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Public International Law - Treaties - Case Digests

Politics and Governance (Ateneo de Manila University)

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TREATIES 
 
Qatar v. Bahrain (July 1994) 
This case is about the disputes between Qatar and Bahrain relating to sovereignty over the Hawar Islands, 
sovereign rights over the shoals of Dibal and Qi’at Jaradah, and the delimitation of the maritime areas of the 
2 states. Saudi Arabia decided to mediate between the 2 states and this resulted in the approval of the 
“Principles for the Framework for Reaching a Settlement” which contained the following: 
● First Principle: All issues of dispute between the 2 countries, relating to sovereignty over the islands, 
maritime boundaries, and territorial waters, are to be considered as complementary, indivisible 
issues, to be solved comprehensively together 
● Second Principle: Maintenance of the status quo and of a cordial atmosphere between the parties 
● Third Principle: The parties must undertake to not present the dispute to any international 
organization 
● Fourth Principle: A Tripartite Committee shall be formed, with the aim of reaching substantive 
solutions acceptable to the 2 parties 
● Fifth Principle: The governments of the 2 countries shall undertake, in consultation with the 
government of Saudi Arabia, to determine the best means of resolving matters on the basis of the 
provisions of International Law 
For the next following years, there was no progress towards any settlement. The King of Saudi Arabia sent 
letters to Qatar and Bahrain containing a new proposal with the following points: 
● First Point: All the disputed matters shall be referred to the ICJ at The Hague, for a final ruling binding 
upon both parties 
● Second Point: Maintenance of the status quo 
● Third Point: Formation of a committee composed of representatives of the Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and 
Qatar, for the purpose of submitting the dispute to the ICJ 
● Fourth Point: Saudi Arabia is to continue its mediation to guarantee the implementation of the terms 
provided in the letters 
Qatar and Bahrain requested for the ICJ to decide any matter of territorial right or other title or interest which 
may be a matter of difference between them, and to draw a single maritime boundary between their 
respective maritime areas of seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters. Qatar believes that the ICJ now has 
jurisdiction over the dispute because it filed an Application for that purpose in December 1987, during the 
time that the parties had an international agreement through the exchange of letters. Bahrain, however, 
maintains that such international agreement entered into cannot be made the basis for the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ. Bahrain explains that the Exchange of Letters of December 1987 and the Minutes of the December 1990 
session were simply records of the meeting, and did not summarize any points of agreement or 
disagreement. 
RULING: The Minutes of December 1987 and the Exchange of Letters of December 1990 constitute an 
international agreement creating rights and obligations for the parties. Also, based on the Exchange of 
Letters of December 1987, the parties explicitly agreed to allow the ICJ to resolve the disputed matters. The 
request of the parties to have a single maritime boundary drawn between their territories shall be completed 
within 5 months from the date of this Judgment. 
● Treaty​ - an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
International Law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in 2 or more related instruments, and 
whatever its particular designation (1969 Vienna Convention, Article 2) 
● International agreements​ may take a number of forms and be given a diversity of names. The ICJ 
knows no rule of International Law which might preclude a joint communique from constituting an 
international agreement to submit a dispute to arbitration or settlement. 
 
Tanada v. Angara 
History: Following WWII, global financial leaders held a conference in Bretton Woods to discuss the global 
economy. This led to the establishment of three great institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (World Bank), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and International Trade Organization (ITO). 
The ITO, however, failed to materialize. Instead, there came the ​General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs 
(GATT)​. The World Trade Organization was established because of the GATT. The WTO is an institution that 
regulates trade among nations, including the reduction of tariff and barriers. 
President Fidel Ramos signed the Instrument of Ratification for a treaty entered into by the Philippines to 
become part of the WTO. Such treaty was also duly concurred in by the Senate. 
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the WTO Agreement, because: 

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● It violates the Constitutional mandate to “develop a self-reliant and independent national economy 
effectively controlled by Filipinos, to give preference to qualified Filipinos and to promote the 
preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.” 
● The “national treatment” and “parity provisions” of the WTO Agreement place nationals and products 
of other countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the 
“Filipino First” policy of the Constitution 
● It renders meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos” under Article II, Section 19 of 
the Constitution 
RULING: The provisions of the WTO Agreement do not contravene Article II Section 19, Article II and Article 
XII, Sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution. The provisions of the Trade-Related Investment Measures 
(TRIMS), the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and the GATT actually give more 
preference to under-developed countries, for them to be on equal footing with other developed countries. 
It must be noted that Article II, Section 19 and Article XII, Sections 10 and 12 of the Constitution are not 
self-executing. These provisions merely guide the exercise of judicial review and the creation of laws. 
● Article II, Section 19: “The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy 
effectively controlled by Filipinos...:” 
● Article XII, Section 10: “Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and 
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, 
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to 
qualified Filipinos.” 
● Article XII, Section 12: The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic 
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them competitive.” 
○ Also, Sections 10 and 12 must be read and understood in relation to the other sections of the 
Article 
○ The goals of the national economy under Article XII, Section 1: 
■ More equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth 
■ Sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation 
■ Expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all 
■ Promote industrialization and full employment 
The issue here is not whether these constitutional provisions are self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is 
whether, as a rule, there are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the 
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are. 
● The WTO recognizes the need to protect weak economies.Unlike in the UN where major states have 
permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the 
basis of ​sovereign equality​, with each member’s vote equal in weight. 
● Specific WTO provisos are aimed towards the protection of developing countries 
○ Tariff Reduction: Developed countries must reduce at rate of 36% in 6 years, while developing 
countries must reduce 24% in 10 years 
○ Domestic Subsidy: Developed countries must reduce 20% over six (6) years, while developing 
countries at 13% in 10 years 
○ Export Subsidy: Developed countries, 36% in 6 years; developing countries, 3/4ths of 36% in 
10 years 
The Constitution does not rule out foreign competition. It actually encourages industries that are competitive 
in both domestic and foreign markets.  
A portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution. While sovereignty has traditionally 
been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and 
limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of 
nations. The sovereignty of a State therefore cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. 
 
Pimentel, et al. v. Executive Secretary 
This is a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary (OES) and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs (DFA) to transmit a signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the 
Senate for its concurrence, in accordance with ​Article VII, Section 21, of the 1987 Constitution​. 
● Article VII, Section 21: “No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless 
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.” 
The ​Rome Statute​ established the International Criminal Court (ICC) which shall have the power to exercise 
its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, and shall be 
complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions. Its jurisdiction covers genocide, crimes against 

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humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression, as defined in the Rome Statute. The Philippines signed the 
Rome Statute on December 31, 2000 through Enrique Manalo of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations 
(PMUN). Its provisions, however, require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval of the 
signatory states. 
Do the OES and the DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed 
by a member of the PMUN, even without the signature of the President? 
RULING: Petitioners erroneously interpreted Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution to mean that the power 
to ratify treaties belongs to the Senate. 
● In our system of government, the President, being the head of the state, is regarded as the sole organ 
and authority in external relations and is the country’s sole representative with foreign nations. The 
1987 Constitution provided a limitation to this power under Article VII, Section 21. By requiring the 
concurrence of the Legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures 
a healthy system of checks and balance. 
● Treaty-Making Process​: Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the President, but he now usually 
assigns this task to his authorized representatives. State-parties submit their proposals and 
counter-proposals to each other. And these become the basis of subsequent negotiations. If and 
when the negotiators finally decide in the terms of the treaty, the same becomes open for signature. 
The purpose of signing the treaty is to symbolize the good faith of the state-parties, but this is not an 
indication of the final consent of the states. The treaty must still be ratified by the state-parties. Once 
ratified, the final step is for the state-parties to exchange instruments of ratification. 
 
BAYAN MUNA v. Executive Secretary Romulo 
In 2000, the Philippines signed the ​Rome Statute​ through Enrique Manalo of the PMUN, which, by its terms, is 
“subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval by the signatory States.” The Philippines, represented by the 
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), through Exchange of Notes with the US, finalized a 
Non-Surrender Agreement​. The agreement was aimed to protect certain persons of the Philippines and the 
US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be brought against them in international tribunals. 
Petitioners filed this complaint, contending that the Respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in 
concluding and ratifying the agreement. Petitioners also ask the Court to declare such agreement 
unconstitutional. 
RULING: The Non-Surrender Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it differ from, the Rome 
Statute. They merely complement each other. Under Article 1 of the Rome Statute, the jurisdiction of the ICC 
is to be “complementary to national criminal jurisdictions of the signatory States.” This means that the State 
shall still have primary jurisdiction, and the ICC’s jurisdiction only comes into play when the signatory States 
are unwilling or unable to prosecute the case. 
Also, under international law, there is a considerable difference between a State-party and a signatory to a 
treaty. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a ​signatory state​ is only obliged to refrain from 
acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. The Philippines is only a signatory to the Rome 
Statute and not a State-party for lack of ratification by the Senate (Pimentel et al. v. Executive Secretary). 
Thus, any argument obliging the Philippines to follow any provision in the treaty would be premature. And 
even assuming that the Philippines is a State-party, the Rome Statute still recognizes the primacy of 
international agreements entered into between States, even when one of the States is not a State-party to the 
Rome Statute. 
 
BAYAN v. Zamora 
In 1947, the Philippines and the USA forged a Military Bases Agreement (MBA) which formalized the use of 
installations in the Philippine territory by the US military personnel. To further strengthen their defense, 
security, and relationship, the Philippines and the US entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) in 1951. 
Under the MDT, the State-parties agreed to respond to any external armed attack on their territory, armed 
forces, public vessels, and aircraft. 
The MBA was to expire in 1991, and in view thereof, the State-parties negotiated for a possible extension of 
the agreement. The Senate, however, rejected the proposal of the US, called the Treaty of Friendship, 
Cooperation, and Security, which in effect would have extended the presence of the US military bases in the 
Philippines. Despite the non-renewal of the MBA, the defense and security relationship between the 
Philippines and the US still continued, pursuant to the MDT. 
The United States Panel, headed by the US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific Kurt 
Campbell, met with the Philippine Panel, headed by the Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr. to 

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exchange notes on the possible elements of a new agreement, the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The VFA 
was approved by President Fidel Ramos, which was by the representatives of both State-parties. 
In 1998, President Estrada ratified the VFA. He, acting through Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially 
transmitted the Instrument of Ratification to the Senate for concurrence. 
Petitioners assail the validity of the VFA, contending that it violates ​Article XVIII, Section 25 of the 
Constitution​. They also contend that the US only treats the VFA as an executive agreement and not as a 
treaty, therefore, one of the requirements under Section 5 is not met. 
● Article XVIII, Section 25: “After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the 
Philippines and the United States of America concerning military bases, foreign military bases, 
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by 
the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people 
in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting 
State.” 
Respondents, however, explain that the VFA is not a basing agreement, but is actually a regular agreement 
which involves temporary visits of US personnel engaged in joint military exercises. They therefore conclude 
that ​Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution​ applies in this case. 
● No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least 
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. 
RULING: The VFA is valid. 
● Article VII, Section 21 deals with treaties or international agreements in general, in which case, the 
concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate is required to make the treaty 
binding on the part of the Philippines. 
● Article XVIII, Section 25 is a special provision that applies to treaties involving the presence of foreign 
military bases, troops, or facilities. Foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may only be allowed in 
the Philippines if the following conditions are met: 
○ Such agreement must be under a treaty 
○ The treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate, and when so required by the Congress, 
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum 
○ Recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State 
● It is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA only as an executive agreement, because under 
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty. As long as the VFA possesses the 
elements of an agreement recognized under international law, the said agreement is to be taken 
equally as a treaty. 
 
Nicolas v. Romulo 
Respondent LCpl. Daniel Smith is a member of the US Armed Forces. He was charged with the crime of rape 
committed against Suzette Nicolas sometime in November 2005, in conspiracy with Ssgt. Chad Brian 
Carpentier, Dominic Duplantis, and Keith Silkwood. 
Pursuant to the VFA, the US was granted custody of Smith pending the proceedings. The Makati RTC found 
him guilty and detained him in the Makati jail, but he was taken out by a contingent if the Philippine law 
enforcement agents, purportedly acting under the orders or the Department of Interior and Local Government 
(DILG). He was brought again to a US-controlled facility, pursuant to the ​Romulo-Kenney Agreement​ of 
December 19, 2006. 
Nicolas contends that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because, first of all, the VFA is void and 
unconstitutional. 
● The VFA is a violation of ​Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution​, because the US does not 
recognize it as a treaty. Such provision requires that, for a treaty concerning foreign military bases, 
troops, or facilities to be valid, it must be: 
○ Duly concurred in by the Senate 
○ When the Congress do requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a 
national referendum held for that purpose 
○ Recognized as a treaty buy the other contracting State 
● The undertakings violate ​Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution​, which provides for the exclusive 
power of the SC to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines. To allow the transfer of 
custody to a foreign power id to provide for a different rule of procedure. 
RULING: The VFA is valid and constitutional. 
● The VFA is recognized by the US as a treaty, in compliance with Article XVIII, Section 25. 

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○ The VFA was recognized by the duly authorized representative of the US government. The 
fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the US Senate does not 
detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty recognized by the said 
State. This is a matter of internal US law. Notice can be taken of the internationally known 
practice by the US of submitting to its Senate for advice and consent agreements that are 
policy-making in nature, whereas, those that carry out or further implement these 
policy-making agreements are merely submitted to the Congress, under the provisions of 
their ​Case-Zablocki Act​. 
○ The earlier MDT entered into by the State-parties was signed and duly ratified with the 
concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate. 
● The VFA similarly does not violate Article VIII, Section 5(5), as it does not interfere with the power of 
the SC to adopt rules of procedure for all courts in the Philippines. 
○ The VFA recognizes the difference between ​custody during trial​ and ​detention after 
conviction​. 
■ Article V, Section 6 of the VFA provides that the US shall immediately have custody 
of any US personnel over whom the Philippines is to exercise criminal jurisdiction. 
■ Article V, Section 10, however, provides that the confinement or detention by the 
Philippine authorities of US personnel shall he carried out in facilities agreed on by 
the appropriate authorities of the Philippines and the US. 
○ Public Respondents must therefore comply with the VFA and negotiate with the 
representatives of the US regarding the place where Smith shall be detained after conviction. 
● The VFA is a ​self-executing agreement​, because the parties intend its provisions to be enforceable, 
and because the Agreement is intended to carry out the obligations and undertakings under the MDT. 
● The VFA is covered by the Case-Zablocki Act, inasmuch as it is the very purpose and intent of the US 
Congress that executive agreements under this Act, within 60 days from their ratification, be 
immediately implemented. 
● The MDT was advised and consented to by the US Senate on March 20, 1952. It must be noted that it 
was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution, in adopting Article XVIII, Section 25, to 
require the other contracting State to convert their system to achieve alignment and parity with ours.  
 
Saguisag, et al. v. Executive Secretary Ochoa 
Petitioners explain that, since the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) is a treaty, it comply 
with the requirements set forth in ​Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution​. 
In 2016, the SC ruled that the EDCA is not a treaty; rather, it is an executive agreement, as it merely 
implements the VFA and the MDT. This is the principal reason for the present case for a Motion for 
Reconsideration filed by Petitioners. 
● The EDCA’s provisions fall outside the limited scope of the VFA and MDT, because it provides a 
broader arrangement for military bases, troops, and facilities, and it allows the establishment of US 
military bases in the Philippines. 
● The VFA and the MDT did not allow for EDCA to contain the following provisions: 
○ Agreed Locations 
○ Rotational Presence of Personnel 
○ US Contractors 
○ Activities of US Contractors 
RULING: The EDCA is not a treaty despite the presence of the disputed provisions. The very nature of the 
EDCA, its provisions, and its subject matter, indubitably categorize it as an executive agreement, for which the 
concurrence of the Senate is not required. 
● Executive agreements may dispense with the requirement of Senate concurrence because of the 
legal mandate with which they are concluded. Executive agreements are concluded: 
○ To adjust the details of a treaty 
○ Pursuant to or upon confirmation by an act of the Legislature 
○ In the exercise of the President’s independent powers under the Constitution 
● Executive agreements merely involve arrangements on the implementation of existing policies, rules, 
laws, or agreements. The most important purpose of executive agreements hinges on prior 
constitutional or legislative authorizations. 
○ The special nature of an executive agreement is not just a domestic variation in international 
agreements. International practice has accepted the use of various forms and designations 
of international agreements, ranging from the traditional notion of a treaty (which connotes a 

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formal, solemn instrument) to engagements concluded in modern, simplified forms that no 
longer necessitate ratification. 
○ An international agreement may take different forms: treaties, acts, protocols, conventions, 
covenants, pacts, etc. Under International Law, the distinction between a treaty and an 
international agreement or even an executive agreement is irrelevant for the purpose of 
determining international rights and obligations. 
● There are two important features that distinguishes treaties from executive agreements: 
○ First, executive agreements must remain traceable to an express or implied authorization 
under the Constitution, statutes, or treaties. The absence of these precedents puts the 
validity and effectivity of executive agreements under serious question, for the main function 
of the Executive is to enforce the Constitution and the laws enacted by the Legislature, and 
not to defeat or interfere in the performance of these rules. 
○ Second, treaties are, by their very nature, considered superior to executive agreements. 
Treaties are products of the acts of the Executive and the Senate. Because of such legislative 
participation, a treaty is regarded as being on the same level as a statute. 
■ When there is irreconcilable conflict between a prior law and a later treaty, the later 
treaty takes precedence. 
■ However, when it is an executive agreement that is inconsistent with an existing law 
or treaty, it will simply be considered ineffective. 
 
IPAP v. Executive Secretary Ochoa 
The Madrid System for the International Registration of Marks (Madrid System) is a centralized system 
providing a one-stop solution for registering and managing marks worldwide, and allows the trademark owner 
to file one application in one language, and to pay one set of fees to protect his mark in the territories of up to 
97 member-States. The Madrid System is governed by the ​Madrid Agreement​ (concluded in 1891) and the 
Madrid Protocol​ (concluded in 1989).The Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL) arrived at 
the conclusion that accession to the Madrid Protocol would benefit the country and help raise the level of 
competitiveness for Filipino brands. Hence, it recommended in 2011 to the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFA) that the Philippines should accede to the Madrid Protocol. The DFA, in turn, endorsed to the President 
the country’s accession to the Madrid Protocol. President Benigno Aquino III ratified the Madrid Protocol 
through an instrument of accession, and this instrument was deposited with the Director General of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 
The Intellectual Property Association of the Philippines (IPAP) sought to declare the Philippine’s accession to 
the Madrid Protocol unconstitutional, on the following grounds:  
● Lack of concurrence by the Senate, as required under Article XVIII, Section 25 of the Constitution 
○ It involves changes in the national policy and it is of a permanent character, therefore, Senate 
concurrence is vital 
● The provisions thereof are in conflict with R.A. No. 8293 (Intellectual Property Code) 
○ R.A. No. 8293, Section 125​: “If the applicant is not domiciled or has no real and effective 
commercial establishment in the Philippines, he shall designate by a written document… the 
name and address of a Philippine resident who may be served notices… affecting the mark…” 
○ Madrid Protocol, Article 2​ provides that foreign trademark applicants may file their 
applications through the WIPO and their applications will be automatically granted trademark 
protection without the need for designating their resident agents in the Philippines. 
The OSG insisted, however, that the ratification of the Madrid Protocol is an executive agreement, because: 
● IPAP lacks legal standing, because they failed the direct injury test 
● Its provisions are only procedural and do not create substantive rights 
● The adoption of the Madrid Protocol does not require the amendment of R.A. No. 8293 
RULING: The Madrid Protocol is a valid and constitutional executive agreement, which does not require the 
concurrence of the Senate for its ratification. 
● IPAP does not have legal standing. The injury that IPAP will allegedly suffer from the implementation 
of the Madrid Protocol is imaginary, incidental, and speculative. 
○ The ​direct injury test​ for determining whether a petitioner in a public action has l​ ocus standi 
requires that the person who assails the validity of a statute must have a “personal and 
substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a 
result.” 
● Treaties, international agreements, and executive agreements must be distinguished: 

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○ International agreement​ is a contract or understanding, regardless of nomenclature, entered 

into between the Philippines and another government in written form and governed by 
International Law, whether embodied in a single instrument or two or more related 
instruments. 
○ Treaty​ is an international agreement entered into by the Philippines, which requires legislative 
concurrence after executive ratification. 
○ Executive agreement​ is similar to treaties, except that it does not require legislative 
concurrence. 
○ International agreements involving political issues or changes of national policy, and those 
involving international arrangements of a permanent character usually take the form of 
treaties. But international agreements embodying adjustments of detail carrying out 
well-established national policies and traditions and those involving arrangements of a more 
or less temporary nature usually take the form of executive agreements. 
● In ​Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading​, the SC explained that “executive agreements 
covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most-favored-nation rights, patent 
rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal, and navigation arrangements, and the settlement 
of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by our courts.” 
● The method of registration through the Intellectual Property Office of the Philippines (IPOPHL), as 
laid down by R.A. No. 8293, is distinct and separate from the method of registration through the 
WIPO. Comparing the two methods of registration despite their being governed by two separate 
systems of registration is misplaced. 
● The Madrid Protocol accords with the intent and spirit of R.A. No. 8293, particularly on the subject of 
the registration of trademarks. The Madrid Protocol does not amend or modify R.A. No. 8293 on the 
acquisition of trademark rights considering that the applications under the Madrid Protocol are still 
examined according to the relevant national law. 
 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (June 
1971) 
South Africa began occupation in Namibia under the following claims: 
● It has the right to annex the Namibian territory 
● Namibia’s nationals desired South Africa’s rule 
South Africa was subject to a UN Mandate prohibiting States from taking physical control over the territories of 
other countries, because it is a member-State of the United Nations. The UN Security Council adopted a 
Resolution which declared that the continuous presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal and South Africa 
must withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately. The Council also called upon other member-States 
to act accordingly, meaning: 
● To recognize the illegality of South Africa’s presence in Namibia 
● To refrain from any dealings with the government of South Africa implying the recognition of the 
legality thereof 
● To refrain from lending support or assistance to, such presence and administration 
South Africa contended that the Council was not competent to deliver such Resolution, as it was invalid for the 
following reasons: 
● Two permanent members of the Council abstained from voting 
● Members of the Council which are parties to a dispute are required to abstain from voting 
○ UN Charter, Article 27(3)​: “Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made 
by an affirmative vote of 9 members, including the concurring votes of the permanent 
members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a 
party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.” 
● The question related to a dispute between South Africa and other member-States of the UN, therefore, 
South Africa should have been invited to participate in the discussion 
● Even if the Council had such competence, it still should have refused to give the opinion (resolution) 
requested, on account of political pressure to which the Court had been or might have been subjected 
RULING: 
● The abstention of a permanent member of the Council has consistently been interpreted as not 
constituting a bar to the adoption of Resolutions by the Council 
● The Council placed the question on Namibia as a ​situation​ and not as a d ​ ispute​, which does not require 
South Africa’s participation 

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● Member-States of the UN are bound by its mandates, and violations or breaches thereof result in a 
legal obligation on the part of the violator to rectify the vionation. It is also an obligation on the part of 
the other member-States to recognize the conduct as a violation and refuse to aid in such violation. 
 
Fisheries Jurisdiction: UK v. Iceland (February 1973) 
In 1961, the UK recognized Iceland’s claim to a 12-mile fisheries limit. UK and Iceland both agreed through 
Exchange of Notes that any dispute concerning Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction beyond such 12-mile limit will 
be referred to the ICJ. However, in 1972, Iceland proposed to extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to 50 
miles around its shores. UK, in turn, filed an application before the ICJ to settle the dispute, on the ground that 
the proposed extension is a breach of a previously established agreement between the two States. 
Iceland maintained that the ICJ has no jurisdiction. It claimed that the agreement is no longer valid due to a 
change in circumstances, being that the 12-mile limit is now generally recognized and that there would be a 
failure of consideration for the 1961 Exchange of Notes. 
UK, on the other hand, asserted that in order for changes in circumstances to give rise to the termination of a 
treaty, it is necessary that the change resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still 
to be performed. 
Iceland contended that the increase of exploitation in its fisheries and the danger of further exploitation are 
tantamount to the required change in circumstances that caused the termination of the 1961 Exchange of 
Notes. This is because its economy was highly dependent on fishing. 
RULING: UK is correct in stating that the ​change in circumstances​ must have resulted in a radical 
transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be performed, in order for such change to give rise to a 
ground for invoking the termination of a treaty or agreement. The change must have increased the burden of 
the obligations yet to be executed, to the extent of rendering the performance of something essentially 
different from that initially undertaken. The change in circumstances alleged by Iceland, in this case, cannot 
be said to have radically transformed the extent of the jurisdictional obligation that was imposed in the 1961 
Exchange of Notes. 
 
Danube Dam Case: Hungary v. Slovakia (September 1997) 
In 1977, Hungary and Czechoslovakia entered into a treaty concerning the construction and operation of the 
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros System of Locks (GN Project). This project was designed so that both countries could 
utilize the Bratislava-Budapest section of the Danube River for the purpose of hydroelectricity. The project 
would be jointly owned in equal measure by both State-parties, and ownership would be vested on the State 
on whose territory the works are constructed. This meant that Hungary would have control over the 
Nagymaros area, while Czechoslovakia would have control over the Gabcikovo area. In addition, Hungary was 
tasked to construct a dam at Dunakiliti. 
A Joint Contractual Plan (JCP) was to be drawn up for the purposes of the treaty, containing the following: 
● Technical specifications 
● Specified water balance 
● In the event that the water level becomes imbalanced, the share of electric power of the State-party 
benefiting from the excess withdrawal of water shall be reduced 
● Ensure that Danube River will not be impaired as a result of the GN Project 
Political and economic changes started occurring in Europe, and the project became an increasing 
apprehension for both State-parties. The uncertainties were both about the economic viability of the project 
and its ecological impact. Hence, the State-parties decided to suspend the works at Nagymaros but 
maintained status quo at Dunakiliti. Hungary, however, subsequently suspended the works at Dunakiliti. 
The State-parties decided to one again renegotiate the terms of the GN Project. Czechoslovakia started 
investigating alternative solutions, one of which was “Variant C.” Variant C entailed a unilateral diversion of 
the Danube River by Czechoslovakia and the construction of a dam at Cunovo (Czechoslovakian territory) to 
essentially function as a replacement for the Dunakiliti portion which Hungary suspended. 
In 1991, the Czechoslovakian government decided to begin the construction of Variant C, despite Hungary’s 
protest. Hungary sent a Note Verbale to Czechoslovakia terminating the 1977 treaty. 
Both parties agreed to submit the dispute to the ICJ. 
Hungary asserted that the damming of the Danube River had been agreed upon, but only on the ground of a 
joint operation and sharing of benefits associated with the project, and Czechoslovakia unlawfully and 
unilaterally assumed control over a shared resource. 
When Slovakia became an independent State (from Czechoslovakia), it entered into a special agreement with 
Hungary concerning the GN Project, all while the previously submitted dispute was still pending before the 

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ICJ. Subsequently, Slovakia claimed that the 1977 treaty no longer applies to it, as it has already become an 
independent State. 
RULING: The 1977 treaty is still binding between the parties, including Slovakia. Each State-party must 
compensate the other for the damage caused by their respective conduct. Watercourse States shall 
participate in the use, development, and protection of an international watercourse in an equitable and 
reasonable manner. Hungary was deprived of its rights to an equitable and reasonable share of the natural 
resources of the Danube River by Czechoslovakia, because the latter failed to respect the proportionality that 
is required by International Law. Cooperative administration must be reestablished by the parties of what 
remains of the project. 
 
Kuroda v. Jalandoni 
E.O. No. 68​, establishing a National War Crimes Office and prescribing rules and regulations governing the 
trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President in 1947. 
Shigenori Kuroda is a former Lieutenant General of the Japanese Imperial Army and Commanding General of 
the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines from 1943 to 1944. He was charged before a Military 
Commission convened by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with having 
unlawfully disregarded and failed “to discharge his duties as such commander, to control the operations of 
members of his command, permitting them to commit brutal atrocities and other high crimes against 
non-combatant civilians and prisoners, in violation of the laws and customs of war.” 
Kuroda sought to declare E.O. No. 68 invalid and unconstitutional, on the following grounds: 
● It violates, not only the provisions of the Constitution, but also other local laws 
● The Philippines is not a signatory of the ​Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land 
Warfare​, therefore, Kuroda is charged of ‘crimes’ not based on law, national or international 
Kuroda also asserted that the participation in the prosecution of the case of the Commissioner on behalf of 
the US, of Atty. Melville Hussey, and of Atty. Robert Port, who are not attorneys authorized by the SC, is a 
diminution of our personality as an independent State, and their appointments as prosecutors are a violation 
of our Constitution because they are not qualified to practice law in the Philippines. 
RULING: 
● E.O. No. 68 is valid and constitutional. In accordance with the generally accepted principles of 
international law (GAPIL) of the present day, including the Hague Convention, the Geneva Convention, 
and significant precedents of international jurisprudence established by the UN, all those persons, 
military or civilian, who have been guilty of planning, preparing, or waging a war of aggression and of 
the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto, in violation of the laws 
and customs of war, of humanity and civilization, are held accountable therefor. Consequently, in the 
promulgation and enforcement of E.O. No. 68, the President has acted in conformity with the GAPIL, 
which are part of our Constitution. 
○ The promulgation of the said EO is an exercise by the President of his powers as 
Commander-in-Chief of all our armed forces. He is fully empowered to consummate this 
unfinished trial and punishment of war criminals. 
○ The SC explained in Y ​ amashita v. Styer​: “War has not ended simply because hostilities have 
ceased. After cessation of armed hostilities, incidents of war may remain pending which 
should be disposed of as in time of war. An important incident to a conduct of war is the 
adoption of measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies, but 
to seize and subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who, in their attempt to thwart 
or impede our military effort, have violated the law of war.” 
● When the crimes charged against Kuroda were allegedly committed, the Philippines was under the 
sovereignty of the US, and thus, we equally bound together with the US and with Japan, to the rights 
and obligations contained in the treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and 
obligations were not erased by our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all, our emergence as a free 
State entitles us to enforce the right, on our own, of trying and punishing those who committed 
crimes against our people. 
● The participation of the Military Commission and the two American attorneys is not a violation of law, 
and it does not relinquish our sovereignty. 
○ The Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a special law and not by 
the Rules of Court. There is nothing in the EO which requires that the counsel appearing 
before the Military Commission must be attorneys qualified to practice law in the Philippines. 
In fact, it is common in military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military 
personnel who are neither attorneys nor even possessed of legal training. 

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○ The appointment of Atty. Hussey and Atty. Port is allowed, because it is only fair and proper 
that the US, which has submitted the vindication of crimes against its government and its 
people to a tribunal of our nation, should be allowed representation in the trial for those very 
crimes. 
 
Republic v. Sandiganbayan (GR No. 104768) 
Immediately after her assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued 
E.O. No. 1, creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The PCGG is primarily tasked 
to recover all the ill-gotten wealth of President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and 
close associates. E.O. No. 1 vested the PCGG with the following powers: 
● To conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of 
this order 
● To promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order 
The PCGG thereafter created the AFP Anti-Graft Board, which was tasked to investigate reports of the alleged 
unexplained wealth of Major General Josephus Ramas. 
● Ramas is the owner of a house-and-lot located in La Vista, Quezon City, valued at P700,000 
● Ramas owns another house-and-lot in Cebu with an area of 3,327 sqm 
● The raiding team confiscated military equipment, jewelry, and money in the amount of P2.87 million 
and $50,000 from the house of Elizabeth Dimaano, the mistress of Ramas 
● Dimaano had no visible means of income 
The PCGG filed a complaint against Ramas in 1987. An amended complaint was filed to implead Dimaano as 
co-defendant. However, in 1989, PCGG filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to charge the 
forfeiture against Dimaano alone. Due to PCGG’s lack of witnesses and sufficient evidence, it manifested its 
inability to proceed to trial. The PCGG delayed the case for over a year, mainly because of its many 
postponements. During another trial in 1990, the PCGG again manifested its inability to proceed to trial. In 
1991, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case on the ground that the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate 
and prosecute military officers, by reason of mere position held, without showing any proof that they are 
“subordinates” of President Marcos. Also, the Sandiganbayan did not admit into evidence several of the 
articles confiscated from Dimaano’s home, because they were not included in the search warrant. The 
warrant only mentioned of “illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.” 
The PCGG came to the SC when its Motion for Reconsideration was denied, and raised the following issues: 
● The Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case for the PCGG’s lack of jurisdiction 
● The Sandiganbayan did not give them the opportunity to present evidence 
● During the Revolutionary Government, the Bill of Rights was not in effect, therefore, it cannot be said 
that the money, jewelry, land titles, etc taken were confiscated in violation of Dimaano’s right against 
unlawful searches and seizures 
RULING: The PCGG has no jurisdiction over this case filed against Ramas and Dimaano. The Sandiganbayan 
did not err in dismissing the case. 
● The PCGG, through the AFP Anti-Graft Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt 
practices of AFP personnel who full under either of the two following categories: 
○ AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of 
President Marcos by being the latter’s immediate family, relative, subordinate, or close 
associate, taking undue advantage of their public office 
○ AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption, provided that the President 
assigns their case to the PCGG 
● It cannot be said that Ramas was “undoubtedly a subordinate of President Marcos” simply because 
of his position as the Commanding General. Mere position held by a military officer does not 
automatically make him a “subordinate” as the term is used under E.O. No. 1. The PCGG must 
provide a p
​ rima facie​ showing that Ramas was a close associate of President Marcos, in the same 
manner that business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees of President Marcos were close to 
him. 
● The Sandiganbayan did, in fact, give them enough time to prepare for the trial, but it was the PCGG 
that delayed the case for two years. 
● While it is true that the Bill of Rights was not in effect during the interregnum period of the 
Revolutionary Government, the ​International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights​ (ICCPR) and the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights​ (UDHR) remained in force. 

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○ ICCPR, Article 17(1) provides that the revolutionary government has the duty to insure that no 
one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home, or 
correspondence. 
○ UDHR, Article 17(2): “...no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” 
 
Lim and Ersando v. Executive Secretary 
Beginning January 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the US started arriving in Mindanao to take part, 
in conjunction with the Philippine military, in the Balikatan 02-1. These so-called Balikatan exercises are the 
largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. Arthur Lim, Paulino Ersando, and 
two partylist organizations filed a petition for c ​ ertiorari a
​ nd prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of such 
joint exercise. 
Petitioners raised the following arguments: 
● The Philippines and the US signed the MDT in 1951 to provide mutual military assistance of each 
country, only in the case of an armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third-party country. 
By no stretch of the imagination can it be said that the Abu Sayyaf Bandits in Basilan constitute an 
external armed force. 
● Neither does the VFA of 1999 authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in the 
Philippine territory, not even to fire back if fired upon. 
RULING: The Balikatan 02-1 is permitted and covered by the VFA. There is no proof that American troops are 
actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance 
exercise. As a rule, the SC does not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports, not because of any 
issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must first be established 
in accordance with the rules of evidence. As a result, the SC cannot accept the Petitioners’ allegations that 
the government is engaged in “doublespeak” in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive 
effort by foreign troops on native soil. 
● The VFA permits US personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in certain activities (the term 
‘activities’ was not defined in the Agreement). However, the permit under the VFA grants US 
personnel a wide scope of undertaking, subject only to the approval of the Philippine government. In 
general, US personnel must abstain from any activities inconsistent with the Agreement, and in 
particular, from political activities. All other activities are allowed. The Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties contains provisions governing the interpretation of international agreements. The cardinal 
rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is presumed to verbalize the 
intentions of the parties. 
● Both the MDT and the VFA must be read in the context of the Constitution. The MDT was concluded 
way before the present Charter, though it nevertheless remains in effect as a valid source of 
obligation. From the perspective of Public International Law, a treaty is favored over municipal law, 
pursuant to the ​principle of p
​ acta sunt servanda​. Hence, every treaty in force is binding upon the 
parties to it, and it must be performed by them in good faith. A party to a treaty is not allowed to 
invoke provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. 
 
International Status of Southwest Africa (July 1950) 
The Territory of Southwest Africa (now called Namibia) was one of the German overseas possessions in 
respect of which Germany renounced all its rights and titles in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers. After the 1914-1918 war, this Territory was placed under a Mandate conferred upon the Union of 
South Africa, which was to have full power of administration and legislation over the Territory, as an integral 
portion of the Union. 
The Union government was to exercise international function of administration on behalf of the League, with 
the objective of promoting the well-being and development of the inhabitants. 
After WWII, the Union of South Africa sought the recognition of the UN to the integration of the Territory in the 
Union, alleging that the Mandate it had been given by the League of Nations to administer Namibia had 
lapsed. The UN refused to do so, and invited the Union of South Africa to place the Territory under 
trusteeship. The Union refused to comply. 
RULING: Namibia is a territory under the Mandate, and South Africa is not competent to modify the 
international status of Namibia. 
● Article 38(I)(c) allows the ICJ to apply the “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” 
in its decisions. This is done by regarding any features or terminology which are reminiscent of the 
rules and institutions of private law as an indication of policy and principles, rather than as directly 
importing these rules and institutions. 

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● The ICJ was tasked with interpreting the “sacred trust of civilization.” The historical basis of the legal 
enforcement of the English trust was that, it was binding upon the conscience of the trustee, and 
thus, should be enforceable in law. Nearly every legal system possesses some institution whereby 
the property, and sometimes the person, of those who are not ​sui juris​, such as a minor or disabled 
person, can be entrusted to some responsible person as a trustee. The trust has been used to protect 
the weak and the dependent. 
● There are three general principles which are common to all these institutions: 
○ The control of the trustee over the property is limited in one way or another. He is not in the 
position of the normal complete owner, who can do what he likes with his own, as he is 
precluded from administering the property for his own personal benefit. 
○ The trustee is under some kind of legal obligation, based on confidence and conscience, to 
carry out the trust or mission confided to him, for the benefit of some other person or for 
some public purposes. 
○ Any attempt by one of these persons to absorb the property entrusted to him into his own 
patrimony would be illegal and would be prevented by the law. 

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