APPEALS, RULES, BOND

Aklan College v. Enero

FACTS: Perpetuo Enero, Arlyn Castigador, Nuena Sermon, and Jocelyn Zolina were high school teachers
employed by Aklan College. When high school students of the college handled by the said teachers held mass
actions against the principal of the high school department, the teachers were dismissed after an
administrative investigation. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the school with the LA, and
the LA ruled in their favor, stating that they had indeed been illegally dismissed, and granting them
reinstatement, backwages, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay, and moral and exemplary damages.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA decision, stating that the teachers’ dismissal was valid. However, the
NLRC ordered Aklan College to pay the teachers their 13 th month pay and service incentive leave pay. Both
parties filed a motion for reconsideration, but the NLRC denied both motions for lack of merit.

Aklan College filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, seeking to partially annul the NLRC
decision insofar as it held the school liable for the payment of the dismissed teachers’ 13 th month pay and
service incentive leave pay despite the finding that they were illegally dismissed from service. The teachers
did not anymore file an appeal from the NLRC decision. The CA held that the NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in awarding the teachers 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. However, it
modified the award to conform to the dismissed teachers’ employment history, thus even increasing the
amount awarded to each of the dismissed teachers. Aklan College appeals the CA decision.

ISSUE: W/N the CA committed grievous error when it increased the monetary awards of 13 th month pay and
service incentive leave pay in favor of the non-appealing private respondents.

NO. As a rule, a party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative relief from the
appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower tribunal, if any, whose decision is brought up
on appeal. Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who did not appeal. As an
exception, he may assign an error where the purpose is to maintain the judgment on other grounds, but he
cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief unless he has also appealed or filed
a separate petition. In this case, the CA is not precluded from affirming, reversing, or modifying the propriety
of payment of the 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay to the respondents. It is the propriety of the
award of these benefits which were precisely the issues raised by Aklan College in its appeal before the said
appellate court. By way of exception, the CA may reverse the decision of the lower tribunal on the basis of
grounds other than those raised on appeal in the following instances:

(1) Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(2) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law;
(3) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in arriving at a just
decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the interest of justice or to avoid dispensing
piecemeal justice;
(4) Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are matters of
record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed to raise or which the
lower court ignored;
(5) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and
(6) Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a question properly
assigned, is dependent.

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The CA committed no reversible error in increasing the amounts of the 13 th month pay and the service
incentive leave pay in order to correct the error committed by the NLRC in the computation. The instant
controversy falls squarely under the third exception enumerated above. A just, fair, and complete resolution
of the case necessarily entails the correct computation of these benefits. To avoid dispensing piecemeal
justice, the full period of employment of respondents was rightfully considered by the CA in the computation
of the 13th month pay and the service incentive leave pay. The procedural lapse on the part of the NLRC in this
case in failing to take into account the number of years when the private respondents did not receive their
13th month and service incentive leave pay cannot defeat their right to receive these benefits as granted under
substantive law. The Supreme Court simply could not uphold an erroneous computation of the said unpaid
benefits. Hence, it had to re-compute, and, as a consequence, increased it.

Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.

 It does not follow that since the employer is not guilty of illegal dismissal, then he is not liable for
non-payment of 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay. Illegal dismissal and non-payment of
benefits are entirely different grounds on which an employer can be held liable.

Tacloban Far East Marketing v. CA

FACTS: Benjamin Sabulao was hired by Tacloban Far East Marketing Corp. as a helper in its hardware
business, then as delivery truck driver. Sometime in May 2001, Sabulao allegedly asked permission to absent
himself for five days because of his grandfather’s death. When he reported back to work, he was informed
that he cannot work there anymore.

In August 2001, Sabulao filed before the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims
against Tacloban. The LA ruled in favor of Tacloban, finding that Sabulao had abandoned his work and as
such, his dismissal was valid. At the same time, Tacloban was ordered to pay Sabulao his salary differentials
and service incentive leave pay. The other money claims were denied for failure to substantiate the same. On
appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA, ruling that Sabulao had been illegally dismissed, and ordering Tacloban to
pay Sabulao his backwages and separation pay, salary differentials, and service incentive leave pay. Tacloban
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which merely affirmed the decision of the NLRC. Tacloban then
appealed to the SC by way of petition for review on certiorari, two months after the receipt of the decision of
the CA denying its petition.

ISSUE: W/N Tacloban was able to file a timely appeal.

NO. At the outset, it must be stated that Tacloban adopted the wrong mode of remedy in bringing the case
before the SC. It is well-settled that the proper recourse of an aggrieved party to assail the decision of the CA
is to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Rules preclude recourse to
the special civil action of certiorari if appeal, by way of a petition for review is available, as the remedies of
appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. Certiorari cannot be used as a
substitute for a lost appeal. Though there are instances when certiorari was granted despite the availability of
appeal, none of these recognized exceptions was shown to be present in the case at bar. Moreover, while it is
true that the Court may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45 in the interest of
substantial justice, the present petition could not be given the same leniency because it was filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari. The records show that the
petitioners, instead of filing a petition for review on certiorari within 15 days of their receipt of the CA
Resolution denying their petition, they waited for two months before filing the instant petition. Accordingly,

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the decision of the CA had already become final and executory and beyond the purview of the SC to act upon.
The inescapable conclusion is that the present petition was filed belatedly to make up for a lost appeal.

Petition denied for lack of merit. CA decision affirmed.

 In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal was for
a just and valid cause and failure to discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified
and therefore illegal.

McBurnie v. Ganzon

FACTS: Andrew James McBurnie, an Australian national, signed a five-year employment contract as executive
vice president of EGI in May 1999. In November of the same year, he featured in an accident that fractured his
skull and necessitated his confinement at the Makati Medical Center. While recuperating from his injuries in
Australia, he was informed by EGI’s president that his services were no longer needed since the project he
had been hired to work on had been permanently discontinued. In October 2002, McBurnie filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal with prayer for the payment of his salary and benefits under the unexpired term of the
contract, damages, and attorney’s fees. The LA ruled in his favor, declaring his dismissal to be illegal and
ordering EGI to pay his salary and benefits for the unexpired term of the contract amounting to $985,162.00,
as well as moral and exemplary damages amounting to P2M, and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the
total monetary award. Ten days after EGI received the LA’s decision, it filed a memorandum of appeal with
the NLRC and Motion to Reduce Bond, and posted the amount of P100,000.00, arguing that the awards of the
LA were null and excessive, with the premeditated intention to render the employer incapable of posting an
appeal bond and consequently deprive him of the right to appeal. The NLRC subsequently denied the motion
to reduce bond and ordered EGI to post an additional bond of P54M together with the other requirements
under Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure within a non-extendible period of 10 days from
receipt thereof, otherwise the appeal shall be dismissed. Instead of complying with the NLRC order, EGI filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA with prayer for issuance of a preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order. A 60-day TRO was issued by the CA. However, upon the expiration of the 60-day
TRO, and EGI still failed to post additional bond, the NLRC dismissed EGI’s appeal. EGI again filed with the CA
a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction, which
was granted. The CA then issued a writ of preliminary injunction after EGI posted an injunction bond of
P10M. McBurnie assails the issuance of the writ before the SC, but was dismissed for submitting an affidavit
of service which failed to show a competent evidence of the affiant’s identity. The CA then granted EGI’s
Motion to Reduce Bond and directed it to post an appeal bond of P10M with the NLRC, which was likewise
ordered to give due course to the appeal and to conduct further proceedings. McBurnie appealed to the SC.

ISSUE 1:W/N the CA committed grave abuse of discretion by lowering the amount of bond to be posted by
EGI in the course of its appeal.

YES. While the bond may be reduced upon motion by the employer, this is subject to the conditions that (1)
the motion to reduce bond shall be on meritorious grounds; and (2) a reasonable amount in relation to the
monetary award is posted by the appellant, otherwise the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop
the running of the period to perfect an appeal. The qualification effectively requires that unless the NLRC
grants the reduction of cash bond within the 10-day reglementary period, the employer is still expected to
post the cash or surety bond securing the full amount within the said 10-day period. If the NLRC does
eventually grant the motion for reduction after the reglementary period has elapsed, the correct relief would
be to reduce the cash or surety bond already posted by the employer within the 10-day period. Records show
that EGI filed their Memorandum of Appeal and Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond on the 10 th or last day of the

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reglementary period. Although they posted an initial appeal bond of P100,000.00, the same was grossly
inadequate compared to the monetary awards given by the LA. Further, there is no basis in EGI’s contention
that the LA’s awards were null and excessive, and with premeditated intention to render EGI incapable of
posting an appeal bond and deprive them of the right to appeal. Moreover, the cash/surety bond requirement
does not necessitate the employer to physically surrender the entire amount of the monetary judgment. The
usual procedure is for the employer to obtain the services of a bonding company, which will then require the
employer to pay a percentage of the award in exchange for a bond securing the full amount. This observation
undercuts the notion of financial hardship as a justification for the inability to timely post the required bond.

 The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary
awards from the decision of the LA. The lawmakers clearly intended to make the bond a mandatory
requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer as inferred from the provision that an
appeal by the employer may be perfected “only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.” The word
“only” makes it clear that the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer is the essential and
exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. On the other hand, the word “may”
refers to the perfection of an appeal as optional on the part of the defeated party, but not to the
compulsory posting of an appeal bond, if he desires to appeal. Moreover, the filing of the bond is not
only mandatory but a jurisdictional requirement as well, that must be complied with in order to
confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the LA final
and executory. This requirement is intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in the case,
they will receive the money judgment in their favor upon the dismissal of the employer’s appeal. It is
intended to discourage employers from using an appeal to delay or evade their obligation to satisfy
their employees’ just and lawful claims.

ISSUE 2:W/N the failure of EGI to comply with the requirement of posting a bond equivalent in amount to the
monetary award is fatal to their appeal.

YES. EGI, for filing its motion only on the final day within which to perfect an appeal, it cannot be allowed to
seek refuge in a liberal application of the rules. Under such circumstance, there is neither way for the NLRC to
exercise its discretion to grant or deny the motion, nor for the respondents to post the full amount of the
bond, without risk of summary dismissal for non-perfection of the appeal.

While the SC, in certain instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, it never intends to forge a
weapon for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of the
rules apply only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and other justifiable causes and circumstances, but
none obtains in this case. The NLRC had, therefore, the full discretion to grant or deny their motion to reduce
the amount of the appeal bond. The finding of the labor tribunal that EGI did not present sufficient
justification for the reduction thereof cannot be said to have been done with grave abuse of discretion. The
records show that after the motion to reduce appeal bond was denied, the NLRC still allowed EGI a new
period of 10 days from receipt of the order of denial within which to post the additional bond. Nevertheless,
EGI failed to post the additional bond and instead moved for reconsideration. On this score alone, their appeal
should have been dismissed outright for not having been perfected on time. The NLRC even bent over
backwards by entertaining the motion for reconsideration and even granted EGI another 10 days within
which to post the appeal bond. However, EGI did not take advantage of this liberality when it persistently
failed and refused to post the additional bond despite the extensions given it.

Petition granted. CA decision granting motion to reduce appeal bond and ordering the NLRC to give due
course to EGI’s appeal reversed and set aside. NLRC decision dismissing EGI’s appeal for failure to perfect an
appeal reinstated and affirmed.

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  The right to appeal is not a constitutional right, but a mere statutory privilege. Hence, parties who
seek to avail themselves of it must comply with the statutes or rules allowing it. To reiterate,
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is mandatory and
jurisdictional. The requirements for perfecting an appeal must, as a rule, strictly be followed. Such
requirements are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and are necessary
for the orderly discharge of the judicial business. Failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment
of the court final and executory. Just as a losing party has the privilege to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so does the winner also have the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
decision.

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