CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 1
Republic of the Philippines The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 22041           September 11, 1924
JOSE ALEJANDRINO, petitioner,  enjoy all of his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and
vs.
MANUEL L. QUEZON, ET AL., respondents.
Araneta & Zaragoza for petitioner.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
MALCOLM, J.:
The petitioner in this original proceeding in mandamus and
injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the
Governor-General to represent the Twelfth Senatorial District.
The respondents are Manuel L. Quezon, President of the
Philippine Senate; Isabelo de los Reyes, Santiago Fonacier,
Alejo Mabanag, Bernabe de Guzman, Ramon Fernandez,
Emiliano T. Tirona, Antero Soriano, Juan B. Alegre, Vicente de
Vera, Jose Ma. Arroyo, Francisco Enage, Tomas Gomez,
Sergio Osmeña, Celestino Rodriguez, Francisco Soriano, Jose
A. Clarin, Hadji Butu, Espiridion Guanco, Hermenegildo
Villanueva, Jose Hontiveros, Teodoro Sandiko, and Santiago
Lucero, all members of the Philippine Senate; Faustino Aguilar,
Secretary of the Philippine Senate; Bernabe Bustamante,
Sergeant-at-arms of the Philippine Senate, and Francisco
Dayaw, Paymaster of the Philippine Senate.
The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine
Senate composed of the respondent Senators, on February 5,
1924, depriving Senator Alejandrino of all the prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of one
year from the first of January, 1924. The resolution reads as
follows:
Resolved: That the Honorable Jose Alejandrino,
Senator for the Twelfth District, be, as he is hereby
declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant
violation of the privileges of the Senate for having
treacherously assaulted the Honorable Vicente de
Vera, Senator for the Sixth District on the occasion of
the debate regarding the credentials of said Mr.
Alejandrino;
Resolved, further: That the Honorable Jose
Alejandrino be, as he is hereby, deprived of all of his
prerogatives, privileges and emoluments as such
Senator during one year from the first of January,
nineteen hundred and twenty-four;
And, resolved, lastly: That the said Honorable Jose
Alejandrino, being a Senator appointed by the
Governor-General of these Islands, a copy of this
resolution be furnished said Governor-General for his
information.
above quoted is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect, for
five reasons. He prays the court: (1) To issue a preliminary
injunction against the respondents enjoining them from
executing the resolution; (2) to declare the aforesaid resolution
of the Senate null and void; and (3) as a consequence of the
foregoing, to issue a final writ of mandamus and injunction
against the respondents ordering them to recognize the rights
of the petitioner to exercise his office as Senator and that he
prohibiting them from preventing the petitioner from exercising
the rights of his office, and from carrying the order of
suspension, into effect. By special appearance, the Attorney-
General, in representation of the respondents, has objected to
the jurisdiction of the court, and later, by demurrer, has
pressed the same point.
In order that an obvious angle to the case may not
subsequently embarrass us, we desire first of all to say that
looking through the form of the action to the substance, this is,
in effect, a suit instituted by one member of the Philippine
Senate against the Philippine Senate and certain of its official
employees. May the Supreme Court of the Philippines Islands
by mandamus and injunction annul the suspension of Senator
Alejandrino and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him
in his official position? Without, therefore, at this time
discussing any of the other interesting questions which have
been raised and argued, we proceed at once to resolve the
issue here suggested.
There are certain basic principles which lie at the foundation of
the Government of the Philippine Islands, which are familiar to
students of public law. It is here only necessary to recall that
under our system of government, each of the three
departments is distinct and not directly subject to the control of
another department. The power to control is the power to
abrogate and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp.
Each department may, nevertheless, indirectly restrain the
others.
It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to
enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper
constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended.
The courts must determine the validity of legislative
enactments as well as the legality of all private and official
acts. To this extent, do the courts restrain the other
departments.
With these sound premises in mind, we are not at all surprised
to find the general rule of mandamus to be, that the writ will not
lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch,
for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the
other. Mandamus will not lie against the legislative body, its
members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties
purely legislative in their character which therefore pertain to
their legislative, functions and over which they have exclusive
control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without
a gross usurpation of power. So it has been held that there
where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the
courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion
was right or wrong, to issue a mandate to compel his
reinstatement. (Code of Civil Procedure, secs. 222, 515; 18 R.
C. L., 186, 187; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 190;
French vs.Senate [1905], 146 Cal., 604; Hiss vs. Bartlett

[1855], 69 Mass., 468; Ex parte Echols [1886], 39 Ala., 698;
State vs.Bolte [1889], 151 Mo., 362; De Diego vs. House of
Delegates [1904], 5 Porto Rico, 235; Greenwood Cemetery
Land Co. vs. Routt [1892], 17 Colo., 156; State ex rel.
Cranmer vs. Thorson [1896], 33 L. R. A., 582; People ex rel.
Billings vs. Bissell [1857], 19 Ill., 229; People ex rel.
Bruce vs. Dunne [1913], 258 Ill., 441; People ex rel. La
Chicote vs. Best [1907], 187 N. Y., 1; Abueva vs. Wood [1924],
45 Phil., 612.)
The authorities which support the doctrines above announced
are numerous and instructive. They are found among the
decisions of our own court, of the United States Supreme
Court, and of other jurisdictions. If some of these cases relate
to the chief executive rather than to the legislature, it is only
necessary to explain that the same rules which govern the
relations of the court to the chief executive likewise govern the
relations of the courts to the legislature.
The controlling case in this jurisdiction on the subject
is Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of
Occidental Negros ([1910], 16 Phil., 366). This was an original
application made in this court praying for a writ
of mandamus to the Governor-General to compel him to call a
special election as provided by law. The Attorney-General
demurred to the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
and the court, after an elaborate discussion, reached the
conclusion that "we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the
Governor-General of these Islands, as the head of the
executive department, in the performance of any of his official
acts." The demurrer was accordingly sustained and the
complaint dismissed. It is noted that in this decision reliance
was placed on the cases of Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord
([1867], 4 Wall., 475, and Sutherland vs. Governor ([1874], 29
Mich., 320), which we will now proceed to notice.
State of Mississippi vs. Andrew Johnson, President of the
United States, supra, concerned a bill praying the United
States, Supreme Court to enjoin and restrain Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, and E. O. C. Ord, General
Commanding in the District of Mississippi and Arkansas from
executing certain Acts of Congress. Mr. Chief Justice Chase
delivering the opinion of the court said the single point which
required consideration was this: Can the President be
restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of
Congress alleged to be unconstitutional? He continued:
The Congress is the Legislative Department of the
Government; the President is the Executive
Department. Neither can be restrained in its action by
the Judicial Department; though the acts of both,
when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its
cognizance.
The impropriety of such interference will be clearly
seen upon consideration of its possible
consequences.
Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for
allowed. If the President refuse obedience, it is
needless to observe that the court is without power to
enforce its process. If, on the other hand, the
President complies with the order of the court and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 2
refuses to execute the Acts of Congress, is it not
clear that a collision may occur between the
Executive and Legislative Departments of the
Government? May not the House of Representatives
impeach the President for such refusal? And in that
case could this court interfere in behalf of the
President, thus endangered by compliance with its
mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the
United States from sitting as a court of impeachment?
Would the strange spectacle be offered to the public
wonder of an attempt by this court to arrest
proceedings in that court?
These questions answer themselves.
xxx           xxx           xxx
We are fully satisfied that this court has no jurisdiction
of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of
his official duties; and that no such bill ought to be
received by us.
It has been suggested that the bill contains a prayer
that, if the relief sought cannot be had against Andrew
Johnson, as President, it may be granted against
Andrew Johnson, as a citizen of Tennessee. But it is
plain that relief as against the execution of an Act of
Congress by Andrew Johnson, is relief against its
execution by the President. . . .
Sutherland vs. Governor of Michigan, supra, well known to the
legal fraternity on account of being written by Judge Cooley,
related to an application for mandamus to the Governor to
compel him to perform a duty imposed upon him by statute.
Judge Cooley, in part, said:
. . . Our government is on whose powers have been
carefully apportioned between three distinct
departments, which emanate alike from the people,
have their powers alike limited and defined by the
constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their
respective spheres of action equally independent.
xxx           xxx           xxx
It is true that neither of the departments can operate
in all respects independently of the others, and that
what are called the checks and balances of
government constitute each a restraint upon the rest. .
. . But in each of these cases the action of the
department which controls, modifies, or in any
manner influences that of another, is had strictly
within its own sphere, and for that reason gives no
occasion for conflict, controversy or jealousy. The
Legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is acting
within its proper province in making laws, while the
courts, in declining to enforce an unconstitutional law,
are in like manner acting within their proper province,
because they are only applying that which is law to
the controversies in which they are called upon to
give judgment. It is mainly by means of these checks
and balances that the officers of the several

departments are kept within their jurisdiction, and if
they are disregarded in any case, and power is
usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment,
and not by another department of the government
attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a
superior authority over that which by the constitution
is its equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the
Legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their
judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such
judgments after they have been rendered. If it could,
constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the
Legislature could in like manner override executive
action also, the government would become only a
despotism under popular forms. On the other hand it
would be readily cancelled that no court can compel
the Legislature to make or to refrain from making
laws, or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take
any action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be
made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. In
these cases the exemption of the one department
from the control of the other is not only implied in the
framework of government, but is indispensably
necessary if any useful apportionment of power is to
exist.
xxx           xxx           xxx
It is not attempted to be disguised on the part of the
relators that any other course than that which leaves
the head of the executive department to act
independently in the discharge of his duties might
possibly lead to unseemly conflicts, if not to
something worse, should the courts undertake to
enforce their mandates and the executive refuse to
obey. . . . And while we should concede, if jurisdiction
was plainly vested in us, the inability to enforce our
judgment would be no sufficient reason for failing to
pronounce it, especially against an officer who would
be presumed ready and anxious in all cases to render
obedience to the law, yet in a case where jurisdiction
is involved in doubt it is not consistent with the dignity
of the court to pronounce judgments which may be
disregarded with impunity, nor with that of the
executive to place him in position where, in a matter
within his own province, he must act contrary to his
judgment, or strand convicted of a disregard of the
laws.
We only take space to notice on more case, which concerns
specifically the right of the judiciary to control
by mandamus the action of the legislature. French vs. Senate
of the State of California, supra, was an original proceeding
in mandamus brought by the petitioners who were duly elected
senators of the state to compel the Senate of California to
admit them as members thereof. It was alleged that the
petitioners had been expelled without hearing or opportunity for
defense. The writ was denied, Mr. Justice Shaw delivering the
opinion of the court, saying:
Even if we should give these allegations their fullest
force in favor of the pleader, they do not make a case
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 3
justifying the interposition of this court. Under our
form of government the judicial department has no
power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair
action of the legislative department, or of their house
thereof, taken in pursuance of the power committed
exclusively to that department by the constitution. . . .
There can be noted as specific corroborative authority,
State vs. Bolte, supra, Abueva vs. Wood, supra, and
Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Mellon, Secretary of the
Treasury ([1923], 262 U. S., 447), the latest expression of
opinion by the United States Supreme Court. The record
discloses that it was the firm opinion of the late Chief Justice
that the court should not assume jurisdiction of the
proceedings.
So as to be perfectly fair to the petitioner, it is but proper to
state that the principles laid down in some of the preceding
authorities have been the subject of adverse criticism. It is said
that the fallacy of the argument lies in the statement that the
three departments of the government are independent of each
other. "They are independent in so far as they proceed within
their legitimate province and perform the duties that the law
requires; yet it has never been held that the executive was the
sole judge of what duties the law imposes upon him, or the
manner in which duties shall be exercised. The final arbiter in
cases of dispute is the judiciary, and to this extent at least the
executive department may be said to be dependent upon and
subordinate to the judiciary. . . . It is not the office of the person
to whom the writ of mandamus is directed, but the nature of the
thing to be done, by which the propriety of issuing
a mandamus is to be determined." (2 Bailey on Mandamus, pp.
926-927.) But these were arguments which should have been
presented years ago in this court, and which when recently
presented by counsel in his argument for the petitioner in the
case of Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G. No. 20867, 1 met with no
favorable response from the court. It is now too late to go back
and revise previous decisions and overturn them; in fact this
would be not only impracticable but impossible since at least
two decision of the United States Supreme Court seem to us to
be controlling.
No court has ever held and we apprehend no court will ever
hold that it possesses the power to direct the Chief Executive
or the Legislature or a branch thereof to take any particular
action. If a court should ever be so rash as to thus trench on
the domain of either of the other departments, it will be the end
of popular government as we know it in democracies.
It is intimated rather faintly that, conceding all that is said with
reference to the right of the Supreme Court to
issue mandamus directed to the Philippine Senate, yet we
would be justified in having our mandate run not against the
Philippine Senate or against the President of the Philippine
Senate and his fellow Senators but against the secretary, the
sergeant-at-arms, and the disbursing officer of the Senate. But
this begs the question. If we have no authority to control the
Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the actions
of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the
Senate. The secretary, sergeant-at-arms, and disbursing
officer of the Senate are mere agents of the Senate who
cannot act independently of the will of that body. Should the
Court do as requested, we might have the spectable presented
of the court ordering the secretary, the sergeant-at-arms, and

the disbursing officer of the Philippine Senate to do one thing,
and the Philippine Senate ordering them to do another thing.
The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly
appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute
power to execute it. (Turnbull vs. Giddings [1893], 95 Mich.,
314; Abueva vs. Wood, supra.)
The question of jurisdiction is invariably one of perplexing
difficulty. On the one hand, no consideration of policy or
convenience should induce this court to exercise a power that
does not belong to it. On the other hand, no consideration of
policy or convenience should induce this court to surrender a
power which it is its duty to exercise. But
certainly mandamus should never issue from this court where it
will not prove to be effectual and beneficial. It should not be
awarded where it will create discord and confusion. It should
not be awarded where mischievous consequences are likely to
follow. Judgment should not be pronounced which might
possibly lead to unseemly conflicts or which might be
disregarded with impunity. This court should offer no means by
a decision for any possible collision between it as the highest
court in the Philippines and the Philippine Senate as a branch
of a coordinate department, or between the Court and the
Chief Executive or the Chief Executive and the Legislature.
On the merits of the controversy, we will only say this: The
Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General of the Philippine
Islands to appoint two senators and nine representatives to
represent the non-Christian regions in the Philippine
Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office
until removed by the Governor-General." (Organic Act, secs.
16, 17.) They may not be removed by the Philippine
Legislature. However, to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively, is granted the power to "punish
its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence
of two-thirds, expel an elective member." (Organic Act, sec.
18.) Either House may thus punish an appointive member for
disorderly behavior. Neither House may expel an appointive
member for any reason. As to whether the power to "suspend"
is then included in the power to "punish," a power granted to
the two Houses of the Legislature by the Constitution, or in the
power to "remove," a power granted to the Governor-General
by the Constitution, it would appear that neither is the correct
hypothesis. The Constitution has purposely withheld from the
two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike
the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature.
It is noteworthy that the Congress of the United States has not
in all its long history suspended a member. And the reason is
obvious. Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates
the outraged dignity of the House without depriving the
constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible,
likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while
giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but
suspension deprives the electoral district of representation
without that district being afforded any means by which to fill
the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filed but the
occupant is silenced. Suspension for one year is equivalent to
qualified expulsion or removal.
It is beyond the power of any branch of the Government of the
Philippine Islands to exercise its functions in any other way
than that prescribed by the Organic Law or by local laws which
conform to the Organic Law. This was, in effect, our holding in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 4
the comparatively recent case of Concepcion vs.
Paredes ([1921], 42 Phil., 599), when we had under particular
consideration a legislative attempt to deprive the Chief
Executive of his constitutional power of appointment. What was
there announced is equally applicable to the instant
proceedings.
While what has just been said may be unnecessary for a
correct decision, it is inserted so that the vital question argued
with so much ability may not pass entirely unnoticed, and so
that there may be at least an indication of the attitude of the
court as a restraining force, with respect to the checks and
balances of government. The Supreme Court, out of respect
for the Upper House of a coordinate branch of the government,
takes no affirmative action. But the perfection of the entire
system suggests the thought that no action should be taken
elsewhere which would constitute, or even seem to constitute,
disregard for the Constitution.
Conceding therefore that the power of the Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior does not authorize it to
suspend on appointive member from the exercise of his office
for one year, conceding what has been so well stated by the
learned counsel for the petitioner, conceding all this and more,
yet the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the all-conclusive
reason that the Supreme Court does not possess the power of
coercion to make the Philippine Senate take any particular
action. If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner
without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the
repository of all wisdom and all power. It would hardly be
becoming for the judiciary to assume the role of either a
credulous inquisitor, a querulous censor, or a jaunty knight,
who passes down the halls of legislation and of administration
giving heed to those who have grievances against the
Legislature and the Chief Executive.
We rule that neither the Philippine Legislature nor a branch
thereof can be directly controlled in the exercise of their
legislative powers by any judicial process. The court
accordingly lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition and the
demurrer must be sustained. As it is unlikely that the petition
could be amended to state a cause of action, it must be
dismissed without costs. Such is the judgment of the court. So
ordered.
Street, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AVANCEÑA, J.,  concurring:
I agree with the dispositive part and the grounds and
considerations set forth in the decision about the want of
jurisdiction of this court to review the proceeding of the Senate.
But this court having no jurisdiction, the insinuation contained
in the decision that proceeding of the Senate was illegal seems
to me unnecessary and improper.
JOHNSON, J.,  dissenting:

Among the important questions presented by the petition and
demurrer in the present case, three may be mentioned:
First. Is the resolution in question legal or illegal?
Second. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction even to consider
its legality?
Third. Can the Supreme Court grant the remedy prayed for?
FIRST. Legality of the resolution
The Supreme Court is unanimous in its opinion that the
resolution, by which Jose Alejandrino was deprived of "all his
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one
year" as an appointed senator, is an expulsion or removal of
him as such senator and therefore illegal and ultra vires for the
reason that the power of expulsion or removal of an appointed
senator is vested exclusively in the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands. (Section 17 of the Jones Law — Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916 — Public Laws, vol. 12 p. 243.)
By reason of the unanimous opinion upon that question, it
becomes unnecessary further to discuss it except to give the
particular reasons which induced my opinion. Said section 17
provides that: "Senators and representatives appointed by the
Governor-General shall hold office until removed by the
Governor-General." Section 18 provides, among other things,
that "each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and,
with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member."
The petitioner is an appointive member of the Senate.
It will be noted from the two quotations just given, that the
power to expel a member of either branch of the Legislature,
by the Legislature, is limited to "elective members," while the
power "to punish members for disorderly behavior" applies to
all members whether elective or appointive. In view of the fact
that neither branch of the Legislature can expel an appointive
member, can either branch deprive such a member of all his
"prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one
year" under the power "to punish for disorderly behavior"? It
will be noted that the law contains no definition of the
"punishment" which may be imposed for disorderly behavior.
Considering, however, that neither branch has the right to
expel an appointive member, certainly no one will contend that
the punishment imposed for disorderly behavior may amount to
an expulsion. If the punishment amounts to an expulsion then
certainly the Legislature has exceeded its authority and has
encroached upon the power of the executive, for the reason
that the power to expel belongs to the Governor-General.
We have, then, the question squarely presented, whether or
not a resolution of the Senate of the Philippine Islands which
deprives an appointed senator of all his "prerogatives,
privileges, and emoluments for the period of one year"
amounts to an expulsion. If it does, then the resolution is
illegal, null, and void, and beyond the powers of the legislative
department of the Government and an unwarranted exercise of
the powers which belong to the Governor-General.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 5
The said resolution not only deprives the petitioner of all his
"prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for the period of one
year" but also deprives the people of his district, composed of
about one million persons, of any representation or
participation in the legislative, affairs of the government for a
period of one year, — a right which is guaranteed to them
under the constitution. Such a result was certainly not
contemplated by the provisions of the Jones Law. Certainly the
framers of the constitution of the Philippine Islands never
dreamed that when the Legislature of the Philippine Islands
was given the power to "punish" its members for misbehavior,
that such a power would ever be used as a guise for
"expelling" an appointive member.
The power to punish for misbehavior was intended purely as a
disciplinary measure. When a member of the Legislature is
removed either by the Governor-General or by the Legislature,
a vacancy exists, and the law gives the Governor-General the
right to appoint, and the people of the district the right to fill the
vacancy by election, so that the people may again, under
either case, be represented. A "suspension" of a member,
however, does not create a vacancy, and the people of the
district are without a representative and the Governor-General
cannot appoint one and the people cannot elect one during the
period of suspension. They are without representation during
that period. They are, for the period of suspension, taxed
without representation. If a member, under the power to
punish, can be suspended for one year, for the same reason
he may be suspended for ten or more years, thus depriving the
Governor-General of his right under the law, and the people of
the district, of a representative, and without a remedy in the
premises.
If the power "to punish for disorderly behavior" includes the
power to suspend or to deprive a member of all his rights, and
if the suspension is in effect a removal, then an appointed
member may be removed, under the power to punish, by a
mere majority, while the law requires a two-thirds majority to
remove an elective member. In other words, if under the power
to "punish," any member of the Legislature, including an
appointive member, may be in effect removed, then an elective
member may be removed by a majority vote only thus
encroaching upon the power of the executive department of
the government, as well as violating the powers conferred
upon the Legislature, because the Legislature cannot remove
an elective member except by two-thirds majority.
It is strenuously argued by the respondent that the resolution
depriving the petitioner "of all his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments for the period of one year" is not a removal from
his office but a mere suspension. The resolution does not use
the word "suspend" but does use the word "deprive." It
provides that the petitioner is "deprived" of all his prerogatives,
etc., for a period of one year. If that word means anything it
means that all of the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments
of the petitioner and the citizens whom he represents have
been taken from him and them. His prerogatives, privileges,
and emoluments constitute his right to be a member of the
Senate under his appointment, his right to represent the people
of his district, and his right to exercise all the duties and to
assume all the responsibilities pertaining to his office. His
emoluments constitute his right to receive his salary and the
benefits pertaining to his office as a senator. If a value can be
placed upon his prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and

if he has been deprived of them, then it must follow that they
have been removed from him, or that he has been removed
from them. At any rate, the resolution has separated the
petitioner and the people whom he represents and deprived
them of all of their prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for
the period of one year; and, for all intents and purposes, he
and the people whom he represents, have been deprived of
their prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, and in effect,
have been removed from any participation in the legislative
affairs of the government.
A great many cases have been studied on the question of
removal and suspension, and we are confident in the assertion
that the power to punish does not include the power to remove
or suspend. A suspension from an office or a deprivation of the
rights of an officer of all his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments, is in effect a deprivation or a removal from office
for the time mentioned in the order of suspension. It has been
held that a suspension from office for an indefinite time and
lasting for a period of six months, lost its temporary character,
ceased to be a suspension, and in effect became a removal
from such office. It was held, in the case of State vs. Chamber
of Commerce, that the suspension of a member was a
qualified expulsion, and that whether it was called a
suspension or expulsion or removal, it in effect disfranchised
the person suspended. In the case of Metsker vs. Nelly, it was
held that a suspension or a deprivation for either a definite or
indefinite period is in effect a removal. In the case of
Gregory vs. New York, it was held that the power to remove an
officer or punish him does not include the power to suspend
him temporarily from his office. A mere suspension would not
create a vacancy, and the anomalous and unfortunate
condition would exist of an office, — an officer, — but no
vacancy, and of no one whose right and duty it was to execute
the office. In the case of Commonwealth vs. Barry, it was
decided that to punish an officer for "disorderly behavior" such
misbehavior must be such as affects the performance of his
duties or the legal or ordinary procedure of the body of which
he is a member, and not disorderly behavior which affects his
character as a private individual.
In this connection it may be noted that the alleged
"misbehavior" on the part of the petitioner was committed
outside of the legislative halls and at a time when there was no
session of the Senate; that said alleged "misbehavior" did not
take place in or near the Senate chamber, nor cause any
disorder, disturbance, annoyance, or impediment whatever to
the orderly and dignified procedure of any session of the
Senate; that said "misbehavior" did not interfere in any manner
whatever with the honor, dignity, and efficiency, nor with the
orderly proceedings of the Senate; that the petitioner did not
know, at the time of the alleged "misbehavior," that he had
been admitted as a member of the Philippine Senate. The
question of his admission as a senator had been under
discussion for weeks theretofore.
Paragraph 2 of section 5 of the Constitution of the United
States provides that "each house may determined the rules of
its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member." That
provision of the Constitution of the United States is exactly the
language used in section 18 of the Jones Law, with the only
difference that the phrase "expel a member" in the Constitution
is changed in the Jones Law to "expel and elective member."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 6
That provision of the Constitution of the United States has
been enforced for a period of about one hundred forty years. It
will be noted that said provision of the Constitution of the
United States contains two provisions: (a) to punish and (b) to
expel.
An examination of the long history of the Congress of the
United States has been made for the purpose of ascertaining
how that august body has interpreted its powers under said
provisions. First, it may be said that the Congress of the United
States is perhaps as dignified a legislative body as that of any
of the states or territories of the United States. Its records have
been searched upon the question of its power to punish and
remove its members, and no case has been found — and it is
believed there are none — where Congress, under its power
topunish, has attempted to deprive a member of all his rights,
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for anytime
whatever, although many cases of removal have been found
under that power to remove. The power to  punish for
disorderly behavior has never been exercised further than to
impose a mere reprimand. We regard the fact that the
Congress of the United States has never exercised its power,
to  punish  for disorderly behavior, by depriving a member of all
of his rights, prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, as
strong proof that it did not believe that its power to punish
justified an order or resolution depriving a member of all of his
rights, prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments. Many cases
might be cited showing misbehavior of much more serious
character than that charged against the petitioner and where a
reprimand only was imposed.
SECOND. Jurisdiction to consider question.
Whether or not the courts will take jurisdiction of any action
whatever to interfere with, direct or control the action of either
the executive or legislative departments of the government, is
a question which has been presented to the courts many times
since the leading case of Marbury vs. Madison  was decided
([1803], 1 Cranch, [U. S.]., 137). In hundreds of cases which
have come before the courts since that time, the decisions
have been about equally divided. One line of decisions
indicates that the courts will never take jurisdiction to control,
order, or direct either the executive or legislative departments
of the government to perform or not to perform any particular
act expressly imposed upon or confined to them either by the
organic act or by statute. (Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord, 4
Wall. [U. S.], 475; Sutherland vs. Governor, 29 Mich., 320;
Hawkins vs. Governor, 1 Ark., 570; People vs. Bissell, 19 Ill.,
229; State vs. Governor, 22 La. Ann., 1; Rice vs. Governor, 27
Minn., 1; Vicksburg & Co. vs. Governor, 61 Miss., 102.)
The other line of decisions hold that the courts will take
jurisdiction to control, order and direct both the executive and
legislative departments of the government to do and to perform
what are generally termed purely ministerial duties imposed by
either the organic act or by statute. (Tennessee & Railway
Co. vs. Governor, 36 Ala., 371; Middleton vs. Governor, 30
Cal., 596; State vs. Governor, 72 Ind., 567; State vs. Governor,
5 Ohio State, 528.)
It is here confidently asserted that a careful study of the first
line of decisions will show, that each case might have been
decided upon the ground that the duty, the performance of

which was sought to be coerced, was one which was either
a discretionary or official duty of the respondent, and that the
doctrine relied upon, as announced in said cases, was
purely obiter dicta; that each of the first line of cases might
have been decided upon the ground that the performance of
the particular acts was entirely within the discretion or official
duty of the respondent and a question confided solely to them.
From an examination of all of the cases upon the question
before us, the following rule of law is accepted as
the general rule:
"That the executive, legislative, and judicial departments of the
government are distinct and independent, and neither is
responsible to the other for the performance of its duties, and
neither can enforce the performance of the duties of the other."
Exceptions or modifications of this general rule will be noted
later.
After a careful study of all the cases on the subject, we are of
the opinion that a fair summary of the power of the courts in
the premises may be stated under two heads as follows:
First. That the courts have jurisdiction to examine acts
"actually" taken by the executive or legislative departments of
the government when such acts affect the rights, privileges,
property, or lives of individuals.
Second. That the courts will not take jurisdiction to order,
coerce, or enjoin any act or acts of either the executive or
legislative departments of the government upon any question
or questions, the performance of which is confided by law to
said departments. The courts will not take jurisdiction until
some positive "action" is taken by the other coordinate
departments of the government.
With reference to the first proposition, we desire to say that,
while the courts hesitate, and rightfully so, to inquire into the
legality of the acts of the executive or legislative departments
of government, yet they are without discretionin the premises
in cases where it is alleged that a person is illegally deprived of
his life, liberty, or property by said departments. The law
makes no distinction with reference to the person or persons,
or departments or bureaus who are responsible for the illegal
and unlawful deprivation of the right of individuals in the state.
The mere fact that such alleged illegal deprivation of life, liberty
or property is caused by the chief executive or the legislative
department of the government, in the face of mandatory
provisions of the law, is no sufficient excuse or justification for
a refusal on the part of the courts to take jurisdiction for the
purpose of inquiring into such alleged illegal deprivation and to
make pronouncement thereon. Under the system of checks
and balances, by virtue of the existence of the different
departments of the government, in the Government of the
United States and its territories, it becomes the legal and
bounded duty of the courts to inquire into the legality, when
called upon so to do, of the acts of either of the other
departments of the government and to make pronouncements
thereon. (Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87;
Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534 [228 U.
S., 549]; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil., 41, 211 224;
Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil.,
1, 65; U. S. vs. Ten Yu, 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs.Board of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 7
Health and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus,
31 Phil., 218.)
There is no more sacred duty of the courts, when a case is
presented to them in which the life, liberty, or property of the
citizens of the state are involved, than that of maintaining,
unimpaired, those securities for the personal rights of the
individuals of the state which have been guaranteed to them by
the organic law of the land and which have received for ages
the sanction of the jurists and the statesmen of the civilized
nations of the world. In such cases no narrow or illiberal
construction should be given to the language of the
fundamental law of the state. (Ex parte Lang, 85 U. S., 163.)
Since the Constitution of the Philippine Islands is intended for
the observance of the judiciary as well as the other
departments of the government, and the judges are sworn to
support its provisions, they are not liberty to overlook or
disregard its command, and therefore when it is clear that a
statute or resolution of the Legislature transgresses the
authority vested by the Constitution in the Legislature, it is the
duty of the courts to declare the acts or resolutions
unconstitutional, and from that duty the courts cannot shrink
without violating their oath of office. (United States vs. Fisher, 2
Cranch [U. S.], 396; Darmouth College vs. Woodward, 4
Wheaton [U. S.], 518; Green vs. Biddle, 8 Wheaton [U. S.], 1.)
The duty of the courts to declare a law or resolution
unconstitutional, in a proper case, cannot be declined and
must be performed in accordance with the deliberate judgment
of the court. (Pollock vs. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S.,
429.) Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute
or resolution of the legislature is a judicial matter, the courts
will not decline to exercise jurisdiction upon the mere
suggestion that some action might be taken by the political
agencies of the government in disregard of the judgment of the
court. (McPherson vs. Blacker, 146 U. S., 869.)
The doctrine of the all omnipotent power of the legislature as
recognized by the Government of England, does not prevail in
the United States, and every law or resolution adopted by the
legislative department of the government must conform to the
constitution. When a statute or a resolution of the legislative
department exceeds the jurisdiction and powers of the
legislature, it is null and void.
The principle which permits courts to pronounce an act or
resolution of the legislature null and void, because it conflicts
with the provisions of the constitution, is a doctrine so well
established under constitutional governments that it seems
really unnecessary to discuss it here. It has been declared in
many cases that the power of the court to make
pronouncements upon the legality of acts or resolutions of the
legislative department, is the strongest barrier ever devised
against the tyrannies of political assemblies. The right to
construe the constitution and to apply it to particular laws or
resolution of the legislature must necessarily be lodged in
some department of the government to insure that practical
sanction to its mandates which are essential for the
preservation of their validity and force and the perpetuation of
stable and orderly government. The duty of the court to
maintain the constitution as the fundamental law of the state
and to permit no one to transgress its provisions, is imperative.

Whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, it is
the sworn duty of the courts so to adjudge. Any other course
would lead to the destruction of the fundamental law of the
state. It has been said by eminent jurists and authorities that
the judiciary should protect the rights of the people with great
care and jealousy, not only because it is its sworn duty, but
also because in times of great popular excitement the courts
are the last resort. (Gardner vs. Stephens, 2 Am. Rep., 700;
State vs. Peel Splint Co., 17 L. R. A., 385; Rathbone vs. Wirth,
34 L. R. A., 408; Wells vs. Mo. Railway Co., 15 L. R. A., 847;
State vs. Butler, 24 L. R. A., [N. S.], 744;
Sanders vs. Commonwealth, 111 Am. State Rep., 219;
State vs. Miller, 87 Ohio State, 12; Miller vs. Johnson, 15 L. R.
A., 524.)
The right and power of the courts to declare whether
enactments of the legislature exceed the constitutional
limitations and are invalid, has always been considered a
grave responsibility as well as a solemn duty, and its exercise
is, at all times, a matter of much delicacy, for, apart from the
necessity of avoiding conflicts between coordinate branches of
the government, it is often difficult to determine whether such
enactments are within the powers granted to or possessed by
the legislature. It has also been said that the power of the
courts to nullify acts of the legislature, as being in violation of
the constitution, is one of the highest functions and authorities
of the courts. (Nichol vs. Ames, 173 U. S., 509;
People vs. Henning Co., 260 Ill., 554; Edwards vs. Lesueur, 31
L. R. A., 815.)
The courts have no jurisdiction in matters of a purely political
nature which have been confided to the executive or legislative
department of the government, nor the power to interfere with
the duties of either of said departments, unless under special
circumstances and when it becomes necessary for the
protection of the rights, the life and the property of the
individuals of the state. (In re Sawyer, 124 U. S., 200;
Luther vs. Borden, 7 Howard [U. S.], 1; Mississippi vs. Johnson
and Ord, 4 Wall. [U. S.], 475.)
The jurisdiction of the courts over the acts of either of the other
departments is limited to cases where the acts of such
departments tend to deprive the citizens of their rights,
liberties, and property. To assume jurisdiction to control the
exercise of purely political rights, would be to invade the
domain of the other departments of the government.
(Fletcher vs. Tutle, 151 Ill., 41.)
We do not desire to be understood, however, as holding that
even political rights  are not a matter of judicial solicitude and
protection and that the appropriate judicial tribunal will not, in a
proper case, give a prompt and efficient protection to citizens.
(Muskrat vs. United States, 219 U. S., 346.)
In the case of Burnham vs. Morrissey (14 Gray [Mass.], 226),
Mr. Justice Hoar, later a United States Senator, said: "The
house of representatives is not the final  judge of its own
powers and privileges in cases in which the rights and liberties
of the subject are concerned; but the legality of its action may
be examined and determined by this court. . . . Especially is it
competent and proper for this court to consider whether its
(legislature's) proceedings are in conformity with the
constitution and laws, because, living under a written
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 8
constitution no branch or department of the department is
supreme; and it is the province and duty of the judicial
department to determine, in cases regularly brought before
them, whether the powers of any branch of the government
and even those of the legislature in the enactment of laws (or
resolutions), have been exercised in conformity with the
constitution; and if they have not been, to treat their acts as
null and void.
The house of representatives has the power, under
the constitution, to imprison for contempt; but this
power is limited to cases expressly provided for by the
constitution, or to cases where the power is
necessarily implied from those constitutional functions
and duties, to the proper performance of which it is
essential. . . .
The doctrine of the omnipotence of either the executive or
legislative department of government has long since been
denied, and has no place under the American flag.
Of course, when a discretionary power is conferred, with the
right to act or not to act, and when the discretion is honestly
exercised and not abused, then the official or department is
relieved from personal responsibility; but when action is taken,
and an individual of the state is thereby deprived, illegally, of
his life, liberty or property, his remedy to be restored to his
rights is properly submitted to the courts. In every case where
the courts are called upon to exercise their original jurisdiction
to question the illegality of action already taken  by the
legislative or executive department of the government, they will
not do so upon a mere formal or colorable showing either as to
the parties or subject-matter. The courts will look through the
form to the real character or substance of the alleged illegal
act. (Wisconsin vs. Insurance Co., 127 U. S., 265;
Louisiana vs. Texas, 176 U. S., 1; Oklahoma vs. Railway Co.,
220 U. S., 277.)
A statute or a resolution of the legislative department of the
government which deprives a citizen of the rights guaranteed
to him by the Organic Law of the land is null and void.
(Harrison vs. Railway Co., 232 U. S., 318; Terral vs. Burke &
Co., 257 U. S., 529.)
Decision of the highest courts, without number, may be cited in
support of the rule "that all governmental officers, departments
or agencies are subject to judicial restraint when they act in
excess  of their authority either statutory or constitutional, by
virtue of which citizens are deprived of their rights."
(Osborn vs. U. S. Bank, 9 Wheaton [U. S.], 739; Board of
Liquidation vs. McComb, 92 U. S., 531; United States vs. Lee,
106 U. S., 196; Virginia Cases, 114 U. S., 311;
Regan vs. Farmers & Co., 154 U. S., 362; Smith vs. Ames, 169
U. S., 466; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S., 123; Philadelphia
Co. vs. Stimson, 223 U. S., 605.)
CHECKS AND BALANCES
The three great departments of the government — the
executive, legislative, and judicial — were created for the
purpose of "checks and balances." Under the Organic Law of
the Philippine Islands the executive power of the states is

conferred upon the Governor-General. The legislative power is
vested in the Senate and House of Representatives. The
judicial power is vested in the courts. The three great branches
of the government are separate and distinct, but are coequal
and coordinate. Their powers have been carefully apportioned.
The legislature makes the laws, the courts construe them and
adjudge as to the rights of persons to life, liberty, and property
thereunder, while the executive department executes the laws
and the judgments of the courts. Each department, in its own
sphere, is in a sense independent. Each operates as a check
or restraint upon the other. The Acts of the legislative
department have to be presented to the executive department
for its approval. The executive department may disapprove the
Acts of the legislature if in its judgment they are not in
conformity with the organic law of the state or if in their
enforcement they might work a hardship upon the people. The
judicial department is authorized to construe and interpret the
Acts of the legislature. The judicial department is authorized to
determine the validity of the Acts of the legislature under the
constitution. The executive department may also set aside the
judgments of the judicial department and modify the action of
the courts by the interposition of its pardoning power. The
legislative department may also recall, modify, or annul
decisions of the courts if in its judgment the interpretation given
to a law by the courts is not in harmony with the general policy
of the state, by the enactment of a new law or by
an amendment of the old, giving its such a nondisputed
meaning and interpretation as to clearly wipe out the decisions
of the judicial department.
Thus, we have the checks and balances known under the
American form of government. But in every case in which one
department controls, modifies, or influences the action of
another, it acts strictly within its own sphere, thus giving no
occasion for conflict and thus preserving the purpose of the
original scheme of a division of powers among the three great
coordinate branches of government, each operating as a
restraint upon the other, but still in harmony.
By the use of the power of veto and or pardoning, the
executive department may annul and set aside absolutely the
action of both the legislative and judicial departments. The
legislative department may, by adopting a new law or by
amendment or by passing a law over the veto of the executive
department, annul, recall, and set aside the action of both the
executive and judicial departments. But it must be observed
that when the judicial department inquires into an act of either
the executive or legislative departments for the purpose or
determining the legality of such acts, it is not because it desires
to impose its own opinions upon such departments nor to
examine into the wisdom or advisability of a particular act or
statute, but simply because said departments have acted in a
way which is forbidden by the fundamental law of the land and
because the will of the people, as declared in such
fundamental law, is paramount and must be obeyed even by
the legislative and executive departments. In pronouncing a
statute of the legislature illegal or an act of the executive
department beyond its powers, the courts are simply
interpreting the meaning, force and application o the
fundamental law of the state.
If the doctrine that the different departments — executive,
legislative and judicial — are absolutely independent and one
can never interfere to control or restrain, modify or annul, the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 9
action of the other, then the very purpose of the organization of
the three departments for "checks and balances" would be
defeated. (Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser, 24 Phil., 250;
U. S. vs. Joson, 26 Phil., 1, 64; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31
Phil., 218, 225, 228; Tajanlangit vs.Peñaranda, 37 Phil., 155;
Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883, 899;
Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of
Occidental Negros, 16 Phil., 366; U. S. vs. Bull., 15 Phil., 7;
Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; Concepcion vs. Paredes,
42 Phil., 599; Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cranch [U. S.], 137, 152,
170, 172.)
The following are among the leading cases in which the courts
have taken jurisdiction for the purpose of determining the
legality or illegality of acts, or orders or resolutions of the
executive and legislative departments:
First. Acts of the Executive Department of the Government —
(a) Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson (5 Phil., 87),
where the action of the Governor-General was
pronounced legal;
(b) Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16 Phil.,
534; 228 U. S., 549) where the action of the
Governor-General was pronounced legal;
(c) In re McCulloch Dick (38 Phil., 41, 62, 63, 109,
211, 244), where the action of the Governor-General
was pronounced legal;
(d) Borromeo vs. Mariano (41 Phil., 322), where the
action of the Governor-General was pronounced
illegal.
Second. Acts of the Legislative Department of the
Government —
(a) Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599), where the
act of the legislative department was pronounced
illegal;
(b) Kilbourn vs. Thompson (103 U. S., 168, 181, 199),
where the act of the one branch of the Congress of
the United States was held illegal.
Referring to the second "Summary of the Powers of the
Courts" above, it may be said that in this jurisdiction the
doctrine is now well established, that, until the executive or
legislative department has taken some steps or has acted
upon some question, the courts will neither undertake to
compel action nor to restrain action in said departments. It is
only when said departments have acted and their acts
detrimentally affect the interest of the citizen, that the courts
will inquire into the legality or constitutionality of such acts.
(Barcelon vs. Baker and Thompson, 5 Phil., 87;
Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil., 534;
Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil., 322; Perfecto vs. Wood, R. G.
No. 208671; Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612.)

The judicial department of the government will not attempt to
intervene or control or direct or command any action whatever
upon any subject which has been specifically confided by law
to the other departments, until they have taken some action
which tends to and does establish some theory or policy
contrary to the organic law of the land, or has deprived some
citizen of his life, liberty, property, or privilege granted to him by
the organic law. Under such facts, the judicial department is,
under the law, bound to take jurisdiction and to make
pronouncements thereon. In such cases it becomes the legal
and bounden duty of the courts to inquire into the legality or
illegality of the acts of the other departments of the government
and to declare what the law is and what the rights of the parties
are. When such a case is presented to the courts, its
responsibility to the people of the state, under the law,
demands that a thorough investigation of the facts be made
and of the rights of the parties under the law, and to make a
pronouncement, without reference to the fact whether or not
the court have the proper machinery for the purpose of
enforcing their conclusions and judgments.
The following are among the cases holding that the courts will
not intervene for the purpose of compelling or directing any
action on the part of the executive or legislative departments of
the government with reference to any duty or obligation
specifically confided to said departments:
First. Acts of the Executive Department of the Government —
(a) Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial
Board of Occidental Negros, 16 Phil., 366;
(b) Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612;
(c) Sutherland vs. Governor, 29 Mich., 320;
(d) Hawkins vs. Governor, 1 Ark., 570;
(e) People vs. Bissell, 19 Ill., 229.
Second. Acts of the Legislative Department of
Government —
Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil., 612.
In view of the foregoing arguments and citation of authorities
and inasmuch as the petitioner alleges that by
an actor resolution of the Senate of the Philippine Islands he
has been deprived of his prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments for a period of one year, which have been granted
to him by the organic law of the land, through the officers and
employees of the Senate, we are of the opinion, and so decide,
that under such allegations the court is not only justified, but
authorized and compelled under the duties and powers
conferred upon it, to take jurisdiction of the petition for the
purpose of examining into the question whether or not the
petitioner has been deprived of any rights granted to him under
the Constitution of the Philippine Islands.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 10
Are the facts stated in the petition and admitted by the
demurrer sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and do they
justify the court in taking jurisdiction of the case?
The petitioner alleges that he is a Senator of the Philippine
Islands legally appointed by the Governor-General under the
provisions of section 16 of the Jones Law; that by virtue of said
appointment he is given all the rights of a senator, with all the
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments thereunto belonging;
that he has, as such senator, the right to continue to serve the
people of his district; that he has the right to be and act as a
member of the Senate until removed by the Governor-General;
that he has been deprived of the right to act as a senator and
has been removed as such senator by the respondents and
thereby deprived of a right conferred upon him by law and of all
of the rights, prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments
belonging to him as a citizen of the Philippine Islands and as a
member of the Senate; that the citizens of his district have
been deprived of their right to be represented and to participate
in the affairs of their government; that unless the said
resolution of the Senate be pronounced illegal, null, and void,
he will be unable to exercise the rights of a citizen and a
senator and to enjoy the prerogatives, privileges, and
emoluments to him rightfully belonging; that by becoming a
member of the Senate he has not lost his rights as a citizen;
that he is still entitled to be protected in all of his rights and
privileges as a citizen under the law; that the punishment
imposed by said resolution is one created after the alleged
grounds for suspension had occurred; that the punishment
imposed is quasi-criminal; that no punishment for his acts had
been prescribed as is expressly provided under the substantive
law of the Philippine Islands; that the punishment provided for
in said resolution of the 5th day of February, 1924, was ex post
facto and is illegal and void under section 3 of the Organic
Law, in that his acts were pronounced to be illegal by said
resolution long after they had been committed; that the
respondents were without authority of law to remove him as a
member of the Senate; that the Governor-General only has the
authority to remove him; that the alleged acts for which he has
been suspended were not committed in or near the Senate
chamber; that they in no way tended to or did interfere with the
orderly procedure of the Senate and therefore cannot be
regarded as "disorderly behavior;" that the Senate has no right
the
or authority to suspend or remove one of its members for
disorderly behavior unless and until such disorderly behavior
tends to and does interfere with, hamper or impede the legal
and orderly procedure of the body; that while it requires a two-
thirds vote of the Senate to expel its elective members, he has
been removed, contrary to law, by the Senate, when the
Governor-General is the only authority who can remove him;
that if the Senate can remove him under the power to punish,
then an appointive member can be removed by a majority vote,
while it requires a two-thirds majority vote to remove an
elective member; and, for all of the foregoing reasons, the
petitioner and the people of his district have been deprived of
their rights, privileges, prerogatives, and emoluments by
an actual act or resolution of the Senate, which is contrary to
law, and that he is entitled to have a pronouncement of his
rights made by the courts and to be restored to his rights,
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of which he has been
so illegally deprived.
The Constitution of the Philippine Islands, the Organic Act
(Jones Law) provides: "That no law shall be enacted which

deprives any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, or deny to person therein the equal protection
of the laws." That provision of law is equally binding upon each
department of government. "Due process of law" cannot be
used as a cloak for depriving a citizen of his rights when the
procedure is based upon a illegal or unconstitutional act or
resolution.
Under the American form of government, the executive,
legislative, and judicial departments are coequal and co-
important. But it does not follow that the judiciary, the
constitutional duty of which is to declare and interpret the
supreme law of the land, has not the power to declare a law or
a resolution, passed by the legislature or either of its branches,
unconstitutional. The will of the people, as expressed in their
constitution, is the paramount law and controls every and each
department of the government. The judiciary, under its powers
to interpret the constitution and the laws, has the duty and the
right to declare what the will of the people is, as expressed in
the fundamental law of the land. Hence, where the acts of the
executive or legislative departments violate the will of the
people as expressed in the organic law of the land, it is the
sworn duty of the judiciary to interpret and to declare that the
will of the people and the right of a citizen has been violated
and transgressed.
While the imposition of a disciplinary measure by the
legislature or either branch thereof upon one of its members for
an offense committed against its dignity may be regarded as a
matter of internal concern only of that body, over which the
other departments may not exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the
separation established by the fundamental law, it does not
follow that the legislature, in imposing disciplinary measure,
has not or may not overstep its own powers as limited or
defined by the Organic Law. The legislative department of the
government cannot, under the guise of a resolution imposing
disciplinary measure, transgress the constitution, and when it
does, its acts cease to be a mere internal concern. Even the
members of the legislature have their rights under the
constitution. They have not lost the fundamental rights to their
life, liberty, and privileges as citizens by becoming members of
the legislative department of the government.
The argument of the respondents leads to the conclusion that
under their power to punish they may impose any punishment
which their wish, whim, prejudice, or caprice may dictate. That
contention will hardly withstand the scrutiny of modern
civilization.
The respondents defend upon the ground that they are
absolutely immune from judicial inquiry; that the courts have no
power or authority to inquire into the acts of the executive or
legislative branches of the government, however clear it may
be made to appear that such departments do not possess the
power or authority exercised. The fact is evidently overlooked
by them that the provision of the Jones Law above quoted is
as binding upon them as it is upon any department, bureau, or
person in the government. The provisions of the Jones Law, for
the security of the rights of the citizen, stand in the same
connection and upon the same ground as they do in regard to
his liberty and his property. It cannot be denied that both were
intended to be enforced by the judicial department of the
government. As has been said, the writ of habeas corpus has
been often used to defend the liberty of the citizen, and even
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 11
his life, against the exercise of unlawful authority on the part of
the executive and legislative branches of the government.
No man, individual, department, bureau, or officer in the
Philippine Islands, under the Jones Law, is so high that he is
above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at
defiance with impunity. All officers of the government, from the
highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law, and are bound
to obey it. The Philippine Government is a government by law
and not a government by the whim or caprice of any individual
or department. It (the law) is the only supreme power in our
system of government; and every man who, by accepting an
office by appointment or election, participates in its function, is
only the more strongly bound to that supremacy (the law) and
to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of
the authority which it (the law) gives. Courts of justice are
established, not only to decide upon the controverted rights of
the citizens as against each other, but also upon rights and
controversies between them and the government, and the
dockets of the courts are not without cases containing
controversies of the latter class.
Shall it be said, in the face of the provisions of the Jones Law,
and of the acknowledged right of the judicial department of the
government to decide in proper cases, that statutes which
have been passed by both branches of the Legislature and
approved by the Governor-General are illegal and
unconstitutional, and that said department cannot give a
remedy when the citizen has been deprived of his life or
property without lawful authority and without due
compensation, simply because the executive or legislative
department has ordered it? If that is the law in the Philippines it
sanctions a tyranny which has no existence in the monarchies
of Europe nor in any other government which has a just claim
to a well-regulated liberty and the protection of the personal
rights, privileges, life, and property of the individual.
Can it be said that the judicial department of the government
can intervene in a petition for the writ of habeas corpus to
relieve a citizen who has been imprisoned, illegally, and cannot
take jurisdiction in proper proceedings to consider the question
whether or not he has been deprived of his  property  even
though such deprivation has been brought about by an illegal
act or resolution of the Legislature, or by an order of the
executive department of the government? Here again we are
of the opinion that the question contains its own answer to the
average citizen.
We cannot give our assent to the doctrine that the Senate or
House of Representatives is the final judge of its own powers
and privileges, without restraint, especially in cases in which
the rights, privileges, emoluments, property, and liberties of a
citizen are concerned. The legality of their action may always
be examined and determined by the courts. Especially are the
courts competent, and it is proper for them to consider whether
the proceedings of the legislative department of the
government are in conformity with the laws and the
constitution of the land, because, living under a written
constitution, no branch or department of the government is
supreme; and it is not only the province, but the sworn duty, of
the judicial department, to determine in cases regularly brought
before it, whether the powers of any branch of the government,
even those of the legislature in the enactment of laws or
resolutions, have been exercised in conformity with the organic

law of the land, if they have not, to treat such acts or
resolutions as null and void.
All of the foregoing arguments are intended to apply only to
cases in which some action has been taken, which illegally
deprives a citizen of his rights, privileges, prerogatives, and
emoluments. Nothing herein is intended to modify in the
slightest degree the decisions heretofore announced in the
cases of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board
of Occidental Negros, Perfecto vs. Wood, and Abueva vs.
Wood, above cited. In those cases the courts were called upon
to require one or both of the other two coordinate departments
to act in a particular way upon questions which were specially
confided to those departments, while in the present case the
courts are called upon to decide whether or not the action
which the legislative department of the government has taken
is legal and in conformity with the powers conferred by the
organic law of the land. A wide distinction must be made
between requiring a particular act to be done and a
pronouncement upon the legality of that act after it is
performed. The courts will not require the legislative
department of the government to adopt a particular law, but
they are authorized and empowered, and it is their sworn duty
to pronounce a statute null and void after adoption if the same
is found to be contrary to the provisions of the organic law of
the land and beyond the powers of the legislative department.
This doctrine is amply exemplified in the thousands of cases
which have been brought before the courts in petitions
for habeas corpus where the petitioner alleged that he has
been imprisoned under an unconstitutional law and in many,
many cases where men have been deprived of their rights and
property by an illegal and unconstitutional act adopted by the
legislature. In the first class of cases mentioned, the courts will
never interfere in this jurisdiction to direct or coerce action,
while in the second class of cases the courts should always
take jurisdiction for the purpose of determining and making
pronouncements upon the legality and constitutionality of acts
actually taken.
In view of the facts and the law, we are compelled to decide
that we are justified, authorized, and, under our oath of office,
compelled to take jurisdiction of the petition for the purpose of
ascertaining whether or not the petitioner has been deprived,
illegally, of a right guaranteed to him under the Constitution
and laws of the Philippine Islands. In exercising the high
authority conferred upon us to pronounce valid or invalid a
particular resolution or statute of the legislature, we are only
the administrators of the public will as expressed in the
fundamental law of the land. If an act of the legislature is to be
held illegal by the courts, it is not because the judges have any
control over the legislature, but because the particular statute
or resolution is forbidden by the fundamental law of the land,
and because the will of the people, as declared in such
fundamental law, is paramount and must be obeyed by every
citizen, even the Legislature. In pronouncing a statute or
resolution illegal, we are simply interpreting the meaning, force,
and application of the fundamental law of the state. If a
particular resolution or statute of the legislature is within its
constitutional power, it will be sustained, whether the courts
agree or not in the wisdom of its enactment. If the resolution or
statute covers a subject not authorized by the fundamental law
of the land, then the courts are not only authorized but are
compelled and justified in pronouncing the same illegal and
void, no matter how wise or beneficient such resolution or
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 12
statute may seem to be. The courts will not measure their
opinion with the opinion of the legislative department, as
expressed in the resolution or statute, upon the question of the
wisdom, justice, and advisability of a particular law, but the
wisdom, justice, and advisability of a particular law must be
tested by the provisions of the fundamental law of the state. It
is the sworn duty of the judicial department of the government
to determine the limits, under the law and the constitution, of
the authority of both the executive and legislative departments.
THIRD. May the Supreme Court grant the remedy prayed for?
In the Government of the Philippine Islands no man is so high
that he is above the law. All the officers of the government,
from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law and are
bound to obey it. It cannot be said, in view of the acknowledge
right of the judicial department of the government to pass upon
the constitutionality of statutes or resolutions of the legislative
department, that the courts cannot give a remedy to a citizen of
the state when he has been illegally deprived of his life, his
property, or his liberty by force, or by virtue of an
unconstitutional act or resolution of the legislative department.
A contrary conclusion would sanction a tyranny under the
American flag, which has no existence even in the monarchies
nor in any other government which has a just claim to a stable
government, a well-regulated liberty, and the protection of the
personal rights of individuals. Every department, every
officer of the government, and every individual, are equally
bound by the mandatory provisions of the fundamental law.
When a citizen under the American flag has been deprived of
his life, his liberty, or his property by an illegal statute or
resolution, the official or department so depriving him cannot
say to the courts: "Stop here, for the reason that I (we)
have acted as a representative of a different department of the
government."
A pronouncement, by the highest tribunal of justice in the
Philippine Islands, that the resolution is ultra vires, illegal, and
void, we confidently believe, will be sufficient to cause an
immediate revocation of the same, and the adoption of a
further order to the effect that all persons affected by it will be
restored to their rights. We are confident in that belief, because
we cannot believe that the resolution was adopted out of a
spirit of malice, hatred, or revenge, but in the full belief that the
law permitted it as a disciplinary measure. We cannot believe
that the honorable senators who took part in its adoption
intended to deprive any of the citizens of their county of the
constitutional right. We are confident that the honorable
senators recognize, as fully as the courts do, that the
constitution is the supreme law of the land and is equally
binding upon them as it is upon every citizen, high or low, and
upon every branch, bureau, or department of the government.
We are sure that the respondents will be among the very first
to openly criticize and vigorously denounce any person, entity,
or department within the Philippine Islands, who should be
guilty of the slightest disregard or disobedience to the
mandates of the constitution — the law of the people.
The majority opinion decides that the petitioner and the people
whom he represents have been illegally deprived of their
rights, but that he and they are without a remedy — damnum
absque injuria. To that doctrine we cannot give our assent.

The nightmare which runs through the majority opinion
concerning the impossibility of the execution of a judgment, is
hardly justified in a stable and well-organized government,
among a people who love peace and good order, who despise
disobedience to law and disloyalty to the constituted
authorities. The history of the Filipino people shows that they
love peace, good order, and will, with a spirit of alacrity, obey
the law when they once understand what the law is. We rest in
the confident faith that spirit still controls in the Philippine
Islands. The remedy prayed for should be granted in a
modified form.
RESUME
1. The Organic Law (Jones Law) prohibits the removal of an
appointive senator by the Legislature.
2. The said resolution has the effect of a removal of an
appointive senator.
3. The resolution, therefore, is invalid, illegal, and void,
according to the unanimous opinion of the court.
4. The legislative power and procedure of the Senate must be
exercised in conformity with the Organic Law.
5. The courts have jurisdiction to inquire into the legality or
constitutionality of a law or resolution of the legislative
department, whenever a citizen alleges that he has been
deprived of his rights under such law or resolution.
6. The courts of the Philippine Islands have jurisdiction to
determine the constitutionality of acts or resolutions or
procedure of the Senate.
7. The petition and demurrer present the question of the
constitutionality of said resolution, as well as the constitutional
power of the Senate to adopt it.
8. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, having
jurisdiction, its decree or order should afford relief from the
effect of said illegal resolution.
Therefore, the enforcement of the said illegal and void
resolution should be enjoined.
OSTRAND, J.,  dissenting:
With much of what is said in the majority opinion I am in entire
accord. I agree that the Senate in suspending the petitioner,
declaring his pay forfeited and depriving his senatorial district
of the representation granted by the Organic Act, exceeds its
powers and jurisdiction. I also concede that the courts will not,
by mandamus or other writs, attempt to control the exercise by
the other departments of the government of discretional or
executive powers or duties conferred upon them by the
constitution or by constitutional statutes. I further concede that
the courts will not interfere with acts of another department
when such acts are of a purely political and non-justiciable
character.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 13
But when the court holds, as it in effects does in this case, that
because the respondents are members of officers of another
department the courts have no power to restrain or prohibit
them from carrying into effect an unconstitutional and therefore
void act of that department, an act wholly outside of its
province, and which deprives a citizen of rights and privileges
to which he, by law, is entitled, I find myself unable to follow its
reasoning or to yield my assent to its conclusions.
Before entering upon a more extended discussion of the issues
in the case, it may be well to emphasize that there is here no
question as to the power of the Philippine Senate to punish its
members for disorderly behavior. That is conceded. But I
contend that the court may intervene to prevent the execution
of the penalty imposed if such penalty transcends the domain
of the Legislature and encroaches upon that of the Chief
Executive in direct violation of the Organic Act. I shall also
maintain that the assertion in the majority opinion to the effect
that this, in substance, is an action against the Senate as a
body, is erroneous.
The fundamental error into which the court has fallen is that it
has failed to note the distinction between acts within the
province of a department and those outside thereof; it confuses
entire absence of power with the alleged improper exercise of
legitimate powers. This distinction is obvious and very
important. Where a power or duty has been entrusted to the
Chief Executive by the Organic Act, this court will not, under
the rule laid down in the case of Severino vs. Governor-
General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros (16 Phil.,
366), attempt to control or direct the exercise by him of that
power or duty; he is presumed to be the best judge of the time
and the manner of its exercise. For the same reason, the court
will not undertake to direct the exercise of the discretional
powers of the legislative department within its legitimate
sphere. But it must necessarily be otherwise where either
department steps outside of its province and arrogates to itself
any of the constitutional powers of the other. The doctrine of
non-interference by the judiciary with the other departments of
the government rests primarily on the ground that each
department is presumed to possess special qualifications and
opportunities for the exercise of the powers entrusted to it by
the constitution. It follows that the doctrine does not apply to
cases where a department goes beyond its legitimate sphere.
This is, indeed, the first time any court has ever held that in
such cases there may be no judicial interference. (Bailey
on Mandamus, p. 926.)
That the court has overlooked this distinction is very apparent
from the fact that in all of the cases cited in support of its
conclusion, the acts complained of were within the province of
the respondents and that in none of them is there any question
of the encroachment by one department upon the domain of
another. It is very true that in some of the cases dicta are to be
found which, taken by themselves alone and without reference
to the context, may, at first sight, lead to the inference that the
separation of the various departments of the government is so
complete that the courts, under no circumstances, will
review any act of the Legislature or the Executive, irrespective
of its character, but when the cases where such dicta occur are
closely examined, this impression disappears and it becomes
obvious that the dicta have no reference to acts of clear
usurpation of powers.

Five of the cases cited relate to judicial review of the exercise
of the legislative powers. In the first of these cases, Hiss vs.
Bartlett ([1853], 69 Mass., 468), a habeas corpus proceeding, it
was held that the House of Representatives of Massachusetts
had the implied power to expel a member and that the reasons
for the expulsion, and the question whether a member was
duly heard before being expelled, could not be inquired into by
the courts.
French vs. Senate ([1905], 146 Cal., 604), was a proceeding
in mandamus. The Constitution of the State of California
expressly gives either house of the Legislature authority to
expel members by a two-thirds majority vote. The petitioners
had been so expelled from the Senate but alleged that it had
been done without due process of law and therefore asked that
the Senate be compelled to again admit them as members.
The court denied the writ holding that the judicial department
had no power "to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair
action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof,
taken in pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that
department by the Constitution."
State vs. Bolte ([1899], 151 Mo., 362), was a suit for a writ
of mandamus to compel the presiding officer and the secretary
of the State Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and its chief clerk, to take the necessary steps
to complete the enactment of a certain bill, it being alleged that
it had already passed both houses by a majority vote. The
petition was resisted on the ground that the presiding officer of
the Senate had ruled that the bill did not pass the Senate and
that the court had no jurisdiction to review the ruling. The court
held that the duty the performance of which it was sought to
enforce was one strictly within the line of the duties of the
presiding officer of the Senate and was not merely ministerial.
The writ was therefore denied.
The case of Ex-parte Echols ({[1886], 89 Ala., 698), was a
petition by one of the members of the State Legislature for a
writ of mandamus to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to compel him to send a certain bill to the
Senate. The Speaker ruled that the bill had not passed the
house with the requisite majority of votes and therefore refused
to certify it to the Senate. The petition was denied, the court
stating that it would not "interfere with either of the coordinate
departments of the government in the legitimate exercise of
their jurisdiction and powers."
There is, as far as I can see, absolutely nothing in these cases
which can have any direct bearing on the present case. In two
of them the question before the court was the alleged abuse of
constitutional powers resting in the Legislature; the other three
were actions to compel the performance of duties entrusted by
law to the Legislature or its officers and which were not merely
ministerial. In all of them the Legislature operated within its
own domain.
The other cases cited to the same point in the majority opinion
are actions directed against chief executives. The two most
favorable to the majority of the court are
Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord (4 Wall., 475) and
Sutherland vs.Governor (29 Mich., 320). The facts of the first
case are stated in the majority opinion and need not be
restated here. But the portions quoted from the decision in that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 14
case should be read in connection with the following quotation
from the same decision, which I think forms its real basis:
The single point which requires consideration is this:
Can the President be restrained by injunction from
carrying into effect an Act of Congress alleged to be
unconstitutional?
It is assumed by the counsel of the State of
Mississippi, that the President, in the execution of the
Reconstruction Acts, is required to perform a mere
ministerial duty. In this assumption there is, we think,
a confounding of the terms `ministerial' and
`executive,' which are by no means equivalent in
import.
A ministerial duty, the performance of which may, in
proper cases, be required of the head of the
department, by judicial process, is one in respect to
which nothing is left to discretion. It is a simple,
definite duty, arising under conditions admitted or
proved to exist, and imposed by law.
xxx           xxx           xxx
Very different is the duty of the President in the
exercise of the power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed, and among these laws the Acts
named in the bill. By the first of these Acts he is
required to assign generals to command in the
several military districts, and to detail sufficient
military force to enable such officers to discharge their
duties under the law. By the supplementary Act, other
duties are imposed on the several commanding
generals, and these duties must necessarily be
performed under the supervision of the President as
Commander-in-Chief. The duty thus imposed on the
President is in no just sense ministerial. It is purely
executive and political.
Considering the language here quoted, it is difficult to regard
the first paragraph of the quotation from the same decision in
the majority opinion as anything but dictum. In any event, if it is
to be taken as authority for the proposition that the United
States Supreme Court may prevent officers or members of
Congress from carrying into effect an unconstitutional
resolution, it is definitely overruled by the decision in the case
of Kilbourn vs. Thompson(103 U. S., 168), in which the court
held that an action would lie against the Speaker and other
officers of the House of Representatives of Congress for
attempting to carry into effect an unconstitutional resolution of
the house committing Kilbourn to prison for contempt. The
court further held that "the House of Representatives (of
Congress) is not the final judge of its own power and privileges
in cases in which the rights and liberties of the subject are
concerned, but the legality of its action may be examined and
determined by this court."
The case of Sutherland vs. Governor, supra, is the leading
case in favor of the view that all official acts of the chief
executive of a State are executive as distinguished from
ministerial and therefore not subject to judicial review. The

case represents the extreme limit to which courts have gone in
that direction and its soundness has been questioned by most
authorities on the subject, but because of the high reputation of
the writer of the decision, Judge Cooley, it is, nevertheless,
entitled to consideration.
The case was a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the
Governor of Michigan to issue a certificate of the completion of
the construction of the Portage Lake and Lake Superior Ship
Canal. The statutes required the governor to issue the
certificate when he should be satisfied that the work had been
done in conformity with the law. The duty devolving upon the
governor was therefore clearly discretional and this was
recognized by the court, but Judge Cooley preferred to plant
the decision on additional and broader grounds, which may
best be stated in the language of the court:
. . . There is no very clear and palpable line of
distinction between those duties of the governor
which are political and those which are to be
considered ministerial merely; and if we should
undertake to draw one, and to declare that in all
cases falling on one side the line the governor was
subject to judicial process, and in all falling on the
other he was independent of it, we should open the
doors to an endless train of litigation, and the cases
would be numerous in which neither the governor nor
the parties would be able to determine whether his
conclusion was, under the law, to be final, and the
courts would be appealed to by every dissatisfied
party to subject a coordinate department of the
government to their jurisdiction. However desirable a
power in the judiciary to interfere in such cases might
seem from the standpoint of interested parties, it is
manifest that harmony of action between the
executive and judicial departments would be directly
threatened, and that the exercise of such power could
only be justified on most imperative reasons.
Moreover, it is not customary in our republican
government to confer upon the governor duties
merely ministerial, and in the performance of which he
is to be left to no discretion whatever; and the
presumption in all cases must be, where a duty is
devolved upon the chief executive of the State rather
than upon an inferior officer, that it is so because this
superior judgment, discretion, and sense of
responsibility were confided in for a more accurate,
faithful, and discreet performance than could be relied
upon if the duty were devolved upon an officer chosen
for inferior duties. And if we concede that cases may
be pointed out in which it is manifest that the governor
is left to no discretion, the present is certainly not
among them, for here, by law, he is required to judge,
on a personal inspection of the work, and must give
his certificate on his own judgment, and not on that of
any other person, officer, or department.
We are not disposed, however, in the present case, to
attempt on any grounds to distinguish it from other
cases of executive duty with a view to lay down a
narrow rule which, while disposing of this motion, may
leave the grave question it presents to be presented
again and again in other cases which the ingenuity of
counsel may be able to distinguish in some minor
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 15
particulars from the one before us. If a broad general
principle underlies all these cases, and requires the
same decision in all, it would scarcely be respectful to
the governor, or consistent with our own sense of
duty, that we should seek to avoid its application and
strive to decide each in succession upon some
narrow and perhaps technical point peculiar to the
special case, if such might be discovered.
And that there is such a broad general principle
seems to us very plain. Our government is one whose
powers have been carefully apportioned among three
distinct departments, which emanate alike from the
people, have their powers alike limited and defined by
the constitution, are of equal dignity, and within their
respective spheres of action equally independent.
One makes the laws, another applies the laws in
contested cases, while the other must see that the
laws are executed. This division is accepted as a
necessity in all free governments, and the very
apportionment of power to one department is
understood to be a prohibition of its exercise by either
of the others. The executive is forbidden to exercise
judicial power by the same implication which forbids
the courts to take upon themselves his duties.
It is true that neither of the departments can operate
in all respects independently of the others, and that
what are called the checks and balances of
government constitute each a restraint upon the rest.
The legislature prescribes rules of action for the
courts, and in many particulars may increase or
diminish their jurisdiction; it also, in many cases, may
prescribe rules for executive action, and impose
duties upon, or take powers from the governor; while
in turn the governor may veto legislative acts, and the
courts may declare them void where they conflict with
the constitution, notwithstanding, after having been
passed by the legislature, they have received the
governor's approval. But in each of these cases the
action of the department which controls, modifies, or
in any manner influences that of another, is had
strictly within its own sphere, and for that reason gives
no occasion for conflict, controversy, or jealousy. The
legislature in prescribing rules for the courts, is acting
within its proper province in making laws, while the
courts, in declining to enforce an unconstitutional law,
are in like manner acting within their proper province,
because they are only applying that which is law to
the controversies in which they are called upon to
give judgment. It is mainly by means of these checks
and balances that the officers of the several
departments are kept within their jurisdiction, and if
they are disregarded in any case, and power is
usurped or abused, the remedy is by impeachment,
and not by another department of the government
attempting to correct the wrong by asserting a
superior authority over that which by the constitution
is its equal.
It has long been a maxim in this country that the
legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their
judgments shall be, or set aside or alter such
judgments after they have been rendered. If it could,

constitutional liberty would cease to exist; and if the
legislature could in like manner override executive
action also, the government would become only a
despotism under popular forms. On the other hand it
would be readily conceded that no court can compel
the legislature to make or to refrain from making laws,
or to meet or adjourn at its command, or to take any
action whatsoever, though the duty to take it be made
ever so clear by the constitution or the laws. In these
cases the exemption of the one department from the
control of the other is not only implied in the
framework of government, but is indispensably
necessary in any useful apportionment of power is to
exist.
In view of the fact that the duty to be performed was
discretional and therefore, by the concensus of judicial opinion,
not subject to judicial review, the extensive discussion of other
grounds for the decision lays it open to the same criticism as
that frequently voiced in regard to Chief Justice Marshall's
dissertation in the case of Murbury vs.Madison (1 Cranch,
137); namely, that it was unnecessary to the decision of the
case and therefore in the nature of obiter dicta. It may also be
noted that the courts of last resort in the States of Alabama,
California, Colorado, Kansas, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio and Wyoming have allowed writs
of mandamus to the governors of their States for the
performance of ministerial duties, without bringing about any of
the serious consequences predicted in
Sutherland vs. Governor, supra. These States seem to have
fared fully as well as the States of Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesotta, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Tennessee, and Texas
which, together with the Philippine Islands, have adopted the
opposite view.
But taking the decision in Sutherland vs. Governor, supra, at its
full face value, I am unable to see that it is determinative of the
present case. I readily concede that under the decisions of this
court all acts of the chief executive within the limits of his
jurisdiction are executive acts involving a measure of discretion
and may not be reviewed by the courts. It may also be
conceded that no court can compel the legislature as such to
make or refrain from making laws, or to meet or adjourn at its
command, or "to take any action whatsoever though the duty to
take it be made ever so clear by the constitution or the laws."
But that does not mean that the courts may not restrain officers
and individual members of the legislature from carrying into
effect an unconstitutional resolution transcending the limits of
the legislative department and encroaching upon another. If
that is beyond the power of the courts, what will then become
of the checks and balances of which Judge Cooley speaks and
which are regarded fully as essential a feature of our system of
government as that of departmental distribution of powers?
Time forbids a full discussion of other decisions of courts in the
United States which adhere to the doctrine that the judiciary
will not interfere with the acts of the chief executive within the
limits of his jurisdiction. It is sufficient to say that they all relate
to acts within the domain of the executive and that none of
them has any direct application to the present case.
But we are given to understand that by reason of its own
previous decisions this court stands committed to the doctrine
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 16
that it has no power to interfere with any act of the other
coordinate departments of the government whether they
transcend the limits of their jurisdiction or not.
A brief analysis of the decisions of this court upon the subject
will show that this is a misapprehension.
The first of these decisions is that in the case of Barcelon vs.
Baker and Thompson  (5 Phil., 87), a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902, conferred on the Governor-General the power to
suspend the writ whenever the public safety might require it in
cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, and the case
involved the question as to whether the courts may inquire into
the legality of an order of the Governor-General suspending
the privilege of the writ. The court held that "whenever a statute
gives discretionary power to a person to be exercised by him
upon his own opinion on certain facts, such statute constitutes
him the sole and exclusive judge of the existence of those
facts;" and that when the Governor-General, "with the approval
of the Philippine Commission declares that a state of rebellion,
insurrection, or invasion exists, this declaration or conclusion is
conclusive against the judicial department of the government."
The writ was therefore denied.
The leading case of Severino vs. Governor-General and
Provincial Board of Occidental Negros  (16 Phil., 366), was a
petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor-
General to call a special election for the purpose of electing a
municipal president of the town of Silay, Occidental Negros,
and to restrain the provincial board of Occidental Negros from
appointing a municipal president during the pendency of the
action. By statute, the duty of calling a special election
devolves upon the Governor-General and the principal
question presented for consideration was whether the court
had power to compel the Governor-General to immediately
perform such duty. The court denied the writ holding that
"where a duty is devolved upon the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, rather that upon an inferior officer, it will be
presumed to have been done because his superior judgment,
discretion, and sense of responsibility were confined in for a
more accurate, faithful, and discreet performance than could
be relied upon if the duty were put upon an officer chosen for
inferior duties," and that the court would not undertake to direct
or control the exercise of such duty. Incidentally, the court also
stated that "the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands are far more
comprehensive than those of State governors of the United
States;" and laid down the rule that "the courts of the Philippine
Islands have no jurisdiction to interfere, by means of a writ
of mandamus or injunction, with the Governor-General as the
head of the executive department in the performance of any of
his official acts."
In the case of Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield (16
Phil., 534), the facts may be briefly stated as follows:
The Governor-General deported certain Chinese persons from
Manila to Amoy, China. The deportees subsequently returned
to Manila and brought an action in the Court of First Instance
against the Governor-General and certain police officials for
damages, alleging that the deportation was unlawful. The
defendants thereupon filed a petition in this court for a writ of

prohibition commanding the Judge of the Court of First
Instance to refrain from assuming jurisdiction in the case
brought by the deportees, the petitioners alleging that "the
power to deport foreign subjects of the Chinese Empire is a
privative one of the Governor-General and is not subject to
judicial review." This court granted the writ holding that "the
Governor-General, acting in his political and executive
capacity, is invested with plenary power to deport obnoxious
aliens whose continued presence in the territory is found by
him to be injurious to the public interest, and in the absence of
express or prescribed rules as to the method of deporting or
expelling them, he may use such methods as his official
judgment and good conscience may dictate;" that he could not
be held liable in damages for the exercise of such power and
that the courts would not interfere.
Case R. G. No. 20867, Perfecto vs. Wood  (not published in the
reports) involved exactly the same principles as Severino vs.
Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental
Negros, supra, except that the special election was to be called
for the purpose of filing a vacancy in the Senate. The majority
decision, signed by four justices, denied the petition on the
same grounds as those stated in the Severino case. Three
justices concurred in the result on the ground that the case had
then become a moot case.
The doctrine laid down in Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and
Crossfield, supra, was followed in the case of In re McCulloch
Dick.
The case of Abueva vs. Wood  (45 Phil., 612), was a petition
for a writ of mandamus to compel the Governor-General, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Insular Auditor, the Executive Secretary
of the Independence Committee and the Secretary of the same
Committee to permit the petitioners to examine all vouchers
and documents in connection with disbursements and
payments made from the fund of the Independent Commission.
The petition was denied, the court stating:
. . . It may be asserted as a principle founded upon
the clearest legal reasoning that the legislature or
legislative officers, in so far as concerns their purely
legislative functions, are beyond the control of the
courts by the writ of mandamus. The legislative
department, being a coordinate and independent
branch of the government, its action within its own
sphere cannot be revised or controlled
by mandamus by the judicial department, without a
gross usurpation of power upon the part of the latter.
When the legislative department of the government
imposes upon its officers the performance of certain
duties which are not prohibited by the organic law of
the land, the performance, the nonperformance, or
the manner of the performance is under the direct
control of the legislature, and such officers are not
subject to the direction of the courts. . . .
The case of Concepcion vs. Paredes (42 Phil., 599), was a
petition for a writ of prohibition commanding the respondent
Secretary of Justice to desist from carrying into effect the
provisions of Act No. 2941 requiring the Judges of the Courts
of First Instance to draw lots every five years for exchange of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 17
districts. The court held that the Act constituted an
encroachment by the Legislature upon the Governor-General's
power of appointment and was therefore unconstitutional. The
writ was granted.
What is there in these cases which can serve as authority for
the theory that the courts may not interfere with the execution
of acts beyond the jurisdiction of the department sought to be
restrained? Absolutely nothing. The rather broad dictum  in the
case of Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board
of Occidental Negros, supra, that the courts of the Philippine
Islands have no jurisdiction to interfere with the head of the
executive department in the performance of any of his official
acts, must be considered in connection with the context and is
clearly limited to acts within the limits of his jurisdiction.
In Abueva vs. Wood, supra, the doctrine of noninterference
with the Legislature is carefully limited to "actions within its own
sphere" and "duties not prohibited by the organic law of the
land."
In the present case we are not dealing with an act of political
and nonjusticiable character, nor is there a question of
interference with the exercise of discretionary powers of duties
resting in the Legislature under the Organic Act. We are simply
called upon to prevent the carrying into effect of
unconstitutional and therefore, in a legal sense, nonexistent
parts of a resolution of one of the branches of the Legislature
which, if executed, will result in an encroachment upon the
domain of another department and deprive the petitioner of
rights and privileges to which he is by law entitled. There is no
question as to the power of the Senate to punish its members
for disorderly behavior, but it must be insisted that the penalty
shall not constitute a usurpation of the powers of another
department of the government in violation of the Organic Act. It
is agreed that as long as the penalty does not expressly or
impliedly violate that Act, the courts will not interfere.
That the resolution is unconstitutional and void cannot be
seriously questioned and is conceded in the majority opinion,
but in order to bring the issue into clear relief, it may be well to
briefly state the reasons why it must be so held:
The Senate exercises delegated powers, all of which are
derived from the Organic Act. That Act provides for twenty-two
senators to be elected by the people and for two other
senators to be appointed by the Governor-General. In the
language of the Act, the appointive senators "shall hold office
until removed by the Governor-General." The Act further
provides that "The Senate and House of Representatives,
respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns
and qualifications of their elective member." It will be observed
that no power to expel or remove appointive members is
conferred on the houses of the Legislature, nor can such
power be inferred or implied from the statute, in view of the fact
that it is expressly placed in the hands of the Governor-
General. The Act does not limit or qualify the term "remove"
and it therefore includes both temporary and permanent
removals.
An examination of the Senate resolution in question shows that
in effect it provides for a complete temporary removal of the
petitioner. It does not merely exclude him from the floor of the

Senate Chamber, but he is also "deprived of all his
prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments as such senator," for
the period of one year. As far as he is concerned, his removal
from office for that period could not be made more complete. In
attempting to exercise the power of such removal, the Senate
clearly arrogated to itself powers which it does not possess
and which, under the Organic Act, rest in the Chief Executive.
Its resolution to that effect is consequent unconstitutional and
void. As is the case with an unconstitutional statute, it has, in
the eyes of the law, never existed.
We are therefore confronted with the facts that the petitioner is
a duly appointed senate; that he, as a matter of law, is not and
never has been removed or suspended from office; that he,
therefore, as such senate always has been, and still is, entitled
to all the prerogative, privileges, and emoluments of his office;
and that, nevertheless, certain officers and members of the
Senate, without any legal authority whatever, deprive him of
such prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments, including his
salary. The Senate has nothing to do with the appointment of
an appointive senator and is not, as in the case of elective
members, the judge of his qualifications; when duly appointed,
the officers of the Senate are legally bound to recognize him as
a senator; they have no discretion in the matter and their duties
in regard thereto are purely ministerial.
In the circumstances, upon what legal principles is this court
precluded from granting the petitioner the relief he demands?
Why cannot, for instance, members of the Committee on
Accounts and the Paymaster of the Senate be directed to
cause to be paid to the petitioner the salary fixed by law?
Other courts have not hesitated to use the writ of mandamus to
compel performance of similar duties by officers of the
legislature. In Ex parte  Pickett (24 Ala., 91), the writ was
issued to the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
compel him to certify to the Comptroller of Public Accounts the
amount to which the petitioner was entitled as a member of the
House for mileage and per diem compensation. In
State vs. Elder (31 Neb., 169), the writ was issued to compel
the Speaker to open and publish returns of the general
election. In State vs. Moffitt (5 Ohio, 350), mandamus was held
to lie to the Speaker of the House to compel him to certify the
election and appointment of officers. In Wolfe vs. McCaull (76
Va., 87), the writ was issued to compel the Keeper of the Rolls
of the House of Delegates to print and publish a bill passed by
the Legislature and upon request to furnish a copy thereof
properly certified. (See also Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S.,
168; State vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla., 41; People vs. Marton, 156 N.
Y., 136.) As stated as the outset, it is erroneously asserted in
the majority opinion that this action is, in substance, a suit
against the Senate as a body. This might be true if the act
complained of was an act within the jurisdiction of the Senate,
but such is not the case here. A practical illustration may,
perhaps, make the point clear. Let us suppose that a majority
of the members of the Senate should agree to commit a crime
against another member and should pass a senatorial
resolution to that effect. Would that, in anything but form,
constitute a senatorial act? And suppose the same members
should proceed to carry the resolution into effect, would not an
action lie against such members and could that, in substance,
be regarded as an action against the Senate? The questions
answer themselves, and though in the present case the illegal
act does not constitute a crime, the analogy is, nevertheless
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 18
obvious; the distinction is one without a difference. As has
already been pointed out, the United States Supreme Court
has held that an action may, at the instances of the injured
party, be maintained against the presiding officer, as well as
other officers, of one of the houses of Congress for the
execution of an unconstitutional resolution. In the same case it
is also intimated that the action will lie against all members
who take direct part in the execution of such a resolution.
(Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra.)
It may further be noted that though the prayer in the petition in
this case does not expressly so state, the body of the petition
shows sufficiently that the remedy to be applied may not be the
same in regard to all of the defendants. The allegations seem
broad enough to cover both mandamus and prohibition and the
petition is not demurred to on that ground. It is also possible
that if evidence were permitted some of the defendants might
be absolved from the complaint.
It has been suggested that to entertain an action against a
coordinate department of the government would be an
unwarranted assertion of superiority on our part. I fail to see
the validity of this observation. This is not a question of
departmental superiority or inferiority. This court asserts no
superiority for itself; it only maintains the superiority of the law
to which all of us must yield obedience. The pronouncements
of the court are simply the voice of the law as understood by
the court and are not personal matters. Even if this action were
brought against a coordinate department as a body — which it
is not — the court would still be in duty bound to apply the law
of the land to the case and do its best to enforce that law
irrespective of the rank or importance of the parties.
In the course of the argument of the case it was intimated that
if the writ prayed for were issued its enforcement might be the
cause of disturbance and strife. The suggestion is almost an
insult to the intelligence and patriotism of the defendants and I
feel sure that the fear thus expressed is entirely without
foundation. At least there has been no trouble of that kind in
other jurisdictions where writs have issued to officers or
members of the legislature. If courts perform their duties with
firmless, rectitude and moderation, regardless of personal or
political considerations, their decisions will be respected and
their orders and writs generally obeyed. It is usually when
courts fail in these respects, and thus prove unfaithful to their
trust, that their orders are disregarded and trouble ensues.
The decision of the court in the present case enjoys the
distinction of being without a precedent and of resting on no
sound legal prejudice of which I am aware. The arguments
advanced in its support are excuses and not reasons. If carried
to its logical conclusion, it may have far-reaching and serious
consequences. If one branch of the government may with
impunity, and with freedom from judicial intervention, freely
usurp the powers of another branch, it may eventually lead
either to anarchy or to tyranny. A wrong has been committed
for which there is no other remedy but that there sought by the
petitioner, yet the court refuses to take jurisdiction on the
strength of alleged precedents which, as we have seen, in
reality have no bearing whatever upon the issues of the case.
It is hardly necessary to say that when men are deliberately
denied redress for wrongs, the temptation is strong for them to
take the law into their own hands and there is perhaps no more
fruitful source of popular unrest and disturbance.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 19

I regret to see the decision find a place in our jurisprudence

and can only hope that it will not be followed by this court in the
future.

The demurrer to the petition should be overruled.

Footnotes

1
Promulgated January 25, 1924, not reported.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17144            October 28, 1960
SERGIO OSMEÑA, JR., petitioner,  Second District of Cebu, if made maliciously or
vs.
SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z. GUINTO, JR., VICENTE
L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G. TEVES,
JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO,
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO,
FELIPE S. ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL
B. FERNADEZ, and EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity
as members of the Special Committee created by House
Resolution No. 59,respondents.
Antonio Y. de Pio in his own behalf.
F. S. Abeleda, A. b. Fernandez. E. S. Baltao and Tecla San
Andres Ziga in their own behalf.
C. T. Villareal and R. D. Bagatsing as amici curiae.
BENGZON, J.:
On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,
submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief,
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against
Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun and fourteen other
congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special
Committee created by House Resolution No. 59. He asked for
annulment of such Resolution on the ground of infringenment
of his parliamentary immunity; he also asked, principally, that
said members of the special committee be enjoined from
proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion
authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges
against the President with the admonition that if he failed to do
so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him.
The petition attached a copy of House Resolution No. 59, the
pertinent portions of which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of June, 1960 , the
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., Member of the House
of Representatives from the Second District of the
province of Cebu, took the floor of this chamber on
the one hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled 'A
Message to Garcia;
WHEREAS, in the course of said speech, the
Congressman from the Second District of Cebu stated
the following:.
xxx           xxx           xxx
The people, Mr. President, have been hearing of ugly
reports that under your unpopular administration the
free things they used to get from the government are
now for sale at premium prices. They say that even
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 20
pardons are for sale, and that regardless of the
gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit
can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as
he can come across with a handsome dole. I am
afraid, such an anomalous situation would reflect
badly on the kind of justice that your administration is
dispensing. . . . .
WHEREAS, the charges of the gentleman from the
recklessly and without basis in truth and in fact, would
constitute a serious assault upon the dignity and
prestige of the Office of 37 3 the President, which is
the one visible symbol of the sovereignty of the
Filipino people, and would expose said office to
contempt and disrepute; . . . .
Resolved by the House of Representative, that a
special committee of fifteen Members to be appointed
by the Speaker be, and the same hereby is, created
to investigate the truth of the charges against the
President of the Philippines made by Honorable
Sergio Osmeña, Jr., in his privilege speech of June
223, 1960, and for such purpose it is authorized to
summon Honorable Sergio Osmeña, jr., to appear
before it to substantiate his charges, as well as to
issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces tecum  to
require the attendance of witnesses and/or the
production of pertinent papers before it, and if
Honorable Sergio Osmeña, Jr., fails to do so to
require him to show cause why he should not be
punished by the House. The special committee shall
submit to the House a report of its findings and
recommendations before the adjournment of the
present special session of the Congress of the
Philippines.
In support of his request, Congressman Osmeña alleged; first,
the Resolution violated his constitutional absolute
parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House;
second, his words constituted no actionable conduct; and third,
after his allegedly objectionable speech and words, the House
took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of
House provides that if other business has intervened after the
member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not
be held  to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the
House.
Although some members of the court expressed doubts of
petitioner's cause of action and the Court's jurisdiction, the
majority decided to hear the matter further, and required
respondents to answer, without issuing any preliminary
injunction. Evidently aware of such circumstance with its
implications, and pressed for time in view of the imminent
adjournment of the legislative session, the special committee
continued to perform its talk, and after giving Congressman
Osmeña a chance to defend himself, submitted its reports on
July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious
disorderly behaviour; and acting on such report, the House
approved on the same day—before closing its session—House
Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and
suspending him from office for fifteen months.

Thereafter, on July 19, 1960, the respondents (with the
exception of Congressmen De Pio, Abeleda, San Andres Ziga,
Fernandez and Balatao)1 filed their answer, challenged the
jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, defended the
power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension,
upheld a House Resolution No. 175 and then invited attention
to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18,
1960, the Committee—whose members are the sole
respondents—had thereby ceased to exist.
There is no question that Congressman Osmeña, in a privilege
speech delivered before the House, made the serious
imputations of bribery against the President which are quoted
in Resolution No. 59 and that he refused to produce before the
House Committee created for the purpose, evidence to
substantiate such imputations. There is also no question that
for having made the imputations and for failing to produce
evidence in support thereof, he was, by resolution of the
House, suspended from office for a period of fifteen months for
serious disorderly behaviour.
Resolution No. 175 states in part:
WHEREAS, the Special Committee created under
and by virtue of Resolution No. 59, adopted on July 8,
1960, found Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr.,
guilty of serious disorderly behaviour for making
without basis in truth and in fact, scurrilous, malicious,
reckless and irresponsible charges against the
President of the Philippines in his privilege speech of
June 23, 1960; and
WHEREAS, the said charges are so vile in character
that they affronted and degraded the dignity of the
House of Representative: Now, Therefore, be it
RESOLVED by the House of Representatives. That
Representative Sergio Osmeña, Jr., be, as he hereby
is, declared guilty of serious disorderly behaviour; and
...
As previously stated, Osmeña contended in his petition that:
(1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary
immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not
to be questioned; (20 that his speech constituted no disorderly
behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing
he could be questioned and discipline therefor, the House had
lost the power to do so because it had taken up other business
before approving House Resolution No. 59. Now, he takes the
additional position (4) that the House has no power, under the
Constitution, to suspend one of its members.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that "for any
speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of
the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in any
other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6,
clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In
that country, the provision has always been understood to
mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for
their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress
may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 21
that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than
Congress.
Furthermore, the Rules of the House which petitioner himself
has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7), recognize the House's power
to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a
fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative assembly
of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its
purpose "is to enable and encourage a representative of the
public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success"
for "it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the
fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from
the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense." 2 Such immunity
has come to this country from the practices of Parliamentary as
construed and applied by the Congress of the United States.
Its extent and application remain no longer in doubt in so far as
related to the question before us. It guarantees the legislator
complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any
other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But is does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself
whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. In the United
States Congress, Congressman Fernando Wood of New York
was censured for using the following language on the floor of
the House: "A monstrosity, a measure the most infamous of
the many infamous acts of the infamous Congress." (Hinds'
Precedents, Vol. 2,. pp. 798-799). Two other congressmen
were censured for employing insulting words during debate. (2
Hinds' Precedents, 799-801). In one case, a member of
Congress was summoned to testify on a statement made by
him in debate, but invoked his parliamentary privilege. The
Committee rejected his plea. (3 Hinds' Precedents 123-124.)
For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of
Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to
prison3, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The
appendix to this decision amply attest to the consensus of
informed opinion regarding the practice and the traditional
power of legislative assemblies to take disciplinary action
against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or
expulsion. It mentions one instance of suspension of a
legislator in a foreign country.
And to cite a local illustration, the Philippine Senate, in April
1949, suspended a senator for one year.
Needless to add, the Rules of Philippine House of
Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the
Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary
manner to its proceedings.
This brings up the third point of petitioner: the House may no
longer take action against me, he argues, because after my
speech, and before approving Resolution No. 59, it had taken
up other business. Respondents answer that Resolution No.
59 was unanimously approved by the House, that such
approval amounted to a suspension of the House Rules, which
according to standard parliamentary practice may done by
unanimous consent.

Granted, counters the petitioner, that the House may
suspended the operation of its Rules, it may not, however,
affect past acts or renew its rights to take action which had
already lapsed.
The situation might thus be compared to laws 4 extending the
period of limitation of actions and making them applicable to
actions that had lapsed. The Supreme Court of the United
States has upheld such laws as against the contention that
they impaired vested rights in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment (Campbell vs. Holt, 115 U. S. 620). The states
hold divergent views. At any rate, court are subject to
revocation modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them."5 And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules
are merely procedural, and with their observancem, the courts
have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body." Consequently, "mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisited number of members
have agreed to a particular measure."6
The following is quoted from a reported decision of the
Supreme court of Tennessee:
The rule here invoked is one of parliamentary
procedure, and it is uniformly held that it is within the
power of all deliberative bodies to abolish, modify, or
waive their own rules of procedure, adopted for the
orderly con duct of business, and as security against
hasty action. (Bennet vs. New Bedford, 110 Mass,
433; Holt vs.Somerville, 127 Mass. 408, 411; City of
Sadalia vs. Scott, 104 Mo. App. 595, 78 S. W. 276; Ex
parte Mayor, etc., of Albany, 23 Wend. [N. Y.] 277,
280; Wheelock vs. City of Lowell, 196 Mass. 220,
230. 81 N. e. 977, 124 Am. St. Rep. 543, 12 Ann.
Cas. 1109; City of Corinth vs. Sharp, 107 Miss. 696,
65 So. 888; McGraw vs.Whitson, 69 Iowa, 348, 28 N.
W. 632; Tuell vs. Meacham Contracting Co. 145 Ky.
181, 186, 140 S. W. Ann. Cas. 1913B, 802.)
[Takenfrom the case of Rutherford vs. City of
Nashville, 78 south Western Reporter, p. 584.]
It may be noted in this connection, that in the case of
Congressman Stanbery of Ohio, who insulted the Speaker, for
which Act a resolution of censure was presented, the House
approved the resolution, despite the argument that other
business had intervened after the objectionable remarks. (2
Hinds' Precedents pp. 799-800.)
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the
Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmeña may be discipline, many arguments pro and con have
been advanced. We believe, however, that the House is the
judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour, not only
because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but
also because the matter depends mainly on factual
circumstances of which the House knows best but which can
not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and
adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed
the power to determine whether Osmeña conduct constituted
disorderly behaviour, it would thereby have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer
upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 22
separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court,
demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each
department, it has been said, had exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139.)
SEC. 200. Judicial Interference with Legislature. —
The principle is well established that the courts will
not assume a jurisdiction in any case amount to an
interference by the judicial department with the
legislature since each department is equally
independent within the power conferred upon it by the
Constitution. . . . .
The general rule has been applied in other cases to
cause the courts to refuse to intervene in what are
exclusively legislative functions. Thus, where the
stated Senate is given the power to example a
member, the court will not review its action or
revise even a most arbitrary or unfair decision. (11
Am. Jur., Const. Law, sec. p. 902.) [Emphasis Ours.].
The above statement of American law merely abridged the
landmark case of Clifford vs. French.7 In 1905, several
senators who had been expelled by the State Senate of
California for having taken a bribe, filed mandamus proceeding
to compel reinstatement, alleging the Senate had given them
no hearing, nor a chance to make defense, besides falsity of
the charges of bribery. The Supreme Court of California
declined to interfere , explaining in orthodox juristic language:
Under our form of government, the judicial
department has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, or of either house thereof, taking in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that
department by the Constitution. It has been held by
high authority that, even in the absence of an express
provision conferring the power, every legislative body
in which is vested the general legislative power of the
state has the implied power to expel a member for
any cause which it may deem sufficient. In Hiss. vs.
Barlett, 3 Gray 473, 63 Am. Dec. 768, the supreme
court of Mass. says, in substance, that this power is
inherent in every legislative body; that it is necessary
to the to enable the body 'to perform its high
functions, and is necessary to the safety of the state;'
'That it is a power of self-protection, and that the
legislative body must necessarily be the sole judge of
the exigency which may justify and require its
exercise. '. . . There is no provision authority courts to
control, direct, supervise, or forbid the exercise by
either house of the power to expel a member. These
powers are functions of the legislative department
and therefore, in the exercise of the power this
committed to it, the senate is supreme. An attempt by
this court to direct or control the legislature, or either
house thereof, in the exercise of the power, would be
an attempt to exercise legislative functions, which it is
expressly forbidden to do.
We have underscored in the above quotation those lines which
in our opinion emphasize the principles controlling this

litigation. Although referring to expulsion, they may as well be
applied to other disciplinary action. Their gist as applied to the
case at bar: the House has exclusive power; the courts have
no jurisdiction to interfere.
Our refusal to intervene might impress some readers as
subconscious hesitation due to discovery of impermissible
course of action in the legislative chamber. Nothing of that sort:
we merely refuse to disregard the allocation of constitutional
functions which it is our special duty to maintain. Indeed, in the
interest of comity, we feel bound to state that in a
conscientious survey of governing principles and/or episodic
illustrations, we found the House of Representatives of the
United States taking the position upon at least two occasions,
that personal attacks upon the Chief Executive constitute
unparliamentary conduct or breach of orders.8 And in several
instances, it took action against offenders, even after other
business had been considered.9
Petitioner's principal argument against the House's power to
suspend is the Alejandrino precedent. In 1924, Senator
Alejandrino was, by resolution of Senate, suspended from
office for 12 months because he had assaulted another
member of the that Body or certain phrases the latter had
uttered in the course of a debate. The Senator applied to this
Court for reinstatement, challenging the validity of the
resolution. Although this Court held that in view of the
separation of powers, it had no jurisdiction to compel the
Senate to reinstate petitioner, it nevertheless went on to say
the Senate had no power to adopt the resolution because
suspension for 12 months amounted to removal, and the Jones
Law (under which the Senate was then functioning) gave the
Senate no power to remove an appointive member, like
Senator Alejandrino. The Jones Law specifically provided that
"each house may punish its members for disorderly behaviour,
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds votes, expel
an elective member (sec. 18). Note particularly the word
"elective."
The Jones Law, it mist be observed, empowered the Governor
General to appoint "without consent of the Senate and without
restriction as to residence senators . . . who will, in his opinion,
best represent the Twelfth District." Alejandrino was one
appointive Senator.
It is true, the opinion in that case contained an obiter
dictum  that "suspension deprives the electoral district of
representation without that district being afforded any means
by which to fill that vacancy." But that remark should be
understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who
was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones
Law charged with the duty to represent the Twelfth District and
maybe the view of the Government of the United States or of
the Governor-General, who had appointed him.
It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature
had only those power which were granted to it by the Jones
Law10; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative
powers and preprogatives  of a sovereign nation, except as
restricted by the Constitution. In other words, in the Alejandrino
case, the Court reached the conclusion that the Jones Law did
not give the Senate the power it then exercised—the power of
suspension for one year. Whereas now, as we find, the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 23
Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of
suspension11 which the Constitution did not impair. In fact, as
already pointed out, the Philippine Senate suspended a
Senator for 12 months in 1949.
The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is
plenary, subject only to such limitations are found in
the Republic's Constitution. So that any power
deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is
necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress,
unless the Constitution provides otherwise.
(Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212 .)
In any event, petitioner's argument as to the deprivation of the
district's representation can not be more weightly in the matter
of suspension than in the case of imprisonment of a legislator;
yet deliberative bodies have the power in proper cases, to
commit one of their members to jail.12
Now come questions of procedure and jurisdiction. the petition
intended to prevent the Special Committee from acting tin
pursuance of House Resolution No. 59. Because no
preliminary injunction had been issued, the Committee
performed its task, reported to the House, and the latter
approved the suspension order. The House had closed it
session, and the Committee has ceased to exist as such. It
would seem, therefore, the case should be dismissed for
having become moot or academic.13 Of course, there is nothing
to prevent petitioner from filing new pleadings to include all
members of the House as respondents, ask for reinstatement
and thereby to present a justiciable cause. Most probable
outcome of such reformed suit, however, will be a
pronouncement of lack of jurisdiction, as in Vera vs.
Avelino14 and Alejandrino vs. Qeuaon.15
At any rate, having perceived suitable solutions to the
important questions of political law, the Court thought it proper
to express at this time its conclusions on such issues as were
deemed relevant and decisive.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be, and is hereby
dismissed. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Gutierrez
David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
REYES, J. B. L., J.,  dissenting:
I concur with the majority that the petition filed by
Congressman Osmeña, Jr. does not make out a case either for
declaratory judgment or certiorari, since this Court has no
original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment proceedings,
and certiorari is available only against bodies exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial powers. The respondent committee,
being merely fact finding, was not properly subject to certiorari.

I submit, however, that Congressman Osmeña was entitled to
invoke the Court's jurisdiction on his petition for a writ of
prohibition against the committee, in so far as House
Resolution No. 59 (and its sequel, Resolution No. 175)
constituted an unlawful attempt to divest him of an immunity
from censure or punishment, an immunity vested under the
very Rules of the House of Representatives.
House Rule XVII, on Decorum and Debates, in its section V,
provides as follows:
If it is requested that a Member be called to order for
words spoken in debate, the Member making such
request shall indicate the words excepted to, and they
shall be taken down in writing by the Secretary and
read aloud to the House; but the Member who uttered
them shall not be held to answer, nor be subject to
the censure of the House therefor, if further debate or
other business has intervened.
Now, it is not disputed that after Congressman Osmeña had
delivered his speech and before the House adopted, fifteen
days later, the resolution (No. 59) creating the respondent
Committee and empowering it to investigate and recommend
proper action in the case, the House had acted on other
matters and debated them. That being the case, the
Congressman, even before the resolution was adopted, had
ceased to be answerable for the words uttered by him in his
privilege speech. By the express wording of the Rules, he was
no longer subject to censure or disciplinary action by the
House. Hence, the resolution, in so far as it attempts to divest
him of the immunity so acquired and subject him to discipline
and punishment, when he was previously not so subject,
violates the constitutional inhibition against ex post
facto  legislation, and Resolution Nos. 59 and 175 are legally
obnoxious and invalid on that score. The rule is well
established that a law which deprives an accused person of
any substantial right or immunity possessed by him before its
passage is ex post facto as to prior offenses (Cor. Jur. vol. 16-
A, section 144, p. 153; People vs. Mc Donnell, 11 Fed. Supp.
1015; People vs. Talklington, 47 Pac. 2d 368; U.
S. vs.Garfinkel, 69 F. Supp. 849).
The foregoing also answer the contention that since the
immunity was but an effect of section 7 of House Rule XVII, the
House could, at any time, remove it by amending those Rules,
and Resolutions Nos. 59 and 175 effected such an amendment
by implication. the right of the House to amend its Rules does
not carry with it the right to retroactive divest the petitioner of
an immunity he had already acquired. The Bill of Rights is
against it.
It is contended that as the liability for his speech attached
when the Congressman delivered it, the subsequent action of
the House only affected the procedure for dealing with that
liability. But whatever liability Congressman Sergio Osmeña,
Jr. then incurred was extinguished when the House thereafter
considered other business; and this extinction is a substantive
right that can not be subsequently torn away to his
disadvantage. On an analogous issue, this Court, in People vs.
Parel, 44 Phil., 437 has ruled:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 24
In regards to the point that the subject of prescription
of penalties and of penal actions pertains to remedial
and not substantive law, it is to be observed that in
the Spanish legal system, provisions for limitation or
prescription of actions are invariably classified as
substantive and not as remedial law; we thus find the
provisions for the prescription of criminal actions in
the Penal Code and not in the 'Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal.' This is in reality a more logical law. In
criminal cases prescription is not, strictly speaking, a
matter of procedure; it bars or cuts off the right to
punish the crime and consequently, goes directly to
the substance of the action. . . . (Emphasis supplied.).
I see no substantial difference, from the standpoint of the
constitutional prohibition against ex post facto  laws, that the
objectionable measures happen to be House Resolutions and
not statutes. In so far as the position of petitioner Osmeña is
concerned, the essential point is that he is being subjected to a
punishment to which he was formerly not amenable. And while
he was only meted out a suspension of privileges that
suspension is as much a penalty as imprisonment or a fine,
which the House could have inflicted upon him had it been so
minded. Such punitive action is violative of the spirit, if not of
the letter, of the constitutional provision against ex post
facto legislation. Nor is it material that the punishment was
inflicted in the exercise of disciplinary power. "The ex post
facto effect of a law," the Federal Supreme Court has ruled,
"can not be evaded by giving civil form to that which is
essentially criminal" (Burgess vs. Salmon, 97 L. Ed. [U. S.]
1104, 1106; Cummings vs. MIssouri, 18 L. Ed. 276).
The plain purpose of the immunity provided by the House rules
is to protect the freedom of action of its members and to relieve
them from the fear of disciplinary action taken upon second
thought, as a result of political convenience, vindictiveness, or
pressures. it is unrealistic to overlook that, without the
immunity so provided, no member of Congress can remain free
from the haunting fear that his most innocuous expressions
may at any time afterwards place him in jeopardy of
punishment whenever a majority, however transient, should
feel that the shifting sands of political expediency so demand.
A rule designed to assure that members of the House of the
House may freely act as their conscience and sense of duty
should dictate complements the parliamentary immunity from
outside pressure enshrined in our Constitution, and is certainly
deserving of liberal interpretation and application.
The various precedents, cited in the majority opinion, as
instances of disciplinary taken notwithstanding intervening
business, are not truly applicable. Of the five instances cited by
Deschkler (in his edition of Jefferson's Manual), the case of
Congressman Watson of Georgia involved
also  printed disparaging remarks by the respondent (III Hinds'
Precedents, sec. 2637), so that the debate immunity rule
afforded no defense; that of Congressmen Weaver and Sparks
was one of censure for actual disorderly conduct (II Hinds, sec.
1657); while the cases of Congressmen Stanbery of Ohio, Alex
Long of Ohio, and of Lovell Rousseau of Kentucky (II Hinds,
sec. 1248, 1252 and 1655) were decided under Rule 62 of the
U. s. House of Representatives as it stood before the 1880
amendments, and was differently worded. Thus, in the
Rousseau case, the ruling of Speaker Colfax was to the
following effect (II Hinds' Precedents, page 1131):

This sixty-second rule is divided in the middle a
semicolon, and the Chair asks the attention of the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Wilson) top the language of
that rule, as it settles the whole question:
62. If a Member be called to order for words spoken in
debate, the person calling him to be order shall repeat
the words excerpted to —
That is, the "calling to order" is "excepting" to words
spoken in debate "and they shall be taken done in
writing at the Clerk's table; and no Member shall be
held to answer, or be subject to the censure of the
House, for words spoken, or other business has
intervened, after the words spoken, and before
exception to them shall have been taken.
The first part of this rule declares that "calling to
order" is "excepting to words spoken in debate." the
second part of the rule declares that a Member shall
not be held subject to censure for words spoken in
debate if other business has intervened after the
words have been spoken and before "exception" to
them has been taken. Exception to the words of the
gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Grinnell) was taken by the
gentleman from Illinois (Mr. Harding), the gentleman
from Massachusetts (Mr. Banks), the gentleman from
Kentucky (Mr. Rosseau), and also by the Speaker of
the House, as the records of the Congressional Globe
will show. The distinction is obvious between the two
parts of the rule. In the first part it speaks of a
Member excepting to language of another and having
the words taken down. In the last part of the rule it
says he shall not be censured thereafter unless
exception to his words were taken; but it omits to add
as an condition that words must also have been taken
down. The substantial point, indeed the only point,
required in the latter part of the rule is, that exception
to the objectionable words must have taken.
The difference between the Rules as invoked in these cases
and the Rules of our House of Representatives is easily
apparent. As Rule 62 of the United States House of
Representatives stood before 1880, all that was required to
preserve the disciplinary power of the Hose was that exception
should have been taken  to the remarks on the floor before
further debate or other business intervened. Under the rules of
the Philippines House of Representatives, however, the
immunity becomes absolute if other debate or business has
taken place before the motion for censure is made, whether or
not exceptions or point of order have been made to the
remarks complained of at the time they were uttered.
While it is clear that the parliamentary immunity established in
Article VI, section 15 of our Constitution does not bar the
members being questioned and disciplined by Congress itself
fro remarks made on the floor, that disciplinary power does not,
as I have noted, include the right to retroactively amend the
rules so as to divest a member of an immunity already gained.
And if Courts can shield an ordinary citizen from the effects
of ex post facto legislation, I see no reason why a member of
Congress should be deprived of the same protection. Surely
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 25
membership in the Legislature does not mean forfeiture of the
liberties enjoyed by the individual citizen.
The Constitution empowers each house to determine
its rules of proceedings. If may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraint or violate fundamental
rights  and there should be a reasonable relation
between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. But within these limitation all matters of
method are open to the determination of the House,
and it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some
other way would be better, more accurate or even
more just. (U. S. vs. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 36 Law Ed.,
324-325.)
Court will not interfere with the action of the state
senate in reconsideration its vote on a resolution
submitting an amendment to the Constitution, where
its action was in compliance with its own rules, and
there was no constitutional provision to the contrary.
(Crawford vs. Gilchrist, 64 Fla. 41, 59 So. 963)
(Emphasis supplied.).
Finally, that this Court possesses no power to direct or compel
the Legislature to act in any specified manner, should not deter
it from recognizing and declaring the unconstitutionality and
nullify of the questioned resolutions and of all action that has
been disbanded after the case was filed, the basic issues
remain so important as to require adjudication by this Court.
LABRADOR, J.,  dissenting:
I fully concur in the above dissent Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes,
Reyes, and I venture to add:
Within a constitutional government and in a regime which
purports to be one of law, where law is supreme, even the
Congress in the exercise of the power conferred upon it to
discipline its members, must follow the rules and regulation
that it had itself promulgated for its guidance and for that of its
members. The rules in force at the time Congressman Osmeña
delivered the speech declared by the House to constitutes a
disorderly conduct provides:
. . . but the Member who uttered them shall not be
held to answer, nor be subject to the censure of the
House therefor, if further debate or other business
has intervened. (Rule XVII, Sec. 7, Rules, House of
Representatives.)
Congressman Osmeña delivered the speech in question on
June 23, 1960. It was only on July 8, or 15 days after June 23,
1060 when the House created the committee that would
investigated him. For fully 15 days the House took up other
matters. All that was done, while the speech was being
delivered, was to have certains portions thereof deleted. I hold
that pursuant to its own Rules the House may no longer punish
Congressman Osmeña for the delivered fifteen days before.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 26

The fact that no action was promptly taken to punish itself, fix the period during which punishment may be meted
Congressman Osmeña immediately after its delivery, except to out, said Rules should be enforced regardless of who may be
have some part of the speech deleted, show that the members prejudicated thereby. Only in that way may the supermacy of
of the House did not consider Osmeña's speech a disorderly the law be maintained.
conduct. The idea to punish Congressman Osmeña, which
came 15 days after, was, therefore, an afterthought. It is,
therefore, clear that Congressman Osmeña is being made to
answer for an act, after the time during which he could be
punished therefor had lapsed. Footnotes

1
The majority opinion holds that the House can amend its rules  These, except Congressman Abeleda, share the
any time. We do not dispute this principle, but we hold that the views of petitioner.
House may not do so in utter disregard of the fundamental
2
principle of law that an amendment takes place only after its  Tenney vs. Brandhove, 341 U. S. 367.
approval, or, as in this case, to the extent of punishing an
offense after the time to punishing an had elapsed. Since the 3
 Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 189;
rule, that a member can be punished only before other Hiss. vs. Barlett & Gray. 468, 63 Am. Dec. 768, 770.
proceedings have intervened, was in force at the time
Congressman Osmeña delivered his speech, the House may 4
not ignore said rule. It is said in the majority opinion that the  Rules of the House not the force of law, but they are
rule limiting the period for imposition of a penalty for a speech merely in the nature of by-laws prescribed for the
to the day it was made, is merely one of procedure. With due orderly and convenient conduct of their own
respect to the majority, we do not think that it is merely a rule proceedings. (67 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 870)
of procedure; we believe it actually is a limitation of the time in
which the House may take punitive action against an offending 5
 Corpus Juris Secumdum, p. 870.
member; it is alienation (in reference to time) on the liability to
punishment. As Mr. Justice J.B.L., Reyes points out, the rule is 6
 South Georgia Power vs. Bauman, 169 Ga. 649;
substantive, not merely a procedural principle, and may not be 151 s. w. 515.
ignored when invoked.
7
 146 Cal. 604; 69 L. R. A. 556.
If this Government of laws and not of men, then the House
should observe its own rule and not violate it by punishing a 8
member after the period for indictment and punishment had  Canno's Precedents (1936) par. 2497) William
already passed. Not because the subject of the Philippic is no Willet, Jr. of New York); par. 2498 (Louis v. Mc
less than the Chief Magistrate of the nation should the rule of Fadden of Pensylvania).
the House be ignored by itself. It is true that our Government is
based on the principle of separation of powers between the 9
 Constitution, Jefferson's Manual and the House of
three branches thereof. I also agree to the corollary proposition Representative by Louis Deschler (1955) p. 382.
that this Court should not interfere with the legislature in the
manner it performs its functions; but I also hold that the Court 10
 the Jones Law placed "in the hands of the people of
cannot abandon its duty to pronounce what the law is when
the Philippines as large a control of their domestic
any of its (the House) members, or any humble citizen, invokes
affairs as can be given them, without in the meantime
the law.
impairing the rights of sovereignty by the people of
the United States." (Preamble)
Congressman Osmeña had invoked the protection of a rule of
the House. I believe it is our bounden duty to state what the 11
 Apart from the view that power to remove includes
rule being invoked by him is, to point out the fact that the rule is
the power to suspend asan incident. (Burnap vs. U. s.
being violated in meting out punishment for his speech; we
252, U. S. 512, 64 L. Ed. 693, 695.) This view is
should not shirk our responsibility to declare his rights under
distinguishable from Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil.,
the rule simply on the board excuse of separation of powers.
175.(See Gregory vs. Mayor, 21 N. E. 120) But we
Even the legislature may not ignore the rule it has promulgated
need not explain this now. Enough to rely on
for the government of the conduct of its members, and the fact
congressional inherent power.
that a coordinate branches of the Government is involved,
should not deter us from performing our duty. We may not
12
possess the power to enforce our opinion if the House chooses  See appendix par. VII, Cushing.
to disregard the same. In such case the members thereof
stand before the bar of public opinion to answer for their act in 13
 This, apart from doubts on (a) our jurisdiction to
ignoring what they themselves have approved as their norm of entertain original petitions for declaratory judgments,
conduct. and (b) availability of certiorari or prohibition against
respondents who are not exercising judicial or
Let it be clearly understood that the writer of this dissent ministerial functions (Rule 67, sec. 1 and 2).
personally believe that vitreous attacks against the Chief
Executive, or any official or citizen for that matter, should be 14
 See supra.
condemned. But where the Rules, promulgated by the House
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 27

15
 Phil., 83.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 128055. April 18, 2001]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner,
vs.  SANDIGANBAYAN, FRANCIS E.
GARCHITORENA, JOSE S. BALAJADIA AND
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO, AS PRESIDING
JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE FIRST
DIVISION, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The Court is called upon to review the act of the
Sandiganbayan, and how far it can go, in ordering the
preventive suspension of petitioner, Mme. Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, in connection with pending criminal cases
filed against her for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The instant case arose from complaints filed by a group
of employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation (CID) against petitioner, then CID Commissioner,
for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act. The investigating panel, that took over the case from
Investigator Gualberto dela Llana after having been constituted
by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon upon petitioners request,
came up with a resolution which it referred, for approval, to the
Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) and the
Ombudsman. In his Memorandum, dated 26 April 1991, the
Ombudsman directed the OSP to file the appropriate
informations against petitioner. On 13 May 1991, OSP
submitted to the Ombudsman the informations for clearance;
approved, forthwith, three informations were filed on even date.
In Criminal Case No. 16698 filed before the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner was indicted thusly:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public officer, being then the
Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally approve the application for
legalization of the stay of the following aliens: Jhamtani Shalini
Narendra, Ting Siok Hun, Ching Suat Liong Ting, Cu Kui Pein
Uy, Cu Kui Pwe Uy, Hong Shao Guan, Hong Xiao Yuan, Xu Li
Xuan, Qui Ming Xia Ong, Wu Sui Xin Quiu, Wu Hong Guan Qui
@ Betty Go, Wu Hong Ru Qui @ Mary Go Xu Yin Yin Kua,
Hong Shao Hua Xu, Hong Shao Wei Xu, Lu Shing Qing, Lu Shi
Tian, Lu Se Chong, Shi Qing Yu, Xu Angun @ Xu An Cin, Xu
Pinting, Wang Xiu Jin, Cai Pian Pian, Cai Wen Xu, Cai Min
Min, Cai Ping Ping, Choi Kin Kwok @ Bernardo Suarez, Yen
Liang Ju @ Jeslyn Gan, Cai Yan Nan, Yen Ling Chien @
Chrismayne Gan, So Chen Yueh-O, Cai Ya Rong, who arrived
in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of
Executive Order no. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which prohibits
the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully well
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 28
that said aliens are disqualified, thereby giving unwarranted
benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was
unlawfully legalized by said accused.[1]
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel,
were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed,
respectively, No. 91-94555 and no. 91-94897.
Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan,
Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for
the arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand
(P15,000.00) Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need
for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from
injuries sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan
granted her provisional liberty until 05 June 1991 or until her
physical condition would warrant her physical appearance in
court. Upon manifestation by the Ombudsman, however, that
petitioner was able to come unaided to his office on 20 May
1991, Sandiganbayan issued an order setting the arraignment
on 27 May 1991.
Meanwhile, petitioner moved for the cancellation of her
cash bond and prayed that she be allowed provisional liberty
upon a recognizance.
On 24 May 1991, petitioner filed, concurrently, a Petition
for Certiorari with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction before
the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698
and a motion before the Sandiganbayan to meanwhile defer
her arraignment. The Court taking cognizance of the petition
issued a temporary restraining order.
The Sandiganbayan, thus, informed, issued an order
deferring petitioners arraignment and the consideration of her
motion to cancel the cash bond until further advice from the
court.
On 13 January 1992, the Court rendered its decision
dismissing the petition and lifting the temporary restraining
order. The subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner proved unavailing.
On 06 July 1992, in the wake of media reports
announcing petitioners intention to accept a fellowship from the
John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University,
the Sandiganbayan issued an order to enjoin petitioner from
leaving the country.
On 15 October 1992, petitioner moved to inhibit
Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case
and to defer her arraignment pending action on her motion to
inhibit. On 09 November 1992, her motion was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. The following day, she filed anew a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with urgent Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction with the Court, docketed G.R. No. 99289-90. At the
same time, petitioner filed a motion for bill of particulars with
the Sandiganbayan asseverating that the names of the aliens
whose applications she purportedly approved and thereby
supposedly extended undue advantage were conspicuously
omitted in the complaint.
The Court, in its resolution of 12 November 1992,
directed the Sandiganbayan to reset petitioners arraignment
not later than five days from receipt of notice thereof.

On 07 December 1992, the OSP and the Ombudsman
filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to admit thirty-two
amended informations. Petitioner moved for the dismissal of
the 32 informations. The court, in its 11th March 1993
resolution, denied her motion to dismiss the said informations
and directed her to post bail on the criminal cases, docketed
Criminal Case No. 18371-18402, filed against her.
Unrelenting, petitioner, once again came to this
Court via  a Petition for Certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 109266,
assailing the 03rd March 1993 resolution of the Sandiganbayan
which resolved not to disqualify its Presiding Justice, as well as
its 14th March 1993 resolution admitting the 32 Amended
Informations, and seeking the nullification thereof.
Initially, the Court issued a temporary restraining order
directing Presiding Justice Garchitorena to cease and desist
from sitting in the case, as well as from enforcing the
11th March 1993 resolution ordering petitioner to post bail
bonds for the 32 amended informations, and from proceeding
with her arraignment on 12 April 1993 until the matter of his
disqualification would have been resolved by the Court.
On 02 December 1993, the Court, in its decision in G.R.
109266, directed the OSP and Ombudsman to consolidate the
32 amended informations. Conformably therewith, all the 32
informations were consolidated into one information under
Criminal Case No. 16698.
Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to
Redetermine probable Cause and to dismiss or quash said
information. Pending the resolution of this incident, the
prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to issue an order suspending petitioner.
On 03 August 1995, the Sandiganbayan resolved to allow
the testimony of one Rodolfo Pedellaga (Pedellaga). The
presentation was scheduled on 15 September 1995.
In the interim, the Sandiganbayan directed petitioner to
file her opposition to the 31st July 1995 motion for the
prosecution within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
On 18 August 1995, petitioner submitted to the
Sandiganbayan a motion for reconsideration of its 03rd August
1995 order which would allow the testimony of Pedellaga. The
incident, later denied by the Sandiganbayan, was elevated to
the Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, entitled
Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan, docketed G.R.
No. 123792.
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the
motion of the prosecution to suspend her. On 25 January
1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the Court hereby grants
the motion under consideration and hereby suspends the
accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago from her position as
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines and from any other
government position she may be holding at present or
hereafter. Her suspension shall be for ninety (90) days only
and shall take effect immediately upon notice.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Hon. Ernesto
Maceda, Senate President, Senate of the Philippines,
Executive House, Taft Ave., Manila, through the Hon.
Secretary of the Senate, for the implementation of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 29
suspension herein ordered. The Secretary of the Senate shall
inform this court of the action taken thereon within five (5) days
from receipt hereof.
The said official shall likewise inform this Court of the actual
date of implementation of the suspension order as well as the
expiry of the ninetieth day thereof so that the same may be
lifted at the time.[2]
Hence, the instant recourse. The petition assails the
authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a ninety-day
preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any
government position, and furnishing a copy thereof to the
Senate of the Philippines for the implementation of the
suspension order.
The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the
preventive suspension of an incumbent public official charged
with violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has
both legal and jurisprudential support. Section 13 of the statute
provides:
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent
public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property whether as a simple or
as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended
from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall
lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he
is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the
salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already
been separated from the service, has already received such
benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the
Government. (As amended by BP Blg. 195, March 16, 1982).
In the relatively recent case of Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan,
[3]
 the Court reiterated:
The validity of Section 13, R.A. 3019, as amended --- treating
of the suspension pendente lite of an accused public officer ---
may no longer be put at issue, having been repeatedly upheld
by this Court.
xxx xxx xxx
The provision of suspension pendente lite applies to all
persons indicted upon a valid information under the Act,
whether they be appointive or elective officials; or permanent
or temporary employees, or pertaining to the career or non-
career service.[4]
It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the
court to issue an order of suspension upon determination of
the validity of the information filed before it. Once the
information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, the
court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of
course, and there seems to be no ifs and buts  about it.

[5]
 Explaining the nature of the preventive suspension, the
Court in the case of Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan[6] observed:
x x x It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of
judicial proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during suspension.[7]
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the
Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the clear an unequivocal
mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the
Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority
to decree the suspension of public officials and employees
indicted before it.
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that
the public officer concerned must be suspended only in the
office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with
which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the
use of the word office would indicate that it applies to any
office which the officer charged may be holding, and not
only the particular office under which he stands accused. [8]
En passan, while the imposition of suspension is not
automatic or self-operative as the validity of the information
must be determined in a pre-suspension hearing, there is no
hard and fast rule as to the conduct thereof. It has been said
that-
x x x No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-
suspension hearing. Suffice it to state that the accused should
be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the
VALIDITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS against him,
e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not
constitute a violation of the provisions of Republic Act 3019 or
the bribery provisions of the revised Penal Code which would
warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13
of the Act; or he may present a motion to quash the information
on any of the grounds provided for in Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, he is accorded the right to challenge the propriety of
his prosecution on the ground that the acts for which he is
charged do not constitute a violation of Rep. Act 3019, or of the
provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal Code, and the right
to present a motion to quash the information on any other
grounds provided in Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
However, a challenge to the validity of the criminal proceedings
on the ground that the acts for which the accused is charged
do not constitute a violation of the provisions of Rep. Act 3019,
or of the provisions on bribery of the revised Penal Code,
should be treated only in the same manner as a challenge to
the criminal proceeding by way of a motion to quash on the
ground provided in Paragraph (a), section 2 of Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense. In other words, a resolution of the challenge to the
validity of the criminal proceeding, on such ground, should be
limited to an inquiry whether the facts alleged in the
information, if hypothetically admitted, constitute the elements
of an offense punishable under Rep. Act 3019 or the provisions
on bribery of the Revised Penal Code.[9]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 30
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused
must be established in a pre-suspension proceeding before
trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a
proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of
culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense charged,
or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records an other evidence before the court could have a valid
basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of
the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity
to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due
preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not
constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory
suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the
grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules
on Criminal procedure.[10]
The instant petition is not the first time that an incident
relating to petitioners case before the Sandiganbayan has
been brought to this Court. In previous occasions, the Court
has been called upon the resolve several other matters on the
subject. Thus: (1) In Santiago vs. Vasquez, [11] petitioner sought
to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with Criminal
case No. 16698 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019; (2) in
Santiago vs. Vasquez,[12] petitioner sought the nullification of
the hold departure order issued by the Sandiganbayan via a
Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold
Departure Order with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion to
set Pending Incident for Hearing; (3) in Santiago vs.
Garchitorena,[13] petitioner sought the nullification of the
resolution, dated 03 March 1993, in Criminal Case No. 16698
of the Sandiganbayan (First Division) and to declare Presiding
Justice Garchitorena disqualified from acting in said criminal
case, and the resolution, dated 14 March 1993, which deemed
as filed the 32 amended informations against her; and (4) in
Miriam Defensor Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan,[14] petitioner
assailed the denial by the Sandiganbayan of her motion for her
reconsideration from its 03rd August 1995 order allowing the
testimony of Pedellaga. In one of these cases,[15] the Court
declared:
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before
us involving Criminal Case No. 16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-
99290; G.R. No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why
she failed to raise the issue of the delay in the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information against her in
those petitions. A piece-meal presentation of issues, like the
splitting of causes of action, is self-defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended informations did not
charge any offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No.
3019 because the official acts complained of therein were
authorized under Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board
of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation adopted the
policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of qualified aliens even though they
had arrived in the Philippines after December 31 1983. She
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her
motion to quash the informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).

In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the
allegations of fact in the information (People vs. Supnad, 7
SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted
hypothetically in her motion that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of
the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the execution of her official functions.
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the
offense defined in Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.[16]
The pronouncement, upholding the validity of the
information filed against petitioner, behooved Sandiganbayan
to discharge its mandated duty to forthwith issue the order of
preventive suspension.
The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No.
3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its
own ranks under the Constitution which provides that each-
x x x house may determine the rules of its proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, suspend or
expel a Member.A penalty of suspension, when imposed,
shall not exceed sixty days.[17]
The suspension contemplated in the above constitutional
provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the house of Representatives,
as the case may be, upon an erring member. Thus, in its
resolution in the case of Ceferino Paredes, Jr., vs.
Sandiganbayan, et al.,[18] the Court affirmed the order of
suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on
the prerogatives of congress. The Court ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the
Constitution which deals with the power of each House of
Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly
behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a vote of two-
thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the
penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding
from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner
for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be
deemed to have effectively excluded members of Congress
from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim
simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent,
albeit coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative,
the Executive and the Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of influence and effectively
prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 31
Parenthetically, it might be well to elaborate a bit. Section
1, Article VIII, of the 1987 Constitution, empowers the Court to
act not only in the settlement of actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also
in the determination of whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. The provision allowing the Court to look into
any possible grave abuse of discretion committed by any
government instrumentality has evidently been couched in
general terms in order to make it malleable to judicial
interpretation in the light of any emerging milieu. In its normal
concept, the term has been said to imply an arbitrary, despotic,
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. When the question, however, pertains
to an affair internal to either of Congress or the Executive, the
Court subscribes to the view[19] that unless an infringement
of any specific Constitutional proscription thereby inheres
the Court should not deign substitute its own judgment
over that of any of the other two branches of
government. It is an impairment or a clear disregard of a
specific constitutional precept or provision that can unbolt
the steel door for judicial intervention. If any part of the
Constitution is not, or ceases to be, responsive to
contemporary needs, it is the people, not the Court, who must
promptly react in the manner prescribed by the Charter itself.
Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its
coverage the members of Congress and that, therefore,
the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the
assailed preventive suspension order.
Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case
No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division of the
Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein
petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it appropriate to
render this decision for future guidance on the significant issue
raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1]
 Rollo, p. 96.
[2]
 Rollo, p. 20.
[3]
 288 SCRA 328.
[4]
 At pp. 336-337.
[5]
 Libanan vs. Sandiganbayan, 163 SCRA 163.
[6]
 Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383.
[7]
 At p. 386.
[8]
 Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; Segovia vs.
Sandiganbayan, supra.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 32

[9]
 Luciano vs. Mariano, 40 SCRA 187; People vs. Albano, 163
SCRA 511, 517-519.
[10]
 Segovia vs. Sandiganbayan, supra; Resolution of the
Supreme Court in A.M. No. 00-05-03-SC, dated 03 October
2000, which became effective on 01 December 2000.
[11]
 205 SCRA 162.
[12]
 217 SCRA 633.
[13]
 228 SCRA 214.
[14]
 G.R. No. 123792.
[15]
 Santiago vs. Garchitorena, Idem.
[16]
 At pp. 221-222.
[17]
 Section 16(3), Article VI, 1987 Constitution.
[18]
 G.R. No. 118364, 08 August 1995.
[19]
 Somewhat made implicit in my understanding of Arroyo vs.
De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268, 289.

[G.R. No. 130240.February 5, 2002]
DE VENECIA, JR., et al., vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (1st DIV.)
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this
Court dated FEB 5 2002.
G.R. No. 130240(Jose de Venecia, Jr., in his capacity as
Speaker of the House of Representatives; Roberto P.
Nazareno, in his capacity as Secretary-General of the House
of Representatives; Jose Ma. Antonio B. Tuaño, Cashier,
House of Representatives; Antonio M. Chan, Chief, Property
Division, House of Representatives, petitioners, vs. The
Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division), respondent.)
The principal issue in this petitioner for certiorari [1]cralaw is
whether of not the Sandiganbayan may cite in contempt of
court the Speaker of the House of Representatives for refusing
to implement the preventive suspension order it issued in a
criminal case against a member of the House.
Petitioners seek the annulment of:
(1) the Order dated August 18, 1997 of the Sandiganbayan
(First Division),[2]cralaw directing Speaker Jose de Venecia of
the House of Representatives, to implement the preventive
suspension of then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr., in
connection with Criminal Case No. 18857 entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. and Gregorio S.
Branzuela"; and
[3]
(2) the Resolution dated August 29, 1997, cralaw also of the
Sandiganbayan, declaring Speaker de Venecia in contempt of
court for refusing to implement the preventive suspension
order.
The facts are as follows:
On March 12, 1993, an Information (docketed as Criminal
Case No. 18857) was filed with the Sandiganbayan (First
Division) against then Congressman Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr.,
of Agusan del Sur for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended).
After the accused pleaded not guilty, the prosecution filed a
"Motion To Suspend The Accused Pendente Lite."
In its Resolution dated June 6, 1997, the
Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the Speaker
to suspend the accused.But the Speaker did not comply.Thus,
on August 12, 1997, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution
requiring him to appear before it, on August 18, 1997 at 8:00
o'clock in the morning, to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt of court.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 33
Unrelenting, the Speaker filed, through counsel, a motion for
reconsideration, invoking the rule on separation of powers and
claiming that he can only act as may be dictated by the House
as a body pursuant to House Resolution No. 116 adopted on
August 13, 1997.
On August 29, 1997, the Sandiganbayan rendered the now
assailed Resolution[4]cralaw declaring Speaker Jose C. de
Venecia, Jr. in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a fine
of P10,000.00 within 10 days from notice.
Hence, the instant recourse.
The issue before us had long been settled by this Court
in Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan  in G.R. No.
118354 (August 8, 1995).We ruled that the suspension
provided for in the Anti-Graft law is mandatory and is of
different nature and purpose.It is imposed by the court, not as
a penalty, but as a precautionary measure resorted to upon
the filing of a valid Information.Its purpose is to prevent the
accused public officer from frustrating his prosecution by
influencing witnesses or tampering with documentary evidence
and from committing further acts of malfeasance while in
office.It is thus an incident to the criminal proceedings before
the court.On the other hand, the suspension or expulsion
contemplated in the Constitution is a House-imposed sanction
against its members.It is, therefore, a penalty for disorderly
behavior to enforce discipline, maintain order in its
proceedings, or vindicate its honor and integrity.
Just recently, in Miriam Defensor Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,
et al., this Court en banc,  through Justice Jose C. Vitug, held
that the doctrine of separation of powers does not exclude the
members of Congress from the mandate of R.A. 3019, thus:
"The order of suspension
prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is
distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its own ranks under the
Constitution. x x x.
"The suspension contemplated in
the above constitutional provision is a
punitive measure that is imposed upon a
determination by the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, upon
an erring member. x x x.
"The doctrine of separation of
powers by itself may not be deemed to
have effectively excluded members of
Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor
from its sanctions.The maxim simply
recognizes that each of the three co-equal
and independent, albeit coordinate,
branches of the government - the
Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary -
has exclusive prerogatives and
cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one
branch from unduly intruding into the
internal affairs of either
branch." (Emphasis ours)
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 34

We note that the term of then Congressman Ceferino Paredes,

Jr. expired on June 30, 1988.This rendered moot and
academic the instant case.

WHEREFORE, for being moot, this case is deemed

CLOSED and TERMINATED.(Quisumbing, J., no
part.Quisumbing and Carpio, JJ., abroad on official business)

Endnotes:

[1]
cralaw Under rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.

[2]
cralaw Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena,
and concurred in by Justices Minita V. Chico-Nazario and
Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. (a special member, now a member of
the Supreme Court).

[3]
cralaw Penned by Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena,
and concurred in by Justices Minita V. Chico-Nazario and
Edilberto G. Sandoval.

[4]
cralaw Annex "B," ibid., pp. 48-67.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17931             February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner, 
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General
of the Philippines, 
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of
the Central Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General
denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine
Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines
issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To
supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a
memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for
exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said
Republic Act No. 2609. Several times in November and
December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
— which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin
glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and
hardwood producers — bought foreign exchange for the
importation of urea and formaldehyde — which are the main
raw materials in the production of said glues — and paid
therefor the aforementioned margin fee aggregating
P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another purchase
of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin
fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum
of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the
Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959,
declaring that the separate importation of urea and
formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last
importation of these products, petitioner made a similar request
for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee therefor.
Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin
fee vouchers for the refund of said amounts, the Auditor of the
Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon
the ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board
for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde
is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph
XVIII of Republic Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner,
the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of the
Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 35
The only question for determination in this case is whether or
not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are exempt by law from the
payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board
pursuant to the provision of section one hereof shall
not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for
the importation of the following:.
xxx     xxx     xxx
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of
plywood and hardboard when imported by and for the
exclusive use of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their
case not covered by this stipulation of
facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde"
appearing in this provision should be construed as
"urea andformaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that
respondents herein, the Auditor General and the Auditor of the
Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this
connection, it should be noted that, whereas "urea" and
"formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of
Science and Technology has expressed, through its
Commissioner, the view that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the
synthetic resin formed as a condensation product
from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde
under certain conditions relating to temperature,
acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when
applied in water solution and extended with
inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost
adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood.
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which
is patently distinct and different from urea" and "formaldehyde",
as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic
resin known as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends,
however, that the bill approved in Congress contained the
copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and
"formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to
exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential
elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called
"urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product, citing
in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the
Senate, during the consideration of the bill before said House,
by members thereof. But, said individual statements do not
necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they
indicate the intent of the House of Representatives (see Song
Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615;
Mayon Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 36

vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29,

1960]). Furthermore, it is well settled that the enrolled bill —
which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" — is conclusive upon the courts as regards the
tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by
the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on
Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has been
any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by
the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive — on
which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle
of separation of powers and undermining one of the
cornerstones of our democratic system — the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,

with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes,

J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11530            August 12, 1916
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,  1 of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void.
vs.
JUAN PONS, defendant-appellant.
Jose Varela y Calderon for appellant.
Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
The information in this case reads:
The undersigned charges Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons,
and Jacinto Lasarte with the crime of illegal
importation of opium, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said
accused, conspiring together and plotting among
themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and fraudulently, bring from a foreign
country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the
steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into
the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and within the
jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125
kilograms of opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine
currency; and that, then and there, the said accused,
also conspiring together and plotting among
themselves, did receive and conceal the said quantity
of opium and aided each other in the transportation,
receipt and concealment of the same after the said
opium had been imported, knowing that said drug had
been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally
introduced into the Philippine Islands from a foreign
country; an act committed in violation of law."
On motion of counsel Juan Pons and Gabino Beliso were tried
separately. (Jacinto Lasarte had not yet been arrested.) Each
were found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced
accordingly, the former to be confined in Bilibid Prison for the
period of two years, to pay a fine of P1,000, to suffer the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to the payment of one-half of the costs. The same
penalties were imposed upon the latter, except that he was
sentenced to pay a fine of P3,000. Both appealed. Beliso later
withdrew his appeal and the judgment as to him has become
final.
The contentions for reversal are numerous (twenty-five
assignments of error) and are greatly multiplied by their
reiteration in a somewhat changed form of statement under the
many propositions embraced in the elaborate printed brief, but
their essence, when correctly understood, are these: The court
erred (a) in denying this appellant's motion, dated May 6, 1915,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 37
and reproduced on July 27, 1915, and (b) in finding that the
legal evidence of record establishes the guilt of the appellant,
Juan Pons, beyond a reasonable doubt.
In his motion above mentioned, counsel alleged and offered to
prove that the last day of the special session of the Philippine
Legislature for 1914 was the 28th day of February; that Act No.
2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was
not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March
The validity of the Act is not otherwise questioned. As it is
admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the
Governor-General's proclamation, February 28 and that the
appellant is charged with having violated the provisions of Act
No. 2381, the vital question is the date of adjournment of the
Legislature, and this reduces itself to two others, namely, (1)
how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or
extraneous evidence and (2) whether the court can take
judicial notice of the journals. These questions will be
considered in the reversed order.
Act No. 1679 provides that the Secretary of the Commission
shall perform the duties which would properly be required of
the Recorder of the Commission under the existing law. And
rules 15 and 16 of the Legislative Procedure of the Philippine
Commission provides, among other things, "that the
proceedings of the Commission shall be briefly and accurately
stated on the journal," and that it shall be the duty of the
Secretary "to keep a correct journal of the proceedings of the
Commission." On page 793 of volume 7 of the Commission
Journal for the ordinary and special sessions of the Third
Philippine Legislature, the following appears:
The Journal for Saturday, February 28, 1914, was
approved. Adjournment sine die of the Commission
as a Chamber of the Philippine Legislature. The hour
of midnight having arrived, on motion of
Commissioner Palma, the Commission, as a
Chamber of the Philippine Legislature, adjourned sine
die.
The Act of Congress, approved July 1, 1902, provides, among
other things, in section 7, that the Philippine Assembly "shall
keep in journal of its proceedings, which shall be
published . . . ." In obedience to this mandate, the journal of the
Assembly's proceedings for the sessions of 1914 was duly
published and it appears therein (vol. 9, p. 1029), that the
Assembly adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on
February 28, 1914.
Section 275 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the
existence of the "official acts of the legislative, executive, and
judicial departments of the United States and of the Philippine
Islands ... shall be judicially recognized by the court without the
introduction of proof; but the court may receive evidence upon
any of the subjects in this section states, when it shall find it
necessary for its own information, and may resort for its aid to
appropriate books, documents, or evidence." And section 313
[as amended by sec. 1 of Act No. 2210], of the same Code
also provides that:

Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . .
(2) The proceedings of the Philippine Commission, or
of any legislative body that may be provided for the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of
those bodies or of either house thereof, or by
published statutes or resolutions, or by copies
certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their
order: Provided, That in the case of Acts of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature
when there is in existence a copy signed by the
presiding officers and the secretaries of said bodies, it
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Act
and of the due enactment thereof.
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon
the exact question whether the courts may take judicial notice
of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the United States
that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining
the question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The
State ex rel. Herron vs. Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited
therein.) The result is that the law and the adjudicated cases
make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals
of the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914.
These journals are not ambiguous or contradictory as to the
actual time of the adjournment. They show, with absolute
certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock
midnight on February 28, 1914.
Passing over the question whether the printed Act (No. 2381),
published by authority of law, is conclusive evidence as to the
date when it was passed, we will inquire whether the courts
may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journals are
clear and explicit. From the foregoing it is clear that this
investigation belongs entirely to that branch of legal science
which embraces and illustrates the laws of evidence. On the
one hand, it is maintained that the Legislature did not, as we
have indicated, adjourn at midnight on February 28, 1914, but
on March 1st, and that this allegation or alleged fact may be
established by extraneous evidence; while, on the other hand,
it is urged that the contents of the legislative journals are
conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment. In order to
understand these opposing positions, it is necessary to
consider the nature and character of the evidence thus
involved. Evidence is understood to be that which proves or
disproves "any matter in question or to influence the belief
respecting it," and "conclusive evidence is that which
establishes the fact, as in the instance of conclusive
presumptions." (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 701 et
seq.) Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his
contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or
recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the
acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very
nature and object the records of the Legislature are as
important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they
are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a
coordinate and independent department of the Government,
and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the
Legislature. But counsel in his argument says that the public
knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on February 28,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 38
1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the
discussion of all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands
of the clock were stayed in order to enable the Assembly to
effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the
Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special
session, in direct violation of the Act of Congress of July 1,
1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here suggested,
"the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of
altering the probative force and character of legislative records,
and making the proof of legislative action depend upon
uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and
so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long,
long centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to
the adoption of the rule giving verity and unimpeachability to
legislative records. If that character is to be taken away for one
purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of the
laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and
durable than that afforded by the law to many contracts
between private individuals concerning comparatively trifling
matters." (Capito vs. Topping, W. Va., 22 L. R. A. [N. S.],
1089.) Upon the same point the court, in the State ex rel.
Herron vs. Smith (44 Ohio, 348), decided in 1886, said:
Counsel have exhibited unusual industry in looking up
the various cases upon this question; and, out of a
multitude of citations, not one is found in which any
court has assumed to go beyond the proceedings of
the legislature, as recorded in the journals required to
be kept in each of its branches, on the question
whether a law has been adopted. And if reasons for
the limitation upon judicial inquiry in such matters
have not generally been stated, in doubtless arises
from the fact that they are apparent. Imperative
reasons of public policy require that the authenticity of
laws should rest upon public memorials of the most
permanent character. They should be public, because
all are required to conform to them; they should be
permanent, that right acquired to-day upon the faith of
what has been declared to be law shall not be
destroyed to-morrow, or at some remote period of
time, by facts resting only in the memory of
individuals.
In the case from which this last quotation is taken, the court
cited numerous decisions of the various states in the American
Union in support of the rule therein laid down, and we have
been unable to find a single case of a later date where the rule
has been in the least changed or modified when the legislative
journals cover the point. As the Constitution of the Philippine
Government is modeled after those of the Federal Government
and the various states, we do not hesitate to follow the courts
in that country in the matter now before us. The journals say
that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28,
1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in
declining to go behind these journals.
On or about the 5th or 6th of April, 1915, the Spanish mail
steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain, bringing,
among other cargo, twenty-five barrels which were manifested
as "wine" and consigned to Jacinto Lasarte. Gabino Beliso had
been, prior to the arrival of this cargo, engaged in the business
of a wine merchant, with an office and warehouse located at
203 Calle San Anton in this city. The shipper's invoice and bill
of lading for the twenty-five barrels were delivered to Gregorio

Cansipit, a customs broker, by Beliso. These documents were
indorsed as follows: "Deliver to Don Gabino Beliso" and signed
"Jacinto Lasarte." Cansipit conducted the negotiations incident
to the release of the merchandise from the customhouse and
the twenty-five barrels were delivered in due course to the
warehouse of Beliso at the aforementioned street and number.
Beliso signed the paper acknowledging delivery. Shortly
thereafter the custom authorities, having noticed that
shipments of merchandise manifested as "wine" had been
arriving in Manila from Spain, consigned to persons whose
names were not listed as merchants, and having some doubt
as to the nature of the merchandise so consigned, instituted an
investigation and traced on the 10th of April, 1915, the twenty-
five barrels to Beliso's warehouse, being aided by the customs
registry number of the shipment, the entry number, and the
serial number of each barrel. It was found that the twenty-five
barrels began to arrive on bull carts at Beliso's warehouse
about 11 o'clock on the morning of April 9. Before the
merchandise arrived at that place, the appellant, Juan Pons,
went to Beliso's warehouse and joined Beliso in the latter's
office, where the two engaged in conversation. Pons then left
and shortly thereafter several of the barrels arrived and were
unloaded in Beliso's bodega. He called one of his employees,
Cornelius Sese, and directed him to go out and get a bull cart.
This Sese did and returned with the vehicle. Beliso then
carefully selected five barrels out of the shipment of twenty-five
and told Sese to load these five on the cart and to deliver them
to Juan Pons at No. 144 Calle General Solano. This order was
complied with by Sese and the barrels delivered to Pons at the
place designated. Pursuing their investigation, which started on
the 10th, the customs secret service agents entered Beliso's
bodega on that date before the office was opened and awaited
the arrival of Beliso. Sese was found in the bodega and placed
under arrest. The agents then proceeded to separate the
recent shipment from the other merchandise stored in the
warehouse, identifying the barrels by the customs registry and
entry numbers. Only twenty of the twenty-five barrels could be
found on Beliso's premises. Upon being questioned or
interrogated, Sese informed the customs agents that the five
missing barrels had been delivered by him to Pons at 144
Calle General Solano by order of Beliso. The agents,
accompanied by Sese, proceeded to 144 Calle General Solano
and here found the five missing barrels, which were identified
by the registry and entry numbers as well as by the serial
numbers. The five barrels were empty, the staves having been
sprung and the iron hoops removed. Five empty tins, each
corresponding in size to the heads of the five barrels, were
found on the floor nearby. The customs officers noticed several
baskets of lime scattered about the basement of the house and
on further search they found 77 tins of opium in one of these
baskets. There was no one in the house when this search was
made, but some clothing was discovered which bore the initials
"J. P." It then became important to the customs agents to
ascertain the owner and occupant of house No. 144 on Calle
General Solano where the five barrels were delivered. The
owner was found, upon investigation, to be Mariano Limjap,
and from the latter's agent it was learned that the house was
rented by one F. C. Garcia. When the lease of the house was
produced by the agent of the owner, the agents saw that the
same was signed "F. C. Garcia, by Juan Pons." After
discovering these facts they returned to the house of Beliso
and selected three of the twenty barrels and ordered them
returned to the customhouse. Upon opening these three
barrels each was found to contain a large tin fitted into the
head of the barrel with wooden cleats and securely nailed.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 39
Each large tin contained 75 small tins of opium. A comparison
of the large tins taken out of the three barrels with the empty
ones found at 144 Calle General Solano show, says the trial
court, "that they were in every way identical in size, form, etc."
While the customs officers were still at the office and
warehouse of Beliso on the morning of April 10, Pons,
apparently unaware that anything unusual was going on,
arrived there and was placed under arrest, and taken to the
office of Captain Hawkins, chief of the customs secret service,
and according to Hawkins, voluntarily confessed his
participation in the smuggling of the opium. He maintained,
however, that the 77 tins of opium found at 144 Calle General
Solano represented the entire importation. Pons, being at the
customhouse under arrest at the time the three barrels were
opened and the customs officers appearing to be no doubt as
to which end of the barrels contained the opium, Pons showed
the officers how to open the barrels and pointed out that the
end of the barrel, which had the impression of a bottle stamped
in the wood, contained the opium. On seeing the 195 tins of
opium taken from the three barrels, Pons further stated that he
had delivered some 250 tins of opium of this shipment to a
Chinaman at 7.30 a. m. on the morning of April 10, following
the instructions given him by Beliso. On being further
questioned, Pons stated that he and Beliso had been partners
in several opium transactions; that the house at No. 144 Calle
General Solano had been leased by him at the suggestion of
Beliso for the purpose of handling the prohibited drug; and that
he and Beliso had shared the profits of a previous importation
of opium. Sese testified that he had delivered a previous
shipment to 144 Calle General Solano. The customs agents
then went with Pons to his house and found in his yard several
large tin receptacles, in every way similar to those found at 144
Calle General Solano and those taken from the barrels at the
customhouse. At first Pons stated that F. C. Garcia was a
tobacco merchant traveling in the between the Provinces of
Isabela and Cagayan, and later he retracted this statement and
admitted that Garcia was a fictitious person. But during the trial
of this case in the court below Pons testified that Garcia was a
wine merchant and a resident of Spain, and that Garcia had
written him a letter directing him to rent a house for him
(Garcia) and retain it until the arrival in the Philippine Islands of
Garcia. According to Pons this letter arrived on the same
steamer which brought the 25 barrels of "wine," but that he had
destroyed it because he feared that it would compromise him.
On being asked during the trial why he insisted, in purchasing
wine from Beliso, in receiving a part of the wine which had just
arrived on the Lopez y Lopez, answered, "Naturally because F.
C. Garcia told me in this letter that this opium was coming in
barrels of wine sent to Beliso by a man the name of Jacinto
Lasarte, and that is the reason I wanted to get these barrels of
wine."
The foregoing are substantially the fats found by the trial court
and these fats establish the guilt of the appellant beyond any
question of a doubt, notwithstanding his feeble attempt to show
that the opium as shipped to him from Spain by a childhood
fried named Garcia. The appellant took a direct part in this
huge smuggling transaction and profited thereby. The penalty
imposed by the trial court is in accordance with la and the
decisions of this court in similar cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 40

Torres, Johnson, Moreland, and Araullo, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. L-23475 April 30, 1974
HERMINIO A. ASTORGA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of
Manila, petitioner, 
vs.
ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila,
THE HON., THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ABELARDO
SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service,
EDUARDO QUINTOS, in his capacity as Chief of Police of
Manila, MANUEL CUDIAMAT, in his capacity as City
Treasurer of Manila, CITY OF MANILA, JOSE SEMBRANO,
FRANCISCO GATMAITAN, MARTIN ISIDRO, CESAR
LUCERO, PADERES TINOCO, LEONARDO FUGOSO,
FRANCIS YUSECO, APOLONIO GENER, AMBROCIO
LORENZO, JR., ALFONSO MENDOZA, JR., SERGIO
LOYOLA, GERINO TOLENTINO, MARIANO MAGSALIN,
EDUARDO QUINTOS, JR., AVELINO VILLACORTA, PABLO
OCAMPO, FELICISIMO CABIGAO, JOSE BRILLANTES,
JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARINA FRANCISCO, in their
capacities as members of the Municipal
Board, respondents.
Artemio V. Panganiban and Renito V. Saguisag and Crispin D.
Baizas and Associates for petitioner.
Paredes Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Antonio Barredo
for respondent Mayor of Manila.
Romeo L. Kahayon for respondents City Treasurer of Manila,
etc., et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant
Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Solicitor Jorge R.
Coquia and Solicitor Ricardo L. Pronove, Jr. for respondents
The Executive Secretary and Commissioner of Civil Service.
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio V. Raquiza as amici curiae.
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:p
The present controversy revolves around the passage of
House Bill No. 9266, which became Republic Act 4065, "An
Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor
of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose
Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four
Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila."
The facts as set forth in the pleadings appear undisputed:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 41
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local
application, was filed in the House of Representatives. It was
there passed on third reading without amendments on April 21,
1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its
concurrence. It was referred to the Senate Committee on
Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably
recommended approval with a minor amendment, suggested
by Senator Roxas, that instead of the City Engineer it be the
President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act
as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on
second reading on May 20, 1964, substantial amendments to
Section 11 were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino. Those
amendments were approved in toto  by the Senate. The
amendment recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear
in the journal of the Senate proceedings as having been acted
upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to
the House of Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had
been passed by the Senate on May 20, 1964 "with
amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the
amendment, which was the one recommended by Senator
Roxas and not the Tolentino amendments which were the ones
actually approved by the Senate. The House of
Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill
No. 9266 as sent back to it, and copies thereof were caused to
be printed. The printed copies were then certified and attested
by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate
and the Senate President. On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of
the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill to the
President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto
by way of approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon
became Republic Act No. 4065.
The furor over the Act which ensued as a result of the public
denunciation mounted by respondent City Mayor drew
immediate reaction from Senator Tolentino, who on July 5,
1964 issued a press statement that the enrolled copy of House
Bill No. 9266 signed into law by the President of the Philippines
was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by him
and approved on the Senate floor. As a consequence the
Senate President, through the Secretary of the Senate,
addressed a letter dated July 11, 1964 to the President of the
Philippines, explaining that the enrolled copy of House Bill No.
9266 signed by the secretaries of both Houses as well as by
the presiding officers thereof was not the bill duly approved by
Congress and that he considered his signature on the enrolled
bill as invalid and of no effect. A subsequent letter dated July
21, 1964 made the further clarification that the invalidation by
the Senate President of his signature meant that the bill on
which his signature appeared had never been approved by the
Senate and therefore the fact that he and the Senate Secretary
had signed it did not make the bill a valid enactment.
On July 31, 1964 the President of the Philippines sent a
message to the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress

informing them that in view of the circumstances he was
officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill No. 9266
(which had been returned to the Senate the previous July 3),
adding that "it would be untenable and against public policy to
convert into law what was not actually approved by the two
Houses of Congress."
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas,
issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs of offices
of the city government as well as to the owners, operators
and/or managers of business establishments in Manila to
disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065. He likewise
issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of
the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor
presumably under authority of Republic Act 4065.
Reacting to these steps taken by Mayor Villegas, the then
Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this Court
on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or
Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of Manila, the
Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil Service, the
Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer and the
members of the municipal board to comply with the provisions
of Republic Act 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065
never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by
the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and
not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of
the issue.
On April 28, 1965, upon motion of respondent Mayor, who was
then going abroad on an official trip, this Court issued a
restraining order, without bond, "enjoining the petitioner Vice-
Mayor Herminio Astorga from exercising any of the powers of
an Acting Mayor purportedly conferred upon the Vice-Mayor of
Manila under the so-called Republic Act 4065 and not
otherwise conferred upon said Vice-Mayor under any other law
until further orders from this Court."
The original petitioner, Herminio A. Astorga, has since been
succeeded by others as Vice-Mayor of Manila. Attorneys
Fortunato de Leon and Antonio Raquiza, with previous leave of
this Court, appeared as amici curiae, and have filed extensive
and highly enlightening memoranda on the issues raised by
the parties.
Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of
authorities, principally decisions of United States Federal and
State Courts, have been submitted on the question of whether
the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be
adhered to in this jurisdiction. A similar question came up
before this Court and elicited differing opinions in the case of
Mabanag, et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al. (March 5, 1947), 78 Phil.
Reports 1. While the majority of the Court in that case applied
the "enrolled bill" doctrine, it cannot be truly said that the
question has been laid to rest and that the decision therein
constitutes a binding precedent.
The issue in that case was whether or not a resolution of both
Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the (1935)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 42
Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto (the so-
called parity rights provision) had been passed by "a vote of
three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives" pursuant to Article XV of the
Constitution.
The main opinion, delivered by Justice Pedro Tuason and
concurred in by Justices Manuel V. Moran, Guillermo F. Pablo
and Jose M. Hontiveros, held that the case involved a political
question which was not within the province of the judiciary in
view of the principle of separation of powers in our
government. The "enrolled bill" theory was relied upon merely
to bolster the ruling on the jurisdictional question, the
reasoning being that "if a political question conclusively binds
the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly
certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the
"enrolled bill rule" born of that respect."
Justice Cesar Bengzon wrote a separate opinion, concurred in
by Justice Sabino Padilla, holding that the Court had
jurisdiction to resolve the question presented, and affirming
categorically that "the enrolled copy of the resolution and the
legislative journals are conclusive upon us," specifically in view
of Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210. This
provision in the Rules of Evidence in the old Code of Civil
Procedure appears indeed to be the only statutory basis on
which the "enrolled bill" theory rests. It reads:
The proceedings of the Philippine
Commission, or of any legislative body that
may be provided for in the Philippine Islands,
or of Congress (may be proved) by the
journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk
or secretary, printed by their order; provided,
that in the case of acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature,
when there is in existence a copy signed by
the presiding officers and secretaries of said
bodies, it shall be conclusive proof  of the
provisions of such acts and of the due
enactment thereof.
Congress devised its own system of authenticating bills duly
approved by both Houses, namely, by the signatures of their
respective presiding officers and secretaries on the printed
copy of the approved bill.2 It has been held that this procedure
is merely a mode of authentication,3 to signify to the Chief
Executive that the bill being presented to him has been duly
approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or
rejection.4 The function of an attestation is therefore not of
approval, because a bill is considered approved after it has
passed both Houses. Even where such attestation is provided
for in the Constitution authorities are divided as to whether or
not the signatures are mandatory such that their absence
would render the statute invalid.5 The affirmative view, it is
pointed out, would be in effect giving the presiding officers the
power of veto, which in itself is a strong argument to the
contrary6 There is less reason to make the attestation a
requisite for the validity of a bill where the Constitution does
not even provide that the presiding officers should sign the bill
before it is submitted to the President.

In one case in the United States, where the (State)Constitution
required the presiding officers to sign a bill and this provision
was deemed mandatory, the duly authenticated enrolled bill
was considered as conclusive proof of its due
enactment.7 Another case however, under the same
circumstances, held that the enrolled bill was not conclusive
evidence.8 But in the case of Field vs. Clark,9 the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the signatures of the presiding
officers on a bill, although not required by the Constitution, is
conclusive evidence of its passage. The authorities in the
United States are thus not unanimous on this point.
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said
case of Field vs. Clark  as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and, by the President of
the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled
bill, is an official attestation by the two
houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to
the President, that a bill, thus attested, has
received, in due form, the sanction of the
legislative branch of the government, and
that it is delivered to him in obedience to the
constitutional requirement that all bills which
pass Congress shall be presented to him.
And when a bill, thus attested, receives his
approval, and is deposited in the public
archives, its authentication as a bill that has
passed Congress should be deemed
complete and unimpeachable. As the
President has no authority to approve a bill
not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in
the custody of the Secretary of State, and
having the official attestations of the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President
of the United States, carries, on its face, a
solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government,
charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was
passed by Congress. The respect due to
coequal and independent departments
requires the judicial department to act upon
that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in
the manner stated; leaving the courts to
determine, when the question properly
arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is
in conformity with the Constitution.
It may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on
"the respect due to coequal and independent departments,"
which requires the judicial department "to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated."
Thus it has also been stated in other cases that if the
attestation is absent and the same is not required for the
validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and
other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This
was the logical conclusion reached in a number of
decisions, 10 although they are silent as to whether the journals
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 43
may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding
officers is present.
The (1935) Constitution is silent as to what shall constitute
proof of due enactment of a bill. It does not require the
presiding officers to certify to the same. But the said
Constitution does contain the following provisions:
Sec. 10 (4). "Each House shall keep a
Journal of its proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same, excepting such parts
as may in its judgment require secrecy; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at
the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal."
Sec. 21 (2). "No bill shall be passed by either
House unless it shall have been printed and
copies thereof in its final form furnished its
Members at least three calendar days prior
to its passage, except when the President
shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading
of a bill no amendment thereof shall be
allowed, and the question upon its passage
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the  yeas and nays entered on the Journal."
Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding
officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due
enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal
department of the government, 11 is neutralized in this case by
the fact that the Senate President declared his signature on the
bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the
invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed
had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this
declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the
attestation it invalidated, which it did for a reason that is
undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic.
As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing
sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It
is merely a mode of authentication. The lawmaking process in
Congress ends when the bill is approved by both Houses, and
the certification does not add to the validity of the bill or cure
any defect already present upon its passage. In other words it
is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the
presiding officers that is essential. Thus the (1935) Constitution
says that "[e] very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it
becomes law, be presented to the President. 12 In Brown vs.
Morris, supra, the Supreme Court of Missouri, interpreting a
similar provision in the State Constitution, said that the same
"makes it clear that the indispensable step is the final passage
and it follows that if a bill, otherwise fully enacted as a law, is
not attested by the presiding officer, of the proof that it has
"passed both houses" will satisfy the constitutional
requirement."
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory
but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate President,
granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that
there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity
of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 44

would remain valid and binding. This argument begs the issue. 2 See Rules of the House of
It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of Representatives, Rules II (d) and IV(j) and
the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity Rules of the Senate; Sections 3(e) and 6(h).
of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such
attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently 3 Brown vs. Morris, 290 SW 2d 160, 164.
there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there
to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In
such a case the entries in the journal should be consulted. 4 Taylor vs. Wilson, 22 NW 119, 120.

The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is 5 See Annotations in 95 ALR 273.
no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is true
that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the risks 6 Brown vs. Morris supra, at pp. 164-165.
of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this
case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of 7 Hammond vs. Lynch, 151 NW 81, 88.
House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive was the
same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the
specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do 8 Lynch vs. Hutchinson 76 NE 370.
this and resort to the Senate journal for the purpose. The
journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments 9 143 U. S. 294, 303; 36 L. ed. 294.
were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but
were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the President
10 Gray vs. Taylor, 113 P 588, 591, affirmed
and signed by him. This Court is not asked to incorporate such
in 227 U. S. 51, 57, 57 L. ed. 413, 416; Pelt
amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a risky
vs. Payne, 30 SW 426, 427.
undertaking, 13 but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted
and therefore did not become law. This We do, as indeed both
the President of the Senate and the Chief Executive did, when 11 Field vs. Clark, supra at p. 303; Mabanag
they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1, 13; Morales vs.
manifest error committed and subsequently rectified by the Subido, L-29658, Feb. 27, 1969, 27 SCRA
President of the Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this 131, 134.
Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification
and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to 12 Article VI, Section 20(1). The 1973
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous Constitution similarly provides in Article VIII,
consequences not intended by the law-making body. Section 20(1) that "(E)very bill passed by the
National Assembly shall, before it becomes a
In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is denied law, be presented to the Prime Minister ... "
and the so-called Republic Act No. 4065 entitled "AN ACT
DEFINING THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF THE 13 See, for example, the decisions of this
VICE-MAYOR OF THE CITY OF MANILA, FURTHER Court in Casco Phil. Chemical Co. vs.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS TEN AND Gimenez, L-17931, Feb. 28, 1963, 7 SCRA
ELEVEN OF REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED FOUR HUNDRED 347 and Morales vs. Subido, supra.
NINE, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
REVISED CHARTER OF THE CITY OF MANILA" is declared
not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become
law. The temporary restraining order dated April 28, 1965 is
hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

Castro, Teehankee, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez, Muñoz

Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Fernando and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Makasiar, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Amending Section 10 of R. A. No. 409

defining the powers and duties of the Vice-
Mayor.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29658      November 29, 1968
ENRIQUE V. MORALES, petitioner,  petition for mandamus to compel the respondent to include the
vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, as Commissioner of Civil
Service, respondent.
Vicente Rodriguez, for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
The question for resolution in this case is whether a person
who has served as captain in the police department of a city for
at least three years but does not possess a bachelor's degree,
is qualified for appointment as chief of police. The question
calls for an interpretation of the following provisions of section
10 of the Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864):
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of
Police Agency. — No person may be appointed chief
of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree from a recognized institution of learning and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or
has served as chief of police with exemplary record,
or has served in the police department of any city with
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least
eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
The petitioner Enrique V. Morales is the chief of the detective
bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of
lieutenant colonel. He began his career in 1934 as patrolman
and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the
resignation of Brig. Gen. Ricardo G. Papa on March 14, 1968,
the petitioner was designated acting chief of police of Manila
and, at the same time, given a provisional appointment to the
same position by the mayor of Manila.
On September 24, 1968 the respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service Abelardo Subido approved the designation of the
petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the
minimum educational and civil service eligibility requirements
for the said position." Instead, the respondent certified other
persons as qualified for the post and called the attention of the
mayor to section 4 of the Decentralization Act of 1967 which
requires the filling of a vacancy within 30 days after its coming
into existence. Earlier, on September 5, he announced in the
metropolitan newspapers that the position of chief of police of
Manila was vacant and listed the qualifications which
applicants should possess.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 45
The petitioner's reaction to the announcement was a demand
that the respondent include him in a list of eligible and qualified
applicants from which the mayor might appoint one as chief of
police of the city. He contended that his service alone as
captain for more than three years in the Manila Police
Department qualified him for appointment. The demand was
contained in a letter which he wrote to the respondent on
October 8, 1968. The mayor endorsed the letter favorably, but
the respondent refused to reconsider his stand. Hence this
petitioner in a list of "five next ranking eligible and qualified
persons."
The petitioner's reading of section 10 of the Police Act of 1966
is, per his own phrasing, as follows:
NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless HE
(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a recognized
institution of learning AND has served in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines OR the National Bureau of
Investigation, OR
(2) has served as chief of police with exemplary
record, OR
(3) has served in the police department of any city
with the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at
least three years; OR
(4) any high school graduate who has served as
officer in the Armed Forces for at least eight years
with the rank of captain and/or higher.
As he has served successively as captain, major and
lieutenant colonel in the MPD since 1954, the petitioner's
insistence is that he falls under the third class of persons
qualified for appointment as chief of a city police department.
In support of this proposition, he adverts to the policy of the Act
"to place the local police service on a professional level,"1 and
contends that a bachelor's degree does not guarantee that one
who possesses it will make a good policeman, but that, on the
other hand, one who, like the petitioner, has risen from
patrolman to lieutenant colonel "meets the test of
professionalism."
Even if we concede the correctness of the petitioner's view still
we do not see how the requirement of a college degree as
additional qualification can run counter to the avowed policy of
the Act. On the contrary, we should think that the requirement
of such additional qualification will best carry out that policy.
The fallacy of petitioner's argument lies in its assumption that
the choice is between one who has served long and loyally in a
city police agency and another who, not having so served, has
only a bachelor's degree. But that is not the issue in this case.
The issue rather is whether, within the meaning and
intendment of the law, in addition to service qualification, one

should have educational qualification as shown by the
possession of a bachelor's degree.
The petitioner invokes the last paragraph of section 9 of the
Act which provides:
Persons who at the time of the approval of this Act
have rendered at least five years of satisfactory
service in a provincial, city or municipal police agency
although they have not qualified in an appropriate civil
service examination are considered as civil service
eligibles for the purpose of this Act.
In effect, he contends that if a person who has rendered at
least five years of satisfactory service in a police agency is
considered a civil service eligible, so must a person be
considered qualified even though he does not possess a
bachelor's degree.
The petitioner's argument is fallacious in two respects. First, it
fails to distinguish between eligibility and qualification. For the
statute may allow the compensation of service for a person's
lack of eligibility but not necessarily for his lack of educational
qualification. Second, section 9 governs the appointment
of members of a  police agency only. On the other hand, the
appointment of chiefs of police is the precise gravamen of
section 10, the last paragraph of which states:
Where no civil service eligible is available, provisional
appointment may be made in accordance with Civil
Service Law and rules: Provided, that the appointee
possesses the above educational qualification:
Provided, further, That in no case shall such
appointment extend beyond six months, except for a
valid cause, and with the approval of the Civil Service
Commission.
Thus, while the Act gives credit for service and allows it to
compensate for the lack of civil service eligibility in the case of
a member of a police agency, it gives no such credit for lack of
civil service eligibility in the case of a chief of police. On the
contrary, by providing that a person, who is not a civil service
eligible, may be provisionally appointed2 chief of police
"[  p]rovided, [t]hat the appointee possesses the above
educational qualification," the Act makes it unequivocal that the
possession of a college degree or a high school diploma (in
addition to service) is an indispensable requisite.
It is next contended that to read section 10 as requiring a
bachelor's degree, in addition to service either in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines or in the National Bureau of
Investigation or as chief of police with an exemplary record or
as a captain in a city police department for at least three years,
would be to create an "absurd situation" in which a person who
has served for only one month in the AFP or the NBI is in law
considered the equal of another who has been a chief of police
or has been a captain in a city police agency for at least three
years. From this it is concluded that "the only logical
equivalence of these two groups (Chief of Police with
exemplary record and Police Captain for at least 3 years in a
City Police Agency) is the bachelor's degree."
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 46
Section 10, it must be admitted, does not specify in what
capacity service in the AFP or in the NBI must have been
rendered, but an admission of the existence of the ambiguity in
the statute does not necessarily compel acquiescence in the
conclusion that it is only in cases where the appointee's service
has been in the AFP or in the NBI that he must be required to
have a bachelor's degree. The logical implication of the
petitioner's argument that a person who has served as captain
in a city police department for at least three years need not
have a bachelor's degree to qualify, is that such person need
not even be a high school graduate. If such be the case would
there still be need for a person to be at least a high school
graduate provided he has had at least eight years of service as
captain in the AFP?
The truth is that, except for the ambiguity referred to (the
meaning of which is not in issue in this case), section 10 of the
Act needs no interpretation because its meaning is clear. That
the purpose is to require both educational and service
qualifications of those seeking appointment as chief of police is
evidence from a reading of the original provision of House Bill
6951 and the successive revision it underwent. Thus, section
12 of House Bill 6951 (now section 10 of the Police Act of
1966) read:
Minimum Qualification for Appointment as Chief of a
Police Agency. — No chief of a police agency of a
province or chartered city shall be appointed unless
he is a member of the Philippine Bar, or a holder of a
bachelor's degree in police administration. Any holder
of a bachelor's degree who served either in the
Philippine Constabulary or the police department of
any city from the rank of captain or inspector, second
class, or its equivalent for at least three years shall be
eligible for appointment to the position of chief of the
police agency.
No chief of a municipal police force shall be appointed
unless he is a holder of a four-year college degree
course or a holder of a Bachelor's degree in Police
Administration or Criminology.
Where no civil service eligible is available provisional
appointment may be made in accordance with Civil
Service Law and rules, provided the appointee
possesses the above educational qualification but in
no case shall such appointment exceed beyond six
months.
It was precisely because the bill was clearly understood as
requiring both educational and service qualifications that the
following exchanges of view were made on the floor of the
house of Representatives:
MR. VELOSO (F.). Section 12, Minimum Qualification
for Appointment of Chief of a Police Agency, provides
that the chief of a police agency of a province or a
chartered city should be at least a member of the
Philippine Bar or a holder of a bachelor's degree in
Police Administration; and the chief of police of a
municipality should be at least a holder of a four
years' college degree or holder of a bachelor's degree
in Police Administration or Criminology.

At first blush, there is no reason why I should object
to these minimum requirements; but I find such
requirement very rigid because it would not allow a
man to rise from the ranks. Take a policeman who
rose from the ranks. He became a corporal, a
sergeant, a police lieutenant. Shouldn't he be allowed
to go higher? If he merited it, he should also be
appointed chief of police of a city or municipality.
MR. AMANTE. During our committee discussions, I
objected to this provision of the bill because it is a
very high qualification. However, somebody insisted
that in order to professionalize our police system and
also to attain a high standard of police efficiency, we
must have a chief of police who has a college degree.
The point which the gentleman is now raising was
brought up by one Member in the sense that a
policeman who rose from the ranks through serious
hard work, even after serving for fifteen or twenty
years in the police force, cannot become chief of
police for lack of a college degree.
The gentleman's objection is a very good and
reasonable one. I assure him that if he brings it up
during the period of amendments, I will consider it.
MR. VELOSO (F.). I am glad that the Committee will
accept my amendment. My only regret, however, is
that because I made a number of proposed
amendments, I will not be ready to submit them
immediately. We should just limit ourselves to the
sponsorship this evening.3
Thus it appears that it was because of the educational
requirement contained in the bill that objections were
expressed, but while it was agreed to delete this requirement
during the period of amendment, no motion was ever
presented to effect the change.4
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization,
to which House Bill 6951 was referred, reported a substitute
measure.5 It is to this substitute bill that section 10 of the Act
owes its present form and substance.
Parenthetically, the substitute measure gives light on the
meaning of the ambiguous phrase "and who has served either
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the National Bureau
of Investigation." The provision of the substitute bill reads:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of
captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years or any high school graduate who has served
the police department of a city for at least 8 years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.
Thus, service in the AFP or the NBI was intended to be in the
capacity of captain for at least three years.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 47
At the behest of Senator Francisco Rodrigo, the phrase "has
served as officer in the Armed Forces" was inserted so as to
make the provision read:
No person may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless he holds a bachelor's degree and has
served either in the Armed Forces of the Philippines
or the National Bureau of Investigation or police
department of any city and has held the rank of
captain or its equivalent therein for at least three
years or any high school graduate who has served
the police department of a city or who has served as
officer in the Armed Forces for at least 8 years with
the rank of captain and/or higher.6
It is to be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature
of an addition to the phrase, "who has served the police
department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher," under which the petitioner herein, who is at
least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the
petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could
possibly qualify. However, somewhere in the legislative
process the phrase was dropped and only the Rodrigo
amendment was retained.
Because of the suggested possibility that the deletion was
made by mistake, the writer of this opinion personally and
painstakingly read and examined the enrolled bill in the
possession of the legislative secretary of the Office of the
President and found that the text of section 10 of the Act is as
set forth in the beginning of this opinion. The text of the Act
bears on page 15 thereof the signatures of President of the
Senate Arturo M. Tolentino and Speaker of the House of
Representatives Cornelio T. Villareal, and on page 16 thereof
those of Eliseo M. Tenza, Secretary of the Senate, and
Inocencio B. Pareja, Secretary of the House of
Representatives, and of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Under
the enrolled bill theory, announced in Mabanag v. Lopez
Vito8 this text of the Act must be deemed as importing absolute
verity and as binding on the courts. As the Supreme Court of
the United States said in Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark:9
The signing by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and, by the President of the Senate,
in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official
attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that
has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the two
houses, through their presiding officers, to the
President that a bill, thus attested, has received in the
form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the
government, and that it is delivered to him in
obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bill
which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And
when a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, its
authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As
the President has no authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of
the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the house of
Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and
of the President of the United States, carries, on its
face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the government, charged,

respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing
the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect
due to co-equal and independent department requires
the judicial department to act upon that assurance,
and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills
authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the courts
to determine, when the question properly arises,
whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity
with the Constitution.10
To proceed with the history of the statute, it appears that, when
the two chambers of the legislature met in conference
committee, the phrase "has served as chief of police with
exemplary record" was added, thereby accounting for its
presence in section 10 of the Act.11
What, then, is the significance of this? It logically means that —
except for that vagrant phrase "who has served the police
department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain
and/or higher" — a high school graduate, no matter how long
he has served in a city police department, is not qualified for
appointment as chief of police.
Still it is insisted that "if a high school graduate who has served
as captain in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for eight
years irrespective of the branch of service where he served
can be Chief of Police of Manila, why not one who holds an
A.A. degree, completed two years in Law School, and served
as Chief of the Detective Bureau for 14 years, holding the
successive ranks of Captain, Major and Lt. Colonel? Not to
mention the fact that he was awarded three Presidential
Awards, and was given the Congressional Commendation —
the highest award ever conferred in the history of the Manila
Police Department."
The trouble with such argument is that even if we were to
concede its soundness, still we would be hard put reading it in
the law because it is not there. The inclusion of desirable
enlargements in the statute is addressed to the judgment of
Congress and unless such enlargements are by it accepted
courts are without power to make them. As Mr. Justice
Frankfurter put the matter with lucidity:
An omission at the time of enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
however much later wisdom may recomment the
inclusion.
The vital difference between initiating policy, often
involving a decided break with the past, and merely
carrying out a formulated policy, indicates the
relatively narrow limits within which choice is fairly
open to courts and the extent to which interpreting law
is inescapably making law.12
In conclusion, we hold that, under the present state of the law,
the petitioner is neither qualified nor eligible for appointment as
chief of police of the city of Manila. Consequently, the
respondent has no corresponding legal duty — and therefore
may not be compelled by mandamus to certify the petitioner as
qualified and eligible.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 48
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for mandamus is denied. No
pronouncements as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Sanchez,
Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., concurs in the result.
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
DIZON, J.,  concurring:
As stated in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, petitioner Enrique V. Morales began his career in the
Manila Police Department in 1934 as patrolman and gradually
rose to his present position — that of Chief of the Detective
Bureau thereof — and holds the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.
In my opinion, a man bearing such credentials can be
reasonably expected to be a good Chief of the Manila Police
Department. But the issue before us is not whether or not his
training and experience justify that expectation, but whether or
not, under and in accordance with the pertinent law, he is
qualified for appointment to such office to the extent that he is
entitled to the relief sought, namely, the issuance of a writ of
mandamus compelling the respondent Commissioner of Civil
Service to include him in a list of eligible and qualified
applicants from which the mayor of the City of Manila might
choose the appointee who will fill the vacant position of Chief
of Police of the City of Manila.
Section 10 of Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act 4864) — which
controls the issue before us, reads as follows:
Minimum qualification for appointment as Chief of
Police Agency. — No person may be appointed chief
of a city police agency unless he holds a bachelor's
degree from a recognized institution of learning and
has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation, or
has served as chief of police with exemplary record,
or has served in the police department of any city with
the rank of captain or its equivalent therein for at least
three years; or any high school graduate who has
served as officer in the Armed Forces for at least
eight years with the rank of captain and/or higher.
The above legal provision may be construed as providing for
two different kinds of academic qualification, namely, (1) a
bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of learning, and
(2) a high school degree, each of which is coupled with
separate and distinct service qualifications. Any one of the
latter, joined with either of the aforesaid academic
requirements, would qualify a person for appointment as Chief
of a city police agency. In other words, an applicant who is a
holder of a bachelor's degree from a recognized institution of
learning and has served either in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the National Bureau of Investigation would make
the grade, in the same manner as would another applicant with
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 49

a similar bachelor's degree who has served as chief of police there is no appropriate register of eligibles at the time
with exemplary record, etc. of appointment."

3
In the case of an applicant who is a mere high school  Cong. R . No. 64, 156-57 (1966) (emphasis added).
graduate, the service qualification is not only different but is
higher and more exacting — for obvious reasons. 4
 See 1 Cong. Rec. No. 65, 28-36 (1966).

Petitioner, however, would construe and read the law as 5

follows:
NO PERSON may be appointed chief of a city police
agency unless HE
(1) holds a bachelor's degree from a
recognized institution of learning AND has
served in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines OR the National Bureau of
Investigation, OR
(2) has served as chief of police with
exemplary record, OR
 See Committee Report 667.
6
 Unpublished Journal of the Proceedings of August
25-26, 1966 of the Senate.
7
 Of three copies of an enrolled bill signed into law,
one is kept in the Office of the President, a second
one in the Senate and a third one in the House of
Representatives. See Bernal, The Legislative
Process, 27 Phil. L.J. 507, 533 (1952).
8
 78 Phil. 1 (1947) (overruled on other points in
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov.
9, 1967).

(3) has served in the police department of 9

 143 U.S. 647 (1891).
any city with the rank of captain or its
equivalent therein for at least three years; 10
OR  Id. at 672.

11
(4) any high school graduate who has served  1 Cong. Rec. No. 7 (special session, Aug. 27, 1966)
as officer in the Armed Forces for at least 45.
eight years with the rank of captain and/or
higher. 12
 Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of
Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 534 (1947).
While, in my view, petitioner's interpretation is not
unreasonable, it falls short of showing that it is the true and
correct meaning and intent of the law aforesaid. This, in my
opinion, must lead to the conclusion that petitioner is not
entitled to the issuance of a writ of mandamus for the purpose
stated in his petition because to be entitled thereto he must
show that, in relation to the matter at issue, he has a clear
enforceable right, on the one hand, and that the respondent
has an imperative legal duty to perform, on the other. Because
of this I am constrained to concur in the result.

Footnotes

1
 Sec. 2.

2
 Section 24(c) of the Civil Service Act of 1959
provides: Provisional Appointment. — A provisional
appointment may be issued upon the prior
authorization of the Commissioner in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and the rules and standards
promulgated in pursuance thereto to a person who
has not qualified in an appropriate examination but
who otherwise meets the requirements for
appointment to a regular position in the competitive
service, whenever a vacancy occurs and the filling
thereof is necessary in the interest of the service and

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25554            October 4, 1966
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION,
INC., petitioner,  appear to be:
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY and JOSE VELASCO, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta and Felixberto Serrano for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Philippine Constitution Association, a non-stock, non-profit
association duly incorporated and organized under the laws of
the Philippines, and whose members are Filipino citizens and
taxpayers, has filed in this Court a suit against the former
Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and Jose Velasco,
Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, duly assigned
thereto by the Auditor General as his representative, seeking
to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries
authorized by Republic Act No. 4134 (approved June 10, 1964)
to the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives
before December 30, 1969. Subsequently, Ismael Mathay,
present Auditor General, was substituted for Amable M.
Aguiluz, former Acting Auditor General.
Section 1, paragraph 1, of Republic Act No. 4134
provided, inter alia, that the annual salary of the President of
the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be P40,000.00 each; that of the
Senators and members of the House of Representatives,
P32,000.00 each (thereby increasing their present
compensation of P16,000.00 and P7,200.00 per annum for the
Presiding officers and members, respectively, as set in the
Constitution). The section expressly provided that "the salary
increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the
provisions of the Constitution". Section 7 of the same Act
provides "that the salary increase of the President of the
Senate and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives
shall take effect on the effectivity of the salary increase of
Congressmen and Senators.
The Appropriation Act (Budget) for the Fiscal Year July 1,
1965, to June 30, 1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) contained the
following items for the House of Representatives:
SPEAKER
1. The Speaker of the House of
Representatives at P16,000 from July 1 to
December 29, 1965
and P40,000 from December 30, 1965 to
June 30, 1966 . . . P29,129.00
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 50
MEMBERS
2. One hundred three Members of the House
of Representatives at P7,200 from July 1 to
December 29, 1965
and P32,000 from December 30, 1965 to
June 30, 1966 2,032,866.00
while for the Senate the corresponding appropriation items
1. The President of the Senate . . . . . . . .    P
16,000.00
2. Twenty-three Senators at P7,200 . . . .    
165,600.00.
Thus showing that the 1965-1966 Budget (R.A. No. 4642)
implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives set by Republic Act
4134, approved just the preceding year 1964.
The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of
Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, as amended in 1940,
that provides as follows:
SEC. 14. The Senators and the Members of the
House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual compensation of
seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including
per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and
exclusive only of traveling expenses to and from their
respective districts in the case of Members of the
House of Representatives, and to and from their
places of residence in the case of Senators, when
attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such, increase. Until otherwise provided by
law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall each receive an
annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
(Emphasis supplied)
The reason given being that the term of the eight senators
elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of Republic
Act No. 4134, will expire only on December 30, 1969; while the
term of the members of the House who participated in the
approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
From the record we also glean that upon receipt of a written
protest from petitioners (Petition, Annex "A"), along the lines
summarized above, the then Auditor General requested the
Solicitor General to secure a judicial construction of the law
involved (Annex "B"); but the Solicitor General evaded the
issue by suggesting that an opinion on the matter be sought
from the Secretary of Justice (Annex "C", Petition).
Conformably to the suggestion, the former Acting Auditor
General endorsed the PHILCONSA letter to the Secretary of

Justice on November 26, 1965; but on or before January,
1966, and before the Justice Secretary could act, respondent
Aguiluz, as former Acting Auditor General, directed his
representative in Congress, respondent Velasco, to pass in
audit and approve the payment of the increased salaries within
the limits of the Appropriation Act in force; hence the filing of
the present action.
The answer of respondents pleads first the alleged lack of
personality of petitioners to institute the action, for lack of
showing of injury; and that the Speaker and Members of the
House should be joined parties defendant. On the merits, the
answer alleges that the protested action is in conformity with
the Constitutional provisions, insofar as present members of
the Lower House are concerned, for they were elected in 1965,
subsequent to the passage of Republic Act 4134. Their stand,
in short, is that the expiration of the term of the members of the
House of Representatives who approved the increase suffices
to make the higher compensation effective for them, regardless
of the term of the members of the Senate.
The procedural points raised by respondent, through the
Solicitor General, as their counsel, need not give pause. As
taxpayers, the petitioners may bring an action to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law (Cf. PHILCONSA vs.
Gimenez, L-23326, December 18, 1965; Tayabas vs. Perez,
56 Phil. 257; Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works L-10405,
December 29, 1960; Pelaez vs. Auditor General, L-23825,
December 24, 1965; Iloilo Palay & Corn Planters Association
vs. Feliciano, L-24022, March 3, 1965). Moreover, as stated in
52 Am. Jur., page 5:
The rule that a taxpayer can not, in his individual
capacity as such, sue to enjoin an unlawful
expenditure or waste of state funds is the minority
doctrine.
On the alleged non-joinder of the members of the Lower House
of Congress as parties defendants, suffice it to say that since
the acts sought to be enjoined were the respondents' passing
in audit and the approval of the payment of the
Representatives' increased salaries, and not the collection or
receipt thereof, only respondent auditors were indispensable or
proper parties defendant to this action.
These preliminary questions out of the way, we now proceed to
the main issue: Does Section 14, Art. VI, of the Constitution
require that not only the term of all the members of the House
but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase
must have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
Or, on the contrary, as respondents contend, does it allow the
payment of the increased compensation to the members of the
House of Representatives who were elected after the
expiration of the term of those House members who approved
the increase, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of
office of the Senators who, likewise, participated in the
approval of the increase?
It is admitted that the purpose of the provision is to place "a
legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to
increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher
compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 51
elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a
deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is
clearly felt" (Tañada & Fernando, Constitution of the
Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 867).
Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting
period before the increased compensation for legislators
becomes fully effective, the constitutional provision refers to
"all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives" in the same sentence, as a single unit,
without distinction or separation between them. This unitary
treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks
of the "expiration of the full term" of the Senators and
Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular
form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of
office (six years for Senators and four for Representatives
thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both
houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single
Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when
combined with the following phrase "all the members of the
Senate and of the House", underscores that in the application
of Article VI, Section 14, the fundamental consideration is that
the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that
enacted the measure (whether Senators or Representatives)
must have expired before the increase in compensation can
become operative. Such disregard of the separate houses, in
favor of the whole, accords in turn with the fact that the
enactment of laws rests on the shoulders of the entire
Legislative body; responsibility therefor is not apportionable
between the two chambers.
It is also highly relevant, in the Court's opinion, to note that, as
reported by Aruego (Framing of the Constitution, Vol. 1, p.
296, et. seq.), the committee on legislative power in the
Constitutional Convention of 1934, before it was decided that
the Legislature should be bicameral in
form, initially  recommended that the increase in the
compensation of legislators should not take effect until the
expiration of the term of office of all  members of the
Legislature that approved the increase. The report of the
committee read as follows:
The Senator and Representatives shall receive for
their services an annual compensation of four
thousand pesos including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances and exclusive of travelling
expenses to and from their respective residences
when attending sessions of the National Legislature,
unless otherwise fixed by law: Provided, That no
increase in this yearly compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the terms of office of all the
Members of the Legislature that approved such
increase. (Emphasis supplied) .
The spirit of this restrictive proviso, modified to suit the final
choice of a unicameral legislature, was carried over and made
more rigid in the first draft of the constitutional provision, which
read:
Provided, That any increase in said compensation shall not
take effect until after the expiration of the term of office of the
Members of the National Assembly who may be

elected subsequent  to the approval of such increase. (Aruego,
1, p. 297)
As recorded by the Committee on Style, and as finally
approved and enacted, Article VI, section 5, of the Constitution
of the Commonwealth, provided that:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of the Members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent  to the approval of such
increase.
Finally, with the return to bicameralism in the 1940
amendments to our fundamental law, the limitation assumed its
present form:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.
It is apparent that throughout its changes of phraseology the
plain spirit of the restriction has not been altered. From the first
proposal of the committee on the legislative power of the 1934
Convention down to the present, the intendment of the clause
has been to require expiration of the full term of all members of
the Legislature that approved the higher compensation,
whether the Legislature be unicameral or bicameral, in order to
circumvent, as far as possible, the influence of self-interest in
its adoption.
The Solicitor General argues on behalf of the respondents that
if the framers of the 1940 amendments to the Constitution had
intended to require the expiration of the terms not only of the
Representatives but also of the Senators who approved the
increase, they would have just used the expression "term of all
the members of the Congress" instead of specifying "all the
members of the Senate and of the House". This is a distinction
without a difference, since the Senate and the House together
constitute the Congress or Legislature. We think that the
reason for specifying the component chambers was rather the
desire to emphasize the transition from a unicameral to a
bicameral legislature as a result of the 1940 amendments to
the Constitution.
It is also contended that there is significance in the use of the
words "of the" before "House" in the provision being
considered, and in the use of the phrase "of the Senate and of
the  House" when it could have employed the shorter
expression "of the Senate and the House". It was
grammatically correct to refer to "the members of the Senate
and (the members) of the House", because the members of the
Senate are not members of the House. To speak of "members
of the Senate and the House" would imply that the members of
the Senate also held membership in the House.
The argument that if the intention was to require that the term
of office of the Senators, as well as that of the
Representatives, must all expire the Constitution would have
spoken of the "terms" (in the plural) "of the members of the
Senate and of the House", instead of using "term" in the
singular (as the Constitution does in section 14 of Article VI),
has been already considered. As previously observed, the use
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 52
of the singular form "term" precisely emphasizes that in the
provision in question the Constitution envisaged both
legislative chambers as one single unit, and this conclusion is
reinforced by the expression employed, "until the expiration
of the full term of ALL  the members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives approving such increase".
It is finally urged that to require the expiration of the full term of
the Senators before the effectivity of the increased
compensation would subject the present members of the
House of Representatives to the same restrictions as under the
Constitution prior to its amendment. It may well be wondered
whether this was not, in fact, the design of the framers of the
1940 constitutional amendments. For under either the original
limitation or the present one, as amended, as maximum delay
of six (6) years and a minimum of four (4) is necessary before
an increase of legislators' compensation can take effect.
If that increase were approved in the session immediately
following an election, two assemblymen's terms, of 3 years
each, had to elapse under the former limitation in order that the
increase could become operative, because the original
Constitution required that the new emolument should operate
only after expiration of the term of assemblymen
elected subsequently  to those who approved it (Art. VI, sec. 5),
and an assemblyman's term was then 3 years only. Under the
Constitution, as amended, the same interval obtains, since
Senators hold office for six (6) years.
On the other hand, if the increase of compensation were
approved by the legislature on its last session just prior to an
election, the delay is reduced to four (4) years under the
original restriction, because to the last year of the term of the
approving assemblymen the full 3-year term of their
successors must be added. Once again an identical period
must elapse under the 1940 amendment: because one-third of
the Senators are elected every two years, so that just before a
given election four of the approving Senators' full six-year term
still remain to run.
To illustrate: if under the original Constitution the assemblymen
elected in, say, 1935 were to approve an increase of pay in the
1936 sessions, the new pay would not be effective until after
the expiration of the term of the succeeding assemblymen
elected in 1938; i.e., the increase would not be payable until
December 30, 1941, six years after 1935. Under the present
Constitution, if the higher pay were approved in 1964 with the
participation of Senators elected in 1963, the same would not
be collectible until December 30, 1969, since the said
Senators' term would expire on the latter date.
But if the assemblymen elected in 1935 (under the original
Constitution) were to approve the increase in compensation,
not in 1936 but in 1938 (the last of their 3-year term), the new
compensation would still operate on December 30, 1941, four
years later, since the term of assemblymen elected in
November of 1938 (subsequent to the approval of the
increase) would end in December 30,1941.
Again, under the present Constitution, if the increase is
approved in the 1965 sessions immediately preceding the
elections in November of that year, the higher compensation
would be operative only on December 30, 1969, also four

years later, because the most recently elected members of the
Senate would then be Senators chosen by the electors in
November of 1963, and their term would not expire until
December 30, 1969.
This coincidence of minimum and maximum delays under the
original and the amended constitution can not be just due to
accident, and is proof that the intent and spirit of the
Constitutional restriction on Congressional salaries has been
maintained unaltered. But whether designed or not, it shows
how unfounded is the argument that by requiring members of
the present House to await the expiration of the term of the
Senators, who concurred in approving the increase in
compensation, they are placed in a worse position than under
the Constitution as originally written.
The reason for the minimum interval of four years is plainly to
discourage the approval of increases of compensation just
before an election by legislators who can anticipate their
reelection with more or less accuracy. This salutary precaution
should not be nullified by resorting to technical and involved
interpretation of the constitutional mandate.
In resume, the Court agrees with petitioners that the increased
compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not
operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it on June
20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation for
such increased compensation may not be disbursed until
December 30, 1969. In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-
1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the disbursement of the
increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also
violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.
In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is
hereby granted, and the items of the Appropriation Act for the
fiscal year 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642) purporting to
authorize the disbursement of the increased compensation to
members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
even prior to December 30, 1969 are declared void, as
violative of Article VI, section 14, of the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines; and the respondents, the Auditor
General and the Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines, are
prohibited and enjoined from approving and passing in audit
any disbursements of the increased compensation authorized
by Republic Act No. 4134 for Senators and members of the
House of Representatives, before December 30, 1969. No
costs.
We concur in the foregoing opinion and in the concurring
opinions of Justices Bengzon, Zaldivar and Castro.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and
Sanchez, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
BENGZON, J.P., J.,  concurring:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 53
Fully concurring with the ponencia  of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, I
should like only to mention a few thoughts related to some
points contained therein.
As stated in the majority opinion, it is argued by respondents
that if it was intended that the increase should take effect at the
same time, the provision of the Constitution could have been
phrased as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Congress  approving such increase.
They maintain that in specifying "the Senate" and "the
House"  instead of just using the words "the Congress"  the
body obviously considered that inasmuch as the terms of the
Representatives and Senators under the legislature provided
for, would not necessarily coincide, the effective date of the
increased salary of the Representatives could also be different
from that of the Senators.
The fact that "Congress"  is not used in the provision in
question, in my opinion, is rather an argument for the petitioner
herein. "Congress" is not used, obviously because after every
four years the Congress is dissolved. On the other hand, the
term of a member of the Senate, being six years, goes beyond
the duration of one Congress and extends to that of the next
Congress. In other words, while the term of the members of the
House of Representatives coincides with the lifetime of the
Congress, the term of a member of the Senate goes beyond
the existence of one Congress.
The Constitution, instead, uses (1) "Senate"  and "House of
Representatives" and (2) adds "all"  before "the
Members",  clearly intending that no increase in the
compensation therein provided for shall take effect until after
the expiration of the term of the most junior among the
members of the Senate at the time the increase was approved.
Precisely, therefore, because the Constitution speaks
of "Senate"  and "House of Representatives" instead
of "Congress",  the prohibition against effectivity continues even
after the end of the Congress which approved the measure
and, which amounts to the same thing, even after the end of
the term of the members of the House of Representatives
approving the increase. In specifying "the expiration of the full
term of all  the Members of the Senate and  of the House of
Representatives approving such increase", the Constitution
leaves no doubt that until after the condition is met as to the
Senate, no increase in the compensation laid down for
Senators and Representatives shall take effect.
It is also contended by respondents that the Constitution in
using "term" instead of "terms"  shows the clear intention to
consider the "term" of the Senators independently from that of
the Representatives. The contention is untenable. The
provision clearly uses "term" in the general sense. For,
otherwise, even in referring to members of the Senate alone, it
should have used "terms"  since the Senators had originally
different terms of office (two, four and six years), as provided
for in Section 3 of Article VI of the Constitution, a provision
contemporaneous with the one involved herein. Yet just the
same, the Constitution uses the would "term" (singular) to
cover all these different terms  of office.

I am of the opinion therefore that no other course is open to the
Supreme Court in this case but to apply the provision of the
Constitution restricting the increase of salaries of Senators and
Representatives by subjecting it to a period of waiting. To
forestall the view that the Supreme Court thereby offends
equity, because the other Constitutional officers — including
the members of said Court — are already receiving their
increased salaries under Republic Act No. 4134, suffice it to
bear in mind that it was within the hands of the legislators
themselves if they had so desired, to have provided that the
salary increases of the aforesaid other Constitution officers
take effect at the same time as their own. In other words, if
they had thought it would be inequitable to grant salary
increases to others before they could receive their own salary
increase — an argument which, I am glad to note, has not
been advanced — they could have easily provided that the
salary increases therein given be effective December 30, 1969,
as in their case.
I consequently reiterate my concurrence.
ZALDIVAR, J.,  concurring:
During the third regular session of the Fifth Congress of the
Republic of the Philippines House Bill No. 6190 was approved,
and this bill was signed into law on June 20, 1964 by the
President of the Philippines and became Republic Act No.
4134.
Section 1, paragraph A of Republic Act 4134 provides, among
others, that the annual salary of the President of the Senate
and of the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be
forty thousand pesos, and that of the Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives shall be thirty-two thousand
pesos each. The paragraph ends with this sentence: "The
salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution."
The pertinent provision of the Constitution as far as the
effectivity of any law increasing the compensation of the
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives is
concerned reads as follows:
. . . No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. . . . (Article
VI, Section 14 of the Constitution)
Inasmuch as House Bill No. 6190 was passed during the third
regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines, in
1964, said bill was approved by the House of Representatives
whose members were elected in the elections of November,
1961 and whose term of office would expire on December 29,
1965; and by the Senate whose membership was composed
of: eight Senators who were elected in November, 1959 and
whose term would expire on December 29, 1965; eight
Senators who were elected in November, 1961 and whose
term would expire on December 29, 1967; and eight Senators
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 54
who were elected in November, 1963 whose term would expire
on December 29, 1969.
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, writing the opinion of the Court in the
case now before Us, interpreting the effectivity clause in
paragraph A, Section 1 of Republic Act 4134 in relation to the
pertinent provision of Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution,
herein-above quoted, says that the increased compensation
provided by Republic Act 4134 for the Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives will not take effect until
December 30, 1969. I concur with this opinion because it will
not be until December 29, 1969 when the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
that approved the increase in 1964 would expire. And I also
agree with the opinion that in so far as Republic Act No. 4642
(Appropriation Law for the fiscal year 1965-1966) authorizes
the disbursement of the increased compensation for the
Members of the House of Representatives prior to December
30, 1960 violates the Constitution and must be held null and
void..
My opinion in this regard is based upon a personal knowledge
of how the constitutional proviso, Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution, which is now in question, became a part of our
present Constitution. It was the Second National Assembly
which amended our original Constitution. I was a humble
Member of the Second National Assembly, representing the
province of Antique.
The three important amendments that were incorporated in our
Constitution by the Second National Assembly in 1940 were
the provisions regarding (1) the establishment of a bicameral
legislature composed of a House of Representatives and a
Senate, to take the place of the then existing unicameral
legislature known as the National Assembly; (2) the change in
the term of the office of the President of the Philippines, and
the Vice-President, which formerly was for a period of six
years, to that of four years, with the proviso that no person
shall serve as President for more than eight consecutive years;
and (3) the creation of the Commission on Elections.
It is regrettable that the deliberations of the Second National
Assembly on the 1940 amendments to the Constitution were
mostly done in caucuses behind closed doors, and the
discussions were not recorded. It was during the first special
sessions of the Second National Assembly in September, 1939
when discussions on proposed amendments to the
Constitution were held. It was only after the propose
amendments had been approved in caucuses when the
amendments were embodied in a resolution and submitted to
the National Assembly in open session. The amendments as
approved in caucuses were embodied in Resolution No. 38
and adopted on September 15, 1939. However, during the
second regular sessions in 1940 Resolution No. 38 was
amended by Resolution No. 73 which was adopted on April 11,
1940. That is how the amendments came to be known as the
1940 Amendments. Those amendments were approved in a
plebiscite that was held on June 18, 1940.
I still have vivid recollections of the important points brought up
during the deliberations in caucus over proposed amendments
and of the agreements arrived at. I remember too the
influences that worked, and the pressures that were brought to

bear upon the Assemblymen, in the efforts to bring about
agreements on very controversial matters and thus secure the
insertion of the desired amendments to the Constitution. The
discussions on the proposed amendments affecting the
legislative branch of the government were specially of interest
to us then because we were in some way personally affected,
as most of us were interested in running for reelection.
It is not my purpose here to impose on anyone my
recollections of matters that were brought up during our
caucuses then, but I only wish to emphasize the fact that my
concurring opinion in the decision of the case now before Us
has for its basis my honest and best recollections of what had
transpired, or what had been expressed, during the caucuses
held by the Members of the Second National Assembly in the
deliberations which later brought about the 1940 amendments.
I distinctly remember that the proposed amendment to change
the legislature from unicameral to that of bicameral, just as the
proposal to change the term of office of the President from six
years without reelection to that of four years with one
reelection, at first met very strong oppositon by a considerable
group of Assemblymen. But somehow the opposition was
finally subdued, so to say. In the case of the legislature, the
basic idea of having two chambers of the legislature — one
chamber serving as a check to the other — was accepted. It
was then considered as a wise idea to have the Senate as the
upper chamber, to be composed of members who would be
elected at large, and it was expected that those who would be
elected to the Senate would be men of national prestige;
prestigious because of their known integrity, in their record and
experience as a public servant, or in their prominence as a
successful member of his profession. It was even said, then,
that the Senate would be a training ground for future
Presidents of the nation. And so, when it was agreed that a
bicameral legislature would be provided in the Constitution, the
next matter that had to be considered was the tenure of office
of the members of each of the two chambers of the legislature.
As far as the terms of the members of the lower chamber, to
be known as the House of Representatives, there was no
disagreement over the idea that their term be for a period of
four years, to coincide with the term of the President. But as far
as the term of office of the members of the upper chamber, to
be known as the Senate, there was at first a divergence of
opinion. There was a group that supported the idea that the
term of the members of the upper chamber be four years,
similar to that of the House of Representatives, so that in the
national elections that would take place every four years there
would be elections for President, Vice-President, and all the
members of the Congress of the Philippines. However, there
was a very strong advocacy on the part of top political leaders
at that time that the Senate should be made a continuing body,
such that the complete membership of that chamber should not
be elected during the national elections that would take place
every four years.
Finally, it was agreed that the members of the Senate, which
was decided to be composed of twenty-four, would have a
term of six years, one-third of which number would be elected
every two years. The idea of having elections of one-third of
the membership of the Senate was adjusted to the situation
that in between two national elections there were the elections
for local officials. The question regarding the term of office of
the Members of the first Senate to be elected under the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 55
Constitution as amended was settled by inserting a proviso
that the first senators elected should, in the manner provided
by law, be divided equally into three groups: the senators of
the first group to serve for a term of six years, those of the
second group to serve for a term of four years, and those of
the third group for a term of two years (Article VI, Section 3).
And for the purposes of the first elections under the amended
Constitution Commonwealth Act No. 666 was enacted by the
National Assembly providing, as far as the first Senate was
concerned, that "The Senate shall, within ten days after it shall
have been organized with the election of its President,
determine by lot which of the elected Senators shall belong to
the group who shall serve six years, which to the group who
shall serve for four years, and which to the group which shall
serve for two years." (Section 9, Com. Act No. 666)
When the matter regarding the compensation of the members
of both chambers came up for the deliberation, there were
proposals that the Senators be given more compensation than
the Members of the House of Representatives, and a number
of proposals were presented regarding the amount of
compensation that would be paid to the Senators or to the
Representatives, as the case may be. This matter was the
subject of long discussions. It was finally agreed that the
amount of compensation for the Senators and for the Members
of the House of Representatives be the same, and it was fixed
at P7,200.00 per annum each, including per diems and other
emoluments, exclusive only of travelling expenses in going to
and returning from the sessions. There was an increase of
P2,200.00 over the P5,000.00 per annum that the Members of
the National Assembly were receiving at the time. It is thus
seen that in the matter of compensation the sense of the
Members of the Second National Assembly who amended the
Constitution in 1940 was to provide for an equal compensation
for the Members of the Senate and to the Members of the
House of Representatives.
When the matter regarding the increase in the compensation of
the Senators and of the Representatives came up for
consideration, there was unanimity among the Assemblymen
in support of the idea that members of the Congress of the
Philippines may approve a law increasing their compensation,
but that no Member of the House of Representatives or of the
Senate that approved the law increasing the compensation
should receive the increased compensation during their term of
office when the increase was approved. I remember that the
question as to when the increase of compensation as
approved by the Members of the Congress of the Philippines
should take effect was the subject of a prolonged and heated
discussion. Many Members of the National Assembly wanted
to continue with the provision of Article VI, Section 5 of the
original Constitution that "No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the
Members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to the
approval of such increase." I have taken note that no less than
eighteen members of the Second National Assembly in 1940
were members of the 1934 constitutional convention that
drafted the original Constitution, and it was this group of
Assemblymen that were zealous in maintaining the idea that
one full term of a member of the legislature subsequent to the
approval of the increase in compensation should be made to
lapse before the increase shall take effect. But this idea could
not be insisted upon because while that was feasible in the
case of Members of the National Assembly which was a

unicameral body, that idea could not be adopted in a bicameral
body where the term of office of the members of one chamber
was not the same as that of the members of the other
chamber. I recall that it was finally agreed to simply adopt the
constitutional precept that no Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives may receive any increase in compensation,
as approved by the House and the Senate of a particular
Congress, before the expiration of the term of all the members
of the House of Representatives and of the Senate that
approved the increase. Inasmuch as the term of the Members
of the House of Representatives is shorter than that of the
Senators, it was understood that the expiration of the term of
the Members of the Senate that approved the increase should
be awaited before the increase in compensation would take
effect. As finally worded by the Committee on Style of the
Assembly, and that Committee on Style was headed by the
illustrious and indefatigable Assemblyman Gregorio Perfecto,
who later became a worthy member of this Court, that
constitutional precept which became part of Section 14, Article
VI of the amended Constitution was worded as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase.
It should be noted that the above-quoted portion of Section 14,
Article VI of the Constitution talks of the "expiration of the full
term of all the Members" then followed by the words "of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase." This proviso contemplates not the Representatives
or the Senators who voted in favor of the increase, but the
Senate and the House of Representatives as a body that
approved the increase. And so, because the understanding of
the amending Assemblymen was that the effectiveness of the
increase should take place after the expiration of the term of
the Senators with the longest term among the Members of
the Senate that approved  the increase the constitutional
proviso was so worded "shall take effect until after the full term
of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase." It will be noted that
this Section 14 starts with using the words "Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives" in referring to the
compensation to be received by each. They are considered
individually. But in the matter of determining the time when the
increase is to take effect they are considered as collective by
the use of the phrase "all the Members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives approving such increase." The
use of the word all includes every Member of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives, regardless of whether or not
he or she voted affirmatively for the increase. It is the House
and the Senate that approved the increase. And so because
the effectiveness of the increase depends on the expiration of
the term of all the members  of both chambers it stands to
reason that all the members of the two chambers were taken
into consideration, and because when the increase was
approved by the Senate and the House of Representatives
there were members of the Senate whose term of office was
longer than that of some other Members of the Senate and of
the Members of the House of Representatives it is the term of
the Senators which was the longest that should first expire
before the increase should take effect. That is how I
understood then that portion of Section 14, Article VI of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 56
Constitution, and I sincerely believe that that was also how
most if not all of my colleagues understood it.
The question precisely was raised whether under that
constitutional proviso, as above-quoted, the Members of the
House of Representatives who are elected during the elections
subsequent to the approval of the increase by the Congress of
the Philippines could receive the increased compensation
inasmuch as the term of those Members of the House that had
approved the increase had already expired. I remember that it
was the understanding of the Members of the National
Assembly that those members of the House of
Representatives who would be elected subsequent to the
approval of such increase could not immediately receive the
increased compensation as approved during the preceding
Congress; and neither could the eight Senators who would be
elected along with those Representatives in the same
elections. To allow those newly elected Representatives and
Senators to receive the increased compensation would give
rise to a situation whereby the Members of the House of
Representatives and eight Senators would be receiving a
compensation higher than that received by at least sixteen
Members of the Senate, including the President of the Senate,
as the case might happen. That would be inconsistent with the
basic idea adopted by the Members of the National Assembly
that the compensation of the Members of the House of
Representatives and those of the Senate should be the same;
and it is only logical that when we say that the compensation of
the Members of the House and of the Members of the Senate
is the same, that compensation should be the same not only in
amount but also at the same time within their respective terms
of office.
It was envisaged by the Members of the National Assembly
that the salary increase, under the constitutional proviso now in
question, would become effective after the lapse of two years,
or four years, as the case may be, after the commencement of
the term of office of those Members of the House of
Representatives that are elected in the elections subsequent to
the approval of the increase. In the case of the lapse of four
years, which we have just stated, it would mean that it would
be the Members of the House of Representatives who would
be elected in the second elections subsequent to the approval
of the increase who would receive the increased
compensation.
As I have stated, it was the sense of the Members of the
Second National Assembly that approved the constitutional
amendment in 1940 that the increase in the compensation for
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate
would take effect only until after the expiration of the full term
of the senators who were Members of the Senate that
approved the increase. It is my recollection that the main idea
of the Members of the National Assembly in adopting the
proviso in question was to maintain the equality of the
compensation of the Members of the House of
Representatives and of the Senate at all times.
Three situations were anticipated to happen by the amending
Assemblymen under the constitutional proviso in question:
1. This is the first situation. Let us take the case of the First
Congress of the Philippines which was elected in November,

1941 already under the Constitution as amended in 1940. This
Congress was composed of a House of Representatives
whose members were elected for a term of 4 years, to expire
on December 29, 1945; and of a Senate composed of eight
Senators with a term of 6 years to expire on December 29,
1947; eight senators with a term of 4 years to expire on
December 29, 1945, and eight senators with a term of 2 years
to expire on December 29, 1943.
If a law increasing the compensation of Members of Congress
was passed during the sessions of 1942, supposing that there
was no war, the increase would take effect on December 30,
1947, after the expiration of the term of the eight senators who
were elected in the elections in November, 1941 who served
for a term of six years. The term of the eight senators who
were elected in 1941 and who would have served for only two
years would have expired on December 29, 1943; and the term
of the eight senators who would have served for four years
would have expired on December 29, 1945. The term (4 years)
of the Representatives who were elected in November, 1941
would also have expired on December 29, 1945. But in
November, 1943 elections for eight senators who would serve
for a regular term of 6 years would have taken place; and
likewise elections for a full House of Representatives and for
another set of senators to serve for a full term of six years
would have taken place in November, 1945. If the war did not
upset the national affairs a new Congress would have
convened in January, 1946, already composed of a House of
Representatives and a Senate whose members would all have
been elected for a term of six years each.
So, on December 30, 1947 when the increase in the
compensation would take effect, the increased compensation
would be uniformly enjoyed by all  members of Congress
(Senators and Representatives alike) — those Senators who
were elected in the 1943, 1945 and 1947 elections, and by the
Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in
the 1945 elections. Under that situation, the Members of the
House of Representatives who were elected in 1945 would
have waited for two  years before they could receive the
increased compensation that was approved in the 1942
sessions of Congress. And this is so, because it is on
December 29, 1947, when the six-year term of the eight
Senators who were Members of the Senate that approved the
increased compensation in 1942 (along with the then existing
House of Representatives) had expired.
2. Now let us take the second situation. Let us take the case of
a Congress that is normally constituted. When I say "normally
constituted" I mean a Congress composed of a House of
Representatives whose members had been elected for a term
of four years, and a Senate that is composed of Members who
had each been elected for a term of six years, although at
different elections, as provided in the Constitution.
We make the Third Congress of the Republic of the Philippines
as an example. This Congress covered the period of four years
from January, 1954 to December, 1957, inclusive. During the
first two years (or two regular sessions) this Congress was
composed of the House of Representatives whose members
were elected in the elections of November, 1953 and whose
term would expire on December 29, 1957; and twenty-four
senators: eight who were elected in November, 1953 whose
term would expire on December 29, 1959; eight who were
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 57
elected in November, 1951 and whose term would expire on
December 29, 1957; and eight who were elected in November,
1949 and whose term would expire on December 29, 1955.
If a law increasing the salary is passed, say in the first regular
session of the Third Congress in May, 1954, then the increase
provided for in this law would take effect on December 30,
1959. Why? Because that law was approved by the House of
Representatives (the term of whose members ended on
December 29, 1957) and by a Senate at least eight of whose
members were elected in November, 1953 and whose term of
office would expire on December 29, 1959. That means that
the members of the House of Representatives who were
elected in the elections of November, 1957 (many of whom
may be members of the Third Congress who voted for the law
in May, 1954) would have to wait for two years before they
could receive the increased compensation. In other words,
beginning December 30, 1959, the Members of the House of
Representatives and all the Members of the Senate (those
elected in the 1955, 1957 and 1959 elections) would all
be uniformly getting the increased salary.
3. Let us take the third situation. We still use the Third
Congress of the Republic of the Philippines as an example. Let
us suppose that the law increasing the compensation was
passed in the third regular session of the Third Congress in
May, 1956. This time the Third Congress is composed of the
same members of the House of Representatives who were
elected in November, 1953, but the Senate has a different
composition. The Senate would already be composed of eight
new Senators who were elected during the elections of
November, 1955 and whose term of office would expire on
December 29, 1961, the remaining eight Senators elected in
1953 and eight Senators who were elected in 1951. If the law
increasing the compensation is passed during the regular
session of 1956 this law would be approved by the House of
Representatives and by the Senate that had eight new
members whose term would expire on December 29, 1961.
Since the term of these new eight Senators would expire on
December 29, 1961, then the increased compensation would
take effect on December 30, 1961.
In November, 1957 there were elections and a new House of
Representatives was then elected, and the term of office of the
members of the new House would expire on December 29,
1961. Likewise, a new set of eight Senators were elected
whose term would expire on December 29, 1963. Those
Members of the House of Representatives who were elected in
November, 1957, among whom perhaps were Representatives
who voted for the increase during the 1956 sessions, would not
enjoy the increased compensation because their term would
expire on December 29, 1961 — the very same date of the
termination of the term of the eight Senators who were elected
in 1955 and who were Members of the Senate that approved
the increase during the session of 1956. In this case the
increased compensation would be received by the Members of
the House of Representatives who were elected in the
elections of November, 1961, along with the Senators who
were elected in November, 1961 and the remaining Senators
who were elected in 1959 and 1957. They would all be
receiving the same compensation and at the same time  while
they are in office during the term for which they were elected.

As far as the House of Representatives is concerned, the
situation as portrayed in this third case is the same situation as
that which was contemplated by the framers of the original
Constitution of 1935 when it was provided in the Constitution
as adopted that the increase in salary should not take effect
"until after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the
National Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase." In the example we have given, the increase in
salaries of the Members of the House of Representatives
which was approved by the Members of the House in the third
regular session of the Third Congress did not take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of the Members of the
House who were elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase.
The case now before Us is similar to Case No. 3 that we have
portrayed above. Republic Act 4134 was approved during the
regular session of the Fifth Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines in May, 1964 and signed into law by the President
on June 20, 1964. As I have stated earlier, the increase
provided in this law was approved by the House of
Representatives whose members were elected in November,
1961, and whose term of office expired on December 29, 1965;
and by the Senate composed of eight Senators who were
elected in November, 1963 whose term would expire on
December 29, 1969, eight Senators who were elected in
November, 1961 whose term would expire on December 29,
1967, and eight Senators who were elected in November, 1959
whose term had expired on December 29, 1965. Inasmuch as
the increase would take effect at the expiration of the term of
the Senators who were elected in November, 1963 — which is
on December 29, 1969 — the Members of the present House
of Representatives cannot receive this increased
compensation during their present term of office. It will be the
Members of the House of Representatives who will be elected
in November, 1969, along with the Senators elected in 1965,
1967 and 1969, who will receive this increased compensation.
They will then all be receiving the same compensation during
the time that they are in office.
I have endeavored to make a discourse of facts as I know
them, because I sincerely believe that the interpretation
embodied in the opinion penned by my esteemed colleague,
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, of the pertinent provision of Article VI,
Section 14 of our Constitution is in consonance with the facts
and circumstances as I remember them, and as I know them.
As I have stated at the early part of this concurring opinion, it is
not my purpose to impose on anyone my recollection of what
transpired, or of what had been discussed about, or of what
had been agreed upon, by the Members of the Second
National Assembly during the deliberations which brought
about the 1940 amendments to our Constitution. My perception
and my memory are as frail as those of any other human
being, and I may have incurred myself in error. It just
happened that the facts and the circumstances that I have
herein narrated, as I remember them, have engendered in my
mind an opinion, nay a conviction, which dovetails with the
opinion of my illustrious colleague  that has penned the opinion
for the majority of the Court in this case.
CASTRO J., concurring:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 58
Republic Act 4134, increasing the salary of all the members of
Congress, was approved on June 20, 1964. In the light of the
constitutional prohibition or station embodied in section 14 of
article VI of the Constitution, when does such increase in
salary take effect? Shall effectivity be this year 1966 for the
members of the House of Representatives, considering that
the full term of the members thereof who participated in the
approval of the salary increase has expired? Even if the full
terms of all the members of the Senate, as composed in 1964,
have not expired? Or shall effectivity be only on December 30,
1969, after the expiration of the full term of the senators
elected in 1963? .
I fully adhere to and support the position taken by my
esteemed brethren, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Jose P. Bengzon
and Calixto Zaldivar. Their thorough going treatment of the
issue effectively exploits logical, historical and empirical
considerations leading quite inevitably to the firm conclusion
that the salary increase provided for by Congress in 1964 can
take effect, for any and all members of Congress, only after the
expiration of the full term of the senators elected in 1963, that
is to say, only after December 29, 1969.
There is, however, a vital aspect of the problem that, in my
view, requires not only projection but emphasis as well. This is
the language of the pertinent constitutional prohibition or
limitation which by itself forcefully compels the very conclusion
arrived at by the majority of the Court.
We cannot overemphasize the essential role of language. It is
one of the distinctive qualities of man, especially of modern
thinking man. Man does feel and analyze his intellectual and
material experiences; but more than this he has the ability to
articulate, and through articulation he manages synthesis and
brings forth the creation and evolution of culture, literature,
science and law. In the process, the unceasing effort is to say
what is meant and to mean what is said.
How, then, is the constitutional prohibition or limitation on
congressional salary increases stated? "No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase." This statement has
a literal message of striking clarity. The phrase "No increase in
said compensation shall take effect" establishes the character
of the provision as a prohibition or limitation, as can be seen
from the unqualified words "no increase". The words "until after
the expiration of the full term" impart the period of time during
which the prohibition or limitation operates, after which period
the increase in compensation can take effect. Whose full term
must first expire before the increase can take effect? It is the
full term "of the members of the Senate and  of the House of
Representatives approving such increase." The immediate as
well as lasting impact of these words is that what must first
expire is the full term of the members of both houses of
Congress approving the increase. It cannot be the full term of
the members of either house, nor yet the full term of the
members of the Senate or that of the members of the House of
Representatives.
The key word is the particle "and". "And" is a conjunction
pertinently defined as meaning "together with," "joined with"
(Funk and Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 59

Language, p. 105); "along or together with," "added to or linked

to," used to conjoin word with word, phrase with phrase, clause
with clause (Webster's New International Dictionary, p. 98).
The word "and" does not mean "or"; it is a conjunction used to
denote a joinder or union, "binding together relating the one to
the other" (See 3 Words and Phrases, 569-571.).

As understood from the common and usual meaning of the

conjunction "and," the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the Senate is inseparable from the expiration of
the full term of all the members of the House of
Representatives. From the perspective of semantics, it is
undeniably perceived that those who framed the constitutional
provision, when they utilized the word "and," stated what they
meant and meant what they stated.

There is, to be sure, a specific rule of interpretation that would

allow "or" to be interchanged with "and," in which event a
negation of the concept of joinder would ensue. But this is the
exception rather than the general rule. The exception is
resorted to only when a literal interpretation would pervert the
plain intention of the writer or draftsman as gleaned from the
overall context of the writing and/or from external factors. This
does not obtain in the provision under discussion. Indeed, a
departure from the general rule and a resort to the exception
would pervert section 14 of article VI. Note the parity of
compensation of the senators and the members of the House
of Representatives. If the expiration of the full term of the
members of the Senate would be considered as separable
from the expiration of the full term of the members of the
House of Representatives, despite the conjunction "and," then
the result would be to allow members of the House of
Representatives to enjoy the increase in compensation ahead
of the senators, thereby producing a disparity of compensation.
Furthermore, if the framers of the provision were concerned
with the realities of the term of office of the senators and that of
the representatives, more than with the reality of the parity of
compensation, then they should have staggered the effectivity
of entitlement to the increased salary and allowed the first
group of senators elected after the approval of the increase to
enjoy such increase.

The prohibition or limitation may be stated elsewise: "The full

terms of all the members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase must first expire
before an increase in compensation can take effect." Would
the literal meaning of the provision still be in doubt?

The framers of the constitutional provision under discussion

certainly were not wanting of competent legal stylists. With
such more reason, then, must they be regarded as having
achieved a unity of intention, statement and meaning. These
experienced stylists could have so easily phrased the provision
differently to conform to a different intention. For example, it
could have been: ". . . until after the expiration of the full term
of all the members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives approving such increase, as the case may
be." But this was not done, and we cannot deviate from what
able stylists have plainly stated in plain language.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and

Sanchez, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
 
G.R. No. L-34676 April 30, 1974
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, petitioner,  mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution
vs.
ISMAEL MATHAY, Auditor General and JOSE V.
VELASCO, Auditor, Congress of the
Philippines, respondents.
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr. for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General, for respondent.
TEEHANKEE, J.:p
The Court dismisses the petition for review and thereby affirms
the Auditor-General's decision that petitioner as a
Congressman whose term of office expired on December 30,
1969 and qualified for retirement benefits by virtue of a
minimum of twenty years of government service is entitled to a
retirement gratuity based on the salary actually received by
him as a member of Congress of P7,200.00 per annum. To
grant petitioner's contention that the retirement gratuity of
members of Congress; such as himself whose
terms expired on December 30, 1969 should be computed on
the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
under Republic Act 4134 which could only by operative with
incoming members of Congress whose terms of office would
commence on December 30, 1969, by virtue of the
Constitutional mandate that such salary increases could take
effect only upon the expiration of the full term of all members of
Congress that approved on June 20, 1964 such increased
salary, (since petitioner and other outgoing members of
Congress were constitutionally prohibited from receiving such
salary increase during their term of office) would be a subtle
way of going around the constitutional prohibition and
increasing in effect their compensation during their term of
office and of doing indirectly what could not be done directly.
Petitioner served as a member of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three
consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from
December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
During his second term in office (1961-1965), Republic Act No.
4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain
other officials of the national government" was enacted into law
and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The
salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman)
were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00
per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 60
"shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution." (section 1)
Petitioner was re-elected to a third term (December 30, 1965 to
December 30, 1969) but was held not entitled to the salary
increase of P32,000.00 during such third term by virtue of this
Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay1 "that the
increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all
members of the Senate and House that approved it on June
20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional
which provides that "No increase in said compensation shall
take effect until after the expiration of the  full term of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase."
Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive fourth term in the 1969
elections and his term having expired on December 30, 1969,
filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186,
section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which
provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee,
appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of
service, the last three years of which are continuous on the
basis therein provided "in case of employees based on
the highest rate received and in case of elected officials on
the rates of pay as provided by law."2
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a
treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in petitioner's favor
as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress which he
never received during his incumbency and which under this
Court's above-quoted decision in Philconsa vs. Mathay could
become operative only on December 30, 1969 with the
expiration of the full terms of all members of Congress that
approved on June 20, 1964 such increased salary.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the
warrant, however, pending resolution by the Auditor General of
a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T.
Singson, whose term as Congressman likewise expired on
December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally
requested petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting
papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim, enclosing
therewith copy of the Auditor General's adverse decision on
ex-Congressman Singson's claim for retirement gratuity as
computed on the basis of the salary increase of P32,000.00
per annum for members of Congress under Republic Act No.
4134.
Petitioner's request for reconsideration was denied in due
course on January 20, 1972, by the Auditor General through
respondent Auditor who further advised petitioner and
furnished him with copy of the 2nd indorsement of June 29,
1971, of the Office of the President, dismissing the appeal of
Congressman Singson from the Auditor General's adverse
decision disallowing the claim for retirement gratuity, computed
on a salary basis of P32,000.00 per annum.

Hence the present petition for review by way of appeal from
the adverse decision of the Auditor General.
The thrust of petitioner's appeal is that his claim for retirement
gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was
not applied to him during his incumbency
which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held
in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become
operative only for members of Congress elected to serve
therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have
been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the
increased salary for members of Congress "as provided by
law" (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per
annum.
Petitioner's contention is untenable for the following reasons:
1. Since the salary increase to P32,000.00 per annum for
members of Congress under Republic Act 4134 could be
operative only  from December 30, 1969 for incoming members
of Congress when the full term of all members of Congress
(House and Senate) that approved the increase (such as
petitioner) will have expired, by virtue of the constitutional
mandate of Article VI, section 14 of the 1935 Constitution, it is
self-evident that the "rate of pay as provided by law" for
members of Congress retiring on December 30, 1969 such as
petitioner must necessarily be P7,200.00 per annum, the
compensation they received "as provided by law" and the
Constitution during their term of office.
2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose
terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of
an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they
were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their
term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments
which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were
permitted by the Constitution to receive during their
incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor General in his decision
in the similar case of petitioner's colleague, ex-Congressman
Singson, "(S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution
for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling
administrative authorities to do indirectly what can not be done
directly."3
The Auditor-General further aptly observed that "(I)t should not
escape notice that during his entire tenure as Congressman
(Dec. 30, 1965 to December 30, 1969) comprising the last four
years of his government service, the herein claimant-retiree
was unable to receive the increased salary of P32,000.00 per
annum for Members of Congress precisely because of the
,constitutional ban. To allow him now to collect such amount in
the guise of retirement gratuity defies logic. Nor does it stand
to reason that while he could not legally receive such rate as
salary while still in the service, he would now be allowed to
enjoy it thereafter by virtue of his retirement."4
3. Petitioner's contention that since the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum was already operative when his
retirement took effect on December 30, 1969, his retirement
gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be
sustained as far as he and other members of Congress
similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 61
1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement
gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview
of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and
"other emoluments" to their salary as provided by law.
This was the clear teaching of Philconsa vs. Jimenez.5 In
striking down Republic Act No. 3836 as null and void insofar as
it referred to the retirement of members of Congress and the
elected officials thereof for being violative of the Constitution,
this Court held that "it is evident that retirement benefit is a
form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of
compensation for services of one possessing any office" and
that "Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in
the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act,
which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement benefits were
immediately availablethereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and
the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
section 14 of the Constitution."6
It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o
allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of
P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his
compensation during his term of office and of achieving
indirectly what he could not obtain directly."
4. The other ancillary contentions of petitioner in pressing his
claim were amply refuted by the Office of the President in
dismissing the appeal in the similar case of ex-Congressman
Singson and therefore likewise serve to show the untenability
of petitioner's stand in this appeal, mutatis mutandis, as
follows:
It is evident, therefore, that the increased
compensation of P32,000 is the rate of pay
prescribed by Republic Act No. 4134 for Mr.
Singson's successor in office, while Mr.
Singson and his colleagues of the same term
are limited to the annual compensation of
P7,200 fixed in the Constitution. To compute
his retirement gratuity at the rate of P32,000
per annum after the expiration of his term of
office would effectively give him the benefits
of increased compensation to which he was
not entitled during his term, thereby violating
the constitutional prohibition against
increased compensation of legislators during
their term of office (Sec. 14, Art. VI, Const.)
which was presumably in the mind of
Congress when it stated in Republic Act No.
4134 that "the salary increases herein fixed
shall be in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
Neither an argument of logic nor a judicial
pronouncement supports the proposition
that, as Mr. Singson's retirement legally
started simultaneously with the beginning of
the term of his successor and the effective
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 62

rate of pay of his successor and all incoming
members of Congress was already the new
rate of P32,000 per annum, it is this new rate
of pay that should be made the basis in
computing his retirement gratuity. Suffice it
to say that P7,200 per annum is Mr.
Singson's authorized compensation during
his term of office and, therefore, the rate of
pay prescribed by law for him on his
retirement, while P32,000 per annum is the
allowable compensation of incoming
members of Congress during their term and,
hence, the rate of pay prescribed by law for
them on their retirement. There is, then, no
basis for equating a constitutionally
prohibited compensation for Mr. Singson
with a statutory prescribed rate of pay for his
successor in computing his retirement
gratuity.
twenty years of service, the last three years
of which are continuous. The benefit shall, in
addition to the return of his personal
contributions with interest compounded
monthly and the payment of the
corresponding employer's premiums,
described in subsection (a) of Section five
hereof, without interest, be only a gratuity
equivalent to one month's salary for every
year of the first twenty years of service, plus
one and one-half month's salary for every
year of service over twenty but below thirty
years and two month's salary for every year
over thirty years in case of employees based
on the highest rate received and in case of
elected officials on the rates of pay as
provided by law. ..."
3 Rollo, p. 21.

It is likewise contended by Mr. Singson that 4 Idem.

the new rate of pay (P32,000) authorized
him Republic Act No. 4134 would be used in
the instant case, not to compensate him for 5 15 SCRA 479, 490-491 (Dec. 18, 1965).
services during the constitutionally prohibited
period, but would simply serve as basis for 6 Emphasis supplied.
computing his retirement gratuity for services
rendered by him not only as a member of 7 2nd Indorsement of June 29, 1971, Rollo,
Congress but in other branches of the pp. 35-36.
government as well. The foregoing
contention carries its own refutation.
Retirement benefit is compensation for
services rendered (PHILCONSA VS.
GIMENEZ, supra). Since Mr. Singson
applied for retirement as an "elected official,"
it is evident that he seeks compensation not
only for services rendered in other branches
of the Government but also for his services
as member of Congress using P32,000, an
amount prohibited for him but allowed for his
successor, in the computation of his
retirement gratuity."7

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ.,

concur.

Makasiar, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 18 SCRA 300, 312 (Oct. 4, 1966);

emphasis supplied.

2 The pertinent text of the cited retirement

law reads: "(c) Retirement is likewise allowed
to any official or employee, appointive, or
elective, regardless of age and employment
status, who has rendered a total of at least

 
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.  ROMEO G. JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged
member of Congress who is now confined at the national
penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two
counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1] is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense.
The issue raised is one of first impression.
Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons
in general? In answering the query, we are called upon to
balance relevant and conflicting factors in the judicial
interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.
The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge
Mandate As Member of House of Representatives" was filed
on the grounds that
1. Accused-appellants reelection being an
expression of popular will cannot be
rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority
to any right or interest not even the police
power of the State.
2. To deprive the electorate of their elected
representative amounts to taxation without
representation.
3. To bar accused-appellant from performing
his duties amounts to his
suspension/removal and mocks the renewed
mandate entrusted to him by the people.
4. The electorate of the First District of
Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be
heard.
5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a
detained lawmaker to attend sessions of the
U.S. Congress.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 63
6. The House treats accused-appellant as
a bona fide member thereof and urges a co-
equal branch of government to respect its
mandate.
7. The concept of temporary detention does
not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-
appellant to discharge his mandate.
8. Accused-appellant has always complied
with the conditions/restrictions when allowed
to leave jail.
The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of
sovereign will." He states that the sovereign electorate of the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as their
representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his
constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of a
Congressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents
made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that it
cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising
from pending criminal cases.
True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the
people. In the exercise of suffrage, a free people expects to
achieve the continuity of government and the perpetuation of
its benefits. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges
and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged
or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable
law.
We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials
of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to
the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in
the public mind that election or appointment to high
government office, by itself, frees the official from the common
restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law,
not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the
rank, the greater is the requirement of obedience rather than
exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, the latter
customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision
shows that the privilege has always been granted in a
restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a
special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,
implication or equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the
Legislative Department:
Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases
except treason, felony, and breach of the
peace be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the sessions of Congress, and
in going to and returning from the same; xxx.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the
peace, the exemption applied only to civil arrests. A
congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title
Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim
parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the
same general laws governing all persons still to be tried or
whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as
follows:
Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the
Batasang Pambansa shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest
during his attendance at its sessions and in
going to and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment,
there was no immunity from arrest. The restrictive
interpretation of immunity and the intent to confine it within
carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit:
xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall
surrender the member involved to the
custody of the law within twenty four hours
after its adjournment for a recess or for its
next session, otherwise such privilege shall
cease upon its failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule
minus the obligation of Congress to surrender the subject
Congressman to the custody of the law. The requirement that
he should be attending sessions or committee meetings has
also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough
that Congress is in session.
The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress
function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution which states that
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute
a quorum to do business, but a smaller
number may adjourn from day to day and
may compel the attendance of absent
Members in such manner, and under such
penalties, as such House may provide.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why
he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11,
Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress
cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of
a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized
by law, it has constitutional foundations.
Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v.
Santos[2], which states, inter alia, that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 64
The Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his present term
of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their
officers. When a people have elected a man
to office, it must be assumed that they did
this with the knowledge of his life and
character, and that they disregarded or
forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. It is not for the Court, by
reason of such fault or misconduct, to
practically overrule the will of the people.
will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily
seen in the above-quoted ruling that the Aguinaldo case
involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.
Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not
removal, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He
remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or,
otherwise, disqualified.
One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or
after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must
protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to
others.
A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes
of the administration of justice. As stated in United States v.
Gustilo,[3] it is the injury to the public which State action in
criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the
complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the
accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to
incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.[4]
The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate
which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded
fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to
perform congressional duties outside his regular place of
confinement.
It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants
arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call
from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to
attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the
authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call he
initially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify
his present motion. This can not be countenanced because, to
reiterate, aside from its being contrary to well-defined
Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of
the States penal system.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati granted several motions to
temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail, for official or
medical reasons, to wit:
a) to attend hearings of the House
Committee on Ethics held at the Batasan
Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of

whether to expel/suspend him from the
House of Representatives;
b) to undergo dental examination and
treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati
City;
c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up
at the Makati Medical Center, Makati City;
d) to register as a voter at his hometown in
Dapitan City. In this case, accused-appellant
commuted by chartered plane and private
vehicle.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at
the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was
likewise allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises, to wit:
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-
volunteer program" for the purpose of 1)
establishing a mahogany seedling bank and
2) planting mahogany trees, at the NBP
reservation. For this purpose, he was
assigned one guard and allowed to use his
own vehicle and driver in going to and from
the project area and his place of
confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the
clinic of his dentist in Makati City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical
Center in Makati City for his heart condition.
There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to
him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling
temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all
prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders.
What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency
nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only
elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it
also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction
system. Of particular relevance in this regard are the following
observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]
The above conclusion reached by this Court
is bolstered and fortified by policy
considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise
delegates to the Constitutional Convention,
entitled to the utmost freedom to enable
them to discharge their vital responsibilities,
bowing to no other force except the dictates
of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 65
latitude in free speech should be accorded
them. When it comes to freedom from arrest,
however, it would amount to the creation of a
privileged class, without justification in
reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a
criminal offense, they would be considered
immune during their attendance in Congress
and in going to and returning from the same.
There is likely to be no dissent from the
proposition that a legislator or a delegate can
perform his functions efficiently and well,
without the need for any transgression of the
criminal law. Should such an unfortunate
event come to pass, he is to be treated like
any other citizen considering that there is a
strong public interest in seeing to it that
crime should not go unpunished. To the fear
that may be expressed that the prosecuting
arm of the government might unjustly go
after legislators belonging to the minority, it
suffices to answer that precisely all the
safeguards thrown around an accused by
the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to
such an attempt at abuse of power. The
presumption of course is that the judiciary
would remain independent. It is trite to say
that in each and every manifestation of
judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the
essence.
The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First
District of Zamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard
and that since he is treated as bona fide member of the House
of Representatives, the latter urges a co-equal branch of
government to respect his mandate. He also claims that the
concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his
duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always
complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to
leave jail.
We remain unpersuaded.
No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any
other member of the House of Representatives "[h]e is
provided with a congressional office situated at Room N-214,
North Wing Building, House of Representatives Complex,
Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of
staff paid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department
coordination, he is also provided with an office at the
Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City,
where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellant
further admits that while under detention, he has filed several
bills and resolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving
his salaries and other monetary benefits. Succinctly stated,
accused-appellant has been discharging his mandate as a
member of the House of Representative consistent with the
restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a
detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been
allowed by the prison authorities at the National Pentientiary to
perform these acts.
When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to
Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on

his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he
could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more
drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge
that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing
that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.
In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a
question of constitutional equal protection.
The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of laws."[6] This simply means that
all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights
enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7] The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to
any person. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.
Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction
that allows different treatment? Is being a Congressman a
substantial differentiation which removes the accused-
appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all persons
validly confined under law?
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by
public officers has never been an excuse to free a person
validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the
people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of
government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the
24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical
absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the
exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the
President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the
highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function
depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to
nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A
doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those
with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve
provincial constituents. A police officer must maintain peace
and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification from those others who
are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or
otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in favor of or
against groups or types of individuals.[8]
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded.[9]
We, therefore, find that election to the position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.[10]
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 66
Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty;
coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise
of his power of locomotion.[11]
More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the
restraint of ones liberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by
judgment of a court or lawful tribunal, and is personal to the
accused.[12] The term refers to the restraint on the personal
liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place
to place, or of his free action according to his own pleasure
and will.[13] Imprisonment is the detention of another against his
will depriving him of his power of locomotion[14] and it "[is]
something more than mere loss of freedom. It includes the
notion of restraint within limits defined by wall or any exterior
barrier."[15]
It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its
nature, changes an individuals status in society.[16] Prison
officials have the difficult and often thankless job of preserving
the security in a potentially explosive setting, as well as of
attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for
re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these
demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain
rights.[17]
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the
accused-appellants claim that re-election to public office gives
priority to any other right or interest, including the police power
of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Mendoza,
JJ.,  concurs in the main and separate opinion.
[1]
 RTC Decision, pp. 54-55.
[2]
 212 SCRA 768, at 773 [1992].
[3]
 19 Phil. 208, 212.
[4]
 Cubillo v. City Warden, 97 SCRA 771 [1980].
[5]
 44 SCRA 37 [1972].
[6]
 Art. III, Sec. 1.
[7]
 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
[8]
 Skinuer v. Oklahoma, 315 US 535.
[9]
 See Fernando, Constitution of the Philippines, 2nd Edition, p.
548.
[10]
 See Felwa v. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966];
Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155; Dumlao v. Commission
on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; Ceniza v. Commission on
Elections, 96 SCRA 763 (1980); People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
[11]
 Blacks Law Dictionary, Special Deluxe 5th Ed., p. 681.
[12]
 20 Words And Phrases, Permanent Ed., p. 466, citing
US v. Safeway Stores [Tex.] C.C.C.A. Kan. 140 F 2d 834, 839
and US v. Mitchell, 163 F. 1014, 1016 at p. 470.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 67

[13]
 Ibid., p. 470, citing Pine v. Okzewski, 170 A. 825, 827, 112
N.J.L. 429.
[14]
 Id., p. 472, citing US v. Benner, 24 Fed. Cas. 1084, 1087.
[15]
 Id., citing Bird v. Jones, 4 N.Y. Leg. Obs. 158, 159.
[16]
 Sheldon, Krantz, 1988 Supplement. The Law of Correction
and Prisoners Rights, 3rd Ed., p. 121.
[17]
 Ibid.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15905             August 3, 1966
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,  defendant caused said letter to be published in several
vs.
BARTOLOME CABANGBANG, defendant and appellee.
Liwag and Vivo and S. Artiaga, Jr. for plaintiffs and appellants.
Jose S. Zafra and Associates and V. M. Fortich Zerda for
defendant and appellee.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor
T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose L. Lukban, of several
sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an
allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the
complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not
libelous, and that, even if were, said letter is a privileged
communication. This motion having been granted by the lower
court, plaintiffs interposed the present appeal from the
corresponding order of dismissal.
The issues before us are: (1) whether the publication in
question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether
it is libelous or not.
The first issue stems from the fact that, at the time of said
publication, defendant was a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense, and that pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason,
felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
Congress, and in going to and returning from the
same; and for any speech or debate therein, they
shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI,
Section 15.)
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not
the aforementioned publication falls within the purview of the
phrase "speech or debate therein" — that is to say, in
Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in
the performance of their official functions, such as speeches
delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not,
and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress
or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 68
discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its
functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in
question.1
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this
category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open
letter to the President of the Philippines, dated November 14,
1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines, on or
about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his
official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or
any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by
His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
Was it libelous, insofar as the plaintiffs herein are concerned?
Addressed to the President, the communication began with the
following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however
unfortunate had nevertheless involved the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the unfair attacks
against the duly elected members of Congress of
engaging in intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow
me, Your Excellency, to address this open letter to
focus public attention to certain vital information
which, under the present circumstances, I feel it my
solemn duty to our people to expose.1äwphï1.ñët
It has come to my attention that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study
by some ambitious AFP officers, with the aid of some
civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans"
referred to in the second paragraph. The first plan is said to be
"an insidious plan or a massive political build-up" of then
Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by
propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be
prepared to become a candidate for President in 1961". To this
end, the "planners" are said to "have adopted the sales-talk
that Secretary Vargas is 'Communists' Public Enemy No. 1 in
the Philippines." Moreover, the P4,000,000.00 "intelligence and
psychological warfare funds" of the Department of National
Defense, and the "Peace and Amelioration Fund" — the letter
says — are "available to adequately finance a political
campaign". It further adds:
It is reported that the "Planners" have under their
control the following: (1) Col. Nicanor Jimenez of
NICA, (2) Lt. Col. Jose Lukban of NBI, (3) Capt.
Carlos Albert (PN) of G-2 AFP, (4) Col. Fidel Llamas
of MIS (5) Lt. Col. Jose Regala of the Psychological
Warfare Office, DND, and (6) Major Jose Reyna of
the Public information Office, DND. To insure this
control, the "Planners" purportedly sent Lt. Col. Job
Mayo, Chief of MIS to Europe to study and while
Mayo was in Europe, he was relieved by Col. Fidel

Llamas. They also sent Lt. Col. Deogracias Caballero,
Chief of Psychological Warfare Office, DND, to USA
to study and while Caballero was in USA, he was
relieved by Lt. Col. Jose Regala. The "Planners"
wanted to relieve Lt. Col. Ramon Galvezon, Chief of
CIS (PC) but failed. Hence, Galvezon is considered a
missing link in the intelligence network. It is, of
course, possible that the offices mentioned above are
unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge. (Emphasis ours.)
Among the means said to be used to carry out the plan the
letter lists, under the heading "other operational technique the
following:
(a) Continuous speaking engagements all over the
Philippines for Secretary Vargas to talk on
"Communism" and Apologetics on civilian supremacy
over the military;
(b) Articles in magazines, news releases, and
hundreds of letters — "typed in two (2) typewriters
only" — to Editors of magazines and newspapers,
extolling Secretary Vargas as the "hero of democracy
in 1951, 1953, 1955 and 1957 elections";
(c) Radio announcements extolling Vargas and
criticizing the administration;
(d) Virtual assumption by Vargas of the functions of
the Chief of Staff and an attempt to pack key positions
in several branches of the Armed Forces with men
belonging to his clique;
(e) Insidious propaganda and rumors spread in such
a way as to give the impression that they reflect the
feeling of the people or the opposition parties, to
undermine the administration.
Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in connection with
which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning
stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and
subject to future developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by
trying to assuage the President and the public with a loyalty
parade, in connection with which Gen. Arellano delivered a
speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress, in
an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him,
and gain popular and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary
Vargas be asked to resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be
divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the Secretary of
National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man;
(4) that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that
Gen. Arellano be asked to resign or retire; (6) that the present
chiefs of the various intelligence agencies in the Armed Forces
including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence
agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned,
considering that "they were handpicked by Secretary Vargas
and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most probably, they belong to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 69
the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military personnel now
serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those
holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular
Division of the AFP stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be
dispersed by batallion strength to the various stand-by or
training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas
and Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or
undertaking an investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to
support plaintiffs' action for damages. Although the letter says
that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed persons
therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been
handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs
"probably belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique", it should be
noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of course
possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which
they may have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the
very document upon which plaintiffs' action is based explicitly
indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged
operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools
of the planners. We do not think that this statement is
derogatory to the plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to
recover damages, considering that they are officers of our
Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control
of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff,
and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the group
therein described as "planners" include these two (2) high
ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in
question was written by the defendant, knowing that it is false
and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs' reputation, to expose
them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and to
alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are
mere conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of
said letter and can not prevail over the same, it being the very
basis of the complaint. Then too, when plaintiffs allege in their
complaint that said communication is false, they could not have
possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to
stage a coup d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the
"planners". Again, the aforementioned passage in the
defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs were not among
the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not
be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said
"planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so
ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192; Tenney vs.
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367; Coffin vs. Coffin, 4 Mass 1.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-68159 March 18, 1985
HOMOBONO ADAZA, petitioner,  serve as vice-governor, much less assume the office of
vs.
FERNANDO PACANA, JR., respondent
ESCOLIN, J.:
The issues posed for determination in this petition for
prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order are: [1] whether or not a provincial governor
who was elected and had qualified as a Mambabatas
Pambansa [MP] can exercise and discharge the functions of
both offices simultaneously; and [2] whether or not a vice-
governor who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa,
but lost, can continue serving as vice-governor and
subsequently succeed to the office of governor if the said office
is vacated.
The factual background of the present controversy is as
follows:
Petitioner Homobono A. Adaza was elected governor of the
province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980 elections.
He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as
provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Elected vice-governor
for said province in the same elections was respondent
Fernando Pacana, Jr., who likewise qualified for and assumed
said office on March 3, 1980. Under the law, their respective
terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986.
On March 27, 1984, respondent Pacana filed his certificate of
candidacy for the May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections;
petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing
elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates,
while respondent lost.
Petitioner took his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on
July 19, 1984 1 and since then he has discharged the functions
of said office.
On July 23, 1984, respondent took his oath of office as
governor of Misamis Oriental before President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, 2 and started to perform the duties of governor on July
25, 1984.
Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office,
petitioner has brought this petition to exclude respondent
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a
term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of the
province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided
by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system,
as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 70
official can hold the position to which he had been elected and
simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament.
Petitioner further contends that respondent Pacana should be
considered to have abandoned or resigned from the position of
vice-governor when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
1984 Batas Pambansa elections; and since respondent had
reverted to the status of a mere private citizen after he lost in
the Batas Pambansa elections, he could no longer continue to
governor.
1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the
Batasan Pambansa from holding any other office or
employment in the government during his tenure is clear and
unambiguous. Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution
provides as follows:
Section 10 A member of the National
Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa shall not
hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government
owned or controlled corporations, during his
tenure, except that of prime minister or
member of the cabinet. ...
The language used in the above-cited section is plain, certain
and free from ambiguity. The only exceptions mentioned
therein are the offices of prime minister and cabinet member.
The wisdom or expediency of the said provision is a matter
which is not within the province of the Court to determine.
A public office is a public trust. 3 It is created for the interest
and the benefit of the people. As such, a holder thereof "is
subject to such regulations and conditions as the law may
impose" and "he cannot complain of any restrictions which
public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one
office." 4 It is therefore of no avail to petitioner that the system
of government in other states allows a local elective official to
act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time.
The dictate of the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is
explicit. It provides no exceptions save the two offices
specifically cited in the above-quoted constitutional provision.
Thus, while it may be said that within the purely parliamentary
system of government no incompatibility exists in the nature of
the two offices under consideration, as incompatibility is
understood in common law, the incompatibility herein present
is one created by no less than the constitution itself. In the
case at bar, there is no question that petitioner has taken his
oath of office as an elected Mambabatas Pambansa and has
been discharging his duties as such. In the light of the oft-
mentioned constitutional provision, this fact operated to vacate
his former post and he cannot now continue to occupy the
same, nor attempt to discharge its functions.
2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that
respondent Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to
assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to
the Batasan Pambansa. He maintains that respondent should
be considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vice-
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 71

governorship when he filed his certificate of candidacy for the provided for in Section 48, paragraph 16 of
Batas Pambansa elections. The point pressed runs afoul of this Code;
Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, the law governing the election of
members of the Batasan Pambansa on May 14, 1984, Section WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby dismissed. No
13[2] of which specifically provides that "governors, mayors, costs.
members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials
shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on
forced leave of absence from office." Indubitably, respondent SO ORDERED.
falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at
the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 Teehankee, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Melencio-
Batasan Pambansa election he was a member of the Herrera, Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas
Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and and Alampay, JJ., concur.
205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code. The reason the position of vice- Fernando, C.J., and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
governor was not included in Section 13[2] of BP Blg. 697 is
explained by the following interchange between Assemblymen
San Juan and Davide during the deliberations on said  
legislation:
Footnotes
MR. DAVIDE. If I was able to get correctly
the proposed amendment it would cover only Footnotes
governors and members of the different
sanggunians? Mayor, governors?
1 Exh. "7", Resp., p. 89, Rollo.

MR. SAN JUAN. Governors, mayors,

2 Exh. "8", Resp., p. 90, Rollo.
members of the various sanggunian or
barangay officials. A vice-governor is a
member of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan. 3 Sec. 1, Art. XIII, 1973 Constitution.

MR. DAVIDE. All. Why don't we instead use
the word, "Local officials?
MR. SAN JUAN. Well, Mr. Speaker, your
humble representation ...
MR. DAVIDE. And, secondly, why don't we
include the vice-governor, the vice-mayors?
4 42 Am. Jur. 926.
5 Sec. 204. Powers, Duties and Privileges:
1] The vice-governor shall be an ex-officio
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
with all the rights, duties and privileges of
any member thereof;

MR. SAN JUAN. Because they are members Section 205. Composition:
of the Sanggunians, Mr. Speaker. They are
covered by the provision on members of 1] xxx
sanggunian. [Record of Proceedings,
February 20, 1984, p. 92, Rollo]
2] The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be
composed of the governor, vice-governor,
Thus, when respondent reassumed the position of vice- elective members of said sanggunians, and
governor after the Batas Pambansa elections, he was acting the president of the Katipunang
within the law. His succession to the governorship was equally Panlalawigan, etc. ...
legal and valid, the same being in accordance with Section
204[2] [a] of the same Local Government Code, which reads
6 Section 48, par. 1, BP Blg. 337 reads:
as follows:

Sec. 48. Permanent Vacancy in the Office of

SECTION 204. Powers, Duties and
the Governor, City or Municipal Mayor — [1]
Privileges:
In case a permanent vacancy arises when a
governor, city or municipal mayor refuses to
1] x x x assume office, fails to qualify; dies, or is
removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is
2] He shall: otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office, the vice-
governor, city or municipal vice-mayor, as
a] Assume the office of the governor for the
the case may be, shall assume the office for
unexpired term of the latter in the cases
the unexpired term of the former.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO
P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R. BLANCO,
RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L.
LARDIZABAL, petitioners,  (i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate
Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M.
BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA,
JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary
Injunction is poised against the Order of respondent Associate
Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave
to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the
following dates and allegations are being given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the
International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) a private
corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following
were elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group;
those on the right, the Acero Group. Thus, the Puyat Group
would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo warrantoproceedings,
docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the
election of May 14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the
stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at
conferences of the parties with respondent SEC Commissioner
de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member
of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, orally entered his
appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the
Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 72
Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force, provided
that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any
administrative body", and SEC was an administrative body.
Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April
7, 1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being
clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his
appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out
that:
Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased
from Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of
stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero to qualify him to run for
election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized
only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to be
registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the
notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez'
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent
Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as
the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging
legal interest in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the
basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of the said ten shares. 1 It
is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant
petition for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI, against
N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and
respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale
of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent Acero (CC No.
33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as
counsel for defendant Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that
Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a
case originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such
situation the Court would be one "without appellate
jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary
Restraining Order enjoining respondent SEC Associate
Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor,
of respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the
proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent
Commissioner, supports the stand of the latter in allowing
intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979,
resolved to consider the Comment as an Answer to the
Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not
Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI may

intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article
VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall
appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or
employee of the Government is accused of
an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be
interested financially in any contract with, or
in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including
any government-owned or controlled
corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene
in any cause or matter where he may be
called to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening
in the SEC Case, Assemblyman Fernandez is, in effect,
appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative
body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention,
Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another,
although he is joining the cause of the private respondents. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in
litigation and not for the protection of the petitioners nor
respondents who have their respective capable and respected
counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the
intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He
had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI,
representing ten shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He
acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after
the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after
the quo warranto suit had been filed on May 25, 1979 before
SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case
before the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he
moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as
counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was
objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of
the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground
of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 73
noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First
Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior, co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to
find that there has been an indirect "appearance as counsel
before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The
"intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe
the avowed purpose, that is, to enable him eventually to vote
and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable
outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would
still appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the
constitutional provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need
do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire
a minimal participation in the "interest" of the client and then
"intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution
directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a
general legislative act which is intended to accomplish the
objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman
Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent
the question of the constitutional prohibition against members
of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of
stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy
before the SEC relating to intra-corporate matters. A resolution
of that question is not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting
Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case
No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary
Restraining Order heretofore issued is hereby made
permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Ericta, Plana
and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., I reserve my vote.
 
 
Footnotes
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 74

1 p. 23, Rollo.

2 p. 6, Ibid.

3 Am. Digest, 2d Dicennial Ed., Vol. 5, citing

Atkinson vs. Board, etc., 108 P. 1046.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 75

  corporations or their subsidiaries, during his

EN BANC term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall
he be appointed to any office which may
DANTE V. LIBAN, G.R. No. 175352 have been created or the emoluments
REYNALDO M. thereof increased during the term for which
BERNARDO, Present: he was elected.
and SALVADOR M. Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,[2] which held that the
VIARI, PUNO, C.J., PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation.
Petitioner QUISUMBING, Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of
s, YNARES-SANTIAGO, Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has
CARPIO, automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuant
CORONA, to Flores v. Drilon,[3] which held that incumbent national
CARPIO MORALES, legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to
CHICO-NAZARIO, another government office.
VELASCO, JR.,  
NACHURA, In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, standing to file this petition which appears to be an action for
- versus - BRION, quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent
PERALTA, and committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a
BERSAMIN, JJ. ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners do not claim
to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Under Section
5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, only a person
claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully
Promulgated: held by another may bring an action for quo warranto in his
July 15, 2009 own name. If the petition is one for quo warranto, it is already
RICHARD J. barred by prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the
GORDON, Rules of Civil Procedure, the action should be commenced
Respondent. within one year after the cause of the public officers forfeiture
  of office. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red
x--------------------------------------------- Cross volunteer for the past 40 years. Respondent was already
- - - - - x Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when he was
  elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected Chairman in
DECISION 2003 and re-elected in 2005.
   
CARPIO, J.: Respondent contends that even if the present petition is
  treated as a taxpayers suit, petitioners cannot be allowed to
The Case raise a constitutional question in the absence of any claim that
  they suffered some actual damage or threatened injury as a
This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent. Furthermore,
(respondent) as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. taxpayers are allowed to sue only when there is a claim of
  illegal disbursement of public funds, or that public money is
The Facts being diverted to any improper purpose, or where petitioners
  seek to restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and results in wastage of public funds.
Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to  
Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one
Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the for declaratory relief, this Court would have no jurisdiction
Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies with the
of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Regional Trial Court.
Governors.  
  Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-
During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of owned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under
the Philippines,[1] he was elected Chairman of the PNRC during Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the
the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an
Governors. Petitioners allege that by accepting the office nor an employment.
chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent  
has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an
Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads: action for quo warranto nor an action for declaratory relief.
  Petitioners maintain that the present petition is a taxpayers suit
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the questioning the unlawful disbursement of funds, considering
House of Representatives may hold any that respondent has been drawing his salaries and other
other office or employment in the compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or his office. Petitioners point out that this Court has jurisdiction
instrumentality thereof, including over this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional issue
government-owned or controlled which is of transcendental importance.

The Issues
 
Petitioners raise the following issues:
 
1. Whether the Philippine National Red
Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned
or controlled corporation;
 
2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution applies to the
case of respondent who is Chairman of
the PNRC and at the same time a
Member of the Senate;
 
3.    Whether respondent should be
automatically removed as a Senator
pursuant to Section 13, Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution; and
 
4.    Whether petitioners may legally
institute this petition against
respondent.[4]
 
 
 
The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the
PNRC Chairman is a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of
the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution.
 
The Courts Ruling
 
We find the petition without merit.
 
Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for
quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
provides:
 
Section 1. Action by Government against
individuals. An action for the usurpation of
a public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought
in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,
position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by
provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of
his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without lawful
authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)
 
Petitioners allege in their petition that:
4. Respondent became the Chairman of the
PNRC when he was elected as such during
the First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the
Board of Governors of the PNRC held on
February 23, 2006, the minutes of which is
hereto attached and made integral part
hereof as Annex A.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 76
5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of
the PNRC Board of Governors, during his
incumbency as a Member of the House of
Senate of the Congress of the Philippines,
having been elected as such during the
national elections last May 2004.
 
6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, which position he duly accepted, respondent has
been exercising the powers and discharging the functions and
duties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator.
7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by
accepting the chairmanship of the Board of Governors of
the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a Member of the
House of Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution, x x x
xxxx
10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position
of Chairman of the Board of Governors of the PNRC on
February 23, 2006, respondent has automatically forfeited
his seat in the House of Senate and, therefore, has long
ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to the ruling of this
Honorable Court in the case of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON
AND GORDON, G.R. No. 104732, x x x
11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent
continues to act as such and still performs the powers,
functions and duties of a senator, contrary to the constitution,
law and jurisprudence.
12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to
falsely act and represent himself as a senator or member of
the House of Senate, collecting the salaries, emoluments and
other compensations, benefits and privileges appertaining and
due only to the legitimate senators, to the damage, great and
irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipino people.
[5]
 (Emphasis supplied)
 
Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of
Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has
automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short,
petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against
respondent, a public officer who allegedly committed an act
which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office.
Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under
Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
 
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as
the proper party plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an
action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly
usurped by another, in which case he can bring the action in
his own name. The person instituting quo warranto
proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show
that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action
may be dismissed at any stage.[6] In the present case,
petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the
present petition.
 
Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and
treats it as a taxpayers suit, the petition would still fail on the
merits.
 
PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public
Functions

 
On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas
signed Republic Act No. 95,[7] otherwise known as the PNRC
Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary,
humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely,
effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the
most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race,
religion, gender, social status, or political affiliation.[8] The
PNRC provides six major services: Blood Services, Disaster
Management, Safety Services, Community Health and
Nursing, Social Services and Voluntary Service.[9]
 
The Republic of the Philippines, adhering to the Geneva
Conventions, established the PNRC as a voluntary
organization for the purpose contemplated in the Geneva
Convention of 27 July 1929.[10] The Whereas clauses of the
PNRC Charter read:
 
WHEREAS, there was developed at
Geneva, Switzerland, on August 22, 1864, a
convention by which the nations of the world
were invited to join together in diminishing,
so far lies within their power, the evils
inherent in war;
WHEREAS, more than sixty nations of the
world have ratified or adhered to the
subsequent revision of said convention,
namely the Convention of Geneva of July 29
[sic], 1929 for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick of
Armies in the Field (referred to in this Charter
as the Geneva Red Cross Convention);
WHEREAS, the Geneva Red Cross Convention envisages
the establishment in each country of a voluntary
organization to assist in caring for the wounded and
sick of the armed forces and to furnish supplies for
that purpose;
WHEREAS, the Republic of the
Philippines became an independent
nation on July 4, 1946 and proclaimed its
adherence to the Geneva Red Cross
Convention on February 14, 1947, and by
that action indicated its desire to
participate with the nations of the world in
mitigating the suffering caused by war
and to establish in the Philippines
a voluntary organization for that purpose
as contemplated by the Geneva Red
Cross Convention;
WHEREAS, there existed in the Philippines
since 1917 a Charter of the American
National Red Cross which must be
terminated in view of the independence of
the Philippines; and
WHEREAS, the volunteer organizations
established in the other countries which have
ratified or adhered to the Geneva Red Cross
Convention assist in promoting the health
and welfare of their people in peace and in
war, and through their mutual assistance and
cooperation directly and through their
international organizations promote better
understanding and sympathy among the
peoples of the world. (Emphasis supplied)
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 77
The PNRC is a member National Society of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Movement), which is
composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (International Federation), and the National
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (National Societies).
The Movement is united and guided by its seven Fundamental
Principles:
 
1. HUMANITY The International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement, born of a
desire to bring assistance without
discrimination to the wounded on the
battlefield, endeavors, in its international
and national capacity, to prevent and
alleviate human suffering wherever it
may be found. Its purpose is to protect
life and health and to ensure respect for
the human being. It promotes mutual
understanding, friendship, cooperation
and lasting peace amongst all peoples.
2. IMPARTIALITY It makes no discrimination as to nationality,
race, religious beliefs, class or political opinions. It endeavors
to relieve the suffering of individuals, being guided solely by
their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent cases of
distress.
3. NEUTRALITY In order to continue to
enjoy the confidence of all, the
Movement may not take sides in
hostilities or engage at any time in
controversies of a political, racial,
religious or ideological nature.
4. INDEPENDENCE The Movement is
independent. The National Societies,
while auxiliaries in the humanitarian
services of their governments and
subject to the laws of their respective
countries, must always maintain their
autonomy so that they may be able at
all times to act in accordance with the
principles of the Movement.
5. VOLUNTARY SERVICE It is a voluntary
relief movement not prompted in any
manner by desire for gain.
6. UNITY There can be only one Red Cross or one Red
Crescent Society in any one country. It must be open to all. It
must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.
7. UNIVERSALITY The International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, in which all Societies have equal status
and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each
other, is worldwide. (Emphasis supplied)
 
 
The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of
reference for all members of the Movement. The PNRC, as a
member National Society of the Movement, has the duty to
uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the
Movement. In order to be recognized as a National Society, the
PNRC has to be autonomous and must operate in conformity
with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement.[11]
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted
by warring belligerents as neutral workers during international
or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers must not be
seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the
Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a

Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as
government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC
volunteers be identified as government personnel or as
instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or
separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the
volunteers tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the
displaced civilians in conflict areas.
 
Thus, the PNRC must not only be, but must also be seen to
be, autonomous, neutral and independent in order to conduct
its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles.
The PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that
implements government policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the
trust of all and cannot effectively carry out its mission as a
National Red Cross Society.[12] It is imperative that the PNRC
must be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to
the State.
 
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and
independence, the PNRC cannot be owned or controlled by
the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not
own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets
and does not receive any appropriation from the Philippine
Congress.[13] The PNRC is financed primarily by contributions
from private individuals and private entities obtained through
solicitation campaigns organized by its Board of Governors, as
provided under Section 11 of the PNRC Charter:
 
SECTION 11. As a national voluntary
organization, the Philippine National
Red Cross shall be financed primarily by
contributions obtained through
solicitation campaigns throughout the
year which shall be organized by the
Board of Governors and conducted by the
Chapters in their respective
jurisdictions. These fund raising campaigns
shall be conducted independently of other
fund drives by other organizations.
(Emphasis supplied)
 
 
The government does not control the PNRC. Under the PNRC
Charter, as amended, only six of the thirty members of the
PNRC Board of Governors are appointed by the President
of the Philippines. Thus, twenty-four members, or four-fifths
(4/5), of the PNRC Board of Governors are not appointed by
the President. Section 6 of the PNRC Charter, as amended,
provides:
 
SECTION 6. The governing powers and
authority shall be vested in a Board of
Governors composed of thirty members, six
of whom shall be appointed by the President
of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected
by chapter delegates in biennial conventions
and the remaining six shall be selected by
the twenty-four members of the Board
already chosen. x x x.
 
Thus, of the twenty-four members of the PNRC Board,
eighteen are elected by the chapter delegates of the PNRC,
and six are elected by the twenty-four members already
chosen a select group where the private sector members have
three-fourths majority.Clearly, an overwhelming majority of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 78
four-fifths of the PNRC Board are elected or chosen by the
private sector members of the PNRC.
 
The PNRC Board of Governors, which exercises all corporate
powers of the PNRC, elects the PNRC Chairman and all other
officers of the PNRC. The incumbent Chairman of PNRC,
respondent Senator Gordon, was elected, as all PNRC
Chairmen are elected, by a private sector-controlled PNRC
Board four-fifths of whom are private sector members of the
PNRC. The PNRC Chairman is not appointed by the President
or by any subordinate government official.
 
Under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, [14] the
President appoints all officials and employees in the Executive
branch whose appointments are vested in the President by the
Constitution or by law. The President also appoints those
whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. Under
this Section 16, the law may also authorize the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint
officers lower in rank than such heads of departments,
agencies, commissions or boards.[15] InRufino v. Endriga,[16] the
Court explained appointments under Section 16 in this wise:
 
 
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, the President appoints three
groups of officers. The first group refers to
the heads of the Executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the
rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in
the President by the Constitution. The
second group refers to those whom the
President may be authorized by law to
appoint. The third group refers to all other
officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by
law.
 
Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group of lower-
ranked officers whose appointments Congress may by law vest
in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. x x x
 
xxx
 
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the
Secretary. The law may not authorize the Undersecretary,
acting as such Undersecretary, to appoint lower-ranked
officers in the Executive department. In an agency, the power
is vested in the head of the agency for it would be
preposterous to vest it in the agency itself. In a commission,
the head is the chairperson of the commission. In a board, the
head is also the chairperson of the board. In the last three
situations, the law may not also authorize officers other than
the heads of the agency, commission, or board to appoint
lower-ranked officers.
 
xxx
 
The Constitution authorizes Congress to vest the power to
appoint lower-ranked officers specifically in the heads of the
specified offices, and in no other person. The word heads

refers to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards and
not to their members, for several reasons.
 
 
The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC.
Neither does the head of any department, agency, commission
or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive
branch since his appointment does not fall under Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is
not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This
leads us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is
not an official or employee of the Philippine Government. Not
being a government official or employee, the PNRC
Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or
employment.
 
Under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, [17] the
President exercises control over all government offices in the
Executive branch. If an office is legally not under the
control of the President, then such office is not part of the
Executive branch. In Rufino v. Endriga,[18] the Court explained
the Presidents power of control over all government offices as
follows:
 
Every government office, entity, or agency
must fall under the Executive, Legislative, or
Judicial branches, or must belong to one of
the independent constitutional bodies, or
must be a quasi-judicial body or local
government unit. Otherwise, such
government office, entity, or agency has no
legal and constitutional basis for its
existence.
 
The CCP does not fall under the Legislative or Judicial
branches of government. The CCP is also not one of the
independent constitutional bodies. Neither is the CCP a quasi-
judicial body nor a local government unit. Thus, the CCP must
fall under the Executive branch. Under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, any agency not placed by law or
order creating them under any specific department falls under
the Office of the President.
Since the President exercises control over all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices, the President necessarily
exercises control over the CCP which is an office in the
Executive branch. In mandating that the President shall have
control of all executive . . . offices, Section 17, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution does not exempt any executive office one
performing executive functions outside of the independent
constitutional bodies from the Presidents power of control.
There is no dispute that the CCP performs executive, and not
legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial functions.
 
The Presidents power of control applies to the acts or
decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is
true whether such officers are appointed by the President
or by heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards. The power of control means the power to revise or
reverse the acts or decisions of a subordinate officer
involving the exercise of discretion.
 
In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive branch,
and exercises control of all the executive departments,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 79
bureaus, and offices. There can be no instance under the
Constitution where an officer of the Executive branch is outside
the control of the President. The Executive branch is unitary
since there is only one President vested with executive power
exercising control over the entire Executive branch. Any office
in the Executive branch that is not under the control of the
President is a lost command whose existence is without any
legal or constitutional basis. (Emphasis supplied)
 
 
An overwhelming four-fifths majority of the PNRC Board are
private sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board by the
private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board
exercises all corporate powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is
controlled by private sector individuals. Decisions or actions of
the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The
President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or
actions of the PNRC Board. Neither can the President
reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or
modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This
proves again that the office of the PNRC Chairman is a private
office, not a government office.
Although the State is often represented in the governing bodies
of a National Society, this can be justified by the need for
proper coordination with the public authorities, and the
government representatives may take part in decision-making
within a National Society. However, the freely-elected
representatives of a National Societys active members must
remain in a large majority in a National Societys governing
bodies.[19]
 
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The
vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are
private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC
Charter, those who contribute to the annual fund campaign of
the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one
year. Thus, any one between 6 and 65 years of age can be a
PNRC member for one year upon
contributing P35, P100, P300, P500 or P1,000 for the year.
[20]
 Even foreigners, whether residents or not, can be members
of the PNRC. Section 5 of the PNRC Charter, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1264,[21] reads:
SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine
National Red Cross shall be open to the
entire population in the Philippines
regardless of citizenship. Any contribution to
the Philippine National Red Cross Annual
Fund Campaign shall entitle the contributor
to membership for one year and said
contribution shall be deductible in full for
taxation purposes.
 
Thus, the PNRC is a privately owned, privately funded, and
privately run charitable organization. The PNRC is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation.
 
Petitioners anchor their petition on the 1999 case
of Camporedondo v. NLRC,[22] which ruled that the PNRC is a
government-owned or controlled corporation. In ruling that the
PNRC is a government-owned or controlled corporation, the
simple test used was whether the corporation was created by
its own special charter for the exercise of a public function or
by incorporation under the general corporation law. Since the

PNRC was created under a special charter, the Court then
ruled that it is a government corporation. However,
the Camporedondo ruling failed to consider the definition of a
government-owned or controlled corporation as provided under
Section 2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987:
 
 
 
SEC. 2. General Terms Defined. x x x
(13) Government-owned or controlled
corporation refers to any agency
organized as a stock or non-stock
corporation, vested with functions
relating to public needs whether
governmental or proprietary in
nature, and owned by the Government
directly or through its instrumentalities
either wholly, or where applicable as in
the case of stock corporations, to the
extent of at least fifty-one (51) percent of
its capital stock: Provided, That
government-owned or controlled corporations
may be further categorized by the
Department of the Budget, the Civil Service
Commission, and the Commission on Audit
for purposes of the exercise and discharge of
their respective powers, functions and
responsibilities with respect to such
corporations.(Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
 
 
A government-owned or controlled corporation must
be owned by the government, and in the case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be
owned by the government. In the case of a non-stock
corporation, by analogy at least a majority of the members
must be government officials holding such membership by
appointment or designation by the government. Under this
criterion, and as discussed earlier, the government does not
own or control PNRC.
 
The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional
Proscription against the Creation of Private Corporations
by Special Law
 
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the
PNRC was created by special charter on 22 March 1947.
Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution, as
amended, reads:
 
SEC. 7. The Congress shall not,
except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of
private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.
 
 
The subsequent 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain similar
provisions prohibiting Congress from creating private
corporations except by general law. Section 1 of the PNRC
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 80
Charter, as amended, creates the PNRC as a body
corporate and politic, thus:
 
SECTION 1. There is hereby created in
the Republic of the Philippines a body
corporate and politic to be the voluntary
organization officially designated to
assist the Republic of the Philippines in
discharging the obligations set forth in
the Geneva Conventions and to perform
such other duties as are inherent upon a
National Red Cross Society. The national
headquarters of this Corporation shall be
located in Metropolitan Manila. (Emphasis
supplied)
 
 
In Feliciano v. Commission on Audit,[23] the Court explained the
constitutional provision prohibiting Congress from creating
private corporations in this wise:
 
We begin by explaining the general
framework under the fundamental law. The
Constitution recognizes two classes of
corporations. The first refers to private
corporations created under a general law.
The second refers to government-owned or
controlled corporations created by special
charters. Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution provides:
 
Sec. 16. The Congress
shall not, except by
general law, provide for
the formation,
organization, or regulation
of private corporations.
Government-owned or
controlled corporations
may be created or
established by special
charters in the interest of
the common good and
subject to the test of
economic viability.
 
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the
creation of private corporations except by
general law applicable to all citizens. The
purpose of this constitutional provision is to
ban private corporations created by special
charters, which historically gave certain
individuals, families or groups special
privileges denied to other citizens.
 
In short, Congress cannot enact a law
creating a private corporation with a
special charter. Such legislation would be
unconstitutional. Private corporations
may exist only under a general law. If the
corporation is private, it must necessarily
exist under a general law. Stated
differently, only corporations created under a
general law can qualify as private
corporations. Under existing laws, the

general law is the Corporation Code, except
that the Cooperative Code governs the
incorporation of cooperatives.
 
 
The Constitution authorizes Congress to
create government-owned or controlled
corporations through special charters. Since
private corporations cannot have special
charters, it follows that Congress can create
corporations with special charters only if
such corporations are government-owned or
controlled.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
 
 
In Feliciano, the Court held that the Local Water Districts are
government-owned or controlled corporations since they exist
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 198, which constitutes
their special charter. The seed capital assets of the Local
Water Districts, such as waterworks and sewerage facilities,
were public property which were managed, operated by or
under the control of the city, municipality or province before the
assets were transferred to the Local Water Districts. The Local
Water Districts also receive subsidies and loans from the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). In fact, under the 2009
General Appropriations Act,[25]the LWUA has a budget
amounting to P400,000,000 for its subsidy requirements.
[26]
 There is no private capital invested in the Local Water
Districts. The capital assets and operating funds of the Local
Water Districts all come from the government, either through
transfer of assets, loans, subsidies or the income from such
assets or funds.
 
The government also controls the Local Water Districts
because the municipal or city mayor, or the provincial
governor, appoints all the board directors of the Local Water
Districts. Furthermore, the board directors and other personnel
of the Local Water Districts are government employees subject
to civil service laws and anti-graft laws. Clearly, the Local
Water Districts are considered government-owned or
controlled corporations not only because of their creation by
special charter but also because the government in fact owns
and controls the Local Water Districts.
Just like the Local Water Districts, the PNRC was created
through a special charter. However, unlike the Local Water
Districts, the elements of government ownership and
control are clearly lacking in the PNRC. Thus, although the
PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered
a government-owned or controlled corporation in the absence
of the essential elements of ownership and control by the
government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity,
Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However,
the constitutional prohibition against the creation of private
corporations by special charters provides no exception even
for non-profit or charitable corporations. Consequently, the
PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation and grants it corporate powers,[27] is void for being
unconstitutional. Thus, Sections 1,[28] 2,[29] 3,[30] 4(a),[31]5,[32] 6,
[33]
 7,[34] 8,[35] 9,[36] 10,[37] 11,[38] 12,[39] and 13[40] of the PNRC
Charter, as amended, are void.
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 81
 
The other provisions[41] of the PNRC Charter remain valid as
they can be considered as a recognition by the State that the
unincorporated PNRC is the local National Society of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and
thus entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set
forth in the PNRC Charter. The other provisions of the PNRC
Charter implement the Philippine Governments treaty
obligations under Article 4(5) of the Statutes of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, which
provides that to be recognized as a National Society, the
Society must be duly recognized by the legal government of its
country on the basis of the Geneva Conventions and of the
national legislation as a voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the
public authorities in the humanitarian field.
 
In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is not a
government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section
13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. However, since the
PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a
private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and
Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private corporation.
 
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of
the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or
an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. We also declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the Charter of the Philippine
National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as amended by
Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it
corporate powers.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 
 
 
 
 
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 82

  ategicDirections.aspxHYPERLINK
  "http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirec
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES tions.aspx" (visited 25 March 2009).
[9]
Associate Justice Associate Justice PNRC Website,HYPERLINK
  "http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirec
  tions.aspx" HYPERLINK
  "http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/About.aspx"ht
  tp://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/About.aspx (visit
  ed 25 March 2009).
[10]
  Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field.
[11]
Associate Justice Associate Justice Article 4 of the Statutes of the International Red Cross and
    Red Crescent Movement reads:
     
    ARTICLE 4
    Conditions for Recognition of National
  Societies
   
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE In order to be recognized in terms of Article
NACHURA CASTRO 5, paragraph 2 b) as a National Society, the
Associate Justice Associate Justice Society shall meet the following conditions:
     
    1. Be constituted on the territory of
    an independent State where the
    Geneva Convention for the
    Amelioration of the Condition of the
ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
Associate Justice Associate Justice in the Field is in force.
    2. Be the only National Red Cross or
  Red Crescent Society of the said
  State and be directed by a central
  body which shall alone be
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN competent to represent it in its
Associate Justice dealings with other components of
  the Movement.
  3. Be duly recognized by the legal
CERTIFICATION government of its country on the
  basis of the Geneva Conventions
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify and of the national legislation as a
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached voluntary aid society, auxiliary to the
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of public authorities in the
the opinion of the Court. humanitarian field.
  4. Have an autonomous status
  which allows it to operation in
REYNATO S. PUNO conformity with the Fundamental
CHIEF JUSTICE Principles of the Movement.
5. Use a name and distinctive
emblem in conformity with the
Geneva Conventions and their
[1]
Additional Protocols.
Respondent was elected as a Senator during the May 2004 6. Be so organized as to be able to
elections. fulfill the tasks defined in its own
[2]
370 Phil. 901 (1999). statutes, including the preparation in
[3]
G.R. No. 104732, 22 June 1993, 223 SCRA 568. peace time for its statutory tasks in
[4]
Rollo, p. 181. case of armed conflicts.
[5]
Id. at 3-5. 7. Extend its activities to the entire territory of the State.
[6]
The Secretary of Justice Cuevas v. Atty. Bacal, 400 Phil. 8. Recruit its voluntary members and its staff without
1115 (2000); Garcia v. Perez, 188 Phil. 43 (1980). consideration of race, sex, class, religion or political
[7]
An Act to Incorporate the Philippine National Red Cross, as opinions.
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1264. 9. Adhere to the present Statutes, share in the fellowship which
[8]
PNRC Website,HYPERLINK unites the components of the Movement and cooperate
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirec with them.
tions.aspx" HYPERLINK 10. Respect the Fundamental
"http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/StrategicDirec Principles of the Movement and
tions.aspx" http://www.redcross.org.ph/Site/PNRC/Str be guided in its work by the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 83

principles of international 2. Of succession by its corporate name for the period of time
humanitarian law. (Emphasis stated in the articles of incorporation and the certificate of
supplied) incorporation;
[12]
 The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red 3. To adopt and use a corporate seal;
Crescent, ICRC Publication, p. 17. 4. To amend its articles of incorporation in accordance with the
[13]
Although under Section 4(c) of the PNRC Charter, as provisions of this Code;
amended, the PNRC is allotted one lottery draw 5. To adopt by-laws, not contrary to law, morals or public
yearly by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes for the policy, and to amend or repeal the same in accordance with
support of its disaster relief operations, in addition to this Code;
its existing lottery draws for the Blood Program, such 6. In case of stock corporations, to issue or sell stocks to
allotments are donations given to most charitable subscribers and to sell treasury stocks in accordance with
organizations. the provisions of this Code; and to admit members to the
[14]
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution provides: corporation if it be a non-stock corporation;
  7. To purchase, receive, take or grant, hold, convey, sell,
The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the lease, pledge, mortgage and otherwise deal with such real
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the and personal property, including securities and bonds of
executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers other corporations, as the transaction of the lawful business
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of of the corporation may reasonably and necessarily require,
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose subject to the limitations prescribed by law and the
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall Constitution;
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose 8. To adopt any plan of merger or consolidation as provided in
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those this Code;
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress 9. To make reasonable donations, including those for the
may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in public welfare or for hospital, charitable, cultural, scientific,
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of civic, or similar purposes: Provided, That no corporation,
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. domestic or foreign, shall give donations in aid of any
The President shall have the power to make political party or candidate or for purposes of partisan
appointments during the recess of the Congress, political activity;
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such 10. To establish pension, retirement and other plans for the
appointments shall be effective only until after benefit of its directors, trustees, officers and employees;
disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or and
until the next adjournment of the Congress. 11. To exercise such other powers as may be essential or
[15]
 Endriga v. Rufino, G.R. Nos. 139554 & 139565, 21 July necessary to carry out its purpose or purposes as stated in
2006, 496 SCRA 13. its articles of incorporation.
[16] [28]
 Id. at 50-57. SECTION 1. There is hereby created in the Republic of the
[17]
 Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides: Philippines a body corporate and politic to be the
  voluntary organization officially designated to assist
The President shall have control of all the executive the Republic of the Philippines in discharging the
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions and
that the laws be faithfully executed. to perform such other duties as are inherent upon a
[18]
 Supra note 15 at 63-65. national Red Cross Society. The national
[19]
 See note 12 at 20. headquarters of this Corporation shall be located in
[20]
 PNRC Metro Manila.
[29]
Website, http://202.57.124.158/Site/PNRC/membershipInfo SEC. 2. The name of this corporation shall be The Philippine
.aspx#5 (visited 15 June 2009). National Red Cross and by that name shall have
[21]
Issued on 15 December 1977. perpetual succession with the power to sue and be
[22]
Supra note 2. sued; to own and hold such real and personal estate
[23]
464 Phil. 439 (2004). as shall be deemed advisable and to accept
[24]
Id. at 454-455. bequests, donations and contributions of property of
[25]
Republic Act No. 9524. all classes for the purpose of this Corporation
[26]
DBM Website,HYPERLINK hereinafter set forth; to adopt a seal and to alter and
"http://www.dbm.gov.ph/GAA09/bsgc/C1.pdf" HYPER destroy the same at pleasure; and to have the right to
LINK adopt and to use, in carrying out its purposes
"http://www.dbm.gov.ph/GAA09/bsgc/C1.pdf" http://w hereinafter designated, as an emblem and badge, a
ww.dbm.gov.ph/GAA09/bsgc/C1.pdf (visited 25 June red Greek cross on a white ground, the same as has
2009). been described in the Geneva Conventions, and
[27]
Section 36 of the Corporation Code enumerates the general adopted by the several nations ratifying or adhering
powers of a corporation: thereto; to ordain and establish by-laws and
  regulations not inconsistent with the laws of the
SEC. 36. Corporate powers and capacity. Republic of the Philippines, and generally to do all
Every corporation incorporated under this such acts and things as may be necessary to carry
Code has the power and capacity: into effect the provisions of this Act and promote the
1. To sue and be sued in its corporate name; purposes of said organization; and the corporation
hereby created is designated as the organization
which is authorized to act in matters of relief under

said Convention. In accordance with the Geneva
Conventions, the issuance of the distinctive Red
Cross emblem to medical units and establishments,
personnel and materials neutralized in time of war
shall be left to the military authorities. The red Greek
cross on a white ground, as has been described by
the Geneva Conventions is not, and shall not be
construed as a religious symbol, and shall have equal
efficacy and applicability to persons of all faiths,
creeds and beliefs. The operational jurisdiction of the
Philippine National Red Cross shall be over the entire
territory of the Philippines.
[30]
SEC. 3. That the purposes of this Corporation shall be as
follows:
a. To provide volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of the
armed forces in time of war, in accordance with the spirit of
and under the conditions prescribed by the Geneva
Conventions to which the Republic of the Philippines
proclaimed its adherence;
b. For the purposes mentioned in the preceding sub-section, to
perform all duties devolving upon the Corporation as a
result of the adherence of the Republic of the Philippines to
the said Convention;
c. To act in matters of voluntary relief and in accordance with
the authorities of the armed forces as a medium of
communication between the people of the Republic of the
Philippines and their Armed Forces, in time of peace and in
time of war, and to act in such matters between similar
national societies of other governments and the
Government and people and the Armed Forces of the
Republic of the Philippines;
d. To establish and maintain a system of national and
international relief in time of peace and in time of war and
apply the same in meeting the emergency needs caused by
typhoons, flood, fires, earthquakes, and other natural
disasters and to devise and carry on measures for
minimizing the suffering caused by such disasters;
e. To devise and promote such other services in time of peace
and in time of war as may be found desirable in improving
the health, safety and welfare of the Filipino people;
f. To devise such means as to make every citizen and/or
resident of the Philippines a member of the Red Cross.
[31]
SEC. 4. In furtherance of the purposes mentioned in the
preceding sub-paragraphs, the Philippine National
Red Cross shall:
a. Be authorized to secure loans from any financial institution
which shall not exceed its budget of the previous year.
[32]
SEC. 5. Membership in the Philippine National Red Cross
shall be open to the entire population in the
Philippines regardless of citizenship. Any contribution
to the Philippine National Red Cross Annual Fund
Campaign shall entitle the contributor to membership
for one year and said contribution shall be deductible
in full for taxation purposes.
[33]
SEC. 6. The governing powers and authority shall be vested
in the Board of Governors composed of thirty
members, six of whom shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines, eighteen shall be elected
by chapter delegates in biennial conventions and the
remaining six shall be selected by the twenty-four
members of the Board already chosen. At least one
but not more than three of the Presidential appointees
shall be chosen from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 84
a. The term of office of all members of the Board shall be four
years, including those appointed by the President of the
Philippines, renewable at the pleasure of the appointing
power or elective bodies.
b. Vacancies in the Board of Governors caused by death or
resignation shall be filled by election by the Board of
Governors at its next meeting, except that vacancies
among the Presidential appointees shall be filled by the
President.
[34]
SEC. 7. The President of the Philippines shall be the
Honorary President of the Philippine National Red
Cross. The officers shall consist of a Chairman, a
Vice-Chairman, a Secretary, a Treasurer, a
Counselor, an Assistant Secretary and an Assistant
Treasurer, all of whom shall be elected by the Board
of Governors from among its membership for a term
of two years and may be re-elected. The election of
officers shall take place within sixty days after all the
members of the Board of Governors have been
chosen and have qualified.
[35]
SEC. 8. The Biennial meeting of chapter delegates shall be
held on such date and such place as may be
specified by the Board of Governors to elect members
of the Board of Governors and advice the Board of
Governors on the activities of the Philippine National
Red Cross; Provided, however, that during periods of
great emergency, the Board of Governors in its
discretion may determine that the best interest of the
corporation shall be served by postponing such
biennial meeting.
[36]
SEC. 9. The power to ordain, adopt and amend by-laws and
regulations shall be vested in the Board of Governors.
[37]
SEC. 10. The members of the Board of Governors, as well
as the officers of the corporation, shall serve without
compensation. The compensation of the paid staff of
the corporation shall be determined by the Board of
Governors upon the recommendation of the Secretary
General.
[38]
SEC. 11. As a national voluntary organization, the Philippine
National Red Cross shall be financed primarily by
contributions obtained through solicitation campaigns
throughout the year which shall be organized by the
Board of Governors and conducted by the Chapters in
their respective jurisdictions. These fund raising
campaigns shall be conducted independently of other
fund drives by other organizations.
[39]
SEC. 12. The Board of Governors shall promulgate rules
and regulations for the organization of local units of
the Philippine National Red Cross to be known as
Chapters. Said rules and regulations shall fix the
relationship of the Chapters to the Corporation, define
their territorial jurisdictions, and determine the number
of delegates for each chapter based on population,
fund campaign potentials and service needs.
[40]
SEC. 13. The Corporation shall, at the end of every calendar
year submit to the President of the Philippines an
annual report containing the activities of the
Corporation showing its financial condition, the
receipts and disbursements.
[41]
 The valid provisions are Sections 4(b) and (c), 14, 15,
16, and 17:
SEC. 4. In furtherance of the purposes mentioned in the
preceding sub-paragraphs, the Philippine National Red
Cross shall:
xxx
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 85

b. Be exempt from payment of all duties, taxes, fees,

and other charges of all kinds on all importations and
purchases for its exclusive use, on donations for its
disaster relief work and other Red Cross services,
and in its benefits and fund raising drives all
provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding.
c. Be allotted by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office one
lottery draw yearly for the support of its disaster relief
operations in addition to its existing lottery draws for the
Blood Program.
SEC. 14. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit, collect or
receive money, materials, or property of any kind by
falsely representing or pretending himself to be a
member, agent or representative of the Philippine
National Red Cross.
SEC. 15. The use of the name Red Cross is reserved
exclusively to the Philippine National Red Cross and
the use of the emblem of the red Greek cross on a
white ground is reserved exclusively to the Philippine
National Red Cross, medical services of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and such other medical
facilities or other institutions as may be authorized by
the Philippine National Red Cross as provided under
Article 44 of the Geneva Conventions. It shall be
unlawful for any other person or entity to use the
words Red Cross or Geneva Cross or to use the
emblem of the red Greek cross on a white ground or
any designation, sign, or insignia constituting an
imitation thereof for any purpose whatsoever.
SEC. 16. As used in this Decree, the term person shall include
any legal person, group, or legal entity whatsoever nature,
and any person violating any section of this Article shall,
upon conviction therefore be liable to a fin[e] of not less
than one thousand pesos or imprisonment for a term not
exceeding one year, or both, at the discretion of the court,
for each and every offense. In case the violation is
committed by a corporation or association, the penalty shall
devolve upon the president, director or any other officer
responsible for such violation.
SEC. 17. All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with
the provisions of this Decree are hereby repealed.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 83767 October 27, 1988
FIRDAUSI SMAIL ABBAS, HOMOBONO A. ADAZA,
ALEJANDRO D. ALMENDRAS, ABUL KAHYR D. ALONTO,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, RENE G. ESPINA, WILSON P.
GAMBOA, ROILO S. GOLEZ, ROMEO G. JALOSJOS EVA
R. ESTRADA-KALAW, WENCESLAO R. LAGUMBAY,
VICENTE P. MAGSAYSAY, JEREMIAS U. MONTEMAYOR,
BLAS F. OPLE, RAFAEL P. PALMARES, ZOSIMO JESUS
M. PAREDES, JR., VICENTE G. PUYAT, EDITH N. RABAT,
ISIDRO S. RODRIGUEZ, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, LORENZO
G. TEVES, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, and FERNANDO R.
VELOSO, petitioners,  as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members
vs.
THE SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a Special Civil Action for certiorari to nullify and set
aside the Resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal dated
February 12, 1988 and May 27, 1988, denying, respectively,
the petitioners' Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition and their
Motion for Reconsideration thereafter filed.
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent
Tribunal an election contest docketed as SET Case No. 002-87
against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were
proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional
elections by the Commission on Elections. The respondent
Tribunal was at the time composed of three (3) Justices of the
Supreme Court and six (6) Senators, namely: Senior Associate
Justice Pedro L. Yap (Chairman). Associate Justices Andres
R. Narvasa and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., and Senators Joseph
E. Estrada, Neptali A. Gonzales, Teofisto T. Guingona, Jose
Lina, Jr., Mamintal A.J. Tamano and Victor S. Ziga.
On November 17, 1987, the petitioners, with the exception of
Senator Estrada but including Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (who
had been designated Member of the Tribunal replacing
Senator Estrada, the latter having affiliated with the Liberal
Party and resigned as the Opposition's representative in the
Tribunal) filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof
from the hearing and resolution of SET Case No. 002-87 on
the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case,
as respondents therein. Before that, Senator Rene A.V.
Saguisag, one of the respondents in the same case, had filed a
Petition to Recuse and later a Supplemental Petition to Recuse
the same Senators-Members of the Tribunal on essentially the
same ground. Senator Vicente T. Paterno, another respondent
in the same contest, thereafter filed his comments on both the
petitions to recuse and the motion for disqualification or
inhibition. Memoranda on the subject were also filed and oral
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 86
arguments were heard by the respondent Tribunal, with the
latter afterwards issuing the Resolutions now complained of.
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in the meantime had voluntarily
inhibited himself from participating in the hearings and
deliberations of the respondent tribunal in both SET Case No.
00287 and SET Case No. 001-87, the latter being another
contest filed by Augusto's Sanchez against him and Senator
Santanina T. Rasul as alternative respondents, citing his
personal involvement as a party in the two cases.
The petitioners, in essence, argue that considerations of public
policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively
require the mass disqualification sought and that the doctrine
of necessity which they perceive to be the foundation petition
of the questioned Resolutions does not rule out a solution both
practicable and constitutionally unobjectionable, namely; the
amendment of the respondent Tribunal's Rules of procedure so
of the Tribunal.
The proposed amendment to the Tribunal's Rules (Section 24)
—requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the
adoption of resolutions of whatever nature is a proviso that
where more than four (4) members are disqualified, the
remaining members shall constitute a quorum, if not less than
three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions
by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit
the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this
would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of
the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all
Justices of this Court, whose disqualification is not sought.
We do not agree with petitioners' thesis that the suggested
device is neither unfeasible nor repugnant to the Constitution.
We opine that in fact the most fundamental objection to such
proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of the Constitution
itself which, in its Article VI, Section 17, creates the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its
jurisdiction and powers.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as
the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal hall be its
Chairman.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 87

It seems quite clear to us that in thus providing for a Tribunal to
be staffed by both Justices of the Supreme Court and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both
those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The
respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of this
proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear
expression of an intent that all (such) contests ... shall be
resolved by a panel or body in which their (the Senators') peers
in that Chamber are represented." 1 The other part, of course,
is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the
participation in the same process of decision of a
representative or representatives of the Supreme Court.
function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and
that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three
Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication of a
senatorial election contest.
The charge that the respondent Tribunal gravely abused its
discretion in its disposition of the incidents referred to must
therefore fail. In the circumstances, it acted well within law and
principle in dismissing the petition for disqualification or
inhibition filed by herein petitioners. The instant petition for
certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Said intent is even more clearly signalled by the fact that the Fernandez, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Padilla, Bidin,
proportion of Senators to Justices in the prescribed Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado
membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is 2 to 1-an JJ., concur.
unmistakable indication that the "legislative component" cannot
be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., took no part.
senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit
and intent of the Constitution.  

Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the  

substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his
other colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same
objections to the substitute's competence, the proposed mass Separate Opinions
disqualification, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other  
court or body can perform, but which it cannot lawfully
discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire membership
FELICIANO, J.:,  concurring:
of Senators.

I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration—that the
his opinion for the Court. I would merely like to carry forward
Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
however slightly the analysis found in the penultimate
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in
paragraph of his opinion.
the highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly
imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that
participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a
the framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of
Tribunal would result that would be balanced between the
the possibility of an election contest that would involve all 24
three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members
Senators-elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in
and still constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a
judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might surface again
Tribunal, both the considerations of public policy and fair play
in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for the
raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted
last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the
concerning the mixed "judicial" and "legislative" composition of
Constitution provides no scheme or mode for settling such
the Electoral Tribunals would appear to be substantially met
unusual situations or for the substitution of Senators
and served. This denouement, however, must be voluntarily
designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
reached and not compelled by certiorari.
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust
and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of
the Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and  
collectively.
 
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-
Member of the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or Separate Opinions
disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
FELICIANO, J.:,  concurring:
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution
of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or
biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial I quite agree with what Mr. Justice Gancayco has written into
judgment. What we are merely saying is that in the light of the his opinion for the Court. I would merely like to carry forward
Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 88

however slightly the analysis found in the penultimate

paragraph of his opinion.

Should any three (3) Senator-Members of the Senate Electoral

Tribunal voluntarily inhibit or disqualify themselves from
participating in the proceedings in SET Case No. 002-87, a
Tribunal would result that would be balanced between the
three (3) Justice-Members and the three (3) Senator-Members
and still constitute more than a bare quorum. In such a
Tribunal, both the considerations of public policy and fair play
raised by petitioners and the constitutional intent above noted
concerning the mixed "judicial" and "legislative" composition of
the Electoral Tribunals would appear to be substantially met
and served. This denouement, however, must be voluntarily
reached and not compelled by certiorari.

Footnotes

1 Page 2, Resolution of public respondent

Tribunal of May 27, 1988; p. 25, Rollo.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,  ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered
vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA,
MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G.
CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be
appointed vice representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.,
and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J.
Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.
GRIO-AQUIÑO, J.:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of
Representatives, at the request of the dominant political party
therein, change that party's representation in the House
Electoral Tribunal to thwart the promulgation of a decision
freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action
of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century
ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60 (1803), had hesitated
to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other
two branches of the Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome
as well as delicate" because it could be considered by some as
"an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to
intermeddle with their prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and
weakest branch of our Government, was all too willing to avoid
a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying
its head ostrich-like in the sands of the "political question"
doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the
matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their
sovereign capacity or to the sole determination by either or
both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is
beyond judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the
party proceeded against was either the President or Congress,
or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act."
(Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the
constitutionality and validity of legislative or executive action,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 89
especially when private rights are affected came to be
recognized. As we pointed out in the celebrated Aquino case, a
showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the
improvident exercise or the abuse thereof may give rise to a
justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority
is not usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to
what may be done and how it is to be accomplished,
necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to
to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to
assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld"
(Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by
an express grant under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate
cases, the actions of the executive and legislative branches of
the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to
the President and the Legislature. It does mean though that the
judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the
constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action
when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by
someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such
action, as in this case. It is —
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power
vested in courts to enable them to administer justice
according to law. ... It is simply a necessary
concomitant of the power to hear and dispose of a
case or controversy properly before the court, to the
determination of which must be brought the test and
measure of the law. (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192,
203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987,
Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party
(NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative
for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga. Each
received the following votes in the canvass made by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the
election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest (HRET Case No.
25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 90

short) which is composed of nine (9) members, three of whom

ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining six are
members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis
Congressman  
of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
2nd District Zamboanga del Sur  
represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as
follows:
(formerly GAD, now NP)  
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman

Associate Justice   After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence,
and submission of memoranda, Bondoc's protest was
Supreme Court   submitted for decision in July, 1989.

ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which
Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of twenty-three (23)
Associate Justice   votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted
on a reappreciation and recount of the ballots cast in some
Supreme Court   precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the
finalization of the decision in the case.
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted
Associate Justice  
in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda to 107 votes.
Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court
Supreme Court  
Justices and Congressman Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member

Congressman   Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura

revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief," Congressman Jose
1st District   S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final
tally in the Bondoc case but also that he voted for Bondoc
Benguet LDP   "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to
honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member HRET that they would "abide by the result of the appreciation
of the contested ballot1 Congressman Camasura's revelation
Congressman   stirred a hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of
plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-Bondoc
1st District Palawan   majority in the Tribunal.

LDP   On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation

of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30 P.M. in HRET Case No.
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on
March 6, 1991.
Congressman  
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc
2nd District Nueva Ecija   decision, Congressman Cojuangco informed Congressman
Camasura by letter2 that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP
LDP   Davao del Sur Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution
No. 03-91 had already expelled him and Congressman
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to
organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco,
Congressman   and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del
Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not
1st District Davao del Sur   only inimical uncalled for, unethical and immoral, but also a
complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty
LDP   to LDP," in a meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive
Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.3
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member

Congressman   At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker

Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the two congressmen from
4th District Batangas   the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the
Speaker, to take note of it 'especially in matters where party
LDP   membership is a prerequisite.4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the
Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M. Herrera, received the
following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the
Secretary General of the House of Representatives, informing
the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the
House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March
13, 1991, decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the
election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of
Electoral Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
Constitution Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral
Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13
March 1991, to withdraw the nomination and to
rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G.
Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal on the
basis of an LDP communication which is self-
explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge
Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the
Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court in
writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be
relieved from their assignments in the HRET because —
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation
of the decision of the Tribunal in the electoral protest
entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25),
previously scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to
be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. 73777-78 promulgated 12 September 1990).
Even if there were no legal impediment to its
promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5
to 4 vote may now be confidently expected to be
overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the
party-litigant which would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early
as October 1990 with a margin of 23 votes in favor of
protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the
Tribunal requested re-appreciation of some ballots,
the finalization of the decision had to be deferred by
at least 4 months.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 91
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now
with a margin of 107 votes in favor of protestant
Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A.
Melencio-Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P.
Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G. Camasura
and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14
March 1991, with Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino,
David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and
Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v.
Pineda case was, in our view, a conscience vote, for
which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also
the loss of the confidence of the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable
situation has come about. It is extremely difficult to
continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the
Tribunal to preserve it. 8 integrity and credibility as a
constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is
clear to us that the unseating of an incumbent
member of Congress is being prevented at all costs.
We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered
in the performance of its constitutional function by
factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the
cases before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that
the provision for proportional representation in the
Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution, should be amended to provide instead
for a return to the composition mandated in the 1935
Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the
House or Senate upon nomination of the party having
the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party
having the second largest number of votes: and a
judicial component consisting of three (3) justices
from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or
coalition of parties can dominate the legislative
component in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could
perhaps sit as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the House of Representatives. Similarly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as the
sole judge of all such contests involving members of
the Senate. In this way, there should be lesser
chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive
role in the resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in
the Constitution that upon designation to membership
in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should
divest themselves of affiliation with their respective
political parties, to insure their independence and
objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision
by the Tribunal. Bondoc should have been
promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v.
Apacible (HRET Case No. 21) is scheduled for
promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v.

Dimaporo (HRET Case No. 45), after the Holy Week
recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment
of the constitutionally mandated task of the Tribunal
well ahead of the completion of the present
congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask
to be relieved from the chairmanship and membership
in the Tribunal.
x x x           x x x          x x x
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same
day, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 91-0018 cancelling the
promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The
resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received
at 9:45 tills morning from the House of
Representatives that at its plenary session held on
March 13, 1991, it had voted to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman
Camasura to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the
promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda
(HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for this afternoon.
This is because, without Congressman Camasura's
vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five
members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of
the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-
members of the Supreme Court, being of the opinion
that this development undermines the independence
of the Tribunal and derails the orderly adjudication of
electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in
a letter of even date, for their relief from membership
in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles
also manifested his intention to resign as a member of
the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino,
Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and Calingasan also
manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the
request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano,
resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal.
The Court observed that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of
the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole judge' of all
contests relationship to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of Congress, all
members of these bodies are appropriately guided
only by purely legal considerations in the decision of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 92
the cases before them and that in the contemplation
of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof,
upon assumption of their duties therein, sit in the
Tribunal no longer as representatives of their
respective political parties but as impartial judges.
The view was also submitted that, to further bolster
the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office
of every member thereof should be considered co-
extensive with the corresponding legislative term and
may not be legally terminated except only by death,
resignation, permanent disability, or removal for valid
cause, not including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE
the request of justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano to
be relieved from their membership in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to
DIRECT them to resume their duties therein: b) to
EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-
judicial factors in the proceedings of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs
functions purely judicial in character despite the
inclusion of legislators in its membership; and c) to
NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the
Electoral Tribunals, including those from the
legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but
only for valid legal cause, and to REQUIRE the
Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue
to the said Tribunal in the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I
concur, but I wish to add that Rep. Camasura should
be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of
protestant Bondoc, otherwise a political and judicial
travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and
Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc against
Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol,
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., or any other representative who may
be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.,
and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying
this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives
of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw the nomination and to
rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G.
Camasura, Jr. to the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent
Palacol or whomsoever may be designated in place of
respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and
discharging functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent
Camasura to immediately reassume and discharge
his functions as a member of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal; and

4. Grant such other relief as may be just and
equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due
course, required the respondents to comment5 on the petition
within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from
reorganizing and allowing participation in its proceedings of
Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated to
replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until the issue of the
withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of
said Congressman Camasura as member of the HRET by the
House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until
otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the
petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of
the petition is centered on Congress' being the sole authority
that nominates and elects from its members. Upon
recommendation by the political parties therein, those who are
to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and
in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it
allegedly has the sole power to remove any of them whenever
the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the
House or Senate is materially changed on account of death,
incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political party;6 that a
Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his
legislative term,7 for if a member of the Tribunal who changes
his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the
constitutional provision mandating representation based on
political affiliation would be completely nullified;8 and that the
expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely
a party affair" of the LDP9 and the decision to rescind his
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole
prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives,
hence, it is a purely political question beyond the reach of
judicial review.10
In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M.
Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no cause of action
against him because he has not yet been nominated by the
LDP for membership in the HRET.11 Moreover, the petition
failed to implead the House of Representatives as an
indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that
withdrew and rescinded Congressman Camasura's
membership in the HRET.12
The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a
similar vein; that the inclusion of the HETH as a party
respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause
of action against the Tribunal. The petitioner does not question
any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What he
assails is the act of the House of Representatives of
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of
Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the
HRET.13
Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner
argued that while the Tribunal indeed had nothing to do with
the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it
acknowledged that decision by cancelling the promulgation of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 93
its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's)
prejudice.14 Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an
indispensable party, it is a necessary party to the suit, to
assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in
the ultimate, the Tribunal would have to acknowledge, give
recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to
whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from
the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is valid."15
In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner
explained that Congressman Palacol was impleaded as one of
the respondents in this case because after the House of
Representatives had announced the termination of
Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several
newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of
Representatives would nominate and elect Congressman
Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the
Tribunal.16
Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the
Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with the disposition of
an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the
ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the
majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the
answer to that question. It provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of their
respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or House of Representatives,
as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties
and the parties or organizations registered under the
party list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution, except the provision on the representation of the
main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties,
instead of equal representation of three members from each of
the first and second largest political aggrupations in the
Legislature. The 1935 constitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the
party having the largest number of votes and three of

the party having the second largest member of votes
therein. The senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the
Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding
votes, aid it was impossible for any political party to control the
voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal
in the Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution
underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral
Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February 5, 1990). The
tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court
although two-thirds of its members are politicians. It is a non-
political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier
said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the
electoral tribunals of the Senate and House of
Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating
the Electoral Commission was to provide an
independent and impartial tribunal for the
determination of contests to legislative office, devoid
of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that
tribunal all the powers previously exercised by the
legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections
of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to
judge contests relating to the election and
qualification of members of the National Assembly is
intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it
had remained in the legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House
were created by the Constitution as special tribunals
to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election
returns and qualifications of members of the
legislative houses, and, as such, are independent
bodies which must be permitted to select their own
employees, and to supervise and control them,
without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief
Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House
Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its jurisdiction to hear
and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared
by it with the Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from
and independent of the legislature and though not a
power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to
all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits
of its authority, an independent organ; while
composed of a majority of members of the legislature
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 94
it is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ
created for the specific purpose of determining
contests relating to election returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly may not be
interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission for the
purpose of determining the character, scope and
extent of the constitutional grant to the commission as
sole judge of all contests relating to the election and
qualifications of the members of the National
Assembly. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved
undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as the following
exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong
and Azcuna in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast
as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal, either
of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that
these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will
distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan
and the Sandiganbayan which are created by
mandate of the Constitution but they are not
constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that
either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House
Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it
then subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional
restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the
ruling in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will
still be applicable to the present bodies we are
creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are
not separate departments of the government. Would
that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate
departments because the separate departments are
the legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but
they are constitutional bodies.

MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate
departments of government, I would like to know
again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to
the present bodies we are deciding on, when the
Supreme court said that these electoral tribunals are
independent from Congress, devoid of partisan
influence or consideration and, therefore, Congress
has no power to regulate proceedings of these
electoral tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are
independent although they are not a separate branch
of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all
parliaments of the world, the invariable rule is to leave
unto themselves the determination of controversies
with respect to the election and qualifications of their
members, and precisely they have this Committee on
Privileges which takes care of this particular
controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of
electoral tribunals is an exception to this rule because
apparently we have an independent electoral
tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral
tribunals are independent, but the Gentleman will
notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an
Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still the Senate Electoral
Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So,
technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal
of the Senate although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have
agreed on, are independent from both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my
question. How can we say that these bodies are
independent when we still have six politicians sitting
in both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent,
Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we
discussed a portion of this in the Committee on the
Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice
Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there
seems to be some incongruity in these electoral
tribunals, considering that politicians still sit in the
tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the
case of Sanidad vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal
Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in accordance
with law and justice with complete detachment from
an political considerations. That is why I am asking
now for the record how we could achieve such
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 95
detachment when there are six politicians sitting
there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman,
while chosen on behalf of the opposition, has, with
sterling competence, shown independence in the
proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also
trust that the members of the tribunals will be
independent. (pp. 111-112, Journal, Tuesday, July 22,
1986, Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the
independence of the HRET. —
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so
zealously guarded by the framers of our Constitution, would,
however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of
Representatives, or the majority party therein, may shuffle and
manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial)
component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the
party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing
Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for
disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the
Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment
of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal
to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda
and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives
in the work of the House Electoral Tribunal would reduce the
tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in
power (LDP) which the three justices of the Supreme Court
and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop. A
minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the
threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of
membership in the HRET. —
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan.
They must discharge their functions with complete detachment,
impartiality, and independence even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party"
and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds for the
expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling
Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the
result of the examination and appreciation of the ballots and
the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an
injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of
expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null
and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to
security of tenure. —
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the
House of Representatives is that it violates Congressman
Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET

as "sole judge" of congressional election contests, are entitled
to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution). Therefore, membership in the House Electoral
Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such
as, the expiration of the member's congressional term of office,
his death, permanent disability, resignation from the political
party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with
another political party, or removal for other valid cause. A
member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives
for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated
with another political group. As the records of this case fail to
show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP
and from the HRET was not for a valid cause, hence, it violated
his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that
members of the House Electoral Tribunal are not entitled to
security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme
Court Justices in the Tribunal were changed before the end of
the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice,
was replaced by Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, and the latter,
who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco,
when he (J. Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a
lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed, however, that
those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no
political implications at all unlike the present attempt to remove
Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief
Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice
Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They acted on their own
free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail
the disposition of a pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was
expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish him for "party
disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of
the party how he voted in the Bondoc case. The purpose of the
expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in
the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be
promulgated, and so that the way could be cleared for the LDP
to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the
Tribunal. That stratagem of the LDP and the House of
Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman
Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the
HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc
for the protection of his rights against the strong arm of the
majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court
cannot be deaf to his plea for relief, nor indifferent to his
charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from
the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls upon the Court, as
guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and
discharge its duty to protect his rights as the party aggrieved
by the action of the House. The Court must perform
its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the
highest official of the land or the Government itself"
(Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 207).
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 96
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the
House Electoral Tribunal by the House of Representatives was
not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with
the tribunal's disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive
Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his favor, the
action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of
the constitutional mandate (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)
which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole
judge" of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
We, therefore, declare null and void the resolution dated March
13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the
nomination, and rescinding the election, of Congressman
Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal. The
petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he
prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is granted. The decision of the House of
Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding
the election of Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a
member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null
and void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and
Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is ordered reinstated
to his position as a member of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal. The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated
March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision in
HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A.
Pineda") is also set aside. Considering the unconscionable
delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the
prejudice of the speedy resolution of electoral cases, the Court,
in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of
justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY
PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies thereof on
the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs
against respondent Marciano A. Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took
no part.
 
 
Separate Opinions
 
PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:
Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House
of Representatives, assuming that said act were politically
motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its
authority?

The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to
do so on the strength of the second paragraph, Section 1 of
Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the
House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding its
nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman
Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. and order Camasura's reinstatement
to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot join the majority's posture
which, I believe, is violative of the almost sacramental doctrine
of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for
this reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the
powers of government are distributed among three (3) great
departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these
departments is separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with
the others each one deriving its authority directly from the
fundamental law.1 As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the
three departments are not only coordinate, they are co-equal
and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each
is unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without
the other, they are nevertheless in many senses independent
of each other. That is to say, one department may not control
or even interfere with another in the exercise of its particular
functions.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual
independence does not, however, extend to the point that
those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the
acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant to the
authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every
other department.3 In other words, one department must not
encroach upon nor interfere with acts done within the
constitutional competence of the other where full discretionary
authority has been delegated by the Constitution to said
department. That department alone, to the exclusion of the
others, has both right and duty to exercise it free from any
encroachment or interference of whomsoever.4
This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced
by the judiciary through the exercise of its power of judicial
review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases
involving political questions.5
In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when
the House of Representatives withdrew and rended the
nomination of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the
House Electoral Tribunal. This act was, it seems, precipitated
by a letter of Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr. informing
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the expulsion
of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for
having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly having invited other
LDP members to join the said political party. As a result of this
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 97
letter, the nomination of Camasura to the House Electoral
Tribunal was withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of
Representatives and the House Electoral Tribunal was
informed of such action of the House.
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of
Representatives as it is, he alleges, but a employ to thwart the
promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by
him (petitioner Bondoc) against Marciano M. Pineda, a
member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and
which decision would be favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner
contends that not only does the action of the House of
Representatives violate the independence of the House
Electoral Tribunal but that it also violates the security of tenure
of Congressman Camasura, Jr. in said electoral tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits
that the House of Representatives has the sole authority to
nominate and select from among its members who are to sit in
the House Electoral Tribunal, upon recommendation of the
political parties therein, hence, it also has the sole power to
remove any of them from the electoral tribunal whenever the
ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is
materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or
expulsion of a House member from a political party. A Tribunal
member's term of office in said electoral tribunal is not,
Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with his legislative
term. Were that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating
representation in the electoral tribunal based on political
affiliation may be completely nullified in the event that a
member of the Tribunal changes party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members
of the House Electoral Tribunal. Three (3) of the members of
the tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The remaining six
(6) members come from the members of the House chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
partylist system.6 The House of Representatives has the power
to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal
(representing the House) provided, of course, that the
proportional representation of parties is maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination
extended to a member of the electoral tribunal (representing
the House of Representatives) after the majority party in the
House has expelled him from its ranks? I believe it can. The
power to appoint or designate a member of the House of
Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal must, to my mind, necessarily include the power to
remove said member. A withdrawal of the nomination of a
member of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain
the proportional representation of the political parties,
mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and
respected, no matter how politically motivated it might be.
Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power not
with policy, wisdom or expediency.7The question that must be
asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does the
House of Representatives have the power to do what it has
done and not whether the House of Representatives should
have done what it has done.

Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a
legislative act done within the constitutional authority to the
legislature? I believe not, in the same way that, for instance,
the House cannot question the act of the Chief Justice, should
he deem it proper to change the Justices who sit as members
of the House Electoral Tribunal. Matters such as who will be
designated or nominated as members of the electoral tribunal,
how they should vote — surely are matters that not merely
concern political action as far as members of the House are
concerned, but are the very essence of political action, if
political life has any connotation at all. To open courts of justice
to such political controversies would have courts sit in
judgment over the manifold disputes engendered by political
manuevers and skirmishes. This would drag the courts into the
political arena which in the long run could undermine and
destroy their independence.
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, taken in the exercise of power committed
exclusively to it by the Constitution.8 It is not within the province
of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative acts
as to keep them within the bounds of propriety, fairness and
common sense. Such acts, like the one at bar, are exclusively
of legislative concern.9 To hold otherwise would be to
invalidate the principle of separation of powers. As Judge
Learned Hand so aptly observed, "one cannot find among the
powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the
validity of the decisions of another 'Department' as to the
scope of that 'Department's' powers. Indeed, it is to be
understood that the three (3), Departments' were separate and
co-equal, each being, as it were, a Leibnizian monad, looking
up to the Heaven of the Electorate, but without any mutual
dependence. What could be better evidence of complete
dependence than to subject the validity of the decision of one
'Department' as to its authority on a given occasion to review
and reversal by another? Such a doctrine makes supreme the
Department that has the last word. "10 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the
division of power tacitly accepted by society runs counter to its
own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This
may be because the society is still unsure of what the best
division of power would be and so temporarily accepts the
existing one, or because the society has vacated its
decisionmaking function and special interest groups have
stepped in to fill the vacuum. In either case, the Court can
neither validate a clearly unconstitutional distribution, and
thereby subject its role as guardian to claims of fraud, nor
invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be
ignored. To do either would be to sacrifice the popular prestige
which is the Court's primarily source of power."11
Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in
withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of Congressman
Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of
how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the electoral protests
before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to
invalidate said act of the House of Representatives, since it is
done within the limits of its constitutional power. Besides, what
other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not politically
motivated? After all, that branch of government is a political
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 98
branch and necessarily or pragmatically all of its acts are and
will always be politically motivated.
The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered
opinion, bring it within the Court's power to strike down the
legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not
this court — who should ultimately judge the act when they
cast their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate unto itself the
power to institute what it perceives to be political reforms, for in
the last analysis on which all else depend, the vitality of a
political system would be greatly weakened by reliance on the
judiciary for any and all political reforms and, in time, a
complacent body politic will result. It is the responsibility of the
people and none other, to remain ever vigilant about their
government to the end that they can continue to live under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy. To leave this task to
the Court, would in the long run be inimical to and destructive
of democratic government itself
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
 
SARMIENTO, J.,  disssenting:
Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too
am unable to agree with the majority. I believe that the
questions as Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an
act of Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is
a political question and a question in which the Court can not
intervene.
It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court
includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of
Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the
principle principle of separation of powers.
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal
was a result of political maneuvers within the lower house. This
Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the
last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If
they do, they risk their independence.
 
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J.,  dissenting:
Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House
of Representatives, assuming that said act were politically
motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its
authority?
The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to
do so on the strength of the second paragraph, Section 1 of
Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the
House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding its
nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman
Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. and order Camasura's reinstatement
to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot join the majority's posture
which, I believe, is violative of the almost sacramental doctrine
of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution. It is for
this reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the
powers of government are distributed among three (3) great
departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these
departments is separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with
the others each one deriving its authority directly from the
fundamental law.1 As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the
three departments are not only coordinate, they are co-equal
and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each
is unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without
the other, they are nevertheless in many senses independent
of each other. That is to say, one department may not control
or even interfere with another in the exercise of its particular
functions.2 (Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual
independence does not, however, extend to the point that
those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the
acts of those in authority in the others, done pursuant to the
authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every
other department.3 In other words, one department must not
encroach upon nor interfere with acts done within the
constitutional competence of the other where full discretionary
authority has been delegated by the Constitution to said
department. That department alone, to the exclusion of the
others, has both right and duty to exercise it free from any
encroachment or interference of whomsoever.4
This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced
by the judiciary through the exercise of its power of judicial
review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases
involving political questions.5
In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when
the House of Representatives withdrew and rended the
nomination of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the
House Electoral Tribunal. This act was, it seems, precipitated
by a letter of Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr. informing
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of the expulsion
of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. from the LDP for
having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Mr.
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and for allegedly having invited other
LDP members to join the said political party. As a result of this
letter, the nomination of Camasura to the House Electoral
Tribunal was withdrawn at a plenary session of the House of
Representatives and the House Electoral Tribunal was
informed of such action of the House.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 99
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of
Representatives as it is, he alleges, but a employ to thwart the
promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by
him (petitioner Bondoc) against Marciano M. Pineda, a
member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and
which decision would be favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner
contends that not only does the action of the House of
Representatives violate the independence of the House
Electoral Tribunal but that it also violates the security of tenure
of Congressman Camasura, Jr. in said electoral tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits
that the House of Representatives has the sole authority to
nominate and select from among its members who are to sit in
the House Electoral Tribunal, upon recommendation of the
political parties therein, hence, it also has the sole power to
remove any of them from the electoral tribunal whenever the
ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House is
materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or
expulsion of a House member from a political party. A Tribunal
member's term of office in said electoral tribunal is not,
Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with his legislative
term. Were that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating
representation in the electoral tribunal based on political
affiliation may be completely nullified in the event that a
member of the Tribunal changes party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members
of the House Electoral Tribunal. Three (3) of the members of
the tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The remaining six
(6) members come from the members of the House chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
partylist system.6 The House of Representatives has the power
to nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal
(representing the House) provided, of course, that the
proportional representation of parties is maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination
extended to a member of the electoral tribunal (representing
the House of Representatives) after the majority party in the
House has expelled him from its ranks? I believe it can. The
power to appoint or designate a member of the House of
Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral
Tribunal must, to my mind, necessarily include the power to
remove said member. A withdrawal of the nomination of a
member of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain
the proportional representation of the political parties,
mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and
respected, no matter how politically motivated it might be.
Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power not
with policy, wisdom or expediency.7The question that must be
asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does the
House of Representatives have the power to do what it has
done and not whether the House of Representatives should
have done what it has done.
Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a
legislative act done within the constitutional authority to the
legislature? I believe not, in the same way that, for instance,
the House cannot question the act of the Chief Justice, should
he deem it proper to change the Justices who sit as members
of the House Electoral Tribunal. Matters such as who will be

designated or nominated as members of the electoral tribunal,
how they should vote — surely are matters that not merely
concern political action as far as members of the House are
concerned, but are the very essence of political action, if
political life has any connotation at all. To open courts of justice
to such political controversies would have courts sit in
judgment over the manifold disputes engendered by political
manuevers and skirmishes. This would drag the courts into the
political arena which in the long run could undermine and
destroy their independence.
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review
even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative
department, taken in the exercise of power committed
exclusively to it by the Constitution.8 It is not within the province
of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative acts
as to keep them within the bounds of propriety, fairness and
common sense. Such acts, like the one at bar, are exclusively
of legislative concern.9 To hold otherwise would be to
invalidate the principle of separation of powers. As Judge
Learned Hand so aptly observed, "one cannot find among the
powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the
validity of the decisions of another 'Department' as to the
scope of that 'Department's' powers. Indeed, it is to be
understood that the three (3), Departments' were separate and
co-equal, each being, as it were, a Leibnizian monad, looking
up to the Heaven of the Electorate, but without any mutual
dependence. What could be better evidence of complete
dependence than to subject the validity of the decision of one
'Department' as to its authority on a given occasion to review
and reversal by another? Such a doctrine makes supreme the
Department that has the last word. "10 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the
division of power tacitly accepted by society runs counter to its
own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This
may be because the society is still unsure of what the best
division of power would be and so temporarily accepts the
existing one, or because the society has vacated its
decisionmaking function and special interest groups have
stepped in to fill the vacuum. In either case, the Court can
neither validate a clearly unconstitutional distribution, and
thereby subject its role as guardian to claims of fraud, nor
invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be
ignored. To do either would be to sacrifice the popular prestige
which is the Court's primarily source of power."11
Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in
withdrawing and rescinding the nomination of Congressman
Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is
politically motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of
how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the electoral protests
before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to
invalidate said act of the House of Representatives, since it is
done within the limits of its constitutional power. Besides, what
other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not politically
motivated? After all, that branch of government is a political
branch and necessarily or pragmatically all of its acts are and
will always be politically motivated.
The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered
opinion, bring it within the Court's power to strike down the
legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation — not
this court — who should ultimately judge the act when they
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 100
cast their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate unto itself the
power to institute what it perceives to be political reforms, for in
the last analysis on which all else depend, the vitality of a
political system would be greatly weakened by reliance on the
judiciary for any and all political reforms and, in time, a
complacent body politic will result. It is the responsibility of the
people and none other, to remain ever vigilant about their
government to the end that they can continue to live under a
regime of justice, liberty and democracy. To leave this task to
the Court, would in the long run be inimical to and destructive
of democratic government itself
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
SARMIENTO, J.,  disssenting:
Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too
am unable to agree with the majority. I believe that the
questions as Justice Padilla raised it — can the Court annul an
act of Congress, revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? — is
a political question and a question in which the Court can not
intervene.
It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court
includes the power to strike down excesses of any agency of
Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the
principle principle of separation of powers.
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal
was a result of political maneuvers within the lower house. This
Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the
last persons to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If
they do, they risk their independence.
Footnotes
1 Annex B, p. 29, Rollo.
2 Annex D, p. 34, Rollo.
3 Resolution No. 03-91 p. 35, Rollo.
4 Annex D-2 p. 36, Rollo.
5 The comments of the respondents were later
treated as their answer ers to the petition to which the
Court gave due course.
6 p. 53, Rollo.
7 p. 93, Rollo.
8 p. 94, Rollo.
9 p. 111, Rollo.
10 p. 99, Rollo.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 101

11 p. 127, Rollo.

12 p. 130, Rollo.

13 p. 142, Rollo.

14 p. 150, Rollo.

15 5 p. 152, Rollo.

16 p. 157, Rollo.

Padilla, J.:

1 People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56.

2 Province of Tarlac vs. Gale, 26 Phil. 338, 349.

3 Kilbourn vs. Thomson, 103 US 168, 25 L. ed. 177;

Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612.

4 Mr. Justice Concepcion in Tanada, et al. vs.

Mariano Jesus Cuenco, et al., G.R. No. L-10520, 28
February 1957.

5 Neptali Gonzales, Philippine Political Law, 1966 ed.,

p. 102.

6 Section 17, Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

7 Bautista vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 86439, 13 April

1989, 172 SCRA 182.

8 Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192.

9 People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535.

10 delivered on occasion of the Oliver Wendell

Homes Lecture of 1958 and published in LEARNED
HAND, The Bill of Rights 4 (1958).

11 Philippines Strum, "The Supreme Court and

Political Questions" a study in judicial evasion, 1974
ed., p. 103.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002]
EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE
DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their
official capacities as Speaker and Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives,
respectively, and MA. VICTORIA L.
LOCSIN, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he
who has been rejected by the people cannot represent the
people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001
elections as Representative of the 4thlegislative district of
Leyte. The most sophisticated legal alchemy cannot justify her
insistence that she should continue governing the people of
Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the sovereign will
of the people is not subject to the discretion of any official of
the land.
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto
directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and
Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of
Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of
the Commission on Elections en banc by (a) administering the
oath of office to petitioner as the duly-elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the
name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of
Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L.
Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding and
exercising the said public office on the basis of a void
proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent
Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001
elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City
while respondent Locsin was the sitting Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine
de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly
with the COMELEC main office a Petition for
Disqualification[1] against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting
votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob,
Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election
Code. It was alleged that the petitioner used the equipments
and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to
extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of
Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing,
influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the
petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates, [2] Danilo D.
Maglasang,[3] Cesar A. Laurente;[4] (b) Joint Affidavit of
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Salvera;[5] (c) Extract
Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police
Superintendent Elson G. Pecho;[6] and (d) Photographs
showing government dump trucks, haulers and surfacers and
portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and surfaced through
the intercession of the respondent.[7] The case was docketed
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 102
as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the COMELECs Second
Division.
On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued
an Order delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on
the disqualification case to the Office of the Regional Director
of Region VIII.[8] On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second
Division sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a
disqualification case was filed against him and that the petition
was remanded to the Regional Election Director for
investigation.[9]
At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the
Regional Election Director had yet to hear the
disqualification case.Consequently, petitioner was included
in the list of candidates for district representative and was
voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was the
winning candidate.
On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished,
respondent Locsin joined as intervenor in SPA No. 128 and
filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent [herein petitioner] with the COMELEC Second
Division.[10] Respondent Locsin alleged that the evidence on
record against respondent is very strong and unless rebutted
remains. She urged the Commission to set the hearing of the
disqualification case and prayed for the suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent so as not to render the present
disqualification case moot and academic. A copy of the
Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by registered
mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto.[11]
On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a Second
Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of
Respondent stating there is clear and convincing evidence
showing that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the
charges against him and this remains unrebutted by the
respondent. A copy of the Motion was sent to the petitioner
and the corresponding registry receipt was attached to the
pleading.[12] The records, however, do not show the date the
petitioner received the motion.
On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second
Division issued an Ex-Parte Order[13] directing the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by
reason of the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for
disqualification.[14] It also directed the Regional Election
Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward
immediately the complete records together with its
recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the Commission.
[15]
 As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even
though the final election results showed that he garnered
71,350 votes as against respondent Locsins 53,447 votes.[16]
At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its
Order suspending his proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be
summoned to answer the petition for disqualification. Neither
has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May 24,
2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition
for his disqualification with the Regional Election Director,
alleging that: (a) he has not received the summons together
with the copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the
matter only by virtue of the telegram sent by the COMELEC
Second Division informing him that a petition was filed against
him and that the Regional Election Director was directed to

investigate and receive evidence therewith; and (c) he
obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC Regional
Office No. 8 at his own instance. [17] Petitioner further alleged
that the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of barangay
roads in the municipalities of Matag-ob and Kananga were
undertaken without his authority, participation or directive as
City Mayor of Ormoc. He attached in his Answer the following:
(a) Affidavit of Alex B. Borinaga; [18] (b) Copy of the Excerpt
from the Minutes of the Regular Session of Barangay
Monterico;[19] (c) Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel; [20] (d)
Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;[21] and (e) Affidavit of
Arnel Y. Padayao.[22]
On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order
of Suspension,[23] alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of
the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was
denied the right to rebut and refute the allegations in the
Motion; (b) that he did not receive a copy of the summons on
the petition for disqualification and after personally obtaining a
copy of the petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24,
2001; and (c) that he received the telegraph Order of the
COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation only
on May 22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in
support of his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his
proclamation, and requested the setting of a hearing on his
Motion.[24]
On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on
the petitioners Motion and the parties were ordered to submit
their respective memoranda.[25] On June 4, 2001, petitioner
submitted his Memorandum[26] in support of his Motion
assailing the suspension of his proclamation on the grounds
that: (a) he was not afforded due process; (b) the order has no
legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is patently
inexistent for the purpose of suspending his proclamation. He
prayed that his proclamation as winning congressional
candidate be expediently made, even while the disqualification
case against him continue upon due notice and hearing. He
attached the following additional evidence in his Memorandum:
(a) Copy of certification issued by PNP Senior Inspector
Benjamin T. Gorre;[27] (b) Certification issued by Elena S.
Aviles, City Budget Officer;[28] (c) Copy of certification issued by
Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc;[29](d) Joint Affidavit of
Antonio Patenio and Pepito Restituto;[30] and (e) Affidavits of
Demetrio Brion,[31] Igmedio Rita[32] and Gerardo Monteza.
[33]
 Respondent Locsins memorandum also contained
additional affidavits of his witnesses.[34]
Petitioners Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension,
however, was not resolved. Instead, on June 14, 2001,
the COMELEC Second Division promulgated its
Resolution[35] in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner
guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered
his disqualification. It directed the immediate proclamation
of the candidate who garnered the highest number of
votes xxx. A copy of said Resolution was sent by fax to the
counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the
following day.[36]
By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for
petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray even before
said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15, 2001,
respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a Certificate
of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 103
Candidates for Member of the House of Representatives
stating that MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN obtained a
total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY
SEVEN (53,447) votes representing the highest number of
votes legally cast in the legislative district for said office.
[37]
 Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June 18,
2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.
On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the
COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration[38] from
the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division which ordered his disqualification, as well as an
Addendum to the Motion for Reconsideration. [39] Petitioner
alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration that the COMELEC
Second Division erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the
basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for
respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the
resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in
directing therein the immediate proclamation of the second
highest vote getter. Respondent Locsin and her co-petitioner in
SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration.[40]
On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en
banc a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation,
[41]
 docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the validity of the
proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only
the second highest number of votes.Respondent Locsin
filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost
jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the
proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the election,
returns, and qualification of Locsin can only be taken
cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the
first instance by a Division of the Commission and not directly
by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of
Locsin was valid because she received the highest number of
valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla being stray.
On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent
Manifestation[42] stating that he was deprived of a fair hearing
on the disqualification case because while the documentary
evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of
his Motion for the lifting of the suspension of his
proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead
ruled on the main disqualification case. In consonance with
his prayer that a full-dress hearing be conducted on the
disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional
witnesses[43] which he claims would refute and substantially
belie the allegations of petitioners/intervenors witnesses. A
Reply,[44] Rejoinder[45] and Sur-Rejoinder[46]were respectively
filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for
reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition for
declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-324 were submitted for
resolution.
From the records, it appears that initially, a Resolution
penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, dated July 24,
2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman, dismissing
the petition for declaration of nullity for lack of jurisdiction and
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
Codilla.[47] Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and
Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting
opinions[48] to the Javier resolution. It bears emphasis that
Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the Resolution

of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered the
disqualification of petitioner but after considering the additional
evidence presented by the latter, he concluded that the totality
of the evidence was clearly in petitioners favor. Equally worth
mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion,
who was the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division,
also dissented and voted to grant Codillas motion for
reconsideration on the ground that [T]he people of Leyte have
spoken and I respect the electorates will. x x x. [49]
On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo
L. Benipayo issued a Vote and Opinion and Summary of
Votes reversing the resolution of the Second Division and
declaring the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null
and void. The dispositive portion reads:
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I
concur with Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra,
Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner
Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion for
reconsideration and to REVERSE the resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 1, 2001,
disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to
GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as
null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin.
Accordingly:
1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification
resolution against Codilla, promulgated by the Commission
(Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-208), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for
Reconsideration of respondent-
movant Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr.,
and to REVERSE the Resolution of
the Commission (Second Division)
promulgated on June 14, 2001, for
insufficiency of evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of
proclamation of petitioner Codilla,
issued by the Commission (Second
Division) on May 18, 2001, having
been issued without hearing and
without any finding that the
evidence of guilt of petitioner
Codilla is strong and, thus, null and
void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the
Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on
June 14, 2001, for (t)he immediate
proclamation of the candidate who
garnered the highest number of
votes, to the exclusion of
respondent and the concurrent
order for the Provincial Board of
Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to
immediately reconvene and
thereafter proclaim forthwith the
candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes counting out the
Respondent the same being
violative of election laws,
established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 104
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the
Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated o
June 14, 2001, that the votes of
respondent Codilla are considered
stray and invalid said ruling being
issued on the basis of an
inapplicable decision, and contrary
to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte, upon the
finality of this resolution, to
reconvene and proclaim petitioner
Codilla as the winning candidate for
Representative of the Fourth
Legislative district of Leyte to
comply with its ministerial duty to
proclaim the candidate who
garnered the highest number of
votes in the elections for that
position; and
(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin,
upon the finality of this resolution,
to vacate the office of
Representative of the House of
Representatives representing the
Fourth legislative district of Leyte
and, for this purpose, to inform the
House of Representatives through
the Honorable Speaker of this
resolution for its attention and
guidance; and
2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of
respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino
M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null
and void the proclamation of losing
candidate Locsin, the proclamation
being violative of election laws,
established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission on
Elections;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of
proclamation of petitioner Codilla,
issued by the Commission (Second
Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA
No. 01-208, having been issued
without hearing and without any
finding that the evidence of guilt of
petitioner Codilla is strong and,
thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the
Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on
June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208,
for (t)he immediate proclamation of
the candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes, to the
exclusion of respondent and the
concurrent order for the provincial
Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte

to immediately reconvene and
thereafter proclaim forthwith the
candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes counting out the
Respondent the same being
violative of election laws,
established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the
Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on
June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208,
that the votes of respondent Codilla
are considered stray and
invalid said ruling being issued on
the basis of an inapplicable
decision, and contrary to
established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte, upon the
finality of this resolution, to
reconvene and proclaim petitioner
Codilla as the winning candidate for
Representative of the Fourth
legislative district of Leyte he (sic)
having garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections for
the position; and
(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon
the finality of this resolution, to
vacate the office of Representative
of the House of Representatives
representing the Fourth Legislative
district of Leyte and, for this
purpose, to inform the House of
Representatives through the
Honorable Speaker of this
resolution for its attention and
guidance.
Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and
Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason,
Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for
Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the disqualification
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) in SPA No.
01-208, promulgated on June 14, 2001, and as an inevitable
consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of
nullity of the proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No.
01-324, the verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three (3)
Commissioners taken together now stands, as it is, the
MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both
cases; and the Resolution submitted by three (3)
Commissioners, namely, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier,
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner
Mehol K. Sadain, is considered, as it is, the MINORITY
DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases.
The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper
consultation with those who joined the majority. The Chairman
and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the majority
decided that no one will be assigned to write a Majority
Decision. Instead, each one will write his own separate
opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and the
undersigned Chairman submitted separate
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 105
opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote an explanation on his
vote.[50]
The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a Vote of
Adoption signed by Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion,
Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.[51]
Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision
annulling her proclamation. Instead, she filed a Comment
and Manifestation[52] with the COMELEC en banc questioning
the procedure and the manner by which the decision was
issued. In addition, respondent Locsin requested and was
issued an opinion by House of Representatives Executive
Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B. Palicte III
declaring that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the
proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken her
oath and assumed office since it is the HRET which is the sole
judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the
House.[53]Relying on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted
a written privileged speech to the House during its regular
session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that she
will not only disregard but will openly defy and disobey the
COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate her
position.[54]
On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued
an Order[55] constituting the members of the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid decision. It
likewise ordered the Board to reconvene and proclaim the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the
district, as the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth
Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate
of Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for
Member of the House of Representatives x x x, based on the
city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to
the previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte x x x.
On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was
proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the
duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of
Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the
highest number of votes cast in the district.[56] On the same
day, petitioner took his oath of office before Executive Judge
Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City.
[57]
On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of
Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia,
informing the House of the August 29, 2001 COMELEC en
banc resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent
Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
[58]
 Petitioner also served notice that I am assuming the duties
and responsibilities as Representative of the fourth legislative
district of Leyte to which position I have been lawfully elected
and proclaimed. On behalf of my constituents, I therefore
expect that all rights and privileges intended for the position of
Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte be
accorded to me, including all physical facilities and staff
support. On the basis of this letter, a Memorandum[59] dated
October 8, 2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy Secretary-
General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia,
stating that there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly
promulgated and now final and executory COMELEC Decision
of August 29, 2001 x x x.

These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House
of Representatives of a copy of the COMELEC en
banc resolution on September 20, 2001,[60] no action was
taken by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence,
petitioner sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP, which sent a letter[61] addressed to respondent Speaker
De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party
President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General
Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio
Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the House of Representatives to
act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner can avail of
whatever remedy is available should their action remain
unfavorable or otherwise undecisive.
In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter[62] dated
October 30, 2001, stating that:
We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we
are inclined to sustain it. However, Rep. Locsin has officially
notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech, inserted in the
HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall
openly defy and disobey the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately
means that implementing the decision would result in the
spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same
congressional seat, a legal situation, the only consideration,
that effectively deters the HOUSEs liberty to take action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the
implementation of the COMELEC decision is a matter that
can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the Supreme
Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most
expeditiously. (emphases supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo
warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc  which has become final and executory for
failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has
become the ministerial duty: (1) of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, as its Administrative Head and Presiding
Officer, to implement the said resolution of the COMELEC en
banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-
General, as official custodian of the records of the House, to
formally register his name in the Roll of Members of the House
and delete the name of respondent Locsin
therefrom. Petitioner further contends that respondent Locsin
has been usurping and unlawfully holding the public office of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering
that her premature proclamation has been declared null and
void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges that the action or
inaction of public respondents has deprived him of his lawful
right to assume the office of Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte.
In his Comment,[63] public respondent Speaker De
Venecia alleged that mandamus will not lie to compel the
implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely
a ministerial duty but one which requires the exercise of
discretion by the Speaker of the House considering that: (1) it
affects the membership of the House; and (2) there is nothing
in the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a
duty on the House Speaker to implement a COMELEC
decision that unseats an incumbent House member.
In his Comment,[64] public respondent Secretary-General
Nazareno alleged that in reading the name of respondent
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 106
Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take her oath
before the Speaker-elect and sit as Member of the House
during the Joint Session of Congress, he was merely
performing official acts in compliance with the
opinions[65] rendered by House of Representatives Chief
Counsel and Executive Director Leonardo C. Palicte III stating
that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the
proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void since it is
the HRET which is the sole judge of all election, returns and
qualifications of Members of the House. He also contends that
the determination of who will sit as Member of the House of
Representatives is not a ministerial function and cannot, thus,
be compelled by mandamus.
Respondent Locsin, in her Comment,[66] alleged that the
Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over an action
for quo warranto involving a member of the House of
Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of the
Constitution it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise
asserts that this Court cannot issue the writ of mandamus
against a co-equal legislative department without grossly
violating the principle of separation of powers. She contends
that the act of recognizing who should be seated as a bona
fide member of the House of Representatives is not a
ministerial function but a legislative prerogative, the
performance of which cannot be compelled by
mandamus.Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus
cannot be directed against the Speaker and Secretary-General
because they do not have the authority to enforce and
implement the resolution of the COMELEC.
Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution
of the COMELEC en banc is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case pending
before it after her proclamation and after she had taken her
oath of office. Jurisdiction then was vested in the HRET to
unseat and remove a Member of the House of
Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration of nullity
is clearly a pre-proclamation controversy and the
COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to hear and
decide a pre-proclamation controversy. It must first be heard
by a COMELEC Division. Third, the questioned decision is
actually a hodge-podge decision because of the peculiar
manner in which the COMELEC disposed of the case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her
qualification and eligibility has been categorically affirmed by
the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case filed
against her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043,
entitled Paciano Travero vs. Ma. Victoria Locsin, on the
ground that the allegations stated therein are not proper
grounds for a petition for quo warranto  against a Member of
the House of Representatives under section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, and
that the petition was filed late.[67]
In his Reply,[68] petitioner asserts that the remedy of
respondent Locsin from the COMELEC decision was to file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to seek an
opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House of
Representatives; that the HRET has no jurisdiction over a
petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation which is based
not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the
candidate proclaimed as winner did not obtain the highest

number of votes; that the petition for annulment of
proclamation is a pre-proclamation controversy and, hence,
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant
to section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881[69] and section 3, Article IX (C)
of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia
himself recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but
has decided to refer the matter to the Supreme Court for
adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a
final decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial act and
does not encroach on the legislative power of Congress; and
that the power to determine who will sit as Member of the
House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is
vested in the sovereign will of the electorate.
The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the
proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second
Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the
COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c)
assuming the invalidity of said proclamation, whether it is the
ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize
petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
I No. C01-001;
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find
that the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and void for
the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during
the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of
respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 3402[70] sets the procedure
for disqualification cases pursuant to section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, viz:
C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE
PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS
ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO
DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF
QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME
GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION
(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate
pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and the verified petition to disqualify a
candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing
same grounds for disqualification, may be filed
any day after the last day for filing of certificates
of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to
Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be
filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of
voting age, or duly registered political party,
organization or coalition of political parties
against any candidate who in an action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found
by the Commission of:
2.a having given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or
corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 107
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy;
2.c having spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by the
Omnibus Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections
89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus
Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85,
86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code, shall be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate, or if he has
been elected, from holding the office.
x x x x x x x x x
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and
legal research fee of P20.00, the offices
concerned shall docket the petition and assign
to it a docket number which must be
consecutive, according to the order of receipt
and must bear the year and prefixed as SPA
with the corresponding initial of the name of the
office, i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES)
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions,
the offices concerned shall issue summons to
the respondent candidate together with a copy
of the petition and its enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days
from receipt of summons within which to file his
verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the
petition in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy
thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for Motion
to Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative
defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In
lieu of the testimonies, the parties shall submit
their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidences including their position
paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10)
days from the date of the filing of the answer.
The hearing officer concerned shall submit to
the Clerk of the Commission through the fastest
means of communication, his findings, reports
and recommendations within five (5) days from
the completion of the hearing and reception of
evidence together with the complete records of
the case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the
findings, reports and recommendation of the
hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the
Commission shall immediately docket the case
consecutively and calendar the same for raffle
to a division;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall
after consultation, assign the same to a
member who shall pen the decision, within
five (5) days from the date of consultation.
Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC,
through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to
the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition
and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of

the petition for disqualification.Undoubtedly, this is to afford the
respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations
in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with
this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires
the return of the summons together with the proof of service to
the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been
completed, viz:
Rule 14. Summons
x x x x x x x x x
Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by
personal service, the server shall give notice thereof, by
registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and shall return
the summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who issued it,
accompanied with the proof of service.
Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons
shall be made in the manner provided for in the Rules of Court
in the Philippines.
Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10)
days from the filing of the Answer, must be conducted. The
hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the
Commission his findings, reports and recommendations within
five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception
of evidence together with the complete records of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for
his disqualification through the service of
summons nor of the Motions to suspend his
proclamation.
The records of the case do not show that summons was
served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the
summons allegedly served on the petitioner and its
corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private
respondent never rebutted petitioners repeated assertion that
he was not properly notified of the petition for his
disqualification because he never received summons.
[71]
 Petitioner claims that prior to receiving a telegraphed Order
from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001,
directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend his
proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of
the petition for his disqualification. He was able to obtain a
copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC
Second Division by personally going to the COMELEC
Regional Office on May 23, 2001. Thus, he was able to file his
Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.
More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended
in gross violation of section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code
which provides:
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The
Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end
that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the disqualification is
sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, his violation
of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office. (emphases supplied)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 108
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by
final judgment when the elections were conducted on May 14,
2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to conduct
hearing on the petition for his disqualification. After the
elections, petitioner was voted in office by a wide margin of
17,903. On May 16, 2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a
Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioners
proclamation. The Most Urgent Motion contained a statement
to the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner through
registered mail.The records reveal that no registry receipt was
attached to prove such service.[72] This violates COMELEC
Rules of Procedure requiring notice and service of the motion
to all parties, viz:
Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the
movant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before
the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the motion. For
good cause shown, the motion may be heard on shorter notice,
especially on matters which the Commission or the Division
may dispose of on its own motion.
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall
state the time and place of the hearing of the motion.
Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon
by the Commission without proof of service of notice thereof,
except when the Commission or a Division is satisfied that the
rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected.
Respondents Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the
exceptions to notice and service of motions. First, the
suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a
matter which the COMELEC Second Division can dispose
of motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646[73] requires that the
suspension must be upon motion by the complainant or any
intervenor, viz:
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who
has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with the
trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during
the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong. (emphases supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the
petitioner, is clearly affected. Given the lack of service of the
Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said Motion is a mere
scrap of paper.[74] It cannot be acted upon by the COMELEC
Second Division.
On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m.,[75] respondent
Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for the suspension
of petitioners proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the
Second Motion again by registered mail. A registry
receipt[76] was attached evidencing service of the Second Most
Urgent Motion to the petitioner but it does not appear when the
petitioner received a copy thereof. That same day, the
COMELEC Second Division issued an Order suspending the
proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was not given
any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the
petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the very
same day the Second Most Urgent Motion was filed. The
petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent

Motion, let alone answer the same on time as he was served a
copy thereof by registered mail.
Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can
suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning
candidates guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the COMELEC
Second Division did not make any specific finding that
evidence of petitioners guilt is strong. Its only basis in
suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is
the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for
disqualification. Pertinent portion of the Order reads:
Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission
(2nd Division), pursuant to Section 72 of the Omnibus Election
Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 xxx
and considering the serious allegations in the petition,
hereby directs the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to suspend the proclamation of respondent, if
winning, until further orders.[77] (emphases supplied)
We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the
guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division
gravely abused its power when it suspended his proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give
ample opportunity to the petitioner to adduce
evidence in support of his defense in the
petition for his disqualification.
All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted
on the petition for disqualification in gross violation of section 6
of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins the COMELEC
to continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry,
or protest. This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution
No. 3402 requiring the Regional Election Director to complete
the hearing and reception of evidencewithin ten (10) days
from the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings,
reports, and recommendations within the five (5) days from
completion of the hearing and the reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension of his proclamation on May 25, 2001. Although an
oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were
allowed to file their respective memoranda, the Motion was not
acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second Division issued a
Resolution on the petition for disqualification against the
petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the
affidavits attached to the Petition for Disqualification; (b) the
affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the respective
memoranda of the parties.
On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for
Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension cannot be substituted
for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although
intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed that the evidence of
the parties in the main disqualification case are the same as
those in the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. The parties
may have other evidence which they may deem proper to
present only on the hearing for the disqualification case. Also,
there may be evidence which are unavailable during the
hearing for the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but
which may be available during the hearing for the
disqualification case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his
Memorandum merely to support his Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension. It was not intended to answer and refute the
disqualification case against him. This submission was
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 109
sustained by the COMELEC en banc.Hence, the members of
the COMELEC en banc concluded, upon consideration of the
additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that
the evidence to disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More
specifically, the ponente  of the challenged Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division held:
Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing
of the COMELEC (Second Division) concerns only the incident
relating to the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of
Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission
of the parties respective memoranda was in lieu of the parties
oral argument on the motion. This would explain the fact that
Codillas Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of the
issuance of the order of suspension of proclamation. There is,
however, no record of any hearing on the urgent motion for the
suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the
filing of the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the
Members of the Commission (Second Division) and other
Members of the Commission en banc had the opportunity
to consider Codillas affidavits. This time, Codilla was able
to present his side, thus, completing the presentation of
evidentiary documents from both sides.[78](emphases
supplied)
Indeed, careful reading of the petitioners Memorandum
shows that he confined his arguments in support of his Motion
to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said Memorandum,
petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he was utterly
deprived of procedural due process, and consequently, the
order suspending his proclamation is null and void; (b) the said
order of suspension of proclamation has no legal and factual
basis; and (c) evidence of guilt on his part is patently inexistent
for the purpose of directing the suspension of his proclamation.
[79]
 He urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct a full
dress hearing on the main disqualification case should the
suspension be lifted.[80]
(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division disqualifying the petitioner is not
based on substantial evidence.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot
be considered to be based on substantial evidence. It relied
merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for
disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division
gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. In
reversing said Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly
observed:
Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second
Division) made its decisions based mainly on the allegation of
the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this lopsided
evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission
(Second Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified.[81]
Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division,
even without the evidence coming from the petitioner, failed to
prove the gravamen of the offense for which he was charged.
[82]
Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus
Election Code which reads:
Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or
protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a
competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials

performing official functions, xxx shall be disqualified from
continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding office
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the
following elements must be proved: (a) the candidate,
personally or through his instructions, must have given money
or other material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money
or other material consideration must be for the purpose of
influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions.
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged
that (a) petitioner ordered the extraction, hauling and
distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to
induce and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob,
Leyte to vote for him. Pertinent portion of the petition reads:
[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period,
took advantage of his current elective position as City Mayor of
Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using during the
prohibited period, public equipments and vehicles belonging to
and owned by the City Government of Ormoc City in
extracting, hauling and distributing gravel and sand to the
residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and
Matag-ob Leyte, well within the territorial limits of the
4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were executed
without period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly
inducing or directly corrupting various voters of Kananga and
Matag-ob, within the 4th legislative district of Leyte, for the
precise purpose of inducing and influencing the
voters/beneficiaries of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast
their votes for said respondent.[83]
The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second
Division failed to prove these allegations. For instance, Cesar
A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) ten-wheeler
dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the markings
Ormoc City Government extracting and hauling sand and
gravel from the riverbed adjacent to the property owned by the
Codilla family.[84]
Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint
Affidavit merely stated that they saw white trucks owned by the
City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on the
road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader
then scattered the sand and gravel unloaded by the white
trucks.[85]
On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary
employee of the City Government of Ormoc assigned to check
and record the delivery of sand and gravel for the different
barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel
Padayo, an employee of the City Engineering Office, Ormoc
City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the
source of the sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to
Kananga but Engr. Padayao said that its not a problem as it
was Mayor Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. who ordered this and the
property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to
deliver sand and gravel to whoever requests from Mayor
Codilla.[86]
Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the
offense charged against the petitioner. He alleged that on April
18, 2001, a white truck with the marking City Government of
Ormoc came to his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and
unloaded mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told him to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 110
vote for Codilla as a (sic) congressman during election.[87] His
statement is hearsay. He has no personal knowledge of the
supposed order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand
for the purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him. The
same could be said about the affidavits of Randy T. Merin,
[88]
 Alfredo C. De la Pea,[89] Miguel P. Pandac,[90] Paquito
Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez , Glicerio Rios,[91] Romulo Alkuino,
Sr.,[92] Abner Casas,[93] Rita Trangia,[94] and Judith
Erispe[95] attached to respondent Locsins Memorandum on the
Motion to Lift the Suspension of Proclamation.
Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses [96] of
respondent Locsin, all similarly worded, which alleged that the
petitioner ordered the repair of the road in Purok 6, Barangay
San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area
where the cockfights were to be held. These allegations are
extraneous to the charge in the petition for disqualification.
More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a ground
to disqualify the petitioner based on section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed
other election offenses against the petitioner, particularly
section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of
an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person
who gives, offers or promises money or anything
of value, gives or promises any office or
employment, franchise or grant, public or
private, or make or offers to make an
expenditure, directly or indirectly, or cause an
expenditure to be made to any person,
association, corporation, entity or community in
order to induce anyone or the public in general,
to vote for or against any candidate or withhold
his vote in the election, or to vote for or against
any aspirant for the nomination or choice of a
candidate in a convention or similar selection
process of a political party.
x x x x x x x x x
(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust,
equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the
government for an election campaign.- Any
person who uses under any guise whatsoever
directly or indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment,
vehicle, facility, apparatus, or paraphernalia
owned by the government or by its political
subdivisions, agencies including government-
owned or controlled corporations, or by the
Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election
campaign or for any partisan political activity x x
x.
However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify
candidates is limited to those enumerated in section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond
the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction.[97] They are criminal and
not administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268
of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is
confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the
alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the
alleged offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:

Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its
duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses
punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event
that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four
months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint
with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for
proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
x x x x x x x x x
Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have
the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal
action or proceeding for violation of this Code, except those
relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote
which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal
will lie as in other criminal cases.
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it
decided the disqualification case based on section 261 (a) and
(o), and not on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the
petitioner and the proclamation of
respondent Locsin was done with undue
haste.
The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of
the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the proclamation of
the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the
opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15,
2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on
the strength of the said Resolution excluding the votes
received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin
received the highest number of votes. On this basis,
respondent Locsin was proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only through his
counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15,
2001[98] when everything was already fait accompli.
Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the
Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of respondent
Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be
heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any
decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner
cannot be considered stray and respondent cannot be
validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA
No. 01-208 contains two dispositions: (1) it ruled that the
petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the position of
Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered
the immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the
highest number of votes, to the exclusion of the respondent
[herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner
is null and void for being violative of due process and for want
of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the
petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the
COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 111
of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this basis,
proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest
number of votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final,
hence, the votes cast in favor of the
petitioner cannot be considered stray.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the
Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the
election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be
considered stray. Hence, when a candidate has not yet been
disqualified by final judgment during the election day and was
voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray.
To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in
whom sovereignty resides.[99] For in voting for a candidate who
has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election
day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any intention
to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the
candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they
would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.[100]
This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar
considering that the petitioner has not been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified not only before but even
after the elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and
hence, could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a
Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and
Resolutions reads:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary
actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special
reliefs, a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc
shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or
resolution of the Commission en banc shall become
final and executory after five (5) days in Special
Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days
in all other proceedings, following their promulgation.
(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably
filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five
(5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases
and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or
proceedings, following its promulgation.
(emphasis supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, [101] issued
in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in
disqualification cases, provides:
This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the
Commission en banc or division, particularly on Special
Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials
on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special action
cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES,
as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the
Commission on disqualification cases shall

become final and executory after five (5) days
from its promulgation unless restrained by the
Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on
disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless
a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by
reason of non-residence, citizenship, violation of
election laws and other analogous cases and on
the day of the election the resolution has not
become final and executory the BEI shall tally
and count the votes for such disqualified
candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on
nuisance candidates, particularly whether the
nuisance candidate has the same name as the
bona fide candidate shall be immediately
executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on
nuisance candidate, particularly where the
nuisance candidate has the same name as the
bona fide candidate shall be immediately
executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless
a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed.
In which case, the votes cast shall not be
considered stray but shall be counted and tallied
for the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are
hereby modified or repealed.
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely
abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification
of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in
his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for
Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or
implementation of the resolution, viz:
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution or implementation of the decision, resolution,
order or ruling. (emphases supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot
be proclaimed.
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin
which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who
obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is
disqualified.[102] In every election, the peoples choice is the
paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all
times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into
office a candidate by giving him the highest number of votes
cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared
elected in his place.[103] In Domino v. COMELEC,[104] this Court
ruled, viz:
It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who
has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed
winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the
second placer would have received that (sic)other votes would
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 112
be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He
could not be considered the first among the qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified
candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.
x x x x x x x x x
The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an
office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of
victory cannot be transferred from the disqualified winner to the
repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes
a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a
plurality of votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In
such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the
election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated
candidate to take over the elective position despite his
rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate
without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance
and meaning of democracy and the peoples right to elect
officials of their choice.[105]
Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a
disqualification based on personal circumstances such as age,
residence or citizenship and disqualification based on election
offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later
disqualified based on election offenses like those enumerated
in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code should be
invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage
and as such, the votes cast in his favor should not be
considered.[106]
This contention is without merit. In the recent case
of Trinidad v. COMELEC,[107] this Court ruled that the effect of
a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the
election, based on personal circumstances or section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code is the same: the second placer could
not take the place of the disqualified winner.
II
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested
the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en
banc has no jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. She
maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of
jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation because
she has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Thus, she contends that the proper forum to
question her membership to the House of Representatives is
the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
First. The validity of the respondents proclamation
was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration
seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued that the COMELEC
Second Division erred thus:
(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of
the dubious declaration of the witnesses for
respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin; and

(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of
its own rules of procedure and in directing
therein the immediate proclamation of the
second highest vote getter. (emphases
supplied)
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner
argued that the Second Divisions directive for the immediate
proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is premature
considering that the Resolution has yet to become final and
executory.[108] Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsins
proclamation was made a central issue in the Motion for
Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without
doubt, the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on
the issue.
The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was
filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is of no
moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en
banc could still rule on the nullity of respondents proclamation
because it was properly raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers
the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for
reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a
division, viz:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order
to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be
heard and decided in division, provided that motions for
reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the
Commission en banc.
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure provides:
Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.-
Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion
for reconsideration may be filed on the grounds that the
evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling, or
that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A
motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a
Division shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation
thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the
execution or implementation of the decision, resolution,
order or ruling.
Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.-
The motion shall be verified and shall point out specifically the
findings or conclusions of the decision, resolution, order or
ruling which are not supported by the evidence or which are
contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or
documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be
contrary to such findings or resolutions.
Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to
Appeal.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or
ruling when not pro forma, suspends the running of the period
to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.-
Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution,
order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall,
within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the
Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days
thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 113
Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set
Motion for Hearing.- The Clerk of Court concerned shall
calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the
Commission en banc  within ten (10) days from the certification
thereof. (emphases supplied)
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to
review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division.The
said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it
has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be
used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant
case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and
having taken oath as representative of the 4 th legislative district
of Leyte, any question relative to her election and eligibility
should be brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.[109]
We reject respondents contention.
(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of
the COMELEC Second Division has not yet
been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.
To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of
respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to
resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the
matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua,[110] even the HRET ruled that the
doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a
candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has
jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the
House of Representatives, could not have been immediately
applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the
very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is
because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or
decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en
banc.
(b) The instant case does not involve the
election and qualification of respondent
Locsin.
Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of
the petitioner is to file a petition for quo warranto with the
HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the
grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines.[111] In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of the
respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she was
qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 114

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed
against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for
having obtained the highest number of votes but whose
eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is
evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the subject of quo
warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the
petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent
nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the
beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a
loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via
a quo warranto proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents
to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected
Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent
Locsin.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of
the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the
COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with jurisdiction on
the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be
obeyed by all officials of the land. There is no alternative
to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is
granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA,
SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte. Public respondent Secretary-General shall
likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of
Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken
his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,  C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-
Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr.,  and Azcuna, JJ.,  concur.
Carpio, J., no part.

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for
mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the [1]
 Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, pp. 1-7.
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
[2]
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and  Id., Annex A-1, p. 8.
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, [3]
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in  Id., Annex A-2, p. 9.
the ordinary course of law.[112] For a petition for mandamus to [4]
 Id., Annex A-4, p. 11.
prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for
[5]
mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely  Id., Annex A-3, p. 10.
discretionary on the part of the board, officer or person, and [6]
that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to  Id., Annexes A-5 to A-6, pp. 12-13.
warrant the grant thereof. [7]
 Id., Annexes B-1 to B-5, pp. 14-18.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary [8]
 Id., p. 23.
act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in [9]
 Id., p. 21.
a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal [10]
authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment  Id., pp. 24-26. From the Records, it appears that respondent
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law Locsin did not file a separate Motion for Intervention.
imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to [11]
 Id., p. 26.
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only [12]
 Id., Registry Receipt No. 78660, p. 30.
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise
[13]
of official discretion or judgment.[113]  Id., pp. 36-40.
[14]
In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the  Id., p. 39.
registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the [15]
 Id., pp. 39-40.
House of Representatives representing the 4 th legislative
district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of [16]
 Id., p. 234.
the public respondents. The facts are settled and beyond
[17]
dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against  Id., pp. 74-79.
respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, [18]
2001 elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially  Id., Annex 1, pp. 80-81.
ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for [19]
 Id., Annex 1-A, p. 82.
Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of
its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the [20]
 Id., Annex 2, pp. 83-84.
petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en banc has not [21]
been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and  Id., Annex 2-A, pp. 122-123.
said Decision has become final and executory. [22]
 Id., Annex 3, pp. 124-125.
[23]
 Id., pp. 41-46.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 115

[24] [57]
 Id., p. 47.  Id., Annex A-5; id., p. 39.
[25] [58]
 Id., p. 71.  Id., Annex F; id., pp. 234-242.
[26] [59]
 Id., pp. 211-233.  Id., Annex H-1; id., pp. 245-249.
[27] [60]
 Id., Annex 4, p. 281.  Id., Annex G; id., p. 243.
[28] [61]
 Id., Annex 6, p. 283.  Id., Annex I; id., pp. 250-255.
[29] [62]
 Id., Annex 7, p. 284.  Id., Annex J; id., pp. 256-257.
[30] [63]
 Id., Annex 8, pp. 285-286.  Rollo, pp. 281-287.
[31] [64]
 Id., Annex 9, p. 287.  Id., pp. 382-401.
[32] [65]
 Id., Annex 10, p. 288.  The first Memorandum of Chief Counsel Palicte III dated
[33]
July 22, 2001 was issued at the instance of Secretary
 Id., Annex 11, p. 421. General Nazareno on the basis of a Memorandum
[34]
 Id., pp. 92-93. issued by COMELEC Chairman Benipayo ordering
the investigation of the Provincial Board of
[35]
 Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol II, pp. 6-20. Canvassers and the Provincial Election Supervisor of
Leyte in connection with the proclamation of
[36]
 Id., Annexes B and C, pp. 57-76. respondent Locsin, id., pp. 408-412. A second
[37] Memorandum reiterating his previous opinion was
 Id., Annex D-1, p. 138.
issued on August 31, 2001 pursuant to a request
[38]
 Id., pp. 23-41. made by respondent Locsin relative to the COMELEC
En Banc Resolution of August 29, 2001, id., pp. 403-
[39]
 Id., p. 87. 407.
[40]
 Id., pp. 174-192. [66]
 Rollo, pp. 288-348.
[41]
 Records, SPC No. 01-324, pp. 1-14. [67]
 Resolution dated October 18, 2001, HRET Case No. 01-
[42] 043; Annex 5, Comment of Respondent Locsin; Rollo,
 Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, pp. 163-165. pp.377-379.
[43]
 Id., pp. 166-173. Annex A contains the Affidavits of Edgardo [68]
 Rollo, pp. 426-454.
Apuya, Carmelita Manongsong, Danilo Pingoy,
Rolando Viovicente, and Samuel Antipuesto; Annex B [69]
 Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, December 3,
includes the Affidavits of Samuel Antipuesto, Pastora 1985.
Capuyan and Feliciano Apuya; Annex C consists of
[70]
Affidavits of Agripino Beltran, Taciana Beltran,  Rules Delegating to COMELEC Field Officials the Hearing
Samuel Antipuesto, Buenaventura Tasan, Rustico and Reception of Evidence of Disqualification Cases
Alogbate, Pastora Capuyan, Feliciano Apuya, Ellen Filed in Connection with the May 14, 2001 National
Pingoy and Joel Ranolas; Annex D contains the and Local Elections, December 15, 2000.
Affidavits of NoelGomez and Jovito Laurente; and [71]
 See petitioners Answer, Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p.
Annex E contains the Affidavit of Roman Domasin.
74; Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation, id., p.
[44]
 Records, SPC No. 01-324, pp. 108-115. 42; Memorandum,  id., p. 343; Motion for
Reconsideration, id., vol. II, p. 24.
[45]
 Id., pp. 43-163.
[72]
 Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 26.
[46]
 Id., pp. 212-219.
[73]
 The Electoral Reform Law of 1987, January 5, 1988.
[47]
 Petition, Annex B-2; Rollo, pp. 149-159.
[74]
 Cledera vs. Sarmiento, 39 SCRA 562 (1971); Andra v. CA,
[48]
 Petition, Annexes B-4 and B-5; Rollo, pp. 162-179. 60 SCRA 379 (1979); Sembrano v. Ramirez, 166
[49] SCRA 30 (1988).
 Rollo, pp. 40-44.
[75]
[50]  Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 27.
 Petition, Annex B; Rollo, pp. 40-146.
[76]
[51]  Id., p. 30, Registry Receipt No. 78660.
 Id., Annex B-1; id., pp. 147-148.
[77]
[52]  Id., pp. 36-40.
 Rollo, pp. 323-337.
[78]
[53]  Rollo, p. 89.
 Memorandum dated August 31, 2001; Rollo, pp. 403-407.
[79]
[54]  Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, pp. 214-228.
 Petition, Annex D-1; Rollo, pp. 216-225.
[80]
[55]  Id., pp. 229-231.
 Id., Annex E; id., pp. 226-233.
[81]
[56]  Rollo, p. 89.
 Id., Annex A; id., p. 34.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 116

[82] [111]
 Id., pp. 95-102.  Rule 17, Revised Rules of HRET provides: Quo Warranto.-
[83]
A verified petition for quo warranto  contesting the
 Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. I, p. 3. election of a Member of the House of Representatives
[84]
 Id., p. 11. shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the
[85]
 Id., p. 10. same office, within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the winner.
[86]
 Id., p. 9.
[112]
 Section 3 of Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[87]
 Id., p. 8.
[113]
 Samson v. Barrios, 63 Phil. 198 (1936); Lemi v. Valencia,
[88]
 Id., p. 304. 26 SCRA 203 (1968); Meralco Securities
[89] Corp. v. Savellano, et al., 177 SCRA 804 (1982), as
 Id., p. 306
cited in I Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 714
[90]
 Id., p. 307. (1997).
[91]
 Id., p. 310.
[92]
 Id., p. 312.
[93]
 Id., p. 313.
[94]
 Id., p. 318.
[95]
 Id., p. 319.
[96]
 See Affidavits of Arnel Surillo, id., p. 308; Tolentino
Denoy, id., p. 314; Jerome Ychon, id., p. 315;
Benjamin Aparis, id., p. 316; and Rene
Maurecio, id., p. 317.
[97]
 Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure states:
Section 1. Authority of the Commission to
Prosecute Election Offenses.- The Commission
shall have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under
the election laws and to prosecute the same, except
as may otherwise be provided by law.
[98]
 Copy of the facsimile message was attached to the
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. See Records,
SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 57-76.
[99]
 Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1 (1989).
[100]
 Reyes v. COMELEC, 254 SCRA 514 (1996);
Nolasco v. COMELEC, 275 SCRA 762 (1997).
[101]
 May 7, 2001.
[102]
 Labo v. COMELEC, supra; Abella v. COMELEC, 201
SCRA 253 (1991); Aquino v. COMELEC, supra.
[103]
 Benito v. COMELEC, 235 SCRA 546 (1994).
[104]
 310 SCRA 546 (1999).
[105]
 Id., pp. 573-574 (citations omitted).
[106]
 Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 87.
[107]
 315 SCRA 175 (1999).
[108]
 Records, SPA No. 01-208, vol. II, p. 37.
[109]
 The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members.
[110]
 HRET Case No. 42, July 25, 1988, 1 HRET 32-33.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 141489. November 29, 2002]
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE,
LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C.
PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA
M. SARENAS, petitioners, vs. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
JUSTICES JOSE A.R. MELO, VICENTE V.
MENDOZA and JOSE C. VITUG, and
REPRESENTATIVES ASANI S. TAMMANG, RAUL
M. GONZALES, DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN,
DANTON Q. BUESER,[1] NAPOLEON R. BERATIO,
SIMEON E. GARCIA and SPEAKER MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR., respondents.
[G.R. No. 141490 November 29, 2002]
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
REPRESENTATIVES MELVYN D. EBALLE,
LEONARDO Q. MONTEMAYOR, CRESENTE C.
PAEZ, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES and PATRICIA
M. SARENAS, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, its Chair, SENATE PRESIDENT
BLAS F. OPLE, and Members, namely:
SENATORS FRANKLIN M. DRILON, RENATO L.
CAYETANO, LOREN LEGARDA-LEVISTE,
ROBERT Z. BARBERS, ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L.
COSETENG, GREGORIO HONASAN, RAMON B.
MAGSAYSAY, JR., TERESA AQUINO-ORETA,
RAUL S. ROCO, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, VICENTE
C. SOTTO III and REPRESENTATIVES LUIS A.
ASISTIO, EMILIO R. ESPINOSA, JR., WIGBERTO
E. TAADA, MANUEL M. GARCIA, SIMEON A.
DATUMANONG, ANTONIO M. DIAZ, FAUSTINO S.
DY, JR., PACIFICO M. FAJARDO, ERNESTO F.
HERRERA, NUR G. JAAFAR, CARLOS M.
PADILLA, ROGELIO M. SARMIENTO and
SPEAKER MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court are two original petitions for prohibition
and mandamus  with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assail the composition of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET for brevity)[2] and the
Commission on Appointments (CA for brevity).[3] Petitioners
pray that respondents be ordered to alter, reorganize,
reconstitute and reconfigure the composition of the HRET and
the CA to include party-list representatives in accordance with
Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
Republic Act No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 117
System Act. Petitioners further pray that the HRET and the CA
be enjoined from exercising their functions until they have been
reorganized.
Antecedent Facts
Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for a
party-list system in the House of Representatives (House for
brevity), as follows:
Sec. 5.  (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of
their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those
under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated
to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law,
by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other
sectors as may be provided by law except the religious sector.
On March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect.
The Act sought to promote proportional representation in the
election of representatives, to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become
members of the House of Representatives.[4]
On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List
System Act, national elections were held which included, for
the first time, the election through popular vote of party-list
groups and organizations whose nominees would become
members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations, including petitioners
from party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang Bayanihan ng mga
Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA),
NATCO Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens
Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse! Pinay (ABANSE). Due
to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2
representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list
groups had one representative each. Also elected were district
representatives belonging to various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET and CA
contingent[6] by electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who are
to occupy seats in the HRET and the CA. [7] From available

records, it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998
elections the party-list groups in the House nominated any of
their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of
filing of the instant petitions, the House contingents to the
HRET and the CA were composed solely of district
representatives belonging to the different political parties.
On January 18, 2000, Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.
wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F.
Ople,[8] as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo (now retired),[9] as Chairman of
the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and
Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the
HRET, respectively, to include party-list representatives to
conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
In its meeting of January 20, 2000, the HRET resolved to
direct the Secretary of the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentels
letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives.[10] On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy
B. Panga-Vega, in an Indorsement[11] of even date, referred the
letter to House of Representatives Secretary General Roberto
P. Nazareno.
On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their
Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction
(with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order) against the
HRET, its Chairman and Members,[12] and against the CA, its
Chairman and Members.[13]Petitioners contend that, under the
Constitution and the Party-List System Act, party-list
representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET,
[14]
 and 2.4 seats in the CA.[15] Petitioners charge that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its
Resolution of February 8, 2000,[16] the Court en banc directed
the consolidation of G.R. No. 141490 with G.R. No. 141489.
On February 11, 2000, petitioners filed in both cases a
motion[17] to amend their petitions to implead then Speaker
Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his
capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members
of the CA. The Court granted both motions and admitted the
amended petitions.
Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the
strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the
Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer and as a member
of the CA. He was joined by 5  party-list representatives from
APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-
petitioners.
Petitioners cite as basis Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of
the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and
the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House
of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 118
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex
officio  Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the
House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall
not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the
Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by
a majority vote of all the Members,[18] (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners also invoke the following provision of Section
11 of Republic Act No. 7941:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The party-list
representatives shall constitute twenty per centum  (20%) of
the total number of the members of the House of
Representatives including those under the party-list. xxx[19]
According to the Solicitor Generals Consolidated
Comment,[20] at the time petitioners filed the instant petitions
the House had 220 members, 14 of whom were party-list
representatives, constituting 6.3636% of the House. Of the
remaining 206 district representatives affiliated with different
political parties, 151 belonged to LAMP (68.6354%),  36
belonged to LAKAS (16.3636%), 13 to the Liberal
Party (5.9090%), 1 member (0.4545%) each to KBL, PDRLM,
Aksyon Demokratiko, Reporma and PROMDI, and 1
representative was an independent.
In their Reply to Consolidated Comment, [21] petitioners
alleged that, following the Solicitor Generals computation, the
LP and LAKAS were over-represented in the HRET and the
CA. Petitioners particularly assail the presence of one LP
representative each in the HRET and the CA, and maintain
that the LP representatives should be ousted and replaced with
nominees of the 14 party-list representatives.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE PRESENT COMPOSITION OF
THE HOUSE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REQUIREMENT OF PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION BECAUSE THERE ARE
NO PARTY-LIST REPRESENTATIVES IN THE
HRET.
2. WHETHER THE PRESENT MEMBERSHIP OF
THE HOUSE IN THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION
BECAUSE THERE ARE NO PARTY-LIST
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE CA.
3. WHETHER THE REFUSAL OF THE HRET AND
THE CA TO RECONSTITUTE THEMSELVES
TO INCLUDE PARTY-LIST

REPRESENTATIVES CONSTITUTES GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General argues that the
instant petitions are procedurally defective and substantially
lacking in merit for having been filed prematurely, thus:
It is a generally accepted principle that the averments in the
pleading determine the existence of a cause of action. In the
instant petitions, petitioners failed to aver that they or any one
of them was elected by a party or organization registered
under the party-list system as a Member of the HRET or CA to
represent said party or organization under the party-list system
of the House of Representatives.[22]
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners urge the Court to rule on the issues raised in
the petitions under review, citing the following pronouncement
in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales :[23]
Where constitutional issues are properly raised in the context
of the alleged facts, procedural questions acquire a relatively
minor significance, and the transcendental importance to the
public of the case demands that they be settled promptly and
definitely brushing aside xxx technicalities of procedure.
Petitioners reliance on Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales is
misplaced. The procedural questions that petitioners want the
Court to brush aside are not mere technicalities but substantive
matters that are specifically provided for in the constitutional
provisions cited by petitioners.
The Constitution expressly grants to the House of
Representatives the prerogative, within constitutionally defined
limits, to choose from among its district and party-list
representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the
House in the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the
Constitution[24] explicitly confers on the Senate and on the
House the authority to elect among their members those who
would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House
members in the Commission on Appointments. Under Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution,[25] each chamber of Congress
exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6
seats of each chambers respective electoral tribunal.
These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3
and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, to wit:
Rule 3. Composition. - The Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the House of Representatives who
shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
Senior Justice in the Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Rule 4. Organization. - (a) Upon the designation of the Justices
of the Supreme Court and the election of the Members of the
House of Representatives who are to compose the House of
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 119
Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to Sections 17
and 19 of Article VI of the Constitution, the Tribunal shall meet
for its organization and adoption of such resolutions as it may
deem proper. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, Section 1 of the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments provides:
Section 1. Composition of the Commission On Appointments.
Within thirty (30) days after both Houses of Congress shall
have organized themselves with the election of the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Commission on Appointments shall be constituted. It shall
be composed of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12)
members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and parties or organizations registered under
the party-list system represented herein.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even assuming that party-list representatives
comprise a sufficient number and have agreed to designate
common nominees to the HRET and the CA,
their primary  recourse clearly rests with the House of
Representatives and not with this Court. Under Sections 17
and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list representatives
must first show to the House that they possess the required
numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and the
CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the
Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in
the HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek
recourse to this Court under its power of judicial review. Under
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House
is necessary before petitioners may bring the instant case to
the court. Consequently, petitioners direct recourse to this
Court is premature.
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the
HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.
[26]
 However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine of separation
of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone
to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court
speculate on what action the House may take if party-list
representatives are duly nominated for membership in the
HRET and the CA.
The instant petitions are bereft of any allegation that
respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from
participating in the election of members of the HRET and the
CA. Neither does it appear that after the May 11, 1998
elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from
seeking membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears
from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House
at that time simply refrained from participating in the election
process. The party-list representatives did not designate their
nominees even up to the time they filed the instant petitions,
with the predictable result that the House did not consider any
party-list representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As
the primary recourse of the party-list representatives lies with
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 120

[3]
the House of Representatives, the Court cannot resolve the  Docketed as G.R. NO. 141490.
issues presented by petitioners at this time. [4]
 Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7941, An Act Providing For the
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule that a constitutional Election Of Party-List Representatives Through The Party-List
question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless System, and Appropriating Funds Therefor (1995).
the following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there [5]
must be an actual controversy; (2) the person or party raising  Erroneously cited in petitioners Amended Petitions as
the constitutional issue must have a personal and substantial Association of Philippine Cooperatives.
interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the controversy [6]
 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 19 states in part:
must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4)
the resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable Sec. 19. The Electoral Tribunals and the Commission on
to the final determination of the controversy.[29] Appointments shall be constituted within thirty days after the
Senate and House of Representatives shall have been
The five party-list representatives who are petitioners in organized with the election of the President and the Speaker.
the instant case have not alleged that they are entitled to, and xxx
have been unlawfully deprived of, seats in the HRET or the
CA. Neither have they claimed that they have been nominated [7]
 Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 34, and Rollo of G.R. No.
by the party-list groups in the House to the HRET or the CA. 141490, p. 46.
As such, they do not possess the personal and substantial [8]
interest required to confer them with locus standi. The party  Rollo, of G.R. No. 141490, p. 18.
raising the constitutional issue must have such personal [9]
 Rollo, of G.R. No. 141489, p. 15.
stake  in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of [10]
 Ibid., p. 56.
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
[11]
constitutional questions.[30]  Ibid., p. 58.
[12]
We likewise find no grave abuse in the action or lack of  Ibid., p. 3.
action by the HRET and the CA in response to the letters of [13]
 Rollo of G.R. No. 141490, p. 3.
Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the [14]
 Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 26.
CA are bereft of any power to reconstitute themselves.
[15]
 Rollo of G.R. No. 141490, p. 32.
Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been
[16]
rendered academic by subsequent events. On May 14, 2001, a  Ibid., p. 21.
new set of district and party-list representatives were elected to [17]
the House. The Court cannot now resolve the issue of  Ibid., p. 23; Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 18.
proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on [18]
 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sections 17 and 18.
the present composition of the House of Representatives as
presented by petitioners and the Solicitor General. With the [19]
 R.A. No. 7941, supra, see note 4.
May 14, 2001 elections, it is certain that the composition of the [20]
House has changed. In the absence of a proper petition  Supra, see note 7.
assailing the present composition of the HRET and the CA, the [21]
 Rollo of G.R. No. 141489, p. 60, and Rollo of G.R. No.
instant petitions must fail. Otherwise, for the Court to rule on 141490, p. 71.
the instant petitions at this time would be tantamount to
rendering an advisory opinion, which is outside our jurisdiction. [22]
 Supra, see note 7.
[31]
[23]
 214 SCRA 789 (1992).
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition
[24]
and mandamus  are DISMISSED.  Supra, see note 18.
[25]
SO ORDERED.  Ibid.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban, [26]
 Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326 (1993);
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona,
Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989).
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,  and  Azcuna, JJ.,  concur.
Vitug and Mendoza, J., no part; a respondent in G.R. No. [27]
 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
141489.
[28]
Austria-Martinez,J., on leave.  Guingona, Jr. vs. CA, 292 SCRA 402 (1998).
[29]
 Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81
(2000); Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88 (1996);
Fernandez v. Torres, 215 SCRA 489 (1992); Garcia v.
[1]
Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 (1991); People v. Vera,
 Erroneously cited in petitioners Petition for Prohibition, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction, Rollo of G.R. No.
[30]
141489, p. 3, as DIDAGEN Q. BUESER.  Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, supra.
[2]
 Docketed as G.R. No. 141489. [31]
 Supra, see note 28.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,  Appointments.
vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO
IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House
of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve seats
in the Commission on Appointments among the several
political parties represented in that chamber, including the
Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal
Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18,
of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those
chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal
Party. 1
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the
House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal
Party formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP,
thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly
reducing their former party to only 17 members. 2
On the basis of this development, the House of
Representatives revised its representation in the Commission
on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the
petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On
December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of
representatives consisting of the original members except the
petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as
the additional member from the LDP. 3
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to
challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments
and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting
initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with
preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order
that same day to prevent both the petitioner and the
respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments.4
Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot
be removed from the Commission on Appointments because
his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine
announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is
not based on a permanent political realignment because the
LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet
attained political stability.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 121
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by
the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been
improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the
House of Representatives which changed its representation in
the Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner.
Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it
required that the political party be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the Commission on
In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment
was submitted by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae in
compliance with an order from the Court.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the
Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve
Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House
on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman
of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their
submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to
the respondent's assertion, the Court has the competence to
act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is
not a discretionary act of the House of Representatives that
may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature.
What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act
of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the
Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question
because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v.
Cuenco. 6
... the term "political question" connotes, in
legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In
other words, ... it refers "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to
the Legislature or executive branch of the
Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of
a particular measure.
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the
petitioners therein to annul the election of two members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that

they had not been validly nominated. The Senate then
consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the
petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator
Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only himself as the minority
representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected
Senators Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its
own ranks, to complete the nine-man composition of the
Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner
came to this Court, contending that under Article VI, Section
11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of the Tribunal
were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon nomination of
the party having the largest number of votes and three of the
party having the second largest number of votes therein." As
the majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could
nominate only three members and could not also fill the other
two seats pertaining to the minority.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents
contended inter alia that the subject of the petition was an
internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court
rejected this argument, holding that what was involved was not
the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the
legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the
Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner of
filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so.
The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political
question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for
determination in the present case. Here, we
are called upon to decide whether the
election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by
the Senate, as members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by
Senator Primicias-member and spokesman
of the party having the largest number of
votes in the Senate-behalf of its Committee
on Rules, contravenes the constitutional
mandate that said members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon
nomination ... of the party having the second
largest number of votes" in the Senate and
hence, is null and void. The Senate is not
clothed with "full discretionary authority" in
the choice of members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power
thereon is subject to constitutional limitations
which are claimed to be mandatory in nature.
It is clearly within the legitimate province of
the judicial department to pass upon the
validity of the proceeding in connection
therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has
been in accordance with law is for the
judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative
department has by statute prescribed
election procedure in a given situation, the
judiciary may determine whether a particular
election has been in conformity with such
statute, and particularly, whether such
statute has been applied in a way to deny or
transgress on constitutional or statutory
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 122
rights ...' (1 6 C.J.S., 439; emphasis
supplied)
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not
only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider
and determine the principal issue raised by
the parties herein."
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was
made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner or
legality of the organization of the Commission on
Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the
choice of its representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes
even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we
were to assume that the issue presented before us was
political in nature, we would still not be precluded from
resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts
of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The respondent's contention that he has been improperly
impleaded is even less persuasive. While he may be
technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the
petitioner's removal, we feel that this objection is also not an
insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We
may, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo
warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the
respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on
Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the
Emergency Powers Cases 7 that where serious constitutional
questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly
and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure." The same policy has since then been consistently
followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, 8 where we held through Chief Justice Fernando:
In the course of the deliberations, a serious
procedural objection was raised by five
members of the Court. It is their view that
respondent Commission on Elections not
being sought to be restrained from
performing any specific act, this suit cannot
be characterized as other than a mere
request for an advisory opinion. Such a view,
from the remedial law standpoint, has much
to recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority

would affirm the original stand that under the
circumstances, it could still rightfully be
treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of justice Laurel fits the case:
"All await the decision of this Court on the
constitutional question. Considering,
therefore, the importance which the instant
case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity
of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that [its] constitutionality ... be now
resolved.' It may likewise be added that the
exceptional character of the situation that
confronts us, the paramount public interest,
and the undeniable necessity for ruling, the
national elections being barely six months
away, reinforce our stand. It would appear
undeniable, therefore, that before us is an
appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to
prevent the enforcement of an alleged
unconstitutional statute. We are left with no
choice then; we must act on the matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that
both the petitioner and the respondent are invoking the case of
Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best,
therefore, to make a quick review of that case for a proper
disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961,
72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the Liberal
Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation
of the chamber in the Commission on Appointments was
apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4
from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the
Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House
leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and
formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new
Speaker and reorganize the chamber. Included in this
reorganization was the House representation in the
Commission on appointments where three of the Nacionalista
congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of their
party colleagues who had joined the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy
Administrator of the Reforestration Administration was rejected
by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and
respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his
place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the
rejection of his appointment was null and void because the
Commission itself was invalidly constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a
merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors
had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the
new political group. Officially, they were still members of the
Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on
Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the
proportional representation of the political parties in the House
of Representatives as required by the Constitution. The Court
held:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 123
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a
given time, even if du to arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature, like the one
that has led to the formation of the so-called
"Allied Majority," does not suffice to
authorize a reorganization of the
membership of the Commission for said
House. Otherwise the Commission on
Appointments may have to be reorganized
as often as votes shift from one side to
another in the House. The framers of our
Constitution could not have intended to thus
place a constitutional organ, like the
Commission on Appointments, at the mercy
of each House of Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the
permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution
because it has not been registered in accordance with Article
IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to the other provisions of the
Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet
achieved stability and suggests it might be no different from
several other political groups that have died "a-bornin'," like the
LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different
viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly allows
reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political
alignments in Congress, provided only that such changes are
permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the
former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal
congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That
change fully justified his designation to the Commission on
Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation
therein. Thus, the Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional
provision to the effect that "there shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of
twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12)
members of the House of Representatives
elected by each House, respectively, on the
basis of proportional REPRESENTATION
OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN,"
necessarily connotes the authority of each
House of Congress to see to it that this
requirement is duly complied with. As a
consequence, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial
organization of the Commission, but also,
subsequently thereto. If by reason of
successful election protests against
members of a House, or of their expulsion
from the political party to which they
belonged and/or of their affiliation with
another political party, the ratio in the
representation of the political parties in the
House is materially changed, the House is
clothed with authority to declare vacant the
necessary number of seats in the
Commission on Appointments held by
members of said House belonging to the
political party adversely affected by the

change and then fill said vacancies in
conformity with the Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the
petitioner and the respondent (who was supported by the
Solicitor General) an important development has supervened
to considerably simplify the present controversy. The
petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-
registration of the LDP which, he claims has not provided the
permanent political realignment to justify the questioned
reorganization. As he insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-
called new coalesced
majority is actually the
LDP itself, then the
proposed reorganization is
likewise illegal and
ineffectual, because the
LDP, not being a duly
registered political party, is
not entitled to the "rights
and privileges granted by
law to political parties'
(See. 160, BP No. 881),
and therefore cannot
legally claim the right to be
considered in determining
the required proportional
representation of political
parties in the House of
Representatives. 9
xxx xxx xxx
... the clear constitutional intent behind
Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987
Constitution, is to give the right of
representation in the Commission on
Appointment only to political parties who are
duly registered with the Comelec. 10
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged
against the petitioner. On that date, the Commission on
Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its
First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of
the LDP for registration as a political party. 11 This has taken
the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he
must now limp to shore as best he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party
must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence is not
acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the
majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (or the
Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the
Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only
recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would
fall in such a category. That party was created in December
1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded
therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the Presidency
of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946. 12 The
Liberal Party won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet
no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 124
Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by
virtue of its status as the majority party in both chambers of the
Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It
now has 157 members in the House of Representatives and 6
members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the
President of the Philippines and its President is Senator
Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still
are, some internal disagreements among its members, but
these are to be expected in any political organization,
especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact even the
monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states has
undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it
surely cannot be considered still temporary because of such
discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157
members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would
have to be denied representation in the Commission on
Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal.
By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now
"history only," should also be written off. The independents
also cannot be represented because they belong to no political
party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all
of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the
House of Representatives in the Commission on Appointments
and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party
was alloted two of the seats in the Commission on
Appointments, it did not express any
objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the
withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has
been cut by more than half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit,
that the party must survive in a general congressional election,
the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously.
It may even be said that as it now commands the biggest
following in the House of Representatives, the party has not
only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was
never laid down in Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing
considerations, that the issue presented to us is justiciable
rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the
wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling the
Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the
Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it
would still come within our powers of review under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section
1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government. As for the alleged technical
flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the
existence of such a defect, the same may be brushed aside,
conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important
constitutional issue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we
resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of
Representatives to change its representation in the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 125

Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the 11 SPP No. 88-001 (SPC No. 88-839).
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. It is understood that such changes must be 12 Renato Constantino, The Philippines: The
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or Continuing Past, 1978 edition, pp. 181-187 &
factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties 188; Manuel Buenafe, Wartime Philippines,
or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from 1950 edition, p. 284,
one political party to another.
13 The other seat was given to Rep. Lorna
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, Verano-Yap, who is now affiliated with the
leaving it to be settled by the House of Representatives or the Liberal Party.
Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved.
But as our jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly,
because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there
was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In
doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the said
agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely
discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the
Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves
betray our oath.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary

restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The
Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a
member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to
assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18,
of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,

Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cows, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 4 and 23.

2 Ibid, p. 87.

3 Id., pp. 7 and 34, Annex "F" of Petition.

4 Id., 52-53.

5 SCRA 1.

6 103 Phil. 1051.

7 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368;

Rodriguez v. Gella, 92 Phil. 603.

8 21 SCRA 774.

9 Petition, p. 12; Rollo, p. 12.

10 Consolidated Reply, p. 11; Ibid., p. 163.

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 126

Republic of the Philippines Bandon Jr. PDP-Laban

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990
ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN
PARA SA INANG BAYAN, petitioners,  Beltran, Jr. LB/Unido/NP
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON.
FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as Majority Floor Leader of the
House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines; HON. JOVITO SALONGA, as Ex-Oficio
Chairman of the Commission on Appointments; HON.
ROQUE R. ABLAN, JR., HON. LORNA L. VERANO-YAP,
HON. MIGUEL ROMERO, HON. ANTONIO V. CUENCO,
HON. ROGACIANO M. MERCADO, HON. ALAWADIN T.
BANDON, JR., HON. JOSE L. CABOCHAN, HON. CARLOS
R. IMPERIAL, HON. MA. CLARA L. LOBREGAT, HON.
NATALIO M. BELTRAN, JR., HON. CARMELO J. LOCSIN &
HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, as Members of the Commission
on Appointments for the House of Representatives of the
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P.
Fernandez for petitioners.
Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law Offices for
Lorna L. Verano-Yap.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
6. Hon. Jose Cabochan
PDP-Laban
7. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-
Yap LP
8. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial
IND
9. Hon. Ma. Clara L.
Lobregat IND
10. Hon Natalio M.
11. Hon. Carmelo J.
Locsin PDP-Laban/LB
(pp. 115-116, Rollo.)
On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor
Leader, the House elected Honorable Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL,
as the twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments,
representing the Coalesced Minority in the House.
A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was organized as a
political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of
Representatives formally affiliated with the LDP, the House
committees, including the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments, had to be reorganized.
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to
Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as representative of
KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on
Appointments and House Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her
request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen, namely, Hon.
Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa,
Gerardo Cabochan, Jose D. Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo
N. Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and Isacio Pelaez.

The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on
election to the House of Representatives of the candidates of motion of the Majority Floor Leader and over the objection of
diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Cong. Raul A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority
Bansa (LB), Liberal Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong membership in the Commission on Appointments to conform
Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang Bayan with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A.
(KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, as follows:
M.L. Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the
banner of KAIBA.
1. Hon. Miguel L. Romero
LDP
On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon 2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco
nomination by the Majority Floor Leader, Cong. Francisco LDP
Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) 3. Hon. Rogaciano M.
out of twelve (12) congressmen to represent the House in the Mercado LDP
Commission on Appointments. They were: 4. Hon. Alawadin T.
Bandon, Jr. LDP
1. Hon. Miguel Romero LP 5. Hon. Jose L. Cabochan
(Liberal Party) LDP
2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco 6. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial
LB-Panaghiusa LDP
3. Hon. Rogaciano 7. Hon. Maria Clara L.
Mercado LB (Lakas ng Lobregat LDP
Bayan) 8. Hon. Natalio M. Beltran,
4. Hon. Raul Daza LP Jr. LDP
5. Hon. Alawadin T. 9. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin

LDP
10. Hon. Luis C. Singson
LDP
11. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-
Yap LP
(p. 122, Rollo.)
Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member
representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her
party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for Extraordinary Legal
Writs (which may be considered as a petition for quo
warranto and injunction) praying this Court to declare as null
and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap,
Romero, Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial,
Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members of the
Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as
such and to enjoin also the other respondents from recognizing
them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the
theory that their election to that Commission violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation because:
1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202
members of the House) is entitled to only nine (9) seats out of
the twelve to be filled by the House (p. 29, Rollo);
2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions
thereof, must be nominated by their respective political parties
or coalitions;
3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by
the respondents as representative of the minority was clearly
invalid (p. 31, Rollo); and
4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan
as Minority member in the Commission because he was
neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or
parties in the House (p. 31, Rollo).
Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in
the Commission on Appointments as a representative of the
Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other
congressmen and congresswomen of the Minority (p.
31, Rollo).
In their collective Comment, the respondents House of
Representatives, the Speaker, the Majority Floor Leader, the
members of the Commission on Appointments including
Congressman Roque R. Ablan, but excluding Congresswoman
Lorna Verano-Yap (who filed a separate Comment), alleged:
(1) that the legality of the reorganization of the Commission on
Appointments is a political question, hence, outside the
jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the
reorganization was "strictly in consonance with Section 18,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties, considering
the majority coalition "as a form of a political party" (pp. 115,
118, Rollo). They further alleged that as of March 3, 1989, 160
members of the House (including 26 former Liberals) had
expressly renounced in writing their respective political party
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 127
affiliations and formally affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15
Liberals in the House (p. 119, Rollo).i•t•c-aüslAfter its petition
for registration as a political party was granted on August 28,
1989 by the First Division of the COMELEC) and affirmed on
November 23, 1989 by the COMELEC en banc, the LDP
become the new Majority in the House. They finally argued that
as KAIBA is part of the Coalesced Majority which supports the
administration of President Corazon C. Aquino, not of the
minority, petitioner is bound by the choice of the Coalesced
Majority of the members who would sit in the Commission on
Appointments.
Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment alleged
that the petitioner has no better light than those already
selected, to be chosen as a member of the Commission on
Appointments because: (1) the Constitution was not violated in
electing Yap and eleven (11) other House members to the
Commission on Appointments; (2) respondent Yap is a rightful
incumbent; and (3) petitioner's claim to a seat on the
Commission on Appointments is without legal and factual basis
(pp. 217-218, Rollo).
The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand on the
petition as the issues involved may touch on the validity of its
organization and the legality of the entitlement of the LDP or
the LP to representation, which are raised in the case of Daza
vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, then pending before this Court
(pp. 195-198, Rollo).
The issue here is whether the members of the House in the
Commission on Appointments were chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties therein as
provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
which reads:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex oficio Chairman, twelve
Senators, and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives elected by each House
on the basis of  proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or
organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The chairman of
the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their
submission. The commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI,
1987 Constitution.)
After deliberating on the petition and the comments of the
respondents, we hold that the petition should be dismissed, not
because it raises a political question, which it does not, but
because the revision of the House representation in the
Commission on Appointments is based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson,
G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989, where this Court ruled
that "the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 128

the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Sarmiento, J., took no part.

Constitution" is justiciable, and, "even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within our powers of
review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by
Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the
authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed
by any branch or instrumentality of the government."

The composition of the House membership in the Commission

on Appointments was based on proportional representation of
the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of
the LDP in the House. They represent 79% of the House
membership (which may be rounded out to 80%). Eighty
percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on
Appointments would equal 9.6 members, which may be
rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining
two seats were apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna
Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced
Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the
principal opposition party in the House. There is no doubt that
this apportionment of the House membership in the
Commission on Appointments was done "on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties therein."

The other political parties or groups in the House, such as

petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a member also of the
Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even
if KAIBA were to be considered as an opposition party, its lone
member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or less than
1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one
of the 12 House seats in the Commission on Appointments. To
be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission
on Appointments, a political party should represent at least
8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it should have been able
to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.

The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and

congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's election to the
Commission are inconsequential because they are not
members of her party and they signed identical indorsements
in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.

There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House

members in the Commission on Appointments should have
been nominated and elected by their respective political
parties. The petition itself shows that they were nominated by
their respective floor leaders in the House. They were elected
by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18,
Article VI of the Constitution. The validity of their election to the
Commission on Appointments — eleven (11) from the
Coalesced Majority and one from the minority — is
unassailable.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs

against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,

Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes, Medialdea
and Regalado, JJ., concur.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 129

Republic of the Philippines Political Coalition Membership

SUPREME COURT Representatives
Manila
LDP 15 7.5 members
EN BANC NPC 5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
  LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members

G.R. No. 106971 October 20, 1992 At the organization meeting of the Senate held on August 27,
1992, Senator Romulo in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader
nominated, for and in his behalf of the LDP, eight (8) senators
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., AND LAKAS-NATIONAL for membership in the Commission on Appointments, namely
UNION OF CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS (LAKAS- Senators Angara, Herrera, Alvarez, Aquino, Mercado, Ople,
NUCD), petitioners,  Sotto and Romulo. The nomination of the eight senators 2 was
vs. objected to by Petitioner, Senator Guingona, as Minority Floor
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ALBERTO ROMULO and Leader, and Senator John Osmeña, in representation of the
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, respondents. NPC. To resolve the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino
proposed a compromise to the effect that Senate elect 3
NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, petitioner-in-
intervention. . . . 12 members to the Commission on
Appointments, eight coming from the LDP,
two coming from NPC, one coming from the
CAMPOS, JR., J.: Liberal Party, with the understanding that
there are strong reservations against this
This is a petition for Prohibition to prohibit respondents Senator proportion of these numbers so that if later
Alberto Romulo and Wigberto Tañada from sitting and on in action in the Supreme Court, if any
assuming the position of members of the Commission on party is found to have an excess in
Appointments and to prohibit Senators Neptali Gonzales, as representation, and if any party is found to
ex-officio Chairman, of said Commission from recognizing and have a deficiency in representation, that
allowing the respondent senators to sit as members thereof. party will be entitled to nominate and have
elected by this body its additional
representatives.
As a result of the national elections held last May 11, 1992, the
Senate is composed of the following members or Senators
representing the respective political affiliations: The proposed compromise above stated was a
temporary arrangement and, inspite of the objections
of Senator Guingona and Osmeña, to enable the
LDP –– 15 senators Commission on Appointments to be organized by the
NPC –– 5 senators election of its members, it was approved. The elected
LAKAS-NUCD –– 3 members consisted of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-
senators LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
LP-PDP-LABAN –– 1
senator
On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona. Jr., in his
behalf and in behalf of Lakas-National Union of Christian
Applying the mathematical formula agreed to by the parties as Democrats (LAKAS-NUCD), filed a petition for the issuance of
follow as: a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondent Senate President
Neptali Gonzales, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission
No. of senators of a on Appointments, from recognizing the membership of
political party x 12 seats Senators Alberto Romulo as the eight senator elected by the
––––––––––––––––––––– LDP, and Wigberto E. Tañada, as the lone member
––––– representing the LP-PDP-LABAN, in the Commission on
Total no. of senators Appointments, on the ground that the proposed compromise of
elected Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional
representation, and that it is the right of the minority political
parties in the Senate, consistent with the Constitution, 4 to
the resulting composition of the senate based on the
combine their fractional representation in the Commission on
rule of proportional representation of each political
Appointments to complete one seat therein, and to decide who,
party with elected representatives in the Senate, is as
among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally
follows:
nominated and elected thereto.

Political Party/ Proportional


Section 18 Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides fro
the creation of a Commission on Appointments and the
allocation of its membership, as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on
Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve
members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each house on
the basis of proportional representation  from
the political parties or organizations
registered under the party list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote except in case of
a tie. The Commission shall act on all
appointments submitted to it within the
session days of the Congress from their
submission of all the members. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Based on the mathematical computation of proportional
representation of the various political parties with elected
senators in the senators in the Senate, each of these political
parties is entitled to a fractional membership in the
Commission on Appointments as stated in the first paragraph
of this decision.5 Each political party has a claim to an extra
half seat, and the election of respondents Senator Romulo and
Senator Tañada to the Commission on Appointments by the
LDP majority is precisely questioned by the petitioners
because, according to them, it unduly increased the
membership of LDP and LP-PDP-LABAN in the commission
and reduced the membership of the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC
correspondingly. In view of the conflicting claims of each of the
political parties/coalition duly represented in the Senate to a
fractional membership in the Commission on Appointments,
the election of respondents Senator Romulo and Senator
Tañada has become controversial and its validity questionable.
Hence, this petition. It has been established that the legality of
filling up the membership of the Commission on Appointments
is a justiciable issue and not a political question. 6
We deem it necessary to resolve the respondents' argument as
to the nature of the instant petition. There is no doubt that the
issues involved herein are constitutional in nature and are of
vital importance to our nation. They involve the interpretation of
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution which creates a
Commission on Appointments. Where constitutional issues are
properly raised in the context of the alleged facts, procedural
questions acquire a relatively minor significance 7 and the
"transcendental importance to the public of the case demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside . . .
technicalities of procedure". 8
For the purpose of resolving the case at bar, the instant
petition may be regarded as one of prohibition 9 wherein the
Senate is claimed to have acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction when it designated respondent Senator Romulo as
eighth member of the Commission on Appointments, upon
nomination by the LDP, and respondent Senator Tañada as LP
nominee, notwithstanding, that, in both instance, LDP and LP
are each entitled only to "half a member". In the alternative, the
petition may be regarded as one for mandamus, 10 in which it
is claimed that the LAKAS-NUCD and NPC were unlawfully
excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 130
which each is entitled. Considering the importance of the case
at bar and in keeping with the Court's duty under the
Constitution to keep the other branches of the government
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws of the land,
this Court has decided to brush aside legal technicalities of
procedure and take cognizance of this case.
The issues for determination by this Court may be stated as
follows:
1) Whether the election of Senators Alberto
Romulo and Wigberto E. Tañada as
members of the Commission on
Appointments is in accordance with the
provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
2) If said membership of the respondent
senators in the Commission is violative of
the Constitutional provision, did the
respondent Senate act in grave abuse of
discretion in electing the respondent
Senators?
3) If there was grave abuse of discretion by
respondent Senate, acting through the LDP
majority, should a writ of prohibition
enjoining, prohibiting and restraining
respondent Senators from sitting as
members of and participating in the
proceeding of the Commission on
Appointments be issued?
It is an established fact to which all the parties agree that the
mathematical representation of each of the political parties
represented in the Senate is as follows:
LDP –– 7.5
NPC –– .5
LAKAS-NUCD –– 2.5
LP-PDP-LABAN –– 1.5
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each
of them entitled to a fractional membership on the
basis of the rule on proportional representation of
each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no
other manner of application than as above. The
problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to
which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority
in the Senate converted a fractional half membership
into a whole membership of one senator by adding
one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Senator
Romulo. In so doing one other party's fractional
membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the
latter's representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional
representation in the Senate. This is clearly a violation

of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance
with its mandate that membership in the Commission
be based on the proportional representation of the
political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave
more representation to the LDP and reduced the
representation of one political party — either the
LAKAS-NUCD or the NPC.
On the claim of Senator Tañada that under the ruling in the
case of Senator Lorenzo Tañada, 11 and the cases of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, he has a right to be elected as a member of
the Commission on Appointments because of: (a) the physical
impossibility of dividing a person, so that the fractional
membership must be rounded up into one senator; (b) being
the sole elected senator of his party, his party is entitled to be
represented in the Commission on Appointments; (c) having
been elected senator, rounding up into one full senator his
fractional membership is consistent with the provision and spirit
of the Constitution and would be in full accord with the principle
of republicanism that emphasizes democracy.
The cases of the two former senators mentioned cannot be
invoked as a precedent in support of incumbent Senator
Tañada's claim to a membership in the present Commission on
Appointments. In the time of his illustrious father, out of 24
elected senators in the upper chamber of Congress, 23
belonged to the Nacionalista Party, while Senator Lorenzo
Tañada, who belonged to the Citizen's Party, was the lone
opposition. By force of circumstance, he became a member of
the Commission on Appointments because he alone
represented the minority party. Had there been another
senator belonging to a party other than the Citizens' Party, this
problem of who should sit as the sole representative of the
opposition party would have arisen. In the case of Senator
Ponce Enrile, there were two senators elected from the
opposition party, namely, he and Senator Estrada. Applying
the rule of proportional representation mentioned earlier (see
formula), the opposition was entitled to full member (not a
fractional membership). Senator Enrile was thus legally
nominated and elected as the minority representative in the
Senate. In the present case, if there were a political parties in
the Senate, and We follow Senators Tañada's claim that he is
entitled to full membership as lone representative of his party,
We the anomaly of having 13 senators, where the Constitution
allows only twelve (12) in the Commission on Appointments.
We find the respondents' claim to membership in the
Commission on Appointments by nomination and election of
the LDP majority in the Senate as not in accordance with
Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and therefore
violative of the same because it is not in compliance with the
requirements that twelve senators shall be elected on the basis
of proportional representation of the resulting fractional
membership of the political parties represented therein. To
disturb the resulting fractional membership of the political
parties in the Commission on Appointments by adding together
two halves to make a whole is a breach of the rule on
proportional representation because it will give the LDP an
added member in the Commission by utilizing the fractional
membership of the minority political party, who is deprived of
half a representation.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is
mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 131
the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule
on proportional representation; otherwise, the party with a
majority representation in the Senate or the House of
Representatives can by sheer force of number impose its will
on the hapless minority. By requiring a proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments, Section 18
in effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate
and helps to maintain the balance of power. No party can claim
more than what it is entitled to under such rule. To allow it to
elect more than its proportional share of members is to confer
upon such a party a greater share in the membership in the
Commission on Appointments and more power to impose its
will on the minority, who by the same token, suffers a
diminution of its rightful membership in the Commission.
Section 18, also assures representation in the Commission on
Appointments of any political party who succeeds in electing
members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators
so elected enables it to put a representative in the Commission
on Appointments. Drawing from the ruling in the case
of Coseteng vs.  Mitra, Jr.,  12 a political party must have at
least two senators in the Senate to be able to have a
representatives in the Commission on Appointments, so that
any number less than 2 will not entitle such a party a
membership in the Commission on Appointments. This applies
to the respondent Senator Tañada.
We lay down the following guidelines accordingly:
1) In the Senate, political party or coalition
must have at least two duly elected senators
for every seat in the Commission on
Appointments.
2) Where there are more than two political
parties represented in the Senate, a political
party/coalition with a single senator in the
Senate cannot constitutionally claims seat in
the Commission.
We do not agree with respondents' claim that it is
mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on
Appointments. The Constitution does not contemplate
that the Commission on Appointments must
necessarily include twelve (12) senators and twelve
(12) members of the House of Representatives. What
the Constitution requires is that there be at least a
majority of the entire membership. Under Section 18,
the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all the
members and in Section 19, the Commission shall
meet only while congress is in session, at the call of
its Chairman or a majority of all its members "to
discharge such powers and functions herein
conferred upon it". Implementing the above provisions
of the Constitution, Section 10 Chapter 3 of the Rules
of the Commission on Appointments, provides as
follows:
Sec. 10. — Place of Meeting and Quorum:
The Commission shall meet at either the
session hall of the Senate or the House of
Representatives upon call of the Chairman
or as the Commission may designate. The
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 132

presence of at least thirteen (13) members is and from allowing and permitting them from sitting and
necessary to constitute a quorum. Provided, participating as members of said Commission.
however, that at least four (4) of the
members constituting the quorum should SO ORDERED.
come from either house. . . .
Narvasa C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin,
It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Nocon and
election and presence of twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
members of the House of Representatives in order that the
Commission may function. Other instances may be mentioned
of Constitutional collegial bodies which perform their Medialdea, J., is on leave,
composition is expressly specified by the Constitution. Among
these are the Supreme  
Court, 13 Civil Service Commission, 14 Commission on
Election, 15 Commission on Audit. 16 They perform their Footnotes
function so long and there is the required quorum, usually a
majority of its membership. The Commission on Appointments
may perform its functions and transact it s business even if 1 Includes Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
only ten (10) senators are elected thereto as long as a quorum
exists. 2 Senator Alberto Romulo.

It may also be mentioned that while the Constitution provides 3 T.S.N., Session of August 27, 1992, p. 29
for equal membership from the Senate and the House of as Annex to Petitions
Representatives in the Commission on Appointments, the
senators on the one hand, and the representatives, on the
4 Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
other, do not vote separately but jointly, and usually along
party lines. Even if Senator Tañada would not be able sit in the
Commission on Appointments, the LP-LDP-LABAN would still 5 See  page 2 of the Decision.
be represented in the Commission by congressman Ponce
Enrile who has become a member of the LP. On the other 6 Coseteng vs. Mitra, Jr., 187 SCRA 377
hand, there is nothing to stop any of the political party in order (1990).
to fill up the two vacancies resulting from this decision.
7 Daza vs. Sinson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989).
Assuming that the Constitution intended that there be always
twelve (12) senators in the Commission on Appointments, the
8 Osmeña vs. Commission on Elections, 199
instant situation cannot be rectified by the Senate in disregard
SCRA 750 ( 1991).
of the rule on proportional representation. The election of
senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the
Commission on Appointments by the LDP majority in the 9 Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Senate was clearly a violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. Their nomination and election by the LDP 10 Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the
Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in
grave abuse of discretion. Where power is exercised in a 11 Tañada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051
manner inconsistent with the command of the Constitution, and (1957).
by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not merely
inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority 12 Supra, note 6.
granted by law and grave abuse of discretion is properly found
to exist. 13 Section 4, Article VIII.

In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable 14 Section 1 (1), Article IX-A.
rules and jurisprudence on the matter before this Court, We
declare the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator
Wigberto Tañada as members of the Commission on 15 Section 1 (1), Article IX-C.
Appointments as null and void for being in violation of the rule
on proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of 15 Section 1 (1), Article IX-D.
the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. Accordingly, a writ of
prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents
Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada to desist from assuming,
occupying and discharging the functions of members of the
Commission on Appointments; and ordering the respondents
Senate President Neptali Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-
officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments, to desist
from recognizing the membership of the respondent Senators

 
EN BANC
FRANKLIN M. DRILON as President and in
representation of the LIBERAL PARTY OF THE
PHILIPPINES (LP), AND HON. JOSEPH EMILIO A.
ABAYA, HON. WAHAB M. AKBAR, HON. MARIA EVITA
R. ARAGO, HON. PROCESSO J. ALCALA, HON.
ROZZANO RUFINO BIAZON, HON. MARY MITZI
CAJAYON, HON. FREDENIL H. CASTRO, HON. GLENN
ANG CHONG, HON. SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO, HON.
PAUL RUIZ DAZA, HON. ANTONIO A. DEL ROSARIO,
HON. CECILIA S. LUNA, HON. MANUEL M. MAMBA,
HON. HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS, HON. ALVIN
SANDOVAL, HON. LORENZO R. TAADA III, HON.
REYNALDO S. UY, HON. ALFONSO V. UMALI JR., HON.
LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO,
Petitioners,
 
-versus-
 
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA JR. in his official capacity as
Speaker of the House of Representatives; HON.
ARTHUR D. DEFENSOR, SR., in his official capacity as  
Majority Floor Leader of the House of Representatives,  
HON. MANUEL B. VILLAR, in his official capacity as ex-  
officio  Chairman of the Commission on Appointments,  
ATTY. MA. GEMMA D. ASPIRAS, in her official capacity  
as Secretary of the Commission on Appointments,  
HON. PROSPERO C. NOGRALES, HON. EDGARDO C.  
ZIALCITA, HON. ABDULLAH D. DIMAPORO, HON.  
JOSE CARLOS V. LACSON, HON. EILEEN R. ERMITA-  
BUHAIN, HON. JOSE V. YAP, HON. RODOLFO T.  
ALBANO III, HON. EDUARDO R. GULLAS, HON.  
CONRADO M. ESTRELLA III, HON. RODOLFO OMPONG  
PLAZA, HON. EMMYLOU J. TALIO-MENDOZA and HON.  
EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, in their individual  
official capacities as elected members of the  
Commission on Appointments,  
Respondents.  
   
x----------------------x  
   
SENATOR MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL,  
Petitioner,  
- versus -  
SENATOR MANUEL VILLAR in his capacity as Senate  
President and Ex-Officio Chairman of the  
Commission on Appointments, REPRESENTATIVE  
PROSPERO NOGRALES in his capacity as the Speaker  
of the House of Representatives, and THE  
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS,  
Respondents.  
 
 
 
 
 
G.R. No.
 
 
 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 133
x---------------------------------------------
- - - - - -x
G.R. No.
D E 180055
CISION
   
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
   
PUNO, In August 2007, the Senate and the House of
QUISUMBING,
Representatives elected their respective contingents to the
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Commission on Appointments (CA).
CARPIO, The contingent in the Senate to the CA was
CORONA,
composed of the following senators with their respective
CARPIOpolitical
MORALES,
parties:
CHICO-NAZARIO,  
VELASCO, JR., Sen. Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal PDP-
NACHURA,
Laban
LEONARDO-DE Sen.
CASTRO,
Joker Arroyo KAMPI
BRION, Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano Lakas-CMD
PERALTA, andSen. Panfilo Lacson UNO
BERSAMIN, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada PMP
Promulgated: Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile PMP
  Sen. Loren Legarda NPC
July 31, 2009 Sen. Richard Gordon Lakas-CMD
Sen. Mar Roxas LP
Sen. Lito Lapid Lakas-CMD
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago PRP
 
 
The members of the contingent of the House of
Representatives in the CA and their respective political
parties were as follows:
 
Rep. Prospero C. Nograles Lakas-CMD
Rep. Eduardo C. Zialcita Lakas-CMD
Rep. Abdullah D. Dimaporo Lakas-CMD
Rep. Jose Carlos V. Lacson Lakas-CMD
Rep. Eileen R. Ermita-Buhain Lakas-CMD
Rep. Jose V. Yap Lakas-CMD
Rep. Rodolfo T. Albano III KAMPI
Rep. Eduardo R. Gullas KAMPI
Rep. Rodolfo Ompong G. Plaza NPC
Rep. Conrado M. Estrella NPC
Rep. Emmylou J. Talio-Mendoza NP
Rep. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva CIBAC Party
List
 
In the second week of August 2007, petitioners in
the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, went to respondent
then Speaker Jose de Venecia to ask for one seat for the
Liberal Party in the CA. Speaker Jose de Venecia merely
said that he would study their demand.[1]
 
During the session of the House of
Representatives on September 3, 2007, petitioner in
the first petition, Representative Taada, requested from
the House of Representatives leadership[2] one seat in the
CA for the Liberal Party.[3] To his request, Representative
Neptali Gonzales II[4] begged the indulgence of the Liberal
Party to allow the Legal Department to make a study on
the matter.[5]
In a separate move, Representative Taada, by
letter of September 10, 2007, requested the Secretary
General of the House of Representatives the

reconstitution of the House contingent in the CA to include
one seat for the Liberal Party in compliance with the
provision of Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
[6]
 Representative Taada also brought the matter to the
attention of then Speaker De Venecia, reiterating the
position that since there were at least 20 members of the
Liberal Party in the 14 th Congress, the party should be
represented in the CA.[7]
 
As of October 15, 2007, however, no report or
recommendation was proffered by the Legal Department,
drawing Representative Taada to request a report or
recommendation on the matter within three days.[8]
 
In reply, Atty. Grace Andres of the Legal Affairs
Bureau of the House of Representatives informed
Representative Taada that the department was
constrained to withhold the release of its legal opinion
because the handling lawyer was directed to secure
documents necessary to establish some of the members
party affiliations.[9]
 
Hence spawned the filing on October 31, 2007 of
the first petition by petitioner former Senator Franklin M.
Drilon (in representation of the Liberal Party), et al., for
prohibition, mandamus, and quo warranto with prayer for
the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order, against then Speaker De
Venecia, Representative Arthur Defensor, Sr. in his
capacity as Majority Floor Leader of the House of
Representatives, Senator Manuel B. Villar in his capacity
as ex officio chairman of the CA, Atty. Ma. Gemma D.
Aspiras in her capacity as Secretary of the CA, and the
individual members of the House of Representatives
contingent to the CA.[10] The petition in G.R. No. 180055
raises the following issues:
a.                   WHETHER THE
LIBERAL PARTY WITH AT LEAST
TWENTY (20) MEMBERS WHO SIGNED
HEREIN AS PETITIONERS, IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY ENTITLED TO ONE
(1) SEAT IN THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS.
 
b.                  WHETHER THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
RESPONDENTS HAVE COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN CONSTITUTING THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE REQUIRED
PROPORTIONAL CONSTITUTION BY
DEPRIVING THE LIBERAL PARTY OF ITS
CONSTITUTIONAL ENTITLEMENT TO
ONE (1) SEAT THEREIN.
c.                   WHETHER AS A
RESULT OF THE GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION COMMITTED BY THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
RESPONDENTS, THE WRITS PRAYED
FOR IN THIS PETITION BE ISSUED
NULLIFYING THE CURRENT
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 134
COMPOSITION OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, RESTRAINING THE
CURRENT HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
MEMBERS FROM SITTING AND
PARTICIPATING IN THE PROCEEDINGS
OF THE COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS, OUSTING THE
AFFECTED RESPONDENTS WHO
USURPED, INTRUDED INTO AND
UNLAWFULLY HELD POSITIONS IN THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS AND
REQUIRING THE RESPONDENTS TO
RECONSTITUTE AND/OR REELECT THE
MEMBERS OF SAID COMMISSION.
[11]
 (Italics in the original)
 
 
And it prays that this Court:
 
a.             Immediately upon the filing of the
instant Petition, issue a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or a Writ of
Preliminary Prohibitory and
Mandatory Injunction, enjoining all
Respondents and all persons under
their direction, authority, supervision,
and control from further proceeding
with their actions relating to the illegal
and unconstitutional constitution of
the Commission on Appointments and
to the unlawful exercise of its
members functions, contrary to the
rule on proportional representation of
political parties with respect to the
House of Representatives contingent
in the said Commission;
b.            After careful consideration of the
merits of the case, render judgment
making the injunction permanent and
ordering Respondents and all persons
under their direction, authority,
supervision, and control;
 
xxxx
 
c.             Declare Respondents action in not
allotting one (1) seat to Petitioners
null and void for being a direct
violation of Section 18, Article VI of
the Constitution;
 
d.            Declare the proceedings of the
Commission on Appointments null
and void, insofar as they violate the
rule on proportional representation of
political parties in said Commission;
e.             Oust the affected respondents,
whoever they are, who usurped,
intruded into and have unlawfully held
positions in the Commission on
Appointments and
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 135

f.             Require Respondents to alter, APPOINTMENTS. IT IS,

reorganize, reconstitute and THEREFORE, NOT THE PROPER
reconfigure the composition of the PARTY TO INSTITUTE THE
Commission on Appointments in INSTANT PETITION FOR QUO
accordance with proportional WARRANTO.[17]
representation based on the actual  
numbers of members belonging to              III.                  THE PETITIONERS FAILED
duly accredited and registered TO EXHAUST THE REMEDIES
political parties who were elected into AVAILABLE TO THEM.[18]
office during the last May 14, 2007  
Elections by, at the very least,              IV.                  THE CONFLICTING CLAIMS
respecting and allowing Congressman OF THE PARTIES AS TO THE
Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. as the duly AFFILIATION OF THE MEMBERS
nominated Commission on NEED TO BE SETTLED IN A TRIAL.
[19]
Appointments member of the Liberal  (Emphasis in the original)
Party of the Philippines to sit therein  
as such.[12]  
  Meantime, Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S.
  Madrigal of PDP-Laban, by separate letters of April 17,
Respondents Senator Villar and CA Secretary 2008 to Senator Villar and Speaker Prospero Nograles,
Aspiras filed their Comment[13] on December 6, 2007, claimed that the composition of the Senate contingent in
moving for the dismissal of the petition on these grounds: the CA violated the constitutional requirement of
  proportional representation for the following reasons:
                   I.                  THE POWER TO ELECT 1.            PMP has two representatives in the
MEMBERS TO THE COMMISSION CA although it only has two members
ON APPOINTMENTS BELONGS TO in the Senate and thus [is] entitled
EACH HOUSE OF CONGRESS only to one (1) seat.
PURSUANT TO THE  
CONSTITUTION. AS SUCH, THE 2.            KAMPI has only one (1) member in
PETITION IS NOT DIRECTED AT the Senate and thus is not entitled to
THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS. a CA seat and yet it is represented in
  the CA.
                II.                  THE CONSTITUTION DOES  
NOT REQUIRE THAT THE 3.            PRP has only one (1) member in
COMMISSION MUST HAVE the Senate and thus is not entitled to
COMPLETE MEMBERSHIP IN a CA seat and yet it is represented in
ORDER THAT IT CAN the CA.
FUNCTION. WHAT THE  
CONSTITUTION REQUIRES IS 4.            If Senators Richard Gordon and
THAT THERE MUST AT LEAST BE Pilar Juliana Cayetano are
A MAJORITY OF ALL THE Independents, then Sen. Gordon
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION cannot be a member of the CA as
FOR IT TO VALIDLY CONDUCT ITS Independents cannot be represented
PROCEEDINGS AND TRANSACT in the CA even though there will be
ITS BUSINESS.[14] (Emphasis in the three Independents in the CA.
original)  
  5.            If Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano is now
  NP, he still can sit in the CA
Then Speaker De Venecia and Representative representing NP.[20]
Defensor filed their Comment and Opposition[15] on  
February 18, 2008, moving too for the dismissal of the She also claimed that the composition of the House of
petition on these grounds: Representatives contingent in the CA violated the
  constitutional requirement of proportional representation for
                   I.                  THE ACTS COMPLAINED the following reasons:
OF DO NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE  
ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT 1.            Lakas-CMD currently has five (5)
WILL JUSTIFY THE GRANT OF THE members in the Commission on
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF Appointments although it is entitled
MANDAMUS.[16] only to four (4) representatives and
  thus [is] in excess of a member;
                II.                  THE LIBERAL PARTY DOES  
NOT POSSESS THE REQUISITE 2.            KAMPI currently has three (3)
NUMBER OF MEMBERS THAT members in the Commission on
WOULD ENTITLE THE PARTY TO A Appointments although it is entitled
SEAT IN THE COMMISSION ON

only to two (2) representatives and
thus is excess of a member;
 
3.            Liberal Party is not represented in
the Commission on Appointments
although it is entitled to one (1)
nominee; and
 
4.            Party-List CIBAC has a Committee on Rules and Resolutions. It was
representative in the Commission on
Appointments although it only has two
members in the House of
Representatives and therefore [is] not
entitled to any seat.[21]
 
Senator Madrigal thus requested the
reorganization of the membership of the CA and that, in
the meantime, all actions of [the] CA be held in abeyance
as the same may be construed as illegal and
unconstitutional.[22]
 
By letter of May 13, 2008, Senator Madrigal
again wrote Senator Villar as follows:
 
Today, I was advised that the
Committee on Budget and Management of
Senator Mar Roxas has endorsed the ad
interimappointment of Rolando G. Andaya as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Management for approval by the CA in the
plenary. I believe it is imperative that the
serious constitutional questions that I have
raised be settled before the plenary acts on
this endorsement by the Committee on
Budget and Management. Otherwise, like
Damocles sword, a specter of doubt
continues to be raised on the validity of
actions taken by the CA and its committees.
[23]
 
 
Still later or on May 19, 2008, Senator Madrigal
sent another letter to Senator Villar declaring that she
cannot in good conscience continue to participate in the
proceedings of the CA, until such time as [she] get[s] a
response to [her] letters and until the constitutional issue
of the CAs composition is resolved by the leadership of
the Commission,[24] and that without any such resolution,
she would be forced to invoke Section 20 of the CA rules
against every official whose confirmation would be
submitted to the body for deliberation.[25]
 
The CA Committee on Rules and Resolutions, by
letter-comment of May 26, 2008, opined that the CA has
neither the power nor the discretion to reject a member
who is elected by either House, and that any complaints
about the election of a member or members should be
addressed to the body that elected them.[26]
 
By letter of May 28, 2008, Senator Villar advised
Senator Madrigal as follows:
 
 
xxxx
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 136
 
Noting your position that you will
not continue to participate in the proceedings
of the CA until the constitutional issue of the
CAs composition is resolved by the
leadership of the Commission x x x, the
Secretary of the Commission, upon my
instructions, transmitted the same to the CA
my intention to have the Committee study
and deliberate on the matter and to
recommend what step/s to take on your
request that all actions of the Commission be
held in abeyance x x x.
In view however, of your
manifestation during the May 26, 2008
meeting of the CA Committee on Rules and
Resolutions, and of the written comment of
Sen. Arroyo that If there is a complaint in
the election of a member or members, it
shall be addressed to the bodythat elected
them, namely the Senate and/or the House, I
have given instructions to transmit the
original copies of your letters to the Senate
Secretary for their immediate inclusion in the
Order of Business of the Session of the
Senate so that your concerns may be
addressed by the Senate in caucus and/or in
plenary.[27] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
 
 
Undaunted, Senator Madrigal, by letter of June 2,
2008 addressed to Senator Villar, reiterated her request
that all actions of the CA be held in abeyance pending the
reorganization of both the Senate and House of
Representatives contingents.[28]
 
Senator Madrigal thereafter filed on June 13, 2008
the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, for prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for issuance of temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction against
Senator Villar in his capacity as Senate President and Ex-
Officio Chairman of the CA, Speaker Nograles, and the CA,
[29]
 alleging that respondents committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
 
A.          . . . IN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH
THE CONSTITUTIONALLY
REQUIRED PROPORTIONAL
PARTY REPRESENTATION OF THE
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENTS;
 
B.           . . . IN CONTINUOUSLY
CONDUCTING HEARINGS AND
PROCEEDINGS ON THE
APPOINTMENTS DESPITE THE
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
COMPOSITION WHICH MUST BE
PROHIBITED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT; and
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 137

C.          . . . IN FAILING, DESPITE Eduardo M. Gullas of KAMPI, their petition had become
REPEATED DEMANDS FROM moot and academic.
PETITIONER, TO RE-ORGANIZE  
THE COMMISSION ON In his Comment of August 19, 2008 on
APPOINTMENTS IN ACCORDANCE the second petition, respondent Senator Villar proffered the
WITH THE MANDATED following arguments:
PROPORTIONAL PARTY  
REPRESENTATION OF THE 1987 I.
CONSTITUTION, WHICH  
REQUIREMENT MUST BE Petitioner has no standing to file [the]
ENFORCED BY THIS HONORABLE petition.
COURT.[30] (Emphasis in the original)  
  II.
She thus prayed for the  
  Petitioner failed to observe the doctrine
1.            . . . issu[ance of] a temporary of primary jurisdiction or prior
restraining order/a writ of preliminary resort. Each House of Congress has the
injunction to enjoin Respondents from sole function of reconstituting or
proceeding with their illegal and changing the composition of its own
unlawful actions as officials and contingent to the CA.
members of the Commission on  
Appointments which composition is III.
unconstitutional, pending resolution of  
the instant Petition; Petitioner is estopped.
   
2.            Declar[ation that] the composition IV.
of the Commission on Appointments  
[is] null and void insofar as it violates Presumption of regularity in the conduct
the proportional party representation of official functions.
requirement mandated by Article VI,  
Section 18 of the 1987 Philippine V.
Constitution;  
  The extraordinary remedies of Prohibition
3.            Issu[ance of] a Writ of Prohibition and Mandamus and the relief of a TRO
against respondents Senate President are not available to the Petitioner.
[34]
Manuel Villar, Speaker Prospero  (Emphasis in the original; underscoring
Nograles and Secretary Gemma supplied)
Aspiras to desist from further  
proceeding with their illegal and  
unlawful actions as officers of the In his Comment and Opposition[35] filed
Commission on Appointments, the on September 3, 2008, Speaker Nograles proffered the
composition of which is null and void following arguments:
for being violative of the proportional  
party representation requirement A.          WITH RESPECT TO THE HOUSE
under Article VI, Section 18 of the OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE
1987 Philippine Constitution; and PETITIONS HAVE ALREADY
  BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC
4.            Issu[ance of] a Writ of Mandamus UPON THE ELECTION OF
commanding respondents Senate REPRESENTATIVE ALFONSO V.
President Manuel Villar, Speaker UMALI, JR., MEMBER OF THE
Prospero Nograles and Secretary LIBERAL PARTY, TO THE HOUSE
Gemma Aspiras to reorganize and CONTINGENT TO THE
reconstitute the Commission on COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS.
[36]
Appointments in accordance with the
1987 Constitution.[31]  
  B.           THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF DO
The Court consolidated G.R. No. 180055[32] and NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE ABUSE
G.R. No. 183055 on July 1, 2008. OF DISCRETION THAT
  WILL JUSTIFY THE ASSUMPTION 
Petitioners in the first petition, G.R. No. 180055, OF JURISDICTION BY THE
later filed on August 15, 2008 a Motion with Leave of Court HONORABLE COURT AND THE
to Withdraw the Petition,[33] alleging that with the GRANT OF THE EXTRAORDINARY
designation of Representative Alfonso V. Umali, Jr. of the WRITS OF MANDAMUS AND
Liberal Party as a member of the House of Representatives PROHIBITION.[37]
contingent in the CA in replacement of Representative  
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 138

C.          THE REMEDY OF THOSE WHO restructured to conform to the constitutional

SEEK TO RECONSTITUTE THE provision on proportional representation. xxx
HOUSE CONTINGENT TO THE Without awaiting final determination of the
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS question xxx, Pimentel filed a Petition for
RESTS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, Prohibition and Mandamus with the Supreme
WITH THE HOUSE OF Court. In the said case, the Honorable Court
REPRESENTATIVES.[38] ruled:
   
D.          CONSIDERING THE The Constitution
AFOREMENTIONED FACTS AND expressly grants to the
JURISPRUDENCE, IT IS House of Representatives
SUBMITTED THAT SENATOR the prerogative, within
MADRIGAL HAS NO STANDING TO constitutionally defined
PURSUE THE INSTANT CASE. limits, to choose from
  among its district and
E.           THE PETITION IS NOT party-list representatives
ACCOMPANIED BY A those who may occupy the
VERIFICATION AND seats allotted to the House
CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM in the HRET and the
SHOPPING AS REQUIRED BY CA.  Section 18, Article VI
RULE 65 SECTIONS 2 AND 3 AND of the Constitution
SUPREME COURT explicitly confers on the
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. Senate and on the House
28-91.(Emphasis and underscoring in the authority to elect
the original) among their members
  those who would fill the 12
  seats for Senators and 12
The first  petition, G.R. No. 180055, has thus indeed seats for House members
been rendered moot with the designation of a Liberal Party in the Commission on
member of the House contingent to the CA, hence, as Appointments. Under
prayed for, the petition is withdrawn. Section 17, Article VI of
  the Constitution, each
As for the second petition, G.R. No. 183055, it chamber exercises the
fails. power to choose, within
  constitutionally defined
Senator Madrigal failed to show that she limits, who among their
sustained direct injury as a result of the act complained of. members would occupy
[39]
 Her petition does not in fact allege that she or her the allotted 6 seats of
political party PDP-Laban was deprived of a seat in the CA, each chambers respective
or that she or PDP-Laban possesses personal and electoral tribunal.
substantial interest to confer on her/it locus standi.  
  x x xx
Senator Madrigals primary recourse rests with the  
respective Houses of Congress and not with this Thus,  even
Court. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction dictates that assuming that party-list
prior recourse to the House is necessary before she may representatives
bring her petition to court.[40] Senator Villars invocation of comprise a sufficient
said doctrine is thus well-taken, as is the following number and have agreed
observation of Speaker Nograles, citing Sen. Pimentel, Jr. to designate common
v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal:[41] nominees to the HRET
  and the CA, their
In order that the remedies of primary recourse clearly
Prohibition and Mandamus may be availed rests with the House of
of, there must be no appeal, nor any plain, Representatives and not
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary this Court.  Under
course of law. Sections 17 and 18, Article
  VI of the Constitution,
It is worth recalling that, in the party-list representatives
11th Congress, Senator Aquilino Pimentel must first show to the
advocated the allocation of a position in the House that they possess
Commission on Appointments for the Party- the required strength to be
List Representatives. Just like the Petitioner entitled to seats in the
in the instant case, Senator Pimentel first HRET and the CA.  Only if
wrote to the Senate President, requesting the House fails to comply
that the Commission on Appointments be with the directive of the
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 139

Constitution on is GRANTED. The Petition is WITHDRAWN. The Petition

proportional in G.R. No. 183055 is DISMISSED.
representation of political  
parties in the HRET and SO ORDERED.
the CA can the party-list  
representatives seek CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
recourse to this Court Associate Justice
under its power of judicial  
review.  Under the  
doctrine of primary  
jurisdiction, prior  
recourse to the House is WE CONCUR:
necessary before  
petitioners may bring  
the instant case to the  
court.Consequently, REYNATO S. PUNO
petitioners direct Chief Justice
recourse to this Court is  
premature.  
   
   
Following the ruling in Pimentel, it LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-
cannot be said that recourse was already Associate Justice Associate Justice
had in the House of  
Representatives. Furnishing a copy of  
Petitioners letter to the Senate President and  
to the Speaker of the House of  
Representatives does not constitute the ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA
primary recourse required prior to the Associate Justice Associate Justice
invocation of the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. Further, it is the Members of the  
House who claim to have been deprived of a  
seat in the Commission on Appointments  
that must first show to the House that they MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELA
possess the required numerical strength to Associate Justice Associate Justice
be entitled to seats in the Commission on  
Appointments. Just like Senator Pimentel,  
demanding seats in the Commission on  
Appointments for Congressmen, who have  
not even raised the issue of its present  
composition in the House, is not Senator  
Madrigals affair.[42] (Italics, underscoring, and TERESITA J. LEONAR
emphasis supplied by Representative ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice
Nograles) Associate Justice  
   
   
It bears noting that Senator Villar had already
transmitted original copies of Senator Madrigals letters to
the Senate Secretary for inclusion in the Order of BusinessARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERAL
of the Session of the Senate to address Associate her Justice Associate Justice
concerns. Senator Madrigals filing of the secondpetition is
thus premature.  
   
Senator Madrigals suggestion that Senators Pilar LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Juliana Cayetano and Richard Gordon be considered Associate Justice
independent senators such that the latter should not be  
allowed to be a member of the CA,[43] and that Senator Alan  
Peter Cayetano be considered a member of the NP such  
that he may sit in the CA as his inclusion in NP will entitle  
his party to one seat involves a determination of party  
affiliations, a question of fact which the Court does not  
resolve.  
  CERTIFICATION
WHEREFORE, the Motion with Leave of Court to  
Withdraw the Petition in G.R. No. 180055  
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 140

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby

certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
 

*
 On official leave.
[1]
 Vide rollo (G.R. No. 180055), pp. 23-24.
[2]
 Vide id. at 14.
[3]
 Ibid.
[4]
 In what capacity he replied to Representative Taada is not
mentioned in the rollo.
[5]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 180055), p. 14.
[6]
 Id. at 25.
[7]
 Ibid.
[8]
 Id. at 14-15.
[9]
 Id. at 53.
[10]
 Id. at 3-44.
[11]
 Id. at 26.
[12]
 Id. at 35-36.
[13]
 Id. at 69-77.
[14]
 Id. at 71, 73.
[15]
 Id. at 111-181.
[16]
 Id. at 113.
[17]
 Id. at 125.
[18]
 Id. at 133.
[19]
 Id. at 137.
[20]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 183055), pp. 34-35.
[21]
 Id. at 37.
[22]
 Id. at 37-38.
[23]
 Id. at 39.
[24]
 Id. at 42.
[25]
 Ibid.
[26]
 Id. at 43.
[27]
 Id. at 44.
[28]
 Id. at 46.
[29]
 Id. at 3-29.
[30]
 Id. at 12.
[31]
 Id. at 26-27.
[32]
 Id. at 106.
[33]
 Id. at 245-257.
[34]
 Id. at 133.
[35]
 Id. at 158-184.
[36]
 Id. at 163.
[37]
 Id. at 164.
[38]
 Id. at 174.
[39]
 Vide David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3,
2006, 489 SCRA 160, 327.
[40]
 Sen. Pimentel, Jr. v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 441 Phil. 492, 503 (2002).
[41]
 Id. at 497-498, 500-503.
[42]
 Rollo (G.R. No. 183055), pp. 175-176.
[43]
 Id. at 18-19.

EN BANC
June 18, 1987
G.R. No. L-75697
VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style
of OMI ENTERPRISES, petitioner,  contractor's specific, amusement and other taxes,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF
FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR
and CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.
Nelson Y. Ng for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and City
Treasurer.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on
his own behalf and purportedly on behalf of other videogram
operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate
and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly
referred to as the BOARD). The Decree was promulgated on
October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15)
days after completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the
abovementioned decree, Presidential Decree No. 1994
amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing,  inter
alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected
on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for
playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five
pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject to sales
tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters
Association, Integrated Movie Producers, Importers and
Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine
Motion Pictures Producers Association, hereinafter collectively
referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to
intervene in the case, over petitioner's opposition, upon the
allegations that intervention was necessary for the complete
protection of their rights and that their "survival and very
existence is threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film
piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter allowed to file their
Comment in Intervention.
The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out
in its preambular clauses as follows:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 141
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among others,
videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical
improvement or variation thereof, have greatly
prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and
theaters, and have caused a sharp decline in
theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%)
and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales,
thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at
P450 Million annually in government revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments
collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from
rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and
such earnings have not been subjected to tax,
thereby depriving the Government of approximately
P180 Million in taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram
establishments have also affected the viability of the
movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200
movie houses and theaters throughout the country,
and occasioned industry-wide displacement and
unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous
moviehouses and theaters;
4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic
recovery, it is imperative for the Government to create
an environment conducive to growth and
development of all business industries, including the
movie industry which has an accumulated investment
of about P3 Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of
videogram establishments will not only alleviate the
dire financial condition of the movie industry upon
which more than 75,000 families and 500,000 workers
depend for their livelihood, but also provide an
additional source of revenue for the Government, and
at the same time rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing
of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear
and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-
being of the youth, and impairs the mandate of the
Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of
moral character and promote their physical,
intellectual, and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have
called for remedial measures to curb these blatant
malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and
copyright laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies
corroding the moral values of the people and
betraying the national economic recovery program,

bold emergency measures must be adopted with
dispatch; ... (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).
Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests
on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on
the gross receipts payable to the local government is
a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject
matter thereof;
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive
and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the
due process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise
by the President of the vast powers conferred upon
him by Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it
were a nuisance, which it is not.
We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.
1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be
comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a
statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title
express each and every end that the statute wishes to
accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the
statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject and title. 2An act having a
single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject
by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general object." 3 The rule also is that the constitutional
requirement as to the title of a bill should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. 4 It
should be given practical rather than technical construction. 5
Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the
tax provision of the DECREE is a rider is without merit. That
section reads, inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of
Videograms. — Notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty
percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as
the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition
of a videogram containing a reproduction of any
motion picture or audiovisual program. Fifty percent
(50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall
accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 142
(50%) shall acrrue to the municipality where the tax is
collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila,
the tax shall be shared equally by the
City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of, the general
object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video
industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board as
expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with,
nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for
regulation 6 it is simply one of the regulatory and control
mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express
purpose of the DECREE to include taxation of the video
industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from
Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those preambles explain the
motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of
the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram
Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the
purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all
its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those objectives
in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the
DECREE. 7
2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax
imposed is harsh and oppressive, confiscatory, and in restraint
of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does
not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages,
or even definitely deters the activities taxed. 8 The power to
impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in
extent, that the courts scarcely venture to declare that it is
subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the
discretion of the authority which exercises it. 9 In imposing a
tax, the legislature acts upon its constituents. This is, in
general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive
taxation. 10
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but
also a revenue measure prompted by the realization that
earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million
per annum have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving
the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an
end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they
make available for public viewing. It is similar to the 30%
amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which
the theater-owners pay to the government, but which is passed
on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting the
tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is
imposed uniformly on all videogram operators.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed
primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant
violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of
the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a
valid imposition.

The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if
the motive which impelled the legislature to impose
the tax was to favor one industry over another. 11
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to
select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a
singling out of one particular class for taxation or
exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement
of the state's police power.13
At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the
taxing legislature.
3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis
for the promulgation of the DECREE by the former President
under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing
that "whenever in the judgment of the President ... , there
exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or
whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular
National Assembly fails or is unable to act adequately on any
matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate
action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the
necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which
shall form part of the law of the land."
In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office
aver that the 8th "whereas" clause sufficiently summarizes the
justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral
values of the people and betraying the national economic
recovery program necessitated bold emergency measures to
be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the
judgment" of the then President, considering that the issue of
the validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said
Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we
reserve resolution of the question raised at the proper time.
4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE
contains an undue delegation of legislative power. The grant in
Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to
"solicit the direct assistance of other agencies and units of the
government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period, the
heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform
enforcement functions for the Board" is not a delegation of the
power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or
discretion as to its execution, enforcement, and
implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation
of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a
discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter, no
valid objection can be made." 14 Besides, in the very language
of the decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such
assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with the deputized
agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control
of the BOARD." That the grant of such authority might be the
source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the
DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the
aggrieved parties will not be without adequate remedy in law.
5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle.
An ex post facto law is, among other categories, one which
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 143
"alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction
upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense." It is petitioner's position
that Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that:
All videogram establishments in the Philippines are
hereby given a period of forty-five (45) days after the
effectivity of this Decree within which to register with
and secure a permit from the BOARD to engage in
the videogram business and to register with the
BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including
videotapes, discs, cassettes or other technical
improvements or variations thereof, before they could
be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of. Thereafter
any videogram found in the possession of any person
engaged in the videogram business without the
required proof of registration by the BOARD, shall be
prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree,
whether the possession of such videogram be for
private showing and/or public exhibition.
raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the
DECREE when the required proof of registration of any
videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes of the
nature of an ex post facto law.
The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent
case of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 15
... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional
objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a
contrary presumption founded upon the experience of
human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be
sufficient to overcome such presumption of
innocence" (People vs. Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at
858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the
"legislature may enact that when certain facts have
been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of
the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the
burden of proof provided there be a rational
connection between the facts proved and the ultimate
facts presumed so that the inference of the one from
proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary
because of lack of connection between the two in
common experience". 16
Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that
there is a rational connection between the fact proved, which is
non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is
violation of the DECREE, besides the fact that the prima
facie  presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only
after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is,
therefore, neither retrospective in character.
6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is
being over-regulated and being eased out of existence as if it
were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for
its regulation was apparent. While the underlying objective of
the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie industry, there is
no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 144

piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public
brought about by the availability of unclassified and
unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and
films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government
revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to
mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are
virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business. 17
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not
brought about the "demise" of the video industry. On the
contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in
many places notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the
necessity, wisdom and expediency of the DECREE. These
considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter
of legislative concern.
2
 Sumulong vs. COMELEC, No. 48609, October 10,
1941, 73 Phil. 288; Cordero vs. Hon. Jose
Cabatuando, et al., L-14542, Oct. 31, 1962,6 SCRA
418.
3
 Public Service Co., Recktenwald, 290 III. 314, 8 ALR
466, 470.
4
 Government vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation, No. 44257, November 22, 1938, 66 Phil.
483; Cordero vs. Cabatuando, et al., supra.
5
 Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, supra.
6
 United States vs. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44, 1950,
cited in Bernas, Philippines Constitutional Law, p.
594.

7
Only congressional power or competence, not the  People vs. Carlos, L-239, June 30, 1947, 78 Phil.
wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for 535.
declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be.
The principle of separation of powers has in the main 8
 U.S. vs. Sanchez, supra.
wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a 9
 II Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional
sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable Limitations, p. 986.
under the Constitution if on a matter left to the
discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would 10
substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of  ibid., p. 987.
law, as there ought to be, the last offender should be
courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their 11
 Magnano Co. vs. Hamilton, 292, U.S. 40.
controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the
supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The 12
 Lutz vs. Araneta, L-7859, December 22, 1955, 98
attack on the validity of the challenged provision
Phil. 148, citing Carmichael vs. Southern Coal and
likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if
Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 81 L. Ed. 1245.
valid and cogent on its wisdom cannot be
sustained. 18
13
 ibid., citing Great Atl. and Pacific Tea Co. vs.
Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. vs.
In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed. 477; M'Culloch vs.
which attaches to a challenged statute. We find no clear
Maryland, 4 Wheat, 316,4 L. Ed. 579.
violation of the Constitution which would justify us in
pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional
14
and void.  Cincinnati, W & Z.R. Co. vs. Clinton County Comrs
(1852) 1 Ohio St. 88.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.
15
 G. R. No. L-40195, May 29, 1987.
No costs.
16
 ibid., citing People vs. Mingoa, supra, See also U.S.
vs. Luling No. 11162, August 12, 1916,34 Phil. 725.
SO ORDERED.
17
 Solicitor General's Comments, p. 102, Rollo.
Teehankee, (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,
Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and
18
Cortes, JJ., concur.  Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22
SCRA 424, 450-451.

Footnotes

1
 Section 19[1], Article VIII, 1973 Constitution; Section
26[l] Article VI, 1987 Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28089            October 25, 1967
BARA LIDASAN, petitioner,  Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Suntay for petitioner.  Cotabato, the barrios of Bayanga, Langkong,
Barrios and Fule for respondent.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question initially presented to the Commission on
Elections,1 is this: Is Republic Act 4790, which is entitled "An
Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another
province — Cotabato — to be spared from attack planted upon
the constitutional mandate that "No bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill"? Comelec's answer is in the
affirmative. Offshoot is the present original petition
for certiorari and prohibition.
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House
Bill 1247, known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The
body of the statute, reproduced in haec verba, reads:
Sec. 1. Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan,
Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan, Bakikis,
Bungabung, Losain, Matimos and Magolatung, in the
Municipalities of Butig and Balabagan, Province of
Lanao del Sur, are separated from said municipalities
and constituted into a distinct and independent
municipality of the same province to be known as the
Municipality of Dianaton, Province of Lanao del Sur.
The seat of government of the municipality shall be in
Togaig.
Sec. 2. The first mayor, vice-mayor and councilors of
the new municipality shall be elected in the nineteen
hundred sixty-seven general elections for local
officials.
Sec. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just
mentioned are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of
Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo,
Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality,
the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 145
Prompted by the coming elections, Comelec adopted its
resolution of August 15, 1967, the pertinent portions of which
are:
For purposes of establishment of precincts,
registration of voters and for other election purposes,
the Commission RESOLVED that pursuant to RA
4790, the new municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur
shall comprise the barrios of Kapatagan, Bongabong,
Matimos, and Magolatung situated in the municipality
of Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, the barrios of Togaig
and Madalum situated in the municipality of Buldon,
Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan situated in the
municipality of Parang, also of Cotabato.
Doubtless, as the statute stands, twelve barrios — in two
municipalities in the province of Cotabato — are transferred to
the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in
the boundaries of the two provinces.
Apprised of this development, on September 7, 1967, the
Office of the President, through the Assistant Executive
Secretary, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the
statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."
Comelec, by resolution of September 20, 1967, stood by its
own interpretation, declared that the statute "should be
implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court."
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and
prohibition by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the
detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for
the 1967 elections. He prays that Republic Act 4790 be
declared unconstitutional; and that Comelec's resolutions of
August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967 implementing the
same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
1. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional requirement
aforestated, that "[n]o bill which may be enacted into law shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in
the title of the bill."2
It may be well to state, right at the outset, that the constitutional
provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power. First.
Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute,
of heterogeneous subjects. Second. The title of the bill is to be
couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and
the public and those concerned of the import of the single
subject thereof.
Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the
statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This
constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of
command."3 Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the
Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read
during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the
case of House Bill 1247, which became Republic Act 4790,

only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in
the House of Representatives4 where the bill, being of local
application, originated.5
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision
as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to
inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same,
take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or
fraud upon the legislators.6
In our task of ascertaining whether or not the title of a statute
conforms with the constitutional requirement, the following, we
believe, may be taken as guidelines:
The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it
is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not
essential, and the subject need not be stated in
express terms where it is clearly inferable from the
details set forth, a title which is so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to
its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different
one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any
expression or indication of the real subject or scope
of the act, is bad.
xxx           xxx           xxx
In determining sufficiency of particular title its
substance rather than its form should be considered,
and the purpose of the constitutional requirement, of
giving notice to all persons interested, should be kept
in mind by the court.7
With the foregoing principles at hand, we take a hard look at
the disputed statute. The title — "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton, in the Province of Lanao del Sur"8 —
projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del
Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest
intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of
Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The
phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without
subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive.
For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged
purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality
of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of
Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur;
and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a
province different from Lanao del Sur.
The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so
difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform the members of
Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the
people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in
the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 146
taken away from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the
dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by
the bill. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against
the constitutionality of Republic Act 4790.
Respondent's stance is that the change in boundaries of the
two provinces resulting in "the substantial diminution of
territorial limits" of Cotabato province is "merely the incidental
legal results of the definition of the boundary" of the
municipality of Dianaton and that, therefore, reference to the
fact that portions in Cotabato are taken away "need not be
expressed in the title of the law." This posture — we must say
— but emphasizes the error of constitutional dimensions in
writing down the title of the bill. Transfer of a sizeable portion of
territory from one province to another of necessity involves
reduction of area, population and income of the first and the
corresponding increase of those of the other. This is as
important as the creation of a municipality. And yet, the title did
not reflect this fact.
Respondent asks us to read Felwa vs. Salas, L-16511,
October 29, 1966, as controlling here. The Felwa case is not in
focus. For there, the title of the Act (Republic Act 4695) reads:
"An Act Creating the Provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province,
Ifugao, and Kalinga-Apayao." That title was assailed as
unconstitutional upon the averment that the provisions of the
law (Section, 8 thereof) in reference to the elective officials of
the provinces thus created, were not set forth in the title of the
bill. We there ruled that this pretense is devoid of merit "for,
surely, an Act creating said provinces must be expected to
provide for the officers who shall run the affairs thereof" —
which is "manifestly germane to the subject" of the legislation,
as set forth in its title. The statute now before us stands
altogether on a different footing. The lumping together of
barrios in adjacent but separate provinces under one statute is
neither a natural nor logical consequence of the creation of the
new municipality of Dianaton. A change of boundaries of the
two provinces may be made without necessarily creating a new
municipality and vice versa.
As we canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is
drawn to Hume vs. Village of Fruitport, 219 NW 648, 649.
There, the statute in controversy bears the title "An Act to
Incorporate the Village of Fruitport, in the County of
Muskegon." The statute, however, in its section 1 reads: "The
people of the state of Michigan enact, that the following
described territory in the counties of Muskegon and Ottawa
Michigan, to wit: . . . be, and the same is hereby constituted a
village corporate, by the name of the Village of Fruitport." This
statute was challenged as void by plaintiff, a resident of Ottawa
county, in an action to restraint the Village from exercising
jurisdiction and control, including taxing his lands. Plaintiff
based his claim on Section 20, Article IV of the Michigan State
Constitution, which reads: "No law shall embrace more than
one object, which shall be expressed in its title." The Circuit
Court decree voided the statute and defendant appealed. The
Supreme Court of Michigan voted to uphold the decree of
nullity. The following, said in Hume, may well apply to this
case:
It may be that words, "An act to incorporate the village
of Fruitport," would have been a sufficient title, and
that the words, "in the county of Muskegon" were

unnecessary; but we do not agree with appellant that
the words last quoted may, for that reason, be
disregarded as surplusage.
. . . Under the guise of discarding surplusage, a court
cannot reject a part of the title of an act for the
purpose of saving the act. Schmalz vs. Woody, 56
N.J. Eq. 649, 39 A. 539.
A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to
"challenge the attention of those affected by the act to
its provisions." Savings Bank vs. State of Michigan,
228 Mich. 316, 200 NW 262.
The title here is restrictive. It restricts the operation of
the act of Muskegon county. The act goes beyond the
restriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. Wooly, supra:
"The title is erroneous in the worst degree, for it is
misleading."9
Similar statutes aimed at changing boundaries of political
subdivisions, which legislative purpose is not expressed in the
title, were likewise declared unconstitutional."10
We rule that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be
salvaged with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities
of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere
nullification of the portion thereof which took away the twelve
barrios in the municipalities of Buldon and Parang in the other
province of Cotabato. The reasoning advocated is that the
limited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the
province of Lanao del Sur.
We are not unmindful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of
long standing, that where a portion of a statute is rendered
unconstitutional and the remainder valid, the parts will be
separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Black,
however, gives the exception to this rule, thus:
. . . But when the parts of the statute are so mutually
dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for
each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be
carried into effect, the legislature would not pass the
residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus
dependent, conditional, or connected, must fall with
them,11
In substantially similar language, the same exception is
recognized in the jurisprudence of this Court, thus:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void,
as repugnant to the Organic Law, while another part
is valid, the valid portion if separable from the invalid,
may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this,
the valid portion must be so far independent of the
invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 147
Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had
supposed that they could not constitutionally enact
the other. . . Enough must remain to make a
complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries
out the legislative intent. . . . The language used in the
invalid part of the statute can have no legal force or
efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains
must express the legislative will independently of the
void part, since the court has no power to
legislate, . . . .12
Could we indulge in the assumption that Congress still
intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine
barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan in Lanao del Sur
into the town of Dianaton, if the twelve barrios  in the towns of
Buldon and Parang, Cotabato were to be excluded therefrom?
The answer must be in the negative.
Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They
serve as an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the
functions of government. Secondly. They act as an agency of
the community in the administration of local affairs. It is in the
latter character that they are a separate entity acting for their
own purposes and not a subdivision of the State.13
Consequently, several factors come to the fore in the
consideration of whether a group of barrios is capable of
maintaining itself as an independent municipality. Amongst
these are population, territory, and income. It was apparently
these same factors which induced the writing out of House Bill
1247 creating the town of Dianaton. Speaking of the
original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new
municipality, the explanatory note to House Bill 1247, now
Republic Act 4790, reads:
The territory is now a progressive community; the
aggregate population is large; and the collective
income is sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality.
This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants
concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the
blessings of municipal autonomy.
When the foregoing bill was presented in Congress,
unquestionably, the totality of the twenty-one barrios — not
nine barrios — was in the mind of the proponent thereof. That
this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,
thereafter enacted into law, states that the seat of the
government is in Togaig, which is a barrio in the municipality of
Buldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a
number of questions, thus: Could the observations as to
progressive community, large aggregate population, collective
income sufficient to maintain an independent municipality, still
apply to a motley group of only nine barrios out of the twenty-
one? Is it fair to assume that the inhabitants of the said
remaining barrios would have agreed that they be formed into
a municipality, what with the consequent duties and liabilities of
an independent municipal corporation? Could they stand on
their own feet with the income to be derived in their
community? How about the peace and order, sanitation, and
other corporate obligations? This Court may not supply the
answer to any of these disturbing questions. And yet, to remain

deaf to these problems, or to answer them in the negative and
still cling to the rule on separability, we are afraid, is to impute
to Congress an undeclared will. With the known premise that
Dianaton was created upon the basic considerations of
progressive community, large aggregate population and
sufficient income, we may not now say that Congress intended
to create Dianaton with only nine — of the original twenty-one
— barrios, with a seat of government still left to be conjectured.
For, this unduly stretches judicial interpretation of
congressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed,
is to pass the line which circumscribes the judiciary and tread
on legislative premises. Paying due respect to the traditional
separation of powers, we may not now melt and recast
Republic Act 4790 to read a Dianaton town of nine instead of
the originally intended twenty-one barrios. Really, if these nine
barrios are to constitute a town at all, it is the function of
Congress, not of this Court, to spell out that congressional will.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null
and void in its totality.14
3. There remains for consideration the issue raised by
respondent, namely, that petitioner has no substantial legal
interest adversely affected by the implementation of Republic
Act 4790. Stated differently, respondent's pose is that
petitioner is not the real party in interest.
Here the validity of a statute is challenged on the ground that it
violates the constitutional requirement that the subject of the
bill be expressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hinges
on whether petitioner's substantial rights or interests are
impaired by lack of notification in the title that the barrio in
Parang, Cotabato, where he is residing has been transferred to
a different provincial hegemony.
The right of every citizen, taxpayer and voter of a community
affected by legislation creating a town to ascertain that the law
so created is not dismembering his place of residence "in
accordance with the Constitution" is recognized in this
jurisdiction.15
Petitioner is a qualified voter. He expects to vote in the 1967
elections. His right to vote in his own barrio before it was
annexed to a new town is affected. He may not want, as is the
case here, to vote in a town different from his actual residence.
He may not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different
communities which are fanned into the new town; he may
prefer to remain in the place where he is and as it was
constituted, and continue to enjoy the rights and benefits he
acquired therein. He may not even know the candidates of the
new town; he may express a lack of desire to vote for anyone
of them; he may feel that his vote should be cast for the
officials in the town before dismemberment. Since by
constitutional direction the purpose of a bill must be shown in
its title for the benefit, amongst others, of the community
affected thereby,16 it stands to reason to say that when the
constitutional right to vote on the part of any citizen of that
community is affected, he may become a suitor to challenge
the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Congress.
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790
null and void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from
implementing the same for electoral purposes.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 148
No costs allowed. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon,
J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J.,  dissenting:
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion
of the Court, I find myself unable to give my assent. Hence
these few words to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the
creation of the municipality of Dianaton in the province of
Lanao del Sur. The title makes evident what is the subject
matter of such an enactment. The mere fact that in the body of
such statute barrios found in two other municipalities of
another province were included does not of itself suffice for a
finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision
invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the
insubstantial doubts about its validity must be construed as not
including the barrios, located not in the municipalities of Butig
and Balabagan, Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon,
Cotabato.
The constitutional requirement is that no bill which may be
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill. 1 This provision is
similar to those found in the Constitution of many American
States. It is aimed against the evils, of the so-called omnibus
bills, and log-rolling legislation, and against surreptitious or
unconsidered enactments.2 Where the subject of a bill is
limited to a particular matter, the members of the legislature as
well as the people should be informed of the subject of
proposed legislative measures. This constitutional provision
thus precludes the insertion of riders in legislation, a rider
being a provision not germane to the subject matter of the bill.
It is not to be narrowly construed though as to cripple or
impede proper legislation. The construction must be
reasonable and not technical. It is sufficient if the title be
comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general
object which the statute seeks to effect without expressing
each and every end and means necessary for the
accomplishment of that object. Mere details need not be set
forth. The legislature is not required to make the title of the act
a complete index of its contents. The constitutional provision is
satisfied if all parts of an act which relates to its subject find
expression in its title.3
The first decision of this Court, after the establishment of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, in 1938, construing a
provision of this nature, Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai
Bank,4 held that the inclusion of Section 11 of Act No. 4007,
the Reorganization Law, providing for the mode in which the
total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking may be
reimbursed through assessment levied upon all banking
institutions subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner
was not violative of such a requirement in the Jones Law, the

previous organic act. Justice Laurel, however, vigorously
dissented, his view being that while the main subject of the act
was reorganization, the provision assailed did not deal with
reorganization but with taxation. While the case of Government
vs. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank was decided by a bare
majority of four justices against three, the present trend seems
to be that the constitutional requirement is to be given the
liberal test as indicated in the majority opinion penned by
Justice Abad Santos, and not the strict test as desired by the
majority headed by Justice Laurel.
Such a trend has been reflected in subsequent decisions
beginning with Sumulong v. Commission on Elections,5 up to
and including Felwa vs. Salas, a 1966 decision,6 the opinion
coming from Justice Concepcion.
It is true of course that in Philconsa v. Gimenez,7 one of the
grounds on which the invalidity of Republic Act No. 3836 was
predicated was the violation of the above constitutional
provision. This Retirement Act for senators and representatives
was entitled "AN ACT AMENDING SUB-SECTION (c),
SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC
ACT NUMBERED THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX." As we
noted, the paragraph in Republic Act No. 3836 deemed
objectionable "refers to members of Congress and to elective
officers thereof who are not members of the Government
Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits,
therefore, for these officials, would relate to a subject matter
which is not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other
words, this portion of the amendment ( re retirement benefits
for Members of Congress and appointive officers, such as the
Secretary and Sergeants-at-arms for each house) is not
related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act No.
186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System
and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefits
to its members." Nonetheless our opinion was careful to note
that there was no abandonment of the principle of liberality.
Thus: "we are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a
general disposition in all courts to construe the constitutional
provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act,
liberally."
It would follow therefore that the challenged legislation
Republic Act No. 4790 is not susceptible to the indictment that
the constitutional requirement as to legislation having only one
subject which should be expressed in his title was not met. The
subject was the creation of the municipality of Dianaton. That
was embodied in the title.
It is in the light of the aforementioned judicial decisions of this
Court, some of the opinions coming from jurists illustrious for
their mastery of constitutional law and their acknowledged
erudition, that, with all due respect, I find the citation
from Corpus Juris Secundum, unnecessary and far from
persuasive. The State decisions cited, I do not deem
controlling, as the freedom of this Court to accept or reject
doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat,
several barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao del Sur
were included in the municipality of Dianaton of that province.
That itself would not have given rise to a constitutional
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 149
question considering the broad, well-high plenary powers
possessed by Congress to alter provincial and municipal
boundaries. What justified resort to this Court was the
congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios in two
municipalities located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of
the newly created municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.
To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it must be
construed as to exclude from Dianaton all of such barrios
mentioned in Republic Act No. 4790 found in municipalities
outside Lanao del Sur. As thus interpreted, the statute can
meet the test of the most rigid scrutiny. Nor is this to do
violence to the legislative intent. What was created was a new
municipality from barrios named as found in Lanao del Sur.
This construction assures precisely that.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support
in basic principles underlying precedents, which if not precisely
controlling, have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v.
Agregado,8 certain provisions of the Administrative Code were
interpreted and given a "construction which would be more in
harmony with the tenets of the fundamental law." In Sanchez
v. Lyon Construction,9 this Court had a similar ruling: "Article
302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied in consonance
with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The above
principle gained acceptance at a much earlier period in our
constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re
Guariña:10"In construing a statute enacted by the Philippine
Commission we deem it our duty not to give it a construction
which would be repugnant to an Act of Congress, if the
language of the statute is fairly susceptible of another
construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so, we
think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching
the apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to the
conclusion that the Commission intended to enact a law in
violation of the Act of Congress. However specious the
argument may be in favor of one of two possible constructions,
it must be disregarded if on examination it is found to rest on
the contention that the legislator designed an attempt to
transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his
apparent intention was to enact an invalid law."
American Supreme Court decisions are equally explicit. The
then Justice, later Chief Justice, Stone, construed statutes
"with an eye to possible constitutional limitations so as to avoid
doubts as to [their] validity."11 From the pen of the articulate
jurist, Frankfurter:12 "Accordingly, the phrase "lobbying
activities" in the resolution must be given the meaning that may
fairly be attributed to it, having special regard for the principle
of constitutional adjudication which makes it decisive in the
choice of fair alternatives that one construction may raise
serious constitutional questions avoided by another." His
opinion in the Rumely case continues with the above
pronouncement of Stone and two other former Chief Justices:
"In the words of Mr. Chief Justice Taft, '(i)t is our duty in the
interpretation of federal statutes to reach conclusion which will
avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality', Richmond Screw
Anchor Co. v. United States, 275 US 331, 346, 48 S. Ct. 194,
198, 72 L. ed. 303. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief Justice
Hughes, "if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.' Crowell v. Benson, 285, 296, 76 L.
ed. 598, and cases cited." The prevailing doctrine then as set

forth by Justice Clark in a 1963 decision, 13 is that courts "have
consistently sought an interpretation which supports the
constitutionality of legislation." Phrased differently by Justice
Douglas, the judiciary favors "that interpretation of legislation
which gives it the greater change of surviving the test of
constitutionality."14
It would follow then that both Philippine and American
decisions unite in the view that a legislative measure, in the
language of Van Devanter "should not be given a construction
which will imperil its validity where it is reasonably open to
construction free from such peril." 15 Republic Act No. 4790 as
above construed incurs no such risk and is free from the peril
of nullity.
So I would view the matter, with all due acknowledgment of the
practical considerations clearly brought to light in the opinion of
the Court.
Footnotes
1
 Hereinafter referred to as Comelec.
2
 Article VI, Sec. 21(1), Philippine Constitution.
3
 Stiglitz vs. Schiardien, 40 SW 2d 315, 317, 320.
4
 Congressional Record, Vol. I, No. 40, p. 8; Vol. I,
No. 50, pp. 40-41.
5 13
 Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution, provides:
"Sec. 18. All appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private
bills, shall originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives, but the Senate may
propose or concur with amendments."
6
 Vidal de Roces vs. Posadas, 58 Phil. 108, 111-112;
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1188-1190.
7
 82 C.J.S. pp. 365, 370; emphasis supplied.
8
 Emphasis ours.
9
 Emphasis supplied.
10
 Examples: Wilcox vs. Paddock, 31 NW 609, where
the statute entitled "An act making an appropriation of
state swamp lands to aid the county of Gratiot in
improving the channel of Maple river . . ." but the body
of the act affected another county other than Gratiot.
State vs. Burr, 238 P 585, the statute entitled
"An act to amend Secs. 4318 and 4327 of
the Codes of Montana relating to changing
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 150
the boundaries of Fergus and Judith Basin
countries" was rendered void because the
body of the act included the boundaries of
Petroleum county.
Atchison vs. Kearney County, 48 P 583,
where the title of the act purported to attach
Kearney county to Finney county the body of
the act attached it to Hamilton county.
State vs. Nelson, 98 So. 715, the title of the
act purporting to alter or rearrange the
boundaries of Decatur city and the body of
the act which actually diminished the
boundary lines of the city were considered
by the court as dealing with incongruous
matters. The reading of the former would
give no clear suggestion that the latter would
follow and be made the subject of the act.
Jackson, Clerk vs. Sherrod, 92 So. 481; City
of Ensley vs. Simpson, 52 So. 61, cited.
Fairview vs. City of Detroit, 113 NW 368,
where the title gave notice that the entire
village of Fairview is annexed to Detroit
when the body affected only a portion.
11
 Black, Interpretation of Laws, 2d. ed., p. 116.
12
 Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. 44, 47-48, quoted
in  Government vs. Springer (50 Phil. 259, 292;
emphasis supplied).
 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d ed., pp. 456-
464.
14
 In the case of Fuqua vs. City of Mobile, 121 So.
696, it was asserted that the portion of the statute
excluding a territory from Mobile which was not
express in the title "An act to alter and rearrange the
boundary lines of the city of Mobile in the state of
Alabama" should be the only portion invalidated. The
court, using the test whether or not after the
objectionable feature is stricken off there would still
remain an act complete in itself, sensible, capable of
being executed, ruled that there can be no
segregation of that portion dealing with the excluded
territory from that dealing with additional territory
because these two matters are all embraced and
intermingled in one section dealing with the corporate
limits of the city.
In the case of Engle vs. Bonnie, 204 SW 2d
963, the statute involved was entitled "An Act
relating to cities". Section 4 thereof "requires
the creation of a municipality on petition of a
majority of voters or 500 voters." But some of
the provisions were germane to the title of
the law. This statute was declared void in
toto. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky ruled
as follows:
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 151

"The judgment declared only Section 4
[relative to the creation of a municipality on
petition of the voters] to be void and the
remainder valid. While some of the
provisions of the act are germane to the title,
since they deal with the classification of
cities to be created, they seem merely to
harmonize other sections of the statute
which they amend with a new creation of
cities other than sixth class towns. To
remove only Section 4 would be like taking
the motor of an automobile which leaves the
machine of no use. We are quite sure that
these provisions would not have been
enacted without Section 4; hence, they too
must fall."
15
 Macias vs. The Commission on Elections, L-18684,
September 14, 1961.
16
 Brooks vs. Hydorn, 42 NW 1122, 1123-1124;
Fairview vs. City of Detroit, 113 NW 368, 370.
there is doubt, or uncertainty as to the meaning of the
legislature, if the words or provisions of the statute are
obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of
two or more constructions, that interpretation will be
adopted which will avoid the effect of
unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary,
for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or
apparent impact of the language employed."
11
 Lucas v. Alexander (1928). 279 US 573, 577-578,
citing United States ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Delaware &
H. Co. 213 US 366, 407, 408, 53 L. ed. 836, 848, 849,
29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 527: United States v. Standard
Brewery, 251 US 210, 220, 64 L. ed. 229, 235, 40
Sup. Ct. Rep. 139; Texas v. Eastern Texas R. Co.
258 US 204, 217, 66 L. ed. 566, 572, 42 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 281; Bratton v. Chandler, 260 US 110, 114, 67
L. ed. 157, 161, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43; Panama R. Co.
v. Johnson, 264 US 375, 390, 68 L. ed. 748, 754, 44
Sup. Ct. Rep. 391.
12
 United States v. Rumely (1953), 345 US 41, 45.

13
 United States v. National Dairy Product Corp. 373
US 29, 32.
FERNANDO, J., dissenting:
14
 Ex parte Endo (1944), 323 US 283, 299-300.
1
 Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1, Constitution.
15
 Chippewa Indians v. United States (1937), 301 US
2
 Government v. Hongkong & Shanghai Bank (1938), 358, 376.
66 Phil. 483.

3
 People vs. Carlos (1947), 78 Phil. 535.

4
 66 Phil. 483.

5
 73 Phil. (1942) 228.

6
 L-26511, October 29, 1960. The other cases that
may be cited follows People v. Carlos (1947), 78 Phil.
535; Nuval v. de la Fuente (1953), 92 Phil. 1074;
Ichong v. Hernandez (1951), 101 Phil. 1155; Cordero
v. Cabatuando, L-14542, Oct. 31, 1962; Municipality
of Jose Panganiban v. Shell Company, L-18349, July
30, 1966.

7
 L-23326, December 18, 1965.

8
 86 Phil. 429 (1950).

9
 87 Phil. 309 (1950), Cf  . City of Manila v. Arellano
Law Colleges, Inc. (1950), 85 Phil. 663.

10
 24 Phil. 37. Justice Carson who penned the opinion
cited Black on Interpretation of Laws to this effect:
"Hence it follows that the courts will not so construe
the law as to make it conflict with the constitution, but
will rather put such an interpretation upon it as will
avoid conflict with the constitution and give it full force
and effect, if this can be done without extravagance. If

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, RENATO ALIPIO, JOSE TORRES
III, LEONCIO CORPUZ, TERESITA CALOT, ROSALIA
FERNANDEZ, ELIZABETH VELASCO, NANETTE
VILLANUEVA, HONORATO BUENAVENTURA, RUBEN DE
CASTRO, VICENTE ROXAS, RICARDO DAMIAN, DOMDINO
ROMDINA, ANGELINA OBLIGACION, CONRADO
GREGORIO, TEODORO REYES, LYDIA ATRACTIVO,
NAPOLEON MENDOZA, PERFECTO GUMATAY, ANDRES
SABANGAN, ROSITA DURAN, SOCORRO BERNARDEZ,
and PEDRO GABRIEL, petitioners,  given them as provided in Section 8 hereof and thenceforth,
vs.
THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, MATIAS
RAMIREZ as the Municipal Mayor, MARIO MENDOZA as
the Municipal Vice-Mayor, and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
OF BOCAUE, BULACAN, respondents.
Federico N. Alday for petitioners.
Dakila F. Castro for respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The crucial question posed by this certiorari proceeding is
whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan,
represented by respondents, 1 can, prohibit the exercise of a
lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses. It is
contended that the ordinance assailed as invalid is tainted with
nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a
lawful business, occupation or calling, petitioners at the same
time alleging that their rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously
given to them was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing. 2
The assailed ordinance 3 is worded as follows: "Section 1.
— Title of Ordinance.— This Ordinance shall be known and
may be cited as the [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] of
Bocaue, Bulacan. Section 2. — Definitions of Terms — (a)
'Night Club' shall include any place or establishment selling to
the public food or drinks where customers are allowed to
dance. (b) 'Cabaret' or 'Dance Hall' shall include any place or
establishment where dancing is permitted to the public and
where professional hostesses or hospitality girls and
professional dancers are employed. (c) 'Professional
hostesses' or 'hospitality girls' shall include any woman
employed by any of the establishments herein defined to
entertain guests and customers at their table or to dance with
them. (d) 'Professional dancer' shall include any woman who
dances at any of the establishments herein defined for a fee or
remuneration paid directly or indirectly by the operator or by
the persons she dances with. (e) 'Operator' shall include the
owner, manager, administrator or any person who operates
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 152
and is responsible for the operation of any night club, cabaret
or dance hall. Section 3. — Prohibition in the Issuance and
Renewal of Licenses, Permits. — Being the principal cause in
the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse
effects on this community as explained above, no operator of
night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued
permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the
municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any
professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer
for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments.
The prohibition in the issuance of licenses/permits to said
persons and operators of said establishments shall include
prohibition in the renewal thereof. Section 4.— Revocation of
Permits and Licenses.— The licenses and permits issued to
operators of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls which are now
in operation including permits issued to professional
hostesses, hospitality girls and professional dancers are
hereby revoked upon the expiration of the thirty-day period
the operation of these establishments within the jurisdiction of
the municipality shall be illegal. Section 5.— Penalty in case of
violation. — Violation of any of the provisions of this Ordinance
shall be punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three (3)
months or a fine not exceeding P200.00 or both at the
discretion of the Court. If the offense is committed by a juridical
entity, the person charged with the management and/or
operation thereof shall be liable for the penalty provided herein.
Section 6. — Separability Clause.— If, for any reason, any
section or provision of this Ordinance is held unconstitutional
or invalid, no other section or provision hereof shall be affected
thereby. Section 7.— Repealing Clause.— All ordinance,
resolutions, circulars, memoranda or parts thereof that are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance are hereby
repealed. Section 8.— Effectivity.— This Ordinance shall take
effect immediately upon its approval; provided, however, that
operators of night clubs, cabarets and dance halls now in
operation including professional hostesses, hospitality girls and
professional dancers are given a period of thirty days from the
approval hereof within which to wind up their businesses and
comply with the provisions of this Ordinance." 4
On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibition with
preliminary injunction were filed with the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan. 5 The grounds alleged follow:
1. Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no
authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.
2. Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners' right to due
process and the equal protection of the law, as the license
previously given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without
judicial hearing. 3. That under Presidential Decree No. 189, as
amended, by Presidential Decree No. 259, the power to
license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night
clubs, has been transferred to the Department of
Tourism." 6 The cases were assigned to respondent Judge,
now Associate Justice Paras of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, who issued a restraining order on November 7, 1975.
The answers were thereafter filed. It was therein alleged: " 1.
That the Municipal Council is authorized by law not only to
regulate but to prohibit the establishment, maintenance and
operation of night clubs invoking Section 2243 of the RAC, CA
601, Republic Acts Nos. 938, 978 and 1224. 2. The Ordinance

No. 84 is not violative of petitioners' right to due process and
the equal protection of the law, since property rights are
subordinate to public interests. 3. That Presidential Decree No.
189, as amended, did not deprive Municipal Councils of their
jurisdiction to regulate or prohibit night clubs." 7 There was the
admission of the following facts as having been established: "l.
That petitioners Vicente de la Cruz, et al. in Civil Case No.
4755-M had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal
Mayor of Bocaue-petitioner Jose Torres III, since 1958;
petitioner Vicente de la Cruz, since 1960; petitioner Renato
Alipio, since 1961 and petitioner Leoncio Corpuz, since 1972;
2. That petitioners had invested large sums of money in their
businesses; 3. That the night clubs are well-lighted and have
no partitions, the tables being near each other; 4. That the
petitioners owners/operators of these clubs do not allow the
hospitality girls therein to engage in immoral acts and to go out
with customers; 5. That these hospitality girls are made to go
through periodic medical check-ups and not one of them is
suffering from any venereal disease and that those who fail to
submit to a medical check-up or those who are found to be
infected with venereal disease are not allowed to work; 6. That
the crime rate there is better than in other parts of Bocaue or in
other towns of Bulacan." 8 Then came on January 15, 1976 the
decision upholding the constitutionality and validity of
Ordinance No. 84 and dismissing the cases. Hence this
petition for certiorari by way of appeal.
In an exhaustive as well as scholarly opinion, the lower court
dismissed the petitions. Its rationale is set forth in the opening
paragraph thus: "Those who lust cannot last. This in essence is
why the Municipality of Bocaue, Province of Bulacan,
stigmatized as it has been by innuendos of sexual titillation and
fearful of what the awesome future holds for it, had no
alternative except to order thru its legislative machinery, and
even at the risk of partial economic dislocation, the closure of
its night clubs and/or cabarets. This in essence is also why this
Court, obedient to the mandates of good government, and
cognizant of the categorical imperatives of the current legal
and social revolution, hereby [upholds] in the name of police
power the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84,
Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan.
The restraining orders heretofore issued in these two cases
are therefore hereby rifted, effective the first day of February,
1976, the purpose of the grace period being to enable the
petitioners herein to apply to the proper appellate tribunals for
any contemplated redress."9 This Court is, however, unable to
agree with such a conclusion and for reasons herein set forth,
holds that reliance on the police power is insufficient to justify
the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be declared
null and void.
1. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general
terms as follows: "General power of council to enact
ordinances and make regulations. - The municipal council shall
enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein." 10 It is practically a reproduction of the
former Section 39 of Municipal Code. 11 An ordinance enacted
by virtue thereof, according to Justice Moreland, speaking for
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 153
the Court in the leading case of United States v. Abendan 12 "is
valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the
Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or
unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of common
right. Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and
the mode of its exercise and the details of such legislation are
not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be
a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will be pronounced
invalid." 13 In another leading case, United States v.
Salaveria, 14 the ponente this time being Justice Malcolm,
where the present Administrative Code provision was applied,
it was stated by this Court: "The general welfare clause has
two branches: One branch attaches itself to the main trunk of
municipal authority, and relates to such ordinances and
regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal
council by law. With this class we are not here directly
concerned. The second branch of the clause is much more
independent of the specific functions of the council which are
enumerated by law. It authorizes such ordinances as shall
seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace,
good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality and
the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein.' It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of
the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be
reasonable, consonant with the general powersand purposes
of the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy
of the State." 15 If night clubs were merely then regulated and
not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the
test of validity. In the two leading cases above set forth, this
Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as
well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It
cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking
power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable. The
objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end
can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too
wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized
by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could
have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by
an absolute prohibition. The admonition in Salaveria should be
heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or
property rights under the guise of police regulation." 16 It is
clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this
instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights,
personal in the case of those individuals desirous of
patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the
investments made and salaries to be earned by those therein
employed.
2. The decision now under review refers to Republic Act No.
938 as amended. 17 It was originally enacted on June 20, 1953.
It is entitled: "AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE
THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION
OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR
RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS.' 18 Its first
section insofar as pertinent reads: "The municipal or city board
or council of each chartered city shall have the power to
regulate by ordinance the establishment, maintenance and
operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions,
cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other

similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: ...
" 19Then on May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to
include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit
... " 20 The title, however, remained the same. It is worded
exactly as Republic Act No. 938. It is to be admitted that as
thus amended, if only the above portion of the Act were
considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the
operation of night clubs. If that were all, then the appealed
decision is not devoid of support in law. That is not all,
however. The title was not in any way altered. It was not
changed one whit. The exact wording was followed. The power
granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There is
thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to
construe Republic Act No. 938 as allowing the prohibition of
the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional
question. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
" 21 Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to
regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being
invalid if, as was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the
operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap
between the exercise of a regulatory power "to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, 22 in the language of the Administrative Code, such
competence extending to all "the great public needs, 23 to
quote from Holmes, and to interdict any calling, occupation, or
enterprise. In accordance with the well-settled principle of
constitutional construction that between two possible
interpretations by one of which it will be free from constitutional
infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the
former is to be preferred. A construction that would save rather
than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends
itself. We have done so before We do so again. 24
3. There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of
a specific provision of the recently-enacted Local Government
Code. 25 The general welfare clause, a reiteration of the
Administrative Code provision, is set forth in the first paragraph
of Section 149 defining the powers and duties of
the sangguniang bayan. It read as follows: "(a) Enact such
ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary to
carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it
by law, and such as shall be necessary and proper to provide
for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain
peace and order, improve public morals, promote the
prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property
therein; ..." 26 There are in addition provisions that may have a
bearing on the question now before this Court. Thus
the sangguniang bayanshall "(rr) Regulate cafes, restaurants,
beer-houses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses and lodging
houses, except travel agencies, tourist guides, tourist
transports, hotels, resorts, de luxe restaurants, and tourist inns
of international standards which shall remain under the
licensing and regulatory power of the Ministry of Tourism which
shall exercise such authority without infringing on the taxing or
regulatory powers of the municipality; (ss) Regulate public
dancing schools, public dance halls, and sauna baths or
massage parlors; (tt) Regulate the establishment and operation
of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other
forms of entertainment; ..." 27 It is clear that municipal
corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They
may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their
business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the
decision under review were sustained. All that petitioners
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 154
would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate
night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such
businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial
correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the
operation and continued existence of night clubs subject to
appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel
petitioners to close their establishments, the necessary result
of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary
termination of their business. During such time, their
employees would undergo a period of deprivation. Certainly, if
such an undesirable outcome can be avoided, it should be.
The law should not be susceptible to the reproach that it
displays less than sympathetic concern for the plight of those
who, under a mistaken appreciation of a municipal power, were
thus left without employment. Such a deplorable consequence
is to be avoided. If it were not thus, then the element of
arbitrariness enters the picture. That is to pay less, very much
less, than full deference to the due process clause with its
mandate of fairness and reasonableness.
4. The conclusion reached by this Court is not to be interpreted
as a retreat from its resolute stand sustaining police power
legislation to promote public morals. The commitment to such
an Ideal forbids such a backward step. Legislation of that
character is deserving of the fullest sympathy from the
judiciary. Accordingly, the judiciary has not been hesitant to
lend the weight of its support to measures that can be
characterized as falling within that aspect of the police power.
Reference is made by respondents to  Ermita-Malate Hotel and
Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of
Manila. 28 There is a misapprehension as to what was decided
by this Court. That was a regulatory measure. Necessarily,
there was no valid objection on due process or equal
protection grounds. It did not prohibit motels. It merely
regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order
precisely to put an end to practices which could encourage
vice and immorality. This is an entirely different case. What
was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory
power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
Moreover, while it was pointed out in the aforesaid Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. decision
that there must be a factual foundation of invalidity, it was
likewise made clear that there is no need to satisfy such a
requirement if a statute were void on its face. That it certainly is
if the power to enact such ordinance is at the most dubious
and under the present Local Government Code non-existent.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the decision
of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed, set aside,
and nullied. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the
Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional.
The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby
made permanent. No costs.
Teehankee, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos,
Plana, Escolin Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Makasiar, J, reserves his right to file a dissent.
De Castro, Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., are on leave.
 
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 155

Footnotes of panguingue on days not Sundays or legal

1 Municipal Mayor Matias Ramirez and
Municipal Vice-Mayor Mario Mendoza.
2 Petition, 7. The other question raised was
the jurisdiction of a municipal council to
prohibit the operation of nightclubs, it being
alleged that the power of regulating tourist-
oriented businesses being granted to the
then Department, now Ministry, of Tourism.
3 Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975.
4 Ibid.
holidays was declared as valid.
17 It was amended by Republic Act No. 979
and Republic Act No. 1224.
18 Title of Republic Act No. 938 as
amended.
19 Republic Act No. 938, Section 1.
20 Republic Act No. 979, Section 1.
21 Article VIII, Section 19, par. 1 of the
Constitution.

5 Vicente de la Cruz, et al. v. Matias 22 Section 2238.

Ramirez, et al., and Teresita Calot, et al. v.
The Municipal Mayor, docketed as Civil
Cases Nos. 4755-M and 4756-M,
respectively. On November 21, 1975, the
petition in one of the above cases was
amended to raise the further issue of lack of
authority of respondent Municipal Officials to
pass the ordinance in question, since the
power to license, supervise and regulate
night clubs has been transferred to the
Department of Tourism by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 189, as amended.
6 Petition, 7.
7 Ibid, 8.
8 Ibid, 8-9.
9 Decision, Annex A to Petition 1.
10 Section 2238, Revised Administrative
Code of the Philippines (1917).
23 Otis v. Parker, 187 US 606 (1902).
24 Cf. Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111 SCRA
433. Separate opinion of Justice Makasiar.
De la Llana v. Alba, G.R. No. 57883, March
12,1982,112 SCRA 294.
25 Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (1983). Under
Section 234 of the Code it took effect one
month after its publication in the Official
Gazette. It was published in the issue of
February 14,1983.
26 Ibid, Section 149 (1) (a).
27 Ibid, Section 149 (1) (rr, ss and tt ).
28 L-24693, 20 SCRA 849, July 31, 1967.

11 Act No. 82 (1901).

12 24 Phil. 165 (1913). Abendan is followed

in United States v. Tamparong, 31 Phil. 321
(1915); United States v. Gaspay, 33 Phil. 96
(1915) and Sarmiento v. Balderol, 112 Phil.
394 (1961).

13 Ibid, 168. Cf. United States v. Ten Yu, 24

Phil. 1 (1912); Case v. Board of Health, 24
Phil. 250 (1913).

14 39 Phil. 102 (1918).

15 Ibid,  109-110.

16 Ibid,  111. In Salaveria though the

ordinance penalizing the playing

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
 
G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM,
GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS,
JR. petitioners,  which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY
TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.
BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting
the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City
to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only
one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent
congressional representative of this legislative district,
sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675.
President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9,
1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite
was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were
asked whether they approved of the conversion of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as
provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite
was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of
these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A.
No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is
unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions
of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of
Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative
district with the first representative to be
elected in the next national elections after
the passage of this Act. The remainder of the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 156
former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new
legislative district of San Juan with its first
representative to be elected at the same
election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A.
No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule,
as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to
wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49
in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal
subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional
district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not
germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said
law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. Therefore,
since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in
the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been
complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI,
Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number
of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a party list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the
return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standard provided in
this section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and
Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under
Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in
the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not
made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population
requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49

has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as
aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the
Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than
two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with
the "one city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative"
(Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional
mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district
for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII,
Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a
highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence
of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of
R.A. No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong"
necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated
under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to
cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v.
Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that the constitutional
requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1)
"should be given a practical rather than a technical
construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had
been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21 SCRA 496
[1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It
suffices if the title should serve the purpose
of the constitutional demand that it inform the
legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the
nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation" (emphasis
supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by
petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 157
law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan
had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000
inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative
districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of
R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional processes, including
due consideration by the members of Congress of the
minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws
emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data
considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present
limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,
Section 5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of
250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides
that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law."
The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself
so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the
increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A.
No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan
do not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed
Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect
preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since
petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself
which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly
preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675,
petitioners present further arguments against the validity
thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have
been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as
the same involved a change in their legislative district. The
contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved
in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a
highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants
of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as
they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law
has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the practice of
creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or
party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo
Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent
representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district,
having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 158

been diminished, which development could hardly be

considered as favorable to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,

Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 159

Republic of the Philippines OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE

SUPREME COURT EXECUTIVE.
Manila
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING
EN BANC TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE
PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987 THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER
AND THE TREASURER OF THE
PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND
M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P., HONORATO Y. JURISDICTION. 2
AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R.
CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G.
ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court
REAL, M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. resolution dated September 19, 1985, the Solicitor General, for
MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P., VICTOR the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of
S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,  petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an advisory
vs. opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF fit for resolution or determination. He further contended that the
THE BUDGET and VICTOR MACALINGCAG in his capacity provision under consideration was enacted pursuant to Section
as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate,
prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a
coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within
the latter's sphere of responsibility.
FERNAN, J.:
On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of a Reply to the Comment. This, they did, stating, among others,
preliminary injunction is the constitutionality of the first that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a
paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, need to hold the resolution of the present case in abeyance
otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." "until developments arise to enable the parties to concretize
their respective stands." 3
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens
of this country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder.
Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss,
parties with general interest common to all the people of the setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section
Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom
affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly rendered
grounds relied upon in this petition as follows: the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the
"seven pillars" enunciated by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) 4 as basis for the petition's
REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES dismissal.
UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY
AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections
OF PUBLIC MONEYS. and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos. 68379-81, September 22,
1986, We stated that:
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa
THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO and the disappearance of the office in
SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND dispute between the petitioner and the
PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED private respondents — both of whom have
TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE. gone their separate ways — could be a
convenient justification for dismissing the
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL case. But there are larger issues involved
DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE that must be resolved now, once and for all,
PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE not only to dispel the legal ambiguities here
SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE raised. The more important purpose is to
PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN manifest in the clearest possible terms that
APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS. this Court will not disregard and in effect
condone wrong on the simplistic and tolerant
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE pretext that the case has become moot and
AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION academic.

The Supreme Court is not only the highest
arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen
comes to us in quest of law but we must also
give him justice. The two are not always the
same. There are times when we cannot
grant the latter because the issue has been
settled and decision is no longer possible
according to the law. But there are also
times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless
cries out to be resolved. Justice demands
that we act then, not only for the vindication
of the outraged right, though gone, but also
for the guidance of and as a restraint upon
the future.
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as
well as to avoid great disservice to national interest that We
take cognizance of this petition and thus deny public
respondents' motion to dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact
that the new Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in the
plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section
16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution under Section 24[5],
Article VI. And while Congress has not officially reconvened,
We see no cogent reason for further delaying the resolution of
the case at bar.
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves
scant consideration. The case of Pascual v. Secretary of
Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of
petitioners' locus standi. Thus:
Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a
statute may be contested only by one who
will sustain a direct injury in consequence of
its enforcement. Yet, there are many
decisions nullifying at the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the
disbursement of public funds, upon the
theory that the expenditure of public funds by
an officer of the state for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional
actconstitutes a misapplication of such funds
which may be enjoined at the request of a
taxpayer. Although there are some decisions
to the contrary, the prevailing view in the
United States is stated in the American
Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the
degree of interest
essential to give the
requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a
statute, the general rule is
that not only persons
individually affected, but
also taxpayers have
sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal
expenditures of moneys
raised by taxation and
may therefore question the
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 160
constitutionality of statutes
requiring expenditure of
public moneys. [ 11 Am.
Jur. 761, Emphasis
supplied. ]
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v.
Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that as regards taxpayers'
suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the
same or not.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential
Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading
thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to
transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program, project
or activity of any department, bureau, or
office included in the General Appropriations
Act or approved after its enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under
consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed
authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President, the Prime Minister,
the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of
constitutional commis ions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items
of their respective appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to
another was explicit and categorical under the 1973
Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different
branches of the government and those of the constitutional
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds
and resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law
authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting
an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body concerned. The
leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions
for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer
may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and
such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over
extends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General

Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It
does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money
belonging to no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an
even greater temptation for misappropriation and
embezzlement. This, evidently, was foremost in the minds of
the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the
rules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public
funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 of Article VIII of the
1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of
money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the
use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the
prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another
[See. 16(5) and the requirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)],
among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall
abuses in the expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of
Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as
correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited
authority bestowed upon the President, "... Pres. Decree No.
1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded
appropriations, results in uncontrolled executive expenditures,
diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and
entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well
expand [sic] public money not on the basis of development
priorities but on political and personal expediency." 5The
contention of public respondents that paragraph 1 of Section
44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its
face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that
prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government
against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of
duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional
Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little, Brown and Company,
Boston, explained:
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate
departments of the government, of equal
dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise
of its proper functions, and cannot directly or
indirectly, while acting within the limits of its
authority, be subjected to the control or
supervision of the other, without an
unwarrantable assumption by that other of
power which, by the Constitution, is not
conferred upon it. The Constitution
apportions the powers of government, but it
does not make any one of the three
departments subordinate to another, when
exercising the trust committed to it. The
courts may declare legislative enactments
unconstitutional and void in some cases, but
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 161
not because the judicial power is superior in
degree or dignity to the legislative. Being
required to declare what the law is in the
cases which come before them, they must
enforce the Constitution, as the paramount
law, whenever a legislative enactment
comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit,
not to review or revise the legislative action,
but to enforce the legislative will, and it is
only where they find that the legislature has
failed to keep within its constitutional limits,
that they are at liberty to disregard its action;
and in doing so, they only do what every
private citizen may do in respect to the
mandates of the courts when the judges
assumed to act and to render judgments or
decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising
this high authority, the judges claim no
judicial supremacy; they are only the
administrators of the public will. If an act of
the legislature is held void, it is not because
the judges have any control over the
legislative power, but because the act is
forbidden by the Constitution, and because
the will of the people, which is therein
declared, is paramount to that of their
representatives expressed in any law."
[Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38,
61; People v. Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v.
Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A.
[N.S.] 409, 105 Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-
334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting
within the limits of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought
not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the
executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other
branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This
is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution
"in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and
which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and
Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power
this Court has exercised in many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a
provision of law which We have earlier mentioned to be
constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot
therefore accord them the protection sought as they are not
acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the
economic destitution brought about by the plundering of the
Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision
which allows even the slightest possibility of a repetition of this
sad experience cannot remain written in our statute books.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of
Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared
null and void for being unconstitutional.

SO ORDER RED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,
Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
 
Footnotes
1 Petition, p. 3, Rollo.
2 pp. 6-7, Rollo
3 p. 169, Rollo.
4 The relevant portions read as follows:
The Court developed, for its own governance
in the case confessedly within its jurisdiction,
a series of rules under which it has avoided
passing upon a large part of all the
constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision. They are:
1. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation in a friendly,
non-adversary proceeding, declining
because to decide such questions "is
legitimate only in the last resort, and as a
necessity in the determination of real,
earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought tht, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the
legislature could transfer to the courts an
inquiry as to the constitutionality of the
legislative act." Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry.
v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345.
2. The Court will not "anticipate question of
constitutional law in advance of the necessity
of deciding it." Liverpool. N.Y. & P.S.S. Co.
v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33,
39 ... "It is not the habit of the Court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature
unless absolutely necessary to a decision of
the case. 'Burton v. United States. 196 U.S.
283, 295.
3. The Court will not formulate a rule of
constitutional law broader than is required by
the precise facts to which it is to be applied."
Liverpool, N.Y. & P.S.S. Co. v. Emigration
Commissioners, supra.
4. The Court will not pass upon a
constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also
present some other ground upon which the
case may be disposed of. This rule has
found most varied application. Thus, if a
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 162
case can be decided on either of two
grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will
decide only the latter. Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191; Light v.
United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging
its decision of a question under the Federal
Constitution are frequently dismissed
because the judgment can be sustained on
an independent state ground. Berea College
v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of
a statute upon complaint of one who fails to
show that he is injured by its operation. Tyler
v. The Judges, 179 U.S. 405; Hendrick v.
Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 621. Among the
many applications of this rule, none is more
striking than the denial of the right of
challenge to one who lacks a personal or
property right. Thus, the challenge by a
public official interested only in the
performance of his official duty will not be
entertained..... In Fairchild v. Hughes, 258
U.S. 126, the Court affirmed the dismissal of
a suit brought by a citizenwho sought to
have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447, the challenge of the federal
Maternity Act was not entertained although
made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all
its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the
constitutionality of a statute at the instance of
one who has availed himself of its benefits.
Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Attorney General,
124, U.S. 581 . . .
7. "When the validity of an act of the
Congress is drawn in question, and even if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it
is a cardinal principle that this Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.' Cromwell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62." [pp. 176-177,
Rollo].
5 p. 14, Rollo.
* Casanovas vs. Hord 8 Phil. 125; McGirr vs.
Hamilton, 30 Phil. 563; Compania General
de Tabacos vs. Board of Public Utility, 34
Phil. 136; Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil.
883; Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil. 599;
US vs. Ang Tang Ho 43 Phil. 6; McDaniel vs.
Apacible, 44 Phil. 248; People vs. Pomar, 46
Phil. 440; Agcaoili vs. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676;
Government of P.I. vs. Springer, 50 Phil.
259; Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transp.
 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 163

Co., 57 Phil. 600: People vs. Linsangan; 62

Phil. 464; People and Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corp. vs. Jose O. Vera, 65 Phil. 56;
People vs. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535; City of
Baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 Phil. 144; City of
Cebu vs. Nawasa, 107 Phil, 1112; Rutter vs.
Esteban 93 Phil. 68.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I I ACJUCO 164