Drilon vs Lim

Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code which gave the secretary of justice the power to decide on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures.

The Secretary of Justice had declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the
Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy.

The City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the Secretary's
resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural
requirements had been observed. It declared Section 187 of the Local Government
Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the
power of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the
President of the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments.

The RTC judge opined that the challenged section gave to the Secretary the power
of control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the President
of the Philippines.

Issue:
WON Sec 187 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
No.

Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality
or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not
also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code
should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis
for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he
found only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was
determine if the petitioners were performing their functions is accordance with law,
that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the
grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we
see it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order
the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court,
Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so
performed an act not of control but of mere supervision.

All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax

measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact, Secretary
Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to wit, the inclusion
therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or
reasonableness of the tax measure.

Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on
the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required
by Art. 276(b) of the LGC nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in
three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision

of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its Ending that the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.
The Solicitor General v. Metropolitan Manila Authority

Facts:
In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong
the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic
violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila
Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid down
by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there
also observed that even the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was
not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be
imposed by the Commission.

Several complaints were filed. In these complaints, driver's license were confiscated
by Traffic Enforcers for traffic violations. There was also a complaint were license
plates were also removed.

On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11,
Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the license plate/tow and impound
attended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the
flow of traffic in Metro Manila."

The Authority argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the
ordinance because the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter.
The Solicitor General expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void
because it represented an invalid exercise of a delegated legislative power. The fee
in the measure was that it violated existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does
not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the removal of license plates and the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
Ganzon v CA

Facts:
Private respondent Tumambing contracted the services of petitioner Ganzon to haul
305 tons of scrap iron from Bataan to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT
“Batman.” Petitioner sent his lighter with its Captain Filomeno to dock at Mariveles,
where respondent Tumambing delivered the scrap irons for loading which also
begun on the same day. Mayor Advincula arrived at the port and demanded P 5,000
shakedown from respondent. The two ended up in a heated argument where
respondent had to be taken to a hospital to be treated of a gunshot wound. After
sometime, the loading of the scrap iron was resumed. But now, the Acting Mayor
together with 3 policemen ordered Captain Filomeno to dump the scrap iron where
the lighter was docked and the rest to be brought to NASSCO compound. Later, the
Acting Mayor issued a receipt stating that the Municipality had taken custody of the
scrap iron. Respondent instituted an action for damages against petitioner.
Respondent Court found in favor for Tumambing.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner Ganzon, a common carrier, can be exempt from liability
by invoking order of competent authority.
Ruling: NO.
The petitioner has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any of the
following causes enumerated in Article 1734 of the Civil Code.
Before the appellee Ganzon could be absolved from responsibility on the ground
that he was ordered by competent public authority to unload the scrap iron, it must
be shown that Acting Mayor Basilio Rub had the power to issue the disputed order,
or that it was lawful, or that it was issued under legal process of authority. The
appellee failed to establish this. Indeed, no authority or power of the acting mayor
to issue such an order was given in evidence. Neither has it been shown that the
cargo of scrap iron belonged to the Municipality of Mariveles. The fact remains that
the order given by the acting mayor to dump the scrap iron into the sea was part of
the pressure applied by Mayor Jose Advincula to shakedown the appellant for
P5,000.00. The order of the acting mayor did not constitute valid authority for
appellee Mauro Ganzon and his representatives to carry out. The petitioner was not
duty bound to obey the illegal order to dump into the sea the scrap iron.