Pugwash Newsletter Discusses Nuclear Threat and Global Security

Pugwash
N E W S L E T T E R
issued by the Council of the Pugwash

Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Nobel Peace Prize 1995
The Nuclear Threat
Volume 39 Number 2 December 2002

T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
To the Pugwash Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Pugwash Meeting no. 275 – The 10th Quinquennial Conference

52nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs:
Science↔Sustainability↔Security
University of California, San Diego–La Jolla, California, 10–14 August 2002
Statement of the Pugwash Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Goals for the 10th Quinquennium, 2002-2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Presidential Address – Sir Michael Atiyah . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Conference Schedule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Report of the Secretary General – Prof. George Rathjens. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Remarks from the incoming President, M.S. Swaminathan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
52nd Pugwash Conference Working Groups. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Reports of the Conference Working Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
REPORTS ON RECENT PUGWASH WORKSHOPS
Pugwash Meeting no. 272 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

8th Pugwash Workshop on The Middle East
Alexandria, Egypt, 30 May – 2 June 2002

17th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation
of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions
Oeestgeest, Netherlands, 14-15 June 2002

Pugwash Workshop: Impending Challenges to Strategic Stability
Moscow, Russia, 8-10 July 2002

Pugwash Workshop: Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Como, Italy, 27-29 September 2002

Pugwash Workshop on South Asian Security
Geneva, Switzerland, 1-3 November 2002

18th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Implementation
of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions
Pugwash
Geneva, Switzerland, 9-10 November 2002

Pugwash Workshop: No First Use of Nuclear Weapons
Volume 39 Number 2 London, England, 15-17 November 2002
December 2002
OTHER PUGWASH NEWS
Editor: Pugwash Netherlands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Jeffrey Boutwell
International Student/Young Pugwash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Design and Layout: Report on Space Weapons
Anne Read
OBITUARIES: Tahseen Basheer, George Marx . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
Cover photo:
Members of the Pugwash Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
1957 Nuclear Weapons Test
US Department of Energy Calendar of Future Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Inside back cover
To the Pugwash Community
Nuclear Weapons and Global Security The 52nd Pugwash Conference and the
The opening days of 2003 witnessed a number of 10th Quinquennium
critical challenges to international security in general Some 225 participants from 40 countries convened
and the nuclear non-proliferation regime in in La Jolla, California this past August for the 52nd
particular. War in the form of a US-led attack on Pugwash Conference, Science↔Sustainability↔
Iraq loomed in the Middle East as UN inspectors Security, that was held on the campus of the
continued their search for weapons of mass University of California, San Diego. Blessed with
destruction, while tensions rose on the Korean typically beautiful San Diego weather, the 10th
peninsula and North Korea withdrew from the Quinquennium Conference agenda included a wide
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. variety of working group topics, plenary and panel
As much as at any time in the recent past, and sessions, and special public events to discuss how
certainly since the end of the Cold War, the world is new developments in science and technology can
perched precariously on the knife edge of the nuclear address the challenges to global sustainability and
dilemma. The world’s major nuclear weapons security facing the international community.
power, the US, revises its nuclear doctrine to include Noteworthy as well in San Diego was the inaugu-
the possibility of nuclear pre-emption, continues ration of new Pugwash officers, including M.S.
efforts to develop and deploy a national missile Swaminathan as President, Paolo-Cotta Ramusino as
defense, and hints at the possibility of a resumption Secretary General, Marie Muller as Chair of the
of nuclear testing that would destroy the Pugwash Council, and Jeffrey Boutwell as Executive
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In South Asia, India Director. New members of the Pugwash Council
and Pakistan are engaged in a stand-off across their were also selected, and the roster of the Council for
common border, with little resolution in sight of the 2002-2007 can be found on pp. 107–108 of this
issues underlying their conflict. Israel continues to Newsletter.
get a free ride as an undeclared nuclear-weapons Participants at the 10th Quinquennial Conference
state, with little prospect of a settlement to the formally adopted new guidelines that will shape the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And now, nuclear activities and governance of Pugwash for the period
weapons play a major role in the crises involving the from 2002 to 2007, and these can be found on
US, Iraq, North Korea and the international page 5.
community. The success of the 52nd Pugwash Conference
Ominously, the international community faces in would not have been possible without the sustained
the coming months and years the very real danger and enthusiastic cooperation of the UC, San Diego
that nuclear weapons might be used in conflict. community. Pugwash would like to thank the many
Pugwash and the scientific community that gave people on the La Jolla campus, from the Chancellor’s
birth to such weapons must do all in their power to office to various academic departments, IGCC, and
mobilize global public opinion to prevent such a the School of International Relations/Pacific Studies,
catastrophe and redouble efforts to eliminate nuclear to Conference Services and the Price Center, and oth-
and other weapons of mass destruction. ers, who contributed to the conference both intellec-
tually and organizationally. Pugwash would also Acknowledgments
like to thank its funders and individual supporters, Pugwash would like to thank Götz Neuneck and his
including: The San Diego Foundation, Ploughshares wife, Christa Ochs, and Andre Mechelynck for the
Fund, Heinz Family Foundation, Cyrus Eaton many wonderful photos they contributed of the La
Foundation, Toda Institute for Global Peace and Jolla Conference.
Policy Research, Harle Montgomery, the office of Pugwash is grateful to the Italian National
Chancellor Robert Dynes, and the William Y. Research Council, the German Research Society, the
Turner Fund. Cyrus Eaton Foundation, and the John D. and
Looking ahead, Pugwash greatly anticipates the Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for their
convening of the 53rd Pugwash Conference, support of the Pugwash Newsletter, the Pugwash
Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology, website, and other Pugwash publications.
Politics and Ethics, in Halifax, Nova Scotia from 16-
22 July 2003, with a special day trip on Sunday, July
20 to the birthplace of Pugwash, the Cyrus Eaton
home at Thinker’s Lodge, Pugwash, Nova Scotia.
The Editor
Thinker’s Lodge, Pugwash, Nova Scotia
2 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

T H E 10 T H Q U I N Q U E N N I A L C O N F E R E N C E
52nd Pugwash Conference on

Science and World Affairs:
10–14 August 2002

University of California, San Diego–La Jolla, California
Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 3

P U G WA S H M E E T I N G N o . 2 7 5
THE 10TH QUINQUENNIAL CONFERENCE

52nd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs:
10–14 August 2002, University of California, San Diego–La Jolla, California
grade uranium, which represents the

Statement of the Pugwash Council
greater danger regarding possible ter-
15 August 2002
rorist manufacture of a crude nuclear
device.
T
he Pugwash Council, meeting governments not to take military Moreover, US withdrawal from
during the 52nd Pugwash action against Iraq without a UN the ABM Treaty has voided impor-
Conference in La Jolla, mandate. tant restraints preventing the
California, expresses its concern over More broadly, the shock to the weaponization of space, while the US
accelerating threats to global sustain- international system caused by the Nuclear Posture Review (to the
ability and security that will require events of September 11, 2001 still extent made public) signals alarming
intensified multinational cooperation reverberates around the world. While new trends in terms of the threat to
and the strengthening of much of the coordinated use nuclear weapons against non-
international institutions to safeguard international action to combat orga- nuclear states and the prospect of
human security. nized terrorist groups is both neces- developing new, more potentially
The most immediate of these is sary and urgent, the Pugwash usable, small yield and fissionless-
the prospect of military action Council deplores the fact that the fusion weapons. The Pugwash
against Iraq, whether carried out uni- campaign against ‘terrorism’ has Council is especially concerned that
laterally by the United States or in become an excuse for increased the latter could lead to a resumption
coalition with other countries, with- defense budgets and military deploy- of nuclear testing that would totally
out a UN mandate. A military con- ments, the curtailment of civil liber- unravel the Comprehensive Test Ban
flict in Iraq would surely cause wide- ties, and support for authoritarian and the Non-Proliferation treaties.
spread human suffering and could regimes on the part of some govern- Accordingly, the Pugwash Council
lead to political destabilization across ments and organizations. calls on all the nuclear weapon states
the entire region. The Pugwash In the nuclear field, woefully to recognize the illegality and
Council calls on the United Nations inadequate is the recently concluded immorality of nuclear weapons and
and all countries to exhaust every agreement between Presidents Bush to move expeditiously to eliminate
possible option short of military and Putin to lower American and such weapons in the near future. In
force to compel Iraq’s compliance Russian arsenals to 1,700 – 2,200 addition, a massive, broad-based
with UN Security Council resolutions deployed weapons by the year 2012. education campaign is needed to alert
to allow the return of weapons Far too many nuclear weapons will all peoples to the very real and con-
inspectors in order to certify the remain stockpiled for possible use tinuing risk of a nuclear catastrophe.
absence of efforts to develop and too few resources are being Regionally, the failure to reach a
weapons of mass destruction. It also devoted to totally eliminating excess final and just settlement between the
calls on the US and other plutonium and especially weapon- Palestinians and Israelis breeds a hor-

52nd Pugwash Conference
ture, medicine and other fields.

In all areas of human endeavor,
scientists must anticipate and evalu-
ate the full range of possible conse-
quences of scientific and technologi-
cal developments, and promote
debate and reflection on the ethical
obligations of scientists in taking
responsibility for their work.
In recalling the founding docu-
ment of Pugwash, the 1955 Russell-
Marvin Goldberger, George Rathjens, Joseph Rotblat, Ruth Adams, Herbert York. Einstein Manifesto, the Pugwash
Council appeals to the scientific com-
munity and all peoples to “remember
rendous cycle of violence between the Greater risk assessment, transparency your humanity and forget the rest” in
two peoples and could well spark a and capacity-building is also needed the continuing effort to renounce war
wider Middle East conflict. In South on the part of both industrial and and improve the human condition in
Asia, the military confrontation developing countries regarding the every region of the globe.
between India and Pakistan carries use of new biotechnologies in agricul-
with it the risk of a major conflict that
could also involve the catastrophic
use of nuclear weapons. The interna-
Goals of Pugwash in its Tenth Quinquennium:
tional community has a responsibility
2002-2007
to assist in the conclusion of equitable
settlements of both conflicts.
The need for greater and more At the beginning of each quinquen- ity by the vast destructive power of
equitable international cooperation, nium, the Pugwash Council issues a nuclear weapons, the accumulation
especially between industrial and statement relating the enduring mis- of these weapons in huge numbers in
developing countries, extends as well sion and objectives of Pugwash to its the arsenals of the United States and
to sustainable development, individual evolving agenda in the context of Russia, and their spread into the pos-
responsibility, and the role of science recent international developments. session of the United Kingdom,
and technology in promoting true The following contains the goals of France, China, India, Pakistan and
human security for all individuals. Pugwash for its Tenth Quinquen- Israel. To these ongoing challenges
Recognizing the links between the nium, from 2002 to 2007, adopted at must now be added the increased
lack of basic resources such as energy a plenary session of the 52nd Pugwash threats posed by the possible acquisi-
and water, and the potential for con- Conference at the University of tion and use of weapons of mass
flict, the Pugwash Council calls on California, San Diego, in August destruction by other states and by
the leaders meeting at the World 2002. non-state groups.
Summit on Sustainable Development Pugwash is strongly committed to
that begins August 26, 2002 in
Johannesburg, South Africa, to
implement measures to foster cooper-
T he overriding peril which preoc-
cupied the founders of Pugwash
in 1955-1957, and which has claimed
the goal of abolishing all nuclear
weapons. It is imperative that Pugwash
constantly remind the international
ation in energy research, sustainable much of the attention of Pugwash community of the immorality, illegal-
use of resources, and in achieving participants in the intervening 45 ity, and peril inherent in nuclear wea-
global greenhouse gas reductions. years, is the danger posed to human- pons, and to propose concrete steps

towards their elimination. Test Ban Treaty), proposed treaties been on the Pugwash agenda. The
Despite promising steps in the where no apparent progress is made entry into force of the Chemical
early 1990s to reduce the numbers of (Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty), and Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997
nuclear weapons, more recent devel- commitments for nuclear arms con- completed the process of the compre-
opments give rise to serious concern trol and disarmament, such as the 13 hensive prohibition of chemical and
about a reversal in this process of steps of the 2000 NPT Review biological weapons that began with
controlling, reducing and abolishing Conference, that are assumed but the Biological and Toxic Weapons
nuclear weapons. The nuclear peril, largely disregarded in practice. Most Convention (BTWC) of 1972. But
while somewhat abated, nonetheless importantly, the implementation of much remains to be done to make
persists: Article VI of the NPT that mandates these prohibitions fully effective,
• in the tens of thousands of wea- nuclear disarmament is far from especially in light of failed efforts to
pons still deployed (many in being the basis of the policy of the implement a comprehensive monitor-
rapid response alert), nuclear powers. ing and verification protocol for the
• in doctrines calling for the first Thus the Pugwash goal of reduc- BTWC. Pugwash will continue to
use of nuclear weapons, and ing and eliminating the nuclear peril contribute to efforts at strengthening
also for the possible use of will be more important than ever in the implementation and verification
nuclear weapons against non- the Tenth Quinquennium. Specific of both the CWC and BTWC.
nuclear countries, points on the Pugwash agenda will In the case of chemical and bio-
• in the presence of nuclear wea- include prescriptions for much deeper logical weapons, there is also the risk
pons in regions having a signifi- cuts in nuclear arsenals, for the effec- of proliferation to state and non-state
cant risk of conflict tive dismantlement of retired actors. This risk is enhanced by the
• in the risk of the further spread warheads, for much greater fact that some CB agents can be pro-
of nuclear weapons, transparency and control of all the duced with relatively limited means
• in the risk of theft of nuclear deployed forces and warheads in and that some of the CBW material
weapons or nuclear-weapons storage, for stronger non-prolifera- deriving from past activities of many
material from widely dispersed tion measures and verification, espe- countries is still stockpiled in precari-
and sometimes inadequately cially regarding the safety of nuclear ous conditions and its destruction
guarded stockpiles, materials, for fast disposal of fissile delayed. Pugwash is committed to the
• in the risk of the use of nuclear material, for the entry into force of prevention of the spread of any wea-
weapons by international ter- the nuclear test ban, for a stop to the pons of mass destruction and to the
rorist groups, production of new weapons and new elimination of all such weapons; this
• in the development of new types weapon-grade material, and for the applies to nuclear weapons as well as
of nuclear weapons, that may abandonment of nuclear policies that to chemical and biological weapons.
call for the resumption of allow an early use or a first use of Nuclear, chemical and biological
nuclear tests, nuclear weapons. Pugwash will also weapons do not, however, exhaust
• in the challenge to arms control consider as an essential element of the categories of weaponry that will
and strategic stability posed by the non-proliferation agenda the pre- continue to be of concern to Pugwash
the development of missile vention of the proliferation of exper- in its Tenth Quinquennium. Conven-
defenses and the deployment of tise, where nuclear weapons experts tional weapons, ranging from small
new types of weapons. may be induced to work for countries arms to antipersonnel mines to new
The whole system of nuclear arms or subnational groups wishing to high-technology weapons, are all too
control is, moreover, under strain, acquire nuclear weapons often the instruments of indiscrimi-
with treaties that are renounced by The need to reduce and eliminate nate destruction, especially for civil-
one party (the ABM Treaty), treaties the dangers posed by chemical and ians. Accordingly, the pursuit of fur-
that are not ratified (Comprehensive biological weapons has likewise long ther international monitoring and

restriction of conventional arms

development, production, and trans-
fer will remain an important priority
for Pugwash.
One of the great strengths of
Pugwash during the Cold War was
the ability to bring together scientists,
experts, and policy makers from
countries situated at opposite sides of
world politics. Through continuous,
patient work Pugwash was able to
create a climate of mutual under-
standing and trust, which eased East-
West tensions and avoided war.
Pugwash needs now to use its inter-
national membership to carry on the
same policy of bringing together sci-
entists, experts and policy makers Price Center, UC, San Diego.
belonging to countries or group of
countries divided by different percep-
tions of security, antithetical interests,
different ideologies or religious hos- and unequal access that are deplor- nologies that could endanger human-
tility of any kind. This task is particu- able in themselves and give rise to kind and the environment and exac-
larly significant for Pugwash if these despair, resentment, hostility, and erbate tension and strife in the world
potential conflicts or tensions involve violence around the world. Pugwash community.
countries that possess or may possess will continue to address this broad From weapons of mass destruc-
weapons of mass destruction as is the web of inter-related dangers, and to tion to new developments in biotech-
case in South Asia, the Middle East work for the sustainable use of nology and other sciences, Pugwash
and Northeast Asia. energy and natural resources and the will continue to stress the ethical and
At a more general level, Pugwash constraint of anthropogenic disrup- moral responsibility of scientists in
has recognized from the start the tion of climate. furthering the beneficial applications
indispensability of the goal of mini- Ways have to be found to address of their work and preventing their
mizing and finally eliminating the the causes and motivations for terror- misuse. The global community at the
incidence of war itself. As Pugwash ism, other than by military action. To start of the 21st century stands on the
has historically done in a wide variety that end, Pugwash in its Tenth threshold of an era that holds great
of contexts, this means seeking cre- Quinquennium will strengthen its promise for advancing the human
ative ways for resolving disputes efforts at finding and promoting condition. Following the dictum of
before they break out in armed con- solutions that reduce the dangerous Rabelais that “science is but the con-
flict, and for ending quickly and with gaps within and between countries. science of the soul,” it will remain the
minimum destruction those armed Pugwash will seek means of maxi- enduring task of Pugwash to ensure
conflicts that do occur. mizing the benefits of new develop- that science and technology are
It also means working to trans- ments in science and technology, and employed for the benefit of
form and reverse the conditions of conversely, of foreseeing the possible humankind, and not its destruction.
economic deprivation, environmental negative consequences of develop- [14 August 2002]
deterioration, and resource scarcity ments and applications of new tech-

Most of my life has been spent in

Presidential Address
Britain which (despite what you read
S IR M ICHAEL ATIYAH in the English tabloid press) is part of
14 August 2002
Europe. Having shrugged off its
imperial past, with its vast colonies,
A s you know I am stepping down

as President of Pugwash after
five years in office. It is natural that I
to address this last issue - that of ter-
rorism. I did so by analyzing four
case histories: Ireland, South Africa,
and having endured two major wars,
Europe is now struggling to find its
feet in the 21st century. A unique
should look back and see how the Kashmir and Palestine, to see what experiment is going on, inching hesi-
world has changed in these five years. general lessons might be learnt from tantly towards economic and politi-
Have things got worse or better, in such comparisons. The last six cal integration, while maintaining its
what ways, and how should this months have seen a slight diminution traditional variety of cultures. It will
affect the Pugwash agenda? I would of the threat of an Indo-Pakistani shortly bring together over 500 mil-
like to share my thoughts with you war, but an unfortunate escalation in lion people in an economy that will
and point the way ahead for the new the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where rival that of the United States.
officers and Council. the Old Testament injunction to Being a European I believe this is
I should emphasize that I speak in exact an “eye for an eye and a tooth a good thing and that the new
a purely personal capacity, and that for a tooth’’ is being relentlessly pur- Europe can be a bulwark for peace in
none of the officers or Council of sued. I do not think that, in either the world. But diversity will remain
Pugwash know in advance what I am case, my speech or any of the actions and there will be a wide range of
going to say. The fact that, tomorrow, of Pugwash had any influence what- opinions in those 500 million minds.
I will no longer be President encour- soever. But perhaps I should add that Although my working life has
ages a certain brash courage! I we took advantage of our personal been mainly spent in Britain I have
adopted a similar line when I gave contacts with Government Ministers lived and worked in the United States
my final Presidential Address to the in both India and Pakistan to write over long periods. Many of my pro-
Royal Society in 1995, when I letters urging caution and restraint. fessional collaborators and closest
attacked (not physically) the British Today, and since we are meeting friends are American and I have come
Nuclear Deterrent. The result of the in the United States, I would like to over for short visits on literally innu-
speech was that I was thought suit- look at the whole issue of terrorism merable occasions. In recent times,
able to become President of Pugwash. in a broader context and from a when I have applied for a US visa, I
I hasten to add that, on this occasion, global perspective. have had to fill in the very small form
I intend fully to retire and I am not As expressed so eloquently in the that is provided and one question
angling for further presidencies! UNESCO Constitution of 1945, that is asked is “Have you ever been
Although the Cold War is over “Since wars begin in the minds of in the United States before, and if so
and the threat from nuclear weapons men, so it is in the minds of men that give the dates’’. There is a small box
is subsiding the world is as far from the defences of peace must be con- for the answer, just large enough for
peace and stability as it was five years structed’’. I want to look into the me to insert the words “more than 50
ago. The problems keep changing. minds of men—of different men—to times since 1955’’. That is almost cer-
For a time we had regional conflicts search for the roots of our problems. tainly an underestimate by now.
emerging from the collapse of Since I want to look at the issue from Finally, let me revert to my child-
Communism and now we have the different geographical and political hood. My father was Lebanese, I was
events of September 11th and the vantage points I must digress to give brought up in Khartoum, had my
response to it. you a potted history of my own life, secondary education in Cairo and
At the Pugwash conference in so that you can see where my experi- Alexandria, and spent vacations with
Agra, just six months ago, I felt I had ences lie. my grandmother in Lebanon and my

Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, George Rathjens, Richard Attiyeh, Joseph Rotblat, Ana María Cetto, Jeffrey Boutwell
Aunt and Uncle in Haifa. Although gravity - a mean point, about which of the Eiffel tower and Notre Dame.
English was literally my mother things fluctuate. It is like people look- Rome offers even more choice. The
tongue I spoke fluent Arabic and of ing out of the windows of a large physical destruction together with the
course I loved Lebanese food. I left house - there are many views to be death of thousands has been com-
the Middle East when I was 16, but I seen depending on which window pared with Pearl Harbour, and so it is
have returned on various occasions you look out of. But the fact that the very understandable that it produced
and I still have close relatives in Beirut. house is in the middle of a wood or a similar reaction - this is a war and
Having a mixed background may on top of a hill affects everyone. we must unite to defeat the enemy.
not make one totally impartial but at So, after this long preamble, let But the parallels with Pearl Harbour
least it does provide a basis for a bet- me try to describe the world as cur- stop there - the Japanese were a visi-
ter understanding of different view- rently seen by the American people - bly powerful force about to embark
points. So let me use my experience we are in the United States for this on military expansion across Asia
to describe the view from these three conference, so this is the natural and the Pacific. The new enemy was
different parts of the world. Before I starting point. I might add that, ear- much harder to identify, a loose shad-
start let me emphasize one general lier this year, I spent six weeks in the owy organization blending into the
point. In every region, large or small, US and had a chance to imbibe the landscape. Afghanistan, a poor back-
there are men (and women) with very political atmosphere at first hand. ward country devastated by decades
different views, depending on their We have to begin with the events of war with Russia and internal
background, experience and individ- of September 11th and the devasta- struggles, provided the only reason-
uality. So, in strict sense, there is no tion in New York and (to a lesser ably clear target. In due course it was
such thing as “the American point of extent) in Washington. Those of you dealt with, the unloved Taliban
view’’. There is the view of the who are not American may have to regime was obliterated and the first
President, of the Democrats in be reminded what a traumatic experi- phase of the war was over.
Congress, of the media, of the opin- ence it was to see the heart of New But what happens next? The war
ion polls and of the American partici- York devastated. You have to put it on terrorism has been defined in such
pants in this conference. In such a into your own context: if you are a vague way, and the public has been
complex and varied society these may from London, imagine Big Ben or St. led to expect such a long war, that
diverge widely. Nevertheless, since Paul’s destroyed (something even there are not many options. One is to
no-one is uninfluenced by his Hitler failed to do), while Parisians increase vigilance on the home front
milieux, there tends to be a centre of may like to contemplate the collapse and vast resources are being devoted

to this objective. Foreigners may

52nd Pugwash Conference on question this use of America’s wealth,
Science and World Affairs: but if you are an American citizen it
all seems perfectly reasonable, even if
it is going to cost you more money
University of California, San Diego–La Jolla, California
and waste your time at airports. But
10–14 August 2002
this is a merely passive activity. There
Schedule is a natural inclination in a war to do
more - to search out the enemy
[Events listed in bold were open to the public] before he launches an attack. This is
Saturday, August 10: now what is expected. Find the
9:00 – 10:30: Conference Plenary (Open) – Price Center, Ballroom crooks and go after them. You line
Chair - Sec. Gen. George Rathjens
Welcoming Remarks: Ruth Adams, Marvin Goldberger and up the usual suspects, starting with
Herb York Saddam Hussein, but with secondary
Response from Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director,
Pugwash characters such as North Korea and
Pugwash Obituaries – Sir Joseph Rotblat Iran not far behind.
10:30 – 11:00: Coffee Break At this stage there is, from the
11:00 – 12:15: Conference Plenary (Open) continues American point of view, a side-issue
Chair – Sec. Gen. George Rathjens
Keynote Address – Dr. William Perry, former Secretary of that needs to be addressed. An attack
Defense on Iraq might produce a back-lash in
12:30: Lunch – Canyon Vista, Warren College the Arab world and destabilize an
14:30 – 18:00: Working Groups #1-6 Meet in Break-out Sessions
area which, with its vast oil reserves,
18:30: Dinner at Canyon Vista, Warren College
is of vital interest to the US. The Arab
20:00: Lecture in Price Center Theater:
Christopher Chyba (Stanford University) opposition might be mitigated if the
“The Asteroid/Comet Impact Hazard” Palestinian issue could be resolved in
21:00 – 22:00: Secretary General and Pugwash Council meet with national some way, but here again terrorists
Pugwash groups and members of International Student/Young
Pugwash become involved, no progress is
being made and there is an impasse.
Sunday, August 11:
Moreover, to the Israelis and to the
9:00 – 12:30: Working Groups #1-6 Meet in Break-out Sessions
Americans the Palestinian suicide
12:30: Lunch at Canyon Vista, Warren College
bombers are lumped together with
14:00 – 16:00: Concurrent Panel Discussions, Price Center
New Challenges to Climate Change Science those who flew their planes into the
Chair: Richard Somerville (Scripps Institution) Twin Towers - Islamic extremists,
Panelists: John Holdren (Harvard Univ.) and Kevin Trenberth
(NCAR) driven by a blind hatred of America
The Bioterrorist Threat: Scenarios and Responses and its friends. Similar measures in
Chair: Mark Thiemens (UCSD) response are necessary: Arafat and
Panelists: Kathryn Nixdorff (Univ. of Darmstadt), Ronald
Atlas (American Society of Microbiology) and Larry Smarr his henchmen play the role, in lower
(UCSD) key, of Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.
The Future of Nuclear Weapons
Chair: Herbert York (UCSD)
I think this is the best I can do to
Panelists: Michael May (Stanford Univ.), Air Commodore explain American attitudes to terror-
Jasjit Singh (India), and Gen. Pan Zhenqiang (China)
ism though I am conscious that some
18:30 – 20:00: Dinner at Canyon Vista, Warren College
latent scepticism may have slipped
20:00: Film/discussion in Price Center Theater: “Pakistan and India:
Under the Nuclear Shadow”, with Pervez Hoodbhoy through the net.
(Pakistan) and Jasjit Singh (India) Let me now turn to the Middle
East and try to describe the world

through the eyes of the Arabs. We

must begin by looking at the history
Schedule continued
of the 20th century.
This was the period when the
Monday, August 12:
Arabs (together with peoples in
9:00 – 12:30: Working Groups # 1-6 Meet in Break-out Sessions
Africa and Asia) were emerging from
a colonial background, first under
14:00 – 15:30: Conference Plenary (Closed) – Price Center, Ballroom
the Ottoman Empire and then under Chair: Prof. Francesco Calogero, Chair, Pugwash Council:
the British and French. Except for Presentation and affirmation of Pugwash Officers, election of
new Council Members, and adoption of Quinquennial Bylaws
Algeria this process was relatively
16:00 – 17:00: Depart by bus for San Diego Zoo
peaceful, with the Arabs adapting to,
17:30: Excursion and Dinner at San Diego Zoo
or even welcoming, the modern west- 21:00 – 22:00: Return by bus to UCSD
ern world.
However there was one major Tuesday, August 13:
exception - the creation of Israel. At 9:00 – 12:30: Conference Plenary (Closed): Brief Q&A on
Working Group Summaries
the same time as the West was with-
Chair – Prof. Ana María Cetto, Chair, Pugwash Executive
drawing from power in the region it Committee: Secretary General’s Report (George Rathjens and
Paolo Cotta-Ramusino); Discussion of Current/Future
fostered an intrusive new entity. The
Pugwash Initiatives
British Government, with its Balfour 12:30: Lunch at Canyon Vista, Warren College
Declaration, decided to support a 14:00 – 15:45: Conference Plenary (Open): “Science and Society: Public
National Home for the Jewish peo- Perceptions of Complex Scientific Issues”
Chair: Richard Attiyeh, Vice Chancellor, Research
ple, with the proviso (almost as an University of California, San Diego
after-thought) that this should not Panelists: Daniel Yankelovich, founder, Public Agenda
“Science and Society: Narrowing the Gap”
prejudice the rights of the indigenous Charles Kennel, Director, Scripps Institution
inhabitants (i.e., the Palestinians). It “Stabilizing the Climate for Climate Change Science”
was a recipe for disaster. With the 15:45 – 16:15: Coffee Break
weight of British, and subsequently 16:15 – 18:00 Conference Plenary (Open): “Islam and the West: Science,
Security and September 11”
American, backing it developed into Chair:Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino (Univ. of Milan)
a very one-sided conflict, so that now Panelists: Pervez Hoodbhoy (Univ. of Islamabad, Pakistan)
Graham Fuller (formerly, RAND Corporation)
the Palestinians are either in exile or
18:30 – 20:00: Barbeque Dinner at Canyon Vista, Warren College
live under a brutal Israeli occupation
in a small fraction of their original Wednesday, August 14:
territory. 9:00 – 10:30: Conference Plenary (Open) – Price Center, Ballroom
It should come as no surprise that Dorothy Hodgkin Memorial Lecture
Prof. M.S. Swaminathan, “Science and Achieving the Goal of
this situation has produced, in des- a Hunger-Free World”
peration, a violent reaction and led to Co-Chairs: Prof. Ana María Cetto and Sir Joseph Rotblat
10:30: Coffee Break
the growth of extremist groups.
11:00 – 12:00 Conference Plenary (Open) continues
Although it is the Palestinians Presidential Address – Sir Michael Atiyah (delivered by Prof.
who are directly affected by the cre- Richard Attiyeh)
ation and expansion of Israel all the Concluding Remarks – Secretaries General George Rathjens
and Paolo Cotta-Ramusino
Arabs (as well as the wider Muslim
world) feel deeply involved, in part Conference Participants depart
because of the religious importance
of Jerusalem. For the Arabs the con-
flict with Israel, so far from being the

America. As a European I hope it can

do more.
Europeans understand the
American need for security after the
events of September 11th but they
think the US Government is in dan-
ger of over-reacting and perhaps
embarking on a dangerous path,
which will lead to less security for us
all. In particular they do not see the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the same
light as the Americans
Having put forward these three
different world-views on the subject
of terrorism, which illustrate how
divergent they are, let me return to
La Jolla coastline.
US policy in a more general way. The
aftermath of September 11th has seen
minor side-show it is for the Ameri- and there are close contacts in partic- a seismic shift in US attitudes across a
cans, is the focal point of their world. ular with Israel at the cultural and broad band, not just on the issue of
Hostility to America has arisen, to a scientific level, there is also a good terrorism. In almost every single area,
great extent, from this single source, understanding of the Arab position: military, diplomatic, economic, envi-
and it is ultimately a large factor Lawrence of Arabia was after all an ronmental, the US has decided to go
behind the terrorist attack on New Englishman. Spain, with its long its own way. International treaties
York. Moorish heritage, has deep links with and conventions are seen as
If Americans want real security Arab civilization which will survive unacceptable restraints on US free-
nothing would enhance it more than the current skirmishes over a few dom of action. Conscious of its sole
a solution of the Israeli-Palestinian rocks in the sea. It is no coincidence superpower status, it no longer sees
problem which was acceptable to the that Madrid was the venue for the the need to take account of the views
Arab World. The outlines of such a last serious attempt at a peaceful res- of others, even of its close allies.
solution were in fact recently put for- olution of the Palestinian issue. Italy, American interests and security come
ward by Saudi Arabia and are within with its appendix of Sicily, extends first. A very cogent analysis and
the bounds of political reality, pro- close to the North African coast and explanation of this new American
vided the leaders of the western world Cyprus, which is negotiating with the policy has been given by our
have the wisdom and determination European Union, is not far from the Pugwash colleague Steve Miller, and I
to achieve them. shore of Lebanon. found his conclusions stark and
Having put into opposite poles The Arab world, or at least the daunting. A vast gulf has opened up
the American and Arab views let me Mediterranean part of it, is closer to between the United Sates and the rest
now look at Europe. As one might Europe in most respects than Latin of the world, with Europe and in par-
expect the view here is somewhere in America is to the United States. ticular Britain caught unhappily in
the middle. Europe and North Africa Europe has a really vital interest in between.
share the Mediterranean coast-line the whole region and it should have a So far all our political leaders put
and a common history. They lived key role to play in searching for a brave face on it, papering over the
together for centuries. While Israel peace. So far it has only taken tenta- cracks, emphasizing the unifying role
was primarily a European creation, tive steps, playing second fiddle to of NATO and saying that the com-

mon ground is much greater than the Finally, let me say a few words to ter world and it will be for succeed-
differences. I hope they are right, but the younger members of this ing generations to bring this about.
the arguments are not convincing. audience and in particular to the The young have energy and enthusi-
There is a danger that the US and Student Young Pugwash members asm, two vital qualities that will be
Europe are on a collision course, not who are present. I have felt it my needed for the future.
of course in a military sense, but on duty to describe some of the serious
all important economic and political problems of the world as I see them. For family reasons, Sir Michael was
issues. In doing so I may have painted too unable to attend the conference, and
When ships or aircraft are on a gloomy a picture. Our problems are his Presidential address was delivered
collision course, mishaps can be not insoluble, we can hope for a bet- by his cousin, Prof. Richard Attiyeh.
avoided by using radar and careful
steering. I am not sure what the polit-
ical equivalent of Radar is — perhaps Report of the Secretary General
it is bodies like Pugwash which can
G EORGE W. R ATHJENS
bounce ideas backwards and forwards.
13 August 2002
As for steering, political leaders come
and go and new captains may take
the helm, so I am not predicting cata-
strophe. But, as I leave Pugwash, this
divergence of world-views is to my
A s I believe most of you realize,
this will be my last report as
Pugwash Secretary General. In the
towards unilateralism.
Should we, in hopelessness, rail
against this or alternatively confine
mind the most disturbing event of circumstances, I intend to focus not our activities largely to problems in
our time. The Atlantic Ocean has on the events of the last year, but which the Bush Administration is
become much bigger. rather on those of the whole five years likely to be so little interested as to
Talking of new captains taking I have served as Secretary General, not get involved? In my view, quite
the helm brings me naturally to the weaving in comments about particu- the contrary, a point I will develop in
internal affairs of Pugwash and the lar workshops that I think might be my concluding remarks, but I feel I
fact that Professor Swaminathan of special interest. I would note here should say now that I see no basis at
from India is to be my successor. He that we have had excellent reportage this time for believing that President
will be the first Pugwash President of the work-shops during these years Bush and most of those in the next
from outside Europe and he will pre- and that many of the best papers couple of levels down in his
side at a time when Asia is playing an have been published, largely due to Administration will experience a
increasingly important role on the the work of Jeffrey Boutwell. I will in Saul-on-the-road-to-Damascus kind
world stage. With the largest popula- no sense attempt to cover all that of conversion or epiphany.
tions of the world, India and China ground. I intend to conclude with
are now emerging as major economic observations about future challenges. The International Scene:
powers and it is highly appropriate My focus will be particularly on 1997-2002
that the Pugwash President should the United States, in part because we Now, I would turn to the events of
come from this area. are meeting here, and because an the last five years, first commenting
Professor Swaminathan’s interests unusually large fraction of you are briefly on changes in the
have been primarily in fostering the from this country: mainly though international scene and then on what
Green Revolution and feeding the because it is the only super-power in Pugwash has tried to do in the con-
vast populations of Asia. He will the world and because, since the elec- text of that changing scene.
undoubtedly bring a new perspective tion of President Bush, the policies of The Cold War is over, and in my
to Pugwash and I wish him well in the American government have view, was so a dozen years ago. But
the difficult times ahead. moved so dramatically and so far this has not been fully reflected in

tive nuclear capabilities down to the

range of a dozen weapons each if the
price is the emergence of new nuclear
powers in the Far East and/or
Southwest Asia.
The other most important change
in the international scene I have
already alluded to: the emergence of
the United States as king of the hill,
with an Administration committed to
unilateralism and with a phobic reac-
tion to international arms control
and disarmament agreements, both
existing and prospective; and with a
belief in the continuing and perhaps
expanded utility of a broader range
Taking a break at the San Diego Zoo. of nuclear capabilities, not so much
for deterrence or other political pur-
important circles in the United States bility of accidents and/or prolifera- poses, as for actual use for preemp-
and Russia, and most particularly in tion with high force levels. I would tive attack including most especially
a large part of the arms control and suggest that the threshold level may against hard-to-destroy targets.
disarmament community, including be in the range of 50 deliverable wea- Consider the American
Pugwash. pons for the United States (and withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
Even as recently as in the last sev- Russia)—and perhaps as low as zero The Administration had come to
eral years we have heard and read for the U.K. and France. Others will believe, quite misguidedly in my view,
much about balanced force certainly disagree with my number of that a National Missile Defense that
reductions in Russian and American 50, but I come up with it believing would be both technically effective
nuclear stockpiles: reductions from that other states’ political-military and worth deploying could be built.
tens of thousands of nuclear decisions regarding the use of force It then decided that continuing
warheads by factors of around two are not likely to depend significantly adherence to the ABM Treaty would
and of operationally deliverable on whether the United States retains be an inhibiting factor in the realiza-
strategic nuclear warheads down to a capability of delivery of 50 nuclear tion of its objective but would have
the range of 2000 or so, as if such weapons or 2000: for example, Iraq’s no corresponding effect on Russian
reductions were militarily and politi- again taking aggressive actions aspirations—or on those of any of
cally meaningful. I, in contrast, against its neighbors. I believe, how- the other successor states to the
believe that very likely there is a ever, that at some lower level, Soviet Union. None were in a posi-
threshold of delivery capability above perhaps in the range of 10 to 20 wea- tion economically to pursue such a
which there is essentially no political pons, Japan, South Korea or Taiwan program, nor would the ABM Treaty
and/or military utility in increasing might so question the American secu- have any inhibiting effects on any
force levels—and to which there rity guarantee under which they now other nation since no others were
would be advantage in reducing them live as to decide to acquire national either parties to the Treaty nor had
because of the likelihood of reduced nuclear capabilities. And, I’m not at any apparent interest in developing
damage should nuclear weapons be all sure that that’s a happy trade-off: defenses that would be affected by it.
used destructively and because of the having the United States (and Discounting, then, the opinion of
greater cost and likely greater possi- perhaps Russia) reducing their effec- other nations—and many Americans

—the Administration could logically early 70s about limiting work on, that the American administration
conclude that the Treaty was out- and deployment of, multiple indepen- would go along with limitations
moded and disadvantageous to the dently targetable re-entry vehicles and/or reductions in arms that it
United States, while having no mean- (MIRVs), but never even got to the might not consider narrowly advan-
ingful effect on the aspirations of any point in those days of negotiations tageous to it if other parties would
other state. So, why not withdraw about them. The United States was so make concessions to American inter-
from it? far ahead that the American military ests in unrelated areas.
And, why negotiate seriously with was unwilling to foreswear what they But I do suggest that the era of
Russia—or any other state—on saw as an advantage, and the Soviets ABM/SALT/START kinds of agree-
reductions in strategic arms or, for were not interested in being frozen in ments that dominated the thinking of
that matter, about many other issues, a position of inferiority. many of us throughout the Cold War
given that other states would gener- And, if we got nowhere with these has come to an end, at least in so far
ally be far more constrained by eco- problems of asymmetry in bilateral as the United States might be
nomic and technological limitations negotiations with the Soviets, con- involved.
in what they could do than would be sider how poor the prospects must be
the United States? for serious negotiations with the The Pugwash Agenda
I would here make a side com- Russians, given the asymmetries that I turn now to the questions of criteria
ment about negotiations with the now exist; and, worse yet, how poor for deciding on the allocation of
Soviet Union at the height of the the prospects must be for progress in Pugwash’s efforts to different prob-
Cold War. We had some success in multilateral negotiations, given the lem areas.
the ABM, SALT and START negotia- classic problem of n>2 game theory:
1. Pugwash should focus on
tions, but these were all carried out the possibility of coalitions. (And this
problems of importance, and, in gen-
under very special conditions that are may be a problem even in the Indo-
eral, since it is an international orga-
unlikely to obtain at any time during Pakistani case: the possibility that
nization, on those of direct concern
at least the foreseeable future (except other significant powers might get
to more than one country. This seems
possibly as between India and involved, perhaps China siding more
so obvious as to hardly merit men-
Pakistan). There was an extraordinary or less with Pakistan and Russia
tioning.
degree of symmetry in the situation more or less with India.)
of the two superpowers. Both Does this mean that approaches 2. It should concentrate its efforts in
appeared to be able to run a competi- to arms control and disarmament areas where it has comparative
tive race in missile delivery capability through negotiated agreement are advantage over other like-minded
and neither had an effective ABM outmoded? Not quite. There is still organizations. This turns out to be a
defense capability or much prospect the possibility of agreements that are very difficult proposition or dictum
of developing one that could not be unambiguously advantageous to all for it to live by, and I think it is only
easily countered at less cost by adver- parties to them, even if the advantage fair to say that the majority of our
sary improvements in offensive capa- to some may be greater than to oth- Council members do not agree with
bilities. By analogy one might have ers. Controls on exports of some kind me on this matter. It is especially
thought that if the ABM Treaty made of weapons and/or of critical compo- troublesome that with respect to
sense, why not negotiate similar nents to third parties are examples; most nuclear weapons issues, where
treaties on anti-aircraft defense and and dealing with the problems of Pugwash once had a probable lead
anti-submarine warfare? This was loose nukes, inadequately protected over other NGOs, this is no longer
never even tried. The Soviets had too fissionable materials, and loose, the case. At least, the CISAC
much of a lead in the former and the impoverished scientists and engineers (Committee on International Security
United States too much of a lead in in Russia with weapons expertise is and Arms Control) of the US
the latter. We talked a little in the another. And, there is the possibility National Academy of Sciences and

sion at the 1997 Lillehammer confer-

ence of the American proposal that
NATO be enlarged to include
Poland, Hungary and the Czech
Republic, and the Council included
in its Lillehammer Statement a num-
ber of arguments against such an
expansion. Most of the Council—but
not all—were, I believe, opposed to
expansion; and mobilizing opposi-
tion struck me as an extraordinary
“knife-edge” opportunity for
Pugwash. All that would have been
needed to defeat the proposal was a
dissenting vote by any one out of 16
(NATO) parliaments; and how often
is Pugwash likely to have 16 shots at
Peter Buckley, Haruyo Ohnishi, Madelaine Gilinsky, killing a bad idea? So, I, with the help
Sophie Nalecz, Haifa Baramki, Sara Boutwell.
of Venance Journé, organized the
May workshop in the hope that at
the analogous group of the Russian in decades. The uncertainties about
least one parliament might be
Academy can typically mobilize world politics are just too large (and
persuaded to vote against NATO
groups with more expertise than can the personal discount rates of most of
enlargement. It was too little, too
Pugwash. (I call your attention to the us are just too high.)
late. But why had Pugwash not taken
lean participation of Russians here,
If I had more time, I would here up the issue before Lillehammer?
including the fact that only one was
get into a systematic discussion about Could it have been because of its rule
scheduled to be in the working group
criteria for measuring success of our that all important decisions must be
dealing most directly with nuclear
efforts. As it is, I will do so only made by consensus? If so, I suggest it
weapons issues—and, because of visa
episodically as I discuss a selected is a strong argument for abandoning
problems, he did not get here). The
sample of those workshops we have this rule. But I doubt that this was the
only significant areas where I think
had in the last five years. I would, reason, since I am unaware of any
we now have an unequivocal com-
though, mention that such an assess- Pugwashites except Hugh Beach and
parative advantage over other NGOs
ment is, I think, highly desirable. I myself vigorously opposing NATO
are in chemical and biological war-
have proposed, with essentially no enlargement in 1997. Was it just
fare.
receptivity, that Pugwash would ben- blindness to opportunities or general
3. Pugwash must concentrate its efit by having an audit or visiting unwillingness in the Council to
efforts generally on what I call knife- committee largely composed of non- oppose the United States?
edge problems: on decisions where Council people to review and evalu- The second Paris workshop, a
the forces on the two sides of an ate its work. Franco-British initiative, was on
argument are close to being in balance: nuclear power. I was skeptical about
problems where possible Pugwash Pugwash 1997-2002 this because I had been involved ear-
involvement might be instrumental in I will turn first to two work-shops lier in two large American studies
pushing the decision one way or the that we had in Paris in May and and a much larger 60-nation one,
other—and on a time-scale measured December 1998. and was unaware of significant new
in months or years; not one measured We had had an extensive discus- developments in the intervening

years. My skepticism was in large mer, were areas where Cuba quite turned out, a successful one, to get
measure justified. Notwithstanding clearly led the developing world. I highly qualified participants from
the participation of some very highly cite this effort here particularly these two countries, including, I
qualified people and the production because I think it the best example in believe, unprecedentedly, an Inuit
of excellent papers, which were then my experience as Secretary General woman from Greeenland who was
collected in a book, I am unaware of of follow-through to work-shops. active in opposing upgrading of the
the workshop having had any impact Jeffrey Boutwell produced the first of Thule radar. We produced an
on significant decisions by govern- our Issue Briefs, and it has been Occasional Paper based on the work-
ments or international institutions. widely distributed, including to all shop. Whether or not our efforts will
Our scale of effort was perhaps too members of Congress; and he, Ken have any impact remains to be seen.
small, but more significantly, the tim- Bridges of the Harvard Medical The second Sigtuna meeting, with
ing was, I believe, not propitious. School, and Elliot Schiffmann of the emphasis (at the Swedes’ request) on
Still, I would count the effort at least US National Cancer Institute met tactical nuclear weapons, had an
a qualified success in that we with a number of members of the US unexpected pay-off for this audience
provided an opportunity for worth- Congress and their aides to discuss in that one of the background papers
while, sophisticated exchanges the workshops and the importance of was the one you heard discussed here
between people, some of whom had terminating the US embargo of Cuba. by Mike May. On the basis of my
not been previously acquainted; and The fact that three Cubans whom we reading of it, and the exceedingly
we brought new expertise into the invited to this meeting were denied favorable reaction to it in Sigtuna, I
Pugwash fold, something I have felt visas suggests that we still have work urged Mike to present it here, and
should be an important secondary to do, but it does seem to me that our with his permission, am now trying
objective of all of our activities efforts relating to Cuba deserve high to get hearings built around it before
I turn now to two workshops that marks. We have been on the right the US Senate Foreign Relations and
we had in Havana in October 1998 side of a battle that can be won. Armed Services Committees.
and February 2001 on public health Now, brief comments on two In early September, 2001 we had
and medical research. I had initiated workshops we had in Sigtuna, another workshop, this one in Como,
these mainly as a bridge-building Sweden. The first, in October 2000, Italy, on Nuclear Stability and Missile
effort between Cuban scientists and was to inform Europeans about Defenses. With the September 11 ter-
the broader international community, American programs for anti-ballistic rorist attacks just a few days later
including particularly Americans, at a missile defenses and, most notably, to against the World Trade towers in
time when it seemed opportune. Even mobilize discussion of U.S. National New York and the Pentagon in
though the Bush Administration, Missile Defense efforts. This seemed Washington, DC, world attention
many right-wing Republicans, and sensible because the NMD proposal shifted to those events, and one can
many Miami Cubans had been seemed nonsensical to most techni- only speculate about whether the
strongly opposed to normalization of cally informed Americans and to a Como workshop had, or ever will
Cuban-American relations, sentiment number of European governments, have, any direct impact on interna-
for it was growing in the American and it seemed likely that Pugwash tional affairs. I mention the
Congress, much of the business and might, considering its large European workshop with a particular point in
agricultural communities, and among constituency, have some advantage mind. I had made a special effort to
many other Americans. It seemed like over US NGOs in trying to stop this get participants who could knowl-
another “knife-edge” opportunity. I foolish program. Moreover, it seemed edgeably discuss the domestic politics
picked public health and likely that upgrading of radar of decision-making as regards wea-
developments in the pharmaceutical stations in the UK and Greenland pons development, acquisition,
industry as topics for discussion would be important parts of the pro- deployment and use, where there are
because these, particularly the for- gram, so we made an effort, as it very powerful actors with radically

different views involved. I hit the rights. My work in this area began in are likely to be with us for as far into
jackpot, particularly as regards the the mid-1990s with a seminar that I the future as I can see. I remain
United States. We had not only Steve and Carl Kaysen organized for senior deeply troubled about the criteria for
Miller, who is always very good on graduate students at MIT. It ran for intervention, about who should be
such topics, but 5 or 6 other about three years, more-or-less con- involved, and about post-conflict
Americans with great knowledge. In currently with another effort by the reconstruction and governance.
addition, we had very informative two of us and more senior Next, I would highlight the prob-
interventions from several other participants on presenting the case lems of terrorism. With societies
countries. for a volunteer UN military force. increasingly interdependent and in
I turn now to what has been for Pugwash efforts emerged out of a many ways increasingly fragile, and
me a perplexing anomaly about our workshop in Castellón de la Plana, with means of massive destruction
work of the last five years. In, I Spain that was ostensibly to be about and disruption becoming increasingly
believe, all of the 19 annual confer- the utility of NATO. However, by the available, I have little confidence that
ences in which I have participated, time we met in early July, 1999, the the problems can be largely dealt
the working groups on nuclear wea- much-debated allied intervention in with through denial of capabilities
pons issues have always been the Kosovo had become a hot topic, and and physical protection of valued
most popular. Yet, we have had, since much of our July meeting focused on assets. I suggest that the causes of ter-
I have been Secretary General, great, this. rorism, and which kinds of actions
and increasing, difficulty, in getting This was followed by four more even merit the sobriquet, ought to get
effective, knowledgeable people from work-shops on intervention and sov- a lot more attention than they are
the nuclear weapons states, other ereignty, culminating in one in now getting by governments and
than the United States, to participate Pugwash, Nova Scotia in July 2001 NGOs, and that Pugwash can have a
in our workshops on nuclear matters. held jointly with the Canadian-man- comparative advantage in consider-
Our meeting in Moscow on Strategic aged International Commission on ing them—and those of intervention,
Stability last month is dramatically Intervention and State Sovereignty. as well—given the diversity of its
illustrative. We had no one from We had an unusually diverse group of constituency.
China, India, Pakistan or Israel; only participants in these workshops,
one each from France and the UK; most from outside the usual Pugwash Concluding Thoughts
but 12 from the United States; and circles, including notably two hard- I would close by noting that during
while many Russians participated to-get people with needed specialized the years I have been Secretary
part time, several of those with knowledge of international law. Two General we have commonly had at
whom we have had the most useful commendable volumes in our the end of the agenda for our Council
discussions in the past did not show Occasional Paper series were pub- meetings an item, “Situation in
up at all. With very little information lished in February 2000 and January Troubled Regions”, followed by a
about possible participation even up 2001. Notwithstanding our having short specific list, but I can recollect
to the day of departure for Moscow, I had four plus meetings, I see this no instance of our ever having gotten
seriously considered canceling the effort as very much a work in to this agenda item. I suggest that the
meeting. progress. Most intervention efforts Council should in the future find time
In turning to what I think are have not worked out well: to cite to do so, if necessary by extending its
some of the major programmatic extreme cases, those in the Congo in annual meetings.
areas to which I believe the Pugwash the 60s and those more recently in One of the problem areas which
Council should give urgent attention, Rwanda, Somalia and Haiti have left has not been on Pugwash’s troubled
I begin with the questions of humani- these countries in scarcely better regions agenda, but which I feel must
tarian intervention, sovereignty, shape than before the interventions be there, is sub-Sahara Africa, given
international security and human occurred. Yet, more such problems the AIDS pandemic, and that, in

recent years, internecine slaughter States might equally be in what I Humankind cannot have a better
and genocide has resulted in an enor- have characterized as a knife-edge common future without a better
mous number of fatalities; in situation: one where there is in the common present. Unsustainable life
Rwanda and the Congo alone, public, in the higher echelons of the styles on the part of a few, and unac-
roughly ten times as many as were military services and in the very ceptable poverty on the part of large
produced by the Hiroshima and evenly divided US Congress, such numbers should not continue to co-
Nagasaki bombs. strong and growing opposition to exist, if we are to achieve the new
This year, I suggested very seri- much of what the Administration Paradise referred to in the Russell –
ously, and probably without prece- would like to do that there is a real Einstein Manifesto.
dent, that, in light of the Bush possibility of many of President My initial acquaintance with the
Administration’s commitment to uni- Bush’s wishes regarding unilateralist mission of Pugwash was in 1958,
lateralist approaches to international approaches to international relations when at the second UN Conference
affairs, the United States should also and the use of force being largely on the Peaceful uses of Atomic
be included in the Pugwash list of thwarted—if war in Iraq can be fore- Energy held in Geneva, Prof. H. J.
troubled regions. stalled until after America’s mid-term Muller explained to me the purpose
But, I would now conclude my election this November. I much regret of Pugwash. Since then, I have fol-
remarks by hypothesizing that with that I did not have the wit to schedule lowed with great admiration the
its somewhat complex separation-of- for this Conference a panel discus- statements issued after Pugwash
powers kind of government and some sion on this hypothesis. Conferences, and rejoiced along with
very powerful interest groups oppos- I apologize for the length of numerous other like-minded persons
ing many aspects of the my remarks. Thank you for your the recognition given to Sir Joseph
Administration’s policies, the United attention. Rotblat and to Pugwash in 1995
through the Nobel Peace Prize.
During my tenure as President, I
Remarks by P ROF. M. S. S WAMINATHAN shall do my best to draw public and
following his election as President of the political attention to the catastrophic
consequences of the use of nuclear
Pugwash Conferences
weapons, as well as to the moral and
12 August 2002 ethical responsibility of scientists for
their inventions. Anthropogenic
I feel very humble standing before I am particularly happy that we threats to human security are increas-
you to accept the Presidency of this have at this meeting large numbers of ing day by day. In addition to the
unique organisation, considering the International Student / Young nuclear peril, we should fight the bio-
eminence of those who have occupied Pugwash members. Their participa- logical and chemical perils now
this position before. I am happy that tion helps to bridge the generation looming large on the horizon. For
Sir Joseph Rotblat, one of the gap in perceptions and priorities. human induced maladies, only
founders of this organisation is with I realize that I am the first from a human beings can find remedies. I am
us. We do miss Sir Michael Atiyah, Third World Country to be elected confident that together with our
who along with Prof. George President. This imposes on me the young Pugwash members, we can
Rathjens, has done so much during obligation to bring to your attention continue to keep Pugwash an affirm-
the past 5 years to strengthen the the threats to human security arising ing flame, and a powerful moral
contemporary relevance of Pugwash. from poverty, hunger and unemploy- force in the midst of the growing vio-
We are indebted to both of them for ment. Clean drinking water is becom- lence in the human heart we are wit-
their monumental contributions to ing a chemical curiosity in several nessing today.
the organisation. parts of the developing world. While there are many forms of

mon opportunities opened up by

modern science and technology help Working Groups
to confer on every child, woman and
man on our planet the four freedoms WG 1:
Eliminating Nuclear Weapons
which President Roosevelt advocated
• Future of US-Russian arms control
60 years ago – freedom from fear, • China, South Asia and the Middle
freedom from want, freedom of East
expression and freedom of worship. • Future of the CTBT, NPT and
I thank you again very much. goal of eliminating nuclear
M. S. Swaminathan weapons
WG 2:
M.S. Swaminathan. Prof. M.S. Swaminathan, UNESCO- Missile Defense and the
Uses of Space
Cousteau Professor in Ecotechnology
• After the ABM Treaty: NMD and
and Chairman, M.S. Swaminathan
military uses of space
threats to a sustainable human Research Foundation in Chennai, • Growing tensions between
future, we should not relax our India, has long been recognized for his military and civilian uses of space
efforts in getting a Comprehensive singular contributions to sustainable • European and international
Test Ban Treaty on all kinds of agriculture and food security, Prof. perspectives; multilateral
nuclear weapons approved by all Swaminathan helped launch the cooperation
nations by the year 2005, which “green revolution” which dramatically WG 3:
marks the 50th anniversary of the increased crop yields and converted CBW and WMD Terrorism
Russell-Einstein Manifesto, and the India from a net food importer to a • Strengthening the CWC and
60th anniversary of the dropping of food exporter. Prof. Swaminathan BTWC
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and • Terrorist use of CBW
received his Ph.D. from the School of
• Nuclear terrorism
Nagasaki. I consider the launching of Agriculture, University of Cambridge,
an Agenda 2005 programme UK, in 1952, and is the recipient of WG 4:
designed to terminate nuclear, biolog- International Governance and
numerous honorary degrees and inter- Security
ical and chemical perils forever, will national awards, including most • the phenomenon of terrorism
meet with widespread support from recently the Franklin D. Roosevelt • resources and conflict
concerned citizens worldwide who Four Freedoms Award (2000) and the • strengthening multilateral security
are all bewildered at the direction Planet and Humanity Medal of the cooperation
human civilization is taking follow- International Geographical Union WG 5:
ing the September 11, 2001, events. (2000). Globalization and Technology
We should focus our moral and intel- • equity in the global economy
lectual resources to fostering • information technology haves and
harmony within humankind and have-nots
between humankind and nature. • biotechnology and development
In all such efforts, we should keep WG 6:
in mind what Mother Theresa once Climate Change, Energy and the
said, “My work may be a drop in the Environment
• scenarios of global climate change
ocean; but the ocean will be less with
• climate change and energy needs
that missing drop”. Let us continue
(e.g., nuclear energy)
to strive to be an organisation which • policy implications of climate
helps to make a difference to human change
destiny – a destiny where the uncom-

reinforced by the events of September

REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 1
11th, were seen by many in the group
The Elimination of Nuclear Weapons as potentially presaging just such a
Jo Husbands and Sverre Lodgaard, Co-Convenors
return to a new era of weapons devel-
Tom Milne, Rapporteur
opment and proliferation.
The leaked 2002 Nuclear Posture
Eliminate or Marginalize? was painfully slow and faltering, Review and the recent Bush-Putin
Following the end of the Cold War a headway clearly was being made – nuclear arms reduction treaty, in par-
debate began between those favour- nuclear weapons were becoming less ticular, together with the Bush
ing explicit policies intended to elimi- prominent in defence planning – and Administration’s open aversion to
nate (more properly, prohibit) bodies such as Pugwash could look arms control, convey attitudes to
nuclear weapons on a timescale of ahead to the problems of moving to nuclear issues and apparent policy
practical interest, and those prefer- low numbers of nuclear weapons and directions disquieting to most if not
ring instead to seek the ‘marginaliza- eventually zero. all of the Working Group. Criticism
tion’ of nuclear weapons in world This was all well and good, but can, of course, be made of the
affairs, by which was meant the grad- the primary argument against mar- nuclear policies of many other coun-
ual de-emphasizing of nuclear wea- ginalization had always been that a tries (the continuing deployment by
pons in defence planning. Among the condition of ‘low nuclear salience’ Russia of large numbers of tactical
marginalizers were those who were would not be sustainable. Unless the nuclear weapons was deplored, for
not wholly convinced of the nuclear weapon states made a example), but in view of the domi-
desirability of a nuclear-weapon-free nuclear-weapon-free world their nant role that it plays in world affairs
world, and continued to believe that determined and explicit objective, the it was considered futile to discuss
the retention of minimum nuclear argument went, then sooner or later prospects for eliminating nuclear
forces by a few nations would be progress in disarmament would be weapons without ‘focusing intensely
beneficial to international security. derailed and the world would return on the role of the United States.’
Others believed that, as a matter of to high nuclear salience – that is to Among these attitudes and intentions
tactics, it would be unwise to concen- say, arms racing and proliferation. are the following:
trate from the outset on the goal of The precise reasons for returning to • That nuclear weapons are legiti-
zero for fear of dissipating the politi- high nuclear salience could not neces- mate weapons, which the US
cal will needed to take even the first sarily be foreseen. The point was the plans to retain in large numbers
important steps to roll back Cold more general one, that a situation in for the indefinite future.
War excesses. which nuclear weapons had been • That the US may be prepared to
There was widespread agreement, marginalized would forever be vul- use nuclear weapons in a widen-
however, on the main requirements nerable to unavoidable processes of ing range of circumstances, in
of an immediate agenda of reductions political change. The analogy could particular in operations such as
and reform of nuclear arsenals and be made with a forest fire: as long as attacks on underground mili-
operational practices. For several embers persist there would be the tary facilities, or to pre-empt or
years, in the latter part of the 1980s danger that a change of wind could respond to chemical or biologi-
and early 1990s, significant progress re-ignite the flames. cal weapons attack.
was made in reducing nuclear dan- • That the US will invest heavily
Renewed Emphasis on in its nuclear weapons
gers, culminating in the prospect of
Nuclear Weapons infrastructure; that new
the verified destruction of warheads
in the context of a prospective The acquisition of nuclear weapons warheads may be developed and
START III. While for some progress by India and Pakistan, and develop- nuclear explosion testing may
ments in US nuclear weapons policy, resume.

• That the US is unlikely to allow

itself to be constrained by exist-
ing arms control commitments,
and unlikely to engage in addi-
tional meaningful measures of
nuclear arms control and disar-
mament.
Little enthusiasm was expressed
in the Group for the Bush-Putin
Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty
(SORT), which commits each side to
reduce its strategic nuclear weapons
to 1,700-2,200 by 31 December
2012 when the treaty expires. The
general feeling was that it constituted
not much more than a ‘statement of Sverre Lodgaard, Gwyn Prins, Marie Muller.
intent to carry out actions already
planned.’ By failing to require
destruction of infrastructure, delivery The nuclear confrontation in argued that this might be easier to
vehicles or warheads, moreover, and South Asia is, of course, of more achieve than an agreement on no first
specifying no schedule of reductions immediate grave concern. There has use of nuclear weapons, which
between now and the treaty’s expiry been an apparent willingness on both Pakistan would find difficult to
date, the US has effectively aban- sides to take enormous risks since accept, although India has set out its
doned the bilateral process of verified nuclear weapons were introduced long-term intention to deploy land,
nuclear disarmament that had been into the region, with nuclear threats sea and air-based nuclear forces.
developing through the INF and being made during periods of great In briefly discussing the situation
START agreements and which, it had tension that have seen massive and in Iraq, the Group stressed the
been hoped, would eventually sustained military confrontation urgency of bringing the UN weapons
broaden to include the other nuclear along a long border. The possibility inspectors back to the country. In
weapon states. Similarly, by flouting that a conventional war could esca- varying degrees, those who expressed
several of the ‘steps towards disarma- late to nuclear use clearly cannot be an opinion warned against the grave
ment’ agreed at the 2000 NPT discounted. risks of a military attack to change
Review Conference – for example, in Tensions have diminished from the Iraqi regime.
developing ballistic missile defence, the most recent crisis point in the
withdrawing support for the compre- spring of this year, but the presence Recommitment to Nuclear
hensive test ban, and planning under of nuclear weapons means that the Disarmament
SORT to retain thousands of intact situation is still very dangerous and a While regretting the content and tone
warheads and warhead components further ‘cooling off period’ is needed. of recent US policy, not everyone in
in reserve, thus ensuring that reduc- There was some discussion in the the group was inclined to draw the
tions being made to the US arsenal group of measures that might be taken same conclusions about the appropri-
can rapidly be reversed – US policy- to reduce the nuclear risks, including ate way to respond. There were
making would appear now to disre- an agreement on non-deployment of some, for instance, who cautioned
gard almost entirely the obligation nuclear forces given that neither against exaggerating the significance
(‘unequivocal undertaking’) to dis- nation yet deploys nuclear weapons of current adverse developments; tak-
arm under Article VI of the NPT. on a routine operational basis. It was ing a longer-term perspective, the role

of nuclear weapons may still be seen elimination of nuclear weapons, and (2) that Pugwash study the means
to be diminishing and the nuclear together with the broadest possible to strengthen enforcement of the
establishment atrophying, they coalition of like-minded bodies non-proliferation provisions of the
argued. While it would have been launch a campaign aimed at rekin- NPT;
preferable had the SORT agreement dling public interest in the nuclear (3) that Pugwash study the means
provided for the destruction rather issue. First and foremost this should to foster the development of nuclear-
than storage of decommissioned be because reliance on nuclear wea- weapon-free zones, as well as any
nuclear weapons, the treaty does at pons is immoral. They are the worst other supplementary regional
least prescribe a continuing reduction of all weapons, carrying a unique arrangements, including, for exam-
of deployed weapons and, in this threat to civilization. Second, it ple, zones fee of weapons of mass
respect, should be welcomed. should be on the basis that nations destruction; and
Similarly, although the NPR might be must adhere to international law, (4) that Pugwash provide a source
‘needlessly imprudent,’ the including the obligations undertaken of innovative thinking on means to
recommendations that it makes will under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation increase multilateral and
not necessarily be put into practice. Treaty in particular. In the meanwhile international cooperation in the
After all, it seems hard to understand what should be sought is a consensus nuclear field, including but not lim-
why the US would want to widen the that the sole legitimate purpose of ited to a revitalization of the
role of nuclear weapons (the great nuclear weapons, for as long as Conference on Disarmament, and
potential equalizers) when, as nations retain them, is to deter the covering areas such as de-alerting of
demonstrated in recent wars, it has use of nuclear weapons by others, nuclear weapons, global material
quite unrivalled conventional mili- which is to say attempts should be controls and accounting, anti-terror-
tary capabilities. A similar point was made to persuade each of the nuclear ism, and the science and technology
made about the decision of India to weapon states to announce policies underlying verification and other
develop and deploy nuclear weapons, of no first use. aspects of nuclear arms control, non-
given the likelihood that Pakistan Nothing will be accomplished if proliferation and disarmament.
would do the same. further proliferation of nuclear wea- If the conclusions reached by this
But this was not the prevailing pons is not prevented. A key function group are accepted, then logically
sentiment in the group. The wider of Pugwash, therefore, should be to Pugwash would hold a continuing
view was that the actions of the US, help provide the ideas, research and series of workshops on nuclear forces
India and Pakistan among others argumentation needed to protect, debating these and other issues, and
could best be explained as evidence strengthen and revitalize the global aimed at achieving a nuclear-weapon-
of a continuing belief in the value of non-proliferation regime. Among the free world, comparable to those con-
nuclear weapons as a source of secu- suggestions put forward in the group cerned with nuclear arms limitation
rity. Longstanding fundamental ques- for Pugwash activities in this respect and control held in the Cold War
tions about the utility and legitimacy were the following: period.
of nuclear weapons remain unresolved. (1) that Pugwash does all that it
Until these issues are addressed, dis- can to ensure that there is not a
cussion of the details of nuclear wea- resumption of nuclear explosion test-
pons policy will be peripheral and, ing by any nation (should the United
ultimately, ineffective. States begin to test again, for exam-
In this context there were a num- ple, then this would almost certainly
ber of impassioned pleas, which be followed by testing by other
found a resonance in the group as a nations with potentially extremely
whole, amounting to a call for adverse consequences for arms con-
Pugwash to recommit itself to the trol and disarmament);

lasers, trans-atmospheric vehicles,

“brilliant pebbles,” and others. It
Missile Defenses and the Uses of Space was observed that the Commission to
Catherine Kelleher and Jasjit Singh, Co-Convenors:
Assess United States National
Götz Neuneck, Rapporteur
Security Space Management and
Organization, which was chaired by
T he Working Group on Missile

Defenses and the Uses of Space
was composed of 22 members from
If U.S. plans were to be realized, it
would pose an enormous challenge
not only for potential US adversaries,
Donald Rumsfeld prior to his becom-
ing Secretary of Defense, echoed
more extreme formulations with its
11 countries. The discussion focused but also for the commercial space call for the “development of doctrine,
on the status of U.S. plans to develop industry. The treaty prohibited the concepts of operations and capabili-
and deploy both theater and national testing and deployment of not only ties for space, including weapons sys-
missile defense systems, the linkage sensors in space, but also space-based tems that operate in space and that
of those systems to the increasing interceptors which have also an anti- can defend assets in orbit.”
danger of the weaponization of outer satellite capability. The distinction Despite all efforts to push
space, the possible consequences for between ABM and ASAT systems has forward the weaponization of space
future civilian space activities, and now been lost and a new treaty-based by a small group of space advocates,
the prospects of future space arms definition is urgently needed. it is not yet the policy of the U.S. to
control measures. There was in gen- In the absence of such an agree- weaponize space. Nevertheless fund-
eral a high level of consensus within ment, the United States and subse- ing for the kinetic energy ASAT and
the group. quently other nations with access to the space-based laser continues,
The group started with an analy- space are free to test and deploy albeit on a limited level. A more
sis of the technologies and wider space weapons. It is feared that this aggressive program is conceivable.
implications of the current U.S. process could result in a costly and A discussion about the relation of
administration’s declared plans, dangerous arms race in space. offensive and defensive technologies
which include the placement of strike It was noted that advocacy for in space was conducted. It was sug-
weapons in space. Space weapons are space weapons in the United States gested not only that is it difficult to
on the one hand devices deployed in has picked up increasing momentum distinguish between offensive and
space whose mission is to destroy or despite the huge technical, financial defensive weapons in space but also
permanently disable satellites or tar- and political obstacles that have pre- that weapons for destroying satellites
gets on land, air, sea or space. On the vented the development of these wea- are likely to be less costly and more
other hand, they comprise weapons pons to date. A small group of space effective than weapons for defending
on the ground, at sea, or in the air enthusiasts, especially in the U.S. assets in space. In such a context,
that target satellites, inevitably Space Command, have envisioned many countries could interpret the
including exoatmospheric ballistic missions and technologies for con- placement of defensive weapons in
missile defenses into the subject. trolling outright the use of space and space as an offensive move and
The demise of the ABM Treaty using the domain of space as a would consider in advance the use of
removed important restrictions on medium for the direct application of countermeasures. The result would
the deployment of weapons in space. military force. A fanciful set of exotic be a competitive weaponization of
Current U.S. plans for a multi-tiered weapons underlies the aspirations of space. Today there are no strike wea-
missile defense system include not these “space fundamentalists,” and pons in space. However, it should be
only previously prohibited space- there is a wide range of weapons con- recognized that perceptions of the
based components but also an inher- ceivable (if still technically intentions of others, rather than tech-
ent capability to destroy from the infeasible): maneuverable kill vehi- nical capabilities, will drive the future
ground satellites in low-earth orbits. cles, space mines, parasite satellites, planning of various states with ambi-

tions in space and trigger new R&D regulations revealed that the provi- ing” capabilities must be the next
in this field. sions apply to specific military activi- major focus of the arms control com-
Many participants expressed the ties, but do not prohibit the deploy- munity. One key issue is finding an
fear that the vision of a small group ment, operation, and the use of appropriate forum for developing
of “space warriors” could lead to a conventional weapons in and from new space regulations. Another is
condition of U.S. supremacy in space. space. The preamble of the 1967 finding arms-control allies in the mil-
The U.S. might develop the capability Outer Space Treaty (OST) recognizes itary as well in the space industry and
to intervene anywhere on the planet the common interest in the use of in space-faring nations including
from space if these plans were to outer space for peaceful purposes and Russia, China, Canada, France,
materialize. US domination of space prohibits the orbiting around the Germany, Sweden Japan, Brazil or
could result in a feeling of helpless- earth, and the stationing in outer others—perhaps even within the
ness and degradation for many coun- space of weapons of mass destruc- United States. The current body of
tries. In some states this would trig- tion. The 1963 Partial Test Ban space law needs to adapt to the cur-
ger a call for counteractions. Other Treaty prohibits nuclear weapon tests rent political situation and to the new
countries and their space industries “or any other nuclear explosions” in technological realities.
could become totally dependent on outer space. The OST did not define Another subject of the group was
the United States. There was consid- the term “space weapon,” though the threat and the vulnerability of
erable skepticism in the group that this might now be an advantage space assets. Satellites are certainly
such dominance would be feasible, because it provides room for intro- fragile against other high-velocity
but even the perception of such steps ducing new definitions. By asserting objects in space. Geosynchronous
could cause harm in the international that space belongs to everyone, the orbit can be “poisoned,” but doing
relations. OST builds a strong norm against the so would take time, resources, and
Often it is argued that the domination of space by one power. determination.
medium of space is comparable to The OST was signed by Most of the scenarios that are
that of the sea, where navies with a approximately 100 countries and mentioned in US planning documents
variety of weapons for offense and constitutes an important barrier as justification for weapons develop-
defense have long been present. This against the deployment of nuclear ment are highly unlikely and can be
picture seems to be seductive but weapons in space. The regime should matched with different measures. A
does not hold up to deeper analysis. be strengthened. “space Pearl Harbor” is an unjusti-
Behavior at sea is also regulated by It was generally agreed that the fied exaggeration. A space system
the international law of the sea. It US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty consists of several ground stations
should be clear that space is different: created urgent need for a new system with uplink and downlink connec-
No country “owns” space; unlike the to regulate the peaceful use of space. tions to a space segment. It is more
sea, space is not a medium for trans- Although individual proposals exist, than an single object. The threat of
porting goods, but rather one for the arms control community should physical attack on ground stations by
transmitting information; and the devote more time, creativity and states or terrorists might be conceiv-
loss of assets at sea is not likely to awareness to work out new regula- able, but the best protection would
have consequences of a magnitude tions for space arms control. A efficient safeguards on the ground of
comparable to the loss of assets in revival of the ABM-treaty or any sim- key facilities. Communications satel-
space. A closer analogy to space ilar initiative is quite unlikely as long lites are mostly in geostationary
might be Antarctica, where the major as the present US administration orbits and are safe given present tech-
powers have agreed to share respon- remains in office. A new government nologies. With regard to space
sibility for its safekeeping, and have with interest in arms control might launchers which are necessary to hit
pledged not to place weapons there. come to other conclusions. Active, satellites in space, only a threat from
An examination of existing space anti-satellite platforms with “shoot- major space-faring nations seems to

be possible. Conventional ASATs such as the Airborne or Space Based well as the regional and global conse-
against GEO satellites are not easy to Laser could not only deny the access quences for nuclear disarmament and
field and need much time for maneu- to space by shooting down space arms control. The group could start
vering and testing. Many in the launchers but could also intercept with a workshop that would include
group felt that a threat to satellites is satellites. The “Brilliant Pebbles” not only scientists and policy experts
remote and reminiscent of claims concept which consists of some 1500 from like-minded nations but also
about the long-range ballistic missile satellites could either be used for mis- officials from the space industry and
threat. sile defense or as an attack system to the military. One participant
While the threat of ASAT wea- destroy satellites in orbit. proposed that the chairman of such a
pons is remote, payload verification The implications of BMD for group should not be from Russia,
and the notification of launches and nuclear deterrence and for regions China or the United States. The
satellites were believed by many to be such as South or South East Asia group welcomed a paper by the
problems that were not insoluable. were also discussed. Missile defense Student Pugwash-Group that
One advantage of space is its trans- can turn defense into offense and outlined their vision of the problem
parency. Satellites emit a lot of data. might trigger new arms races in dif- and proposed a full set of concrete
Not only would “killer satellites” ferent regions. For the regional con- steps. Pugwash should emphasize the
look quite different given their func- text, the situation for countries such space issue in their Goals for the
tion and data flows, they would have as Japan, India or China is more tenth Quinquennium. Pugwash
to be tested, which could be complicated, if the U.S. deploys should be also be present at the
observed. Theater Missile Defenses. The combi- “Space Policy Summit” in Houston,
On the issue of testing ASAT wea- nation of missile defense, space sup- USA in October 2002. The next
pons, the issue of debris was port and the ideas of the “Nuclear Pugwash conference in Halifax,
discussed. Testing or launch failures Posture Review” will increase the Canada should establish the working
or accidents would aggravate the risk of the use of nuclear weapons in group on the subject.
threat for civilian satellites in low local conflicts. (2) Regarding options, the “easy-
earth orbits. The working group session ended to-handle” proposal would an
The group also considered the with several proposals and amendment to the Outer Space
implications of the US plans to recommendations for future work Treaty which should prohibit the
deploy ballistic missile defense sys- and action: placing in orbit of any kind of
tems for space arms control. The (1) With respect to actions for weapon, not only objects carrying
planned land or sea based intercep- Pugwash, it was recommended that nuclear weapons or other WMD, as
tors are also capable of intercepting Pugwash should become more deeply it is the case today. Many countries
satellites in LEO. There are strong engaged with the problem of the have signed the Treaty and this
arguments, that the planned U.S. weaponization of outer space. There amendment would increase the pres-
midcourse missile defense system will was unanimous support for the idea sure on the U.S. to abide by the prin-
not work, or if it works, it will not be that Pugwash establishs a continuing ciple of the treaty, which recognizes
efficient. It seems to be also clear that working group to study the subject in the common interest in the use of
the BM threat is not ballistic, but depth. The group should examine outer space for peaceful purposes. An
stems from nuclear weapons or other issues such as the nature of the ballis- exclusion of the United States should
WMD delivered by simple carriers tic missile threat, missile defense and optimally be avoided. The so-called
such as ships or cars. The group felt its linkage to outer space activities, Registration Convention of 1976
that an invincible Maginot-line in the the dual-use problem, future space which provides for the recording of
sky and in space is illusionary and threat scenarios and their likelihood, all space objects launched from earth,
creates a false sense of security. the possibility for a space arms con- which is adhered to by over 40 states,
Future intercept-technologies, trol treaty or “rules of the road,” as should be expanded.

(3) Another concrete step favored • to help less developed countries cal moment urgent action is needed.
by the working group would be an to achieve access to space for Pugwash can and should contribute
effort to internationalize the agree- peaceful purposes. to this by informing the public and
ment on non-interference with In addition, the United Nations the parliaments about the danger of
“peaceful” assets orbiting in space, General Assembly should also accel- space weaponization. Again, the
enlarging upon the thirty-year old erate its efforts to maintain space as a group thinks that no state has the
examples contained in the SALT and domain free of weapons. A caucus of right to put arms into space. Space
START dealing with the protection of state parties to the OST this fall in belongs to all mankind and should
“National Technical Means.” This NY during the General Assembly only be used for peaceful and scien-
effort could perhaps take the form of should enable a first discussion of the tific purposes, international coopera-
an United Nations Resolution. above proposed elements. tion and the prevention of conflicts.
(4) Concerning the international Having discussed space policies A costly arms race in space can be
level and the appropriate fora, a set and the possible future danger of an avoided if decisive steps by the inter-
of ideas for strengthening existing arms race in space the group came to national community are starting now.
treaties were discussed. First, there is the conclusion that in this very criti-
some hope but not much confidence
that the CD would overcome its
stalemate. The new joint Chinese- REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 3
Russian working paper was CBW and WMD Terrorism

welcomed as a useful starting point Robin Coupland and Judith Reppy, Co-convenors
for a fruitful discussion on the sub- Clayton Nall, Rapporteur
ject. Second, there was a proposal to
initiate an Ottawa-II Process, mod-
eled after the Landmine treaty to
establish an international movement
W orking Group 3 discussed the
strengthening of chemical and
biological arms control treaties, as
Convention (CWC), which just had
its fifth anniversary. Currently, 174
states have signed the treaty, and 145
for the prevention of an arms race in well as chemical, biological, and have ratified it, testifying to the pop-
Outer Space. Such a conference could nuclear terrorism. The group decided ularity of complete chemical disarma-
start with a common statement to that the best way to discuss these top- ment. The treaty is a watershed in
create common set of principles and ics in the sessions allotted was to disarmament verification, especially
standards. Like-minded governments, hold five largely separate discussions in terms of its on-site inspection pro-
NGOs, and representatives from the on the following issues: visions administered by the
space industry could elaborate • Strengthening the Chemical Organization for the Prohibition of
details. A goal for the future is cer- Weapons Convention (CWC) Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
tainly a comprehensive and • Strengthening the Biological and However, States Parties must solve a
freestanding treaty that would forbid Toxin Weapons Convention range of implementation challenges if
attack vehicles in space and weapons (BTWC) the treaty is to function effectively at
against space objects and include ver- • Preventing chemical terrorism prohibiting chemical weapons.
ification measures. Additionally, an • Preventing biological terrorism One working group presentation
international space agency could be • Preventing nuclear terrorism. identified three far-reaching imple-
founded mentation problems that have arisen
• to bring international capabili- Strengthening the Chemical since the treaty’s entry into force:
ties such as PAXSAT into Outer Weapons Convention noncompliance of certain states with
Space, The discussion began with a presen- the treaty’s verification provisions,
• to regulate and maintain space tation on the implementation prob- the predicted failure of certain states
traffic and lems under the Chemical Weapons to meet an ambitious April 2007

pants repeated three major points.

First, the treaty’s near-term responsi-
bility is to ensure destruction of
declared stockpiles, and to make every
effort to do as much as possible before
2007, especially in Russia. Second,
participants said that emphasis should
be shifted from routine inspections,
many of which could be carried out
with automatic monitoring equipment
such as that employed by UNSCOM.
It was observed that this would free
resources for challenge inspections
and more direct challenges to treaty
Pan Zhenqiang, M.S. Swaminathan, Chen Jifeng. violators. Third, on a range of issues
participants encouraged States
Parties to adopt a more scrupulous
deadline to destroy their CW stock- orously in treaty interpretation. interpretation of treaty provisions
piles, and atrophy of various treaty The GPC was central to one point ranging from the General Purpose
provisions because individual States of concern raised about research on Criterion to the loophole provided
Parties have not used them. so-called non-lethal weapons for “riot control agents.”
Several states have not complied (NLWs), including sedatives, retching It was observed that at least one
fully with the CWC’s provisions. The agents, and psychoactive substances. positive development has emerged
United States, for example, was cited While the treaty does allow for use of from the CWC: the chemical indus-
as ratifying the CWC with significant riot-control agents in non-combat try’s support for the treaty regime.
conditions. This sets a poor example and law-enforcement situations, the This support persists, and appears
and precedent that other states may US appears to give itself the benefit of critical to the success of any treaty
follow or exploit politically. Many the doubt when interpreting the where dual-use dilemmas may emerge.
states have yet to create a National treaty, potentially allowing for the
Authority for domestic implementa- use of such agents in operations other Strengthening the Biological
tion of the treaty. Such noncompli- than war. Some group members were and Toxin Weapons
ance undermines the treaty. aghast at such developments, saying Convention (BTWC)
It was noted that neglect of cer- they undermine treaties and that the Discussion on strengthening the
tain provisions has weakened the “non-lethal” label is scientifically BTWC focused not only on the need
treaty regime. Challenge inspections unsound in any case. Others were for such a regime, but also on new
have not occurred, yet were to have more open to NLWs, noting their biotechnology developments that, if
provided teeth to the CWC’s verifica- potential practicality in peacekeeping left unfettered, could imperil the
tion regime. They serve as a contrac- and other military operations where BTWC altogether. As with the CWC,
tual obligation that requires states to armed individuals could be hiding in less-than-scrupulous interpretation of
operate inside the treaty’s institutions crowded areas or using hostages as treaty loopholes by States Parties was
to pursue evidence of accused pro- human shields. cited as a problem that could be a
grams. Similarly, the General Purpose A range of proposed remedies “treaty breaker.”
Criterion (GPC), a catchall for con- arose from this discussion. While no This discussion seemed based on
trol of agents not scheduled under the particular proposal received a stamp the assumption that little progress
convention, has not been applied vig- of approval from the group, partici- will occur when the Fifth BTWC

Review Conference resumes in tions on the discrete organic chemical elicit support of industries that would
November. The United States’ rejec- (DOC) plants that employ biotech- be affected, especially by winning
tion of the Draft Protocol and its nology to produce toxic chemicals. A support of such groups as the
attempt to terminate the Ad Hoc BTWC monitoring protocol could Pharmaceutical Researchers and
Group’s mandate have left a leader- also take the risks of new develop- Manufacturers of America. Such sup-
ship vacuum in Geneva. Given this, ments into account. port may require compromises, but it
few new measures are expected Confronted with these thorny was offered that useful provisions,
besides limited biosafety and issues, participants noted that certain including green-light challenge
biocriminality measures of the type false dichotomies muddle efforts to inspections and disease outbreak
backed by the US and the UK. It was bring substances under treaty con- investigations, might be accepted by
argued that these proposals, which trol. One is the “lethal weapon” ver- industry. Inconsistencies in inspection
are limited in scope, will be a useful sus “non-lethal weapon” dichotomy. requirements would still have to be
basis for moving forward, but do not A group member noted that no worked out—sectors from brewing
constitute an adequate protocol in chemical agent could be called non- to pharmaceuticals to education
themselves. lethal, since lethality is ultimately a would likely be affected by BTWC
The group focused a great deal on function of the dose administered. inspections.
emerging concerns. Among these was Others questioned this dichotomy on A widespread feeling prevailed
the threat from new biochemical the grounds that non-lethal that little progress will take place
techniques that could create a host of substances not only would be indis- without increased US involvement.
new weaponizable toxins. Using tinguishable from lethal agents in real Many group members dismissed the
combinatorial techniques, industry is time, but also would almost certainly idea of attempting an Ottawa-type
now screening 3 million chemicals be employed in tandem with lethal process in lieu of US leadership.
per year; 50,000 of which are found weapons, a clear violation of human-
to have highly toxic properties. Such itarian principles. Another problem- Chemical and Biological
techniques also yield “non-lethal” atic dichotomy is the provision in the Terrorism
agents that could be weaponized. treaty distinguishing between offen- The group was uncomfortable with
Unfortunately, the technology’s sive and defensive purposes for pos- the word “terrorism,” believing that
potential use for toxin synthesis pre- sessing biological agents. Under the it requires careful definition. Group
sents another major challenge to both treaty, States Parties are able to con- members did acknowledge that “ter-
CWC and BTWC verification. duct activities that are indistinguish- rorism” does usually encompass a
Another group member raised con- able from offensive research and manifestation of politically or ideo-
cerns about recombinant DNA development but for the stated intent. logically driven violence. It was gen-
experiments, citing a research study US biodefense activities are particu- erally also used as a term of reference
in which a recombinant mouse larly troubling in this regard. for the use of weapons against a pop-
poxvirus designed to serve as a deliv- Group members suggested a few ulation outside of a recognized com-
ery vehicle for contraceptive gene steps to get BTWC verification back bat situation. Rather than debating
therapy for rodent control was inad- on track. One proposed measure was definitions, the group deliberated on
vertently converted into a fatal to use the British Green Paper on the motivations for chemical and bio-
pathogen. Abuse of genomics BTWC verification, which summa- logical weapons use and the effects of
research is also a concern. rizes a number of politically viable such weapons.
In light of the potential misuse of options, as a basis for moving Shying from the term “terrorism,”
this new technology, it was proposed forward. The Ad Hoc Group remains an analytical framework of armed
that these activities be regulated a suitable forum for discussing a pro- violence was introduced as the basis
under existing treaties. Under the tocol. Even more critically, support- for discussion. This framework was
CWC, the OPCW could focus inspec- ers of a strong BTWC protocol must meant to serve as a model to identify

the chain of events that would con- manifestations of unconventional their effects will not differ as signifi-
tribute to a chemical or biological weapons use. The group questioned cantly from one victim to another.
attack, or, for that matter, any violent the value of labeling weapons types Also, some chemical agents, such as
act and measure its effects. Four key according to the damage caused. chlorine and cyanide, are more man-
determinants are at play in this Nor can effects simply be measured ageable and more accessible than BW.
framework: in terms of physical damage. Terror Some proposals to address the
• The potential of the weapon to thrives on ignorance and sensational- terror threat did come out of the
cause the desired effect ism, both of which were served in working group. One was for states to
heaping portions following September prepare for attacks by strengthening
• The number of potential users
11. Thus, an effect of anthrax letters public health and educating public in
armed
was not only the people killed and order to mitigate psychological
• The vulnerability of the victim(s)
the buildings quarantined, but also effects of terror attacks. This would
• The psychological potential for vio- the widespread fear that any letter entail expanded epidemiological
lence. among billions could contain anthrax research and monitoring as well.
Each of these determinants is to spores. Another noted consequence Another measure is for states to sign
some degree a function of the others. of the media feeding frenzy over the on to treaties establishing stiff penal-
Two simple concepts make this anthrax scare was an erosion of the ties for biological weapons posses-
framework useful. First, if any of norm against BW use. sion and use and maintaining tight
these factors is measured at zero, Working group members agreed control over pathogens. Participants
there will be no violent effect. that several “bioterror” scenarios are also agreed on a treaty requiring
Secondly, the psychological potential cause for grave concern. For exam- states to establish stiff criminal penal-
for violence is shaped by an individ- ple, it was accepted that the deliber- ties for possession and use of illicit
ual’s perception of the other three ate release of smallpox or any other biological agents.
determinants. This framework was highly contagious and fatal disease
presented as a useful way, for exam- would be a crime against humanity Nuclear Terrorism
ple, to assess the sending of anthrax potentially leading to hundreds of Nuclear terrorism presents a range of
letters in the US last fall. Participants thousands, if not millions of deaths. unique problems that the group
took this model as a point of depar- The deliberate release of a vaccine- determined would be worth longer
ture to address the likelihood of use resistant contagion is also worrying. discussion. Nuclear terrorism encom-
and the likely effects of biological or At the same time, participants noted passes the range of threats involving
chemical weapons. that no use of BW would be able to nuclear materials. Roughly in order
The question of the effects of destroy human civilization, although of increase threat level, these are:
CBW use, and their resulting attrac- it is feasible that some pathogens • Radioactive dispersion devices
tiveness to non-state actors, was dis- could cause 90 percent fatality rates,
• Attacks on nuclear power installa-
cussed. Participants agreed that leading to a crisis unprecedented in
tions
chemical and biological weapons human history.
• Acquisition or use of nuclear mate-
have a spectrum of effects, most of Non-state use of chemical wea-
rials suitable for use in functioning
which could not be termed “mass pons prompted less discussion. While
nuclear explosive devices
destruction.” Even the term “mass they would cause significant localized
destruction,” it was said, creates damage, they were not treated as a • Acquisition or use of intact nuclear
problems. How does one compare “megaterrorism” threat, to quote one weapons.
the effects of deliberately released participant. Participants said that The problem with the current
smallpox, which could kill millions, CW remained a threat, particularly response, especially from the United
and the more intense local effect of a because they can be targeted more States, to this four-fold threat is that
nuclear explosion? These are but two easily than biological agents, and it is not the product of an effort to

consider or compare the full range of Recommendations for next ten years. The moneys under the
nuclear terrorist threats. Participants comprehensive action against G8 commitment could also occur
argued that we must decide which nuclear terrorism through debt reduction linked to
threats will be a priority. The first two threats listed—radio- Russian nonproliferation support.
For example, the first threat, logical attacks and nuclear Participants noted that the EU also
radioactive dispersal devices (RDDs), sabotage—merit attention, but could deserved strong criticism for its fail-
is more psychological than physical. be addressed primarily by immediate ure to fund CTR efforts in the former
The second, sabotage of nuclear safety measures and a public infor- Soviet Union. It was strongly urged
power installations, is not a mation campaign. In the short-term, that more money should go to accel-
hypothetical threat, given cases of screening of personnel could begin erating HEU downblending.
sabotage in the former Soviet Union. immediately at the world’s nuclear On the international legal level, a
In one instance, a nuclear facility was facilities. In the intermediate term, draft convention against nuclear ter-
subject to blackmail, in another, a fissile material controls should be rorism has been tabled by Russia.
plant security system was faced a enacted, as should controls on other Other conventions apply to nuclear
planned computer virus attack. This radiological materials. One such pro- safety, each of which could be a part
threat is most acute where reactors posal suggested that an international of the comprehensive plan of action.
are in urban areas. Russian agency could be assigned to control
blueprints for a maritime mobile of radioactive materials, especially in Openness in Science
power reactor based on highly the nuclear fuel cycle. To conclude discussion, participants
enriched uranium (HEU) naval reac- Tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) questioned whether the technical fea-
tors are also problematic. The safety are vulnerable to theft. One partici- sibility of chemical, nuclear, or bio-
of facilities in Pakistan and India also pant said that more cooperative logical attacks should be explained in
prompted concern. threat reduction funds, both from the public fora. Participants agreed that
The third category, theft of fissile US Nunn-Lugar program and foreign responsible and realistic communica-
material, was also raised as a real governments, should go to TNW dis- tion with the public is crucial before
concern, given its usefulness in fash- mantling. In fact, the US and Russia and after predictable unconventional
ioning a working nuclear device. In should adhere to their 1991 and weapons events. When properly
fact, it is a key choke point in nuclear 1992 agreements to take such wea- informed, people will be less likely to
weapons production. HEU can be pons out of deployment. panic over small threats. And if such
easily incorporated into a crude gun- The Nunn-Lugar programs an event happens to be severe, then
type nuclear device. However, pro- received universal acclaim for their the public still benefits from access to
grams to downblend HEU to a sub- role in addressing the nuclear terror- scientific knowledge by knowing
weapons-grade level are moving ism threat in the former Soviet Union how to respond.
slowly. and as a model for international ini- The group generally concluded
Fourth and finally, acquisition of tiatives against the global nuclear ter- that the full spectrum of threats from
functional nuclear weapons is a grave rorism threat. The group lauded the nuclear, chemical, and biological
concern. Thousands of tactical US political commitment at the G8 to weapons demands a domestic com-
nuclear weapons are in storage and move forward with funding for CTR mitment from governments and a
not well protected, especially in for at least another decade. However, shared international response.
Russia. Yet these weapons, which this commitment to funding is
pose the greatest proliferation threat, marred by tricky accounting where
are not subject to any legally binding funds already committed to CTR are
transparency or verification mecha- being counted as “new commit-
nism that could ensure their security. ments” to nonproliferation over the

massive destruction by strategic

bombing. States normally have a
International Governance and Security monopoly on the use of force, but
Ochieng Adala and Lynn Eden, Co-Convenors
under normal circumstances this use
John Avery, Rapporteur
of force is constrained by the safe-
guards of law and the principles of
human rights. When states act out-
W orking Group 4 focused on and the purpose politically moti-
three issues: (1) The phenom- vated. However the majority of the side the law, it was felt, they act as
enon of terrorism; (2) Resources and group members felt that limiting the terrorists.
conflict; and (3) Strengthening definition of terrorism to non-state We agreed that in combating
multilateral security cooperation. actors ignored similarities and causal terrorism, it is extremely important
relationships linking state terror to to examine the reasons why people
The phenomenon of terrorism non-state terror. For example, in the become terrorists, and to eliminate
The group agreed that the tragic conflict between Israel and Palestine, those causes. One cannot get rid of
events of September 11, 2001, had a there is a circular causal relationship terrorism by killing or jailing individ-
profound effect on the international between the use of helicopters and ual terrorists, since others will spring
scene, as well as on the psyche and tanks against unarmed civilians by up in their places. Our only chance is
foreign policy of the United States. It Israel and the suicide bombings by to understand and to correct the root
was pointed out that as a result of Palestinians. Most of us felt that causes of the phenomenon, remem-
attacks, many people lost their sense states can also act as terrorists, when bering, of course, that no motivation
of security and stability. There was a they maintain their power by fear can possibly excuse violent acts
wave of suicides, and use of rather than by democratic principles, directed at innocent people. It was
antidepressant drugs. Irrational non- when they violate human rights, or pointed out that the September 11
specific fear produced symptoms of kill large numbers of their own attacks against the United States were
paranoia and anxiety. There were citizens, when they invade foreign apparently motivated partly by anger
also realistic fears that a global civil countries, or when they produce and frustration over what was
war might be starting .
The response of the Bush Admin-
istration was also worrying. There
was an initial worldwide outpouring
of sympathy for the US and for the
families of the innocent victims of the
attacks, but this sympathy was soon
combined with alarm when President
Bush claimed the right to unilaterally
initiate war against potential enemies
and when civil liberties began to be
eroded by antiterrorist measures.
In discussing the phenomenon of
terrorism, we found it hard to agree
on a definition. One of the partici-
pants proposed that by definition,
terrorism has to be committed by a
non-state actor, that the act must be
Ochieng Adala, Alexander Animalu, Umaru Shehu.
indiscriminate, the victims innocent,

perceived to be US bias in favour of sources of conflict in the 21st century. Colonization started to end with the
Israel, and partly by anger caused by Both population growth and the founding of the United Nations, but
US troops stationed in Saudi Arabia. increased use of automobiles will now we are facing a new avalanche
Terrorism often arises as the greatly increase the demand for of massive power, outside
result of unbearable situations, which resources. international law, and outside
cannot be corrected in any other way. Among the “loot-seeking wars” control.
To suppress terrorism, we have to which were mentioned in our Oil is important for the United
strike at the base, at the unbearable discussion were conflicts in Angola, States, but it is also important for the
situation that fuels the fanaticism. Sri Lanka, Liberia, Congo, Indonesia, rest of the world. Pugwash should
Religion is often an excuse, where East Timor, Fiji, Colombia, raise its voice against the use of
poverty, ignorance, injustice, Chechnya, Zimbabwe and unchecked unilateral military power
dictatorship and hopelessness are the Uzbekistan. In many cases, to monopolize resources. We should
real reasons. indigenous people have been use international law, and especially
Because of the enormous increase intimidated and driven out of their the International Criminal Court, as
in global communication, the world traditional lands, for example by the the medium for guaranteeing justice.
is now a fishbowl. The lifestyle of the use of fire, so that the resources of No country is above the law.
rich is exhibited in a frustrating way these lands may be seized. On a more positive note, our
to the poor, who have no chance to A discussion paper presented to group thought that resources can in
emulate it. The have-nots of the our group focused especially on the some cases be a source of coopera-
world have nothing to hang onto conflicts over oil which threaten to tion rather than of conflict. For
except their ethnic identity, because develop during the next few decades. example, it is predicted that the
material goods are not available to A report was published by the US population of the Nile Basin will
them. Terrorism is the poor man’s National Energy Policy Group on triple during the next century. In
weapon - a way of waging an May 17, 2001. In this report (known order to support this increased
unsymmetrical struggle against a as the “Cheney report” after its population, cooperation in the field
superior power. principal author, Vice President Dick of water resources will be needed.
Finally, we noted that in spite of Cheney) it is estimated that by 2020, Mutual planning of water use could
its powerful psychological impact, the United States will have to increase lead to other forms of cooperation
terrorism is statistically a minor its imports of foreign oil by 60%. within the region.
problem compared with many Most of this oil is only available in
others. Globally, the numbers of regions, which are either politically Strengthening multilateral
deaths involved are extremely small unstable or else unsympathetic with security cooperation
compared with the mortality from the United States. The discussion Our working group discussed a paper
AIDS or starvation. We must not paper linked the Bush which emphasized that the goal of all
allow the issue of terrorism to Administration’s increased military those who desire a peaceful world
distract our attention from the other spending and wish to project military must be to substitute the rule of law
very serious problems that the world power into these regions with its for the rule of force in the domain of
is facing. desire to insure future availability of international security. The paper
oil for the US. noted that this goal is the same as
Resources and conflict The group noted that during the that embodied in the United Nations
Conflict is often found where colonial era, military power was Charter, but that as we survey the
communities compete for a source of often used by industrial nations to current international scene, we seem
wealth. Thus, the accelerating obtain natural resources, under the to be veering away from it.
demand for water, oil, timber and cover of improving the lot of people Our multilateral institutions have
mineral resources may be important in the less developed countries. been weakened by the Bush Admin-

istration’s reluctance to accept the discussion paper was participation in the country’s traditionally egalitarian
constraints of international law and anti-terror programs. This could be principles are now at risk. The
international treaties. Examples of made conditional on withdrawal of danger of the fight against terrorism
this include withdrawal from the US objections to the International is that it entails invasion of privacy,
ABM Treaty and initiation of a Criminal Court and US participation restraints on free movements of
national missile defence program; in other multilateral institutions. The people and ideas, and control of
withdrawal from the Rome Treaty jurisdiction of the ICC might even be communications (phone-tapping, e-
establishing the International extended to cover crimes of terror. mail supervision, press censorship)
Criminal Court; postponing action Finally, the discussion paper that may in the end compromise
on the Biological Weapons Conven- stressed the important role of NGO’s democracy. The more the US
tion Protocol; rejecting the Compre- in working to replace the rule of becomes an empire, we felt, the less it
hensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and force by the rule of law. These will be a democracy.
the proposal for developing a new organizations have shown their The planned attack on Iraq was
class of nuclear weapons. effectiveness in the past, for example thought to be potentially catastrophic
The unilateralism of the current in environmental and human rights because of the vision which motivates
US Administration is only thinly issues Their help is now needed to it. It was noted the “power corrupts,
disguised by its eagerness in seeking prevent the erosion of our and absolute power corrupts
coalitions on an issue-by-issue basis, multinational institutions and to absolutely”. However, our group felt
for example in dealing with terrorism support the authority of the United that the United States is many things,
or in combating international drug Nations. and that there are many voices within
traffic. The discussion paper pro- In discussing this paper, our the US which disagree with the
posed that other nations, who wish group added that Pugwash, as an unilateralism of the present
to see our multilateral institutions NGO, must do its part in Administration. We should appeal to
strengthened rather than weakened, strengthening both the United these voices of dissent, and encourage
might act by refusing to join such Nations and the International them.
coalitions unless the US participated Criminal Court. The efforts of Regarding the threat of a US
in building norms that cumulatively Pugwash could be coordinated with invasion of Iraq, and a consequent
would constitute an international those of other NGO’s. Pugwash threatened destabilization of the
rule of law. Several examples were could be made more open, and it Middle East and Southeast Asia, it
given: could make efforts to influence was suggested that it might be useful
Turkey, Jordan, the Gulf States, public opinion. for Pugwash to send a delegation to
and Saudi Arabia might make parti- Much of the discussion of the Iraq to discuss the situation
cipation in a coalition against paper was related to the current informally with Iraqi scientists.
Saddam Hussein’s government in concentration of power in the hands During the Cold War, such informal
Iraq conditional on the authority of of the US. One of the group members channels of discussion proved useful,
the Security Council. In the absence remarked that empires are not and this might be the case again.
of a Security Council mandate for necessarily a bad thing, and that the However, it is possible that Pugwash
action against Iraq, they could refuse United States would be his choice for scientists would be prohibited from
to allow the US to use their land the country best suited to have an talking directly to scientists employed
bases or air space. This example empire. The majority of the group, by the Iraqi government, since this
touches the broader question of however, thought that unilateral was the experience of a recent
“unilateral preemptive self-defence”, international power is inconsistent delegation sent to Iraq by
which is prohibited under the UN with the principle of equality of International Physicians for the
Charter. nations and of peoples. The group Prevention of Nuclear War.
A second example given in the also felt that within the United States, Looking towards the more distant

future, we discussed ways in which We also noted that there is a need regulations, and social arrangements
the United Nations might be for reforming international monetary so elaborate that they will suffocate
improved and made more effective. A organizations, such as the World economic growth.
future United Nations might have a Bank, and the International Mone- It was argued that Article 1 (1) of
legislature, which would build up a tary Fund. These institutions are, in the Universal Declaration of Human
system of international laws, guided fact, a part of the United Nations, Rights: “All human beings are born
by the principle of subsidiarity. These and their influence ought to be used free and equal in dignity and human
laws, acting on individuals rather to help the poorer countries, but this rights” implies a lever towards reduc-
than on states, could be enforced by has sometimes not been the case. ing socio-economic inequalities. This
an expanded version of the Debt relief for the less-developed Article ought to be reflected not
International Criminal Court. The countries is urgently needed. merely in institutions and their acces-
notion of state security might be Finally, we concluded that ethical sibility to all, nor just in principles of
replaced by concept of security for considerations and altruism, due process, but also in outcomes.
peoples. An Assembly of Peoples, combined with respect for human The degrees of substantial inequality
with delegates directly elected by rights and the environment, are that exist can be seen as a violation of
popular vote, could be added to the urgently needed in our increasingly Article 1.
General Assembly. Thus a bicameral technological modern world. We Technology and knowledge are
system could be established, need to achieve ethical and political needed to fight poverty. However,
analogous to the Senate and the maturity to match our scientific technology has been important his-
House of Representatives. progress. torically in creating inequity. The
challenge is to harness it as an instru-
ment for equity. Developing countries
must have the capability to adapt
technology to their needs, and the
Globalization and Technology first world must share with them the
Miles Kahler and Marie Muller, Co-Convenors fruits of technology. Yet global forces
John Finney, Rapporteur – especially relating to trade – may
increase inequity. There is no level
T he group discussed papers under

three heads: equity in the global
economy, information technology
poverty elimination, and relocation
of international agencies.
Possible threats to the long-term
playing field between mass produc-
tion technologies and
microenterprises. Intellectual prop-
haves and have-nots, and biotechnol- stability of global capitalism were erty rights (IPR) can make matters
ogy and development. Although with proposed. The first is chronic insuffi- worse – think only of health in
such a broad agenda, extensive in- cient economic demand, further Africa. Equity must be inclusive, and
depth discussion was unrealistic, eroded by technological change. must include equity with respect to
issues were identified for possible Secondly, large material and energy IPR. Technology should also be used
more detailed studies. These are throughputs overload the planet’s to empower women – and there are
itemised in the summary. ecological systems. Finally, a relent- many successful examples of this.
less tendency towards greater com- It was argued that external public
Equity in the global economy plexity and pace is reflected in capi- debt is increasing poverty, sometimes
Six papers were discussed in the first talism’s technologies, institutions and dramatically. Unless we reverse this
session. These addressed intrinsic social relations. Under the constraints tendency, we will end up broadening
problems of capitalism, equity and of global capitalism, the paper so-called ‘Islamic terrorism’ to
human rights, foreign debt, education argued that we can sustain the bios- include ‘African’ and ‘Latin-
in Afghanistan, knowledge and phere only by developing institutions, American terrorism’. A public debt

oped and developing countries was

graphically illustrated. This gap is
not only large, but also increasing for
some developing countries. The
Internet might be seen as an intellec-
tual technology. It can give everyone
access to writing and to knowledge,
and to intellectual tools.
A case study of India was
presented, detailing the current state
of its IT infrastructure and regulatory
environment. Some successful, innov-
ative experiments illustrated how
enhanced IT access could improve
local economics through access to
market prices. Enormous innovation
can be locally driven – bottom-up
changes can result in imaginative
Brindan Byrne, Harle Montgomery, Richard Somerville. ways of using – and tinkering with –
the network to meet local need.
Problems in developing the infra-
Pugwash Study Group could tackle be taken to perturb the frequently structure were seen as not economic
the relationship between increasing observed graphs quantifying ‘cumu- per se – rather they relate to the poli-
poverty and debt. lative advantage’ – for example those tics of adjusting market arrangements
A small step was suggested that showing the majority of the world’s to take advantage of the technology.
might significantly reduce economic food/health/resources are in the pos- With proper policies using market led
and social inequity: relocate interna- session of the minority? If we under- growth and appropriate subsidies, it
tional agencies to countries relevant stood the dynamics of this apparently was argued that the infrastructure
to their mission. For example, the universal set of curves, we might be can be developed effectively.
Organisation of American States able to bias them in favour of reduc- The linkage of IT use to develop-
could move to South America, or the ing inequity. ment was queried. How much
World Health Organisation to sub- research is there on the impact of IT
Saharan Africa. Information Technology on societies and individuals in the
Since the power of political and Haves and Have-nots developing world? The lack of such
economic groups partly explains the One of the main reasons for past fail- studies was acknowledged, though
present inequity, can this situation be ures to alleviate poverty may be our gut economic instinct suggested that
changed only by countervailing failure to focus on technology as a in the long term the benefit is likely
power? Or is an internal value major driver of socio-economic trans- to be enormous. However, even when
change possible – an internal accep- formation, in particular information the infrastructure is there, success in
tance that the international situation technology. It may break down barri- use can be a hit-or-miss affair. The
should be refined? Are there things ers to knowledge and participation, social substrate on which the technol-
Pugwash can do to introduce other and consequently play a significant ogy is introduced is important. To be
concepts into the existing system so role in development and the allevia- successful, IT development has to
the world evolves in a more equitable tion of poverty. take into account local needs and
direction? Are there actions that can The digital divide between devel- ideas. Experience has shown that

when the Internet is available rurally, Computers as a means of educa- Biotechnology and
people learn to use it in ways previ- tion delivery were discussed. Development
ously not thought of. The informa- However, as there is no convincing
Biomedical Research and the
tion accessed is converted into what data to demonstrate the value of developing world.
is useful to local people. Western computers in extending the abilities
Biomedical R&D and related patent
ideas and western quality control of the teacher, studies need to be
protection is driven by ‘high-income
may not be appropriate. Private ini- undertaken. Producing material for
clients’ and their diseases. There is an
tiative and appropriate technology computer-assisted learning is
ample supply of scientists with the
are. In India, development of IT resource intensive. Yet good material
ability and desire to work on diseases
locally has empowered women, and is essential. It would be a severe mis-
prevalent in developing countries.
their status has indeed risen as a con- take to transport without modifica-
What is often absent is the finance
sequence of increased IT access. tion courses developed in, for exam-
for such R&D. Even when appropri-
Some argued that the effective use ple, the US – the material must relate
ate drugs exist, patent protection
of IT tools requires literacy. As less to the situation in which it is being
makes their use in poorer communi-
than half the world is literate, it was used, and hence must be developed
ties unaffordable.
argued that illiteracy needs to be con- locally.
Suggested ways to tackle this prob-
quered before IT is considered a pri- Where is the infrastructure to
lem included making patent protection
ority. Good teachers are needed to keep computers going? Using IT stu-
(or extension) conditional on pursu-
teach writing and its use as a tool. dents as interns to service the infra-
ing work on diseases of little interest
However, experience shows that chil- structure was suggested. Moreover, it
to the developed world. Or is straight
dren easily learn to use the net – first is important to simplify both the
public subsidy a better way? Or can
for amusement, then for information. hardware and the software. The ‘sim-
we find – together with workers in
But what about the variable quality puter’ developed in Bangalore recog-
the pharmaceutical industry – imagi-
of information on the web, and its nised the hardware problem, and
native mechanisms that liberate the
use for propaganda? It was counter- using open source software – as is
industry from its current competitive
argued that quality control is needed increasingly done in commerce and
constraints so that such research can
– just as in any educational industry in the developed world – is
proceed effectively? A Pugwash work-
procedure. Teachers are important in not only less resource intensive, but
shop bringing together those in indus-
selecting information, and in educat- also facilitates local development.
try with other stakeholders may be a
ing children in the use of the net. Suggested ways forward to help
way to begin to look for a solution.
It was further pointed out that as poorer societies become more knowl-
the African situation is so desperate, edge-based included a co-ordinated, Genetic modification in third world
we have no choice but to use the global effort by institutions such as agriculture.
resource despite these problems – the the World Bank, UNDP, UNESCO
It was argued that it is economic
teacher shortage and quality are so and other NGOs. Regulatory policies
interests that are promoting biotech-
stretched that ‘traditional’ teaching is should encourage, not suppress,
nology as a ‘magic bullet’ that will
likely to be similarly defective any- innovation and experimentation.
revolutionise third world agriculture.
way. We have to be able to deliver In summary, policy, income, liter-
Yet studies have demonstrated lower
formal education with a severe acy, and education were seen as the
yields of genetically modified crops,
teacher shortage: using IT-based dis- major barriers to effective exploita-
no reduction in the use of pesticides,
tance learning, a handful of good tion of IT in development. Different
increased pest losses, reduced vari-
teachers can reach and teach many members of the group gave different
ability, development of pesticide
students. This is true at tertiary as emphases to these. But none of them
resistance and effects on nitrogen-
well as lower levels. were seen to be insurmountable.
fixing flora. Small farmers are being

pushed out, yet there is evidence to venting farmers being able to buy the on cholera in a place where there is
suggest a major role for small farm- needed fertilisers. A consequent drop no clean water? The history of
ers, who are often repositories of in production of some 40% has been CGIAR (Consultative Group for
indigenous knowledge. Evidence in estimated. International Agricultural Research)
indigenous farming systems of an Both small farmers and public was brought up as a cautionary tale.
inverse relation between size and pro- institutions are hamstrung by IPR. Even though the funding apparently
ductivity implies we should invest in Consequently, they have to do deals came with no strings attached, the
the small farm approach. To benefit with private companies, and then the outcome was not as hoped – with
the rural poor, agricultural research agenda changes. The patent system suggestions that there were strings
and development should operate allows firms to monopolise tools for which resulted in the importation of
‘bottom-up’, using and building on new development. This is a choice inappropriate ideas. There was also a
resources already available. society makes to give a temporary view that institutions in the develop-
The outcome of the Mexico City advantage to a monopoly. But in its ing world should not be limited to
May 2002 Workshop on The Impact present application, it has gone too those that deal only with ‘local’ prob-
of Agricultural Biotechnology on far – it no longer promotes innova- lems. Science in the developing world
Environmental and Food Security’ tion but stifles it. A Pugwash must aim to be comprehensive. As it
was summarised. In addition to the Workshop might look at ways of is not practical to send significant
six principles identified at the work- restructuring the patent system to numbers of young people to work at
shop to guide agricultural biotechnol- retain some protection for the inven- the International Centre for
ogy research and policy making, on tor, but without stifling further devel- Theoretical Physics in Trieste, why
which Pugwash was recommended to opment. not set up an Institute of
organise future meetings, a number Mathematics in Nigeria? We talk
Location of research infrastructure.
of further issues were raised. To about asking what Africans want,
address the ethical, economic, social, The pros and cons of siting appropri- but generally only in the context of
and environmental dilemmas that ate research institutions in the devel- immediate issues such as health,
have emerged from the development, oping world, where the need is both poverty, and hunger. Pugwash should
use, and release of GMOs, the broad recognised and immediately relevant, address this issue of sustainable sci-
spectrum of applications of were discussed. The International ence for developing countries.
transgenic organisms must be Rice Research Institute in Bangladesh
discussed, rather than just focusing has resulted in an eight-fold increase
on those technologies related to agri- in production. In medicine, some
culture. These again could give rise to questioned why there are so few trop-
future themes for workshops. ical medicine research facilities in the
Two questions were asked at the tropics. Again in Bangladesh, an
beginning of the discussion. First, can institute set up for cholera research
GM feed 9-10 billion people by later developed wider roles in public
2050? Secondly, will it benefit the health, nutrition, and disease preven-
poor? If the answer to either question tion. Perhaps research on malaria
is no, then GM techniques should not and HIV should be centred in Africa,
be a priority. Ability to even use the fostering additional research infra-
technology is not necessarily avail- structure.
able in poorer countries. A case in Some caution was expressed
point is that of Argentina, which has about this idea. For example, is it
large GM plantings. However, the sensible to site an institute working
recent economic problems are pre-

nologies. Hence, the challenge of

transforming the current energy sup-
Climate Change, Energy and the Environment ply system is considerable. This does
Lisa Shaffer and Tatsujiro Suzuki, Co-convenors
not imply, however, that the
Bob van der Zwaan, Rapporteur
challenge of transforming this energy
system into an environmentally
Climate change most projections for 2100 give an friendly one is insurmountable.
increase of global mean surface tem- A recommendable strategy to
Climate changes have occurred in the
perature between about 2 to 4°C. address the global warming problem
past naturally, for various reasons.
The last decade has been the warmest would be not to let carbon dioxide
However, currently mankind is modi-
decade, on average, on record; 1998 concentrations in the atmosphere
fying the Earth’s environment, in var-
has been the warmest year and 2001 increase to more than a stabilization
ious ways, notably because we are
the second warmest year ever level of about twice as high as the
changing the climate. Largely as a
recorded. Increases in atmospheric pre-industrial level of 280 ppmv.
result of the large-scale combustion
greenhouse gas concentrations not While the climate change impacts of
of fossil fuels, the atmosphere is at
only increase mean global surface such an objective could be consider-
present polluted with particulates,
temperature, but, perhaps more able, to which mankind will need to
and the balance of the radiation on
importantly, involve regional and adapt, there is then at least a good
Earth is being further altered through
local climate effects, such as chance that the situation would be
the emission of anthropogenic green-
increased drought, precipitation, manageable. The chance of our abil-
house gases. Among the latter, the
floods, and storms. ity to manage the impacts would
most important are carbon dioxide
diminish sharply if the concentrations
and methane. Global warming and Energy supply and economic were to rise toward a tripling or qua-
the associated effects of regional and prosperity drupling of carbon concentrations
local climate change are expected as a
A reliable and affordable supply of that would be associated with a con-
result. In 2001, the International
energy is critical to maintaining and tinuation of business-as-usual. Since
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
expanding economic prosperity we are already well on our way to
confirmed that “There is new and
where such prosperity already exists reaching a doubling, mankind will in
stronger evidence that most of the
and to creating it where it does not. any case need to adapt to the climate
warming observed over the last 50
But at the same time, the core of the changes this doubled carbon dioxide
years is attributable to human activi-
challenge of expanding and sustain- concentration will involve. Geotech-
ties”. After a decade of intensified
ing economic prosperity is the chal- nical engineering the atmosphere to
scientific research during the 1990s,
lenge of limiting, at affordable cost, reduce the effects of greenhouse-gas
there is now no longer doubt about
the environmental impacts of an increases in the atmosphere on cli-
earlier observations that mankind is
expanding energy supply. The worth matic variables seems undesirable,
changing the climate on Earth.
of today’s largely fossil-based world but might at some point in the future
In particular, the magnitude and
energy system is some 10 trillion dol- be needed. Removing from the atmos-
rate of change of global mean surface
lars at replacement cost. Also because phere the emissions that have previ-
temperature over the past few
of the equipment turnover time ously been added, for example through
decades is shown to be outside the
amounting to around a few decades, afforestation or through enlarging
range of anything deduced from
the current energy supply system can- other biological sinks, can contribute
paleo-climate records for the last
not be rapidly replaced with non-car- to only moderate extent to solving
1000 years. A global warming has
bon emitting alternatives, even if they the climate change challenge mankind
been taken place over the past one
were economically more attractive is currently facing. In addition to
hundred years of about 0.7 °C, and
than conventional fossil-based tech- these measures, reducing greenhouse

gas emissions below levels that would improved range of energy production and R&D into all energy alternatives
be implied by a “business-as-usual” options, fundamental research, applied can mitigate the drawbacks that each
scenario is therefore imperative. research, development, demonstra- of them involves, and can render
tion and deployment should be immi- their favorable properties in terms of
Reducing carbon dioxide nently accelerated, starting today. global warming accessible. A global
emissions International cooperation in energy framework of commitments should
The determinants of anthropogenic research is paramount, firstly in order be realized to constraining
carbon dioxide emissions – the most to economize on scarcely available greenhouse gases in the long run.
important greenhouse gas – are popu- funding. Stimulating collaboration in Many policy options are open to this
lation, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) energy technology development end, one of which seems to be partic-
per person, energy use per unit of between industrialized countries, ularly attractive. All present energy
GDP, and carbon emissions per unit countries in transition and developing technologies possess detrimental
of energy. The available leverage of in countries can also be instrumental in environmental and health externali-
principle each of them should be used the exchange of expertise in technol- ties, so that there are at present no
to reduce carbon dioxide emissions. ogy development and experience in winners or losers among the energy
International support for education, the use of new energy technologies. options available. By internalizing
development and family planning are At the moment, no single energy these externalities, that is, by consid-
effective measures to slow down pop- resource or technology constitutes a ering them as real costs that are
ulation growth and should therefore panacea to solve the climate change reflected in energy prices, a fair level
receive high attention, also since pop- challenge. Therefore, all available playing field of competition can be
ulation control simultaneously options to address this challenge created. Such internalization of exter-
involves addressing a spectrum of should be employed and kept open. nal environmental effects should
other problems. However desirable a This involves both increasing energy become the basis for energy decision-
re-orientation of human wants in efficiencies and savings, and keeping making, and should be realized
terms of material consumption might a non-carbon energy spectrum as according to an internationally deter-
be, it is unlikely that any political diversified as possible. Among the mined set of agreements.
decision-making body will anywhere latter are notably the use of
soon adopt this approach. Industries decarbonized fossil fuels (through Climate change uncertainties
and individual consumers should be carbon capture and sequestration), While the phenomenon of human-
motivated to choose among the avail- the use of renewables (such as induced global warming and the
able energy options those that are hydropower, wind, solar and biomass overall effects of associated climate
least energy consuming, and to real- energy), and the use of nuclear change, such as an increase in global
ize savings in an as broad as possible energy. Also in view of ascertaining sea levels, have been scientifically well
range of energy uses. Equally, incen- energy supply security, maintaining established, many aspects of climate
tives should be provided to make the use of a combination of these change remain subject to uncertain-
low- and non-carbon choices from options is advisable, since with a ties. The extent to which, when pre-
the menu of energy-supply options diversified energy system nations are cisely, and in what parts of the world
available at any given time. better able to hedge against potential its effects will become predominant is
energy supply shortages. Meanwhile, still difficult to predict scientifically
Energy resources and research the advantages of distributed in all its possible dimensions. However,
The menu from which choices can be energy/electricity systems can be these uncertainties are no reason for
made between energy technologies exploited to a fuller extent than in inaction. On the contrary, irrespec-
that are both environmentally the currently largely centralized tive of these uncertainties, action
friendly and economically affordable energy production infrastructure. should be undertaken so as to hedge
can be enlarged. To achieve an Increased fundamental research humanity against some small proba-

bility, but highly adverse, climatic addressing the many facets of the that Pugwash should enhance its
effects, such as a deviation of large solutions to problems involved with activities in the climate and energy
ocean currents. Especially the possibil- climate change. International cooper- field, notably through the organiza-
ity that certain climate effects can be ation is in particular essential for tion of workshops on this subjects
incremental, non-linear, interactive or establishing global accountability matter, and by including among its
self-enhancing should make us weary and commitments to reduce carbon Council members experts that are
of the risks that could be at stake. emissions. It is also necessary for knowledgeable in both the natural
The IPCC seems the appropriate making energy policy decisions on scientific and social scientific (e.g.
body to analyze climate change the basis of the true cost of energy economic) aspects of this multi-
uncertainties, as well as summarize production, including the detrimental faceted challenge.
them and convey them to a large effects that may be caused to the
public. It should continue to inform environment or to human health as a Concise Summary
national governments and individuals result of energy production. Whereas climate changes have
that the energy-climate challenge Establishing individual responsi- occurred in the past naturally, there is
must, and can, be met. Scientific bility in energy and resource use will today overwhelming evidence that
knowledge about why doing so is also be paramount to solving the cli- mankind is modifying the Earth’s
necessary is abundant, and proposals mate change problem. Public educa- environment and is provoking an
on how to proceed to address this tion and dissemination, notably by increase of the average global atmos-
challenge abound. The costs of the scientists, plays a fundamental role in pheric temperature and the associ-
required action are most likely small increasing the public understanding ated detrimental effects of regional
in comparison to the environmental that climate change is a problem, and local climate change.
and economic damages averted, as which ought to be addressed as of In order to minimize the risks
well as small compared to the invest- today. Enhancing public awareness of induced by substantial climate
ments made globally in maintaining the potential threats to humankind change, carbon dioxide concentra-
national military forces. involved with global warming can tions should be stabilized, preferably
help creating the political conviction during the 21st century and at a level
International cooperation and that action is required now. not exceeding twice the pre-industrial
individual responsibility International cooperation, both in level.
Today, the poor countries contribute energy research and in establishing Adaptation to the consequences
little to the causes of the problem of global greenhouse gas reduction com- of climate change will almost
climate change, while they are likely mitments, as well as the promotion of certainly be necessary; geotechnical
to suffer most of its consequences, establishing individual responsibility, engineering to counteract the radia-
partly because of the stronger depen- should be central at the forthcoming tive effects of increased levels of
dence of people in the developing Johannesburg Summit. Given the rel- greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
world on natural ecosystems, and evance of the global warming prob- may at some point be needed; and
because they are less able to adapt to lem, and given Pugwash’s history in removal of carbon dioxide from the
the adverse impacts of climate bringing together scientists from dif- atmosphere through the employment
change. Especially in many develop- ferent disciplines and backgrounds, of large-scale biological sinks (e.g. by
ing countries the vulnerability to the convincing policy makers of under- afforestation) can only to a limited
various effects of climate change is taking action vis-à-vis urgent global extent contribute to mitigating cli-
likely to be high. Like with questions threats, and stimulating the realiza- mate change.
of global nuclear disarmament, inter- tion of international treaties that Thus, reducing anthropogenic
national cooperation – notably address these threats, Working greenhouse gas emissions
between developing and industrial- Group 6 on “climate change, energy substantially below levels that would
ized countries – is the crux for and the environment” recommends be implied by a “business-as-usual”

scenario is imperative; this can – and

Participants
should – be realized through a reduc-
tion in population growth, decreasing
Gen. (ret.) Mansour Abo Rashid, Dr. Richard Attiyeh, Vice Chancellor for
levels of energy use per unit of Gross Chairman, Amman Center for Peace and Research and Dean of Graduate Studies,
Domestic Product, and decreasing Development, Amman, Jordan University of California, San Diego, La
levels of carbon emissions per unit of Jolla, CA, USA
Amb. (ret.) Ochieng Adala, Africa Peace
energy use. Forum (APFO), Nairobi, Kenya Prof. John Avery, Associate Professor of
Reduction in energy demand is Theoretical Chemistry, H.C. Ørsted
Prof. Robert McCormack Adams, Institute, University of Copenhagen,
essential for addressing the global Adjunct Professor, University of Denmark
California, San Diego, La Jolla,
warming challenge, and measures
California, USA Dr. Prof. Kirill K. Babievsky, Member,
regarding the end-use of energy, in Russian Pugwash Committee; Institute of
Ms. Ruth S. Adams, San Diego, CA, USA Organoelement Compounds (INEOS),
e.g. transport, building and construc-
Mr. Muhammad Afzal, Minister Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow,
tion, should be pursued aggressively.
(Technical), Permanent Mission of Russian Federation
Since no panacea energy resource
Pakistan, Geneva, Switzerland Prof. Gabriel Baramki, Consultant to the
exists, all non-carbon emitting energy Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education,
Dr. Dee (Dianne) Aker, Assistant
resources should for the moment Director, and Director WorldLink (con- Ramallah; President, Palestinian Council
remain – and become – part of an necting youth to global affairs), Joan B. for Justice and Peace; Member, Pugwash
Kroc Institute for Peace & Justice, San Council
energy mix as diversified as possible –
Diego, California, USA Sir Hugh Beach, Board Member, Center
also in order to ensure energy secu-
Prof. Maria A. Alberti, Department of for Defence Studies, VERTIC and ISIS,
rity for mankind during the 21st cen- London, UK
Information Sciences, University of
tury – at least to allow further miti- Milan, Milan, Italy Dr. Ronald J. Bee, Director of
gating some of the intricacies that Development and Special Projects,
Prof. Miguel Altieri, University of
available options possess; among California, Berkeley, California, USA Institute on Global Conflict and
Cooperation (IGCC), University of
these energy resources are
Mr. Jürgen Altmann, Scientific Staff California, San Diego, La Jolla,
decarbonized fossil fuels, renewables Member, Experimentalle Physik III, California, USA
and nuclear energy; all of these Universität Dortmund, Germany
Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director,
should be subjected to increased lev- Prof. Alexander O.W. Animalu, Pugwash Conferences on Science and
els of research, development, demon- Theoretical Physicist, Institute for Basic World Affairs, Cambridge, MA, USA
Research, and President, Nigerian
stration and deployment. Academy of Science, Abuja, Nigeria Prof. Patrick Boyer, Q.C., Chairman,
As with questions of global Pugwash Park Commission, Nova Scotia,
Dr. Gunnar Arbman, Director of Canada; Adjunct Professor, University of
nuclear disarmament, international Research, Swedish Defence Research Guelph; President, Breakout Educational
cooperation, notably between devel- Agency (FOI), Stockholm, Sweden Network; President, Canadian Shield
oping and industrialized countries, is Communications Corp.; Practising
Dr. Ronald Atlas, Graduate Dean, Lawyer
the crux for addressing the many Professor of Biology, Head of Center on
Deterrence of Biowarfare and Dr. Adele Buckley, Vice President,
facets of the solutions to problems
Bioterrorism, University of Louisville, Technology & Research, Ontario Centre
involved with climate change; among Louisville, Kentucky, USA; President- for Environmental Technology
these are establishing global account- elect, American Society for Microbiology; Advancement (OCETA), Toronto,
Chair, ASM Task Force on Biological Ontario, Canada; Deputy Chair,
ability and commitments to reduce
Weapons Canadian Pugwash Group
carbon emissions and making energy
Ms. Carin Atterling Wedar, Lector, Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of
policy decisions on the basis of the Theoretical Physics, University of Rome
Theological Faculty, University of
true cost of energy production; also Gothenburg; Secretary-General, Swedish “La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy; Chairman,
establishing individual responsibility Initiative for Peace, Security and Pugwash Council
International Relations (SIPSIR),
in energy and resource use will be Stockholm; Member, Swedish Pugwash Mr. Pierre Canonne,
paramount to solving the climate Group Lecturer/Disarmament and Verification
issues, Univ. Marne-la-Vallés/Paris,
change problem. France

Participants continued
Prof. Ana María Cetto, Chair, Pugwash Dr. Christopher Chyba, Co-director, Dr. Robin Coupland (UK), Coordinator
Executive Committee; Research Center for International Security and of Surgery, Health Division, International
Professor, Institute of Physics, Cooperation, Stanford University, Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
Universidad Autonoma de Mexico Stanford, CA, USA; Carl Sagan Chair for Geneva, Switzerland
(UNAM); Member, Council, United the Study of Life in the Universe, Seti
Nations University; Member, Scientific Institute, Mountain View, CA; Associate Dr. Peter F. Cowhey, Director, Institute
Organizing Committee, UNESCO-ICSU Professor (Research), Department of on Global Conflict and Cooperation
World Science Conference Geological and Environmental Sciences, (IGCC), and pending Dean, International
Stanford University Relations/Pacific Studies School,
Prof. Ignacio Chapela, Assistant University of California, San Diego, La
Professor (Microbial Ecology), Ecosystem Dr. Raymond Clark, Postdoctoral Jolla, California, USA
Sciences Division, Dept. of Research Fellow, Department of
Environmental Science, Policy and Medicine, University of California San The Honorable Philip E. Coyle, Senior
Management, University of California, Diego, La Jolla, California, USA; Chair, Advisor, Center for Defense Information
Berkeley, California, USA UC Council of Postdoctoral Scholars (CDI), Los Angeles, CA USA
Mr. Chen Jifeng, Member, Pugwash Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Professor of Ms. Fruzsina Csaszar, Special Assistant
Council; Convener, Pugwash Group of Mathematical Physics, University of and Program Coordinator, Center for
China; Vice President, China Arms Milan, Italy; Secretary General, Union of Strategic and International Studies
Control and Disarmament Association; Italian Scientists for Disarmament (CSIS), Washington, DC, USA
Executive Vice-President, China (USPID); Director, Program on Dr. Ana Damian, Research Fellow,
Association for Promotion of Disarmament and International Security, Institute of International Politics and
International Science and Peace; Adviser, Landau Network – Centro Volta, Como, Economics, Belgrade, Yugoslavia
Chinese People’s Association for Peace Italy
and Disarmament (CPAPD)

Prof. Nola Dippenaar, Professor, Dept. of Dr. Victor Gilinsky, Energy Consultant, Dr. David Holloway (Ireland), Director,
Physiology, School of Medicine, Faculty Glen Echo, Maryland, USA Institute for International Studies, and
of Health Sciences, University of Pretoria, Professor of Political Science and History,
Pretoria, South Africa; Vice-Chair, South Dr. Jozef Goldblat (Sweden/Switzerland), Stanford University, Stanford, California,
African Pugwash Group Vice President, Geneva International USA
Peace Research Institute (GIPRI),
Prof. Walter Dorn, Visiting Professor, Geneva, Switzerland; Consultant, United Thomas Homer-Dixon, Canada,
Department of Politics and Economics, Nations, Geneva Director, Peace and Conflict Studies
Royal Military College of Canada, Program, University of Toronto;
Kingston, Ontario, Canada Prof. Klaus Gottstein, Emeritus Professor,
Max Planck Institute for Physics, Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Department of
Dr. Leonie Dreschler-Fischer, Professor of Munich, Germany Physics, Quaid-e-Azam University,
Computer Science, Department of Islamabad, Pakistan
Informatics, University of Hamburg, Mr. Eric Guichard, Head, Réseaux,
Germany Savoirs & Territoires” Research Group, Dr. Jo Husbands, Director, Committee on
Ecole normale superieure, Paris, France; International Security and Arms Control
Dr. Lynn Eden, Senior Research Scholar, Secretary, French Pugwash Group (CISAC), National Academy of Sciences
Center for International Security and (NAS), Washington, D.C., USA
Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford Mr. Ejaz Haider, Foreign/Op-Ed Editor,
University, Stanford, California, USA The Daily Times, Lahore, Pakistan Dr. Masako Ikegami-Andersson,
Associate Professor and Director, Center
Prof. Karl-Erik Eriksson, Visiting Dr. Karen Hallberg, Research Fellow, for Pacific Asia Studies (CPAS),
Professor, Department of Energy and National Council of Science and Stockholm University, Stockholm,
Environmental Systems, Karlstad Technology, Argentina; Professor, Sweden; Guest Lecturer, Faculty of
University, Karlstad, Sweden Balseiro Institute (Bariloche, Argentina) International Studies, Meijigakuin
Dr. Gert Harigel, Senior Physicist University, Tokyo, Japan
Prof. Yair Evron, Professor Emeritus, Tel
Aviv University, Israel (Emeritus), European Laboratory for Prof. Michael D. Intriligator, Professor of
Particle Physics (CERN), Geneva, Economics, Political Science, and Policy
Dr. Esmat Ezz, Member, Pugwash Switzerland Studies, UCLA and Director, UCLA
Council; Professor, Military Medical Burkle Center for International Relations,
Academy, Cairo, Egypt Prof. John (Jack) Harris, Member, British
Pugwash Council, former Editor, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Dr. Eric T. Ferguson, Secretary of Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, UK Dr. Saiful Islam, President, International
Pugwash Netherlands; Consultant on Study Group on Self-Organization,
Energy and Development, MacFergus bv, Dr. Jean Paul Hébert, Member of
Economic Defense Council; Member, Munich, Germany
Eindhoven, Netherlands
National Commission for Antipersonnel Dr. Venance Journé, Researcher, National
Prof. John Finney, Professor of Physics, Landmines Elimination; Engineer, Ecole Scientific Research Council (CNRS),
Dept. of Physics and Astronomy, des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales Paris, France
University College London, UK (EHESS), Paris, France
Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said,
Prof. Bas de Gaay Fortman, Chair Prof. Robert Hinde, former Royal Society Head of Military Studies Unit and
Political Economy, Institute of Social Research Professor (now retired), Technology Advisor, Al-Ahram Center
Studies, The Hague, Netherlands, and University of Cambridge, UK for Political and Strategic Studies, Al-
Professor of Political Economy of Human Ahram Foundation, Cairo, Egypt
Rights, Faculty of Law, Utrecht Prof. John Holdren, Teresa & John Heinz
University, The Netherlands Professor of Environmental Policy & Prof. Miles Kahler, Rohr Professor of
Director, Program in Science, Technology, Pacific International Relations, University
Prof. Richard Garwin, Senior Fellow for & Public Policy, Center for Science & of California, San Diego, USA; Interim
Science and Technology, Council on International Affairs (CSIA), John F. Director, Institute for International,
Foreign Relations, New York, NY, USA; Kennedy School of Government, and Comparative, and Area Studies (IICAS),
IBM Fellow Emeritus; Adjunct Professor Professor of Environmental Science & UCSD
of Physics, Columbia University Public Policy, Dept. of Earth and
Planetary Sciences, Harvard University, Prof. Catherine McArdle Kelleher,
Dr. Ursula von Gierke, Physician, USA Visiting Research Professor, Strategic
Division of Infectious Diseases and Research Department, College of Naval
Tropical Medicine, General Hospital, Warfare Studies, US Naval War College,
Munich, Germany Newport, Rhode Island, USA

Dr. Charles Kennel, Director, Scripps

Institution of Oceanography, and Vice
Chancellor, University of California, San
Diego, La Jolla, California, USA
Prof. Alexander Keynan, Visiting

Professor, Rockefeller University, New
York, NY; Special Advisor to President,
Israel Academy of Sciences
Mr. Mohammad Khodadadi, Director,

International Academic Relations, School
of International Relations, Tehran, Iran;
Member, Iranian Delegation to the
OPCW, The Hague
Prof. Michael Klare, Five College

Program in Peace & World Security
Studies, Hampshire College, Amherst,
Massachusetts, USA Jeffrey and Sara Boutwell.
Prof. Vladimir Knapp, Faculty of

Electrical Engineering and Computing, Dr. Martin Malin, Program Director, Mr. Lucius (D.L.O.) Mendis, Technical
University of Zagreb, Croatia; Associate Committee on International Security Advisor, Ministry of Irrigation and Water
Member, Academy of Science Studies (CISS), American Academy of Management, Colombo, Sri Lanka;
Arts and Sciences (AAAS), Cambridge, Secretary/Convenor, Sri Lankan Pugwash
Dr. Lydie Koch-Miramond, Scientific Massachusetts, USA Group
Advisor, French Atomic Energy
Commission (CEA), Direction des Mrs. Pauline Marstrand, former Principal Acad. Jorma K. Miettinen, Academician
Sciences de la Matiere, Paris, France Lecturer (now retired) in Human and Emeritus Professor of
Ecology, Huddersfield (1984-87); former Radiochemistry, University of Helsinki,
Prof. Michiji Konuma, Adviser to Goto Senior Fellow, Science Policy Research Finland; President, Finnish Pugwash
Ikueikai; Member, Pugwash Council; Unit, University of Sussex (1969-80), UK Group
Professor Emeritus, Keio University;
Honorary Member, Hungarian Academy Prof. Maurizio Martellini, Secretary Dr. Steven Miller, Director, International
of Sciences; Adviser to the Association of General, Landau Network-Centro Volta Security Program, Center for Science &
Asia Pacific Physical Societies (AAPPS) (LNCV), Como, Italy; Professor of International Affairs (CSIA), Harvard
Physics, University of Insubria, Como, University, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Dr. Francesco Lenci, National Research Italy USA; Editor-in-Chief, International
Council (CNR) Research Director, Pisa, Security; Member, Pugwash Council; Co-
Italy Prof. Luis Masperi, Director, Latin Chair, U.S. Pugwash Group
American Centre for Physics (CLAF), Rio
Rev. Martin Levine, Deputy Chairman, de Janeiro, Brazil; Member, Pugwash Mr. Tom Milne, Staff Member, Pugwash
Major Issues & Theology Centre, Council; Professor, Instituto Balseiro, Conferences on Science and World
Beecroft, New South Wales, Australia Argentina Affairs; PhD student, Programme of
Prof. Liu Min, Advisor, Program for Policy Research in Engineering, Science
Dr. Michael May, Stanford University and Technology, University of
Science and National Security Studies, (former Director, Lawrence Livermore
China Academy of Engineering Physics Manchester, UK
National Laboratory), USA
(CAEP), Beijing, China Dr. Maria Elena Montero Cabrera,
Prof. Anne McLaren, Principal Research Titular Researcher B, Head of the
Mr. Sverre Lodgaard, Director, Associate, Wellcome Trust/Cancer
International Peace Research Institute Environmental Radiological Surveillance
Research UK, Institute of Cell and Laboratory, Centro de Investigación en
Oslo (PRIO), Norway; Member, Pugwash Developmental Biology, member of
Council Materiales Avanzados, Chihuahua,
Pugwash Council México
Prof. Saideh Lotfian, Associate Professor Mr. André L. Mechelynck, retired
of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Dr. Ali Akbar Mohammadi, Director,
Engineer, now Consultant in Energy Department of Environmental Damage
Political Science, University of Tehran, Matters, Huldenberg, Belgium
Iran Assessment, Tehran, Iran; President,
Iranian Society of Microbiology

Dr. Robert Mtonga, Federation Vice Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Director, Center for Dr. Annaswamy Narayana Prasad,
President representing Africa, Political and International Studies (CPIS), Commissioner, UNMOVIC (which is
International Physicians for the Prevention Moscow, Russia; Deputy Chair, Russian overseeing the disarmament of Iraq), India
of Nuclear War (IPPNW), Zambia; Pugwash Committee of Scientists for
Registrar, University of Zambia, Lusaka Disarmament and International Security Mr. Jan Prawitz, Visiting Scholar, Swedish
Institute for International Affairs,
Prof. Marie Muller, Dean, Faculty of Prof. Hitoshi Ohnishi, Professor of Stockholm, Sweden
Humanities, University of Pretoria, South International Relations, School of Law,
Africa; Chair, Pugwash South Africa; Tohoku University, Sendai, Japan Prof. Gwyn Prins, Professorial Research
Member, Pugwash Council Fellow, The European Institute, London
Gen. Pan Zhenqiang, Professor, Institute School of Economics (LSE), London, UK
Prof. Mohan Munasinghe, Sri Lanka of Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, PLA, China Ambassador Waliur Rahman, Director,
Prof. Michael Nacht, Dean and Professor Bangladesh Institute of Law and
of Public Policy, Goldman School of Public Dr. Georges Parisot, Senior Adviser, International Affairs (BILIA), Dhaka,
Policy, University of California, Berkeley, Technical and Strategic Assessment, Bangladesh
California, USA France Telecom R&D, Paris, France
Prof. J. Martin Ramirez, Professor of
Prof. Maciej Nalecz, Member, Pugwash Shri Ashok Parthasarathi, Professor and Psychiatry, and Head, Psychobiology
Council, retired Director, Institute of Chairperson, Centre for Studies in Science Department, & Institute for Biofunctional
Biocybernetics and Biomedical Policy, School of Social Sciences, Studies, Universidad Complutense,
Engineering, PAS (1975-94), Warsaw, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Madrid, Spain
Poland Delhi, India; Member, Executive
Committee, Indian Pugwash Society Prof. Harold Ramkissoon, Professor in
Dr. Götz Neuneck, Senior Fellow, IFSH, Applied Mathematics, The University of
Hamburg, Germany Prof. Amnon Pazy, Member, Pugwash the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad,
Council; Professor of Mathematics, The West Indies
Dr. Hanna Newcombe, Director and Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel
Editor, Peace Research Institute-Dundas, Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General,
Dundas, Canada Prof. Luiz Pinguelli Rosa, Full Professor Pugwash Conferences on Science and
and Director, Graduate School of World Affairs; Professor Emeritus,
Mr. Nguyen Van Dao, Vietnam Peace Engineering (COPPE), Federal University Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Committee, Ha Noi of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ), Brazil (MIT), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Prof. Kathryn Nixdorff, Dept. of Prof. William Potter, Institute Professor Dr. Janaka Ratnasiri, General President,
Microbiology and Genetics, Darmstadt and Director, Center for Nonproliferation Sri Lanka Association for the
University of Technology, Darmstadt, Studies, Monterey Institute of Advancement of Science, Colombo, Sri
Germany International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, Lanka
California, USA
Prof. Judith Reppy, Professor, Department
of Science & Technology Studies, Cornell
University, Ithaca, New York, USA
Hon. John B. Rhinelander, Senior

Counsel, Shaw Pittman, Washington, DC,
USA
Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., The Senate

of Canada, Ottawa, Ontario
Dr. Carsten Rohr (Germany/UK),

Research Associate, Quantum
Photovoltaics Group, Experimental Solid
State Physics, Blackett Laboratory,
Imperial College of Science, Technology
and Medicine, London, UK; Chair,
Student Pugwash, UK
Dinner at the San Diego Zoo.

Sir Joseph Rotblat, Emeritus Professor of Prof. Richard Somerville, Professor of Dr. Mark Wheelis, Senior Lecturer, Section
Physics, University of London, UK; 1995 Meteorology, Scripps Institution of of Microbiology, University of California,
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate; Member, Oceanography, University of California, Davis, California, USA
Pugwash Executive Committee San Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA
Mr. Clive Williams MG, Director of
Acad. Yuri Ryzhov, President of the Prof. Fernando de Souza Barros, Professor Terrorism Studies, Strategic and Defence
International Engineering University, Emeritus, Physics Institute, Federal Studies Centre, The Australian National
Moscow, Russia, chair of the Russian University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil University, Canberra, Australia
Pugwash Group, member of Pugwash
Council Dr. Geoffrey Stone (USA/Canada), Dr. Daniel Yankelovich, Chairman,
Research Scientist, Newbiotics Inc., San Viewpoint Learning, La Jolla, California,
Mr. Henrik Salander, Swedish Foreign Diego, California USA; Chairman, DYG Inc.: Chairman,
Ministry, Stockholm Public Agenda
Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh
Dr. Walter Scheuer, former Senior (Germany/South Korea), Member, Prof. Herb York, Professor Emeritus,
Researcher/Head of Department, Pugwash Council; Senior Researcher, Free University of California San Diego, La
Argentine Atomic Energy Commission University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany; Jolla, California, USA
President, Korean Pugwash Group
Dr. Lisa Shaffer, Director of Policy Dr. Aharon Zohar, Consultant, Regional
Programs and International Relations, Dr. Tatsujiro Suzuki, Senior Research and Environmental Planning, Carmei-
Scripps Institution of Oceanography, Scientist, Socio-Economic Research Yosef, Israel
University of California, San Diego, La Center, Central Research Institute of
Jolla, CA, USA Electric Power Industry (CRIEPI), Tokyo, Dr. Bob van der Zwaan, Researcher,
Japan Energy Research Center of the
Amb. Dr. Mohamed Shaker, Foreign Netherlands (ECN), Amsterdam, The
Ministry, Cairo, Egypt Prof. M.S. Swaminathan, President-elect, Netherlands
Pugwash Conferences on Science and
Prof. Umaru Shehu, Professor Emeritus, World Affairs; UNESCO Chair in STUDENT/YOUNG
University of Maiduguri, Maiduguri, Ecotechnology; Swaminathan Research P U G WA S H
Nigeria Foundation/Centre for Research on
Ms. Sarah Bokhari, Free-lance Journalist
Dr. Bart van der Sÿde, Lecturer on Physics Sustainable Agricultural and Rural
on security matters, Islamabad, Pakistan
and Society, Faculty of Physics, Eindhoven Development, Chennai, India
University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Mr. Alexander Brekhovskikh, PhD
Prof. Takao Takahara, Professor of Student, A.N. Bach Institute of
Netherlands; Secretary and Board International Politics and Peace Research,
Member, Pugwash-Netherlands Biochemistry, Russian Academy of
Faculty of International Studies,
Sciences, Moscow, Russia; Member,
Prof. Erika Simpson, Associate Professor, Meijigakuin University, Yokohama, Japan
Russian Student Pugwash
Department of Political Science, University Prof. Majid Tehranian, Professor and
of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Mr. Andreas Domnick (Germany), 3rd
Director, Toda Institute for Global Peace year undergraduate student in physics, St.
Canada and Policy Research, University of Hawaii, John’s College, University of Cambridge,
Air Commodore. Jasjit Singh, Director, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA UK; President, Cambridge Student
Centre for Strategic and International Dr. Giancarlo Tenaglia, voluntary Staff Pugwash
Studies; Member, Pugwash Executive Member, Pugwash Conferences on Science
Committee; Member, Indian Pugwash Mr. Hugo Daniel Estrella Tampieri,
and World Affairs, Rome, Italy;
Society Chairman, International Student/Young
Prof. Mark Thiemens, Dean of Physical Pugwash Board, Cordoba, Argentina;
Prof. Ivo Slaus, Member of the Croatian Sciences, University of California, San Consultant, Córdoba State Congress (edu-
Parliament, Zagreb Diego, La Jolla, California, USA cation); Coordinator, Department of
Social Studies, Universidad Siglo XXI,
Prof. Larry Smarr, University of Dr. Kevin Trenberth, Head, Climate Cordoba
California, San Diego, La Jolla, California, Analysis Section, National Center for
USA Atmospheric Research (NCAR), Boulder, Ms. Laura Gastellier, France
Prof. Harry Smith, Emeritus Professor of Colorado, USA

Mr. Julian Hamfjord (Norway), Student in
Microbiology and Senior Honorary Mrs. Milena Vlahovic, Foreign Policy Medicine, University of London, King’s
Research Fellow, The Medical School, Advisor of the Prime Minister of College, UK
University of Birmingham, UK Yugoslavia, Belgrade, FRY

Mr. Tom Børsen Hansen, Assistant Oxford, UK; Founder, Oxford Student Ms. Gina van Schalkwyk, MA Student
Professor, Centre for Science Education, Pugwash; Member, Institute of Physics and Tutorial Lecturer, University of
Faculty of Science, University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, South Africa
Copenhagen, Denmark: Member, Board of Ms. Keiko Nakamura, Researcher, The
International Student/Young Pugwash Peace Depot, Yokohama, Japan Ms. Smriti Shrestha (Nepal), 3rd year BS
Student in Biomedical Engineering,
Mr. Madhan Mohan Jaganathan, Junior Mr. Clayton Nall, Research Assistant, The Worcester Polytechnic Institute (WPI),
Research Fellow, Centre for International Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, Worcester, Massachusetts
Politics, School of International Studies, DC, USA
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Ms. E.J. Stern, Student in Philosophy and
Ms. Lina Nayak, Illinois Mathematics and Communications; Summer Intern, Student
Delhi, India Science Academy, Chicago, USA Pugwash USA, Washington, DC
Ms. Silvija Kos, MA student, Zagreb, Mr. Ali Negyal, 1st year undergraduate in
Croatia Mr. Pablo Suarez (Argentina), PhD
Natural Sciences, St. Catharine’s College, Student (climate change, decision-making,
Ms. Magdalena Kropiwnicka (Poland), Cambridge, UK environmental justice) and Research
MA student International Affairs, St. Mr. Juan Pablo Pardo Guerra, Mexico Assistant, Boston University, Boston, MA
John’s College, Rome Campus, Italy
Dr Arthur Petersen, Senior Social Scientist, Ms. Susan Veres, Executive Director,
Mr. Ashwin Kumar (India), Graduate Office for Environmental Assessment, Student Pugwash USA (SPUSA),
Student in Mechanical Engineering, National Institute of Public Health and the Washington, DC
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Environment (RIVM), Bilthoven, The
Indiana, USA Ms. Nataliya Vibla, PhD Student, Ivan
Netherlands Franco L’viv National University, L’viv,
Mr. Rian Leith, Student and Research Mr. Arpit Rajain, PhD Candidate, Centre Ukraine
Assistant (Diplomatic for International Politics, Organisation
Studies/International Relations), Ms. Iryna Vuytsyk, PhD Student, Dept. of
and Disarmament, School of International International Relations, Ivan Franco L’viv
University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New
Africa National University, L’viv, Ukraine
Delhi, India
Ms. Jessica Lombardo, National Outreach S TA F F
Mr. Benjamin Rusek, Research Intern and
Coordinator, Student Pugwash USA, Masters Candidate, The Henry L. Stimson ROME PUGWASH OFFICE
Washington, DC, USA Center, Washington, DC, USA Claudia Vaughn and Mimma de Santis
Mr. William Marshall, PhD Student, Mr. Lessy Youssouf Salami, Masters LONDON PUGWASH OFFICE
Department of Physics, University of Student in Economics, Univ. de Lomé, Jean Egerton
Lomé, Togo (West Africa)
The La Jolla cliffs.

8th Pugwash Workshop on the Middle East

Alexandria, Egypt, 31 May–2 June 2002
• Resuming the Peace Process: The led the Israeli government to take
Report
Proposed International Peace necessary security measures which in
by Helena Hörnebrandt
Conference; turn hinders any peace negotiations.
• Lessons of September 11 for Arab- Three ways to advance the peace
The 8th Pugwash workshop on the Israeli-US Relations; process were laid out: (1) to pick up
Middle East convened at the Swedish • Ramifications of Extending the War from where previous talks ended; (2)
Institute in Alexandria and was co- on Terrorism: Prospects of a US through an interim agreement; and
hosted by the Egyptian Pugwash Military Attack on Iraq, the Role of (3) through unilateral steps. The first
Group. Attending were 30 partici- Iran and other Scenarios; approach has little chance of success,
pants from seven countries, including • Future Scenarios of Middle East and few participants had faith in the
Palestine, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, USA, Peace and Security Frameworks; second approach. Accordingly, it was
Italy and Sweden. Pugwash is grate- • Future Modes of Israeli-Arab felt that the third approach would
ful to the Swedish Institute and to the Cooperation. best create a basis for positive negoti-
governments of Egypt and Sweden ations. The support of and engage-
for their support. Current Situation ment by the international community
The workshop was originally The first part of the Workshop could compensate for the weaker
scheduled for April and was post- focused on the current situation of position of Palestine.
poned due to continuing violence in the region, with participants express- Peace negotiations must focus on
Israel/Palestine and the difficulty of ing grave concerns on the develop- Palestine as an independent state,
traveling. Unfortunately, this meeting ment of the conflict. In order to with demographic and personal secu-
was marked as well by the inability resolve the conflict, a few participants rity for Israel. While this could mean
of some invited Palestinians to obtain argued the necessity of concentrating building walls and fences to secure
exit permits from Israeli authorities, on the root of the matter; i.e., so far Israelis, this would not be an optimal
and from the decision of other the focus has been one-sided, as it has solution and should be seen strictly as
Palestinians not to leave Palestine been focusing on the suicidal bombers a security option and not a political
during these most difficult times. It rather than the fact that Palestine is solution.
was also the case that several invited under occupation. Two questions
Israelis chose not to attend because flow from this: can Palestine conduct Processes and Opinion
of security concerns due to demon- elections when it is under occupation, Others proposed going beyond uni-
strations and violence in the Arab and does Israel need to end the occu- lateral steps and directly involving
world directed at Israel. pation and respect Palestinian nation- the United Nations or other actors.
alist aspirations before peace negotia- Those in the midst of conflict will
T he workshop discussed the fol-

lowing issues:
• Breaking the Stalemate: Israel-
tions can start?
Other participants felt that Israel
always protect their own interests
first, thus it is imperative to use exter-
is under siege from Palestinian nal and internal pressures. There was
Palestinian Relations; bombers. These circumstances have also discussion of the role of the US,

Pugwash Meeting No. 272
ify the who, what, when, and why of not exist, it must be restored before
a peace conference before it under- joint projects become possible.
taking it. Two important elements to
It was felt by some that nothing remember are the asymmetry of
concrete could come out of a confer- power and the asymmetry of gain
ence between Israel and Palestine due between the parties undertaking
to the current violence and the gulf cooperative efforts. If you can iden-
between them. Others felt that, even tify objective elements that both par-
if nothing tangible is gained from a ties can agree to, there is a greater
Francesco Calogero and such a conference, the process would chance for the process to work in a
Amnon Pazy in La Jolla.
nonetheless legitimize Palestine as a positive direction towards peace.
negotiation partner. Even negotiations Cooperation may not resolve the
with some expressing dismay that the that contribute to an understanding political issue, but it might be an ele-
US government has a limited under- of outstanding issues could help get ment that ultimately contributes
standing of Middle East dynamics. the peace process back on track. towards a political resolution.
Others felt that US involvement can Mention was also made of the
never be more than limited, that the beneficial role that is played by exter- Impact of September 11
parties themselves must resolve the nal organizations like the United While the terrorist attacks of 11
issues. Nations and International Red Cross, September 2001 were justly con-
Workshop participants agreed and the need for strengthening their demned around the world, many peo-
that public opinion is very important, involvement during times of violence. ple still have difficulty conceptually
and that opinions and perceptions understanding these capacities for
must change dramatically for peace Economic Cooperation terrorism. Not only has this made it
to be possible. The current war is a There was broad agreement that both difficult for some to understand the
conflict over both territory and iden- social and economic cooperation, impact September 11 had on the
tity. Personal fears need to be reduced whether in health, education, or busi- United States and other countries, it
and the two societies need to find a ness, can beneficially assist the peace has brought about major changes in
common language. How can we start process. Such cooperation can stimu- how America sees itself and the rest
working together? late economic growth and attract for- of the world. It has also brought to
eign investment while creating the fore very simplistic ways of defin-
Peace Conferences improved social and environmental ing complex concepts of evil and good.
Peace conferences are often triggered conditions. While Islam is often directly
by leadership problems, initiated in Others felt that a comprehensive linked to terrorism in the media, it
situations where the leaders do not peace must be in place before joint should be borne in mind that most
know what to do. So, what purpose social or economic projects can be Muslims see Osama bin-Laden as
should a conference serve: to reach discussed. Furthermore, how is it having exploited Islam for his own
common understandings or simply possible to even discuss cooperation purposes. It is also true that other
to exchange ideas? Can conferences when one side is under occupation? ‘fundamentalists,’ whether Christian
at times be counterproductive to Moreover, such cooperation is both or Jewish, have also undertaken acts
stated goals? In situations of severe time consuming and expensive under of terrorism for their own ‘causes.’
conflict, a poorly arranged and han- the current political situation. It is What is important is to focus on
dled conference can end up worsen- one thing to discuss joint projects on the aims and bases of support of ter-
ing the relationship between the par- infrastructure, yet this same rorist organisations? Terrorism is dif-
ties. One participant emphasized that infrastructure is being destroyed by ficult to define, it has different mani-
Israelis and Palestinians need to clar- military actions. Where hope does festations all over the world. We need

to look at what stimulates terrorist It was suggested that a joint steer- Prof. Everett Mendelsohn, Professor of
the History of Science, Harvard
actions and terrorist groups, while ing group, consisting of Israelis and
University, Cambridge, MA USA
also making clear that it is never per- Palestinians, be established to explore
Ms. Merri Minuskin, Director, Middle
missible to kill civilians, no matter practical and regional forms of coop- East Desk, International Institute for
what the political, social, or religious eration as well as to prepare relevant Solidarity and Development, Israel;
cause. topics for future meetings. Close Pedagogical Advisor, Arab Teachers
Training College; Teacher of Psychology
cooperation with Jordan and Egypt and Sociology
The Future was also emphasized. Participants
Ms. Sharon Roling, Projects Director,
There was consensus among the par- expressed their appreciation to the Economic Cooperation Foundation
ticipants, despite the difficulties in Swedish Institute in Alexandria and (ECF), a Tel-Aviv-based non-profit NGO,
Israel
holding the meeting and in having all the Swedish government for their
Ms. Karin Roxman, Director, Middle
those invited able to attend, that such support for this and possibly future
East Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
meetings should continue. meetings. Stockholm, Sweden; Political Advisor to
the EU Special Representative to MEPP
Participants Dr. Abdel Moneim Said, Director, Al-

Ahram Center for Political and Strategic
Studies, Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo,
Gen. (ret.) Mansour Abo Rashid, Dr. Maher El-Kurd, Economic Advisor to Egypt
Chairman, Amman Center for Peace and the President of the Palestinian National
Development, Amman, Jordan Authority (PNA); Secretary General of Dr. Jerome Segal, Director, The Jerusalem
the Higher Commission for Investment Project, Center for International and
Mr. Yossi Alpher, Coeditor, and Finance; Deputy Minister for Security Studies, University of Maryland,
bitterlemons.org, an Israeli-Palestinian Economy & Trade, Palestine College Park, MD, USA; President, The
internet-based dialogue project; Jewish Peace Lobby
Independent Writer/Consultant and Amb. Omran El-Shafei, Adviser, National
Director, The Political Security Domain, Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Cairo, Mr. Daniel Seideman, Attorney,
Israel Egypt; Retired Ambassador Jerusalem, Israel
Ms. Carin Atterling Wedar, Lector, Dr. Esmat Ezz, Member, Pugwash Amb. Dr. Mohamed Shaker, Foreign
Theological Faculty, University of Council; Professor, Military Medical Ministry, Cairo, Egypt
Gothenburg; Secretary-General, Swedish Academy, Cairo, Egypt
Mrs. Charlotta Sparre, First Secretary,
Initiative for Peace, Security and Embassy of Sweden, Cairo, Egypt
Amb. Ahmed Haggag, Secretary General
International Relations (SIPSIR),
of Africa Society, Cairo, Egypt
Stockholm, Sweden; Member, Swedish Amb. Jan Ståhl, Director, The Swedish
Pugwash Group Dr. Fawzy H. Hammad, former Institute, former Swedish Ambassador to
President, Atomic Energy Authority Cairo
Mr. Daoud Barakat, Senior Assistant
(AEA) of Egypt, Cairo
Head, Department of Refugees, PLO, Dr. Ratib Jalil Swais, Deputy Dean,
Palestine Ms. Helena Hörnebrant, Masters of Higher Education & Training, and
International Economics, University of Director, M.S. International Business,
Ms. Aliza Belman Inbal, Head of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy, Amman,
Stockholm; Global Project Manager for
Middle Eastern Desk, Centre for Jordan
central banks/investment banks, Sweden
International Cooperation (MASHAV),
Israel Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said, Mr. Majalie Wahbee, Director General,
Head of Military Studies Unit and Ministry of Regional Cooperation, Tel-
Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of Aviv, Israel
Technology Advisor, Al-Ahram Center
Theoretical Physics, University of Rome
for Political and Strategic Studies, Al-
“La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy; Chairman, Ms. Abeer Yassin, Researcher, Al-Ahram
Ahram Foundation, Cairo, Egypt;
Pugwash Council Center for Political and Strategic Studies,
Professor of Missile Mechanics of Flight,
Al-Ahram Foundation, Cairo, Egypt
Prof. Paolo Cotta Ramusino, Professor of Military Technical College (MTC), Cairo
Mathematical Physics, University of Dr. Aharon Zohar, Consultant, Regional
Lt.-Col. (ret) Leif Kihlsten, Analyst and
Milan, Italy; Secretary General, Union of Planning and Environmental Protection,
Lecturer (retired), Department of
Italian Scientists for Disarmament Carmei-Yosef, Israel
Strategic Studies, Swedish Defence
(USPID); Director, Program on
College, Sweden S TA F F
Disarmament and International Security,
Landau Network – Centro Volta, Como, Dr. Yoram Meitel, Chair, Department of Claudia Vaughn, Pugwash Conferences,
Italy Middle Eastern Studies, Ben-Gurion Rome, Italy
University, Beer-Sheva, Israel

17th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the

Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions:
The Impending First CWC Review
Oegstgeest, The Netherlands, 15-16 June 2002
T
Report he workshop focused on coordination with the International
the First Review Conference Union of Pure and Applied
By Pamela Mills, Harvard Sussex
Program Hague Researcher of the 1997 Chemical Chemistry (IUPAC).
Weapons Convention (CWC), which After reports on the general status
This was the seventeenth of the cur- is scheduled to begin in less than a of the CBW treaties, workshop par-
rent Pugwash workshop series on year’s time on 28 April 2003. Under ticipants devoted discussion to a
chemical and biological weapons the Convention, a special session of number of issues/topics impacting
(CBW), held in collaboration with the Conference of the States Parties upon the review: universality and
the Harvard Sussex Program on (known as a Review Conference) emerging challenges, including ter-
CBW Armament and Arms Limita- must be convened prior to the expiry rorism, impact of relevant develop-
tion (HSP). Like the eight preceding of the sixth year after entry into ments in science and technology,
workshops of the series held in the force, which was 29 April 1997. A ensuring non-proliferation, verifica-
Netherlands, it was hosted by the review process to prepare for the tion in general, national implementa-
Netherlands Pugwash Group. The Review Conference was launched by tion, assistance and protection and
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Technical Secretariat of the international cooperation, effective-
and the Dutch Ministry of Defense, Organization for the Prohibition of ness of the OPCW structure, the con-
as well as Blücher GmbH, a German Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in tribution of non-governmental orga-
chemical protection company, pro- January 2002. Much of the review is nizations (NGOs), and the general
vided financial assistance for the being conducted and coordinated by effectiveness of the review. These cat-
meeting. The meetings were held at an Open-Ended Working Group on egories corresponded roughly with
the Congreshotel Oud Poelgeest in clusters of issues important to the
Preparations for the First Review
Oegstgeest, The Netherlands.
Conference (WGRC) established by review established by the WGRC at
Participating by invitation were
the OPCW Executive Council in its first meeting in November 2001.
35 people from 13 countries (Australia,
September 2001. The objective of the Also considered by the Study Group
Belgium, Cuba, France, Germany,
first review conference is to review was the important work of counter-
Italy, Mexico, The Netherlands,
the operation of the CWC and any acting biospecific terrorism and future
Poland, Russia, Sweden, United King-
developments in science and technol- work of the Study Group itself.
dom, and the United States), all of
ogy that may impact CWC
them doing so in their private capaci- Reports on International CBW
implementation. The review process
ties. The present report is the sole
currently underway will help the Activities and Initiatives
responsibility of its author, who was
OPCW to achieve this goal. To this BWC: Progress in Implementation
asked by the meeting to prepare a
report in consultation with the Steer- end, both the states parties and the With respect to the Biological and
ing Committee. It does not necessarily Secretariat are preparing papers for Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC),
reflect a consensus of the workshop the WGRC to examine, as is the the last six months were marked by
as a whole, or of the Study Group. Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), in the failure of the states parties to

adopt any measures to strengthen the such allegations. The fifth review without a protocol, were encouraged
BWC regime. The Study Group was conference was forced to adjourn, to utilize the consultation procedures
informed that the rejection of a draft and will reconvene on 11 November and the system of CBMs already pro-
verification protocol for the BWC 2002. Meanwhile, the states parties vided for. Also, there was a need for
was a missed opportunity that will were encouraged to make proposals better preparation on the part of the
have lasting consequences for biolog- on ways to strengthen the BWC short states parties, who could use the fifth
ical weapons disarmament efforts. of a protocol. review conference in November as a
In March 2001, the chairman of The United Kingdom released a forum in which to reaffirm the inter-
the Ad Hoc Group, which was man- “Green Paper” containing proposals national norms against biological
dated to negotiate a protocol, on how to strengthen the BWC in weapons. If there is no consensus, the
presented a draft composite text to April 2002. It suggests mechanisms states parties should be prepared to
the states parties. The text was more for investigations of non-compliance, take any motion to a vote, rather
than 95 per cent agreed language and assistance in the event or threat of than allow one or more states parties
contained all the key elements of an use, and national criminal legislation to block action. States parties in sup-
effective verification regime for bio- to implement the Convention, as well port of a strengthened BWC, and
logical weapons. However, at the as a scientific advisory panel to assess who did support the draft protocol,
twenty-fourth session of the Ad Hoc develops in science and technology should make a renewed commitment
Group in July 2001, one state party, that impact on the Convention, an to a positive outcome for the
the United States, repudiated the expanded system of confidence- November 2002 review conference.
approach taken by the draft protocol, building measures (CBMs), standards The Study Group also heard
stating concerns of its effectiveness in for the physical protection of about the efforts of other organiza-
“catching cheaters” and the impact pathogens, increased disease surveil- tions to take up where the Ad Hoc
such verification would have on the lance, a code of conduct for academic Group was forced to leave off in
pharmaceutical and biotechnology and professional bodies, and the uni- December 2001. The International
industries. Despite international versal criminalization of CBW Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
attention after the events of offences. was one such organization very con-
September 11th and the anthrax The U.S. concerns over the weak- cerned about the failure of the BWC
attacks in the United States, the U.S. ness of the draft protocol and its bur- states parties to adopt a verification
position on the protocol did not den on industry were largely protocol. As biotechnology advances,
change. In November 2001, when the unfounded as the protocol’s aim was the ability to address such innovation
fifth review conference of the BWC not to “catch” cheaters but rather to within the current BWC regime
first convened, there was a lack of demonstrate compliance, build confi- diminishes greatly. As the guardians
political will to conclude a protocol dence among states parties, and deter of international humanitarian law,
in the absence of U.S. support and no potential violators of the BWC. U.S. the ICRC felt a responsibility to pre-
agreement was possible on other industry would have been subject to vent the erosion of moral and ethical
measures, such as the establishment a maximum of seven inspections per norms against biological weapons
of interim supportive institutions. year of declared facilities; the FDA and to work therefore to strengthen
The United States used the forum of does thousands. Inspections of indus- international efforts in support of the
the fifth review conference to “name try under the CWC verification BWC. To this end, the ICRC was
names” of those countries it thought regime have proven that confidential working on a declaration on
had biological weapons programs, or information and information relevant “biotechnology, weapons, and
weapons capabilities, in violation of to national security can be humanity”. It hoped to convene a
the BWC. The consultation adequately protected. meeting of government representa-
procedures under Article V of the States parties with concerns over tives to discuss this subject and
Convention were designed to handle the effectiveness of the BWC, with or decide on action prior to the

November 2002 resumption of the defense. This study looked at a num- account. In the study, it was con-
fifth review conference of the BWC. ber of issue areas: evaluation of the cluded that a “web of deterrence” is
Another program in the process of hazards and NATO’s ability to of utmost importance, because, par-
being established is a biological wea- respond, effect levels, detection, ticularly with biological weapons, the
pons monitoring group, which is a physical protection, medical counter- development of reliable defense tech-
group of responsible NGOs that are measures, contamination control, nology is unlikely.
looking to step in where governments training, and CB terrorism (which The results of the NATO LTSS
have failed and work toward the was added to the study only after are a NATO unclassified document
implementation of a verification September 11th). and will be released officially in 2003.
mechanism for the BWC. The study highlights the threat Participants in the LTSS plan to eval-
Lessons to be had from the expe- posed by the increased potential for uate progress and research biannually.
rience of BWC review conferences, new, possibly more virulent, biologi-
Progress in Implementing the CWC
for the first CWC review conference, cal agents as a result of developments
include the need to focus on key in genomics and proteomics. There is On 29 April 2002, the OPCW
issues and engage in extensive plan- also a potential threat from hidden marked the fifth anniversary of the
ning and preparation; the outcome of stocks of biological weapons or CWC. Looking back over five years,
the Conference must be agreed. agents in states both party and not the CWC has both met with great
The Study Group was, however, party to the BWC. Both of these success and encountered serious diffi-
warned against drawing too many aspects create unknowns with regard culties. The OPCW has overseen the
parallels between the fifth review to the effect of and response to a destruction of 10 percent of the
conference of the BWC and the first chemical attack. A wider range of declared stockpile of chemical agents,
CWC review conference, as they are detection methods should be devel- and 24 percent of the declared stock-
different instruments, designed with oped, including generic detection, pile of munitions and containers.
different intentions and in different which would allow the detection of Both India and the United States have
international environments. The many agents with a single procedure met the deadline to destroy 20 per-
CWC review conference would seek or mechanism. There was also a need cent of their Category 1 chemical
to adjust an already existing and for multivalent or generic vaccines weapons. Russia and another state
functioning verification regime, while that counteract a variety of biological party of withheld identity have both
the BWC review conference was agents instead of a vaccine targeted submitted requests for the extension
asked to adopt one. The Study Group to one agent or virus. Radical new of their destruction deadlines. All
also explored the role of verification approaches to therapy must be devel- states parties in possession of
in inspiring greater confidence in a oped in order to respond to genomic Category 2 and 3 chemical weapons
treaty regime. Verification should or proteomic agents. On the question have met the deadline to destroy 100
decrease the confidence of violators of contamination, the question is percent of their stockpiles, which
that they can work in secret, thus “how dirty is clean enough?”—new coincided with the fifth anniversary.
deterring violations of the convention decontamination techniques will be All states parties that declared chemi-
in the first place. Any BWC protocol explored. Prior to September 11th, cal weapons production facilities met
must therefore, first and foremost, chemical and biological terrorism the deadline to destroy 40 percent of
serve as a deterrent. was not considered a military prob- their production capacity. Difficulties
lem in the context of NATO; how- previously encountered during the
NATO Longterm Scientific Study conduct of inspections at certain
ever with Article V (collective
(LTSS) Schedule 2 facilities have been
response) enacted, NATO must take
The Study Group received a presenta- the “war against terror” and the resolved bilaterally.
tion on the results of a 3-year NATO potential use by terrorists of chemical In both the United States and
study on chemical and biological and/or biological weapons into Russia destruction activities are

research into the under-declaration or

non-declaration of declarable indus-
trial facilities; using open-source pub-
lic information, 44 such facilities
were identified. The states parties
involved have been contacted and
were appreciative of the Secretariat’s
assistance.
Programming in the area of inter-
national cooperation and assistance
had been severely affected by the cash
deficit, but results have been achieved
nonetheless. In 2002, two meetings
were held for regional National
Authorities, in Slovakia and Brazil.
UNSCOM Inspecting CW in Iraq. United Naitons Photo 158837
Also in Brazil, there was an interna-
tional meeting on assistance and pro-
increasing their pace and many facili- The emphasis will instead shift to tection. The annual National
ties are scheduled to come on-line in Schedule 3 and DOC facilities and/or Authority Day meeting is scheduled
the forthcoming year, including those plant sites; this trend is already to take place in the fall, as are basic
at Aberdeen and Umatilla in the reflected in the draft 2003 budget. and advanced training courses for
United States and Gorny in Russia. However, there will be a need to National Authority personnel. The
These developments will necessitate a establish a new mechanism for the Technical Secretariat is planning a
larger budget for verification activi- selection of sites/facilities for inspec- major exercise on the delivery of
ties, such as continuous monitoring tion, keeping in mind the type of assistance, to take place in Croatia in
of chemical weapons destruction facility and geographic distribution. November. The third annual
facilities (CWDFs). The number of Progress has been achieved in the Associate Programme will begin in
CWDFs being monitored is expected resolution of unresolved issues July 2002, this time with the support
to increase from one to five in the related to Article VI, such as bound- of a chemical company in Italy, in
course of 2003. Furthermore, the aries of production and captive use, addition to the University of Surrey,
Technical Secretariat is looking to re- aggregate national data, low concen- United Kingdom, and chemical com-
examine, as part of the review trations of Schedule 2A and 2A* panies in Belgium, France, and the
process, inspection methodologies chemicals, and the selection of other Netherlands.
under Articles IV, V, and VI. The chemical weapons production facili- Although no states have become
midterm plan for 2004-2006 foresees ties (OCPFS, i.e. DOC/PSF) for party to the CWC in 2002, the
as many as 12 fully operation inspection. However there is a worry- Technical Secretariat continues to
CWDFs by 2006, which will then ing lack of progress concerning the pursue universality, through a
necessitate even larger amounts of issue of transfers of Schedule 3 chem- regional approach and bilaterally. In
time spent on continuous and on-site icals to states not party to the addition, there was a need to reevalu-
monitoring inspections and even Convention, and whether or not to ate the public outreach strategy of the
larger budget increases. Changes may impose a trade ban; it is thought that OPCW.
also be imminent for the industry the states parties will only be able to Since January 2001, the OPCW
inspection regime under Article VI, agree to some measure short of a has been experiencing a severe cash
including lower frequencies of inspec- total ban. The Technical Secretariat flow problem, which has reduced
tion for Schedule 1 and 2 facilities. of the OPCW has been doing program delivery (including inspec-

tions) by as much as 50 percent. The loss of confidence. It is hoped that a already been discussed by the public
funding of programming has been new Director-General will be international law working group of
prioritized based on the CWC man- appointed prior to the seventh ses- the EU, which has submitted it to the
date, with the monitoring of the sion of the Conference of the States EU governments for consideration.
destruction of chemical weapons tak- Parties in October 2002 and that The draft convention also merited
ing precedence. There has been a both the Secretariat and the states mention in the April 2002 UK Green
marked reduction in the inspection of parties can soon put the financial and Paper on measures to strengthen the
chemical weapons storage facilities political problems behind them and BWC. One important aspect of such
(CWSFs) and in industry inspections; focus on the critical issues, such as a convention is that it will also crimi-
in 2002, there will be only between preparations for the first review con- nalize the production, development,
45 and 50 industry inspections rather ference or use of chemical or biological wea-
than the 132 originally planned. The pons by states not party to the CWC
HSP Draft Convention on CBW
financial crisis first arose most or BWC, or their nationals, as well as
Criminalisation
directly from discrepancies in the by non-state actors. It will also cover
income budgeted and that received in As in previous workshops, the Study riot control agents and other so-
reimbursements for the costs of Group was provided an update on called non-lethal weapons, if they
Article IV and V inspections. The rea- the progress achieved by HSP in pro- were used for prohibited purposes
sons for this are varied, including late moting its draft convention on CBW (i.e. warfare rather than domestic riot
or non-payment by the states parties Criminalisation, which aims to estab- control).
concerned and late invoicing by the lish universal jurisdiction for crimes Concerns were raised about the
Secretariat. New mechanisms are involving violations of the prohibi- combining of chemical and biological
being explored to more accurately tions contained in both the CWC and crimes in one treaty and the lack of
estimate the amount of income this the BWC. States will have an obliga- involvement by the OPCW in this
area generates in any given year and tion to either extradite or prosecute project. The HSP draft does,
for the payment of these funds, i.e. offenders no matter their nationality however, aid efforts to harmonize
advance payments instead of reim- or where the crime was committed. international criminal law.
bursements. As inspection activities This convention is a necessity given
that only a minority of states are in The Impending First CWC
in this area are expected to increase
full compliance with the legislative Review
with the upsurge in destruction activ-
ities, action must be taken as soon as provisions of the CWC (Article VII) Universality and Emerging
and the BWC (Article IV), and legis- Challenges
possible. The argument can be made
that verification is being held hostage lation, regulation, and penalties vary One of the major challenges for the
by the untimely payment of arrears widely. Furthermore, the statutes of CWC at the beginning of the twenty-
and that perhaps it is time to ques- the new International Criminal Court first century is to reaffirm a commit-
tion the possessor pays principle. do not provide jurisdiction over ment to its core mandate: to take all
Since verification provides confidence chemical and biological crimes. The and any measures to eliminate all
for all in the regime, should not all two possible routes for the draft con- chemical weapons worldwide.
states parties fund these activities? vention to take to become interna- Because today’s international envi-
In addition to the financial crisis, tional law are the sixth committee of ronment differs significantly from
there is a political crisis facing the the United Nations or a separate what it was when the CWC was
OPCW in the form of a lack of diplomatic committee. Either action negotiated (10 years ago) and first
Director-General. The first Director- would immeasurably aid efforts to implemented (5 years ago), the
General was voted out by a special maintain the moral norm against OPCW (states parties and Technical
session of the Conference of the chemical and biological weapons. Secretariat) must ask themselves
States Parties in April 2002, citing a The draft convention text has what today’s threats are and what

resources are available. For example, calculations, including 29 signatory Impact of Relevant Developments in
as the threat of state use of chemical states. The states that remain outside Science and Technology
weapons decreases, the number of of the OPCW can be found in four The dominant issue when it comes to
threats from non-state actors is main regions—Caribbean, South developments in science and technol-
increasing; the goal in 1993 was dis- Pacific, Middle East, and Africa— ogy are the great advances being
armament, the goal for 2002 may be and their reasons for not joining fall made in biotechnology; science will
considered non-proliferation. into a number of broad categories: not stand still and neither should the
Another example, is the obliga- unawareness of the treaty, infrastruc- CWC. The Convention, under the
tion of the OPCW to respond to tural or economic deficiencies, a lack general purpose criterion (GPC),
international terrorism and work of the capacity to implement the defines a chemical weapon as any
towards the response to and preven- Convention, government instability, chemical intended to cause harm,
tion of acts of terrorism using chemi- or security concerns. Those states thereby not limiting the application
cal weapons. To this end, the OPCW with the latter, found mainly in the of the CWC provisions to Scheduled
Executive Council has established an Middle East, will not join until they chemicals. This definition, which
open-ended working group on the perceive that the Convention is being includes substances such as bioregu-
role of the OPCW in international implemented to its fullest and most lators, calmatives, maloderants, and
anti-terrorism efforts. Although ter- complete extent, including full assur- other so-called non-lethal weapons,
rorism is not explicitly mentioned in ance of compliance by all states par- must be reaffirmed by the states par-
the CWC, many of its provisions— ties. ties during the review conference.
Article IV, V, VI, VII, X, etc—have For those states outside of the Otherwise, there is a danger of an
direct relevance to efforts to combat Middle East, the OPCW can and explosion of non-lethal weapon
terrorism. One measure that the should engage in programming and development by state actors—they
Council has taken so far in this activities designed to encourage could be viewed as an alternative to
respect is to adopt a decision on membership, including regional semi- lethal weapons and may assuage pub-
national implementation measures, nars and bilateral assistance lic outcry over death tolls in conflict.
stressing the need for every state meetings. The members of the It was also noted that if terrorists
party to criminalize chemical wea- Executive Council could be involved were to employ toxic chemicals they
pons offences in order to rid the in a focused way to encourage uni- would most likely not use any found
world of “safe havens” for any versality, perhaps by working with on the Schedules.
potential violators of the Convention. states not party in their own region The CWC GPC also applies to
Universal adherence to the treaty, or with whom they have special rela- toxins, and in the wake of the failure
or universality, is one mechanism for tionships. One example is the recent of states parties to adopt measures to
helping to eliminate any safe havens EU practice of carrying out strengthen the BWC, the CWC states
for would-be violators of the demarches in the capitals of states parties should reaffirm the overlap
Convention. Universality will also not party in support of CWC adher- between the two regimes and more
greatly aid efforts to ensure the non- ence. The Council could also help by assiduously apply the CWC provi-
proliferation of both chemical wea- adopting stricter controls on the sions to toxins. Currently, only three
pons and toxic chemicals and precur- transfer of Schedule 3 chemicals to toxins can be found on the CWC
sors. The OPCW, however, must be states not party. Regional National Schedules: hydrogen cyanide, ricin,
careful not to overemphasize the role Authorities as well as NGOs, and saxitoxin.
of universality at the expense of key activists, and academics within the IUPAC and the OPCW SAB are
parts of the CWC mandate, such as states not party can also be encour- preparing an analysis of scientific and
the verification of destruction. There aged to get involved in the universal- technological developments. The
are a total of 49 states not party to ity efforts. results of the study will be released
the Convention, according to OPCW after an IUPAC workshop in Norway

in July 2002. enforcement of the transfer bans on being allowed to walk through the
For the OPCW, scientific develop- Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals and what plant site, thereby avoiding any
ments may lead to more declarations, restrictions to impose on the transfer “ambiguities” in the final inspection
more inspections, and more exper- of Schedule 3 chemicals, short of a report.
tise, meaning more activity and larger ban. It was determined that the issue
budgets. The states parties must by As part of efforts to combat ter- of plant or plant site delineation is
prepared to accept such a situation as rorism, the security of CWSFs and one for the facility agreement, and
inevitable. any other locations where chemical therefore should not hamper on-site
stockpiles are stored and/or present is activities. It was also noted that doc-
Ensuring Non-Proliferation
being evaluated. Also, to ensure non- ument control has increased signifi-
Article VI of the CWC is dedicated to proliferation, the industry regime cantly since September 11th and that
the non-proliferation of toxic chemi- might at some point have to be currently no documents are allowed
cals and their precursors that could expanded beyond the Schedules, to leave the inspected site.
be used to manufacture chemical beyond DOCs even, to capture all It was noted during subsequent
weapons. The mechanism it estab- possible dual-use chemicals, discussion that under the
lishes to achieve this is the industry processes, and equipment. Although, Convention, inspectors should be
verification regime. Facilities that some participants felt that the addi- granted unimpeded access to the
produce and/or consume Schedule 1, tion of chemicals to the Schedules entire plant site and that a facility
Schedule 2, or Schedule 3 chemicals was counterproductive and/or that agreement is not necessary. The sort
are all subject to declaration and amending the Schedules is still a of managed access practiced by U.S.
inspection procedures. There is an politically unthinkable action, and industry is not permitted; the
additional category of OCPFs that the OPCW should rather expend Convention only provides for man-
(OCPFs), which must be declared resources on inspecting those facili- aged access to protect national secu-
and inspected. These facilities pro- ties already declared. rity is the context of a challenge
duce discrete organic chemicals inspection. It is important to note
(DOCs), and it is the concern that the Verification in General
that in order to achieve a level play-
facility itself could be diverted for The first topic taken up by the Study ing field within the industry regime;
prohibited purposes that justifies dec- Group under this agenda item was an all states parties must be treated simi-
larations and inspections. There are update on the issue of site access dur- larly.
more DOC plant sites than Schedule ing industry inspections in the United The Study Group next considered
1, 2 and 3 facilities put together— States. According to the report, the issue of boundaries of production
more than 4,000 have been declared where there were previously within the context of declarations
so far. The selection of DOC plant problems, solutions have been found under Article VI. Related issues
sites for inspection is an issue that and the inspection of U.S. industry is include the declaration of intermedi-
merits serious attention. As does the proceeding smoothly. The main issue ates and the production of low con-
over-inspection or non-inspection of was access to the “plant”—location centrations of Schedule 2 chemicals
Schedule 1, 2 and 3 facilities. where activities involving Scheduled within DOC plant sites. It was
The trade in Scheduled chemicals chemicals were taking place—versus pointed out that nearly all of the
is in need of more effective monitor- access to the “plant site”—wider area chemicals on the Schedules are inter-
ing, and an effort is being made to in which the Scheduled chemicals mediates and not end products.
correlate import and export data sub- were present. OPCW inspectors were There are many other serious
mitted by the chemical industry to granted full access to the plant, but issues under consideration and in
National Authorities and reported to were only permitted to inspect the need of attention with regard to the
the OPCW. The states parties are also perimeter of the plant site. Bilateral OPCW verification regime, both for
exploring issues related to the consultation resulted in inspectors chemical weapons related sites and

industrial facilities. The verification sus-decisionmaking, which is not only if those responsible for its imple-
concept must be defended from ero- mandated by the Convention and mentation—the states parties and the
sion. The key principles in this con- which effectively holds decisions Technical Secretariat—take their
cept are that verification is designed hostage to the whims of one or a few obligations seriously. Change is
to demonstrate compliance with the states parties. As well, over the last sorely needed.
provisions of the CWC and verifica- couple years, the Council has been
National Implementation
tion must be carried out in the least plagued by a dominance of adminis-
intrusive manner and through coop- trative and procedural issues over Universality is not just about num-
erative means. Verification begins substantive topics. In order to ensure bers, but is also about application. It
and ends with the independence of effective verification, the Council is not enough for the CWC to be
the Technical Secretariat, and thus of must function more efficiently and adopted universally, it must be imple-
inspectors, to carry out their effectively, which requires better mented universally as well.
mandate. While there have been no focus, more preparation, and greater Article VII of the Convention
gross violations of the CWC to date, political will and participation. requires states parties to take the nec-
and the verification regime is func- In addition to Articles IV, V, and essary measures to implement the
tioning, it is also impeded by numer- VI (the chemical weapons-related and CWC at the national level, including
ous roadblocks erected by the states industry verification provisions), the implementing legislation that crimi-
parties—managed access, lack of OPCW must turn its attention to the nalizes the CWC prohibitions. The
transparency, reinterpretation of the implementation of Article IX of the verification regime will only fully
Convention, underbudgeting, reser- CWC: challenge inspections. The fact function with the collaboration of all
vations, etc. These restrictions have that no state party has called for a the states parties, and the states par-
resulted in less than optimum perfor- challenge inspection to be conducted ties must be empowered to collabo-
mance and may gradually erode the anywhere in the first five years of the rate. To date, only a minority of
confidence placed by the states par- OPCW’s existence is seen by some as states parties (63) have enacted
ties in the CWC. proof of the CWC’s effectiveness and implementing legislation, and the
A large piece of the verification believe that the role of a challenge forms and provisions of such legisla-
puzzle is the ability to the OPCW inspection is deterrence, while others tion vary widely. Although interna-
Executive Council to take the deci- see the non-implementation of Article tional law can, for some legal
sions necessary to enable the verifica- IX as a deficiency that must be cor- systems, automatically become the
tion regime to fully function, such as rected as soon as possible. They view law of the land, regulatory legislation
the approval of detailed plans for the challenge inspections as important is still necessary to ensure proper
verification of destruction of chemi- CBMs that should become routine implementation. Work must be done
cal weapons and CWPFs, for the con- practice. If a state party does have towards the enactment and the har-
version of CWPFs, and facility agree- concerns about the compliance of monization of domestic legislation
ments, as well as decisions on the another state party, it has an obliga- among all 145 states parties.
unresolved industry issues: low con- tion to pursue such allegations One area in which the divergence
centrations, aggregate national data, through either the consultation and in legislative measures is most pro-
boundaries of production and captive clarification procedures provided for nounced is in the definition of what
use, transfers of Schedule 3 chemi- in the Convention or via a challenge constitutes a chemical weapon—
cals, etc. The Executive Council, inspection. The fact that this has not some states parties limit it to the
rather than making quick decisions, occurred and the role challenge Schedules while others rightly use the
has a tendency to defer decision from inspections should play in CWC GPC. Under the Convention, states
session to session, often for as much implementation must be addressed parties are obligated to do the latter,
as a year or more. At the root of the during the review process. but there is much debate over how to
problem is an emphasis on consen- The Convention is viable, but implement the GPC, which by its

very nature is broad and all inclusive must also be made more aware of the 2001—NGOs have been informed
leading to greater resources for moni- CWC and industry’s role in the that they are welcome to attend the
toring, analysis, and declaration. implementation of the global chemi- Review Conference under the usual
The states parties and their National cal weapons ban. rules of procedure and that they are
Authorities must work diligently to In addition to discussion of the additionally invited to submit papers
prevent the misuse of all toxic topics addressed above, the Study to the WGRC. There is the added
chemicals. Group received a paper on Russia’s possibility of NGOs briefing the
On the issue of the GPC and national implementation measures, WGRC directly or being provided
national implementation in general, including details about the request with an informal session or forum
the OPCW should show leadership to extend its destruction deadline to during the Review Conference at
and promote awareness among the 2012. Russia views national imple- which to speak. A general acknowl-
states parties. This it has done to mentation of the Convention as an edgement of the value of NGO par-
some extent already, most recently international project, particularly ticipation has been voiced within the
via two questionnaires sent to states with respect to the destruction pro- WGRC, but NGOs must push for
parties requesting information about gram, which can not be completed more formal involvement; one way to
their national implementation mea- without international financial do this is by answering the WGRC’s
sures, both in regard to the import assistance. invitation for papers, the sooner the
and export of toxic chemicals and better.
penal legislation. The one NGO currently most
In other areas of national imple- An OPCW program, the ethics involved in the review process is
mentation, the OPCW has made IUPAC, which is preparing its study
project, is in its preliminary stage.
great progress: the training of of scientific and technological devel-
National Authorities, the exchange This project seeks to engage opments relevant to the CWC. An
of information, capacity building, academia and research centers effort is being made to involve
support for the work of National National Authorities and particularly
within the scientific field for the
Authorities, and encouraging com- their technical advisors in this process,
munication between National purpose of ethical education. in order to provide the states parties
Authorities regionally and inter- a channel for participation. It is
nationally. Another OPCW program, important that the IUPAC study
the ethics project, is in its preliminary Although much is being done remain pertinent and relevant to the
stage. This project seeks to engage already, there is more that could be review process and not make wide-
academia and research centers within done by both the Technical ranging recommendations that can-
the scientific field for the purpose of Secretariat and the states parties in not be translated into near-term
ethical education; reaffirming the the area of national implementation. action.
global norm against the unethical A greater commitment of political Industry should also be encour-
activities involving chemical and economic resources is needed aged to take a more active role in the
weapons. The ethics project will from the states parties to ensure the review process and participate in the
work to increase awareness of the reliability and viability of national review conference.
CWC within the chemical sciences implementation.
Assuring an Effective Outcome
and educate students and scientists
The Contributions of NGOs There is a real potential crisis in that
about the deleterious applications of
their work. Scientists must be made In response to a letter sent from a the states parties do not yet seem
to realize that any activities involving group of NGOs to the Director- engaged or interested in the review
chemical weapons are not only General—an initiative that began at process. This will hopefully change
unethical but also illegal. Industry the Study Group workshop in June when national papers are finalized

and submitted. The states parties find whether people are safer inside of advance global response capabilities.
themselves preoccupied with the sealed or ventilated rooms during a All of this is only possible, however,
question of appointing a new chemical attack. The conclusion was if there is an effort to increase aware-
Director-General of the Technical surprising and contradictory to much ness within the scientific community
Secretariat. There is also a need to of the information released in recent of the hazards of both chemical and
determine what the end product of months. People are safer in a room biological weapons and the interna-
the review conference will be: a final with some ventilation than in a room tional treaties designed to control
declaration, a set of decisions, a that is “completely” sealed—a com- and eliminate them.
report? The outcome has not yet plete seal is almost impossible to
been decided. achieve and ventilation will help to Future Work of the Study
Preparation and participation will dissipate any agent that did gain Group
be the keys to a successful review. access to the room. With over 45 years of work to its
There must be consensus on an The Study Group was also pre- credit, Pugwash has made great
agreed clear vision of what the review sented with an analytical framework strides in the linking of science with
should accomplish. The circle of of armed violence. The determinants world affairs, particularly in the area
active participants must be extended of the effect armed violence has on a of disarmament. However, in the
wider than the 9-10 delegations that population include: the potential of twenty-first century there may be a
are most active in the work of the the weapon to cause the effect, the need to reevaluate role and strategy
OPCW. The CWC and the OPCW number of potential armed users, the of Pugwash. In the last few decades,
are about upholding an international vulnerability of the victim, and the civil society and the public at large
norm; therefore, the review process potential for a situation to come to has taken on a greater role in large
must be inclusive and involve all violence in the first place. In order to areas of public policy and
stakeholders: the states parties, the respond to armed violence, protect international politics. Until now,
Technical Secretariat, NGOs, acade- populations, and save lives, answers Pugwash has had little interaction
mia, industry, etc. To this end, trans- must be sought to these questions, as with these groups. Perhaps it is time
parency and public participation are well as the questions of the context for Pugwash to enter into coalitions
key not only to the review process and intent of weapons use and how with civil society, and to become
but also to the longterm success of to prevent or limit the effects of a more advocacy oriented? Pugwash
the OPCW. particular weapon or weapons. also must explore ways to reach out
With this framework in mind, to and involve the next generation of
Counteracting Biospecific Terrorism
there is much that the international scientists and policymakers. One
The issue of how to protect people community can do to reduce the example is the nascent BW monitor-
and animals from chemical and bio- potential for and the impact of the ing group. Should Pugwash join
logical weapons, particularly if such use of intentional disease as a them?
weapons are used by terrorists, is an weapon. Number one is the conclu- The Study Group hopes to hold
important topic of discussion in a sion of a verification protocol for the its eighteenth workshop in Geneva
post-September 11th world. The two BWC and universal adherence to during 9-10 November 2002, just
facets of this problem are deterring both the Convention and the proto- prior to the resumption of the fifth
the use of chemical and biological col, as well as criminalisation at both review conference of the BWC on 11
weapons and establishing the proper the national and international levels November. This workshop will focus
mechanisms for passive defense: proof biological weapons offences. on the fifth review conference and on
tection, detection, and decontamina- Better disease surveillance and con- efforts to ensure the establishment of
tion. As one example, the Study trol of known pathogens in combina- a verification mechanism for the
Group heard a report of a practical tion with better preparation within BWC.
exercise conducted to determine the health services will significantly

Participants
Dr. Maurizio Barbeschi (Italy), Senior Research, University of Sussex, Brighton, Department of Peace Studies, University
Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Industry, UK of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire,
DGSPC, off. E-1, and Director of the UK; Member, HSP Advisory Board
Mr. John Gee (Australia), Deputy
CBW Programme of the Landau
Director-General, Organisation for the Dr. Peter Plant, Independent Consultant,
Network-Centro Volta
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, The PJP Consultants, Midhurst, West Sussex,
Amb. Serguei Batsanov, Director, Special Hague, The Netherlands UK; Member, UK National Authority
Projects, Organization for the Prohibition Advisory Committee
Mr. Sylwin Jerzy Gizowski, Director,
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The
Secretariat for the Policy-Making Organs, Prof. Julian Perry Robinson, Sussex
Hague, The Netherlands
Organisation for the Prohibition of Director, Harvard-Sussex Program,
Ms. Magda Bauta, Head, Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The Hague, Science & Technology Policy Research
Implementation Support Branch, The Netherlands (SPRU), University of Sussex, Brighton,
International Cooperation and Assistance UK
Ms. Diana Gosens, Policy Advisor, CWC
Division (ICA), Organisation for the
National Authority, Ministry of Mr. Martin Rudduck, Head of UK
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
Economic Affairs, The Hague, The Chemical Weapons Convention National
(OPCW), The Hague, The Netherlands
Netherlands Authority, Department of Trade &
Mr. Robert Blum, Alternate Permanent Industry, London, UK
Mr. Peter Kaiser, Branch Head, Media &
Representative, U.S. Delegation to the
Public Affairs, OPCW, The Hague, The Mr. Nicholas Sims, Senior Lecturer in
OPCW, The Hague, The Netherlands
Netherlands International Relations, London School
Dr. Henk L. Boter, former Head (now of Economics and Political Science (LSE),
Dr. Alexander Kelle, Science Fellow,
retired), Research Group on Analytical University of London, London, UK
Center for International Security and
Chemistry, TNO Prins Maurits
Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford Dr. Thomas Stock, Sales Manager,
Laboratory, Rijswijk, as well as former
University, Stanford, California Dynasafe Germany GmbH, Muelheim an
Consultant, TNO Prins Maurits
(September 2001-August 2002) der Ruhr, Germany
Laboratory, and Advisor Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands Mr. Ian Kenyon, Visiting Senior Research Ms. Maria Norma Suarez Paniagua,
Fellow, Mountbatten Centre for Counsellor of the Mexican Embassy, and
Mr. Gordon M. Burck, Principal Policy
International Studies, University of Alternate Representative of the Mexican
Analyst, EAI Corporation, Alexandria,
Southampton, Highfield, Southampton, Delegation to the OPCW, The Hague,
Virginia, USA; Senior Scientist, Chemical
UK The Netherlands
& Biological Arms Control Institute
Dr. Walter Krutzsch, CWC Consultant, Ms. Lisa Tabassi, Legal Officer, OPCW,
Mr. Richard H. Burgess, Consultant (in
Berlin, Germany The Hague, The Netherlands
trade, treaty compliance and patents) to
DuPont Company and others, Newark, Ms. Joan Link, Consultant, VERTIC, Dr. Eric Terzuolo, U.S. Permanent (resi-
Delaware, USA London, UK; Counsellor (on sabbatical), dent) Representative to the OPCW, The
Foreign and Commonwealth Office Hague, The Netherlands
Mr. Pierre Canonne,
(FCO), UK
Lecturer/Disarmament and Verification Dr. Ralf Trapp (Germany), Secretary,
issues, Univ. Marne-la-Vallés/Paris, Dr. Jan Medema, Consultant, TNO-Prins Review Conference Steering Group,
France Maurits Laboratory, Rijswijk, The Office of the Deputy Director-General,
Netherlands Organisation for the Prohibition of
Dr. Robin Coupland (UK), Coordinator
Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The Hague,
of Surgery, Health Division, International Prof. Matthew S. Meselson, Thomas
The Netherlands
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Dudley Cabot Professor of the Natural
Geneva, Switzerland Sciences, Department of Molecular and Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders, Project Leader,
Cellular Biology, Harvard University, CBW Project, SIPRI, Solna, Sweden
Prof. Herbert De Bisschop, Professor
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
(Chemistry), Royal Military Academy,
Ms. Pamela Mills (USA), Harvard Sussex P U G WA S H S TA F F :
Brussels, Belgium; Scientific Advisor on
CW Matters, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Program Researcher at the Organisation Claudia Vaughn, Pugwash Conferences,
Belgium for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Rome, Italy
(OPCW), The Hague, The Netherlands
Mr. Richard Ekwall, Permanent
Representative of Sweden to the OPCW, Prof. Kathryn Nixdorff, Dept. of
Embassy of Sweden, The Hague, The Microbiology and Genetics, Darmstadt
Netherlands University of Technology, Darmstadt,
Germany
Mr. Daniel Feakes (UK), Researcher,
SPRU-Science and Technology Policy Prof. Graham S. Pearson, Visiting
Professor of International Security,

Working Papers
Gordon M. Burck: Contribution to I TA L I A N P U G WA S H G R O U P
Discussion on Boundaries of Production
Richard H. Burgess: A Short Note on
Site Access During Industry Inspections I S O DA RC O
Pamela Mills: The Icing on the Cake:
CWC Universality
International School on
Disarmament and Research on Conflicts
Pamela Mills: The First Review Process
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, an
Update 24TH SUMMER COURSE
Ian R. Kenyon: The Chemical Weapons Candrai (Trento) Italy
Convention and OPCW: The challenges 16–26 June 2003
of the 21st century (to be published in
The CBW Conventions Bulletin, no. 56,
June 2002)—[Background Document]
Julian Perry Robinson: The Threat of
Nuclear Weapons in the
Chemical and Biological Weapons (text
of presentation at the 3rd Swiss Student New International Context:
Pugwash National Conference, Geneva,
10 May 2002, corrected and annotated Hopes of Reductions, Risks of
12.05.02)—[Background Document]
Alexandre Kaliadin: National Implemen-
Proliferation
tation Measures of the CWC: The case of
the Russian Federation—Background
Paper [Background Document]
Julian Perry Robinson: Should the First ISODARCO has been organizing residential courses on
CWC Review Address State-Party Non-
compliance with the National global security since 1966. The courses are intended for
Implementation Provisions? people already having a professional interest in the prob-
Walter Krutzsch and Pamela Mills: lems of international conflicts, or for those who would like
Verification in General
Matthew Meselson: “Bioterror, What
to play a more active and technically competent role in this
Can Be Done?”, May 2000, in A Draft field. The courses have an interdisciplinary nature, and
Convention to Prohibit Biological and
Chemical Weapons under International their subject matter extends from the technical and scien-
Criminal Law, Matthew Meselson and tific side of the problems to their sociological and political
Julian Robinson, Harvard Sussex
Program on CBW Armament and Arms implications.
Limitation—[Background Document]
Graham Pearson: Maximising the
Effectiveness of the First CWC Review
For more information, contact:
Conference [slide presentation]
Prof. CARLO SCHAERF
Graham Pearson: BTWC Developments
since June 2001 (slide presentation) Department of Physics
Jan Medema: Technologies That Make a University of Rome “Tor Vergata”
Difference in CB Defence Via della Ricerca Scientifica 1, I-00133 Rome, Italy
Jean Pascal Zanders, John Hart and Tel.: (+39) 06 72594560/1 — Fax: (+39) 06 2040309
Frida Kuhlau: “Chemical and Biological
Weapons Developments and Arms
E-mail: isodarco@roma2.infn.it
Control”, SIPRI Yearbook 2002 www.isodarco.it
Robin Coupland: An Analytical Frame-
work of Armed Violence/Measures to
Reduce the Chances of People Suffering
the Effects of Intentional Disease

Pugwash Workshop:
Impending Challenges to Strategic Stability: Constraining the Nuclear Threat
Moscow, Russia, 8-10 July 2002
Participants seemed to take their cue

Report US-Russian Strategic Relations
from President Putin’s conclusion
by John B. Rhinelander Notwithstanding the signing of the that in the near-term (10 to 15 years),
Declaration on New Strategic US ballistic missile defense programs
This workshop on strategic stability Relations at the May summit would not adversely effect Russia’s
and nuclear threats, held 8-10 July between Presidents Bush and Putin, deterrent capability. The general
2002 in Moscow, covered subjects far the nature of this evolving relation- sense was that the primary impact of
different from those during the Cold ship is unclear even as Russia moves the US BMD programs would be
War. A strong theme was the poten- politically toward the West and elsewhere, particularly East Asia.
tial or present instability in East Asia focuses on its economic development. The US-Russian Cooperative
and particularly South Asia and the The Strategic Offensive Reductions Threat Reduction program, now in
Middle East. The US-Russian rela- Treaty itself is a flawed document, its tenth year, has been successful, but
tionship was discussed in the immedi- but will keep Russia in rough parity needs to be accelerated and expand-
ate aftermath of the Moscow Summit with the US on deployed strategic
ed. Participants were fortunate to
in May, where the successor to the nuclear weapons through 2012, par-
hear a pioneering proposal to apply
SALT-START strategic nuclear wea- ticularly since the ban on MIRV’d
the learning and experience in Russia
pons treaties was signed, and the ter- ICBMs in START II will never enter
to the physical protection of nuclear
mination in June of the Anti-Ballistic into force. Hope was expressed at the
weapons and facilities in other coun-
Missile (ABM) Treaty upon the US workshop that some of the ambigui-
withdrawal. The fact that the work- tries, particularly India and Pakistan,
ties in the new treaty, including how
shop covered but did not dwell on in this era of heightened concern with
to count the deployed weapons cov-
these US-Russian matters (or even terrorism and nuclear proliferation.
ered by the Treaty and the verifica-
the changing political relationship be- But neither India nor Pakistan is a
tion regime, might be resolved over
tween the two) is evidence that con- party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
the new term and that ratification
cerns about strategic stability and (NPT), nor is either a member of the
would be prompt. Neither has hap-
nuclear weapons are largely focused Nuclear Suppliers Group. The legal
pened as the year 2002 draws to a
elsewhere. Thus, the seventeen partic- and policy issues are new and acute,
close. Left unresolved by a ceiling of
ipants from outside Russia, who were and even the readiness of India or
1700-2200 deployed warheads are
joined by a large and knowledgeable Pakistan to accept outside suggestions
central questions starting with the
Russian contingent, covered a broad or assistance is uncertain. Further, no
continuing role of nuclear weapons,
range of subjects. They also enjoyed a single approach is likely to work and
the dismantlement of the excess war-
never-ending variety of events sched- cooperation may occur first on non-
heads and conversion of the fissile
uled by the energetic Alexander nuclear- weapon materials. Neverthe-
materials. Little optimism was voiced
Nikitin and hosted by the Russian less, this new initiative could be of
that these carryover issues from the
Pugwash Group, and benefited from Cold War buildups would be real importance and non-governmen-
informative sessions at the Russian addressed anytime soon. tal groups, including Pugwash, could
Foreign Ministry, the Ministry of The demise of the ABM Treaty have important roles. Unfortunately,
Atomic Energy and the Kurchatov was noted more by sadness than as no one from India or Pakistan was
Institute. raising Russian security concerns. present to respond in Moscow.

Nuclear proliferation has already

occurred in South Asia and raises
acute and continuing challenges. The
two other geographic regions dis-
cussed were East Asia and the Middle
East. The former appeared to many
to be less pressing, assuming China’s
modernization remains unprovoca-
tive, disputes over Taiwan do not
flair up dangerously, and North
Korea remains contained. Concerns
Workshop Participants Visiting Kurchatov Institute.
were expressed about Pyongyang’s
intent and the future of the Agreed
Framework, but in July 2002 when even if Iraq’s programs were credibly particularly in the absence of peace
the workshop was held the Korean stopped. negotiations between Israel and the
peninsula was still quiet [editor’s note: The discussion of Iraq’s nuclear Palestinians. Returning to the general
this situation markedly deteriorated ambitions raised the most diverse theme of the workshop, one partici-
in November 2002 when North Korea views. One participant bluntly stated pant suggested that the search for
announced it was resuming pursuit of his understanding of US policy—Iraq stability in the Middle East may in
a nuclear weapons capability.] was on course to develop nuclear fact lead to instability.
The Middle East, particularly weapons, sanctions were ineffective, Other themes expressed at the
including Iraq and Iran, were the cen- and military action therefore neces- workshop on related matters
ter of intense discussions. No one dif- sary. (At the same time, he indicated included:
fered with the conclusion stated by a military response was not consid- • the NPT regime seemed relatively
several that if Iraq crossed the nuclear- ered appropriate for dealing with stable for most states,
weapon threshold, Iran would as well. either Iran or North Korea.) Regime notwithstanding the differing
Iran is clearly on a path that brings it change might come from an internal applicable standards to certain par-
closer to nuclear-weapon capability, coup, but the US view was that a pre- ties and among the three non-par-
but the public evidence of its policy is emptive strike was necessary in the ties, Israel, India and Pakistan, and
ambiguous. While several participants alternative. He described the differing the suspect performance of several
stressed the US desire that Russia cur- motivations within the Bush adminis- parties;
tail or end its nuclear relationship tration, and thought they would • Russian nuclear weapons had no
with Iran, one suggested that the US never be resolved. He noted the dis- role in areas of regional conflict
should no longer oppose Russian pol- agreement among experts on the con- and should be removed; and
icy if Russia committed to the take sequences of military action, particu- • the building a new US-Russian rela-
back the spent fuel from any reactors larly a US occupation of Iraq. tionship will take a great deal of
it builds in Iran. Other participants The Russian and Chinese posi- time and must be based on a real
noted the ambiguity in past and pre- tions were presented as dependent on understanding of each other’s secu-
sent Iranian acts, but believe Russian the UN Security Council actions and rity needs and concerns.
assistance, particularly the construc- giving Iraq a final chance. One par- In brief, the workshop explored a
tion of a single reactor at Bushehr, is ticipant thought a coup within Iraq number of difficult, if not intractable,
appropriate. Those supporting the unlikely and raised questions about problems in a fast-changing world
differing US and Russian policies all the impact of war on the Iraqi civil where anti-terrorism and nuclear
seemed to agree that Iran’s future population, the general geographic non-proliferation are priorities. It
decisions would be guided, in part, area, and public opinion in Europe. was clear from the discussions that
by developments in Iraq. No one sug- Israel’s three-decade nuclear capabil- while agreement on ends may be
gested that Iran would necessarily ity, even if devoted to its defense, was achieved, the means to achieve them
remain a non-nuclear weapon state recognized as a huge unsettling factor are likely to remain divisive.

Participants
Dr. Gunnar Arbman, Director of DC, USA; Vice Chairman, Lawyers Dr. Igor Gonnov, Director, Obninsk
Research, Swedish Defence Research Alliance for World Security (LAWS); Business and Innovation Center,
Agency (FOI), Stockholm, Sweden Director, Arms Control Association Secretary, Obninsk Branch of the Russian
(ACA) Pugwash Committee, Obninsk, Kaluga
Dr. Kennette Benedict, Area Director,
Region
International Peace and Security, Global Mr. Gary Samore, International Institute
Security and Sustainability, The John D. for Strategic Studies (IISS), London, UK Dr. Dmitri Danilov, Head of Department
and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, of European Security, Institute of Europe,
Mr. Paul Schulte, Director Proliferation
Chicago, Illinois, USA Russian Academy of Science, Moscow
and Arms Control, Ministry of Defence,
Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director, London, UK Maj. Gen. (Rtd.) Vladimir Dvorkin,
Pugwash Conferences on Science and Leading Scientist, Institute of World
Rear-Admiral (Rtd.) Camille Sellier,
World Affairs, Cambridge, MA, USA Economy and International Relations of
Adviser, Commissariat a l’Energie
the Russian Academy of Sciences, (former
Dr. Oleg Bukharin, Research Scientist, Atomique (CEA), Direction des
Director of the 4th Central Institute of the
Princeton University, Princeton, New Applications Militaries (DAM), Bruyères
Russian Defence Ministry), member of
Jersey, USA Le Châtel, France
the Russian Pugwash Committee,
Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of Mr. Daniel Sneider, National/Foreign Moscow
Theoretical Physics, University of Rome Editor, The San Jose Mercury News, San
Dr. Anatoly Dyakov, Director of Center,
“La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy; Chairman, Jose, California, USA
Moscow Physical and Technical Institute,
Pugwash Council
P U G WA S H R O M E O F F I C E : Dolgoprudny, Moscow Region
Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Professor of
Claudia Vaughn, Pugwash Conferences, Gen. Lt. Sergey Zelentsov, Deputy
Mathematical Physics, University of
via della Lungara 10, I-00165 Rome, Director, Institute of Srtategic Stability of
Milan, Italy; Secretary General, Union of
Italy, Tel. (++39-06) 687-2606, Fax: Minatom, Moscow
Italian Scientists for Disarmament
(USPID); Director, Program on (++39-06) 687-8376, Mobile: (++39-333) Prof. Nikolay Chernoplekov,
Disarmament and International Security, 456-6661, E-mail: pugwash@iol.it Corresponding Member of the Russian
Landau Network – Centro Volta, Como, Academy of Sciences, Director of the
Italy; Secretary-General (elect), Pugwash RUSSIAN AND CIS Institute of Superconductivity and Solid
Conferences on Science and World PA R T I C I PA N T S State Physics of the RNC “Kurchatov
Affairs Institute”, Moscow
Acad. Georgy Arbatov, Emeritus Director
Robert Einhorn, Senior Advisor, Center of the Institute of USA and Canada Prof. Mikhail Ignatev, Head of
for Strategic and International Studies Studies, Russian Academy of Science, Department, St. Petersburg State
(CSIS), Washington, DC, USA member of the Russian Pugwash University of Aerospace Ingineering,
Committee, Moscow Chairman, St. Petersburg Branch of the
Dr. Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate,
Russian Pugwash Committee, St.
Carnegie Endowment for International Dr. Dmitri Borisov, Program Manager
Petersburg
Peace, Washington, DC, USA (Nuclear Programs in Russia), Nuclear
Threat Initiative, Inc. (Moscow Office) Acad. Yuri Kagan, Head of Section, RNC
Prof. Frank von Hippel, Professor of
Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy,
Public and International Affairs, Program Acad. Yevgeni Velikhov, President, RNC
Moscow
on Science and Global Security, Princeton Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy,
University, Princeton, New Jersey, USA Academician-Secretary of the Devision of Dr. Viktor Kamyshanov, Deputy
the Information Technology and Chairman, International Federation for
Mr. Hu Zhongkun, Second Secretary,
Computers Systems of the Russian Peace and Conciliation, Moscow
Department of Arms Control and
Academy of Sciences, (former Vice
Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Prof. Serguei Kapitza, Deputy Chairman
President of the Russian Academy of
Affairs, Beijing, China of the Russian Pugwash Committee,
Sciences), member of the Presidium of the
Head of laboratory, Institute of Physical
Mr. Robert Nurick (USA), Director, Russian Pugwash Committee, Moscow
Problems, Russian Academy of Science,
Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow,
Prof. Alexander Ginzburg, Deputy Moscow
Russia
Director, A.M. Obukhov Institute of
Anton Khlopkov, Research Fellow, PIR—
Prof. George Rathjens, Secretary-General, Atmospheric Physics, Russian Academy
Center of Political Studies, Moscow
Pugwash Conferences on Science and of Science, Professor of Climate Change,
World Affairs; Professor Emeritus, International University in Moscow; Acad. Sergey Kolesnikov, Member of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Director, Development and Environment State Duma of Federal Assembly
(MIT), Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA Foundation; Consultant to Moscow (Parliament) of the Russian Federation,
Mayor Department, member of the Chairman, Russian Committee of the
Honorable John B. Rhinelander, Senior
Presidium of the Russian Pugwash International Physicians for Prevention of
Counsel, Shaw Pittman, Washington,
Committee, Moscow Nuclear War (IPPNW), Chairman of the

East Sebirian Scientific Center of the Dr. Vladimir Orlov, Director, PIR— GUEST
Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, Center for Political Studies, member of Luodmila Goldanskaya, Moscow
Member, Russian Pugwash Committee, the Russian Pugwash Committee,
Moscow / Irkutsk Moscow STUDENT / YOUNG
Prof. Vassily Krivokhizha, Deputy Dr. Veniamin Polysaev, Assistant PA R T I C I PA N T S
Director, Russian Institute of Strategic Director, Institute of Srtategic Stability of Nickolay Bobylyov, Lector, Saint
Studies, Member, Russian Pugwash Minatom, Moscow Petersburg State Technical University, St.
Committee, Moscow Petersburg
Acad. Nickolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy,
Acad. Nickolay Laverov, Vice President Vice President, RNC Kurchatov Institute Alexander Brekhovskikh, PhD Student of
of the Russian Academy of Science, of Atomic Energy, Moscow the A.N. Bakh Institute of Biochemistry,
Director, Institute of Geology of Ore Russian Academy of Sciences, Board
Dr. Stanislav Rodionov, Senior Research
Deposits, Petrography, Mineralogy and Member of the Russian Student Pugwash,
Fellow, Institute of Space Studies, Russian
Geochemistry of the Russian Academy of Moscow
Academy of Science, member of the
Sciences, member of the Russian
Russian Pugwash Committee, Moscow Veronica A. Ginzburg, Deputy Chairman,
Pugwash Committee, (former Vice
Acad. Yuri A. Ryzhov, Chairman of the Russian Student Pugwash, Research
Chairman of the USSR Council of
Russian Pugwash Committee, Fellow, Institute of Global Climate and
Ministers [1987—1991]), Moscow
Ambassador Extraordinary and Ecology, Russian Academy of Science,
Mikhail A. Lebedev, Executive Secretary Moscow
Plenipotentiary of the Russian
of the Russian Pugwash Committee
Federation, President of International Yulia A. Nikitina, Student, Moscow State
under Presidium of the Russian Academy
Engineering University, (former Member Institute of International Relations,
of Sciences, Program Manager
of the Presidential Council of the Russian Member Russian Student Pugwash,
(International Security and Disarmament)
Federation [1991—2000], Russian Moscow
of the International Federation for Peace
Ambassador to France [1992—1999];
and Conciliation, Chairman of the
Chairman of Scientific Committee of the UKRAINE
Russian Student Pugwash, Moscow
Soviet Parliament [1989—1991], Rector Gen. Maj. Vadim Grechaninov, President
Acad. Boris Litvinov, Deputy Scientific of the Moscow Aviation Institute [1986— of the Ukrainian Atlantic Council, Kiev
Head of Russian Federal Nuclear Center 1992]), Moscow
— All-Russian scientific institute of Dr. Anatoly Shevtsov, Director,
Marshal Igor D. Sergeev, Advisor to the Dnepropetrovsk Branch, National
theoretical physics (RFNC — VNIITF),
President of the Russian Federation on Institute for Strategic Studies, Vice
member of the Russian Pugwash
Strategic Stability, former Minister of Chairman Ukrainian Pugwash
Committee, Snezhinsk, Chelyabinsk
Defense of the Russian Federation Committee, Dnepropetrovsk
Region
[1997—2001], Moscow
Lt. Gen. Vladimir Medvedev, Head of S TA F F
Amb. Roland Timerbaev, Chairman of
Department, Institute of Srtategic
the Council of the PIR—Center for Alexander Buchnev, Center for Political
Stability of Minatom, Moscow
Political Studies, member of the Russian and International Studies, Moscow
Acad. Viktor Mikhailov, Director, Pugwash Committee (former Soviet
Institute of Srtategic Stability of Ambassador to Vienna UN
Minatom, Scientific Head of Russian organizations), Moscow
Federal Nuclear Center — All-Russian
Acad. Yuri Trutnev, Deputy Scientific
scientific institute of exper imental
Head of Russian Federal Nuclear Center
physics (PFNC — VNIIEF), member of
— All-Russian scientific institute of
the Russian Pugwash Committee (former
experimental physics (PFNC — VNIIEF),
Minister of Atomic Energy of Russia
member of the Russian Pugwash
[1992—1998]), Moscow / Sarov, Nizhny
Committee, Sarov, Nizhny Novgorod
Novgorod Region
Region
Prof. Alexander Nikitin, Deputy
Dr. Yuri Fedorov, Deputy Director, PIR—
Chairman of the Russian Pugwash
Center for Political Studies, member of
Committee, Director, Center for Political
the Russian Pugwash Committee,
and International Studies, Professor of
Moscow
Moscow State Institute of International
Relations, First Vice President Russian Gen. Col. Vladimir Yakovlev, Chief, Staff
Association of Political Science, Member for Coordination of Military
of the Pugwash Council, Moscow Cooperation of CIS States, Moscow

Pugwash Workshop:
Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Como, Italy, 26-28 September 2002
type plutonium device is far more

Report
Pugwash
Volume 2, Number 1
September 2002
technically demanding. The HEU
by Götz Neuneck Editor:
Jeffrey Boutwell
Production:
Claudia Vaughn
Design and Layout:
I S S U E B R I E F
Issued by the Council of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
device could be constructed in several
Anne Read Nobel Peace Prize 1995
weeks or months by groups having

Nuclear Terrorism:
The first in a planned series of The Danger of
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)
access to sufficient quantities of HEU
Pugwash workshops on Terrorism (on the order of 100 kilos), though
T
This is the second of a new his Pugwash Issue Brief focuses on this has begun to change, most notably with
publication series, re-titled a danger of immediate and increas- the decision in June 2002 by the G8 coun-
Pugwash Issue Briefs, that ing concern to the international tries to spend $20 billion over 10 years to
and Weapons of Mass Destruction will highlight important

issues which lie at the inter-
section of science, technol-
community – the prospect that a terrorist
group could manufacture and explode a
nuclear bomb in the heart of a major city,
eliminate large quantities of fissile material
(and chemical weapons), especially in Rus-
sia (the so-called “10+10 over 10” pro-
without being able to test the device,
ogy and public policy. with horrifying consequences. The avail- gram). Yet, as is argued in this Pugwash
was held in Como, Italy from 26–28 Intended for wide circulation
to policy makers and
ability of open-source information on how
to construct a nuclear device, and the rela-
Issue Brief, more needs to be done, far more
quickly. its precise yield would remain
tive ease with which a well-financed and The Pugwash Conferences will devote
analysts, the media, NGOs,
technically competent group of individuals much of its efforts over the coming months
September 2002. There were 25 par- the academic and research

communities, as well as the
Pugwash community,
could in fact accomplish such an act, have
been well known to the scientific and intelli-
and years to highlighting methods for
decreasing the threat posed by terrorist use
unknown. [See the Pugwash Issue
gence communities for many years now. As of nuclear weapons, and biological and
Pugwash Issue Briefs will
ticipants from 11 countries, all attend- contain articles, commen-

taries and conclusions that
long ago as 1986, five distinguished physi-
cists and former Los Alamos scientists,
(Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor, Eugene
chemical weapons as well, as part of its
overall mission of working for the complete
elimination of nuclear, biological and chem-
Brief, “Nuclear Terrorism: The
emanate from the broad
Eyster, William Maraman, and Jacob Wech- ical weapons.
Danger of Highly Enriched Uranium

range of Pugwash workshops
ing in their private capacity. The work- and conferences held each
year.
sler) issued such a warning, “Can Terrorists
Build Nuclear Weapons?”, that was pub-
lished by the Nuclear Control Institute of
For more information on this and other
issues of concern to the Pugwash Confer-
ences, please visit the Pugwash website at
Perspectives and recommen- Washington, DC. www.pugwash.org.
shop was made possible through the dations contained in the

Issue Briefs represent those
In the year since September 11, there
have been many warnings about the risks of
“Against a great evil, a small
(HEU)” by Jeffrey Boutwell,
of the individual authors, not nuclear terrorism (including a Pugwash
Council statement reprinted here), yet for remedy does not produce a
Francesco Calogero and Jack Harris
of the Pugwash Conferences
generous support of the Municipality or its funders. Pugwash Issue

Briefs are funded in part by
too long there was too little concrete action
by national governments and the interna-
small result, it produces no
result at all.”
the John D. and Catherine T. tional community to prevent such a catas- —John Stuart Mill
of Como, and Pugwash is grateful to

MacArthur Foundation. trophe from occurring. In recent months,
(available at www.pugwash.org)].
the Municipality and the Landau Despite progress by the US and
Network Centro Volta for their efforts kill up to a hundred thousand unpro- Russia to secure and eliminate much
in organizing the meeting. The follow- tected civilians and devastate an area excess HEU in Russia, there remains
ing report is the sole responsibility of of several square kilometers, with far too much ‘loose’ fissile material.
the rapporteur and does not necessar- tremendous longer-term physical, Given sufficient resources and politi-
ily reflect the views of other partici- economic, social and political conse- cal will, excess HEU could be elimi-
pants or the workshop as a whole. quences. Even the detonation of a one- nated far more quickly than the
kiloton nuclear device in a densely current 20-year projection. One par-
T
he opening session focused populated area is likely to create an ticipant warned that politicians will
on technical aspects of overwhelming challenge for catastro- grasp the scale of the problem only
“terrorism with weapons of phe-management response services. when it is too late, when “a nuclear
mass destruction,” primarily nuclear. Concerning the design of nuclear explosion is triggered by a terrorist
Participants reviewed the wide range weapons, much scientific information organization.” Scientists have a
of destructive effects of nuclear wea- is publicly available. The most signif- responsibility to draw the attention
pons, including death, injury and the icant technical barrier to constructing of all governments, not just the US
physical destruction of infrastructure such devices is the acquisition of fis- and Russian, to the problem, and to
through blast and heat, as well as sile material, either highly-enriched propose ways of overcoming political
widespread contamination by radio- uranium (>20% U-235) or pluton- and commercial obstacles to the
active fallout (including long-term ium-239. It is generally agreed in the speedy implementation of eliminating
genetic effects). A nuclear device like scientific community that fabricating HEU all over the world. The explo-
the type used in Hiroshima (13 kilo- a gun-type HEU-device is difficult sion by terrorists of an HEU-device is
tons), detonated in a big city, could but feasible, whereas the implosion- a threat to all peoples and nations.

As noted in the Pugwash Issue There exist worldwide many rity gaps remain: chemical weapons
Brief: “a team of terrorists with suffi- sources of weapons-grade nuclear stockpiles are still vulnerable to air
cient knowledge of physics, explo- material. There are in military stock- attacks, border control is not yet
sives and machining could, having piles some 1300-2100 metric tons of implemented, and the oversight of
gathered information in open and HEU and 200-270 metric tons of sep- weapons scientists will be essential
easily available sources, construct a arated plutonium, with an additional for the next 10 years. Continuing
crude nuclear bomb that would have 200 metric tons in civilian stockpiles. problems are lack of funds for high-
a high probability of exploding with More than 20 metric tons of HEU are priority projects, extremely thin sup-
a high nuclear yield.” (p.3) Never- located at research reactors in 39 port from politicians, poorly coordi-
theless, nuclear aspirants must still countries, and HEU also serves as nated strategies and an intransigent
(a) develop a design for its nuclear fuel for reactors of nuclear-propelled bureaucracy.
device or obtain it from a nuclear submarines. The IAEA is preparing a concrete
weapon state; (b) produce the nuclear The risk of such material being action plan to improve security
material for the device or obtain it smuggled, stolen or purchased ille- against terrorism, comprising “physi-
from external sources; (c) shape the gally most definitely exists, even if it cal protection of nuclear material and
nuclear and non-nuclear parts into a is difficult to quantify. Some cases of facilities, detection of malicious activ-
nuclear device; and (d) verify the reli- illicit activity have been thwarted, ities involving nuclear and radioac-
ability of all of these elements. most involving material that origi- tive materials, the security of radioac-
The requirements for the perfor- nated from nuclear facilities in Russia tive resources, the assessment of
mance and delivery of a military or the former Soviet Union. Given the safety and security related vulnerabil-
weapon versus a terrorist device are, difficulties of ensuring the security of ities at nuclear facilities and the
of course, quite different. A terrorist fissile materials in storage, or control- enhancement of program coordina-
device will entail less technical sophis- ling borders and interdicting attempts tion and information management,
tication in terms of yield, safety and at smuggling, the only viable option etc.” The G-8 Global Partnership
reliability. For terrorists, any explo- is to eliminate this material altogether. Program “10+10 over 10 years” is an
sion within the lower kiloton range The second session was devoted to important step to invest more for
would represent an unprecedented the prevention of terrorism with threat reduction, but there are doubts
achievement. Even a plutonium device WMD, especially the control of criti- that the G-8 program will be well
that failed to achieve a sustained, cal material in the former Soviet coordinated and fully funded. It was
critical reaction would represent a Union and elsewhere. An analysis of suggested that Pugwash could
radiological weapon with severe con- the US-Russian “Cooperative Threat strengthen such efforts by establish-
sequences. Terrorists also have the Reduction” (CTR) program showed ing a road map of priorities.
option of seeking to steal or buy a that arms control, not security issues, Certainly the Europeans should do
“tactical nuclear weapon” from the are driving the reductions. Ten years more to support the nuclear cities
large stockpiles of TNW remaining in of dismantlement has yielded impres- initiative and the ISTC and TACIS
Russia. Many older TNWs are not sive results: 6,000 nuclear warheads, programs. There are also continuing
secured with modern electronic per- 900 launchers and 800 silos have issues of Russian transparency
missive action links (PALs), thus been eliminated thus far, but the regarding CTR.
making it easier for nuclear terrorists legacy of the Cold War is still huge: The third session dealt with military
to detonate such a warhead should too many warheads, missiles and means to prevent terrorism with
they obtain one (see Report on the silos remain active. After September WMD, and began with a discussion
Pugwash Workshop on Tactical 11, expenditures for fissile material of Bush administration calls for
Nuclear Weapons, Sigtuna, Sweden, security were doubled by the Bush launching a preventive war against
May 2002, in the Pugwash Administration to $320 million for Saddam Hussein´s Iraq. For the US
Newsletter, Vol. 39 (1), June 2002). 2002. Nevertheless, too many secu- government, Saddam Hussein repre-

sents a clear and imminent danger; likely to increase significantly. on November 18, 2002], there were
Iraq has substantial biological and On the other hand, the US mili- concerns that Iraqi compliance might
chemical weapon capabilities and tary might just win such a war in not be enough to dissuade the Bush
missiles and, left unfettered, the fairly short order, given the tactical administration from military action.
nuclear option for Iraq would only operational capabilities of US forces The proposed coercive inspections
be a question of time. Regime change and the degraded state of Iraqi wea- also create new questions: Can Hussein
is therefore the only option. pons and troops. Yet the important differentiate between forces support-
For many participants, attacking question remains: why Iraq and why ing the inspections and an occupation
Iraq cannot be justified by Article 51 now? More than a few think that a force? And who ultimately decides on
of the UN Charter [editor’s note: this war mentality since September 11, the use of force: Chief Weapons
was prior to adoption of UN Security 2001 is being used by some hardlin- Inspector Hans Blix, the UN Security
Council Resolution 1441 on ers as a pretext to achieve other for- Council or the US government?
November 8, 2002], and that a more eign policy goals, such as US influ- For some, the Iraq issue must be
realistic assessment of Saddam’s ence and control of oil supplies in the seen in the light of the new “National
WMD capabilities is needed. There is Middle East. Security Strategy” of the US,
much opinion that the Iraqi forces Regarding WMD, the irony is published in September 2002, which
are now weaker than they were ten that Saddam would likely be more states that the US would not hesitate
years ago and that Saddam Hussein prone to use such weapons when to act alone and “pre-emptively” to
might deploy and possibly use bio- attacked. Chemical weapons, espe- thwart dangers from rogue/hostile
logical and chemical weapons only if cially, could be used as weapons of countries or terrorist groups armed
driven to a hopeless situation. mass disruption to complicate and with, or seeking, nuclear, biological
Participants discussed the pros raise the costs of an invasion. The or chemical weapons. The strategy
and cons, and possible scenarios and same holds true for setting the oil also calls for the Pentagon to be able
outcomes, of a military intervention. fields on fire and putting large num- to defeat two aggressors at the same
Most participants did not feel that a bers of Iraqi civilians at risk in time, “while preserving the option
war against Iraq should be seen in the defending the country. It remains for one massive counteroffensive to
context of the war on terrorism, but unclear how the Iraqi people and mil- occupy an aggressor´s capital and
rather by the beliefs of a small group itary forces will react to an attack, replace its regime”. (Donald Rumsfeld,
of US officials that Saddam Hussein what the ramifications will be for “Transforming the Military,” in
must be dealt with ‘once and for all ’. civil war in Iraq involving the Kurds Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002, pp.
To achieve this, a full scale invasion in the north and the Shiites in the 20-46, p. 24). While “regime change”
and costly urban warfare will likely South, and how difficult any post- is defined as a new mission for the
be needed. And, while the Bush war occupation might be. military, the question remains as to
administration may hope for a post- For many, what is more impor- who decides which country is ripe for
Saddam “democratic Iraq”, it is tant than regime change in Iraq are a forceful regime change and what
unclear how this is to be good faith efforts to resolve the kind of a new world order would be
accomplished. There are concerns Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the created? In light of this, one partici-
over political unrest and violence in wider Middle East confrontation; pant argued that “the biggest trouble
Jordan and throughout the Islamic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian spot today is the United States.”
world, not to mention between conflict would undercut much of Concern was also expressed over
Palestinians and Israelis. Finally, even Saddam’s appeal and that of terrorist the proclivity for unilateralism in US
though a regime change in Iraq is groups like al-Qaeda. foreign policy. These objections were
likely to be welcomed by most of the Regarding the possible return of expressed mainly in regards to the
international community, hostility UN weapons inspectors [editor’s credibility and sustainability of inter-
and terrorism toward the West is note: UN inspectors returned to Iraq national law as expressed by the UN

charter, the Non-Proliferation Treaty the BWC and the CWC and that weapons testing. Accordingly,
(NPT) and other arms control additionally, the USA is not funding Pugwash should base its thinking and
regimes, such as the ABM Treaty, the the CTBT verification efforts. action on seeking to strengthen inter-
CTBT and the Biological Weapons Pugwash should bring such facts to national norms and regimes. The
Convention. The 13 practical steps to the attention of politicians, the absence of superpower rivalry pro-
implement Article VI of the Non- media, and the public. vides unique opportunities to create
Proliferation Treaty, unanimously Generally, multilateral institutions new international frameworks and
adopted in the Final Declaration at and agreements are being marginal- norms of behavior, and Pugwash
the 2000 Review Conference, are still ized by the Bush administration, and should continue to bring its expertise
awaiting implementation. One par- could set dangerous precedents for to bear in these areas.
ticipant especially pointed to the fact other countries. This could especially
that the US is not in compliance with be true in the area of nuclear
Participants
Dr. Gunnar Arbman, Director of Landau Network – Centro Volta, Como, Mr. Morten Bremer Maerli, Researcher,
Research, Swedish Defence Research Italy Norwegian Institute of International
Agency (FOI), Stockholm, Sweden Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway
Mr. Lars van Dassen, Director, Swedish
Ms. Carin Atterling Wedar, Lector, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Assistance Prof. Maurizio Martellini, Secretary
Theological Faculty, University of Programme (SNNAP), Office of Non- General, Landau Network-Centro Volta
Gothenburg; Secretary-General, Swedish Proliferation, Swedish Nuclear Power (LNCV), Como, Italy; Professor of
Initiative for Peace, Security and Inspectorate (SKI), Stockholm, Sweden Physics, University of Insubria, Como,
International Relations (SIPSIR), Italy
Dr. Michael Donovan, Research Analyst,
Stockholm, Sweden; Member, Swedish
Center for Defense Information (CDI), Dr. Timothy McCarthy, Director and
Pugwash Group
Washington, DC, USA Senior Analyst, Prolieration Research and
Prof. Gabriel Baramki, Consultant to the Assessment Program, Center for Non-
Prof. Ahmed Hashim, US Naval War
Palestinian Ministry of Higher Education, Proliferation Studies, Monterey Institute
College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA
Ramallah; President, Palestinian Council of International Studies (MIIS),
for Justice and Peace Mr. Jeremy Issacharoff, Deputy Director Monterey, CA, USA
General for Strategic Affairs, Ministry of
Mr. Matt Bunn, Senior Research Dr. Steven Miller, Director, International
Foreign Affairs, Israel
Associate, Science, Technology and Public Security Program, Center for Science &
Policy Program, Kennedy School of Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said, International Affairs (CSIA), Harvard
Government, Cambridge, MA, USA; Member, Pugwash Council; Head of University, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
Consultant, Nuclear Power Initiative; Military Studies Unit and Technology USA; Editor-in-Chief, International
Member, RANSAC; Member, Board of Advisor, Al-Ahram Center for Political Security; Member, Pugwash Council; Co-
Directors, Arms Control Association and Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Chair, U.S. Pugwash Group
Foundation, Cairo, Egypt; Professor of
Prof. Francesco Calogero, Professor of Dr. Götz Neuneck, Senior Fellow, IFSH,
Missile Mechanics of Flight, Military
Theoretical Physics, University of Rome Hamburg, Germany; Member, Pugwash
Technical College (MTC), Cairo
“La Sapienza”, Rome, Italy; Member, Council
Pugwash Council Mr. Sverre Lodgaard, Director,
Dr. Alexander Nikitin, Director, Center
International Peace Research Institute
Mr. Pierre Canonne, Member, Pugwash for Political and International Studies
Oslo (PRIO), Norway
Council; Lecturer/Disarmament and (CPIS), Moscow, Russia; Deputy Chair,
Verification issues, Univ. Marne-la- Mr. Rüdiger Lüdeking, Director, Nuclear Russian Pugwash Committee of Scientists
Vallés/Paris, France Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, for Disarmament and International
Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Germany Security; Vice-President of the Russian
Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary
Mr. Kenneth Luongo, Executive Director, Political Science Association; Professor,
General, Pugwash Conferences on
Russian-American Nuclear Security Moscow State Institute of International
Science and World Affairs; Professor of
Advisory, Council, Washington, DC, Relations; Member, Pugwash Council
Milan, Italy; Director, Program on USA; Visiting Research Collaborator, Mr. Jan Prawitz, Visiting Scholar,
Disarmament and International Security, Program on Science and International Swedish Institute for International
Security, Princeton University Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden

Participants continued Working Papers

Prof. George Rathjens, Professor Is it possible for terrorists to produce BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS
Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of highly enriched uranium? And can it be
Nuclear Terrorism: The Danger of Highly
Technology (MIT), Cambridge, traced and detected in the hands of
Enriched Uranium (HEU), Pugwash Issue
Massachusetts, USA terrorists?, by Gunnar Arbman and
Brief, by Jeffrey Boutwell, Francesco
Anders Ringbom (Sweden)
Mr. Tariq Rauf (Pakistan), Head, Calogero and Jack Harris, Vol. 2, no. 1,
Verification and Security Policy Consequences of an attack on Iraq on the September 2002
Coordination Section, Office of External Palestinian-Israeli conflict, by Gabriel
Relations and Policy Coordination, “Securing Nuclear Weapons and
Baramki (Palestine)
International Atomic Energy Agency Materials: Seven Steps for Immediate
(IAEA), Vienna, Austria The IAEA’s plan of action for protection Action,” by Matthew Bunn, John P.
against nuclear terrorism, by Tariq Rauf Holdren, Anthony Wier, Project on
Hon. John B. Rhinelander, Senior (IAEA) Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for
Counsel, Shaw Pittman, Washington, Science and International Affairs, John F.
DC, USA; Vice Chairman, Lawyers The decision process of war on Iraq: The Kennedy School of Government, May
Alliance for World Security (LAWS); wrong way and the right way, by John B. 2002
Director, Arms Control Association Rhinelander (USA)
(ACA)
Terrorists and Crude Nuclear Devices
Prof. Carlo Schaerf, Professor of Physics, (II), by Morten Bremer Maerli (Norway)
University of Rome “Tor Vergata”,
Rome, Italy; President and Director, Implications of US Military Action
International School on Disarmament against Iraq: An Egyptian Perspective, by
and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO), Mohamed Kadry Said (Egypt)
Rome
Invading Iraq: The Political and Military
Prof. László Valki, Professor of Risks, by Michael Donovan (USA)
International Law, Eötvös University,
Budapest, Hungary; Director, NATO Legal Foundations, Mechanisms and
Information and Research Center, Eötvös Measures for the Fight against WMD
University Terrorism, by Alexander Nikitin (Russia)
Mr. Lars Wredberg, Consultant to the Chemical Terrorism, by Pierre Canonne

Swedish Nuclear power Inspectorate (France)
(SKI), Stockholm, Sweden
Force, Order, and the Implications of War
S TA F F : with Iraq, by Steven Miller (USA)
Pugwash Rome Office: Claudia Vaughn,

Pugwash Conferences, Rome, Italy
B O O K S O F N OT E
The Heart of War:

On Power, Conflict and Obligation
in the Twenty-First Century
by Gwyn Prins
Routledge Books, 2002

Pugwash Workshop on South Asian Security

1-3 November 2002, Geneva, Switzerland
between them. Even if conventional and dangerous) consequence being

Report
war did break out, according to this that both India and Pakistan feel
by Jeffrey Boutwell
view, a military stalemate would be large risks can be taken because these
the most likely outcome. In addition, won’t lead to all out conflict.
This workshop was co-hosted by nuclear use by miscalculation or by In terms of the major issues fuel-
the Pugwash Conferences and the accident is unlikely, and nuclear pre- ing the conflict between them, cross-
Geneva International Peace Research emptive strikes are not a likely border terrorism is for India the key
Institute (GIPRI) and involved 32 option. What is needed is for both issue; it simply must stop. One Indian
participants from seven countries sides to lower the inflammatory characterized India as a status quo
meeting over two and a half days to rhetoric. power confronting a revisionist
discuss major points of tension Others disagreed strongly with power that uses and manipulates ter-
between India and Pakistan and this thinking, arguing that nuclear rorism for its own ends. The dilemma
ways of building confidence between use by accident, miscalculation, or for New Delhi is how to respond:
the two and finding a resolution of unauthorized use is very much possi- military mobilization, punitive
the Kashmir dispute. Both Pugwash ble. This view held that both coun- actions, diplomacy? The point was
and GIPRI gratefully acknowledge tries have been on the brink so often made forcefully by one participant
financial support from the Swiss that risk-taking has become ingrained that Pakistan seems to feel that its
government. in policy-making; the (unfortunate nuclear weapons have given it a free
Conventional Confrontation and

the Risk of Nuclear Escalation
A central focus of the workshop was
the risk that future military
confrontations along the Indian-
Pakistan border, and the Line of
Control in Jammu-Kashmir, might
lead to the use of nuclear weapons.
Discussion began with a few par-
ticipants voicing the opinion that the
risk of large-scale conflict between
the two countries remains remote,
and that belligerent postures in Delhi
and Islamabad are rooted primarily
in domestic politics. In this light, nei-
ther country at present has much of
an incentive to change current poli-
cies which perpetuate the stalemate

hand to pursue low intensity warfare major conflict and will facilitate an major conventional operations for
without fear of conventional retalia- ultimate settlement between India any length of time (one analyst has
tion. India can not countenance stay- and Pakistan. Others clearly feel the maintained that the Indian army has
ing in the box, and will have to opposite, that perceptions of a logistic capabilities for only 2-3 weeks
respond, perhaps with preemptive ‘nuclear stalemate’ greatly enhance of sustained conventional conflict),
options. the risk of conventional conflicts (e.g., thus increasing the pressures for
A Pakistani response is that India Kargil). Whatever Pakistani assump- nuclear weapons use. More ominous
is manipulating the meaning of ter- tions might be, however, about the is the role of non-state actors in pro-
rorism when it talks of Pakistan using role of India’s nuclear weapons, the voking India and Pakistan; terrorist
its nuclear shield to promote terror- opinion was voiced that Pakistan attacks in South Asia have become
ism, and that India greatly over-sim- should not take ‘no (first) nuclear use’ more provocative following 9/11,
plifies the problem of controlling ter- by India for granted. and this is the wild card that is most
rorism (as India should know from The same dichotomy of opinion is potentially destabilizing.
its own domestic terrorism). Given found, not surprisingly, in Pakistan, Some participants felt that the
instability in Pakistan, the Pakistani with some believing that nuclear militaries in the two countries recog-
government will need political cover weapons in South Asia are self-deter- nize that the confrontation is a no-
(talks on Kashmir, economic relations) ring, with little risk that a conventional win situation, and that it is the politi-
as a quid pro quo for cracking down conflict will lead to the use of nuclear cians who are responding to and/or
on cross-border and domestic terror- weapons. Others believe that, while exploiting domestic political pressures
ism. Another participant asserted Pakistani views on nuclear weapons in sustaining the conflict. This is
that Pakistan’s national security pol- have matured since the early 1990s, especially true in terms of the actions
icy has changed substantially in the with a greater realization of the con- of non-state actors being exploited
post 9/11 environment, and India sequences of their use, there is still a for political purposes. Yet, assump-
should recognize and acknowledge tendency to underestimate the dan- tions about the low probability of
these changes. Moreover, Pakistan gers of ‘going nuclear.’ Credit was major conflict could themselves
has accepted its military imbalance given to Pugwash for helping to edu- become self-deluding dangers. And,
with India and won’t try and engage cate Pakistan’s strategic community more generally, there are the eco-
in an arms race in every area. on the dangers of nuclear weapons, nomic and political costs of main-
[Although not discussed at length but more such efforts are needed, taining the military confrontation,
during the workshop, press reports especially in terms of public aware- both in terms of money spent and
shortly before the meeting that North ness of the dangers of nuclear war. investment lost in a region seen as
Korea had admitted to violating the One participant stressed that it is unusable.
1994 Agreed Framework by building important to lay bare what the India- One participant suggested that
up a stockpile of highly enriched ura- Pakistan strategic dialogue is all both the following propositions are
nium, and that Pakistan had aided about. A nuclear confrontation in true: that there is a low probability of
these efforts in return for North South Asia would have horrific con- actual conflict, yet extreme interna-
Korean ballistic missiles, could only sequences for the subcontinent, as tional concern that such a conflict
further complicate the situation.] well as strategic implications for the could occur. It is this concern, espe-
outside world, and various major cially over nuclear war and over the
The Nuclear Dynamic powers will exert themselves accord- ability of the two countries to control
Discussion followed on perceptions ingly. Optimistic predictions that their nuclear weapons and fissile
of the role of nuclear weapons in conventional conflict would not go material, that will keep the US and
South Asia. For some in India, there nuclear could be undermined by sev- the international community cen-
is the assumption that nuclear wea- eral factors. One such is the difficulty trally involved in South Asian affairs.
pons greatly reduce the possibility of both sides might face of sustaining For different reasons, it was also

argued that both India and Pakistan value for elites and publics in both
at times manipulate this nuclear con- countries (others disagreed about
cern to keep US and the world this, feeling that elites in both coun-
involved in South Asia. tries are well aware of what nuclear
Others do not share this confi- war would mean, and are self-
dence in the military being able to deterred accordingly).
control the situation. Things can go If there was one silver lining to
wrong, and short timelines for deci- the crisis that began with attack on
sion making compound the problem. the Indian parliament in December
Senior leaders in both countries have 2001 and led to troop mobilization
intimated a willingness to use nuclear in early 2002, it is the increased inter-
weapons if need be, and there are the est on both sides (and in the interna-
worrisome developments of more tional community) to find ways of
extreme elements in both govern- resolving the long-standing Indian-
ments. It was also noted that scien- Pakistani confrontation, and the need
tists should play a stronger role, but now to seize this opportunity.
Jasjit Singh and Ana María Cetto at the
don’t, in policymaking in both coun- 52nd Pugwash Conference.
tries, in part because of secrecy laws Defusing the Nuclear
that greatly constrain those scientists Confrontation other actions, are preludes to immi-
who worked on nuclear and other Any discussion of ways to reduce the nent nuclear attack), or mispercep-
programs. likelihood of nuclear weapon use in tion (a mistaken belief, even in the
Even if the risk of nuclear war is South Asia must begin with dispelling absence of any evidence, that the
low; US concerns about nuclear war misconceptions about nuclear wea- other side should be and is preparing
stem from the imbalance in conven- pons and nuclear strategy. Given a nuclear attack).
tional forces and Indo-Pakistani mis- short flight times between the two Other participants dismissed
perceptions about each other’s red counties (8-12 minutes for known these concerns, arguing that each
lines. For example, the Kargil stand- missile systems), radars and satellites country has in place strict command
off was one thing, but conflict across will provide precious little ‘early and control procedures for authoriz-
their joint border would be signifi- warning’. Precisely because there ing the use of nuclear weapons.
cantly different, in terms of the Indian would be essentially no time for Whatever the reality, at a mini-
army threatening major Pakistani political decision-makers to order mum both India and Pakistan should
cities or lines of communication, or retaliatory attacks in the case of gen- adhere to their current moratorium
where Indian air force superiority uine attack, one participant feared on nuclear testing, but the greater
could inadvertently or deliberately that each or both countries might feel need is to go beyond this to explore
lead to pre-emption of nuclear assets, impelled to pre-delegate launch ways of limiting nuclear weapons on
leading to Pakistani threats to use authority to commanders in the field both sides in ways that can
nuclear weapons. in order not to lose their nuclear strengthen stability and reduce pres-
There is an inherent fallacy in forces to preemptive attack. Such a sures for preemption. In doing so, it
thinking that deterrence is a stable posture, of course, would produce its will be important to note the differ-
condition, that India and Pakistan own instability, in that nuclear forces ent utility (perceived and real) that
have somehow reached a deterrent could be launched mistakenly, in nuclear weapons have for India and
plateau; deterrence is a dynamic con- response to false alarms (e.g., geese Pakistan, and these need to be taken
dition that is subject to change. on the radar), miscalculation (a mis- into account when discussing strate-
Moreover, deterrence is weakening as taken belief that actual events, such gies for reducing and eliminating
nuclear weapons lose their terror as mobilization at nuclear bases or nuclear weapons in South Asia.

There followed a general discus- port for India and Pakistan joining attitude towards India and Pakistan
sion of pre-emption: its effectiveness the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at the moment) and decreased legiti-
or lack thereof, the possible destabi- and the Fissile Material Cut-Off macy of militancy (i.e., those who
lizing effects of even discussing it, regimes, though both are highly claim to commit violence in the name
and the action-reaction cycle of unlikely until substantial progress is of Kashmiris) has opened up new
increasing forces to prevent risk of made on the Kashmir and terrorism possibilities. The new government of
preemption. issues. In the area of conventional Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad
Among the confidence-building forces, suggestions were made for no Sayeed appears open to dialogue with
measures discussed for reducing the forward deployment of military all. The international community
threat posed by nuclear weapons forces, for restraints on the deploy- needs to support and strengthen this
were: ment of landmines along the interna- process, and all parties need to sus-
• agreements not to develop and tional border or line of control, and pend any support for violence of
deploy tactical nuclear weapons; for actual removal of landmines whatever form (Pakistan in terms of
• pre-notification of missile test along the border given that landmine cross-border terrorism, India in terms
launches and military exercises; maps do exist. of special operations forces accused
• improvements to the crisis hotline of human rights violations).
between India and Pakistan (mak- Resuming Dialogue: Kasmiri support for devolution of
ing it a dedicated, hardened and Kashmir and Terrorism authority needs to be carried forward,
continuous communications link); All participants agreed that the major along with demilitarization of the
• maintaining a de-alerted posture obstacle at present is a lack of confi- conflict and reconstruction of the
(separation of warheads from deliv- dence that the other side is genuinely society and economy. It will be
ery systems) interested in moving forward to a important not to permit Indian or
• improving security and safeguards resolution of outstanding issues. Pakistani versions of the end game
of nuclear weapons and nuclear Given the mistrust generated by the block Kashmiri exploration of possi-
facilities, to prevent terrorist or Agra Summit in July 2002, there was ble solutions. What is important for
unauthorized seizure. general sentiment that the two sides Kashmir is an exit strategy for all
• no increase of forces in Silcik; should return to the 1999 Lahore three parties that is perceived as hon-
• naval CBMs (incidents at sea); principles. orable and which can be implemented.
• military to military discussions There was also some hope that The work of the Kashmir Study Group
(even on social and regimental the Kashmir elections in October was mentioned in this regard, propos-
issues); 2002 may have opened up a ‘political ing Kashmiri independence with lim-
• discussions between Indian and space’ for renewed efforts to seriously ited sovereignty.
Pakistani nuclear scientists on such discuss solutions to Jammu and Other elements cited were the
issues as accidents of weapons in Kashmir. The Kashmiris themselves importance of adhering to democracy
transit, or reactors, to help govern- have become more central to resolv- and non-violence; the non-permanence
ments devise response plans; ing the issue of J&K, both in terms of of the LOC as an international boun-
• planning of nuclear risk reduction their sacrifice (more Kashmiris have dary (borders should be soft and
centers as discussed in the Lahore died in internal conflict than Indians porous); common municipal functions
principles. and Pakistanis in their three wars) (infrastructure, tourism) built into
Other proposals included having and credibility gained from their maximum autonomy for Kashmir;
the US and Russia share their exper- recent election. A combination of Indian and Pakistani military protec-
tise on reducing the risk of nuclear these recent free, fair and inclusive tion of the borders; and giving Kashmir
accidents (even if it means recogniz- elections with a growing climate a semi-international presence (obser-
ing the nuclear status of India and against violence (many Kashmiris ver status in international bodies).
Pakistan). There was of course sup- have “plague on both your houses” Specific mention was made of

international monitoring of the LOC risks of accidental or unauthorized available to two percent of the of
to demonstrate Pakistani good faith use; and upgrading of the communi- population) and its desperate need
in stopping cross-border terrorism, cation hotline to reduce misunder- for resources, which could come in
recognizing there are indigenous reli- standing/misinterpretation of events part from academic exchanges with
gious extremists in K&J that are would go far in solidifying a basis for India. Regarding trade and economic
independent of Pakistani control. further progress. Other steps men- activity, economic actors need to be
Reinforcement of UNMOGIP would tioned in this regard included restor- brought into the discussion to expli-
be natural, but India will see this as ing the High Commissioners in Delhi cate the benefits of peace, recognizing
UN intrusion into the Kashmir dis- and Islamabad, resumption of trade that greater bilateral, trade, while in
pute (one Indian countered that India and air/ground links, and reducing the interest of both India and
is not averse to international facilita- inflammatory rhetoric. Pakistan, will still be affected by ten-
tion on J&K, but to international In terms of CBMs, a wide array of sions (as are tourism, transportation,
mediation). Mention was made of military and non-military CBMs communications, etc.). A good exam-
involving SAARC in monitoring the already exist, and a paper outlining a ple is the potential for a natural gas
border, while British Foreign Secretary strategic restraint regime (nuclear pipeline through Pakistan to India,
Jack Straw has proposed an interna- and conventional CBMs) tabled by and the fact that alternatives through
tional helicopter-borne monitoring Pakistan deserves discussion. There Bangladesh are being explored instead.
force. Others were less sanguine could also be joint patrols and moni- Nonetheless, economic CBMs and
about the effectiveness of such monitoring of the Line of Control and regional infrastructure projects could
toring, when incursions across the evaluation of whether Pakistan is help create constituencies for
LOC are rapid and easy? restraining cross-border terrorism. improved relations.
The issue of joint patrols of the In any event, track II dialogue
The Way Forward LOC was floated in July 2002, and should not be constrained by govern-
Participants focused on how the Pakistan responded with UNOMIP; ments, and international engagement
group can take advantage of points such patrols would have automati- by NGOs, foreign leaders, journal-
of leverage in proposing next steps. cally brought a ceasefire into place, ists, and others are important in
Much emphasis was put on fully and this would also have strength- shaping attitudes and policy in the
implementing the various components ened higher level politico-military two countries.
of the 1999 Lahore Declaration, wider contacts that could strengthen crisis One participant thought that,
discussion of CBMs, especially management. Also recommended was although political will for improving
nuclear, and exploring resolution of reinstating the ceasefire in Kashmir bilateral relations is currently lack-
the Kashmir/terrorism issues. One and permitting Kashmiris to go to ing, especially in Delhi, there are
participant noted that measures such Pakistan for talks. grounds for optimism about progess
as CBMs are fine in themselves, but A Helsinki analogy might be over the next six months, especially
what is needed is a vision of future appropriate for the India-Pakistan with US facilitating. Of course, all
goals that will motivate people to confrontation, with three baskets of bets are off should there be an inva-
reaching a final goal and ending 50 issues that could be discussed: sion of Iraq.
years of conflict. Kashmir/terrorism; nuclear/military; A next meeting was scheduled for
Regarding the Lahore Declaration, and trade/social interaction. May 2003 in Geneva, with agree-
various elements that were agreed to Looking at the longer term, par- ment that concrete agenda items and
have not been fully implemented. ticipants stressed emphasizing the papers would be prepared and distrib-
Even in times of tension, such mea- benefits of peace to both countries. uted well in advance so participants
sures as: bilateral consultations on One example given was the total col- can fully explore possible areas of
security concepts and nuclear doc- lapse of the Pakistani educational agreement.
trines; unilateral measures to reduce system (higher education is only

Participants
Prof. Mohammad Hamid Ansari, Visiting Mdm. Claire Galez, Director, Centre for Organization and Disarmament, School
Professor, Academy of Third World South Asian Studies (CSAS), Geneva, of International Studies, Jawaharlal
Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, Switzerland Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi,
India [formerly: Vice Chancellor, Aligarh India; Member, National Security
Dr. Gabriel Galice, Researcher, Geneva
Muslim University, India; Permanent Advisory Board appointed by the Prime
International Peace Research Institute
Representative of India to the United Minister of India
(GIPRI), Geneva, Switzerland
Nations; Ambassador to UAE, Australia,
Dr. C. Raja Mohan, Strategic Affairs
Afghanistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia] Dr. Jozef Goldblat (Sweden/Switzerland),
Editor, The Hindu, New Delhi, India;
Vice President, Geneva International
Prof. Kanti Bajpai, Professor of Convenor, Indian Pugwash Society
Peace Research Institute (GIPRI),
International Politics, Centre for
Geneva, Switzerland; Consultant, United Lt. Gen. (ret) Satish Nambiar, Director,
International Politics, Organization and
Nations, Geneva United Service Institution of India, New
Disarmament, School of International
Delhi [formerly: Director, General
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru Univeristy, Dr. Gert Harigel, Senior Physicist
Military Operations, Indian Army
New Delhi, India (Emeritus), European Laboratory for
Headquarters (1991-92); First Force
Particle Physics (CERN), Geneva,
Mr. Abdul Basit, Counsellor Commander and Head of Mission of the
Switzerland
(Disarmament), Permanent Mission of United Nations Forces in the former
Pakistan to the United Nations, Geneva, Amb. V?lker Heinsberg, German Yugoslavia; Deputy Chief of Staff, Indian
Switzerland [formerly: Director Ambassador to the Conference on Army (1994)]
(Disarmament), Ministry of Foreign Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland
Dr. Nicole Perret, Département fédéral de
Affairs, Islamabad] Dr. Mark Hilborne (UK), Researcher, la défense, de la population et des sports,
Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell, Executive Director, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland Bern, Switzerland
Pugwash Conferences on Science and Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy, Member, Mr. Angelo Persiani, Deputy Head,
World Affairs, Washington, DC, USA Pugwash Council; Professor, Department Permanent Mission of Italy to the
[formerly: Associate Executive Officer, of Physics, Quaid-e-Azam University, Conference on Disarmament, Geneva,
American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Islamabad, Pakistan Switzerland
Cambridge; Staff Aide, National Security
Council, Washington, DC] Dr. Martin Kaplan (USA/Switzerland), Prof. Ramamurti Rajaraman, Professor
Member, Pugwash Council; Director, of Theoretical Physics, School of Physical
Amb. Josef Bucher, Special Pugwash Conferences Geneva Office Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
Representative on Conflict Issues, Swiss
Gen. (ret) Jehangir Karamat, Chairman, New Delhi, India
Federal Department of Foreign Affairs,
Berne, Switzerland Board of Governors, Islamabad Policy Adm. Laxminarayan Ramdas, Chair,
Research Institute (IPRI), Islamabad, Pakistan-India Peoples Forum for Peace
Dr. Christophe Carle, Vice-Director, UNI- Pakistan; Senior Fellow, United Institute & Democracy, Maharashtra, India [for-
DIR, Geneva, Switzerland for Peace, Washington, DC (from April merly: Chief of the Naval Staff, India
Mr. Pran Chopra, Member, Advisory 2003) [formerly: Chairman, Joint Chiefs (1990-93)]
Council, Centre for Policy Research, New of Staff Committee and Chief of Army
Hon. Maharajakrishna Rasgotra,
Delhi, India [formerly: Visiting Professor, Staff, Pakistan Army]
President, ORF Institute of Asian Studies,
Centre for Policy Research; Editorial Mr. Farooq M. Kathwari, Chairman, New Delhi, India; Honorary Advisor,
Director, Press Foundation of Asia, President and CEO, Ethan Allen Inc., Rajiv Gandhi Foundation; Co-Chairman,
Manila; Chief Editor, The Statesman Danbury, CT, USA; Chairman, Kashmir Indo-French Forum; Member, India-Sri
Group, Calcutta, New Delhi] Study Group Lanka Foundation [formerly: Member,
Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary Amb. Aziz Ahmad Khan, Additional Government of India’s National Security
General, Pugwash Conferences on Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Advisory Board (2002-2001)]
Science and World Affairs; Professor of Islamabad, Pakistan Mr. Abbas Rashid, Coordinator, Society
Amb. Jean Lint, Belgian Ambassador to for the Advancement of Education,
Milan, Italy; Director, Program on
the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Lahore, Pakistan; Columnist, Daily
Switzerland Times, Lahore
Landau Network – Centro Volta, Como,
Prof. Maurizio Martellini, Secretary Prof. George Rathjens, Professor
Lt. Gen. (ret) Asad Durrani, recently
General, Landau Network-Centro Volta Emeritus, Massachusetts Institute of
Ambassador of Pakistan to Saudi Arabia
(LNCV), Como, Italy Technology (MIT), Cambridge,
[formerly: Director General, Inter-
Massachusetts, USA [formerly: Secretary-
Services Intelligence (ISI); Commandant, Prof. Amitabh Mattoo, Professor of General (1997-2002), Pugwash
National Defence College; Ambassador Disarmament Studies and Director, Core Conferences on Science and World
to Germany] Group for the Study of National Security, Affairs]
Centre for International Politics,


Madame Claudine-Mariko Richard, Mr. Ravinder Pal Singh (India), Senior South Asian Stability—A Pakistan
Researcher, International Affairs, Geneva, Research Fellow, Center for Pacific Asia Perspective, by Jehangir Karamat
Switzerland Studies (CPAS), Stockholm University, (Pakistan)
Stockholm, Sweden
Brig. Naeem Salik, Director, Arms Some Draft Remarks on the
Control & Disarmament Affairs, Dr. Gian Piero Siroli, Researcher, Conference Agenda, by Abdul Sattar
Strategic Plans Division, Joint Staff Department of Physics, University of (Pakistan)
Headquarters, Rawalpindi, Pakistan Bologna, Bologna, Italy
The Law of Diminishing Threats
Dr. Gary Samore (USA), Senior Fellow Prof. Jean-Pierre Stroot (Revised), by Asad Durrani (Pakistan)
for Non-Proliferation, International (Belgium/Switzerland), retired Physicist;
India-Pakistan Relations and South
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Geneva Pugwash Office; President of the
Asian Security, by Pran Chopra (India)
London, UK [formerly: Special Assistant Board of the Geneva International Peace
to President Clinton; Senior Director, Research Institute (GIPRI), Geneva, Impact of Religious Extremism on
Non-Proliferation & Export Controls at Switzerland Security of South Asia, by L. Ramdas
the National Security Council] (India) [Background Document]
Amb. Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Research
Hon. Abdul Sattar, Member, Sub- Professor, Foreign Policy Institute, The Some Cooperative Initiatives for India-
Commission on Promotion and Johns Hopkins University School of Pakistan Dialogue and Risk Reduction,
Protection of Human Rights, Palais des Advanced International Studies, by Ravinder Pal Singh (India)
Nations, Geneva [former Foreign Washington, DC, USA Nuclear Weapons in South Asia:
Minister of Pakistan, Islamabad] Risks and their Reduction, by R.
Amb. Shaukat Umer, Permanent Mission
Mr. Luigi Scotto, First Secretary, of Pakistan to the United Nations, Rajaraman (India)
Permanent Mission of Italy to the Geneva, Switzerland The Pakistan Elections and After, by
Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, Maharajakrishna Rasgotra (India)
Shri Narinder Nath Vohra, Director,
Switzerland [Background Document]
India International Centre, New Delhi,
Amb. Prakash Shah, Member, Indo-Japan India; Co-Chairman, India-EU Round India and Pakistan (An appeal for
Eminent Persons Group; Director, Table [formerly: Secretary, Defence monitoring LOC) (Revised), by A.H.
Pathfinders International, Watertown, Production, Defence Secretary & Home Nayyar and M. Martellini
MA, USA; Advisor, Dodsal Group, Dubai Secretary, Government of India, and [Background Document]
[formerly: Permanent Representative of Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister;
India to the United Nations, New York & Chairman, National Task Force on India’s Strategic Game: A Paradigm
Geneva; Ambassador to the Committee Internal Security (2000); Member, Shift?, by Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu
on Disarmament, Geneva; Ambassador National Security Advisory Board (1998- (India) [Background Document]
of India to Japan; Special Envoy of the 2001)] Confidence Building Measures in South
UN Secretary general for Iraq] Asia, by Satish Nambiar
Amb. Philippe Welti, Swiss Federal
Dr. Waheguru Pal S. Sidhu (India), Senior Department of Foreign Affairs, Berne, “Signposts for Peace in South Asia”, by
Associate, International Peace Academy Switzerland L. Ramdas, The Hindu, Thursday, July
(IPA), New York, NY, USA; Joint Co- 18, 2002 [Background Document]
editor, International Peacekeeping (since S TA F F :
January 2001); Member, Editorial Board, South Asian Security—An Indian
Pugwash Rome Office:
Global Governance (since January 2001); Perspective, by Maharajakrishna
Claudia Vaughn GIPRI: Charlotte
Core Group Member, Mountbatten Rasgotra (India)
Soumeire
Centre International Missile Forum [for- Indo-Pak Talks: Ten Questions, by C.
merly: Consultant, United Nations Panel Raja Mohan, Strategic Affairs Editor, The
of Governmental Experts on Missiles Hindu, New Delhi
(2001-2002)]
Kashmir—A Way Forward, Kashmir
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Director, Study Group, 2000 [Background
Centre for Strategic and International Document]
Studies; Member, Pugwash Council;
Member, Indian Pugwash Society [for-
merly: Director, Institute for Defence
Studies & Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi;
Director (Operations), Air Headquarters,
New Delhi; Convener, Indian Pugwash
Society]

18th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the

Implementation of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions:
The Resumption of the Fifth BWC Review Conference 2002 and Beyond
Geneva, Switzerland, 9–10 November 2002
Weapons Convention (BWC) Review CWC: Progress in

Report
by Fiona Tregonning
Conference, due to resume after a Implementation
year’s adjournment on Monday 11 A report was given on developments
November 2002, the day following since June 2002 within the
This was the ninth of the current the closing of the workshop. Organisation for the Prohibition of
Pugwash workshop series on chemi- The meeting opened with a wel- Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Issues
cal and biological warfare (CBW) to come by the new Secretary General of covered included: the appointment of
be held in Geneva. It was jointly con- the Pugwash Conferences, Professor a new Director-General; the seventh
vened by the Harvard Sussex Program Paolo Cotta-Ramusino of Italy, and session of the Conference of the
on CBW Armament and Arms Limita- the observation that this was the fifti- States Parties to the CWC; internal
tion (HSP) and the Swiss Pugwash eth international meeting of the PSG- Secretariat problems; the forthcom-
Group. The meetings were held on ICC and its predecessor CBW study ing First Review Conference;
the premises of the Graduate Institute groups, the initial focus of the study progress in CW destruction; verifica-
of International Studies, University group in 1964 being on matters relat- tion activities; and implementation of
of Geneva. ing to Biological Weapons (BW). the CWC.
Fifty-six people attended the In addition to the various reports The first item noted was the
workshop, by invitation and in their on developments outside the BWC appointment of a new Director-
personal capacities, from 19 coun- during the previous year, the main General of the OPCW, Rogelio
tries (Australia, Belgium, Egypt, items for discussion by the workshop Pfirter of Argentina, by a Special
France, Germany, Hungary, India, under the rubric of the Resumption Session of the Conference of the
Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, New of the Fifth BWC Review Conference States Parties in late July. It was
Zealand, Pakistan, Russia, South 2002 included: developments since observed that the period preceding
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the the adjournment of the Review his appointment, including the termi-
United Kingdom and the United Conference in December 2001; key nation of the previous Director-
States of America). This report of the issues for the resumed session, General’s term of office, had been a
workshop is the sole responsibility of namely a final declaration and future painful one for the Organisation and
its author, who was asked by the meetings of the States Parties; taking a number of member states. It had
meeting to prepare a report in consul- stock of the situation, including the also been a unique situation for an
tation with the Steering Committee. role of civil society; and topics that international organisation. Since
It does not necessarily reflect a con- might be addressed at future meet- then, relations between member
sensus of the workshop as a whole, ings of the States Parties. Participants states and the Technical Secretariat
or of the Study Group. also addressed themselves to the were reported to have markedly
future work of the Pugwash Study improved—this has been aided by the
T he focus of the workshop was,

once again, the Fifth Biological
Group on the implementation of the
CBW Conventions.
Director-General having been active
both in The Hague and in his travels

to States Parties. For the first time in conversion requests. While some member states are beginning to
many years, the OPCW, represented States Parties were of the opinion that arrive, including three papers from
by the Director-General, attended the conversion of CWPFs under the CWC the United States. The hope was
First Committee in New York, which was for exceptional situations only expressed that this will lead to a
he addressed, the Director-General and therefore should not be granted political declaration and more spe-
also being due to address the full for two-thirds of the Russian CWPFs, cific decisions by the Review Confer-
General Assembly in November. Staff in the end Russia had received ap- ence, but that the Review Conference
morale within the Organisation was proval to convert. The other major would not try to resolve technical
also reported to be improving with decision taken was in respect of the issues. Finally, a possible need for
this new phase in the OPCW’s history. Russian request for an extension of changes to the rules of attendance of
Second, the seventh session of the intermediate and final deadlines for NGOs at the Review Conference was
Conference of the States Parties in destruction of Category 1 CW stock- said to be being considered—partici-
October was reported to have been piles. Last summer the Russian pants at the workshop expressed
more productive and effective than Federation had produced a revised their desire to contribute construc-
any others save the first session in destruction programme that would tively to the Review process and to
May 1997. The Conference took a see a five year extension of the final attend.
number of decisions, the most impor- destruction deadline. The Conference The CW destruction process was
tant of which was an increase in the agreed “in principle” to an extension reported to be lagging. It is hoped
OPCW’s budget for 2003 by almost of the first two intermediate dead- that the Gorny facility in the Russian
10 per cent. The Director-General lines, the details of which were to be Federation, built with German assis-
was also authorised to withhold the established by the Executive Council tance, will be online early in 2003 so
distribution of the prospective cash in December—the remaining dead- that Russia can meet the first dead-
surplus for 2001. However, the finan- lines will be considered at the next line for destruction of one per cent of
cial decisions taken by the Confer- session of the Conference in October Category 1 CW stockpiles. While the
ence along these lines were ad hoc in 2003. The result, however, is that the United States has made no requests
nature, rather than addressing funda- Russian Federation is now not in tech- for assistance with its destruction pro-
mental structural issues. It was noted nical non-compliance with the CWC. gramme, there have been indications
that the OPCW had also received Third, the participants’ attention that it too might experience delays.
several voluntary contributions, was drawn to internal problems Verification activities, on the
including a US$2 million contribu- within the Secretariat. While these other hand, were reported to be pro-
tion from the United States. In short, existed within the Secretariat, they gressing smoothly and issues from
the current financial situation was had been created together with mem- earlier inspections were being
considered to be improving, enabling ber states through the Staff Rules and addressed. Discussion has been tak-
the OPCW to conduct a full pro- budgetary decisions. Resolving these ing place on overall verification activ-
gramme of activities. problems will take some time, but ities in relation to the most efficient
Several political decisions relating attention is now being focussed on use of resources, 70 per cent of which
to the Russian Federation were taken them. are spent on continuous monitoring
at the Conference: the Conference Increasing attention is being given of destruction. Another issue being
finalised a lengthy and painful pro- to the first CWC Review Conference, discussed is the distribution of Article
cess of consideration and approval of which will take place in The Hague VI inspections.
Russian conversion requests—24 in late April and early May 2003. In terms of implementation of,
chemical weapon production facili- The Working Group for preparations and compliance with, the CWC, it
ties (CWPFs) had been declared by for the Review Conference is now was noted that many member states
Russia, of which six were to be moving to more substantive discus- could not report that they had
destroyed and 18 were the subject of sions and papers and proposals from national implementing legislation or

November of UN Security Council

Resolution 1441 (2002).
In response to questions about
measures to ensure the safety of the
UN inspectors and their possible
extraction if their work was ob-
structed, it was reported that security
had been addressed by Dr Blix with
General Al Sa’adi of Iraq, and that
there was an obligation on Iraq to
ensure the inspectors’ safety. In the
past, UNSCOM had had extraction
plans, and it was assumed that these
would remain in place for UNMOVIC.
As regards security of UNMOVIC
teams, the understanding was that
Mohammed ElBaradei and Hans Blix while no inspections would be coer-
cive, there would be UN guards and
National Authorities, while those new categories of chemical substances UNMOVIC would have bases out-
which had implementing legislation for law enforcement purposes, not side Baghdad. While the unpredicta-
might not necessarily have suffi- being riot control agents; and (iii) bility of Iraq was acknowledged, it
ciently comprehensive legislation. whether the Review Conference was considered that Iraq probably
Participants raised the issue of the would address either of these issues. would accept Resolution 1441 within
recent Moscow hostage crisis and the The first was considered by one par- the timeframe set.
role of the OPCW. It was stated that ticipant not to apply to the Moscow Participants noted the gap in time
the OPCW had watched the situation crisis, as it was a law enforcement since there had been inspectors in
unfold, particularly after the news of situation, not an internal conflict; the Iraq, commenting on the sharp learn-
the use of gas, and had made contact second point was thought to be valid; ing curve experienced by UNSCOM
with the Russian authorities fairly and at this stage there was no pro- during previous inspections and not-
early on. There had been reports that posal to address the issues related to ing a need for a continuity of exper-
one State Party had been about to the Moscow hostage crisis at the tise and knowledge in inspectors.
officially request clarification in Review Conference. UNMOVIC has attempted to gain
respect of the Moscow events in the Finally, participants queried UNSCOM’s knowledge through two
Executive Council, but this did not whether Iraq had made any indica- years of studying the UNSCOM
occur. The official Russian position is tion of acceding to the CWC, Iraq archives and database. In addition,
that what happened had nothing to having, for the first time, attended six training courses for inspectors
do with the CWC and no State Party the seventh session of the Conference have been conducted and some 30
was known to be taking an official this year as an observer. per cent of UNMOVIC were previ-
position that there had been any vio- ously with UNSCOM—while, in gen-
lation of the CWC in respect of the UNMOVIC eral, the inner core of Chief Inspec-
Russian actions. Three issues perti- The workshop then turned its atten- tors will not be there, some will be
nent to the CWC were considered to tion to issues related to UNMOVIC present as monitors. There is a ques-
have been raised by the Moscow and inspections in Iraq, the situation tion as to how Dr Blix will interpret
hostage crisis: (i) the applicability of in respect of Iraq having recently Resolution 1441 regarding the
the CWC to internal conflicts; (ii) changed with the adoption on 8 requirement to ensure that inspection

teams are composed of “the most progress that could be made through pation of the meetings of the group
qualified and experienced experts tough national penal measures. It of experts, was being considered as
available”—this may provide the was noted that most states have gen- an aid to structure the debate and
opportunity for other ex-UNSCOM eral prohibitions on homicide, on the move criminalization forward. In
personnel to be involved. operation of criminal networks and response to the presentation, one sug-
Noting that Iraq had previously money laundering, which should be gestion was that security of patho-
said that it did not possess any sufficiently broad to deal with CBW gens might be more effectively
WMD, and now is required to make related crimes. Areas thought to need addressed through adjustments to
final declarations within 30 days (if it attention were the wrongful diversion existing requirements to protect pub-
accepts the Resolution), it was of chemical agents and legally requir- lic health and the environment, rather
observed that there was no intention ing laboratories to implement ade- than as part of national implementa-
of providing Iraq with any ‘exit’ or quate biosecurity standards, with tion measures for the BWC and CWC.
face-saving strategy. There is a penalties for failure. In addition, Second, an update was provided
requirement in the Resolution for attention should focus on the ability to the workshop on the HSP Draft
total disclosure of weapons pro- to carry out legal prosecutions Convention to Prohibit Biological
grammes, not simply weapons. (Article VII of the CWC and Article and Chemical Weapons Under Inter-
Importance was placed by the work- IV of the BWC) and the strengthen- national Criminal Law. Since the last
shop on the unanimity of the Security ing of co-operation in respect of meeting, it was reported that the
Council Resolution this time—this trans-national crime. It was also con- Swiss representation at the first ses-
was thought to convey the message sidered that carrying out some forms sion of the Fifth BWC Review Con-
to Iraq that it would not be able to of CB research should be criminal- ference had spoken of the need for
exploit any differences of opinion in ized and that the legal authorisation international criminalization. There
the Security Council. and capability of the police to detect had been discussion of the HSP pro-
and surveil wrongful activities must posal, introduced by the Netherlands,
CBW Criminalization be ensured. In terms of surveillance, at the public international law work-
Two reports were given to the work- the conclusion was that an interna- ing group of the Council of the
shop on progress in CBW criminal- tional convention was not required, European Union. On 31 January, the
ization, one focussing on national instead the capabilities of interna- proposal had been referred for con-
measures, the other on international tional organisations such as the World sideration by national governments.
measures. Customs Organisation, Interpol and In addition, a new Convention on
The first focussed on criminaliza- Europol could be drawn on. In Criminalization of CBW, referring to
tion of the inchoate CBW crimes, the essence, national criminalization was the HSP proposal, was the seventh of
preliminary steps of acquiring CB presented as a broad set of measures 11 steps outlined in the April 2002
materials, production and planning for regulating CBW activities, not UK Green Paper on measures to
to use them. The problems of distin- simply targeting non-state actors but strengthen the BWC. The presenta-
guishing between criminal and non- also acting as a brake on state activities. tion highlighted the difference
criminal acts of possessing CB agents In terms of how to move forward between national and universal crimi-
were noted, the conclusion being that on criminalization, it was noted that nal jurisdiction, with the benefits of
a licensing system for access to chem- the expert group meetings contem- universal jurisdiction emphasised.
ical and biological agents was plated by the Tóth proposal Opinions were divided as to the
required. This would create a rebut- (described below) would consider level of support for universal jurisdic-
table presumption of non-criminality. national measures for implementation within the international commu-
Observing the difficulties of tion and biosecurity, both aspects of nity, observations being made that
achieving international criminaliza- criminalization. A possible work- the new International Criminal Court
tion, the presentation emphasised the shop, to be held in Geneva in antici- operates on the principle of comple-

mentary, rather than universal, juris- regarding compliance with the mid-term strategy programme, mix-
diction. On the other hand, it was BWC; and ing both process and substance. The
noted that there are seven interna- 3) If there was to be no Protocol, Tóth proposal is for five issues to be
tional Conventions establishing uni- where to go from here and how to the subject of three annual meetings
versal jurisdiction, with one new follow up on what had been done. of States Parties, each of one week’s
Convention (on Terrorist Bombings) Two weeks were spent in the duration, to be held between 2003
pending, all of which are supported Committee of the Whole, then pro- and 2005:
by the United States. It was reported ceeding to the Drafting Committee to 1) adoption of national measures to
that some states were interested in prepare a draft Final Declaration implement the prohibitions in the
pursuing the issue in the Sixth Com- developed from those of previous BWC, including the enactment of
mittee, however, there are some prob- Review Conferences. However, late penal legislation (for discussion in
lems with that, including whether a on the final day of the Review 2003);
topic which has been viewed as fal- Conference, the United States pro- 2) national mechanisms regarding the
ling into the First Committee’s ambit duced a controversial new proposal security and oversight of patho-
would be able to be shifted to the calling for termination of the Ad Hoc genic micro-organisms and toxins
Sixth Committee. Group and its mandate. Given the (for discussion in 2003);
stage of the Review Conference, the 3) enhancing international capabili-
The Fifth BWC Review President proposed, and it was ties with respect to cases of alleged
Conference (Part I) agreed, to suspend the Conference use of BW or suspicious disease
It was reported that, last year, the for a year until November 2002. outbreaks (for discussion in 2004);
Fifth Review Conference had been At the time of the 18th Pugwash 4) national and international efforts
conceived of as a forum to which a workshop, the Fifth Review Con- and mechanisms for surveillance,
report would have been made on the ference was scheduled to run for a detection, diagnosis and combat-
work of the Ad Hoc Group, which period of two weeks, starting with a ing infectious diseases in humans,
had been negotiating a Protocol to plenary meeting on 11 November. animals and plants (for discussion
strengthen the effectiveness and While much work had been done in 2004); and
improve the implementation of the over the last 12 months, the outcome 5) codes of conduct for scientists (for
BWC. The failure of the Ad Hoc of the Fifth Review Conference was discussion in 2005).
Group in July 2001, however, meant considered still to be very unclear. It is proposed that each of the
that States Parties were in an uncer- annual sessions will be preceded by a
tain position when the Fifth Review The Resumption of the Fifth two-week meeting of experts.
Conference convened in November. BWC Review Conference The background to the Tóth pro-
The Review Conference opened with 2002 and Beyond posal was the three failures in July,
a General Debate in which States Developments since the August and December 2001; failure
Parties had made statements which adjournment in December 2001 to agree on a Protocol, failure of the
included disappointment about the The workshop heard an outline of Ad Hoc Group to report to the Fifth
Ad Hoc Group negotiations and con- the work conducted by the President Review Conference and the suspen-
cerns about compliance with the of the Fifth Review Conference, sion of the Review Conference. In
BWC. Three main issues emerged as Amb. Tibor Tóth, since December December last year, the situation was
requiring resolution in order for the 2001 and his proposal for the recon- tenuous, with a request for the termi-
Conference to reach a consensus vened session. On the morning of nation of the Ad Hoc Group. Since
Final Declaration: Monday 11 November, a draft deci- then, there have been three rounds of
1) The status and future of the Ad sion would be put before the consultations by the President of the
Hoc Group; Conference focussing on one item: Fifth Review Conference and much
2) How to deal with accusations follow-up. This was described as a quiet diplomacy. While in spring and

summer this year, the consultations in the years until 2006, this by defini- Tóth proposal are fewer than those in
appeared to favour the Tóth propo- tion narrows the scope of application the draft Protocol was acknowledged.
sal, in September the position seemed of the BWC. However, there are three Fourth, there are concerns about
hopeless, with the United States indi- precedents for a focussed approach: the lack of legally binding mechan-
cating that it did not want there to be the 1986 decision on CBM declara- isms in terms of compliance. The ref-
any ‘real’ Review Conference. tions; the 1991 tasking of VEREX to erence point for the Tóth proposal
Analysing the proposal, the pre- examine possible verification mea- was said to be the IAEA regime
senter outlined five legitimate con- sures; and the 1994 establishment by between 1957 and 1968, before the
cerns that had been raised by States the Special Conference of the Ad Hoc NPT was in place. The question is
Parties. The first concern relates to Group. The Tóth proposal is seen as whether, in the absence of an agree-
the absence of a Final Declaration. In a mid-term strategy with an annual ment by States Parties on compliance
terms of the situation in December programme of work. measures, the Tóth proposal is an
2001, while over 90 per cent of a acceptable compromise as a mid-term
Final Declaration could have been strategy. In analysing the need for
consolidated from work at the Even if the Tóth proposal is legally binding mechanisms, compar-
Review Conference, there were a accepted, it may be nothing but an isons were drawn with the CW and
number of outstanding issues, on any nuclear regimes, looking at the layers
one of which the Final Declaration empty shell. The Tóth proposal of safety provided by activities during
could have foundered. Those issues could mean only three weeks a the many years prior to entry into
included: the description of what force of the CWC and the NPT.
year of meetings on the five issues
happened in respect of the Ad Hoc The fifth and final concern is that,
Group; whether or not the Ad Hoc contained in the proposal. even if the Tóth proposal is accepted,
Group should continue its work; it may be nothing but an empty shell.
compliance with the BWC; and The Tóth proposal could mean only
export control regimes. By 7 Decem- The third criticism, one that had three weeks a year of meetings on the
ber 2001, it was clear that it would been voiced primarily by non-aligned five issues contained in the proposal
be impossible to resolve the issues states, is that there is a lack of co- —by 2006, it is conceivable that all
relating to the Ad Hoc Group and operation and multilateralism in the focus would be gone and previous
compliance. The absence of a Final proposal. While it was acknowledged progress will be lost. However, it was
Declaration was considered to be a that there could be more co-operation suggested that the annual two-week
substantial loss and an indication in the package, it was emphasised meetings of the experts could be pre-
that the position at the Fifth Review that the situation has to be viewed in ceded by other efforts, including sem-
Conference was negatively different context. At least two items provide inars or papers, not necessarily done
to that at previous Review Confer- concrete spin-offs which historically on an official basis.
ences. The resulting dilemma is are within Article X provisions, items The workshop also received a
whether the Conference should try to which have been in both the draft paper setting out options and uncer-
produce an outcome which is a mix Protocol and previous Final Declara- tainties relating to the resumption of
of procedure and substance. How- tions. The efforts at balancing co- the Review Conference in the context
ever, it was emphasised that the Tóth operation and compliance in the of developments since December
proposal is not a ‘better than noth- Tóth proposal were highlighted, 2001. Tracking the statements and
ing’ approach. although it was also noted that there actions of both the United States and
The second concern is that the was little emphasis on compliance other States Parties to the BWC, the
Tóth proposal is a ‘selective’ measures and thus the balance appears conclusion was that the United States’
approach; that is, because the pro- different to some States Parties. The position had not shifted since Decem-
posal identifies items to be discussed fact that the co-operation items in the ber 2001 but that other States Parties

had reiterated their wish for a tocol, including the UK Green Paper, ings and a clear red-light to possessor
resumed Fifth Review Conference had dealt with the issue of compli- states, were contrasted with the con-
leading to a programme of further ance adequately. Other concerns sequences and message sent if there is
work. Five options for a resumed expressed by the workshop included no Final Declaration. In short, it was
Review Conference were outlined: ensuring that discussion at the Review stated that the Review Conference
agreement on a Final Declaration, Conference meetings in future years needs to be seen to have progressed
either by consensus or a vote; agree- was not limited to simply procedural and that States Parties should act,
ment on a procedural report contain- matters. In more substantive terms, it using the vote mechanism if neces-
ing agreed language from the 2001 was thought that, since the United sary. In discussion on this matter, one
Draft Final Declaration; agreement States was unlikely to support mea- point raised in the workshop was
on a short statement concluding the sures agreed by a vote not going in its that the content of previous final dec-
Review Conference and attaching a favour, the Review Conference might larations would not, and should not,
paper on follow-up; agreement on a not be able to pursue measures re- just disappear, meaning that there is
further adjournment of the Review quiring substantial financial resources not necessarily a need to simply reaf-
Conference; and ending the adjourned to implement them. At a more gen- firm previous final declarations.
Review Conference without agree- eral level, participants also discussed b) Future meetings. The work-
ment. The conclusion was that the the nature and value of multilateral- shop received a presentation on a
situation demanded efforts focussing ism and whether any outcome of the realistic inter-Review-Conference
on agreement on a Final Declaration. Review Conference was necessarily Strategy, which outlined five strate-
The BWC Review Conferences have better than no outcome. A follow-up gies available to States Parties to
already developed, through Final process would, however, at least keep strengthen the BWC and identified
Declarations, extended understand- the issues on the agenda and preserve states as either ‘reformist’ or ‘mini-
ings which had begun to strengthen national and international BW links. malist’ in their approaches to the
the regime; serious damage to this The impact of a hypothetical US BWC. Analysing the strategies, it was
cumulative process was thought withdrawal from the BWC was also concluded that agreement of a
likely if the Fifth Review Conference discussed with respect to the impact Protocol to the BWC could not be
failed to build upon this. Arguments on those States Parties who had taken forward at the present time.
for and against the Review Confer- deposited instruments of ratification The reformist agenda of establishing
ence departing from tradition and with the United States, the conclusion legally binding mechanisms was also
taking a vote were also addressed, the being that this would not spell disas- thought to have come to an end for
position ultimately taken being that, ter; the UNDDA could probably take the time being, with no group of
while voting is best avoided, if it is note of the ratifications and future States Parties prepared to carry it for-
necessary to rescue the Review Con- States Parties could deposit instru- ward. The third strategy of ad hoc
ference from the intransigence of one ments in London or Moscow. and special measures, involving
state, it should be adopted. agreements outside the BWC, was
The key issues for the resumption
Subsequent discussion raised the thought unlikely to be able to gener-
idea that the US position might be a) Final declaration. A paper was ate agreement to raise one problem
fairly encouraging in terms of follow- presented to the workshop on the above all others by the States Parties
up measures and might have devel- importance of a Final Declaration, as a whole. However, smaller groups
oped somewhat in the last two months underlining that, by the afternoon of of like-minded States Parties could
prior to the Review Conference. 7 December 2001, the Final Declara- address such an issue by mutual
Compliance with the BWC was iden- tion was said to be 95 per cent com- agreement. Fourth, external frame-
tified as a central concern of the plete. The benefits of a Final Declar- works and measures outside the
United States, with debate focussing ation, including the reaffirmation of Treaty regime, such as concerted
on whether anything since the Pro- norms, agreed extended understand- action within the European Union

(EU) and export control regimes, col; and the importance of continuing accurate nor complete. In particular,
were thought to offer some possibili- CBMs and declarations. The concern the argument was made that the role
ties. However, there are dangers asso- was also raised that States Parties’ of CBMs should be re-evaluated now
ciated with this - measures outside expanding programmes on biodefence, that there will be no BWC Protocol,
the BWC might not be seen as while initially innocent, may lead to one concern being that they are only
strengthening the Convention itself, operational planning. politically binding. In response, it
and such measures are unlikely to be A paper was also presented on was suggested that if all the EU states
truly multilateral and involve all follow-up to the Fifth Review Con- submitted CBMs, as called for in the
States Parties - there will therefore ference. For there to be considered to EU list of concrete measures, and if
not be an even implementation of be at least a minimum result from the the Andean Community did likewise,
obligations. Finally, the fifth strategy Review Conference, it was consid- having identified the importance of
is to pursue politically-binding agree- ered that there would need to be a CBMs, this would move CBMs from
ments and obligations. While this Final Declaration and follow-up being a piecemeal measure to some-
approach has proved useful in the meetings, making mandatory the thing of more value - allied to this
past, the disadvantages include the most important CBMs, such as bio- was the suggestion of having an indi-
quality of the measure itself (i.e. the defence programmes and vaccine vidual responsible for collating and
lack of a legal obligation) and its producers, agreement on the extended arranging for translations of CBMs.
nature as a fall-back mechanism. CBMs from November 2001 and Others observed the domestic utility
In sum, only the external mea- some form of permanent UN office of CBMs, for example in the United
sures and politically binding measures or official to handle these items. Other States, by keeping all relevant activi-
were thought to offer a feasible strat- areas that it was thought needed to ties, including any which might be
egy to strengthen the BWC before be addressed further included: the questionable, ventilated through
2006. Any measures taken, however, possibility of a framework Conven- national information channels
need to be linked back to the BWC in tion banning bioterrorism, linking between those working on biodefence
order to demonstrate the strengthen- proposed legislation on the criminal- and those implementing the BWC
ing of the regime. The necessity of ising of CBW, the Convention on the within the US administration. CBMs
meetings between 2002 and the Sixth physical protection of dangerous were acknowledged, by their very
Review Conference in 2006 was again pathogens etc; involvement in discus- nature, to be unable to address all the
highlighted, with the observation that sion of the biotechnology and phar- suspicions of foreign states, because
such inter-Review Conference meet- maceutical industry; increasing States all of the information provided comes
ings were not uncommon in other Parties’ confidence in terms of biode- from the State Party. However, they
regimes. fence programmes; initiating discus- remain of value through providing
Following the presentation, the sion on an international licence/cer- potential explanations for possible
workshop discussed the need for care tificate for scientists; and scientific suspicions before they are expressed
in relation to activities outside the discussion of US and other proposals, and through the fact that they go on
BWC regime, in that they can create such as the UK Green Paper. It was record.
disconnects from the Convention. noted that the Swedish Pugwash Given the failure of the Protocol
Some activities that it was thought group would be prepared to promote negotiations, CBMs were thought by
should be contemplated in respect of meetings taking an initiative in one or some to be more important than they
reinforcing the BWC regime included: several of these areas. were previously and that States Parties
member states using their good offices Considerable subsequent discus- should be encouraged to implement
to push for ratifications to the BWC sion amongst workshop participants and enhance them. States could emu-
in the aim of universality; member focussed on CBMs, with a challenge late Canada in unilaterally adopting
states abandoning their existing res- being raised as to the value of CBMs extended CBMs or post their CBMs
ervations to the 1925 Geneva Proto- and perceptions that they are neither on the internet, as Australia has done.

One point made was that a sharp dis- and national and regional authorities. of outreach and education in the CBW
tinction should not be drawn between In respect of the introduction of Codes arena to combat the lack of under-
what is done inside and outside the of Conduct, concerns were raised standing, with the suggestion raised
Convention, noting that Canada’s that, while worth having, they could as to whether there might not with
actions in respect of the extended absorb much time and effort; how- advantage be a BW equivalent prior
CBMs would not be thought to be ever, they could help to promote the to the Sixth Review Conference of
outside what had been agreed by necessary education about prohibited the IUPAC workshop held in Bergen
States Parties. For example, there is activities. National criminal legisla- in July 2001 on the impact of recent
no reason why individual States tion was thought of lesser importance developments in science on the CWC.
Parties should not help each other to in deterring state action, as were Much discussion followed on the
extend their CBMs or to co-operate national controls on pathogens. The value of Codes of Conduct. Some
in terms of national implementation; difficulties of oversight of genetic participants considered them mostly
these actions would not be “outside” engineering were highlighted, while ineffective, noting war crimes by
the BWC. the importance of revised and Nazi physicians and the activities of
extended CBMs was again emphasised. the Japanese Unit 731 and conclud-
Taking stock, including the ing that politics often trumped mor-
role of civil society ality. Thus, while of long-term use in
Reiterating the value of taking stock There is no reason why individual education and articulating norms,
in terms of assigning priorities for the States Parties should not help Codes of Conduct should not be
future, the workshop heard a presen- viewed as an end in themselves.
each other to extend their CBMs or
tation emphasising state actors as the Others, while agreeing that they are
major engine in the biotechnology to co-operate in terms of national not necessarily of deterrent effect,
field. States, rather than non-state observed that a declaration was
implementation.
actors, were thought to be most likely issued to Japanese doctors involved
to set the course of the future because with Unit 731 that Japan’s interests
of their ability to reinterpret and Assistance in the event, or threat of required them to put aside their moral
change norms. Analysing both tyran- use, of BW was thought necessary, as code, thus implying that a Code of
nies and democracies, tyrannies were was a new Convention to criminalize Conduct did have some moral strength.
thought to be potentially interested in CBW—such a Convention must One issue is whether it would be pos-
both lethal (for external conflicts) apply to state acts and include the use sible to have a universal harmonised
and less than lethal (for internal use) of non-lethal chemical or biological code, or whether a Code would have
technologies, while democracies were agents prohibited by the CWC and to be national and culture-specific.
considered more likely to be inter- BWC. However, care needs to be Previous efforts and suggestions in
ested in non-lethal weapons (NLW). taken to ensure that there are no gaps respect of Codes of Conduct were
Concern was expressed about the between the definitions of CW and noted by the Group, and it was
unclear legal status of NLW. BW in such a Convention and those emphasised that any Code of Conduct
The presentation then turned to in the CWC and BWC. A new Con- should be kept simple and should be
topics which might require attention vention on physical protection of generated within the scientific com-
in terms of state conduct in the com- dangerous pathogens could also be munity, rather than dictated from
ing years. It was considered that efforts considered of use to limit the ship- outside. The workshop noted that the
toward universality, and the with- ment of dangerous agents. Tóth proposal included Codes of
drawal of Geneva Protocol reserva- The importance of education Conduct as the item for discussion by
tions, were necessary, while increased and understanding of the terms of the States Parties in 2005.
disease surveillance efforts should be Convention was noted. Workshop The issue of universality was also
left entirely in the hands of the WHO participants agreed on the necessity dwelt on by the workshop, with

some participants considering that to remove the contradictions. It was talk of a single, coherent, US policy.
the negotiation of the BW Protocol observed that the Final Declarations At this stage, the US programme is
could have been a distraction from of the Third and Fourth BWC probably best characterised as biode-
implementation of the BWC and Review Conferences had reiterated fence, rather than containing offen-
efforts towards universality. While it the importance of removing reserva- sive elements.
was conceded that there had not been tions to the Geneva Protocol. A report was then made to the
a formal concerted process by States One point raised in discussion workshop on research conducted,
Parties as a whole towards universal- was the importance of making a dis- under the Freedom of Information
ity, the efforts of the EU and states tinction between how to prevent fur- Act, over the last 18 months into the
such as Australia were noted. A pos- ther deterioration of the BWC US Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Direc-
sible drawback from universality Review Conference situation in the torate (JNLWD) programme. JNLWD
was, however, also noted, with obser- next two weeks and how to strength- programmes have, apparently, been
vations made that one State Party en the regime in general. In the long underway since 1995. While there
which had been required to ratify the term, it was emphasised that, since has been an increase in media atten-
BWC had contributed to the thwart- the end of the Cold War, the tradition on this issue in the United States
ing of consensus decision-making, as tional arms control community since the Moscow hostage crisis, pro-
occurred at the 1996 Review Confer- needed to expand its horizons and ponents of NLW were said to have
ence; this point caused some debate talk to other communities, including used the events in Moscow as a ratio-
within the workshop. While the NGOs. nale for needing better research.
negotiation of the Protocol was not he workshop heard an analysis of Following this, the concept of a
universally viewed as a possible dis- why the United States no longer sup- “lethal” weapon was explored. It
traction, it was considered that issues ported the Protocol, examining the was stated that the lethality of a
such as universality and CBMs, three reasons that the United States weapon is measurable and deter-
which would have been taken into had given: that it was inadequate to mined more by its use than its inher-
account by the Protocol, now needed detect covert proliferation; that it ent nature, whether conventional or
renewed attention. would unacceptably jeopardize com- non-conventional. Thus, the argu-
Clarification was sought as to the mercial proprietary secrets; and that ment was presented that using
current legal effect of reservations to it would endanger the US biodefence “lethal” and “non-lethal” labels for
the Geneva Protocol, given that the program. None of these was consid- weapons could sanction the use of
prohibitions contained within the ered an adequate explanation. The NLW. The dangers of NLW in armed
Geneva Protocol have entered into presentation hypothesised that the US conflict were highlighted, including
customary international law. It was government views global CBW pro- the possible erosion of international
considered that the norm reflected liferation as inevitable, and high- humanitarian law and the increase in
state practice and centred on non-use lighted the likelihood that the United lethality in warfare. It was considered
under the Geneva Protocol—remov- States is developing military applica- that a better phrase than NLW would
ing reservations would thus strength- tions of biotechnology, a slippery be “new weapons”, as these are
en the norm. The disparity was noted slope which, it was considered, oth- required to be subjected to legal
between the BWC, which prohibits ers may follow and from which there scrutiny under Article 36 of Addi-
development, production and stock- may be no reversal. The workshop tional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva
piling BW, and reservations to the noted a US mentality of unilateral- Conventions.
Geneva Protocol which implies a right ism, rather than multilateralism, and Substantial discussion then cen-
to use BW in certain circumstances an opposition to legally-binding tred on the issue of NLW. One item
and thus to retain BW stocks. Accord- (rather than politically-binding) of interest to participants included
ingly, there is a need to withdraw instruments. Observations were the date when US NLW programmes
reservations to the Geneva Protocol made that it may not be correct to commenced, some stating that it

(referring not so much to CBW wea- in military preparations to use CW. sight of genetic engineering; revised
pons as to other forms of NLW) had Pharmacological information was and extended CBMs, assistance in the
originated in the early 1990s. As an also provided to the workshop event of, or threat of use of, BW; a
explanation for why the US withdrew regarding the predictability of mor- new Convention to criminalize CBW;
support for a Protocol, the stated tality in cases where someone is aim- a new Convention on physical pro-
existence of US agencies with projects ing for 90-95 per cent incapacitation tection of dangerous pathogens; and
which “raised questions” was noted. by a gas. other subjects.
A distinction was drawn between Having already discussed univer-
The role of civil society
international armed conflict and law sality and Codes of Conduct in some
enforcement situations; it was, how- The workshop was updated on a new detail, the group noted a proposal for
ever, noted that states often frame initiative, the BioWeapons Prevention a joint initiative by the depositaries of
armed conflict as law enforcement Project (BWPP), created by concerned the BWC, the Geneva Protocol and
situations, which can allow human NGOs in the wake of the premature the CWC, with the UNDDA prepar-
rights abuses. It was observed that closure of the BWC Fifth Review ing an annual regional tabulation of
the BWC uses the broad language of Conference in 2001. The organisa- membership. Attention was also drawn
“hostile purposes”, which would tions involved in the BWPP are the to the FAS Working Group paper on
surely mean that any type of weapon, Department of Peace Studies at the Recommendations for a Code of
lethal or non-lethal, fell within the University of Bradford, VERTIC, Conduct for Biodefense Programs
scope of the treaty. One concern in BASIC, FAS, the Graduate Institute due to be issued and the need for seri-
respect of non-lethal CBW weapons of International Studies (PSIS), the ous discussion on how biodefence
(for law enforcement purposes) is Harvard Sussex Program, INES and activities should be conducted.
that they may justify the development the Centre on Conflict Resolution in The workshop received a presen-
of munitions to deliver toxic or infec- South Africa. The aim is to create tation on the WHO’s overall strategy
tive agents, thus making it difficult to a global network of organisations for dealing with BW. In May 2002,
distinguish between legal and illegal interested in bioweapons prevention. the issue of CBW was addressed by
military programmes. One facet of the project will be the the World Health Assembly and the
Much attention again focussed on regular publication of a BioWeapons Executive Board, resulting in a reso-
the use of gas in the Moscow hostage Monitor, including reports on gov- lution (WHA55.16) endorsed by 191
crisis. Issues raised included: the use- ernment compliance and interna- member states and calling for action
fulness of the general purpose crite- tional and national initiatives and by member states and activities by
rion and the concept of “intent” in information on BW. The initiative the WHO in respect of preparedness
respect of NLW; whether there had was launched in the Palais des for CBW attacks.
been a violation of the CWC; the use Nations on 11 November. It was reported that the WHO
of NLW in enhancing the subsequent already has a strategy within which
use of conventional weapons (i.e. the
Topics for future meetings of CBW is addressed, the Global Health
shooting of the hostage-takers) and
the States Parties Security: Epidemic Alert and
inviting an escalation of conflict in The workshop then turned to topics Response. This is based on a global
battle; and, in general, the need for for future meetings of the States partnership and the WHO “network
NLW to be put on the international Parties to the BWC, including: of networks” approach. There are
agenda. Attention was drawn to universality and withdrawal of three pillars to the strategy: (i) to
Article II of the CWC, which includes Geneva Protocol Reservations; contain known risks (epidemic dis-
law enforcement under the definition increased disease surveillance efforts; eases); (ii) to respond to the unex-
of “purposes not prohibited”, and Codes of Conduct for professional pected; and (iii) to improve prepared-
various prohibitions in the CWC, bodies; national criminal legislation; ness. Amongst the measures pursued
including the prohibition on engaging national controls on pathogens; over- by the WHO are development of

national action plans for surveillance it was noted that VERTIC is conduct- raised as to how to conduct oversight
and early warning systems, strength- ing a survey, given the lack of a cen- of GE without infringing human
ening laboratory capacity, the UN tral collection of public information rights. There needs to be a balance
Disaster Management Training regarding domestic implementation between regulation and safety con-
Programme which has a training of the BW prohibitions. A question- trols on the one hand, and academic
module on terrorism, and developing naire has been issued to governments and industry freedom to research.
systems for using informal informa- on the topic, but so far only 11 One proposal was for an interna-
tion and intelligence. WHO is work- responses have been received. In tional database of all scientists work-
ing on updating the legal framework, addition to this, VERTIC has been ing in the field of genetic engineering.
currently contained in the 1969 able to collect information through The different levels of physical secu-
International Health Regulations and other sources on 65 countries, of rity requirements for plant and
covering only three diseases. The which 15 were reported to have fairly human pathogens were noted.
plan is that a revision of the Inter- comprehensive legislation. VERTIC On CBMs, the current method of
national Health Regulations, con- has also been collecting the texts of submission and collation of CBMs,
taining revised and updated core con- legislation, which it hopes to publish and the lack of a database, is inade-
cepts, will be presented to the WHA as an annex to its report, due out in quate and of limited usefulness to
in 2004-2005. February 2003. The report will be States Parties. Suggestions were for
The workshop agreed that the published in the first edition of the CBMs to be provided on a secure
WHO should not go outside its BioWeapons Monitor. As a result of website, or by disk for distribution to
humanitarian mandate to venture this survey, the need was identified States Parties, or for states to put
into verification or security tasks, as for legal assistance in drafting legisla- them up on the internet, as Australia
this might jeopardise its neutrality. tion, particularly from regional had done. However, some State Party
Concerns were also raised as to the groups. Separately, the EU was also governments have made assurances
preparedness of the other international reported to be exploring this issue. to firms submitting data that the dec-
organisations such as FAO and OIE In discussions on national con- larations would not be made public.
for deliberate attacks on animals and trols on pathogens, participants That it is, however, in general possi-
plants. It was noted that the FAO and observed that the definition of a ble for declarations to be made public
OIE do not yet have the mandate from “pathogen” was difficult and that, was thought clear from the Ottawa
member states that the WHO has. given time, it was possible to isolate Convention, under which Article 7
The ICRC appeal on Biotechnol- almost any pathogen save smallpox. transparency reports are submitted
ogy, Weapons and Humanity, launched The proposal is for health authorities electronically to the UNDDA and
in September 2002, was outlined for to augment the rules on controlling then published on the internet. The
the group, as were the public health access to pathogens within a state. South African proposal for manda-
principles that can be implemented to When looking at oversight of tory CBMs was noted, as was the
limit deliberately spread diseases, the Genetic Engineering, the term “GE” opposition to this by NAM and, given
thesis being that deliberately spread was thought too narrow by some the failure of the Protocol negotiations,
diseases equate to the effects of armed participants, who considered that it the likelihood is that this proposal
violence. It was emphasised that no should include genomic techniques will not be taken forward at the pres-
single measure would be effective on also - another suggestion was “mole- ent time.
its own - there is, instead, a need to cular biotechnology”. The activities In discussions on assistance in the
merge a web of prevention with a and regulatory legislation underway event of, or threat of, BW, it was noted
web of deterrence. The need for plant in the United States were discussed, that Article X of the CWC provides
and animal disease surveillance was including those attempting to control for assistance to be provided to states,
also noted. access of students of some nationali- rather than victims. It was also clari-
On national criminal legislation, ties to laboratories - concerns were fied that the Technical Secretariat in

The Hague is not the body which small international organisation with CWC; “Non-Lethal” weapons;
provides assistance; rather, it is up to a physical structure to shoulder the lessons from events in Iraq; making
member states who have offered burden. use of the Protocol negotiations; and
assistance, the Technical Secretariat policing and self-policing of the sci-
facilitating this and communicating The future work of the entific community.
needs. The ICRC was also reported Study Group The next meeting of the Study
not to be trained or equipped to deal A number of items were identified by Group is planned for 26-27 April
with the use of CBW, though some participants that might be addressed 2003, in the Netherlands. The work-
certain quantities of drugs are avail- in future Study Group meetings. These shop will directly precede the First
able. Some participants expressed include: education; the role of civil Special Session of the Conference of
concern that nothing similar to society; domestic and international the States Parties to review the opera-
Scorpio, which had been available law; CBMs; regional and cross- tions of the Chemical Weapons
during the first Gulf War, was avail- regional measures and co-operation; Convention (the First Review
able today to assist in the event of, or verification and the BWC; the rela- Conference) to be held over a period
threat of, BW. tionship between the BWC and the of two weeks in The Hague.
One benefit of a Convention to
criminalize CBW was thought to be
that it makes individuals in govern- Participants
ments accountable. In terms of how
to take criminalization forward, one Mr. Sameh Aboul-Enein, Counsellor for Disarmament and Arms Control, Univ.
suggestion was for the EU to take this Disarmament, Mission of Egypt to the Marne-la-Vallés/Paris, France
UN, Geneva, Switzerland
to the Sixth Committee. Others Dr. Ottorino Cosivi (Italy), Department
Dr. David Atwood (USA), of Communicable Disease Surveillance
thought this should be done outside Representative, Disarmament and Peace, and Response (CSR), World Health
the Sixth Committee, and without Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva, Organization (WHO), Geneva,
inviting the US to participate, so that Switzerland Switzerland
it could not be blocked at an early Dr. Maurizio Barbeschi (Italy), Senior Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary
Scientific Adviser, Ministry of Industry, General, Pugwash Conferences on
stage. Another possible new Conven- DGSPC, off. E-1, and Director of the Science and World Affairs; Professor of
tion discussed was on the physical CBW Programme of the Landau Mathematical Physics, University of
protection of pathogens. One issue Network-Centro Volta Milan, Italy
identified was the relationship of this Mr. Abdul Basit, Chargé d’Affaires, Dr. Robin Coupland (UK), Medical
Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the Advisor, Legal Division, International
proposal to the Convention on Bio- United Nations, Geneva, Switzerland Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
logical Diversity and the Cartagena Geneva, Switzerland
Amb. Serguei Batsanov, Director, Special
Biosafety Protocol. Projects, Organization for the Prohibition Dr. Brian Davey, Head, Health and Safety
Finally, a presentation was given of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The Branch, Organisation for the Prohibition
Hague, The Netherlands of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), The
on an agenda for the future, in which Hague, The Netherlands
Ms. Una Becker, PhD Associate, Peace
the presenter highlighted a paradigm
Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF), Ms. Patricia Frericks, WHO Intern,
shift from weapons elimination to the Frankfurt, Germany World Health Organization (WHO),
suppression of proliferation. Actions Geneva, Switzerland
Mr. Bernhard Brasack, Head of the
in support of the existing BWC regime, CW/BW Division, Foreign Office, Berlin, Prof.. Erhard Geissler, retired Head,
Germany Bioethical Research Group, Max
and those in support of a future legal-
Delbrueck Center for Molecular
ly-binding instrument were explored, Dr. Vladimir S. Bundin, Senior Specialist,
Medicine, Berlin, Germany
Agency on the Munitions of the Russian
as were questions for a future research Federation, National Authority for CWC, Dr. Jozef Goldblat, Vice President,
agenda. One question raised was how Biology Department, Moscow, Russia Geneva International Peace Research
Institute (GIPRI), Geneva, Switzerland;
to progress without an “OPBW” or Col. (ret.) Pierre Canonne, Member,
Consultant, United Nations, Geneva
Pugwash Council; Senior Lecturer,

Ms. Chandre Gould, Senior Researcher, Dr. Patricia Lewis (UK), Director, UNI- New York (SUNY), Purchase, New York,
Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape DIR, Geneva, Switzerland USA; Chair, Federation of American
Town, South Africa Scientists Working Group on BW
Col. (ret) Shmuel Limone, Senior
Verification
Mr. Edward H. Hammond, US Director Consultant, Defense Policy Planning,
of the Sunshine Project, Austin, Texas Ministry of Defense, Tel Aviv, Israel Mr. Andreas C. Schröder, Deputy Head
of BW/CW Section, Department for
Dr. Gert Harigel, Senior Physicist (Emeri- Dr. Jez Littlewood, Research Fellow,
Disarmament and Arms Control, Foreign
tus), European Laboratory for Particle Mountbatten Centre for International
Office, Berlin, Germany
Physics (CERN), Geneva, Switzerland Studies, Department of Politics, Univer-
sity of Southampton, Southampton, UK Mr. Nicholas Sims, Reader in Interna-
Dr. René Haug, Counsellor, Permanent
tional Relations, London School of
Mission of Switzerland to the Ms. Kathryn McLaughlin, Research
Economics and Political Science (LSE),
international organizations in Geneva Associate, Landau Network-Centro Volta
University of London, London, UK
Mr. Peter Herby, Coordinator, Mines- Prof. Robert Mathews, Principal
Amb. Ali-Ashgar Soltanieh, Ministry of
Arms Unit, International Committee of Research Scientist, Defence Science and
Foreign Affairs, Tehran, Iran [formerly:
the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, Switzerland Technology Organisation, Australia
Deputy Permanent Representative, Per-
Ms. Iris Hunger (Germany), Professional Dr. Oliver Meier, International Represen- manent Mission of the Islamic Republic
Assistant, BTWC Ad Hoc Group tative and Correspondent, Arms Control of Iran to the United Nations, Geneva]
Secretariat, Department for Disarmament Association (ACA), Berlin, Germany
Amb. Rakesh Sood, Permanent Repre-
Affairs, UN Office Geneva, Switzerland
Mr. Piers D. Millett, Doctoral Candidate, sentative of India to the Conference on
Mr. Koichi Ito, Director, Biological and Project on Strengthening the Biological Disarmament, Geneva, Switzerland
Chemical Weapons Conventions and Toxin Weapons Convention, Depart-
Prof. Jean-Pierre Stroot (Belgium/
Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ment of Peace Studies, University of
Switzerland), retired Physicist; Geneva
Tokyo, Japan Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK
Pugwash Office; President of the Board of
Dr. Martin Kaplan, Member, Pugwash Prof. Matthew S. Meselson, Thomas the Geneva International Peace Research
Council; Director, Pugwash Conferences Dudley Cabot Professor of the Natural Institute (GIPRI), Geneva, Switzerland
Geneva Office Sciences, Department of Molecular and
Dr. Annika Thunborg, First Secretary,
Cellular Biology, Harvard University,
Dr. Alexander Kelle, Marie Curie Swedish Mission to the UN in Geneva,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA
Research Fellow, Department of Peace Switzerland
Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford, Prof. Kathryn Nixdorff, Dept. of
Amb. Tibor Toth (Hungary), Chairman,
West Yorkshire, UK Microbiology and Genetics, Darmstadt
Ad Hoc Group of the States Parties to the
University of Technology, Darmstadt,
Prof. Eduard Kellenberger, retired Biological Weapons Convention, Geneva,
Germany
Professor, Institut de Génétique et Switzerland
Biologie Microbienne (IGBM), Université Prof. Graham S. Pearson, Visiting Pro-
Ms. Fiona Tregonning (New Zealand),
de Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland fessor of International Security, Depart-
Harvard Sussex Program Hague
ment of Peace Studies, University of
Prof. Barry Kellman, Director, Interna- Researcher at the OPCW, The Hague,
Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire, UK
tional Weapons Control Institute, DePaul The Netherlands
University College of Law, Chicago, Mr. Angelo Persiani, First Counsellor,
Dr. Mark Wheelis, Senior Lecturer,
Illinois, USA Permanent Mission of Italy to the Confer-
Section of Microbiology, University of
ence on Disarmament, Geneva,
Dr. David Kelly, Senior Adviser, Prolifer- California, Davis, California, USA
Switzerland
ation and Arms Control Secretariat,
Ms. Angela Woodward, Legal Researcher,
Ministry of Defence, London, UK Prof. Julian Perry Robinson, Sussex
Verification Research, Training and Infor-
Director, Harvard-Sussex Program, Science
Mr. Ian Kenyon, Visiting Senior Research mation Centre (VERTIC), London, UK
& Technology Policy Research (SPRU),
Fellow, Mountbatten Centre for Interna-
University of Sussex, Brighton, UK Dr. Jean Pascal Zanders, Project Leader,
tional Studies, University of South-
CBW Project, SIPRI, Solna, Sweden
ampton, Highfield, Southampton, UK Mr. Roger Roffey, Director of BW-
Defence Research, Swedish Defence
Mr. Patrick Lamb, Deputy Head, Non- P U G WA S H S TA F F :
Research Agency, FOI NBC-Defence,
Proliferation Department, Foreign and Rome Office: Claudia Vaughn, Pugwash
Umeå, Sweden; and Ministry of Defence,
Commonwealth Office, London, UK Conferences, Rome, Italy
Unit for International & Security Affairs,
Mr. Richard Lennane, Political Affairs Stockholm; Member of the Board, Geneva Office: Ida Milli, Pugwash
Officer, Secretary of the Fifth Review Swedish Pugwash Group Conferences, Geneva, Switzerland
Conference of the BWC, UN Department
Dr. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Division
for Disarmament Affairs (Geneva
of Natural Sciences, State University of
Branch), Geneva, Switzerland

Working Papers
D I S C U S S I O N PA P E R S BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS Draft Model Convention on the
Prohibition and Prevention of Biological
Is there a danger of radiological warfare?, Fact Sheet: The Biological Weapons Terrorism, prepared for the Workshop on
by Jozef Goldblat Convention (issued by the US Biological Terrorism—An International
Return to Geneva: Uncertainties and Department of State, Bureau of Arms Criminal Law Approach, by Barry
Options, by Graham S. Pearson & Control, May 22, 2002) Kellman, April 29, 2002
Nicholas A. Sims
SIPRI Fact Sheet, November 2001: “Legal Aspects of the Geneva Protocol of
On the Brink: Biodefense, Biotechnology, Biotechnology and the Future of the 1925”, by R.R. Baxter and Thomas
and the Future of Weapons Control, by Biological and Toxin Weapons Buergenthal, American Journal of
Mark Wheelis and Malcolm Dando Convention International Law, vol. 64, 1970, pub-
Follow-up after the Fifth Review “Back to Bioweapons ?”, by Mark lished by The American Society of
Conference of the BTWC, by Roger Wheelis & Malcolm Dando, Bulletin of International Law
Roffey Atomic Scientists, January/February 2003 Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity,
Escaping from the Shadow of the Future Summary Report of an informal meeting
A Draft Convention to Prohibit
over the BTWC (An agenda for the of government and independent experts,
Biological and Chemical Weapons under
future), by Jean Pascal Zanders Montreux, Switzerland, 23-24 September
International Law, by Matthew Meselson
Strengthening the BWC: What is a realis- (USA) and J P Robinson (UK), from 2002
tic inter-Review Conference strategy ?, Treaty Enforcement and International “Preventing the Hostile Use of
by Jez Littlewood Cooperation in Criminal Matters with Biotechnology: The Way Forward Now”,
Special Reference to the Chemical The CBW Conventions Bulletin, Issue
Proposed Guidelines on the Status of Riot
Control Agents and other Toxic Weapons Convention, Rodrigo Yepes- no. 57, September 2002
Chemicals under the Chemical Weapons Enriquez and Lisa Tabassi (eds.), The
Convention, by Abram Chayes, Matthew Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2002 UN Security Council Resolution 1441,
Meselson, and R. Justin Smith adopted at Security Council Meeting
“Bioterror: What Can Be Done ?”, by 4644, 8 November 2002.
Strategy for Bio-criminalization, by Matthew Meselson, in Striking Terror:
Barry Kellman America’s New War, by Philip C. Wilcox Biological Weapons: Issues and Threats,
Jr. et al., Robert B. Silvers and Barbara P.R. Chari and Arpit Rajain, eds.,
Graham Pearson slide presentation:
Epstein (eds), New York Review of Books Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies,
• The Final Declaration New Delhi, October 2002
• Return to Geneva: Uncertainties and
Options (with N. Sims)
• Topics for Future Meetings of the
BTWC States Parties
B O O K S O F N OT E
Resource Wars:
The New Landscape of
Global Conflict
by Michael T. Klare
Metropolitan Books, 2001

Pugwash Workshop:
No First Use of Nuclear Weapons
London, England, 15-17 November 2002
weapon states have discussed, hinted ever, are more prominent than ever.
Report
at, and planned for the first use of In particular, the past decade has seen
by Tom Milne
nuclear weapons for all manner of increasing concerns voiced in the US
purposes. Some of these purposes about chemical and biological wea-
The Pugwash workshop, No First have been bound up with the exis- pons, with US negative security
Use of Nuclear Weapons, was held in tence of other nuclear weapons: plan- assurances—promises that the US has
London from 15–17 November 2002 ning for a pre-emptive nuclear strike made not to use nuclear weapons
and included 29 participants from 15 in the event that nuclear war seemed against non-nuclear weapon states—
countries. The British Pugwash inevitable, for example, or preventive undermined by veiled threats of
Group also organized a public ses- nuclear war in order to destroy an nuclear response to chemical or bio-
sion at the Royal Society on 14 adversary’s incipient or developing logical attack. Secretary of State
November that included panel pre- nuclear weapons capability. Others James Baker implicitly threatened
sentations on No First Use issues have not: in particular nuclear wea- tactical nuclear retaliation to Iraqi
from Hugh Beach, Steven Miller and pons have been used to offset the use of chemical or biological
Alexander Nikitin. The Pugwash conventional forces of an adversary weapons in the Persian Gulf War;
Conferences are grateful to the at an affordable social and economic Clinton administration officials
British Pugwash Trust for their sup- cost, and to serve as a weapon of last added to the ambiguity of US policy
port of the workshop. resort in the face of catastrophic through a series of statements; and
defeat. Use of nuclear weapons has the Bush administration has gone fur-
I
t has long been argued in Pugwash also been threatened as a means of ther still, repeatedly stating that the
circles among others that until coercion and to deter chemical and US may be prepared to take preven-
such time as nuclear weapons can biological weapons attack, and tive military action to disarm adver-
be eliminated the purpose of national notions have been entertained of saries of their weapons of mass
nuclear forces should be confined to “demonstration” nuclear strikes as destruction capabilities, and in this
deterring nuclear attack. The formi- indication of a nation’s seriousness of context openly considering the first
dable political and prudential barri- intent in a developing conflict. A use of nuclear weapons to attack,
ers to any use of nuclear weapons are somewhat different proposition has among others, deeply buried targets.
obvious. Yet it remains the case that been the consideration given to the We might, of course, discuss
the governments and national secu- use of nuclear weapons for ballistic whether such nuclear policies are not
rity establishments of some of the missile defence. promoted as much by an establish-
nuclear weapon states, not least the Some of these perceived roles for ment with a vested interest in the
USA, maintain and act on the belief nuclear weapons may today have less maintenance of nuclear weapons as
that nuclear weapons serve purposes immediacy than in previous times or on the basis of objective judgements
extending beyond deterrence of have perhaps disappeared altogether. on defence strategy. But what cannot
nuclear attack and that policies of no The need for the US to provide be doubted is that, for whatever rea-
first use have been explicitly rejected. extended deterrence to Europe is an son, policies of “first use of nuclear
Over the years the nuclear obvious case in point. Others, how- weapons if necessary” are embedded

effect against chemical and biological

threats, as many would intuitively
believe to be the case, while conclud-
ing that such deterrence is bought at
too high a cost.
This was the basis of the case
made for no first use in the 1997
report from the Committee on Inter-
national Security and Arms Control
of the US National Academy of
Sciences The Future of U.S. Nuclear
Weapons Policy. Although written
from a US perspective, the report
makes a case of more general rele-
Joseph Rotblat address the 52nd Pugwash Conference. vance and formed the basis of the
workshop’s opening presentation.
Credible policies of no first use on
in military and strategic thought. second deterrent. Lesser changes the part of the nuclear weapon states,
Before “no first use” could be em- might need to be made to the nuclear the Committee argued, would signifi-
braced by the current possessors of forces of the other nuclear weapon cantly reduce a number of the fore-
nuclear weapons in a meaningful states. Moreover, the whole approach most dangers stemming from the
way, that is to say as a national secu- taken by the nuclear weapon states to possession of nuclear weapons. In
rity strategy, at least the more power- the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free particular, it would make other
ful among them would have to be world would be transformed: the nations less likely to seek to develop
persuaded that whatever the benefits logic becomes that “if no-one has countervailing nuclear, chemical or
they consider to derive from retaining them no-one needs them” and atten- biological weapons capabilities. The
the option of first use of nuclear wea- tion can turn from debating the util- risk of accidental or unauthorized use
pons should, on balance of risk, be ity of nuclear weapons to the more of nuclear weapons, or of hasty and
foregone. tractable political, administrative and foolish authorized resort to nuclear
Were the nuclear weapon states to technical issues facing deep cuts in weapons in a crisis, would also be
fully embrace no first use of nuclear nuclear arsenals and the eventual cre- reduced as a consequence of associ-
weapons then this would constitute a ation of a nuclear-weapon-free world ated changes to force posture.
highly significant step towards regime and control system. Turning the argument around, to
nuclear disarmament. Whereas the weigh the accompanying risks, the
declaration of no first use by the For and Against No First Use Committee further suggested that the
Soviet Union in 1982 saw no alter- To reiterate, for the current nuclear United States, not itself facing any
ation to Soviet nuclear weapons weapon states to adopt strategies of conventional threat, possesses con-
deployments, and was given little if no first use of nuclear weapons they ventional forces adequate to meet all
any credence by the US and NATO, a need, logically speaking, only to take of its existing security commitments
multilateral agreement on no first the view that the risks of retaining as well as to deter or respond to
use, if it were to be credible, would policies of “nuclear first use if neces- chemical and biological attack. As a
entail sweeping and substantial sary” outweigh the risks of explicitly matter of practical politics, it is more
changes to US and Russian nuclear foregoing this option. It may still be credible that the US plans to confront
deployments, with each nation need- allowed, for example, that nuclear non-nuclear threats with conventional
ing only to retain a survivable strike- weapons could have some deterrent force rather than with nuclear wea-

pons, as well as more proportionate regional situation worse. A further, subtle argument against
to the threat, and by far the prefer- Nuclear deterrence of non- no first use allows that the nuclear
able option in terms of minimizing nuclear threats was for a long time a weapon states should use whatever
the level of violence. Moreover, the controversial issue within NATO, language and confidence-building
existential threat inherent in the pos- especially in the early years when the measures they can to portray a com-
session of nuclear weapons would need for social and economic recon- plete lack of interest in using nuclear
remain a powerful deterrent to unre- struction in Europe was most acute weapons in any circumstances (that
stricted war, even in scenarios in and Western strategy was based on is, there should be no discussion
which first use of nuclear weapons early and massive resort to nuclear whatever of first use), but still resists
had been renounced. weapons. A conventional wisdom any explicit undertaking of no first
The Committee also ventured the has emerged which finds that the bal- use. The reasoning is that such under-
belief that the other nuclear weapon ance eventually struck by NATO takings fail to solve the problem of
states could be persuaded to reach avoiding nuclear war, in the sense
comparable conclusions. This may be that they can never be dependable,
plausible given a US lead. Not just on Not just on the issue of no first while at the same time risking weak-
the issue of no first use, but in the ening the one useful role that nuclear
use, but in the case of nuclear
case of nuclear disarmament more weapons may play, which is that of
generally, the other nuclear weapons disarmament more generally, the inducing caution in a crisis. Since it is
states would probably follow a US other nuclear weapons states not in dispute that the purpose of no
lead. If, however, in addition to the first use is less to seek to constrain
would probably follow a US lead.
five “official” nuclear weapon states, the use of weapons in war than to
India, Pakistan and Israel are to be constrain the deployment of weapons
considered, then while a general between conventional and nuclear in peacetime and to contribute to a
agreement on no first use would deterrence has been proven justified disarmament process, at issue here is
bring a great weight of international (“conventional wisdom” is perhaps whether and when an unwillingness
pressure to follow suit, it should still not the most apt of phrases!) and to openly and legally commit to no
be obvious that for Israel and indeed the NATO model is often first use would impede wider efforts
Pakistan, feeling more directly and invoked to support policies of to devalue and eliminate nuclear
closely threatened by potential nuclear first use applied in other con- weapons.
aggression, committing to a strategy texts. Yet as is often pointed out, and
of no first use of nuclear weapons was reiterated at the workshop, not Implementing a
might be a difficult decision to take. only does this assume both that the No First Use Strategy
Pakistan, for example, which inciden- Soviet Union had the desire and capa- The possibility of first use is, of
tally had not openly “gone nuclear” bility to invade Western Europe (if course, inherent in the possession of
at the time that the Academy study not, there were no grounds for deter- any weapon and thus it may not be
was published, might see itself as rence), and that it would not in any possible to identify a particular point
confronted with an uncomfortable case have been deterred by NATO on the de-alerting spectrum at which
trade-off between first use deterrence conventional forces and the existen- a nation can be said no longer to pos-
of more powerful Indian forces and tial nuclear threat, but it takes no sess a first use capability, nor the abil-
the need to strengthen its conven- account of the incalculable conse- ity secretly to configure one, while
tional forces at a cost the nation quences should the policy have failed, still retaining a credible strike-second
could ill-afford. Israel is unwilling to nor of the stimulus that NATO option. Nonetheless, a combination
make any explicit statement about its nuclear policy might have provided of declaratory policy, legal undertak-
presumed nuclear weapons capability to the nuclear ambitions of other ings, changes to weapon deploy-
for fear of making an already fraught nations. ments, and a general denuclearisation

of war planning, military exercises Opinions differ on the likely precon- process. Certainly there could be no
and training programmes could serve ditions for agreement on such a step, place in the arsenals for weapons such
to reduce, to a large extent, the capa- but as already suggested a serious as those currently being developed for
city and preparedness of a nation to commitment to no first use amounts attacking underground targets.
use nuclear weapons first. Indeed, to a commitment to a process of The technical launch readiness of
once a nation accepts the case for a nuclear disarmament and thus is not nuclear systems could also be relaxed
no first use strategy these changes foreseeable at the current time. As a and delays might be introduced into
become both possible and desirable first step, therefore, it might prove the decision-making process that
in order to promote disarmament, easier to secure agreement from the would authorize nuclear use. Techni-
discourage proliferation, and mini- nuclear weapon states on legally- cal means of de-alerting, which it was
mize danger of accidents. binding and unconditional negative felt should be implemented regardless
Since going nuclear in 1964, security assurances. These would of whether a nation has a strategy of
China has consistently maintained an replace the existing forms of assur- no first use, include disabling missiles
unconditional declaratory policy of ances, which as discussed have been or launch systems to add significant
no first use of nuclear weapons. weakened and undermined in recent time delays to the launch process.
Despite the lack of transparency sur- years, not just by the United States, These measures make sense whether
rounding China’s nuclear and mili- and might provide an important or not the other side reciprocates, so
tary programmes, the apparent boost to the ailing non-proliferation verification of the de-alerted condi-
restraint that China has exercised in regime. A multilateral agreement on tion, which may prove difficult in
its nuclear programme, together with “no first use of weapons of mass some cases, is not crucial.
the public positions taken by the gov- destruction” was also discussed as a A more far-reaching measure of
ernment, has over time helped to possible approach. Such an agree- de-alerting would involve separating
afford credibility to its proclaimed ment could be seen as an advance on warheads from delivery systems and
position. India has announced a simi- the current situation in that it would possibly placing warheads under
lar strategy of no first use, which was explicitly exclude the use of nuclear civilian control. Nations would
considered by many workshop par- weapons to counter conventional thereby revert to practices followed
ticipants as likely to endure even threats, but at the same time it would in the early years of the Cold War
though Indian nuclear doctrine is still legitimise the use of nuclear weapons when warheads were not routinely
evolving. Comparable undertakings in response to chemical and biologi- mated, nor necessarily co-located,
of no first use from the US, NATO cal attack, arguably already the most with delivery systems. It was the sub-
and others, or at least statements to likely route to the use of nuclear wea- sequent development of many of the
the effect that they cannot envisage pons today, in view of which most safety features designed into modern
using nuclear weapons first in any workshop participants judged that warheads and the advent of sophisti-
foreseeable circumstance, where now the idea should be strongly opposed. cated administrative controls on
they pointedly refuse to offer such a A strategy of no first use, pursued nuclear weapons that made higher
judgement, would no doubt help to cooperatively among all the nuclear alert levels possible. At the extreme,
devalue the role of nuclear weapons weapon states, should allow signifi- each side would invite the other side
in international affairs and improve cantly smaller nuclear forces, at least or sides to place observers or techni-
prospects for disarmament. on the part of the USA and Russia. cal means of verification at sites at
At a certain stage in a disarma- There would be no requirement for which warheads were stored, allow-
ment process, however, it was felt counterforce capabilities. Weapons ing them to monitor what went in
that the nuclear weapon states would designed for tactical or battlefield and what went out. Survivability of
be likely to want to move beyond operations ought also largely to be de-alerted nuclear forces would be a
declaratory statements to conclude a eliminated, in the wider context of no significant concern at all stages, but
legally-binding treaty of no first use. first use as part of a disarmament given the relatively benign interna-

tional relations needed for disarma- world’s nations. From this standpoint, nuclear weapons in China, Russia,
ment to make progress should not and because it is closely linked to the NATO, India, Pakistan, the Middle
present any insurmountable problem. objective of multilateral nuclear disar- East and Korea. The papers discuss,
mament, working towards a multilat- among other things, the extent to
No First Use and the eral agreement on no first use of which current undertakings of no
Pugwash Agenda nuclear weapons is an important first use by China and India should
Taking place at a time when the topic for continuing Pugwash atten- be expected to be resilient to political
United States is leading preparations tion, made all the more timely by the change, and possible circumstances in
for preventive war against Iraq, in emphasis on tactical nuclear first use which NATO, Russia, Pakistan and
order to disarm Iraq of whatever in current US doctrine. Israel might reconsider their present
WMD capabilities it might possess Until such time as the United policies in which the first use of
and to depose the current regime, one States might be ready to take the lead nuclear weapons is not explicitly
session of the workshop was given in pursuing a multilateral agreement excluded. Suggestions were made for
over to a general discussion of the on no first use, which seems certain potential bilateral and regional no
world political situation, including its not to be until the current adminis- first use arrangements and could be
relevance to the subject at hand. tration and any successors in kind pursued at future Pugwash meetings.
It seems that with each passing have passed from power, attention It was also noted that in 1994 China
day the greater is the disdain shown may have to be focussed on no first had formally proposed a draft Treaty
by the US administration towards the use agreements in regional and bilat- on the No First Use of Nuclear
current system of multilateral arms eral contexts. Several papers were Weapons. The draft treaty contained
control. Multilateral regimes are dis- presented at the workshop, not no guidance on implementation and
missed as serving mainly an adminis- reflected in this report but available it was suggested that Pugwash might
trative and accounting function, inef- to the interested reader on the usefully meet to elaborate some tech-
fective in the important cases of Pugwash website, setting out current nical guidelines.
recalcitrant states. Indeed the US thinking on policies of no first use of
administration appears to assign little
value to any of the major interna-
tional treaties regulating weapons of Participants
mass destruction. It seems instead
more concerned to ensure that as few Prof. Kanti Bajpai, Professor of Prof. Yuri Fedorov, Deputy Director,
International Politics, Centre for Institute of Applied International
constraints as possible are placed on International Politics, Organization and Research, Moscow, Russia
the unprecedented military and diplo- Disarmament, School of International
Dr Hal Feiveson, Senior Research
Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University,
matic power at its disposal. Scientist, Program on Science and Global
New Delhi, India
While unquestionably the current Security, Woodrow Wilson School of
Sir Hugh Beach, Member, British Public and International Affairs,
system of international arms control Pugwash Group Executive Committee; Princeton University, USA; Editor, Science
has substantial weaknesses, not least Board Member: Centre for Defence and Global Security.
Studies, VERTIC, ISIS - all London, UK
the lack of any effective means of Prof. John Finney, Treasurer, British
enforcement, it was suggested that Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, Secretary Pugwash Group; Professor of Physics,
General, Pugwash Conferences on Department of Physics and Astronomy,
Pugwash must seek to reassert, in Science and World Affairs; Professor of University College London, UK
positive and objective terms, the fun- Mathematical Physics, University of
Prof. Lawrence Freedman, Professor of
Milan, Italy; Director, Program on
damental importance of multilateral War Studies and Head of the School of
approaches to world security and Social Science and Public Policy, King’s
Landau Network – Centro Volta, Como,
College, London, UK.
verified treaty-based disarmament. Prof. Cheng Kaiyu, Researcher, China
Dr Jozef Goldblat, Vice President,
This is, after all, the point of view Academy of Engineering Physics, China.
Geneva International Peace Research
held by the vast majority of the


Institute (GIPRI), Geneva, Switzerland; Security; Member, Pugwash Council; Co- Bajpai, Kanti, No First Use in the India-
Consultant, United Nations, Geneva Chair, U.S. Pugwash Group Pakistan Context.
Prof. John (Jack) Harris, Member, British Dr Tom Milne, Member, British Pugwash Beach, Hugh, Implementation of No First
Pugwash Group Executive Committee, Group Executive Committee; Pugwash Use of Nuclear Weapons
UK Conferences on Science and World Strategy/Agreements.
Affairs, UK.
Prof. Robert Hinde, Chairman, British Boutwell, Jeffrey: The US and No First
Pugwash Group; former Royal Society Dr Harald Mueller, Director, Peace Use: Preemption Trumps Deterrence?
Research Professor (now retired) Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany.
Fedorov, Yuri, Russia’s Doctrine on the
Prof. John Holdren, Teresa & John Heinz Dr Alexander Nikitin, Director, Center Use of Nuclear Weapons.
Professor of Environmental Policy & for Political and International Studies
Feiveson, H.A., Implementing No First
Director, Program in Science, Technology, (CPIS), Moscow, Russia; Deputy Chair,
Use: The Question of De-alerting of
& Public Policy, Center for Science & Russian Pugwash Committee of Scientists
Strategic Nuclear Forces.
International Affairs (CSIA), John F. for Disarmament and International
Kennedy School of Government, and Security; Vice-President of the Russian Freedman, Lawrence, No First Use.
Professor of Environmental Science & Political Science Association; Professor, Goldblat, Jozef, NPT and the Security of
Public Policy, Dept. of Earth and Moscow State Institute of International NNWS.
Planetary Sciences, Harvard University, Relations; Member, Pugwash Council
Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA Hu Side et al., No First Use and China’s
Prof. Amnon Pazy, Professor of Nuclear Doctrine.
Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said, Mathematics, Hebrew University of
Member, Pugwash Council; Head of Jerusalem, Israel Kadry Said, Mohamed, Security and
Military Studies Unit and Technology Defense Dilemmas in the Middle East:
Sir Joseph Rotblat, Member, British The Nuclear Dimension.
Advisor, Al-Ahram Center for Political
Pugwash Group Executive
and Strategic Studies, Al-Ahram Levite, Ariel, Preliminary Reflections on
Committee; Emeritus Professor of
Foundation, Cairo, Egypt; Professor of No First Use Doctrine for the Middle
Physics, University of London, UK;
Missile Mechanics of Flight, Military East.
1995 Nobel Peace Prize Laureate;
Technical College (MTC), Cairo
Emeritus President, Pugwash Lodgaard, Sverre, Obstacles to No-First-
Mr Georges Le Guelte, Director of Conferences on Science and World Use.
Research, Institut des Relations Affairs.
Internationales Stratégiques, Paris, France Miller, Steven E., The Utility of Nuclear
Rear-Admiral (Rtd.) Camille Sellier, Weapons and the Strategy of No-First-
Dr Ariel Levite, Israel Atomic Energy Adviser, Commissariat a l’Energie Use.
Commission. Atomique (CEA), Direction des
Applications Militaries (DAM), Bruyères Mueller, Harald, No First Use: A
Prof. Liu Gongliang, Vice Chief Engineer, European Perspective.
Le Châtel, France
Institute of Applied Physics and
Computational Mathematics (IAPCM), Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Pan Zhenqiang, On China’s No First Use
Beijing, China Director, Centre for Strategic and of Nuclear Wepaons.
International Studies; Member, Raja Mohan, C., No-First-Use and
Mr Sverre Lodgaard, Director,
Pugwash Council; Member, Indian India’s Nuclear Transition.
Norwegian Institute of International
Pugwash Society, India
Affairs (NUPI), Oslo, Norway Rhinelander, John B., No First Use – It’s
Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh Time is Not Foreseeable Whatever its
Dr Saideh Lotfian, Associate Professor of
(Germany/South Korea), Member, Form.
Political Science (on leave), Faculty of
Pugwash Council; Senior Researcher, Free
Law and Political Science, University of Singh, Jasjit, No-First-Use of Nuclear
University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany;
Tehran, Iran; Visiting Iranian Fellow, St Weapons: Credibility and Consequences
President, Korean Pugwash Group
Antony’s College, University of Oxford. of Strategy.
Dr Zia Mian, Program on Science and OBSERVER Suh, Mark B.M., The Implications of No
Global Security, Woodrow Wilson School Ms Carin Atterling Wedar, Lector, First Use of Nuclear Weapons to Korea.
of Public and International Affairs, Theological Faculty, University of
Princeton University, USA. John P. Holdren gave a presentation: No
Gothenburg, Sweden First Use of Nuclear Weapons: Some
Dr Steven Miller, Director, International Introductory Remarks.
Security Program, Center for Science &
International Affairs (CSIA), Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
USA; Editor-in-Chief, International

N AT I O N A L P U G WA S H
Pugwash Netherlands
The Groningen Manifesto
Sharing the Planet: Population—Consumption—Species
F
rom 12-14 June 2002, Pugwash Netherlands called (Netherlands), Jan van Hooff (Netherlands), Frans
together a group of internationally renowned schol- Willekens (Netherlands), and Hamdallah Zedan (Canada).
ars for the Symposium Sharing the Planet: The result of the Symposium, the Groningen
Population – Consumption – Species in Groningen, the Manifesto, can be found on the Pugwash Netherlands
Netherlands, to discuss the interrelated problems of high website [www.pugwash.nl]. The Groningen Manifesto
and rising levels of consumption and population and the was presented to the participants of the 52nd Pugwash
associated problem of large losses of species. Conference on Science and World Affairs in La Jolla. The
Among the participants were Jane Goodall (UK), Anne manifesto has received attention at the World Summit on
Ehrlich (USA), Atiq Rahman (Bangladesh), Bas de Gaay Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg, where
Fortman (Netherlands), Hugo Estrella (Argentina), Eric it was broadly distributed. During the summit its issues
Ferguson (Netherlands), Bob Goudzwaard (Netherlands), have been brought forward by Jane Goodall, Atiq
Bambang Hidayat (Indonesia), Radha Holla (India), Rahman and Jan Pronk during a special parallel session on
Patricia Howard (Netherlands), Sergey Kapitza (Russia), 3 September 2002. The interconnected issues of popula-
Johan van Klinken (Netherlands), Carlos Mallman tion pressure, consumption volume and species preserva-
(Argentina), Patricia Morales (Belgium), Lucas Reijnders tion – so very basic to sustainability on the planet – will be
(Netherlands), Ton Schoot Uiterkamp (Netherlands), Phil treated in depth in a book to be published in 2003.
Smith (Netherlands), Irna van der Molen (Netherlands), For more information, contact Eric Ferguson, Pugwash
Koo van der Wal (Netherlands), Bob van der Zwaan Netherlands, at ferguson@antenna.nl
Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Members of the 1997–2002 Pugwash Council in La Jolla.

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S T U D E N T / YO U N G P U G WA S H
The Weaponisation of Space

An International Student/Young Pugwash Perspective
This article has been written by the International

Report:
Student Young Pugwash in collaboration with the Space
by Will Marshall (UK*), George Whitesides (USA),
Generation Advisory Council in support of the UN
Iole de-Angelis (France), Yuri Takaya (Japan),
Robert Schingler (USA), Paul Reilly (Ireland), Mark Programme on Space Applications (SGAC) and follows a
Lupisella (USA) position paper prepared for Working Group 2 on “Missile
Defenses and the Uses of Space”, at the 52nd Pugwash
“I do say that space can be explored and mastered with- Conference in La Jolla, USA [1]. Since then, ISYP/SGAC
out feeding the fires of war, without repeating the mistakes have been developing our position further and conducting
that man has made in extending his writ around this globe meetings with space policy experts, in particular at the
of ours. … Its conquest deserves the best of all mankind, Space Policy Summit in Houston, USA.
and its opportunity for peaceful cooperation may never
2: Why prohibit space weapons?
come again.”
—President John F. Kennedy, 12th September 1962 The arguments against space weaponisation are manifold
and pressing: weapons in space would be destabilizing,
Abstract because they increase the probability of an arms race and
Humanity has a shared interest in a peaceful future in reduce the time of weapon delivery; polluting and
space. Deploying space weapons† threatens that future. hazardous, due to their potential creation of space debris
The recent demise of the ABM treaty, the lack of a com- in Earth’s orbital sphere; counter-productive, due to their
prehensive weapons ban in existing space treaties, and capacity to inadvertently destroy other satellites, including
developing American plans to deploy space weapons com- in particular monitoring satellites required for military
bine to create an urgent situation. A new system is needed activities; inadequate, due to the enormous technical chal-
to regulate the peaceful use of space, to specifically pro- lenges to their effective use and the availability of better
hibit the deployment of space weapons, and to prevent an Earth-bound alternative measures; illegal, in their poten-
arms race in space. tial conflict with existing treaties currently in force estab-
lishing space as a peaceful zone; and immoral, in that they
1: Introduction bring the possibility of war into the boundless future of
The youth of the world are concerned about the legacy the space.
current generation will pass to them. Space weapons are These arguments may be analyzed in two parts:
particularly troubling in this context, as their deployment 1) How space weapons effect security development on
will impose an enormous burden on future generations. Earth (near to mid-term)
This burden, discussed in section 2, comes in addition to 2) How space weapons effect the future of humanity in
serious shorter-term destabilizing effects. Here we discuss space (mid to long-term)
the reasons why it is important to prohibit space weapons A great deal of the current debate on space weapons
(section 2), the urgency of such prohibitions (section 3) focuses on the immediate issue of international security.
and whether they are realistic (section 4). We also list Themes within this issue are familiar to Pugwashites: the
some recommendations for what Pugwash could do about effects of space weapons on regional and global political
the issue. stability, and on their potential to initiate an arms race

that culminates with weapons of mass destruction in orbit. been demonstrated as being operationally viable (to vary-
Many of these were presented in detail in Working Group ing degrees of success) [6].
2 in La Jolla [1]. However, it is equally critical to consider For these reasons, it is important not only to start an
the long-term ramifications of such weapons. Only by immediate international discussion on this issue, but also
considering both of these time-frames can we make an to create an appropriate international legal framework
informed cost-benefit analysis of space weapons and their and to find substitute programmes capable of gaining the
impact on human security. interest of the defense industry. Prevention is easier than
History teaches us that new strategically-important cure; we have seen the difficulties of disarming weapons of
weapons quickly become embedded into national security mass destruction on Earth once they are created and
strategies. In general, such weapons become so deeply entrenched. Our rapidly disappearing opportunity is to
embedded in the dominant political paradigm that they prevent space weapons from being deployed.
are largely impossible to remove from the strategic arena.
Nuclear weapons represent a good example with which 4: Is it realistic to prohibit space weapons?
Pugwash is familiar, and there is no reason to think that When discussing arguments in favour of preventing the
space weapons shall be any different. weaponisation of space, we firstly note that most countries
Put simply: our generation is concerned that once are against space weapons. On November 29, 2001, the
space weapons are deployed, it will be nigh-impossible to U.N. General Assembly approved by a 156-0 vote the
eliminate them. Thus, before humans expand into space, basis for a treaty establishing a permanent prohibition on
and establish the precedents of their civilization, we must space-based weapons (Resolution 56/535). The Resolution
seize the opportunity now to set up a robust legal frame- stated that Member Nations were “convinced that further
work to prevent the weaponisation of outer space. Space measures should be examined in the search for effective
weapons represent a threat not only to other space systems and verifiable, bilateral and multilateral agreements in
and the national territories of other countries, but to the order to prevent an arms race in outer space, including the
whole of humankind because of their effects on the bal- weaponisation of outer space.” Earlier, on November 20,
ance of armaments and deterrence policy. In fact, space 2000, a similar U.N. General Assembly resolution to pre-
dominance increases the technological asymmetry between vent an arms race in space (Resolution 55/32) was
countries and drives an accelerated need for strategic wea- adopted with a 163-0 vote. In addition, a joint working
pons to achieve the same deterrence effects. For these rea- paper on preventing space weapons was introduced by
sons, a treaty prohibiting space weapons is essential. China and Russia in the United Nations Conference on
Disarmament (UNCD). All of these provide an indication
3: What is the Urgency? of broad support for such an agreement at the highest
There is much critical analysis pointing to the urgency for international levels.
a treaty prohibiting space weapons [1,2]. The expiration Because of this global support, a treaty prohibiting
of the ABM treaty, and the lack of a comprehensive wea- space weapons seems quite feasible in any non-consensus
pons ban in existing space treaties, opens the door for the based forum. Unfortunately, the traditional venue for such
US to advance an aggressive space defense programme. discussions, the UNCD, is consensus based. One possible
With support from the highest levels, space weapons are solution around this problem is for a country which sup-
clearly part of the current intent of US military strategy ports the prohibition of space weapons to host a treaty
[3], representing a marked change from President conference for interested nations. This model was
Kennedy’s speech quoted above, [4]. The time scale for the followed successfully in the so-called “Ottawa Process”,
deployment of such weapons is just a few years. The inten- which lead to the successful Ottawa Land Mines Treaty.
sity of the US effort can be gauged from the large invest- As representatives of the Canadian government have
ment in the National Missile and Ballistic Missile Defense repeatedly supported a ban on space weapons [7], Canada
programmes, which have a large and critical space compo- could be an appropriate host country for such a treaty
nent in their multi-tiered strategy [5], much of which has conference.

Secondly, realistic treaties prohibiting space weapons tion against natural disasters, under international
have already been developed, such as the Space auspices).
Preservation Treaty [8], which includes necessary verifica- b. Incorporating clauses which include reporting, evalu-
tion measures. This treaty is paired with the Space ation, public examination and the passing of appro-
Preservation Act [9], proposed legislation which has been priate disputes to the International Court of Justice
recently introduced in the US Congress (H.R. 3616). (modeled on the Chemical Weapons Convention)
Together, these could be an appropriate starting point for
We recommend that Pugwash:
a treaty conference.
In analyzing the arguments of space weapons propo- 1) Initiate an 18-month working group on space weaponi-
nents, we must recognise that access to space represents a sation charged with:
major defense and economic national interest, in addition a. Establishing recommendations and a time plan for
to being the ultimate military high ground, and thus it is pragmatic steps toward the goal of preventing the
natural for military strategists to consider space weapons weaponisation of space. The recommendations
as a means to improving national security. General S. P. below should be among those considered.
Worden of the U.S. Air Force argues that space weapons, b. Drafting a treaty prohibiting space weapons.
along with information warfare, shall constitute the centre c. Convene a conference on space weapons including
of the post-nuclear deterrence paradigm for the United representatives from the military, senior politicians,
States [10]. We must acknowledge that finding a realistic scientists, academics and young people.
military strategy for the US and other major powers that 2) Initiate a campaign to unify and strengthen support for
avoids using space weapons is clearly not simple. In this the above treaty, particularly within countries whose
sense it is not realistic to think that the US will abandon the governments are moving towards the weaponisation of
policy of space dominance [11]. Even though space wea- space.
pons do not seem to address the most pressing threats to 3) Encourage scientists to withhold expertise on the devel-
national security, such as non-state terrorism, and that their opment of space-based weapons
strategic benefits will be vastly outweighed by the strategic
We recommend that International Student/Young
costs in provoking an arms race, from a military perspec-
Pugwash:
tive the short term national security gains are tangible.
4) Continue to discuss and formulate the position of youth
To arrive at an adequate and sustainable prohibition, it
on the weaponisation of space and to encourage high
is important that productive discussions continue between
level debate on the issue.
organisations like Pugwash and proponents of space wea-
5) Encourage youth groups to monitor and create public
pons. Such discussions can shape the creation of a realistic
debate on the compliance of their country to the space
future deterrence policy which avoids the use of space
treaties it has signed.
weapons and finds substitute long-term programmes capa-
ble of gaining the support of the defense industry. Towards We recommend that in the longer term:
this end, Worden also recommends that “An international
6) The UN set up an International Committee for the
regime of global, real-time monitoring could form the
Long-Range Future, initially for a period of 18 months,
basis of the new global deterrent posture”. Efforts to facil-
with the following goals:
itate dialogue and expand on strategies of this nature must
a. To rigorously analyze the relative weights of risks to
be re-doubled. This is a challenge for Pugwash.
human security in a formal scientific fashion;
5: Recommendations b. To assess future space development and security
needs on a 50 year time scale and beyond;
1) We recommend the establishment of an international
c. To research the feasibility and goals of a permanently
treaty to embody current international customary law by:
established Standing Committee on the Long-Range
a. Prohibiting the placing of primary conventional wea-
Future.
pons in space (except under the conditions of protec-

References [6] Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today, Boese, W.,
“December Missile Defense Tests Yield One Success, One
[1] Report of Working Group 2 on “Missile Defenses and the Failure”, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_01-02/mis-
Uses of Space”, at the 52nd Pugwash Conference in La Jolla, deftestjanfeb02.asp (Last accessed: 02 Sept. 2002)
USA,
[7] Canadian Position on Space Weapons http://www.dfait-
http://www.pugwash.org/reports/pac/52/52_reports_wg2.htm
maeci.gc.ca/arms/outer-en.asp; “Non-Weaponization of Outer
[2] White, Preserving Space for Peaceful Use: A Case for a New Space,” Hon. Bill Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Space Treaty, Centre for Peace Studies, University of Auckland Statement in the House of Commons, Ottawa, Ontario, 27
* February 2002.
[3] Commission to Assess United Space National Security Space [8] Space Preservation Treaty http://www.peaceinspace.com/L3-
Management and Organisation, Chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, legislation-treaty.shtml
2000, “policy is needed to direct development of doctrine,
[9] Space Preservation Act http://www.peaceinspace.com/L3-
concepts of operations and capabilities for space, including
legislation-treaty.shtml
weapons systems that operate in space and that can defend
assets in orbit” [10] S. Worden, M. France, Towards an Evolving Deterrence
Strategy: Space and Information Dominance *
[4] Kennedy, “Moon Speech” Rice University, September, 1962,
http://www.rice.edu/fondren/woodson/speech.html [11] Air Force 2025, Air University Press, Maxwell AFB, USA,
1996. http://www.au.af.mil/au/2025/ “Dominating the space
[5] Sen. Kucinich: “The stage has been set for space weaponisa-
dimension of military operations to protect US interests and
tion for some time. Since 1983, our Pentagon has spent over
investment. Integrating space forces into war-fighting capabili-
one hundred billion dollars on Ballistic Missile Defense and
ties across the full spectrum of conflict.”
over sixty billion dollars on National Missile Defense. It is
expected to spend nearly fifty billion dollars more over the * Available at http://www.unsgac.org/sgs/files/
next dozen years.” Kucinich Speech, Canadian Conference on ./Projects/Peace/MustReadSection
Unity, Sovereignty, and Prosperity, Toronto, Canada, 30th We would welcome your feedback to this article; please address
November 2002. correspondence to wsm@physics.ox.ac.uk
Earth at night. NASA photograph

I N T E R N AT I O N A L S T U D E N T / YO U N G P U G WA S H
Tahseen Basheer
A mbassador Tahseen Basheer, 77, a major figure in

Egyptian policymaking for many decades and a fre-
quent participant in Pugwash workshops on Middle East
East Studies in Cairo, and in 1995-96 he was a senior fel-
low at the US Institute of Peace, in Washington, DC.
Basheer attended more than a half dozen Pugwash
issues, died 10 June 2002 in London. workshops, beginning with the 21st Pugwash Symposium
Basheer was a senior policy advisor and spokesman for on Peace and Development in Africa, held in Cairo in
both President Abdul Nasser and President Anwar Sadat, January 1975, through to the Pugwash Workshop on
as well as Ambassador to Canada and the Arab League, Middle East Security held in Alexandria, Egypt in April
and he continued to be an influential Egyptian voice on 2001. His participation and insights were notable for their
international affairs well into the 1990s. After government warmth and wit, and his incisive analysis and humanity in
service, he was director of the National Center for Middle addressing complex Middle East issues will be missed.
George Marx
G eorge Marx, 76, an internationally renowned

physicist and an active member of the Hungarian
Pugwash group, passed away on 2 December 2002 in
Budapest. Prof. Marx was a member of the Hungarian
Academy of Sciences and the International Academy of
Astronautics, and played important roles in the fields of
particle physics, theoretical astrophysics and in bioastron-
omy. Known for his dedication to strengthening interna-
tional scientific cooperation and science education, Prof.
Marx first attended the 45th Pugwash Conference in
Hiroshima, Japan in July 1995. In February 1998, he D. Berenyi, J. Rotblat, G. Rathjens, G. Marx.
helped organize a Pugwash Workshop on Science and
Ethics, which was held in Debrecen, Hungary, with sup- Budapest marking the centenary of the birth of Leo Szilard,
port from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. This with many Pugwash members attending and presenting
Pugwash workshop coincided with a major conference in papers, which Prof. Marx was instrumental in arranging.

Pugwash Council for the 2002–2007 Quinquennium
Amb. (ret.) Ochieng Adala, of the Africa Promotion of International Science and Gen. (ret.) Dr. Mohamed Kadry Said is
Peace Forum (APFO) in Nairobi, Kenya, Peace; he was formerly Secretary General Head of the Military Studies Unit and
is former Permanent Representative of of the Chinese People’s Association for Technology Advisor at the Al-Ahram
Kenya to the United Nations in New Peace and Disarmament (CPAPD) in Center for Political and Strategic Studies,
York, former Deputy Secretary/Director Beijing, and Council Member of the Al-Ahram Foundation in Cairo, Egypt;
for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Chinese Association for International Professor of Missile Mechanics of Flight
Affairs and International Cooperation, Understanding; CPAPD, PO Box 188, 15 at the Military Technical College (MTC)
and former Ambassador of Kenya to the Wanshou Rd., Beijing, China 100036, in Cairo; Member of the Committee of
Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Tel.: (++86-10) 6827-1736 or 6821-4433 Strategic Planning of the Egyptian
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia; APFO, (ext. 8586), Fax: (++86-10) 6827-3675, Council of Space Science and Technology;
P.O. Box 76621, Tel.: (++254-2) E-mail: jifengchen66@sina.com Al-Ahram Center for Political and
574092/6, Fax: (++254-2) 561357, E- Strategic Studies, Al-Galaa St., Cairo,
Prof. Paolo Cotta-Ramusino is Secretary
mail: kilenem@africaonline.co.ke Egypt, Tel.: (++20-2) 770-5630, Fax:
General of Pugwash Conferences (since
(++20-2) 578-6037, E-mail:
Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell is Executive Director August 2002; Professor of Mathematical
mkadrym@netscape.net
of Pugwash Conferences on Science and Physics at the University of Milan;
World Affairs, former Associate Director of the Program on Science, Dr. Martin Kaplan, an American living in
Executive Officer at the American Technology and International Security, Switzerland, is a former Director of
Academy of Arts and Sciences in Landau Network – Centro Volta, Como; Research at the World Health
Cambridge, and former Staff Aide at the and former Secretary General of the Organization, and former Secretary-
National Security Council in Washington, Union of Italian Scientists for General of Pugwash (1976-88); Pugwash
DC; Pugwash Conferences, 11 Bupont Disarmament (USPID); Department of Geneva Office, 16 rue de la Voie-Creuse,
Circle, NW, Suite 900, Washington, D.C. Physics, University of Milan, Via Celoria CH-1202 Geneva, Switzerland, Tel.
20036, Tel. (++1-202) 478-3440, Fax: 16, 20133 Milan, Italy, Tel.: (**39-02) (++41-22) 919-7920, Fax: (++41-22)
(++1-202) 238-9604, Email: 5031 7277, Fax: (**39-02) 5031 7480, 919-7925, E-mail: pugwash@gcsp.ch
Pugwashdc@aol.com E-mail: cotta@mi.infn.it
Prof. Saideh Lotfian is Associate
Prof. Francesco Calogero is Professor of Dr. Lynn Eden is Associate Director for Professor of Political Science at the
Theoretical Physics at the University of Research and Senior Research Scholar at Faculty of Law and Political Science at
Rome “La Sapienza”. Formerly, he was the Center for International Security and the University of Tehran, Deputy Director
Secretary-General of Pugwash (1989- Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford of the Center for Middle East Strategic
1997), Chair of the Pugwash Council University in California, and co-chair of Studies in Tehran, and the former
(1997-2002), and a member of the the US Pugwash Committee; CISAC, Director of the Middle East Program at
Governing Board of SIPRI (1982-1992); Encina Hall, 2nd floor, Stanford the Center for Strategic Research; Faculty
Pugwash Conferences, via della Lungara University, Stanford, California 94305- of Law & Political Science, University of
10, I-00165 Roma, Italy, Tel. (++39-06) 6165, Tel.: (++1-650) 725 5369, Fax: Tehran, Enghelab Ave., Tehran, Iran, Tel.:
687-2606, Fax: (++39-06) 687-8376, E- (++1-650) 724 5683, E-mail: (++98-21) 611-2546, Fax: (++98-21)
mail: francesco.calogero@roma1.infn.it / lynneden@stanford.edu 896-9565, E-mail: slotfian@ut.ac.ir
francesco.calogero@uniroma1.it (please
Dr. Karen Hallberg is Professor of Physics Prof. Anne McLaren is Principal
use BOTH)
at the Instituto Balseiro (Bariloche, Research Associate at Wellcome
Col. (ret.) Pierre Canonne is a Lecturer in Argentina), Research Fellow at the Trust/Cancer Research UK, Institute of
Disarmament and Arms Control issues at Argentine National Council of Science Cell and Developmental Biology; a
the Univ. Marne-la-Vallés/Paris, former and Technology, a member of the Board Member of the British Pugwash Group;
Head of TDB at the Organization for the of the Argentine Physical Association, Member of the European Commission’s
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The and a member of the Bariloche Group for Life Sciences Group and European Group
Hague, former Senior Staff in the Science and World Affairs; Centro on Ethics; and former Foreign Secretary
Strategic Affairs Department of the Atomico Bariloche, 8400 Bariloche, of the Royal Society; Tel.: (++44-1223)
French Ministry of Defense, and former Argentina, Tel.: (++54-2944) 445170, 334 088, E-mail:
Negotiator, Chemical Weapons Fax: (++54-2944) 445299, E-mail: a.mclaren@welc.cam.ac.uk
Convention; 29 Avenue Danton, 43300 karen@cab.cnea.gov.ar
Dr. Steven Miller is Director of the
Langeac, France, Tel./Fax: (++33-4) 71
Prof. Pervez Hoodbhoy is Professor of International Security Program of the
77 24 57, E-mail: pmcanonne@club-
Nuclear Physics at Quaid-e-Azam Belfer Center for Science and
internet.fr
University in Islamabad; Chairman of International Affairs at Harvard
Mr. Chen Jifeng is Convener of the Mashal Books; an independent maker of University’s Kennedy School of
Pugwash Group of China; Vice President documentary films for popularising sci- Government, Editor-in-chief of the quar-
of the China Arms Control and ence in Pakistan; and an activist for peace terly International Security, and Co-chair
Disarmament Association; Executive Vice and social reform; E-mail: of the US Pugwash Committee.
President of the China Association for hoodbhoy@pierre.mit.edu Formerly, he was a Senior Research

Fellow at the Stockholm International Tohoku University, Kawauchi, Aoba-ku, 891-7701, E-mail: jasjit_singh@vsnl.net
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and Sendai 980-8576, Japan, E-mail: (or) csis_india@yahoo.co.in
taught defense and arms control studies hitohnishi@aol.com
Prof. Ivo Slaus, a Member of the
in the Political Science Department at the
Gen. Pan Zhengqiang is Professor at the Croatian Parliament, is Chairman of the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
Institute of Strategic Studies at the Parliamentary Subcommittee on Science,
CSIA, J.F. Kennedy School of
National Defense University, PLA, China, Higher Education & Technology,
Government, Harvard University, 79 JFK
a retired Major General in the Chinese President of Croatian Pugwash, a
Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138,
People’s Army, and former Director of the Member of the Club of Rome, a Fellow
Tel. (++1-617) 495-1411, Fax: (++1-617)
Institute of Strategic Studies; Institute of of the World Academy and Academia
495-8963, E-mail:
Strategic Studies, National Defense Europea, former Professor of Physics at
steven_miller@Harvard.Edu
University, PLA, China, Tel/Fax: (++86- Rudjer Boskovic Institute, and former
Prof. Marie Muller is Chair of the 10) 8283-1159, E-mail: Foreign Secretary of the Croatian
Pugwash Council, and Dean of the panzq@cgw.net.cn Academy of Sciences & Arts; Rudjer
Faculty of Humanities and Director of Boskovic Institute, Bijenicka 54, P.O. Box
Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., is a mem-
the Centre for International Political 1016, 10000 Zagreb, Croatia,
ber of The Senate of Canada; former
Studies at the University of Pretoria. She Tel.:(++385-1) 46 80 202, Fax: (++385-1)
Visiting Professor at the University of
is also a Council Member of the Academy 46 80 239, E-mail: slaus@rudjer.irb.hr
Alberta in Edmonton; Chairman of the
of Science of South Africa, and Chair of
Canadian Pugwash Group; Chairman of Prof. Fernando de Souza Barros is
the Pugwash South Africa Group;
the Middle Powers Initiative; and former Professor Emeritus at the Physics Institute
University of Pretoria, Pretoria 0002,
Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament; of the Federal University of Rio de
Republic of South Africa, Tel.: (++27-12)
University of Alberta, Edmonton, Janeiro in Brazil; Physics Institute, UFRJ,
420-2318, Fax: (++27-12) 420 4501, E-
Alberta, Canada, Tel.: (++1-780) 466- Tel.: (++55-21) 2562-7337, Fax: (++55-
mail: mmuller@postino.up.ac.za
8072, Fax (++1-780) 469-4732, E-mail: 21) 2562-7368, E-mail:
Dr. Götz Neuneck is a physicist working djroche@shaw.ca (or) fsbarros@if.ufrj.br
on international security issues and tech- roched@sen.parl.gc.ca
Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh, a South
nical aspects of arms control. He is cur-
Prof. Sir Joseph Rotblat is Emeritus Korean political scientist, is a Senior
rently Project Director of the “Preventive
Professor of Physics at the University of Researcher in the Department of Political
Arms Control and New Technologies”
London, Emeritus President of Pugwash, Science at the Free University of Berlin in
Program at the Institute for Peace
and a recipient of the 1995 Nobel Peace Germany and President of the Korean
Research and Security Policy (IFSH) in
Prize; 8 Asmara Road, London NW2 Pugwash Group. He was formerly the
Hamburg; Member of the Council of the
3ST, UK, Tel. (++44-20) 7405-6661, Fax: director of the Korean International
German Physical Society (DPG), and
(++44-20) 7831-5651, E-mail: Peace Research Institute (KIPRI) in Seoul,
Deputy Chairman of the Working Group
pugwash@qmw.ac.uk and a member of the Advisory Council
“Physics and Disarmament” in the DPG;
on Peaceful and Democratic Unification
IFSH, Falkenstein 1, D-22587 Hamburg, Acad. Yuri Ryzhov is President of the
of Korea; Schlieperstr. 12, D-13507
Germany, Tel.: (++49-40) 866077-21, International Engineering University in
Berlin, Germany, Tel.: (++49-30) 433-
Fax: (++49-40) 866-3615, E-mail: neu- Moscow; Chair of the Russian Pugwash
8574, Fax: (++49-30) 433-2896, E-mail:
neck@public.uni-hamburg.de Group; Academician of the Russian
MarkSuh@gmx.net
Academy of Sciences; former Member of
Dr. Alexander Nikitin is Director of the
the Presidential Council of the Russian Prof. M.S. Swaminathan is a renowned
Center for Political and International
Federation; and former Ambassador agriculture scientist. Considered the sci-
Studies (CPIS); Vice Chairman of the
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of entific leader of the Green Revolution, his
Russian Pugwash Committee of Scientists
Russia to France; 6 Leninsky pr., approach in pioneering “ever-green revo-
for Disarmament and International
Moscow, Russia, Tel.: ++7-095) 236- lution” is at the heart of what is now
Security; Professor at Moscow State
5066 / 9761, Fax: (++7-095) 236-1469, called sustainable agriculture. He is a
Institute for International Relations; First
E-mail: info@miu.ru past recipient of the World Food Prize,
Vice-President of the Russian Political
the Honda Award, the Ramon
Science Association; and Board Member Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, AVSM,
Magsaysay Award, the UNESCO Gandhi
of the Russian Academy of Political VrC, VM, a former veteran fighter pilot
Prize, and the Indira Gandhi Prize for
Sciences; CPIS, Prospect Mira 36, and Director of Operations of the Indian
Peace, Disarmament and Development.
Moscow, Russian Federation 129010, Air Force, is currently Director of the
He chaired the International Commission
Tel. (++7-095) 280-3441, Fax: (++7-095) Centre for Strategic and International
on Peace and Food, and is UNESCO
135-5279, E-mail: cpis@orc.ru Studies; he was Director of the Institute
Chair in Ecotechnology, and Chairman of
for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA)
Prof. Hitoshi Ohnishi is Professor of the MS Swaminathan Research
in New Delhi (1987-2001), and a
International Relations and Vice Foundation in Chennai, India; MS
Member of the National Security
President at Tohoku University in Sendai, Swaminathan Research Foundation, 3rd
Advisory Board; he has published exten-
Japan; former President of the Peace Cross Street, Taramani Institutional Area,
sively on strategic and security issues;
Studies Association of Japan; and former Chennai-600 113, India, Tel.: (++91-44)
18/803, Heritage City, Mehrauli Road,
Council Member of the Japanese Political 254 2790 / 1698, Fax: (++91-44) 254
Gurgaon-122002, India, Tel.: (++91-124)
Science Association; School of Law, 1319, E-mail: msswami@mssrf.res.in

Calendar of Future Pugwash Meetings
9–16 February 2003 ISODARCO Meeting no. 49, the 16th Winter Course:
Andalo (Trento), Italy The Surge in Nonstate Violence: Roots, Impacts and Countermeasures
12–13 March 2003 Pugwash Workshop: Avoiding an India-Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation

Lahore, Pakistan
27–30 March 2003 9th Pugwash Workshop on the Middle East

Amman, Jordan
26–27 April 2003 19th Workshop of the Study Group on the Chemical and Biological
Oegstgeest, Netherlands Weapons Conventions
16–18 May 2003 2nd Pugwash Workshop on South Asian Security

Geneva, Switzerland
22–24 May 2003 Pugwash Workshop: Preserving the Non-Weaponisation of Space

Castellón de la Plana, Spain
29 May–1 June 2003 Regional Pugwash Workshop: Towards the Solution of Economic Inequities
Bariloche, Argentina in Latin America
*15–22 June 2003 3rd Pugwash Workshop on East Asian Security

Pyongyang, North Korea
16–26 June 2003 ISODARCO Meeting no. 50: 24th Summer Course: Nuclear Weapons
Candriai (Trento), Italy in the New International Context: Hopes of Reductions and Risks of Proliferation
26–28 June 2003 Pugwash Workshop: The Social and Ethical Responsibilities of Scientists
Paris, France
16–22 July 2003 53rd Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs:
Halifax, Nova Scotia Advancing Human Security: The Role of Technology, Politics and Ethics
2–5 October 2003 2nd Pugwash Workshop on Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Como, Italy
8–9 November 2003 20th Workshop of the Pugwash Study Group on the Chemical and
Geneva, Switzerland Biological Weapons Conventions
*2004 54th Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs

Korea
* - tentative
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
President: Professor M.S. Swaminathan

Secretary-General: Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino
Executive Director: Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell
Pugwash Council
Chairman: Professor Marie Muller
Members: Ambassador Ochieng Adala Professor Anne McLaren

Professor Fernando de Souza Barros Dr. Steven Miller
Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell Dr. Götz Neuneck
Professor Francesco Calogero Dr. Alexander Nikitin
Dr. Pierre Canonne Professor Hitoshi Ohnishi
Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino Maj. Gen. (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang
Dr. Lynn Eden Senator Douglas Roche
Professor Karen Hallberg Professor Joseph Rotblat
Professor Pervez Hoodbhoy Academician Yuri Ryzhov
Mr. Chen Jifeng Air Commodore Jasjit Singh
Maj. Gen. Mohamed Kadry Said Professor Ivo Slaus
Dr. Martin M. Kaplan Dr. Mark Byung-Moon Suh
Professor Saideh Lotfian Professor M.S. Swaminathan
Pugwash Executive Committee
Chairman: Professor Paolo Cotta-Ramusino
Members: Dr. Jeffrey Boutwell Professor M.S. Swaminathan

Professor Saideh Lotfian Maj. Gen. (ret.) Pan Zhenqiang
Professor Marie Muller
Rome Office Geneva Office London Office Washington, DC Office

Accademia Nazionale 16 rue de la Voie-Creuse Flat A Museum Mansions 11 Dupont Circle, NW
dei Lincei 1211 GENEVA, Switzerland 63A Great Russell Street Suite 900
via della Lungara, 10 Phone: **41-22-919-7920 LONDON WC1B 3BJ, England Washington, DC 20036
1-00165 ROME, Italy Fax: **41-22-919-7925 Phone: **44-20-7405-6661 Phone: **1-202.478.3440
Phone: **39-06-6872606 E-mail: pugwash@gcsp.ch Fax: **44-20-7831-5651 Fax: **1-202.238.9604
Fax: **39-06-6878376 E-mail: pugwash@mac.com E-mail: pugwashdc@aol.com
E-mail: pugwash@iol.it
www.pugwash.org
For biodata and addresses, see page 107.

Pugwash Newsletter Discusses Nuclear Threat and Global Security

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Pugwash

issued by the Council of the Pugwash

The Nuclear Threat

Volume 39 Number 2 December 2002

To the Pugwash Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Pugwash Meeting no. 275 – The 10th Quinquennial Conference

REPORTS ON RECENT PUGWASH WORKSHOPS

Pugwash Meeting no. 272 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Pugwash Meeting no. 273 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Pugwash Meeting no. 274 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Pugwash Meeting no. 276 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

Pugwash Meeting no. 277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73

Pugwash Meeting no. 278 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80

Pugwash Meeting no. 279 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Thinker’s Lodge, Pugwash, Nova Scotia

2 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

52nd Pugwash Conference on

10–14 August 2002

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 3

THE 10TH QUINQUENNIAL CONFERENCE

grade uranium, which represents the

4 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

ture, medicine and other fields.

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 5

6 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

restriction of conventional arms

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 7

Most of my life has been spent in

A s you know I am stepping down

8 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 9

to this objective. Foreigners may

10 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

through the eyes of the Arabs. We

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 11

America. As a European I hope it can

12 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 13

tive nuclear capabilities down to the

14 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 15

sion at the 1997 Lillehammer confer-

16 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 17

18 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 19

mon opportunities opened up by

20 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

reinforced by the events of September

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 21

• That the US is unlikely to allow

22 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 23

lasers, trans-atmospheric vehicles,

T he Working Group on Missile

24 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 25

26 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002

Russian working paper was CBW and WMD Terrorism

Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002 27

pants repeated three major points.

28 Pugwash Newsletter, December 2002