C.

Presidency
CASES FACTS ISSUE RATIO

• Senator Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment

• The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon
declaring null and void the continued existence
Whether the the final adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not
Pimentel, Jr. of the Joint Committee of Congress to determine
continued existence affect its non- legislative functions, such as that of being the National Board of
vs Joint the authenticity and due execution of the
of the Joint Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened
Committee certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass
Committee for the by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the
of Congress the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-
canvassing of votes votes for and to proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-President has not,
to Canvass Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004
for President and and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally mandated
the votes cast elections following the adjournment of Congress
Vice-President tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered
for P and VP sine die on June 11, 2004.
proper – YES. functus officio. Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board
• NOTE: this is the Arroyo and De Castro vs.
until it has accomplished its purposes.
Poe Jr. and Legarda election

• The creation of the PET, a separate tribunal
from the Supreme Court, violates Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution; and PET, being a
separate tribunal, exercises quasi-judicial
functions contrary to Section 12, Article VIII of
Macalintal vs
the Constitution.
PET (2010)
• NOTE: Macalintal is also the counsel of
Macapagal-Arroyo in the election protest filed
by FPJ before the PET. (to the court’s mind this
would have been the first opportunity to raise
the issue of constitutionality)
• His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with
his unconditional acceptance of the Tribunal’s authority over the case he was
defending, translates to the clear absence of an indispensable requisite for the proper
invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review
• The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty
characterized as an “awesome” task, includes the means necessary to carry it into
Whether PET,
effect under the doctrine of necessary implication. We cannot overemphasize that
composed of the
the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of power to the Supreme Court,
Members of this
given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted. A plain reading of Article VII,
Court, is
Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the Supreme Court
unconstitutional. –
sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court
NO
exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not
contain any limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme
Court’s method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
through the PET, is actually a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred
by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to “promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
 • Petitioner reiterates his arguments on the
alleged unconstitutional creation of the PET:
o He has standing to file the petition as a
taxpayer and a concerned citizen.
o He is not estopped from assailing the
constitution of the PET simply by virtue of his
Macalintal vs
appearance as counsel of former president
PET (2011)
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo before respondent
tribunal.
o Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does
not provide for the creation of the PET.
o The PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of
the Constitution.
• Jones wants to recover damages against Bill
Clinton. Allegedly, the latter made sexual
Clinton vs
adavances when he was Gov. of Arkansas.
Jones
• Clinton filed an MTD due to Presidential
immunity from suit.
• We reiterate that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the
Constitutional Commission, which drafted the present Constitution. The explicit
reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was merely
statutory before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating
the Supreme Court to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. Suffice it to state that
Whether PET is
the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the specific wording
constitutional – YES
required by petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of the PET.
• Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary.
And under the doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction
bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to
decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means
necessary to carry it into effect.
• Petitioner's principal submission-that in all but the most exceptional cases, the
Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation
arising out of events that occurred before he took office-cannot be sustained on the
basis of precedent. The principal rationale for affording Presidents immunity from
Whether the case damages actions based on their official acts-i. e., to enable them to perform their
should be dismissed designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise
because of to personal liability -provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct.
presidential Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within official capacity are grounded in the
immunity - NO nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. The
Court is also unpersuaded by petitioner's historical evidence, which sheds little light
on the question at issue, and is largely canceled by conflicting evidence that is itself
consistent with both the doctrine of Presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald,
and rejection of the immunity claim in this case.

• Rodriguez was kidnapped and tortured by the
military because of Oplan Bantay Laya. He was
Rodriguez vs tagged as an NPA affiliated with Kilusang
Arroyo Magbubukid ng Pilipinas. Filed a Writ of
Amparo and Habeas Data against Pres. Arroyo
and several military officials and soldiers.
• Pres. Arroyo appointed Maria Elena H.
Bautista as USec of the DOTC and acting
MARINA OIC when the MARINA Admin
Funa vs resigned.
Ermita • During the pendency of this petition, Bautista
was appointed Administrator of the MARINA
vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she assumed her
duties and responsibilities as such.
• Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in
amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-
in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial
killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative. To hold someone
liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must
obtain: a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused
Whether Arroyo
as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the superior knew
should also be held
or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and c.
responsible – NO
the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
(failed to prove she
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The president, being the
was responsible)
commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the
military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command
responsibility doctrine.
• Rodriguez failed to prove through substantial evidence that former President
Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life, liberty
and property.
• While the designation was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity, the
Whether Bautista’s words “hold the office” were employed. Such holding of office pertains to both
concurrent positions appointment and designation because the appointee or designate performs the duties
as DOTC USec and and functions of the office. The 1987 Constitution in prohibiting dual or multiple
MARINA OIC is in offices, as well as incompatible offices, refers to the holding of the office, and not to
violation of Section the nature of the appointment or designation, words which were not even found in
13, Article VII of the Section 13, Article VII nor in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B. To “hold” an
1987 Constitution – office means to “possess or occupy” the same, or “to be in possession and
YES administration,” which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the
functions and duties of the office.
 • Indeed, in the language of Section 13 itself, 1987 Constitution, the Constitution
makes no reference to the nature of the appointment or designation. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to
Whether his apply to all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for it is
appointments violate without question that the avowed objective of Section 13, 1987 Constitution, is to
• Pres. Arroyo appointed Alberto Agra as the
the constitutional prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials,
Acting Secretary of Justice following the
prohibition against specifically the President, the VicePresident, the Members of the Cabinet and their
resignation of Secretary Agnes Devanadera in
dual or multiple deputies and assistants.
Funa vs Agra order to vie for a congressional seat in Quezon
offices for the • The only two exceptions against the holding of multiple offices are: (1) those
Province. Pres. Arroyo designated Agra as the
Members of the provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the
Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent
Cabinet and their Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
capacity.
deputies and Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional
assistants – YES compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the officials’ offices.
• The primary functions of the Office of the Solicitor General are not related or
necessary to the primary functions of the Department of Justice.

• Congress commenced their regular session.
• Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued
appointments as acting secretaries. Respondents
took their oath of office and assumed duties as
acting secretaries.
Pimentel, Jr.
• Senators question the appointments.
vs Ermita
• Congress adjourned. Next day President
Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the departments to
which they were previously appointed in an
acting capacity.
• The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a
stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment
of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by
an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the
President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary
Whether before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress,
appointment of through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint
respondents as acting automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego
secretaries without • In distinguishing ad interim appointments from appointments in an acting
the consent of the capacity, a noted textbook writer on constitutional law has observed: Ad interim
COA while Congress appointments must be distinguished from appointments in an acting capacity. Both
is in session is of them are effective upon acceptance. But ad interim appointments are extended
constitutional – YES only during a recess of Congress, whereas acting appointments may be extended
any time there is a vacancy. Moreover ad interim appointments are submitted to the
Commission on Appointments for confirmation or rejection; acting appointments
are not submitted to the Commission on Appointments. Acting appointments are a
way of temporarily filling important offices but, if abused, they can also be a way of
circumventing the need for confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.

• Two more divisions of Sandiganbayan was

created. Thus, open position for jusitces. • The President is granted the privilege of immunity from suit “to assure the
Aguinaldo vs Whether Aquino III
• JBC sent 6 clustered list to Aquino III for the exercise of Presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction,
Aquino III is immune from suit
open positions. considering that being the Chief Executive of the Government is a job that, aside
(2016) – YES
• Aquino III appointed 6 new justices from the from requiring all of the office-holder’s time, also demands undivided attention.”
list but not one from each list.

Petitioners: Aquino III violated the Constitution
by not choosing one from each list
• JBC asserts that in submitting six short lists for
six vacancies, it was only acting in accordance
with the clear and unambiguous mandate of
Aguinaldo vs Article VIII, Section 93 of the 1987 Constitution
Aquino III for the JBC to submit a list for every vacancy.
(Feb 2017) Considering its independence as a constitutional
body, the JBC has the discretion and wisdom to
perform its mandate in any manner as long as it
is consistent with the Constitution.
• The JBC was created under the 1987 Constitution with the principal function of
recommending appointees to the Judiciary. It is a body, representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, intended to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan
activities.
• It should be stressed that the power to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to
restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the latter’s prerogative to choose
Whether clustering is someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the Judiciary is
constitutional – NO still paramount. As long as in the end, the President appoints someone nominated by
the JBC, the appointment is valid.
• President Aquino was not obliged to appoint one new Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice from each of the six (6) shortlists submitted by the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC).
• JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six (6) clusters, one (1) for every
vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate
of recommending qualified nominees to the President.
• The JBC avers that it has no duty to increase the chances of appointment of every
candidate it has adjudged to have met the minimum qualifications for a judicial
post. The Court does not impose upon the JBC such duty, it only requires that the
JBC gives all qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity to be appointed. The
Whether the clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies
clustering of in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular
nominees for the 6 nominee. A favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong
vacancies impaired contender to ensure his/her appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed in
the President’s a cluster with many strong contenders to minimize his/her chances of appointment.
power to appoint • The problem is that the JBC has so far failed to present a legal, objective, and
members – YES rational basis for determining which nominee shall be included in a cluster. Simply
saying that it is the result of the deliberation and voting by the JBC for every
vacancy is unsatisfactory. A review of the voting patterns by the JBC Members for
the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice only raises
more questions and doubts than answers.
 • JBC filed a MR (with Motion for the Inhibition
of the Ponente) and a Motion for
Aguinaldo vs Reconsideration-in- Intervention (of the
Aquino III Decision dated 29 November 2016) on February
(Aug 2017) 6, 2017.
• The Court, in a Resolution dated February 21,
2017, denied both Motions.
• Pres. Estrada appointed seven new trustees to
the Cultural Center of the Philippines Board for
a term of four years to replace the Endriga group
Rufino vs
as well as two other incumbent trustees.
Endriga
• Endriga group filed a petition for quo warranto
questioning Pres. Estrada’s appointment of
seven new members to the CCP Board.
• MR-Resolution and Supplement-MR-Resolution lack merit given the admission of
Whether clustering
the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) itself in its previous pleadings of lack of
of nominees impairs
consensus among its own members on the validity of the clustering of nominees for
the President’s
the six (6) simultaneous vacancies in the Sandiganbayan, further bolstering the
power to appoint
unanimous decision of the Supreme Court (SC) against the validity of such
members – YES
clustering.
• By stating that the “President shall have control of all the executive x x x offices,”
the 1987 Constitution empowers the President not only to influence but even to
control all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP—control is far greater
than, and subsumes, influence.
Whether Section • The Chairman of the CCP board is the “head” of the CCP who may be vested by
6(b) and (c) of P.D. law, under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to
No. 15, as amended, appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP; The CCP, being governed by a board, is
insofar as it not an agency but a board for purposes of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
authorizes the Constitution.
remaining trustees to • Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution allows heads of departments,
fill by election agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint only “officers lower in rank” than such
vacancies in the “heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards”—this excludes a
Board of Trustees of situation where the appointing officer appoints an officer equal in rank as him;
the CCP is Insofar as it authorizes the trustees of the CCP Board to elect their co-trustees,
unconstitutional – Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is unconstitutional.
YES • It does not matter that Section 6(b) of PD 15 empowers the remaining trustees to
“elect” and not “appoint” their fellow trustees for the effect is the same, which is to
fill vacancies in the CCP Board.
• The creation of an independent appointing power inherently conflicts with the
President’s power to appoint.
 • The prohibition against presidential appointments under Sec 15, Art VII does not
extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of Members of
the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored
• Chief Justice Puno’s retirement occurred just the meticulous ordering of the provisions.
seven days before the 2010 presidential • The usage in Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution of the word shall—an
elections. imperative, operating to impose a duty that may be enforced—should not be
• Under Sec 4(1) in relation to Sec 9, Art VIII disregarded. Section 4(1) imposes on the President the imperative duty to make an
the “vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from Whether the appointment of a Member of the Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence
the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least 3 incumbent president of the vacancy. This cannot be defeated by mere judicial interpretation in
De Castro vs nominees prepared by the JBC.” can appoint the Valenzuela to the effect that Section 15, Article VII prevailed because it was
JBC • JBC began the process of selection. Although successor of CJ Puno “couched in stronger negative language. Valenzuela was weak, because it relied on
it had begun such process, it has not yet decided upon his retirement – interpretation to determine the intent of the framers rather than on the deliberations
on WON it should submit the list of nominees YES of the Constitutional Commission.
for the position. • Given the background and rationale for the prohibition in Section 15, Article VII,
• OSG’s position = president may appoint and the Court has no doubt that the Constitutional Commission confined the prohibition
JBC was only performing its functions under the to appointments made in the Executive Department. If midnight appointments were
Constitution made in haste and with irregularities, or made by an outgoing Chief Executive in the
last days of his administration out of a desire to subvert the policies of the incoming
President or for partisanship, the appointments to the Judiciary made after the
establishment of JBC would not be suffering from such defects because of the
JBC’s prior processing of candidates.

• Section 15 on its face disallows any appointment in clear negative terms (shall not
make) without specifying the appointments covered by the prohibition. From this
literal reading springs the argument that no exception is provided (except the
exception found in Section 15 itself) so that even the Judiciary is covered by the ban
on appointments. On the other hand, Section 4(1) is likewise very clear and
categorical in its terms: any vacancy in the Court shall be filled within 90 days from
Justice Brion   its occurrence. In the way of Section 15, Section 4(1) is also clear and categorical
and provides no exception; the appointment refers solely to the Members of the
Supreme Court and does not mention any period that would interrupt, hold or
postpone the 90day requirement. Section 9 may offer more flexibility in its
application as the mandate for the President is to issue appointments within 90 days
from submission of the list, without specifying when the submission should be
made.

• The parties were appointed by President GMA
prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections.
This is notwithstanding the ban on midnight
Velicaria- appointments under Section 15, Article VII of
Garafil vs the Constitution.
Office of the • President Aquino issued Executive Order No.
President 2 on July 30. EO No. 2 recalled, withdrew, and
revoked appointments issued by PGMA (see
above) which violated Midnight appointments.
• The petitioners were terminated.
Manalang- • TIDCORP was reorganized pursuant to RA
Demigillo vs 8494. Rosario Manalang-Demigillo was
TIDCORP appointed as Senior VP and assigned to the
Legal and Corporate Services Department
(LCSD).
• TIDCORP Board passed a resolution
reorganizing TIDCORP again, abolishing the
LCSD.
• TIDCORP President later informed Demigillo
that she received a poor performance.
• CSC: reorganization was valid.
• CA: TIDCORP Directors are alter egos of the
President, thus vested with power to reorganize,
Demigillo was demoted and invalidly dropped.
• The following elements should always concur in the making of a valid (which
should be understood as both complete and effective) appointment: (1) authority to
appoint and evidence of the exercise of the authority; (2) transmittal of the
appointment paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant position at the time
of appointment; and (4) receipt of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
Whether
appointment by the appointee who possesses all the qualifications and none of the
appointments were
disqualifications. The concurrence of all these elements should always apply,
unconstitutional,
regardless of when the appointment is made, whether outside, just before, or during
hence invalid, as
the appointment ban. These steps in the appointment process should always concur
provided under
and operate as a single process. There is no valid appointment if the process lacks
Article VII, Section
even one step. And, unlike the dissent's proposal, there is no need to further
15 of the
distinguish between an effective and an ineffective appointment when an
Constitution – YES
appointment is valid.
• Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all four elements of a valid
appointment. They cannot prove with certainty that their appointment papers were
transmitted before the appointment ban took effect. On the other hand, petitioners
admit that they took their oaths of office during the appointment ban.
Whether TIDCORP • Doctrine of qualified political agency (aka alter ego doctrine) does not apply to
reorganization is TIDCORP because its Directors were appointed ex officio by law, not by the
valid on the basis of President. Thus, when the Board of Directors effected the 2002 reorganization,
TIDCORP Directors they were acting as TIDCORP Directors, not as alter egos of the President.
being alter egos of • 2002 reorganization was valid for being done in accordance with authority
the President. – NO expressly granted by RA 8494, which amended PD 1080, the law creating
TIDCORP. Furthermore, SC found that the reorganization was not arbitrary, having
been formulated on the basis of lengthy consultations and coordination with the
offices which would be affected. Thus, there is no legal and practical basis to
reinstate Demigillo to her former position as SVP in the LCSD. This, along with the
records indicating her permanent appointment only to that of SVP, also means that
her reassignment was not a diminution in rank, because she was still SVP when she
was reassigned to the RCMSS.

• Petitioners allege that the grant of standby
authority to the President to increase the VAT
rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive
power to tax because such delegation is not
covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. They argue that VAT is a tax
Abakada vs
levied on the sale or exchange of goods and
Ermita
services which can’t be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption
delegation since this refers to customs duties,
tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the
government and usually imposed
imported/exported goods.
1. the official or employee was rated poor in performance for one evaluation period;
2. the official or employee was notified in writing of the status of her performance
not later than the 4th month of the rating period with sufficient warning that failure
to improve her performance within the remaining period of the semester shall
Whether Demigillo
warrant her separation from the service (SC applied period by analogy to mean that
was validly dropped
the report must be made not later than halfway through the rating period, which was
from the rolls. –
also adequate time to prepare an explanation--see next requisite); and
YES
3. such notice contained adequate information that would enable her to prepare an
explanation (due process whee).
Demigillo was given almost 4 months to improve her performance before she was
dropped from the rolls.
• In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased
rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12%
Whether or not the rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It
RA 9337's stand-by leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters
authority to the outside of the control of the executive. No discretion would be exercised by the
Executive to increase President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the fact that the word SHALL is
the VAT rate, used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL connotes a mandatory
especially on order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
account of the the idea of discretion.
recommendatory • Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate
power granted to the upon the existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty,
Secretary of Finance, which cannot be evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12%
constitutes undue VAT rate when the specified conditions are present.
delegation of • Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the
on
legislative power - existence of a fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a
NO percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government
deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and 1½%. If either
of these two instances has occurred, the Secretary of Finance, by legislative
mandate, must submit such information to the President.

• NPC received a letter from the BIR demanding
immediate payment of P3,8B deficiency VAT
for the sale of the Pantabangan-Masiway Plant
and Magat Plant. The NPC indorsed BIR’s
PSALM vs demand letter to PSALM.
CIR • DOJ: ruled in favor of PSALM. CA: held that
the DOJ Secretary erred in ruling that the CIR is
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
DOJ after having agreed to submit to its
jurisdiction.
• Clearly, the President’s constitutional power of control over all the executive
departments, bureaus and offices cannot be curtailed or diminished by law. “Since
the Constitution has given the President the power of control, with all its awesome
implications, it is the Constitution alone which can curtail such power.” This
constitutional power of control of the President cannot be diminished by the CTA.
Thus, if two executive offices or agencies cannot agree, it is only proper and logical
that the President, as the sole Executive who under the Constitution has control over
both offices or agencies in dispute, should resolve the dispute instead of the courts.
The judiciary should not intrude in this executive function of determining which is
correct between the opposing government offices or agencies, which are both under
the sole control of the President. Under his constitutional power of control, the
Whether the Sec. of President decides the dispute between the two executive offices. The judiciary
Justice has cannot substitute its decision over that of the President. Only after the President has
jurisdiction over the decided or settled the dispute can the courts’ jurisdiction be invoked. Until such
case – YES time, the judiciary should not interfere since the issue is not yet ripe for judicial
adjudication. Otherwise, the judiciary would infringe on the President’s exercise of
his constitutional power of control over all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices.
• To harmonize Section 4 of the 1997 NIRC with PD 242, the following
interpretation should be adopted: (1) As regards private entities and the BIR, the
power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or
other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the NIRC
or other laws administered by the BIR is vested in the CIR subject to the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the CTA, in accordance with Section 4 of the NIRC; and (2)
Where the disputing parties are all public entities (covers disputes between the BIR
and other government entities), the case shall be governed by PD 242.

Whether EO No. 1 is
unconstitutional -
YES
• Biraogo Petition – assails the constitutionality
of the EO (creation of Truth Comm.) for being
violative of the legislative power of Congress as
it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to
appropriate funds therefor. Biragao argues that
the PTC is a public office and not merely an
Biraogo vs
adjunct body of the Office of the President.
Phil. Truth
Thus, in order that the president may create such
Comm.
public office, he must be empowered by the
Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested
in him by law. He adds that the Admin Code
(Sec 31) cannot be used as a basis for the
creation of the PTC since the Admin Code
merely allows reorganization, transfer, merger,
abolition.
Whether the
president’s power of
control includes the
power to create
offices - NO
• Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down
as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. The intent to single
out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been
made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order. Specifically, these
are: * * * In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is
but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class
of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
• The fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification—
the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC), to be true to its mandate of searching for
the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations.
•To say that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is borne out of a restructuring
of the Office of the President under Section 31, Chapter 10, Book III, of Executive
Order (E.O.) No. 292, is a misplaced supposition, even in the plainest meaning
attributable to the term “restructure”—an “alteration of an existing structure”—the
PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the
enactment of Executive Order No. 1.
•The power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices—
the former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a
valid delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
•The creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control
is essentially the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate
officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of
the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different
from the power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive,
while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation from Congress, or his
inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.
 • The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists
• President added Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo
Whether the should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant
Caparas, Francisco Mañosa and Jose Moreno.
inclusion of the laws.
The Committee on Honors purportedly
Almario vs nominees not • In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a
processed these nominations and invited
Exec Sec nominated by NCCA consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of
resource persons to validate the qualifications
and CCP are valid – the President in the matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names
and credentials of the nominees.
NO submitted to him/her by the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCCA) and
• Later, they were declared as National Artists.
the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP) Boards.

• Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his
civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective
• Sandiganbayan convicted Joseph Estrada for
office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to
plunder. However, PGMA extended pardon to
former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
Estrada a month later. Said pardon provided that
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
"He is hereby restored to his civil and political
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the
Risos-Vidal rights." Whether Estrada is
same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
vs • Estrada ran for Mayor in Manila. still qualified to run
• President's power to pardon cannot be limited by legislative action, and the Consti
COMELEC • Alicia Risos-Vidal filed a petition for for office – YES
only prohibits pardon in impeachment cases, cases where is not yet a final
disqualification on the basis that Estrada was
conviction, and election law violations without favorable recommendation from
convicted for plunder and sentenced to reclusion
COMELEC.
perpetua with perpetual absolute
• The pardon granted to former President Estrada admits no other interpretation
disqualification.
other than to mean that, upon acceptance of the pardon granted to him, he regained
his FULL civil and political rights — including the right to seek elective office.
David vs • PGMA issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
Arroyo national emergency. On the same day, she
issued GO No. 5 implementing PP1017. Bases:
Conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the NPA and some members of the
political opposition in a plot to unseat or
assassinate the president, escape of members of
the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood
Mutiny, plans for bombings and attacks during
the Philippine Military Academy Alumni
Homecoming, bombing of telecommunication
towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan,
directive of Communist Party of the Philippines
to hold mass protests in Manila.
• A week after the declaration of a state of
national emergency and after petitions have been
filed questioning its constitutionality, PGMA
lifted PP1017 and issued Proclamation No.
1021.
• Grounds for the petitions questioning the
constitutionality of PP 1017 and GO No. 5 are
as follows:
- Encroaches on emergency power of congress
- It is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law
- Violates freedom of the press, speech, and of
assembly
• The Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora —a recent case most pertinent to
these cases at bar—echoed a principle similar to Lansang. While the Court
considered the President’s “callingout” power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom, it stressed that “this does not prevent an examination of whether such
Whether SC can power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
review the factual exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion.”
bases of PP 1017 – • As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, Lansang
YES adopted the test that “judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not
that the President’s decision is correct,” but that “the President did not act
arbitrarily.” Thus, the standard laid down is not correctness, but arbitrariness.
• Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the callingout power,
by issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis.
Whether PP 1017 CONSTITUTIONAL
and GO No. 5 are - Constitutes a call by the president to the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
constitutional – violence
partly. - Declares a national emergency
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
- Commands AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence
- Commands AFP to enforce decrees promulgated by the president
- Authorizes president to take over privately-owned public utility or business
affected with public interest without prior legislation
- GO No. 5 – acts of terrorism was not defined. Hence, warrantless arrests of David
and Llamas, KMU members are unconstitutional
On decrees:
• President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to Executive Orders, Administrative
Orders, Proclamations, Memorandum Orders, Memorandum Circulars, and General
or Special Orders—she cannot issue decrees similar to those issued by Former
President Marcos under PP 1081. Thus, PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it
grants President Arroyo the authority to promulgate “decrees.”
On taking of privately-owned PU:
• When Section 17 states that the “the State may, during the emergency and under
reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of
any privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest,” it refers
to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the President may exercise such
power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him pursuant to a law
prescribing the reasonable terms thereof. Here, there was no delegation of such
power. While the President alone can declare a state of national emergency,
however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privatelyowned public
utility or business affected with public interest.

• Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited several senior
officers of the AFP to appear before the senate
committee on national defense. “Hello Garci”
incident.
• The AFP directed the petitioners to attend the
hearing. However, PGMA issued a message
stating that No AFP personnel shall appear
before any congressional or senate hearing
without her approval.
Gudani vs
• Respondent Senga tried to communicate this
Senga
message to the petitioners but such attempts
were futile.
• Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which enjoins officials
from the executive department including the
military establishment from appearing in any
legislative inquiry without her approval
• The petitioners testified. The resulted in them
being directed by respondent to appear before
the Office of the Provost Marshal General
• 3 members of the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in
Patikul, Sulu by the Abu Sayyaf (ASG). ICRC
and PNP organized a task force which included
the Sulu Crisis Management Committee, with
Kulayan vs
Sulu Provincial Governor Abdusakur Mahail
Tan
Tan at its head.
• Tan later issued Proclamation 1-09 declaring a
state of emergency in Sulu, invoking the Human
Security Act's provisions on terrorism and the
Sec. 465 of the LGC.
• The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent
before appearing before Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent
specie of presidential authority—the commander-in-chief powers of the President—
which, by tradition and jurisprudence, are not encumbered by the same degree of
restriction as that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control.
• The vitality of the tenet that the President is the commander-in- chief of the Armed
Whether the
Forces is most crucial to the democratic way of life, to civilian supremacy over the
President may enjoin
military, and to the general stability of our representative system of government.
members of the
• It may be so that military culture is a remnant of a less democratic era, yet it has
military to testify
been fully integrated into the democratic system of governance; In the end, it must
before congressional
be borne in mind that the armed forces has a distinct subculture with unique needs, a
inquiries,
specialized society separate from civilian society.
notwithstanding the
• Critical to military discipline is obeisance to the military chain of command;
constitutional rights
Further traditional restrictions on members of the armed forces are those imposed
involved – YES
on free speech and mobility—the discretion of a military officer to restrain the
speech of a soldier under his/her command will be accorded deference, with
minimal regard if at all to the reason for such restraint.
• If the President or the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to
appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such testimony may seek
judicial relief to compel the attendance.
• There is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the
Republic—this means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of
executive power, it is granted to the President and no one else.
• By constitutional fiat, the calling-out powers, which is of lesser gravity than the
power to declare martial law, is bestowed upon the President alone.
Whether Tan had
• Respondent provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the
authority to issue
armed forces at his own bidding. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan
Proclamation 1-09. -
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the
NO.
Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out
powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An
exercise by another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and
may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of the Local Government
Code.

• In 2009, after the Ampatuan Massacre, PGMA
issued PP 1946 to declare a state of emergency
in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato
City.
• She then issued PP 1959 declaring martial law
Fortun vs
and suspending the privilege of the writ of
Arroyo
habeas corpus in Maguindanao (except in
identified areas of MILF). 2 days later she
submitted her report to the Congress.
• Before can Congress could act. PGMA lifted
the Martial Law
Lagman vs • President Rodrigo Roa Duterte issued
Medialdea Proclamation No. 216 declaring a state of
(2017) martial law and suspending the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in the whole of Mindanao.
not exceeding 60 days
• On May 23, 2017, as the President stated in his
Report, the Maute terrorist group took over a
hospital in Marawi City; established several
checkpoints within the city; burned down certain
government and private facilities and inflicted
casualties on the part of Government forces; and
started flying the flag of the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) in several areas, thereby
indicating a removal of allegiance from the
Philippine Government and their capability to
deprive the duly constituted authorities – the
President, foremost – of their powers and
prerogatives.
• Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power
to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a
proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own
review powers, which is automatic rather than initiated. Only when Congress
defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such review should
Whether the SC can the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
review the factual President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is
basis of the first a political question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one
proclamation - YES in the hands of the Court.
• Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of
Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the
petitions in these cases have become moot and the Court has nothing to review. The
lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in
Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy
Whether • The framers of the 1987 Constitution not only placed the President’s proclamation
Proclamation No. of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus within the
216 is constitutional ambit of judicial review, it also relaxed the rule on standing by allowing any citizen
- YES to question before the Supreme Court (SC) the sufficiency of the factual basis of
such proclamation or suspension.
• The President may resort to this extraordinary power (calling out power) whenever
it becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion;
the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is not subject to judicial
review.
• The declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that the Executive
Department has called upon the military to assist in the maintenance of law and
order, and while the emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest and
punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more difficult to restore order and
enforce the law.
• The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if “men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.”
• As Commander-in-Chief, the President has the sole discretion to declare martial
law and/or to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, subject to the
revocation of Congress and the review of the Supreme Court (SC).
• In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the declaration and/or the
suspension, the Supreme Court (SC) should look into the full complement or totality
of the factual basis, and not piecemeal or individually.
• Falsities of and/or inaccuracies in some of the facts stated in the proclamation and
the written report are not enough reasons for the Supreme Court (SC) to invalidate
the declaration and/or suspension as long as there are other facts in the proclamation
and the written Report that support the conclusion that there is an actual invasion or

Padilla vs • Padilla et al. filed petitions assailing failure of
Congress Congress to convene jointly and deliberate on
Proclamation 216, mandamus to compel
Congress to convene. Argument was that
Congress convening was a duty which could be
compelled by mandamus; response was there
was no mandatory duty to "vote jointly",
Constitutional right to information was not
absolute, what was required was the voting re:
whether to revoke and only if Congress wanted
to revoke.
rebellion and that public safety requires the declaration and/or suspension.
• The purpose of judicial review is not the determination of accuracy or veracity of
the facts upon which the President anchored his declaration of martial law or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; rather, only the sufficiency
of the factual basis as to convince the President that there is probable cause that
rebellion exists.
• A review of the aforesaid facts similarly leads the Court to conclude that the
President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to
show that actual rebellion exists. The President’s conclusion, that there was an
armed public uprising, the culpable purpose of which was the removal from the
allegiance of the Philippine Government a portion of its territory and the deprivation
of the President from performing his powers and prerogatives, was reached after a
tactical consideration of the facts. In fine, the President satisfactorily discharged his
burden of proof.
• The Supreme Court (SC) is not concerned about absolute correctness,
accuracy, or precision of the facts because to do so would unduly tie the hands
of the President in responding to an urgent situation.
 Whether Congress • The use of the word “may” in the provision — such that “[t]he Congress x x x may
can be compelled to revoke such proclamation or suspension x x x” — is to be construed as permissive
convene – NO and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke, but
in order to revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of
the Members of the Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation.
• The power to revoke the President’s proclamation of martial law and/or
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus still lies with both Houses of
the Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members.
•The provision in Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the
Congress to vote jointly in a joint session is specifically for the purpose of
revocation of the President’s proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
 •There is no constitutional provision governing concurrence by the Congress in the
President’s proclamation of martial law and/or suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and absent a specific mandate for the Congress to hold a joint
session in the event of concurrence, then whether or not to hold a joint session under
such circumstances is completely within the discretion of the Congress.
•The Court highlights the particular circumstance herein that both Houses of
Congress already separately expressed support for President Duterte's Proclamation
No. 216, so revocation was not even a possibility and the provision on revocation
under Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution requiring the Congress to
vote jointly in a joint session never came into operation. It will be a completely
different scenario if either of the Senate or the House of •Representatives, or if both
Houses of the Congress, resolve/s to revoke the President's proclamation of martial
law and/or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, in which case,
Article VII, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution shall apply and the Congress must
convene in joint session to vote jointly on the revocation of the proclamation and/or
suspension.
•Joint session only required if both houses' opinions are opposing.
2nd paragraph requirement only applies when Congress is not in session.
•Congress cannot be ordered to hold public session, especially when the subject
involves national security, intelligence information, military tactics, etc.
• The imperative necessity of Martial Law as a tool of the government for self-
preservation is enshrined in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. It earned a bad
reputation during the Marcos era and apprehensions still linger in the minds of
doubtful and suspicious individuals. Mindful of its importance and necessity, the
Constitution has provided for safeguards against its abuses.
• Martial law is a constitutional weapon against enemies of the State. • Thus, Martial
law is not designed to oppress or abuse law abiding citizens of this country.
• Unfortunately, the enemies of the State have employed devious, cunning and
calculating means to destabilize the government. They are engaged in an
 Whether issuance of
unconventional, clandestine and protracted war to topple the government. The
Lagman vs Resolution of Both
• 2nd extension of Martial law (Jan-Dec 2018) enemies of the State are not always quantifiable, not always identifiable and not
Pimentel III Houses No. 4 is
visible at all times. They have mingled with ordinary citizens in the community and
constitutional – YES
have unwittingly utilized them in the recruitment, surveillance and attack against
government forces. Inevitably, government forces have arrested, injured and even
killed these ordinary citizens complicit with the enemies.
• Admittedly, innocent civilians have also been victimized in the cross fire as
unintended casualties of this continuing war.
These incidents, however, should not weaken our resolve to defeat the enemies of
the State. In these exigencies, We cannot afford to emasculate, dilute or diminish
the powers of government if in the end it would lead to the destruction of the State
and place the safety of our citizens in peril and their interest in harm's way.
• The requirements of rebellion and public safety are present to uphold the extension
Lagman vs of martial law in Mindanao from January 1, 2019 to December 31, 2019.
• 2nd and 3rd extension of Martial law in Whether this is
Medialdea •The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law and the suspension of
Mindanao until Dec. 2019 constitutional - YES
(2019) the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution does not limit the
period for which it can extend the same. Proclamation No. 216 has not become

• Several NGOs, members of Congress, citizens,
and taxpayers filed a petition for prohibition and
mandamus to compel various parties to the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership
Agreement (JPEPA), a bilateral free trade
Akbayan vs
agreement, to submit the full text thereof,
Auino
including the offers made by each of the parties
during the negotiation process.
• The final text of the JPEPA was made
public later on, but several of the petitioners also
asked to see the initial drafts as well.
functus officio with the cessation of the Marawi siege.
•Proclamation No. 216 has not become functus officio with the cessation of the
Marawi siege.
• The manner by which Congress approved the extension of martial law and the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a political question that is
not reviewable by the Court.
• The allegations of human rights violations in the implementation of martial law in
Mindanao is not sufficient to warrant a nullification of its extension.
• While the Maute uprising was the immediate concern at that time, We must not
forget that the country was confronted with not just one or two rebel bands but
several rebel groups or anti-government entities. The country faced rebellion from
several fronts. The extensions of Proclamation No. 216 are the Chief Executive's
decisive response to several existing rebellions throughout Mindanao. Each of these
persisting challenges to the authority of the legitimate government is certainly a
basis sufficient to warrant the declaration of martial law. Surely, the President does
not want a repeat of the Maute experience and wait until a city is overrun before
declaring martial law. The Constitutional safeguards found in Section 18, Article
VII does not demand that a city be first taken over or people get killed and billions
of properties go up in smoke before the President may be justified to use his options
under Section 18. What the Constitution asks is only that there be actual rebellion,
an existing rebellion in the territory where Martial rule is to be imposed. The
declaration should not be arbitrary or whimsical, but its basis should not also be so
accurate that there is no room for changes or correction. Considering the volatility
of conflict, situations may change at the blink of an eye. And the Executive is
burdened with such responsibility to act decisively.
• To be covered by the right to information, the information sought must meet the
threshold requirement that it be a matter of public concern; From the nature of the
Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) as an international
trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of public concern.
•The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this
jurisdiction.
 Whether the •While the final text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
petitioners could (JPEPA) may not be kept perpetually confidential—since there should be “ample
compel the opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved”—the offers exchanged by
disclosure of the full the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
text--including drafts published; It is reasonable to conclude that the Japanese representatives submitted
and offers--of the their offers with the understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the
JPEPA. – NO same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.
•By hampering the ability of our representatives to compromise, we may be
jeopardizing higher national goals for the sake of securing less critical ones; The
privileged nature of diplomatic negotiations is only presumptive.
• Under Sec. 21 of Art. VII of the Consti, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate and enter into treaties and international agreements; Senate can only
concur.

• Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have
approached the Executive Department through
Vinuya vs the DOJ, DFA and OSG, requesting assistance
Romulo in filing a claim against the Japanese officials
(2010) and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the "comfort women stations in
the Philippines.
Vinuya vs
Romulo •   of the Executive Department. The Court cannot interfere with or question the
(2014)
• Consolidated petitions question the
constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the
PH and the US.
Saguisag vs
• Petitioners claim that respondents committed
Ochoa, Jr.
GADLEJ when they entered into the EDCA
with the US because it allowed the entry of
military troops in the PH without Senate
concurrence as required by Art XIII, Sec 25.
Saguisag vs
•   ineffective provisions, or even absent provisions to bolster their position that EDCA
Ochoa, Jr.
• The question whether the government should espouse claims of its nationals
against a foreign government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the political
branches.
• In this case, the Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners'
cause would be inimical to our country's foreign policy interests, and could disrupt
 Whether the
our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in this
Executive
region. For the Court to overturn the Executive Departments determination would
Department
mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch
committed grave
to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
abuse of discretion
• In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals
in not espousing
to bring a claim within the international legal system has been when the individual
petitioner's claims
is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. Even
for official apology
then, it is not the individuals rights that are being asserted, but rather, the states own
and other forms of
rights. The State, therefore, is the sole judge to decide whether its protection will be
reparations against
granted, to what extent it is granted, and when will it cease.
Japan. – NO
• Even if we sidestep the question of whether jus cogens norms existed in 1951,
petitioners have not deigned to show that the crimes committed by the Japanese
army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or
that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes
obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
• Here, the Constitution has entrusted to the Executive Department the conduct of
foreign relations for the Philippines. Whether or not to espouse petitioners' claim
against the Government of Japan is left to the exclusive determination and judgment
wisdom of the conduct of foreign relations by the Executive Department.
Accordingly, we cannot direct the Executive Department, either by writ of certiorari
or injunction, to conduct our foreign relations with Japan in a certain manner.
• It is an executive agreement and not a treaty, hence no requirement for Senate
concurrence. Further, a treaty is required only for the initial entry of military troops,
not the subsequent entry after initial entry has been allowed by a treaty. Here, the
initial entry was allowed through the Visiting Forces Agreement.
• The power to concur in a treaty or an international agreement is an institutional
prerogative granted by the Constitution to the Senate, not to the entire Legislature.
Whether the EDCA
•It is evident that the constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the
is constitutional -
foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent
YES
acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations provided by the rest of the
Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity
through a treaty.
•The President has the inherent power to enter into agreements with other states,
including the prerogative to conclude binding executive agreements that do not
require further Senate concurrence.
• Petitioners have littered their motion with alleged facts on U.S. practices,
is invalid. In this way, petitioners essentially ask this Court to replace the

• During the campaign period for the 2016
Presidential Election, Duterte announced that he
will allow the Marcos burial. Duterte won.
• Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued
Ocampo vs a Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff General
Enriquez Ricardo R. Visaya regarding the interment of
(2016) former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng Mga Bayani.
• AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued
a directive to the Army on the Funeral Honors
and Service for President Marcos.
prerogative of the political branches and rescind the EDCA because it not a good
deal for the Philippines. Unfortunately, the Court's only concern is the legality of
EDCA and not its wisdom or folly. Their remedy clearly belongs to the executive or
legislative branches of government.
• In the context of recent developments (promulgation of PCA Award - China v.
PH), the President is bound to defend the EEZ of the Philippines and ensure its vast
maritime wealth for the exclusive enjoyment of Filipinos. In this light, he is
obligated to equip himself with all resources within his power to command.
• The nation's history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President
Whether the issuance Duterte, acting through the public respondents, to bury Marcos at the LNMB.
and implementation Whether petitioners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already engraved,
of the assailed albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of
memorandum and Filipinos.
directive violated the • Notably, complementing the statutory powers and functions of the Human Rights
Constitution, and Victims' Claims Board and the HRVV Memorial Commission in the
domestic and memorialization of HRVV s, the National Historical Commission of the Philippines
international laws? (NHCP), formerly known as the National Historical Institute (NHJ), is mandated to
NO. act as the primary government agency responsible for history and is authorized to
determine all factual matters relating to official Philippine history.
Whether historical
facts, laws enacted to
recover ill-gotten •Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and Commander-in-
wealth from the Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a veteran,
Marcoses and their and a Medal of Valor awardee. For his alleged human rights abuses and corrupt
cronies, and the practices, we may disregard Marcos as a President and Commander-in-Chief, but
pronouncements of we cannot deny him the right to be acknowledged based on the other positions he
the Court on the held or the awards he received. In this sense, We agree with the proposition that
Marcos regime have Marcos should be viewed and judged in his totality as a person. While he was not all
nullified his good, he was not pure evil either. Certainly, just a human who erred like us.
entitlement as a •Aside from being eligible for burial at the LNMB, Marcos possessed none of the
soldier and former disqualifications stated in AFP Regulations G 161-375. He was neither convicted by
President to final judgment of the offense involving moral turpitude nor dishonorably
interment at the separated/reverted/discharged from active military service.
LNMB? NO
Whether the Marcos •The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a
family is deemed to self-executing provision of the Constitution and does not require statutory
have waived the implementation, nor may its exercise be limited, much less withdrawn, by the
burial of the remains legislature. This is why President Duterte is not bound by the alleged 1992
of former President Agreement between former President Ramos and the Marcos family to have the
Marcos at the remains of Marcos interred in Batac, Ilocos Norte. As the incumbent President, he is
LNMB after they free to amend, revoke or rescind political agreements entered into by his
entered into an predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers, based on informed
agreement with the judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his mandate.
Government of the •Moreover, under the Administrative Code, the President has the power to reserve
Republic of the for public use and for specific public purposes any of the lands of the public domain
Philippines as to the and that the reserved land shall remain subject to the specific public purpose
 indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation. At present, there is no
law or executive issuance specifically excluding the land in which the LNMB is
conditions and
located from the use it was originally intended by the past Presidents. The allotment
procedures by which
of a cemetery plot at the LNMB for Marcos as a former President and Commander-
his remains shall be
in-Chief, a legislator, a Secretary of National Defense, a military personnel, a
brought back to and
veteran, and a Medal of Valor awardee, whether recognizing his contributions or
interred in the
simply his status as such, satisfies the public use requirement. The disbursement of
Philippines? NO
public funds to cover the expenses incidental to the burial is granted to compensate
him for valuable public services rendered.
• If the grant of presidential pardon to one who is totally undeserving cannot be set
aside under the political question doctrine, the same holds true with respect to the
President’s power to faithfully execute a valid and existing Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) regulation governing the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB) as a
national military cemetery and military shrine.
In the exercise of executive power, the President has inherent power to adopt rules
Ocampo vs
and regulations — a power which is different from a delegated legislative power
Enriquez •  
that can be exercised only within the prescribed standards set by law — and to
(2017)
delegate this power to subordinate executive officials; By granting the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff the power to administer a
militaryreservation site then known as Fort Wm Mckinley (now Fort Andres
Bonifacio), part of which is now the Libingan ng mga Bayani (LNMB), former
President Garcia and the presidents subsequent to him effectively delegated their
rule-making power.