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Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 08/28/2020 01:07 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by A. Miro,Deputy Clerk

1 ANDREW B. BRETTLER (BAR NO. 262928)


MARTIN F. HIRSHLAND (BAR NO. 322629)
2 LAVELY & SINGER
PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
3 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400
Los Angeles, California 90067-2906
4 Telephone: (310) 556-3501
Facsimile: (310) 556-3615
5 Email: abrettler@lavelysinger.com
mhirshland@lavelysinger.com
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Attorneys for Defendant DANIEL MASTERSON
7

8 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

9 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES – CENTRAL DISTRICT

10

11 CHRISSIE CARNELL BIXLER; CEDRIC CASE NO. 19STCV29458


BIXLER-ZAVALA; JANE DOE #1; MARIE
12 BOBETTE RIALES; and JANE DOE #2, [Hon. Steven J. Kleifield – Dept. 57]

13 Plaintiffs, REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT


DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER TO
14 v. PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED
COMPLAINT
15 CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY
INTERNATIONAL; RELIGIOUS
16 TECHNOLOGY CENTER; CHURCH OF Reservation No. 070750198339
SCIENTOLOGY CELEBRITY CENTRE
17 INTERNATIONAL; DAVID MISCAVIGE; Date: September 4, 2020
DANIEL MASTERSON; and DOES 1 – 25, Time: 8:30 a.m.
18 Dept: 57
Defendants.
19 Complaint Filed: August 22, 2019
FAC Filed: February 28, 2020
20 Trial Date: None

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3697-9 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER


TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

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I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 1
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II. THERE ARE NO “EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES” PERMITTING THE
4 DOE PLAINTIFFS TO PROCEED IN THIS CASE UNDER FICTITIOUS NAMES. .... 1
5 III. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE THAT MASTERSON PERSONALLY
PARTICIPATED IN THE ALLEGED HARASSMENT, AND FAIL TO ALLEGE
6 FACTS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CLAIM THAT THE OTHER DEFENDANTS
ACTED PURSUANT TO A PRINCIPAL/AGENT RELATIONSHIP OR
7 CONSPIRACY WITH MASTERSON. .............................................................................. 4
8 A. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege Facts Supporting an Agency Relationship. ..................... 5
9 B. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege Facts Supporting a Conspiracy. ....................................... 6
10 IV. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE MISJOINED AND ARE SUBJECT TO DEMURRER
PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 430.10(E). ....................... 7
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V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................. 10
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3697-9 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2 Page(s)
3 Cases

4 David v. Medtronic, Inc.,

5 237 Cal. App. 4th 734 (2015) ..................................................................................................... 7, 9

6 Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC v. NAK Sealing Techs. Corp.,


148 Cal. App. 4th 937 (2007) ......................................................................................................... 5
7
Gordon v. ARC Mfg., Inc.,
8 43 Cal. App. 5th 705, 718 (2019) ................................................................................................... 5
9 Jane Doe 8015 v. Super. Ct.,
148 Cal. App. 4th 489 (2007) ..................................................................................................... 2, 3
10

11 Johnson v. Super. Ct.,


80 Cal. App. 4th 1050 (2000) ......................................................................................................... 3
12
Moe v. Anderson,
13 207 Cal. App. 4th 826 (2012) ..................................................................................................... 8, 9
14 Rockridge Tr. v. Wells Fargo, N.A.,
985 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 2013) ......................................................................................... 6
15

16 Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.,


214 Cal. App. 4th 743 (2013) ............................................................................................. 5, 6, 7, 8
17
Statutes
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Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 422.40 .............................................................................................................. 3
19
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 430.10(e) ..................................................................................................... 7, 9
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Other Authorities
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California Rules of Court Rule 2.550(c) .............................................................................................. 2
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 I. INTRODUCTION
2 Plaintiffs provide no legally cognizable arguments to support the Doe Plaintiffs continuing
3 to proceed in this case under fictitious names, do not identify any allegations in their First

4 Amended Complaint (“FAC”) establishing that an agency relationship or conspiracy existed

5 between Masterson and the individuals who allegedly threatened or otherwise harmed Plaintiffs,

6 and have failed to demonstrate that their claims alleging conduct that supposedly occurred in

7 different states, at different times, and allegedly at the hands of different individuals are properly

8 joined in this lawsuit. Masterson’s Demurrer should be sustained, in its entirety, without leave to

9 amend.

10 II. THERE ARE NO “EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES” PERMITTING THE DOE


11 PLAINTIFFS TO PROCEED IN THIS CASE UNDER FICTITIOUS NAMES.
12 The Doe Plaintiffs do not identify any “exceptional circumstances” as required by California

13 law to proceed anonymously with their claims against Masterson. The Doe Plaintiffs argue, without

14 evidence or authority, that if their identities are publicly revealed, they supposedly will face “the

15 very real risk of further harm by Masterson, the other Defendants, Church staff and members, and

16 still others that may wish to do them harm.” Opp’n 8:22-24. Without any support, Plaintiffs

17 seemingly believe that church members will “stalk, harass, and surveil them,” i.e. the very same

18 type of conduct which is already at issue in this litigation and which Plaintiffs alleged they have
19 already been subjected to. Opp’n 9:21. The Doe Plaintiffs already have acknowledged the alleged

20 risk of future and continuing harm they face as a result of this lawsuit, whether or not they will

21 proceed under their real names. Their purported fears must not be significant given that at least one

22 of the Doe Plaintiffs has appeared at multiple Court hearings in the case, and another has appeared

23 on the anti-Scientology series that aired on the A&E network. The burden is on these Doe Plaintiffs

24 to identify any exceptional circumstances that would permit them to continue to pursue these claims

25 underneath a cloak of anonymity. Plaintiffs have identified none, nor have they even attempted to

26 identify any case law that supports their position. Further, for purposes of the Demurrer, it is

27 irrelevant that Masterson and his counsel know the identities of these Doe Plaintiffs. What matters

28 is that their identities be known to the public so their credibility can be tested. These individuals
1
3697-9 REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 presumably have filed criminal complaints against Masterson, have cooperated with the District

2 Attorney’s Office, and likely will be witnesses at Masterson’s trial. It is highly prejudicial for the

3 Court to allow these women to assert very serious, public allegations against Masterson all the

4 while masking their identities so as not to face scrutiny from those who might have knowledge

5 about their character, and more importantly, their baseless claims.

6 Plaintiffs’ theory of liability in this case is the most glaring flaw in the Doe Plaintiffs’

7 argument that they should be allowed to proceed anonymously. Plaintiffs do not allege that

8 Masterson personally committed any of the wrongful acts at issue in this lawsuit, and their theory of

9 liability against Masterson is premised entirely upon the erroneous legal conclusion that Masterson

10 is somehow an “agent” of the Church of Scientology and even more fantastically that every

11 Scientologist in the world is an “agent” of Masterson.1 FAC ¶ 12. Accordingly, if Plaintiffs’ theory

12 of the case is to be believed, anyone who could subject them to further harm already knows who

13 they are, and thus there is no risk of “further harm” other than the harm that the Doe Plaintiffs have

14 allegedly already experienced and allegedly will continue to experience, whether or not they remain

15 anonymous to the Court and public on pleading papers. Opp’n 8:23. Therefore, no “exceptional

16 circumstances” exist for the Doe Plaintiffs to proceed anonymously.

17 Plaintiffs’ contention that Masterson failed “to cite controlling law” in support of the

18 proposition that there are no legitimate grounds for the Doe Plaintiffs to proceed anonymously is
19 erroneous. Opp’n 9:16. Masterson has provided the Court with ample authority to distinguish this

20 case from those in which exceptional circumstances existed to permit a party to proceed in a public

21 lawsuit anonymously. See, e.g., CRC Rule 2.550(c) (“Unless confidentiality is required by law,

22 court records are presumed to be open.”); Jane Doe 8015 v. Super. Ct., 148 Cal. App. 4th 489, 492

23 (2007) (HIV-infected patient of a clinical laboratory allowed to sue the laboratory under fictitious

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25 As addressed more fully below, Plaintiffs allege no facts to establish any agency relationship
between Masterson and the individuals who allegedly harmed Plaintiffs, yet they impermissibly ask
26 the Court to adopt the legal conclusion that Masterson and the individuals who allegedly harmed
Plaintiffs are involved in a principal/agent relationship. There is no legal or equitable reason for the
27 Court to do so. Indeed, it would be reversible error for the Court to allow Plaintiffs’ claims to
proceed, as pleaded.
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 name) (emphasis added); Johnson v. Super. Ct., 80 Cal. App. 4th 1050, 1072 (2000) (“John Doe”

2 designation appropriate to protect an anonymous sperm donor’s identity) (emphasis added).

3 Unlike the HIV-infected patient in Jane Doe 8015 and the anonymous sperm donor in Johnson, the

4 Doe Plaintiffs here do not belong to a protected class such that their identities must be kept a secret

5 to prevent further harm. The Doe Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy their burden that exceptional

6 circumstances exist to allow them to proceed anonymously, and in the absence of such exceptional

7 circumstances, they must proceed under their true names.

8 The above-cited authorities involve situations in which the Court determined that the

9 fictitious parties would be further harmed by the disclosure of their true names, unlike here where

10 the alleged harm has already occurred, or will allegedly continue to occur whether or not the Doe

11 Plaintiffs are identified by their true names. The Doe Plaintiffs are not concerned with further harm

12 from the public at large, but from the Defendants who, as they admit, are already aware of their true

13 identities. Opp’n 9:24. Finally, the Doe Plaintiffs’ claim that disclosure of their identities would

14 lead to harm is belied by the fact that there are other named Plaintiffs in the lawsuit already who

15 have alleged the same harm, that this case has received extensive media attention, that the Doe

16 Plaintiffs have participated in television interviews and have posted about this case on social media,

17 and the fact that one of the two “Jane Does” has appeared, in person, for at least two court hearings

18 in this case.
19 In summary, all Plaintiffs have made detailed and scurrilous and detailed allegations of

20 sexual abuse against Masterson, claims which, as Masterson’s Motion to Strike makes clear, are

21 irrelevant and immaterial to the Doe Plaintiffs’ actual claims in this action. Then, based on the

22 immaterial allegations put forth by each Plaintiff, only the Doe Plaintiffs now wish to proceed

23 anonymously. The Doe Plaintiffs cannot have their anonymity cake and eat it too, given that there

24 are already named Plaintiffs in this lawsuit and the identities of the Doe Plaintiffs are known to

25 Defendants – thus obviating the danger of alleged additional harm should they be identified by their

26 true names. Opp’n 9:24. Accordingly, no exceptional circumstances exist for the Doe Plaintiffs to

27 proceed anonymously, and they should be identified in accordance with the rule that “the title of the

28 action shall include the names of all the parties.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 422.40.
3
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 III. PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO ALLEGE THAT MASTERSON PERSONALLY
2 PARTICIPATED IN THE ALLEGED HARASSMENT, AND FAIL TO ALLEGE
3 FACTS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR CLAIM THAT THE OTHER DEFENDANTS
4 ACTED PURSUANT TO A PRINCIPAL/AGENT RELATIONSHIP OR
5 CONSPIRACY WITH MASTERSON.
6 Plaintiffs, through their pleadings and statements to the press, made it clear that this lawsuit

7 against Masterson is nothing more than an attempt to make an end-run around the statute of

8 limitations that has long barred any claims Plaintiffs could assert against Masterson based on

9 decades-old allegations of sexual assault. Plaintiffs do not allege that Masterson himself engaged in

10 any stalking or harassment, as pleaded in the FAC, nor do they adequately allege that Masterson is

11 liable pursuant to a principal/agency relationship or conspiracy. Every cause of action in the FAC is

12 based on the conduct of someone other than Masterson, or the other named Defendants. FAC ¶¶

13 264, 276, 282, 288, 296.2

14 Nowhere in these allegations is Masterson’s name even mentioned. Nor is it ever suggested

15 that Masterson engaged in any such misconduct himself. Further, Plaintiffs do not allege with any

16 specificity whatsoever that any of the individuals who supposedly harmed Plaintiffs did so at the

17 direction of Masterson or were acting under Masterson’s control, or that they were part of a

18 conspiracy with Masterson. Indeed, the FAC contains no allegation that any named Defendant
19 committed any act in furtherance of a claim. As admitted by Plaintiffs in their Opposition, the only

20 allegation of action taken directly by Masterson is the allegation that Masterson wrote “a letter” to

21 one of the Plaintiffs, a letter which is not the subject of any causes of action alleged. Opp’n 11:14-

22 15; FAC ¶ 88. Plaintiffs fail to identify any controlling authority to justify pursuing these claims

23 against Masterson based on bare-bones and conclusory allegations of an agency relationship or

24 conspiracy.

25 2
Masterson hereby joins in Defendants Church of Scientology International and Church of
26 Scientology Celebrity Centre International’s concurrently-filed Reply in Support of Demurrer on the
grounds that Plaintiffs’ claims for stalking, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional
27 distress and loss of consortium are insufficiently alleged against Masterson and impermissibly based
“on information and belief” without adequate factual support.
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 A. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege Facts Supporting an Agency Relationship.
2 Further, while a court at the demurrer stage accepts the truth of all of Plaintiffs’ factual
3 allegations, the court does not assume the truth of “mere contentions, deductions, or conclusions of

4 law.” Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 214 Cal. App. 4th 743, 751 (2013) (emphasis added).

5 Whether Masterson is an agent of the other Defendants, and whether the other Defendants are

6 agents of Masterson, is a conclusion of law, and thus should not be assumed by the Court in the

7 absence of requisite factual allegations.

8 Plaintiffs do not allege sufficient facts to support their theory of agency liability. “Agency is

9 the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the

10 other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.”

11 Gordon v. ARC Mfg., Inc., 43 Cal. App. 5th 705, 718 (2019). In the FAC, Plaintiffs make one

12 passing and conclusory reference to the consent element, alleging that the individuals who allegedly

13 committed tortious acts against Plaintiffs did so with “the permission and consent of their employer

14 and the Institutional Defendants, Mr. Miscavige, and/or Mr. Masterson.” FAC ¶ 12. Even in that

15 bare-bones and conclusory statement, Plaintiffs do not—because they cannot—factually allege that

16 there was any legal relationship between Masterson and the other defendants, or that the alleged

17 tortfeasors acted with Masterson’s permission or consent. Indeed, the conclusory nature of

18 Plaintiffs’ allegations are wholly lacking factual support. Plaintiffs fail to plead which individuals
19 Masterson allegedly told to engage in wrongful acts, when such permission was given, and whether

20 those individuals allegedly acted at the behest of Masterson or another named Defendant. Such

21 pleading deficiencies cannot be overlooked by the Court, and are fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims against

22 Masterson.

23 Plaintiffs likewise fail to allege any facts to indicate that the Church of Scientology

24 “controls” the actions of Masterson, or that Masterson “controls” the actions of any individual

25 Scientologists, nor could they. See Garlock Sealing Techs., LLC v. NAK Sealing Techs. Corp., 148

26 Cal. App. 4th 937, 964 (2007) (Agency relationship requires that “a principal has the right to

27 control the conduct of the agent with respect to matters entrusted to him.”) Rather, Plaintiffs allege,

28 again in conclusory fashion, that all Scientologists “are agents and representatives of [Masterson]
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 when dealing with third parties.” Opp’n 10:7-8. This is a preposterous deduction and certainly not

2 one that the Court must accept as truthful. Scott, 214 Cal. App. 4th at 751. Plainly, that a person is a

3 member of a religion does not establish that all actions performed by that person were done at the

4 direction of the religious institution, or any of its parishioners. (FAC ¶¶ 93, 217, 249.)

5 Plaintiffs do not allege facts sufficient to establish an agency relationship between

6 Masterson and the individuals who allegedly committed harms against Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs merely

7 allege “[u]pon information and belief, all the [purported] acts of harassment, surveillance, and/or

8 stalking were carried out by or at the direction of Defendants’ employees, agents, and/or

9 representatives.” (FAC ¶¶ 93, 172, 217, 249.) This self-serving statement is a conclusion—not a

10 factual allegation sufficient to withstand a demurrer.

11 B. Plaintiffs Fail To Allege Facts Supporting a Conspiracy.


12 Plaintiffs also claim, without adequate factual support, that Masterson and the other

13 Defendants are part of a “conspiracy.” Opp’n 10:10. The formation of a conspiracy, like that of a

14 principal/agent relationship, is a conclusion of law which must be supported by factual allegations.

15 “The elements of a civil conspiracy are (1) the formation of a group of two or more persons who

16 agreed to a common plan or design to commit a tortious act; (2) a wrongful act committed pursuant

17 to the agreement; and (3) resulting damages.” Rockridge Tr. v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 985 F. Supp. 2d

18 1110, 1157 (N.D. Cal. 2013). Plaintiffs claim that Defendants entered into a conspiracy, but provide
19 none of the requisite allegations to withstand demurrer. Ibid. (“Plaintiffs also generally allege that

20 every wrongful act in the FAC was in furtherance of a conspiracy between the Defendants [but]

21 provide no specific factual allegation to support the conclusory allegation that Defendants entered

22 into a conspiracy.”). Plaintiffs allege in conclusory fashion that there was a “conspiracy to cover up

23 that [Masterson] sexually assaulted four young women.” FAC ¶¶ 1, 15. However, Plaintiffs fail to

24 allege when and where the supposed conspiracy was formed, what specific wrongful actions were

25 taken in furtherance of the conspiracy and by whom, and what specific damages to each Plaintiff

26 resulted from the alleged conspiracy. Plaintiff’s conclusory statement that all actions as described in

27 the FAC were taken in furtherance of an alleged conspiracy is insufficient. Scott, 214 Cal. App. 4th

28 at 751.
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 Further, even if the Court (improperly) accepts Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations as true,

2 Plaintiffs allege that only the named Defendants formed a conspiracy to harm Plaintiffs. FAC ¶¶

3 1, 15, 270. The FAC does identify certain individuals by name who supposedly engaged in limited

4 acts of purported wrongful conduct: Steve Miller, Heather Seidler, Virginia Macgregor, Kathy

5 Gold, Taryn Rinder, and Michelle Miskovich. (Id. ¶¶ 108, 109, 110, 111, 116, 175, 190, 227, 256.)

6 Yet, none of those individuals is a named Defendant in the FAC, and none is alleged to have

7 entered into or acted pursuant to any alleged conspiracy between the named Defendants.

8 Accordingly, their actions cannot be attributed to Masterson nor can they be considered as part of

9 the alleged “conspiracy” between only the named Defendants since they are not alleged to have

10 been part of the conspiracy.

11 Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts to establish secondary liability on the

12 part of Masterson, fail to state a claim against Masterson, and Masterson’s Demurrer should be

13 sustained without leave to amend.

14 IV. PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE MISJOINED AND ARE SUBJECT TO DEMURRER


15 PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTION 430.10(e).
16 Plaintiffs do not allege any factual nexus between the alleged harms they suffered as

17 required for the permissive joinder of their claims, nor do Plaintiffs allege that “any question of law

18 or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.” David v. Medtronic, Inc., 237 Cal.
19 App. 4th 734, 741 (2015) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 378). The only factual allegation which is

20 pleaded to support Plaintiffs’ contention that permissive joinder is appropriate is the allegation that

21 Masterson allegedly “sexually assaulted each Plaintiff.” FAC ¶ 1, Opp’n 18:18.3 However, there is

22 no cause of action alleged against Masterson for sexual assault, battery, or any other bodily injury,

23 nor could there be given that each of those claims, even if valid, are long time-barred under

24 California law. Thus, Plaintiff’s only thread linking their allegations is a fact which is immaterial

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As demonstrated above, Plaintiffs agency and conspiracy theories are not well-pleaded with
27 supporting factual allegations and must be disregarded on demurrer as impermissible conclusions of
law. Scott, 214 Cal. App. 4th at 751.
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 and of no consequence to the actual causes of action alleged, which is fatal to Plaintiffs’ permissive

2 joinder argument.

3 Further, claims premised on separate and distinct acts occurring at separate and distinct

4 times do not “arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions,” and joinder is

5 not proper. Moe v. Anderson, 207 Cal. App. 4th 826, 833 (2012). As the Court is aware, the FAC

6 amounts to a recitation of discrete events that each Plaintiff experienced separately at different

7 times and at different places, sometimes in different states, and at the hands of different people

8 (none of which is Masterson or the other named Defendants). (See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 94-100, 108, 112

9 (allegations regarding events occurring at or near Plaintiff Bixler’s home); id. ¶¶ 178, 185-189, 193,

10 195 (allegations regarding events occurring at or near Plaintiff Jane Doe #1’s home); id. ¶¶ 221-

11 223, 225, 228-231 (allegations regarding events occurring at or near Plaintiff Riales’ home); id. ¶

12 254 (allegation regarding event occurring at or near Plaintiff Jane Doe #2’s home).)

13 Plaintiffs’ attempt to distinguish Moe v. Anderson falls flat. In Moe, two plaintiffs brought

14 claims against the same defendant for sexually abusing them when they sought medical treatment

15 from the defendant at his office. 207 Cal. App. 4th at 831. The plaintiffs claimed that joinder was

16 proper because the defendant was “a serial sex abuser” with a “pattern and practice of committing

17 sexual assault and battery upon patients.” Id. at 834. This argument was rejected. The court held

18 that joinder was improper because the plaintiffs’ claims were for “separate and distinct sexual
19 assaults during separate and distinct time periods.” Id. at 833. Further, any argument that Plaintiffs

20 alleged a “modus operandi” with respect to Masterson is irrelevant, Opp’n 19:7-8, because the FAC

21 does not allege that Masterson himself committed any actionable wrongs, nor does the FAC

22 adequately allege facts sufficient to establish Masterson’s vicarious liability. Scott, 214 Cal. App.

23 4th at 751.

24 As in Moe, the gravamen of Plaintiffs’ claims here is the individual acts of alleged

25 harassment and surveillance perpetrated against each plaintiff on separate occasions – at different

26 times and at different locations – and through different means. Here, the individual acts of

27 harassment are distinct and different – including confrontations in public places, surveillance of

28 homes, car doors discovered open, theft of trash, theft of items, poisoning of trees, trimming of
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 trees, and malfunction of electronic devices and security systems. Plaintiffs have not shown that

2 Defendants’ alleged “manner of operation” or harassment was “exactly similar” with respect to

3 each Plaintiff – they have alleged the opposite. Placing a label on the alleged conduct – such as

4 sexual assault in Moe or “Fair Game” or “harassment” here – does not transform separate and

5 distinct acts into the “same transaction or series of transactions.” See Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at

6 833-34. These separate actions, “perpetrated against separate women at separate times, cannot be

7 considered the same transaction or occurrence.” Moe, 207 Cal. App. 4th at 833.4

8 Similarly, in David v. Medtronic, Inc., the Court rejected Plaintiffs’ attempt to join claims in

9 which they alleged that they were injured by the same faulty medical device, because the injuries

10 sustained by each Plaintiff were different and occurred at the hands of different surgeons who had

11 different knowledge of the faulty medical device. 237 Cal. App. at 741 (Holding that “the only

12 common factor is that plaintiffs each had [the medical device]… implanted in them. Plaintiffs do

13 not allege, for example, that they each had the same class of spinal surgery, based at least in part on

14 the same representation, and that the [medical device] failed in each of them in the same way. On

15 the contrary, they had different surgeries, performed by different surgeons, with different

16 knowledge and exposure to different representations by [the medical device manufacturer]. This is

17 not sufficient [for purposes of permissive joinder].”)

18 Like the plaintiffs in Moe and David, the alleged harm to each Plaintiff in this case occurred
19 in different places, at different times, and at the hands of different people. The only commonality

20 alleged is that Plaintiffs had relationships with Masterson, and that the alleged harms were

21 committed by Scientologists. This is insufficient for permissive joinder purposes. Accordingly,

22 Masterson’s Demurrer should be sustained without leave to amend on the basis of improper joinder

23 pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 430.10(e).

24
4
25 The Opposition notes that Moe permitted the plaintiffs’ joined claims to continue against some of
the defendants in that case. (Opp’n 19:6.) Moe did so because those joined claims arose from the
26 exact same event, “the negligent hiring and supervision of Anderson,” which would be proven by
the “same evidence with respect to Healthworks’ hiring and supervision of Anderson.” 207 Cal. App.
27 4th at 835-36. This conclusion does not concern the question presented here, which the Opposition
concedes by not making a single argument based on it.
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 V. CONCLUSION
2 The Doe Plaintiffs have not met their burden in establishing “exceptional circumstances” to

3 proceed anonymously. Further, Plaintiffs fail to state a cognizable claim against Masterson, and ask

4 this court to impermissibly accept conclusions of law as a substitute for well-pleaded facts. Finally,

5 Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions and

6 are thus misjoined. Accordingly, Masterson’s Demurrer should be sustained in its entirety without

7 leave to amend.

9 Dated: August 28, 2020 LAVELY & SINGER


PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
10 ANDREW B. BRETTLER
MARTIN F. HIRSHLAND
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By: s/ Andrew B. Brettler
13 ANDREW B. BRETTLER
Attorneys for Defendant DANIEL MASTERSON
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REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DANIEL MASTERSON’S DEMURRER
TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
1 PROOF OF SERVICE
1013A(3) C.C.P. Revised 5/1/88
2
STATE OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
3
I am employed in the County of Los Angeles, State of California. I am over the age of 18
4 and not a party to the within action. My business address is 2049 Century Park East, Suite 2400,
Los Angeles, California 90067-2906.
5
On the date set forth below, I served the foregoing document described as:
6
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT DANIEL MASTERSON’S
7 DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
8 on the interested parties in this action as follows:

9
PLEASE SEE ATTACHED SERVICE LIST
10

11 [X] BY ELECTRONICALLY FILING with the Court and electronically serving true and
correct copies of the document on counsel of record listed below through ASAP Legal.
12
[ ] BY MAIL: I am "readily familiar" with the firm's practice of collection and processing
13 correspondence for mailing. Under that practice it would be deposited with U.S. postal
service on that same day with postage thereon fully prepaid at Los Angeles, California in
14 the ordinary course of business. I am aware that on motion of the party served, service is
presumed invalid if postal cancellation date or postage meter date is more than one day
15 after date of deposit for mailing in affidavit.

16
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the above is
17 true and correct. Executed August 28, 2020, at Los Angeles, California.

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21 Noelia Echesabal

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PROOF OF SERVICE
1 SERVICE LIST

2 Attorneys for Plaintiffs Chrissie Carnell Bixler; Cedric Bixler-Zavala; Jane Doe #1; Marie
Bobette Riales; and Jane Doe #2:
3 Robert W. Thompson, Esq. (Pro Hac Vice Admissions Pending)
Kristen A. Vierhaus, Esq.
4 Casey A. Gee, Esq. Brian D. Kent, Esq.
THOMPSON LAW OFFICES, P.C. Gaetano D'Andrea, Esq.
5 700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160 M. Stewart Ryan, Esq.
Burlingame, CA 94010-1931 Helen L. Fitzpatrick, Esq.
6 Emails: bobby@tlopc.com Lauren Stram, Esq.
LAFFEY, BUCCI & KENT, LLP
7 1435 Walnut Street, Suite 700
Philadelphia, PA 19102
8 Email: bkent@lbk-law.com
GDAndrea@laffeybuccikent.com
9 Jeffrey P. Fritz, Esq.
SOLOFF & ZERVANOS, P.C.
10 1525 Locust Street, 8th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19102
11 Email: jfritz@lawsz.com
12 Marci Hamilton, Esq.
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
13 Fox-Fels Building
3814 Walnut Street
14 Philadelphia, PA 19104
Email: Hamilton.marci@gmail.com
15 Ricardo M. Martinez-Cid, Esq.
Lea P. Bucciero, Esq.
16 PODHURST ORSECK, P.A.
One S.E. 3rd Avenue, Suite 2300
17 Miami, FL 33131
Email: rmartinez-cid@podhurst.com
18 lbucciero@podhurst.com

19 Attorneys for Defendants Church of Attorneys for Defendant Religious


Scientology International and Church of Technology Center:
Scientology Celebrity Centre International:
20 Robert E. Mangels, Esq.
William H. Forman, Esq. Matthew D. Hinks, Esq.
21 David C. Scheper, Esq. JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER &
Margaret E. Dayton, Esq. MITCHELL LLP
22 Jeffrey L. Steinfeld, Esq. 1900 Avenue of the Stars, 7th Floor
SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP Los Angeles, CA 90067-4308
23 800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor Emails: rmangels@jmbm.com
Los Angeles, CA 90017-2701 mhinks@jmbm.com
24 Emails: wforman@scheperkim.com

25 Specially-Appearing Attorneys for Defendant David Miscavige


Jeffrey K. Riffer, Esq.
26 ELKINS KALT WEINTRAUB REUBEN GARTSIDE LLP
10345 West Olympic Boulevard
27 Los Angeles, CA 90064
Email: jriffer@elkinskalt.com
28

2
PROOF OF SERVICE