accidents heart diseases neoplasms
Males
<1 0.0003 0 0.0026 0 0.0023
1–4 0.0018 0.0002 0.0125 0 0.017
5–9 0.0019 0.0003 0.0104 0 0.0187
10–14 0.0077 0.0004 0.0132 0 0.0171
15–19 0.0941 0.0017 0.0585 0.0043 0.0283
20–24 0.1676 0.0044 0.0874 0.0099 0.0300
25–29 0.1764 0.0089 0.0763 0.0168 0.0291
30–34 0.1538 0.0174 0.0620 0.0240 0.0315
35–39 0.1270 0.0335 0.0531 0.0367 0.0405
40–44 0.0883 0.0599 0.0412 0.0538 0.0514
45–49 0.0595 0.1138 0.0344 0.0815 0.0746
50–54 0.0395 0.1782 0.0304 0.1215 0.1114
55–59 0.0250 0.2441 0.0257 0.1576 0.1519
60–64 0.0161 0.2835 0.0198 0.1906 0.1913
65–69 0.0100 0.2852 0.0159 0.2158 0.2148
70–74 0.0051 0.2389 0.0103 0.2048 0.2045
75–79 0.0021 0.1543 0.0054 0.1580 0.1447
80–84 0.0004 0.0451 0.0013 0.0633 0.0449
Females
<1 0.0002 0.0002 0.0025 0 0.0027
1–4 0.0010 0.0003 0.0096 0 0.0138
5–9 0.0010 0.0004 0.0063 0 0.0159
10–14 0.0020 0.0008 0.0068 0 0.0146
15–19 0.0108 0.0027 0.0146 0.0021 0.0172
20–24 0.0125 0.0044 0.0164 0.0028 0.0172
25–29 0.0114 0.0074 0.0132 0.0045 0.0233
30–34 0.0093 0.0112 0.0103 0.0057 0.0399
35–39 0.0087 0.0207 0.0097 0.0100 0.0649
40–44 0.0065 0.0392 0.0080 0.0166 0.0908
45–49 0.0055 0.0790 0.0080 0.0276 0.1350
50–54 0.0038 0.1416 0.0081 0.0460 0.1754
55–59 0.0023 0.2186 0.0066 0.0657 0.2001
60–64 0.0015 0.2833 0.0066 0.0971 0.2135
65–69 0.0011 0.3047 0.0055 0.1260 0.2098
70–74 0.0005 0.2725 0.0041 0.1462 0.1832
75–79 0.0003 0.1953 0.0026 0.1365 0.1241
80–84 0 0.0654 0.0007 0.0666 0.0395
118 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

Fig. 5.5 Mexico: percentage of years of life expectancy lost (YLEL) between 0 and 85 years by
men, according to selected causes of death and age groups. 2011–2013
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico 119

Fig. 5.6 Mexico: percentage of years of life expectancy lost between 0 and 85 years by women,
according to selected causes of death and age groups. 2011–2013

States such as Nuevo Leon and Coahuila, which in 2001–2003 had reduced
FA-related YLEL, experienced a dramatic increase in YLEL between the two
triennia, more than 17% per year. By contrast, Yucatan was one of the 2 states
where FA-related YLEL declined, despite it being the state that in both three-year
periods had the lowest FA-related YLEL for ages 0–85.
120 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

Table 5.4 Years of life expectancy lost (YLEL) by firearms-related deaths and temporary life
expectancy (TLE) between 0 and 85 years old males, by states. Mexico, 2001–2003 and 2011–
2013
State YLEL YLEL Ratio YLEL TLE TLE Difference
2001– 2011– 2011–2013/ 2001– 2011– 2011–2013/
2003 2013 YLEL 2001– 2003 2013 2001–2003
2003
Mexico 0.40 0.98 2.41 71.26 70.99 −0.28
Aguascalientes 0.12 0.22 1.85 72.24 72.62 0.38
Baja 0.61 0.76 1.24 68.46 69.91 1.45
California
Baja 0.20 0.20 1.02 70.93 72.38 1.45
California Sur
Campeche 0.18 0.22 1.25 72.95 72.11 −0.84
Coahuila 0.22 1.58 7.08 71.39 70.33 −1.07
Colima 0.38 1.46 3.81 72.15 70.58 −1.57
Chiapas 0.35 0.27 0.77 71.58 71.50 −0.08
Chihuahua 0.82 4.06 4.92 68.29 66.34 −1.95
Distrito 0.39 0.46 1.19 70.67 71.27 0.60
Federal
Durango 0.79 1.86 2.36 72.51 70.16 −2.35
Guanajuato 0.21 0.49 2.40 72.41 71.83 −0.58
Guerrero 1.07 3.59 3.34 73.88 69.59 −4.29
Hidalgo 0.26 0.29 1.14 72.16 72.55 0.39
Jalisco 0.36 0.91 2.52 71.29 70.90 −0.39
Mexico State 0.36 0.74 2.03 70.28 71.47 1.19
Michoacán 0.83 1.17 1.41 72.33 71.19 −1.14
Morelos 0.50 1.24 2.46 72.51 71.09 −1.42
Nayarit 0.68 1.51 2.22 72.54 71.76 −0.78
Nuevo León 0.14 1.31 9.69 72.25 71.41 −0.84
Oaxaca 0.67 0.77 1.15 71.30 71.71 0.40
Puebla 0.27 0.31 1.16 69.69 70.76 1.07
Querétaro 0.17 0.20 1.17 71.30 71.68 0.38
Quintana Roo 0.14 0.25 1.72 72.32 72.21 −0.11
San Luis 0.26 0.55 2.11 73.16 72.70 −0.46
Potosí
Sinaloa 1.00 3.09 3.10 72.31 70.39 −1.92
Sonora 0.39 0.90 2.28 70.19 70.33 0.14
Tabasco 0.15 0.31 2.12 71.49 70.52 −0.97
Tamaulipas 0.35 1.51 4.34 71.94 70.49 −1.46
Tlaxcala 0.12 0.16 1.33 71.90 72.32 0.42
Veracruz 0.20 0.58 2.94 71.02 70.39 −0.63
Yucatán 0.09 0.07 0.77 72.54 72.39 −0.14
Zacatecas 0.41 1.10 2.71 73.00 71.91 −1.09
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico 121

Table 5.5 Total of years of life expectancy lost (YLEL) between 0 and 85 years old males and
percentage of YLEL caused by firearms-related deaths, by states. Mexico, 2001–2003 and 2011–
2013
State Total YLEL Total YLEL YLEL (%) by YLEL (%) by
2001–2003 2011–2013 firearms firearms
2001–2003 2011–2013
Mexico 13.74 14.01 2.94 6.97
Aguascalientes 12.75 12.38 0.92 1.76
Baja California 16.54 15.09 3.71 5.04
Baja California 14.07 12.62 1.41 1.61
Sur
Campeche 12.06 12.89 1.48 1.73
Coahuila 13.60 14.67 1.64 10.78
Colima 12.84 14.42 2.98 10.12
Chiapas 13.43 13.50 2.58 1.97
Chihuahua 16.71 18.66 4.93 21.74
Distrito Federal 14.33 13.73 2.72 3.38
Durango 12.50 14.85 6.29 12.49
Guanajuato 12.60 13.17 1.63 3.75
Guerrero 11.12 15.41 9.66 23.31
Hidalgo 12.84 12.45 1.99 2.34
Jalisco 13.71 14.10 2.62 6.42
México State 14.72 13.54 2.46 5.44
Michoacán 12.67 13.81 6.57 8.48
Morelos 12.48 13.91 4.04 8.93
Nayarit 12.46 13.24 5.44 11.38
Nuevo León 12.75 13.59 1.06 9.65
Oaxaca 13.70 13.30 4.88 5.79
Puebla 15.31 14.24 1.73 2.17
Querétaro 13.69 13.32 1.22 1.47
Quintana Roo 12.68 12.79 1.13 1.92
San Luis Potosí 11.84 12.30 2.22 4.51
Sinaloa 12.69 14.61 7.85 21.14
Sonora 14.81 14.67 2.66 6.11
Tabasco 13.51 14.48 1.08 2.13
Tamaulipas 13.06 14.51 2.67 10.42
Tlaxcala 13.10 12.68 0.90 1.23
Veracruz 13.98 14.61 1.42 3.99
Yucatán 12.46 12.61 0.68 0.52
Zacatecas 12.00 13.09 3.39 8.42
122 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

Fig. 5.7 Mexican states according to years of life expectancy lost (YLEL) by firearms-related
deaths between 0 and 85 years old males. 2001–2003 (left) and 2011–2013 (right)

The 12 states with FA-related YLEL above the national average in 2011–2013
can be divided, geographically, into two groups: seven states in the north-northwest
of the country (Tamaulipas, Nuevo Leon, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango,
Zacatecas and Sinaloa), the first four border states with the United States; and five
states in the centre-south of the country (Nayarit, Guerrero, Michoacán, Morelos
and Colima). These last—together with Sinaloa and Durango—have a common
orography, as they are crossed by the Sierra Madre Occidental or the Sierra Madre
del Sur and are located on the slope of the Pacific Ocean (Fig. 5.7).
In general terms, Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show that the states with the highest
FA-related YLEL in 2001–2003 and 2011–2013 (Chihuahua, Guerrero, Durango and
Sinaloa) are among the states that show the greatest presence of drug trafficking
activities, the highest rates of impunity and a higher rate of firearms confiscated by the
army and the police Furthermore, in Guerrero—and to some extent Michoacán—we
also need to add high levels of poverty and social marginalization to the aforemen-
tioned factors. At the other end of the scale, Yucatan—as well as Tlaxcala and
Aguascalientes—with much lower levels of FA-related YLEL, also exhibit levels of
impunity, firearm confiscation and drug trafficking below the national average.
Stepwise multiple linear regression analysis (Table 5.8) indicates that the most
important factor in predicting FA-related YLEL was the number of hectares of
marijuana and opiates destroyed; for the 2001–2003 triennium, the impunity index
was also important, as was the number of confiscated firearms in 2011–2013. In
practice, the results indicate that in those states where the chain of production and
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico 123

Table 5.6 Selected socioeconomic variables by Mexican states, ordered according to years of life
expectancy lost (YLEL) by firearms-related deaths between 0 and 85 years old males. Mexico,
2001–2003
States YLEL Confiscated Destroyed hectares of Impunity Population in
firearms per marijuana and opiates index (%) poverty
100,000 per 100,000 condition
population population (%) 2000
Mexico 0.40 0.97 49.75 77.9 53.6
Guerrero 1.07 0.87 503.26 87.1 75.7
Sinaloa 1.00 4.05 325.03 76.4 44.6
Michoacán 0.83 1.92 90.57 80.4 61.6
Chihuahua 0.82 1.20 253.56 74.8 30.2
Durango 0.79 2.77 507.21 81.5 48.4
Nayarit 0.68 1.11 157.90 74.3 52.7
Oaxaca 0.67 0.53 52.42 88.5 76.1
Baja 0.61 1.53 1.68 78.3 23.7
California
Morelos 0.50 2.07 0.80 84.4 53.1
Zacatecas 0.41 0.72 15.00 80.6 56.3
Sonora 0.39 3.26 33.16 65.1 39.5
Distrito 0.39 0.64 0.00 63.2 28.0
Federal
Colima 0.38 1.88 13.58 53.6 47.7
Mexico State 0.36 0.07 0.77 90.8 47.7
Jalisco 0.36 0.46 34.20 71.8 41.3
Tamaulipas 0.35 1.56 0.13 80.0 40.1
Chiapas 0.35 0.26 1.16 76.4 79.1
Puebla 0.27 0.10 1.70 90.5 68.0
San Luis 0.26 0.37 0.24 73.1 61.3
Potosí
Hidalgo 0.26 0.97 0.00 65.1 62.1
Coahuila 0.22 1.40 0.25 50.2 36.2
Guanajuato 0.21 0.30 0.13 77.9 56.2
Baja 0.20 7.06 0.24 63.8 31.9
California Sur
Veracruz 0.20 0.12 0.35 55.4 65.7
Campeche 0.18 4.17 0.08 72.9 66.8
Querétaro 0.17 2.80 0.00 56.0 50.4
Tabasco 0.15 0.31 0.30 54.7 65.1
Quintana Roo 0.14 1.15 0.08 77.7 52.4
Nuevo León 0.14 1.93 0.18 39.8 28.0
Aguascalientes 0.12 0.10 0.00 49.4 37.8
Tlaxcala 0.12 0.67 0.00 93.9 56.1
Yucatán 0.09 1.99 0.06 59.8 62.4
124 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

Table 5.7 Selected socioeconomic variables by Mexican states, ordered according to years of life
expectancy lost (YLEL) by firearms-related deaths between 0 and 85 years old males. Mexico,
2011–2013
States YLEL Confiscated Destroyed hectares of Impunity Population in
firearms per marijuana and opiates index (%) poverty
100,000 per 100,000 condition
population population (%) 2012
Mexico 0.98 22.76 20.22 94.9 45.4
Chihuahua 4.06 22.23 104.43 98.1 35.3
Guerrero 3.59 39.41 235.44 99.0 69.7
Sinaloa 3.09 74.65 124.35 97.6 36.3
Durango 1.86 68.38 223.22 99.3 50.1
Coahuila 1.58 56.34 0.03 97.0 27.9
Tamaulipas 1.51 205.24 0.08 96.6 38.4
Nayarit 1.51 27.44 88.51 96.8 47.6
Colima 1.46 18.39 6.51 94.2 34.4
Nuevo Leon 1.31 33.70 0.01 97.1 23.2
Morelos 1.24 14.79 0.01 98.7 45.5
Michoacán 1.17 65.11 19.73 93.4 54.4
Zacatecas 1.10 34.06 8.18 95.1 54.2
Jalisco 0.91 10.98 7.41 92.3 39.8
Sonora 0.90 41.92 14.47 81.7 29.1
Oaxaca 0.77 7.18 27.04 97.5 61.9
Baja 0.76 16.38 1.83 92.5 30.2
California
Mexico State 0.74 3.44 0.06 97.6 45.3
Veracruz 0.58 10.73 0.03 95.4 52.6
San Luis 0.55 21.62 0.08 94.8 50.5
Potosí
Guanajuato 0.49 2.63 0.01 90.1 44.5
Distrito 0.46 9.22 0.00 74.3 28.9
Federal
Puebla 0.31 3.70 0.62 93.0 64.5
Tabasco 0.31 3.54 0.00 78.9 49.7
Hidalgo 0.29 1.73 0.00 78.0 52.8
Chiapas 0.27 3.22 0.13 86.0 74.7
Quintana Roo 0.25 4.26 0.03 96.6 38.8
Campeche 0.22 5.46 0.07 86.5 44.7
Aguascalientes 0.22 2.76 0.00 85.9 37.8
Baja 0.20 14.91 0.11 85.1 30.1
California Sur
Querétaro 0.20 4.25 0.00 83.3 36.9
Tlaxcala 0.16 3.32 0.00 96.9 57.9
Yucatán 0.07 0.79 0.02 82.2 48.9
Table 5.8 Association between selected socioeconomic variables and years of life expectancy lost (YLEL) between 0 and 85 years old males caused by
firearms, by states and triennia. Results of multiple linear regression analysis, stepwise method. Mexico, 2001–2003 and 2011–2013
Variables in equation YLEL caused by firearms-related YLEL caused by firearms-related Ratio YLEL 2011–2013/YLEL
deaths, 2001–2003 deaths, 2011–2013 2001–2003
Standardised t P Standardised t P Standardised t P
regression value regression value regression value
coefficient coefficient coefficient
Impunity index (%) 0.259 2.54 0.017 …… …… …… 0.814 7.68 0.000
Destroyed hectares of marijuana 0.751 7.37 0.000 0.740 6.87 0.000 …… …… ……
and opiates per 100,000
population
Confiscated firearms per 100,000 …… …… …… 0.235 2.18 0.038 …… …… ……
population
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico

Model statistics YLEL caused by firearms-related YLEL caused by firearms-related Ratio YLEL 2011–2013/YLEL
deaths, 2001–2003 deaths, 2011–2013 2001–2003
Model DF = 2 F = 35.95 p = 0.000 DF = 2 F = 30.98 p = 0.000 DF = 1 F = 58.99 p = 0.000
Durbin-Watson test 1.94 2.18 2.12
Adjusted R2 0.693 0.659 0.652
R2 0.713 0.681 0.663
R 0.844 0.825 0.814
Note …… Variable did not enter into the model equation
125
126 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

distribution of drugs was maintained throughout the decade, and therefore where
there was a continuous influence of organised crime cartels in their everyday lives,
FA-related YLEL tended to be higher, although in 2011–2013, in line with the
increase in FA mortality, in those states with a higher index of confiscated firearms,
figures for FA-related YLEL tended to be higher too. On the other hand, the relative
growth in state-level FA-related YLEL between 2001–2003 and 2011–2013, is
associated with the rise in the impunity index. This means that in those states in
which there was the greatest increase in the proportion of unsolved homicide cases,
there was also the greatest increase in FA-related YLEL.

5.3.3 Firearms Related Deaths and Life Expectancy


in Context: What Can Be Done?

Although the crude death rate by FA in Mexico in the year 2000 could not be
considered low (6.9 per 100,000), it was not yet among the highest in the world
(Cukier and Sidel 2006). This rate actually decreased between 2000 and 2007, but
in recent years the risk of dying by FA has increased substantially among the
Mexican population. According to international statistics, in 2012 Mexico was
among the countries with the highest mortality rates by FA—surpassed only by
Latin American countries such as Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela,
Colombia and Brazil (Instituto Cisalva and BID 2014; WHO and UNODC 2014)—
and had a higher rate than the US, which is the industrialised country with the
highest FA mortality rate (Murphy et al. 2015).
A comparison of the FA mortality rates in Mexico and in the United States
illustrates the changes that have occurred in recent years: while in 2000 the mor-
tality rate by FA in Mexico was only two-thirds that of the US (6.9 per 100,000 vs.
10.2 100,000) (Cukier and Sidel 2006), by 2013 it was 30% higher than the US rate
(13.7 per 100,000 vs. 10.6 per 100,000) (Murphy et al. 2015).
While FA mortality has increased for both sexes, the increase has been more
pronounced among men than among women. Although male mortality by FA was
high throughout the entire period studied, it has increased dramatically since 2008.
Since then, the male FA mortality rate has been at least 12 times higher than the rate
for females; in 2008, the ratio between the rate for males (18.5 per 100,000) and the
rate for females (1.11 per 100,000) was 16.6:1. These figures exceed those observed
in Argentina (10.6:1) (Spinelli et al. 2015) and the United States (6.2:1) in 2012
(Murphy et al. 2015). Given these rates, we can see why FA mortality would be one
of the leading causes of death in the Mexico, especially among men, if it was listed
as a cause of death by itself.
Along with the increase in FA mortality, the TLE for men between ages 0 and 85
dropped 0.4% in the period considered in this study, while the TLE for women
increased only 0.6%. These results are consistent with the observed slowdown in
the growth of life expectancy at birth in Mexico18 (Pérez-Gómez 2013). The
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico 127

findings of this study show that life expectancy between 0 and 85 years could have
grown more in the decade analysed (or at least not have regressed for men) if the
FA mortality rate had not increased so dramatically in recent years. In the three-year
period of 2011–2013, the negative impact of FA mortality on the life expectancy of
men between 0 and 85 years old was similar to that of the leading causes of death in
the country. Its greatest impact, for both sexes, however, was evident among
younger people.
Unfortunately, there are almost no international studies that could allow us to
compare the impact of firearms on life expectancy. One of the few exceptions is the
study conducted by Lemaire (2005), who estimated (using different methods than
our own) the FA-related YLEL (since age 0) in the United States in the year 2000.
He found a value of 0.46 for men and 0.08 for women, both figures above the
YLEL found in this article for Mexico in the three-year period of 2001–2003
(although our values are based on life expectancy between ages 0 and 85 years).
Spain, by contrast, presents a very different picture: while in Mexico the male
FA-related YLEL for ages 15–75 in 2010–2012 was 0.78, in Spain it was only 0.02,
almost 40 times less. The disparity between women is similar: the YLEL in Mexico
(0.06 was 30 times greater than that of Spain (0.002). Unlike Mexico, in Spain
suicides are responsible for a high proportion of firearms deaths, and although gun
laws are as restrictive as in Mexico, efforts to enforce them seem to be more
successful (González Pérez et al. 2016).
Since the vast majority of FA deaths in Mexico over the last decade were
homicides, some of the arguments used in previous studies (Escalante-Gonzalbo
2011; González-Pérez et al. 2012b; Aburto et al. 2016) to explain the evolution of
the homicide rate in Mexico may be useful for understanding the reduction in the
FA mortality rate between 2000 and 2007, and its dramatic increase since then.
While the reduction appears to have been related to certain structural
improvements, such as the increase in gross domestic product per capita, a slight
decrease in poverty levels and relatively low levels of unemployment, among other
things, the increase in FA mortality observed since 2007 cannot be explained only
by the worsening of these conditions, which undoubtedly occurred, as is evidenced
by the rebound in the percentage of people in poverty since 2008 (CONEVAL
2014). Circumstantial effects had a large influence, such as the upsurge in fighting
between drug cartels for control of territories, which involved the use of very
powerful weapons (cartels have switched from using 38 mm revolvers to assault
rifles such as the AK-47) (Graduate Institute of International and Development
Studies 2012); the war against organised crime launched by the Mexican govern-
ment since 2007 (with the deployment of the army throughout much of the
country); the high levels of impunity and corruption in both the security and justice
systems (Amnistía Internacional 2015; Chabat 2005); and the increasing number of
firearms in the hands of the civilian population, most of which have entered the
country illegally through the US border (Cukier and Sidel 2006; González-Pérez
et al. 2012a). According to international sources, in 2007 there were in Mexico
more than 15.5 million FA in private hands (Karp 2007), of which only 2.8 million
were registered (OEA 2012). Most observers agree that the availability of firearms
128 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

increases the lethality of violence and is directly related to the increase in homicides
by firearms (Cukier and Sidel 2006).
The analysis at state level seems to confirm some of the arguments presented
previously, such as the relevance of organised crime (and in particular the presence
of drug cartels) in the regional variations of male FA-related YLEL in both triennia,
but also the notable role of increasing levels of impunity—and more broadly, the
failure of institutions responsible for ensuring compliance with law and maintaining
public order—to explain the changes observed between the two triennia in each
state. Aburto et al. (2016), have pointed out how the attempt by the Mexican
government to reduce the rise of violence through reforms in the judicial, police and
penal systems have had rather unfavourable results.
It is also evident that there is no one uniform pattern of male mortality due to
firearms in all regions of the country and, in particular, there is a group of five states
where FA-related YLEL represents more than 11% of YLEL total. These five states
coincide with the states identified by Aburto et al. (2016) as those where male life
expectancy at birth has fallen sharply as a result of the increase in homicide rates in
the first decade of the century.
Moreover, the greatest impact of FA mortality on male life expectancy must be
understood from a gender perspective. While violence is not an exclusive practice of
men, it is culturally related to masculine identity. Social norms assign men the role of
protectors and defenders, but also accept their role as facilitators of violent, risky and
extreme behaviours; under these circumstances, the possession of an FA is a symbol of
power and masculine status (Cukier and Sidel 2006). On the one hand, men are much
more likely to participate in organised crime (especially drug cartels, whose great
power stems from the possession and use of high-calibre FA); on the other, conflicts
are more likely to be resolved violently through the use of FA in an environment where
violence has been normalised and even glorified, in which insecurity prevails, and in
which FA are easily available (González-Pérez et al. 2003).
Along with this, certain conditions favour the increase in violence among young
people: social inequality, lack of jobs (or poorer working conditions and greater job
insecurity), academic impoverishment in secondary education (which prevents
students from attaining the qualifications required for college entrance) and the lack
of enough places at public universities. All this, coupled with the fact that Mexico
has today the largest number of adolescents and young people in its entire history,
has produced a high number of young people between 15 and 29 years old who
have no jobs and who are not enrolled in education or training: almost 7 million,
according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
OECD (2014). This situation increases the likelihood that young people become
exposed to criminal acts or become involved themselves in the commission of
crimes, including belonging to a gang or being recruited by organised crime, which
gives access to FA (Thornberry et al. 2003; Bennett and Holloway 2004).
Given the lack of confidence in the authorities, many young people believe that
having an FA at home is indispensable to defend themselves against crime. The
availability of large numbers of FA in the illegal market and the ease with which
they can be obtained—something that young people themselves recognize—
5 Violence, Firearms and Life Expectancy in Mexico 129

(González-Pérez et al. 2014) increase the likelihood of accidents, of suicides


committed with this kind of weapon, and the use of FA in criminal acts, causing a
greater number of deaths. Most of the time, FA-related deaths can be prevented,
making this a pandemic problem that should be addressed by public health pro-
fessionals (Cukier and Sidel 2006). But analysing the impact of deaths caused by
FA from a socio-epidemiological approach does not mean that this issue is seen
from a medical perspective. What is at issue is to recognize that this is not just an
insecurity problem but also a complex problem of public health, and that any
solution should involve the participation of different sectors, with the knowledge
provided by different disciplinary fields (Spinelli et al. 2011).
Firearms are not essential for the perpetration of violent acts, but they do
increase the range and lethality of violence. Keeping them away from violent
conflicts should, therefore, become a goal in itself in the context of public policies
aimed at reducing violence. To the extent that this aim is achieved, lives would be
saved even if the rates of assaults and robberies remained high (Cukier and Sidel
2006). While reducing the level of FA mortality is essential to achieve an increase
in life expectancy in Mexico (specially for men), it would be appropriate and
necessary (not only for the benefit of national public health but also for national
security) to design systematic preventive policies at the national and local levels, to
implement measures to control the illegal entry of firearms into the country and to
generate a debate around the laws governing the possession, carrying and use of FA
(Villaveces et al. 2000; Spinelli et al. 2011).
Among other things, this requires the implementation or strengthening of pro-
grammes aimed at promoting peaceful coexistence in families and schools and to
prevent the entry of weapons into the latter; furthermore, it is necessary to conduct
campaigns to provide information to the population with FA at home about proper
storage and security. In addition, more emphasis should be given to amnesty
policies for owners of illegal FA through the implementation of gun buyback or
exchange programs (Villaveces et al. 2000; Hardy 2006; OPS 2013).
Obviously, policies related to the control of FA should be implemented in the
context of a comprehensive policy that addresses the various dimensions of vio-
lence (Zunino and de Souza 2012). The demand for FA and the number of deaths
caused by them will hardly decrease in the absence of an overall strategy for
addressing basic social problems such as poverty, social inequality, unemployment
and the lack of opportunities for a dignified life, and without the reduction of
impunity and corruption in the country and a re-evaluation of the existing policies
focusing on the trafficking and consumption of illegal drugs (Gamlin 2015).
In addition to this, it is necessary to design strategies focused on changing the
social and cultural norms that perpetuate violence and, in particular, that validate
the use of FA as an instrument for resolving conflicts (OPS 2013). This is
undoubtedly not an easy task, as it implies the need to work with communities to
ensure that the population feel they can solve conflicts peacefully, without the need
of violence and FA (Cure Violence 2016). In particular, the change in social norms
should contribute to reversing values traditionally associated with the hegemonic
concept of masculinity and which involve the exercise of violence (González-Pérez
130 G. J. González-Pérez and M. G. Vega-López

et al. 2003). For these strategies to be successful, it is necessary to drastically reduce


the levels of impunity and corruption that permeate the country’s judicial system.
This study has some limitations; first, although the coverage and quality of mor-
tality records has significantly improved in Mexico (Mathers et al. 2005; OPS 2015) in
last 20 years, there are still problems such as underreporting of infant and maternal
deaths, more pronounced in states with greater social marginalization
(Lozano-Ascencio 2008), making it necessary to use some caution in the interpreta-
tion of any results derived from life tables, such as life expectancy or YLEL. Likewise,
it is probable that the record of FA deaths is not complete or that the quality of the
information is not adequate, especially due to the fact that the majority of FA deaths
are homicides, which could lead to an underestimation of FA mortality and of its
related YLEL. However, there is no evidence that these problems have been greater in
any particular three-year period or that they have been large enough to have a sig-
nificant impact on the comparisons and analyses performed in this study.

5.4 Conclusions

Despite these limitations, the results of this study allow us to make a reasonable
estimate of the recent trends in FA mortality in Mexico and of its impact on life
expectancy in the country and, at the same time, identify the significant inter-state
disparities in male life expectancy and the impact of firearms on it.
The use of an indicator such as YLEL adds strategic value to the analysis of
changes in FA mortality in recent years, and provides decision makers with con-
crete evidence of the impact of FA on the health of the Mexican population and, in
particular, on its role in the stagnation of life expectancy in the country.
Undoubtedly, the notorious impact of violence in the deterioration of life
expectancy—especially among men—and the failure of the policies implemented at
government level to reduce it, are worrying. As a Mexican journalist points out “the
strategy followed until today (by the government) is not the inevitable consequence,
but the effective cause, of the violence it wants to fight” (Aguilar-Camín 2017).
New strategies should be developed, considering the different dimensions of vio-
lence and the possibility of incorporating a public health perspective to attenuate the
effect of FA on the health of the Mexican population.

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Part II
Population Structure
Chapter 6
Sex Ratios in Old Age: Comparing
Countries in Middle Eastern Asia
to East and Southeast Asia

Sehar Ezdi and Harald Künemund

Abstract This chapter analyses the elderly missing women phenomenon—mas-


culinized sex ratios in the elderly population—in countries of Middle Eastern Asia
and East and Southeast Asia. While many studies have explored the missing women
phenomenon in East and Southeast Asia, Middle Eastern Asia, where the extent of
the female deficit is worse, has mostly been neglected. Further, even in East and
Southeast Asia the problem has mostly been studied at young ages. Countries
forming both regions display different facets of the elderly missing women phe-
nomenon, with some countries displaying it as a cohort effect only (e.g. Malaysia in
Southeast Asia and Lebanon in Middle Eastern Asia) while others exhibit it in the
total population as well (e.g. China in East Asia and Qatar in Middle Eastern Asia).
This chapter further shows that in light of the rapid demographic transition of
countries in these regions, it is imperative to change the focus of this issue from
younger to older age groups in East and Southeast Asia and to place greater
emphasis on studying the phenomenon in Middle Eastern Asia.

 
Keywords Sex ratios Female deficit Elderly missing women
 
East Asia Southeast Asia Middle Eastern Asia

6.1 Introduction

Two features characterize societal ageing in the world today: an unprecedentedly


rapid pace and strong heterogeneity within and among regions (Heller 2006;
Canning 2007). Asia is at the forefront of both characteristics, with East Asia
hosting a significantly older population and Middle Eastern Asia consisting of a
relatively younger society (Bloom et al. 2003). These regions, as well as Southeast

S. Ezdi (&)
University of Turku, Turku, Finland
e-mail: sehar.ezdi@utu.fi
H. Künemund
University of Vechta, Vechta, Germany

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 137


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_6
138 S. Ezdi and H. Künemund

Asia with intermediate levels of population ageing, also display significant


intra-regional differences in their demographic profiles. An additional but neglected
feature of these regions is that many countries therein display a missing women
phenomenon in their elderly population.
Missing women is a term introduced by Sen (1990) to refer quantitatively to the
number of women who should be alive at a given point of observation but are not.
Many authors have since attempted to identify the number of missing women
(Coale 1991; Klasen 1994), the causes of this phenomenon (Johansson and Nygren
1991; Park and Cho 1995; Klasen 2008), its consequences (Ebenstein and Sharygin
2009) and policies that may overcome this phenomenon (Chung and Das Gupta
2007), usually focusing on young age groups. In this chapter, we will focus on
elderly missing women, defined as missing women in the 60+ population. This
concept can be measured by comparing the sex ratios (calculated as the number of
men divided by the number of women) for countries and regions in different parts of
the world, both for the 60+ and 75+ populations.
In the world as a whole, in both the more and the less developed regions, the
number of women exceeds the number of men in the 60+ and 75+ age groups
(Table 6.1). Furthermore, the preponderance of women increases with age, as women
have higher life expectancies compared to men. Although this pattern also holds true
for East and Southeast Asia and Middle Eastern Asia, the excess of women appears to
be less pronounced and the female advantage less noticeable in the higher age groups
in Middle Eastern Asia as compared to the world average. For some countries in these
regions, the pattern is even reversed such that men outnumber women even in the 75+
age group. This deficit of elderly women in some parts of Asia shows that, alongside
the challenges of a rapidly ageing population, many countries on the continent may be
facing the additional burdens imposed by the masculinization of old age. This chapter
discusses and compares the extent of this masculinization for countries in East and
Southeast Asia and Middle Eastern Asia. We first present, and subsequently review,
potential explanatory factors1 behind this phenomenon. Next, we describe the data
and methods, which are then used to examine this issue for countries in these regions,
before discussing the results in more detail.

6.2 Literature Review

With regard to geographical region, the bulk of the missing women literature either
discusses the phenomenon in Asia and North Africa from a broader regional per-
spective or emphasizes specific countries in East, Southeast and South Asia. When
Sen (1990, 1992) introduced the concept alongside an estimate of 100 million
missing women worldwide, he emphasised the prevalence of the phenomenon in
specific parts of Asia (e.g. China) and North Africa. Coale (1991) and Klasen

1
For a detailed discussion of existing explanations and potential causes, see Ezdi (2017).
6 Sex Ratios in Old Age … 139

Table 6.1 Sex ratios (male/ Region/country 60+ 75+


female) for selected countries
and regions in 2015. Source World 0.86 0.70
UNDESA (2015a, own More developed region 0.77 0.61
calculations) Less developed region 0.90 0.77
East and Southeast Asia 0.90 0.74
Brunei Darussalam 0.98 0.91
Cambodia 0.68 0.66
China 0.96 0.83
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 0.61 0.34
Hong Kong 0.91 0.75
Indonesia 0.89 0.68
Japan 0.80 0.63
Laos 0.82 0.74
Macao 0.97 0.74
Malaysia 0.96 1.09
Mongolia 0.77 0.65
Myanmar 0.78 0.67
Philippines 0.8 0.62
Republic of Korea 0.77 0.55
Singapore 0.88 0.67
Thailand 0.85 0.73
Timor-Leste 0.91 0.75
Vietnam 0.67 0.48
Middle Eastern Asia 0.99 0.94
Bahrain 1.21 0.97
Iran 1.03 1.15
Iraq 0.84 0.71
Israel 0.82 0.69
Jordan 0.94 0.91
Kuwait 1.26 1.54
Lebanon 0.98 0.83
Oman 1.41 1.08
Palestine 0.91 0.77
Qatar 2.36 1.95
Saudi Arabia 1.12 0.89
Syrian Arab Republic 0.90 0.76
United Arab Emirates 3.49 1.60
Yemen 0.91 0.88

(1994) discussed a similar geographical region when they challenged the hypo-
thetical reference standard adopted by Sen in his calculations of missing women.
Klasen and Wink (2002, 2003) diversified the geographic scope by distinguishing
140 S. Ezdi and H. Künemund

between West, South (Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan, India) and East Asia
(Taiwan, China, South Korea) when comparing how the number of missing women
changed from the 1980s to the 1990s. They concluded that whilst the absolute
number of missing women had increased, the relative number (as a percentage of
the total number of women alive) had declined, leading to an overall improvement
in the missing women phenomenon. Guilmoto (2009) assessed trends in sex ratios
at birth (males/females) for selected countries in Asia (Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, China, Georgia, Pakistan, India, Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam).
Using the latest census figures for these countries, he concluded that sex ratios at
birth (i.e. missing women at birth) were declining, as indicated by a fall in the
number of missing women at birth.
With reference to specific countries, the case of China has predominated the
literature. As early as 1990, Hull emphasized the excessive masculinization of sex
ratios at birth in the country, which, he argued, could result in future cohorts of men
facing difficulties in finding wives. Several authors, such as Coale and Bannister
(1996), Banister (2004) and Jiang et al. (2005) have compared sex ratios in
different birth cohorts historically to assess how social and political developments
in the country shaped the missing women phenomenon in China. They concluded
that the majority of women in China were missing already at the time of birth and
that this number had increased in the 1980s and 1990s. Banister (2004) argued that
the main driver behind this phenomenon was a general son preference, boosted by
technological change and the imposition of the One Child Policy. Hudson and Den
Boer (2002) and Ebenstein and Sharygin (2009) emphasized the consequence of
distorted sex ratios at birth. Similar to Hull (1990), they argued that the deficit of
women at birth was creating a shortage of brides amongst the cohort of men born
after the 1980s. They discussed how this could lead to an increase in female
prostitution and sexually transmitted diseases, a deterioration in the quality of life of
women and a distortion in the care arrangements for elderly men. Attané (2006)
projected the impact of a female deficit in China on future population growth and
sex structure over 2000–2050 and found that, on average, the impact was relatively
minor on total population growth and total number of births but significant on the
sex structure of the population of all ages.
The second most frequently studied case in the East and Southeast Asia region is
South Korea. For example, Park and Cho (1995) and Kim (2004) emphasized the
concentration of the phenomenon at the time of birth and discussed causes, regional
variations and trends in missing women. Kim (2004) pointed to a subsequent
downward trend in sex ratios (male:female) at birth after 1990 due to intense
government efforts that combined policy and media campaigns. Various authors,
e.g. Chung and Das Gupta (2007), detailed the success of South Korea in over-
coming the missing women phenomenon at birth not only by delineating the factors
that allowed this to happen but also deriving recommendations on whether these
factors could be successful in other countries, such as China.
Many authors have clustered countries together when assessing specific aspects
of the phenomenon. East and Southeast Asian countries are predominant in these
clusters as well. For example, Goodkind (1996) used data from China, South Korea
6 Sex Ratios in Old Age … 141

and Malaysia (Indians) to assess the trade-off effect between missing women at birth
and during childhood. He observed that a rising sex ratio at birth (facilitated by the
use of foetal sex-determination technology and subsequent sex selective abortion)
resulted in fewer missing girls in childhood because the daughters who were born
were more likely to be “wanted” by parents and hence less likely to be subjected to
massive post-natal discrimination (Goodkind 1996). Lin et al. (2008) conducted a
similar study for Taiwan. However, since results across countries are not uniform, no
definitive conclusions can be drawn. Nevertheless, Das Gupta et al. (2009) showed
that the number of missing girls in China and India is falling. For earlier decades,
Das Gupta and Shuzhuo (1999) compared the trajectory of missing women in China,
South Korea and India from 1920 to 1990 and showed that the shortage of women
led to the maintenance of a steady bride price in China and South Korea, whereas the
relative abundance of women led to the inflation of dowry in India.
As evident from the literature reviewed above, most studies have emphasized the
missing women phenomenon at very young ages. Nevertheless, some papers
address the phenomenon at older ages as well. Upon an evaluation of data from
India, Milazzo (2014) found a correlation between son preference and adult missing
women. She showed that the share of women with first-born daughters decreases as
women age, although this result disappeared with improvements in women’s
education and socioeconomic status. Using data disaggregated by age and sex for
the year 2000, Anderson and Ray (2010) found that in China, India and
Sub-Saharan Africa the largest number of women were missing at adult ages. Using
worldwide data from the United Nations, Anderson and Ray (2015) estimated the
number of adult missing women in 2000 by comparing marital status across
countries. Assuming that unmarried (single, divorced and widowed) women would
have lower life expectancy due to such factors as weaker financial resources and
social support, they estimated that approximately 40% of missing women of adult
age are an indirect consequence of being unmarried. Klasen and Vollmer (2013)
questioned the methodology of Anderson and Ray (2010) and contended that the
original age distribution of missing women has more plausibility, i.e. the majority
are concentrated at young ages. Although these authors extend the perspective to
adults, old age (and especially very old age) has so far been a neglected area of
research. Furthermore, as evident from the introduction and Table 6.1, the phe-
nomenon is significantly stronger in the countries other than those mostly studied to
date, especially in Middle Eastern Asia. An in-depth analysis of the missing women
phenomenon in Middle Eastern Asia is missing, as is a detailed analysis of the
missing women phenomenon in the elderly populations of East and Southeast Asia
and in Middle Eastern Asia.
With regard to demographic change, a plethora of papers have addressed the
diversity in preparedness of different countries to meet the challenges facing rapidly
ageing populations in terms of labour market reforms, pensions, social security and
medical care (Heller 2006; Canning 2007; Lee et al. 2011). A growing concern is
whether countries will be old before they are rich and hence unable to cope with the
challenges of ageing societies (Heller 2006). Many authors (Heller 2006; Jones
2013) have highlighted the exceptional management of ageing in Singapore and its
142 S. Ezdi and H. Künemund

active pursuit of policies to prepare for its rapidly ageing population. Some studies
have also highlighted the role of migration in altering the demographic trend in
selected countries of the region and its potential as a solution for the challenges
brought about by population decline (Huguet 2003; Hugo 2008). Yet, also in this
strand of literature, with the exception of China (Ebenstein and Sharygin 2009), no
author seems to have addressed the elderly missing women phenomenon for the
East and Southeast Asian region. Rather, some reports on the region have
emphasized the feminization of ageing in the older and oldest populations of these
countries (Mujahid 2006).
The same observation largely holds for studies of Middle Eastern Asia as well.
Several authors discuss stark variations in the pace of ageing and the relatively
recent improvements in demographic indicators that have led to these variations
(Tabutin 2005; Yount and Sibai 2009; Kronofol et al. 2013). An immediate concern
for many authors is the divergent size of youth bulges (and echo bulges) across the
countries of the region and the pressing need to employ them productively (Saxena
2008; Hayutin 2009). The critical role of international migration in altering the
demographic profile of these countries has also been discussed (Hayutin 2009;
Kronofol 2013).
Although research on missing women has largely ignored the Middle Eastern
region of Asia and some authors like Kronofol (2013) have emphasized the femi-
nization of ageing in this region, there is some recognition of the deprivation of
women in old age. For example, when addressing the vulnerabilities of the elderly
population in the Middle East, Yount and Sibai (2009) recognized that women face
greater risks than do men due to poor investments in women’s schooling and health,
and customary structures that reinforce women’s financial dependence on family life.
They emphasized that widowhood solitariness among older women raise concerns
about women’s needs being met. However, studies on the missing women and elderly
women phenomenon are mostly lacking for countries in this region.
It is not possible for this chapter to address all the questions posed by the gaps in
the existing literature. However, by analysing the available data, this study
describes and highlights the extent of the missing women phenomenon in the two
regions that have been studied so far (East and Southeast Asia), as well as in the
region which performs worse (Middle Eastern Asia), and calls attention to some of
the potential causes.

6.3 Potential Explanatory Factors

The elderly missing women phenomenon may be a result of two groups of potential
effects. Firstly, biological and gender related factors may exist at each stage of the
female life course (before/at birth, childhood, young adulthood, adulthood and old
age) that either increase the mortality of women vis-à-vis men at that stage or create
disadvantages that accompany women through subsequent stages, thereby reducing
their probability of survival. Under this scenario, old age represents the peak of
6 Sex Ratios in Old Age … 143

these disadvantages, not only in terms of a female survival disadvantage but also in
the depleted stock of women. Contributing factors may include (but are not limited
to): sex selective abortion of female foetuses before birth leading to abnormally
high sex ratios (male:female) at birth (Guilmoto 2009); intentional delay in seeking
treatment for infectious diseases for female versus male children (Chen et al. 1981);
early marriage and frequent childbearing among young adult women (Okojie 1994);
lack of attention to preventive health needs at the adulthood stage (Paolisso and
Leslie 1995), and widowhood and associated problems in old age (Qureshi 2012).
These factors may interact with intermediary forces that suppress or accentuate the
missing women phenomenon at certain life stages. Such intermediary forces may
include changes in education, income, urbanization, legislation, religion, and social
as well as cultural change in general. Educated women, for instance, may have a
better awareness of their illness symptoms than do less well-educated women,
which may lead them to seek more timely treatment for themselves, thereby
reducing premature mortality. As a result, cohort differences in sex ratios are
expected.
Secondly, the elderly missing women phenomenon may be the result of his-
torical events (conflicts and/or natural disasters). This explanation is rooted in Das
Gupta and Shuzho’s (1999) study of missing women in the history of China, South
Korea and India. It also reflects the wealth of academic evidence indicating that
natural disasters and conflicts may have a more negative impact on women than on
men, especially in the long run (e.g. Plümper and Neumayer 2006; Neumayer and
Plümper 2007). These adverse effects may have affected women more than men in
specific birth cohorts, thereby creating a shortage of women in those cohorts that
form the elderly population in the affected countries today. While a confirmation of
this group of effects would require a complete demographic history of the countries
in question, an examination of whether women are missing in the elderly population
relative to the total population may provide some indication of whether the missing
women phenomenon can possibly be considered a cohort effect, or whether it
follows a more general trend.

6.4 Data and Methods

This chapter follows the convention of the United Nations (UNDESA 2015a) in
defining the following countries as forming part of East and Southeast Asia: Japan,
China, Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR), Macao (SAR), Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Brunei Darussalam,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Philippines, Thailand,
Timor-Leste and Vietnam. For Middle Eastern Asia, this chapter only includes the
countries the World Bank defines as forming part of the Middle East and North Africa
(MENA) region that the United Nations also classifies as forming part of Asia. These
include: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Palestine and Yemen.
144 S. Ezdi and H. Künemund

Data from the United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and
Social Affairs (UNDESA) for 2015 is used for these countries. The UNDESA
population estimates are derived in four steps. First, data are collected from census
surveys, vital and population registers and other sources. These may be considered
reliable for some of the countries in East and Southeast Asia (UN 2014). For
example, in China and South Korea, the majority of the population can easily recall
the animal symbol of their birth, thereby allowing an accurate calculation of their
year of birth and minimizing errors such as age heaping and misreporting (Das
Gupta and Shuzhuo 1999). However, women in developing countries especially
may be at risk of their age being misreported or of being undocumented.
Interviewer and/or respondent bias may eliminate women from the census/survey
altogether or women may be included in an age category to which they do not
belong. Consequently, sex ratios may be overestimated in some age categories and
underestimated in others (Borkotoky and Unisa 2014). Furthermore, age misre-
porting (overstatement, understatement and symmetric) is especially common at
advanced ages. All three forms of misreporting lead to the underestimation of
mortality at older ages (Preston et al. 1999). In particular, age overstatement leads
to mortality underestimation beyond the age of 55, symmetric age misstatement
leads to mortality underestimation beyond the age of 75 and age understatement
leads to mortality underestimation beyond the age of 85 (Preston et al. 1999).
Given the inaccuracies inherent in national surveys, in the subsequent three steps,
UNDESA checks the demographic data it compiles for under-enumeration and age
heaping. For older ages (i.e. above age 85) additional data smoothing techniques are
used to ensure that mortality rates used for producing population estimates are con-
sistent by age, sex and period. In particular, it is required that mortality rates be
monotonically increasing with age; that they monotonically decrease for each sex with
the passage of time; and that male mortality rates be greater than, or equal to, female
rates for any given point in time. UNDESA uses the corrected data to project yearly
population estimates from a base population estimate and further checks whether the
estimates are consistent with each other and with the statistics corrected in the second
step. Finally, since UNDESA is producing estimates for all countries in the world, it
crosschecks the consistency and balances the population estimates at regional and
global levels (see, UN 2014). Given the procedure followed by UNDESA to attain
accurate population statistics by gender and age, the data included here may be
considered the most reliable for many of the countries included in the analysis. This
includes the countries of the Middle East where data transparency and accessibility
remain an issue (ESCWA 2012).
The most important methodological consideration in calculating the number of
missing women in any age group is to identify the ideal hypothetical number of
women that should be alive in any given age group. This requires the identification
of an ideal sex ratio that should prevail in the absence of missing women. In this
chapter, the ideal sex ratio is assumed to be the sex ratio prevailing in the total
world population. Any sex ratio higher than the world average would indicate a
female deficit and hence the presence of missing women in the respective popu-
lation structure of the given country. This comparison does not overestimate the
6 Sex Ratios in Old Age … 145

extent of the missing women phenomenon but provides a rather conservative


measure since not only are the countries studied here included in the world average
but also their population size is very large, surely influencing the world average.
Two types of analysis will be presented in this chapter. The first analysis dis-
cusses the elderly missing women phenomenon in the 60+ and 75+ age groups in
each region. To this end, age-specific sex ratios for each country will be subtracted
from the world average for each age group. A negative number indicates an elderly
missing women phenomenon in the given age group and country (as the ratio of
men to women in that country is higher than the ratio of men to women for the
world). In contrast, a zero or positive number indicates no elderly missing women
phenomenon in the given age group and country, compared to the world average.
This analysis is conducted including and excluding the immigrant stock for each
country, as age and gender specific immigration in some countries (e.g. UAE) may
distort the findings.
The second analysis examines the missing women phenomenon by five-year age
groups (ages 0–75) in selected countries of East and Southeast Asia. This allows an
evaluation of the elderly missing women phenomenon in a given country relative to
its overall demographic profile. The choice of countries for this analysis is con-
tingent upon the stage of demographic transition, speed of ageing and nature of the
elderly missing women phenomenon and will be discussed after the results of the
first analysis.

6.5 Results

Figure 6.1 presents the data for the elderly missing women phenomenon in East and
Southeast Asian countries as deviations from the world mean, where columns
below the mean indicate a female deficit in the respective age group (see Table 6.1

Fig. 6.1 Sex ratios (male/ 0,6


female) for East and
Southeast Asian countries, 0,4
Source UNDESA 2015a, own
calculations 0,2

0,0

-0,2
Allages
60+
-0,4
75+

-0,6
a a
bo m

M lay o

ep in r

am
.R n

m il e
ep C ia
H .Ko ina
In Ko a
ne g
. P Ja sia

on sia
Ph yan lia

Vi -Le d
Si . Ko es

et ste
M ac .

R ilipp ma

ng re
a a

or an
g re
do n

pl pa
M ep

Ti Tha por
d
a m la

M go
h

N
C ssa
u

on
ar
D

.R

em
pl
ei

D
un

.P

os
Br

em

La
D
146 S. Ezdi and H. Künemund

for specific sex ratios). In five countries, the phenomenon is observed in both the
60+ and the 75+ age groups (Brunei-Darussalam, China, Hong Kong, Malaysia and
Timor-Leste), while in some other countries it is visible only in the 75+ age group
(Singapore, Thailand) or in the 60+ age group (Indonesia, Macao). Dramatic
deviations from the world average, however, seem to exist only in Malaysia, fol-
lowed by Brunei Darussalam and China. At first glance, Vietnam and especially the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea seem to be outliers in the opposite direc-
tion, probably indicating high male mortality in the past. These figures may also
reflect the standard of comparison, the world average, which includes all countries.
If the standard of comparison were the industrialized countries of Western Europe,
perhaps even those countries in Fig. 6.1 that seem to be close to, or above, the
world average would show a missing women phenomenon.
A comparison of the female deficit for the selected countries by age groups with
the results for all ages may provide hints on a cohort effect, namely when the female
deficit only appears in the old age groups, but not in the whole population. For
example, in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Macao and Hong Kong, the elderly
missing women phenomenon appears to be a cohort effect, as deficits in the elderly
population are accompanied by surpluses in the total population. This finding is
reinforced by two further observations. First, the elderly missing women phe-
nomenon in Indonesia, Macao and Singapore is only concentrated in specific age
categories of the elderly (i.e. 60+ in the latter two countries and 75+ in the former).
Second, there is a significant difference in the size of the female deficit in the elderly
population of Hong Kong (both age categories) and the female surplus in the total
population. This would make the female deficit in the elderly population of Hong
Kong an outlier for which special cohort-specific circumstances could be respon-
sible. The same is true for Malaysia, specifically in the 75+ age category, which
presents a stark contrast to the female surplus in the total population. Without
historical, cohort-specific data, the existence of age specific discrimination of old
women today cannot be completely ruled out (as would be the result, just to provide
a drastic example, of the ritual burning of widows). Therefore, we assume that the
hypothesis of female discrimination occurring in younger age groups in the past and
accumulating in older age groups today is much more plausible.
For some countries, i.e. Timor-Leste, Brunei Darussalam, and China, the female
deficit in old age is accompanied by a female deficit in the total population. For all
three countries, however, the female deficit in old age exceeds that in the total
population. This could indicate the increased vulnerability of women in old age in
these countries, but it may equally indicate a trend over time. Within the region,
China presents the most striking example of the elderly missing women phe-
nomenon in the 60+ category and Malaysia for the 75+ category. Figure 6.1 further
shows that while all three countries with a female deficit in the total population also
have a missing women phenomenon in the elderly age groups, the reverse is not the
case: there are no countries that exhibit a female deficit in the total population but
not in the elderly population (i.e. the female deficit for neither country is concen-
trated in the 0–59 population alone).
6 Sex Ratios in Old Age … 147

Fig. 6.2 Sex ratios (male/ 0,6


female) for East and
Southeast Asian countries, 0,4
excluding immigrants, Source
UNDESA 2015a, b, own 0,2
calculations
0,0

-0,2
Allages
-0,4 60+
75+
-0,6

bo m

am
In Ko a

M ac .

M ngo ia
ep Ch ia
H . K ina

ne g

a a
. P Ja sia

R ilipp mar

et ste
.R n

M lay o

Ph yan lia

m il e
Vi -Le d
Si . Ko es
M ep
do n
g re

pl pa

a a

ng re

or an
Ti Tha por
d

o s
am la

N
on o
C ssa

ep i
ru
Da

.R

em
ei

pl

D
.P
un

os
Br

em

La
D

The demography of Singapore, Malaysia and several other countries in


Southeast Asia has been shaped by gender and age specific labour immigration and
emigration patterns (Jones 2013). To control for this potential distortion, Fig. 6.2
recalculates the preceding estimates, by excluding immigrants in these countries.
The revised estimates show essentially the same patterns for Timor-Leste, Thailand,
Malaysia and China. However, the elderly missing women phenomenon in Brunei
now looks more like a cohort effect, concentrated in the 60+ population only.
Further, in Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao the phenomenon is no longer likely
to be a cohort effect and now appears to extend to all age groups (with the exception
of the 75+ age group in Singapore). Again—with the exception of Singapore—the
female deficit in the total population of these countries is smaller than the deficit in
the elderly population of either old age category, indicating that the deficit exac-
erbates in old age. After excluding immigrants, Macao exhibits the elderly missing
women phenomenon most severely in the 60+ and Hong Kong in the 75+ age
group.
Figure 6.3 displays further results for selected countries in East and Southeast
Asia, namely China, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Thailand. Amongst the countries
exhibiting the elderly missing women phenomenon in the region, the selected group
combines diverse demographic situations within the region: Hong Kong and
Thailand are furthest along the demographic transition, followed by China and
subsequently Malaysia (Heller 2006; Jones 2013). With reference to the demo-
graphic dividend, Singapore and Hong Kong have long been classified as Tiger
Economies (Sarel 1996), Thailand has successfully reaped its demographic divi-
dend whilst Malaysia has had some success in doing so (Heller 2006). In terms of
projected2 population growth until 2050, Singapore and Thailand are expected to

2
All population projections for 2050 are based on United Nations medium variant estimates.
148 S. Ezdi and H. Künemund

Fig. 6.3 Sex ratios (male/ 1,2


female) by 5-year age groups
for selected countries in East 1,0
and Southeast Asia, Source
UNDESA 2015a, own 0,8
calculations
0,6
World
Thailand
0,4
Malaysia
0,2 China
HongKong
0,0 4
9
15 4
20 9

30 9
35 4
40 9
45 4
50 9
55 4

65 4
70 9
4
+
25 4

60 9
-3

-4
-1

-6

-7
5-

-4
0-

-1

-2
-2

-5
-3

-5

-6

75
10

have the slowest population growth amongst countries with the elderly missing
women phenomenon in this region, followed by China. Conversely, Malaysia has
the most rapid rate of population growth in the selected group of countries (Jones
2013). Consequently, the pace of ageing for these selected countries until 2050 is
projected to be fastest in Hong Kong, followed by Thailand, China and finally
Malaysia (Lee et al. 2011). As results from the first analysis indicate, these coun-
tries are also diverse with respect to the elderly missing women phenomenon.
Sex ratios in Hong Kong are roughly equal to world sex ratios in the younger age
groups, but between age groups 20–24 and 55–59 they fall markedly below world
levels, indicating a surplus of women. After ages 55–59, sex ratios exceed world
levels, reaching a peak of approximately 1.1 at ages 70–74 and remaining above
world levels in the 75+ category. Sex ratios for Thailand remain very close to the
world average—the missing women phenomenon observed earlier seems to have
disappeared. Sex ratios in China exceed the world level in all age groups. This
excess becomes less pronounced in the 30–34 and 45–49 age groups, but in general,
this indicates that the phenomenon is persistent in the Chinese population. Sex
ratios in Malaysia are below the world average in the younger age groups, but
above in the old ager groups. This could indicate that the elderly missing women
phenomenon is a cohort effect, especially because in a majority of the age cate-
gories (from 0–4 to 25–29 and from 40–44 to roughly 60–65) there are large female
surpluses.3
Overall, the missing women phenomenon for these countries seems much less
dramatic than for countries in Middle Eastern Asia. Figure 6.4 displays the elderly
missing women phenomenon for countries in Middle Eastern Asia. Except for Iraq

3
Unfortunately, subtracting immigrants by five-year age groups for these countries unveils data
limitations, with major fluctuations in number that no longer allow for a clear interpretation.
Consequently, this chapter only presents the results for these countries with the inclusion of
immigrants.
6 Sex Ratios in Old Age … 149

Fig. 6.4 Sex ratios (male/ 0,5


female) for Middle Eastern
Asia, Source UNDESA 0,0
2015a, own calulcations
-0,5

-1,0

-1,5

-2,0 Allages
60+
-2,5 75+

-3,0

ba it

i A tar

ria
n

Ku an

O n
n

Is q
Jo el

le n
Sa Q ne

Ye E
en
L e wa
ai

no
Ira
Ira

Pa a

bi

A
ra
rd

m
Sy
i
ud a
st

U
hr

ra
Ba

and Israel, all countries experience the elderly missing women phenomenon in both
the 60+ and 75+ categories (with the latter experiencing it in the 75+ age group
only). Again, it must be emphasized that this is in comparison with the world
average. The potential for the female deficit to be a cohort effect exists, obviously,
in Iran and Lebanon, the only countries where deficits in the elderly population are
accompanied by a slight surplus in the total population. The majority of the
remaining countries can be divided into two categories. In Yemen, Syria, Palestine,
Kuwait, Jordan and Iran not only is the female deficit worse in the elderly popu-
lation than in the total population, but also the female deficit in the 75+ population
is worse than in the 60+ population. This most likely indicates that the situation of
elderly women worsens as they age, although again, the alternative interpretation of
a diminishing trend over time cannot be completely ruled out. In the remaining
countries—Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain—the female deficit in the
elderly population is smaller than the deficit in the total population and the deficit in
the 75+ population is smaller than in the 60+ population. This would indicate that
the missing women phenomenon in these countries decreases with age, or has
become worse over time. As Fig. 6.4 indicates, the UAE and Qatar represent the
severest manifestation of the missing women phenomenon in the 60+ and 75+ age
categories respectively. However, both countries attract workers from other states,
especially men in younger age groups. Such a pattern may distort the picture, so the
female deficit may in fact reflect a male surplus.
For this reason, Fig. 6.5 excludes immigrants. Four differences are immediately
recognizable. First, the female deficit in all three age categories in Kuwait turns into
a surplus, implying that there is no longer a severe missing woman phenomenon in
the country and that the apparent female deficit was an artefact of predominantly
male immigration. Second, an elderly missing women phenomenon emerges in
Israel, which cannot be explained as a cohort effect as the deficit is also apparent in
the total population. Third, the elderly missing women phenomenon in Iraq and
150 S. Ezdi and H. Künemund

1,0

0,5

0,0

-0,5

-1,0

-1,5

-2,0
Allages
-2,5 60+

-3,0 75+

-3,5
Ku n
Jo l

le n

Ye E
r
Le a i t

ria
n

n
e

e
q

en
ud ata
a

Pa ma
no

in
I ra

A
ai

ra
Ira

bi
rd

Sy

m
U
st
hr

ra
Is

Sa Q
ba

O
Ba

iA
Fig. 6.5 Sex ratios (male/female) for Middle Eastern Countries of Asia, excluding immigrants,
Source UNDESA 2015a, b, own calculations

Lebanon becomes less likely to be interpretable as cohort effects as their total


populations also exhibit female deficits. Fourth, the female deficit in the elderly
population of Qatar—and to a lesser extent Iran—can now be explained in terms of
a cohort effect since their total population shows a female surplus. It can further be
seen that the exclusion of immigrants from the UAE has reduced the female deficit
in the 75+ category and total population, but increased it in the 60+ category. This
could, for example, imply that the missing women phenomenon is persistent across
the life course in Qatar but becomes more pronounced in the 60+ population due to
a cohort effect. For Yemen, Syria, Palestine, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Oman, the
missing women trend remains about the same as in Fig. 6.4. After excluding the
migrant stock from countries in Middle Eastern Asia, the UAE and Qatar represent
the severest cases of the elderly missing women phenomenon in the 60+ and 75+
categories, respectively.

6.6 Discussion

The results indicate the presence of an elderly missing women phenomenon in a


number of East and Southeast Asian countries with the inclusion of immigrants:
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Macao, Hong Kong, Thailand, China, Timor-Leste
and Brunei Darussalam. Except for the latter three countries, the phenomenon in
most of these populations can be viewed as a sign of a cohort effect as it is not as
persistent across all ages. It maybe expected, therefore, to become less pronounced
6 Sex Ratios in Old Age … 151

in future cohorts. Amongst the latter three countries, China presents a special case.
Klasen (2008) argues that the imposition of the One Child Policy in China served as
an exogenous shock that amplified the factors behind masculinized sex ratios at
birth and delayed the normalization of these ratios (as occurred in South Korea).
Hence, the elderly missing phenomenon may reflect several decades of government
policy. Nevertheless, the presence of China on this list is a cause for alarm because
it constitutes 18.7% of the world population. Aside from China, Brunei-Darussalam
and Timor-Leste are the only countries in this region that present an elderly missing
women phenomenon alongside a missing women phenomenon in the entire pop-
ulation. Although this might be a significant problem for these countries, it is a
relatively small problem for the region as a whole: These countries account for just
0.3% of the total population of Southeast Asia, although they are growing very
rapidly (Jones 2013).
The exclusion of the immigrant stock from the populations of these countries
changed the main results for Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao where the elderly
missing women phenomenon persists at all ages and would no longer seem to be a
cohort effect. Labour and marriage immigration are common to Singapore,
Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan, and whilst labour immigration may be tem-
porary (with workers returning to their home country before or upon retirement),
marriage migration is more likely to be permanent (Jones 2013). Since the UN
migrant data only accounts for immigrants and does not report on emigrants by both
gender and age, these figures do not represent the sex ratios of a national population
with complete accuracy. Nevertheless, the comparison makes it clear that migration
is an important factor when explaining the missing women phenomenon.
For Middle Eastern Asia, the analysis indicates an elderly missing women
phenomenon in all countries except Israel and Iraq (75+ only). Amongst these
countries that display the elderly missing women phenomenon, only Iran and
Lebanon fit a cohort effect interpretation, giving rise to some expectation that sex
ratios could improve and return to normal as future cohorts of the population enter
old age. For the remaining countries, the deficit in old age is accompanied by a
deficit at all ages. This comparison points clearly to the fact that existing literature
has not taken notice of this region, where the phenomenon is much more pro-
nounced compared to East and Southeast Asia.
Again, the exclusion of immigrants somewhat alters the results. Except for
Yemen and the member states of the Gulf Cooperative Council,4 all Arab countries
are both senders and recipients of immigrants, with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and
Kuwait being the largest sources of remittances worldwide (Kronofol 2013).
However, as already described, the UN provides estimates by both gender and age
for immigrants only. Hence, results including the migrant stock may be considered
more reliable.

4
Countries include: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE. These are recipients of
migrants.
152 S. Ezdi and H. Künemund

It is difficult to attribute exact causal factors behind the elderly missing women
phenomenon in either region. A substantial body of literature has provided evidence
of the factors before/at the time of birth (namely sex selective abortion) in China as
the main reason behind the missing women phenomenon. However, it may be
hypothesized that factors after the stage of birth (i.e. in childhood, young adulthood,
adulthood and old age) may primarily be responsible for the female deficit in the
affected countries in Middle Eastern Asia. The countries in Middle Eastern Asia
that are affected by the elderly missing women phenomenon have a majority
Muslim population (Pew Research Center 2015). Existing literature on missing
women that examines sex selection behaviour among Muslim and non-Muslim
populations provides strong evidence of the absence of sex selective abortions
amongst the former (Borooah and Iyer 2004; Almond et al. 2013). Therefore, in
Middle Eastern Asia, cultural factors after the stage of birth may be more significant
in generating the elderly missing women phenomenon. It is impossible, however, to
point to the exact causative factors, as the case of each country would need to be
examined independently.
The severity of the elderly missing women phenomenon in the Middle Eastern
Asia may be generating deleterious consequences for the elderly population in the
region that, if persistent, would be magnified for future cohorts of the elderly. The
primary implication of a female deficit in old age is a plethora of elderly men with
no one to provide care for them. In general, older women provide health and old age
care to siblings, friends and neighbours more frequently than men do. Currently, at
the global level, the rate of widowhood amongst women is higher than that of men
both because women live longer than men do and male rates of remarriage are
higher than female rates (Bennett 1997). However, if the shortage of women
increases at older ages, not only may male rates of widowhood be expected to
increase but also these widowers will not be able to find women to marry and hence
provide care for them. One may argue that it does not matter if older people are
male or female, as long as children—namely daughters and daughters-in-law—are
available. At the same time, if the female deficit also exists in the cohort of caring
daughters and daughters-in-law, the pressure on the few remaining women will
increase and potentially exacerbate the problem. This will be especially true if
state-supported services (such as the provision of old age nursing homes) were
insufficient.
Existing literature already addresses the consequences of a female deficit in
young adulthood in China, where the current generation of young men (i.e. men
born after the 1980s) are unable to find wives due to a shortage of women (Hudson
and Den Boer 2002; Ebenstein and Sharygin 2009). This is creating many social
problems in the country and has exacerbated the quality of life through increased
rates of kidnapping and prostitution, the “importing” of wives from neighbouring
regions and sexual slavery (see Ebenstein and Sharygin 2009). The consequences of
a high female deficit at young adulthood are liable to be even worse in Middle
Eastern Asia than in China. The bulk of the population in these countries forms the
young adulthood stage, due to the concentration of a youth bulges and expected
echo bulges (Bloom et al. 2003; Hayutin 2009). Therefore, the consequences of a
6 Sex Ratios in Old Age … 153

large female deficit in young adulthood may manifest itself even more strongly in
Middle Eastern Asia where countries are already facing the challenges presented
by a socio-cultural transformation (e.g. delayed marriages, changing household
structures) as well as the difficulty of finding productive employment for their
younger generations (Saxena 2008).
This comparison of the elderly missing women phenomenon between East,
Southeast and Middle Eastern Asia indicates that although the literature has dis-
proportionately concentrated on missing women in East and Southeast Asia, the
phenomenon is much more pervasive now in Middle Eastern Asia. The few
countries in East and Southeast Asia that exhibit the elderly missing women phe-
nomenon—except for China—seem to fit a cohort interpretation, so that the phe-
nomenon may disappear as future cohorts enter old age. On the other hand, China
may not overcome the phenomenon for many decades. China follows a pattern
similar to that of Middle Eastern Asia, where the majority of countries display a
female deficit in both the total and the elderly populations. The missing women
phenomenon in these countries is thus the norm, rather than the exception.
Precaution, nevertheless, is necessary when interpreting the results for Syria and
Yemen. The UN population estimates are based on official figures from Syria for 2010
and from Yemen for 2014 (UN 2014). However, since March 2011 and March 2015,
Syria and Yemen respectively have been engaged in escalated conflicts, which have
resulted in large-scale emigration and excessive mortality (Blanchard et al. 2015;
UNHCR 2015, 2016). Although the United Nations continuously updates its popu-
lation estimates to ensure an accurate representation of the country in question (UN
2014), it may still not be able to capture these changes on a daily basis.5 Moreover, the
United Nations has stopped documenting conflict-related mortality in Syria after
2014, due to an inability to verify the accuracy of sources and it has since only released
estimates on an intermittent basis (Humud et al. 2016). Given these irregularities, it
would be impossible for any model to capture fully the demographic volatilities
presented by conflict, despite the UN’s estimates to provide the most recent population
data for these countries (UN 2014). Nonetheless, based on the assumption6 that
refugees are equally likely to be male or female, it is possible that the missing women
phenomenon in the total population in Syria (and Yemen, if the same conditions
apply) is overestimated, because the underestimation of male mortality would lead to
an overestimation of sex ratios. No similar conclusions can be drawn about the elderly
population because the age distribution of mortality, even until 2014, is unknown
(Price et al. 2014).

5
For example, in the case of mortality in Syria, Price et al. (2014) estimate that from March 2011 to
April 2014, 191,396 Syrian deaths were documented with 85.1% of these deaths being male, 9.3%
female and the sex of the remaining deaths being unknown. Further, the ages of 83.8% of these
deaths were unrecorded (UN 2014), making it impossible to calculate accurately the sex ratios by
age.
6
According to the UNHCR (2016), there were approximately 4.8 million registered Syrian refu-
gees with 50.2% of these being male and 49.8% being female. The majority were concentrated in
the 18–59 age category.
154 S. Ezdi and H. Künemund

Contingent on the causes behind missing women and the life stage in which they
are concentrated (if identifiable), there may also be reasons to suspect that the births
and/or deaths of women are underreported. For example, after the implementation
of the One Child Policy in China, couples who had more than one child (especially
in rural areas) often hid the birth of older daughters but reported that of older sons,
because strong son preference made it appear worthwhile to pay the associated
financial penalty. Nevertheless, even after accounting for underreported births, the
sex ratios at birth, and in the population, remain abnormally high, as couples mostly
opt for sex selection technology to ensure the birth of a son. This suggests that
underreporting accounts for only a small fraction of missing girls in China (Yi et al.
1993). As a result, the deficit in the total population of China (evident in Figs. 6.1
and 6.2) would remain largely unaffected by this underreporting. Further, as the
population aged 60+ was born before the implementation of the One Child Policy,
the deficits for both the 60+ and 75+ populations of China (Figs. 6.1 and 6.2) would
be unaffected by this kind of underreporting and the original non-cohort effect
interpretation for China would remain intact.
For the remaining life stages in other countries, the incidence of underreporting
of female deaths may be high. For example, female deaths from domestic violence,
honour killings, accusations of witchcraft or even intentional neglect may be less
likely to be reported for fear of the perpetrator getting into trouble. Furthermore, in
many countries where property is usually inherited through the male line and
women have minimal ownership of assets, family members may find no utility in
obtaining death certificates for deceased females, as this would yield no monetary
benefit. The underreporting of female deaths would imply that the magnitude of the
missing women phenomenon in all three age categories is underestimated.
Therefore, knowing the extent of underestimation would not alter the main results
about missing women (as the deficits in the respective age categories would
increase) but it may alter the cohort and non-cohort effect interpretation of the
missing women phenomenon for the given countries, depending on the age dis-
tribution of unreported deaths.
The availability of longitudinal data for the affected countries would help
enhance an analysis of the elderly missing women phenomenon by depicting the
magnitude of the female deficit at each life stage, thereby allowing the identification
of the life stage that is most heavily responsible for the masculinization of current
cohorts of the elderly population. This may also allow for improved evaluation of
the factors responsible for the phenomenon in the affected country and for more
targeted policies to be implemented. Longitudinal data would also be useful for
showing the life stage at which the greatest female deficits appear would hence
allow a comparison of the timing of this life stage with the timing of historical
events (such as conflicts or disasters) in the affected countries. This would help in
evaluating the case of the East and Southeast Asian countries that exhibit the elderly
missing women phenomenon as a one-time cohort effect, by confirming (or not) the
plausibility of the cohort effect interpretation.
Given the negative social consequences of the elderly missing women phe-
nomenon, immediate remedial action is necessary to rectify the female deficit where
6 Sex Ratios in Old Age … 155

it occurs. Aside from general gender equality politics, one possibly very effective
mechanism to temper the elderly missing women phenomenon may be the intro-
duction of social pensions. Social pensions constitute a variety of cash transfer to
older people that are non-contributory in nature (i.e. do not require employment or
income contributions), often do not require the elderly to withdraw from the labour
force and are contingent on the elderly meeting specific age and income require-
ments (Barrientos 2015). Hence, elderly women may be in a unique position to
benefit from social pension schemes, due to the large proportion of their lives spent
in caregiving roles (signifying their absence from the labour market) and their
general propensity to participate in the informal labour market both of which
precludes their access to contributory pension schemes (Paolisso and Leslie 1995;
Vlachantoni and Falkingham 2012).
There are several additional reasons for thinking that the provision of social
pensions may help alleviate the elderly missing women phenomenon. First, in
strongly patriarchal societies, the prospect of elderly women being recipients of
social pensions may increase their worth to their families throughout the life course
and provide families with an incentive to allow women to survive to old age.
Consequently, factors that debilitate the female survival advantage at each life stage
may operate less severely or be non-existent (Künemund et al. 2017). Second,
social pensions may strengthen intergenerational relations and family solidarity,
especially for elderly women in societies where widows have weak inheritance
rights and can make little contribution to the joint pool of household resources upon
the death of their husbands. In such scenarios, social pensions may provide col-
lateral for women, not only to remain within the joint family system but also to
elevate their status therein by allowing them some decision-making power. Third,
social pensions allow for consumption smoothing and protect the household and the
elderly against uncertainties (e.g. unemployment of other household members).
This may be especially important for elderly women who, being the most vulner-
able members of society, may be forced to suffer the brunt of a household income
shock. Lastly, social pensions may provide elderly women the resources to invest in
their health and, through a multiplier effect, the health of women in preceding life
stages (see Künemund et al. 2017). Given that inadequate investment in female
healthcare in each life stage is a prime factor behind missing women, the tendency
of women to invest resources in the well-being of their family members, and
especially girls (Cheston 2007; Ardington et al. 2010) may simultaneously ame-
liorate the missing women phenomenon at several life stages.

6.7 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted the need to redirect the focus of literature on missing
women from East and Southeast Asia to Middle Eastern Asia and from young ages
to older age groups in both regions. The results of this analysis further make clear
that the data situation is not convincing; available statistics are mainly the product
156 S. Ezdi and H. Künemund

of estimates, not actual census data, so that there is no certainty whether these
findings accurately reflect the population, or are at least partly an artefact of these
projections. Despite these limitations, given the negative social consequences of the
elderly missing women phenomenon, we would like to argue that immediate
remedial action is necessary to rectify this female deficit. Aside from general gender
equality in politics, one possibly very effective and somewhat neglected mechanism
to temper the elderly missing women phenomenon may be the introduction of
social pensions.

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Chapter 7
From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards
the Ending of Growth. Subnational
Population Trends in New Zealand

Natalie Jackson, Lars Brabyn, Dave Maré, Michael Cameron


and Ian Pool

Abstract In this paper we report on population change and its demographic drivers
for 143 New Zealand towns, 132 rural centres and 66 Territorial Authority Areas
(TAs), for the period 1976-2013. We undertook the exercise to identify whether
New Zealand’s towns and rural centres are following their international counter-
parts in declining from what is proposed as a ‘new’ and increasingly intractable
form of population decline, where net migration loss is accompanied by natural
decrease, as opposed to the ‘old’ form where natural increase is positive but fails to
offset net migration loss. We also examined whether ‘age-selective migration’, as in

Description: The data for towns and rural centres were created by Dave Maré (Motu Research)
under microdata access agreement with Statistics New Zealand, MAA2003/18.
dave.mare@motu.org.nz. The tables contain counts of the 1976, 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996,
2001, 2006 and 2013 usual resident population by age and sex, grouped by 2013 geographic
area boundaries (Territorial Authority and Urban Area). The Urban Area classification has been
extended to identify rural centres (ua13 = 501) separately (using 2013 Area Unit codes). The
allocation to 2013 geographic areas is based on a user-derived correspondence. The counts are
not official statistics but should be thought of estimates intended for use in research.
Disclaimer: Access to the data used in this study for modelling was provided by Statistics New
Zealand under conditions designed to give effect to the security and confidentiality provisions of
the Statistics Act 1975. The results presented in these tables are the work of the author/s, not
Statistics New Zealand.

N. Jackson (&)
Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand
e-mail: demographics@nataliejackson.net
N. Jackson  I. Pool
National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis,
University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand
L. Brabyn
School of Geography, University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand
D. Maré
Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, Wellington, New Zealand
M. Cameron
Department of Economics, National Institute of Demographic and Economic Analysis,
University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 161


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_7
162 N. Jackson et al.

the migration-driven loss of young people and/or gain of older people, is a major
factor driving New Zealand’s subnational structural population ageing. We found
that the old form of depopulation, net migration loss, was the major determinant of
New Zealand’s subnational depopulation across the period 1976-2013; also that
migration was highly age-selective. In the process, it accelerated the structural
ageing of the majority of TAs, towns and rural centres. In 2013, 41 per cent of
towns and 29 per cent of rural centres had populations with greater than 20 per cent
aged 65+ years (compared with just 15 per cent for Total New Zealand); 85 per cent
of towns were older with migration than they would have been in the absence of
migration, as were two-thirds of rural centres and four-fifths of TAs. We also found
the new, ‘dual’ form of depopulation to be present, but as yet affecting a relatively
small number of towns and rural centres. However, projections at TA level indicate
that the shift to natural decrease and the new form of depopulation will soon
escalate, the latter becoming the major cause of depopulation by 2043 and the major
cause of population change per se. Overall our analysis confirms that migration is
not a panacea for growth. Just 39 per cent of towns, 33 per cent of rural centres, and
26 per cent of TAs were larger in 2013 than 1976 as the result of migration.
A further 27 per cent of towns, 17 per cent of rural centres, and 36 per cent of TAs
also grew across the period, but were smaller with migration than they would have
been in its absence; for them, natural increase played the major role in determining
growth. Moreover, we found that migration is negatively correlated with natural
increase, and, relatedly, that the proportion of women aged 15-44 years heavily
determines natural increase. These findings suggest that areas losing their young,
reproductive age population are paying the price of the gains made by other areas.
These findings have a number of policy implications, all of which point to the need
for regionally-specific policies.

 
Keywords Subnational depopulation Natural decrease Age-selective migration
Structural ageing

7.1 Introduction

Population ageing, the ageing-driven end of growth, and the onset of depopulation
are well understood across Europe and Japan, where populations are structurally
older than is their New Zealand counterpart, and many are declining in absolute
terms. Although net migration loss is often involved (Matanle et al. 2011; Johnson
et al. 2015; Murphy 2016), those countries and their regions are increasingly
declining from the shift to more deaths than births. As fertility rates decline and
longevity increases, the older population starts to outnumber the young, natural
increase turns to natural decrease, and migration gains become insufficient to offset
that loss.
The situation is seemingly very different in New Zealand. Over the past two
decades, population growth has averaged around 1.0% per annum and is currently
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 163

closer to 2%. With less than 15.0% aged 65+ years in 2016, the New Zealand
population is somewhat younger than its European and Japanese counterparts, the
legacy of a higher and longer post-war baby boom, and relatively high per capita
net migration gains in most years since. Although Total Fertility (TF)1 has recently
fallen below 1.9, New Zealand today continues to have one of the developed
world’s highest fertility rates, and the shift to natural decrease at the national level is
not expected until well into the second half of the century. National level depop-
ulation is thus ‘over the horizon’ in planning terms.
It is, however, a very different picture at the subnational level, where the same
dynamics observed in the international literature are unfolding in New Zealand.
Numbers at older ages are increasingly exceeding those at younger ages, population
growth is disproportionately accounted for by those aged 65 years and over, and
natural decrease is beginning to emerge (Pool et al. 2004; Jackson 2014, 2016;
Jackson and Cameron 2017). Given that this is an increasingly common situation in
structurally older countries, these trends would be unremarkable were it not for the
fact that in New Zealand they are, at this point, overwhelmingly caused by
age-selective migration (Jackson and Brabyn 2017). On the one hand, there is
widespread net migration loss of young adults, and on the other, substantial,
although more geographically contained, net migration gain of retirees.
Ageing-in-place, whereby people remain living in the area as they age, also con-
tributes to the growth at older ages and to structural ageing, with larger cohorts
replacing smaller ones—technically referred to as population ‘momentum’.
As observed by Beale (1969), Jackson and Kippen (2001) and Johnson (2011), the
loss of migrants at young adult ages hollows out the age structure across the
reproductive age groups, while the gain at older ages inflates the proportion at those
ages, with either or both hastening the onset of natural decrease. Examining the issue
for the United States, Johnson et al. (2015) showed that age-selective migration
played a larger role in the onset of natural decrease across American states and
counties than did the conventionally understood driver of low fertility—the primary
cause of natural decrease in Europe. Using a back-projection methodology, Murphy
(2016) similarly demonstrated the long-term negative impact of net international
migration loss on natural increase for 11 European countries.
Bucher and Mai (2005) expand on the broader implications of these trends. In
the early stages of demographic transition, net migration loss is typically offset by
natural increase. Where natural increase is insufficient to offset net migration loss,
depopulation occurs. Increasingly, net migration loss is being accompanied by
natural decrease, typically the result of conventional structural ageing driven by low
fertility. Bucher and Mai refer to these as the ‘old’ and ‘new’ ‘forms of’
depopulation, respectively (Matanle et al. 2011; Sackmann et al. 2015).
If in fact net migration loss or gain can actually drive structural ageing, we may
expect to see the underlying dynamics become self-reinforcing in some areas,

1
The average number of children a woman would bear across her lifetime if she were exposed to
current age-specific fertility rates as she passed through each reproductive age group.
164 N. Jackson et al.

ultimately resulting in more rapid and profound depopulation than might have
occurred from structural ageing alone. These dynamics are thus deserving of greater
attention. Demographic transition theory focuses on the fertility and mortality
trends of national level populations and recognizes depopulation only when it
occurs at the national level. Except for occasional mentions of the fertility rates and
potential reproductive roles of migrants, demographic transition theory has largely
ignored migration’s age- and sex selective characteristics, which alter both origin
and destination populations and have an ancillary demographic influence (Murphy
2016). Demographic transition theory is not conventionally applied at subnational
level. If migration loss at younger ages or gain at older ages can cause the age
structure to age as effectively as low fertility or increasing longevity and thereby
hasten the onset of natural increase and, potentially, intractable depopulation,
migration needs to become a central element of contemporary demographic anal-
ysis, particularly at the subnational level.
Following Johnson et al. (2015) this chapter examines the subnational mecha-
nisms of depopulation in New Zealand, a relatively youthful country where both
natural growth and population growth per se are expected to continue for the
foreseeable future. Nonetheless, one-third of the nation’s 67 Territorial Authority
Areas (TAs) declined in size between 1996 and 2013—the majority from net
migration loss (Jackson 2014, 2016). Looking ahead 25 years, almost 60% of TAs
are projected to be declining, and a similar proportion—but not in every case the
same TAs—to be experiencing either natural decrease or zero natural increase
(Stats NZ 2017c). In most other cases there is either natural increase, but it is
insufficient to offset net migration loss, or natural decrease, but it is concealed by
net migration gain—often of older retirees. In a growing number of TAs, there is
decline from both negative elements.
To illustrate these trends we draw on four data collections, all originally from
Statistics New Zealand: Subnational Usually Resident Population (URP) by age and
sex at Census mesh block level; Births and Deaths from the Vital Registrations
collection at TA level; Subnational Estimated Resident Population (ERP) by age
and sex at the Territorial Authority (TA) level, and projected subnational population
by age and sex at the TA level. We use the first three collections to create a unique
set of ‘back-projected’ estimations for 143 New Zealand towns and 132 rural
centres for the period 1976–2013, data for which are not otherwise available (see
Jackson et al. 2016 for detailed methodology and output, and Appendix 1 for spatial
definitions). The resulting data are disaggregated by sex and five-year age group
and include estimated components of change (natural increase and net migration).
First, we consider New Zealand’s subnational trends for these 143 towns and
132 rural centres retrospectively, for the period 1976–2013. We then apply the
Pearson correlation coefficient to a limited set of explanatory variables and consider
our findings against those outlined by Johnson et al. (2015) in their comparison of
the ‘counties’ of the United States (US) and Europe. Finally because New Zealand’s
population is still relatively young structurally, we extend the study period by
examining the TA level data both retrospectively (1991–2013) and prospectively
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 165

for the period 2013–2043, for 66 of New Zealand’s 67 TA populations (we exclude
the Chatham Islands due to their very small size).
Although projections do not have the same robustness as observations, it is both
necessary and germane to use them for New Zealand, for three reasons. All are
related to Johnson et al.’s (2015) argument that while entire countries may not yet
be experiencing natural decrease, its onset at subnational level has potentially major
societal consequences. First, like the US, New Zealand is structurally younger than
most of its European counterpart countries. As a result, observed data will struggle
to show the full spectrum of the progression (Jackson 2014). Second, if the com-
bination of observed data and projections do reflect trends in structurally older
countries, they can theoretically inform the global demographic transition. Third, on
a more practical note, New Zealand’s somewhat privileged experience of net
international migration gain may not continue into the future unimpeded.
Structurally older countries are likely to shift from being net exporters of people, to
net importers, seeking to augment their youth and skills. Thus, comparisons made
now on the basis of the assumptions used in the projections can assist policy makers
to ascertain the ‘best’ level of migration for New Zealand. In this paper, we do not
seek to understand the societal factors behind fertility, mortality and migration
change (Sackmann et al. 2015), although we do outline briefly New Zealand’s
social, economic and spatial diversity. Our primary intention here is to generate a
first description of the trends themselves.

7.2 Data and Methodological Notes

The methodology for undertaking the back-projected estimates of New Zealand’s


143 towns and 132 rural centres is detailed in Jackson et al. (2016, see also
Appendix 1 for spatial units). In brief, the data have been generated for research
purposes and are aggregated from census ‘usually resident’ mesh block data to
match Statistics New Zealand’s geographic boundaries for towns and rural centres
extant in 2013, by their size in 1976. The mesh blocks of just under 400,000 people
in 1976 and just over 500,000 people in 2013 living in dispersed rural settlements
could not be exactly matched over time and were aggregated as ‘other rural’. The
resulting population numbers in individual towns and rural centres may thus differ
from published data (where such data are available).
These are also not back-projections in the usual sense of working back from the
present, but rather we have taken the appropriately aggregated usually-resident
populations at each five yearly census by age and sex, applied age-specific birth rates
to women aged 15–49 years, and survived the age-sex groups forward five years2

2
As explained below, for one period (June 2006–13) the span is 7 years.
166 N. Jackson et al.

using a conventional cohort component method.3 Finally we compare the ‘expected’


population (by age and sex) at the subsequent census with the ‘actual’ population, to
generate a residual measure of estimated net migration and accompanying measures
of net migration by age and sex. The technique conceals the impact of population
momentum (as cohorts of different sizes replace each other), but the data are readily
extractable.
The TA level Estimated Resident Population (ERP) data, both retrospective and
projected, are already aggregated by Statistics New Zealand and are subjected only to
the conventional approach for deriving residual net migration numbers: natural
increase between observations is calculated (births minus deaths), and subtracted from
net change (population at time t + 1 minus population at time t). It should be noted that
ERP data differ from the Usually Resident Population (URP) data used for the town
and rural centre analysis, in that the former is rebased at each census, then released
quarterly, with adjustments for births, deaths and migration occurring since the pre-
vious release. In the latter (usually resident population count), people away from home
on census night have been reassigned to their usual postcode and mesh block, but the
data still pertain to the timing of the census (in New Zealand, usually March).
The URP is thus based on the census, while the ERP is an ‘intercensal’ estimate.
As indicated, all towns, rural centres and TAs used in this study differ in size and
all data points are equally weighted in the analysis irrespective of their underlying
size. We adopt this approach rather than weighting the analysis by population size
because the appropriate unit of analysis for planners and policy-makers is the town,
rural centre, or TA.
One other methodological item of importance is that of a seven-year gap
between the last two New Zealand Censuses drawn on in this paper, held in March
2006 and 2013. This discontinuity was due to the devastating 2011 earthquakes in
the Canterbury region, and Christchurch, where Statistics New Zealand’s opera-
tional centre for the census was located. The most severe earthquake occurred just a
week out from the census, killing 160 people, and a decision was made to delay the
census. This discontinuity affects some of the results in the paper.

7.3 A Brief Background to New Zealand

New Zealand is a nation of 4.7 million people, with considerable social, economic
and spatial diversity (Pool et al. 2004, 2005; Jackson 2016, 2017; Spoonley 2016).
Some areas, particularly major cities, are doing very well. Auckland, New

3
We do not have fertility or mortality data at town and rural centre level. Instead, we use as a proxy
the estimated total fertility and survivorship rates for whichever of New Zealand’s 66 territorial
authority areas (TAs) to which each town or rural centre belongs. The TA level rates incorporate
differing population compositions in each TA. For example, TAs with higher than average pro-
portions Māori typically have relatively high total fertility rates and proportions of births at
younger ages, and relatively low life expectancy. These differentials are thus ‘crudely’ captured in
the projection assumptions.
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 167

Zealand’s ‘gateway’ city, is now home to one-third of the population, four times as
many as the second-largest city, Christchurch. Some areas, generally more remote,
are doing poorly, and some areas are in the middle—leading to what Pool et al.
(2005) have termed ‘trichotomisation’. In many cases, regions doing less well have
high proportions of New Zealand’s Indigenous population, Māori, and reflect his-
torical failure to adequately invest in those areas (Pool 2017; Cochrane and Pool
2017). However in both these and others it also reflects natural features such as land
type and use, the impact of external trade shocks, and the demise of previously
strong extractive industries (Easton 1996, 1997; Spoonley 2016). Recently there has
been significant conversion of sheep and beef farms to dairying, and the widespread
development of horticulture, both of which have seen minor increases in population
numbers, particularly in previously depopulating areas of the South Island—
although, notably, the increase has been driven by migrants on temporary Visas as
opposed to redistribution of the resident population. Population distribution has also
been affected by the Canterbury earthquakes of 2010 and 2011, but this is likely to
be temporary.
Demographic factors play a substantial role in both causing and maintaining
New Zealand’s social, economic and spatial diversity (Jackson 2017). There are not
only sizeable differences in population size by major ethnic group (European 67%,
Māori 15%, Asian 11%, Pacific Peoples 7%, Other 1%) but these ratios have
changed dramatically since 1991, when only 8% of the population was neither
European nor Māori. Subnationally, these proportions also differ substantially, with
some regions such as Gisborne and Northland having respectively 40 and 30%
Māori, and others, such as Auckland, having 20% Asian. The age structures of each
population also differ markedly, with Māori and Pacific Peoples having median
ages of just 24 and 22 years, compared with 41 years for European and 31 years for
those of Asian origin. These differences mainly reflect differences in fertility and
mortality, and also the timing of childbearing, and result in the younger (Māori and
Pacific) populations being disproportionately exposed to the ‘risk’ of factors such as
job-seeking, unemployment, family formation and home-seeking, compared with
the structurally older (European and Asian) populations, where greater proportions
are in the middle and older age groups.
This diversity is the backdrop to our study, but it is not examined further in terms of
ethnic composition or in terms of what the trends mean for ethnic or other social
groups. Rather, our primary objective is to examine the subnational mechanisms of
population growth and decline, and to consider their implications for longer-term
growth or decline. Our intended audience is central and local government, and other
policy makers who we believe need to understand how their local demographic
dynamics are unfolding. We do not dwell on why this is so (see Jackson and Cameron
2017 for more detail), but rather, note that at subnational level, reduced local rate
revenue vis-à-vis increased demand from locally ageing and/or declining populations
will render many local governments incapable of providing necessary physical and
social services (Office of the Auditor-General 2014; Local Government New Zealand
2015). Historically, most have planned for growth, and have been able to spread the
costs over future generations. This will no longer be possible for areas that have
Table 7.1 New Zealand population living in growing/declining towns and rural centres 1976–2013, by number and percentage at end year of period
168

1976–1981 1981–1986 1986–1991 1991–1996 1996–2001 2001–2006 2006–2013


Towns (N = 143)
Number and % of towns growing 102 101 90 93 63 95 92
71.3% 70.6% 62.9% 65.0% 44.1% 66.4% 64.3%
Number and % living in growing towns 1525869 2373042 2400228 2740362 2341891 3265701 3034978
48.5% 72.7% 71.1% 75.7% 62.7% 81.1% 71.6%
Number and % living in declining towns 1161132 412077 490062 358332 870669 207698 619851
36.9% 12.6% 14.5% 9.9% 23.3% 5.2% 14.6%
Total Number and % living in towns 2687001 2785119 2890290 3098694 3212560 3473399 3654829
85.5% 85.4% 85.7% 85.6% 86.0% 86.3% 86.2%
Rural centres (N = 132)
Number and % of rural centres growing 70 80 65 79 49 54 53
53.0% 60.6% 49.2% 59.8% 37.1% 40.9% 40.2%
Number and % living in growing rural centres 36006 39549 35328 46011 28081 32484 31929
1.1% 1.2% 1.0% 1.3% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8%
Number and % living in declining rural centres 32694 31533 36549 28593 43409 38611 38629
1.0% 1.0% 1.1% 0.8% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9%
Number and % living in rural centres 68700 71082 71877 74604 71490 71095 70558
2.2% 2.2% 2.1% 2.1% 1.9% 1.8% 1.7%
Total classified
Total number and % living in growing areas 1561875 2412591 2435556 2786373 2369972 3298185 3066907
49.7% 73.9% 72.2% 77.0% 63.4% 81.9% 72.3%
Total number and % living in declining areas 1193826 443610 526611 386925 914078 246309 658480
38.0% 13.6% 15.6% 10.7% 24.5% 6.1% 15.5%
Total number and % (classified) 2755701 2856201 2962167 3173298 3284050 3544494 3725387
87.7% 87.5% 87.8% 87.7% 87.9% 88.0% 87.9%
(continued)
N. Jackson et al.
Table 7.1 (continued)
1976–1981 1981–1986 1986–1991 1991–1996 1996–2001 2001–2006 2006–2013
Not classified
Number and % living in other rural areas 386661 405171 410901 443412 451320 481617 513963
12.3% 12.4% 12.2% 12.3% 12.1% 12.0% 12.1%
Number and % of people Not Classified 792 1749 654 1665 1095 828 690
0.03% 0.05% 0.02% 0.05% 0.03% 0/02% 0.02%
Total population 3143154 3263121 3373722 3618375 3736465 4026939 4240040
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Reproduced from Jackson et al. (2016)
Notes Some numbers and percentages differ slightly to Jackson et al. (2016, Table 2) due to change in method of aggregation
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth …
169
170 N. Jackson et al.

relatively few people of working age and many at old age. It will also become
increasingly difficult to raise those rates, even in growing areas, when large propor-
tions of local populations are retired and on fixed incomes—an indisputable point on
which central government must urgently support local government efforts (Local
Government New Zealand 2015).

7.4 New Zealand’s Towns and Rural Centres, 1976–2013

With the exception of just one observation (1996–2001), the majority of New
Zealand’s 143 towns grew between each census 1976–2013, although the per-
centage growing declined from 71% (N = 102) between 1976 and 1981 to 64%
(N = 92) between 2006 and 2013 (Table 7.1, see also Jackson et al. 2016). In the
anomalous period between 1996 and 2001, just 44% (63 towns) experienced
growth. The period was one of net international migration loss for New Zealand
overall (see Appendix 2) and the low proportions of towns experiencing growth
undoubtedly reflects that situation—although net migration loss had also charac-
terized the late 1970s and early 1980s, when two-thirds of towns were growing. As
we will argue below, this is because in the early part of the period, natural increase
was more able to offset net migration loss.
The trend was similar for New Zealand’s 132 rural centres, but occurred at lower
levels, with 53% (N = 70) growing at the beginning of the period and 40%
(N = 53) at the end. In the relatively low growth period 1996–01, just 37% of rural
centres grew (N = 49), and the proportion has scarcely risen above that since.
The period 1976–2013 was, as elsewhere, one of continuing urbanisation for
New Zealand. However, as can be seen from Table 7.1, the transition was nearly
complete by 1976, with around 86% of the New Zealand population living in towns
in both 1976 and 2013 (at 2013 boundaries), and the proportion in rural centres
declining slightly from 2.2 to 1.7%. Accounting for the difference, the aggregated
group designated ‘other rural’ (scattered rural settlements outside of Statistics New
Zealand’s urban area classification) has remained static, at just on 12%. New
Zealand’s continuing urbanisation over the period thus reflects not so much further
rural to urban shifts, but rather an increase in the proportion living in growing
towns, from 48.5 to 72%, and a decline in the proportion living everywhere else
(Note that we do not include Other Rural in the following analysis, but outline key
comparisons in Jackson and Brabyn 2017.).
The majority of the New Zealand population living in growing towns has
implications for future fertility rates and natural increase/decrease because, with few
exceptions, the urban population has historically had lower birth rates than the rural
population (Pool et al. 2004, 2005, 2007). The exception here pertains to areas with
high proportions of Māori and Pacific Peoples, for example in Northland and South
Auckland towns and rural centres—as noted above these populations being both
structurally younger and having higher fertility rates than the numerically dominant
European-origin population.
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 171

Despite Total Fertility falling from 2.3 in 1976 to 1.9 in 2013, the percentage of
New Zealand’s towns and rural centres (combined) experiencing natural increase
grew slightly across the period, from 82.5 to 85.8% (Table 7.2)—albeit peaking in
1996-2001, then reducing. Similar findings were noted for the counties of the
United States by Johnson et al. (2015, p. 653); both cases can be plausibly
explained by changes in the size of the reproductive age group (reflecting ‘echoes’
of the baby boom) and accompanying shifts in the timing of childbearing. However,
Table 7.2 shows that the overall trend was driven by rural centres only, while the
percentage of towns experiencing natural increase fell slightly (−1.6%). At the
same time, with just one exception (1991–1996), a greater percentage of towns than
rural centres experienced natural increase in each intercensal period. Thus, not only
have rural centres generally been more likely than towns to experience natural
decrease, but the percentage of towns experiencing natural decrease has also grown
while the percentage for rural centres has fallen. These mixed findings are explained
below as related to changes in the underlying age structures of these areas, large-
lydriven by age-selective differences in migration (Jackson and Kippen 2001;

Table 7.2 Number and percentage of New Zealand towns and rural centres experiencing natural
increase or decrease, 1976–2013
1976– 1981– 1986– 1991– 1996– 2001– 2006– Change
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2013 1976–2013
(%)
Number experiencing natural increase
Towns 126 125 130 126 133 128 124 (1.6)
Rural centres 101 110 115 119 115 105 112 10.9
Total (towns and 227 235 245 245 248 233 236 4.0
rural centres)
Percentage experiencing natural increase
Towns 88.1 87.4 90.9 88.1 93.0 89.5 86.7 (1.6)
(N = 143)
Rural centres 76.5 83.3 87.1 90.2 87.1 79.5 84.8 10.9
(N = 132)
Total (N = 275) 82.5 85.5 89.1 89.1 90.2 84.7 85.8 4.0
Number experiencing natural decrease
Towns 17 18 13 17 10 15 19 11.8
Rural centres 31 22 17 13 17 27 20 (35.5)
Total (towns and 48 40 30 30 27 42 39 (18.8)
rural centres)
Percentage experiencing natural decrease
Towns 11.9 12.6 9.1 11.9 7.0 10.5 13.3 11.8
(N = 143)
Rural centres 23.5 16.7 12.9 9.8 12.9 20.5 15.2 (35.5)
(N = 132)
Total (N = 275) 17.5 14.5 10.9 10.9 9.8 15.3 14.2 (18.8)
Source Authors’ calculations
172 N. Jackson et al.

Table 7.3 Percentage of New Zealand population aged 65+ years, 1976–2013 by town or rural
centre residence
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2013 Change 1976–
2013 (%)
Towns 9.4 10.5 11.2 11.9 12.3 12.5 12.7 14.4 53.5
(N = 143)
Rural centres 8.7 9.6 10.0 11.2 12.1 13.2 13.9 17.1 97.4
(N = 132)
Total 8.9 9.9 10.5 11.3 11.7 12.1 12.3 14.3 60.7
(N = 275)
Source Authors’ calculations

Pool et al. 2004, 2005; Jackson 2014; Johnson et al. 2015; Murphy 2016; Jackson
and Brabyn 2017).
It is a popular perception that New Zealand’s urban populations have always
been more youthful than have their rural counterparts. However, this has not always
been the case. As Table 7.3 shows, between 1976 and 1996 the population living in
towns was on average slightly older than that in rural centres—as measured by
percentage aged 65+ years, while since 2001 this distinction has increasingly fallen
to rural centres. This structural ageing has also increased more for rural centres than
towns, ostensibly reflecting the loss of young people from rural centres, their gain to
towns, and in some cases in-migration of older people and/or ageing-in-place.
These changes plausibly explain the greater proportions of rural centres experi-
encing natural decrease.
However, if we examine the percentage of towns and rural centres with more than
20% aged 65+ years (the phenomenon referred to as ‘hyper-ageing’, which typically
precedes the shift to natural decrease by a decade or so), a different picture emerges
(Table 7.4). Until 1986, a smaller proportion of towns than rural centres had in excess
of 20% aged 65+ years, while since then hyper-ageing has affected a much greater
proportion of towns; in 2013, 41% of towns had in excess of 20% aged 65+ years
compared with 29% of rural centres. The explanation for this seemingly contradictory
situation is that the relative youthfulness of towns in Table 7.3 is largely driven by
the size, growth and extreme youthfulness of just one city, Auckland, which in 2013
accounted for one-third of New Zealand’s population. With the addition of two other
relatively large and very youthful cities, Wellington and Hamilton, these three cities
accounted for over 41% of New Zealanders in 2013, up from one-third in 1976. Thus,
although the population living in New Zealand’s rural centres is on average older than
that living in towns, this is only true to the extent that the difference is driven by a few
large cities. The majority of New Zealand’s remaining towns have relatively old age
structures and this explains their increasing shift to natural decrease—albeit in 2013
only 19 towns and 20 rural centres were regularly experiencing natural decrease. As
was found by Johnson et al. (2015), the trend at this stage is intermittent, with 47
town and rural centre areas (17%) experiencing natural decrease across more than one
five-year period between 1976 and 2013, and 22 (8%) experiencing it across five or
more periods.
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 173

Table 7.4 Percentage of New Zealand towns and rural centres with more than 20% aged 65+
years, 1976–2013
1976 1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2013 Change 1976–
2013 (%)
Towns 2.8 4.2 4.9 9.8 15.4 21.0 23.8 41.3 1375.0
(N = 143)
Rural centres 5.3 6.0 5.3 6.8 8.3 10.5 15.8 29.3 457.1
(N = 132)
Total 4.0 5.1 5.1 8.3 12.0 15.9 19.9 35.5 790.9
(N = 275)
Source Authors’ calculations

Whether natural increase ultimately contributes to growth of course depends on


what is also occurring with migration. For example, between 2006 and 2013, 143
towns and rural centres grew (52%), but only 98 experienced net migration gain,
indicating that 45 experienced net migration loss and grew from natural increase
alone (Table 7.6).
As discussed above, the age profile of migrants is also crucial (Jackson and
Brabyn 2017). Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the distribution of net migration by age for
a selection of declining and growing areas respectively, for the period 1976–2013.
We find four main profiles:
• Declining areas typically experience net migration loss at most ages, but par-
ticularly at 15–19, 20–24 and/or 25–29 years, although for a few areas there is a
small net gain at older ages, such as Gore and Balclutha—South Island towns
that attract local rural retirees.
• Rapidly growing areas like Central Auckland and Hamilton City see substantial
net gain within the young adult age groups, gaining many of those who have left
the smaller towns and rural centres for study, work, and life-style, although
Hamilton typically experiences a net loss of people aged 25–29 years after they

Fig. 7.1 Net migration age distribution (number of migrants at each age), selected declining
towns and rural centres, 1976–2013. Source Authors’ calculations
174 N. Jackson et al.

Fig. 7.2 Net migration age distribution (number of migrants at each age), selected growing towns,
1976–2013. Source Authors’ calculations

complete their tertiary studies. By contrast, in these areas there is little net
migration across the older adult age groups.
• Other rapidly growing areas like Tauranga, Kapiti, and Nelson—New Zealand’s
‘sun-belt’ destinations—tend, like declining areas, to see net loss at the young
adult ages against marked gain at older ages, and this tends to hold true irre-
spective of size. However, it is the latter feature (gain at older ages) which is
beginning to differentiate the faster growing areas, and explains their slowing
levels of natural increase and/or earlier onset of natural decrease. Increasing
numbers at older ages may grow the population in the early stages, but if
sustained they contribute to an internal momentum of decline.
• Where there is notable net gain of reproductive age people, there is typically
accompanying gain at childhood ages (Tauranga, Nelson, Katikati, Athenree), or
vice versa (all areas in Fig. 7.1).
Together these dynamics either hollow out, or augment, the age structure at the
relevant ages, with ancillary consequences for natural increase, as shown by
Murphy (2016).
Rather than deal separately with net migration and natural increase (Jackson
et al. 2016), we turn to their combined effects which, expanding on Bucher and Mai
(2005; cited in Matanle et al. 2011, 19–20, 46–47), we illustrate with reference to
three types of growth and three of decline. We also look at two types of zero
growth, summarized here simply as zero growth (Jackson et al. 2015) (Table 7.5).
To assist interpretation we also include, in Appendix 2, an overview of New
Zealand’s experience of annual net international migration over the period 1976–
2016 (Stats NZ 2017a). In general, New Zealand experienced negative net inter-
national migration across most of the 1970s and 1980s, and net international gains
peaking in 1996 and 2003 separated by a brief period of net loss. Low net migration
characterised the period 2005–2008, and 2012 saw a minor net loss.
The overarching picture from Fig. 7.3 is that population change at town and
rural centre level since 1976 has been driven by two main dynamics: growth from
both positive components (which we refer to as Type A growth, natural increase
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 175

Table 7.5 Combined components of growth and decline


Outcome Combination of components
Growth A: Natural increase and net migration are both positive
B: Natural increase offsets net migration loss
C: Net migration gain offsets natural decrease
Decline D: Net migration gain fails to offset natural decrease
E: Natural increase fails to offset net migration loss
F: Natural decrease and net migration loss
Zero growth G: Natural increase = net migration loss
H: Natural decrease = net migration gain
Notes By ‘offset’ in the text we mean to ‘completely conceal’
Reproduced from Jackson et al. (2015)

Fig. 7.3 Percentage of towns and rural centres by combined components of growth and decline,
1976–2013. Reproduced and revised from Jackson et al. (2016, Fig. 10)
176 N. Jackson et al.

plus net migration gain), and decline from natural increase failing to offset net
migration loss (Type E decline, the ‘old’ form of decline) (see also Table 7.6). For
all but one observation (1996–2001), the former has been the primary cause of
population change for towns, and the latter, for rural centres, pertaining to half of
rural centres across the period 2006–13 (Table 7.6). Growth from natural increase
offsetting net migration loss (Type B growth) has been the second major driver of
growth for towns and for rural centres at all observations but 1976–1981, and the
third driver of population change per se, but has declined for towns while increasing
for rural centres. The only other dynamic to play a prominent role, growth from net
migration gain offsetting natural decrease (Type C growth), has remained relatively
stable for towns but diminished for rural centres. Decline from both negative
components—Type F decline, Bucher and Mai’s (2005) ‘new’ form of decline, is
present in all five-year periods and more common for rural centres, but has as yet
played a relatively small role. The data also suggest that zero growth, at least at this
point, is a transitional status, as opposed to an ‘end point’ as indicated by demo-
graphic transition theory.
While rural centres have been consistently somewhat more likely than towns to
decline from natural increase failing to offset net migration loss (Type E decline),
the substantial increase in this combination experienced across the 1996–2001
period is equally present for both towns and rural centres, with barely two per-
centage points difference at that observation (52.4 and 54.5% respectively). Since
2001, the situation for towns has largely returned to that extant prior to 1996, while
for rural centres the role of natural increase in offsetting net migration loss (Type B
growth) has become increasingly important. In total, the period 2006–13 saw nearly
60% of rural centres decline, and that would have been 75% had Type B growth not
been extant for 15% of cases.
Importantly, Type B growth is very different to Type A growth, and should not
be confused with it, as areas growing from Type B growth are somewhat more
vulnerable to depopulation, and will become more so as natural increase reduces.
Similar comments apply to Type C growth (net migration gain offsetting natural
decrease).
In sum, the trends for towns and rural centres are similar but differ in subtle ways
that have important implications for future growth as structural ageing progresses.
For example, net migration loss has always been a greater issue for the rural centres
than for towns, but in the past, much of it was concealed by natural increase,
resulting in overall growth (Type B). With natural increase projected to fall, it will
be increasingly difficult for rural centres to offset underlying net migration loss.
Given that they are also seeing diminishing Type A growth (natural increase and net
migration gain), and greater percentages declining from both negative components
in combination (Type F decline), rural centres will have increasingly limited ability
to reverse the trends. This does not mean that many towns are not facing similar
demographic challenges, as several of the larger and fastest growing towns have
relatively old age structures and appear to be growing largely from retiree migration
(and momentum, from larger cohorts replacing smaller ones), but rather, that their
greater positive growth components will protect them for longer.
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 177

Table 7.6 Percentage of towns and rural centres by combined components of growth and decline,
1976–2013
1976– 1981– 1986– 1991– 1996– 2001– 2006–
81 86 91 96 01 06 13
Towns
Growth A. Growth from both 38.5 39.9 37.1 39.9 33.6 44.1 37.1
positive components
B. Natural increase 22.4 19.6 16.1 15.4 7.0 16.1 17.5
offsets net migration
loss
C. Net migration gain 9.1 10.5 7.7 9.1 3.5 6.3 9.8
offsets natural
decrease
Decline D. Net migration gain 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.4 2.8
fails to offset natural
decrease
E. Natural increase 27.3 27.3 36.4 32.2 52.4 29.4 32.2
fails to offset net
migration loss
F. Decline from both 0.7 1.4 0.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 0.7
negative components
Zero growth (G–H) (%) 1.4 0.7 2.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
Total towns (Number) 143 143 143 143 143 143 143
Summary (towns)
Growth 69.9 69.9 60.8 64.3 44.1 66.4 64.3
Decline 28.7 29.4 37.1 35.0 55.9 33.6 35.7
Zero growth 1.4 0.7 2.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Natural decline) 11.9 12.6 9.1 11.9 7.0 10.5 13.3
Rural centres
Growth A. Growth from both 30.3 37.1 34.1 34.8 20.5 24.2 17.4
positive components
B. Natural increase 8.3 11.4 9.1 17.4 12.1 11.4 15.2
offsets net migration
loss
C. Net migration gain 12.9 10.6 6.1 7.6 4.5 4.5 6.1
offsets natural
decrease
Decline D. Net migration gain 6.1 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.8 6.1 3.8
fails to offset natural
decrease
E. Natural increase 37.1 34.1 43.9 37.9 54.5 43.2 50.8
fails to offset net
migration loss
F. Decline from both 3.8 5.3 4.5 2.3 7.6 9.8 5.3
negative components
(continued)
178 N. Jackson et al.

Table 7.6 (continued)


1976– 1981– 1986– 1991– 1996– 2001– 2006–
81 86 91 96 01 06 13
Zero growth (G–H) (%) 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.5
Total rural centres 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
(number)
Summary (rural centres)
Growth 51.5 59.1 49.2 59.8 37.1 40.2 38.6
Decline 47.0 39.4 50.8 40.2 62.9 59.1 59.8
Zero growth 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.5
(Natural decline) 23.5 16.7 12.9 9.8 12.9 20.5 15.2
Reproduced and revised from Jackson et al. (2016, Table 9)

The relative strength of these relationships can be assessed by applying the


Pearson correlation coefficient4 to them (Table 7.7). Following Johnson et al.
(2015) we also incorporate three additional explanatory variables: percentage aged
65+ years, as an indicator of the extent of structural ageing; percentage of the
female population aged 15–44 years, as an indicator of capacity for natural increase
to sustain population growth; and Total Fertility (TF), as an indicator of its rela-
tionship with natural increase (underlying data are available from Jackson et al.
2016). Unfortunately, because we do not have subnational TF data for more than
three periods, and it is an approximation based on the TF for the TA that each town
or rural centre is located in, these data must be viewed with care. In addition, rather
than follow Johnson et al.’s geographic breakdown of metropolitan and
non-metropolitan aggregations, we present our findings separately for towns and
rural centres, as above. Methodologically, it should be recalled that each data point
carries equal weight, irrespective of size.

7.5 Correlations and Explanatory Variables

The correlation between net growth and net migration gain is both positive and
statistically significant (p = 0.01) for both towns and rural centres at all observations.
It is also slightly stronger for the former but never below +0.92: thus, as we might
expect, areas with higher net migration gain generally have higher growth (Table 7.7)
—while in the case of declining towns and rural centres, the positive correlation also
reflects that both net growth and net migration were generally negative.

4
The Pearson product moment correlation coefficient ‘r’ measures the linear strength of the
relationship between two arrays of data, with +1.00 meaning that each item moved in exactly the
same direction at the same rate of change (whether positively or negatively), and −1.00 meaning
that each item moved in the opposite direction.
Table 7.7 Pearson correlation coefficients for selected combinations of variables, 1976–2013 by town or rural centre
1976–81 1981–86 1986–91 1991–96 1996–01 2001–06 2006–13
Towns
Net change and net migration 0.9760*** 0.9891*** 0.9787*** 0.9795*** 0.9817*** 0.9804*** 0.9692***
Net change and natural increase −0.1990** −0.3424*** −0.5188*** −0.2595*** −0.0862 0.0230 −0.1174
Net change and % 65+ years 0.1869** 0.4111*** 0.4681*** 0.1627* 0.0207 −0.0989 0.0594
Natural increase and net migration −0.4074*** −0.4771*** −0.6831*** −0.4486*** −0.2746*** −0.1744** −0.3583***
Natural increase and % F 15–44 Years 0.7080*** 0.6711*** 0.6698*** 0.7649*** 0.7720*** 0.8269*** 0.8270***
Natural increase and TF … … … … 0.2612*** 0.0992 0.2111**
Natural increase and % 65+ years −0.8279*** −0.8279*** −0.8298*** −0.8806*** −0.8981*** −0.9266*** −0.9305***
Net migration and % 65+ years 0.3579*** 0.5144*** 0.5990*** 0.3341*** 0.1919** 0.0852 0.2865***
Rural centres
Net change and net migration 0.9475*** 0.9724*** 0.9657*** 0.9593*** 0.9510*** 0.9759*** 0.9290***
Net change and natural increase 0.1876** −0.0557 −0.0120 0.1614* 0.1967** 0.1891** −0.0445
Net change and % 65+ years 0.1203 0.3374*** 0.3429*** 0.1243 0.0631 −0.0501 −0.0124
Natural increase and net migration −0.1365 −0.2870*** −0.2712*** −0.1239 −0.1160 −0.0296 −0.4110***
Natural increase and % F 15–44 years 0.4412*** 0.6153*** 0.4286*** 0.6800*** 0.6220*** 0.5829*** 0.7672***
Natural increase and TF … … … … 0.1308 0.1892** 0.2138**
Natural increase and % 65+ years −0.5097*** −0.5490*** −0.6437*** −0.7044*** −0.6403*** −0.6738*** −0.6729***
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth …

Net migration and % 65+ years 0.2873*** 0.4519*** 0.4972*** 0.3266*** 0.2658*** 0.0986 0.2379***
Source Authors’ calculations
Pearson’s ‘r’ measures the linear strength of a relationship between two arrays of data, with +1.00 meaning that each item moved in exactly the same direction
at the same rate of change, and −1.00 meaning that each item moved in the opposite direction
***P-Value significant at <0.01; **significant at <0.05; *significant at <0.10
179
180 N. Jackson et al.

The second-strongest positive relationship for both towns and rural centres,
across all but one period for rural centres, is for natural increase and the percentage
of females aged 15–44 years (p = 0.01 at all observations). As proposed by
Johnson et al. (2015, p. 667), areas with the lowest proportion of women at these
ages have a higher experience of natural decrease, resulting in an inverse
relationship. In our analysis, relatively few areas yet have natural decrease and we
have a strong positive relationship because it is showing that towns and rural
centres with the highest proportions of women at these ages are experiencing the
highest natural increase, and towns with the lowest proportions are experiencing the
lowest natural increase. Our findings thus concur with Johnson et al., that the lower
the proportion of women at the main childbearing ages, the more difficult it is for
them to sustain the natural increase required to offset migration loss.
Seemingly mirroring the latter relationship is that between natural increase and
the percentage aged 65+ years. At all observations this relationship is strongly or
moderately negative, more so for towns than rural centres, and statistically sig-
nificant at p = 0.01. Thus, as was similarly found for US and European counties by
Johnson et al. (2015, pp. 665–666), the higher the percentage aged 65+ years, the
lower the natural increase. That this relationship is somewhat stronger for New
Zealand’s towns than rural centres appears to reflect the earlier finding that many
towns have relatively old age structures, with proportions at older ages presumably
increasing the number of deaths. Historically, New Zealand’s urban fertility rates
have also always been lower than rural rates (Pool et al. 2004, 2005, 2007), thereby
contributing to faster rates of ageing. While a greater proportion of towns than rural
centres have experienced natural increase over the past several decades (refer
Table 7.2), that proportion is now falling at a faster rate than for rural centres.
Notably, these relationships are substantially stronger between net migration/net
growth and natural increase/percentage of women aged 15–44 years than between
natural increase and TF, for both towns and rural centres—albeit there are only
three data periods on which to deliberate, and only some are statistically significant.
While also positive, suggesting that the higher the TF, the higher the natural
increase, the relatively weak values show that there is very little relationship
between the two, and indicate that it is net migration loss (implicitly of reproductive
age people) and/or increasing numbers at older ages, rather than very low fertility,
that is presently associated with subnational New Zealand’s shift towards natural
decrease.
Also showing positive, and, for all but one observation (2001–2006), statistically
significant relationships, for both towns and rural centres, are net migration and
percentage aged 65+ years. Between 2001 and 2006, the relationship is
non-existent, for both towns and rural centres; however, it becomes statistically
significant again between 2006 and 2013, although somewhat weaker. While these
correlations indicate that migration has contributed to the percentage aged 65+
years, it should be recalled that it may have done so indirectly, by removing people
at younger ages, rather than adding those at older ages. The proposition is supported
by the somewhat weaker relationships between net change and the percentage aged
65+ years, which are positive and statistically significant for towns for the first four
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 181

observations only, and for rural centres for only the first two—then becoming
non-significant and/or negative. Together these correlations indicate that those aged
65+ years were contributing to net change in the early to middle part of the period,
but not necessarily as the result of migration.
The relationship between natural increase and net migration is negative for both
towns and rural centres: the higher the net migration, the lower the natural increase.
It is statistically significant for towns at all observations, but only intermittently for
rural centres. The finding of a negative relationship is particularly important, because
it is often assumed that migration will generate additional births and natural increase.
Here we see that is not the case for towns and is often not the case for rural centres—
plausibly because many of those who move to towns reduce their fertility, or are
beyond childbearing age. Supporting this proposition, the relationship between net
change and natural increase is either weakly or moderately negative (for towns) or
fluctuates between weakly positive and negative (for rural centres); it is statistically
significant at only some observations, and generally at lower p values. In general, the
finding implies minimal association between net change and natural increase, con-
trasting with the above findings for net change and net migration, and confirming
that it is migration which is the main determinant of net change.

7.6 Projections

We do not attempt here to undertake projections for our 143 towns and 132 rural
centres, because in many cases numbers by age and sex are too small to generate
robust data. Instead we turn briefly to territorial authority (TA) level data where 67
TAs are enumerated, using Statistics New Zealand’s observed data for the period
1991–2013, and medium variant projections (2013-base Update) for the period
2013–2043 (here we exclude data for the Chatham Islands, thus resulting in 66
TAs).5 Unique assumptions apply for each TA.
As would be expected, the observed trends (Fig. 7.4 and Table 7.8) approximate
those for the towns and rural centres that comprise them (Fig. 7.3 and Table 7.6).
The significant increase in Type E Decline (natural increase failing to offset net
migration loss) between 1996 and 2001 shown for towns and rural centres is clearly
evident for TAs, experienced across that period by 61%. With the exception of that
period, the observed trends would suggest a general increase in the percentage
growing from Type A growth (both positive components) and a general decline in
both the percentage growing from Type B growth (natural increase offsetting net

5
Reflecting New Zealand’s currently high levels of international migration, the national medium
variant projection assumptions are for an initial net gain of 55,340 migrants per year between and
2013 and 2018, falling to 25,800 per year between 2018 and 2023, and to 15,000 per year between
2023 and 2028, then remaining constant; the TF falling slowly to 1.85 births per woman by 2033
and then remaining constant; and life expectancy continuing to increase for both males and
females, but at a decelerating rate (Stats NZ 2017b).
182 N. Jackson et al.

Fig. 7.4 Observed (1991–2013) and projected (2016–2043) percentage of territorial authority
areas by combined components of growth and decline (years ending June). Sources Observed:
Authors; Projected: Stats NZ (2017c)

migration loss) and declining from Type E decline (natural increase failing to offset
net migration loss). However this picture changes abruptly when we observe the
projections, despite their initial very positive assumptions regarding migration.
Reflecting the very high net international migration assumptions in the first few
years of the projections, Type A growth (from both positive components) initially
increases, pertaining to 67% of TAs across the 2013–18 period. However this
growth is not sustained once the migration assumption begins to reduce—from
which time the baby boomer population will also drive an increase in deaths and a
decline in natural increase. After 2018, there is a steady decline in the percentage of
TAs experiencing Types A and B growth, and an increase in Type C growth (net
migration gain offsetting natural decrease). These trends accelerate after 2028, such
that by 2043, just 42% of TAs (N = 28) are projected to be still growing, the
majority from Type C growth (net migration gain offsetting natural decrease). By
then, net migration gain failing to offset natural decrease (Type D decline), natural
increase failing to offset net migration loss (Type E decline), and decline from both
negative components (Type F decline) are projected to pertain to 9.1, 16.7, 27.3%
of TAs respectively, along with 4.5% experiencing zero growth. Thereafter, many
of the 19.7% of TAs projected to be growing from Type C growth between 2038
and 2043 will also become increasingly vulnerable to depopulation, as natural
decrease deepens (Fig. 7.5).
The findings endorse the picture foreshadowed in the above analysis of towns
and rural centres, that the trend away from natural increase and net migration gain
as the major drivers of growth is gathering strength, and from 2028 will begin to tip
the national picture. However, the 28 TAs (42%) projected to be still growing at the
end of the period will account for around 80% of the projected New Zealand
population. We return to this point below.
Table 7.8 Observed (1991–2013) and projected (2013–2043) percentage of territorial authority areas by combined components of growth and decline (years
ending June)
1976– 1981– 1986– 1991– 1996– 2001– 2006– 2013– 2018– 2023– 2028– 2033– 2038–
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2013 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043
Observed Projected (medium variant)
Growth A. Growth from both 21.2 33.3 30.3 43.9 21.2 50.0 40.9 66.7 48.5 39.4 27.3 21.2 16.7
positive components
B. Natural Increase offsets 31.8 31.8 25.8 25.8 18.2 24.2 28.8 22.7 28.8 24.2 21.2 10.6 6.1
net migration loss
C. Net migration gain 0.0 3.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 6.1 4.5 10.6 19.7 21.2 19.7
offsets natural decrease
Decline D. Net migration gain fails 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 7.6 9.1
to offset natural decrease
E. Natural increase fails to 45.5 31.8 42.4 30.3 60.6 24.2 28.8 4.5 13.6 18.2 19.7 18.2 16.7
offset net migration loss
F. Decline from both 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 3.0 7.6 19.7 27.3
negative components
Zero growth (G–H) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.5 1.5 1.5 4.5
Number (total territorial 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
authority areas)
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth …

Summary (territorial authority areas)


Growth 53.0 68.2 57.6 69.7 39.4 75.8 71.2 95.5 81.8 74.2 68.2 53.0 42.4
Decline 47.0 31.8 42.4 30.3 60.6 24.2 28.8 4.5 15.2 21.2 30.3 45.5 53.0
Zero growth 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.5 1.5 1.5 4.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
(Number of TAs) 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66
Sources Observed: Authors; Projected: Stats NZ (2017c)
183
184 N. Jackson et al.

Fig. 7.5 Observed and projected natural increase or decrease by territorial authority area, 2001–
13, 2018–23, 2028–33 and 2038–43. Source Stats NZ (2017c)

These analyses and correlations are presenting an intuitively correct picture of


what we might expect to see as a structural ageing progresses (Jackson and
Cameron 2017). Clearly, periodic changes in the actual level of net international
migration that New Zealand experiences along with the age profile of international
migrants will have an impact on subnational natural increase and decrease, even
though most migrants go to the largest city, Auckland (at least initially). However,
even large migration gains cannot prevent structural ageing (United Nations 2010).
This is very much the case in subnational New Zealand, where the projected
proportion of TAs with more elderly than children by 2043 is almost identical under
the high, medium and low variant projections, ranging between 97 and 100% (Stats
NZ 2017d). High levels of international migration can slow the subnational shift to
natural decrease, but cannot prevent it.
These findings raise a question which we cannot answer here, but towards which
we have developed an evidence base: what are the broader social, economic and
political implications of these subnational trends? By 2043, around 80% of the New
Zealand population is projected to live in just 28 growing TAs, meaning that the
remaining 20% will live in 35 depopulating TAs and three TAs experiencing zero
growth (Table 7.9). Among many other matters, this maldistribution has major
implications for the way in which local government funding has historically been
achieved in New Zealand—largely through locally raised rate revenue (Office of the
Auditor-General 2014; Local Government New Zealand 2015). Just 11 of the
growing TAs are projected to be still growing from both positive components
(natural increase and net migration gain) and these will account for 63% of the
projected New Zealand population. In the past, growing areas have been able to
Table 7.9 Observed (1991–2013) and projected (2013–2043) percentage of New Zealand population by combined components of growth and decline, and
summary data (years ending June)
1976– 1981– 1986– 1991– 1996– 2001– 2006– 2013– 2018– 2023– 2028– 2033– 2038–
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2013 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043
Observed Projected (medium variant)
Growing TAs
A. Growth from both positive 38.8 54.4 54.8 70.8 46.2 78.8 57.7 88.4 80.1 72.0 69.1 65.3 63.4
components
B. Natural increase offsets net 24.7 24.6 25.5 18.6 24.4 14.0 24.6 8.2 14.7 18.4 16.3 9.9 7.5
migration loss
C. Net migration gain offsets natural 0.0 4.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 2.8 2.3 5.0 7.4 10.3 9.9
decrease
Declining TAs
D. Net migration gain fails to offset 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 2.7 3.4
natural decrease
E. Natural increase fails to offset net 32.9 16.6 18.7 10.6 29.4 6.7 17.3 0.7 2.1 2.7 3.4 6.5 6.8
migration loss
F. Decline from both negative 3.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 1.7 4.8 6.8
components
Zero Growth (G-H) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.5 1.0 0.6 2.2
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth …

Total population (millions) 3.142 3.262 3.373 3.617 3.736 4.027 4.241 4.864 5.157 5.389 5.594 5.769 5.923
Summary
Growing TAs (number/66) 35 45 38 46 26 50 47 63 54 49 45 35 28
Growing TAs (% of TAs) 53.0 68.2 57.6 69.7 39.4 75.8 71.2 95.5 81.8 74.2 68.2 53.0 42.4
Growing TAs (% of New Zealand 63.5 83.4 81.3 89.4 70.6 93.3 82.7 99.3 97.0 95.3 92.8 85.5 80.8
population)
Declining TAs (number/66) 31 21 28 20 40 16 19 3 10 14 20 30 35
(continued)
185
Table 7.9 (continued)
186

1976– 1981– 1986– 1991– 1996– 2001– 2006– 2013– 2018– 2023– 2028– 2033– 2038–
1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 2013 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043
Declining TAs (% of TAs) 47.0 31.8 42.4 30.3 60.6 24.2 28.8 4.5 15.2 21.2 30.3 45.5 53.0
Declining TAs (% of New Zealand 36.5 16.6 18.7 10.6 29.4 6.7 17.3 0.7 2.3 3.1 6.2 13.9 17.0
population)
Zero growth TAs (number/66) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 1 3
Zero growth TAs (% of TAs) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 4.5 1.5 1.5 4.5
Zero growth TAs (% of New Zealand 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.5 1.0 0.6 2.2
population)
Natural decrease/zero natural increase 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 4 6 12 21 33 40
(number of TAs)
Natural decrease (% of TAs) 1.5 3.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.5 1.5 6.1 9.1 18.2 31.8 50.0 60.6
Natural decrease/zero natural increase 3.6 4.4 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5 2.8 2.5 5.4 10.2 17.8 20.1
(% of New Zealand population)
Sources Observed: Authors; Projected: Stats NZ (2017c)
N. Jackson et al.
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 187

claim a greater share of resources, and growth certainly facilitates the gathering of
rate revenue; in the future, however, it may be that these TAs will be in the
strongest position to ‘fend for themselves’. By contrast, the 4 TAs growing from
Type B growth (natural increase offsetting net migration loss) and the 13 TAs
growing from Type C growth (net migration gain offsetting natural decrease),which
will together account for around 17% of the 2043 population, will be looking
nervously at the experience of their depopulating counterparts. As noted above,
areas growing from Types B and C growth will be increasingly vulnerable to
depopulation, as natural increase diminishes and natural decrease becomes the
norm. By 2043 around 60% of TAs (N = 40) are projected to be experiencing
natural decrease, and 20% of the population will live in areas so-affected.
By 2043, depopulating TAs (N = 35) will have little chance of returning to
growth of any significance. Six are projected to have natural decrease that is greater
than net migration gain (Type D decline), 11 to have net migration loss that is
greater than natural increase (Type E decline), and 18 to be declining from the new
(Type F) form of depopulation. The three TAs experiencing zero growth will also
struggle to reverse that situation, as it implies either negative natural increase
exactly offset by net migration gain, or vice versa. While the trends also foreshadow
greater proportions affected by depopulation beyond the projection horizon, the
current and near-future situation in New Zealand is very different to that of many
counterpart countries, where national growth has already ended or depopulation
begun. For New Zealand, it is less a case of the imminent end of national population
growth as it is the end of growth for large geographic sections of the country.

7.7 Summary and Discussion

In this paper, we have examined the experience of structural ageing and the
dynamics leading to the proposed ending of population growth for much of sub-
national New Zealand. A primary objective of the study was to ascertain whether
subnational New Zealand is following its structurally older international counter-
parts and experiencing decline from what has been termed the ‘new’ cause of
depopulation: the combined effect of net migration loss and natural decrease.
To do this we generated experimental back-projections of population change for
143 New Zealand towns and 132 rural centres, for the period 1976–2013, in the
process producing previously unavailable retrospective patterns and trends in the
components of change (natural increase and net migration) and age group. Users of
these data should refer back to the caveats given in the introduction concerning the
development of these data for research purposes (see also Jackson et al. 2016).
Because New Zealand is structurally younger than most of its counterpart
countries, and the dynamics of structural ageing less visible, we also ‘extended’ our
analysis by examining both retrospective data for the period 1991–2013, and
medium variant projections for the period 2013–2043, for 66 of New Zealand’s 67
territorial authority areas. These political jurisdictions (see Appendix 1) contain the
188 N. Jackson et al.

towns and rural centres of the main analysis, and, like them, are differently sized.
These differences in size lead to one important methodological limitation of the
study’s findings, namely that all data points are equally weighted irrespective of their
underlying size. Although we refer to the proportion of the New Zealand population
affected by the trends at various junctures, we made a deliberate decision not to
weight the data for population size, in that our primary interest is in how each town,
rural centre and TA is faring demographically, and what this will mean for the future.
Because we are producing these data for the first time, we also develop a primarily
descriptive analysis and provide basic correlations between selected variables such as
net change and net migration, and natural increase and percentage aged 65+ years, using
the Pearson ‘r’. In this paper, we do not seek to understand societal factors behind the
changing fertility, mortality and migration (cf. Sackmann et al. 2015). However, we
briefly outline spatial differences in New Zealand’s social and economic structure.
Our analysis shows that the majority of New Zealand’s towns grew across the
period 1976–2013, while the majority of rural centres declined. However, there was
an overall declining trend for both towns and rural centres, with just on 71% of
towns and 53% of rural centres experiencing growth at the beginning of the 1976–
2013 period. This fell to 64 and 40% respectively at the end (noting that the final
observation covers a seven-year period due to the delayed 2011 Census).
We examined the trends of subnational growth and decline first through the
conventional lens of structural ageing, and then through a typology which identifies
three combined causes of growth and three of decline, along with two combinations
which result in zero population growth. For towns, the main cause of both growth
and population change per se across the period 1976–2013 was, with one exception,
the combination of natural increase and net migration gain—which we refer to as
Type A growth. The exception was the period 1996–2001, when the major dynamic
of population change per se was, temporarily, Type E decline (explained below).
Type A growth was also the main cause of population growth for rural centres. For
them, however, the dominant cause of population change across all intercensal
periods was decline caused by the combination of natural increase failing to offset
net migration loss—referred to by Bucher and Mai (2005) as the ‘old’ form of
population decline, and by us as Type E decline. Towns also experienced Type E
decline, but for them it was second to Type A growth, except in the anomalous
period 1996–2001.
For both towns and rural centres, the second major cause of growth was natural
increase offsetting net migration loss (which we refer to as Type B growth). For
towns this dynamic declined across the period, while increasing for rural centres.
The third cause of growth, again for both towns and rural centres, was net migration
gain offsetting natural decrease (which we refer to as Type C growth). This dynamic
played a somewhat smaller role, and remained fairly constant for towns while
reducing for rural centres.
The two remaining combinations of depopulation, Type D decline, where net
migration gain fails to offset natural decrease, and Type F decline, where both net
migration and natural increase are negative, played very minor roles for both towns
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 189

and rural centres. However Type F decline, Bucher and Mai’s (2005) ‘new’ form of
depopulation, was always present, particularly for rural centres.
Extending the analysis with medium variant projections for territorial authority
areas indicates that an increasing number of New Zealand’s towns and rural centres
should expect a continued diminishing of both Types A and B growth—although
this will not begin in earnest for about a decade. While Type C growth, net
migration gain offsetting natural decrease, is projected to increase (reflecting the
widespread emergence of natural decrease), it is, like Type B growth, an increas-
ingly vulnerable form of growth. Once natural decrease emerges, all growth can
only come from migration. By 2043, just 28 TAs (42%) are projected to remain
growing, the majority from Type C growth.
Perhaps the biggest surprise is the rapid emergence of Type F decline (both
components negative) after 2028, accelerating after 2033. By 2043, this ‘new’
dynamic is projected to be the single largest driver of both population decline and
population change per se at TA level, affecting around 27% of TAs. However, both
other combined causes of depopulation are also projected to increase across the
period, taking the place of the current drivers of growth.
By 2043, the 28 growing TAs are projected to account for around 80% of the New
Zealand population, with 63% concentrated in just 11 TAs growing from Type A
growth, 7.5% in the 4 TAs growing from Type B growth, and 10% in the 13 TAs
growing from Type C growth. The trends thus indicate continuing concentration of
the population in growing towns, and growing depopulation elsewhere—accompa-
nied by increasing vulnerability of TAs experiencing Type B and C growth.
One other important finding was that the (Pearson’s) correlation between the
proportion of women aged 15–44 years and natural increase was consistently strong
and positive for both towns and rural centres, and generally strengthened over time,
confirming that as the proportion at prime reproductive age declines, natural
increase declines. By contrast, the correlation between natural increase and Total
Fertility was relatively weak—although we had only three data periods on which to
base this assessment and only two periods were statistically significant. Although
limited, the finding indicates that at this point in the demographic transition, New
Zealand’s subnational shift towards natural decrease is not caused by the conven-
tional driver of structural ageing, low fertility per se, but rather, by age-selective
migration, as also found for the counties of the United States by Johnson et al.
(2015). At the same time, we also see this as a methodological issue worth pur-
suing, in that it may be a compositional effect. Many New Zealand rural areas have
high fertility rates but very low proportions of women of childbearing age, leading
to low levels of natural increase. In such cases, we believe that the better correlates
are natural increase and percentage of women aged 15–44 years.
Also of note theoretically is the proposition that zero growth in subnational New
Zealand is at this point seemingly a transitional status, as opposed to the ‘end point’
indicated by transition theory. However, the TA level projections suggest a small
but irregular increase in its onset, and it will be interesting to revisit trends in zero
growth at the level of towns and rural centres.
190 N. Jackson et al.

Thus, as proposed at the outset of this paper, New Zealand is still some way off
reaching the ‘new’ ageing-driven end of growth at national level—and could in fact
continue to grow long after its counterpart countries have stopped growing and are
depopulating. However, the subnational dynamics of growth and decline suggest it
will become increasingly harder for that growth to be maintained outside of the
major cities and towns. Reflecting trends in the US and Europe but lagging
somewhat behind them, we agree with Johnson et al. (2015) that the interaction of
migration with age structure is as centrally related to the outcome of natural growth
or decline, and thus overall growth or decline, as is the conventional driver of
structural ageing—low fertility. In New Zealand, the former dynamics remain the
more important. Both the out-migration of reproductive age people removes
reproductive capacity (as well as any children they may have), and the in-migration
of older retirees augments growth at older ages. The latter is likely to be increas-
ingly visible in many sun-belt towns, rural centres and TAs over the next few
decades, but should not be confused with the old form of growth. Ultimately, it will
hasten their path to the onset of natural decrease. Neither should subnational
depopulation in New Zealand be considered only in terms of the proportion of the
total population affected by the trends. The broad geographic area that will be
affected will have equally widespread social, economic and political implications,
the nature of which many New Zealanders have scarcely begun to envisage.

Acknowledgments Work on this paper was supported by a New Zealand Royal Society
Marsden-Funded programme of research: Tai Timu Tangata: Taihoa e? (The subnational mech-
anisms of the ending of population growth: Towards a theory of depopulation) [Contract
MAU1308, 2013–2016].

Appendix 1: Definition of Geographic Spatial Units


Referred to in this Paper

Mesh block: A mesh block is the smallest geographic unit for which Statistics New
Zealand collects statistical data. Mesh blocks vary in size, from part of a city block
to large areas of rural land. Each mesh block borders on another to cover all of New
Zealand, extending out to the 200-mile economic zone (approximately 320 km).
Mesh blocks are aggregated to build larger geographic areas, such as area units,
territorial authorities, and regional councils. At the time of the 2013 Census, there
were 46,637 mesh blocks in New Zealand.
Urban area: Urban areas are statistically defined areas without administrative or
legal basis. They are hierarchically subdivided into main, secondary, and minor
urban areas. Together they comprise the statistically defined ‘urban’ population of
New Zealand.
7 From Ageing-Driven Growth Towards the Ending of Growth … 191

Main urban areas are very large urban areas centred on a city or major urban
centre, with a minimum population of 30,000. Urban areas in the main conurbations
have been further divided into urban zones, with each urban zone defined as a
separate urban area.
Secondary urban areas were established at the 1981 Census. They have a
population between 10,000 and 29,999 people and are centred on the larger regional
centres.
Minor urban areas are urbanised settlements (outside main and secondary
urban areas), centred around smaller towns with a population between 1,000 and
9,999 people. This complies with the international definitions of ‘urban’ population
that includes towns with over 1,000 people.
Rural area: The rural areas of New Zealand are those that are not specifically
designated as ‘urban’. They include rural centres, and district territories where these
are not included in main, secondary, or minor urban areas; and inlets, islands, inland
waters, and oceanic waters that are outside urban areas.
The standard urban area classification as used by Statistics New Zealand has two
categories of rural areas: rural centres and other rural. Rural centres are defined by
population size, having a population of 300–999 in a reasonably compact area that
services surrounding rural areas (district territory). They have a defined statistical
boundary (an area unit) but no legal status. ‘Other rural’ is the urban area classi-
fication residual category and includes all area units not in urban areas or rural
centres. This category includes inlets, islands, inland waters, and oceanic waters
outside urban areas.
One rural centre6 growing by over 2000% at the final observation 2006–2013
was deemed an outlier, substantially biasing some results, and was removed from
the analysis.
Territorial Authority Area: Territorial Authority Areas have both adminis-
trative and legal status. A territorial authority is defined under the Local
Government Act 2002 as a city council or district council. There are 67 territorial
authorities comprising 12 cities, 53 districts, Auckland Council and Chatham
Islands territory. Representing just one territorial authority area but four ‘urban
zones’, the Auckland Council was formed as part of new local government
arrangements in 2010. It is the single-largest administrative area, in 2013
accounting for just on one-third of the New Zealand population (Stats NZ 2013).

Appendix 2

Annual net permanent and long-term international migration (number), New Zealand, 1976–2016.
Source Stats NZ (2017a)

6
Rural Centre Pegasus grew from 44 persons to 1,047 between 2006 and 2013.
192 N. Jackson et al.

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Chapter 8
Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral
Nations: County-Level Analyses
of Mexico and Turkey

Guadalupe Marquez-Velarde, Ceylan Engin and Dudley L. Poston Jr.

Abstract Natural decrease is the demographic phenomenon in which more deaths


than births occur in a population in a given period. In many countries, developed
and developing, natural increase, i.e., the excess of births over deaths, typically
accounts for most of the population increase, and often is large enough to offset
population losses due to outmigration. However, if the excess births are replaced by
excess deaths, i.e., natural decrease, then it is unlikely there will be any population
growth. Demographic research has shown that it is at the subnational (county) level
where the excess of deaths over births first begins to appear. In this chapter, we
analyse the birth:death ratios of the 2457 municipios (counties) of Mexico in the
2005–2013 period, and the 81 subnational units (counties) of Turkey in the 2007–
2014 period. We analyse the two countries as two individual case studies. We do so
separately and do not compare the data and empirical patterns of the two countries.
In this sense, the country-specific spatial characteristics of one country will not
affect the analysis of the other country. This is not a perfect answer to the issue of
the differences in the size of their respective subnational units. Nonetheless, it is the
best we can do given the strategies the two governments have chosen with respect
to the spatial configurations of their respective counties. In our chapter, we show
that natural decrease is indeed occurring at the subnational level in Mexico in over
16% of all the counties. In Turkey, we did not find evidence of natural decrease in
any of its counties, although some of its counties are moving toward having more
deaths than births; in other words, they are “near natural decrease.” We then used
two demographic independent variables, one focusing on fertility, the other on the
presence of elderly, and modelled the birth:death ratio among the counties in the
two countries. We conclude our chapter by drawing out some of the social and
economic implications of our findings for the two countries.

G. Marquez-Velarde (&)
Utah State University, Logan, UT, USA
C. Engin
Universita degli Studi di Milano, Milan, Italy
D. L. Poston Jr.
Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
e-mail: d-poston@tamu.edu

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 195


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_8
196 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

Keywords Mexico  Turkey  Natural decrease  Fertility  Elderly

8.1 Introduction

Natural decrease is the demographic phenomenon in which more deaths than births
occur in a population in a given period of time (Johnson and Beale 1992). Natural
decrease is a sociological phenomenon worthy of our attention. It is of particular
interest because in many countries, developed and developing, the excess of births
over deaths typically accounts for almost all of the population increase, and often is
large enough to offset population losses due to outmigration. However, if the excess
births are replaced by excess deaths, then it is unlikely there will be any population
growth. We have seen that in many European counties the continual existence of
natural decrease has led some to conclude that the potential of the countries “for
sustained and widespread population growth is extremely limited and that at best it
might experience periods of intermittent population growth and decline in the
future” (Johnson et al. 2015, p. 651).
Demographic research has shown that it is at the subnational (county) level
where the excess of deaths over births first begins to appear (Johnson et al. 2015).
In this chapter, we analyse the birth:death ratios of the 2457 municipios (counties)
of Mexico in the 2005–2013 period, and the 81 subnational units (counties) of
Turkey in the 2007–2014 period. Mexico, a country of over 120 million people has
over 2400 counties, while Turkey, a country of 80 million people, has but 81
counties. In our analyses, we use the spatial units designated and formulated by the
respective governments of each country, even though the counties of Turkey are
much larger spatially and demographically than those of Mexico. In the case of
Turkey, there are no smaller units; in the case of Mexico, we could aggregate the
municipios into a smaller number of larger spatial units, but we would then be
discarding data and detail regarding demographic change.
In this chapter, we analyse Mexico and Turkey as two individual case studies.
We do so separately and do not compare their data and empirical patterns, so the
country-specific spatial characteristics of one country will not affect the analysis of
the other country. This is not a perfect answer to the issue of the differences in the
size of their respective subnational units, but it is the best we can do given the
strategies the two governments have chosen regarding the spatial configurations of
their counties.
Our descriptive analyses indicate that natural decrease is indeed occurring at the
subnational level in Mexico in 396 (over 16%) of all the counties in the time under
study. In Turkey, we did not find evidence of natural decrease in any of its counties,
but we did find that some of Turkey’s counties are moving toward having more
deaths than births, in other words, that they are “near natural decrease.” Had we
been able to conduct our subnational analyses of Turkey using geographically
smaller units of analysis, it is likely we would have found some of them experi-
encing natural decrease.
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 197

We then used two demographic independent variables, one focusing on fertility,


the other on the presence of elderly, and modelled the birth:death ratio among the
counties in the two countries. Prior analyses by demographers have indicated that
natural decrease is largely caused by lower fertility rather than by the presence of
large numbers of elders (Johnson 2011b). Other research has evaluated the impact
of migration processes on natural decrease(Johnson et al. 2015), showing that in
some instances the presence of large numbers of old people in an area is not due to
their “ageing in place,” but, instead, to their migrating into the area. Owing to data
limitations, our descriptive analyses will only be able to consider the effects of
fertility and ageing in the Mexican and Turkish contexts.
Prior to presenting our case studies, let us mention the rationale behind our decision
to analyse natural decrease in Turkey and Mexico. First, both countries are geo-
graphically close to countries characterised by natural decrease at the national or
subnational levels. Poston et al. (2016) have reported that 35% of the counties in the
United States, Mexico’s northern neighbour, were natural decrease counties in the
post-2010 period. Similarly, they noted that 62% of all the counties of Europe reported
more deaths than births in the same period. Although Turkey is located in both Europe
and Asia, 10% of its population is located in the European side of the country.
Therefore, we were interested in ascertaining whether Mexico and Turkey were fol-
lowing demographic patterns similar to those of the United States and Europe.
Second, Mexico and Turkey are in the final stage of the first demographic
transition and are now characterised by low birth and death rates. In recent decades,
both countries have experienced remarkable demographic transformations, espe-
cially in terms of fertility declines. In the, 1960s, their Total Fertility was over 6.0
children per woman. Mexican women in the 1960s were having on average 6.75
children while Turkish women were having around 6.2 children. Nowadays,
Mexican women have an average of 2.3 children, and Turkish women have 2.2
children. Therefore, in the last fifty years, Mexico and Turkey have undergone
similar and remarkable fertility reductions. Coincidentally, they both became
democratic countries in the 1920s, Mexico in 1921 and Turkey in 1923. Since then,
both countries have undergone a dramatic modernization process, which has had an
effect on their demographic patterns. However, as one of the reviewers of this
chapter observed, it is difficult to classify either of these countries today as true
democracies. We agree.
In the next section, we review the relevant literature on the topic of natural
decrease before presenting our two case studies of Mexico and Turkey. Each case
study will include pertinent information on the demographic trends of each country
in order to provide context for our analysis of natural decrease.

8.2 Literature Review: Natural Decrease

The phenomenon of natural decrease, i.e., a population having more deaths than
births, has received significant attention in recent decades (Doteuchi 2006; Johnson
1993, 2011a, b; van de Kaa 1987; Johnson et al. 2015; Poston et al. 2016). As we
198 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

noted in an earlier paragraph, natural decrease is of special sociological significance


and relevance because it inhibits population growth and reduces demographic
stability. It tends to have an uneven spatial distribution and is largely the result of
several demographic forces at play usually over an extended period of time
(Johnson et al. 2015; Johnson 1993; Johnson and Beale 1992). Natural decrease
also has major consequences for the society and carries important policy implica-
tions. A national decrease country tends to be less competitive in the global eco-
nomic market. At the subnational level, natural decrease will often result in
financial stress, declining property values and tax bases, and difficulties in sus-
taining resources (Johnson and Beale 1992). Currently, the nations of Germany,
Italy and Japan are experiencing natural decrease at the national level, while others
like the United States are observing natural decrease only at the subnational level
(Johnson et al. 2015; Poston et al. 2016).
Natural decrease has had a very low prevalence in the United States. One of the
earliest analyses of natural decrease was Dorn’s (1939) in which he reported that
145 U.S. counties had more deaths than births in 1930, and that 255 counties
experienced natural decrease during the 1935–1936 period. These were small
percentages of the more than 3000 counties in the U.S. These instances of sub-
national natural decrease during the Great Depression years were mainly attributed
to low fertility (Johnson and Beale 1992; Johnson 1993). Fertility rates increased in
subsequent decades in the United States, and the frequency of natural decrease
among the counties declined. However, it was observed again starting in the 1950s,
and by, 1966 natural decrease was present in 271 counties (Beale 1969). The
incidence of natural decrease declined somewhat in the 1970s, and by, 1979 only
184 counties reported having more deaths than births. This trend continued into the
1980s (Fuguitt et al. 1989). Later, between 1990 and 2000, the number of natural
decrease counties in the U.S. doubled to over 400 counties (Johnson 2011b). Recent
evidence indicates that 28% of U.S. counties were natural decrease counties during
the 2000–2010 period and 35% in the post-2010 period. Even though this is over
one-third of all U.S. counties, it is a much smaller percentage figure compared to
the 58% of European counties in 2000–2010 and the 62% in the post-2010 years
(Johnson et al. 2015; Poston et al. 2016).
In Europe, there is virtually no current population growth via natural increase.
The crude birth and death rates in Europe as a whole are equal. In 2015 in Europe,
there were 11 babies born per 1000 persons in the population, and there were 11
deaths per 1000 persons in the population, resulting in a percentage rate of natural
increase (RNI) of 0.0. Similarly, in 2015 in the European Union, the birth and death
rates were both 10/1000, also resulting in an RNI of 0.0. All of Europe’s 45
countries now have RNIs less than 1.0, the highest being both Kosovo and Ireland
at 0.9%. Seventeen of Europe’s countries have negative RNIs, and seven have RNIs
of 0.0%. The countries with the highest negative RNIs are Bulgaria at −0.6%,
Serbia at −0.5%, and Hungary, Ukraine, and Romania, all at −0.4%. Russia, the
largest country in Europe with a population of 144.3 million (although technically
only around 110 million live in Europe), has an RNI of 0.0%. Two more of
Europe’s larger nations have negative RNIs, namely, Germany at 81.1 million with
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 199

an RNI of −0.3%, and Italy at 62.5 million with an RNI of −0.2% (Johnson et al.
2015; Population Reference Bureau 2015).
According to previous research, some of the main factors contributing to natural
decrease are population ageing and declining fertility (Johnson et al. 2015). When
subnational natural decrease was first documented in the U.S., low fertility was argued
to be the main cause (Dorn 1939). Similarly, Coleman and Rowthorn (2011) have
noted that low fertility is the main cause of natural decrease in the European nations.
Beale (1969), on the other hand, reported that the main contributing factor to sub-
national natural decrease in the U.S. was a radical change in the age structure of
counties due to internal migration. The change in age structure mainly occurred when
adults in the childbearing ages moved out of certain regions leaving behind fewer
couples able to produce more births than deaths (Johnson and Beale 1992; Beale
1969). It has also been argued that when older individuals move to retirement desti-
nations, the concentration of an ageing population causes natural decrease although
this is a less frequent occurrence compared to the outmigration of young adults (ibid.).
Although research suggests that migration plays a role in natural decrease, it is
also a contributing factor to population increase. Beale (1969) identified
age-selective outmigration as a contributing factor to disturbed population age
structures when he first observed subnational natural decrease in the United States.
As early as, 1939, it was shown that migration could offset natural decrease (Dorn
1939). Currently, internal and international migration are being discussed as
alternatives, alongside pronatalist policies, in order for countries to avoid popula-
tion loss (UN 2001).
Many small towns and rural areas in the U.S., particularly in the Midwest and
the South, are experiencing unexpected population growth due to Hispanic (Latino)
in-migration. The Hispanic populations have higher fertility rates and relatively
younger age distributions contrasted to the older populations who are usually left
behind by their younger counterparts (Johnson and Lichter 2008). Natural increase
among U.S. Hispanics, along with the influx of international immigrants from
Mexico and Latin America, are a major force contributing to population growth in
the U.S. (ibid.).

8.3 Case Study 1: Mexico

8.3.1 Overview

During the twentieth century, Mexico transitioned from a rural and agrarian society
to an urban and industrial one. The economy experienced its first major period of
growth as an independent nation in the 1950s. The government had begun
implementing development strategies in the 1940s by supporting industrial growth
and centralised banking. By the, 1960s, the maquiladora (manufacturing) industry,
part of the Border Industrialization Program, had spearheaded regional industrial-
ization and hence paved the way for industrialization in Mexico’s non-border cities.
200 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

The period from 1940 to 1960 has become known as the “Mexican miracle,” a
combination of rapid industrial development and urbanization. During the 1960s,
the industrial sector surpassed the agricultural sector in its share of gross domestic
product, but national development showed signs of weakening. In the 1970s and
1980s, rising foreign debt and the oil boom, respectively, kept economic growth
afloat. Then in the late 1980s, in the midst of a foreign debt crisis, the government
reformulated economic policy focusing on macroeconomic stability, low inflation
and low deficits. A new development plan was crafted giving manufacturing
exports a central role in national growth while slowly dismantling the state’s role in
the economy.
Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986 and pri-
vatised 1000 formerly state-owned enterprises. The state was no longer actively
promoting development. Public investment, funding and fiscal stimuli were
replaced with the “market forces” of capitalism. In the 1990s, this trend continued,
and Mexico joined the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Overall,
the Mexican economy changed significantly in the 20th century (Trejo-Nieto 2017).
Presently, Mexico is the world’s 11th largest economy, and is best classified as
an upper-middle income economy. Per capita gross domestic product grew by 22%
between 1980 and 2010. However, as of 2010, 51% of the Mexican population
were below the poverty level, compared to 53% in 1984. But illiteracy has dropped
from 17% in 1980 to 8% in 2010, and access to health care has increased from 41%
in 2000 to 67% in 2010 (Passel et al. 2012).
In recent years, Mexico has experienced and continues to experience a spike in
violence due to drug cartel activity that began in the late 2000s. In 2011, Mexico
registered 37,100 homicides in the country, a 44% increase since 2000 (ibid.).

8.3.2 Demographic Trends in Mexico

Currently, Mexico is experiencing population growth at the national level. Its


population in 2015 stands at 127 million people making Mexico the 10th most
populous country in the world. Its current crude birth rate is 19 per 1000, and its
crude death rate is 5 per 1000. Thus, in 2015, in the country as a whole, there were
14 more births than deaths per 1000 population. Mexico’s Total Fertility in 2016 of
2.3 is a substantial reduction from its very high TF of 6.8 in the early 1970s. Overall
life expectancy in the country is 75 years, specifically, 73 for males and 78 for
females (Population Reference Bureau 2015).
In the nineteenth century, during its first years as an independent country,
Mexico experienced “demographic anaemia” (Zavala de Cosio 1990). The country
was largely under-populated, and several epidemics threatened its already small
population (ibid.). In the early part of the twentieth century, Mexico experienced
irregular demographic patterns including reductions in population due to the rev-
olution, armed conflict and its aftermath, followed byslight population increases
(Partida Bush 2005). In the 1900–1910 period, while still under the dictatorship of
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 201

Porfirio Diaz, social conditions in Mexico started to improve, resulting in modest


declines in mortality and larger increases in the population. The population grew
from 13.6 million persons to 15.1 million (1.1% growth rate) mainly due to natural
increase (Cabrera 1994). The Mexican Revolution in the years from 1910 to 1921
curtailed population growth. During this period, the total population declined from
15.1 to 14.3 million due to armed conflicts, the Spanish flu epidemic, emigration to
the U.S., lower marriage rates, and the separation of already married couples during
the turmoil of the revolution (ibid.). Once the revolution was over and peace was
restored in most of the country, the demographic transition began with accelerated
reductions in mortality starting in the 1930s. For the thirty-year period from the
mid-1930s to the mid-1960s, the CDR declined dramatically from 26.6 deaths per
1000 to 9.6 (Benítez Zenteno 1966). In the, 1930s, new population policies influ-
enced by nationalist sentiments were enacted. The General Population Law of 1936
focused on promoting natural growth, marriage and family formation, mortality
reduction, and the repatriation of nationals who had left during the revolution
period. The government also tried to influence internal migration flows in order to
promote intermarriage (mestizaje) between those of Spanish descent and the
indigenous population (Cabrera 1994). Contraceptive measures were forbidden, big
families received monetary awards, and some states took drastic measures to
increase growth, including imposing taxes on single people over 25 years old,
divorcees, and widows without children (ibid.). Consequently, Mexico had a
population boom in the 1940s (augepoblacionista). The population reached 20
million people, women had an average of six children, and life expectancy at birth
increased from 29.3 years at the turn of the century to 41 years. Mexico was
predominantly rural, and 80% of its people still lived in non-urban areas (Benítez
Zenteno 1966).
In the 1950s, the population reached 26 million, and by 1960, Mexico had
36 million people and a growth rate of 3.2%. Life expectancy at birth grew to
59 years, gaining almost twenty years since the 1940s. This accelerated growth
worried demographers and government officials. They started lobbying for a reform
in population policy. The “Mexican Miracle” of high population and record eco-
nomic growth (6% annually) was starting to show signs of trouble. A 15%
unemployment rate signalled that the economic model would not be able to keep
pace with population growth (Zavala de Cosio 1990; Alba and Potter 1986; Rabell
et al. 1986; Cabrera 1994). Health researchers began to analyse how the population
could adopt contraception measures to curb the higher fertility so heavily promoted
just three decades previously (Ordorica Mellado 1994).
In the 1970s, Mexico had 50 million people and a 3.3% growth rate. Fertility
remained unchanged, and life expectancy grew only by three years. However, the
extensive demographic research conducted at the time significantly influenced
demographic policy. In 1974, the Mexican government reformed the General Law
of Population with the objective of regulating “the phenomena that affect popula-
tion in relation to growth, structure, dynamics and distribution in the Mexican
territory with the goal that the entirety of the population can justly and equitably
participate in the benefits of development” (ibid., p. 38). In the same year, a new
202 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

entity, the National Council on Population, was created in order to guide the efforts
of the reformed policy. The Council aimed to reduce growth to 2.5% by the 1980s
and to 1% by the year 2000 (Ordorica Mellado 1994). The National Plan of Family
Planning was unveiled in 1977 to carry out the goals of reduced growth. The Plan
aimed to provide Mexican families with family planning services (Zavala de Cosio
1990).
In 1980, the population reached 70 million, and 81 million by 1990. The popu-
lation growth rate declined to 2.7% in the 1980s and to 2.0% in the 1990s, while life
expectancy at birth grew to 66 years and then to 70 years. TF in the 1980s was around
5.0 children per woman, but dropped to 3.0 in 1990 (Ordorica Mellado 1994). The
reformed population policy had accomplished its goal, and Mexico averted the
dreaded population projections formulated in the 1970s, which suggested that by the
year 2000, Mexico would have between 126 and 153 million people. The redirection
of population policy made it possible for Mexico to have slightly under 100 million
people by the year 2000 (Romo Viramontes and Castillo 2009).
Mexico in the 2000s had the same levels of population growth that it had at the
beginning of the century, although its population was seven times larger and the
levels of fertility and mortality were lower (Partida Bush 2005). However, Mexican

Fig. 8.1 Total Fertility in Mexico from 1960 to 2030. Source of data UN (2015)
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 203

Fig. 8.2 Crude birth rates and crude death rates in Mexico, 1950–2020. Source of data UN (2015)

demographers realised that these patterns were not similar across the Mexican
regions. Those living in urban areas were experiencing lower fertility and mortality,
but this was not the case for those in rural areas (Ordorica Mellado 1994) which
continued to lag with respect to access to family planning, contraception, health
care and education (Romo Viramontes and Castillo 2009).
Figures 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate the changes in Total Fertility (Fig. 8.1), and in the
crude birth rates and crude death rates (Fig. 8.2) in Mexico from 1950–1960 to the
present, with projected figures to 2020–2030.

8.3.3 The Demographic Transition in Mexico and Its


Causes

Even though the first demographic transition in Mexico began later than it did in
most of the developed world, it occurred more rapidly (Juárez et al. 1989). For
instance, the sharp mortality declines observed in Mexico in 30–40 years took
100–150 years in some developed countries (Benítez Zenteno 1966). Mortality
reductions were possible due to urbanization, industrialization, and the expansion of
the educational system (Tuirán et al. 2002). The higher standards of living, com-
bined with increased treatment and prevention of illness, also contributed to the
204 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

mortality decline (Benítez Zenteno 1966). Furthermore, the social security law
enacted in the 1930s allowed the creation of the Mexican Institute for Social
Security (Instituto Mexicano Del Seguro Social, or IMSS), the state-owned health
care system and cornerstone of the Mexican public health infrastructure. IMSS was
the major vehicle used by the government to carry out family planning policies, to
improve population health, and to reduce mortality. In 1977, IMSS debuted its
family planning services according to the reformed population law of 1976 and the
national plan on family planning of 1977. In 1979, family services were extended to
rural and marginalised areas (Zavala de Cosio 1990). The social security law also
expanded other social programs including the education system, which in turn
further influenced fertility reductions. The general improvement of the social
conditions of Mexican women (de Oliveira and García 1990) also had a direct effect
on the fertility reduction. Overall, Mexico will complete the first demographic
transition as soon as it reaches replacement fertility, which should occur in the next
five to ten years (see Fig. 8.1).
It may also be argued that Mexico has started the second demographic transition
(Quilodran 2008; van de Kaa 1987) as observed by changes in family formation and
dissolution, delays in age at first marriage, increases in cohabitation, and increases
in divorce rates (Quilodran 2008; Tuirán et al. 2002). The current median age at first
marriage in Mexico is 30 years for men and 27 for women (INEGI 2015), a
seven-year increase from 23 and 20 years, respectively, just twenty years ago.
Divorce and cohabitation are also much more common these days. In 1980, there
were 4.4 divorces for every 100 marriages; in 2014, the rate had jumped to 19.6.
Data from the 2000 census showed that 10.4% of men and 10.2% of women ages
were cohabiting. Data from the 2010 census reported increases in cohabitation to
14.8% for men and 14.1% for women (INEGI 2015). Other elements of the second
demographic transition such as same-sex marriage, non-marital childbearing and
voluntary childlessness (Poston and Bouvier 2017) are also beginning to emerge in
Mexico. Currently, same-sex marriage is legal in Mexico City and in three other
states. Efforts to legalize same-sex marriage nationwide are currently underway.
With regard to non-marital childbearing, 11.5% of all births in 2012 were to
unmarried women (INEGI, 2015). Voluntary childlessness is also a growing trend.
Among male-led households, 17.2% are childless, and among female-led house-
holds, 6.0%. These changes certainly point to the beginnings of the second
demographic transition in Mexico.
In the previous pages, we have reviewed and traced the progress of Mexico
through the demographic transition, with a special focus on fertility. The country
has experienced a rapid and remarkable transition from high to low fertility and
mortality. Mexico will soon complete the first demographic transition, and as we
have just shown, is now entering the so-called second demographic transition. In
the past several decades, Mexico has moved from a demographically underdevel-
oped country to a demographically modern one. It is at this stage of the demo-
graphic narrative that deaths begin to occur as frequently, or more frequently, than
births, at least in some parts of the country. It is to such an analysis of the mu-
nicipios of Mexico that we now turn our attention.
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 205

8.3.4 Data

In our analysis of natural decrease among the municipios of Mexico, we obtained


data on births and deaths for the period of 2005–2013 from the Instituto Nacional
de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), the Mexican equivalent of the U.S. Census
Bureau. Other relevant variables (see below) were obtained for the year of 2005
from INEGI’s mid-decennial enumeration. In the regression analyses, we undertake
in this chapter, our independent variables correspond to the beginning of the study
period in order to avoid simultaneity bias.
The unit of analysis is the municipio, an aggregate unit in Mexico that is roughly
equivalent to a county in the United States. The municipio is the basis of the
territorial division of the Mexican states and its political and administrative orga-
nization. There are 2457 municipios in the 31 states and the Federal District
(Mexico City) of Mexico. The average municipio has a population size of just over
42 thousand persons.

8.3.5 Variables

The outcome (dependent) variable is the birth:death ratio (BDR), that is, (births/
deaths) * 1000. The birth and death data cover the period from 2005 to 2013. In our
first primarily descriptive analysis, we developed for each municipio a dichotomous
variable indicating whether the municipio was characterised by natural decrease,
i.e., having more deaths than births over the study period, coded 1 if yes, and 0 if
no. There are 396 municipios in Mexico with more deaths than births over the
2005-2013 period, or 16.3% of all the municipios in Mexico.
We show in Fig. 8.3 a map of all the municipios of Mexico; the dark municipios
are those with more deaths than births in the 2005–2013 time-period. As just noted,
more than 16% of Mexico’s municipios had more deaths than births in the period
under study. In the map, one observes a large concentration of natural decrease
municipios in the northern states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, Durango, Sonora, Nuevo
León and San Luis Potosí. The smaller states and their municipal entities in the
occidental region and on the Yucatan Peninsula also account for a significant
proportion of the natural decrease municipios. For instance, Jalisco and Michoacán,
which together form the occidental region, account for over one-fifth of all the
natural decrease municipios.
Figure 8.4 shows data on the birth:death ratio (BDR) for each of the municipios
in Mexico. If a municipio has a BDR of under 1000, it is a natural decrease
municipio, that is, it had less than 1000 births per 1000 deaths in the period from
2005 to 2013. If its BDR is over 1000, it had more births than deaths in the time.
We report the BDR data for the municipios in eight shades; the four darker shades
represent BDRs below 1000; the darker the shade, the greater the amount of natural
decrease; the four lighter shades represent BDRs above 1000, i.e., natural increase;
206 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

the lighter the shade, the greater the amount of natural increase. The maps in both
figures show a significant amount of spatial clustering of natural decrease among
the municipios (Figs. 8.3 and 8.4), that is, natural decrease counties tend to be near
or contiguous to other natural decrease counties.
We noted earlier that the demographic and sociological literature has noted that
natural decrease is mainly caused by low fertility and increasing numbers of elderly
caused by selective outmigration. Our regression analyses will evaluate this argu-
ment by employing two independent variables to predict the birth:death ratio,
namely, the child:women ratio, calculated by dividing the number of children 0–
4 years old by the number of women in the childbearing ages 15–49, multiplied by
1000 (fertility); and the number of persons in the municipio of age 65 and over
divided by the total population of the municipio, multiplied by 100 (elderly index).
We use these two predictor variables because prior research on natural decrease has
indicated their overwhelming influence on the occurrence of natural decrease. We
hypothesize that municipios with high child:women ratios will be less likely to
experience natural decrease and will thus have higher BDRs than those with low
child:woman ratios. We also hypothesize that municipios with high percentages of
population over 65 will be more likely to have lower BDRs than municipios with
low percentages of elderly. We transformed the dependent variable and both
independent variables with natural logarithms in order to correct for issues of
skewness and kurtosis (Lewis-Beck 1995).

Fig. 8.3 Natural decrease (dark) and natural increase (grey) Municipios Mexico, 2005–2013.
Source of data INEGI 2015
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 207

Fig. 8.4 Birth:death ratios: Municipios of Mexico, 2005–2013. Source of data: INEGI (2015)

8.3.6 Results

Our review of the maps in Figs. 8.3 and 8.4 indicated rather extensive spatial
clustering of the birth:death ratios among the municipios of Mexico. This led us to
wonder about the presence of a significant amount of spatial autocorrelation in the
BDRs across the municipios. The Mexican municipios experiencing natural
decrease in the 2005–13 period are likely to be contiguous to other municipios also
experiencing natural decrease in the same period, and similarly for counties
experiencing natural increase. As Waldo Tobler noted many years ago in his for-
mulation of the “first law of geography,” “Everything is related to everything else,
but near things are more related than distant things” (Tobler 1970).
We thus calculated Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation statistic (Moran, 1950) for
the logged BDRs among the municipios. Moran’s I ranges from +1.00 to −1.00 and
may be interpreted much like a correlation coefficient. The higher its positive value,
the greater the spatial clustering in the municipios of like values of a variable; the
higher its negative value, the less the degree of spatial clustering. The Moran’s I
statistic has a value of 0.25 (p < 0.000), indicating that there is a statistically
significant amount of spatial autocorrelation in the birth:death ratios among the
Mexican municipios. Therefore, ordinary least squares regression is statistically
inappropriate for modelling the birth:death ratio. We hence used a spatial error
model to be able to address the spatial autocorrelation in our data. This model
assumes that spatial heterogeneity exists among the variables and controls for it by
adding to the model a spatial error coefficient (lambda), which removes the spatial
208 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

bias from the standard errors associated with the estimated regression parameters of
our two demographic independent variables. “Incorporating a spatial error coeffi-
cient and using maximum likelihood methods to estimate the regression parame-
ters” leads to “multivariate analyses that are more statistically efficient and
inferences from them more valid” (Johnson et al. 2015; Anselin 2002, 2005).

8.3.7 Subnational Natural Decrease

As previously mentioned, Mexico has 396 natural decrease municipios, covering


more than 16% of the municipios in the country. Most of the natural decrease
municipios, 354 of them, are located outside of metro areas. The Mexican states
with the largest percentages of natural decrease municipios are Chihuahua with 28
municipios (7.07% of all the natural decrease municipios), Jalisco with 56
(14.14%), Michoacán with 25 (6.31%), Oaxaca with 29 (7.32%), Tlaxcala with 33
(8.33%) and Veracruz with 30 (7.58%). A commonality among some of these states
are their large shares of Mexican migrants to the United States. In the 2004-2014
period, over 6% of all persons migrating to the U.S. from Mexico hailed from
Jalisco, 10% from Michoacán, 5% from Oaxaca and 6% from Veracruz (Migration
Policy Institute 2014). Therefore, a major limitation in the Mexican data is the
omission of migration. Some of the states with larger shares of natural decrease
municipios have also been associated historically with sending large numbers of
migrants to the United States and to the larger metropolitan areas of Mexico. Our
research would greatly benefit were we able to assess empirically the effect of
internal and international migration on natural decline in Mexican municipios. But
there are no data available to us for addressing this important issue. Even though, as
of now, only 16% of Mexican municipios are natural decrease municipios compared
to 28% of all counties in the United States, the projected continued decrease in
fertility alongside an ageing population will likely increase the percentage of natural
decrease municipios in future years in Mexico.
Descriptive Statistics Table 8.1 presents descriptive statistics for the dependent
and independent variables used in our regression equation. There is a considerable
amount of variation in all three variables. Before estimating the multivariate
models, we calculated bivariate correlations between each of the two independent
variables and the log of the birth:death ratio. The strongest correlation was between
the log of the BDR and the percent of the population aged 65 and over, r = −0.41.

Table 8.1 Descriptive statistics of variables of interest


Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Log of birth:death ratio (nlogbdr) 7.86 1.02 3.70 12.63
Log of child:women ratio (nlogcwr) 6.00 0.21 4.66 6.89
Log of percentage 65+ (nlog65) 1.96 0.43 −0.01 3.43
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 209

The correlation between the logged BDR and the proportion of women in their
childbearing years was 0.35.

8.3.8 Multivariate Analysis

Table 8.2 presents the results of the spatial error multivariate regression model.
Shown are the regression coefficients for the two substantive independent variables,
along with the value of the coefficient lambda, which is the spatial error coefficient.
As we noted earlier, including the lambda coefficient in the model removes the
spatial bias from the standard errors associated with the estimated regression
parameters of the two substantive independent variables.
Of these two independent variables, the percent of the population aged 65+ has
the greatest effect on the birth:death ratio. The higher the proportion of elderly
population in a municipio, the lower the birth:death ratio. The coefficient is sta-
tistically significant (p < 0.000). The proportion of women in their childbearing
years also has a statistically significant effect on the BDR. The higher the proportion
of women of childbearing age, the higher the birth:death ratio, ceteris paribus. This
means that natural decrease is less likely to occur in municipios with large numbers
of women of childbearing age. The spatial autocorrelation coefficient (lambda) is
also statistically significant (p < 0.000), but we already knew this on the basis of
the previously reported statistically significant value of Moran’s I.

8.3.9 Discussion

In our descriptive analysis of Mexico’s birth and death data, we showed that over
16% of the municipios in Mexico experienced natural decrease. Furthermore, in the
multivariate analysis we reported that both fertility and ageing have statistically
significant effects on Mexico’s subnational natural decrease. Compared to the
United States, where 35% of the counties reported more deaths than births in the
post-2010 period (Johnson et al. 2015; Poston et al. 2016), the percentage of natural
decrease counties in Mexico is not as high. However, if the American and European

Table 8.2 Multivariate analysis of birth:death ratio (Logged) for Mexican counties
Variable Coefficient Standard error Z-value Significance
Natural log of the 1.106 0.159 6.927 0.000
child:women ratio
Natural log of the population −1.553 0.121 −12.770 0.000
aged 65 and over
Constant 3.514 1.041 3.373 0.000
Lambda 0.654 0.034 19.073 0.000
210 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

demographic experiences are any indication, we can assert that natural decrease will
continue to extend to larger portions of the Mexican states. This has important
social and demographic implications for Mexico.
We noted earlier that natural decrease inhibits population growth while reducing
demographic stability. Mexico’s rapid demographic changes in the last few decades
have already spearheaded a “progressive reduction in the base of its population
pyramid” (Partida Bush 2005). All demographic projections point to accelerated
population ageing in the next few decades. The population over 60 years old is
expected to quintuple from 6.7 million in the year 2000 to 36.5 million in 2050.
Mexico’s elderly dependency ratio in 2015 was 9.8, its highest value in the last six
decades.The rapid increase in ageing combined with the reductions in fertility has
the potential to reduce the size of the labour force, ultimately making Mexico less
competitive in the global economy. This comprehensive economic resource
shortage has been observed in other countries that have experienced natural
decrease (Johnson et al. 2015; Johnson and Beale 1992).
It is also important to note also that Mexico’s demographic processes are not
spatially uniform. Only the more developed states have reached the final stages of
the demographic transition, and some have even entered the second demographic
transition. States with high poverty levels as well as those with high proportions of
ethnic (indigenous) minorities have not benefitted equally from population policies
aimed at reducing fertility and increasing life expectancy. Thus, social inequality
plays an important role in Mexico’s demographic processes. Poverty in Mexico is
usually accompanied by early mortality, high fertility, high morbidity, early mar-
riage, and the lack of family planning (Tuirán 2002). In other words, Mexico’s
demographic processes are not occurring in isolation but are closely associated with
social and economic forces.

8.4 Case Study 2: Turkey

8.4.1 Overview

When the Republic of Turkey was established in 1923, the great majority of the
Turkish population lived in rural areas (Korkmaz 2013). The Turkish economy was
based on agriculture, and the educational levels of the population were low. Fertility
rates and mortality rates were high (Bakar et al. 2017). With the onset of indus-
trialization in the 1950s, there was a shift toward an industry-based economy. This
process of industrialization led to the rapid urbanization of the society (ibid.). The
percentage of the population living in urban areas increased from 23% in 1950 to
51% in 1990 (Korkmaz 2013).
The beginning of 1980s was an economic turning point for Turkey. The gov-
ernment implemented a new and more liberal economic model (Bakar et al. 2017),
and the state loosened its strict control over the economy. During this time,
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 211

European membership talks began, the private sector grew, and there were increases
in the economy. The government also took measures to increase women’s educa-
tion and their participation in the workforce. The decriminalization of abortion and
easy access to contraceptives were also implemented in an attempt to reduce the
high fertility rates (Yucesahin 2009).
Between 1990 and 2009, agricultural employment decreased by 24%, and
manufacturing jobs increased by almost 5%. Moreover, individuals living below the
poverty line fell by 50% between 2002 and 2012. The percentage of the urban
population had risen to above 70% by 2012. By 2015, life expectancy had increased
to 75 years, and the net enrolment rate in secondary education had increased to 86%
(World Bank 2017).
Turkey currently is among the twenty largest economies in the world, with a
GDP of around $850 billion. Despite the above increases in social and economic
development, other societal features of the country, such as racial, religious and
sexual tolerance and diversity have been relatively stagnant compared to other
Western nations. In the past decade, the Turkish government has followed an
agenda aimed at weakening democracy and secularism. The number of imprisoned
journalists, academics, and critics who spoke against the government has been a
growing concern nationally and internationally. Moreover, gender inequality in
education, employment, and the political sphere persists (World Bank 2012), and
discrimination against racial, sexual, and religious minorities continues to be a
significant problem (Engin 2015; Kaya 2015). In many ways, these human rights
issues have been a major roadblock for Turkey’s accession to the European Union
(EU). Turkey made its first attempt to enter the EU in the late 1980s, but the
negotiations remain unresolved.

8.4.2 Demographic Trends in Turkey

Considering Turkey’s unique geographic position as a spatial bridge between


Europe and Asia, demographic research on natural increase/decrease in the country
is certainly justified. Turkey’s population in 2015 numbered over 78 million
individuals (TUIK 2016). Of all the countries of Europe, only Russia and Germany
have larger populations.
More than 10% of the population of Turkey resides in the so-called Eastern
Thrace, known also as European Turkey (Metz 1996). This portion of Turkey
consists of the counties of Edirne, Tekirdag, Kirklareli, and most of Istanbul.
Turkey’s culture has been influenced by both European and non-European norms
and values. Scholars have argued that Turkey as a nation is in a state of “in
betweeness” not just geographically, but also culturally (Saktanber 2002).
Given Europe’s increasing influence on Turkey and given that more than 10% of
Turkey’s population is located in Europe, we ask in the second part of this chapter
whether there is any evidence of, or reason to expect that, Turkey is following or
starting to follow the European pattern of natural decrease. Turkey is now
212 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

undergoing demographic changes that have characterised much of Europe since the
1980s and 1990s. The country is now starting to enter the final stage of the first
demographic transition in which birth and death rates are low, and the population is
only increasing slightly.
Substantial socio-economic advances and overall transformations in Turkey’s
population have resulted in lower fertility rates. This fertility reduction has also
been a function of increasing use of contraception, birth planning, and the de-
criminalization of abortion (Yucesahin 2009). Since the 1960s, Turkey’s Total
Fertility (TF) has declined markedly from 6.2 to 2.2 children per woman (see
Fig. 8.5), one of the most dramatic and rapid fertility reductions in Europe and
West Asia.
Figure 8.6 shows that the crude birth rate (CBR) has also declined since the
1960s, from 46 births per 1000 population to 17 births per 1000. Moreover,
advances in medical technology in the late 20th century have resulted in a decline in
the crude death rate (Yucesahin 2009) from 20 deaths per 1000 population in the
1960s to 5 per 1000 in 2015 (see Fig. 8.6). In addition, Turkey has become an older
population. In 2016, there were more than 6.6 million elderly individuals (defined
as persons of age 65 and older) in Turkey. The elderly population increased by 17%
between 2012 and 2016 (TUIK 2017). In addition to cultural influences mainly
from Europe, Turkey has also experienced changes in its demographic structure,
resulting in a demography similar to that of many European societies.
In our demographic analysis of Turkey, we analyse the difference between the
birth rate and the death rate among the country’s 81 subnational units, i.e., counties,
for the period of 2007 to 2014. We ask whether Turkey is following, or starting to
follow, the natural decrease patterns of Europe that we have already summarised
above.

Fig. 8.5 Total Fertility, Turkey, 1960–2014. Source of data The Global Economy (2017c)
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 213

Fig. 8.6 Crude birth rates and crude death rates, Turkey, 1960–2014. Source of data The Global
Economy (2017a, b)

8.5 Methods

We use Eurostat’s classification of Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics


(NUTS) adopted by Regulation (EC) No 1059/2003 of the European Parliament
and of the Council in 2003 in our subnational examination of the birth and death
patterns of Turkey. The NUTS classification divides each European nation into
three levels of geography (NUTS 1, NUTS 2, and NUTS 3) producing standard
spatial units that allow cross-national comparisons (Eurostat 2011). We use the
NUTS 3 level to identify the sub-regional populations in Turkey; these are similar
to counties and are the smallest of the NUTS levels. There are 81 NUTS 3 units in
Turkey, and we refer to them as counties. The population size of these counties
ranges from 80,000 to 14.4 million. On average, each county has around 960,000
inhabitants.
Our data are all derived from materials and files of the Turkish Statistical
Institute. The time period for which we calculated birth:death ratios are the years of
2007 to 2014, allowing us to calculate ratios for a period covering eight consecutive
years. As we discuss in more detail below, we use a spatial error model to estimate
the effects of demographic variables on birth:death ratios among the counties of
Turkey.
214 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

8.5.1 Natural Increase and Near Natural Decrease


in Turkey

In this section, we describe the subnational patterns of the birth-death ratio


(BDR) in Turkish society. The birth-death ratio variable is the same as the one we
used in the previous analysis of Mexico, that is, the number of births in a population
per 1000 deaths. A ratio less than 1000 indicates natural decrease (more deaths than
births), and a ratio above 1000, natural increase (more births than deaths). We have
calculated ratios for all the counties of Turkey for the period of 2007–2014.
None of the birth-death ratios in Turkey’s counties over the study period is under
1000. That is, no county in Turkey experienced natural decrease in the period of
2007 to 2014. The ratios across the Turkish counties range from a low of 1400 to a
high of 12,000.
The map in Fig. 8.7 shows the BDRs for all the counties in three broad
groupings, namely, BDRs from 1000 to 1600; BDRs over 1600 to under 2000; and
BDRs of 2000 and above. The lighter the shade, the lower the BDR. Although none
of the 81 counties experienced natural decrease in the study period, four of them are
near natural decrease. These are counties with ratios of less than 1600, that is,
counties with less than 1600 births for every 1000 deaths. In addition, fourteen
more counties have birth:death ratios under 2000.
The county with the lowest BDR is Kastamonu County, and it is followed by
Sinop County; both counties are located north of Ankara (Fig. 8.7). Of particular
demographic and sociological interest is the fact that Sinop County also has the
highest percentage of elderly of all the counties of Turkey, 15%. The counties of
Edirne and Kirlareli, both located on the European side of Turkey (Fig. 8.7), are
also among the counties with the lowest BDRs. Edirne county has the lowest
child-woman ratio of all the counties in the country. These near natural decrease
counties are not large metropolitan areas, such as Istanbul and Ankara, but are rural
areas with small populations.

Fig. 8.7 Birth-death ratios, the counties (NUTS 3 Units) of Turkey, 2007–2014. Source of data
TUIK 2016
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 215

Figure 8.8 is a map of the counties of Turkey showing in more detail, and with
slightly different coding, the values of the county-specific BDRs. We report the
BDRs in four shades: under 2000; 2000 to just under 4000; 4000 to just under
8000; and 8000 and higher. The lighter the shade, the lower the BDR. The counties
in the South-Eastern Anatolian region of Turkey have by far the highest ratios in the
country, as reflected by the darkest shade. All the counties have ratios of at least
8000 births per 1000 deaths. The South-Eastern Anatolian region’s population
consists mainly of Kurdish peoples, who comprise around 15% of the population of
Turkey (Metz 1996). The highest BDRs of all the counties in Turkey are in Sirnak
County and nearby HakkariCounty (Fig. 8.8). Sirnak County’s BDR is over
12,000, that is, there were twelve times more births than deaths in Sirnak County
during the period under study. Sirnak County also has the highest child-woman
ratio in Turkey. Meanwhile, the county with the second highest ratio, Hakkari, has
the smallest percentage of elderly of all the counties in Turkey, just over 2.8%.
We now inquire about the social demographic characteristics of the counties that
might help us better understand the variation in BDRs across the counties. Why
does Sirnak County have the highest ratio, and Kastamonu County the lowest? We
noted earlier in our analysis of natural decrease in Mexico that both the fertility rate
and the prevalence of elders are the two most important predictors. In analyses
conducted among the counties of the U.S. and the counties of Europe, the fertility
rate was recognised as a major driver of natural population change. When the
fertility rate is high, there is natural increase; when it is low, there is natural
decrease. Although there is not yet any evidence of natural decrease among the
counties of Turkey, we expect the fertility rate of the counties to be positively
associated with their birth:death ratios.
We also know from past research, as well as from our earlier analysis of Mexico,
that counties with high proportions of elderly are at a greater risk of natural decrease
than counties with small proportions because of the increased likelihood of mor-
tality losses. Among the counties of Turkey, we expect the prevalence of elderly to
be negatively related to the birth:death ratio.

Fig. 8.8 National population change: births divided by deaths per 1000 inhabitants: counties
(NUTS 3 units) of Turkey. Source of data TUIK 2016
216 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

8.5.2 Results

We model the birth:death ratio among the 81 counties of Turkey with a fertility
index and an ageing index. The descriptive statistics in Table 8.3 show that the
birth:death ratios range across the counties from a low of 1496 to a high of 12,138.
The average county in Turkey had 4105 births for every 1000 deaths over this
period. As just mentioned, our two independent variables are an elderly index and a
fertility index, both measured as of 2007. The elderly index is the number of older
adults (age 65+) per 1000 population. The fertility index is the child:woman ratio,
i.e., children under 5 divided by women 15 − 49 * 1000.
Both the birth:death ratio and the fertility index are skewed, with skewness
scores of 1.41 and 1.49, respectively; if a variable is normally distributed, its
skewness value would be 0.0. Both reported values are well above the
rule-of-thumb value of 0.8 indicating a skewness problem (Lewis-Beck 1995,
p. 16). Hence, we transformed these two variables with their natural logs.
Prior to estimating the multivariate equation, we inquired about the extent to
which spatial autocorrelation in the birth:death ratios might exist across the 81
counties of Turkey. In the map of the counties of Turkey shown earlier (see
Fig. 8.8), there is clear evidence of spatial clustering among the counties. That is,
counties in Turkey with high birth:death ratios tend to be contiguous to other
counties with high birth:death ratios, and similarly for counties with low birth:death
ratios. To determine if the spatial clustering displayed in the map was statistically
significant, we computed Moran’s I spatial autocorrelation statistic (Moran 1950)
for the birth:death ratio across the Turkey counties. The value of Moran’s I eval-
uating the degree of spatial clustering of the BDRs across the counties = 0.30,
p = 0.00. This indicates that there is indeed a sizable and statistically significant
amount of spatial autocorrelation among Turkey’s counties in the BDR. As in our
analysis of Mexico, we thus use a spatial error model for our multiple regression
analysis of the BDR in Turkish counties. This will address the spatial autocorre-
lation in the data and remove the spatial bias from the standard errors associated
with the estimated regression parameters of the substantive independent variables.
The results of the spatial error regression model predicting the birth:death ratio
are presented in Table 8.4. They provide good support for our two hypotheses. The
elderly index is negatively associated with the birth:death ratio, and the fertility

Table 8.3 Descriptive statistics


Mean SD Min Max
Independent variables
Population 65+ (’000) 8.08 2.74 2.83 15.14
Child:woman ratio (’000) 325.76 115.69 197.81 714.89
Dependent variable
Birth:death ratio 4105.40 2706.28 1496.34 12,138.14
Source of data TUIK 2016. N = 81
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 217

Table 8.4 Spatial error model estimating the natural log of birth:death ratio in 2007–2014 with
selected independent variables in 2007:81 counties of Turkey
Coefficient Standard error Z-score
Population 65 + (’000) −0.10*** 0.00 −16.33
Log child-woman ratio (’000) 0.99*** 0.06 15.77
Constant 3.30*** 0.40
Lambda 0.40 0.47 0.39
Final Log likelihood 79.59
Variance ratio (Pseudo R2) 0.96
+p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
Source of data TUIK (2016)

index is positively associated with the ratio. Large numbers of elders in a county
significantly reduce its birth:death ratio (p < 0.01, t = −16.33). More specifically,
for every increase of 1 elderly person per 1000 people in the population, the log of
the birth:death ratio decreases by 0.1, other things equal. On the other hand, the
fertility rate has a significant and positive impact on the birth:death ratio (p < 0.01,
t = 15.77).

8.5.3 Discussion

The phenomenon of natural decrease has become an increasingly important subject


and has garnered significant international attention over the past decade, especially
in peripheral nations. Natural decrease is most prevalent in developed societies
(Johnson et al. 2015). Nevertheless, the phenomenon of deaths exceeding births is
becoming a crucial event in many developing nations. While researchers have paid
significant attention to the issue of natural decrease in the countries of Europe and
in the U.S., the topic of natural decrease in developing nations, such as Turkey, has
received minimum attention.
Turkey is a nation located both in and borderingEurope, one of the major
socio-economic regions of the world. We have shown here that Turkey is beginning
to exhibit demographic similarities with Europe, regarding its fertility and mortality.
For instance, since the 1960s, Turkey’s Total Fertility has dropped from 6.2 to 2.2
children per woman, and it is expected to fall below the replacement level by 2050
(TUIK 2012). Meanwhile, there has been a dramatic increase in life expectancy in
the country. While average life expectancy was only 48 years in 1960, it increased
to 76 by 2013 and is expected to reach 79 years by 2050 (ibid.).
In addition to low fertility, high percentages of elderly are also a crucial factor
explaining natural decrease. Similar to European societies, continuing increases in
the proportion of elderly are a growing concern for Turkey’s demographic and
social stability. The elderly population currently comprises 8% of the population,
which is 17% higher than it was 5 years ago, and it is expected to increase to 10%
218 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

by 2023 (TUIK 2017).Compared to European nations, the proportion of elderly


individuals is much lower in Turkey. However, the speed of the increase in the
ageing population has been faster in Turkey than in most other European societies.
Turkey’s population numbers 79 million persons and is projected to reach
95 million by 2050 (TUIK 2012). Although Turkey’s population continues to grow,
its rate of natural increase has slowed down since the 1960s. The country’s current
rate of natural increase is 1.2% and will likely be 0% by 2050 (ibid.).Unlike the
situation in Europe, natural decrease at the national level is not yet prevalent in
Turkey. However, the demographic trends we have reviewed in this section of the
chapter suggest that we will likely be seeing natural decrease in some of Turkey’s
counties in the not too distant future.
Our analysis of natural decrease in the counties of Turkey has shown that none
of Turkey’s 81 counties is currently experiencing natural decrease. However, four
may be classified as near natural decrease counties. They are likely to experience
natural decrease in the not too distant future. Our multi-variate analysis also indi-
cates that both fertility and population ageing are significant predictors of natural
decrease. Earlier analyses of Europe and the U.S. have shown that the percentage
elderly has the most power explaining natural decrease, with low fertility remaining
as an important factor (Johnson et al. 2015; Johnson and Beale 1992). In the case of
Turkey, we see that both low fertility and the elderly percentage are important for
an understanding of natural decrease.
Population projections for Turkey inform us that low fertility and population
ageing will become even more prevalent in the next couple of decades. If this is the
case, natural decrease at the sub-national level should also become prevalent,
especially in the Western regions of Turkey. This will have important social and
demographic implications for the country. As an industrializing society, Turkey has
been enjoying the economic benefits of having a young population, which has
significantly contributed to the growth of its labour market. However, Turkey will
likely lose these advantages of its demographic dividend owing to both lower
fertility and an ageing population. These demographic changes could well result in
some social problems for Turkey. Unlike many European societies, the Turkish
government seems to be unprepared to cope with the social and economic reper-
cussions of rapidly growing numbers in the elderly population.
Finally, we note that the demographic future of Turkish counties is far from
certain due to the influx into Turkey of Syrian refugees, many of them in the
childbearing ages. Due to data limitations, we were not able to address the effects of
migration in our BDR analysis in this chapter. Hopefully, future research on this
topic in Turkey will be able to incorporate the effects of migration.
8 Natural Decrease in Semi-peripheral Nations … 219

8.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we examined patterns of the birth-death ratio (BDR) among the
counties of Mexico and among the counties of Turkey. No previous demographic
analyses of this demographic phenomenon in Mexico and Turkey have been
undertaken. We have shown that although neither country as a whole is experi-
encing natural decrease, i.e., more deaths than births, over 16% of Mexico’s
counties are natural decrease counties. In Turkey, however, none of its counties is
characterised by natural decrease, although a few are near natural decrease. In this
final section, we review our findings and point to some of the implications of our
research for the two countries.
In our first case study, that of Mexico, natural decrease was shown to be present at
the subnational level in over 16% of the municipios. We reported that population
ageing was a statistically significant predictor of the BDR among the municipios. The
greater the percentage of elderly in a municipio, the lower its BDR. The child:woman
ratio was also shown to have a statistically significant effect in accounting for variation
in the BDR. Current demographic trends in Mexico, including later age at first mar-
riage and voluntary childlessness along with increased levels of population ageing,
suggest the increased importance of the prevalence of elderly on the BDR. Municipios
with high numbers of elderly will continue to be characterised by low BDRs. Even
though we do not forecast that Mexico will become a natural decrease country anytime
soon, the phenomenon will continue to exist and should become more and more
prevalent among the municipios. Previous research has demonstrated that once natural
decrease is present in a population, it is unlikely to disappear.
In the second case study, that of Turkey, we found that none of Turkey’s counties
had more deaths than births in the 2007–2014 period. However, several of them did
have BDRs approaching natural decrease, and we referred to them as “near natural
decrease” counties. Among them, Kastamonu County has the lowest BDR in all of
Turkey, at 1496 births per 1000 deaths. Sinop County has the second lowest BDR, and
Edirne County, located in the Eastern Thrace of Turkey, is also one of the near natural
decrease counties. All these counties had low fertility rates and relatively high
numbers of elderly. We might well see these counties experiencing natural decrease in
another ten years or so. We also found that the counties with the highest BDRs are all
located in the South-Eastern Anatolian region of Turkey, and they all have very large
Kurdish populations. On average, the number of births in these counties is eight times
greater than the number of deaths. It is unlikely that any time in the near or distant
future that these counties will have more deaths than births.
The research we reported in this chapter has fulfilled our major objective of
ascertaining the extent to which natural decrease was occurring among the mu-
nicipios of Mexico and among the counties of Turkey. Prior to the analyses reported
in this chapter, no previous demographic studies of natural decrease in Mexico and
Turkey had been undertaken. The results we reported thus are important new
information; we did not know previously that over 16% of the municipios of
Mexico experienced natural decrease in the 2005–2013 period and that several
220 G. Marquez-Velarde et al.

Turkish counties are near natural decrease. Our analyses also indicated the
importance of population ageing driven mainly by age-specific outmigration, and
fertility, as significant predictors of the county-specific BDRs in both countries.
We should note that our chapter has a number of limitations. First, we
acknowledge that increases in population ageing are not solely due to low fertility
but also to the outmigration of young and reproductive age adults. Our data did not
permit us to incorporate the migration effects on population ageing. Second, we
recognize a disparity in the number of counties in our two case studies. We decided
to include these two nations due to their remarkable demographic trajectories in the
last few decades and their spatial proximity to regions with higher proportions of
natural decrease, even though their spatial definitions of counties are not identical.
The United States and Europe do serve as vantage points for assessing the extent of
the phenomenon of natural decrease, which is one of the reasons why we opted to
focus on Mexico and Turkey. However, their different definitions of counties
resulted in our using spatial areas in Mexico quite a bit smaller, on average,
demographically and spatially, than those used in Turkey.
In summary, the demographic changes in Mexico and Turkey have been note-
worthy. Both countries have almost completed the first demographic transition,
with Mexico and Turkey now being characterised by low levels of fertility and
mortality. In Mexico, over 16% of its municipios are experiencing natural decrease,
and in Turkey, several counties are near natural decrease. When the population in
both countries was young in average age and fertility was high, there was no natural
decrease in either country. Now, we see a good number of the municipios of
Mexico having more deaths than births, and several Turkish counties near natural
decrease. These patterns are remarkable and are best understood with a knowledge
of the demographic trajectories of Mexico and Turkey. It will be interesting to
observe the demographic changes currently underway in both nations, which
suggest that the percentage of natural decrease municipios in Mexico will increase
in the years ahead and that natural decrease may well reach the current levels
experienced in the United States. Similarly, Turkey for the first time will likely
experience natural decrease in a few of its counties in the next decade or so, and in
that sense, Turkey is beginning to follow the European pattern of natural decrease.
However, it is only at the beginning stage. Even though Turkey is partly a European
country, it will be several decades, at least, before Turkey will become a natural
decrease nation like Germany, Russia, Italy and 14 other countries of Europe.

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Chapter 9
From Topic to Problem: Organisational
Mechanisms of Constructing
Demographic Change

Sven Kette

Abstract This article aims at revealing the mechanisms by which organisations


problematize demographic change. It asks (1) for the structural preconditions making
organisations pay attention to demographic change at all. Therefore, the paper starts
from the assumption that demographic change does not impose itself on organisa-
tions but rather appears to organisations as a non-instructive problem, which is
plastic, ambiguous and long-term in character. Consequently, the paper (2) also asks
for the concrete constructs organisations develop to grasp the demographic change.
Based on the empirical analysis of five organisations I show that demographic change
is only problematized by organisations when personal initiatives succeed. However,
the topic tends to fade if exclusive responsibilities are not assigned. Concerning the
constructs, I show that demographic change is most likely to be connected to
established problems but is not yet assessed as an important problem in itself.


Keywords Organisations Demographic change  Case study  Organisational

problems Non-instructive problems

9.1 Introduction: Demographic Change


as a Non-instructive Problem for Organisations1

At least since 1972, when the Club of Rome published its influential report on the
Limits of Growth (Meadows 1972), demography and demographic change have
been broadly discussed in political and public debates. Over the last ten to 15 years

1
I would like to thank the editors as well as Luca Tratschin for their helpful comments on a pre-
vious version of this paper. Gratitude also goes to the research commission of the University
of Lucerne for granting financial support for proofreading services. And finally, I would like
to thank Eva Fenn for proofreading the article.

S. Kette (&)
University of Lucerne, Lucerne, Switzerland
e-mail: sven.kette@unilu.ch

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 225


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_9
226 S. Kette

these debates have been intensifying, with demographic change being widely
understood as a societal challenge facing industrial countries such as Japan and,
particularly, Germany (Birg 2005). Even if their population projections slightly
differ, all demographic models broadly agree on the following demographic trends:
The decrease in fertility along with the increase in life expectancy will lead to an
increase in the population share of the elderly and, at the same time, a decrease in
the overall population. Additionally, migration as a means of mitigating the effects
of an ageing population will gain in importance. At the societal level, these
developments are often marked as a challenge for the welfare state as the ratio of
pensioners to the working population will increase (Willetts 2003). Against this
background, Walker (2005) describes—at the organisational as well as the national
policy level—“the emergence of age management” in Europe.2
The mechanisms and consequences of the expected shifts in population structure
(some of which are already happening) have been studied mainly in the fields of
Social Demography (Hirschman and Tolnay 2005; Konietzka and Geisler 2008;
Hank and Kreyenfeld 2015) and the Sociology of Population (Niephaus et al. 2016).
This branch of research refers to organisations only occasionally (see, however,
Bartl and Sackmann 2016). When demography-related issues are discussed in
connection with organisations, the focus is either—in the field of Organisational
Demography—on the organisation’s internal composition of members (Pfeffer
1983, 1985), or—in the field of Organisational Ecology—on populations of or-
ganisations (Carroll and Hannan 2000).3
Only recently has attention turned to the consequences of demographic change
for organisations. In the field of management studies, as well as from the practical
perspective of managers and consulting firms, there is a large body of literature that
highlights, for example, labour shortage, loss of knowledge and decreased pro-
ductivity as some of the problems demographic change may cause for organisa-
tions. Apart from potential problems, this literature also describes and analyses
organisational strategies for managing demographic change (Sporket 2011; Eck
et al. 2013; Flüter-Hoffmann and Sporket 2013).
It appears plausible to assume that these problems are of high relevance to
organisations. From the perspective of organisational theory, however, it is far from
certain whether organisations take any note of demographic change and if so, in
what respects they consider it problematic. Organisations are constantly confronted
with various problems they have to cope with and make decisions about, be it the
problem of finding staff or keeping up with the latest legal amendments; how to sell
products; how to increase market shares, or attract students. These problems may be
tricky as it is unclear how to resolve or at least mitigate them, but they are
instructive in that only their solution is uncertain, whereas the problems are well
defined.

2
However, opinions are mixed concerning the impact of demographic change on the labour market
and the pension system [see, e.g. the discussion in Kistler (2004, 2006)].
3
For an overview see Carroll and Khessina (2005).
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 227

In the case of a non-instructive problem, not only the best or only possible
solution of the problem is unclear, but also the nature of the problem itself, which
makes it even more tricky. What Lê (2013) describes about climate change also
applies to non-instructive problems: They are strategic issues that are ambiguous,
complex, and of a long-term nature. Thus, we can understand demographic change
as a non-instructive problem as well: Before organisations can start searching for
solutions, they must develop an idea of what exactly is problematic about demo-
graphic change in the first place.4
Keeping this in mind, the question of whether at all organisations regard
demographic change as a relevant problem, and if so in what respects they do so,
are questions in their own right. In other words, it is not only about how organi-
sations recognise demographic change as a relevant topic in their societal envi-
ronment, but also about how they turn it into a problem relevant to themselves.
Shedding light on these questions helps us deepen our understanding of how
organisations make sense of their environment. Moreover, coping strategies
developed in the field of management science and management practice will only
be successful if organisations pay attention to issues related to demographic change.
However, so far, relatively little is known about if and how organisations construct
demographic change as a relevant problem (Jansen and Huchler 2005).
Against this background this article pursues two objectives: First, revealing the
crucial structural elements and mechanisms that encourage organisations to prob-
lematize—and even institutionalise—demographic change, or prevent them from
doing so. Second, analysing the different views organisations take on demographic
change. Do they perceive demographic change as a problem (and if so, as what kind
of problem) or as a solution (and again to which kind of problem)? To put it another
way: This article aims at exploring the question of how organisations take notice of
a topic and actively transform it into a problem.
This perspective suggests taking a step back and focusing on the process of
problematizing rather than on elaborating (more or less) proper solutions. To do so,
this article starts with offering a heuristic model that can be used for the analysis of
such construction processes. This is followed by a brief description of the data
collected and the method used to analyse them. The subsequent section presents
some empirical findings which are finally used for the formation of reasonable
hypotheses that should be instructive for further research. The article ends with a
discussion of the findings’ relevance in a broader theoretical context.

4
In this sense, non-instructive problems share at least some of the features of what Rittel and
Webber (1973) describe as “wicked problems” and what Simon (1973) calls “ill-structured
problems”.
228 S. Kette

9.2 The Organisational Construction of Demographic


Change: Towards a General Heuristic Model5

This article starts from two major conceptual assumptions about organisations:
First, an organisation is understood as a certain kind of social system that is based
on inter-connected decisions and processes of decision making (Luhmann 2000;
March and Simon 1993). As organisations decide upon the premises of future
decisions for themselves, decision making becomes reflexive. Consequently, in
order to receive organisational attention—and not just the attention of single
organisational members—every topic has to go through the organisation’s formal
decision making procedures. The second and complementary assumption is that
organisations do not have direct access to an objective reality. Instead, they con-
tinuously construct their environment through processes of interpretation and
sense-making (e.g. Luhmann 2000; Daft and Weick 1984; Weick 1969, 1995). If
we read these assumptions more radically, this, in turn, means that organisations
can only address those topics they have already identified as relevant. Thus,
pre-decisional sense-making and actual decision-making are two core processes in
an organisation’s construction of environmental events or topics as relevant prob-
lems. However, the structural preconditions determine which events or topics an
organisation pays attention to. For instance, the management of an organisation
may discuss various reasons for decreasing market shares. The price might be too
high, the quality might be too low. But starting this process of sense-making
presupposes in the first place that the organisation has tools for generating data
about market shares.
Our heuristic model makes these initial assumptions explicit. In this study the
model was used as a heuristic device (Kelle 1995) that offered some guidance
during the phase of data collection and analysis without—and that needs to be
emphasised—predetermining the study’s outcome.
In line with the article’s general understanding of organisations, the heuristic
model reflects the idea that topics can only ‘enter’ an organisation if introduced
through communicative processes, which also make topics relevant or turn them
into problems. This communicative construction of demographic change as a rel-
evant problem is illustrated below (see Fig. 9.1). The heuristic’s core elements will
be described in the following.
The heuristic model consists of four main categories: gateways refer to the
mechanisms and structural conditions that make the topic of demographic change
cross the organisation and environment-boundary; catalysts refer to particular
pressures that make it more likely that organisations will pay attention to demo-
graphic change; paths of problematizing refer to the intra-organisational processes
of sense-making and decision making in the course of which the topic of demo-
graphic change is shaped into a certain problem—or not (by deproblematization).

5
The conceptual framework has been developed in close cooperation with Veronika Tacke.
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 229

Catalysts

Organizational con-
Paths of problematizing structs of demo-
Gateways graphic change
(for topics)

Fig. 9.1 General heuristic model: the organizational construction of demographic change

Particular gateways and catalysts may certainly favour some versions of the
problem over others, but they do not determine the final version. The problemati-
zation is still open to alterations at later points of the decision making process, when
more people from different organisational departments and with various back-
grounds are involved; only the last category, organisational construct of demo-
graphic change, refers to what can be seen as the result of all previous
sense-making and decision making processes. The gateways and the catalysts will
now be described in more detail.

9.2.1 Organisational Gateways for Topics

To gain a better understanding of potential gateways, the distinctions between


structure-induced and person-induced attention as well as between internal and
external reference may be useful. If cross-tabulated, we get four types of gateways
that are expected to have a decisive influence on whether a topic will get organi-
sational attention (see Fig. 9.2).

Structure-induced Person-induced
attention attention

Internal Capacities for problem Boundary-spanning


reference solving units

External Routines for observing Participation in external


reference relevant environments networks

Fig. 9.2 Gateways (The distinction between structure-induced and person-induced refers to the
question of whether a specific scheme of relevance is bound to either specific organisational
performance programmes or specific people (March and Simon 1993, p. 163). Thus,
structure-induced schemes of relevance change through formal decisions, whereas
person-related schemes of relevance change through staff turnover.)
230 S. Kette

Capacities for problem solving The first gateway combines a primarily internal
reference with structure-induced organisational attention. It draws on existing
capacities for problem solving. This is what Cohen et al. (1972) describe as their
garbage can model: Organisations tend to prefer well known solutions to innova-
tions. And existing solutions may initiate search activities for corresponding
problems. For instance, an already implemented health management programme
may enhance an organisation’s sensitivity to demographic change in a certain way.
Routines for observing relevant environments Similar to the existing capacities for
problem solving, the second gateway is also structure-induced in that an organi-
sation’s observational routines are rooted in prior organisational decisions.
However, its primary focus is less on the internal but more on an organisation’s
external environment. For example, the establishment of a legal department will
keep an organisation informed about changes in law and the opportunities and risks
they involve. Similarly, the other departments of the organisation will also actively
develop routines for observing the environment relevant to them, in order to keep
up with latest external developments (Daft and Weick 1984).
Boundary spanning units Boundary spanning units (Adams 1980) may be regarded
as a third gateway, as one of their core functions is providing an organisation with
environmental information (Tacke 1997). As the individuals in boundary spanning
positions naturally face conflicting expectations, they are on the one hand
extra-sensitive to an organisation’s internal dynamics (internal reference) and on the
other hand they have much leeway in deciding which and to what extent they bring
a topic to an organisation’s attention (person-induced attention).
Participation in external networks Finally, networks may turn an organisation’s
attention to demographic change as a relevant topic (DiMaggio and Powell 1983).
Here, two types of networks are important: First, networks that make use of indi-
viduals irrespective of their role in an organisation. For instance, regulars’ tables for
entrepreneurs address an organisational member not primarily in his organisational
role but as someone who also holds a certain position. So in case he resigns his
membership in one organisation to join another, he does not necessarily have to
resign from the regulars’ table as well. With institutionalised networks such as
cooperation or innovation networks it is just the opposite. Here, the organisation
sends delegates based on their positions, which means that in case of staff turnover
the new member replaces his predecessor not only in his organisational position but
also within the network. However, both types constitute contexts in which general
societal trends (such as demographic change) may be discussed.

9.2.2 Catalysts for Problematizing: The Factual Dimension

Gateways are structural preconditions that increase the likelihood that an organi-
sation will communicatively takeup the topic of demographic change. Thus, this
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 231

category addresses the fact that organisations are structurally determined systems
(Luhmann 2000). The category ‘catalysts’ on the other hand refers to pressures that
are expected to increase the likelihood that an organisation will turn the topic into a
problem relevant to them, that is, will problematize it. As an analytical starting
point we assume three catalysts to play an important role: Organisational staff,
customers, and legitimacy.
Organisational staff At first glance it seems obvious that demographic change is
relevant to organisations as it also affects the composition of their staff.6 However,
this is not necessarily true for all organisations. It is an open question whether
organisations themselves actually link staff-related problems to demographic
change. And if they do so, they may focus on different dimensions of this link, for
example on recruitment, training and development, or health related issues.
Customers7 As organisations pay a lot of attention to their customers, they can also
be expected to play a crucial part in an organisation’s problematization of demo-
graphic change. This is particularly true for organisations that render age-sensitive
services such as schools, retirement homes, toy producers, possibly even hospitals.
Due to their age group orientation, demographic change might act as an incentive
for these organisations to innovate and adapt organisational structures.
Legitimacy The catalyst ‘legitimacy’ takes into account that organisations some-
times have to respond—at least symbolically—to environmental demands and
expectations (Meyer and Rowan 1977). As demographic change is broadly dis-
cussed in public and in the media, certain organisations are probably not able to
completely ignore this issue. Political parties and trade unions might be obvious
examples of this.

9.3 Data, Methods, and Case Selection

The empirical data analysed in this study were collected in five organisations from
different sectors that were selected as cases.8 Three organisations are business
companies that are engaged in different industries: TUBES AG in the steel industry,
MEDIA SE in the media industry, and WASTE LTD. in the disposal industry.
CITY ADMINISTRATION is a municipal administration and the last one,

6
This aspect is comprehensively reflected in the field of organisational demography (Pfeffer 1983,
1985), but is explicitly not addressed in this article.
7
Here, customers are understood in the broad sense, referring also to patients (in the case of
hospitals), students (in the case of schools and universities), or elderly people (in the case of
retirement homes).
8
Students in one of my research classes at Bielefeld University in 2010–2011 contributed to the
data collection. I would like to thank Sammy Beckmann, Frauke Gradert, Sebastian Hoffschneider,
Lisa Hunder, Laura Schimanski, Christian Ulbricht, and Mike Wortmann.
232 S. Kette

WELFARE CARE, is a regional office of an umbrella organisation in the


non-statutory welfare sector (in German: Freie Wohlfahrtspflege). All organisations
are located in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany.
The case selection is based on some preliminary assumptions. We selected three
organisations that can be assumed to have a natural interest in demographic change
and two organisations (TUBES AG & MEDIA SE) with no obvious links to the
topic. As we expected staff-related problems, like those mentioned above, to be
relevant to all organisations, we particularly included cases that—due to their
business model or organisational goals—are assumed to be oversensitive to changes
in population structure: The waste disposal infrastructure is indeed immediately
affected by the decrease in population and the spatial distribution of population
(WASTE LTD.). As municipal administrations are essentially political organisa-
tions, population can be considered a relevant category to them (CITY
ADMINISTRATION). Since geriatric care institutions are concerned with elderly
people, an ageing population is supposed to be of relevance to them (WELFARE
CARE).
The main data source is semi-structured interviews. We did not select the
interview partners ourselves. Instead, we presented our research project to the
organisations’ general managements and left it to them to propose those organi-
sational members for the interviews who were experts on the topic or in charge of it.
The one exception is the municipal administration, as it was the only organisation
with someone appointed specifically to the post of a demography officer. We
conducted three or four interviews per organisation, lasting from 17 to 68 min (with
an average length of 40 min). Overall, we had 15 semi-structured interviews with
single organisational members and one group interview with three participants.9
All interviews were completely transcribed. As we were only interested in the
informational content of the interviews, intonation, nonverbal elements, pauses etc.
are not represented in our transcriptions—a level of detail that is required for
example in conversational analysis or the analysis of biographic interviews. We
used Atlas.ti for codifying the interviews. In the first coding run we used the
categories from the heuristic model in order to get a grasp on the material and to see
to what extent our model is applicable. Many of the categories used in the heuristic
model, particularly the catalyst ‘organisational staff’, turned out to be of empirical
relevance. However, a more thorough analysis of the data revealed that the heuristic
model does not cover all aspects that are crucial in understanding the organisational
process of problematizing demographic change comprehensively. So we did a
second run of open coding that was sensitive to case specific aspects. Moreover, we
used documents such as annual reports and organisational charts as supplementary
data sources in order to broaden our understanding of the organisational context.
Table 9.1 gives an overview of the cases analysed in this study. For each case,
we present some brief information on the organisation’s type of business, its sector,

9
For a complete list of interviews see Table 9.2 in the appendix.
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 233

its organisational structure, its membership figures as well as our initial assumptions
about the significance the organisation attaches to demographic change.
In the next section the empirical findings will be summarised and illustrated by
representative quotes from the interviews.

9.4 Empirical Findings

We used the general heuristic model for addressing three questions: First, how does
the topic of demographic change capture an organisation’s attention? Second, why
and in what respect do organisations consider demographic change problematic?
And finally, what are the mechanisms that put the issue of demographic change on
an organisation’s long-term agenda or make it disappear form the agenda again?

9.4.1 Gateways: (How) Does Demographic Change Attract


Organisational Attention?

What makes organisations recognise demographic change as a relevant topic? The


analysis of the five cases revealed two different ways of dealing with the topic: Four
organisations paid attention to demographic change, while one organisation actively
ignored it. Regarding the first group, two gateways turned out to be particularly
relevant: Routine observation of population trends and personal initiative promoted
an organisation’s recognition of the topic as a problem. In the remaining case the
strategy of active deproblematization could be observed.
Routine observation of population trends In the case of WELFARE CARE,10 the
organisational interest in demographic change is based on already established
routines of monitoring population development. So there was no special event that
triggered the organisation’s attention to the topic. As an explanation for the
organisation’s general interest in demographic change, the interviewees particularly
emphasised that geriatric care is one of WELFARE CARE’s core activities, as
illustrated in the following statement by the organisation’s Human Resources
(HR) director:
So our future planning has never been haphazard, we rather […] provide services for
people, for specific problematic groups, for specific age groups. And so we have always had
to discuss the question of how the numbers of specific target groups change over time so
that we can tailor our services accordingly (Interview 29).11

10
The analysis of the WELFARE CARE case draws heavily on an unpublished case study con-
ducted by students in one of my research classes (Hunder and Ulbricht 2011).
11
The interview citations were translated by Sven Kette and Eva Fenn.
Table 9.1 Overview of the cases (the same colour indicates similarity)
234

Case Tubes AG Media SE Waste Ltd. City Administration Welfare Care


Regional office of an umbrel-
Type of
Business company Business company Business company Public administration la organisation in the non-
organisation
statutory welfare sector

Sector Steel industry Media industry Waste disposal industry Municipal administration Welfare sector
German umbrella organisa-
Global player with five sub- tion in the welfare sector
German family company
Global player; sidiaries; with several regional offices.
operating in Germany and
Case: one of the three divi- Municipal administration The organisation runs sever-
Organisational three other European coun-
sions in the group’s head- Case: the group’s headquar- with six departments in a al information centres and
structure tries;
quarters (located in Germa- ters (located in Germany); German city care institutions.
Case: headquarters and one
ny) one subsidiary; staff welfare Case: one regional office
regional office
service and a school of geriatric
nursing
More than 370,000 members
More than 3,500 employees Approx. 170,000 full-time
Approx. 110,000 employees Approx. 4,500 full-time
Number of Approx. 30,000 employees group-wide employees in Germany
worldwide equivalents
members worldwide More than 2,000 employees Approx. 12,500 members
More than 35,000 employ- Approx. 5,500 employees
in Germany and 5,500 full-time employ-
ees in Germany
ees in the regional office
Assumed organ- Indirect organisational
No obvious organisational No obvious organisational Reference to population as
isational refer- reference to population due Reference to age as relevant
reference to age or popula- reference to age or popula- relevant organisational cate-
ence to demo- to the connection to the organisational category
tion tion gory
graphic change waste disposal infrastructure
S. Kette
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 235

Given the obvious link between geriatric care and an ageing population it is
indeed not surprising that WELFARE CARE is sensitive to demographic change.
Personal initiative In all organisations the most common mechanism for putting
demographic change on the organisational agenda was personal initiative. In the
heuristic model, personal initiative is reflected in the categories ‘boundary spanning
units’ and ‘participation in external networks’, both functioning as gateways. The
analysis of the five cases shows that interaction with organisational environments
through networking or boundary spanning is an important source of information
and an arena of discussion. This alone, however, is not a sufficient condition for
organisations to take up the topic. Rather the formal and/or informal power of
individual organisational members has turned out to be much more important in this
regard. This could be observed in the cases of TUBES AG, MEDIA SE, and
CITY ADMINISTRATION, where it was the personal initiative of individual
members that put demographic change on the organisational agenda.
TUBES AG started discussing demographic change during a regular meeting of
the company’s HR staff in 2006, when the company owner himself emphasised the
need for the organisation to address this topic in future.12 At MEDIA SE, similarly,
the organisational interest in demographic change emerged in regular meetings of
an organisation-wide HR staff working group. However, the MEDIA SE working
group had not been set up specifically for the reason of developing organisational
responses to demographic change but for discussing general health-related issues.
Thus, demographic change was only one of many topics that were potentially
relevant in the context of HR. According to the interviewees, it was not clear which
of the issues discussed would be subject to intensified efforts. So here as well, the
organisational recognition of demographic change is based on personal initiative.
The group HR deputy director, who had already conducted several analyses of the
organisation’s demography before, had been sensitive to demography-related issues
and promoted the topic within the working group. In the case of
CITY ADMINISTRATION the organisational attention to the topic relied on the
mayor’s personal decision to create the new position of a demography officer.
Active deproblematization We have already shown that individual organisational
members can put the topic of demographic change on an organisation’s agenda.
However, in all three cases the personal initiative was taken at relatively high
authority levels. This was not the case at WASTE LTD., where the head of logistics
in one of the four regional divisions, who had been very sensitive to demographic
developments, repeatedly tried to put the topic on the organisation’s agenda. His
attempts to convince the CEO of his regional division as well as the group HR
department remained unsuccessful, although the group HR deputy director had
recently attended a seminar on the challenges of demographic change for business
companies.

12
Establishing a working group or a project team is a very common way for organizations to deal
with non-instructive problems (Kühl 2018).
236 S. Kette

The vagueness of the topic and the absence of a sense of urgency seem to be the
main reasons why demographic change did not make it onto the organisational
agenda at WASTE LTD. For instance, the group HR deputy director criticised the
seminar for not making clear recommendations on how to cope with demographic
change:
It’s only scratching the surface. But specific recommendations for action […] I couldn’t get
there (Interview 25).

Additionally, he regarded demographic change as something that ‘doesn’t hurt


enough yet’, whose full implications are difficult to grasp. By calling it a ‘strategic
issue’ he made clear that tackling demographic change was not profitable in the
short run.
I think on the one hand it’s just that it doesn’t hurt enough yet. Let’s put it this way, it doesn’t
hurt enough yet […]—such a strategic issue like demography. […] I would have to get any
short-term benefit, or let’s say any short to medium term benefit before I say: okay, it’s worth
tackling the issue of demography, so that it climbs up the priority list (Interview 25).

According to his argument that the costs outweigh the benefits in the short run,
the topic could only be successfully put on the organisation’s agenda by the group’s
top management itself, as they are in charge of resource allocation:
A topic like this must be rooted at the highest management level. They have to be com-
mitted to it, saying: “Okay, demography is an important issue, so let’s tackle this now.” All
that are things that—you won’t get any benefit from in the short run, it will just cost you a
lot of money. In the long run it will pay off, but you’ll need the management for that, that’s
the way I see it (Interview 25).

At WASTE LTD. the group HR department actively deproblematized demo-


graphic change, although the topic had been brought to the organisation’s attention
from the inside by an internal staff member and from the outside by a seminar that
addressed demography-related problems for business companies. The HR depart-
ment nevertheless managed to dismiss the topic doubly: First, they objected to
taking up the issue because of its vagueness and hence the lack of concrete and
effective tools to cope with it. This objection indicates the fatalistic view that there
is nothing you can do about the potential impact of demographic change. And then,
when organisational members at lower levels of authority brought up the topic, it
was first rejected for the reasons mentioned and, at the same time, the responsibility
was attributed to the general management. Thus, the topic was rejected in two ways:
on the one hand technically and factually, by referring to the topic’s diffuse nature;
and on the other hand socially, by claiming not to be in charge and shifting the
responsibility onto the higher management levels.
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 237

9.4.2 Multiple Constructs: Intra-organisational


and Thematic Differences

While the last section analysed the circumstances under which demographic change
gains organisational attention, this section focuses on the different dimensions of
demographic change that were considered problematic. This follow-up question
refers to the category of ‘organisational construct of demographic change’ in the
heuristic model. The analysis has revealed—both across as well as within cases—a
great variety of problems organisations associate with demographic change.
Intra-organisational differences The cases analysed in this study differ as to
whether an organisation has developed only one organisation-wide construct of
demographic change or a variety of them. Both TUBES AG as well as MEDIA SE
had at least tried to develop a common organisation-wide understanding of
demographic change and related problems in regular working group meetings. In
both cases, however, the working groups did not have a hierarchically supported
mandate for implementing their concepts, as the initial interest in the topic had
already faded. Thus, the MEDIA SE working group was rather oriented towards
sensitising and informing the organisation’s subsidiaries than towards binding
decision making. Accordingly, when asked for the headquarters’ control over de-
mography related measures taken in single divisions, the group HR director
answers:
Now and then it might happen that simply because of a meeting or just because the topic of
demography happens to catch on with the staff manager, or because the owner family might
want to hear what the different departments of MEDIA SE are doing about the issue of
demography, apart from that, due to the decentralised organisation, everyone really can
decide for himself. […] But everyone is actually sensitised to the issue, or has been
sensitised by the group HR department (Interview 21).

So even if MEDIA SE had developed an organisation-wide understanding of


demographic change, this did not result in any binding decisions for the organi-
sation’s divisions. It was rather left to the subsidiaries to draw conclusions from the
information given and to take appropriate measures. Consequently, the topic did not
really play a prominent role throughout MEDIA SE:
If I said it [the topic of demographic change, SK] is established, that would be a bit of an
exaggeration I guess (group HR director, Interview 21).

The situation is similar at TUBES AG. They also had set up a working group to
look at the organisational problems related to demographic change. However, the
organisation failed in its attempt to establish an organisation-wide approach to
demographic change. Instead, the organisation’s divisions addressed the issue in
their own way, by rather erratically attaching previously known problems to
demographic change. Moreover, the measures taken had not been evaluated or
reported back to the working group or headquarters, as there were no established
reporting and communicating channels (Interview 15; Interview 16).
238 S. Kette

To sum up, the cases of MEDIA SE and TUBES AG have shown that it might
be easy or at least possible for corporations to develop a group-wide approach to
demographic change. However, divisional boundaries may hinder the implemen-
tation of group-wide measures and strategies to cope with the identified demo-
graphic change related problems. While at MEDIA SE the implementation of a
common strategy across all the divisions failed due to the working group’s insuf-
ficient decisional power—which is why their role was limited to giving information
and raising awareness for the topic—lacking reporting channels prevented a suc-
cessful integration of divisional initiatives into an effective group-wide concept at
TUBES AG. There, the demographic change related activities of single divisions
were cut off from the decision making processes in the group’s headquarters.
Similar to TUBES AG, various definitions of demographic change evolved
across the divisions of WELFARE CARE. Here members from different depart-
ments discussed the topic in a working group headed by the HR director. The
working group was primarily concerned with collecting information from the
operational departments, from the internal controlling department but also from
customer requests. Based on that information four major organisational problems
related to demographic change were defined: (1) ageing of staff (and related health
issues causing higher sick leave rates); (2) growing shortage of skilled workers;
(3) ageing of clientele; and (4) ageing of association members.
The first two aspects in particular were regarded as problems with serious
implications for the organisation, as it becomes clear in the following statement by
the head of geriatric care:
Related to our staff, it surely is a real problem because it touches the core of our services if I
am no longer able to provide these; or if we have to ask ourselves: “Can I still mount a new
project? Does it still make sense?” Or do I realise, yes it does, but no one wants to work on
it (Interview 26).

However, in one of the organisational departments, the school of geriatric care, a


completely different view of demographic change prevailed. There, demographic
change was not regarded as a problem but as an advantage. As an institution that
offers training in geriatric nursing, an ageing population constitutes a strong
argument for the profession, as stated by the head of school:
Yes, of course, we do use [demographic change, SK] as an argument for the profession, to
get people interested in or convinced of this profession. There is hardly any occupational
field that is as future-proof as geriatric care. If you have a job there, you usually won’t lose
it. Unfortunately, far too few people take up this profession because of its public image
that’s still slightly negative (Interview 27).

So the school of geriatric nursing does agree with the other departments of
WELFARE CARE on the problem of skilled labour shortage. However, the head of
the school regards the demographic developments also as an opportunity to pro-
mote geriatric care professions. It is not surprising that different organisational
departments develop different views on the same topic. However, it is not
self-evident that these different views stabilise and coexist. The coexistence of
varying constructs at WELFARE CARE might be explained by the fact that the
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 239

school of geriatric nursing did not actively participate in the working group. Rather
it was just kept informed about the working group’s proceedings. And it was
presumably this loosely coupled structure (Weick 1976) that protected the school’s
freedom to develop and maintain its own construct of demographic change.
At CITY ADMINISTRATION, however, it had never been intended to imple-
ment an organisation-wide approach to demographic change. The demography
officer deliberately abstained from specifying organisation-wide measures to deal
with demography-related problems. Instead, he set some rather broad demographic
policy objectives and left it to the departments to develop appropriate concepts and
programmes. He explains his decentralised approach as follows:
I was supposed to […] draw up a draft about the city’s approach to demographic change
and to prepare a proposal that could be submitted to the city council. […] Contentwise,
there was no further specification, what else, as no one had been familiar with this. And
neither had I. But obviously everyone was just thinking, […] well: “Mr. Mueller is now
writing a few lines, speaking up for more retirement homes or fewer retirement homes […]
and that’s demographic change.” But all that I haven’t done. […] Instead, I outlined
examples of typical fields of action. […] And then I drew up objectives, I called them
demographic policy objectives, based on what I have done, so to speak. […] However,
what I haven’t done was saying we have to do this or that. Rather it was a kind of strategic
approach (Interview 32).

The cases of WELFARE CARE and CITY ADMINISTRATION have shown


that an organisation’s internal boundaries may establish realms of sense-making—
be it by decision or otherwise. The cases of MEDIA SE and TUBES AG, on the
other hand, have shown that even if an organisation makes an effort to develop and
implement one organisation-wide approach to demographic change, this does not
necessarily lead to coordinated action across the divisions. Moreover, the analysis
of the WASTE LTD. case has shown that within one organisation not only different
definitions of demography-related problems may occur, but also a different
assessment of the topic’s organisational relevance.
Thematic differences Shifting the focus of analysis from the different organisational
levels at which the construction of demographic change as a relevant problem
occurs to the constructs itself, a remarkable thematic variance becomes visible.
Scanning the data for the problems the five organisations associated with demo-
graphic change, three subject areas turned out to be particularly salient: Staff-related
topics, output-related topics, and sales arguments. Across all cases, the topics that
were most commonly linked to demographic change were staff-related. At TUBES
AG, MEDIA SE and WELFARE CARE, demographic change was considered
mainly as a challenge to HR management.
For instance, the head of employment law department at TUBES AG regarded
demographic change as problematic primarily in terms of recruitment, knowledge
transfer, and health protection:
To us, demographic change concerns three things. First and foremost it means that we’ll
have fewer young people in future. Well-skilled and qualified employees will be lured away
from us, and we’ll have more older employees and somehow, we have to enable them
240 S. Kette

to—well actually to keep going, if I may put it that way. […] and if anyone leaves, then his
knowledge has to be transferred in some way (Interview 15).

At MEDIA SE the interviewees also related demographic change to staff-related


topics. To them, it was primarily a matter of health promotion as well as of training
and development, which is also reflected in the measures they had taken to respond
to demographic change. The list of measures given by the group HR director
includes ergonomic workplace design, health check-ups, and further education and
training opportunities for older employees (Interview 21). However, the latter two
measures had not been originally introduced in order to meet demographic change.
Rather, they had been reframed as appropriate for meeting the demands of an
ageing staff. The check-up programme was originally intended for managers, but
was later extended to all employees over age 45. Similarly, further education and
training that had been originally offered only to younger employees was then also
provided for the older staff.
At TUBES AG as well, the coping measures for demographic change were
linked to well-established topics. According to an HR staff member, it was already
that way when the working group started discussing demographic change. Focusing
on well-known topics that needed to be addressed anyway was their way of dealing
with the large number of topics that can be related to demographic change:
After our first working group meeting, when we had made a list with all the topics, […] we
were kind of flabbergasted at the amount that still needs to be done and we were thinking,
we have to split that up now, there is no way of doing all that simultaneously, not even if
we were three people or something. We said: “What is the most important to us? What
suggests itself because it has to be done anyway” (Interview 16).

Both cases give the impression that there are no topics or problems inherently
related to demographic change, predetermining a particular agenda or programme.
In fact, the opposite could be observed: Already implemented programmes or
well-known problems are attached to demographic change retrospectively.
A statement by a HR staff member at TUBES AG supports this reading:
Well, that’s also something that is problematic about the topic of demographic change. It
can mean everything and nothing. And that again means that everyone is doing a little
something and then you come to realise, well, that is actually also demography-related
(Interview 16).

At WELFARE CARE, too, staff-related topics such as recruitment and health


promotion were seen as relevant regarding demographic change (Interview 26).
However, apart from that, another topic was considered important. The head of
school of geriatric nursing regarded the ageing of society as a development that
improves the employment prospects of geriatric care workers—an argument that
can be used for attracting future students. Here, demographic change does not
appear as a staff-related problem but a customer-related solution, i.e. a sales
argument.
At CITY ADMINISTRATION each department saw demographic change in its
own way. For instance, infrastructure topics such as the accessibility of bus stops
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 241

and train stations were linked to demographic change as well as housing and urban
development issues such as future housing demands, the demand for childcare
places or shopping opportunities (Interview 32; Interview 34). All these topics can
be summarised under the heading of output-related topics.

9.4.3 Questioned Relevance. The Precarious Status


of Demography-Related Problems

As the WASTE LTD. case has already shown, there is no guarantee that organi-
sations recognise demographic change as a relevant organisational problem.
However, if they pay attention to the topic and acknowledge it as a problem
relevant to them, then, as will be shown subsequently, that does not necessarily
establish demographic change sustainably on their agenda. Instead, the organisa-
tional relevance of demographic change is continuously questioned and under the
risk of falling down the priority list or even disappearing completely from an
organisation’s radar.
There seem to be some inherent reasons for this precarious status of demo-
graphic change: its long-term character and ambiguity might facilitate the topic’s
fading from the spotlight, as could be observed in the cases of MEDIA SE and
TUBES AG. In both organisations, the financial crisis of 2007–2008 was men-
tioned as a reason that temporarily drew the organisational attention away from the
topic. A HR staff member at TUBES AG states:
For the last year and a half we have been rather occupied with the crisis, so there wasn’t any
money to do anything about that neither was there time (Interview 16).

Another member of the organisation, the head of employment law department,


shares this view:
The group hasn’t met for some time. […] We have to say, it has gained a certain
momentum […] We have this working group and we drew up a draft and even presented it,
that’s true, but then we lost sight of it a bit due to the crisis (Interview 15).

At MEDIA SE as well, the financial crisis is cited as an explanation for tem-


porally losing interest in topics related to demographic change, as illustrated in a
statement by the staff welfare officer:
Well, something like the economic crisis has not been without consequences, in that the
managers were increasingly busy with other things. If the economic crises had not hap-
pened, then I guess we would have done more to address these topics, but as it is, they
faded even more into the background (Interview 22).

Once attention and resources are taken away from demography-related projects
and applied to more urgent problems, it is difficult to get demographic change back
on the organisational agenda, as the topic has—according to a HR staff member at
242 S. Kette

TUBES AG—cooled down in the meantime and is no longer able to compete with
day-to-day business for resources and attention:
Actually, the management would have to bring up that matter once more, […] so that you
just hear it from them once more, how important it is, and that they set a deadline or
something, but there isn’t anything like that. And so […] the day-to-day business is just the
squeaky wheel that gets the grease and then you forget, well you do not forget, but then you
just put other things on hold for the time being (Interview 16).

In fact, the only organisation that succeeded in sustainably establishing demo-


graphic change on its agenda is CITY ADMINISTRATION. Scarcity of attention
and resources, which made the topic disappear from the organisations’ radar at
TUBES AG and MEDIA SE, is a well-known issue in municipal administrations as
well. However, as public administrations are not as sensitive to economic devel-
opments as business companies (Kette 2012, 2018), the topic of demographic
change outlasted the financial crisis at CITY ADMINISTRATION.
A case-specific feature that must be highlighted here is certainly the demography
officer. The mayor had newly created this position in order to have someone who is
exclusively responsible for dealing with demography related issues. Moreover,
specific formal rights are attached to this position; for instance, the demography
officer must co-sign all proposals that are, in the broadest sense,
demography-related. The demography officer explains the significance of this
institutionalised responsibility as follows:
Well, I have to sign off on all the proposals from all the departments that consist of planning
processes that—let’s put it that way—stretch into the future (Interview 32).

While in all other cases the topic of demographic change was delegated to
working groups with no clear connection to the organisations’ hierarchical
decision-making structure, at CITY ADMINISTRATION responsibility was clearly
assigned to a person in a position of high formal authority: No strategic decisions
can be made without the demography officer’s seal of approval. The working
groups at TUBES AG and MEDIA SE did not have similar authority, which was—
apart from the missing reporting channels—often criticised by their staff members.
At CITY ADMINSTRATION, such problems had been anticipated. Thus,
according to the mayor’s former secretary, they designed the position of the de-
mography officer in a way that these problems can be avoided:
It has also been suggested that the responsibility for [demographic change, SK] should be
implemented in the different departments. But that has always been the classical way […]
of eliminating a topic. In such a huge administration you need one person […] who
oversees everything and who is in charge and who presses people on the topic and who can
arrange an appointment with the mayor, with the head of administration, in order to say
“Well, Mr. Mayor, things are not done the way you want them to be done”. But if [the
responsibility for demographic change, SK] is implemented across the administration, then
everyone deals with such things the way they think best (Interview 33).
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 243

9.5 Discussion

This article does not provide ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973) or in-depth
explanations of how and why an organisation is concerned with demographic
change. Rather it is an exploratory study of the patterns and mechanisms that shape
the organisational construction of demographic change. Based on the analysis of the
five particular cases, this section aims at formulating reasonable—i.e. not arbitrary
—general hypotheses about the organisational processes of problematizing
demographic change. Therefore, hypotheses 1 and 2 relate to the circumstances
under which demographic change gains organisational relevance—initially and in
the long run. This question is represented in the heuristic model through the cat-
egories ‘gateways’ and ‘catalysts’. Hypotheses 3 and 4 refer to the category ‘or-
ganisational construct of demographic change’ in the heuristic model, i.e. to the
specific problems organisations associate with demographic change.
The first hypothesis takes account of the fact that in all cases where organisations
paid attention to demographic change, personal initiative played a significant role.
Due to its long-term character and its vagueness, demographic change does not
suggest itself to organisations as a relevant topic. Since organisations are faced with
scarce resources, they are rather concerned with short-term and urgent, than with
strategic and long-term, problems (Luhmann 1971). So it appears difficult for a
topic such as demographic change to gain organisational relevance. Moreover, the
analysis suggests that personal initiative is only successful when taken at a high
hierarchical level. As the WASTE LTD. case has shown, initiatives from “activists”
(Nutt 1998) at lower hierarchical levels are rejected very easily. Having said all that,
it appears generally unlikely that organisation start problematizing demographic
change:
Hypothesis 1 (omission thesis) Given the vague and long-term character of
demographic change it is easy for organisations to ignore the topic. If organisations
pay attention to demographic change, then personal initiative and support from
high authority levels are crucial factors.
The second hypothesis is based on the observation that in all but one case,
organisational attention to demographic change had faded over time. Only in the
case of CITY ADMINISTRATION was demographic change institutionalised as a
relevant problem. This was mainly due to the position of the demography officer,
who was exclusively responsible for demography-related issues.13 The other
organisations, too, had assigned working groups to work specifically on demo-
graphic change. But still, the topic was eventually pushed into the background by
day-to-day business or more urgent problems such as the financial crisis; either the
focus of attention shifted, the commitment of activists dwindled, or the general
management completely forgot about the topic.

13
For the effects of assigning responsibilities see Hasse and Japp (1997).
244 S. Kette

This presumably happened because the working groups had only been loosely
connected to the organisations’ formal structure. They had no clear communication
channels in place and their connection to established decision making processes
either failed or had never been intended. Moreover, participation in the working
groups was not part of the members’ main job duties related to their actual posi-
tions. At CITY ADMINISTRATION, by contrast, the demography officer was
exclusively responsible for demography related tasks and, apart from that, he was
effectively involved in the organisation’s decision making structure, as all
‘future-oriented’ decisions needed his seal of approval. The marked tendency for
demographic change to fade over time leads to the second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 (dismissal thesis) Given the vague and long-term character of
demographic change as well as the scarcity of organisational resources, preserving
the organisational relevance of demographic change over time requires exclusively,
or at least clearly assigned, responsibilities as well as an effective involvement in
the organisation’s information and decision structure.
If we now look at the constructs of demographic change developed by the five
organisations, we have seen that the organisations associate a wide variety of
problems with the topic. However, these are, primarily, well-established problems.
In line with the behavioural theory of the firm (March 1994; Cyert and March
1992), MEDIA SE, TUBES AG, and WELFARE CARE activated well-known
organisational problem schemes (such as knowledge transfer, health promotion, or
recruitment) when operationalizing demographic change. This again means that
demographic change does not only turn into a problem to be solved but also into a
justification for certain organisational actions (Starbuck 1983). Thus, the problem
solving strategies already established in an organisation may not serve as a gateway
(as initially assumed in the heuristic model), but they take effect in the process of
problematizing demographic change, as they steer the problematization towards a
particular direction. Consequently, the third hypothesis reads as follows:
Hypothesis 3 (ambiguity thesis) Given the ambiguity of the topic of demographic
change, organisations tend to operationalise the issue towards well-known problem
schemes and existing problem solving strategies.
The last hypothesis refers also to the ambiguity of the topic, but with a slightly
different focus: It is about the likelihood that an organisational construct of
demographic change—once established—might further change over time. It
appears generally possible that demographic change becomes a subject of debate
within an organisation, thus, is subject to change. However, changes of the original
construct could be observed in none of the cases. Once a reading had been
established, no or only minimal changes occurred. For instance, if demographic
change is initially framed as a problem of recruitment, the focus may be broadened
to include issues such as health promotion, as prolonged employability is the
“functional equivalent” (Merton 1957) to the recruitment of new staff. Other issues
such as knowledge transfer or training and development may also gain attention, as
long as they are staff-related.
9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 245

This observed immutability can be explained by Stinchcombe’s (1965) concept


of imprinting that describes “how organisations take on elements of their founding
environment and how these elements persist well beyond the founding phase”
(Marquis and Tilczik 2013, p. 1). It can also be considered a consequence of
hypotheses 1 and 2. After the topic of demographic change has entered an
organisation, responsibilities are assigned (e.g. founding a working group of
experts) and a preliminary list of related problems is compiled. Thus, all alternative
views of demographic change would have to overcome this initial construct
(Hypothesis 1). But since organisational resources are scarce and organisational
attention to the topic decreases over time (Hypothesis 2), introducing a completely
new construct of demographic change becomes difficult: During an initial phase of
organisational enthusiasm a construct is quite stable and protected by the members
in charge. When enthusiasm and attention have waned, then it seems no longer
possible to shape the construct, which is about to fade from the spotlight anyway.
Hypothesis 4 (imprinting thesis) A construct of demographic change, once
established, will later only slightly alter, since the initial construct is protected by
those who developed it and resources as well as organisational attention will
probably have already been applied to other topics.
To conclude, Hypothesis 1 suggest that personal initiative taken at a high
hierarchical level helps the topic of demographic change gain access to an
organisation, while clearly assigned responsibility ensures its persistence. The
remaining gateways described in the heuristic model do not become irrelevant, but
they are less important in their role as gateways. Rather, they have significance in
that they influence the process of creating an initial construct of demographic
change. According to hypothesis 2 one could argue that due to the very nature of
demographic change (its long-term and ambiguous character), its sustainable
institutionalization as a topic of relevance requires far-reaching structural reforms
(i.e. the creation of new positions with an effective involvement in the organisa-
tional decision making structure). Thus, it is much more likely that organisations
pay attention to the topic only temporarily. This temporal attention constitutes ‘a
period of opportunity’ for well-known, yet ignored, problems to be linked to
choices that have emerged as a consequence of considering demographic change
(cf. Hypothesis 3 and 4).14

9.6 Conclusion

The analysis and its empirical findings can be understood as a contribution in three
respects

14
Cohen et al. (1972) introduced the term of ‘problem latency’ to refer to the amount of time that a
problem is active but not linked to a choice.
246 S. Kette

1. It expands the research on demographic change in that it not only looks at


organisations as potentially affected actors but also at the organisational structures
that determine if and how organisations address demographic change. The liter-
ature on demographic change either omits organisations completely or it defines
organisational problems induced by demographic change in advance. This study,
by contrast, adopts an exploratory approach as it regards it as an open question,
whether at all organisations pay attention to demographic change and if so, in what
respects they consider it problematic. This perspective provides insights into the
structural elements and mechanisms that encourage organisations to recognise and
establish demographic change as a relevant organisational problem or prevent
them from doing so. Therefore, it illuminates the question of why it is particularly
difficult for demographic change to gain relevance in an organisational context.
2. While the analysis of how organisations make sense of demographic change has
proved fruitful in the study of demographic change, the study of demographic
change, in turn, might further develop the organisational sense-making per-
spective. The concept of organisational sense-making has been sensitive to
organisational and environmental characteristics for a long time (Daft and
Weick 1984). However, they still play only a minor role in the study of
organisational framing and sense-making processes, which has focussed pri-
marily on sense-making processes at the micro-level of interactions between
organisational members (e.g. Balogun and Johnson 2004; Maitlis 2005; Kaplan
2008) as well as on the question of how particular constructs lead to particular
organisational responses (e.g. Lê 2013). This study, by contrast, explicitly
focuses on how certain organisational structures foster or hinder the develop-
ment, or establishment, of certain constructs (see Fig. 9.3).
3. Finally, it might be promising to generalise the concept of non-instructive
problems across other organisational contexts. Understanding demographic
change as a non-instructive problem drew our attention to the inherent features
of the topic itself. The ambiguous and long-term character of demographic
change poses uncertainty for the organisation not only as to its best or only
possible solution but also as to the different dimensions of the problem itself.
However, demographic change is probably not the only topic that meets the
criteria of a non-instructive problem. So it might be fruitful to do further
research on how organisations deal with other problems of this type, in order to
gain a better understanding about the structural features that determine whether
an organisation turns a non-instructive problem into a particular type of
instructive problem, or ignores it.

Fig. 9.3 Perspectives on sense-making


9 From Topic to Problem: Organisational Mechanisms … 247

Appendix

Table 9.2 List of interviews


Tubes AG
Interview 14 Training officer 61 min
Interview 15 Head of employment law department 45 min
Interview 16 Staff member of HR 35 min
Media SE
Interview 20 Staff member of HR 25 min
Interview 21 Group HR director 50 min
Interview 22 Staff welfare officer 60 min
Waste Ltd.
Interview 23 Head of logistics (regional office) 25 min
Interview 24 Technical director (regional office) 20 min
Interview 25 Group HR deputy director 25 min
City administration
Interview 32 Demography officer 65 min
Interview 33 Former secretary of the mayor 17 min
Interview 34 Head of housing department 68 min
Welfare care
Interview 26 Head of geriatric care 23 min
Interview 27 Head of school of geriatric nursing 26 min
Interview 28 Staff unit for civil society engagement 30 min
Interview 29 Group interview—participants: 53 min
• HR director
• Head of family care
• Head of child care
248 S. Kette

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Part III
Social Policy
Chapter 10
Minorities in Spanish Secondary
Education: School Segregation, Between
Reality and Official Statistics

Brahim El-Habib Draoui, María Jiménez-Delgado


and Raúl Ruiz-Callado

Abstract The deepening of social inequality in Spain during the last decade due to the
global financial crisis has brought a growth in residential and school segregation in
urban areas. This article analyses ethnic segregation across four public secondary
schools in the Northern Area of Alicante (Spain), covering six disadvantaged neigh-
bourhoods with a high concentration of immigrant and Roma populations. To this end,
the student bodies were examined according to their national and ethnic composition
and their expectations for the future. Field work findings show that official statistics do
not reflect the real situation of ethnic diversity in these schools, concealing the worrying
dimensions of school segregation in marginalized areas, a phenomenon which has
negative impacts on minority students’ aspirations and equal opportunities.


Keywords Minority students Immigrant background Roma people 
 
School segregation Official statistics Future aspirations

10.1 Introduction

Many developed countries have experienced significant growth in socio-economic


and educational inequalities in recent years, leading to increased levels of resi-
dential and school segregation (van Zanten 2012; Oberti et al. 2012; Frankenberg
2013; Orfield et al. 2014).1 In Spain this is also clearly visible. The country’s

1
School segregation can be defined as the way in which a city’s student population is distributed
across schools according to families’ socioeconomic and demographic characteristics, including
data such as educational and financial capital, professional and social status and origin or ethnicity
(Gorard et al. 2003). In Spain the causal relationship between residential and educational segre-
gation (reflecting contradictions in public policy and particularly in the education system itself:
Jiménez-Delgado 2016) is widely accepted among specialists (Benito and Gonzàlez-Balletbó
2007; Síndic de Greuges 2008; Alegre et al. 2008; Capellán de Toro et al. 2013).

B. El-Habib Draoui  M. Jiménez-Delgado (&)  R. Ruiz-Callado


University of Alicante, Alicante, Spain
e-mail: maria.jimenez@ua.es

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 253


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_10
254 B. El-Habib Draoui et al.

emergence as one of the world’s main migrant destinations from the mid-1990s
onwards resulted in the development of marginalized urban areas, largely inhabited
by minorities (Defensor del Pueblo 2003; Benito and Gonzàlez-Balletbó 2007;
Síndic de Greuges 2008; Bonal 2013). The present study confirms this trend and
shows that, in education, segregation can have negative effects on the future
aspirations of the youngest and most vulnerable segments of the population.
At first, the primary objective of this study was to determine—according to
school statistics—the national and ethnic composition of schools in the Northern
Area of the city of Alicante, a part of the city with significant levels of socioeco-
nomic vulnerability and high concentrations of immigrant and Roma populations.
A secondary objective was to analyse these students’ future aspirations according to
their origin and ethnicity. However, our research faced a key obstacle from the
beginning, namely that there are no ethnic statistics in official records apart from
those based on nationality status. This means that the only minority visible in
official data are students with foreign nationality, thus excluding Spanish Roma and
nationalized pupils with a foreign background.
Given this lack of necessary data, we were obliged to reformulate our objectives,
setting the new overall aim of illustrating statistically hidden school segregation
through comparison of official statistics with data from our own field work, in order
to counter the inexact impression given by the former. Government-provided data
impede the comprehensive study of schools’ ethnic composition, despite it being
widely known that in Spain pupils of immigrant and Roma backgrounds are the
most seriously affected by the phenomenon of educational segregation (Calvo
Buezas 1994, 2005; Fernández Enguita 2000; Benito and Gonzàlez-Balletbó 2007;
Carrasco et al. 2009; Garreta Bochaca 2011; Río Ruiz 2011; Carabaña 2012;
Moreno Yus 2013).
These statistical shortcomings are due to the fact that official records do not
include detailed information on Spanish-born citizens of immigrant background
(known as the “second generation”), nor on those born abroad but subsequently
naturalized after arriving in Spain as children (known as the “bridge generation”)
(Jiménez-Delgado 2012, 2016). A similar statistical deficiency applies to the
Spanish Roma community, as the government does not collect ethnic data either in
population censuses or other public records such as ministry, regional government
or local council population registers.2
Thus since official figures ignore the fact that “nationality is … a category, as are
ethnicity or country of birth … [which] arguably represent the core concepts for
ethnic and migration studies” (Kraler et al. 2015, p. 40), the naturalized
immigrant-background population and the Roma community are segments of the

2
In Spain, for constitutional reasons, ethnic statistics are not collected in official records, thus
impeding knowledge of Roma school student numbers. All scientific research into this population
is based on estimates or non-official calculations at a local or regional level. In response to this
situation a number of experts have urged European states to collect statistics on this ethnic group in
order to develop more in-depth knowledge and to counteract discrimination (Laparra 2007;
European Council 2008; Vallvé 2009; FRA 2009; Crepaldi et al. 2008).
10 Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education … 255

population which fall into a statistical blind spot, being treated in exactly the same
way as the non-minority Spanish nationals and appearing in the records under the
single all-embracing category of “Spanish nationality”.
Actually, in Spanish statistics and literature there is still no clear consensus on
how to categorize the “foreign-background population”. In most official registers
the criterion adopted is that of “nationality”, even though the National Institute of
Statistics provides data on the population’s countries of birth and allows access to
the possibility of intersecting both variables (‘nationality’ and ‘country of birth’).
However, it is not possible to take advantage of this specific tool when it comes to
education statistics, which are mainly provided by the Ministry of Education and
the regional governments, with nationality as the only reference variable.
In this research, bearing in mind the historical trajectory of Roma people in
Spain and the recent immigration flows into this country, in addition to the
socio-demographic characteristics of the area under study, we opted for the use of
the variables “Roma background” and “immigrant or foreign-born parents” as
reference variables. In the first case, this refers to children with two Spanish Roma
parents or from mixed marriages between Roma and non-Roma. In the second case,
it refers to students with two foreign-born parents, regardless of their own country
of birth or their nationality status. This last “population category” does not respond
to the concept of migrant background as it is conventionally used in other European
countries.3
While, for decades, many national and international studies have shown the
existence and importance of the school “composition effect” on students’
achievements, expectations and educational development (Coleman 1966; Calero
2007; Maroy 2007; van Zanten 2009, 2012; Oberti et al. 2012; Benito and Gonzàlez
2013; Martínez Cía and Ruiz-Callado 2015), the deficiencies of Spanish statistics
hinder the task of scientifically determining what the real dimensions of these
effects are, in which cases they occur, and how policy makers might counteract
those of a negative nature.
Population statistics are the fundamental tool for quantifying any aspect of
public life. As Prewitt (2010, p. 7) remarked, “the empirical social knowledge […]
would not have reached current levels of maturity in the absence of public statistics.
Demography requires vital statistics […] sociology requires race/ethnicity statistics
[…].” Thanks to minority statistics, Maurice Halbwachs was able to decode the
multi-ethnic and segregated reality of Chicago in the 1920s, and to criticize the
picturesque and deceptive descriptions provided by Chicago School sociologists
(Topalov 2006). Halbwachs used population statistics to bring together demogra-
phy and sociology in the study of the distribution of urban citizens, distinguishing
between social morphology in its wide (particular) conception and its stricto sensu
(neat demographic facts) conception (Halbwachs 1970[1938]).

3
In Germany for instance, this concept includes the three following categories, (1) people who
have immigrated to Germany since 1950, (2) people who were born in Germany with foreign
citizenship and (3) people who were born in Germany and are living with at least one parent who
either immigrated or was born in Germany as a foreigner (Scherr 2013).
256 B. El-Habib Draoui et al.

Thanks also to minority statistics, the 2014 Civil Rights Project Report was able
to issue warnings on the growth in segregation in American schools, where it had
reached levels not seen since the 1960s (Orfield et al. 2014). In the UK, more than a
decade after his Community Cohesion Report, following a series of disturbances in
the summer of 2001, Ted Cantle relied on ethnic statistics to prove the increase of
segregation in schools in specific urban areas of England (Cantle 2001, 2013;
Cantle and Kaufmann 2016). The trend in other leading European countries is not
very different. In the case of France, various studies have shown that the
immigrant-background (second-generation) population suffers worse discrimination
than their parents did (Ruiz-Callado 2005, 2007; van Zanten 2009, 2012; Maroy
2007; Oberti et al. 2012; Ben Ayed 2013). This situation is reflected, amongst other
indicators, in current levels of school segregation and unemployment rates, typical
in poorer outlying urban areas. A similar trend is found in Germany (Elrick and
Farah Schwartzman 2015; Scherr 2013).
In France, as in Germany or in the United States, among other immigration
countries, there is an ongoing debate around collecting minority statistics. Besides
the ethical and legal constraints (Laparra 2007; European Council 2008; Crepaldi
et al. 2008; FRA 2009; Vallvé 2009; Simon 2012; Elrick and Farah Schwartzman
2015; Scherr 2013; Kraler et al. 2015) there are technical and methodological
difficulties to solve (Prewitt 2013; Salentin 2014). However, in Spain this debate is
still in an embryonic stage, despite the huge public controversies around minorities,
namely racism, terrorism or school segregation, among others.
In order to contribute to this debate and to counter the shortcomings of official
statistics, the authors of the present study carried out their own survey of students’
origins and expectations in four high schools (Institutos de Educación Secundaria,
or IES) in the Northern area of the city of Alicante. Our results revealed highly
segregated school populations due to high concentrations of pupils of immigrant
and Roma backgrounds. These findings contrast starkly with information gleaned
from the databases of the Valencian Government’s Education Department, which
offers a normalized but distorted view of schools’ ethnic composition.

10.2 Method

The study was executed in two phases. First, a socio-demographic analysis of the
city of Alicante and its Northern Area was carried out, using official statistics and
the relevant literature. The main indices of spatial segregation were calculated and
the limitations of official statistics for the study of such segregation were
highlighted.
In the second phase, the primary focus of this paper, a descriptive-analytical
methodology was applied. Educational data were collected through a survey on the
origins and future aspirations of secondary-school students at the four state high
schools of the Northern Area: the Gran Vía, Leonardo Da Vinci, Virgen del
Remedio and Las Lomas High Schools. To obtain a comparison from outside the
10 Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education … 257

locality, the same survey was also conducted at the Agost High School (Alicante).
For research criteria viability, the population under study was restricted to pupils in
Compulsory Secondary Education (ESO in Spanish) and sixth form (bachillerato).
With the aid of the school staff we were able to carry out the survey with a total of
1094 students, 934 of whom came from the Northern Area high schools, corre-
sponding to 45.5% of students enrolled there in ESO and bachillerato. The survey
also aimed to identify students according to socio-demographic, cultural and ethnic
parameters ranging from school year; group or class; age and sex; area of residence;
place of birth and nationality; future aspirations; languages spoken at home; par-
ents’ birthplaces, and cultural and ethnic origins.
In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the real situation of the target
universe and to avoid any bias derived from sampling techniques (bearing in mind
these schools’ high rates of absenteeism especially among Roma minority pupils),
the questionnaires were administered to the whole target population, with no
specific sampling frame.
The survey design and contents were discussed and validated by the
‘Observatory of Sociology of Education’ research group at the University of
Alicante (Observatorio Sociológico de la Educación), comprised of experts in
different fields of the social and human sciences, from sociology, education and
economics to human geography, demography, anthropology, gender and
linguistics.
Prior to the experts consultation and taking into account the low cultural capital
and ethnic peculiarity of our target school population, we held meetings with school
principals, head teachers and other staff to ensure that the survey questions were
clear, appropriate, consistent and unbiased. Thanks to their suggestions, we made
changes to the content of some questions, and put explanatory notes at the bottom
of the questionnaires to clarify some concepts such as ethnicity and culture in
addition to adding some new options for the future aspirations item. On this basis a
pilot study was carried out with randomly selected groups in two of the schools.
Finally, the fully structured questionnaires were distributed, completed and col-
lected between November 2013 and June 2014. The results obtained were analysed
using the statistical programme SPSS 20.0.

10.3 The Research Context

The Northern Area of the city of Alicante (Spain) is one of the districts with the
highest concentration of Roma and immigrant populations in the city. Since 2007
the area has been the target of a Comprehensive Recovery Plan (Plan Integral de
Recuperación) due to its high levels of socioeconomic vulnerability: widespread
unemployment; low levels of economic activity; high levels of poverty and
exclusion; the need for restructuring due to economic and social issues; the strong
presence of immigrants and ethnic minorities; low levels of educational achieve-
ment; a significant lack of qualifications; high dropout rates in schools; high crime
258 B. El-Habib Draoui et al.

levels; trends towards demographic precariousness, and environmental degradation


(Ayuntamiento de Alicante 2006, 2008).
The Northern Area comprises six districts: Juan XXIII, Virgen del Remedio,
Virgen del Carmen, Las Cuatrocientas Viviendas, Colonia Requena and Sidi
Ifni-Nou Alacant. According to census figures from the National Statistical Institute
(INE in Spanish), these districts combined are home to 38,431 inhabitants, 11.6%
of the city’s total population. Over one-quarter of these are of foreign nationality,
compared with 11.8% in the rest of the city; in Colonia Requena this percentage
reaches 46.7%. However these figures account for neither naturalized immigrants
nor the second-generation, which according to some city council sources would
increase the district’s foreign-background population to 80%.
With a population density in excess of 20,000 inhabitants per km2, more than
twelve times the city average, one in five residents of the area cohabits with four or
more people. This proportion barely approaches 9% in the rest of the city, while it
reaches 36% in the Virgen del Carmen district (Ayuntamiento de Alicante 2014).
A major, although unspecified, segment of the area’s population is of Roma origin,
in Virgen del Carmen representing almost the entire population. However, this
cannot be demonstrated by official statistics due to the lack of ethnic records in both
the residential and educational fields. Despite its specific demographic, educational
and economic features (Fernández Enguita 2000), the Roma community is seen in
the same light as the rest of the non-minority Spanish population, and the same
applies to the naturalized population of immigrant background.

10.4 Consequences of Statistical Deficiencies

In education, as in other areas of social research, taking nationality as the reference


variable means excluding, de facto, a large proportion of the population under
study, which in the case of some groups of origin can amount to as much as half the
total group. This is evidenced in the census figures for 2014, in which 27.5% of the
registered population with Spanish nationality was born outside of the country.
Thus, for example, 47.7% of those born in Equatorial Guinea had Spanish
nationality; 58% of those born in France; 77.2% of those born in Switzerland;
19.5% of those born in Morocco, and 65.4% of those born in Venezuela. Further,
these naturalized populations, excluded from direct identification, are subsumed
under the “Spanish population” (i.e. “native”) category, implying that they are
“non-minority.” Consequently, many research conclusions drawn about the edu-
cational careers of citizens of foreign-background in Spain are seriously affected,
along with, conversely, those relating to actual “Spanish” students.
Another example of this statistical incoherence can be seen in recent trends in
foreign enrolment in the Spanish education system. Between the 2011–2012 and
2013–2014 school years, Ministry of Education data recorded a fall of around
50,000 in the number of students with foreign nationality. This could be attributed
to various causes: for example, migrants returning to their home countries; an
10 Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education … 259

increase in school dropout rates, or a fall in the birth rate among immigrant women.
Yet when these data are compared with figures for the granting of Spanish citi-
zenship to foreign residents, we see that the trend for the same period was com-
pletely the opposite, with a rise of over 145,000 in successfully completed
naturalisation processes (Fig. 10.1).
Figure 10.1 also suggests an alternative explanation for the above, namely, that
there may have been no actual fall in the volume of foreign students in Spanish
schools, and that instead what has happened is that part of this group has been
naturalized, and thus has moved from the “foreign nationality” statistical category
to “Spanish nationality” one. This transfer may well be administratively practical,
but in demographic, ethnic and sociological terms it makes no sense whatsoever. In
2009, Carrasco et al. warned of key statistical shortcomings in this area, as did,
amongst others, the Centre of Studies for the Social Integration and Education of
Immigrants (CeiMigra) (Melero Valdés 2014).
Similarly it should be remarked that a number of key studies carried out in Spain
have concluded that school segregation is less a function of students’ national origin
than of their social class (Benito and Gonzàlez-Balletbó 2007; Alegre et al. 2008;
Síndic de Greuges 2008). However, the question then arises as to whether the same
conclusion would have been reached if empirical studies had adopted a further
criterion, namely, ethnicity. This is difficult to answer. All analysts concur that
Roma families occupy a predominant part among those with the lowest educational,
economic and employment levels. In fact, the results of various studies in the field
lead us to the conclusion that there is a strong correlation between the four vari-
ables. Unfortunately, the lack of statistical data specifically regarding this minority
impedes any real quantitative appraisal of its indices of segregation.4
The case of the Spanish Roma community is paradigmatic. It has been settled in
Spain since the 15th century. Thus it is difficult to understand why after six hundred
years of coexistence, important studies on school segregation, such as those cited
above, still make no explicit reference to it. However, in reality, this ethnic group is
one of those which attracts the most institutional and social attention in the edu-
cational field, as a number of studies show, and also one of those suffering the
highest levels of social discrimination, being traditionally situated at the core of
education and coexistence issues in schools in marginalized areas (Calvo Buezas
1994, 2005; Abajo Alcalde 1999; Fernández Enguita 2000; Alfageme Chao and
Martínez Sancho 2004; Laparra 2007; Abajo Alcalde and Carrasco 2011; Río Ruiz
2011; Bereményi and Carrasco 2013; Capellán de Toro et al. 2013).
At a European level, these statistical deficiencies, whether with regard to the
population of immigrant background (Poveda et al. 2007; Carrasco et al. 2009;
Simon 2012; Elrick and Farah Schwartzman 2015) or the Roma minority
(Alfageme Chao and Martínez Sancho 2004; Laparra 2007; European Council

4
On school segregation and the indices applied in this field, see amongst others Gorard et al.
(2003), Benito and Gonzàlez-Balletbó (2007), Alegre et al. (2008), Oberti et al. (2012, 2014) and
Frankenberg (2013).
260 B. El-Habib Draoui et al.

Foreign students (foreign nationality)*


800.000 Granted citizenship** 300.000

261.295

foreign students (foreign nationality)


781.236
Anual figures citizenship granted

780.000 260.000

Anual figures
760.000 763.215 220.000

740.000 180.000

731.167

720.000 140.000
114.599
115.557

700.000 100.000
2011 2012 2013

Fig. 10.1 Foreign students and general population naturalisations, 2011–2013. Sources
*Ministry of education, culture and sport, **secretary of state for immigration and emigration

2008; Crepaldi et al. 2008; Vallvé 2009; Sordé et al. 2013; Salentin 2014) represent
a major obstacle to undertaking research into the subject of school composition and
educational and housing segregation. On the other hand, producing differentiated
ethnic statistics, as noted by Kraler and others (2015), makes minorities visible and
enriches our view of each community’s particularities. Thus for the present study
the authors created their own database in order to investigate both phenomena in the
four public high schools of the Northern Area of Alicante city.

10.5 Ethnic and Geographical Origins and Aspirations


of Secondary School Students

10.5.1 Survey Coverage

Table 10.1 shows the survey coverage rates, which (despite the goodwill of school
staff) did not exceed 45.5% of students enrolled.5

5
It should be borne in mind that some of these schools have very high absenteeism and dropout
rates.
10 Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education … 261

Table 10.1 Percentage of survey coverage by IES and level of study


ESO Bachillerato Total
IES 1 55.4 81.3 59.6
IES 2 67.3 17.2 47.0
IES 3 53.2 22.5 42.8
IES 4 35.9 21.4 34.5
Total students enrolled (absolute numbers)* 1457 594 2051
Total questionnaires collected (absolute numbers)** 766 158 934
Total coverage (%) 52.6 26.6 45.5
Sources *Schools databases, **own survey

10.5.2 Students Composition According to Origin

The four high schools surveyed presented a wide diversity of origins. The highest
number of students was from Morocco: while the foreign-born population resident
in Alicante is 9.5% Moroccan, in the Northern Area it reaches 22.2%, and nearly
one in three students interviewed was born in that country.
Here a double process of concentration can be observed, the first residential and
the second educational: the Moroccan-born population is highly concentrated in the
Northern Zone and even more concentrated in its schools. The Ecuadorian-born
community presents a similar situation in schools, although less so in residential
terms, while the Algerian-born population shows a third variant, their residential
concentration being much higher than that in schools (Fig. 10.2).

35%
Whole city * Northern Area* Northern Area High Schools**
30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

Fig. 10.2 Percentage of foreign-born population by country of birth 2014 (main origins). Sources
*Data from population continuous register (INE) and city council population statistics, **own survey
262 B. El-Habib Draoui et al.

Table 10.2 Percentage of students of foreign-background by data source and IES


Foreign students Students of immigrant background according to our survey**
according to schools*
Students with Foreign-born At least one Foreign-born Students with
foreign parents foreign-born students foreign
nationality parent nationality
IES 1 15.64 30.93 36.02 21.61 11.02
IES 2 22.04 43.46 47.35 36.40 18.37
Sources *Data from IES 1 and IES 2 databases, **own survey

Foreign-born parents Other students

IES 1 32.7% 67.3%

IES 2 45.4% 54.6%

IES 3 34.0% 66.0%

IES 4 44.3% 55.7%

Fig. 10.3 Percentage of students’ composition by origin. Source Own survey

It is essential, however, to stress the difference between the information derived


from this study and that from high school databases, which, collected by the Spanish
regional governments, forms the main statistical source for research in the field. If we
take for example High Schools 1 and 2,6 the data from the Valencian Education
Department show percentages of students with foreign nationality at 15 and 22%
respectively, while our survey results showed lower values for the same variable (11
and 18% respectively). On the other hand, our survey data revealed that the proportion
of the school population with both parents born abroad was 30 and 43% respectively,
thus demonstrating that pupils with immigrant background are double those in the
official figures, which only count students with foreign nationality. This difference is
due once again to the fact that the administration’s classification criterion for the
population is “nationality,” while that adopted in our survey was “country of birth,”
fathers and mothers included (Table 10.2). Thus we see that this statistical feature can
create significant bias in studies based on official registers.
Figure 10.3 shows that in each of the four high schools, the proportion of
students with both parents born abroad considerably exceeded the average of the
immigrant population living in the area according to the Population Register

6
In order to preserve the identity of the schools studied their names have been omitted.
10 Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education … 263

(26.5%). This may be a clear indicator that in the Northern Area of Alicante, school
segregation is greater than residential segregation, as in the case of students with
Moroccan parents. In other words, there is a greater proportion of young people
with foreign-born parents amongst the student body than there is of immigrants in
the total population. This may be due to a combination of two factors:
1. A higher birth rate among the immigrant population than among natives. This is
a key but disputable argument, if we bear in mind the high number of children
per mother among Spanish Roma families in the area.
2. More realistically, native Spanish middle-class families are avoiding sending
their children to local schools and are instead sending them to schools in other
districts of the city, with a lower presence of minority-background students
(Gorard et al. 2003; van Zanten 2009, 2012; Maroy 2007; Alegre et al. 2008;
Garreta Bochaca 2011; Oberti et al. 2012; Frankenberg 2013).
From the figure above we can also see that proportions of students with
foreign-born parents varied from one high school to another. The school with the
strongest presence of this population was High School 2, followed by High School 4,
High School 3 and High School 1. In the light of these data, we may conclude that
levels of segregation in these schools follow the same pattern. However, this figure
does not reflect a key variable in school segregation: ethnicity. The Spanish popula-
tion interviewed in these schools was not ethnically homogeneous, since a quarter was
from a Roma background, 15% in the total student body (non-Spanish included).
Therefore the ethnic map of these schools is actually made up of 51% “minorities”
(Fig. 10.4). These data, broken down for each high school, are shown in Fig. 10.5.

Spanish with
invalid responses
on
"Culture/Ethnicity" Others
15.0% 6.0%
Spanish
non-Roma
27.8%

Foreign-born
parents
36.4%
Roma background
14.8%

Fig. 10.4 Percentage of students’ composition by origin and ethnicity. Source Own survey
264 B. El-Habib Draoui et al.

Foreign-born parents
Roma background
Spanish non-Roma
Spaniards with invalid responses on "Culture/Ethnicity"

IES 1 32.7% 27.8% 28.7% 10.8%

IES 2 45.4% 7.7% 30.3% 16.6%

IES 3 34.0% 5.9% 33.6% 26.5%

IES 4 44.3% 30.5% 22.1% 3.1%

Fig. 10.5 Percentage of students’ composition by origin, ethnicity and high school. Source Own
survey

While, from Fig. 10.3, High School 2 could be seen as the most segregated due
to the stronger presence of students with foreign-born parents, Fig. 10.5 (now with
two new categories; “Roma background”, and “Spanish students who have not
answered on culture/ethnicity”) situates it in third place on the list, which is now
headed by High School 4, with 75% of “minority” students.
In brief, then, comparison of the data in Table 10.2 and Figs. 10.3, 10.4 and 10.5
offers further evidence of school segregation that official registers are incapable of
showing. As a consequence of this incapacity, the state’s own figures give a dis-
torted image of schools, particularly those located in marginalized areas.

10.5.3 Distribution of Students by Origin, Ethnicity, Gender


and School Year

The data resulting from our research showed that 86% of the interviewed Roma
students were concentrated in the first part of ESO, confirming the overwhelming
tendency towards absenteeism and school dropout among this minority, who fell
from being a third of the student body in the first year of high school to less than 4%
in the fourth. Measures aimed at the Roma community in recent years have failed to
bear the hoped-for fruit. As Río Ruíz (2011) confirms, their rates of absenteeism are
still at statistically disproportionate levels compared to their demographic presence
in schools, which are designed, in the words of Fernández Enguita (2000, p. 9), “by
and for payos” (non-Roma people). Here again we would stress the opacity and lack
of transparency of official statistics as an obstacle to a detailed analysis of absen-
teeism and school dropout rates according to ethnicity (Río Ruiz 2011).
10 Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education … 265

The distribution of both the non-Roma Spanish students and those of immigrant
parents was relatively more balanced, although the presence of the latter group
diminished from the fourth year of high school onwards compared with the
non-Roma Spanish students, thus evidencing generally lower levels of access to
post-compulsory education among immigrant-origin students (Fig. 10.6). When we
break the statistics down by sex (Fig. 10.7) we see that females of Roma back-
ground were the minority at all educational levels except the 3rd year of high
school. This may be because only 43% of Roma students interviewed were girls and
because their dropout rates soared from age 14–15 onwards, an age at which they
are assigned greater domestic responsibilities and when their sexual maturity means
that some parents consider it unfit for them to stay “unprotected” in a mixed
environment such as school.
Among non-Roma Spanish pupils, sex did not appear as a significant factor as
they moved up the years. The clearest tendency, however, is seen in students of
immigrant parents. Males followed a diminishing curve whose hinge was the 3rd
year of high school, while the presence of females grew until they were 69% in the
final year of bachillerato (sixth form), although only representing 46% of their
population category. This indicates that girls of immigrant background remain
longer than their male counterparts in the compulsory and post-compulsory edu-
cation system, as shown also in Ministry of Education statistics and in other
national studies (Fernández Enguita et al. 2010).

120
Roma Background Spanish non-Roma Foreign-born parents

100

80

60

40

20

Fig. 10.6 Students’ composition by origin, ethnicity and educational level. Source Own survey
266 B. El-Habib Draoui et al.

Females Males
2nd year of bach 71.4% 28.6%
Foriegn-born parents

1st year of bach 57.8% 42.2%


4th year of ESO 52.4% 47.6%
3rd year of ESO 38.0% 62.0%
2nd year of ESO 44.9% 55.1%
1st year of ESO 45.5% 54.5%
Spanish non-Roma

2nd year of bach 44.0% 56.0%


1st year of bach 53.5% 46.5%
4th year of ESO 54.0% 46.0%
3rd year of ESO 41.0% 59.0%
2nd year of ESO 49.3% 50.7%
1st year of ESO 42.1% 57.9%

0.0%
Roma background

2nd year of bach


1st year of bach 25.0% 75.0%
4th year of ESO 40.0% 60.0%
3rd year of ESO 80.0% 20.0%
2nd year of ESO 22.9% 77.1%
1st year of ESO 45.8% 54.2%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Fig. 10.7 Percentage of students’ composition by origin, ethnicity, sex and educational level.
Source Own survey

10.5.4 Students’ Future Aspirations (ESO)7

In general, among the options for future aspirations in this study, “finishing ESO”
and “finding a job” were the most selected options. As can be seen in Fig. 10.8, the
order of priorities changed according to origin and ethnicity. Students from Roma
background most frequently chose “studying a PCPI” (initial vocational qualifi-
cation programme),8 “Staying at home,” or “Getting married,” and were the group
with the lowest aspirations to “Go on to post-compulsory” and “Higher Education”.
By contrast, students of foreign-born parents, in particular, chose these two latter
options, showing that this population generally gives formal education a high
priority, although their real access to it is a different matter, as Fig. 10.6 shows. This
is because -as Zamora Fortuny (2006) has shown and as we have confirmed-,
students, etc of migrant parents from low socio-economic backgrounds, as is the
case in our area of study, tend to occupy the least prestigious branches of education

7
For greater analytical homogeneity this section is restricted to students of ESO.
8
PCPI and FP (Formación Profesional) are both vocational training programmes, however the
former is taught at an equivalent level as the 2° cycle of ESO while the latter is taught at a
post-compulsory level.
10 Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education … 267

80% Spanish non-Roma Roma background Foreign-born parents

60%

40%

20%

0%
Finishing Studying Studying Studying Going to Finding a Staying at Getting
ESO PCPI FP bachillerato university job home married

Fig. 10.8 Percentage of students’ aspirations by origin and ethnicity. Source Own survey

80%
Females Males

60%

40%

20%

0%
Finishing Studying Studying Studying Going to Finding a Staying at Getting
ESO PCPI FP bachillerato university job home married

Fig. 10.9 Percentage of students’ future aspirations by sex. Source Own survey

(like vocational training programmes), instead of staying at school and reaching


higher education.
These data take on further nuances when broken down according to sex
(Fig. 10.9). Girls’ educational aspirations were higher than boys’. This situation
was observed both among immigrant-origin students and natives, confirming how,
despite their precarious socio-demographic context, girls from immigrant
268 B. El-Habib Draoui et al.

140%
Vocational training Post-compulsory and higher education Finding a job

120%

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%
IES 1 IES 2 IES 3 IES 4

Fig. 10.10 Percentage of students’ future aspirations by high school (Percentages could be over
100% as the responses admit cumulative choices; pupils who want to pursue bachillerato studies
could also aspire to higher education, others who prefer a PCPI grade may want to have access to
an FP programme too). Source Own survey

backgrounds see post-compulsory and higher education as an opportunity for


improving their social and family status and for achieving greater autonomy and
personal freedom (Jiménez-Delgado 2012; Jiménez-Delgado et al. 2016).
Finally, and in the light of Fig. 10.10, it can be seen that aspirations changed
from one high school to another. In High Schools 2 and 3 they seemed to be
identical, with a clearly visible stress on the aspiration to post-compulsory and
higher education compared with High Schools 1 and 4, where vocational training
(studying PCPI or a FP) was more frequently chosen.
The high expectations of students from High Schools 2 and 3, compared with the
other two schools, may have been influenced by their ethnic and social composi-
tion, since, looking back at Fig. 10.6, the proportion of Roma and mixed population
at the first schools was much lower than at schools 1 and 4.

10.6 Conclusions

Statistical analysis of the Municipal Population Register of Alicante shows sub-


stantial evidence of residential segregation in the city, particularly in its Northern
Area. The results of our survey on the origins and aspirations of secondary school
students show that residential segregation results in even more marked segregation
in schools, and that this is not reflected in official data. Since—as stated by the
government—schools treat nationality as the only criterion for recording the origin
10 Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education … 269

of their students, the outcome is a deceptive view of the schools’ composition.


When we factor in “ethnicity” and “country of birth” (including those of the par-
ents) the resulting image is clearly distinguished from the previous one and con-
forms much more closely to the real situation of the area’s population. Some high
schools, which, according to official statistics, have a normal student body com-
position, in reality, suffer from significant levels of segregation, since they include a
considerable number of pupils from Roma and immigrant backgrounds.
Furthermore, these students, who are at risk of social exclusion, are at the same time
statistically invisible, as they are counted as Spanish nationals.
This study also found a direct relationship between students’ aspirations and the
population composition of each school by origin, ethnicity and sex. This is par-
ticularly true of the ethnic Roma population, while being less so for students of
immigrant parents, since the higher the proportion of the former in a school, the
lower are aspirations across the whole school. Further, our study shows that almost
nine out of ten Roma students are concentrated in the first two years of high school,
with absenteeism and dropout rates higher among female students.
Regarding immigrant-origin students, a downward trend can also be observed
from the third year of high school onwards, compared with non-Roma native
students; however comparison by sex shows that despite being quantitatively fewer
than males, immigrant-background female students were more likely to reach
post-compulsory grades and to aspire to higher levels of education.
For greater analytical precision it is essential to have access to statistical data
which, at present, no public administration provides. Without a state statistical
register, including comprehensive and detailed information on minorities, how can
their educational development and levels of segregation and inequality compared to
the majority population be assessed and rigorously tracked? How can the success or
failure of publically-funded policies and projects aimed at these groups be assessed?
How can situations of social conflict stemming from their residential and educa-
tional discrimination be foreseen? These are only a few of the questions which are
worth asking and whose answer, at present, can only be based on narrative
knowledge and estimates at a restricted local level.
To cite only a few examples, according to Poveda et al. (2007), statistical
shortcomings in the educational field are an obstacle to providing a precise view of
the distribution of foreign students in the Community of Madrid. In 2008, Carrasco
and others also stressed how these deficiencies impeded a proper analysis of foreign
students’ educational development and inequalities experienced in Catalonia. In
2011, Río Ruiz showed that the lack of statistical transparency of the Andalusian
education department hindered the study of absenteeism, an extremely important
phenomenon in education, which widely affects minorities. Lastly, CeiMigra
(Melero Valdés 2014) spelled out the need for more detailed information on the
immigrant-background population for the design of effective educational policy in
the Valencian Region.
At an international level, authors like Simon (2012) and Kraler et al. (2015) have
pointed out the lack of statistical data on migrants available in public registers in
European countries, and called for a harmonization of European data collection on
270 B. El-Habib Draoui et al.

migration, allowing the monitoring of their integration process, among other social
indicators. Also Salentin (2014) has described ethnic categorization as crucial for
diversity research and for the study of the life chances of minorities in Germany.
With regard to governments’ reluctance to collect data on the Roma population,
apart from the ethical and historical grounds usually given, we may legitimately
suspect that one reason may be to conceal many of the deep inequalities that this
group suffers (Sordé et al. 2013) since, according to Fernández Enguita (2000,
p. 10), “general policy towards [it] has often consisted in denying or ignoring its
existence, even in decreeing its non-existence”.
Many years ago, experts began calling for a need to review the legal prohibition
on collecting data on minorities. In 2004, the Advisory Committee On the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities found it necessary
to collect and process statistical data on the Spanish Roma population, a measure
which “may have considerable impact in the preparation and monitoring of mea-
sures designed to ensure full and effective equality, as well as on the work of the
international bodies aiming to ensure that Spain meets its obligations under the
Framework Convention” (European Council 2004, Article 4, point 41). A decade
ago, Laparra (2007) called for the development of tools for collecting information
on this population. Vallvé showed, in 2009, the difficulties of studying a key topic
such as the housing conditions of the Spanish Roma minority in the absence of
public statistics. In the same vein, several European-level reports on the Roma
community and its education have criticised at length the lack of statistical data on
this ethnic group in many European countries including Spain (European Council
2008; Crepaldi et al. 2008; FRA 2009). Despite these experts’ calls, the Spanish
government has not taken any further steps to modify its statistical policy regarding
minorities.
Regardless of the conceptual, ethical and legal debate around collecting ethnic
statistics and that on the technical and methodological difficulties of doing so, there
is little doubt that public statistics have always been used politically on behalf of
social interests. In this context, minority statistics represent a double-edged sword
for those who are in power, serving for population monitoring and control on the
one hand, and exposing governments’ failures in integration policy and social
equalities, on the other. In fact, numbers are crucial to emphasizing inequalities and
institutional discrimination, as Prewitt (1986, p. 123) remarks: “political visibility
closely follow[s] on statistical visibility”.
In the light of data from the present study and in concurrence with the research
of Poveda et al. (2007) on the Madrid Regional Administration, we may conclude
that deficiencies in education statistics and difficulties in access to the data already
available from the regional government of Valencia represent a serious hindrance to
the scientific community’s research and to detailed public knowledge of the real
situation of the almost systematic educational segregation of populations of
immigrant and Roma backgrounds.
10 Minorities in Spanish Secondary Education … 271

10.7 Limitations of This Study

Although our findings have revealed significant data about the disturbing phe-
nomenon of school segregation, a number of limitations need to be noted regarding
the present study. The most important limitations are expressed as follows:
• The theoretical framework needs a more in-depth historical and sociological
approach to the subject.
• The survey coverage, of only 45% of the students enrolled in ESO and
bachillerato, did not include students enrolled in the vocational training pro-
grammes (PCPI and FP). Pupils in these programmes make up almost half of the
student body in the four schools under study.
• Data processing and analysis were simple and lacked complex statistical
treatment.
• The study did not measure academic achievements by origin and ethnicity. This
aspect, in addition to the future aspirations item, would have provided important
information regarding the impacts of school segregation.
• The study did not include either a national or an international comparison with
respect to the public statistics on school composition.
• The authors did not carry out in-depth interviews with teachers and students
about their perception of this segregated reality.

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Chapter 11
Small School Closures in Rural
Areas—The Beginning or the End
of a Downward Spiral? Some Evidence
from Austria

Sigrid Kroismayr

Abstract School closures in rural areas are especially relevant because schools are
assumed to fulfil not only educational but also social functions for the local com-
munity. Critics of school closures maintain that the closure of the last local school
might induce an overall negative development of the affected municipality. This
article explores the demographic, economic, and, social trends in Austrian
municipalities where at least one primary school was closed down. Two groups of
municipalities are compared: those that had lost their last school and those that still
had a school left within their municipal borders but closed a local village school.
Altogether, eleven municipalities in four Austrian regions were included in the
study. The results show that the municipalities follow different coping strategies
concerning the former school building: those with no school left tended to retain
ownership, whereas those with still one municipal school open were inclined to sell
the former school building(s). However both groups tried to find ways to preserve
the public character of the building. The demographic and economic trends fol-
lowing the school closure differ. In most of the municipalities, the decrease in the
number of inhabitants was due mainly to outmigration rather than to falling
numbers of births. Economic developments did not reflect the downward movement
in the population but improved in most municipalities of the sample. Finally, the
analyses show that a high proportion working in the agricultural sector, especially
in remote areas, seems to have a positive impact on the demographic and economic
trends in the municipality and mitigates possible negative effects of school closure.


Keywords Primary schools School closures  Declining infrastructure

Rural development Austria

S. Kroismayr (&)
Club of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
e-mail: sigrid.kroismayr@univie.ac.at

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 275


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_11
276 S. Kroismayr

11.1 Introduction

The closure of small schools can be seen all over the world, but rural areas in low
fertility countries are especially confronted with this issue. A school closure is a
very emotive issue that often provokes a great deal of concern among the affected
communities and municipalities. Besides its educational function, the school is
often seen as crucial to a rural community’s and municipality’s cultural and social
make-up. In the political/public debate about closing, possible long-term conse-
quences for the local population are usually completely blanked out. Instead, fi-
nancial aspects (Kearns et al. 2009, p. 133; Autti and Hyry-Beihammer 2014, p. 1)
or benchmarks of pupil numbers—educationally legitimised or not—dominate the
decision-making process (Kroismayr 2016). In recent years two Austrian Federal
States (Styria and Upper Austria) have increased the minimum number of pupils
required for primary schools to remain open, which has targeted the abolition of
one-class-schools (all four classes taught together). As a consequence, these two
Federal States were responsible for half of the closures in the period from 2011 to
2014, during which time the number of closures in all of Austria totalled 114. By
contrast, other Federal States have maintained their rural schools, despite shrinking
pupil numbers, or made adaptations at an earlier period of time.1
Comparatively little scientific research has been carried out on how the demo-
graphic, economic, and social situation in the communities and municipalities has
developed after the closure of a small school. This is even more surprising, as “at a
time when evidence-based policy making is perceived as desirable, if not the norm,
the evidence base surrounding the social and economic aspects of school closures in
rural communities is remarkably limited” (Slee and Miller 2015, p. 80). In
explaining the academic void in this research field, one reason could be the com-
plexity of community studies (König 1974). Furthermore, fluctuating trends in
research interests could be another reason, given that rural sociology was at its
height in the 1970s, but has since declined in popularity. However, recent trends of
depopulation, falling pupil numbers in rural areas and financial problems in terms of
public budgets, may propel community matters—including the closure of small
schools—back into the limelight of research interest.
This article addresses the question of whether the closure of a small school is the
beginning or the end of a downward spiral for a municipality. By the concept of a
downward spiral, we refer to the long term development of a municipality with
congruent trends in at least three relevant dimensions (operationalised in this
chapter as demographic, economic, and social development). We compared at least

1
Burgenland restricted the minimum number for schools to 10 pupils in 1995; Carinthia legalized
the installments of „Expositurklassen“ in 2001, meaning that the administrative and management
tasks are carried out by the nearest school to which it is connected in order to enable the main-
tenance of schools as long as possible. At the same time the construction of „Bildungszentren“
(educational centres) has been supported, but not on a strategic level like in South Tyrol, Italy
(Hofer and Watschinger 2013). Lower Austria, Salzburg, Tyrol and Vorarlberg have made no
changes in their education policy.
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End … 277

two rural municipalities in each of four Austrian regions. The municipalities were
selected such that, in each region, one municipality had closed its last school while
the other had closed a local village school, but still had a school left operating
within its municipal borders. The decision to close was made either by the Federal
State, which has the legal authority to open or close down compulsory education
institutions,2 or the municipality. As the owner of the school building,3 the
municipality can also make a request for a school closure, but in any case, the
Federal State has the final say. In general the municipalities share the interests of the
local population and try to keep the school open as long as possible.4
In answering the question about further trends in communities after the school
closure, we start with a review of the literature. Most analyses have used a quali-
tative approach, while quantitative investigations, in particular those trying to build
up a whole picture of possible trends after the closure, being rather rare. The current
analysis is based on data from the census and from our own (primarily quantitative)
inquiry. The analysis of further developments includes demographic trends (pop-
ulation size, natural population growth, migration, numbers of births and families),
economic trends (local businesses, numbers of employees and self-employed per-
sons), and social trends (subsequent use of the former school building). At the end,
the discussion section dwells on what this case may teach us for other low-fertility
countries across Europe and how the rural space can preserve its attractiveness as a
living environment.

11.2 Current State of Research

The aim of this study is to consider whether the closure of a community’s school is
combined with a downward spiral for the community or municipality, or not. In
other words, do school closures, in the long run, go hand in hand with downward
demographic, economic, and social trends, or not? Therefore, the literature
reviewed in this section was selected for its potential to capture, during and after the
closing process, possible further dynamics in the communities in a comprehensive
way. We thus sought studies that looked at school closure from different angles
simultaneously or provided important views of the affected people.
One of the most conclusive works stems from Hanhart et al. (1990, 1991a, b, c, d),
who inquired into five cantons in French-speaking Switzerland, where small
mountain schools had been closed. The investigation covered the period between

2
The Federal State is responsible for supplying and paying the teaching staff, although they can
claim most of the money for salaries from the state government.
3
This includes the responsibility for the maintenance of the school building and for the covering of
the running costs. In the case of a general refurbishment, the Federal State provides financial
support.
4
In Austria, more than half of the municipalities have less than 2000 inhabitants, so there is a close
contact between mayor/municipal council and the population.
278 S. Kroismayr

1970 and 1985, in order to ensure that the long-term effects of the closure could be
properly observed. At the time of closure, between four and seven children attended
each school. The authors provided descriptive analysis, conducted interviews with
some of the villagers and used a questionnaire for former pupils of the schools who
had left the villages. In their research, they focused on demographic and economic
trends, but also on changes in the extent of social activities over time. In doing so,
they tried to find out if there were any differences between municipalities which had,
and had not, lost their schools, and municipalities which still maintained their school
and which was now attended by the pupils of the schools which had been
closed down.
The results are easy to summarise: school closures had practically no unfa-
vourable impacts on the demographic, economic, or social situation in the
municipalities. In some of them, the number of inhabitants actually increased after
the school closure, due to a tourist upswing in the region, the closeness to the centre
of Fribourg, or the attractiveness of the municipality as a residential place for
people from outside (Hanhart et al. 1990, 1991c).5 The survey of the people who
had left the municipality revealed that emigration was caused by occupational
ambitions and lack of work opportunities in the municipality (Hanhart et al. 1990,
1991d). At the same time, they found no connection between the closure of the
school and the municipality’s economic situation. In their view, neither the job
situation nor the local infrastructure was affected by the closure. Their conclusions
regarding social and cultural activities are similar. In some cases, the community
itself took over the organization of some of the events which had been held at and/
or had been linked to the school. In other municipalities, the number of events
connected with the school/school building was very low, so that no significant
social ‘upheavals’ (bouleversements sociaux) were observed (Hanhart et al.
1991a, b, c, d).
The findings of Hanhart and his team could possibly be explained by the fact that
the number of pupils attending the school at the time of the closure was fairly small.
Moreover one has to bear in mind that the 1970s and 1980s were a time of
economic prosperity, and although the annual growth in Gross Domestic Product in
Switzerland was rather low in comparison to other European countries, unem-
ployment and inflation remained at a very low level during this time. Therefore, it
might have been easier even for small villages to overcome the loss of the school
because the general trend was one of positive future prospects (Bernegger 1990).
Egelund and Laustsen (2006) also found no negative impacts in their study of 30
Danish communities in which the school had closed down permanently in the
period between 1990 and 1999. Over the course of 2003, the researchers visited
each of the communities for a day, gathering impressions of the effects on these
communities four to fourteen years after the closure of the school. They assessed
the conditions of the homes and the vitality of the places, and had informal con-
versations with people wherever they met them: on the street, across garden fences,

5
Forsythe (1983) presented similar results for Scotland.
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End … 279

at bus stations, etc. Based on this data, they differentiated between three types of
communities. The first type was the “lively local society”, located near a big town,
with good transport connections and a vital local supply chain. The former school
building still served the local community. The second type was the “dying local
society” where the old rural village schools were located in remote areas or on the
coast. In these cases, the closure was seen as the product of a declining number of
inhabitants in the local community caused by emigration of inhabitants from the
area, starting in the 1960s. The third type of community was the “small island
society”, where the industrialisation of farming and fishing in the past few decades
had led the population to decline by about a third or even a half. Today, the
government subsidizes employment on the islands.
Although they differentiated between three community types, Egelund and
Laustsen (2006) identified depopulation resulting in falling pupil numbers as the
most important reason for the school closures. However, it is very difficult to
understand their line of argument, as the average number of pupils per school was
69 (with a maximum of 182 and a minimum of seven) (ibid., p. 432), which can be
considered a reasonable number of school children compared to the numbers in
Hanhart et al.’s study. So the huge difference in the number of pupils at the time of
school closure reflects more the political dimension of the closing decision rather
than demographic decline.6 Moreover, it raises the question of how it was possible
that the special situation of the “small island society”, where the school played a
decisive role for the identity of the population (ibid., p. 438), was not of similar
importance in the other communities.
Finnish researchers Autti and Hyry-Beihammer (2014) also conducted research
in communities affected by school closures. Interestingly, the authors did not
originally set out to study the closure process and its consequences. However, as
they interviewed active community members in a certain Finnish region, they
noticed that this was a hotly-debated and recurring topic. It turned out that as long
as the school was open, it was taken for granted. In fact, in many cases, the
inhabitants realized the full extent of the school’s role in community life only after
its closure. The researchers came to the conclusion that the closure of a school
negatively affected to community’s social capital (ibid., p.12).7
Other negative effects for the community were found by Witten et al. (2001) who
studied the closure of the Surrey Park School in New Zealand, which had been the
third largest school in the region. They used a qualitative research design,

6
More evidence for the “quantification of politics” with regard to demographic decline and edu-
cational infrastructure can be found in Bartl (2016) and Bartl and Sackmann (2016).
7
Oncescu (2014), in her research focusing on the closure process of the last small school in
Limerick (Saskatchewan, Canada), a small community of approximately 150 inhabitants, found
that the opposite is also possible. There, the community’s resilience and feeling of solidarity was
strengthened by the fight to keep the school open—an insight which Hanhart et al. (1990, 1991a, b,
c, d) also observed in some of the communities they studied. In both studies, the size of the
communities was very small, so that close and strong ties within the population could be expected
and would explain these findings.
280 S. Kroismayr

conducting interviews both with parents who were fighting against the closure and
with those who did not take part in the protests. Their findings showed that the
closure affected some parents and pupils more than others. After the threat of
closure became public, some of the parents tried to find another school for their
children, while other parents fought to keep the school open. This situation caused a
measure of conflict and had a negative impact on community solidarity. In par-
ticular, the parents with low incomes faced drawbacks because the new situation fed
their fear of social exclusion. In some cases, they were unable to send their children
to the new school, where most of the former village pupils went, due to financial
constraints and limited mobility. These results were reproduced by Kearns et al.
(2009) in evaluating the closing processes of four schools in the Region of South
Taranaki in New Zealand.
In a recent study, Cedering (2016) sought to investigate how the closure of rural
village schools affected the everyday life and views of the local community in two
communities in the South-East of Sweden. She conducted interviews with parents,
the mayors, local politicians, and opponents of the closure, and analysed the overall
time schedules drawn up by the parents and the ‘mental maps’ drawn by
ten-year-old children. Her research showed that since the closures, the social
contacts, activity and movement patterns, and places frequented by the residents
had altered. The closures meant that some activities were now further away and
daily driving time had increased, reducing the leisure time available for children
and parents alike. In short, local social intercourse in the community had been
reduced.
Thus, the assessments of a school closure’s impact on community life vary
considerably in the different studies. This is primarily caused by different time
horizons of the research and the methods used in the studies. Studies with a long
time horizon (ten years or more after the closure) tend to find no effects of school
closures on the community’s further development, regardless of whether a quan-
titative design (Hanhart et al. 1990) or a qualitative approach (Egelund and
Laustsen 2006) is used. However, these findings were challenged by Autti and
Hyry-Beihammer (2014) as their qualitative interviews with community members
during, or shortly after, the school closure pointed to the importance of the school
for the community. Qualitative research studies, with a shorter time horizon, were
more sensitive to both positive (see Footnote 7) and negative effects for the com-
munities and revealed conflicts between parents, or the decline of contacts between
the community’s inhabitants.
From the review of the literature it can be expected that, although the closure
might have some disadvantageous consequences for community members, it is
much harder to find evidence of unfavourable trends in demographic or economic
terms in comprehensive community studies of school closures. However, evidence
from studies investigating the effect of school closures and single local outcomes
will be presented in the respective empirical sections of this chapter.
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End … 281

11.3 Research Design and Data Used

11.3.1 Sampling

School closures are first and foremost political decisions and as such they take place
within political institutions. These institutions have spatial, administrative borders
and therefore the question of possible demographic, economic, or social dynamics
needs to be investigated within these political borders, for our purposes—within
municipal borders. To get a better understanding of the further development in
municipalities after the closure of a small school, we used a special comparative
design in order to sharpen the power of description and bring into focus similarities
and contrasts among cases (Collier 1993, p. 107).
Our point of departure was the compilation of all school closures in Austria
between 2001 and 2014. It turned out that in this period 230 small schools were
closed down, more than the half of them between 2011 and 2014. In ensuring a long
enough observation period to see what demographic and economic trends were,
following the closure, it was decided to focus on municipalities which reported the
closure of a primary school between 2001 and 2008. We referred to the data from
the censuses carried out in 2001 and 2011, so that the evolutions along different
dimensions could be observed for a period covering a minimum of three years
(from 2008 to 2011) and a maximum of 10 years (from 2001 to 2011). Where
possible, the time before 2001 and after 2011 were also taken into consideration.
Moreover, according to the research design, each municipality needed at least one
matching municipality within the same region: while both had experienced the closure
of a small school, one of them had lost their last school while the other still had a school
left within its municipal borders. All in all, this resulted in a sample of eleven
municipalities in four regions: South Burgenland (two municipalities); Murau in
Upper Styria (three municipalities); the “Sommer- und Teichalm-Region”, one of the
largest mountain pasture regions of Central Europe (Dax and Hovorak 2004, p. 2),
here referred to as the “Styrian pasture region” (two municipalities); and the Außerfern
(Reutte region) in Tyrol. The aim was not to compare the municipalities within a
specific region as such but to get a broader picture of the societal conditions where
they were located (Belina and Miggelbrink 2010, p. 20) and how the school closure
affects them.
Table 11.1 gives an overview of the most important information, which might
also be relevant for the understanding of further municipal trends after the school
closure. Starting with size, the number of inhabitants must be considered as fairly
small. More than half of the selected municipalities had below 500 inhabitants,
while the proportion in this category among all municipalities in Austria is 7.9%
(Statistics Austria 2013). All these very small municipalities had lost their last
school. Another outstanding feature is that only very few pupils attended the school
at the time of the closure. This is due to the informal practice in the majority of the
Federal States not to close a primary school until the number of pupils falls below
ten. As mentioned above (see Footnote 1) Burgenland even took this number as a
282 S. Kroismayr

Table 11.1 Overview of the selected municipalities


Region/ Size of the Average Year of Number Distance
Federal municipality number of closure of pupilsa to the
State (2015) inhabitants/ at closure next
km2 school
(km)
South Burgenland/Burgenland
M1: last school closed 443 49 2001 7 3.2
M2: one school 1693 104 2004, 12–15 2–4b
remaining 2006 each
Murau/Styria
M1: last school closed 310 47 2008 <10 5.4
M2: last school closed 160 37 2008 5 6.8
M3: one school 2087 84 2008 23 3.4
remaining
Styrian Pasture Region/Styria
M1: last school closed 534 99 2004 5 9.5
M2: one school 1118 75 2007 8 5
remaining
Außerfern/Tyrol
M1: last school closed 46 71 2008 3 8.1
M2: last school closed 91 68 2003 4 5.6
M3: one school 641 164 2007 4 2.2
remaining
M4: one school 564 210 2007 3 2.7
remaining
Source Own study
a
The numbers are based on the assessment of the person we interviewed by telephone. In South
Burgenland M2 each of the three schools closed had between twelve and fifteen pupils
b
The range of kilometres relates to the different distances of each of the three schools closed to the
remaining school in the administrative centre of the municipality

legal threshold. In international comparison, this seems to be extremely low. Yet,


the legal provisions in Tyrol which allow a school to remain open if it has at least
three pupils (RIS 1991) is also exceptional by Austrian standards and explains the
low numbers of pupils in Außerfern at the time of closure. This regulation is
induced by geographical (obstructions of traffic in the wintertime; danger of ava-
lanches) and historical reasons (strong will for self-assertion of the small munici-
palities) (Meusburger and Kramer 1991, p. 185). Only one municipality in the
Styrian Pasture Region (M3) closed the local village school even though it had
more than twenty pupils (Fig. 11.1).
The distance to the next school indicates how many kilometres the old school is
separated from the new one. It is obvious that in municipalities where the last
school had been closed the next school is farther away than in those municipalities
where the school children now attend the school in the main town. However, the
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End … 283

Fig. 11.1 Overview of the four regions where the analysed municipalities are located

number of kilometres permits no straightforward conclusion concerning the trav-


elling time to school. Here, the conditions of the roads or the number of the hamlets
where the bus passes in order to pick up the children are of considerable importance
for the length of travelling time. However, the children’s way to school starts much
earlier. They often have to get up around six in the morning to be in good time at
the bus stop. Moreover, they often have to wait for the school to start and to wait for
the bus to go back home.

11.3.2 Periodisation and Data Used

Setting the demographic, economic, and social trends in the municipality with no
school in a spatial context allows to evaluate the concept of a downward spiral. In
this regard two questions are of particular interest: the first one is, when did the
decline in demographic and economic indicators start—in the period before the
school closure, during or afterwards? Here, the study refers to census data, e.g.
population, natural population growth, migration, numbers of births and families,
the number of businesses, of employees and of self-employed persons. The period
between 1991 and 2001 covered the time before the first closure, the period
between 2001 and 2011 was seen as a phase of “transition” where the municipal-
ities adapted to the new situation. The year 2008, when the last closure occurred,
was taken as a bench mark to ensure that at least three years of later data were
available in order to trace the further trends in the municipality. The observation
period between 2011 and 2015 referred to the time after the closure and illustrated
the long-term developments in the municipality. The second question refers to the
spatial dimension, where we ask if an observed decline in demographic and eco-
nomic indicators of a municipality is a general trend in the region, or not?
284 S. Kroismayr

The assessment of the social dimension is based on the subsequent use of the
school building. This information was gathered by telephone interviews with an
employee in the municipal office or the mayor. In this interview, also, basic
information about the circumstances were asked, such as the year of closure, the
number of pupils at the time, the distance to the next school. We also noted if the
interviewee provided some additional information.

11.4 Results

The following section sheds light on the situation in the municipalities before,
during and after the school closure and gives some insights between the closure of
the school and the further demographic, economic, and—in very broad terms—the
social development of the municipalities. Does the closure mark the beginning or
the end of a downward spiral—or perhaps neither?

11.4.1 Demographic Trends

In a first step the assumption of a downward spiral after the school closure is
applied to the demographic situation in the municipalities, or as someone had stated
in an interview with The Independent “This is a recipe for depopulation” (January
7, 2001; cited in Barakat 2014, p. 735). So, a declining population trend at least
after the closing period would be a partial argument for a more comprehensive
downward spiral.
Population trends: The dynamics in population numbers reveal different patterns
between the regions analysed. In the region of South Burgenland both municipal-
ities were affected by a decline of more than 10% in the 1990s and a significant
weakening of this trend between 2001 and 2011 and the years afterwards. By
contrast, the population trends in the municipalities in Murau and the Styrian
pasture region showed no homogeneous pattern during all three periods of time.
What is most striking is that, in the period after the closure, some of the munici-
palities in particular those which had lost their last school, show increasing pop-
ulation trends again. In the fourth region, Außerfern, the general pattern can be
summarized as follows: in the 1990s a growth in the population was recorded (with
exception of M3), followed by a downward trend during the 2000s in two
municipalities, which affected all of them during 2011 and 2015. Unexpectedly,
those municipalities where there is still one remaining school show, in general, a
greater population decline over the years.
Of particular interest is also the trend in the total number of inhabitants between
1991 and 2015 (not shown). This highlights the fact that one municipality (M1 in
the Styrian pasture region) now has more inhabitants, and that the size of the
population in two municipalities in the region of Außerfern which had lost their last
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End … 285

school, was only marginally smaller than in the beginning of the 1990s. This raises
the questions of “waves” in population size. While in some periods the population
is expected to shrink because potential parents are at the end of their reproduction
phase, in other periods the number of births increases again as the next generation
enter the phase of starting a family. Especially in small municipalities, the fluctu-
ations in births are much more pronounced than in municipalities with more
inhabitants. So what might look like a downward spiral could also turn out to be a
temporary loop (Table 11.2).
Trends in natural population growth and migration: Using demographic devel-
opment as the sole focus of analysis permits only a very limited interpretation.
A deeper understanding can only be provided if both natural population growth
(balance of births and deaths) and in- and out-migration are examined, to see how they
contribute to the demographic trend in the municipalities. As Table 11.3 illustrates,
negative natural population growth and a negative migration balance caused popu-
lation decline in South Burgenland in the 1990s. In the following decade, both trends
considerably slowed down, especially the out-migration, which ground to a halt.
Although the natural growth figures were more favourable than the regional average,
they remained negative in both municipalities. Interestingly, the pattern of natural
growth in nearly all other municipalities—both in the decade between 1991 and 2001
as well as between 2001 and 2011—shows a completely different picture. The
municipalities registered an increase in their natural growth in both decades, which
means that more people were born than died (expect M1 and M4 in Außerfern).

Table 11.2 Trends of percentage changes in population numbers


Region/Federal State 1991–2001 (%) 2001–2011 (%) 2011–2015 (%)
South Burgenland/Burgenland
M1: last school closed −11.5 −1.9 −2.6
M2: one school remaining −13.5 −2.6 −3.7
Murau/Styria
M1: last school closed −8.2 −6.2 +2.3
M2: last school closed 0.0 −12.1 0.0
M3: one school remaining −4.4 −4.0 −0.3
Styrian Pasture Region/Styria
M1: last school closed +3.1 −1.3 +2.9
M2: one school remaining −5.1 −5.5 −2.4
Außerfern/Tyrol
M1: last school closed +20.0 −11.7 −13.2
M2: last school closed -6.1 +4.3 −5.1
M3: one school remaining +0.6 0.0 −6.8
M4: one school remaining +12.7 −9.4 −2.4
Average last school closed −0.4 −4.8 −2.6
Average one school remaining −1.9 −4.3 −3.1
Source Statistics Austria(2013). Percentages calculated by the author
286 S. Kroismayr

Table 11.3 Trends of percentage changes in natural population and migration


Region/Federal Natural population trend Migration trendsa
State
South 1991– 2001– 2001– 1991– 2001– 2001–
Burgenland/ 2001 2011 2011 2001 2011 2011
Burgenland Municipal Municipal District Municipal Municipal District
level (%) level (%) level (%) level (%) level level (%)
M1: last school −6.7 −2.6 −4.7 −4.8 +0.6 +2.6
closed
M2: one school −2.8 −2.5 −3.5 −10.8 −0.2 No data
remaining
Murau/Styria
M1: last school +2.3 +1.9 −1.1 −10.5 −8.0 −6.1
closed
M2: last school +12.1 +3.8 −1.1 −12.1 −15.9 −6.1
closed
M3: one school +5.3 +1.2 −1.1 −9.7 −5.2 −6.1
remaining
Styrian Pasture Region/Styria
M1: last school +2.7 +6.7 +0.8 +0.4 −8.0 +1.3
closed
M2: one school +4.2 +2.1 +0.8 −9.2 −7.5 +1.3
remaining
Außerfern/Tyrol
M1: last school −4 +3.3 +1.1 +24.0 −15.0 −0.9
closed
M2: last school +1.0 +3.3 +1.1 −7.1 +1.1 −0.9
closed
M3: one school +0.9 +1.6 +1.1 −0.3 −1.6 −0.9
remaining
M4: one school +3.0 −1.3 +1.1 +9.7 −8.2 −0.9
remaining
Average last 1.2 2.7 −0.7 −1.7 −7.5 −1.7
school closed
Average one 2.1 0.2 −0.3 −4.1 −4.5 −0.5
school
remaining
a
The term “migration development” denotes the balance between the people who move into and
out of a given area in a specific time period
Source Statistics Austria (2013). Percentages calculated by the author

Thus, in these municipalities, population decline (at least until 2011) stemmed
exclusively from out-migration. In Murau, this trend was in line with the negative
migration trend in the region. Here, small rural municipalities which had no school
left were affected by this trend above the regional average. Although the trend of
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End … 287

out-migration in municipalities in the Styrian pasture region was similar between


2001 and 2011, the trend in the rest of the region was different, as a slight immi-
gration increase could be observed. Migration in the municipalities of Außerfern
does not reveal a coherent pattern. Compared with the regional trend, out-migration
does not seem to have been a major issue.
To sum up, between 2001 and 2011 all municipalities (except those in South
Burgenland)—reported substantial natural population growth and showed better
results than the development in the region (with the exception of M4, Außerfern).
This is especially true for the small rural municipalities which had no school left.
One possible explanation could be that due to the remoteness of the area,
culturally-entrenched gender roles are more prevalent, favouring a higher number of
children in the families. At the same time, the growth in negative migration in most
of the municipalities during this period clearly indicates that people lacked confi-
dence in the future. As Budde (1997, p. 156) pointed out for East Germany,
depopulation in the Austrian regions could be interpreted as an individual strategy
for avoiding unemployment.
Trends in the numbers of families and births: Another question is whether the
closure of the school contributes to out-migration of families. It is often believed
that the loss of the local school poses a threat to the attractiveness of municipalities
as a place for families (Nösterer 1991, p. 12; Budde 1997, p. 153; Meusburger
2009; Bechtold 2012, p. 35). Stockdale (2002), who investigated reasons for rural
out-migration, showed that family out-migration is an insignificant category (which
he listed under “other” reasons). These findings are supported by the research
carried out by Steiner et al. (2011, p. 139). Their interviews with locals and
politicians in rural Alpine municipalities of Vorarlberg (Austria), Grison, St. Gallen
and Valais (Switzerland) showed that the existence of a school plays only a minor
role when couples decide where to live when they want to start a family.
Investigations with statistical data produced contradictory results. Whereas Hyll and
Schneider (2011) found that migration behaviour in the period 1991–2008 in the
Saxony-Anhalt province (East-Germany) was significantly affected by the closure
of primary schools, Barakat, in his findings for Saxony (East-Germany) in the
period 1994–2007, concluded that “the villages losing their only school underwent
strikingly similar migration gains and losses as villages and towns in other cate-
gories, except of course the urban centres” (2014, p. 744). Deeper insights into the
dynamics of family migration were presented by Elshof et al. (2015) for the more
peripheral regions in the north and east of the Netherlands. After analysing mi-
gration data from the period between 1996 and 2011, they found that closing the
last primary school did not affect the inward flow of families with young children,
but that the closure and absence of a primary school were associated with greater
outward flows of families with young children.
Our own data do not include migration movements of families, but only the
percentage change in the number of families over time. Table 11.4 reveals different
trends in the various regions. In South Burgenland the municipalities registered a
288 S. Kroismayr

Table 11.4 Trends of percentage changes in the number of families with children and average
number of births per year (in total numbers)
Region/Federal State Number of families with children Average number of births
1991– 2001– 2011– 1991– 2001– 2011–
2001 (%) 2011 (%) 2014 (%) 2001 2011 2014
South Burgenland/Burgenland
M1: last school closed −7.4 −10.2 −5.1 2 3.5 1.8
M2: one school −11.6 −7.6 −8.6 13.9 10.7 8.8
remaining
Murau/Styria
M1: last school closed −7.6 −8.2 1.8 3 2.9 5
M2: last school closed 0.0 −19.4 0.0 3.1 1.6 0.8
M3: one school −5.9 −5.8 −6.5 28 21.5 20.5
remaining
Styrian Pasture Region/Styria
M1: last school closed −6.9 +4.2 −1.0 5.2 5.9 6.3
M2: one school −19.2 +2.7 −8.5 14.3 9.3 7
remaining
Außerfern/Tyrol
M1: last school closed 27.3 −7.1 −23.1 0.5 0.9 0.3
M2: last school closed −4.8 +10.0 −4.5 0.8 0.8 1
M3: one school 4.3 −2.7 −10.9 8.9 6.8 6.5
remaining
M4: one school 17.1% −17.5 −8.7 6.3 5.3 3.5
remaining
Average last school 0.1% −5.1 −5.3 2.4 2.6 2.5
closed
Average one school −3.1 −6.2 −8.6 14.3 10.7 9.3
remaining
Source Statistics Austria (2013). Further processing of data by the author

decline in the number of families8 during all three periods of time, although the
average number of births increased between 2001 and 2011 in M1. In Murau the
municipalities were also affected by a decrease in the number of families, but those
municipalities which closed their last school could stabilize their situation at least in
the last period between 2011 and 2014. Nevertheless the average number of births
fell sharply in M2 during the years. In the Styrian pasture region the number of
families increased during the closing period—a trend which is also reflected in the
growth of the average number of births during this period. The situation in
Außerfern is characterized by a decline in the number of families during the closing
period (2001–2011) and also the average number of births fell significantly.
Only M2 in this region showed a gain in the number of families during this period

8
This includes married couples with children, cohabiting couples with children, and single-parent
families.
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End … 289

and the average number of births increased, even after the closing period. But as the
number was much too low to form a class, the school could not stay open.
In conclusion, it seems that the municipalities which closed their last school
were not as badly affected as the concept of the downward spiral would imply, as in
our sample the municipalities with one remaining school suffered a much greater
loss in the number of families and births. So there is some evidence that the
existence of a school is of negligible importance, as other factors such as home
ownership commit families to the municipality (Steiner et al. 2011). This point is
even more pivotal since the investigated regions are largely dominated by the
agricultural sector (see Tables 11.5 and 11.6).

11.4.2 Economic Trends

It is also believed that the existence of a school plays a decisive role for the
settlement of companies and contributes to the support of the local economy
(Fickermann et al. 2002; Rösner 2004; Tutt 2007). Other authors construe the
relation between the rural economy and the local school the other way around and
argue that “where basic employment exists …, schools are less likely to close” (Slee
and Miller 2015, p. 94). But as the disposal of infrastructure is (primarily) a political
decision, while economic activities are (mostly) based on private undertaking, the
closure of a school does not necessarily influence the local economy in an unfa-
vourable way. Hence economic factors have been included in the study in order to
consider the mutual relations in greater detail.
Table 11.5 shows the development of the number of working premises (busi-
nesses), defined as a local unit that has a physical address and where at least one
person is or has been (self) employed. The figures indicate the size of the
non-agricultural sector, whereas the economic share of agriculture is shown sepa-
rately. While single municipalities in all four regions exhibited an economic
downward trend in the period before the school closure, almost all of them were
able to increase their economic performance in the following decade. The munic-
ipalities in the Styrian pasture region showed an overall boom during both decades,
whereas in the region of Außerfern no clear trend was discernible.
However, between 2001 and 2011, Statistics Austria changed its method of data
collection for working premises. Whereas a comprehensive survey was conducted
in 1991 and 2001, they decided to change to a register-based census in 2011, which
means that they obtained data from administrative registers that allowed them to
encompass a greater range of data. One of the changes was that data on small firms
now had a greater probability of being included in the census, which might also
explain the general upward trend of the economic situation in the municipalities.9

9
Information from a telephone conversation with Thomas Haider of Statistics Austria on June 27,
2016.
290

Table 11.5 Trends of percentage changes in the number of working premises, employees and self-employed persons
Working premisea Employees and self-employed personsb
Region/Federal State Non-agricultural sector Non-agricultural sector Share in agriculture Non-agricultural sector Non-agricultural sector Share in Agriculture
1991–2001 (%) 2001–2011 (%) 2011 (%) 1991–2001 (%) 2001–2011 (%) 2011 (%)
South Burgenland/Burgenland
M1: last school closed −9.1 −50.0 46 +8.0 +40.7 27
M2: one school remaining +21.1 +17.4 44 −5.1 −12.2 30
Murau/Styria
M1: last school closed −20.0 +75.0 61 +45.5 +31.3 62
M2: last school closed −33.3 +100.0 81 −62.5 +166.7 77
M3: one school remaining +40.4 +30.3 56 +60.7 +11.7 32
Styrian Pasture Region/Styria
M1: last school closed +20.0 +25.0 68 +10.0 +27.3 62
M2: one school remaining +2.8 +29.7 59 +2.2 +31.4 39
Außerfern/Tyrol
M1: last school closed 0.0 0.0 60 −14.3 −16.7 44
M2: last school closed +50.0 +11.1 30 −75.0 −38.0 28
M3: one school remaining +7.0 −2.2 33 +51.1 −33.1 23
M4: one school remaining −8.4 +5.7 7 −17.6 −17.6 4
Mean last school closed +1.3 +43.5 58 +10.3 +35.2 50
Mean one school remaining +12.6 +16.2 40 −21.1 −3.9 26
a
The figures indicate the situation in the non-agricultural sector, whereas the agricultural sector is exhibited separately in the last column
b
The figures indicate the situation in the non-agricultural sector, whereas the agricultural sector is shown separately in the last column
Source Statistics Austria (2015). Percentages calculated by the author
S. Kroismayr
Table 11.6 Subsequent use of the former school building
11

Region/Federal State Use Owner Purpose


Private/public
South Burgenland/Burgenland
M1: last school closed Community housing Municipality Private
M2: one school remaining Two school buildings were sold. The third was turned Private/Municipality Private/semi-public
into a home for children and youngsters with special
needs
Murau/Styria
M1: last school closed Municipal archive/Community housing Municipality Both
M2: last school closed Community housing Municipality Private
M3: one school remaining Sold to a company Private/semi-public Private/semi-public
Styrian Pasture Region/Styria
M1: last school closed Municipal office for the citizens/Community housing Municipality Both
M2: one school remaining Sold Private Private
Außerfern/Tyrol
M1: last school closed As the school was located in the municipal office, the Municipality Both
former school premises now house a municipal
archives. The former school gym and arts and crafts
room are used by the local community; the former
teacher’s flat is rented
M2: last school closed The school was located in the municipal office; the Municipality Public
former school now houses a local museum. The
Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End …

building also houses the volunteer fire brigade


M3: one school remaining Building has been sold and is now an inn called Private Both
“ZuraltenSchule” (“The Old School”). It serves also as
a residential for the owner
M4: one school remaining Divided into community housing and polling station Municipality Both
Source Data collected by the author
291
292 S. Kroismayr

A salient feature of the municipalities in the sample is that, in many of them, the
agricultural sector made up a substantial share of the economy as a whole. In
Austria, farming accounts for 15% of the economy, yet the majority of the
municipalities in this study clearly exceeded this value (Statistics Austria 2015). In
particular, the municipalities in Murau and in the Styrian pasture region are char-
acterized by a dominant agricultural sector. This is also reflected in the percentage
of people working in that domain. While 4.4% of the Austrian population is in
farming, in our study, only M4 in Außerfern is in line with this figure. An expla-
nation is provided by the fact that, since tourism has become more important, many
farmers have given up farming. With more than 419 overnight stays per inhabitant
in 2011, it shows by far the highest rate of all. The other municipalities in Außerfern
also enjoy great popularity among tourists, while this economic branch is of minor
importance in the rest of the sample.
Interestingly, the trend in the number of employees and self-employed only
partially reflects the positive trend in the number of working premises. In fact, the
municipality with the remaining school in South Burgenland lost job holders
despite the increase in the number of working premises. The municipalities in
Außerfern experienced similar developments. Here, the number of working pre-
mises remained stable between 2001 and 2011, but the number of people working
in these local units dropped considerably in all four municipalities. Fortunately, the
other regions exhibited a much more favourable development and were able to
augment the number of employees and self-employed persons in the decade
between 2001 and 2011. This is especially surprising in the peripheral regions of
Murau and the Styrian pasture region. Here, the municipalities had more working
staff in the municipal territory than the decade before. As regards M1 in the Styrian
pasture region, this trend will continue because, as the mayor told in the telephone
interview, a mechanical engineering company with seven or eight employees is
about to set up in the municipality.
Thus, the argument of Slee and Miller (2015, p. 94) that the preservation or
creation of employment makes it less likely for schools to close, does not match up
with our results. On the contrary, the municipalities which shut down their last
school showed a more promising trend than those in which there was one remaining
school. In particular during the closing period between 2001 and 2011, the figures
are much more favourable for the former. So, with respect to economic dynamics at
the time of school closure, the model of a downward spiral could not confirmed.

11.4.3 Subsequent Use of the Former School Building

As long as the school existed, it served as a social meeting place where school,
parents and community members maintained multiple levels of contact. If the
school was located in the centre of the village, there were many opportunities for
daily interactions between the villagers and the school (children, teacher(s),
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End … 293

suppliers and others). Also numerous festivities in the course of the school year
acted as important opportunities to bring the villagers together.10 A sense of
responsibility becomes obvious as sometimes parents conducted smaller repairs
inside the building or painting of walls, without charging the municipality. So, how
the municipality (as the owner of the building) decides on the subsequent use of the
former school premises is a major issue for the local community.
Surprisingly, the literature is silent about the subsequent use of former school
buildings and gives only a few accounts of how the subject is handled by munic-
ipalities. Usually, there is no administrative register of vacant public buildings that
would allow for more systematic research on the topic (Amey 2014). Slee and
Miller (2015, p. 88) point to the fact that almost all of the 23 former schools in
West Aberdeenshire, Scotland, had become private residences—only one retained
its community function.11 The vast majority of school buildings thus lost their
public character. By contrast, in the region of Óbidos, Portugal, almost all of the
closed schools were converted into community premises for social, cultural, or
economic projects and supported the local population (Godinho 2012).
Our own investigation shows that only those municipalities which still have at
least one school within their borders sold the school building, while municipalities
with no school keep the ownership of it (Kroismayr 2017). Yet, selling the school
building seems to be accompanied by an attempt to prefer someone who will
preserve, at least to a certain extent, the public character of the building. In
Table 11.6, the examples of a home for children and youngsters with special needs
and the headquarters of a company are mentioned. In this regard, also, the
arrangement in M3, Außerfern, is particularly interesting: here, the municipal
council managed to find a female buyer, who converted the school building into an
inn. This was also part of the official sales contract, as the chief officer of the
municipality explained in the telephone interview. In this case, the building has
preserved its public character and is now commonly known as “Zur alten Schule”
(“The Old School”).
The municipalities with no school did not sell the building but tried to find ways
for it to serve community purposes. Some of them refurbished the former school
premises, turning them into residential premises. This helped to provide accom-
modation for people in the municipality or from outside. Remote areas, in partic-
ular, traditionally suffered from a lack of rental accommodation, which is a big
barrier for people who want to live in a mountain village (Steiner et al. 2011,
p. 131). Not only do council flats provide additional accommodation, but they are a
regular source of income for the municipality, while at the same time keeping the
decision-making power in the hands of the municipality itself.

10
Such festivities as St. Martin’s, Krippenspiel, Carnival, or the end-of-year party.
11
Google Streetview™ was used to find out how the former school building is currently being
used. This not only raises ethical issues (covert observation as method) but also questions of
accuracy: how can we be sure that the former school buildings are now being used as private
residences and not for other purposes as well?
294 S. Kroismayr

In three municipalities the school was located in the municipal office. In these
cases, the school building kept its public character as the building “is a centre in the
centre”, as one mayor described it. Similarly, the public character of the former
school premises was maintained by turning the former classroom into a museum or
making the gym and arts and crafts room available for use by the local community.
In addition, two of them decided to combine public and residential use, and turned
the first floor of former school premises into flats. Here, two advantages are com-
bined: firstly, the municipalities are able to make use of the building in various
ways which can be seen as a reasonable use of resources (Dichanz 2004, p. 141)
and secondly, the negative impacts on community life as a result of the closure are
not fully felt, as the building keeps its public purpose.

11.5 Synthetic Analysis

This paper set out to evaluate the demographic, economic and social trends in the
context of the closure of a municipality’s last school. Referring to the concept of a
downward spiral, the crucial question is at what time a shrinking in population or
economic activities can be observed—before, during or after the closure. Or is there
no effect at all? The social aspect was studied by investigating whether of the
former school building is used for community purposes. For comparative reasons,
at least two municipalities in the same region were chosen—one which was forced
to close its last school, while the other municipality shut down a local village
school, but kept open the school in the main town—in order to evaluate the effects
of closure on local trends.
The results show that, in general, all municipalities were affected by a decline in
population. A more detailed analysis revealed that regional outmigration was
mainly responsible for the loss in the population. Murau and the Styrian pasture
region were particularly affected by this trend. On the other hand, in all munici-
palities, natural population growth remained stable or indicated even a slight gain;
in addition the municipalities in the sample showed an even more positive trend
than the region in which they were located.
However, the gain through natural population growth does not seem to be
connected with the number of families in a straightforward way, as in the majority
of municipalities the number of families with children dropped over the years.
Moreover, the evolution of the number of births—maybe the most important
dimension of all—did not entirely reflect the trend in the number of families with
children in the two municipal groups. While the mean value in municipalities with
one remaining school dropped from 14.3 in the 1990s to 9.3 between 2011 and
2014, the trend in the municipalities with no school showed constantly stable mean
values in births in all three periods, with 2.5 children on average every year.
Although this is far too few to make up a school, it must be underlined that the
municipalities without a school do not show a downward trend in the yearly
average number of births.
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End … 295

The economic sector ran counter to the declining demographic trends, as the
number of businesses (working premises) rose in all the municipalities during these
years. The number of employees and self-employed persons also increased, even
though this was not a general trend. It is worth mentioning that the mean percentage
changes were often more favourable in the municipalities which had lost their last
school. In these municipalities, the closure of the last school seems not to have had
a negative effect in economic terms.
Both demographic and economic trends in municipalities which closed their last
school pose a challenge to the assumption of a downward spiral as in many cases
the figures demonstrate an upward, rather than a downward trend over the years.
The municipalities which still had one school and which were expected to show
better results, did not fulfil these expectations.
It is much more difficult to assess the social impact on the population. One
remarkable finding is that municipalities with no school did not sell the school
building, but rather, sought means to use it for community purposes or for resi-
dential purposes. In three cases, the former school was located in a building which
housed the municipal office and other community services. Here, the public char-
acter of the building was preserved after the closure. Interestingly, the intention of
keeping the building open for the public (to a certain extent) can also be observed in
municipalities with one remaining school. In two cases, the municipalities sold the
former school building, but they tried to find a purchaser who wanted to use the
building in a way that maintained the public openness of the building. So it seems
that, in most cases, the municipality makes attempts to ensure that the subsequent
use of the school building serves, by some means or other, the benefits of the
community.
In conclusion, at least as far as the demographic and economic developments are
concerned, there were a variety of trends before, during or after the closure of the
(last) school. Although depopulation is quite prevalent in some regions, it would be
overhasty to interpret this as a sign of a downward spiral because, as the data have
shown, some years later the number of inhabitants could rise again, or a company
could be found which wants to settle in the municipality, creating jobs for several
people. The social dimension was investigated with regard to the subsequent use of
the school building. Many municipalities tried to preserve the public character of
the building. In this respect some municipalities with one remaining school fol-
lowed a strategy of finding a purchaser who was able to assure this purpose.

11.6 Discussion and Conclusions

As the findings in this paper demonstrate, the closure of the last school signals
neither the beginning nor the end of a downward spiral. First, the municipalities
where the last school was closed did not show a linear declining trend in the
investigated dimensions of demography and economy. Second, the analysed
dimensions did not follow a general trend, meaning that the demographic
296 S. Kroismayr

evolutions showed a multifaceted picture while the economic situation revealed


uprising trends in the majority of municipalities studied. Third, the reduction in
birth rates was not very pronounced, at least in those municipalities where the last
school had closed. However, this does not necessarily suggest that the pupil
numbers in the school district remained stable, as the parents can decide to send
their child to another school. Nevertheless, this gives the impression that the
population in remote rural areas is very resilient, despite diminishing local
opportunity structures.
One key to this resilience may be the differences in the share of employees and
self-employed persons in agriculture. Municipalities with no remaining school had
relatively more of their population in agriculture than those with one remaining
school. The higher portion of population in the agricultural sector might explain the
comparatively stable trend in natural population growth as farmers tend to have, on
average, more children than other population groups.12 As people in agriculture are
less mobile this might also reduce migration away from the rural area. It appears that,
without the high share of people working in agriculture, the trend of depopulation
could be even more pronounced in these municipalities. Therefore this case study
may be instructive for the many other low-fertility regions across Europe (and East
Asia) losing children and schools, namely, that the maintenance of the agricultural
sector is a crucial element in order to keep people in the (remote) countryside.
A key question for the maintenance of farms as a form of (small) business which
emerges partially from demographic change is the handing over of the farm to the
next generation. One of the most comprehensive works in the last years stem from
Rossier et al. (2007) who showed that two dimensions are of particular importance
to ensure the continuation of farming businesses: the number of sons and the size of
the farm. While the number of sons a farmer may have is not (yet) subject to human
decision making, the latter plays a pivotal role in the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) of the European Union. The EU system of agricultural subsidies and other
programmes are geared to foster competition, which favours the production of a
large amount of cheap products for export. Aims such as long-term food security, or
adaptation to climate change, are subordinated. This has accelerated the process of
“prosper or perish” which has been criticised for a long time (Benning and Reichert
2016). Therefore a new foundation of the agricultural policy in the EU is called for.
We need to place a greater emphasis on organic farming; strengthening of regional
markets; an end to the dumping of exports, and a reduction of meat consumption.
These are all crucial elements if we wish to protect our environment and at the same
time ensure a decent income for farmers. Moreover such a policy would help to
preserve the attractiveness of the countryside as a living environment.

12
A quick analysis on demand conducted by Mr. Norbert Neuwirth from the Austrian Institute for
Family Studies shows that professional farmers (aged 15–65) have on average 1.8 children in
comparison to 1.3 children in the rest of the population (figures are rounded). The calculations are
based on the census data of 2011 from Statistics Austria. Unfortunately no scientific literature
could be found on the topic.
11 Small School Closures in Rural Areas—The Beginning or the End … 297

In addition, the traditional tasks of farming need to be complemented by a


broader understanding of agriculture as provided by the concept of multi-functional
agriculture, one of the models for the diversification in agricultural and regional
programmes of the EU, such as the rural development program LE 14-20. In this
context the approach of a social agriculture (Wiesinger et al. 2013, p. 163) can offer
new fields of activities in an agricultural setting, for instance care of elderly people,
workshops for disabled people, therapies for drug addicts or permanently unem-
ployed persons. Social agriculture is in particular an alternative for small farms with
limited natural resources, as the size of the farm is of minor importance. For small
farms, the field of education can also contribute to preserve (remote) rural areas as a
living space. Cooperation between farms and schools permit the establishment of
alternative forms of learning such as “Schule am Bauernhof” (schooling on a farm),
which is already established in some places in Austria and where children have the
chance to experience nature and related work as a learning environment.
It must be underlined that the educational domain is also a very promising
concept for municipalities as they have the opportunity to use their school building
for alternative forms of schools with a different concept of learning and teaching.
Such an approach could even allow very small municipalities to prosper again, as
the example of the 100-soul village of Bratsch, Valais, shows. Here, the munici-
pality offered the former school building to a young educator for the foundation of a
private school with an alternative teaching concept13—an example where small
rural schools could be in the forefront of new socio-spatial concepts of learning and
learning spaces (Banerjee 2015).

References

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Chapter 12
Maternal Outcomes in the Context
of Free Maternal Healthcare
Provisioning in North Central
and South Western Nigeria

Anthony Ajayi and Wilson Akpan

Abstract Most maternal deaths are avoidable, if quality life-saving interventions


are available and accessible. However, inequality in access remains a major hin-
drance, particularly in low and middle-income countries. Many countries in
sub-Saharan Africa, have introduced free maternal healthcare to improve the util-
isation of skilled birth facilities and reduce inequalities of access to these and other
maternal healthcare services. However, poor utilisation rates and disparities in
access to maternal healthcare services persist, and these are not adequately
explained by the varied challenges associated with policy implementation. This
paper examines maternal outcomes in the context of free maternal healthcare in
Nigeria, which accounts for fully 19% of global maternal deaths. Specifically, it
examines the effects of free maternal health policy on maternal healthcare utilisa-
tion, inequality in access to maternal healthcare services, and health system func-
tion, as well as user perceptions and experiences of free maternal healthcare services
in two main regions of the country. In the main, the paper argues that there are other
barriers to service use, apart from financial ones, and addressing issues related to
culture and contextual differences are crucial for reducing inequality in access to
maternal healthcare.

Keywords Free maternal health  Inequality  Utilisation  Nigeria

12.1 Introduction

Maternal mortality is one of the most significant health and development problems
facing the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, especially Nigeria. Deaths from com-
plications of pregnancy or child birth are not only individual tragedies: they cause
much grief in families, they threaten the health of the infants left behind and they

A. Ajayi (&)  W. Akpan


Sociology Department, University of Fort Hare, East London, South Africa
e-mail: aiajayi@ufh.ac.za

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 301


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_12
302 A. Ajayi and W. Akpan

represent major losses to the community (Houle et al. 2015; Moucheraud et al.
2015). Scholars agree that skilled health staff and well-equipped health centres can
help treat nearly all obstetric emergencies, and that quality antenatal and postnatal
care can further help prevent nearly all maternal deaths not associated with acci-
dents or injuries (Bankole et al. 2009; WHO 2015b). Thus, if women continue to
die during childbirth, this is due either to the lack of adequate facilities, or because
of social factors that restrict the accessibility of these facilities. These can include
poor leadership and policy implementation; harmful cultural practices; distance;
inadequate services; poverty and inequality (Donnay 2000; Matsuoka et al. 2010;
Say and Raine 2007; Sharma et al. 2005; Singh et al. 2009).
To address these social factors, many sub-Saharan Africa countries have recently
introduced free maternal healthcare to reduce inequalities in service access, increase
uptake of skilled delivery and antenatal care (ANC), and reduce maternal deaths.
However, it is questionable if this measure has led to a significant improvement in
maternal outcomes (WHO 2015a, b). The World Health Organisation (WHO) has
estimated that approximately 303,000 maternal deaths occurred in 2015, 99% of
them in developing regions, with sub-Saharan Africa accounting for about 66%
(201,000) of all maternal deaths. Nigeria alone accounts for 19% of global maternal
deaths. The lifetime risk of maternal death for a woman in Nigeria is one in 29, as
compared to one in 4,900 in developed countries (WHO 2015b). This chapter
explores the policy effects of free maternal healthcare on access and use of maternal
health services in Nigeria. Before examining the situation in Nigeria, however, we
first review the existing literature on the effects of free maternal healthcare in
sub-Saharan Africa.

12.2 Literature Review

Starting in the mid-1990s, many African countries began to reduce or abolish user
fees for publicly financed maternity care services, with the aim of increasing skilled
birth attendance and reducing the catastrophic costs of emergency delivery care. It
was argued that user fees added little to revenue, discouraged the use of childbirth
services and created a high cost burden on poor households (Yates 2009). However,
few of the studies evaluating the impact of user fees on maternal health service
utilisation yielded reliable estimates of the effects on health outcomes or on equity
in access to, and use of, care (Dzakpasu et al. 2014; Hatt et al. 2013). This is
because such studies almost invariably employed inadequate study designs and
methods and rarely used comparison groups or addressed potential sources of bias
such as secular trends over time. Also, the representativeness of such studies is
questionable because they are mostly hospital- or facility-based rather than
population-based (Dzakpasu et al. 2014). In addition, most studies do not ade-
quately discuss contextual or implementation factors that may influence outcomes
ibid.).
12 Maternal Outcomes in the Context of Free Maternal … 303

12.2.1 User Fee Removal and Utilisation of Facility


Deliveries

Evidence of the effect of user fee removal on facility deliveries is mixed. There is
evidence that the removal of user fees increases facility delivery (Dzakpasu et al.
2014; Hatt et al. 2013; Leone et al. 2016), although it has also been reported that
improvement in the quality of care rather than user fee removal is responsible for
the increase in maternal healthcare utilisation (Schneider and Gilson 1999).
Nonetheless, many studies have consistently reported that free maternal healthcare
is associated with increased utilisation of maternal healthcare services (De Allegri
et al. 2011; Ezegwui et al. 2013; Leone et al. 2016; Ponsar et al. 2011). For
example, in Ghana, Nepal, Sierra Leone, Zambia and Zimbabwe, maternal
healthcare use tended to increase following the introduction of free maternal
healthcare (Mcpake et al. 2013). Free maternal healthcare is associated with
increases in skilled delivery and, in particular,caesarean service use (Witter et al.
2013). However, there is no evidence that the sharp increase in utilisation following
the removal of user fee is sustained, and some studies have suggested that the initial
increase may decline due to poor quality of care (Dzakpasu et al. 2014; Lagarde
et al. 2012; Lagarde 2008; Lagarde and Palmer 2011). In South Africa, for example,
the number of hospital visits among children and pregnant women grew rapidly
after the first abolition of user fees, but then began to decline due to poor service
quality (Wilkinson et al. 2001). Many authors have suggested that making free
services available causes major difficulties in catering to the increased influx of
patients, with the result that many turn to other, paid, services (Deininger and
Mpuga 2005; Xu et al. 2006; Yates et al. 2006). At least one study has shown that
user fee exemptions were not sufficient to increase the volume of facility-based
deliveries at public health facilities (Chama-Chiliba and Koch 2016). For Nigeria.,
little information exists on the policy effects of the recent removal of user fees,
especially on the number of facility births, despite the huge burden of maternal
mortality and the importance of the issue.

12.2.2 Free Maternal Healthcare and Inequality in Access


to Maternal Healthcare

One of the main reasons given for the abolition of user fees is to improve maternal
healthcare utilisation among the poor, but evidence for this is somewhat equivocal.
Studies have shown that free health services reduce (Nabyonga et al. 2005), widen
(Ben Ameur et al. 2012; El-Khoury et al. 2012; Johnson 2016; McKinnon et al.
2015a; Preker and Langenbrunner 2005), or even fail to affectsocioeconomic gra-
dients (De Allegri et al. 2011; McKinnon et al. 2015b). Witter et al. (2010) argue
that the removal of user fees actually exacerbates inequalities, especially between
rural and urban women, in a context of poor availability of services and staff. Other
304 A. Ajayi and W. Akpan

studies have reported that the poor were the least likely to benefit from user fee
removal (Johnson 2016; Witter et al. 2008). There are some indications that
middle-class women are the most likely to benefit from removal of user fees. In
Ghana, both socioeconomic and geographical inequality in access to maternal
healthcare persisted following the removal of user fees (Arthur 2012).

12.2.3 Free Maternal Healthcare and Maternal Mortality

Evidence on the effects of free maternal health provision on maternal mortality is


also inconclusive and weak (Hatt et al. 2013). There is evidence that user-fee
exemptions reduced institutional maternal mortality in Ghana and Nigeria (Bosu
et al. 2007; Ezegwui et al. 2013), but an increase in institutional maternal mortality
was reported in South Africa (Daponte et al. 2000). However, these studies failed to
document the extent to which the change in maternal mortality was attributable to
fee removal. Bosu et al. (2007) argued that the downward trend in institutional
mortality in Ghana started before the implementation of the delivery fee-exemption
policy, but a population-based estimate of the effect of free maternal healthcare
policy on maternal mortality is currently unavailable. This is, in part, due to defi-
cient vital registration in most sub-Saharan settings that have implemented free
maternal healthcare. Even where available, attributing decline in maternal mortality
to the implementation of free maternal healthcare alone is difficult because
numerous other factors could have influenced such a decline. Nonetheless, policy
makers need to know how many maternal deaths could be prevented following the
implementation of free maternal healthcare, as well as other impacts of facility
delivery. This study, conducted in several states of Nigeria, attempts to shed some
light on these questions, although much more work from other parts of Nigeria and
the continent will be needed to answer these important policy issues more fully.

12.2.4 Effects of Free Maternal Healthcare on Health


System Performance

In many sub-Saharan Africa countries where user fees were removed suddenly, the
effects on health systems have been destabilizing (Ridde et al. 2012). Healthcare
personnel have become overworked without commensurate compensation, often
leading to poorer quality of care (Dzakpasu et al. 2014; Ridde et al. 2012). The
immediate and significant increase in service utilisation has led to hospital supply
stockouts, increased patient waiting times, and overcrowding, further contradicting
the promise of ‘free’ services (Ben Ameur et al. 2012). However, such disruptive
outcomes are to be expected if adequate preparations are not made for the imple-
mentation of the exemption policies. The damage caused to the reputation of the
12 Maternal Outcomes in the Context of Free Maternal … 305

health facilities is immeasurable. Free healthcare policy that is meant to help the
poor may be quickly deemed unacceptable and unusable due to its poor quality, the
unavailability of drugs and other problems (ibid.).
The debate about the effectiveness of free maternal healthcare policy in
sub-Saharan Africa remains unresolved because evidence about its effects is mixed.
Nigeria has removed user fees for maternal health services in a bid to reduce the
heavy burden of maternal deaths, but little is known about the policy outcomes,
how women perceive the user fee removal policy, and the impact of such per-
ceptions on the use of maternal health service. This study examines women’s
perception of free maternal healthcare and the effects of the policy on service use,
maternal mortality and health system performance in North Central and South
Western Nigeria.

12.3 Methods

The data analysed in this study are from a survey, in-depth interviews and focus
group discussions conducted between May and September 2016 in two main
regions1 of Nigeria–Nasarawa state in the North Central region and Ondo and Ekiti
states in South Western Nigeria. These study areas were chosen because of the
differences in their maternal health outcomes and in their implementation of free
maternal healthcare programmes (see Table 12.1). Data collection took place in 20
rural, 13 semi-urban, and 10 urban areas. While universal, free, maternal- and
child-healthcare was initiated in Ondo state in 2010, only partly free maternal and
child healthcare has been initiated in Ekiti and Nasarawa states.
The findings are based on a survey involving 1227 women who gave birth to at
least one child between 2010 and 2015 and who were selected using multi-stage
sampling. A pretested questionnaire, measuring demographic characteristics; use of
maternal healthcare services; perception of quality of services; satisfaction with
services, and beliefs about free services, was administered using face-to-face
interviews. The main outcome variable in this study was “use of maternal health-
care services”, which was measured using the following questions, When you got
pregnant with your last birth, did you see anyone for antenatal care for this
pregnancy? Whom did you see? Where did you receive antenatal care for this
pregnancy? Where did you deliver your pregnancy? Each question has a binary
response (yes/no) and assesses an important dimension of the use of maternal
healthcare services. Antenatal care utilisation was defined as “at least one antenatal
care visit to a skilled provider”. Pearson chi-square tests and logistic regression

1
For ease of administration, Nigeria is divided into six geopolitical zones (regions). Each region
consists of people with similar culture, language, and ethnic groups. Regions are further subdi-
vided into federated states and have a system of government consisting of executive, headed by a
governor, legislative and judiciary. Ondo and Ekiti are two states near to each other in the South
West region and can be effectively considered as being in one region.
306 A. Ajayi and W. Akpan

Table 12.1 Free maternal healthcare policy implementation process and scope of coverage in
Ekiti, Ondo and Nasarawa states
Free maternal Ekiti Ondo Nasarawa
healthcare
policy
Coverage Implemented only in Universally implemented in Implemented in selected
selected government all state government government hospitals,
clinics, primary health care hospitals and clinics across clinics, primary health
centres and dispensaries the state centres, and dispensaries
Content and Covers antenatal care Covers antenatal care Covers antenatal care
benefit services, medications, and services, medications, and services, medications, and
package cost of delivery in the cost of delivery including cost of delivery including
selected primary health caesarean sections caesarean sections
centres. User fees for
caesarian sections and
treatment of
childbirth-related
complications were
exempted in the tertiary
hospital, provided that the
pregnant woman was
referred from the selected
primary healthcare centre
Funding The free healthcare Funded by federal The free healthcare
programme was funded government, state programme was funded
largely by the state government and many largely by the state
government and also by the international donor government and also by the
federal government under agencies federal government under
the SURE-P initiative the SURE-P initiative
Compensating The government supplied Two new tertiary facilities, Due to financial constraints,
health facilities delivery items and named Mother and Child, only a few government
and medication and these items were built and well healthcare facilities were
accompanying were restocked when the equipped. New primary selected and were not
measures health centres used up the healthcare care facilities limited to primary
items. More health workers were built and derelict ones healthcare centres
such as midwives and renovated in many
nurses were recruited to excluded communities.
provide support for existing More health workers were
health workers in the recruited and more
selected facilities and to medicines provided
take care of the anticipated
influx of new users. Also,
health infrastructure was
ungraded and potable water
was provided in the
selected facilities

were used to examine the relationships between and among variables and a p-value
less than 0.05 was considered significant. SPSS Version 23 was used for data
analysis.
For the qualitative analysis, 68 in-depth interviews and eight focus group dis-
cussions (FGD) were conducted among women who gave birth to at least one child
12 Maternal Outcomes in the Context of Free Maternal … 307

in the five years preceding the study across the study area. Each section of the FGD
consisted of approximately six participants of similar age and each section lasted for
a minimum of one hour. The first author moderated all six sections of the FGDs in
this study. Participants were recruited through snowball sampling. The purpose of
the study was explained to women who gave birth in the past five years preceding
the study, and each assisted in recruiting additional women who met the inclusion
criteria. Lastly, 12 key informant interviews were conducted with healthcare pro-
viders and with officials in the health ministries of Ondo State and Ekiti State (in
South Western Nigeria) and Nasarawa State (in North Central Nigeria). The
qualitative data were analysed thematically.

12.4 Results

12.4.1 Background Characteristics of Participants

Most participants were currently married (96%) and almost half had completed at
least secondary education (47%), with better educated women far more likely to
give birth at skilled birth facilities than at home or in faith-based facilities
(Table 12.2). Women were also more likely to give birth at skilled birth facilities if
they were urban and of higher socio-economic status.

Table 12.2 Demographic distribution of participants by place of childbirth


Variables All women Women who gave Women who gave birth at p-value
birth in SBF home or in FBF
Regions
North central 411 (33.9) 239 (58.2) 172 (41.8) <0.001
South Western 802 (66.1) 650 (81.0) 152 (19.0)
Age
 20 69 (5.7) 37 (53.6) 32 (46.4) <0.001
21–25 239 (19.7) 162 (67.8) 77 (32.2)
26–30 371 (30.6) 279 (75.2) 92 (24.8)
31–35 276 (22.8) 219 (79.3) 57 (20.7)
36–40 189 (15.6) 141 (74.6) 48 (25.4)
>40 69 (5.7) 51 (73.9) 18 (26.1)
Education level
No education 93 (7.7) 32 (34.4) 61 (65.6) <0.001
Primary 207 (17.1) 121 (58.5) 86 (41.5)
Secondary 572 (47.2) 433 (75.7) 139 (24.3)
Tertiary 339 (28.0) 301 (88.8) 38 (11.2)
(continued)
308 A. Ajayi and W. Akpan

Table 12.2 (continued)


Variables All women Women who gave Women who gave birth at p-value
birth in SBF home or in FBF
Marital status
Currently married 1163 (95.9) 854 (73.4) 309 (26.6) p > 0.05
Previously 12 (1.0) 6 (50.0) 6 (50.0)
married
Never married 38 (3.1) 29 (76.3) 9 (23.7)
Residence
Urban 384 (31.7) 298 (77.6) 86 (22.4) <0.001
Semi-urban 331 (27.3) 265 (80.1) 66 (19.9)
Rural 498 (41.1) 326 (65.5) 172 (34.5)
Socioeconomic status
High 374 (31.5) 329 (88.0) 45 (12.0) <0.001
Middle 611 (51.5) 468 (76.6) 143 (23.4)
Low 201 (16.9) 77 (38.3) 124 (61.7)
Key: SBF skilled birth facility; FBF faith-based facility; p-value based on Pearson Chi-Square test

12.4.2 Free Healthcare and Health System Performance

The analysis of the key informant interviews showed that the free maternal
healthcare policy was adequately planned and key stakeholders were involved in
both the planning and initiation stages. The key informants confirmed that more
health workers were recruited to address the anticipated influx of new users. There
was timely replenishment of medical supplies such as delivery items and medica-
tions. Overall, the analysis reveals that the modifications introduced to the maternal
healthcare programmes in South Western and North Central Nigeria did not cause
any major disruptions to health system performance.

12.4.3 Perceptions of Free Maternal Health

The in-depth interviews indicated that participants were divided in their opinions
about whether fees for maternal healthcare services were exempted. Women,
especially those residing in rural areas of North Central Nigeria, stated that user fees
for maternal healthcare services were not exempted, although the vast majority
confirmed the implementation of free maternal health care. The findings from key
informant interviews explain why some women stated that user fees were not
exempted. In Ekiti state, the key informants stated that user fee removal was limited
to primary health centres, leading women who prefer secondary and tertiary health
facilities to be unaware of free health services. In contrast, free maternal healthcare
in Nasarawa state was implemented only in selected primary, secondary and tertiary
facilities, mostly in urban areas. This explains why most rural women were unaware
12 Maternal Outcomes in the Context of Free Maternal … 309

of free maternal healthcare services. Nevertheless, most women in Ondo state stated
the maternal health care services were free and even the few women who reported
user fee charges considered the fees to be unofficial. Key informants in Ondo state
asserted that the universal user fee removal policy was implemented in all state
government health facilities. In each state, most women who were aware of free
maternal health had a favourable perception of free maternal health. However,
women who preferred private healthcare facilities were more likely to hold less
favourable perceptions of free maternal healthcare.

12.4.4 Perceptions of Quality of Services Under Free


Maternal Healthcare

The perceptions of quality of services provided under free maternal healthcare were
rather mixed. Some women, especially those residing in rural areas, affirmed that
the quality of care under free maternal healthcare was good, whereas others, mainly
from urban areas, considered it to be poor. Challenges related to prolonged waiting
times, inadequate infrastructure and personnel, and poor attitudes of health workers,
were the main reasons why women were dissatisfied with free maternal health
services in the study settings. As one middle-aged woman interviewed in Ekiti state
put it:
“I am aware that childbirth is free in primary healthcare centres but I do not trust the quality
of care offered there. The resources there are inadequate, they even use candlesticks to take
delivery at night.”

Overall, women were more likely to express satisfaction with the quality of
services in rural health facilities than in urban areas, where there were more
complaints about the inadequate number of skilled health workers.

12.4.5 Free Healthcare and Maternal Mortality

Findings from key informant interviews with policy makers in Nigeria suggest that
free maternal healthcare has facilitated a decline in maternal mortality. Citing an
unpublished confidential enquiry into maternal deaths conducted by Ondo state
government, one key informant claimed that maternal mortality had declined by
50% following the initiation of the Abiye (safe motherhood) programme. Such
views were typical of those expressed in interviews by the state-level policymakers.
The Abiye programme involved a combination of health system strengthening and
user fee exemption for maternal healthcare services. However, none of the poli-
cymakers interviewed in Ekiti and Narawa states could cite clear evidence of the
link between user fee removal and maternal deaths.
310 A. Ajayi and W. Akpan

12.4.6 Free Maternal Healthcare and Use of Maternal


Health Services

An increase in the rate of utilisation of maternal healthcare services was observed in


each region, but there was variation in the rate of increase across the study settings.
The proportions of women who reported attendance at ANC across the study
settings has improved considerably since 2013. For example, in both states in South
Western Nigeria, 95% of women aged 15–49 who gave birth in the five years
preceding the survey had at least one antenatal visit, compared to 74% reported in
the 2013 National Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) (National Population
Commission[Nigeria] and ICF International, 2014). The rate of increase in ANC
utilisation was 45% in Nasarawa state (Table 12.3).
The majority of births in Ondo (85.5%) and Ekiti (76.5%) took place in skilled
birth facilities, significantly more than in Nasarawa (58.2%). Utilisation of skilled
birth facilities increases with age, level of education, and socioeconomic status. In
both South Western states, the rate of population-level increase in utilisation of
maternal healthcare services exceeded 20% and this rise can also be attributed to
increasing coverage of maternal healthcare services rather than the removal of user
fees alone. In North Central Nigeria, the rate of population-level increase in
maternal healthcare utilisation was 10% and this also reflected the coverage of
maternal healthcare services. Many communities visited in North Central Nigeria
lacked access to maternal healthcare services, where most women were even
unaware that free maternal healthcare services were available in public health
facilities. Nonetheless, there was evidence of increased maternal health service use,
especially in Ondo State where 85.5% of women gave birth in skilled birth facilities
compared to only 56.2% in 2013 (NPC and ICF 2014). However, the rate of skilled
facility delivery declined in Ekiti State from 86.3 to 76.5%, largely due to a
preference for faith-based facilities.

12.4.7 Free Maternal Health Care and Inequality in Access


to Maternal Health Care

After adjusting for age, marital status and educational level (confounding vari-
ables), place of residence and socioeconomic status were found to be significant
predictors of non-use of skilled birth facility for childbirth in North Central and
South Western Nigeria (Table 12.4). Major inequalities in the use of free maternal
healthcare services persist, although the pattern of inequality differs across regions.
While women residing in rural areas were less likely not to use skilled birth
facilities for childbirth in South Western Nigeria, rural women in North Central
Nigeria were by far the most likely not to give birth with assistance from skilled
birth attendants. Moreover, rural women residing in North Central Nigeria were
eight times more likely not to give birth in a skilled birth facility as compared to
12

Table 12.3 Effects of user fee removal for maternal health on use of maternal healthcare services
Ekiti Ondo Nasarawa
2008 2013 Current 2008 2013 2016 2008 2013 2016 Current
n = 115 n = 200 study n = 107 n = 568 Current n = 161 n = 460 study n = 411
n = 400 study
n = 402
Antenatal care 91.3 86.8 95.8 77.6 78.6 97.3 87.6 63.2 91.5
Births attended by ** 84.7 93.3 ** 67.2 93.5 ** 40.7 67.9
skilled birth attendants
Births that took place in 80.0 86.3 76.5 57.0 56.2 85.5 29.8 40.1 58.2
Maternal Outcomes in the Context of Free Maternal …

health facilities
Note Antenatal care means at least one visit to a skilled provider during pregnancy. Skilled birth attendants are physicians, midwives and nurses working in
both private and public health facilities, including primary, secondary and tertiary health facilities
** Represents not available
311
312 A. Ajayi and W. Akpan

Table 12.4 Binary logistic regression showing socioeconomic determinants of non-use of skilled
facility for childbirth
South Western Nigeria North central Nigeria
AOR (95% CI) p-value AOR (95%CI) p-value
Residence
Rural 0.3 (0.2–0.5) <0.001 7.7 (3.5–16.9) <0.001
Peri-urban 0.7 (0.4–1.0) >0.05 2.3 (1.0–5.6) >0.05
Urban (reference)
Socioeconomic status
Low 5.1 (2.4–10.9) <0.001 14.3 (5.7–35.7) <0.001
Middle 2.3 (1.5–3.4) <0.001 3.0 (1.2–7.2) <0.05
High (reference)
Key: AOR adjusted odd ratio; CI confidence interval; p-value based on binary logistic regression
test

their urban counterparts, despite the introduction of free maternal health care
(Table 12.3). In contrast, use of skilled facilities was higher in rural areas than in
urban areas. However, there was huge geographical inequality in access to maternal
healthcare services in North Central Nigeria where many rural women were una-
ware of free maternal healthcare services, indicating that free maternal healthcare
did not affect geographical inequality in this region.
Despite the removal of user fees for maternal healthcare services, women of low
socioeconomic status were more likely not to use a skilled birth facility for child
delivery in both South Western and North Central Nigeria. Compared to women in
the high socioeconomic group, women with low socioeconomic status were 14
times more likely not to use skilled facilities for childbirth in North Central Nigeria
(Table 12.3).

12.5 Discussion

This paper has examined some of the most salient effects of free maternal healthcare
policy on the utilisation of maternal healthcare services, inequality in access to
maternal healthcare, maternal mortality, and health system performance in North
Central and South Western Nigeria. The study found that the proportion of women
utilising skilled birth facilities for ANC and child delivery care in both North
Central and South Western Nigeria has increased significantly, a finding consistent
with research conducted in other sub-Saharan African countries. This suggests that
free maternal healthcare is an important strategy to improve access to maternal
healthcare services, but service use is still far from universal, especially in North
Central Nigeria. The state of the existing health infrastructure and its distribution
seem to be critical underlying factors in the use of maternal health services. Many
12 Maternal Outcomes in the Context of Free Maternal … 313

communities in North Central Nigeria lack access to health facilities, which likely
helps explain the high proportion of births still taking place at home.
Despite the increases in the use of maternal healthcare services following the
removal of user fees, persistent disparities of access to such services remain.
Clearly, some other barriers to service use remain after the removal of user fees.
Consistent with previous research (Atchessi et al. 2016; Yates 2009), the findings of
this study indicate that the removal of user fees alone is neither sufficient to
eliminate maternal mortality, nor to ensure universal access to maternal healthcare
services. In settings where user fees have been removed, many women still give
birth at home or are attended to by traditional/faith-based birth attendants.
Socio-economic status remains the most important determinant of maternal health
following the removal of user fees. Non-use of maternal healthcare services con-
tinues to be primarily a problem for poor people, especially in rural areas of North
Central Nigeria.
The uneven distribution of health facilities constitutes a barrier to the utilisation
of maternal healthcare in settings where user fees are removed. Many poor women
live in underserved settings, forcing them to travel long distances in order to benefit
from free maternal healthcare services. The cost of transportation often accounts for
a substantial part of the household income for the poor. Since free maternal
healthcare only covers hospital or clinic charges, poor women who live in under-
served settings do not always benefit from the user fee removal policy compared to
women of middle-to-high socio-economic status who tend to live in close proximity
to health facilities (Echoka et al. 2013; Koblinsky et al. 2006; Ng’anjo Phiri et al.
2014). In addition, poor road networks and lack of transportation (especially in rural
areas) further make it difficult for women, their partners or families to decide
whether to use or reach a health facility during childbirth even if the cost of
childbirth is free (Gabrysch and Campbell 2009; Jacobsen et al. 2012). Access to
health care is still beyond the reach of women who live in underserved areas, a
problem that remains unresolved even after the removal of user fees. The cost of
transportation, unavailability of transportation and poor road networks require other
innovative strategies. Making maternal healthcare universally accessible is an
achievable goal, but policy makers need to understand the context and consider the
distribution of health facilities if they are to help make maternal healthcare truly
universal.
In this study, most women had a favourable perception of free maternal
healthcare, but some women (and especially those living in rural areas of North
Central Nigeria) were unaware that maternal healthcare services were available for
free, perhaps due to the unavailability of health facilities in their communities.
Women generally considered free maternal healthcare as an important strategy for
ensuring they would not lack access to maternal healthcare services, but there were
challenges related to the perceived quality of care, especially in urban areas.
Perceived prolonged waiting times and the attitudes of health workers still con-
stitute barriers to the utilisation of maternal healthcare services in the context of free
maternal healthcare provisioning. The perceived poor quality of services provided
in health facilities offering free maternal healthcare has seemingly become conflated
314 A. Ajayi and W. Akpan

with the debate regarding whether free goods and services can be of good quality.
Women’s narratives regarding free maternal healthcare were overall positive; but
often suggested the need to improve the quality of care.
The imperative to improve maternal services in public facilities in order to
stimulate their use has also been highlighted in other research (Atinga and Baku
2013). In particular, increasing facility delivery through the removal of user fees is
an important and effective public health strategy where the capacity exists to pro-
vide good quality care. The quality of care offered has been highlighted as a reason
why women still do not utilise skilled birth attendants for child delivery in settings
where the service is free (Pearson et al. 2011; Akashi et al. 2004). One Tanzanian
study shows that women bypass free health facilities in favour of paid facilities that
promise better quality care (Kruk et al. 2008) and in Ghana, pregnant women
bypass lower-order facilities for ANC and childbirth assistance (Aboagye and
Agyemang 2013). Our study found that some women preferred faith-based provi-
ders and private facilities because of the poor quality of care associated with free
maternal healthcare services in government health facilities.
Earlier studies have shown that workloads can increase for health workers
without corresponding increases in personnel or in staff remuneration, and materials
for treatment can run out without immediate replenishment (Nimpagaritse and
Bertone 2011), but this was not the case in North Central and South Western
Nigeria. However, in urban areas of Nigeria, prolonged waiting times, inadequate
infrastructure and personnel, and poor attitudes of health workers were reported.

12.6 Conclusion

Maternal mortality has declined in many sub-Saharan African countries, but at a


slower pace than that called for in national and international policies and plans.
Since the turn of the century, many sub-Saharan African countries have instituted
policies to reduce or abolish user fees for maternity care services. However, robust
evidence quantifying the impact of such policies on maternal health outcomes and
on equity in access to care remains scant. This study concludes that free maternal
healthcare is an important strategy for improving maternal outcomes, but this alone
cannot guarantee the desired outcome. It is imperative to understand the contextual
needs associated with free maternal healthcare provisioning and to address these,
with additional health system strengthening, to improve the quality of care and
equity, as well as access to facility delivery and to emergency obstetric care. These
additional measures would further help improve maternal health outcomes and
allow for a more comprehensive understanding of user fee effects in Nigeria, as well
as in sub-Saharan Africa more generally.
12 Maternal Outcomes in the Context of Free Maternal … 315

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Chapter 13
The Association Between Household
and Community Single Motherhood
and Adolescent Pregnancy in South
Africa

Sibusiso Mkwananzi

Abstract This study investigated the independent association of single mother-


hood at both household- and community-levels with adolescent pregnancy.
A sample of 14,232 female adolescents aged 10–19 years was obtained from the
2011, 2012 and 2013 South African General Household Surveys (GHS). These data
were analysed using descriptive statistics and multilevel binary logistic regression
with Stata. Interaction terms were also tested. Findings showed that living in a
single motherhood household increased the average odds of adolescent pregnancy
as did high levels of single motherhood within communities in the adjusted models.
Significant interaction was found between both household and community single
motherhood variables and education, poverty and household sex composition, after
adjusting for other variables. These results highlight the important need for sup-
porting households headed by single mothers. This need arises from an independent
association as well as the added risk that occurs when single motherhood occurs in
the presence of school non-attendance and poverty. Early pregnancy prevention
programmes and awareness campaigns for females growing up in homes and
environments with greater levels of single motherhood are encouraged in order to
ensure the sexual and reproductive health of young females in South Africa.


Keywords Single motherhood Adolescent pregnancy South Africa 

Multilevel modelling Community and household level factors

S. Mkwananzi (&)
Demography and Population Studies, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg, South Africa
e-mail: Sibusiso.Mkwananzi@wits.ac.za

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 319


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_13
320 S. Mkwananzi

13.1 Introduction

Adolescent pregnancy has been identified as a pressing social and health challenge
in sub-Saharan Africa, as in many other parts of the world, due to its multiple
adverse social, health and demographic consequences. In South Africa, the 2008
National Youth Risk Behaviour Survey indicated that one in four (24.4%) sexually
active teenage females had ever been pregnant (Reddy et al. 2010). Low educa-
tional levels, large household size and low socio-economic status have been con-
sistently described as important individual- and household-level predictors
(Malema 2000; Jewkes et al. 2009; Macleod 2011; Macleod and Durrheim 2002;
Macleod and Tracey 2010; Mkhwanazi 2010; Panday et al. 2009; Timaeus and
Moultrie 2015; Vundule et al. 2001). The number of adolescents who became
pregnant in the previous year increased by 12% over 2009–2013, with the ado-
lescent pregnancy rate rising from 33 to 38 pregnancies per 1000 females aged 10–
19 over 2011–2013, posing growing challenges (Mkwananzi 2017).
Contextual factors accounting for the levels of adolescent pregnancy seen
nationally, as cited by previous authors, suggest addressing socio-structural factors
as an appropriate response that could empower adolescent girls and thus help them
prevent adolescent childbearing and its related risks (Jewkes et al. 2009; Panday
et al. 2009; Macleod 2011; Mkhwanazi 2011). Local studies that have investigated
the effects of community factors on adolescent pregnancy have primarily adopted
qualitative approaches and have cited gender inequality as well as poverty as
important determinants (Limpopo Population and Development Directorate 2014;
Willan 2013). There is a need to investigate quantitatively factors beyond the
individual-level that could be associated with adolescent pregnancy in South Africa,
while controlling for adolescent characteristics.
One such factor is single motherhood, both at the household- and
community-levels. Past international studies have shown a positive association
between lone parenting and the risk of adolescent pregnancy (Luo et al. 2012; Omar
et al. 2010; Ugoji 2011). For example, Francis (2008) demonstrated that the like-
lihood of pregnancy among adolescent single females in Lesotho increased when
they were living in households headed by separated or divorced females. Possible
explanations for the association between single motherhood and adolescent preg-
nancy encompass issues such as paternal absence, intergenerational adolescent
motherhood, as well as reduced communication and embarrassment regarding
sexual matters on the part of single female parents, leading many adolescents to
seek information about sex mostly from their peers (Domenico and Jones 2007;
Ugoji 2011). Such factors underscore the importance of investigating the influence
of single motherhood on adolescent pregnancy in South Africa. This study seeks to
determine the independent relationship between single motherhood and adolescent
pregnancy through answering two major research questions. Firstly, what is the
association between single motherhood and adolescent pregnancy, after controlling
for demographic and socio-economic factors; and secondly, what is the mediating
13 The Association Between Household and Community Single … 321

effect of single motherhood on the association between adolescent pregnancy and


individual, household and community background factors?
In many sub-Saharan African countries, the proportion of female-headed fami-
lies has increased over time, but sub-regional differences exist, with West Africa
having the lowest levels, followed by East Africa and Southern Africa (Dlamini
2006). The most recent demographic and health surveys for Zimbabwe, Lesotho
and Swaziland show high levels of single female headedness that range from 20 to
41%, driven in large part by high levels of premarital childbearing and HIV related
deaths (Mbanefo 2013; Moyo and Kawewe 2009). In South Africa, only about one
third of households are composed of nuclear families (Budlender and Lund 2011)
and the single female-headed family is not a new phenomenon historically. Upon
liberation from the Dutch and British colonial rule, South Africa experienced
apartheid, a system of institutionalised racial segregation and of internal colo-
nization established in 1948 (Bunting 1964). During this period, indigenous whites
subjugated their fellow compatriots, who were unable to purchase land except in
reservations, where few employment opportunities existed. This led to many black
African males migrating for work away from their families, to urban centres or mine
settlements (Bunting 1964; Ministry in the Office of the President 1994), giving rise
to the widespread phenomenon of “absent fathers” at the household-level (Timaeus
and Moultrie 2015).
Consequently, many black African women were forced to raise and fend for their
offspring by themselves (Bunting 1964; Emmett 2003). This phenomenon has
continued to the present day, such that the country is now experiencing a fourth
generation of children raised in single female households. Gustafsson and Worku
(2006) have suggested that black African women may have opted to raise their
children alone due to husbands having higher levels of power and rights in marriage
under apartheid law. They found that exposing black African women to the white
women’s marriage market increased their likelihood of marriage by only 8%. This
could imply that as single female-headed households increased, the desire to marry
among this population group decreased. Other determinants of increasing house-
hold structure diversity have included delays in marriage accompanied by
non-marital childbearing, increases in separation and divorce, as well as rising
widowhood due to higher female life expectancy (Weeks 2011).
In 2010, over 60% of South African urban families, in all race groups, were
headed by female single parents (Holborn and Eddy 2011). In the Witwatersrand
region, the level of single female-headed households increased from 14% in 1962 to
29% in 1985 (Amoateng and Setlalentoa 2015). In 2008, approximately 40% of
South African children were living with their mothers only (Budlender and Lund
2011). Single female-headed households are considered a vulnerable population
group and a priority for development programmes (Kusakabe 2002). Single female
heads are arguably “triply disadvantaged” as they face the weights of poverty,
gender discrimination and the absence of financial support (Buvinić and Gupta
1997). These households experience poverty at higher levels than households
headed by lone fathers with children. They are dependent on a woman’s income,
which is likely to be lower and whose position may be more disadvantaged in the
322 S. Mkwananzi

workforce. They may also be characterized by lower labour power, control over and
access to resources, all of which decrease their economic autonomy (UN 2015). In
some settings this group of women still confronts rejection and prejudice from
society, culture and religion when compared with their married counterparts (Essien
and Bassey 2012). Despite these challenging consequences, single female head-
edness is here to stay and societies urgently need to increase their tolerance and
establish the social orientation and needs of such households (ibid.).

13.2 Contextual Overview of Kinship Relationships


Sub-nationally in South Africa

The kinship and key socio-economic characteristics of the various sub-national


regions (known as provinces in South Africa) are displayed in Table 13.1. The first
column displays levels of adolescent pregnancy across provinces. The three highest
incidence levels for 2011–2013 were seen in the North West, Northern Cape and
Eastern Cape. KwaZulu Natal, Limpopo, Mpumalanga and the Free State also
display pregnancy incidence levels of above 3% per annum.
These seven provinces all have relatively high levels of poverty, paternal
absence and death, single motherhood headship, and community levels of single
motherhood. The North West has the highest level of adolescent pregnancy, with
poverty levels above 60% and almost every second adolescent female here living
without their fathers.
Similarly, the highest levels of poverty were seen in these same provinces
(ranging from 55.56% in the Northern Cape to 76.55% of households in Limpopo).
Adolescent females living in Limpopo also experienced the highest level of paternal
absence (60.32%), with one in five no longer having a living father and one in three
living in homes headed by their single mothers. In addition, the Eastern Cape

Table 13.1 Levels of adolescent kinship characteristics across South African provincesa
Adolescent Poverty Father Father Male Single High community
pregnancyb absent dead headed motherhood single motherhood
Western Cape 1.92 35.62 33.15 10.02 68.00 22.47 4.00
Eastern Cape 4.43 73.23 52.23 22.00 47.91 35.32 60.44
Northern Cape 4.44 55.56 45.24 16.02 57.43 27.37 26.67
Free State 3.29 57.00 46.41 20.02 56.36 31.29 12.9
KwaZulu-Natal 4.10 65.51 55.31 24.12 46.53 36.20 46.57
North West 4.89 62.06 49.74 15.19 52.53 26.95 7.38
Gauteng 2.90 38.59 35.50 14.56 65.29 27.68 0.52
Mpumalanga 3.74 64.22 55.01 20.70 47.90 30.63 33.53
Limpopo 3.92 76.55 60.32 20.19 40.48 32.37 19.53
Source GHS 2011–2013 (Stats SA 2013)
a
Percentages of various phenomena among adolescent females in South Africa
b
Adolescent pregnancy is the percentage of pregnancies among females aged 10–19 years per province
13 The Association Between Household and Community Single … 323

displayed very high levels of poverty (73.23%), paternal absence (52.23%),


paternal orphanhood (22%), single motherhood (35.32%), and with 60.44% of
communities having high levels of single motherhood.
KwaZulu Natal is noteworthy likewise for having a high incidence of adolescent
pregnancy (above 4%), poverty (65.51%), paternal absence and paternal orphan-
hood (occurring among 55.31 and 24.12% of adolescent females, respectively).
Further, KwaZulu Natal had high community levels of single motherhood (46.57%)
and the highest level (36.20%) of adolescent females living in homes headed by
single mothers. The legacy of male migrant labour in South Africa, paternal mor-
tality and low rates of marriage can largely explain many of these patterns (Ford
and Hosegood 2005; Hosegood et al. 2009).

13.3 Data Source and Methods

The data for the study are from the 2013 updated versions of the 2011–2013 general
household surveys (GHS) (Stats SA 2012, 2013, 2014). These datasets were
extracted from the Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) database website (Stats SA
2015). The GHS has been conducted since 2002. It is a nationally representative,
cross-sectional survey conducted to determine levels of development and service
delivery across South Africa. Its sampling technique employs a multi-stage design
where primary sampling units (PSUs) are selected first followed by dwelling units
(DUs) in different clusters, and data stratified by geography and population attri-
butes based on 2001 census data (Stats SA 2013). The GHS included samples of
25,086 households in 2011, 25,330 households in 2012 and 25,786 households in
2013. Although individuals of all age groups were included in the surveys, our
focus is on the 14,232 young females aged 10–19 years living in 9286 households
(5207 from 2011, 4912 from 2012 and 4113 from 2013). The individuals included
in each year are from independent samples that do not allow the same clusters to be
included in each year. Therefore, the likelihood of the same individual being pre-
sent in more than one year is very low.

13.3.1 Study Variables

Adolescent Pregnancy in the Past 12 Months: A single measure for adolescent


pregnancy is used. We define adolescent pregnancy as pregnancy occurring among
adolescents (10–19 year olds). This age group was specifically used in order to
include all pregnancies below the age of 15, which are normally omitted from other
studies due to lack of data. In the survey, individuals were asked to self-report, if
female, and were also allowed to report on behalf of other females within the same
household (“any female household member who had been pregnant during the past
12 months”). This was to help capture pregnancy in sensitive cases (with responses
324 S. Mkwananzi

of Yes, No, Do not know, Not applicable (for males) and Unspecified). Female
household members who answered yes, or who were identified by other household
members from the above question and whose age was below 20, qualified as
pregnant adolescents. Adolescent pregnancy was coded as 1 and adolescent
non-pregnancy as 0. Approximately 3% of the young females in our sample were
currently pregnant or had been pregnant within the preceding year, representing
270,420 adolescent girls at the population level between the years 2011 and 2013 in
South Africa.
Independent variables included variables of interest and controlling variables:
Household and Community Family Disruption:
Single motherhood: households with female heads who are not married or cohab-
iting currently;
Community levels of single motherhood: municipal level of single motherhood
aggregated from household-level data as a percentage of all households within the
municipality that have single female headedness, and classified into three equal
groups of low, medium and high municipal levels.
The individual-level background variables are race, marital status, educational
level and employment status, defined as follows:
Race: Black, White, Coloured,1 Indian/Asian;
Marital status: collapsed into two categories, those never married and those ever
married or currently cohabiting;
Educational level: highest level of educational attainment, collapsed into three
categories of not attending school, primary level and secondary level;
Employment status: employment status of respondent, employed or unemployed.
Background factors at the household-level include household density and sex
composition, defined as follows:
Household density: average number of persons per room in a household (calculated
from the number of persons and rooms per household);
Sex composition: aggregated from individual-level data of all household occupants.
The five possible categories presented included only females, predominantly
females with males, evenly mixed, predominantly males with females, and only
males.
Community-level background variables are place of residence and province,
which were defined as:
Place of residence: classification according to settlement type and population
density, defined as either urban if high density and near city centre, or rural if low
density and in tribal areas or away from the city;

1
South African government race classification nomenclature for people of mixed race.
13 The Association Between Household and Community Single … 325

Province: current province (local reference to sub-national regions) of residence.


The nine provinces are Gauteng, Eastern Cape, North West, Northern Cape,
Western Cape, KwaZulu Natal, Mpumalanga, Free State, Limpopo.

13.3.2 Analysis

The rate of adolescent pregnancy was calculated using the equation below for the
whole country and by year:

Number of adolescent pregnancies


Adolescent Pregnancy Rate ¼  1000 ð13:1Þ
Total number of female adolescents

The chi-square test for trend was used to determine whether the change over time
showed a statistically significant increase or decrease in the linear trend. Bivariate
analysis used cross-tabulations of pregnancy by independent characteristics, with
the chi-squared test (p-value = 0.05) used to determine statistically significant
differences in pregnancy between categories of variables.
Multilevel logistic regression models with random intercepts were used to test
the independent association between single female headedness and adolescent
pregnancy. Five models tested the heterogeneity of adolescent pregnancy in dif-
ferent communities and established the association between single female head-
edness at household and community levels, while controlling for
socio-demographic individual-, household- and community-level variables.
Multilevel modelling is a suitable statistical technique when individuals from the
same households or geographical areas have the potential of being included in a
study sample (Goldstein 2011). This indeed is the case for the general household
survey as households from the primary sampling units (provinces) were sampled
using systematic sampling, but every member within the household was inter-
viewed. However, the model was not nested at the household level due to the
numbers of adolescent females per household ranging between one and three. The
two-level model estimated the variation in the risk of adolescent pregnancy between
communities and between individuals within the same communities. Simple logistic
regression would fail to capture this accurately as members within communities are
similar, thereby violating the logistic regression assumption of independence of
residuals (Kawachi and Subramanian 2007; Merlo 2003; Subramanian 2004). This
would result in an underestimation of standard errors and very small p-values,
making estimates of association appear falsely significant and results erroneous.
Our model can be represented by the following expression:
  X
x
pij
log ¼ d0ij þ dij zij þ eij ð13:2Þ
1  pij ij¼1
326 S. Mkwananzi

where: pij = probability of having been recently pregnant for the ith individual in
the jth community—the dependent variable,
dij are the parameter coefficients of the model, zij are the independent regressors,
and eij are the residual errors.
Results from multilevel analysis incorporate a fixed and random component. The
fixed component depicts individual factors associated with adolescent pregnancy.
These are presented as odds ratios for ease of interpretation with their associated
p-values. A ratio greater than one implies that an individual in a given category
would be more likely to experience adolescent pregnancy as opposed to an indi-
vidual in the base category. The random component quantifies levels of hetero-
geneity between communities and indicates the extent to which unexplained
community effects are present. Also, results of the Akaike’s information criteria
statistic are included to show the suitability of added variables in explaining the
outcome. We use the linear threshold model (also known as the latent variable
approach) to calculate the variable partition coefficient (VPC) for the multilevel
logistic models.2
Interaction testing was conducted through establishing the levels of certain
variables by the two main interest variables (single female headedness and ado-
lescent pregnancy) and adding interaction terms in the regression analysis. The
unadjusted multilevel regression analysis of interaction terms was conducted for all
possible interaction terms, with adjusted multilevel regression performed for those
interaction terms that were significant at bivariate level. Results of interaction
testing are shown in the tables. The analyses were performed using the Stata
(version 13) statistical package.

13.4 Results

The adolescent females were predominantly never married, black, unemployed and
attending secondary school (Table 13.2). Most lived in households that consisted
predominantly of females, had low household density (up to three persons per
room), and were neither characterized by poverty or single female headedness.
Additionally, the majority of adolescent females lived in urban areas, with relatively
more in Gauteng and KwaZulu Natal provinces. Almost half the sample (47%)
came from communities with low levels of single motherhood.
The levels of pregnancy across categories of independent characteristics are
shown in Table 13.3 with the associated chi-squared test results.
Pregnant adolescents were significantly older with a median age of 18 years as
compared to 15 years of age for non-pregnant females. Overall, 6% of 15–19 year-olds

2
This assumes that the underlying binary variable is a continuous latent variable yij, with the
variance at individual level being constant (Browne et al. 2005). The individual variance is
assumed to have a standard logistic distribution, with mean 0 and variance of p2/3 = 3.29.
13 The Association Between Household and Community Single … 327

Table 13.2 Description of study sample by individual, household and community characteristics
Characteristics Sample n = 14,232 (%)
Age (median; IQR) 15; 4
Age group
10–14 year olds 45.88
15–19 year olds 54.12
Marital status
Never married 99.71
Ever married/cohabiting 0.29
Race
African/Black 78.23
Coloured 10.34
Indian/Asian 2.70
White 8.73
Employment status
Unemployed 98.96
Employed 1.04
Educational level
Not attending school 13.50
Primary 33.03
Secondary 53.46
Household sex composition
Only females 9.43
Predominantly males with females 12.76
Predominantly females with males 59.27
Equal males and females 18.51
Household density
0–3
4–7
8–11
Household poverty
No 41.37
Yes 58.63
Single motherhood
No 71.05
Yes 28.95
Place of residence
Urban 61.93
Rural 38.07
Province
Western Cape 12.93
Eastern Cape 11.40
(continued)
328 S. Mkwananzi

Table 13.2 (continued)


Characteristics Sample n = 14,232 (%)
Northern Cape 2.13
Free State 4.94
KwaZulu-Natal 18.72
North West 6.96
Gauteng 2.61
Mpumalanga 8.67
Limpopo 11.64
Municipal levels of single motherhood
Low 46.95
Medium 30.46
High 22.60

Table 13.3 Percentage pregnancy across characteristics in South Africa


Variables Pregnant n = 520 P-value
Age group 0.00
10–14 year olds 0.26
15–19 year olds 5.95
Marital status 0.00
Never married 3.31
Ever married/cohabitting 17.59
Race 0.00
African/Black 3.86
Coloured 2.50
Indian/Asian 0.63
White 0.47
Educational level 0.00
Not attending school 14.57
Primary 0.25
Secondary 2.41
Employment status 0.92
Unemployed 3.34
Employed 2.90
Household sex composition 0.00
Only females 1.91
Predominantly males with females 4.70
Predominantly females with males 3.49
Equal males and females 2.66
(continued)
13 The Association Between Household and Community Single … 329

Table 13.3 (continued)


Variables Pregnant n = 520 P-value
Household poverty 0.00
No 1.79
Yes 4.62
Place of residence 0.00
Urban 2.65
Rural 4.46
Province 0.00
Western Cape 1.86
Eastern Cape 4.16
Northern Cape 3.94
Free State 2.59
KwaZulu-Natal 4.05
North West 4.80
Gauteng 2.64
Mpumalanga 3.44
Limpopo 3.63
Single motherhood 0.00
No 2.78
Yes 4.71
Municipal levels of single motherhood 0.01
Low 2.79
Medium 3.63
High 4.07
Source GHS 2011–2013 (Stats SA 2012, 2013, 2014)

were pregnant over 2011–2013 and the level of pregnancy amongst ever married or
cohabiting adolescent (17.6%) was over five times higher than for those never married
(3.3%).
Pregnancy levels were also higher among black adolescents (3.86%) compared
to whites (0.47%), as well as among those not attending school (14.57%) than for
those currently in secondary school, with the lowest levels among those attending
primary school (0.25%). There was no statistically significantly difference by
employment status. Household composition showed significant differences in
pregnancy levels across its various categories. Pregnancy levels were highest
among adolescent females living in homes constituted predominantly of males with
females (4.70%) and lowest amongst those living in homes with only females
present (1.91%). They were also higher for adolescent females living in poor homes
(4.62%) and in rural areas (4.46%) than among those in homes without poverty or
in urban areas.
Provincial differentials of pregnancy ranged from a low of 1.86% for adolescent
females living in the Western Cape to a high of 4.80% for those living in the North
330 S. Mkwananzi

West. Adolescent females living in homes headed by their single mothers experi-
enced significantly higher pregnancy levels (4.71%) than those without single
mother heads (2.78%). Furthermore, pregnancy levels were higher among adoles-
cent females from communities with high levels of single motherhood (4.07%) than
for those living in communities with low single motherhood.

13.4.1 Multilevel Modelling Results

The random effects and model characteristics are presented first in Table 13.4 to
give details of the community effects on adolescent pregnancy through multilevel
modelling. Regression analysis tested variability in adolescent pregnancy of 14,232
adolescent females across 66 communities of South Africa. The base model shows
results of the empty model, from which we are able to establish the levels of
variability in adolescent pregnancy across communities. The odds of pregnancy for
an adolescent female from an ‘average’ community (µ0j = 0) is 0.04. Therefore, an
adolescent female picked at random from an average community is less likely to be
pregnant, and this risk decreases as we control for further factors to 0.0003 in
Model 5. The between community variance in the log odds of adolescent pregnancy
show that adolescent females across communities differ significantly by 10% with
respect to pregnancy and as variables are controlled for, the level of difference in
the risk of pregnancy decreased.
The addition of background factors decreased the variance in pregnancy risk by
5% in all the models. Intra-cluster correlation reveals a 3% significant similarity
between two adolescent females living in the same community. Controlling for
more factors in subsequent models decreases the level of similarity between ado-
lescent females from the same community to 1% in the fully adjusted model. Model
5 is the best fit for adolescent pregnancy compared to the other models built, as
indicated by the goodness-of-fit statistics (higher Akaike information criterion
(AIC) and log likelihood values).
The fixed effects results of the unadjusted models for each variable and hier-
archically adjusted multilevel logistic regression models are shown in Table 13.5.
Model 1 represents the bivariate association between the various characteristics and
adolescent pregnancy. All tested variables increase the likelihood of adolescent
pregnancy, except for race where a negative yet significant unadjusted relationship
exists. Model 2 shows the adjusted relationship of demographic and socioeconomic
factors at various levels with the outcome and reveals a similar pattern of associ-
ation to that seen in bivariate regression for all variables except employment status,
where the association reverses and becomes negative.
The unadjusted models depict a significant positive relationship between
household- and community-levels of single motherhood with adolescent pregnancy
in South Africa between 2011 and 2013. The fully adjusted model shows that the
presence of a single mother heading a home at the household-level, and high levels
of single motherhood at the community-level, significantly increase the average
13

Table 13.4 Random effects for multilevel logistic regression of adolescent pregnancy in South Africa (GHS 2011–2013)
Random effects Base model Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 0.04*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0003***
Local municipality variance 0.10*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05***
Proportional change in variance 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Intra cluster correlation 0.03** 0.02** 0.02** 0.01** 0.01**
AIC 4446.06 3544.20 3545.17 3544.52 3543.51
Units: local municipalities 66 66 66 66 66
Units: individual teenage females 14,232 14,175 14,175 14,175 14,175
Log likelihood −2221.03 −1747.60 −1746.08 −1747.26 −1745.75
Statistical significance: *p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
The Association Between Household and Community Single …
331
332 S. Mkwananzi

Table 13.5 Multilevel logistic regression of adolescent pregnancy in South Africa


Fixed effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Average Average Average Average Average
odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio
Single motherhood (No†)
Yes 1.34*** 1.20* 1.26**
Municipal levels of single motherhood (Low†)
Medium 1.15 1.05 1.00
High 1.39*** 1.25** 1.22**
Adolescent characteristics
Marital status (Never married†)
Ever married/ 5.36*** 2.58** 2.53** 2.55** 2.52**
cohabiting
Race (Blacks†)
Coloured 0.72** 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.89
Indian/Asian 0.14** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 0.15***
White 0.06*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09***
Educational level (Primary†)
Secondary 13.80*** 14.56*** 14.46*** 14.56*** 14.47***
Not attending school 101.03*** 112.29*** 111.32*** 112.30*** 111.30***
Employment status (Unemployed†)
Employed 1.03 0.32*** 0.28*** 0.32*** 0.32***
Household sex composition (Only Females†)
Predominantly males 2.92*** 2.62*** 2.91*** 2.62*** 2.90***
with females
Predominantly 2.16*** 2.04*** 2.18*** 2.03*** 2.18***
females with males
Equal males and 1.61*** 1.59* 1.73** 1.59* 1.73**
females
Household poverty (No†)
Yes 2.32*** 1.60*** 1.56*** 1.60*** 1.56***
Household density 1.25*** 1.12*** 1.11** 1.12*** 1.11***
Place of residence (Urban†)
Rural 1.64*** 1.33** 1.35** 1.32** 1.35***
Province (Western Cape†)
Eastern Cape 2.23*** 1.88** 1.85** 1.95** 1.92**
Northern Cape 2.12*** 2.39*** 2.38*** 2.51*** 2.50***
Free State 1.66** 1.63 1.62 1.73 1.72
KwaZulu-Natal 1.95*** 1.51 1.47 1.56 1.52
North West 2.29*** 2.06** 2.07** 2.19** 2.19**
(continued)
13 The Association Between Household and Community Single … 333

Table 13.5 (continued)


Fixed effects Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Average Average Average Average Average
odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio odds ratio
Gauteng 1.36 1.38 1.38 1.36 1.35
Mpumalanga 1.77** 1.59 1.58 1.64 1.63
Limpopo 1.88*** 1.64 1.61 1.71 1.69
Constant 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0003***
Source GHS 2011–2013 (Stats SA 2012, 2013, 2014)
Statistical significance: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

odds of adolescent pregnancy by 26 and 22%, respectively. A comparison of Model


2 with Models 3, 4 and 5 indicates the mediating effects of single motherhood.
Models 3 and 4 show that the addition of single motherhood at both the household-
and community-levels increases the magnitude of the association between house-
hold sex composition and adolescent pregnancy. Finally, Model 5 (the full model)
shows that the magnitude in the association of marital status, educational status and
household poverty decreases, magnitude of the association with household sex
composition and province increases and that of race, employment status, household
density and place of residence largely remain the same.
The results indicate a possible interaction between household- and community-
levels of single motherhood, education, sex composition and poverty. The
cross-tabulation of household-level factors (single motherhood and sex composi-
tion) showed that 73% of female-only households were headed by single mothers
with significant differences of sex composition by single motherhood. In addition,
76% of households headed by single mothers had males (either predominantly so or
not) and 71% experienced poverty as opposed to 53% that were headed by others.
These differences were statistically significant. Additionally, cross-tabulation of
community-levels of single motherhood and poverty showed significantly higher
levels of poverty in communities with greater levels of single mothers.
To further test for interactions, we ran multilevel logistic regression models that
included interaction terms for household and community single motherhood with
all control variables. After controlling for other variables, statistical significance
remained between the interaction terms with education, household poverty and
household composition categories. Results for these six significant interaction terms
in the unadjusted and adjusted models are seen below in Tables 13.6 and 13.7.
Table 13.6 shows the results of interaction testing for household single moth-
erhood with education, household poverty and household composition. The highest
risk of adolescent pregnancy was among adolescent females who were not
attending school, at secondary level education and then at primary education level.
In all cases, adolescent females living with single mothers had a higher risk (in the
adjusted model adolescent females not attending school and with single mothers
had a 116 times higher likelihood of pregnancy compared to adolescent females that
334 S. Mkwananzi

Table 13.6 Testing of single motherhood interaction terms in South Africa


Unadjusted models Adjusted models
(AOR) (AOR)
Fixed effects of interaction terms n = 14,232 n = 14,175
Single motherhood and education (No # primary†)
Yes # not attending school 113.32*** 116.29***
No# not attending school 105.01*** 105.36***
Yes # secondary 19.07*** 16.95***
No# secondary 12.77*** 13.44***
Yes # primary 1.23 1.07
Single motherhood and household poverty (No # no†)
Yes # yes 2.64*** 1.65***
No # yes 2.20*** 1.47***
Yes # no 1.10 0.85
Single motherhood and household composition (No # only females†)
Yes # predominantly males with females 3.42*** 2.39**
Yes # predominantly females with males 2.37** 1.69
No # predominantly males with females 2.15** 1.53
Yes # equal males and females 1.95* 1.31
No # predominantly females with males 1.47 1.38
No # equal males and females 1.13 1.12
Yes # only females 0.73 0.65
Source GHS 2011–2013 (Stats SA 2012, 2013, 2014)
Statistical significance: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

Table 13.7 Testing of community single motherhood interaction terms in South Africa
Unadjusted models Adjusted models
(AOR) (AOR)
Fixed effects of interaction terms n = 14,232 n = 14,175
Community single motherhood and education (Low # primary†)
High # not attending school 223.53*** 165.22***
Medium # not attending school 187.15*** 151.88***
Low # not attending school 119.58*** 130.72***
High # secondary 29.78*** 21.38***
Medium # secondary 21.06*** 20.62***
Low # secondary 20.06*** 16.87***
High # primary 2.53 2.05
Medium # primary 1.39 1.19
(continued)
13 The Association Between Household and Community Single … 335

Table 13.7 (continued)


Unadjusted models Adjusted models
(AOR) (AOR)
Community single motherhood and poverty (Low # no†)
High # yes 2.58*** 1.67**
Medium # yes 2.46*** 1.63**
Low # yes 2.34*** 1.53**
High # no 1.39 1.18
Medium # no 0.98 0.93
Community single motherhood and household composition (Low # only females†)
Low # predominantly males with females 4.10*** 4.93***
High # predominantly males with females 2.99** 2.50**
High # predominantly females with males 2.96*** 2.49**
High # equal males and females 2.69** 2.42**
Medium # predominantly males with females 2.49** 2.39**
Medium # predominantly females with males 2.48** 2.29**
Medium # equal males and females 1.93 1.89**
Low # predominantly females with males 1.92* 2.12*
Low # equal males and females 1.22 1.65
High # only females 1.18 1.32
Medium # only females 1.14 1.12
Source GHS 2011–2013 (Stats SA 2012, 2013, 2014)
Statistical significance: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01

were attending primary school and not from a single mothered home). The mag-
nitude and strength of association were higher among adolescent females who lived
in poverty and with their single mothers, with poverty exerting a greater influence
than single motherhood. Finally, the interaction term of single motherhood and
household composition, again, showed a higher risk of adolescent pregnancy
among young females living with single mothers as well as with males (be it
predominantly so or not).
Table 13.7 displays interaction testing results for community levels of single
motherhood with education, household poverty and composition separately. Each
of these interactions remained significant in the unadjusted and adjusted multilevel
models. Specifically, the interaction of education with community levels of single
motherhood revealed that adolescent females that were not attending school had the
highest risk of adolescent pregnancy, but this was modified according to the level of
single motherhood within their communities. The association with adolescent
pregnancy was 14–21% greater for adolescent females that were not attending
school from communities with medium and high levels of single motherhood,
336 S. Mkwananzi

compared to those not attending school and living in communities with low levels
of single motherhood. A similar pattern of modification of association by com-
munity levels of single motherhood occurred for adolescent females attending
secondary and primary schooling.
Likewise, single motherhood at community level modified the association
between poverty and adolescent pregnancy as the association was greater in poverty
yet increased with the level of single motherhood. In the adjusted model, adolescent
females living in poverty and in communities having medium or high levels of
single motherhood had 6–8% higher likelihood of adolescent pregnancy than did
their counterparts, also living in poverty, but in communities with low levels of
single motherhood. All comparisons are with adolescent females not living in
poverty and from communities with low single motherhood levels. Although
similar patterns of modification seemed to occur for adolescent females not living in
poverty, these results were not statistically significant.
Finally, interaction consistently occurred in the unadjusted and adjusted models
for community levels of single motherhood and household composition. Levels of
single motherhood modified the relationship between sex composition and ado-
lescent pregnancy, with greater association shown for higher community levels of
single motherhood. However, adolescent females living in homes consisting pre-
dominantly of males with females also present, and in communities with low levels
of single motherhood, had almost 5 times (4.93) higher likelihood of becoming
pregnant. This finding needs further examination. Furthermore, the association
between household composition and adolescent pregnancy was attenuated as the
community level of single motherhood decreased. Greater likelihood of adolescent
pregnancy was seen for all participants living with males in their household as
compared to their counterparts only living with females.

13.5 Discussion

The modern day experience of adolescent females in South African society is a


distant cry from the desired ideal. High levels of household poverty and
sub-optimal family structures, as well as violence at the societal level, expose many
young females to dire consequences (Delius and Glaser 2002; Emmett 2003). These
are more likely to include difficult relationship dynamics that, in turn, may lead to a
higher incidence of coerced sex, unintended pregnancy, sexually transmitted dis-
eases and HIV (Dunkle et al. 2003; Jewkes et al. 2010; Wood et al. 1998). The
adolescent pregnancy rate in South Africa increased from 33 to 38 pregnancies per
1000 adolescent females over 2011–2013, despite numerous prevention campaigns
and legislation that has legalized termination of pregnancy as well as access to
contraceptives from the age of 12 (Department of Health 1996, 2012; Macleod and
Tracey 2010). It is imperative to raise awareness and to improve all aspects of
access to family planning services in order to help adolescents avoid unwanted
pregnancies.
13 The Association Between Household and Community Single … 337

Our results show that after controlling for background demographic and
socio-economic factors, a positive significant relationship with adolescent preg-
nancy remains for single motherhood both at the household- and community-levels.
These results confirm earlier findings from Southern Africa and elsewhere that
adolescent females living with a divorced or separated female have a higher risk of
non-marital childbearing. For example, Brahmbhatt et al. (2014) found that being
raised by a single parent increased the odds of pregnancy 18 times among teenage
females in Johannesburg, South Africa.
Previous literature has posited a number of pathways through which these
findings may occur. Firstly, the family enables socialisation of children and ado-
lescents including the transfer of values and norms such as those concerning par-
ental views concerning sex and contraception (Moore and Chase-Lansdale 2001;
Muindi 2007). Single parented family structure may elevate predisposition to
premarital birth due to early sexual socialisation (Lee 2001; Powers 2005). These
results may also be due to the risk posed through intergenerational adolescent
motherhood. Studies from many other parts of the world indicate that daughters of
adolescent mothers are significantly more likely than daughters of older women to
have an adolescent childbirth (Meade et al. 2008; Santos and Rosário 2011).
Another form of the socialisation theory states the importance of parental
presence in the development of children’s personality (McLanahan and Bumpass
1988). The 2011 South Africa census indicated that 95% of female adolescents
living in single parented households were not living with their fathers. Paternal
absence is the most common type of parental absence globally, but despite the
social expectation of mothers as primary care givers (McLanahan and Bumpass
1988), fathers can be just as important as mothers in the development and
well-being of children (Luo et al. 2012). For example, an earlier study in Cape
Town, South Africa, indicated that not living with one’s biological father almost
tripled (RR = 2.62) the risk of adolescent pregnancy (Vundule et al. 2001).
Research has found paternal absence to increase the risk of identity crisis, low
self-esteem, the dependence of daughters on men, early sexual debut and adolescent
pregnancy (Franklin 1988; Luo et al. 2012; McLanahan and Bumpass 1988).
Paternal presence assists in cognitive development, nullifies the need for com-
pensatory masculine attention and ensures strict relationship rules for daughters
with the opposite sex. Validation of the girl child from the male parent has a lasting
impression on her personal value and raises confidence levels. Paternal absence also
affects the reassurance of identity.
It is important to understand the systematic creation of the phenomenon of
children growing up without their fathers because of South Africa’s past.
Programmes need to be set up for such children by non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) or other stakeholders to ensure father figures are present in such children’s
lives and, if absent, children should be paired up with suitable “substitute” father
figures. Screening is necessary to mitigate against the possibility of sexual or
physical abuse and other problems. The “substitute” father’s main function would
be to act as a form of support, love, validation and encouragement for the child.
This could be facilitated with the aid of relatives. Programmes could also
338 S. Mkwananzi

incorporate organisation of activities and meetings with these “substitute” father


figures and their “adopted” children periodically, beyond encouraging private
supportive relationships. Measures to reduce adolescent pregnancy among females
growing up with single mothers could include the provision of some forms of
special assistance for single mothers. For example, to help them navigate the
journey of cautiously finding love again, in the presence of children, this could
include special needs that some single mothers may not be fully aware of, such as
counselling on introducing children to potential mates only once they are sure of the
direction of a relationship.
This study has further highlighted the mediating effect of single motherhood on
the association between adolescent pregnancy and individual, household, and
community factors. Findings indicate the strong interaction between both household
and community levels of single motherhood with education, poverty and sex
composition. This includes the additive effects of single motherhood and nonat-
tendance of schooling on the risk of adolescent pregnancy, although the
cross-sectional nature of the data precludes determination of the direction of these
effects.3 The higher risk of pregnancy for adolescent females completing secondary
education as compared to primary school attendees is a function of the correlation
of educational level with age in the data. As shown in the results, 15–19 year-olds
had 23 times higher levels of pregnancy than the younger girls who would still be
attending primary school. Age and educational level variables were significantly
correlated (0.86).
The risk of adolescent pregnancy also appears to be highest in the presence of
single motherhood and poverty. Cross-tabulation of poverty and single motherhood
found that 75% of single mother-headed households were poor and that commu-
nities with medium or high levels of poverty comprised 66% of single-motherhood
headed households, which were significant results according to the chi-squared test.
This predisposition of single female-headed households to poverty could be rooted
in three intrinsic characteristics of such households, as suggested by Buvinić and
Gupta (1997). Firstly, these households may experience greater economic burdens
than do their male-headed counterparts, because they often have more dependents.
Secondly, the female headship of the household introduces economic vulnerability
because women generally have lower wages, fewer resources, lower assets and
worse employment opportunities. Finally, there exists an unfavourable combined
effect of household characteristics and female headship, which leads to such
females working fewer hours in lower-skilled employment to ensure their avail-
ability to perform household chores and domestic care-giving duties (Buvinić and
Gupta 1997). It has been shown for South Africa that “when young children grow
up in residential areas where poverty is entrenched, they are at risk of experiencing
an early pregnancy” (Panday et al. 2009). A participant in another study suggested
that: “Insufficient spaces in the family where parents are sharing a room or a shack
with their children tend to expose children to sexual activities” (Makola 2011).

3
Also, some cases may have dropped out due to pregnancy in the past year.
13 The Association Between Household and Community Single … 339

This problem may be cyclic in nature as adolescents in such homes may choose to
escape the hardship through transactional sex, premarital childbearing, leaving
home or cohabitating with the father of their child (McLanahan and Bumpass
1988). Consequently, single female-headed households need to be supported,
socially and financially, in order to help mitigate poverty as well as unwanted
pregnancy among the home’s female dependents. Initiatives led by NGOs or
community leaders could also assist such households in becoming better accepted
and integrated in society.
The interaction of single motherhood with sex composition is that which is least
understood. Female adolescents from households having females only were shown
to have the least likelihood of pregnancy, which was highest for households with
men and increased with the proportion of men. The relationship of these males to
the adolescent females in question is unclear and needs further investigation,
including by well-executed, qualitative, research. In addition, this study used
cross-sectional data, and cannot establish causation, with pregnancy in the pre-
ceding year used as the outcome to ensure a short time lapse between the outcome
and tested variables. Future studies investigating similar phenomena would benefit
greatly from using a longitudinal and mixed methods approach to establish the
correct sequence of events and understand the links of these issues in the local
setting of South Africa.

13.6 Conclusion

This study has shown the complex association and mediating effects of single
motherhood on adolescent pregnancy in South Africa. The apartheid regime sys-
tematically disrupted the fundamental structure of families, particularly those of
black Africans, by effectively manufacturing the phenomenon of single female
headedness and normalizing paternal absence nationally. Women gradually became
accustomed to raising and fending for offspring alone. The responsibility of raising
a child is already immense for two loving parents even with the assistance of their
families and relatives. Much greater strain can only be expected when a single
mother, heading a household, has to shoulder this responsibility by herself. Early
pregnancy prevention programmes and awareness campaigns for females growing
up in homes and environments with greater levels of single motherhood need to be
strengthened as a matter of urgency to assist in ensuring the sexual and reproductive
health of young females in South Africa.
340 S. Mkwananzi

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Medical Journal, 91(1), 73–80.
Weeks, J. (2011). Population: An introduction to concepts and issues (11th ed.). Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth Cengage Learning.
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knowledge and access to sexual & reproductive health services. Cape Town: Partners in Sexual
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adolescent sexual health agendas. Social Science and Medicine, 47(2), 233–242. https://doi.
org/10.1016/s0277-9536(98)00057-4.
Chapter 14
Tobacco Use Among Men
in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Does Family Structure Matter?

Lorretta Favour C. Ntoimo, Clifford O. Odimegwu


and Christiana A. Alex-Ojei

Abstract Over six million people die annually from tobacco use, with this total
expected to exceed eight million by 2030. Most of these deaths are accounted for
by men in less developed countries. However, factors associated with this harmful
behaviour have received minimal scholarly attention in sub-Saharan Africa. Using
four countries in sub-Saharan Africa with a varied prevalence of tobacco use, this
study examines the role of family characteristics in predicting tobacco use by men
in union. Data were obtained from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in
Nigeria, Ethiopia, Gabon and Namibia. Descriptive results show that the highest
prevalence of tobacco use was in Namibia, where close to 29% of the respondents
used tobacco, whereas the least prevalence was in Nigeria (10.4%). There was a
trend of declining prevalence of tobacco use among men in union in all the
countries except in Gabon where there was no data to examine the trend.
Controlling the effect of potential confounding variables in a logit model, family
characteristics such as type of union, co-residence with wife, number of unions,
duration of union, marital status and household wealth index were significantly
associated with tobacco use. The findings are useful for gender-specific cam-
paigns and family-focused programmes to reduce tobacco use among men in the
region.

Keywords Tobacco use  Union  Men  Family characteristics


Sub-Saharan Africa

L. F. C. Ntoimo (&)  C. A. Alex-Ojei


Department of Demography and Social Statistics, Federal University, Oye-Ekiti, Nigeria
e-mail: ntoimof@yahoo.com
C. O. Odimegwu  C. A. Alex-Ojei
Schools of Social Sciences and Public Health, University of the Witwatersrand,
Johannesburg, South Africa

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 343


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0_14
344 L. F. C. Ntoimo et al.

14.1 Introduction

The global tobacco epidemic causes over seven million deaths annually, at least six
million of which result from direct tobacco use and with perhaps one million
non-smokers dying from exposure to second-hand smoke (WHO 2017). Use of
tobacco, and exposure to second-hand and environmental tobacco smoke, is
associated with multiple adverse health conditions and chronic diseases including
cardiovascular, lung and respiratory diseases; various cancers; low birth weight, as
well as sudden deaths (WHO 2017, 2015a). Many initiatives have been launched to
help design national and global collective action to fight this epidemic, including
the World Health Organization’s (WHO) Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control (FCTC), which entered into force in 2005. However, the prevalence of
tobacco use continues to be high in many countries and is still increasing in parts of
Africa and Asia (WHO 2016; Lee and Eckhardt 2017). Of the one billion smokers
in 2015, about 80% live in low and middle-income countries.
Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa are in the early stages of the tobacco
epidemic and have yet to make a substantial effort to control tobacco use and
protect people from tobacco smoke (WHO 2015b). Indeed, the number of smokers
in the region continues to increase. For instance, the estimated number of tobacco
smokers aged 15 and over in Nigeria more than doubled from 4,604,000 in 2000 to
9,503,400 in 2015, with the numbers also rising in Ethiopia (from about 1.5 million
in 2000 to 2.5 million in 2015) and in Namibia (from 226,900 in 2000 to 357,500 in
2015) (WHO 2015a). The number of smokers in these and other countries in the
region is expected to continue to rise if more effort is not put into implementing
tobacco control measures.
Prevalence of tobacco use varies by gender, with more men than women
smoking in many countries (Brathwaite et al. 2015; Eriksen et al. 2015; Pampel
2008; Subramanian et al. 2004; WHO 2011). Out of 1.1 billion tobacco smokers in
2015, 945 million were male (WHO 2016). According to a WHO report on gender,
health, tobacco and equity, being born male is the greatest predictor of tobacco use
in the developing countries (WHO 2011). For instance, in 2015, an estimated
17.4% of men and only 1% of women smoked tobacco in Nigeria, and in Namibia,
37% of men and 10% of women were tobacco smokers (WHO 2015a). In almost all
countries, women live longer than men due in large part to men’s higher propensity
to engage in risky behaviour, such as tobacco use (Williams 2003). Overall,
tobacco-related deaths are expected to exceed eight million by 2030 if current
trends continue (WHO 2011).
The premature death of a married man has grave consequences for women and
children. Although the death or disability of a mother exposes children to the lack
of maternal care and other difficulties, loss of a father is often more tragic, par-
ticularly in countries where most men earn more income than their wives and play
the breadwinner role. In many sub-Saharan African countries, most employed
women work in the informal low-wage sector (UNDP 2015; World Bank 2014). In
such situations, children go through severe difficulty growing up without a father.
14 Tobacco Use Among Men in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Family … 345

The welfare of women and children is worse if inheritance rights after death are
given to a man’s male sibling instead of his wife as in some patrilineal African
societies (Van de Walle 2011; Young 2006). Ill health, disability and death due to
tobacco use increase the financial burden of the provision of care on governments.
They reduce the productivity of the labour force due to absenteeism during illness
and premature death and thus impinge on the overall economy of a nation. At the
individual and household levels, the money spent on tobacco could have been used
for basic necessities, thus increasing the risk of individual and household poverty,
especially in low-resource countries (WHO 2013). Also, many men smoke in their
homes, thus exposing co-resident family members to second-hand smoke, and the
WHO reports that there are over 4000 chemicals in tobacco smoke, of which at least
250 are harmful and over 50 are known to cause cancer (WHO 2017). Pregnant
wives of smokers and their foetuses face the risk of adverse health when the man
smokes at home (WHO 2013).

14.2 Family and Health-Related Behaviour

A family is usually described as two or more persons related by blood, union, or


adoption and who reside in the same household. Marriage and cohabitation can
enhance health and health-related behaviour (Kiecolt-Glaser and Newton 2001;
McDonough and Walters 2001; Musick and Bumpass 2012; Ross et al. 1990; Waite
1995). Irrespective of a selection effect, the health benefits of marriage operate
through mechanisms, such as institutionalisation, social roles, social support,
commitment, and pooling of marital resource (Musick and Bumpass 2012;
Pudrovska et al. 2006; Waite 1995). Marriage is structured in a way that specifies
rights and responsibilities in the union and appropriate behaviour. Thus, individuals
may benefit from a spouse who monitors these rights, responsibilities and expected
behaviour, such as those associated with health and coping with stressful conditions
(Waite 1995). However, individuals may not adhere to the specified rights,
responsibilities and expected behaviour. The increased strain this may cause in the
union may in turn lead to a growing susceptibility to poor health-related behaviour.
On the other hand, spouses provide social support through intimacy, companion-
ship, daily interactions and connections to friends of the couple, kin, and com-
munity. Further, marriage enhances economic well-being as couples pool financial
resources and, although a private relationship, marriage is often entered into pub-
licly, which facilitates commitment to the union. However, studies also show that
marriage is more protective of men’s health than women’s (Ross et al. 1990; Waite
1995). Men without wives may be more likely to suffer emotional distress, such as
insecurity and uncertainty which may be expressed through deviant or pathological
behaviours (Giddens 1992).
Certain family characteristics can also be a source of stress and disadvantage for
its members. For instance, women in a polygynous union are exposed to more
adverse health disadvantages such as less life satisfaction, increased risk of
346 L. F. C. Ntoimo et al.

exposure to sexually transmitted infections, and have lower access to paid health
care (Bove and Valeggia 2009; Bove et al. 2014). Polygynous unions are also
known to be fraught with co-wives’ tension and suspicions (Aina 1998; Bove et al.
2014; Izugbara and Ezeh 2010), a situation that may engender risky health beha-
viour, such as tobacco use as a coping strategy.
Second-hand smoke exposure in homes is a risk factor for respiratory diseases for
children, adverse pregnancy outcomes such as preterm and low-birth-weight infants,
postmenopausal breast cancer, as well as lung cancer (DiFranza et al. 2012; Hirayama
2000; WHO 2011). Globally, more women (64%) than men die as a result of
second-hand smoke (WHO 2011). A study conducted in four English-speaking
countries found household factors such as having a young child and other
non-smoking adults in a home to be the main predictors of smokers reporting a
smoke-free home (Borland et al. 2006). However, most studies that relate family to
tobacco use have focused mainly on adolescents. On the other hand, the role of family
characteristics (such as the number of wives, duration of union, and the presence of
children) in discouraging or exacerbating tobacco use by men has not received ade-
quate scholarly attention in sub-Saharan Africa.

14.3 Men and Risky Health-Related Behaviour

A large body of empirical evidence shows that more women than men engage in
health-promoting behaviours (McDonough and Walters 2001; Williams 2003).
Men’s higher likelihood to engage in risky health behaviour has been explained
from diverse perspectives, such as male socialisation and sex role (Harrison 1978;
Verbrugge 1985), differential exposure to critical life events and stress
(McDonough and Walters 2001; Williams 2003), social and cultural construction of
masculinity (Courtenay 2000; Odimegwu and Okemgbo 2008). Tobacco use may
be considered a mark of masculinity in many African societies where being male is
defined in terms of risk-taking and strength (Odimegwu and Okemgbo 2008).
Lower socioeconomic status, unemployment, underemployment, loss of employ-
ment, and economic marginalisation have been associated with increased stress and
may lead to alcoholism and depression (Courtenay 2000; UNDP 2015; Williams
2003), behaviours that are associated with tobacco use. In sub-Saharan Africa, these
adverse situations are more likely to be experienced by men because they are more
likely to be employed in the formal sector than women in the region (Chant and
Pedwell 2008). Furthermore, they are traditionally viewed as household heads and
providers for women and children. Married men who experience loss of employ-
ment, underemployment or unemployment may be more prone to adverse health
behaviour if they cannot fulfill their traditional roles as breadwinners. Tobacco use
tends to be associated with low socioeconomic status in many countries (Eriksen
et al. 2015; Pampel 2008; Subramanian et al. 2004; WHO 2011). However, Blakely
et al. (2005) found no association between income poverty and tobacco use in
African countries where there is high child and adult mortality.
14 Tobacco Use Among Men in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Family … 347

Tobacco smoking and chewing by men is associated with other socioeconomic


and demographic characteristics, such as social class, religion, age, place of resi-
dence and marital status (Pampel 2008; Subramanian et al. 2004). Evidence from 14
sub-Saharan African countries reveals that cigarette smoking for men peaks at about
40 years of age and then declines. In addition, it was found to be more common in
urban centres, among agricultural workers and rural residents, and those in manual
and service occupations. Conversely, tobacco use was less prevalent among those
without jobs and among Protestants compared to other major religious groups
(Pampel 2008).

14.4 The Current Study

Several individual-level and macro factors such as level of education, age, place of
residence, occupation and implementation of tobacco control policies have been
associated with tobacco use by males in sub-Saharan Africa (Brathwaite et al. 2015;
Pampel 2008; Townsend et al. 2006). However, negligible scholarly attention has
been paid to family structure as a predictor of tobacco use by men. Although the
traditional structure and function of the family are changing, the family, which is a
basic social and economic unit of the society, remains influential in shaping human
behaviour through socialisation and stabilization of the adult personality. Several
empirical studies relate family characteristics to diverse demographic and
health-related behaviours. For instance, compared to being single, marital union and
cohabitation have been shown to enhance health and health-related behaviour
(Musick and Bumpass 2012; Ross et al. 1990; Waite 1995).The family can also be a
source of stress that may lead to tobacco use if a man is raising children alone, lost a
partner due to death or voluntary dissolution, or if he is unemployed (McDonough
and Walters 2001; Williams 2003). Therefore, we hypothesize that family char-
acteristics will be significantly associated with tobacco use among men in
sub-Saharan Africa.
This paper examines the prevalence of tobacco use by men in union aged 18 and
over and the role of family structure in predicting tobacco use in countries pur-
posively selected from each of the four sub-regions in sub-Saharan Africa to rep-
resent moderately high and low levels of tobacco use and human development. The
four countries are Nigeria (Western Africa), Gabon (Middle Africa), Ethiopia
(Eastern Africa) and Namibia (Southern Africa). Tobacco use by men aged
15 years and over in 2015 was moderately high in Namibia (37%) and Gabon
(22.3%), and low in Nigeria (17.4%) and Ethiopia (8.1%) (WHO 2015a). Gabon
and Namibia are classified as having medium values on the human development
index, whereas Nigeria and Ethiopia are ranked as low human development index
(UNDP 2015). Nigeria has both the largest population and economy in sub-Saharan
Africa, although both Namibia and Gabon have higher Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) per capita (Table 14.1). Gabon and Namibia have much smaller populations
(1.7 million and 2.4 million, respectively) than Nigeria and Ethiopia (estimated, in
348 L. F. C. Ntoimo et al.

Table 14.1 Major demographic and economic characteristics for Nigeria, Ethiopia, Gabon and
Namibia, 2015
Country Population % GNP per Life GDP (US$ Unemployment
(in millions) Urban capita PPP expectancy in billions) (%)
(US$) at birth
Nigeria 182.2 48 5810 54.5 486.7 23
Ethiopia 99.3 20 1620 64.1 61.5 4.5
Gabon 1.7 87 18,880 66.0 14.2 20.4
Namibia 2.4 47 10,880 65.8 11.4 29.6
Source WHO (2016), Population Reference Bureau (2016), World Bank (2017), and UNDP (2015)
Note Life expectancy is the combined value for both sexes

2015, at 182.2 million and 99.3 million respectively). Ethiopia has the lowest GDP
p. c., although it has enjoyed considerable social and economic progress since the
turn of the century. Official unemployment rates are high in Nigeria, Gabon and
Namibia, but lower in Ethiopia.
The four countries are at different levels of implementation of tobacco control
measures, including WHO’s FCTC. For instance, all public places in Namibia are
completely smoke-free, but in Gabon, Ethiopia and Nigeria between 2–5% of
public places are completely smoke-free (WHO 2015b). Study findings may assist
efforts to reduce the prevalence of tobacco use, as called for repeatedly by health
authorities and as now also included in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 3
which includes tobacco control as an indicator (WHO 2016). Reduction in the
prevalence of tobacco use is associated with benefits such as reduction in morbidity
and mortality and an increase in life expectancy. For example, a recent Australian
study indicated that a 10% reduction in the prevalence of tobacco smoking results in
gains of average life expectancy of about 0.1–0.4 years for all men and 0.1–
0.3 years for all women (Mannan et al. 2016). Distinguishing men who use tobacco
by their family characteristics in sub-Saharan Africa could assist development of
gender-specific and family-focused interventions for tobacco control, and thereby
reduce premature death in a region that is challenged further by multiple other
health threats.

14.5 Data and Methods

Data for this study were obtained from Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for
Nigeria (2003, 2008 and 2013), Ethiopia (2005 and 2011), Gabon (2012) and
Namibia (2000, 2006–7 and 2013) (ICF 2003–2013). The DHS collects data on a
nationally representative sample of women and men in their reproductive ages,
selected through a multi-stage cluster design. This study was limited to men aged
18 and over who were in a union (married and living together). The upper age limits
of the samples were 49 years for Nigeria and Ethiopia, 59 for Gabon and 64 in
Namibia. The age range for men in the DHS varies from 15 to different upper limits
14 Tobacco Use Among Men in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Family … 349

across countries; it was retained in this study in order not to further reduce the
sample size in Namibia and Gabon. The weighted sample of men aged 18 years and
over who were in union was 1244 in 2003, 8610 in 2008; and 8718 in 2013 in
Nigeria; Ethiopia, 3420 in 2005 and 8076 in 2011; Namibia, 1041 in 2000, 1204 in
2006–7, and 1525 in 2013; and for Gabon, 2890 in 2012. Although Ethiopia and
Gabon fielded three and two DHS survey rounds, respectively, neither collected any
data on tobacco use in their 2000 surveys.
The outcome, tobacco use, categorised as a dichotomous variable, included
smoking cigarettes, pipe, chewing tobacco, using snuff, and any other way that
respondents reported smoking. The independent variables of primary interest
included a number of characteristics of family structure, including whether the
union was monogamous or polygynous (although this variable was not used in
Namibia because of the small number of men in polygynous unions); co-residence
with wife/partner (residing with wife or wife staying elsewhere); number of unions;
age at first union; duration of union; number of living children (none, 1–4 and 5+);
marital status (married or living together); household wealth index, and number of
extramarital sexual partners. (The number of sex partners excluding wife in the past
twelve months before the survey could arguably be considered a proxy for de facto
polygyny.) Studies in sub-Saharan Africa show that extramarital sex is common
among men (Isiugo-Abanihe 1994; Smith 2007; Kwena et al. 2017), sometimes as a
form of marital relationship which has been described as an ‘outside wife’ (Karanja
1987). We also considered how likely a man in a union is to smoke when his
partner is pregnant. Drawing from characteristics associated with tobacco use in
past studies, the following socioeconomic and demographic variables were added as
control variables: age, place of residence, the highest level of education, occupa-
tion, and religion. Age was dropped in the analysis because it was highly collinear
with duration of union.
Individual weights were used for descriptive statistics using Stata 12 for
Windows. Percentages were used to describe the profile of the study population and
trend in prevalence of tobacco use. Binary logistic regression analysis was used to
estimate the odds of tobacco use by men in union, taking into consideration the
hierarchical nature of the DHS data by using the svy command in Stata. The
multivariate analysis was based on the most recent DHS in each country. Results of
the regression were presented as odds ratio with their 95% confidence intervals.

14.6 Results

14.6.1 Description of the Study Population

The profile of the study population by selected background and family character-
istics is presented in Table 14.2. Most respondents in Nigeria and Ethiopia resided
in rural areas, but in Gabon and Namibia the majority lived in urban places.
One-third of Nigerian respondents had attained secondary education, but in
350 L. F. C. Ntoimo et al.

Table 14.2 Selected family and background characteristics of the study population by country
Variable Nigeria Ethiopia Gabon Namibia
n = 8718 n = 8076 n = 2890 n = 1525
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Type of union
Monogamy 83.17 94.51 91.77 97.23
Polygyny 16.83 5.49 8.23 2.77
Co-residence with wife/partner
Living with him 93.95 96.32 76.34 85.04
Staying elsewhere 6.05 3.68 23.66 14.96
Number of unions
1 73.38 70.04 59.74 87.84
2+ 26.62 29.96 40.26 12.16
Age at first union
15–25 55.72 78.97 53.74 42.78
26–49 44.28 21.03 46.26 57.22
Duration of union
0–4 26.60 17.97 24.46 26.29
5–9 22.85 19.12 20.90 19.97
10–14 21.60 16.51 18.28 17.55
15–19 14.51 15.77 11.94 12.45
20–24 9.27 11.23 9.50 10.30
25–29 4.34 8.90 7.22 5.43
30+ 0.83 10.50 7.70 8.01
Number of living children
0 10.24 9.17 8.36 9.34
1–4 59.51 54.65 59.91 69.04
5+ 30.25 36.18 31.73 21.62
Extramarital sexual partner
None 93.69 99.22 61.71 89.70
1+ 6.31 0.78 38.29 10.30
Household wealth index
Poorest 20.57 19.19 14.90 14.54
Poorer 19.85 20.41 19.71 16.51
Middle 17.26 20.70 22.77 19.54
Richer 19.46 19.77 23.42 24.13
Richest 22.85 19.93 19.20 25.28
Wife pregnant
Not pregnant 79.48 85.92 – –
Not pregnant/unsure – – 88.23 89.13
Pregnant 19.09 11.75 11.77 10.87
Unsure 2.43 2.33 – –
(continued)
14 Tobacco Use Among Men in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Family … 351

Table 14.2 (continued)


Variable Nigeria Ethiopia Gabon Namibia
n = 8718 n = 8076 n = 2890 n = 1525
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Marital status
Married 97.69 96.31 49.21 58.76
Living together 2.31 3.69 50.79 41.24
Place of residence
Urban 37.87 17.76 85.48 60.69
Rural 62.13 82.24 14.52 39.31
Occupation
Not working 1.01 0.75 8.11 20.70
White collar 13.47 5.20 17.34 17.65
Sales/services 24.05 8.50 49.80 21.73
Agriculture 35.91 77.52 6.11 9.03
Manual/others 25.56 8.03 18.64 30.89
Education
No education 29.74 45.50 9.33 12.08
Primary 21.25 44.26 14.85 25.39
Secondary 33.95 5.14 57.03 49.81
Higher 15.06 5.10 18.79 12.72
Religion
Catholic 9.72 – 42.14 25.18
Orthodox/Catholic – 47.24 – –
Protestant/other Christian 31.60 19.40 28.18 55.84
Muslim 57.28 30.50 19.59 –
Traditional/no religion/other 1.40 2.86 10.09 18.98
Source 2013 Nigeria DHS, 2011 Ethiopia DHS, 2012 Gabon DHS, and 2013 Namibia DHS

Ethiopia most respondents had received no higher than primary education, if any.
Most respondents in Gabon (57%) and close to half in Namibia had secondary
education. All four countries differed by majority religious group, with Catholics
constituting the majority in Gabon, other Christians (predominantly the Evangelical
Lutherans) in Namibia, Orthodox Christians and Catholics in Ethiopia, and
Muslims in Nigeria. Unemployed respondents were least in Ethiopia and Nigeria,
whereas Namibia had the highest. In all countries, the majority of men worked in
the informal sectors of sales, services, agriculture.
With regard to family characteristics, most respondents were in a monogamous
union, but polygyny was more prevalent in Nigeria than elsewhere. The majority
resided with their spouses, but in Gabon nearly one in four men (24%) had partners
who resided elsewhere. In all four countries, most men were in their first union, but
the prevalence of second and higher order unions was relatively high in Gabon
(40%) and lower (12%) in Namibia. Except in Namibia, most men had married
352 L. F. C. Ntoimo et al.

before they had reached 26 years of age and in all four countries, most men
reported having had 1–4 living children. Extramarital sexual relationships were
relatively common in Gabon where over 38% of men reported having had sexual
partners other than their wives within the twelve months preceding the survey.

14.6.2 Trend in Prevalence of Tobacco Use Among


the Study Population

As shown in Fig. 14.1, the highest prevalence of tobacco use in the latest DHS
(round 2011–2013) was reported for Namibia (28.6%) and the lowest in Nigeria
(10.4%). There was insufficient data to indicate time trends accurately for Gabon. In
Ethiopia, on the other hand, the prevalence of tobacco use by men in union declined
substantially, by 34.7%, over 2005–2011 and in Namibia, it declined from 40.8% in
2000 to 28.6% in 2013. In Nigeria, the prevalence reportedly increased by 19.2%
between 2003 and 2008 but then declined by 33.3% over 2008–2013. The decline
in Namibia was more pronounced (25%) between 2000 and 2006–2007 and then
declined by only 6.5% between 2007 and 2015.

14.6.3 Family Structure and Tobacco Use

The logistic regression analysis of family structure variables on tobacco use shows
that after controlling for the effects of potential confounding variables, several
family structure variables were significantly associated with tobacco use by men in
union (Table 14.3). In Nigeria and Gabon, polygynous men were significantly less
likely than their monogamous counterparts to be using tobacco. Men who did not

Round 3(2000-2003) Round 2 (2005-2008) Round 1 (2011-2013)


40,8

30,6
28,6
22,9

15,6 17
12,6
10,4 11,1

Nigeria Ethiopia Gabon Namibia

Fig. 14.1 Trend in prevalence of tobacco use by men in union


14 Tobacco Use Among Men in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Family … 353

reside with their spouses were 32 and 61% more likely to be using tobacco in
Ethiopia and in Gabon, respectively, but the significance in Gabon was marginal
(p < 0.10). Compared to respondents in their first union, Nigerian men in second
and higher order union were 53% more likely (OR 1.53, 95% CI = 1.19–1.96) to
use tobacco. Marital duration mattered in the likelihood of using tobacco in Nigeria,
Ethiopia, and Namibia, although the direction of association varied. Tobacco use in
Nigeria and Ethiopia was more likely in durations longer than 0–4 years. The
longer men are in union in Ethiopia and Nigeria, the more likely that they are
tobacco smokers, but in Namibia, the odds of using tobacco were lower for those
whose unions had lasted 10–14 years (OR 0.75, p < 0.05). Extramarital sexual
relationships was a significant predictor in Nigeria only, where men who had a
sexual partner other than their spouse were twice as likely as those who had none to
be using tobacco (OR 2.08, p < 0.001).
Respondents in Ethiopia and Namibia who lived together with a partner without
a formal marriage were also more likely to be tobacco users. In Ethiopia, the
significance was marginal, but in Namibia, they were 63% more likely to be
tobacco users than were married men (p < 0.01). In Nigeria, men in the richest
households were 50% less likely to use tobacco (OR 0.50, 95% CI = 0.31–0.80)
than those in the poorest wealth quintile. Tobacco use was inversely associated with
higher household wealth in Ethiopia and Gabon, but the difference between the
poorest and other groups was not statistically significant in Namibia. Respondents
in the richest quintile were 63% less likely than the poorest category to be using
tobacco in Ethiopia, and 65% less likely to do so in Gabon.
Place of residence was a significant predictor only in Nigeria, where rural
respondents were less likely to use tobacco than those in urban areas (OR 0.72,
p < 0.05). In Gabon, respondents in sales and services occupation had lower odds
of tobacco use than those who did not work (OR 0.59, p < 0.05), and in Namibia,
men with agricultural occupations were 61% more likely to be using tobacco than
those who were not working, but the significance was marginal (p < 0.10). The
highest level of education was a significant predictor in Nigeria and Namibia.
The likelihood of using tobacco was 36% higher for men who attained primary
education than for respondents with no education in Nigeria (OR 1.36, 95%
CI = 1.03–1.80). In Namibia, the likelihood of tobacco use was 68% lower for men
with higher education than for their uneducated counterparts. In Nigeria, the odds of
using tobacco were significantly lower for other Christians and Muslims than for
Catholics, but they were higher for those who said they practiced traditional, other
religions or none (OR 2.65, 95% CI = 1.50–4.67). In Ethiopia, however, Muslims,
adherents of non-Christian religions, and those who expressed no religion were
significantly more likely to be using tobacco than were Orthodox and Catholic men.
In Namibia, which has virtually no Muslims, respondents who were affiliated with
other Christian denominations were marginally less likely than Catholics to be
using tobacco.
354 L. F. C. Ntoimo et al.

Table 14.3 Logistic Regression model predicting tobacco use among men in union by selected
countries
Variable Nigeria Ethiopia Gabon Namibia
OR/(95% CI) OR/(95% CI) OR/(95% CI) OR/(95% CI)
Type of union
Monogamy (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 Not used
Polygyny 0.67 (0.49–0.91)* 1.29 (0.84–2.13) 0.40 (0.25–0.66)
***
Co-residence with wife/partner
Living with him (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Staying elsewhere 1.23 (0.91–1.66) 1.68 (1.01–2.81)* 1.39 (0.99–1.94)† 0.80 (0.50–1.26)
Number of unions
1 (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2+ 1.53 (1.19–1.96)** 0.86 (0.65–1.3) 1.31 (0.91–1.88) 2.09 (1.31–3.35)
**
Age at first union
15–25 (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
26–49 1.03 (0.85–1.25) – – –
26–54 – 1.12 (0.87–1.46) 1.09 (0.80–1.45) –
26–60 – – – 0.74 (0.53–1.04)
Duration of union
0–4 (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
5–9 1.29 (0.98–1.70)† 1.70 (1.10–2.65)* 1.05 (0.68–1.62) 0.84 (0.56–1.28)
10–14 1.46 (1.09–1.95)* 2.38 (1.48–3.81) 1.00 (0.63–1.58) 0.75 (0.48–1.18)*
***
15–19 1.32 (0.94–1.85) 2.45 (1.46–4.11)** 1.14 (0.68–1.89) 0.95 (0.53–1.71)
20–24 1.74 (1.00–2.17)* 3.41 (2.05–5.68)** 1.22 (0.71–2.09) 0.93 (0.46–1.87)
25–29 1.25 (0.76–2.05) 3.94 (2.20–7.05) 0.84 (−0.47–1.50) 1.62 (0.64–4.14)
***
30+ 2.40 (1.12–5.15)* 3.96 (2.26–6.94) 0.73 (0.38–1.38) 0.25 (0.02–2.85)
***
Number of living children
0 (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1–4 1.24 (0.89–1.75) 0.78 (0.43–1.40) 1.20 (0.69–2.09) 1.02 (0.62–1.67)
5+ 1.31 (0.87–1.98) 0.77 (0.41–1.45) 0.75 (0.41–1.38) 0.88 (0.47–1.64)
Extramarital sexual partner
None (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1+ 2.08 (1.55–2.80) 1.097 (0.3–3.25) 0.94 (0.67–1.30) 0.99 (0.60–1.61)
***
Wife pregnant
Not pregnant (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00
Not pregnant/unsure (RC) – – 1.00 1.00
Pregnant 1.09 (0.86–1.39) 0.67 (0.63–1.22) 1.25 (0.85–1.84) 1.06 (0.65–1.73)
Unsure 0.89 (0.38–2.06) 1.13 (0.52–2.44) – –
Marital status
Married (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Living together 0.80 (0.48–1.33) 1.61 (0.96–2.70)† 1.42 (0.85–2.37) 1.63 (1.14–2.35)
**
(continued)
14 Tobacco Use Among Men in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Family … 355

Table 14.3 (continued)


Variable Nigeria Ethiopia Gabon Namibia
OR/(95% CI) OR/(95% CI) OR/(95% CI) OR/(95% CI)
Household wealth
Poorest (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Poorer 1.10 (0.81–1.48) 0.75 (0.53–1.06) 0.67 (0.47–0.97)* 0.84 (0.51–1.38)
Middle 0.92 (0.66–1.27) 0.53 (0.37–0.76)** 0.41 (0.25–0.66) 0.73 (0.43–1.24)
***
Richer 0.76 (0.51–1.14) 0.58 (0.39–0.86)** 0.44 (0.27–0.71)** 1.09 (0.62–1.90)
Richest 0.50 (0.31–0.80)** 0.37 (0.16–0.85)* 0.35 (0.17–0.69)** 1.05 (0.53–2.08)
Place of residence
Urban (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Rural 0.72 (0.54–0.95)* 0.56 (0.28–1.11) 1.08 (0.82–1.41) 0.90 (0.60–1.34)
Occupation
Not working (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
White collar 0.96 (0.35–2.60) 1.07 (0.44–2.61) 0.65 (0.34–1.22) 1.01 (0.55–1.84)
Sales and services 1.22 (0.45–3.32) 1.09 (0.45–2.63) 0.59 (0.37–0.93)* 0.74 (0.47–1.16)
Agriculture 1.66 (0.62–4.43) 0.97 (0.45–2.12) 0.93 (0.56–1.53) 1.61 (0.95–2.74)†
Manual/others 1.72 (0.64–4.60) 1.62 (0.66–3.93) 0.69 (0.39–1.21) 0.83 (0.51–1.34)
Highest education
No education (RC) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Primary 1.36 (1.03–1.80)* 1.10 (0.83–1.46) 1.24 (0.72–2.13) 0.90 (0.56–1.44)
Secondary 1.20 (0.87–1.65) 1.11 (0.67–1.63) 1.16 (0.62–2.14) 1.10 (0.70–1.71)
Higher 0.72 (0.46–1.11) 0.63 (0.29–1.34) 0.43 (0.15–1.21) 0.32 (0.13–0.75)
**
Religion
Catholic (RC) 1.00 – 1.00 1.00
Orthodox/catholic (RC) – 1.00 – –
Other Christian 0.54 (0.40–0.74) 1.18 (0.72–1.94) 0.62 (0.46–0.85)** 0.74 (0.52–1.04)†
***
Muslim 0.18 (0.13–0.26) 5.48 (3.89–7.90) 0.63 (0.31–1.27) –
*** ***
Traditional/no religion/ 2.65 (1.50–4.67)** 5.47 (2.99–10.0) 0.94 (0.67–1.30) 1.00 (0.64–157)
others ***
Note ***p < 0.001 **p < 0.01 *p < 0.05 †p < 0.10 (marginal significance level); CI: Confidence Interval; RC—
Reference category

14.7 Discussion

Using four countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Gabon and Namibia)
with varied prevalence rates of tobacco use, this study examined the profile of
tobacco smokers, trends in use prevalence, and the association between family
characteristics and the likelihood of tobacco use among men in union. The higher
prevalence of tobacco use by men in union in Namibia and Gabon may be asso-
ciated with differentials in critical life events and stress such as unemployment
(McDonough and Walters 2001; Williams 2003), which was higher in these
356 L. F. C. Ntoimo et al.

countries than in Nigeria and Ethiopia. Additional studies are needed using other
sources of data to explore differentials in socialisation, sex roles, exposure to life
events and stress, social and cultural construction of masculinity, so as to further
understand the variation in tobacco use by men in union in these and other African
countries.
In general, the prevalence of tobacco use by men aged 18 years and over who
were in union declined in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Nigeria over the study period,
although consumption rose in Nigeria between 2003 and 2008. This is contrary to
the rising trend of tobacco use among men ages 15 and over in these countries
indicated by other data (WHO 2015a). This result may be an indication that family
characteristics are protective of men’s health behaviour as observed in past studies
in other regions (Giddens 1992; Ross et al. 1990; Waite 1995). Although the survey
data used for this study do not provide information on when tobacco use was
initiated (before or after union), it is likely that men in union may quit using tobacco
to please and protect their wives and children, given the high value placed on family
in many sub-Saharan African countries. The extent of decline in tobacco use dif-
fered across the three countries. The decline is expected to continue in Namibia,
which has implemented tobacco reduction measures better than have Nigeria and
Ethiopia, particularly in smoke-free policies and health warnings on cigarette
packages (WHO 2015b). Nigeria and Ethiopia experienced substantial declines in
tobacco use, but whether these will be sustained is uncertain. The WHO predicts
that if the general trends in Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Namibia continue, they will not
achieve the smoking component of the global target of 30% reduction by 2025
(WHO 2015a). However, the experience of more developed regions suggests that
tobacco use starts to decline at some point and continues as countries implement
more tobacco control measures. Therefore, as Namibia, Nigeria and Ethiopia
implement more tobacco reduction policies, it is likely that the decline in smoking
use among men in union will be sustained and a decline may also be achieved for
the general population ages 15 and over.
Evidence that family characteristics are associated with tobacco use among men
in union was found in all four countries. Polygyny was inversely associated with
tobacco use among men in Nigeria and Gabon. It is plausible that the
health-promoting benefit of having a wife is multiplied for polygynous men given
that they have more than one wife to monitor their health behaviour, but the effect
may also be a result of the structure of polygyny. Past studies in sub-Saharan Africa
show that the burden of child rearing in polygynous households is disproportion-
ately shared with women bearing the greater burden (Akorede 2010; Desai 1992), a
situation that may partly alleviate men from sole breadwinning and the stress
associated with failure in that role which may encourage tobacco use. Most
polygynists in the two countries are Muslims and this study further shows that, in
the aggregate, Muslims in Nigeria and Gabon were less likely to be using tobacco,
although the relationship was insignificant in Gabon.
Other family factors that increased the likelihood of tobacco use across the four
countries were having a non-resident spouse, second and higher order union, or
extramarital sexual relationship in the previous year, as well as the duration of
14 Tobacco Use Among Men in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Family … 357

union, marital status, and household wealth index. In Ethiopia and Gabon,
non-residence with wife increased the likelihood of tobacco use. The higher pro-
portion of Gabonese men with non-co-resident wives would require more scholarly
investigation to understand this trend in Gabon in particular. Second and higher
order union was found to be significantly related with tobacco use in Nigeria and
Namibia, confirming earlier findings for sub-Saharan Africa (Pampel 2008). Men
who enter a second or higher order union after bereavement, divorce or separation
are likely to have increased levels of depression and stress (Amato 2000; Schmeer
and Kroeger 2011), and tobacco use is one of the coping strategies of men for stress
(McDonough and Walters 2001; Williams 2003).
Tobacco use was also associated with longer marital durations in Ethiopia and
Nigeria, perhaps because of the increased financial stress connected to caring for
more children particularly in low-resource countries. These countries are poorer and
have higher fertility rates than Gabon and Namibia. Living in a consensual union
was common in Gabon and Namibia, but it was only a significant predictor of
tobacco use among respondents in Namibia and Ethiopia. The level of commitment
in such relationships may be lower than that found in formalised unions, which may
enhance the risk of men to adverse health behaviour. Similarly, having an extra-
marital sexual relationship was found to be a significant predictor of tobacco use in
Nigeria, perhaps because men who have other sexual relationships are likely to be
less committed to their formal union, thus losing the protective function of marriage
on their health behaviour (Musick and Bumpass 2012; Waite 1995).
In the three countries where household wealth was a significant predictor of
tobacco use, men in better-off households had lower odds of tobacco use than those
in the poorest households, corroborating other findings for sub-Saharan Africa,
India, the USA and elsewhere (Pampel 2008; Subramanian et al. 2004; WHO 2011,
2016; Williams 2003). The finding is indicative of the class selectivity in health
behaviour and inequality in health in general (Matthews et al. 1999; Williams
2003). People in more affluent wealth quintiles are more likely to be better educated
than their poorest counterparts and, consequently, more likely to understand the
health hazards associated with tobacco use. It is also indicative of the likelihood that
tobacco use may be associated with poverty-related stress.

14.7.1 Limitations of the Study

The findings of this study have highlighted a set of associations between family
characteristics and tobacco use. Causality cannot be determined, however, because
of the cross-sectional nature of the data. The reported level of tobacco use in this
study may not be an accurate representation of the prevalence among men in union
in the four countries, as some respondents may not have reported all forms of
tobacco they use. Nevertheless, we are not aware of any studies that indicate that
the DHS data quality on tobacco use is deficient in any significant way. Examining
trends across time using the DHS survey rounds was not feasible in Gabon, where
358 L. F. C. Ntoimo et al.

the variable for tobacco use was not available in the first of its two DHS surveys, as
was also the case for the 2000 Ethiopia DHS. Working with DHS data precludes
inclusion of some influences on tobacco use (such as its cost and psychosocial
factors) for which data have not been collected. In addition, DHS data does not
allow for consideration of older men aged 65 and over who use tobacco. However,
the comparability of DHS questions across countries provides valuable information
regarding the characteristics of smokers, the prevalence of tobacco use and
family-related factors associated with tobacco use by men in union in Nigeria,
Ethiopia, Gabon, and Namibia. While not fully representative of sub-Saharan
Africa or its sub-regions, the findings from the four countries provide useful insight
into the relationship between family characteristics and tobacco use among men in
union in moderately high and low tobacco prevalence countries on the continent.

14.8 Conclusions

This study has examined how a number of family circumstances influence tobacco
use among men in union in sub-Saharan Africa. The results attest to the pressing
need for gender-specific and family oriented public health programmes to reduce
tobacco use among men in sub-Saharan Africa.
Tobacco use is not only a health hazard to men and their co-resident family
members. It also has deleterious consequences for sustainable development in
sub-Saharan Africa, because of its pernicious effects on individual and family
welfare, the environment, social policy, health care expenditures and gender rela-
tions at the family and societal level (Baris et al. 2000). Between 1995 and 2012,
the area under tobacco cultivation in Africa is estimated to have increased by
65.3%, as compared to 10.6% globally (WHO and UNCTAD 2015). During the
same period, tobacco leaf production in Africa rose by 35.7%, compared to only
2.27% worldwide, with Eastern Africa accounting for 86.3% of the region’s
tobacco production. The proportion of global tobacco leaf production accounted for
by Africa rose from 6.5% in 1995 to 8.6% in 2012. Although the volume of tobacco
exports from African countries increased between 1995 and 2012, tobacco imports
over the same period grew by 244.1% compared to 107.9% worldwide.
Given the increasing production of tobacco in Africa, growing importation of
tobacco, persistent socioeconomic and cultural factors that encourage men to use
tobacco, weak governmental controls and population growth, sub-Saharan Africa
will continue to see a growing number of male tobacco users in spite of the decline
in the proportion of men in union who use it. The increase in male tobacco users
will raise male death rates in the region, deplete the adult workforce and subject
many women and children to lifelong poverty, as a result of the premature death of
their breadwinners. Further, although the major tobacco producers in Africa, such
as Malawi and Zimbabwe export tobacco, these countries and their farmers receive
relatively little income from such activities, as most of the profits from tobacco are
made by the multinational companies that manufacture tobacco products.
14 Tobacco Use Among Men in Sub-Saharan Africa: Does Family … 359

Efforts to enhance sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa require stricter


implementation of the recommendations of the 2015 Nairobi declaration on the
implementation of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control in the
region. To achieve this, far more translational and intervention research is needed
on family-related and other risk factors associated with tobacco use. This should
proceed alongside advocacy activities by non-governmental organisations, with
further assistance from development partners, to mobilize and provide support to
governments in the region for implementing tobacco reduction measures.

Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge the support of the DST-NRF Centre of Excellence
in Human Development, South Africa. Opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at are those of
the authors and are not to be attributed to the Centre of Excellence in Human Development.

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Author Index

A Arias-Valencia, M. M., 34
Abajo Alcalde, J. E., 259 Armar-Klemesu, M., 304, 307
Abdel‐Rahman, M. E., 303 Armijo, L. E., 8
Abdirahman, H. A., 313 Armstrong, S., 8
Abel, G. J., 5 Arriaga, E., 107, 109, 110
Aburto, J. M., 127, 128 Arrow, K. J., 78
Adams, J. S., 230 Arthur, E., 245, 304
Addo, J., 344, 347 Ashford, L. S., 302
Aguilar-Camín, H., 130 Asi, M., 58
Aguilar, A. M., 130 Atchessi, N., 313
Aguirre, B. E., 61 Atinga, R. A., 314
Ahmad, O. B., 110 Attané, I., 140
Aina, O. I., 346 Autti, O., 276, 279, 280
Ajayi, A., 17, 18 Ayuntamiento de Alicante, 258
Ajrouch, K., 69
Akkari, A., 277 B
Akorede, Y., 356 Bado, A. R., 303, 304
Akpan, W., 17, 18 Bakar, C., 210
Alazraqui, M., 109, 126, 129 Baku, A. A., 314
Alba, F., 59, 60, 79, 201 Ball, P., 153
Alba, R. D., 59, 60 Ballestín, B., 254, 259
Alegre, M., 259, 263 Balogun, J., 246
Alexander, T., 62 Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID),
Alex-Ojei, C. A., 343 126
Alfageme Chao, A., 259 Banerjee, I., 297
Almond, D., 152 Bangura, U., 313
Amato, P. R., 357 Bankole, A., 302
Ameur, A. B, 303, 304 Bannister, J., 140
Amey, F., 293 Baochang, G., 153
Amnistía Internacional, 127 Barakat, B., 284, 287
Anderson, S., 141 Baris, E., 358
Anselin, L., 208 Barlösius, E., 20
Anson, J., 1 Barrett, A. M., 346
Ansumana, R., 313 Barrientos, A., 155
Ardington, C., 155 Barroy, H., 303

© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 363


J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0
364 Author Index

Bart, W., 20 Brabyn, L., 16, 163, 169, 170, 172, 173
Bassey, A., 322 Brahmbhatt, H., 337
Batalova, J., 58 Brandmeir, K., 11
Bauman, Z., 8 Brathwaite, R., 344, 347
Baxendine, S., 167 Breen, R., 80
Beale, C. L., 163, 196, 198, 199, 210, 218 Brigden, L. W., 358
Bean, F. D., 59, 60 Brittingham, A., 58
Beaulieu, D., 58 Brown, D. L., 3, 6
Bechtold, J., 287 Brown, H., 336
Beer Fluckinger, V., 277, 279 Browne, W., 326
Beicht, U., 81 Brussig, M., 76
Bell, J., 201 Bucher, H., 19, 163, 174, 176, 188, 189
Beltrán-Sánchez, H., 127, 128 Budde, H., 287
Benítez Zenteno, R., 201 Budlender D., 321
Benito, R., 254, 259 Buhaug, H., 3
Bennett, K. M., 152 Bumpass, L., 337
Bennett, L., 15 Bundesagentur für Arbeit, 77
Bennett, T., 128 Bunting, B., 321
Benning, R., 296 Buvinić, M., 338
Bereményi, B. Á., 259
Bergevin, Y., 303 C
Bernegger, M., 278 Cabrera, G., 201
Bertone, M. P., 314 Cainkar, L. A., 57, 70
Bertran, M., 209, 259 Caldwell, B., 27
Beusen, A., 4 Caldwell, J. C., 28, 47
Birg, H., 226 Caldwell, P., 27, 28
Blakely, T., 346 Calvo Buezas, T., 254, 259
Blanchard, C. M., 153 Cameron, M., 16
Blau, F. D., 57, 59 Cameron, M. P., 163, 167, 184
Blau, P. M., 79 Campbell, O. M., 313
Bleich, E., 57 Canning, D., 137, 141
Bloom, D. E., 18, 137, 152 Cantle, T., 256
Blossfeld, H. -P., 78, 82 Capellán de Toro, L., 259
Boatcă, M., 11 Carabaña, J., 254
Bocco, M., 110 Carrasco, S., 254, 259, 269
Bockarie, A. S., 313 Carroll, G. R., 226
Bogaard, A., 217 Carvano, L. M., 52
Bohra-Mishra, P., 61 Casterline, J. B., 18
Boleda, M., 109 Castles, S., 56
Bonacich, E., 60, 79 Cedering, M., 280
Bonal, X., 254 CeiMigra, 259, 269
Bongaarts, J., 18 Cetorelli, V., 303
Borkotoky, K., 144 Chama-Chiliba, C. M., 303
Borland, R., 346 Chant, S., 346
Borooah, V., 152 Chase-Lansdale, P., 337
Boschi-Pinto, C., 110 Chen, L. C., 143
Bossmann, U., 226 Chesnais, J. -C., 6
Bosu, W., 304 Chesser, S. G., 153
Botero-Arias, W., 40 Cheston, S., 155
Boudon, R., 80 Chetty, R., 11
Bourdieu, P., 7 Chishti, M., 57
Bouvier, L. F., 204 Chiswick, B. R., 78, 79
Bove, R., 346 Chola, L., 18
Author Index 365

Christofides, N., 320 Delius, P., 336


Cho, N. -H., 138, 140 Demeny, P., 110
Chung, W., 138, 140 Den Boer, A., 140, 152
Clark, S. J., 302 De Oliveira, O., 204
Coale, A., 6, 30, 110, 138, 140 Departamento Administrativo Nacional de
Cochrane, W., 167 Estadística (DANE), 29, 30, 36, 39, 40,
Cohen, M. D., 230 42, 45, 50
Coleman, D., 3, 199, 255 Desai, S., 356
Colgrove, J., 7 Desmet, M., 303
Collier, D., 281 De Souza, E. R., 109, 129
Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Dieng, T., 308
Caribe (CEPAL), 33–35 Dichanz, H., 294
Conlon, C. M., 302–304 DiFranza, J. R., 346
Consejo Nacional de Evaluación de la Política Di, H., 8
de Desarrollo Social (CONEVAL), 110, Dirección General de Información en Salud
127 (DGIS), 109, 111
Consejo Nacional de Población (CONAPO), Dittmar, V., 76
110 Dlamini, N. S., 321
Constant, A., 78 Domenico, D, 320
Cook, P. J., 108, 109 Donnay, F., 302
Cooper, R., 303 Dorn, H. F., 198, 199
Coopération Internationale pour le Doteuchi, A., 197
Développement et la Solidarité Driedger, L., 28
(CIDSE), 31, 42, 51 D’Souza, S., 109, 129
Courtenay, W. H., 346 Dubourg, D., 313
Credit Suisse, 10 Dunkle, K., 336
Crepaldi, C., 256, 260, 270 Durrheim, K., 320
Cummings, K. M., 346 Dzakpasu, S., 302, 303
Cummings, P., 129
Cure Violence, 129 E
Curtin, S. C., 52 Easaw, J., 11
Curtis, A. J., 348 Easton, B., 167
Cyert, R. M., 244 Ebenstein, A. Y., 138, 140, 142
Czaika, M., 6 Echoka, E., 313
Eck, A., 226
D Eckhardt, J. F., 344
Daft, R. L., 228, 230, 246 Economic and Social Commission for Western
Dahlberg, L. L., 108 Asia (ESCWA), 144
Daponte, A., 304 Economic Commission for Latin America and
Darraidou, V., 109, 129 the Caribbean (ECLAC), 33, 34
Darroch, J. E., 302 Eddy, G., 321
Das Gupta, M., 138, 140, 141, 143, 144 Edlund, L., 152
Dávila-Cervantes, C. A., 109 Ee, J., 253, 256
Davis, K., 6 Egelund, N., 278–280
Dax, T. C., 281 Ehrlich, A. H., 14
Dayaratna, V., 302 Ehrlich, P., 14
De Allegri, M., 303 El-Habib Draoui, B., 16
De Brouwere, V., 303 El-Khoury, M., 303
Decker, M. R., 337 Elrick, J., 256
Defensor del Pueblo, 254 Elshof, H., 287
De Haas, H., 56 Emerson, M., 337
Dehejia, R., 8 Emmett, T., 321, 336
Deininger, K., 303 Engin, C., 16, 211
De la Cruz, G. P., 58 Englander, D., 8
366 Author Index

Entzinger, H. , 254, 256, 269 G


Eriksen, M., 344, 346 Gabrysch, S., 313
Eriksen, T. H., 28 Galea, S., 314
Erikson, R., 80 Gamlin, J., 129
Escalante-Gonzalbo, F., 127 Gandaho, T., 303
Espitia, V. E., 129 Gangl, M., 78
Esser, H., 79 Gao, W. B., 320, 337
Essien, A., 322 García Castaño, F. J., 253, 259
European Council, 256, 259, 270 García-Guerrero, V. M., 127, 128
European Union Agency for Fundamental García, B., 204
Rights (FRA), 256, 270 Garreta Bochaca, J., 254, 263
Eurostat, 213 Geddes, A., 3
Evans, D. B., 303 Geertz, C., 243
Evjen-Olsen, B., 313 Geisler, E., 226
Eyer, P., 287, 289, 293 Genadek, K., 62
Ezdi, S., 16 Gérard, H., 108
Ezegwui, H. U., 303, 304 Gerard, S., 303
Ezeh, A. C., 346 Giddens, A, 345, 356
Ezeonu, P., 303, 304 Gilreath, T., 347
Gilson, L., 303
F Giugni, M., 60
Falkingham, J., 155 Glaser, C., 336, 345
Farah Schwartzman, L., 256 Godinho, A. S., 293
Fargues, P., 56 Goeken, R., 62
Fassmann, H., 75 Gohdes, A., 153
Felber, P., 296 Goldenberg, O., 78
Feldman, M., 140 Goldscheider, C., 3, 6
Finlay, J. E., 302 Goldscheider, F. K., 7
Fitz, J., 253, 259, 263 Goldsteen, K., 345, 347, 356
Fernández Enguita, M., 254, 258, 259, 265 Goldstein, H., 325
Fickermann, D., 289 Goldthorpe, J. H., 80
Field, L., 253 Gonzàlez, I., 254, 259
Field, L. M., 253 Gonzalez-Barrera, A., 200
Flahaux, M. -L., 6 González-Pérez, G. J., 15, 109, 127
Flannery, K., 11 González-Vilchis, J. J., 110
Flecha, R., 260, 270 Goodkind, D., 140
Flisher, A. J., 347 Goodman, C., 109
Flores-Villavicencio, M. E., 109, 129 Gorard, S., 263
Flüter-Hoffmann, C., 226 Gordon, M., 56, 59
Forbes, A., 348 Gouws, E., 303
Ford, K., 253 Graduate Institute of International and
Francis, G., 320 Development Studies, 127
Frankenberg, E., 253, 263 Granato, N., 80, 81
Franklin, D., 337 Gray, G., 336
Franzé, A., 259, 269, 270 Grimm, M., 11
Freese, J., 84 Groth, H., 18
Frey, W. H., 55 Grusky, D., 11
Friedberg, R. M., 78 Guevel, C., 109, 126, 129
Friedlander, D., 6 Guidozzi, F., 304
Frings, D., 76 Guilmoto, C. Z., 140, 143
Fuchs, M., 83 Guimond, E., 43
Fuguitt, G. V., 198 Gupta, G., 321, 338
Funani, N., 320 Gustafsson, S., 321
Author Index 367

H Hussain, R., 302


Haartsen, T., 287 Hussein Al‐Amin, R., 303
Haddad, Y. H., 57, 70 Hussein, J., 313
Halbwachs, M., 255 Hwang, S. S., 61
Hales, S., 346 Hyll, W., 287
Halli, S., 28 Hyry-Beihammer, E. K., 276, 279, 280
Hall, M., 55
Hambrusch, J., 297 I
Hamilton, B. E., 52 ICF International, 310
Hanhart, S., 277–280 Ikeako, L. C., 303, 304
Hank, K., 226 Imarhiagbe, C., 302
Hannan, M. T., 226 Ingabire, M. -G., 303, 304
Hardin, G., 15 Inoue, M., 110
Hardy, M. S., 129 Instituto Cisalva, 126
Harlow, S., 336 Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática
Harper, S., 303 del Perú (INEI), 33
Harrington, M., 8 Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE), 258,
Harrison, E., 82 261
Harrison, J., 346 Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía
Hashim, S., 320 (INEGI), 111, 204, 205, 207
Hasim, S., 320 Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on
Hatt, L., 303 Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services
Hatt, L. E., 302–304 (IPBES), 15
Hayutin, A., 142, 152 Isiugo-Abanihe, U. C., 349
Heckmann, F., 76 Islam, M., 70
Heise, M., 11 Iyer, S., 152
Heller, P., 137, 141, 147 Izugbara, C. O., 346
Hell, M., 11
Hendren, N., 11 J
Heron, M., 126 Jackson, N., 16
Herwig, A., 82 Jackson, N. O., 163
Hirayama, T., 346 Jacobsen, K. H., 313
Hirschman, C., 3, 55, 226 Jaffar, A., 320
Hoch, M., 79 Jäger, D., 82
Hofer, U., 276 Jamal, A., 57, 69, 70
Hoffmann, C., 226 Jama, P. N., 336
Hofman, K., 18 James, S., 320
Holborn, L., 321 Jansen, S. A., 227
Holland, J., 303 Janssen, P., 4
Holloway, K., 128 Jareño-Ruiz, D., 253, 268
Holzhausen, A., 11 Jewkes, R. K., 320, 336
Hooglund, E., 57 Jiang, Q., 140
Horn, D., 62 Jiménez-Delgado, M., 16, 254, 268
Houle, B., 302 Jimmy, D. H., 313
Hovorak, G., 281 Jociles, M. I., 259, 269, 270
Huchler, A., 227 Johansson, S., 7, 138
Hudson, V. M., 140, 152 Johansson, S. R., 7
Hugo, G., 142 Johnson, F. A., 164, 303
Huguet, J., 142 Johnson, G., 246
Hummel, D., 20 Johnson, K., 164
Humud, C. E., 153 Johnson, K. M., 162–164, 171, 172, 178, 180,
Hunder, L., 233 190, 196–199, 209, 217, 218
Hunkler, C., 81 Johnstone, K., 27, 28, 44, 47
Huq, E., 143 Jones, G., 141, 147, 148, 151
368 Author Index

Jones, K. H., 320 Kopycka, K., 20, 163, 165, 188


Jordaan, E., 320, 337 Korkmaz, Ö., 210
Jouquet, G., 303 Kraler, A., 254, 256, 260, 269
Joyce, K., 19 Kramer, C., 282
Juárez, F., 203 Kreyenfeld, M., 78, 226
Kristen, C., 80
K Kroeger, R. A., 357
Kadama, P. Y., 303 Krohn, M., 128
Kagesten, A., 337 Kroismayr, S., 17, 276, 293
Kahn, K., 302 Kronofol, N., 142, 151
Kalmijn, M., 56 Krug, E. G., 108
Kalter, F., 78, 81 Kruk, M. E., 314
Kanner, L., 8 Kulczycki, A., 15, 58, 61
Kaplan, S., 246 Kuhn, M., 18, 137, 152
Karamagi, H., 303 Künemund, H., 16, 155
Karanja, W. W., 349 Kuscera, J., 254, 256
Karim, S. S. A., 303 Kvåle, G., 313
Kaufman, J. S., 256 Kwena, Z. A., 349
Kaufmann, E., 256
Kawachi, I., 325 L
Kawewe, S., 321 Lagarde, M., 303
Kaya, N., 211 Lam, D., 155
Kayyali, R. A., 57 Langenbrunner, J., 303
Kearns, R., 276 Laparra, M., 256, 259, 270
Kearns, R. A., 280 Lara, J., 110
Kellermann, A. L., 129 Laustsen, H., 278–280
Kelle, U., 228 Lawrence, D., 15
Kelly, M., 344, 346, 347, 357 Leaning, J., 302
Kershaw, T., 337 Lee, M., 337
Kette, S., 16, 242 Lee, R., 6
Khalid Mousa, K., 303 Lee, S. -H., 141, 148
Khessina, O. M., 226 Lehohla, P., 36
Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K., 345 Leibbrandt, M., 155
Kieft, C., 346 Lê, J. K., 227, 246
Kienast, E., 75 Lemaire, J., 109
Kim, D. -S., 140 Leone, T., 303
King, G., 347 Leslie, J., 143, 155
Kippen, R., 163, 171 Letsoalo, T., 320, 338
Kirmeyer, S., 30 Lewis-Beck, M. S., 206, 216
Kiserud, T., 313 Lichter, D., 60, 61
Kistler, E., 226 Lichter, D. T., 55
Klasen, S., 138, 139, 141, 151 Lieberson, S., 56, 60
Knuth, M., 76 Li, G., 79
Koblinsky, M., 313 Light, I. H., 79
Kochanek, K. D., 126 Lindop, J., 166, 170, 172, 180
Koch, S. F., 303 Liu, J. -T., 141
Koepsell, T. D., 129 Lin, M. -J., 141
Kogan, I., 81 Livi-Bacci, M., 8
Kohler, T. A., 11 Lizotte, A., 128
Kombe, Y., 313 Lobo, A. P., 15, 57, 58, 60, 61
Konietzka, D., 78, 226 Local Government New Zealand (LGNZ), 167,
König, R., 276 170, 184
Koopman, F., 60 Lock, K., 344, 347
Koopmans, R., 78 Long, J. S., 84
Author Index 369

Lopez, A. D., 110, 130 Mavalankar, D., 313


Louis, V. R., 303 Mayer, K. U., 78
Lozano-Ascencio, R., 110, 130 May, J. F., 18
Lozano, R., 110 Mbanefo, C., 321
Ludwig, J., 108 Mbaruku, G., 314
Luhmann, N., 228, 231, 243 Mbengue, D., 303
Lukas, W, 77 McCreanor, T., 276, 280
Lund, F., 321 McDonald, P. F., 27, 28, 47
Luo, J., 320, 337 McDonough, P., 345–347, 355, 357
Lutz, W., 4 McGee, S., 18
Lux, A., 20 McIntyre, J., 336
McKay, A., 11
M McKeown, T., 7
Mackay, J., 344, 346 McKinnon, B., 303
MacInnes, J., 7 McKnight, B., 129
Mackie, C., 57, 60 McLanahan, S., 337, 339
Macleod, C., 320, 336 Meade, C., 337
Madhavan, S., 302 Meadows, D. H., 225
Maforah, F., 320, 337 Meek, R. L., 13
Mahendra, E., 6 Meessen, B., 304
Mai, R., 19 Meissner, D., 57
Maitlis, S., 246 Menendez, A., 155
Makinen, M., 302, 304 Mercy, J. A., 108
Makiwane, M., 320, 338 Merlo, J., 325
Makokha, A., 313 Merskin, D., 70
Makola, M., 338 Merton, R. K., 244
Malthus, T. R., 3, 12–14, 19, 20 Messerschmidt, R., 20
Manduca, R., 11 Metz, C. H., 211, 215
Mannan, H., 348 Meusburger, P., 282, 287
Manor, O., 357 Meyer, J. W., 231
Mann, S., 78, 163, 165, 188, 226 Michel, M., 109
Maral, I., 210 Michelet, J., 287, 289, 293
Maré, D., 16, 169 Michelo, C., 313
Marburger, H., 75 Miggelbrink, J., 281
March, J. G., 153, 228, 244 Migration Policy Institute, 208
Marcus, J., 11 Milanović, B., 12
Margesson, R., 153 Milazzo, A., 141
Marineanu, A., 304 Miller, D., 276, 289, 292
Maroy, C., 255 Miller, M. J., 293
Marquez-Velarde, G., 16 Miller, P. W., 79
Marquis, C., 245 Milligan, K., 152
Marshall, A. -M., 7 Ministerio de Trabajo (MINTRABAJO), 31, 51
Martínez Cía, N., 255 Ministry in the Office of the President, 321
Martínez Sancho, M., 259 Mircea, T., 260, 270
Martin, J. A., 36 Mkhwanazi, N., 320
Marx, K., 3, 10, 12, 13, 20 Mkwananzi, S., 320
Mason, A., 141, 148 Modell, J., 60
Massey, D. S., 61, 78 Mojarro, O., 203, 204, 210
Matanle P., 162, 163, 174 Molla, M., 302
Mathers, C., 130 Montonavele, F., 36
Mathews, T. J., 52 Moore, M., 337
Matsuoka, S., 302 Moran, P. A. P., 207, 209, 216
Matthews, S., 357 Moreira, I., 303
Matthews, Z., 303 Moreno Yus, M. Á., 254
370 Author Index

Morgan, S. P., 60 Okemgbo, C. N., 346


Morrell, R., 320 Okitsu, A., 302
Moucheraud, C., 302 Okojie, C. E. E., 143
Moultrie, T., 320, 321 Okonofua, F., 302
Moyo, O., 321 Olmos Alcaraz, A., 259
Mpuga, P., 303 Olsen, J. P., 230
Mridha, M. K., 313 Olumide, A., 337
Müggenburg, A., 75 Omar, K., 320
Muhammad, N., 320 Omaswa, F., 303
Muindi, K., 337 Oncescu, J., 279
Mujahid, G., 142 Onoh, R. C., 303, 304
Mulder, C. H., 287 Onyebuchi, A., 303, 304
Münch, C., 79 Ordorica Mellado, M., 201–203
Muñoz de la Torre, A., 15, 109, 127 Orfalea, G., 57
Munz, R., 75 Orfield, G., 253, 256
Murphy, M., 162–164, 174 Organización de Estados Americanos (OEA),
Murphy, S. L., 126 127
Murray, C. J. L., 110 Organización Panamericana de la Salud (OPS),
Murray, N., 57 110, 129, 130
Musick, K., 345, 347, 357 Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Mwangi, M., 313 Development (OECD), 128
Orwell, G., 8
N Osterman, M. J. K., 52
Naber, N., 57, 70 Oymak, S., 210
Nabyonga, J., 303
Naff, A., 57, 70 P
Nandy, S., 344, 346, 347, 357 Pàmies, J., 254, 259, 269
Narang, J., 11 Pagnini, D. L., 60
Nasa-Indigenous Survey of Household and Paixão, M., 36
Productive Units (NSHP), CIDSE 2016, Palmer, N., 303
31, 32, 41, 45, 51 Pampel, F., 344, 346, 347, 357
National Population Commission (NPC), 109, Pamuk, S., 7
310 Panday, S., 320, 338
National Research Council, 60 Paolisso, M., 143, 155
Natter, K., 6 Papademetriou, D. G., 57
Nayab, D., 18 Pardo-Montaño, A. M., 109
Neal, S., 303 Parekh, B. C., 60
Nee, V., 60 Park, C. B., 138, 140
Newton, T. L., 345 Partida Bush, V., 200, 202, 210
Niephaus, Y., 3, 226 Partida, V., 203
Nikitin, M. B. D., 153 Passel, J. S., 200
Nimpagaritse, M., 314 Passy, F., 60
Nösterer, F., 287 Pedwell, C., 346
Ntoimo, L. F., 17, 19 Perez, A. D., 55
Nutt, P. C., 243 Pérez Díaz, J., 7
Nygren, O., 138 Pérez-Gómez, L. E., 109, 126
Perisset, D., 287, 289, 293
O Perroulaz, G., 278, 280
Oberti, M., 253, 255, 256, 263 Peterson, C. E., 11
O´Day, R., 8 Peterzell, J., 57
Odimegwu, C. O., 346 Pew Research Center, 58, 152
Office of the Auditor General (OAG), 167, 184 Pfeffer, J., 226
Ogwal, P. O., 303 Piketty, T., 11
Ojengbede, O., 337 Pine, M., 302
Author Index 371

Piñeres-Petersen, M., 32 Reichert T., 296


Ping, T., 154 Relikowski, I., 80
Ponferrada, M., 254, 259, 269 Ridde, V., 304
Ponsar, F., 303 Río Ruiz, M., 254, 264, 269
Pool, I., 16, 163, 166, 167, 170, 171, 180 Rittel, H. W. J., 227
Population Reference Bureau (PRB), 199, 200, Rivas, A. M., 259
348 Rivière, C., 253
Portes, A., 60 Riviere, J., 254
Poston, D. L., 197, 198, 204, 209 Rizk, A., 142
Poston, D. L. Jr., 16 Robert, E., 304
Potter, J. E., 201 Robertson, R., 8
Poveda, D., 259, 269, 270 Robitaille, N., 43
Powell-Jackson, T., 302–304 Rockers, P. C., 314
Power, C., 357 Rodríguez, D. A., 33, 39, 53
Powers, D., 337 Rodríguez-Sánchez, D. A., 53
Preker, A. S., 303 Rogers, A., 3
Preston, S. H., 144 Romo Viramontes, R., 202, 203
Préteceille, E., 253, 255, 256, 263 Rosário, F, 337
Prettner, K., 138, 153 Rose, D., 60
Prewitt, K., 255, 256, 270 Rösner, E., 289
Price, M., 153 Ross, C. E., 345, 347, 356
Pries, L., 79 Rosseto, I., 52
Prindiville, J., 358 Rossier, R., 296
Profamilia, 31, 32, 37 Rowan, B., 231
Project on Ethnicity and Race in Latin America Rowthorn, R., 199
(PERLA), 28 Rubio Gómez, M., 259
Pudrovska, T., 345 Ruggles, S. J., 62
Puren, A., 320, 336 Ruiz-Callado, R., 16, 255, 256
Purushothaman, R., 8 Ruiz-Salguero, M., 32
Rumbaut, R. G., 60
Q Ruppen, P., 287
Qian, N., 141 Ryan, W., 14
Qian, Z., 60, 61
Quendler, E., 297 S
Queuille, L., 303, 304 Sabogal, L. E., 32
Quilodrán, J., 203 Sach, M., 303
Quintero-Vega, P. P., 109, 127, 128, 130 Sachs, A., 79
Quiroz, L. G., 47 Sackmann, R., 20, 78, 163, 165, 188, 226
Qureshi, K., 143 Saed, M., 303
Saenz, R., 61
R Saktanber, A., 211
Rabell, C. A., 201 Salentin, K., 256, 260, 270
Rademacher, C., 163, 165, 188 Salvo, J. J., 57, 60
Raine, R., 302 Samari, G., 57
Ramasubramanian, L., 279 Samir, K. C., 4
Ranchod, C., 320, 338 Sánchez, P., 260, 269, 270
Rao, Ch., 130 Santillán, A., 110, 130
Rao, K. C. S., 8 Santoro, A., 109, 126, 129
Rasmey, L. C., 302 Sarel, M., 147
Rathavy, T., 302 Savoia, A., 11
Rausch, A., 162, 163, 174 Saxena, P., 142, 153
Ray, D., 141 Say, L., 302
Reddy, S., 320 Sceats, J., 16
Reichel, D., 254, 256, 260, 269 Scherr, A., 256
372 Author Index

Schieman, S., 345 Steiner, E., 287, 289, 293


Schimpl-Neimanns, B., 82 Stevens, G., 60
Schindlmayr, T., 27, 28, 47 Stewart, Q., 144
Schmeer, K. K., 357 Stinchcombe, A. L., 245
Schmiz, A., 75 Stockdale, A., 287
Schneider, H., 303 Stover, J., 30
Schneider, L., 287 Stüwe, K., 75
Schroeder, M. B., 62 Subramanian, S., 325, 344, 346, 357
Schulzeck, U., 289 Sullivan, J., 30
Sedgh, G., 302 Survey of Employment and Quality of Life in
Seebaß, K., 77 Cali (SEQL), 31, 41, 52
Sen, A., 138
Sevilla, J., 18 T
Sewpaul, R., 320 Tabutin, D., 142
Sharma, S., 302 Tach, L., 55
Sharygin, E. J., 138, 140, 152 Tacke, V., 228, 230
Shisanya, C. A., 349 Taylor, C., 263
Shuzhuo, L., 141 Telles, E., 28
Sibai, A. M., 142 Thornberry, T., 128
Siegert, M., 77 Tiendrebéogo, J., 303
Sifunda, S., 320 Tilczik, A., 245
Simon, H. A., 228 Timaeus, I., 320
Simon, J. L., 19 Tobin, K., 128
Simon, P., 256, 259 Tobler, W., 207
Singh, S., 302 Tollman, S., 301
Siraj, H., 320 Tolnay, S. E., 3, 226
Sistema de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador Topalov, C., 255
(SISPAE), 36 Tornui, J., 304
Sistema de Identificación de Potenciales Torres, L. M., 110, 130
Beneficiarios de Programas Sociales Townsend, L., 347
(SISBEN III), DNP 2014, 31, 35, 45, 52 Tracey, T., 320, 336
Skeldon, R., 6 Trejo Nieto, A., 200
Slee, B., 276, 289, 293 Troltsch, K., 81
Smeeth, L., 344, 347 Trovato, F., 52
Smith, C., 128 Trussel, J., 30, 51, 53
Smith, D. J., 349 Tugendhaft, A., 18
Smith, M. E., 11 Tuirán, R., 203, 210
Smith, S., 302 Turkish Statistical Institute (TUIK), 213
Síndic de Greuges, 254, 259 Tutt, C., 289
Sobek, M., 62
Sonneveldt, E., 302 U
Sordé, T., 260, 270 Ugoji, F., 320
Spade, J. Z., 7 Ulbricht, C., 231, 233
Spence, M., 78 Unisa, S., 144
Spinelli, H., 109, 126, 129 United Nations, Department of Economic and
Spoonley, P., 166 Social Affairs (UNDESA), 144
Sporket, M., 226 United Nations Development Programme
Sridharan, P., 8 (UNDP), 344, 346, 347
Stalker, P., 74 United Nations High Commissioner for
Starbuck, W. H., 244 Refugees (UNHCR), 153
Statistics New Zealand (Stats NZ), 164, 174, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), 34
184 United Nations (UN), 1, 4, 9, 27, 141, 143, 153
Statistics South Africa (Stats SA), 323 Urdal, H., 3
Statistisches Bundesamt, 83 Urrea-Giraldo, F., 15, 30, 32, 33, 37, 39, 40, 47
Steidle, H., 79
Author Index 373

V Wink, C., 139


Vala-Haynes, E., 346 Winkler, O., 15
Valeggia, C., 346 Wishnie, M. J., 57
Valentine, C. G., 7 Witten, K., 279
Valle-Barbosa, A., 15, 109, 127–129 Witter, S., 303
Vallvé, X., 256, 270 Wood, K., 336
Vandecar, K., 15 Woods, R., 7
Van de Kaa, D. J., 198, 204 Wooldridge, J. M., 82
Van de Walle, D., 345 Worbs, S., 81
Van Herp, M., 303 Worku, A., 302
Van Zanten, A., 253, 255, 256, 263 Worku, S., 321
Vega-López, M. G., 15, 109, 127 World Bank, 27, 31, 44
Verbrugge, L. M., 109 World Health Organization (WHO), 19, 108,
Vezzoli, S., 6 302, 344
Viáfara, L. C., 53 Wulf, D., 302
Vijayakumar, N., 8
Villaamil, F., 259, 269, 270 X
Villaveces, A., 129 Xu, J., 303
Viveros V. M., 53 Xu, K., 303
Vlachantoni, A., 155 Xunta de Galicia, 110
Vlassoff, M., 302
Vollmer, S., 141 Y
Vundule, C., 320, 337 Yale-Loehr, S. W., 57
Yamin, A., 302
W Yates, J., 303
Wade, P., 28 Yates, R., 302
Waite, L. J., 7, 345, 356, 357 Yé, M., 303
Walden, G., 81 Yilmaz, E., 80
Wald, K. D., 69 Yi, X., 154
Walker, A., 226 Yi, Z., 154
Walker, O., 303 Yong, H. H., 346
Walters, V., 345–347, 355, 357 Yongpiing, L., 154
Wang, L. G., 320, 337 Young, K., 345
Waters, M. C., 56, 59 Yount, K. M., 142
Watkins, S. C., 6 Yucesahin, M. M., 211, 212
Watschinger, J., 276
Webber, M. M., 227 Z
Weeks, J., 321 Zachariah, R., 303
Weiß, A., 11 Zaidi, A., 16, 155
Weick, K. E., 228, 230, 239, 246 Zamora Fortuny, B., 266
Weishaupt, H., 289 Zavala de Cosío, M. E., 200, 201, 204
Weiss, K., 75, 80, 81 Zelinsky, W., 6
Wielage, N., 76 Ziegler, P., 7
Wiesinger, G., 297 Zong, J., 58
Wiley, N. F., 79 Zopf, S., 81
Wilkinson, D., 303 Zúñiga, E., 203, 210
Willan, S., 320 Zunino, M. G., 109, 129
Willetts, D., 226 Zunzunegui, M. -V., 313
Williams, D. R., 344, 346, 347, 357 Zwack, M., 226
Wilson, D., 8 Zwi, A. B., 108
Subject Index

A L
Africa, 1, 9, 10, 18, 19, 31, 62, 301, 302, 305, Life expectancy, 15, 20, 40, 42, 107, 109, 110,
314, 321, 322, 324, 331, 336, 337, 339 115, 116, 119, 120, 124, 126, 128, 130,
America (North America, Latin America, 200, 202, 217, 348
Mesoamerica), 7, 8, 10, 12, 18, 31, 32,
46, 58, 61, 70, 163 M
Asia, 8, 9, 137, 138, 140, 141, 147, 152, 211, Malthus, Thomas Robert, 3, 12–14, 19
344 Marx, Karl, 12
Migration, 2, 6, 9, 12, 16, 19, 73, 74, 78,
D 163–166, 170, 174, 176, 178, 180–182,
Demographic decline, 279 184, 187–190, 197, 199, 208, 254, 277,
Demographic dividend, 18, 147, 218 283, 287
Demographic transition, 5–7, 15, 28, 36, 145, Mortality, 1, 2, 4–7, 15, 18, 40, 41, 107–111,
163, 189, 203, 204, 220 114, 116, 126–128, 130, 142, 144, 146,
Demographic winter, 19 165, 201, 203, 204, 210, 220, 304, 309,
Demography, 2, 20, 28, 147, 212, 225, 313, 348
235–237, 239, 241–244, 255, 257, 295
Depopulation, 16, 21, 163, 164, 187, 189, 276, P
287, 296 Population control, 10, 12
Population decline, 3, 18, 188, 284
E Population growth, 1, 3, 5, 8, 10, 12, 19, 140,
Europe, 1, 8, 74, 163, 165, 180, 197, 198, 212, 148, 167, 188, 196, 199, 202, 283, 294,
217, 220, 254, 269, 296 358
Poverty, 3, 8, 12, 13, 17, 27, 41, 42, 110, 122,
F 127, 129, 200, 210, 211, 257, 319–322,
Fertility, 1–4, 6, 9, 13, 15, 18, 19, 27, 28, 326, 329, 333, 336, 338, 339, 345, 358
31–34, 37–39, 41, 43, 44, 48, 163, 165,
171, 180, 189, 195, 197, 199, 208, 210, S
215–220, 276, 357 Social demography, 2, 3, 215, 218, 226, 283,
294
I Sociology of population, 3, 226
Inequality (wealth inequality, income
inequality), 3, 10–12, 301, 312

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J. Anson et al. (eds.), Studies in the Sociology of Population,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-94869-0

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