“That the Practice of Arms is the most excellent”:

Chivalry, Honor, and Violence in Late Medieval Florence

by

Peter W. Sposato

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the

Requirements for the Degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Supervised by Professor Richard Kaeuper

Department of History

School of Arts, Sciences, and Engineering

University of Rochester
Rochester, New York

2014
 UMI Number: 3621270

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 ii

This dissertation is dedicated with love to my wife, Margaret,

on whose encouragement and support I have always been able to rely.

It is also dedicated to the memory of my father,

Carl Frederick Sposato.

iamque opus exegi…

 iii

Biographical Sketch

The author was born in Stony Brook, New York. He attended the State University of

New York at Stony Brook, graduating with a Bachelor of Arts degree in History in 2006.

He began doctoral studies in medieval history at the University of Rochester in 2006.

During the course of his studies he received the Master of Arts degree from the

University of Rochester. He pursued his research in the social and cultural history of late

medieval Florence under the direction of Professor Richard Kaeuper.

The following publications were a result of work conducted during doctoral study:

Peter W. Sposato, “Chivalry and Honor-Violence in Late Medieval Florence”, in

Prowess, Piety, and Public Order in Medieval Society: Studies in Honor of Richard W.
Kaeuper, eds. Daniel Franke and Craig Nakashian (Brill Press, forthcoming).

Peter W. Sposato, “A Local Feud in the midst of National Conflict: The Swynnerton-
Staffords of Sandon Feud, Staffordshire 1304-34,” Staffordshire Studies 19 (Spring
2010): 15-42.

Peter W. Sposato, “The Perception of Anglo-Norman ‘modernity’ and the Conquest of

Ireland,” Comitatus: A Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 40 (2009): 25-44.
 iv

Acknowledgments

This study was made possible through the help of a number of individuals who I

would like to acknowledge and to whom I remain indebted. My adviser, Dr. Richard

Kaeuper, has given new meaning to the concept of meritorious suffering, offering

guidance, sage advice, and unwavering support during my years at Rochester. I owe him

immeasurable thanks. I wish also to express my gratitude to Dr. William Caferro of

Vanderbilt University, who provided important guidance and support, especially during

my time in the archives and libraries of Florence. Thanks are also due to the members of

my dissertation committee who worked around my complicated schedule and generously

lent their time and expertise.

At Rochester I benefited immensely from the camaraderie, support, and wide-

ranging knowledge of my fellow medievalists. I wish to thank Dan Franke, Paul

Dingman, Chris Guyol, Sam Claussen, and Craig Nakashian for their friendship and

assistance at nearly every stage of this project. I would also like to acknowledge a debt of

gratitude to two of my classmates: Jeff Ludwig and Kira Thurman. Jeff has provided

steady friendship and encouragement over the years, while Kira offered invaluable help

during the arduous process of applying for a Fulbright Fellowship and during my

successful foray into the job market. I thank them both.

At the University of Rochester’s Rush Rhees Library, I received considerable

assistance from Alan Unsworth, a veritable wizard of the library sciences. I thank him for

using his magic to track down the seemingly impossible-to-find sources and for his

willingness to open the Library purse strings to purchase the latest and often esoteric
 v

scholarship. Special thanks are also owed to the folks at the Interlibrary Loan Office who

tirelessly procured innumerable articles, books, dissertations, and published primary

sources- without their invaluable work, this project would not have been possible.

I would like to thank several colleagues for their assistance during my sojourns in

beautiful Firenze. First and foremost I am indebted to Dr. Luka Špoljarić, friend and

compatriot in arms, for his encouragement and motivation, as well as for offering me

hospitality and respite in his wonderful patria. Thanks are also due to Dr. Stefano

Baldassarri of the International Studies Institute at Palazzo Rucellai in Florence for his

early encouragement and guidance, and to Marty Martoccio of Northwestern University

for the many useful conversations about our mutual interests, discussions held after long

hours spent in the Archivio di Stato and in the most conducive of locations: Florentine

enoteche.

Finally the support of my family was essential, and I thank both my parents and

my in-laws for their steady encouragement and support, particularly in view of the time

and effort it took to complete the dissertation. Special gratitude is reserved, as always, to

my wife, Margaret, whose support was instrumental in the completion of this project.
 vi

Abstract

This study examines the influence of chivalric ideas, ideals, and attitudes on the

mentality and lifestyle of the traditional warrior elite of late medieval Florence. I argue

that chivalry encouraged these strenuous knights and arms bearers to see the profession

of arms and honor as central to their identities. Indeed, for the chivalric elite, personal

and familial honor were worth more than life itself, to be asserted, enhanced, and

defended with bloody violence. Likewise, the corporate honor of the chivalric elite had to

be maintained at the point of a sword, especially against the rise of new men and the

emerging power of the popular classes in late medieval Florence. One important element

of this fight to maintain the traditional autonomy and superiority of the chivalric elite was

their monopoly on martial skills, experience, and expertise. Indeed, warfare was the

raison d’etre of strenuous Florentine knights and arms bearers, who saw battles and

skirmishes as the ultimate arena for demonstrating their personal prowess and valor, in

the process winning or losing honor.

Not surprisingly given chivalry’s valorization of violence, especially in armed

conflict over matters of honor and in the context of warfare, many contemporaries

expressed concern about the negative consequences of such violence for public order and

the common good. As a result, would-be reformers in both chivalric and non-chivalric

circles promoted certain reformative virtues, like prudence, restraint, and wisdom, which

were intended to balance out the dominant, violent tenets of the ideology of chivalry

joyfully (in the pursuit of honor and renown) or wrathfully (in the pursuit of vengeance)

employed with great effect by strenuous knights and arms bearers.

 vii

This dissertation not only studies ideas and action, but also of the mediums of

cultural exchange that facilitated the development and strengthening of chivalric culture

in Florence. One medium are the practitioners of chivalry themselves, both native

Florentine and foreign strenuous knights and arms bearers. The second are works of

imaginative chivalric literature, of both native and foreign provenance, which spread

chivalric ideas and ideals not only into and around Florence, but also throughout the

Italian peninsula.
 viii

Contributors and Funding Sources

This work was supervised by a dissertation committee consisting of Professors Richard

Kaeuper (advisor) and Thomas Devaney of the Department of History, David Walsh of

the Department of Art and Art History, and Donatella Stocchi-Perucchio of the

Department of Modern Languages and Cultures. Professor William Caferro of the

Department of History at Vanderbilt University also offered guidance and supervision.

All work conducted for the dissertation was completed by the student independently.

Graduate study was supported by a fellowship stipend from the Department of History at

the University of Rochester. Dissertation research was supported by a grant from

Rochester’s Department of History and by a Renaissance Society of America Dissertation

Research Grant.
 ix

Table of Contents

Title Page i

Dedication ii

Biographical Sketch iii

Acknowledgements iv

Abstract vi

Contributors and Funding Sources viii

Chapter 1 Chivalry and Society in Late Medieval Florence 1

Chapter 2 Chivalry and Honor-Violence in Late Medieval Florence 59

Chapter 3 Chivalry and Social Violence 139

Chapter 4 Chivalry and Warfare 185

Chapter 5 Reformative Virtues and Themes in Imaginative Chivalric 283

Literature

Chapter 6 Brunetto Latini’s Il Tesoretto- A Case Study in Chivalric Reform 347

Bibliography 373
 1

Chapter I:
Chivalry and Society in Late Medieval Florence

“Citizens in arms, proud and combative”1

I. Introduction and Overview of the Dissertation

The ideology of chivalry exercised a profound influence on strenuous knights and

arms bearers in thirteenth and fourteenth century Florence, encouraging this “chivalric

elite”, like their counterparts throughout the Italian peninsula and across the Alps, to

cultivate the profession of arms and to use violence to assert, enhance, and defend

personal and familial honor. Indeed, warfare was the raison d’etre of these warriors, who

saw warfare as an ennobling enterprise that promised the glittering reward of honor and

glory, along with other more tangible material benefits. In addition, the practitioners of

chivalry valued honor as worth more than life itself, and treated dishonor and shame as

cancers to be excised with the sharp edge and point of the sword. Since honor was

intimately connected to politics, economics, and society in late medieval Florence,

strenuous knights and arms bearers from the traditional elite also employed violence in

order to assert and defend their social superiority and their access to the reins of political

power.

Not surprisingly, the antagonistic and violent culture encouraged and exploited by

these elites led contemporaries to offer potential reforms or to take drastic action to

combat the threat posed by the practitioners of chivalry. Messages of reform came from

1
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, ed. and trans. Daniel Bornstein (University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1986), 5 [cited hereafter as Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence].
2
John Najemy, A History of Florence, 1200-1575 (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 5-6: Najemy
 2

both chivalric and non-chivalric circles, and tended to emphasize what might be called

the reformative virtues of chivalry, namely: prudence, restraint, and wisdom. More

drastic action was undertaken by the two popular governments of Florence, the Primo

Popolo (1250-1260) and the Secondo Popolo (1292-1295), which created public military

companies to combat the private military power of elite families, as well as repressive

legislation, the Ordinances of Justice (1293) aimed at preventing personal violence and

public disorder. The violent reaction of the chivalric elite to such measures is equally

unsurprising.

Outline of Chapters

My dissertation reconsiders knighthood and chivalry in late medieval Florence, a

project inherently multifaceted: the first step (the current chapter) provides an in depth

reexamination of certain aspects of lay elite culture in communal Florence. It will first

argue for a distinction between the social institution of knighthood and the practitioners

of chivalry who formed an amorphous social group termed herein as “the chivalric elite”.

Secondly (chapters two through six), it will present an original study of the influence of

chivalric ideology on the attitudes, motivations, and actions of these warriors, especially

in the context of formal warfare and other forms of martial violence, most notably honor-

violence and social violence.2 Building on the excellent recent scholarship on the general

2
John Najemy, A History of Florence, 1200-1575 (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008), 5-6: Najemy
argues that the term “elite” best describes the powerful families of medieval Florence, referred to by
contemporaries as the grandi, because they did not form a legally defined order with titles (a nobility) and
they were also not an “aristocracy”, a term which suggests long-term hegemony, nobility is applied in
many contexts in which a legal nobility did not exist (e.g.- medieval England). The flexibility of the term
“noble” in an Italian context, however, means that it is still apposite for many of the individuals and
 3

European phenomenon of chivalry and important studies on medieval and renaissance

Florence, this dissertation will advance our understanding of the chivalric elite as a social

group, as well as the nature and influence of chivalric ideology. This will serve as an

important, and necessary, corrective for the scholarship of the late nineteenth and early

twentieth century which still hold sway.3

The current chapter seeks to set the stage for what follows by reconsidering

chivalry and the social institution of knighthood in late medieval Florence. I argue that by

the late-thirteenth century membership in the social institution of knighthood was no

longer directly linked to the profession of arms or adherence to the traditional tenets of

chivarly, requiring historians to look beyond these narrow criteria to identify the true

practitioners of chivalry. Indeed, as Richard Kaeuper has argued persuasively, the

influence of chivalry was felt by strenuous arms bearers outside of the highest circles of

the nobility and social elite. Furthermore, through the influence of a series of popular

governments and the rise of a mercantile and commercial elite within the Popolo as a

whole, the social institution of knighthood took on a service, rather than an exclusively

martial character.

This first chapter will also consider the agents of cultural exchange that helped

foster and fortify the chivalric culture already extant in late medieval Florence. Two

primary mediums will be examined: the first is the significant influx of foreign knights

families considered in my study. The versatility of the term is highlighted in John Larner’s excellent study
Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch (New York: Longman Inc., 1980), 83: “The term nobility could be
applied to a wide variety of men among whom there were great disparities of wealth, status and manner of
life.”
3
John Larner makes explict (pages 127-9 in particular) the need to reexamine extent concepts of Italian
knighthood and chivalry in his article “Chivalric Culture in the age of Dante,” Renaissance Studies 2:2
(June, 1988): 117-30.
 4

and arms bearers into Italy during the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries,

often taking command of, serving alongside, or fighting against the Florentine chivalric

elite; the second is the corpus of imaginative chivalric literature, both native and foreign

in origin, which spread throughout the Italian peninsula. No doubt Florentines saw these

warriors as exemplars of chivalry so that they imparted chivalric ideas and ideals during

their considerable interaction with Florentine knights and arms bearers. Works of

imaginative literature likewise served as a crucial conduit for the spread of chivalric

ideas, ideals, and attitudes.

The second chapter of my dissertation considers the important connection

between chivalric ideology and honor-violence in late medieval Florence. Honor-

violence, which encompasses the highly contested terms and concepts of vengeance,

revenge, and feuding, was central to the identity of strenuous knights and arms bearers,

for while all Florentines felt the weight of honor in varying degrees, these men

considered honor to be worth more than life itself and thus to be defended with bloody

violence. Chapter three considers chivalry and social violence, that is, violence

perpetrated by strenuous knights and arms bearers against those lower in the social

hierarchy. Though it also involved honor, in this case the issue was the corporate honor

of the chivalric elite, which, along with their monopoly on political power and social

prestige, came increasingly under attack by the rise of new men and the centralization of

power in Florence under first popular regimes, and later a mercantile and commerical

elite. A third form of chivalric violence, warfare, is the topic of chapter four. War was the

raison d’être of a chivalric elite and thus central to the identity of strenuous Florentine
 5

knights and arms bearers, who saw the practice of arms as their primary profession.

Among the topics considered in this chapter are the treatment of prisoners

(ransom/clementia, death), mesuré (restraint), and the pursuit of honor on the battlefield

(military discipline vs. the desire for individual honor accomplished through deeds of

arms).

Chapters five and six consider another important aspect of chivalry: messages of

reform in both allegorical works and imaginative literature aimed at various aspects of

chivalric action in all of the contexts discussed in the previous chapters. Chapter five is a

broad ranging survey of reform themes prominent in contemporary works of imaginative

literature produced or circulating in late medieval Florence. Chapter six is a case study of

an important reform text, Il Tesoretto, composed by the thirteenth century Florentine

intellectual, Brunetto Latini.

II. Defining the Chivalric Elite in Late Medieval Florence

The nature of knighthood in medieval Florence has been the topic of considerable

debate since the end of the nineteenth century when scholars, led by Gaetano Salvemini,

argued both for the “democratization” or embourgeoisment of knighthood and the

incompatibility of chivalry with the dominant bourgeois environment of communal Italy.4

In the eyes of many early scholars of “Italian” and especially “Florentine” knighthood,

chivalry was utterly alien to the bourgeoisie patriciates who came to rule communal Italy.

4
For an excellent overview of the historiography and an important addition to the study of the dignity of
knighthood in late medieval Italy, see Trevor Dean, “Knighthood in later medieval Italy,” in Europa e
Italia. Studi in onore di Giorgio Chittolini (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2011), 143-155.
 6

With the question of the very existence, or at least the democratic character, of Italian

knighthood in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries at the forefront of such scholarship,

the result was often a forced schema by which knighthood was subsumed and derogated

by a wealthy bourgeois ruling class which saw the dignity of knighthood (la dignita

cavalleresca) simply as a matter of style and prestige.

As knighthood was usually closely tied in the minds of these scholars to a nobility

of feudal origins, this was seen as part of a larger process by which this feudal nobility,

established primarily in the contado, was forcibly assimilated into the ruling classes of

the cities of communal Italy. Thus, the form of knighthood that survived in communal

Italy, according to these scholars, was a dilapidated and disfigured shadow of its purer

cousin north of the Alps. While historians of the late nineteenth and early twentieth

century applied this concept, and the process that brought it about, liberally across central

and northern Italy, Florence was always touted as their first and finest example. Indeed,

Gaetano Salvemini’s watershed study published in 1896, the first and only major study of

the dignity of knighthood in medieval Florence, is a paradigm of such historical thought.5

The proponents of this view not only inadvertently conflate the social institution

with the strenuous practitioners of traditional knighthood, but they also demonstrate a

lack of understanding about the specific and flexible nature of chivalric ideology. There

have been numerous challenges to this conception of Florentine knighthood over the past

century, but while these works challenge the concept of a bourgeois patriciate and

acknowledge the pervasive practice of vengeance and other elements that I will attribute

5
Gaetano Salvemini, La dignita cavalleresca nel comune di Firenze (Florence: Tipografia M. Ricci, 1896;
Reprint: 2009).
 7

in this project to the influence of chivalric ideology and the powerful socio-cultural

forces of honor-shame, they fail to offer a complete picture of the practitioners of

chivalry or take into consideration recent scholarship on chivalric ideology itself. As a

result, much, but certainly not all, of the extant scholarship on Florentine knighthood

requires reexamination.6 Indeed, despite Salvemini’s deserved prominence in Italian

historical circles, the time is ripe to consider knighthood anew in communal Florence,

particularly in light of the abovementioned new research on the Florentine elite, on

concepts of knighthood in Italy, and on the ideology of chivalry in general.

Historiography

The logical starting points of any historiographical survey are Gaetano

Salvemini’s Magnati e Popolani and the related La dignita cavalleresca nel comune di

Firenze.7 The former is a work of extraordinary research and insight, the first real

assessment the ceti dirigenti, and the nature and course of social conflict in medieval

Florentine society during a narrow, but important period, 1280-1295. Salvemini argued

that conflict in late thirteenth century Florence was not predicated upon strife between a

Florentine commune supported by the papacy (Guelfs) and a feudal nobility supported by

the Empire (Ghibellines), but rather the competition to control civic government between

groups of local origin with shifting allegiances and local interests. The multitude of

judicial measures formulated by the Florentine government aimed at maintaining public

6
The most notable attempt to correct aspects of Salvemini’s conclusions is an excellent article by Giovanni
Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri a Bologna e a Firenze fra XII e XIII secolo,” Studi medievali 17 (1976): 41-76.
7
Gaetano Salvemini, Magnati e Popolani in Firenze dal 1280 al 1295 (Florence: Tipografia G.
Carnesecchi, 1899).
 8

order during this relatively narrow period of time highlights the unrestrained factionalism

that plagued Florence. This constitutes important and insightful analysis, yet Salvemini

had a real axe to grind and his conclusions were couched in Marxist ideas of class-

consciousness and conflict. In addition, he paid little attention to military and cultural

aspects of the conflict, focusing his attention on the economic and legal. Thus, violent

conflict in Florence appears as competition between a class of domineering rentier

magnates (consumers), and a group of popolani families who derived their wealth from

commerce and industry (producers). It is regrettable that Salvemini’s conclusions are

skewed by the imposition of such a simple dichotomy on the composition of Florentine

society and the positing of an argument heavily laden with ideology.

As mentioned above, Salvemini’s excellent study on Florentine knighthood was

the first, and remains the only, major study of the topic. Indeed his research and

discussion of the concepts of knighthood and nobility in Florence during the twelfth

century is very instructive and worth a brief look here. Salvemini argued that knighthood

was an attribute of the nobility, and social and legal privileges were accorded to

individuals because of noble status, rather than possession of the dignity of knighthood.8

As Giovanni Tabacco observed, Salvemini’s argument presupposes not only a concept of

nobility autonomous from that of knighthood, but also the existence of a nobility of blood

(a legally privileged class), of feudal origin, pre-existing the communal age.9 For

Salvemini, this closed urban nobility of blood and ancient feudal tradition came together

8
Salvemini, La dignita cavalleresca, 52: “quei privilegi son dati al cavaliere non perché è cavaliere, ma
perché è nobile.”
9
Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”, 41.
 9

first in a societas militium, a rigous association of belted knights, which served as the

custodians of the privileges of the nobility.10 Later this societas formed the “ancient

commune militum” and actively registered those who were knighted, a practice that was

picked up by the Guelf and Ghibelline parties in the thirteenth century.11 In fact,

Salvemini suggests that the commune militum served as the basis for the Parte Guelfa of

the late thirteenth century.12

Instructive, but in the end still inchoate, is Salvemini’s discussion of the origins

and framework of Florentine knighthood, an institution made up of an amalgam of

elements. Salvemini attributes knighthood’s spirit of adventure and sense of honor and

loyalty to its military origins in the feudal aristocracy of pre-communal Italy. While the

dedication to duty also had military roots, deep Christian influences were also present,

manifest in the struggle against the enemies of the Church. Finally the chivalric treatment

of women was engendered by several sources: the intimate conditions of life in medieval

castles, Christian teachings, and the social and moral ideas of the ancient Teutons and

Celts. Needless to say, Salvemini’s conception of the framework of chivalry lacks the

breadth and insight provided by the modern studies of chivalry.

In summary, Salvemini’s diligent research, based primarily upon legal and public

documents, is useful but his conclusions are tainted by the biases discussed above. The

result is an attempt to depict the assimilation of a feudal magnate class, the successors of

the commune militum, into a bourgeois elite, a process that inevitably led to the decay or
10
Salvemini, La dignita cavalleresca, 70ff.
11
Salvemini, La dignita cavalleresca, 72.
12
This argument is challenged by Davidsohn in his majesterial multi-volume study of Florence: R.
Davidsohn, Storia di Firenze, 5 vols. (Florence: Sansoni, 1956-68); See also Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”,
56.
 10

‘democratization’ of the institutions of knighthood. According to Salvemini, these

institutions gradually dissolved or were deprived of their original character and integrated

into the proto-burgher social order that comprised the ruling class in late thirteenth

century Florence. The growth of a powerful commercial class, fueled by the exponential

expansion of trade and finance resulted in the vitiation of knighthood into no more than

“a vain, external decoration, bereft of any importance whatever.”13 Surely such

conclusions need to be revisited in light of new research on chivalry, the institutions of

knighthood and the Florentine elite.

One of the primary critics of Salvemini’s scuola economico-giuridica is the

Russian historian, Nicola Ottokar. Ottokar attacked Salvemini’s oversimplified views on

class struggles in the Florentine commune by breaking down the traditional (and broad)

social categories, such as popolani or magnati, into their discrete components

(individuals and families), thus providing a fuller and more flexible picture of Florentine

politics and elite society. Ottokar sought to offer a better understanding of social mobility

and groupings, and made use of the novel methodology of prosopography in his archival

research.14 His argument was that the groups comprising the Florentine elite were so

interconnected by dense networks of business associations, marriages and neighborhood

links, that it was impossible to regard them as distinct social classes with divergent

interests. Therefore Ottokar’s most important contribution was the assertion that political

conflict in the late-thirteenth century was not shaped by determinate economic interests,

13
Salvemini, La dignita cavalleresca, 99: “una vana decorazione esterna, priva di qualsiasi importanza”.
14
N. Ottokar, Il Comune di Firenze alla fine del Dugento (Torino: Einaudi, 1962).
 11

but by constant jockeying for power within a relatively rigid ruling class. Obviously this

precludes the assimilation of a ‘feudal’ nobility into a merchant proto-bourgeoisie.

In fact, Ottokar argues that the concept of nobility was anachronistic in the urban

setting of the thirteenth century, no longer functioning, as in ancient (pre-communal)

times, as a social distinction.15 On the topic of knighthood, however, Ottokar is very

informative when he inserts thirteenth century Florentine magnates into the knightly

military tradition which stretched back to the twelfth century and the glory days of

consortiums and a vibrant nobility. Indeed, he characterizes the nature of these magnates

as “rappresentanti principali della tradizione e delle esperienze militari”, in connection

with “forze politiche in parte indipendenti dal normale regime di vita del comune”. He

also goes as far as to describe them as the “fiore della milizia” (the flower of the

communal militia), recalling the language of chivalric literature. Most importantly he

argues that the magnates were structured as a group like a consortium and supported by

fortresses and followers that stretched into the contado.16

A number of other scholars, most notably Ottokar’s pupil, Nicolai Rubinstein,

followed in stressing the limitations of a class-based interpretation of Florentine history.17

Rubinstein offered a theory of the ceti dirigenti (ruling classes) that emphasized the

consolidation of political power in the hands of a limited group, which despite the

compositional changes that occur naturally over time (e.g.- the infusion of new families),

remained fundamentally unaltered. For Rubinstein, building on Ottokar, the popolani

15
Ottokar, Il Comune di Firenze alla fine del Dugento, 54, 132ff.
16
Ottokar, Il Comune di Firenze alla fine del Dugento, 134ff.
17
N. Rubinstein, La Lotta Contro I Magnati, vol 2: Le Origini della Legge sul “Sodamento” (Firenze: L.S.
Olschki, 1939) [cited hereafter Rubinstein, La Lotta Contro I Magnati].
 12

grassi were upper-class non-magnate families who rightly belonged to the same social

and cultural milieu as those individuals and families who were legally proscribed as

magnates. The main point was that the magnates did not form a separate class, but rather

shared many economic activities and interests with the popolani grassi.

On the other hand, the fact that the only discernible criterion for determining

magnate status was knighthood is illuminating. If a particular family included a knight

among its numbers in the past twenty years, it automatically belonged among the

magnates (grandi), unless it managed to somehow avoid such proscription. This is an

important point that is expanded upon by Rubinstein- if the determining criterion for the

offending class is knightly rank and not the possession of wealth or even being of noble

stock (although nobility generally implied knighthood), knighthood must have been of

considerable importance to both the elite and the popular elements of Florentine society-

albeit for very different reasons.18 Undoubtedly the ideology underpinning traditional

knighthood, one that promoted violence, glorified private warfare, and established a

strong connection to the prerogatives (blood feud, etc.) of the nobility, was seen as

serious threat to public order in Florence.19 Rubinstein cogently asserts that the

connection found between the ancient nobility and magnates, founded on the knightly

tradition, was manifest not in external trappings or rights, but as a “sistema di vita

cavalleresca”.20

18
Rubinstein, La Lotta Contro I Magnati, 50, 55: Rubinstein argues that the magnates did not form the
entirety of the ruling class of Florence and that many of the families of the nobility of blood were not
included.
19
Rubinstein, La Lotta Contro I Magnati, 8, 49.
20
Rubinstein, La Lotta Contro I Magnati, 49.
 13

Indeed, his argument that the magnates were a social group addicted to private

violence, one that posed a serious threat to public order, is extremely useful.21 What is

implied, of course, is that those who held knightly rank (and those closely associated with

them) subscribed to an ethos (a set of ideals, behaviors, and attitudes) that constituted

through its inherent violence and recourse to private justice, a threat to the Florentine

state. In other words, the vita cavalleresca is not compatible with the peaceful pursuits of

the vita civile. Consequently, the Ordinances are seen by Rubinstein as part of a broader

European effort to restrict the nobility (i.e. the chivalric elite) from their traditional

recourse to private justice and vendetta, a stage in the growth of the authority of the

state.22 Thus rather than a class struggle between the rising popolo and an elite in

dèrogance, Rubinstein contends that this was part of the process by which the state

asserted its authority over the private individual.

Obviously his conclusions have important consequences for any effort to define

and study the Florentine chivalric elite, as he suggests a connection between these Tuscan

knights and the same chivalric ideology that was embraced by ‘true’ knights north of the

Alps. It also has a certain intellectual logic to it: the story of conflict between a popular

regime seeking through its capacity as a centralized authority to stifle the chivalric elite

and their violent lifestyle might well have read differently if the central authority had

been a chivalric king who sought to control or use to mutual advantage these same

chivalric impulses.

21
Rubinstein, La Lotta Contro I Magnati, 49, 56.
22
Rubinstein, La Lotta Contro I Magnati, 50.
 14

In terms of more recent studies, Giovanni Tabacco’s remarkable essay on

knighthood and nobility in Bologna and Florence is a work of particular importance.23 In

addition to providing useful analysis of a number of prominent historians’ conceptions of

knighthood and nobility in the form of a historiographical survey, he offers his own

penetrating insight into these important topics. On the topic of nobility, Tabacco observes

that the idea of a nobility of blood persisting into the communal age is supported by

evidence in the case of Florence and argues adamantly against a simple and linear

evolution from a closed nobility to their undoing for the profit of the Popolo. He

perceives instead a tangle of lines, without contrast between them, within a growing

entanglement on the institutional level.24 Indeed, he contends that while the term nobiles

tends to express more exactly the descent from grand (i.e. noble) ancestry/stock, the use

of the term in its social significance should be expanded to include reference to the

magnates.25

Tabacco also makes an important argument about the nature of knighthood in the

thirteenth century presenting a tripartite significance: as a military organiziation of the

commune, as a tradition of knightly lifestyle, and as a dignity consecrated by rite.26 As an

appellation, he notes how the title of knight diffused through the old knightly class

because it was comprised of lords of men and lands. According to Tabacco, the first

diffusion of knightly rites in the city of Florence is actually a reflection of the

organizational development of the nobility in the consules militum, attested in Florence

23
Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”, op. cit. n.6.
24
Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”, 55.
25
Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”, 73.
26
Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”, 56.
 15

from 1184-1236, and then again episodically in 1280.27 In the interim (1233) Florentine

law required every man of the contado to declare in front of a Florentine notary his

condition, most notably nobiles or milites. Indeed, Tabacco argues that the magnates of

the late thirteenth century were mostly descended from the nobility of the twelfth century.

Those of diverse origins used the rites of knighthood when they were already welcomed

among the magnates, thus connecting them to the same chivalric culture/ethos as those

descended from noble stock.28

Tabacco also addresses the issue of grandezza arguing that nobility presupposed

it, at least in the past of the families to which it belonged, a past to which is referred more

and more over the course of the thirteenth century. Indeed, the record of the past

constantly superimposed itself on contemporary reality. He also makes the important

point that recourse to knighthood is not a consequence of grandezza already reached, but

rather is a part of the process by which a wealthy popolo family is transformed into a

magnate family, thus is the weight attached to knighthood.29 In sum, Tabacco’s article is

critical for both its excellent analysis of past scholarship and its penetrating insight into

the topics of nobility and knighthood in Florence. As a result, it will serve as an important

building block for my own research.

Across the Atlantic among Anglophone scholars, Carol Lansing’s excellent study

of the Florentine magnates proves exceptionally useful. The Florentine Magnates offers a

comprehensive reconstruction of this social category as contemporaries understood it in

27
Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”, 59-61.
28
Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”, 71.
29
Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”, 72.
 16

the late-thirteenth century. She argues that violence was an integral part of magnate

culture, and that it was fostered by the intensity of competition between lineages and by

the contradictory nature of the lineage itself.30 Lansing astutely observes that the lineage

demanded unity of action, but failed to provide underlying unity of interests, thus

encouraging violent conflict. This violence was exacerbated by the adoption of chivalric

values by the knightly elite, the maintenance of private armies, and by the blurring of

public and private loyalties, turning family matters into civic wars. While Lansing’s study

does include some discussion of chivalry and knighthood, including an interesting

argument (channeling Georges Duby) contending that prolonged male adolescence

further intensified elite violence, she does not see chivalry as a catalyst of action or

knighthood as much more than a matter of prestige and style.31 More importantly, for

Lansing, knighthood does not imply military service.32 As a result, Lansing’s study does

not place the appropriate emphasis on the centrality of prowess (the focal point of

chivalry) to the knightly mentalité or acknowledge the chivalry’s role in the violence of

Florentine society.

Lansing’s laudable study lacks the benefit of much of the insight produced by the

modern studies of chivalry over the last decade. The scope of her study also relegates

political exiles to an afterthought, regardless of their provenance among the grandi.

Despite these shortcomings, The Florentine Magnates does provide an excellent

30
C. Lansing, The Florentine Magnates: Lineage and Faction in a Medieval Commune (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1991), 164.
31
For Lansing’s take on Florentine knighthood, see The Florentine Magnates, 145-64.
32
This generalization is one area of disagreement with this study as it excises those members of the
Florentine elite who predicated their superior social status on military service. That knightly honor in war
was crucial cannot be doubted, even in Florence.
 17

contextualized history of those individuals and families that were to be legally defined as

magnates by the Ordinances of Justice (1293), particularly their origins, structures,

collective properties and gender relations. In this regard, her study serves as an important

and useful building block for my own work.

John Najemy, one of the most accomplished Anglophone scholars of medieval

and Renaissance Florence, has exercised significant influence on the state of scholarship

in these fields.33 His challenge to Ottokar’s portrayal of a static ruling class in Florence is

based on an explication of the removal of the older elite from power in the late Duecento

by a new group of families whose power and prestige were based on wealth earned

through commerce and finance. Although a satisfactory explanation for the

transformation he describes is lacking, Najemy’s work is important for a number of

reasons, including his discussion of methodology. He rightly points out that American

scholarship on the Italian republics, particularly Florence, has been largely in the vein of

the “consensus school”, which emphasizes the role of the political culture and values of

the elite, but which fails to come to terms with the causes of political conflict.34 This is

important because my study of the knightly mentalité attempts to contribute to this effort

to discern these causes.

On the topic of chivalry and knighthood in medieval Florence, Najemy follows

previous scholars in highlighting the elite’s propensity for violence, a symptom of its

“very predilection for the courtly rituals surrounding knighthood.”35 His argument is for a

33
Of particular interest are John Najemy, A History of Florence and Corporatism and Consensus in
Florentine Electoral Politics, 1280-1400 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
34
An insightful discussion of Najemy’s work can be found in Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 20.
35
Najemy, A History of Florence, 13.
 18

gradual transformation of the dominant ethos of the ceti dirigenti, one that neatly

parallels the aforementioned transition from the old chivalric eliteto the new families of

merchant or banking origin.36 One aspect of this transition is the simple observation that

knights from elite families served in person in the communal militia in the thirteenth, but

hired replacements in the fourteenth century.37 While it is true that the number of

cavalieri di corredo (milites strenui) recorded (in this case by Giovanni Villani) fell

precipitously from 250 in 1293 to 100 in 1327 and finally only 75 in 1338,38 such

numbers overlook those members of the chivalric elitewho were in exile: in 1323 more

than 4,000 exiles took up arms in order to qualify for an amnesty declared by a Florentine

government threatened by invasion from Lucca.39

Indeed, Najemy and other historians fail to take into consideration that those elite

families who still served in person did so under great duress, a factor which certainly

caused many to hesitate or even decline to take up arms for the commune. There is clear

evidence in contemporary chronicles of these feelings of discontent and anger into the

1320s when members of the chivalric elitecomplained that while they were expected to

lead the commune in war, they were treated only as second-class citizens.40 Moreover,

their leadership was seemingly questioned at every turn, and while all enjoyed the

plaudits of victory, blame was quickly and indiscriminately placed at their feet.
36
For Najemy’s take on Florentine knighthood, see A History of Florence, 11-20.
37
The traditional view on the decline of the communal militia is reproduced by C.C. Bayley, War and
Society in Renaissance Florence: The De Militia of Leonardo Bruni (University of Toronto Press, 1961), 3:
“the decline was occasioned by the harsh lessons learned on the field of battle, the fierce inner conflicts
which divided the citizen body, the growing wealth of the community, and the pursuit of a policy of
territorial expansion which increased the duration and burden of war.”
38
Figures are cited in Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence, 6.
39
R. Starn, Contrary Commonwealth: The Theme of Exile in Medieval and Renaissance Italy (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1982), 45.
40
Bayley, War and society in renaissance Florence, 4-5.
 19

Najemy seems to adhere to Salvemini’s argument that knightly institutions fell

into decadence as a new elite replaced and only partially absorbed the old. His

concession that those “thirteenth-century elite families, both the newer lineages and the

older ones that traced their prominence back to the twelfth century, actively cultivated the

practice and culture of war, and most elite families counted in their ranks many knights”

is accordingly misleading.41 He is certainly correct in observing that the culture of

knighthood was the primary mark of distinction between the elite and the Popolo, with its

courtly ethos linking the Florentine knightly families to the chivalric world of the social

elite of the Lombard principalities in the north and the Neapolitan kingdom in the south.

Less convincing is his subsequent generalization that the Florentine elite were never a

professional warrior class, but rather were dedicated more to the most visible symbols of

their status.42 While it is certainly true that there were a large number of individuals and

families among the Florentine elite who fought only on occasion and spent a majority of

their time engaged in commercial endeavors, this does not negate the fundamental fact

that others, particularly those with lineages dating back to the twelfth century, saw

themselves not only as the natural military leaders of the commune, but as a military

class.

As I have stressed above, commerce and financial investment were undertaken by

these men only to bolster their coffers; these pursuits were never their raison d’être or

even how they defined themselves. This fact is clear both from the tendency of

41
Najemy, A History of Florence, 11.
42
Najemy, A History of Florence, 12: Najemy argues for the “part-time quality of [their]… military
activities”.
 20

contemporaries to make distinctions between “i milites di antica tradizione e i milites di

recente estrazione”.43 Also important is the general reaction of the cavalieri di antica

tradizione to these novi gente, “knights of recent extraction” (or of lowly birth) who

through the invasive power of money threatened the knightly elite’s social predominance,

forcing them to highlight a superiority garnered through a prestigious military function.

In terms of Italian scholarship in the field, one of the most recent, comprehensive,

and subsequently useful studies is that of Paolo Grillo. His Cavalieri e popoli in armi: le

instituzioni nell'Italia medievale provides a wonderfully detailed synthesis of military

developments in medieval Italy, covering a broad chronology. Grillo’s study stresses the

close connection between the military and pacific spheres: neither war-related institutions

and civic ones, nor the private and public realms were distinct in communal Italy. This is

important because Italian states possessed a monopoly on coercion, and as a result,

violence and warfare were more pervasive and persistent.

While his work offers more synthesis than penetrating analysis, Grillo on

occasion lends support to my own arguments. For example, Grillo takes issue with

imposing a simple and encompassing definition on the group of combatants who fought

on horseback. He argues that the category represented a complex amalgam of individuals,

including “i veri e propri cavalieri, dotati di destriero ed equipaggiati con armatura

pesante, ma pure i cosiddetti “berrovieri” [light cavalry]” in addition to wealthy

merchants and artisans.44 He also stresses that such historical definitions fail to take into

consideration the contemporary division, as noted above, between milites of ancient

43
P. Grillo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi: le instituzioni nell'Italia medievale (Rome: 2008), 118.
44
Grillo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi, 117.
 21

tradition and milites of recent extraction.45 This is critical as it lends credence to my own

argument that the Florentine elite cannot either be lumped together indiscriminately or

divided into two convenient and rigid groups (grandi e popolani grassi), leaving little

room for expansion, contraction, and overlap. The chivalric elitewas itself a group

comprised of various elements, and the complicated constitution of the popolani grassi is

well known.

In addition, Grillo’s study supports my own contention that political exiles are

critical to the study of the cultural milieu of the knightly elite, and that historians have

hitherto largely overlooked them. He quite rightly points out that the diffusion in the late

thirteenth century of the practice of exiling political enemies acted as a catalyst for the

growing mercenary market because it introduced a remarkable number of knights and

men with both the means and motivation to wage war on their native cities and their

respective allies.46 Fortunately, his discussion of this important group is terse and rather

than provide insight into their important role in the multitude of wars in which they

participated or discussion of a unifying ethos (i.e. chivalric), he simply states that the

fuorusciti merit further investigations.47

Grillo’s discussion of the costs and profits of war, particularly the practice of

ransom, will be of use to my own work on the treatment of ‘noble’ (i.e. knightly)

prisoners during this period. He offers interesting insight into the increasingly invasive

45
Grillo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi, 118: this differentiation was made in the Bolognese statutes of 1250.
46
Grillo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi, 144: “Anche il diffondersi della prassi di esiliare gli avversari politici
rappresentó una spinta in tal senso, poiché immetteva nel mercato del professionismo bellico una notevole
quantitá di personaggi a cui veniva impedito l’accesso all’esercito dei comuni di origine.”
47
Grillo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi, 144: “Il ruolo militare dei fuoriusciti merita ancora indagini
approfondite”.
 22

control of such aspects of war by the commune over the course of the Duecento, a

process which he links to both the growing influence of popular elements in communal

government and the greater reliance on guerrieri assoldati, particularly mercenaries.48

These two processes merit further consideration, not only because they both directly

affected the traditional province of the knightly elite, warfare. The growing influence of

the commune, under popular leadership, in the management of the army meant a

diminution of the customary role of the chivalric eliteas leaders of the communal army.

This process played a determinant role in the lives of the chivalric elitein the late

Duecento and early Trecento.

The growing prevalence of mercenaries also did not completely undermine the

traditional role of the chivalric eliteas the communal cavalry, although these men became

less inclined to serve as the Duecento wore on, both out of fear of political exile (it was

common and easy to declare individuals and families to be political enemies of the

commune and thus exiled once they were no longer physically present in the city with

their followers) and the aforementioned distaste for their precarious existence under the

constraints of the Ordinances. On the other hand, the existence of such a market meant

that those who were exiled had the opportunities to continue to utilize the skills of their

genus, often against their native cities.

This discussion leads nicely into the most intriguing section of Grillo’s study: his

investigation of social conflict and military institutions in communal Italy. The

development of the taglia, a force of 300-600 knights employed by the Guelf alliance

48
Grillo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi, 124-6.
 23

under the leadership of Florence, was an important development in the late Duecento.

Not only did it offer legitimization of a popular regime in Florence that excluded all or

part of the Florentine knightly elite, but it also introduced into Tuscany an abundance of

foreign knights.49 In addition, a climate of persistent conflict between Guelfs and

Ghibellines, both inside and outside of Florence’s walls, inextricably intertwined with

assiduous social discord as popular organizations tried to impose themselves in the

leadership of the commune at the expense of the “old elite”.50 Due to the close association

of the communal cavalry with the “old elite” (chivalric elite), these popular organizations

based themselves instead in the local societies that comprised the pedites (foot soldiers).

As a result, efforts were made by the popular regimes to control magnate (i.e. chivalric)

violence at home, to exert greater influence on the strategy and leadership of communal

armies, and to limit that of the chivalric eliteextended into the military sphere. The taglia

was one such measure, as it decidedly moved away from the traditional means of

populating a communal cavalry force by employing foreign mercenaries, and only those

Guelf knights who proved loyal and battle-tested.

Indeed, a concomitant development was the growing control of the commune in

the leadership of military campaigns. This led to a reduced desire and number of

opportunities for the martially-inclined to exercise their traditional calling. Consequently,

the chivalric elitewere hard-pressed to enrich themselves through war and found it more

difficult to earn honor through the demonstration of prowess in deeds of arms. Service on

49
Grillo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi, 139.
50
Grillo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi, 139: “si intrecciava inestricabilmente con un accanito scontro sociale
che vedeva le organizzazioni di popolo tentare di imporsi alla guida dei comuni”.
 24

horseback became an obligation in many communes, including Florence, rather than a

symbol of privilege and status, as men, particularly the knightly elite, were increasingly

disaffected with the notion of taking up arms for a commune that treated them like

second-class citizens or for causes which were not in their interest.

This leads us to the question of citizen (in particular members of the knightly

elite) participation in the communal militia during the course of the thirteenth century. As

mentioned previously, scholarship on the military history of Florence during this period

is sparse at best. Fortunately an excellent, if a bit dated, article by Daniel Waley provides

a good deal of information and serves as an ideal launching point for my own study in

chapter four.51 In addition, Jean Claude Maire Vigueur’s important work, Cavalieri e

cittadini: Guerra, conflitti, e società nell’Italia comunale, also contributes to my work on

this topic, especially his discussion of the monopoly possessed by the traditional elite on

military matters in the communal age.52

Finally, there is a limited amount of scholarship examining the development,

influence and basic framework of chivalry in its Italian context. The most notable study

in English is an excellent article by John Larner that serves as a useful blueprint for my

own work on Florentine knighthood and chivalry.53 Larner breaks with past scholarship

by insisting that chivalric culture was a major part of the world of medieval Italy, even in

the communal north. He points to the influx from France of chivalric literature and to its

51
D. Waley, “The Army of the Florentine Republic from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Century,” in
Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence, ed. Nicolai Rubinstein (Evanston, IL:
Northwestern University Press, 1968), 70-108.
52
Jean Claude Maire Vigueur, Cavalieri e cittadini: Guerra, conflitti, e società nell’Italia comunale
(Bologna: Il Mulino, 2010).
53
Larner, “Chivalric Culture in the Age of Dante”, op. cit. n.3.
 25

subsequent domestication and popularity in Duecento Italy.54 For Larner, thirteenth

century Italy was a world imbued with “aristocratic glamour in war and [courtly] love.”55

He also parallels Richard Kaeuper in many ways by stressing that while the popularity of

chivalric literature does not imply its values necessarily had potency in real life, evidence

of its considerable influence abounds.56

Despite eschewing an involved discussion of the manifestations of chivalric

values in daily life, Larner does present a convincing case by emphasizing the striking

pageantry that “colour[ed] the externals of life”, ceremony and spectacle which highlights

an obsession among the elite in particular with knighthood, even in communal Italy.57

This pageantry, and thus the influence of chivalry on Italian society in general, is

manifest in two forms: the first are the great chivalric ceremonies, such as dubbings,

tournaments, and festivals, which were common to most of Europe; the second is the

great corte, a lavish festival which was often associated with chivalry (accompanying

ceremonies of dubbing, tournaments, etc.), but could also be held for its own sake, or on

the occasion of weddings or the celebration of victories.58

54
Larner, “Chivalric Culture”, 118-9: Larner identifies three major forms of chivalric literature in Italy:
Provençal lyric (popular from the 1170s-1320s), the courtly-epic tradition of the Matters of Britain and
Rome (known in the twelfth century but widely popular from the 1240s), and the Matter of France, stories
of Charlemagne and the paladins, forming the most long-lived and popular (manuscripts dating from the
1270s).
55
Larner, “Chivalric Culture”, 119.
56
R. Kaeuper, “Literature as Essential Evidence for Understanding Chivalry,” The Journal of Medieval
Military History, 5 (2007): 1-15; 1: Kaeuper takes this a step further in effectively positing that chivalric
literature itself can provide insight into the mentalité of those who patronized and enjoyed it. Moreover, the
literature also can function as a window into a society quickly fading into the lacuna of history.
57
Larner, “Chivalric Culture”, 120. For discussion of this passion for knighthood, including a reference to a
Florentine law of 1296 forbidding attempts to knight the dead, see page 122.
58
Larner, “Chivalric Culture”, 120-4. For tournaments and other chivalric events, see Paoloa Ventrone,
“Feste, apparati, spettacoli”, in Comuni e Signorie, ed. F. Cardini (Florence: Casa Editrice Le Monnier,
2000), 393-412.
 26

Against this background of pageantry, Larner stresses the role of the heroes of

chivalric literature as “continued sources of moral reference”, an observation that pans

out in the conspicuous influence of chivalry in political writings (e.g. Brunetto Latini,

Dante’s master, wrote about the correct behavior of lo cavaliere gioioso), religion (e.g.

Fra Remigio Girolami’s distinction, while preaching in Santa Maria Novella in the early

Trecento, between the different orders of knighthood), and in life in general.59 Indeed,

many historians of chivalry working north of the Alps echo Larner’s point that the

chivalric ethos had a capacity “to express, perhaps shape, often, certainly, distort

contemporaries’ vision of themselves and the world they live in”.60 Thus, Larner’s study

serves as an excellent basis for my own work, particularly because he lends credence to

the fact that Italians in communal Italy not only thought of themselves in chivalric terms,

but also used this language in descriptions of war and violence.

Larner makes another important contribution to countering the flawed historical

perspective on Italian chivalry by addressing the flawed historical product of the late

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He identifies two sources, one medieval and one

modern, for the concept that Italian chivalric culture represents merely “some

‘Tennysonian’ nostalgia for a past world or … the embourgeoisement of ‘true’

chivalry.”61 The medieval source of such erroneous ideas is the claim of some Frenchmen

of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that Italian nobles were not truly noble or knightly,

59
Larner, “Chivalric Culture”, 124-5; cf. David Herlihy, “Tuscan Names, 1200-1530”, Renaissance
Quarterly 41:4 (Winter, 1988): 561-82; Olof Bratto, Studi di antroponimia fiorentina: Il Libro di
Montaperti (1260) (Goteborg: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1953) and A. Castellani, “Nomi fiorentini
del Dugento,” Zeitschrift für romanische Philologie 72:1-2 (1956): 54–87.
60
Larner, “Chivalric Culture”, 124-5.
61
Larner, “Chivalric culture”, 127.
 27

based upon a perception that all Lombards were cowards or that they took part in trade or

were trained in the law. Larner wonders if a French knight would have made such

statements to any of the 300 milites de corredo (fully-dubbed knights) who were to be

found in Florence in 1285.62 Larner’s corrective of the erroneous nineteenth century

perspective on Italian chivalry is even more important. He argues vehemently against the

stereotype of northern (communal) Italy as the world of the triumphant bourgeoisie, of a

Popolo dominated by burghers who had seized control of political power and social

preeminence from an elite bereft of nobility, and of rich merchants who paid for others to

fight in their stead.

This stereotype is attacked on two grounds: firstly, in the age of Dante (indeed

even more so before) every citizen, let alone the martial elite, was expected to fight for

his commune and so required an ethos which not only asserted but also valorized their

own value, both to the world and to themselves; secondly, the idea that Italian medieval

commercial capitalism was the province of bourgeois values is particularly specious.

Most of the great merchant families were ‘noble’ (i.e. elite or distinguished, if not noble)

by birth or became so through achievement and wealth. Therefore while their

involvement (to varying degrees) in the world of commerce led to the creation of a

‘nobility’ which was in many ways different from that which existed north of the Alps, it

was not by any means the dérogeance of chivalry.63 In fact, Larner argues that chivalric

62
Larner, “Chivalric Culture”, 127.
63
Larner, “Chivalric Culture”, 128.
 28

ideals and values lay behind the actions of these men and the growth of the long-distance

commerce undertaken by the commercially inclined members of the Florentine elite.64

Daniel Waley, another prominent Anglophone scholar of medieval Italy, provides

his own take on ‘Italian’ chivalry in an article focusing on the creation of knights by the

commune of San Gimignano in Tuscany.65 Again, this study proves an excellent resource

for my own work on Florence, particularly in regards to the questions Waley asks about

the nature of knighthood in this small commune. Waley’s primary concern is not to

discuss why individuals sought knighthood, but rather the motives of the commune for

creating knights. One important observation to be made from Waley’s study is the fact

that San Gimignano, and other communes, required an individual to be knighted in order

to hold civic office.66 This can be contrasted by the attitude in communal Florence, which

not only did not require an individual be knighted, but also associated knighthood with

the violence of the mores magnatum. This should highlight the uniquely ‘noble’ and elite

aspect of knighthood in Florence, albeit leaving aside those men who were created by the

commune milites popoli, one that corresponds with the general status of knights in certain

regions of Italy and north of the Alps. Indeed, one can see, even in San Gimignano, the

conflict inherent in the need to justify the acquisition of knighthood: for the honor of the

commune was preferred to the honor of the individual.67

64
Larner, “Chivalric culture”, 128-9.
65
Waley, “Chivalry and Cavalry at San Gimignano: Knighthood in a small Italian commune”, in
Recognitions: Essays Presented to Edmund Fryde, eds. C. Richmond and I. Harvey (Aberystwyth: National
Library of Wales, 1996), 39-53.
66
Waley, “Chivalry and Cavalry”, 45-6.
67
Waley, “Chivalry and Cavalry”, 46.
 29

Thus, there is a clear military element to San Gimignano’s motivation for creating

knights.68 First alliance with, and later the overlordship of, Guelf Florence (post 1269)

meant that the commune of San Gimignano was required to supply a certain number of

cavalry troops for the Guelf host. It is therefore natural that the commune would seek to

augment its cavallata (the cavalry element of the civic militia) by creating milites popoli.

While this was probably common practice in other communes, it must be noted that the

size of San Gimignano makes the conclusions of Waley’s study not necessarily

representative of the situation in a larger city such as Florence. For example, there is little

evidence of a self-aware knightly “elite” in San Gimignano, as suggested by the recourse

of “nobles” to seek knighthood from the commune.

Despite this, Waley’s study of knighthood in San Gimignano strengthens my

contention that there existed, in the midst of economic expansion and the flood of new

elite families created by the invasive power of money, a core group of individuals and

families who still defined themselves by their taking up knighthood and the

responsibilities and mores this entailed. Their absence (at least in the evidence presented

by Waley) in San Gimignano probably has more to do with the size and power of the

commune and less with the existence of such a group. More importantly, the assertion

that many communes, of varying sizes, sought to create knights to reinforce their cavalry

militias is instructive because it helps to illuminate the possible motivations behind the

creation of milites popoli in Florence. It also raises questions about tension between these

68
Waley, “Chivalry and Cavalry”, 49.
 30

men (and the popolo or commune itself) and knights from among the elite families of the

city and contado who were dubbed ‘privately’ by their peers or visiting lords.

In summary, there exists a great deal of room for my own study of Florentine

knighthood and chivalry, despite the plethora of scholarship on medieval chivalry,

including the excellent recent works of Strickland, Kaeuper, Keen, Larner and Waley.

This is particularly true in the consideration of the conduct of war and knightly behavior

in the context of martial violence. The unique situation in which the Florentine elite

found themselves and Florence's own social, political and economic importance alone

warrant such a study. Moreover, the considerable and rich source material documenting

the perpetual internal violence in the city and plethora of external wars waged by

Florentine state during this period combines with the lack of an adequate treatment of this

material to support the necessity and feasibility of my project.

Defining the Chivalric Elite

In order to successfully build on, and in some cases, offer correction to existing

studies of Florentine elite culture, it is first necessary to better define the membership of

the Florentine social group defined herein as the “chivalric elite”. The importance of this

task is enhanced by the proclivity of historians to conclude that the differences of

Florentine (and Italian for that matter) social structure precluded the existence of a

chivalric culture. While the social terrain in which Florentine (and other Italian) knights

and arms bearers operated was certainly different from contemporary French, German

and English society, it seems clear that their self-perception was not. If anything, these
 31

challenges to the traditional autonomy and superiority of these men intensified this self-

perception. I argue that not only was there a chivalric elite in thirteenth and fourteenth

century Florence, but they were the product of a vibrant chivalric culture that cut across

many of the barriers erected by social and economic distinctions. Indeed, it is this

heterogenous membership that makes it more profitable to write of a “chivalric elite”,

rather than simply a “knightly class”.69

In order to make better sense of the fluid and often utterly confused social

topography of late medieval Florence, it is useful to define the composition of the

Florentine chivalric elite as we move through our historical period, roughly 1200-1400.

The membership in the first-quarter, if not half, of the thirteenth century is much clearer

than that which follows as knights and nobles almost exclusively formed the consular

(municipal) and rural nobilities.70 Many of them also belonged to a societas militum.

69
The term ceto cavalleresco is borrowed from Italian historian Giovanni Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”, 45.
The diversity of origin of the members of the knightly class is implied by the hybrid language used to
describe them, terms which convey nobility, knighthood, and wealth: ‘magnates’, maggiori, potentes,
grandi, ricchi, boni, meliores, or ottimati (‘optimates’): see P.J. Jones, The Italian City-State: From
Commune to Signoria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 222-5. J.C. Maire Vigueur offers an
excellent definition which nicely fits with my own for the chivalric elite when he identifies the class of
milites as “those who owned warhorses and had a taste for mounted warfare, and had the resources,
attitudes and values to match”: as quoted in Dean, “Knighthood in later medieval Italy”, 145. Andrea Zorzi,
“Legitimation and Legal Sanction of Vendetta in Italian Cities from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth
Centuries,” in The Culture of Violence in Renaissance Italy: Proceedings of the International Conference
(Georgetown University at Villa Le Balze, 3-4 May, 2010), ed. Samuel Kline Cohn Jr. and Fabrizio
Ricciardelli (Florence: Le Lettere, 2012), 27-54: In the process of emphasizing the practice of vendetta and
feud across social boundaries in late medieval Florence, Zorzi implies that chivalric ideas and ideals are
limited to a class of dubbed knights: “It is beyond question that the urban militia- a militia, significantly,
open to anyone who could afford a horse, not to the chivalric class alone” (quotation from page 35). This is
a misunderstanding about the nature of chivalry that appears in many scholarly works.
70
As P.J. Jones has argued persuasively, the urban communes of the eleventh and twelfth centuries were
the creation of landlords, nobles and knights, who were forced to move into the cities to seek more stable
sources of income by the drastic economic changes which occurred during the period 1000-1250, resulting
in the fragmentation of their estates. Jones conteds that land-ownership remained the first ambition of all
urban classes into the fourteenth century.
 32

When we move into the late-thirteenth and early-fourteenth centuries, however, the

significant social mobility of the period saw changes in the composition of this group.

Examining the major social and political developments that occured in Florence

during this period also provides insight. The most important was the delineation, through

communal legislation, of a social group, the grandi (magnates), defined by its violent

lifestyle, penchant for seeking private justice, self-perceived social superiority, and close

adherence to the ideas and ideals of chivalry. Indeed, many of the individuals and

families that comprised the Florentine chivalric elite were legally defined by the

Ordinances of Justice (1293) as magnates, but my study will not be limited to this group,

despite the fact that they represent the most conspicuous adherents of the tenets of

chivalry. After all, the list produced by the Ordinances was the result of subjective

political compromise and thus does not constitute a comprehensive catalog of even those

individuals and families who were considered to be elite by virtue of their wealth,

political power, social status, and public reputation (fama), let alone of all of those who

may have adhered to chivalric ideology and the violence it promoted.71

Herein lies one of the points of distinction between previous attempts to define

and study the Florentine elite in this period and my own: many scholars impose onto the

complexities of Florentine elite society a simple dichotomy that divides the individuals

and families who were stigmatized as magnates, closely identified with knighthood and

martial violence, from those who were not, the latter being considered as a separate entity

71
For a more general discussion of fama, including outside of context of medieval and Renaissance Italy,
see the work of Daniel Lord Smail in particular, and that of the other prominent scholars featured in
Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail, eds., Fama: The Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval
Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).
 33

free from the vices of the former and engaged in the more tranquil business of commerce

and banking. For modern historians (and some near contemporaries), one consequence of

this simple dichotomy is the derogance of knighthood in Florence, and the dignity’s

increasing repugnance to the milieu of a majority of the elite. One of the major

weakenesses of such a conception of Florentine elite society is the failure to consider

those families that, despite living a similarly violent and ‘knightly’ lifestyle, managed

through luck, alliance or perceived impotence to avoid being proscribed as magnates.

These families cannot be simply explained away by arguing for a process by which they

were assimilated into the “new elite”.

Therefore, I would argue that the composition of the chivalric elite in Florence

changed in the late Duecento and early Trecento, a result of the demarcatation of this

group by the invasive power of money and the growing clout of the various corporate

bodies that comprised the Popolo. As a result four groups of fluctuating membership

came to comprise the chivalric elitein this period: 1) the magnates; 2) men from

prominent families of mercantile or commercial origins who did not simply ape the

lifestyle of the nobility, but demonstrated the marked influence of the ideology of

chivalry and the mores militium;72 3) the “grandi” fuorusciti (political exiles); and 4) the

rural nobility who are often found collaborating with the exiles. Despite the different

social origins and standings of these warriors, they were all united by the influence of

72
One thinks here of the Cerchi, Donati, Bardi, and any number of other families, although not every male
member of these families can be considered a practitioner of chivalry. For an excellent study of the
Florentine Magnates, particularly their social organization, familial strategies, gender relations, and
property ownership, see Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, op. cit. n.30.
 34

chivalric ideology, which encouraged them to treat honor and prowess, especially in the

context of war or in armed encounters in the city streets, as central to their very identity.

The latter two groups in particular represent critical elements of the Florentine

chivalric eliteand are largely absent from scholarship on knighthood and chivalry in

medieval Florence. The rural elite, many of whom were assiduous in maintaining their

feudal prerogatives in the contado well into the thirteenth century, often kept only

temporary residences in the city. Many preferred to reside in their rocche and country

estates. Indeed, the nobility of the contado were still a force to be reckoned with in the

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, despite concerted efforts made by the commune for

more than two centuries (c.1100-1300) to extend its control over the surrounding

countryside. Evidence for the continued existence of this semi-autonomous nobility can

be found in the multitude of descriptions of political exiles, particularly Ghibellines,

taking refuge in their castles, and in the accounts of war waged by Florence against such

families as the Uberti.73 In addition, one historian has highlighted the military capability

of such nobles (feudatories) and their concomitant retinues through discussion of their

service as ‘native’ mercenaries in the Florentine armies of the late thirteenth and

fourteenth centuries.74

Even more important are the fuorusciti who undoubtedly took their chivalric

mentality with them into exile from which they waged perpetual war against their native

73
For references to the maintenance of Ghibellines and Guelfs in the rural strongholds of noble families,
see Starn, Contrary Commonwealth, 30-44. Evidence also appears in the descriptions of chroniclers, most
notably Dino Compagni, cf. J.K. Hyde, “Contemporary Views on Faction and Civil Strife in Thirteenth-
and Fourteenth-Century Italy,” in Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200-1500, ed. Lauro
Martines (Berkeley, 1972), 273-307. See also C. Caduff, “Magnati e popolani nel contado fiorentino:
dinamiche sociali e rapporti di potere nel Trecento,” Rivista di storia dell’agricoltura 33:2 (1993): 15-63.
74
See Waley, “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, op. cit. n.51.
 35

city.75 These two groups represent important practitioners of chivalry, a fact that does not

escape contemporaries. Instructive in this regard is the evidence provided by Dino

Compagni, a Trecento Florentine historian, who wrote about one prominent Ghibelline

family, “For more than forty years [the Uberti] had been rebels of their homeland, nor

had they ever found mercy or pity there, remaining exiles in great estate; and they never

lowered their honor but stayed always with kings and lords and set themselves to great

deeds.”76 It seems likely that these families did not simply abandon their sense of

prominence (warranted in their estimation by virtue of their distinguished lineages,

tradition of military service, and membership in the ordo equestris) because of the

pejorative connotation attached to knighthood by the more radical elements of the Popolo

or because of a sense of the inevitable decline of the institution itself. More likely, the

institution and ethos of knighthood became even more important during their exile, for

warfare served not only as their raison d’être but represented the only means of survival.

Thus it is my intention to consider all individuals and families who may have subscribed

to chivalric ideology and shared a special and exclusive mentalité regardless of whether

or not they were involved in civic politics or if they had been forced into exile.

It is crucial to distinguish these strenuous warriors from their peers among the

mercantile and commercial elite, the buoni cittadini popolani e mercatanti, many of

75
For an excellent study of political exiles in Italy, see Starn, Contrary Commonwealth, op. cit. n.39. See
also C. Shaw, The Politics of Exile in Renaissance Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)
and L. Martines, “Political Conflict in the Italian City States”, Government and Opposition 3 (1968): 69-91
(pages 88-91 in particular). Further evidence can be gathered from the wonder, awe and, in some cases,
excitement, which accompanied the return after nearly four decades of the Ghibelline exiles in the company
of the White Guelfs in 1304: see Starn, Contrary Commonwealth, 50. Also informative is the frenzied
reaction of Ghibellines to the expected arrival in Italy of Henry of Luxemburg in 1310: Ibid, 54-9.
76
As quoted in Starn, Contrary Commonwealth, 44: I have added the italics for emphasis.
 36

whom were knights thanks to their membership in the social institution of knighthood,

but who eschewed the extreme personal violence and traditional military facets of

chivalry; these men adopted the dignity only as a symbol of status and prestige.77 This

division between the social institution of knighthood and the chivalric elite became even

more pronounced during the course of the fourteenth century as political power and

social prestige became increasingly less connected, at least in a formal sense, to the

practice of war, the raison d’etre of the chivalric elite.

Periodization

There is a temptation to divide Florentine chivalric culture into two rough stages

in order to connect changes in its character to contemporary political, social, intellectual,

and economic developments. While such an approach is useful, it denies the clear

continuity of chivalric culture throughout the entire period under consideration herein.

With that being said, it is prudent to acknowledge that the late twelfth and a majority of

the thirteenth century (up to the promulgation of the Ordinances of Justice in 1293) saw

the flowering of Florentine chivalry,78 when the chivalric elite thrived in Florence,

defined by its traditional military function, social prestige, and adherence to the ideology

77
P.J. Jones, The Italian City-State, 223: These men and their fellow popolani grassi came to comprise the
upper echelons of a “hybrid business class” formed by the “double intercourse of nobility with trade and
traders with noblilty” in which the basic division lay “between those who laboured with their hands and
those who did not”, rather than between nobles and bourgeoisie. Along side this hyrid business class stood
the chivalric elitedescribed above sharing political power and social preeminence.
78
This concept is based on an apposite phrase borrowed from Richard Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance
Florence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), 216: “when knighthood was in flower”.
 37

of chivalry.79 It must be stressed, however, that chivalric culture continued to thrive

during the fourteenth century.

One clear element of this continuity, among many examined in this dissertation, is

the persistent seriousness with which the chivalric elite took their roles as military leaders

of the commune and as strenuous knights and arms bearers. It is imperative that

historians come to see the chivalric elite saw themselves (not as the popularly-inclined

contemporary chroniclers did), as milites strenui, a nobility of arms.80 For these

individuals war was “a mode of business, of acquisition or economic pursuit… a daily

affair.”81 Indeed, when formal warfare against an external enemy, or fuorusciti, was not

to be had, these men actively practiced warlike violence in the streets of Florence and the

countryside surrounding the city. They also excelled in the time-honored use of violence

to achieve political ends, often with catastrophic results. This is, of course, unsurprising

given that a man with a great family name functioned “like a magnet: he attracted or

repelled the men and groups around him. He galvanized action, that of the regime, or that

79
This assertion is supported by the important work of Giovanni Tabacco who wrote of a “class
distinguished by a knightly lifestyle”, one formed by “groups of lords, nobles, [and] knights, who in the
contado traditionally distinguished themselves from the rural populations in a very clear way”- Tabacco,
“Nobili e cavalieri”, 60: “ceto contraddistinto da uno stile di vita cavalleresca”; “quei gruppi di domini, di
nobiles, di milites, che nel contado si distinguono tradizionalmente in modo assai netto dalla popolazione
dei rustici”.
80
Najemy (A History of Florence, 12) and Larner (Italy in the Age of Dante, 216) have questioned their
professionalism but these characterizations of the Florentine chivalric eliteas amateurs on the field of battle
are at best anachronistic and at worst misleading. While Carol Lansing acknowledges that the Florentine
elite as a whole were trained in the military arts, she mistakenly lumps together all of these individuals and
families and thus incorrectly concludes that they were all wealthy amateurs parading as knights in the
communal cavalry: see Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 154-5. Waley offers an important, if
undeveloped, corrective in his discussion of the competent participation of Florentines in the communal
army from the twelfth to the fourteenth century: Waley, “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, op. cit.
n.51.
81
L. Martines, “Political Violence in the Thirteenth Century,” in Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian
Cities, ed. L. Martines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972): 331-53 (the quotation is from page
337).
 38

of the discontented.”82 Finally, these knights undoubtedly sought to portray themselves in

stark contrast to those Florentines of the buoni cittadini popolani for whom knighthood

was mainly a matter of style, and service on horse in the communal militia often an

onerous requirement imposed on account of their wealth.

To be sure certain qualifications must be made: my argument is not that all would

be peaceful sans the influence of chivalric ideology, or that every banker, merchant, or

even aspiring knight who took up knighthood strictly adhered to the most cherished

tenets of the ideology by embracing its violent, honor-driven mentalité. But the sheer

number of strenuous knights and arms bearers in thirteenth and fourteenth century elite

families makes clear the pervasive influence in Florentine society chivalry. Also present,

if relatively untouched by modern scholarship, is a contemporary sense of membership in

an ordo equestris, of knightly fraternity capable of transcending political boundaries

across Italy. Illuminating in this regard are the May Day festivals celebrated in Florence

each year, fête strongly colored by chivalric ideology. During these lavish celebrations

the chivalric eliteperformed feats of arms for large and adoring crowds, and “no foreigner

passed Florence of any name or standing [re: nobleman or knight]” without being offered

hospitality.83 Such chivalric festivals allowed knights from different regions of Italy and

Western Europe to bask together in the glow of the “fifth of the great joys of life” (‘la

quinta allegrezza si è farsi cavaliere’), to be made a knight.84 Indeed, the movement of

82
Martines, “Political Conflict in the Italian City States”, 71.
83
The excerpt is from Giovanni Villani’s Nuova Cronica, as quoted in Trexler, Public Life, 217. For more
discussion of the May Day celebrations and other chivalric festivals, see ibid, 217-22.
84
As quoted on page 41 of Daniel Waley, “Chivalry and Cavalry at San Gimignano”. Much like their
brethren north of the Alps, this fraternity did not preclude violent and virulent conflict among its exclusive
membership.
 39

chivalric ideas, ideals, and experience across the Alps (and I would add throughout Italy)

was “particularly vivacious”.85

If knights were to be found among the buoni popolani grassi as well, this is more

a testament to the attractiveness of the lifestyle and its resonance in the milieu of the

Florentine elite, than a symptom of its vitiation. As Rubinstein cogently argues, in Italy,

and in Florence in particular, knighthood, nobility and mercantile activities were never

incompatible.86 Indeed, Daniel Waley has argued that those wealthy merchants who

regarded military service as little more than an onerous obligation still cultivated a

martial spirit.87 For example, the Black and White Guelfs heavily involved in banking

and mercantile pursuits were not slow in taking up arms against each other when their

power, honor, and prominence were threatened, thereby resorting to the same time-

honored violence some of them had deliberately sought to leave behind. In other words,

the ideals, behaviors, and attitudes that formed the chivalric mentalité could still wax

supreme in the early Trecento, even among those who had embraced an existence outside

of civil strife. More importantly, it suggests that chivalry’s influence was not restricted to

groups forced to the edges of society by their violence.

In order to understand the intercourse of knighthood and commerce on the other

side of the spectrum, we must recall the fundamental difference, in the context of the

85
Tabacco, “Nobili e cavalieri”, 78: “per quanto concerne la nobiltà cavalleresca, si può suppore che il
movimento di idée e di esperienze attraverso le Alpi si stato particolarmente vivace dal mondo transalpine
verso l’Italia”.
86
Rubinstein, La Lotta Contro I Magnati a Firenze: Rubinstein argues that mercantile activity could easily
be reconciled with grandezza and a knightly lifestyle, as it served as just one among many instruments used
by powerful families to guarantee them the economic base needed to strengthen their political and military
power.
87
Waley, “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, 99: “There is no evidence that the Florence of 1300 was
a city of soft, decadent businessmen who preferred to pay others to fight on their behalf.”
 40

chivalric ethos, between resorting to business endeavors to augment declining incomes

with the express intention of continuing to live a traditional knightly lifestyle, and the use

of such income to simply amass wealth, a symptom of the greed which contemporaries

thought plagued “bourgeois” society. The cupidity of merchants is a topic of considerable

contention north of the Alps, where knights stressed often and adamantly that such

acquisitiveness distinguished affluent townsmen drapped in the trappings of knighthood

from the chivalric largesse of ‘real’ knights, who were in many cases less wealthy. Thus

chivalry served as another means of distinguishing between men of political and social

prominence, one that is apposite to communal Italy in general, and Florence in particular.

It follows then that those who formed the chivalric elite in Florentine society

adhered to the same autonomous value system that permeated noble society across

Western Europe- they were not simply merchants and bankers who imitated the milites

strenui of England, France and Germany when leisure time permitted. As Maurice Keen

points out, “[t]he town air of… Tuscany did not make [its] nobles any less proud and

quarrelsome than the rural nobility of other lands.”88 As a result they shared with other

knights many of the principles and beliefs of the chivalric ethos, notably the right or duty

to use (and even glory in using) force to secure justice and recourse to violence (vendetta)

when honor was impinged.89

88
M. Keen, Chivalry (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 147.
89
While north of the Alps the chivalric ideology set knights apart in a strictly hierarchical society (social
status based on function), in Florence, it formed a determinate mentalité distinguishing the Florentine
chivalric elitefrom other wealthy and powerful individuals and novi gente, while connecting them to the
martial elite of other regions of Italy. See also Keen, Chivalry, 38-40. Jones, The Italian City-State, 312:
This same point is made by Jones who argues “it would be grossly wrong to visualize the nobility of
communal Italy as somehow forming at any stage an alien species, a race apart, among the aristocracies of
Europe”.
 41

Indeed, there is a clear tendency for the Florentine chivalric eliteto resort to

violence upon even slight provocation, the inevitable result of both their strict adherence

to a code of honor, and also the tenacity and irrationality with which they faced a new

world that constantly challenged their privileges and social preeminence.90 They were

also persistent in the belief that honor-violence as a form of private justice was superior

to recourse to public authority for the redress of grievances of personal insult or injury.91

Naturally, they happily embraced the traditional autonomy of the chivalric elite, a

concept that was coupled with an emphasis on honor and prestige that had to be proven

primarily through violent competition. The result was an intense competitive dimension

of chivalry that even the inclusive professionalism of the chivalric esprit de corps could

not negate.92 Honor is won everywhere, including Florence, through prowess done on

other knights’ bodies.93 Consequently, the pressure of “manly competitiveness and the

rewards it brings” raised serious concerns about the maintenance of public order in the

cramped urban space of medieval Florence.

90
Martines, “Political Violence in the Thirteenth Century”, 331-53: Martines argues (on page 337) that “the
velocity of such [economic and social] change… could not fail to affect noblemen… render[ing] them more
tenacious and irrational about their claims, prerogatives, and expectations… [t]rained to bear arms,
noblemen were ready for combat. But the critical rate of [such] historical change intensified this readiness.”
These economic changes caused considerable strains upon the rural and urban nobility, pushing many of
them to engage in mercantile and financial activities to augment declining incomes.
91
W.M. Bowsky, “The Medieval Commune and Internal Violence: Police Power and Public Safety in
Siena, 1287-1355,” The American Historical Review 73:1 (Oct., 1967): 1-17. Bowsky argues convincingly
that recourse to violent self-help was viable option for all elements of Sienese society, but clearly favored
by the elite.
92
I am particularly indebted here to Richard Kaeuper’s work on chivalry. For the existence in Italy of the
knightly esprit de corps, one need look no further than the magnificent knightly festivals held in Tuscany,
Lombardy, and the March of Treviso which demonstrated the influence of chivalry and a passion for
knightly ceremony. It seems likely that there existed an elite “society” of knights that transcended political
boundaries, as evidenced by the cosmopolitan origins of the participants. As discussed above, the
pretentious and exclusive May Day festival was closely associated with a celebration of knighthood and
elite culture- see Trexler, Public Life, 217-9.
93
Richard Kaeuper and Montgomery Bohna, “War and Chivalry,” in A Companion to Medieval English
Literature and Culture, c.1350-c.1500, ed. Peter Brown (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), 277.
 42

This concern is highlighted by the diverse measures put forth by the Popolo,

under the leadership of its more radical popular elements, to curb honor- and social-

violence.94 While this violence was only one strategy used by the Florentine elite, both its

knightly and mercantile elements, to make their significant influence felt in society and

politics, it was certainly the most troubling.95 Some families of the Florentine chivalric

elite were notorious for their arrogance, lawlessness, and propensity for violence. Many

of these families undoubtedly found themselves on the list of magnates published in 1293

or one of the later revisions. It is instructive then to examine the Popolo’s negative

characterization of these individuals and families, observations that provide an interesting

glimpse of a number of the elements of the mores militum. The following stand out: an

excessive sense of honor, a belligerent spirit, a propensity to quarrel with neighbors, the

refusal to submit economic activities to the restrictions of the Arte, solidarity with groups

having too many relatives, and excessive urgency, turbulence, and disorder in the

management of estates and life.96 In other words, although these individuals and families

94
The cramped space of the city of Florence meant that violence between elite families was magnified due
to close proximity. Moreover, the restricted space also meant that the Popolo was more directly affected by
such violence, creating particular difficulties for the Florentine elite. Whereas north of the Alps the social
equivalent of the Popolo either did not exist or were not powerful enough to challenge the elite, in Florence
wealth generated by banking and commerce made them a force to be reckoned with. Indeed, in Florence,
the Popolo can, with certain reservations, be thought of as replacing the resurgence of royal power,
experienced north of the Alps, as the champion of public peace. However, its priorities, methods and
sensibilities were conspicuously different from those of the English and French crowns- cooperation with
the chivalric elitewas decidedly subordinated to an effort to subdue these overbearing individuals and
families. For attempts to curb magnate violence in the Duecento, see Lansing, The Florentine Magnates,
164-212 and Najemy, A History of Florence, 66-88.
95
The Florentine elite, whether or mercantile or knightly persuasion, used both direct and indirect means:
physical violence in the streets combined with the less intrusive systems of clientage and patronage, and the
power of money, to allow these families to establish ties with non-elites and ultimately to control civic
government.
96
Christiane Klapisch-Zuber, “Nobles or Pariahs? The Exclusion of Florentine Magnates from the
Thirteenth to the Fifteenth Centuries,” Comparative Studies in Society and History 39:2 (April 1997): 215-
 43

might have courtly aspirations and seek to distinguish themselves through their

generosity, style, and perhaps even for some, success in business, their social identity,

like that of other knights, was firmly rooted in prowess.

Social factors need also be considered. As the excellent work of Carol Lansing

has shown, Florentine magnates organized themselves into patrilineages and sought to

control urban neighborhoods while also acquiring rural estates.97 In the late twelfth and

first-half of the thirteenth century, they dominated the physical landscape of the city from

their imposing towers and palaces and contested control of the countryside from their

castles and estates. The close proximity of warring families in the city, and the blurring of

the private and public spheres in general, therefore helps to explain the elite's

intransigence and propensity for violence.98 Another symptom of this patrilineal culture

was the creation of a large group of young men with martial training who were barred

from any adult economic or political responsibilities.99 These young men responded to

their idleness by forming brigate, or bands, which roamed the city streets and

countryside, and were easily provoked into violence. In many ways then, the city of

Florence and the surrounding country were battlegrounds between a kaleidoscope of

forces: elite families fought each other for dominion and prestige; they also battled with

burgeoning popular organizations for political power and control of civic offices; and all

230 (reference to page 226). These mores can undoubtedly be applied to the larger group of Florentine
knightly elite.
97
Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 27-107.
98
The physical landscape and layout of the city itself was an invitation to violence: see Martines, “Political
Violence in the Thirteenth Century”, 345.
99
Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 161-163: The fact that these young men from elite families received
training in arms is in itself illuminating: it suggests that families saw knighthood as a means to keep these
young men occupied, or perhaps as even a source of employment, whether permanent or temporary.
 44

the while they dealt with sharp divisions of interest within families and lineages

themselves.100

It follows naturally at this point to briefly consider the Popolo, a powerful element

in Florentine society that came increasingly to be in conflict with the chivalric eliteduring

the course of the thirteenth century. While the families that formed the Popolo were of

diverse origins and means, they were all the product of a booming economy, closely

linking town and country, which elevated large numbers of men and gave them a stake in

society.101 The Popolo are important to my study not only because most chroniclers and

social critics were members of this heterogeneous group, but also because the prominent

Popolo families, the grandi popolani (popolo grasso, popolani grassi), experienced

significant social mobility and many joined the elite, particularly in the second-half of the

Duecento.102 That is to say the chivalric elite and grandi popolani were not separated by

diverse material interests, but rather were a group of patricians characterized by a range

of lifestyles.103 Indeed, as discussed above with the ‘merchant-‘ and ‘banker-knights’, if a

number of families of mercantile or banking origin came to enjoy considerable wealth

and power during the course of the Duecento, many of these same families readily

adopted aspects of the chivalric ethos that colored the milieu of the knightly elite.

100
Martines, “Political Violence in the Thirteenth Century,” 339: Martines lists three primary causes of
political violence in the thirteenth century: class conflict over political power, the steadfast allegiance of the
chivalric eliteto family and faction, and the economic strain which pushed many noblemen into war.
101
Ibid, 335: Martines argues that by the second or third decade of the thirteenth century, the decisive
struggle was characterized by the growing tensions between privilege and institutionalized disadvantage:
between those who had political power and those who could realistically aspire to it, but had little or none.
102
The dominance in contemporary chronicles of the perspective of the Popolo may explain why historians
have found it so difficult to study the chivalric elitein their element, war.
103
Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 145.
 45

It is important not to generalize, however, as the Popolo was comprised of more

than just wealthy bankers and merchants. The amorphous institution itself came

increasingly under the influence of more popular and radical elements over the course of

the thirteenth century. These men were adamant in their vituperative condemnation of

knightly violence and faction, and unlikely to express admiration for an elite culture that

demanded their deference and rained violence down upon them. Accompanying this

castigation was a popular denouncement of the immorality of the knightly or magnate

lifestyle, a point emphasized by contemporaries and modern historians alike. While such

censure is surely warranted, the chivalric code did not make moral distinctions: a knight

who demonstrates prowess in search of honor is recognized as a man of chivalry by his

peers, whether or not he was a good man.104 Thus much of the tension present elsewhere

in medieval Europe is clearly palpable in Florence: there is a need for violence, but only

if practiced by the 'right' parties. The complexity of the Florentine situation stems from

the mutability of who constitutes the ‘right’ party. After all the legitimacy of violence is

determined by the government, or more specifically for Italy, by the political group that

controls it at any given time.105 Thus the same violent act may be deemed licit or illicit,

depending on the perspective of the controlling interests.

It is also useful to examine communal Italy on a more general level because the

complex socio-political landscape in this region undoubtedly produced conditions

104
Lauro Martines, “Introduction: The Historical Approach to Violence,” in Violence and Civil Disorder in
Italian Cities, 1200-1500, ed. L. Martines (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 3-18: Martines
argues (particularly on page 13) that the historian of violence’s “readiness to strike spontaneous moral
attitudes, as in his abhorrence of violent men, should give him pause when he takes up the study of
violence”- a scholar should not express judgment on the morality of his or her subjects, but must
“continually reexamine and challenge his [or her] hidden or unconscious presuppositions.”
105
See the excellent discussion in Martines, “Political Violence in the Thirteenth Century”, 348-51.
 46

conducive to martial violence. Newly minted communes faced both internal and external

struggles: conflict and competition between the multiple and diverse corporate bodies

that formed civic society (in Florence: the societa of knights and merchants (Calimala),

as well as other popular organizations) could tear a city apart as they vied to control

communal government. The inadequacy of communal justice, a symptom of weak central

authority, exacerbated conflict and disorder. In addition, civic government had to contest

with rural secular and ecclesiastical lordships, as well as smaller towns for control of the

contado. The countryside supplied critical foodstuffs and resources, as well as serving as

a safe haven for exiles and other malcontents who sought to challenge the commune’s

authority. Indeed, a land such as Italy, characterized by the predominance of noble

consorterie (alliances of knights and their families), the existence of an entrenched rural

nobility with little interest in civic politics, the prevalence of feuding within cities and

constant warfare between communes, lends itself perfectly to an examination of the

influence and impact of chivalry in a society pervaded by martial violence.

The generally intermittent, but occasionally intense, involvement in communal

Italy of the papacy and the Empire undoubtedly exacerbated the virulent factional conflict

and disorder that fermented in the cities and countryside. Florence, as one of the

wealthiest, most capable and outspoken powers in Italy, served as a focal point of both

resistance and support for these external powers. Therefore, the intervention of these

external forces also meant that both foreign notables and mercenary companies in their

employ regularly traversed the Tuscan countryside from the 1260s onward and interacted

with Florentine knights. This is important because such interactions undoubtedly led to
 47

the interchange of chivalric values, behaviors and ideas between these foreign knights

and their Florentine counterparts.

Finally, a note on chronology: the period chosen represents a particularly

important time in the history of medieval Italy. It was during this period that the

communes of northern Italy experienced significant institutional development, partly in

response to the expanding influence and authority of these cities into their respective

contado and partly the result of conflict between corporate bodies vying for control of

civic government. Expansion into the contado required increasingly complex institutions

in order to subdue, administer, defend, and exploit the countryside. More importantly,

this was an era characterized by the struggle between the Guelfs and Ghibellines, a

conflict with pan-European implications, but one that was fought almost entirely on the

Italian peninsula. The conflict itself was theoretically predicated on support for either the

Hohenstaufen house (Empire) or the Papal-Angevin cause, leading to decisive divisions

among the elite. In practice, these divisions tended to be along lines of local interests and

previous familial alliances.

III. Agents of Cultural Exchange

Chivalric ideas, attitudes, and ideals circulated around the Italian peninsula

through a variety of means. The Florentine chivalric elite, strenuous knights and arms

bearers, interacted extensively with a multitude of foreign and native “Italian” warriors,

many of whom enjoyed distinguished martial reputations and were practitioners of

chivalry in their own kingdoms. In addition, the Florentine chivalric elite consumed
 48

works of imaginative chivalric literature, perhaps the ultimate conduit of the ideology of

chivalry. Indeed, a large corpus of prose romances, chanson de geste, and epics, of both

native and foreign provenance, were available and popular in late medieval Florence.

Circulation of Warriors

The city of Florence in the thirteen and fourteenth centuries was a hub of chivalric

culture, playing host to numerous warriors from lands across Europe and the

Mediterranean. As a result of their presence, Florentine knights and arms bearers

interacted extensively, both on the field of battle and off, with these strenuous warriors.

In fact, according to contemporary and near-contemporary chroniclers like Dino

Compagni, the Villani, and Leonardo Bruni, Florentine knights and arms interacted on

many levels with some of the foremost knights and military experts of the thirteenth and

fourteenth centuries.

Examples of important personages abound, but perhaps chief among them was

King Charles I of Naples (r.1266-1285) and those of his dynasty who supplied Florence

with important leadership and strenuous warriors from roughly 1266 until the death of

King Robert in 1343.106 Contemporary descriptions of Charles reveal the high esteem in

which he was held, and it is noteworthy that these descriptions take on a distinctly

chivalric character. Villani described Charles as “wise, prudent in counsel and valiant in

arms… steadfast in carying out every great undertaking, firm in every adversity…

106
Franco Cardini, L’acciar de’ cavalieri: studi sulla cavalleria nel mondo Toscano (Florence: Le Lettere,
1997), 98: Cardini argues that Angevin Naples was the primary source of chivalric texts and practices in
late medieval Florence.
 49

speaking little and acting much… liberal was he to knights in arms, but greedy in

acquiring land and lordship… to furnish means for his enterprises and wars” and “a bold

and courageous lord, prepared to pass without any regard to the lying-in-wait of his

enemies”.107 There can be little doubt that Charles served as a model for Florentine

knights and arms bearers, sometimes quite literally, as in 1265 when he “str[uck] into the

battle [against Manfred of Sicily]”, for Villani writes he was followed “boldy [by the

Florentines, who] performed marvellous feats of arms that day”.108 Bruni likewise singled

Charles out as “a king outstanding for his military experience, a man to be compared with

the greatest commanders”, but tempered this high praise with the same criticism he

leveled at the practitioners of traditional chivalry: while he was “unquestionably a

distinguished man, [he was] far more able in the arts of war than in those of peace”.109

Charles’s grandson Robert, King of Naples (r.1309-1343) was also the recepient

of praise from Bruni, who called him an “outstandingly gifted youth of great promise”

who traveled in the company of “noblemen and elite warriors”.110 Villani meanwhile

praised Robert’s great personal prowess and bravery, which he demonstrated on

numerous occasions, including a battle against the Ghibelline exiles of Genoa and their

107
Giovanni Villani, ed. G.E. Sansone (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 2003), 255: “Ma il detto
Carlo, come franco e ardito signore, si mise a passare, non guardando agli aguati de’ suoi nimici” [cited
hereafter as Villani].
108
Villani, 262: “E i’l buono re Carlo veggendo i suoi così malmenare, non tenne l’ordine della battaglia di
difendersi colla seconda schiera, avisandosi che se la prima schiera de’ Franceschi ove avea tutta sua
fidanza fosse rotta, piccola speranza di salute attendea dell’altre; incontanente colla sua schiera si mise al
soccorso della schiera de’ Franceschi contro a quella de’ Tedeschi; e come gli usciti di Firenze e loro
schiera vidono lo re Carlo fedire alla battaglia, si misono appresso francamente, e feciono maravigliose
cose d’arme il giorno, seguendo sempre la persona del re Carlo”.
109
Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, ed. and trans. James Hankins (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 2001), 311.
110
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 439. For an excellent study of the life and reign of
King Robert of Naples, see Samantha Kelly, The New Solomon: Robert of Naples (1309-1343) and
Fourteenth-Century Kingship (Leiden: Brill Press, 2003).
 50

Lombard allies, during which he led by example from the front lines.111 Likewise,

Robert’s youngest son Messer Piero, who was sent to Florence to serve as captain of war

in 1314, is praised by Villani as “very young and courteous and wise and handsome”,112

while Robert’s brother, Duke Philip of Taranto, also led in 1315 the Florentine forces

against Uguccione della Faggiuola (d.1319), the Ghibelline lord of Pisa, Lucca and

Forli.113

In addition to the great lords of the Angevin dynasty in Naples, the Florentine

warrior elite also served alongside many other important military figures who sought to

hone and utilize their military skills in the many wars that plagued late medieval Italy.

One foreign knight of note is Bernardone della Serra Guascone (d.1412), a strenuous

warrior and military captain from the Aquitaine in southern France who served Florence

twice in the late-fourteenth century (1396-1398, 1399-1402) and was, according to Bruni,

“known throughout Italy thanks to his long military career here”.114 Indeed, Bernardone

made a considerable impression upon the Florentines not only through his leadership and

bravery,115 but also his touchy sense of honor and propreity (telltale characteristics of

111
Villani, 513: “onde il re in persona s’armò con tutta sua gente, e con gran vigore affrontandosi in su le
mura rovinate colle spade in mano, pure i maggiori baroni e cavalieri del re ripinsono fuori i loro nemici
con gran danno di gente dell’una parte e dell’altra, e rifeciono le mura con grande affanno in poco di
tempo, lavorandovi di dì e di notte”.
112
Villani, 494-495: “messer Piero suo minore fratello, giovane molto grazioso e savio e bello”.
113
Villani, 430.
114
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, 211.
115
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, 293: Bernardone is praised for his leadership and
bravery in 1402 in a battle against the Milanese near Bologna- “The enemy therefore exited their camp,
arranged their order of battle, and attacked our camps with a sudden blow. There was a bitter encounter, our
troops fought back with distinction, and Bernardone the captain-general was there to exhort and direct the
battle”.
 51

chivalry) which led him into conflict with several other captains while in the service of

Florence.116

A second exemplar is Messer Giovanni d’Appia (Jean de’Eppe, d.1285), a noble

and knight of France who had participated in King Louis IX’s failed crusade to Tunisia

before enjoying a long and successful military career in Italy, including serving the

Florentines as captain of war. Villani described him as “a very proven knight in arms, and

one of the best fighters of France” and singles out one of his feats of arm as particularly

praiseworthy: in 1282 d’Appia performed a “notable deed of chivalry, [as he] travel[led]

along the walls of the castle [of Meldola] with few companions and almost disarmed”.117

No doubt such a demonstration of prowess and bravery would have had an appreciable

effect upon Florentine knights and arms bearers. A third French warrior, Messer Piero di

Narsi (Pierre de Naix, d.1326), a banner knight of the county of Bar-le-Duc and erstwhile

crusader, also used his considerable martial talents in the service of Florence against

Castruccio Castracani in 1325-1326. Villani, in particular, praises Piero for his prowess,

leadership, and loyalty, writing “he led with great prowess and readiness, keeping

Castruccio weakened through war”.118

116
For Bernardone’s touchy sense of honor and propriety, see the incident involving Bartolomeo of Prato:
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, 221-223.
117
Villani, 319, 320: “messer Gianni d’Epa, gentile uomo di Francia, e molto provato cavaliere in arme, e
tenuto uno de’ migliori battaglieri di Francia”; “In quella stanzia dell’asedio di Meldola venne fatta a
messer Gianni d’Epa una presta e notabile cavalleria, ch’egli avea in usanza ogni giorno in sulla terza, egli
con poca compagnia e quasi disarmato, andava intorno al castello proveggendo”.
118
Villani, 621, 626: “e presa lui la signoria, con molta prodezza e sollecitudine si resse, tenendo
Castruccio assai corto de la guerra”. When M. Piero di Narsi was executed by Castruccio because he had
violated his oath to never again fight against the lord of Lucca and Pisa, Villani challenged this claim,
insisting that the French knight was a “loyal and good knight”; “ma non fu vero, che messer Piero era leale
cavaliere e pro’”.
 52

Florentine knights and arms bearers also interacted with famous native Italian

commanders during this period. Malatesta II (d.1364), lord of Rimini, better known as

Guastafamiglia, was Florentine captain of war in 1337. Bruni described him “the most

distinguished soldier of the time”, while Villani wrote that he was “a wise man in

war”.119 Even more familiar to the Florentine warrior elite was Maghinardo Pagani da

Susinana (d.1302), the scion of a noble family of the Romagna who was raised in

Florence and served the commune militarily on several occasions. Villani wrote that

Maghinardo was “a good and wise captain in war” and “very fortunate in many battles,

and in his time he did great things”.120

A third example is that of Messer Amerigo (Aimery/Aimeric) IV, Viscount of

Narbonne, a French knight sent by King Charles I of Naples to serve as the captain of war

in Florence. Bruni and Villani praise Amerigo as “an experienced war leader” and “a man

very noble, and brave and wise in war”.121 Finally, Messer Pietro de’ Rossi, a noble of the

contado of Parma, is singled out by both Villani and Bruni for his outstanding military

service on behalf of the Florentine government. Villani, a contemporary of many of

Pietro’s exploits, writes with obvious admiration that he was “a wise and brave captain”

who demonstrated notable prowess and bravery on numerous occasions.122 At the time of

his death in 1337, Villani laments the loss of “the most capable captain and expert in war

119
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 257-259; Villani, 899: “savio uomo in guerra”.
120
Villani, 352: “e Maghinardo da Susinana buono capitano e savio di guerra”.
121
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 333-335; Villani, 351: “Amerigo di Nerbona grande
gentile uomo, e prode e savio in guerra”.
122
Villani, 826: on one such occasion in 1336, Villani praises Pietro for fighting bravely and holding the
line against the enemy: “ma per buona capitaneria di meser Piero, e per la franca gente ch’era co llui,
sostennero combattendo vigorosamente”. For a diverse collection of studies on the Rossi of Parma, see Le
signorie dei Rossi di Parma tra XIV e XVI, eds. Letizia Arcangeli e Marco Gentile (Florence: Firenze
University Press, 2007).
 53

and prowess in all of Italy”.123 Bruni echoes this admiration, adding that Pietro was “an

outstanding military man”.124

Even decided enemies of the Guelf Party and the Florentine commune were

recognized and praised for their martial expertise and skill by the authors of historical

accounts, who were themselves almost exclusively Guelf. Castruccio Castracani

(d.1328), the Ghibelline lord of Pisa and Lucca, is an important example. Castruccio

orchestrated two crucial victories over Florence and its allies at the battles of Montecatini

(1315) and Altopascio (1325), and took many Ghibelline and White Guelf exiles into his

retinue and army.125 Despite his being a steadfast and dangerous enemy of Florence, our

Florentine authors overwhelmingly praise his martial skill and expertise. The fourteenth

century Florentine chronicler, Marchionnne di Coppo Stefani (d.1385) wrote that

Castruccio “always sought war” and consistently depicts him as possessing the ideal

combination of wisdom, prudence, bravery, and great prowess.126 Likewise, Leonardo

Bruni, looking back from the first-quarter of the fifteenth century described Castruccio as

a “youth from the high nobility”, “first in deeds and daring”, while Giovanni Villani also

123
Villani, 840: “era il più sofficiente capitano e savio di guerra e prode di sua persona, che nullo altro ch’a
ssuo tempo fosse non che in Lombardia, ma in tutta Italia”.
124
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 213.
125
For Castruccio’s life and career, see: Louis Green, Castruccio Castracani: A Study on the origins and
character of a fourteenth-century Italian despotism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986).
126
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, eds. G. Carducci and V. Fiorini, Rerum Italicarum
Scriptores, new series, vol.30, pt.1 (Città di Castello: Editore S. Lapi, 1903), 136, 150: “Castruccio,
siccome uomo di gueerra sollicito”; Castruccio demonstrated his wisdom and restraint when in October
1326 he sought a temporary truce upon learning of the arrival of the Duke of Calabria with a large force:
“ma Castruccio savio trattò pace col Legato e col Duca, e non fece oste”.
 54

highlighted Castruccio’s great wisdom and prowess which allowed him to capture from

the Florentines the strategic city of Pistoia despite adverse conditions.127

Giordano Lancia d’Agliano, count of San Severino and vicar and captain of the

forces of Manfred, the natural son of Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen and king of

Sicily (1258-1266), in Ghibelline-led Florence, is also praised for his martial attributes by

Florentine chroniclers. This is crucial because Count Giordano spent significant time with

the Florentine warrior elite in his role as the captain of the Ghibelline forces of Florence

and Tuscany, leading them to a notable victory over the Guelfs at the battle of Montaperti

in 1260. Despite his seminal role in this dark moment in the history of Florence and the

Guelf Party, of which Villani was a steadfast member, Giordano is praised for his

prowess, bravery, and loyalty. Villani described him as a “noble of Piedmont in

Lombardy, and kinsman of the mother of Manfred, and by his prowess, and because he

was very faithful to Manfred, and in life and customs as worldly-minded as he, he made

him a count, and gave him lands in Apulia, and from a small estate raised him to great

lordship”.128

Bruni likewise praises Giordano for his chivalric virtues, creating for him

numerous speeches that suggest that the Florentine exiles under his command, along with

127
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 37 and 77: “There was a youth from the high
nobility called Castruccio… He returned to Lucca where he was first in deeds and daring; his age and
family influence gave him eminence”; “When Castrucio saw that reinforcements were arriving, he set up
barriers in the streets and barricaded himself into the upper part of the town. He decided to wait there for
the arrival of the larger forces he had summoned. But his soldiers were exhausted by the nocturnal battle
and when a new attack started, with fresh troops coming down upon the tired men, they could not hold the
position. So they crossed the fortifications and engaged in foul slaughter. Castruccio himself, fighting hand-
to-hand, was wounded in the face. Many of those who had entered the town with him were killed, most
were captured, while the rest jumped down from the walls and escaped”. See also Villani, 684-685.
128
Villani, 242: “Il detto conte Giordano fu gentile uomo di Piemonte in Lombardia, e parente della madre
del re Manfredi; e per la sua prodezza, e perch’era molto fedele di Manfredi, e di vita e di costumi così
mondano com’egli, il fece conte e li diè terra in Puglia, e di piccolo stato il mise in grande signoria”.
 55

their Sienese and German allies, were also animated by similar motivations and attitudes.

For example, Bruni claims that Giordano and his men fought “for fame and glory…

things in themselves… of enormous importance to brave men”, while also attributing to

the Ghibelline count the sentiment that victory would go to those who demonstrated the

greatest prowess, that is, “those who sw[u]ng their swords the more stoutly”.129 Indeed,

while we cannot confirm the veracity of these likely apocryphal declarations, the

association of Giordano and the Ghibelline exiles of Florence under his command with

chivalric virtues such as bravery, prowess, and honor is important, suggesting that

chivalry exercised a powerful influence on the warrior elite of Florence, Tuscany, and

Italy, just as across their trans-Alpine peers.

Other adversaries of Florence who received lavish praise in Florentine chronicles

include Messer Azzone Visconti, a strenuous knight and lord of Milan from 1329-1339,

who is described by Bruni as a “ferocious youth with much experience in war”,130 as well

as Messer Guido di Montefeltro (d.), who despite being the commander of the

Ghibellines of Tuscany and a steadfast enemy of Florence, is described as “the foremost

military man of the time”.131 A final example is that of Pietro Tarlati (d.1355), called

Saccone by contemporaries, the lord of Pisa and imperial vicar of Tuscany. Leonardo

Bruni in particular praised Saccone for his steadfast commitment to the profession of

arms, even into his eighties, writing of him that he was “so robust that almost to the very

end he never stopped donning armor, taking on military tasks by day and night, and

129
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 163.
130
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 91.
131
Villani, 293: “Guido conte di Montefeltro, savio e sottile d’ingegno di guerra più che niuno che fosse al
suo tempo”.
 56

involving himself in battles and perils. He performed many deeds in his life with variable

fortune; he was a rather good captain of war, aside from his excessive audacity and lack

of caution, which sometimes worked to his disadvantage”.132

In addition to the qualitative evidence, there is also the quantitative. Indeed, the

sheer number of foreign and native Italian knights and arms bearers who interacted with

their Florentine counterparts is staggering. Utilizing only the very limited evidence

provided in the Villani family’s Nuova Cronica to construct a brief survey of the period

1266-1314 still makes clear the sheer number of foreign knights who passed through or

remained in Florence to supplement native Florentine forces: 600 German knights were

sent by King Manfred of Sicily to support the Florentine Ghibellines in 1266; in 1267,

800 French and Provencal knights arrived in Florence under Count Guy of Montfort; the

future Charles II of Naples arrived in Florence in 1282 with 600 knights from France and

Provencal; 300 Catalan knights served in Florence under Diego de la Rat, the marshal of

King Robert of Naples, in 1309-1310 (Robert maintained a force of Catalan knights in

Florence under Diego’s command from 1305-1317); in 1311, Messer Gilberto da

Santiglia came to Florence with 200 Catalan knights and 500 Hungarians (mugaveri);

Messer Piero, the son of King Robert of Naples arrived in Florence with 300 men on

horse in 1314, while Robert’s brother, Duke Philip of Taranto, arrived the following year

with 500 more.133 Even if we adjust for the numerical exaggeration typical of medieval

accounts, the numbers are still striking.

132
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 409.
133
Villani, 498-499.
 57

Circulation of Imaginative Chivalric Literature

The second important medium for the dissemination of chivalric ideology is the

large corpus of imaginative literature that circulated late medieval Italy and Florence.

These works varied in origin: many were produced in Florence, while others were

composed elsewhere in Italy and even abroad. They also varied in kind, with prose

romances mixing with chanson de geste and epics to provide a cornucopia of exemplars

and examples of chivalric ideas, ideals, and attitudes. The variable origin of these works

is critical not least because it demonstrates the pan-Italian and transalpine continuity of

chivalric culture.

My dissertation considers a significant and representative sample of these works.

Foremost among them are the three anonymous prose romances composed in Florence

and focused predominantly on Tristan, but also containing stories of King Arthur and the

Knights of the Round Table: the Tristano Riccardiano, the Tristano Panciatichiano, and

La Tavola Ritonda.134 Also important are Rustichello da Pisa’s Il romanzo arturiano,

composed in thirteenth century Pisa during a visit by the future king Edward I of

England, as well as the anonymous Florentine prose romance La storia e legenda di

Messere Prodesagio, which focuses on the Matter of France, that is, the story of

134
Italian Literature II: Tristano Riccardiano, ed. and trans. F.R. Psaki (D.S. Brewer, 2006); Italian
Literature I: Tristano Panciatichiano, ed. and trans. Gloria Allaire (D.S. Brewer, 2002); and Tristan and
the Round Table: A Translation of La Tavola Ritonda, ed. and trans. Anne Shaver (Medieval and
Renaissance Text Studies, 1983).
 58

Charlemagne and his twelve paladins, in this case looking at major events occuring a few

generations after the Song of Roland.135

I also consider several works by Italian heavyweights Giovanni Boccaccio and

Francesco Petrarch. Indeed, Boccaccio’s two romances, Il Filocolo and Il Filostrato, and

Petrarch’s epic, Africa, reflect similar themes, ideas, and ideals as the works listed

above.136 The evidence therein accords nicely with that found in Guido delle Colonne’s

Historia destructionis troiae, the story of the Trojan War popular in Dante’s Florence.137

This is crucial because it means that Florentine knights and arms bearers were inundated

with certain core ideas, ideals, and attitudes that must be considered chivalric.

135
Il romanzo arturiano di Rustichella da Pisa, ed. and trans. Fabrizio Cigni (Pisa: Cassa di risparmio di
Pisa, 1994); La legenda e storia di messere Prodesagio, ed. Marco Maulu (Centro di Studi Filologici Sardi,
2010).
136
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filocolo, trans. Donald Cheney (New York and London: Garland, 1985); idem,
Il Filostrato, ed. V. Pernicone and trans. R.P. apRoberts and A.B. Seldis (New York and London: Garland,
1986); Francesco Petrarch, Africa, trans. Thomas Bergin and Alice Wilson (Yale University Press, 1978).
137
Guido delle Colonne, Historia destructionis troiae, ed. and trans. M.E. Meek (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1974).
 59

Chapter II-
Chivalry and Honor-Violence in Late Medieval Florence

I. Honor, Violence, and Chivalry

There can be no doubt that the violent lifestyle of the strenuous knights138 and

arms bearers139 who comprised the Florentine chivalric elite140 posed a serious threat to

civic peace, stability, and prosperity in late medieval Florence.141 These warriors were

strongly influenced by an ideology of chivalry which valorized and encouraged bloody

violence, especially in matters related to personal and familial honor. Indeed, violence

138
The term strenuous knight is drawn from the work of Michael Prestwich: see Prestwich, “Miles in Armis
Strenuus: The Knight at War,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 6th Ser., v. 5 (1995): 201-220.
Prestwich utilizes the term to distinguish strenuous knights from other mounted warriors in an English
context. It is used by Richard Kaeuper in a more general sense to describe knights who had been dubbed
and were active participants in their military vocation: Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 191.
139
Richard Kaeuper uses the term arms bearers to identify individuals who are not dubbed knights, but
nonetheless define themselves primarily, if not entirely, by their military vocation and a lifestyle
profoundly influenced by chivalric ideology: see Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence and idem, Holy Warriors:
The Religious Ideology of Chivalry.
140
I use the terms warrior elite and chivalric elite interchangeably to describe a social group roughly but not
entirely synonymous with those men known to their contemporaries as grandi (magnates). The socio-legal
designation of grande or magnate was supposed to be a punishment imposed on the martial elite because of
a long history of bloody violence inflicted upon the popular ‘classes’ (popolani) and the threat their violent
and autonomous lifestyles posed to the common good. In reality the designation was employed as a means
to settle personal scores, a political weapon unevenly applied and ineffectively enforced. As a result, to
speak here only of the magnates is to overlook the many strenuous knights and arms bearers who managed
to avoid the stigma of being included among the grandi. As a result, it is more profitable to focus our
attention upon the Florentine chivalric elite, a broader social group whose membership transcended
traditional social categories, with the magnates forming its core. The chivalric elite crafted an identity
centered on honor, social dominance, autonomy, and traditions of military service. These men were at once
greatly feared and admired by their contemporaries, who associated them overwhelmingly with violence,
an obsession with personal and familial honor, and a certain imperiousness and self-confidence known as
noble franchise.
141
Katherine Jansen, “Peacemaking in the Oltrarno, 1287-1297,” in Pope, Church and City: Essays in
Honour of Brenda M. Bolton, eds. Frances Andrews, Christoph Egger and Constance Rousseau (Leiden:
Brill, 2004), 327-344: Jansen argues (pages 327-328) that the “terrible reality of later medieval Tuscan
society” included “armed warfare, feud, vendetta, and violence [which] dominated the landscape and were
never very far from disturbing the precariously established peace”.
 60

and honor stand at the very center of chivalric identity.142 For “popular families” who

sought membership among the chivalric elite, the exercise of honor violence no doubt

served as an assertion of their worthiness and readiness to be included in such lofty

circles.143 As a result, acts of chivalric violence flood the pages of contemporary and

near-contemporary Florentine chronicles, including the major historical works of Dino

Compagni, Giovanni Villani, Leonardo Bruni, as well as many lesser-known accounts.144

For example, the author of the anonymous “Pseudo-Brunetto Latini Chronicle”,

composed in Florence in second-half of the thirteenth century, describes a violent

confrontation between several leading Florentine knights during a banquet.145 The author

writes:

“[In] the year 1215, being podestà messer Currado Orlani, in the land of Canpi
[sic.] six miles from Florence, messer Mazzingo Tegrimi de’ Mazinghi was made
a knight; and all of the noblemen of Florence were invited. And [when] the
knights were seated at the table, a court jester came and lifted up a cut of meat
from in front of messer Uberto dell’Infangati, who was a companion of messer
142
Zorzi, “Legitimation and Legal Sanction of Vendetta in Italian Cities from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth
Centuries”, 36: Zorzi argues that the practice of vendetta was a factor in one’s social reputation.
143
The Vellutti family provides a useful example of a “popular family” seeking to assert its right to be
included among the chivalric elite through the glorification of the martial prowess of its members and their
commitment to asserting and defending their family’s honor through violence. Zorzi also associates the
practice of vendetta with identity and prestige, but places this violence firmly in the context of Florentine
political society: see idem, “Legitimation and Legal Sanction of Vendetta in Italian Cities from the Twelfth
to the Fourteenth Centuries”, 42.
144
Jansen, “Peacemaking in the Oltrarno”, 330: Jansen argues that violence and peacemaking were
common experiences in late medieval Florence, and thus not limited to the elite. This is an important
element of the study of violence that is garnering greater attention in recent years. Likewise, Zorzi argues
“the practices of conflict were widespread among the various social groups” in Italian communal society:
see Zorzi, “Legitimation and Legal Sanction of Vendetta in Italian Cities from the Twelfth to the
Fourteenth Centuries,” 32.
145
For a useful modern edition of the work see: “Cronica Fiorentina compilata nel secolo XIII”, in Pasquale
Villari, The Two First Centuries of Florentine History: The Republic and Parties at the Time of Dante, vol.
II, trans. L. Villari (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1895), 217-293 [cited hereafter as “The Pseudo-Brunetto
Latini”]. Louis Green discusses this work under the title “The Pseudo-Brunetto Latini” in Appendix I of L.
Green, Chronicle into History: An Essay on the Interpretation of History in Florentine Fourteenth-Century
Chronicles (Cambridge, 1972), 155-164. Likewise Enrico Faini refers to it as “Lo pseudo Brunetto”: E.
Faini, “Il Convito del 1216: La Vendetta all’origine del fazionalismo fiorentino”, Annali di storia di
Firenze, I (2006): 9-36.
 61

Bondelmonte di Bondelmonti; who was greatly disturbed [by this]. And messer
Oddo Arrighi de’ Fifanti, a valorous man, villainously mocked messer Uberto; so
that messer Uberto grabbed him by the throat and messer Oddo Arrighi threw a
cut of meat in his face; so that the entire court was troubled; [and] when everyone
got up from the table, messer Bondelmonte stabbed messer Oddo in the arm with
a knife and villainously wounded him”.146

According to the author this incident was the root of significant violence in the

city, including one of the most famous acts in Florentine history: the murder of Messer

Bondelmonte de’ Bondelmonti on Easter Day 1215 by a group of rival knights and arms

bearers, including a number of men mentioned immediately above.147 Indeed,

Marchionne di Coppo Stefani writes that after Buondelmonte “shamed himself” by

repudiating his bethrothed, the repudiated bride’s family showed themselves to be “men

of swift deeds and brave” in pursuit of vengeance.148 Both Compagni and Villani likewise

connect Bondelmonte’s death to his repudiation of a lady of the Amidei lineage to whom

he was betrothed and his subsequent marriage to a lady of the rival Donati family.

146
“The Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 43 (my translation): “esendo podestade messer Currado Orlandi, nella
terra di Canpi apresso a Florenzia vi milgla, si fece chavaliere messer Mazzingo Tegrimi de’ Mazinghi; ed
invitòvi tutta la buona gente di Firenze. Ed essendo li chavalieri a tavola, uno giucolare di corte venne e
llevò uno talgliere fornito dinanzi a messer Uberto dell’ Infangati, il quel era in conpangnia di messer
Bondelmonte di Bondelmonti; donde fortemente si cruccioe. E messer Oddo Arrighi de’ Fifanti, huomo
valoroso, villanamente riprese messer Uberto predecto; onde messer Uberto lo smentio per la gola, e
messer Oddo Arrighi li gittò nel viso uno talgliere fornito di carne: onde tutta la corte ne fue travalgata.
Quando fuorono levate le tavole, e messer Bondelmonte diede d’uno coltello a messer Oddo Arrighi per lo
braccio, e villanamente il fedio”.
147
“The Pseudo-Brunetto Latini” informs us that Oddo consulted his kinsfolk who initially counseled
peace, cemented through the marriage of messer Bondelmonte to the daughter of messer Lambertuccio di
Capo di ponte of the Amidei, the niece of messer Oddo- “The Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 43: “Tornati
ongnuomo a sua magione, messer Oddo Arrighi fece consilglo di suoi amici e parenti, infra lli quali
fuorono Conti da Gangalandi, Uberti, Lanberti e Amidei; e per loro fue consilglato che di queste cose fosse
pace, e messer Bondelmonte tolglesse per molgle la filgluola di messer Lanbertuccio di Capo di ponte, delli
Amidei, la quale era filgluola della sorore di messer Oddo Arrighi”.
148
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 29: Buondelmonte is described as “il cavaliere
vergognandosi”, while the Amidei “furono uomini di leggier fatto e gagliardi”.
 62

The anonymous author of the “Pseudo-Brunetto Latini Chronicle”, on the other

hand, links this marriage alliance to efforts made by the parties to secure peace after the

violent banquet described above. Either way, all of these historical works confirm that the

Amidei and their allies responded with violence, resulting in Bondelmonte's death at the

foot of the statue of Mars, the Roman god of war, which used to stand at the foot of the

Ponte Vecchio:

“on the morning of Easter of the Resurrection the Amidei of San Stefano
assembled in their house, and the said M. Bondelmonte coming from Oltrarno,
nobly arrayed in his new white apparel, and upon a white palfrey, arriving at the
foot of the Ponte Vecchio on this side, just at the foot of the pillar where was the
statue of Mars, the said M. Bondelmonte was dragged from his horse by Schiatta
degli Uberti, and by Mosca Lamberti and Lambertuccio degli Amidei assaulted
and smitten, and by Oderigo Fifanti his veins were opened and he was brought to
his end.”149

Not surprisingly, Bondelmonte’s murder was answered with further violence. The

author of the “Pseudo-Brunetto Latini Chronicle” records the details of a skirmish

between several Florentine knights during which messer Iacopo dello Schiatta Uberti was

killed by Simone Donati. Also killed in this skirmish were messer Oddo Arrighi di Fifanti

and several others, among them a certain messer Guido de’ Galli, whose nose and lips

were cut off and his mouth cut from ear to ear. This was all done by the Bondelmonti

family in revenge for Bondelmonte’s murder.150

149
Villani, 183: “ché la mattina di Pasqua di Risurresso si raunaro in casa gli Amidei da Santo Stefano, e
vegnendo d’Oltrarno il detto messere Bondelmonte vestito nobilemente di nuovo di roba tutta binca, e in su
uno palafreno bianco, giugnendo a piè del ponte Vecchio dal lato di qua, apunot a piè del pilastro ov’era la
’nsegna di Mars, il detto messer Bondelmonte fue atterrato del cavallo per lo Schiatta degli Uberti, e per lo
Mosca Lamberti e Lambertuccio degli Amidei assalito e fedito, e per Oderigo Fifanti gli furono segate le
vene e tratto a ffine”; Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 6: Dino claims it was the daughter of
Messer Oderigo Giantruffetti who was repudiated by Bondelmonte, but regardless the aggrieved families
“decided to avenge themselves, to strike down Buondelmonte and shame him”.
150
The Bondelmonti also took messers Farinata, Neri Piccolino, and Schiatta Uberti prisoner. “The Pseudo-
Brunetto Latini”, 45: “e messer Iacopo dello Schiatta Uberti per Simone Donati vi fue morto, e messer
 63

Even more striking than the number and intensity of the incidents recorded in

these chronicles is the fact that they very likely represent only the tip of the iceburg of

chivalric violence. Indeed, chroniclers generally wrote only about major incidents of

violence, no doubt leaving us in the dark about the many more mundane conflicts. In

addition, the communal judicial records for the years before 1342 were destroyed during

the fiery purges which followed the downfall of Walter, duke of Athens, a French noble

and lord (signore) of Florence, in 1343. As a result, modern historians likely only catch

glimpses of the significant violence that pervaded duecento and trecento Florence.

The causes and consequences of this violence in late medieval Florence and Italy

have been the topic of numerous studies over the past half-century, with a whole host of

political, social, economic, and cultural reasons identified as catalysts.151 In a recent

seminal work, Carol Lansing identifies several predominant causes, including: the

blurring of public and private concerns (personal and political enmity, private vendetta

and factional conflict); the contradictory structure of the lineage which demanded unity

of action from its members without ensuring a unity of interests; the close association of

kinship and political alliance, and the reliance of Florence's leading citizens upon private

military power. Lansing also points to the physical topography of the old city of Florence,

Oddarighi di Fifanti con altri assai gentili huomini; ed a messer Guido de’ Galli fu mozzo il naso con tutto
il labro, e fessa la boccha da ciascuno lato insino alli orecchi. E questo trattato fue di Bondelmonti,
credendo avere preso messer Farinata e messer Neri Piccolino e messer lo Schiatta Uberti”. This “war”
between the Bondelmonti and the Uberti lasted until 1239, when peace was finally made: “The Pseudo-
Brunetto Latini”, 45: “Durando la guerra lunghissimi tenpi, i Bondelmonti e li Uberti fecero pace; e messer
Rinieri Zingani di Bondelmonti diede per molgle la filgluola a messer Neri Piccolino fratello di messer
Farina; ciò fue nel Mccxxxviiii anni”.
151
See in particular the excellent essays in Lauro Martines, ed., Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian
Cities, 1200-1500 (University of California Press, 1972).
 64

which was dominated neighborhood by neighborhood by rival families who built towers

and maintained private armies, ensuring that violent conflict was almost inevitable.152

Lansing and other scholars have also highlighted the importance of honor and

shame among the elite in late medieval Florence. Honor and shame were external

attributes that were acted out: “When a man—or a lineage—was dishonored, the remedy

was drastic public action”.153 Lansing in particular singles out the donzelli as the group

that was most involved in these public acts, especially those involving violence. These

restless and prospectless young men turned to the tenets of chivalry because they were

restricted from adult economic and familial roles. Given the potency and thrust of

chivalric influence, it is not at all surprising that these young knights and arms bearers

were among the most egregious perpetrators of violence in Florentine society.154 Indeed,

these donzelli and other citizens who were closely associated with traditional knighthood

in late medieval Florence were considered because of their violence to be a significant

threat to the state and public order.155

This chapter will build upon the scholarship of Lansing and others by examining

the important role played by chivalric ideology in encouraging and valorizing the "honor-

violence" of strenuous knights and arms bearer Chivalry intensified this violence to such

an extent that it was different enough in degree to be different in kind from the violence

perpetrated by other members of Florentine society. It also encouraged violence

especially when personal and familial honor were on the line. Without question, chivalry,

152
Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 89, 168-176, 185.
153
Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 166.
154
Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 21, 161-163, 184-191.
155
Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 163.
 65

honor, and violence were closely connected in the mentality and lifestyle of the warrior

elite in late medieval Florence and Italy, as elsewhere in Europe.156

The important scholarship of Richard Kaeuper, Matthew Strickland, Craig Taylor,

and others has confirmed the close connection between chivalry and honor in medieval

societies across Europe.157 Honor and shame were likewise important threads in the

fabric of Florentine society, affecting men at every level of society.158 Among the elite,

in particular, honor was a social rather than ethical possession, intimately connected to

social status, political power, and wealth.159 The absence or loss of honor often meant the

forfeit of these prized possessions, a fate that could ruin not just an individual, but an

156
Larner, “Chivalric Culture in the Age of Dante”, 117-118, 125, 126: Larner makes the important point
that the influence of chivalric ideology in Italy has been undervalued, arguing that “the capacity of the
chivalric ethos to express, perhaps shape, often, certainly, distort contemporaries’ vision of themselves and
the world they lived in”. Sarah Rubin Blanshei, Politics and Justice in Late Medieval Bologna (Leiden:
Brill, 2010), 227, 231, 243: Blanshei discusses the chivalric lifestyle in late medieval Bologna under the
guise of the honorable life (vita honorabilis), and while she points out that both strenuous knights and
members of the popolo grasso could pursue the vita honorabilis, what distinguished them was “the nature
of their work and the people with whom they associated”. Kate McGrath, “The Politics of Chivalry”, in
Feud, Violence and Practice: Essays in Medieval Studies in Honor of Stephen D. White (Burlington:
Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 60: McGrath also connects chivalry and violence, and emphasizes the
importance of honor, shame, and anger in the context of Anglo-Norman England.
157
Keen, Chivalry; Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence; idem, Holy Warriors; idem, Medieval Chivalry
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); Matthew Strickland, War and Chivalry: The
Conduct and Perception of War in England and Normandy, 1066-1217 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2005); and Craig Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years
War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
158
This is not to say that honor-shame were not important in other cultures in medieval Europe, but Julian
Pitt-Rivers makes a persuasive case for the particular potency of honor-shame in the fabric of
Mediterranean culture: Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status”, in Jean Peristiany, ed., Honour and
Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 19-77.
Najemy, A History of Florence, 15: Najemy observes that honor and shame had an important place in late
medieval Florence, especially in connection with the “ideology of knighthood”.
159
Thomas Kuehn, Law, Family, and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 135, 136, 140: Kuehn makes several important observations
about the role of honor in late medieval and renaissance Florence: honor gave life and property meaning,
serving as the foundation of status and wealth; honor also served as the glue that held society together-
“Family goods and family members were held together by honor”. Sharon Strocchia, “Gender and the Rites
of Honour in Italian Renaissance Cities”, in Gender and Society in Renaissance Italy, eds. Judith Brown
and Robert Davis (London and New York: Longman, 1998), 39: The culture of honor directed the everyday
activities of Italian urban-dwellers of virtually all social groups.
 66

entire family. No segment of Florentine society attached greater importance to honor than

the chivaric elite.

If we flesh out the two examples provided at the beginning of the chapter we can

better grasp the centrality of honor-shame to chivalric violence. After the violent banquet

recorded in the “Pseudo-Brunetto Latini Chronicle”, the anonymous author recounts how

Messer Oddo Arrighi de’ Fifanti took counsel with his friends and kinsfolk, among whom

were the powerful Uberti, Lamberti, and Amidei families of Florence. The chosen course

of action was peace, as discussed above, to be cemented with the marriage of

Bondelmonte and a lady of the Amidei family. The anonymous chronicler also writes

that on the day of Bondelmonte’s wedding, he was accosted by a woman of the Donati

family, Madonna Gualdrada, who disparaged him very publicly in the streets, yelling

“Vituperated knight, you have taken her [the niece of Oddo] through fear of the Uberti

and Fifanti”. For men with a very touchy sense of honor, such a verbal assault

approximated an accusation of cowardice, causing Bondelmonte to be dishonored and

shamed. This very real threat of dishonor is confirmed by Madonna Gualdrada's

exclamation that if Bondelmonte did not repudiate his bride-to-be, “he [would] be forever

a dishonored knight”.160 Less important than the accuracy of this conversation is the fact

that Bondelmonte's personal and familial honor is presented as meaning more to

Bondelmonte than civic peace. The result was his repudiation of the Amidei bride.

160
“The Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 43-44: “e madonna Gualdrada molgle di messer Forese di Donati
sacretamente mandò per messer Bondelmonte e disse: - Chavaliere vitiperato, ch’ài tolto molgle per paura
dell’Uberti e di Fifanti; lascia quella ch’ ai presa e prendi questa, e sarai senpre inorato chavaliere”.
 67

That honor was at stake during this series of related incidents is also suggested by

the fourteenth century Florentine chronicler Marchionne di Coppo Stefani who points to

the great affront done to the honor of the Amidei as a result of Bondelmonte's

repudiation, which resulted in shame that ultimately required vengeance: “The Amidei

and their kinsmen disdained by the shame they had received deliberated how best to

make high vendetta”.161 The author of the “Pseudo-Brunetto Latini Chronicle”, writing

much closer to the time of these events, also focuses on the issue of honor. He writes that

Messer Oddo Arrighi “was very distressed” because of “the shame that messer

Bondelmonte had done to him”.162 This time when Messer Oddo consulted his friends

and kinsfolk, rather than seeking a way to peacefully settle the dispute, the discussion

centered on the degree of violence that was necessary to vindicate both personal and

collective honor and cleanse the stain of dishonor and shame. Some of the men present

advocated wounding Bondelmonte in the face, while others said that he should be beaten

with a stick.163 Finally messer Mosscha di Lanberti (Moscha di Lamberti) spoke, “If you

beat him or wound him, think first to make a hole where you can hide [from retribution];

161
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 29: “Sentito questo i parenti e gli amici sdegnati
della vergogna ricevuta diliberarono di ciò fare alta vendetta”. Cardini, L’acciar de’ cavalieri, 110: Cardini
identifies alta vendetta as a privilege reserved to Italian knights.
162
“The Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 44: “fu molto cruccioso”; “si lamentò della vergongnia che lli era stato
fatto per messer Bondelmonte”.
163
“The Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 44: “Si che fue consilglato per certi huomini ch’ a llui fosse dato d’uno
basstone, e altri dissero k’ elli fosse fedito nella faccia”. It seems likely that facial wounds were often
advocated as responses to dishonor suffered because they would forever serve as a public symbol of the
avenger’s successful vendetta and the shame and dishonor of the victim. ibid, 76-77: The author mentions
other examples of individuals being wounded in the face, including Baldinaccio di m. Bindo delli Adimari,
who was wounded in a skirmish in the city in December 1296.
 68

[but I recommend] that you give him such [a blow] that it will seem that you have taken

his head”.164

Moscha di Lamberti’s frank advice to employ force highlights the stark reality of

honor-violence: the exercise of violence is, in the end, necessary to cleanse the stain of

dishonor and shame. The great problem for medieval societies like that of Florence, of

course, was that this action in turn transferred dishonor and shame to the victim, requiring

the aggrieved party to seek similar vengeance. Moscha’s advice to kill Bondelmonte

likely reflects this concern, as well as the fact that Bondelmonte had twice dishonored the

Amidei and their allies. As a result, half-measures, such as peaceful mediation, were no

longer deemed sufficient to restore balance.

Honor-Violence and Chivalric Identity

The above examples provide us with important insight into the centrality of

honor-shame to chivalric violence. Chivalry was an eminently practical ideology,

naturally intersecting with honor-shame to create an antagonistic and violent lifestyle

among the warrior elite in late medieval Florence.165 Chivalry provided these knights and

164
“The Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 44, my translation: “Se ttu il batti o ffiedi, pensa prima di fare la fossa
dove tue ricoveri; ma dàlli tale ché ssi paia che cosa fatta cappa à”.
165
Larner, “Chivalric Culture in the Age of Dante”, 120: Larner argues for the influence of chivalric ideas
on real life. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 149: “Any society animated by a code of honour will be
highly competitive”. Thomas Kuehn, “Inheritance and Identity in Early Renaissance Florence”, in Society
and the Individual in Renaissance Florence, ed. William J. Connell (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 2002), 137: Kuehn argues that “in a culture of honor, forms of antagonism and assertions of
ownership were necessary and frequently expressed”. Christopher Wickham, Courts and Conflicts in
 69

arms bearers with a “well-developed sense of their superior status, function, and

mission”, all linked by an obsession with honor, which, as we have seen, required the

active employment of violence when asserted, defended, or vindicated.166 Indeed,

chivalric identity was built upon the twin-pillars of prowess and honor. In the minds of

the “chivalric elite”, “enacted prowess”, whether on the field of battle or the streets of

Florence, “yield[ed] honor”, while honor functioned as veritable currency in chivalric

culture, widely considered among the chivalrous to be worth more than life itself.167 As

Twelfth-Century Tuscany (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 220-221: Wickham points out that
twelfth-century Tuscany was full of wars, describing an “armed, agnry, and potentially exposive daily
environment”. Indeed, authors of imaginative chivalric literature often lament how quickly in such an
antagonistic culture friends can become enemies. For example, in Rustichello da Pisa’s Il Romanzo
Arturiano, 342 (chapter 156, verse 29), the author bewails the conflict between Lancelot and Tristan, who
had previously been great friends: “Quello che era successo suscitò un’enorme meraviglia, e molto si
parlava, presso l’una e l’altra parte, di come erano divenuti nemici Tristano e Lancillotto, che solevano
essere così grandi amici”. Vigueur, Cavalieri e Cittadini, 53: Maire Vigueur argues that the militia of the
Italian communes in the consular and podestarial ages (roughly up to 1250) were kept in a state of constant
agitation.
166
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 269: Kaeuper also makes the crucial point that “an obsession with honor
links knightly function, status, and ideology”. See also: idem, Chivalry and Violence, 130: “knights were
indeed the privileged practitioners of violence in their society”; Wickham, Courts and Conflicts in Twelfth-
Century Tuscany, 221: Wickham argues that “a readiness to violence and a structural need to maintain
honor was a particularly military attribute.
167
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 33: Kaeuper argues that honor “remains the great goal and unsurpassed
good, regularly ranked as more valuable than life itself”. We can find occasional suggestions of this fact in
the chronicle evidence- Villani, 240, 272: For example Giovanni Villani’s likely apocryphal conversation
between M. Farinata degl’ Uberti and other Florentine Ghibelline exiles in 1260 hints at the traditional
chivalric attitude that it would be better to die honorably than live in shame: “for if we do not fight while
we have these Germans we are dead men, and shall never return to Florence, and for us death and defeat
would be better than to crawl about the world any longer”; “imperciò che se ora ch’avemo questi Tedeschi
non si combatte, noi siamo morti, e mai non ritorneremo in Firenze; e per noi farebbe meglio la morte e
d’essere isconfitti, ch’andare più tapinando per lo mondo”. Later in the same work (272), Villani relates an
incident that took place at the castle of Santellero, when one Ghibelline rebel, a young man of the Uberti
family, decide it was better to die than suffer the shame of being captured by the Guelfs: “e dicesi che uno
giovane degli Uberti il quale era fuggito in sul campanile, veggendo che non potea scampare, per non
venire a mano de’ Bondelmonti suoi nemici, si gittò di sua volontà del campanile in terra, e mori”. The
conceptualization of honor as the currency of chivalric culture is discussed in Kaeuper, Chivalry and
Violence, 129-130. Cf. Trevor Dean, “Marriage and Mutilation: Vendetta in Late Medieval Italy”, Past and
Present, 157 (Nov. 1997), 34: This concept fits well with the conception in late medieval Florence of
dishonor as a debt and vengeance as repayment. Kuehn, Law, Family, and Women, 79. Strocchia, “Gender
and the Rites of Honour in Italian Renaissance Cities”, 39: Strocchia also observes that honor seemed
“more dear than life itself” to many Italians. For fama, see the useful essays in Fama: The Politics of Talk
and Reputation in Medieval Europe, eds. Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail (Ithaca: Cornell
 70

we know, the failure to defend one’s honor or cleanse the stain of dishonor through

vengeance, led to shame and the loss of status and identity.

For many contemporary Florentine knights and arms bearers, this was a fate

worse than death. Guittone d’Arezzo (d.1294), a famous Tuscan poet, encapsulates this

chivalric attitude in his poetry, writing “for shame is more to be feared than death, / …

for a wise man ought to sincerely love / a beautiful death more than life, / for each person

should believe that he was created / not to stay, but to pass through with honor”.168 The

concern with maintaining honor while they “pass[ed] through” meant that the chivalric

elite were under overwhelming pressure to relentlessly assert and defend personal and

familial honor, and to avenge dishonor with bloody and showy violence.169

Since the successful exercise of honor-violence was made possible by a warrior’s

prowess, prowess was often held to be synonymous with nobility or knighthood, and

certainly ranked among the most important elements employed by contemporaries in the

University Press, 2003). Cf. Wickham, Courts and Conflicts in Twelfth-Century Tuscany, 283, 284:
Wickham says of fama that it was not gossip, but opinion spoken and shared openly, often in a relatively
formalized way, a means to police the Florentine social hierarchy. To a certain extent all members of the
Florentine elite subscribed to the sentiment that “a man who does not look to his fama [i.e. reputation,
directly connected to honor] is insane and, though living, might as well be dead”, but few took the defense
of one’s reputation as far as the chivalric elite.
168
Tuscany Poetry of the Duecento: An Anthology, ed. and trans. Frede Jensen (New York: Taylor and
Francis, 1994), 177.
169
Kuehn, Law, Family, and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy, 134-135: Kuehn
observes that in fifteenth century Florence, honor was both an individual and group possession. Likewise,
dishonor suffered by a single individual impacted his family and likely any other group of which he was a
member. As honor formed part of a family’s symbolic patrimony, all male members had to defend the
family and ensure its dominance and interests. A. Zorzi, “‘Ius erat in armis’. Faide e conflitti tra pratiche
sociali e pratiche di governo”, in Origini dello Stato: processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo
and età moderna, eds. G. Chittolini, A. Molho, and P. Schiera (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994), 624: Zorzi
admits that the knightly aristocracy and noble citizens in communal society and in rural states practiced
feuding as a matter of course. Wickham, Courts and Conflicts in Twelfth-Century Tuscany, 216, 220:
Wickham concurs arguing that chivalric violence is not surprising, because milites and masnaderii of
aristocratic families in the twelfth-century were trained to do violence, all Tuscan males carried arms
routinely, and Tuscan males were prickly about their honor. In addition, he argues that the more public and
committed a claim, the more violent the action needed to support it. Julian Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social
Status”, 25: “On the field of honor, might is right”.
 71

very subjective task of determining membership among the chivalric elite.170 Not

surprisingly, effusive praise of prowess in its own right as well as in association with

honor permeates works of imaginative chivalric literature in Florence and Italy, as

elsewhere in medieval Europe. For example, in Il Romanzo Arturiano, a thirteenth

century Arthurian prose compilation composed by the Pisan warrior-poet, Rustichello da

Pisa, Lancelot witnesses Tristan defeat ten knights by himself. Lancelot marvels at

Tristan’s ability to land “such wonderful blows with the lance”.171 Tristan’s great

prowess convinces Lancelot that he must be the best knight in the world.172 Later in the

same work, Tristan’s host, having seen him defeat a number of knights, praises him,

saying: “Lord, before I thought highly of you because you seemed to be a man of valor,

but now that I know something of your skills, I think even more highly of you”.173 In the

170
This is emphasized throughout Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence. See in particular 129-160 A useful
example can be found in La Tavola Ritonda, 125, when Tristan exhorts a group of knights to prove great
nobility through prowess: “I am sure that you recognize your situation, how you are besieged and
surrounded and in danger of death. You have need of great nobility, and each one must be worth more than
two [in battle]”.
171
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 310 (chapter 50, verses 18-19), my translation: “Lancillotto,
quando vide in che modo Tristano aveva abbattuto tutti e dieci i cavalieri… E pensò che mai, in tutta la
vita, aveva visto un cavaliere che sapesse colpire così bene di lancia come lui”.
172
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 310 (chapter 50, verses 18): “[Lancillotto] poté concludere in
verità che Tristano era quel cavaliere di cui tutti parlavano, cioè il migliore del mondo”.
173
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 329 (chapter 116, verse 8): “E si diresse verso Tristano, e gli
disse, “Signore, prima vi ho apprezzato perché mi sembravate uomo di valore, ma ora che ho saputo
qualcosa sulle vostre doti, vi apprezzo molto di più.’”. An additional example from the same work can be
found on the same page (chapter 115, verse 11) when a damsel praises Galahad for possessing all of the
greatest qualities of knighthood: “Signore… con la sua bontà e la sua cortesia ben ci mostra quanto egli sia
nobile, onesto e valoroso, e pregio nostro Signore di dargli gioaia e onore”. For a third example, see
Tristano Riccardiano, 46/47: The anonymous author of this work suggests that Tristan’s happiness, indeed
his very identity, is directly dependent upon his ability to demonstrate his prowess: “But Tristan was very
happy now that he felt himself quite healed of his wound, and not because he had regained his usual degree
of beauty or color or strength, but because he could endure the exertion of fighting”- “Ma Tristano èe molto
allegro dappoi ke ssi sentio bene guerito de la fedita; ma nnon perk’elli sia tornado ancora in suo ista[to] de
la bellezza né in suo kolore né in sua forza, sie k’egli potesse sofferi[r l’a]ffanno dell’arme”. Health was
important to Tristan only in so far as it allowed him to fulfill the purpose of his ordo, to fight. Indeed, the
loss of the ability to use one’s prowess led to great lamentations and shame on the part of knights and arms
bearers.
 72

minds of the practitioners of chivalry, a knight’s prowess was proof of his membership

among the warrior elite and a barometer of his honor. Naturally in a culture that

cultivated and prized prowess and honor above nearly everything else, violence was

bound to be prevalent.

Historical Exemplars

Historical knights took very seriously the cultivation and defense of their chivalric

identities, with both goals best accomplished through public, bloody violence (i.e.

demonstrations of prowess). As a result, Florentines at every level of society mixed great

admiration for the chivalric elite with significant fear of their violence and

imperiousness.174 Many contemporaries believed that the violence of the warrior elite

threatened Florentine prosperity and “greatness” (grandezza).175 Contemporary

admiration and fear when confronted with these men is clearly depicted in Dino

Compagni’s descriptions of messer Corso Donati (d.1308), one of the most famous

strenuous knights and political figures in late medieval Florence. Compagni described

Corso Donati as:

“A knight in the mold of Catiline the Roman, but more cruel… with his mind
always set on evildoing; one who gathered many armed men and kept a great
entourage, who ordered many arsons and robberies and did great damage to the
174
Contemporaries admired the more peaceful aspects of the chivalric lifestyle, as well as their
demonstration of prowess in the context of external warfare. When this violent side of chivalry was turned
against fellow Florentines, fear ensued. Marvin Becker, “A Study of Political Failure: The Florentine
Magnates, 1280-1343”, in Florentine Essays: Selected Writings of Marvin B. Becker, eds. James Banker
and Carol Lansing (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 254: Members of the chivalric elite,
such as Corso Donati, filled contemporaries with both fear and admiration, “and they were often praised
and condemned in the same breath”.
175
Q. Skinner, Visions of Politics, Volume 2: “Renaissance Virtues” (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004), 21-2: grandezza was a term used by contemporaries to encapsulate the concepts of grandeur
and magnitude, roughly equivalent in this context to glory, honor, and greatness of Florence.
 73

Cerchi and their friends, who gained many possessions and rose to great heights:
such was messer Corso Donati, who because of his pride was called the Baron.
When he passed through he city many cried ‘long live the Baron,’ and the city
seemed to belong to him”.176

Yet even while Compagni actively criticized Corso Donati we can detect traces of

admiration:

“Messer Corso’s bad death was talked about in various ways, according to
whether the speaker was his friend or enemy. But to tell you the truth, he lived
dangerously and died reprehensibly. He was a knight of great spirit and renown,
noble in blood and behavior… and always undertook great things. He was
accustomed to dealing familiarly with great lords and noble men, and had many
friends, and was famous throughout all Italy. He was the enemy of the popolo and
of the popolani, and was loved by his soldiers, he was full of malicious thoughts,
cruel and astute. He was killed in this vile manner by a foreign mercenary; and
messer Corso’s relatives knew full well who killed him, for the killer was
immediately sent away by his companions.”177

Corso’s dangerous lifestyle was not uncommon among the chivalric elite. Nor was his

reprehensible death. Instead, they were part and parcel of the chivalric lifestyle, which he

exemplified in almost every way.178

Another exemplar is the famous dolce stilnovisti poet, Guido Cavalcanti.

Although Cavalcanti is best known among modern audiences for his literary skill and

intellect, Dino Compagni and Giovanni Villani, among others, tend to focus on Guido’s

176
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 48-49.
177
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 85.
178
Occasionally, similarly “chivalric” descriptions of historical knights and arms bearers appear in
contemporary and near contemporary sources. While not all of these men were Florentines, most, if not all,
interacted with, fought against, or served alongside the Florentine chivalric elite. This is crucial to
understanding chivalric culture in late medieval Florence and Italy. A man like Pietro Saccone, lord of
Arezzo, who Bruni described in a pseudo-eulogy as “so robust that almost to the very end he never stopped
donning armor, taking on military tasks by day and night, and involving himself in battles and perils. He
performed many deeds in his life with variable fortune; he was rather good captain in war, aside from his
excessive audacity and lack of caution, which sometimes worked to his disadvantage. But he was totally
unsuited to civic life”. Such a strenuous knight and lord, a historical flower of chivalry, must have had an
appreciable influence on the men he interacted with or fought against, including the Florentine chivalric
elite.
 74

chivalric characteristics. For example, Villani described him, like many of his peers

among the warrior elite, as “too irritable and quick to anger".179 Dino Compagni’s famous

sonnet addressed to Cavalcanti not only praised him for his physical prowess and military

skill, but also exhorted him to give up the violence and contentiousness characteristic of

the chivalric elite.180 As we have already seen, such anger tended to manifest itself in

violence, especially when honor was stake. Indeed, Guido’s own poetry confirms his own

attachment to the practice of vengeance. Particularly illuminating is his “Novelle ti so

dire, odi, Nerone”, in which he exhorted his kinsman Nerone to pursue a vendetta against

the Buondelmonti family.181

As one of the leading members of the Cerchi faction, Guido was a steadfast

enemy of our first exemplar, Corso Donati. It seems that both men tried on several

occasions to kill one another. According to Dino Compagni, Corso tried to have Guido

murdered while he was on pilgrimage, and when Cavalcanti returned to Florence and

learned of the plot, “he stirred up against messer Corso many youths who promised to

support him. And riding one day with some of the Cerchi household, with a dart in hand

he spurred his horse against messer Corso, believing that the Cerchi would follow him

and be drawn into the quarrel. As his horse ran past, he let fly the dart, which missed.

There with messer Corso were his son Simone, a strong and brave youth, and Cecchino

179
Villani, 399: “se non ch’era troppo tenero e stizzoso”.
180
Najemy, A History of Florence, 31.
181
Guido Cavalcanti, The Complete Poems, trans. Marc Cirigliano (New York: Italica Press, 1992),
138/139: “I have news to tell you, do you hear, Nerone: / the Bondelmonti are trembling with fear / and all
the Florentines don’t reassure them / hearing that you have the heart of a lion / more fearful of you than of a
dragon / seeing your face so hard / that no bridge or wall could rival it / except for the tomb of the Pharaoh
/ alas what a great sin you commit / wanting to chase out such noble blood / that all go off without control /
but it is true that they forgave your debt / so you might save your soul / if you can stand the exchange”.
 75

de’ Bardi, and many others with their swords. They chased Guido but failed to catch

him”.182 Guido was also heavily involved in the factional fighting between the Donati

and Cerchi, a conflict that eventually became a contest for political dominance between

the Black and White Guelfs. As a leading figure among the latter, Guido was exiled in

1300.

Conrad (II) Malaspina di Lunigiana (d.1294) provides a third example. He was

the scion of a Florentine noble family whose members were powerful knights and arms

bearers for generations before Dante’s time. In fact, when Dante met Conrad in Purgatory

he recognized him immediately and praised his family, saying: “but where in all Europe /

Are there men by whom they are not talked of? /… The fame which does honour to your

house, / So cries up both the rulers and the country / That without having been there

people know of [the Malaspina]”. Conrad, like most members of the chivalric elite, is

concerned about the honor and fortune of his family. Dante resassures him that his family

remain paragons of chivalry: “And I swear to you… That your race still is honoured, and

has lost / Nothing in generosity or in valour”.183 The important chivalric virtues of

prowess-bravery and largesse are singled out by Dante, a fitting tribute to one of the

historical flowers of Florentine knighthood.

182
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 23.
183
Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, ed. David Higgins and trans. C.H. Sisson (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008), “Purgatorio”, Canto VIII, 118, 121-129. Another example from Dante’s Divine
Comedy is Guido Guerra of the Counts Guidi (d.1272), who Dante describes (in “Inferno”, Canto XVI,
(lines 37-45)) as “active in council and arms” during his lifetime.
 76

Limitations of the Sources

If historians are to better understand chivalry we must understand what was

thought as well as what was done,184 but lifting the veil that shrouds the mentality of the

chivalric elite from the historian’s eye is a difficult task, especially for late medieval

Florence and Italy.185 While traditional historical sources contain plentiful examples

confirming the centrality of honor-violence to chivalric identity, most of the surviving

historical accounts were composed, with very few exceptions, by individuals who were

not themselves practitioners of chivalry. This means that the motivation and mental

framework behind many historical acts of honor-violence are often unknown or obscured.

Popolani chroniclers like Giovanni Villani, Dino Compagni, and Leonardo Bruni

were unsympathetic toward the internecine violence and claims of honor that were central

to chivalric identity, as they represented a serious threat to Florentine society. Indeed, the

popolani chroniclers demonstrated great concern about the deleterious effects of this

lifestyle, particularly upon their class and the common good.186 For example, Dino

Compagni begins the preface of book two of his chronicle with the following diatribe:

184
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 329.
185
Thomas Kuehn uses this metaphor when he discusses the difficult task facing historians who are
interested in studying the “values, thoughts, interests, and circumstances” of litigants in Renaissance
Florence: see Kuehn, Law, Family and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy, 77
186
Wickham, Courts and Conflicts in Twelfth-Century Tuscany, 218: Wickham reminds us that we need to
note the difference between the perspective of the perpetrator and that of the victim. Even a chronicler like
the anonymous author of the “Pseudo-Brunetto Latini” who seems to have travelled in chivalric circles
does not always provide as much information as the historian would like. For example, in January 1295
(1296 according to our modern calendar), the author writes (page 69) that “the podestà of Florence
condemned m. Corso Donati who had wounded m. Simone Galastrone Donati, his cousin”. Unfortunately
we know nothing about why Corso would wound his own cousin. We can only speculate that it had
something to do with honor. Another example from the same text (page 66-67) centers on the Galli family,
the first of the grandi to be punished by the Ordinances. The author tells us that Segna di Galli had killed in
France two brothers of Vanni Ugolini, another Florentine. Again, we are left without any further
explanation. Kuehn, Law, Family, and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy, 78:
Kuehn argues that limits on vendetta, one aspect of the honor-violence discussed in this chapter, were
 77

“Arise, wicked citizens full of discord: grab sword and torch with your own hands
and spread your wicked deeds. Unveil your iniquitous desires and your worst
intentions… Go and reduce to ruins the beauties of your city. Spill the blood of
your brothers, strip yourselves of faith and love, deny one another aid and
support… Look at your ancestors: did they win merit through discord? Yet now
you sell [the] honors which they acquired”.187

This invective against the violent and antagonistic culture of the chivalric elite highlights

the inherent biases of popolani chroniclers: chivalry and honor brought out the worst in

men, encouraging violence between citizens, threatening the stability and prosperity of

the city, and and serving as an obstacle to Florentine grandezza.

As a result, popular authors often fail to demonstrate an understanding of the

mentality of strenuous knights and arms bearers, or of general chivalric attitudes toward

violence.188 Their commentary betrays the significant influence of perspectives

fundamentally different from that of the chivalric elite, especially in regards to the

absolute importance of personal and familial honor.189 Indeed, strenuous knights and

arms bearers are often characterized by non-chivalric contemporaries as living a “noble

lifestyle” with no mention of the powerfully influential ideology of chivalry. These

intended to protect public welfare. Daniel Waley, “A Blood Feud with a Happy Ending: Siena, 1285-1304”,
in City and Countryside in Late Medieval and Renaissance Italy: Essays in P.J. Jones (London:
Hambledon, 1990), 47: Waley argues that perpetuation of vendetta in Siena was a threat to the social
welfare of the city.
187
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 33. Tuscan Poetry of the Duecento, 145-147: Chiaro
Davanzati (ca.1280s-1303), a Florentine poet-warrior from an elite Guelf family, offers a similar
lamentation and critique of the violence of the elite: “Alas, Florence, that is the memory of / your sovereign
state and your freedom / that I just spoke about!, which is debased now, / changed into rudeness and forced
/ into suffering and servitude / by your sons with their corrupt behavior, / who, because they did not forgive
/ one another, have reduced you to a lowly condition. / Alas, where is the knowledge / and the merit and the
valor and the freedom? / Your great nobility, / I believe that it is asleep and resting at a bad place: he who
first pronounced the word “faction,” / may he be tormented among your sons!”.
188
Dean, “Marriage and Mutilation”, 24: Dean discusses the difficulties posed by using chronicles to study
vendetta.
189
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, vol. I, xviii-xix: James Hankins argues in his
introduction to the volume that Bruni believed that the desire for honor was a poor excuse to undertake war
and that the aristocratic obsession with honor is destructive when it was manifest in factionalism.
 78

popolani also associated chivalric violence with knighthood, at least before the Florentine

social institution was refashioned in the thirteenth century into a service knighthood,

maintaining the prestige of the dignity, but shedding its traditional martial and violent

attributes (see chapter one above).190 As a result of the socio-economic status and the

milieu in which the non-chivalric were raised, these authors bring to bear on their works

certain biases which naturally color their understanding and interpretation of the lifestyle

and violence of the chivalric elite.

A brief survey of the major chronicles reaps immediate benefits for our

understanding of the popolani perspective on chivalric violence. One of the first things

the careful reader notices is that Giovanni Villani and other contemporaries were struck

by the pervasiveness and magnitude of chivalric violence in late medieval Florentine

history. For example, when describing the events of 1248 Villani writes that the

Florentine nobles “were ever and again at war among themselves by reason of their

private enmities”.191 Likewise, when reflecting upon the comparatively uneventful year

of 1277, he observed that even in times of peace (or perhaps especially in peaceful

times), the Florentine chivalric elite (he uses the term grandi- magnates) were at each

other’s throats: “In these times the Guelf magnates of Florence- having rest from their

wars without, with victory and honor, and fattening upon the goods of the exiled

Ghibellines, and through other gains- by reason of pride and envy began to strive among

190
Najemy, A History of Florence, 12, 13: Najemy argues that the “culture of knighthood” was associated
with a courtly ethos that “linked the elite to the social world of the upper classes in both the Lombard
principalities to the north and the Neapolitan Kingdom to the south”. This “courtly ethos”, along with the
violent and self-aggrandizing aspects of the ideology of chivalry, were regarded with suspicion by the
popolani and eventually excised when they redefined the social institution of knighthood in late medieval
Florence.
191
Villani, 208: “e spesso si guerreggiassono tra loro di proprie nimistadi”.
 79

themselves; whence arose in Florence many quarrels and enmities between citizens, with

death and wounds”.192

Villani expresses similar sentiments in 1292, writing that the “magnates of

Florence were in greater broils and discords among themselves than ever before since the

Guelfs returned to Florence”.193 Likewise in 1303, when Florence was plagued by

“dissension and civil fighting” and “much evil was committed in the city and in the

country, of murders, and burnings, and robberies, as in a city ungoverned and disordered,

without any rule from the government, save that each should do all possible harm to the

other”.194 Villani adds that “the city would have utterly destroyed itself had not the

Lucchese come to Florence at the request of the commonwealth, with great number of

foot and horse; who took in hand the matter, and the guardianship of the city… so that for

sixteen days they freely ruled the city”.195

Giovanni Villani connected the violence of the Florentine chivalric elite with

worship of Mars, the Roman god of war, whose statue at the foot of the Ponte Vecchio in

192
Villani, 300: “In questi tempi i grandi guelfi di Firenze riposati delle guerre di fuori con vittorie e onori,
e ingrassati sopra i beni de’ ghibellini usciti, e per altri loro procacci, per superbia e invidia cominciarono a
riottare tra loro, onde nacquero in Firenze più brighe e nimistadi tra’ cittadini, mortali, e di fedite”. Dino
Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 13: Compagni also recognizes the pride of the Florentine warrior elite
as a problem, writing at one point that the nobles and great citizens of Florence were “swollen with pride”
following their victory at Campaldino in June 1289.
193
Villani, 370: “E questa novità e cominciamento di popolo, non sarebbe venuta fatta a’ popolani per la
potenzia de’ grandi, se non fosse che in que’ tempi i grandi di Firenze non furono tra loro in tante brighe e
discordie, poich’e’ guelfi tornarono in Firenze”.
194
Villani, 426: “Per la quale dissensione e battaglia cittadina, molto male si commise in città e contado di
micidii e d’arsioni e ruberie, siccome in città sciolta e rotta, sanza niuno ordine di signoria, se non chi più
potea far male l’uno all’altro; ed era la città tutta piena di sbanditi, e di forestieri, e contadini, ciascuna casa
colla sua raunata”.
195
Villani, 426. “ed era la terra per guastarsi al tuotto, se non fossono i Lucchesi che vennero a Firenze a
richiesta del comune con grande gente di popolo e cavalieri, e vollono in mano la questione e la guardia
della città”.
 80

Florence was the site of the murder of Buondelmonte de' Buondelmonti.196 Indeed,

alongside Florence’s well known political connections with Rome, the cities also shared

martial ties, with much of the civic discord plaguing the city blamed by contemporaries

on the influence of Mars.197 Even Dante makes this connection in Inferno (canto XIII),

when one of the suicides populating Hell suggests that Mars was offended when the

Florentines replaced him as patron with John the Baptist, so he afflicted the city with the

scourge of war.198 The influence of the Roman god of war aside, chroniclers and

contemporary writers were equally struck by the pervasive violence of Florentine

strenuous knights and arms bearers.199 Dino Compagni, writing earlier in the fourteenth

century, described the Florentine chivalric elite as “strong in arms, but discordant and

savage”,200 and lamented that they were seemingly determined to destroy themselves.201

According to contemporaries, Tuscans in general and Florentines in particular

seemed especially sensitive to the health of their honor and prone to seeking
196
Villani, 183-184: “And surely it shows that the enemy of the human race, for the sins of the Florentines,
had power in that idol of Mars, which the pagan Florentines of old were wont to worship, that at the foot of
his statue such a murder was committed, whence so much evil followed to the city of Florence”; “E bene
mostra che ’l nemico dell’umana generazione per le peccata de’ Fiorentini avesse podere nell’idolo di
Marti, ch’e’ Fiorentini pagani anticamente adoravano, che appiè della sua figura si commise sì fatto
micidio, onde tanto male è seguito alla città di Firenze”. The statue of Mars is discussed in Brendan
Cassidy, Politics, Civic Ideals and Sculpture in Italy, c.1240-1400 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), 101-102.
197
Cassidy, Politics, Civic Ideals and Sculpture in Italy, 101.
198
As discussed in Cassidy, Politics, Civic Ideals and Sculpture in Italy, 101. Dante, The Divine Comedy,
“Inferno”, 101 (lines 143-147): “I was of the city which changed its first patron / For John the Baptist; for
which reason the first / Will always try his tricks to make it grieve; / And if it were not that, at the crossing
of the Arno, / Some slight trace of his image still remains”.
199
Najemy, A History of Florence, 16: Najemy observes that the elite’s penchant for violence and vendetta
“was always the popolo’s first complaint against these overmighty families”.
200
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 23.
201
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 33: “Arise, wicked citizens full of discord: grab sword and
torch with your own hands and spread your wicked deeds. Unveil your iniquitous desires and your worst
intentions… Go and reduce to ruins the beauties of your city. Spill the blood of your brothers, strip
yourselves of faith and love, deny one another aid and support. Sow your lies, which will fill the granaries
of your children… Look at your ancestors: did they win merit through discord? Yet now you sell your
honors which they acquired.” In this Compagni displays a fundamental misunderstanding of chivalric
honor, which is first and foremost personal and familial, not communal.
 81

vengeance.202 For example, Benvenuto de Rambaldo de Imola, the author of a celebrated

commentary on Dante’s Divine Comedy, observed “though all men naturally tend toward

vendetta, the Florentines are especially ardent in this, both publicly and privately”.203

Giovanni Boccaccio shared the apprehension of his contemporary Benvenuto, which

suggests that they were reflecting a larger social concern. In Boccaccio’s prose romance,

Il Filocolo (ca.1335-1336), the hero, Florio, worries that he might be recognized while in

Rome and come under attack by aggrieved parties therein, “since these people have

Tuscan blood: they never forget an offense without avenging it first”.204

202
Kuehn, Law, Family, and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy, 80: Kuehn
argues that “Florentines’ first thoughts were of revenge. Those thoughts might be quickly dismissed, but
they were there, redolent with the cultural demands of offended honor”. Rustichello da Pisa’s Il Romanzo
Arturiano provides the useful example of Tristan, who after being taken prisoner and slated for execution,
laments that he cannot save himself through his prowess and deeds of arms, and thus will die a shameful
death: Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 312 (chapter 57, verses 19-20): “Tristano, vedendosi in
quell luogo, dove a nulla gli valevano la prodezza e la forza delle armi, e considerando la grande sfortuna
che gli era capitata, divenne furente e disperato, lamentando e piangendo la precoce fine delle sue imprese
di cavaliere. “Oh, signor Lancillotto!” esclamò, “voi non sapete la mia disgrazia, altrimenti mi libereste da
una morte così vergognosa per me, che non sono in grado di difendermi!””. Ilaria Taddei, “Recalling the
Affront: Rituals of War in Italy in the Age of the Communes,” in The Culture of Violence in Renaissance
Italy: Proceedings of the International Conference (Georgetown University at Villa Le Balze, 3-4 May,
2010), ed. Samuel Kline Cohn Jr. and Fabrizio Ricciardelli (Florence: Le Lettere, 2012), 81-98: Taddei
describes (p.95) Tuscany as “a true homeland for insults, not only in the context of military campaigns, but
also in the various spheres of city life”, as well as recognizing “the particularly intensive conflictive nature
of th[e] region”.
203
As quoted in Dean, “Marriage and Mutilation”, 6. Wickham, Courts and Conflicts in Twelfth-Century
Tuscany, 222: Chris Wickham, like Benvenuto de Rambaldo de Imola, suggests that violence was more
common in Florence than in other Tuscan cities like Lucca and Pisa.
204
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filocolo, 423. Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 34: Likewise,
Compagni observed that Charles of Anjou, the king of Naples (d.1285), “did not understand the Tuscans or
their malice”. Giovanni Boccaccio, The Fates of Illustrious Men, trans. L.B. Hall (New York: Frederick
Ungar Publishing Company, 1965), 19: In another of his works, Fates of Illustrious Men (ca.1355-1360),
Giovanni Boccaccio lamented man’s seemingly insatiable desire for revenge, “a common infirmity of
mankind”, which created self-perpetuating cycles of violence. Jansen, “Peacemaking in the Oltrarno”, 341:
Jansen notes that sometimes when warring parties decided to end these cycles of violence they employed a
notary to draft a peace contract. The evidence provided by Jansen, however, suggests that such a practice
may have been limited to non-elites. Indeed, Jansen essentially concedes this point when she argues (pages
342-343) that “peacemaking on the most basic level was not a matter of reconciling feuding magnates
rather, it was about restoring public order in local neighborhoods after an episode of violence had disturbed
the peace of the community”.
 82

Leonardo Bruni, writing in the first quarter of the fifteenth century, followed

Villani, Compagni, and others in criticizing the bloody violence of the “nobility” and

lamenting its deleterious effects on the city. According to Bruni, in 1279-1280 “the

nobility... were at each other’s throats. Families marched in long, armed cavalcades

through the city streets and were constantly involved in bloody fights, causing fear and

disturbance throughout the city”.205 Bruni, like his predecessors, mixed considerable

admiration for the chivalric lifestyle with outrage at its violent excesses. His criticisms,

however, are often couched in the language of civic humanism, a product of the dominant

cultural milieu in early-fifteenth century Florence. As a result of these humanistic

currents, Bruni concludes on a number of occasions that the behavior of the chivalric elite

is incompatible with civic life and thus unbefitting for the leaders of a republic.206

Sometimes he even singled out specific individuals, like Corso Donati, who despite being

“a man of great distinction, [was] too turbulent to be a citizen in a good republic”.207

205
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, vol. I, 287.
206
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, 221 (volume I), 201 (volume 2), 409 (volume 2) are
just a few examples. One of the primary goals of civic life was to increase the prosperity and grandezza of
the patria, goals that could be best realized through collective action and prioritization of the common
good. While they could be at least partially accomplished through “chivalric” means (e.g. successful
expansion through war, etc.), the warrior elite tended to be far more concerned with personal and familial
interests than those of the state. This fundamental change in mentality was the goal of many reformers,
including Brunetto Latini and Leonardo Bruni. See also chapters 5 and 6.
207
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, vol. I, 455. Bruni criticizes other knights by name,
including Charles of Anjou (page 311, volume I) who was “unquestionably a distinguished man, but far
more able in the arts of war than in those of peace”, as well as Pietro Saccone (page 201, volume II), the
lord of Arezzo (d.1355), who “truly outstanding in matters of war, but… less well adapted to civil
behavior”, and finally Bonifazio Lupo of Parma (ca.1361), the commander of the Florentine military
forces, who he described as “man of great ability and great knowledge of military affairs, but of such a free
and independent disposition that he paid no attention whatsoever to the citizens who had been seconded to
him as his counselors”. Storia Fiorentina di Ricordano Malispini. Dall’edificazione di Firenze fino al 1282.
Seguita poi da Giacotto Malispini fino al 1286. 2 vols, ed. Antonio Benci (Livorno: Torchi di Glauco Mas.,
1830), vol. 1, 303: Malispini also notes how the Florentine nobles often fought among themselves [cited
hereafter as Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina].
 83

Armed with these views and, perhaps, an incomplete understanding of chivalry,

authors often misrepresent acts of honor-violence as senseless violence defying

explanation or emphasize purely political and economic causes in an attempt to make

sense of apparently incomprehensible violence. As a result, popolani chronicles often

explain violent incidents as simply competitions for political power or access to

economic resources. When such connections can not be easily made the contexts of these

violent incidents are left shrouded in darkness. Even Ricordano Malispini (d.1290),

despite his noble birth, often fails to satisfy the historian’s desire for context. For

example, Malispini writes about a striking incident that occurred after the Florentine

Ghibellines had captured a number of Guelf exiles who had fought on the side of a

Lucchese army near Castiglione. Taken prisoner in this battle was “messer Cece

Bondelmonti by messer Farinata degli Uberti who was said to have saved/spared him”.208

The honorable treatment of chivalric warriors during battle will be examined below in

chapter four, but for our present purposes it is important to note that this custom was

violated by an act of private violence that is described by Malispini without any

explanation of motive: “however, Farinata’s brother, Piero Asino degli Uberti, killed him

in cold blood with a blow to the head”.209 The absence of any discussion of motive leavs

historians to speculate about the role of honor as a catalyst of violence.

Important recent scholarship on the general medieval phenomenon of chivalry has

provided historians with a methodology that allows us to open windows, however small,

208
Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, vol. 1, 405: “E messer Cece Bondelmonti vi fu preso: e
miseselo in groppa messer Farinata degli Uberti, che disse per scamparlo”.
209
Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, vol. 1, 405: “Ma messer Piero Asino degli Uberti gli diede
d’una mazza di ferro in testa, e in groppa del fratello l’uccise”.
 84

into the minds of strenuous knights and arms bearers. This can be accomplished by

studying imaginative chivalric literature, which “allows us to get inside the warriors’

heads, to learn their formative assumptions, their framework for interpreting the

world”.210 In other words, imaginative literature provides essential evidence about

traditional chivalric attitudes, ideals, and ideas, especially related to violence and honor,

allowing the modern reader to better understand the ideological underpinnings of and

motivations behind the bloody, showy violence of the Florentine warrior elite.

Late medieval Florentines and Italians produced and consumed a substantial

corpus of imaginative literature, composed in both French and Italian vernaculars, which

circulated the peninsula from the middle of the thirteenth century.211 While it is always

difficult to discuss what motivated historical figures, particularly from the distance of

many centuries, it is clear that the chivalric ideas, behaviors, and attitudes contained in

these works would have been very familiar to strenuous knights and arms bearers. In

addition, the promotion of behaviors and attitudes decidedly counter to the prevailing

civic culture of the period, which emphasized peace, prosperity, and the primacy of the

common good (see chapter three below), lends further emphasis to the argument that

these strenuous warriors formed the primary, if not always the explicitly stated, audience

of the abovementioned works.212 As a result, these works, like their counterparts north of

210
Kaeuper, “Literature as Essential Evidence for Understanding Chivalry”, 2.
211
Larner, “Chivalric Culture in the Age of Dante”, 118: Larner argues that Italian chivalry drew
inspiration from French models, although by Dante’s lifetime “must be seen as a fully naturalized and
domesticated product”.
212
While this is open for debate, I would argue that a study of the dominant themes, attitudes, and
behaviors found in these works suggests that they were crafted with a chivalric audience in mind. Certainly
many other Florentines, especially the non-martial social elite, would have enjoyed these works. For a
useful overview of medieval Italian Romance, see F. Regina Psaki, “Chivalry and Medieval Italian
 85

the Alps, provide historians with plentiful evidence for chivalric attitudes about the

honor-violence that was so central to the identity of the warrior elite.213

Chivalric Emotions

One of the most striking aspects of the chivalric lifestyle is the obvious joy

strenuous knights and arms bearers felt when using violence to both dominate others and

to realize personal desires and ambitions, usually at the expense of the collective.214

Richard Kaeuper has observed that knights, animated by a strong impulse to settle all

disputes by force, lived in a world that seemed “almost Hobbesian, with violence carried

out on any scale possible to achieve any end desired”.215 Joy was demonstrated when

great deeds of arms were accomplished through a knight’s prowess, or even more

prominently, when vengeance or the vindication of honor were realized. Indeed, the

joyous exercise of violence is a crucial aspect of chivalric culture, but rather than simply

a desire or need to indiscriminately shed blood (knights are not mindless berserkers), this

celebration of prowess and violence was a means to reinforce and erect barriers around

chivalric identity.

Romance”, in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Romance, ed. Roberta Krueger (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 203-218.
213
Larner, “Chivalric Culture in the Age of Dante”, 119: Larner argues that the values found within Italian
chivalric literature are those familiar from French chivalric literature.
214
This is reflected in the attitudes highlighted in imaginative literature. For example, in the Tristano
Panciatichiano, 545, the author relates the story of two knights who are fighting over a damsel, but they are
too busy attacking one another to notice that the damsel belongs to another knight and has disappeared. For
a discussion of the emotion of joy, see: Stephen W. White, “The Politics of Anger”, in Anger’s Past: The
Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages, ed. Barbara H. Rosenwein (Cornell University Press, 1998),
142-143.
215
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 159, 22.
 86

Emotions, like joy, anger, hatred, and fear appear with regularity in imaginative

literature, but are often left unstated in historical accounts.216 The careful historian can

detect emotions, however, in the descriptions of events and when, on occasion, authors

blame negative emotions like hatred and anger for the violence or disfunction of

Florentine society, as we have already seen in several of the examples discussed above.217

In one incident found in Donato Vellutti’s Cronica Domestica, the author claims that

Napoleone and Sandro di Lippaccio were motivated by mortal hatred when they made the

decision to have their cousin, Dino, son of Lambertuccio, killed.218 Hatred was also the

catalyst behind the private violence which Giovanni Villani describes in his Nuova

Cronica, especially when the Ghibellines allowed their “factious hatred” of their peers

among the Guelfs, manifest in their words and deeds, to influence their decision to

216
The current version of this project will not treat fear or love. Fear of the deleterious effects of shame
will, however, be considered below.
217
Daniel Lord Smail, The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2003), 14: Smail points out that “emotions or moral sentiments such as humiliation,
honor, and shame, though not often present as words, lurk just below the surface of texts”. J.K. Hyde,
“Contemporary Views on Faction and Civil Strife in thirteenth and fourteenth century Italy”, 276: Hyde
argues that contemporaries associated particular sins with particular groups and categories in society.
Likewise Lauro Martines (“Political Violence in the thirteenth century”, 333-334) argues that thirteenth
century chroniclers, though they tended to be moralists, “attributed the troubles and violence of their age to
defects in the moral makeup of citizens”. See also McGrath, “The Politics of Anger”, 61: McGrath argues
that when emotions, such as anger, do appear in historical and literary texts their representation can be
analyzed to understand how contemporary writers regarded the conduct of the individuals associated with
the emotions. Cf. White, “The Politics of Anger”, 137: White argues that when writers imputed anger to
specific people, they did so because they considered the emotion appropriate to a particular situation, rather
than because they had knowledge of their feelings.
218
La Cronica Domestica di Messer Donato Velluti scritta fra il 1367 e il 1370, con le addizioni di Paolo
Velluti, scritte fra il 1555 e il 1560, eds. Isidoro Del Lungo and Guglielmo Volpi (Florence: G.C. Sansoni,
1914), 94: “Dino, figliuolo del detto Lambertuccio, era di età di xx anni o più, quando morì… fu lasciato
per morto a Montelupo, essendo entrati in casa loro i Bostichi, i quali s’aveano a vendicare de’ Frescobaldi
per la morte di Buco Bostichi, il quale fu morto da Tommaso di Lippaccio di messer Lambertuccio. E
questo fu fatto, di vendicarsi sopra il detto Dino, con ordine e trattato di Napoleone e Sandro di Lippaccio:
e questo mi disse il detto Lambertuccio; e loro tenea per mortali nimici, avvegnadio che fossono cugini”
[cited hereafter as Donato Velluti, Cronica Domestica].
 87

participate in a military campaign against neighboring Pistoia.219 Likewise, Leonardo

Bruni laments that in the 1340s “Florentine citizens spurned their military

responsibilities, [instead] fighting one another, breeding feuds and hatreds”.220

These emotions played an important role in distinguishing the violence and

lifestyle of the Florentine chivalric elite from other elites, who, as we will see, also

engaged in the practices of vendetta and feuding,221 as well as the mass of commoners

below them in the social hierarchy.222 The emotions of anger, wrath, hatred, and a thirst

for vengeance “were structural pillars of chivalric ideology”,223 helping to fashion what

Maire Vigueur has called a “culture of hatred” among strenuous knights and arms bearers

219
Villani, 217: “animosità di parte”.
220
Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 263-265.
221
Smail, The Consumption of Justice, 94, 132: “The ability to have hostile emotions in public in any
society is usually the mark of a free and honorable individual” and “hatreds… were useless unless they are
advertised to a general public”. Zorzi, “‘Ius erat in armis’”, 617, 618: Zorzi argues that vendetta formed an
important element of the communal judicial system and that communal statutes did not prohibit vendetta,
but regulated it. The goal of vendetta for these other social groups was to pacify tensions and conclude
conflicts, allowing for the more important matters of politics and commerce. This was never the only or
main goal for the chivalric elite. See also idem, “Legitimation and Legal Sanction of Vendetta in Italian
Cities from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Centuries”, 27, 35, and 37: Zorzi argues vendetta was
institutionalized in late medieval Florence and something that was exercised by men at all levels of society
(i.e. all violence was equal): “Vendetta and feuding were practices within the reach of anyone who could
afford them, regardless of social origin” and “Vendetta was exacted by those who could afford its material
and symbolic costs as well as its social and political consequences”. In addition, vendetta was a matter to
be debated with allies before action was taken. As such, vendetta was a “planned strateg[y], or, in other
words the opposite of impulsive acts”. This, of course, does not take into consideration the emotional snap
reactions of the chivalric elite whose first reaction tended to be the use of violent force. See also White,
“The Politics of Anger”, 139, 140: White argues emotions are often performed publicly in order to make
enmities public knowledge, and that most public displays of anger are carried out by noblemen. In addition,
public displays of anger about an enemy’s actions serves to declare that those actions have caused the
recipient harm (i.e. dishonor), providing them with the publicly recognized right to take revenge. Dean,
“Marriage and Mutilation”, 21: Dean argues that Florentine merchants weighed the costs of different
responses, including vendetta, rather than responding immediately with violence. This quick recourse to
violence was, of course, the modus operandi of the chivalric elite.
222
Paul Freedman, “Peasant Anger in the Late Middle Ages”, in Anger’s Past: The Social Uses of an
Emotion in the Middle Ages, ed. Barbara Rosenwein (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), 171-190.
223
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 309: these emotions are closely associated with “the basic chivalric
concerns about acquiring and preserving honor and status and avoiding dreaded shame”. McGrath, “The
Politics of Chivalry”, 61: By looking at the “rhetoric of anger” historians can access the system of honor
and shame that animated the chivalric elite.
 88

in late medieval Italy.224 Public demonstrations of angry violence, such as the chivalric

elite’s attack upon those popolani who marched as part of the guild procession

celebrating St. John's Eve (1289), helped set the chivalric elite apart from their social

peers.225

Alongside joy, anger and the insatiable thirst for vengeance are among the most

pervasive emotions in the world of chivalry. These emotions served as powerful catalysts

of the bloody, showy violence that is at the very core of chivalric identity. Despite

occasional incidents that suggest otherwise, knights and arms bearers were not mindless

killers, of course, unable to control their emotions.226 Yet anger is closely connected to

vengeance, the defense and vindication of honor, which could drive men to employ

violence. When members of the chivalric elite suffered dishonor or shame, their peers (in

a positive sense) and society at large (in a negative one) expected them to react with

224
Vigueur, Cavalieri e Cittadini, 388-406.: Vigueur points out that hatred is a legacy transferred from one
generation to another, perpetuating competition and conflict between lineages: “gli odi che si trasmettono
da una generazione all’altra con il loro strascico di violenze e di rappresaglie riempiono dei loro clamori la
storia interna delle città italiane”. Fabrizio Ricciardelli, “Violence and Repression in Late Medieval Italy,”
in The Culture of Violence in Renaissance Italy: Proceedings of the International Conference (Georgetown
University at Villa Le Balze, 3-4 May, 2010), ed. Samuel Kline Cohn Jr. and Fabrizio Ricciardelli
(Florence: Le Lettere, 2012), 55-80: Ricciardelli also calls attention to a “political climate… full of
violence and hate” which made it impossible for “communal legislation [to] prohibit the practice of
vendetta” (p.56). Indeed, Ricciardelli is also of the opinion that violence was part of the fabric of late
medieval Italian society: “Late medeival writers make recurrent reference to violence as part of a citizen’s
education. From sources, it is evident that politicians shared, diffused, and accepted the practice of violence
to pacify the political arena” (p. 57).
225
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 24: Compagni writes that “Some magnates laid their hands on
them and struck them, saying “We are the ones who were responsible for the victory at [the battle of]
Campaldino, yet you have taken from us the offices and honors of our city””.
226
Franco Sacchetti, Il Trecentonovelle, ed. E. Faccioli (Torino: Einaudi, 1970), 321-322: In novella
CXXII, Sacchetti writes about messer Giovanni da Negroponte, who after losing everything in a dice game
(zara), sought vengeance against the dice maker: “Messer Giovanni of Negroponte, a very great and brave
man of the court [i.e. courtier], having one day lost all that he possessed at zara, in the heat of his anger and
under the impulse of the game, took a knife and went to seek a maker of dice, and killed him”; “Messer
Giovanni da Negroponte, avendo un di perduto a zara ciò ch’egli avea, essendo grandissimo e valente
uomo di corte, caldo caldo, con l’ira e con l’impeto del giuoco, andò con un coltello a trovare uno che facea
dadi, e si l’uccise.”. This likely apocryphal story is almost certainly a commentary on the violence of the
Florentine elite.
 89

anger and seek violent vengeance. This expectation encouraged these men to eschew

more peaceful and publicly acceptable forms of vindication in favor of violence.

This combination of anger and an almost visceral need for vengeance is often

presented in imaginative literature as more powerful than fear of injury and death,

especially when honor is on the line. For example, in the Arthurian prose compilation

Tristano Panciatichiano, anonymously composed in Florence in the early fourteenth

century, the former lord of the Joyous Guard pursued vengeance against Lancelot

because the famous knight had defeated him and taken his castle. Anger and need for

revenge allows the knight to overcome his fear of death in order to fight Lancelot.227 A

similar situation unfolds when Tristan and Dinadan stay at the house of a fellow knight.

When their host discovered Tristan’s identity, he became very angry because Tristan had

killed his brother.228 The host’s anger and determination to secure vengeance is so deeply

felt that he refuses to call off his vendetta, not even for fear of death. After Tristan easily

defeats him in battle, the man in his rage continues to attack Tristan.229 Even if historical

knights could not so easily shed their fear of death, the behavior and attitudes of literary

flowers of chivalry would have served as an example of an ideal knighthood that centered

on the steadfast pursuit of vengeance in defense of personal and familial honor.

In another incident in the same text, two knights of the Round Table, Erec and

Percival, demonstrate varying degrees of anger when they come into conflict with Breus,

an infamously dishonorable knight (see chapter five below). When Erec witnesses Breus
227
Tristano Panciatichiano, 332/333.
228
Tristano Panciatichiano, 482/483: “Allora fu tutto adirato si forte che lascia tutto lo bere et lo mangiare,
perciò ch’elli si ricorda certamente et veramente conosce che questi era Tristano di Cornovaglia c’avea
ucciso uno suo fratello carnale in Cornovaglia”.
229
Tristano Panciatichiano, 482/483-486/487.
 90

attack Bliobleris, who is injured and on foot, Erec is enraged, calling Breus “a wicked

and disloyal” knight.230 Similarly, Percival feels great anger when he sees a mounted

Breus attack his companion, Erec, who is on foot. In his anger, Percival swears to take

vengeance.231 In La legenda e storia di messere Prodesagio, the eponymous hero feels

intense anger when he sees his friend Moratto killed in battle. As in our other examples,

Prodesagio’s anger fuels his desire for revenge.232 A similar reaction occurs in

Rustichello da Pisa’s Il Romanzo Arturiano when Tristan sees his fellow knights of the

Round Table defeated in single comabt by Branor il Bruno, the Old Knight (Vecchio

Cavaliere). Rustichello writes that “Tristan, after he saw many of his companions fall to

the ground, and above all those who were held to be valorous knights, was furious, and

could no longer take it”, but prepared himself to avenge the dishonor suffered by

friends.233

The great danger associated with anger, of course, is that it will go uncontrolled

by the reformative tenets of chivalric ideology, namely prudence or restraint (see chapter

five above). Such unrestrained anger, usually described as wrath or rage, presented a

grave danger to all. For example at one point in the Tristano Panciatichiano, Lancelot is

so angry that he can barely restrain himself from attacking the king of Norgales and his

knights in order to secure vengeance. The cause of this uncontrolled anger is a

230
Tristano Panciatichiano, 404/405: “Allora dice Erec, “Certo, cavalieri, voi non sete mica leale; anzi sete
disleale e fellone!””.
231
Tristano Panciatichiano, 404/405: “Et quando Prezzivalle vide questo colpo, elli non si puote tenere e
dice, “Cavalieri, voi avete molto fallito, ma, se Dio piace, voi ne serete tosto pentuto.””.
232
La legenda e storia di messere Prodesagio, 17.
233
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 299 (7.1-2), my translation: “Tristano, dopo che ebbe visto
cadere a terra tanti suoi compagni, e soprattutto coloro che stimava essere valorosi cavalieri, ando al colmo
dell’ira, e non potÉ più tenersi… io andrò a giostrare contro il cavaliere per vendicare l’offesa dei miei
compagni”.
 91

conversation he overheard in which the king asserts that Lancelot is “not so valiant” and

that he can easily defeat the famous knight. Lancelot, of course, goes on to vanquish the

knights, but in his uncontrolled rage he finally kills some of them.234 Hector, the Trojan

hero of the Historia Destructionis Troiae, composed in Sicily by Guido della Colonne

around 1287, likewise proves unable on numerous occasions to “restrain the anger of his

heart”, leading him “in his fury” to rush recklessly into battle (see chapter four below for

a discussion of chivalric emotions in the realm of formal warfare).235 Even a literary

flower of chivalry like Tristan can succumb to the powerful influence of anger and

hatred. At one point in Il Romanzo Arturiano Tristan and his companions defeat a

number of knights and put them to flight. Tristan is so overcome by his hatred for the

knights and the customs of their land that he chases after them seeking to inflict further

humiliation upon them.236 Notably, this unrestrained anger passes without comment by

the author.

Indeed, authors of imaginative chivalric literature, like those of traditional

historical works, demonstrate a great awareness of the danger posed by the unrestrained

anger of knights. As a result, chivalric heroes, like Polydamas, son of Antenor, receive

effusive praise when they show restraint and moderation alongside their prowess. Guido

describes Polydamas as “very brave and strong and extremely powerful in arms; although

234
Tristano Panciatichiano, 336/337.
235
Guido della Colonne, Historia Destructionis Troiae, 133 (lines 393-396).
236
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 327 (108.21-23): “I quattro compagni, accaldati e incolleriti,
quando videro che gli abitanti del paese si davano in tal modo all fuga, tennero loro dietro, forti di dutto il
mortale odio che avevano per il malvagio costume istituito in quel luogo allo scopo di umiliare I cavalieri
erranti. Fecero loro pagare molto cara quella fellonia, abbattendo e uccidendo i cavalieri, e umiliando e
disonorando gli abitanti di quel paese con la forza di soli quattro uomini”.
 92

he was rapidly roused to anger, he was curbed by great moderation”.237 Likewise the

famous Florentine knight, Farinata degli Uberti, is immortalized in historical and literary

works, like those of Compagni, Villani, and Dante Alighieri, as well as in a triumphant

statue that still stands today near the Uffizi and Ponte Vecchio, because he demonstrated

incredible restraint in convincing his fellow Ghibellines to spare the city of Florence after

their victory over the Guelfs at the battle of Montaperti in 1260.238

In contrast, those literary and historical knights who fail to control their anger are

described in tones dripping with lamentation and regret. For example, Duke Nestor is

described in the Historia Destructionis Troiae as “tall in stature, with large limbs and

thick arms, most eloquent in speaking, intelligent and practical and always distinguished

for trustworthy advice”. Unfortunately he was also “easily irritated, and, once provoked

to anger, could not be restrained by moderation”.239 The examples of Corso Donati and

Guido Cavalcanti described above confirm that historical knights and arms bearers also

experienced the powerful influence of anger.240

237
Guido della Colonne, Historia Destructionis Troiae, 85 (lines 254-256).
238
Despite this praise of Farinata, Bruni is quick to point out that Farinata was not forgiving toward his
enemies- Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 183: “man of lofty spirit who
always kept his eye fixed on nobler things, yet he behaved more unforgivingly towards his adversaries than
is consistent with the moderation of civilized conduct”.
239
Guido della Colonne, Historia Destructionis Troiae, 83 (lines 172-176).
240
Hatred was closely associated with anger. In literary and historical sources alike, deep-seated hatred
between two or more individuals is often reported as the cause of violence among the warrior elite. In Il
Romanzo Arturiano, Tristan and Palamedes reportedly hate each other so much that there can be no peace
between them. Both maintain that only a battle to the death will end their hatred: Rustichello da Pisa, Il
Romanzo Arturiano, 308 (42.9-21). Likewise, after his uncle Taulas is killed by one of Arthur’s men, Elis il
Rosso, in his anger, attacks every knight of the Round Table he comes across, taking these knights prisoner
or putting them to death: Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 316 (68.11). Later in the same work
Tristan and his friends defeat Elis, he goes “almost crazy with anger”- Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo
Arturiano, 316 (70.5): “Allora Eils, vedendo I suoi uomini così malridotti, quasi non impazzi dalla rabbia”.
In another example, again involving Tristan, the Signore della Rocca initially felt such intense hatred for
the hero that he wanted nothing other than to fight. him: Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 322
(92.14-15): “Mi è forza tornare indietro, che lo voglia o no, perché più avanti sta il mio acerrimo nemico.
 93

Related is a deeply embedded fear of shame which spurred action. Avoiding

shame served as a major source of chivalric violence, as the chivalric elite strove to

escape its deleterious effects. Among the many sources of shame, knights and arms

bearers worried particularly about the ignominy which stemmed from being perceived as

a coward.241 In the Tristano Panciatichiano, Dinadan, arguably a voice of restraint and

prudence in a chivalric world of bravado and reckless violence, is forced against his

wishes to fight the King of the Hundred Knights over possession of a helmet which was

given to him by Iseut (Isolde). Dinadan prefers to give up the helmet without a fight, but

decides against this course of action when he contemplates the great humiliation and

shame he would suffer.242 Later in the same work, Yvain, also a knight renown for his

great prudence and restraint, is forced to fight Palamedes in order to avenge his

companions, who had ignored his earlier counsel of prudence and attacked Palamedes.

Yvain, constrained by the deep aversion to dishonor and shame inculcated in knights and

arms bearers by chivalric ideology, realizes he must fight in order to avoid accusations of

cowardice and shame.243

Historical examples confirm that Florentine knights and arms bearers felt a

similar aversion to the dishonor and shame associated with cowardice. Villani relates

Egli mi porta un odio così feroce che per nessuna cosa al mondo rinuncerebbe ad uccidermi, ovunque mi
possa trovare”.
241
P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 13:
Bourdieu argues that “if a man refuses to take up [a] challenge because of his weakness or lack of courage,
he is in a sense choosing to be the author of his own dishonor which is then irremediable”. Cf. McGrath,
“The Politics of Chivalry”, 63: Inaction was considered shameful and could ruin fama. Likewise White
argues (“The Politics of Anger”, 144) that those who fail to show anger when their honor has been
impugned were “open to criticism and are liable to being shamed by their friends and goaded into anger”.
There was an expectation that the chivalric elite would respond to any affront to their honor with public
anger and violent vengeance.
242
Tristano Panciatichiano, 488/489.
243
Tristano Panciatichiano, 576/577-578/579.
 94

how before a battle against the Sienese in the Colle di Valdelsa in 1269 Messer

Giambertaldo, the Florentine captain of war, took the standard of the commonwealth of

Florence and demanded of the gathered knights and men at arms of Florence,

"amongst whom were representatives of all the Guelf houses, that one of them
should take it; but none advanced to take it, whether through cowardice or
through jealousy… and after they had been a long time in suspense, M.
Aldobrandini, of the house of Pazzi, boldly stepped forward and said: ‘I take it to
the honor of God and of the victory of our commonwealth;’ wherefore he was
much commended for his boldness; and straightway he advanced, and all the
horsemen followed him, and struck boldly into the ranks of the Sienese".244

Indeed, Villani makes it clear that the Florentine knights and arms bearers of the Guelf

party made “great slaughter of their enemies to avenge their kinsfolk and friends which

were slain [by their chivalric peers among the Ghibelline party] at the defeat of

Montaperti (1260); and none, or scarce any, did they lead to prison, but put them all to

death and to the sword”.245

II. Chivalry and Honor-Violence

Chivalric ideology praised the bloody and showy violence performed by knights

and arms bearers, especially when personal and familial honor were at stake.246 Paolo

244
Villani, 283: “prendendo messer Giambertaldo la ’nsegna del Comune del Firenze, e richeggendo I
cavalieri di Firenze che v’erano di tutte le case guelfe, ch’alcuno di loro la prendesse, e nullo si movea a
prenderla, o per viltà o per gara l’uno dell’altro, e stato gran pezza alla contesa, messer Aldobrandino della
casa de’ Pazzi francamente si trasse avanti e disse: “Io la rendo a l’onore d’Iddio, e di vittoria del nostro
Comune”; onde fu molto comendato in franchezza, e incontanente mosse, e tutta la cavalleria seguendolo, e
francamente percosse alla schiera de’ Sanesi”.
245
Villani, 283-284: “faccendo grande uccisione de’ nimici per vendetta di loro parenti e amici che
rimasono alla sconfitta a Monte Aperti; quasi nullo o pochi ne menarono a pregioni, ma gli misono a morte
e alle spade”.
246
H. Moxnes, “Honor and Shame,” in The Social Sciences and New Testament Interpretation, ed. Richard
L. Rohrbaugh (Peabody: Hendrickson Publishers, 1996), 26: Moxnes argues that honor and shame “are not
static, unchangeable concepts, but rather expressions of social and cultural relations, changing with various
cultures and within cultures according to… class [and] status”. Not surprisingly, honor and shame were
 95

Certaldo, a thirteenth century Tuscan moralist, wrote, despite his personal objections to

the practice, that “the first joy [in life] is making vendetta; sorrow is to be offended by

one’s enemy”.247 Contemporary proverbs (ammaestramenti) like “It is an insult in itself

for those who are inured not to seek vengeance” (“Ingiuria fa quegli che ingiuria non

vendica”) and “Those who fear to seek vengeance will do much wrong” (“chi di

vendicarsi teme molti ne farà malvagi”) confirm this sentiment.248 Bono Giamboni

likewise wrote that revenge is the “virtue by which everyone is allowed to vanquish his

enemy”.249 These striking observations no doubt reflected a contemporary obsession with

and concern about the pervasive practice of violent vengeance in late medieval Tuscany

and Italy.

Since traditional historical sources dilineate the chivalric violence which pervaded

late medieval Florentine society, but do not provide much insight into the motivation and

mentality behind these acts, historians of chivalry often must turn to contemporary works

of imaginative literature. Again, the attitudes and behaviors appearing in these works

suggest that Florentine knights and arms bearers felt a need to use violence to assert,

defend, and vindicate honor. Moreover, those chivalrous warriors who fulfilled this

important “elements in the conflicts between various groups, that [sought] to influence and dominate
society”.
247
Quoted in Kuehn, Law, Family, and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy, 80.
Waley, “A Blood Feud with a Happy Ending”, 47-48: Waley argues that vendetta was not merely an
institution that was tolerated, rather individuals who failed to carry it on when appropriate were thought
despicable. Indeed, it was widely recognized in late medieval Italy that “he who fails to avenge a wrong
committs a wrong”.
248
Quoted in Zorzi, “Legitimation and Legal Sanction of Vendetta in Italian Cities from the Twelfth to the
Fourteenth Centuries”, 43.
249
As quoted in Ricciardelli, “Violence and Repression in Late Medieval Italy”, 58.
 96

obligation are inundated with praise in these literary works, commendation that no doubt

encouraged historical knights to emulate their examples.250

Indeed, the significant popularity of imaginative chivalric literature in Florence

and Italy raised the great danger that historical knights might follow suit, if on a more

possible and realistic scale. Tristan's example in particular had power; he ranked as one

of the great flowers of idealized chivalry in Italy and his vengeance worked through

bloody and exaggerated violence.251 Tristan and his fellow literary knights reinforced

through their example time and time again that failure to avenge dishonor produced

shame, a fate worse than death. Historical knights, knew this as well as their literary

counterparts, and as a result, in the minds of the chivalric elite justified carnage could

actually bring praise.252

Although this attitude is for the most part dominant across the large corpus of

Tuscan/Italian imaginative chivalric literature, we do find in these works faint traces of

fear about the consequences of honor-violence. These undertones of concern usually take

the form of ambivalence when famous knights killed or maimed one another for

seemingly trivial reasons or because they failed to recognize one another, being blinded

250
In this emphasis upon imaginative chivalric literature’s valorization of violence as praiseworthy and
honorable differs from the work of Franco Cardini, who conceives of chivalry as ultimately a positive
force, a unifying and pacifying force against to the anarchy of the High Middle Ages. In an interesting
chapter he identifies with the “anti-knight” the behaviors which I argue are actively promoted and praised
by imaginative literature: Franco Cardini, Guerre di primavera: Studi sulla cavalleria e la tradizione
cavalleresca (Florence: Le Lettere, 1992), 209-222. With that being said, Franco Cardini’s is an important
contribution to the study of chivalric literature and social behavior in late medieval Italy.
251
Larner, “Chivalric Culture in the Age of Dante”, 124: “Heroes of chivalric literature served as models
for Italians, especially as a continual source of moral reference”. For the incredible popularity of Tristan in
late medieval Italy, see the work of Daniele Delcorno Branca, especially Tristano e Lancillotto in Italia:
Studi di letteratura arturiana (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1998).
252
Compare the positive judgment of Tristan’s violenc with the decidedly negative assessment of Raoul’s
violence in “Raoul of Cambrai”, in Heroes of French Epic, ed. and trans. Michael Newth (Boydell and
Brewer, 2005), 177-280.
 97

by wrath or lust for glory.253 The careful reader senses that the plethora of violence

depicted in the substantial corpus of works imaginative chivalric literature reflected both

the violent reality of the chivalric lifestyle and a contemporary concern within society

about the chivalric elite’s obsession with violence.

For example, in the Tristano Riccardiano, Governal, Tristan’s tutor and guardian,

expresses his concern that the young hero seemed determined to fight every knight he

encountered.254 Later in the same work Lamorak, a fellow knight of the Round Table,

criticizes Tristan’s obsession with demonstrating his prowess and defending his honor

through bloody violence, claiming that he wanted to “to kill all other knights”.255

Lamorak himself is guilty in the Tristano Riccardiano of fighting over matters of honor

that might seem trivial to a modern audience. In one illuminating incident Lamorak

fought his own brother to prove that the Queen of Orcanie was more beautiful than Isolde

the Blonde.256 In another Lamorak found himself fighting Maleagant over whether Queen

Guinevere or Queen Isolde the Blonde was more beautiful.257

253
Dante also shows a certain amount of ambivalence toward a man of violence, specifically messer
Farinata degli Uberti, a man both hated and loved by contemporary and later Florentines. Dante Alighieri,
The Divine Comedy, 71, 85-89: In Dante’s Inferno, canto VI, Dante, through the guise of Ciacco, praises
Farinata “who w[as] so excellent” and set his “mind on doing well”. In Inferno, canto X, we can see
Dante’s admiration for Farinata who was brave in battle, but ready to shed party loyalty for love of his city.
254
Tristano Riccardiano, 97: “Tristan called on Governal to bring his arms; he brought them at once and
said, “Tristan, if you want to fight all the knights of the kingdom of Logres, you will be very busy”; “E
Tristano sì chiamoe Governale e ffassi venire l’arme, e d egli sì glila portoe tantosto e dissegli: - Tristano,
se ttue vuogli kombattere kon tutti li cavalieri de rreame di Longres, assai avrai ke ffare”.
255
Tristano Riccardiano, 293: “By my faith, Tristan, I see now that you have struck me twice when you
should not; I never saw any knight who wanted to kill all other knights, as you are doing”; “Per mia fé,
Tristano, ora conosco io bene ke voi sì m’avete ferito due fiate e ssì kome voi non dovete, impercioe k’io
non vidi unqua neuno kavaliere il quale volesse menare a morte tutti li cavalieri, sì come fate voi”.
256
Tristano Riccardiano, 153: “Lamorak began to say to his brother, “My lady the queen of Orcanie is
more beautiful than my lady Isolde.” But his relative began to say that Queen Isolde was more beautiful
than the queen of Orcanie. Lamorak answered, “By my faith, if you were not my blood relation I would
prove it to you by force of arms that my lady the queen of Orcanie is more beautiful than Isolde the
Blonde.” And his cousin answered and said, “If you were not my blood relation, I would prove it to you by
 98

In Rustichello da Pisa’s Il Romanzo Arturiano Sir Kay (Keu) the Seneschal

demonstrates a very touchy sense of honor when he asserts that Tristan has challenged his

honor by refusing out of contempt to respond to his challenges to engage in armed

combat. In reality Tristan is lost in his own thoughts and grief after being separated from

Isolde, and doesn’t even realize Sir Kay desires to fight him until he is struck unawares

by a mighty blow.258 In another incident, Tristan is so insulted by a knight who seeks to

force of arms that my lady Isolde is more beautiful than the queen of Orcanie.””; “io diroe k’egl’ée
l’Amoratto di Gau<l>es e uno suo fratello. E l’Amoratto incomincia a dire inkontra a ssuo frate: - Più bella
èe madonna la reina d’Organia ke nonn- è madonna Isotta. – E lo cugino incomincioe a dire ke ppiù bella
èe la reina Isotta ke nonn-è quella d’Organia. Ed allora rispuose l’Amoratto e disse: - Per mia fé, se ttue
non fossi mio cuscino, io ti lo proverei per forza d’arme ke madonna la reina d’Organia èe più bella ke
nonn-èe Isotta la Bionda. – E ssuo cuscino rispuose e disse: - Se non fosse ke ttue see mio cuscino, io lo
proverei a ttei e per forza d’arme e ke madonna Isotta èe più bella ke nonn- è la reina d’Orcania”.
257
Tristano Riccardiano, 315-317: “when Meleagant heard these words, he said, “Lamorak, tell me, so help
you God, how many ladies there are in the world who are as beautiful as my lady Queen Guinevere? She
surpasses all the other ladies in beauty, so there is no lady in the world to compare to her.” When Lamorak
heard these words, he was really very displeased, and said, “By my faith, Meleagant, my lady Isolde the
Blonde is far more beautiful than my lady Queen Guinevere; and the lady of Orcanie is also more beautiful
than the lady you praise so highly.” When Meleagant heard these words he became haughty and said, “By
my faith, Lamorak, I will prove to you by force of arms that Queen Guinevere is far more beautiful than the
lady of Orcanie, of whome you speak.” But when Lamorak heard his lady disparaged so spitefully, he was
more furious than any other man could be, and said, “By my faith, Meleagant, I will prove to you by force
of arms that the lady of Orcanie is infinitely more beautiful than Queen Guinevere whom you praise so
highly.” At this poin the tale tells that when the knights had argued at length about this, they challenged
each other”; “Ma quando Meliaguz intese queste parole, disse: - Amorat, dittemi, se dDio vi salvi, e quante
dame sono al mondo ke ssiano tanto belle quant’èe mia dama la reina Ginevra? La quale passa tutte l’altre
dame di bellezze, onde nonn àe neuna dama al mondo ke a llei si possa appareggiare. – E quando
l’A[mora]t intese queste parole, fue molto doloroso e disse: - Per mia fé, Meliaguz, mia dama Isotta la
Bionda èe assai più bella ke nonn- è mia dama la reina Ginevra, e anche èe vie più bella la dama d’Orcania
ke nonn- èe quella, laonde voi tanto parlate. – E quando Meliaguz intese queste parole, fue molto
innarcoglito e disse: - Per mia fé, Amoratto, io il ti proveroe per forza d’arme sì come <la reina Ginevra è
assai più bella che non èe la dama d’Organia sì come> voi dite. – Ma quando l’Amoratto udio dispregiare
la sua dama kotanto malvagiamente, fue tanto doloroso ke neuno altro piue di lui e disse: - Per mia fé,
Meliaguz, io vi proveroe per forza d’arme che la dama d’Organia è assai più bella che nonn- èe la reina
Ginevra, onde voi tanto parlate.-”.
258
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 352 (chapter 200, verses 8-17, chapter 201, verses 1-3): “Dio
mio, aiutami!”, fece il cavaliere [i.e. Keu], “per mia fe’! Non ho mai incontrato un cavaliere orgoglioso
come questo, che non si degna nemmeno di rispondermi. Che possa essere disgraziato, se non riuscirò a
farlo pentire di questa follia!”… “Keu… spronò il cavallo e si diresse verso Tristano. Lo colpì così forte
che lo disarcionò”.
 99

shame all knights from Cornwall that he declares violence is the only way to repair the

discord and avenge the dishonor done to him.259

Fear and anxiety about chivalric violence emerge in both imaginative literature

and historical accounts. In the latter chivalric violence was condemn rather than praised,

but in the former these concerns and critiques are largely washed out in a diluge of praise

for honor asserted and defended. Indeed, in the minds of the chivalric elite, honor was

important enough to justify such and destructive violence. Moreover, this violence also

served as a public demonstration of an individual’s right to be counted among the warrior

elite, an affirmation of his privileged practice of violence. Compagni wrote that Corso

Donati, the Florentine knight and potentate, believed he deserved power and social

preeminence because “he was a most valiant knight in everything he undertook”.260 This

attitude was not only difficult to change, but also posed a serious threat to public order

and peaceful governance in the commune of Florence.

The influence of chivalry was sufficiently strong that strenuous knights and arms

bearers strove to retain this belief even when cut off from the font of political power or in

exile. Such fates were quite common in late medieval Florence as members of the

chivalric elite fell victim to the punative legal designation of magnate (grandi), an

identity centered on violence and knighthood. Individuals and families who succeeded in

maintaining their identities under such circumstances were the recipients of admiration.

For example, Compagni expresses a mix of respect and awe for the Uberti family, who

259
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 353 (chapter 204, verses 3, 6, 7): “Ma ormai dovete battervi
per forza,” disse Tristano, “e non crediate di scapparmi con le parole… in altri modi non si può pore riparo
al nostro disaccordo”.
260
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 59-60.
 100

“For more than forty years… had been rebels against their country, and found neither

mercy nor peace. Even in exile they kept great state and never diminished their honor, for

they always associated with kings and lords and dedicated themselves to great

undertakings”.261 Contemporaries often lamented the decline of those who struggled or

failed to maintain the former glory of their houses. Either way, the chivalric elite, unlike

their counterparts among the popolani, did not need the state to serve as the font of honor

or to validate the honor possessed or received from their peers or superiors among the

chivalry of medieval Europe.

Naturally, the competition over honor and power led to considerable conflict

between strenuous knights and arms bearers, both in the city of Florence and in the

contado. For example, in 1300, the Cerchi faction attacked Corso Donati and his allies in

the piazza of San Piero Maggiore. Villani writes that the Cerchi and their allies “were

stoutly resisted and driven back and wounded [by the Donati]”, with Villani adjudging

that this was “to the shame and dishonor of the Cerchi and their followers”.262 Later that

same year, the Donati and Cerchi almost came to blows at a funeral, but were stopped by

the common people who armed themselves and intervened.263 A year later, when discord

erupted between members of the Black Guelfs, Compagni identified messer Corso as the

source: “They [the other Blacks] feared his proud spirit and energy, and did not believe

that he could be satisfied with a share of power. So messer Corso gathered many sorts of

261
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 56.
262
Villani, 398: “ov’era messer Corso co’suoi consorti e raunata, da’quali furono riparati, e rinacciati, e
fediti con onta e vergogna de’ Cerchi e de’loro seguaci”.
263
Villani, 398: “Avenne che del mese di dicembre seguente, andando messer Corso Donati e suoi seguaci,
e que’ della casa de’ Cerchi e loro seguaci armati a una morta di casa i Frescobaldi, sguardandosi insieme
l’una parte e l’altra, si vollono assalire, onde tutta la gente ch’era alla morta si levarono a romore”.
 101

people to his side… When messer Corso had rebuilt his faction, they began to speak more

arrogantly in the piazzas and in the councils”.264 Indeed, the closer these men came to

political power and the greater the honor at stake, the more likely they were to engage in

a violent struggle for predominance, conflict that had the potential to destroy the entire

city.265

Strenuous knights and arms bearers, influenced by chivalric ideology, employed

violence in a number of contexts involving personal and familial honor. The remainder of

this chapter will examine three particularly important themes: first, chivalric violence

employed by strenuous knights and arms bearers in order to assert their personal and

familial honor or to win approbation and thus enhance their extant honor; second,

chivalric violence employed in order to defend personal and familial honor or to avenge

dishonor suffered; and third, the consequences of shame: the failure to avenge dishonor

resulted in the loss of identity. Each of these applications of honor-violence also served to

confirm a knight’s or arms bearer’s identity and membership among the chivalric elite.

264
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 82.
265
Villani, 430-431: Villani describes the massive fire that was started during the fighting between the
Cerchi and Donati in 1304 which destroyed whole city blocks. Zorzi, “‘Ius erat in armis’”, 612, 616: Zorzi
argues that conflict between individuals was not only normal, but inevitable, although he also asserts that
vendetta and feud were organized violence that were actually good for society, emphasizing control rather
than the proliferation of undisciplined violence. Waley, “A Blood Feud with a Happy Ending”, 47, 48:
Waley agrees, arguing that “the statutes of Italian communes reflected the view that feud should be limited
when possible, through the encouragement of formal pacifications and by limiting the lateral extension
within families concerned”. Florentine law did not prohibit vendetta but insisted upon proportional
reprisals. In other words, it was highly organized violence that encouraged social order and relieved
tensions when properly regulated.
 102

Chivalric Violence and the Pursuit of Honor

The seemingly insatiable desire of strenuous knights and arms bearers to prove

and enhance their honor through armed combat is one of the most prevalent themes in

works of imaginative chivalric literature. Likewise, numerous incidents of prowess in

action appear in traditional historical sources.266 In one illuminating example, taking

place on Christmas Day 1301, Simone, the son of Corso Donati, attacked his uncle,

Nicola de’ Cerchi, while he crossed the plaza of Santa Croce after praying in the church.

Bruni, looking back from the early fifteenth-century, described the incident in the

following way: “When Simone, the young son of Corso Donati followed messer Niccolò

Cerchi as the latter was riding out into the country he attacked him on the road: both men

had companions and both sides fought well, but in the end Niccolò died, while Simone

died the next day after being wounded”.267 Villani tells a slightly different story, relating

that Simone

“urged and prompted to evil-doing, followed the said M. Niccola [Niccolò] with
his companions and troopers on horseback; and when he came up with him at the
Ponte ad Affrico, he assailed him in combat; wherefore the said M. Niccola,
without fault or cause, not being on his guard against his said nephew Simone,
was slain and dragged from his horse. But… the said Simone being struck in the
side by the said M. Niccola, died that same night…. it was held as a great loss,
forasmuch as the said Simone was the most finished and accomplished youth of
Florence, and would have come to greater honor and state, and was all the hope of

266
Tristano Riccardiano, 340/341: Tristan “demonstrate[d] his prowess, like the good and noble knight he
is”. Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 21, 45, 162-163: Lansing argues that marriage and inheritance
practices were such that Florentine society included groups of restless and prospectless young men from
elite families who readily turned to the tenets of chivalry and saw “factional conflict as a potential
vocation”. Florentine men did not get married or inherit until the death or incapacity of the father, while
younger sons played no real economic role unless emancipated, “thus forming a group of wealthy and
irresponsible young men who were active subscribers of the martial code of chiavlry and participants in
chivalric culture”. Cf. Dean, “Marriage and Mutilation”, 19.
267
Bruni, History of the Florentine People, volume I, 409.
 103

his father, M. Corso”.268

Villani, in particular, interprets these events from the perspective of the popolani,

lamenting the seeming senselessness of chivalric violence, while attributing Simone’s

actions to the negative influence of his peers who pressured him into evil-doing. Villani

also observed that Nicola was not even part of the Cerchi faction and thus did not deserve

to be the victim of the violence perpetrated by the Donati, certainly not at the hands of his

own nephew, a reckless young knight concerned with establishing his reputation.

Indeed, the most active participants in the battlefield of honor were young knights

and donzelli, arms bearers of noble or distinguished birth who fully embraced the

chivalric lifestyle and ideology, but were not yet knights (roughly equivalent to Duby's

juvenes).269 Both historical and literary knights and arms bearers in their youth sought to

prove themselves and enhance their reputations through public demonstrations of

prowess. The anonymous author of La Tavola Ritonda captures this desire in his

description of a young Tristan, who refused to settle down before he had become

properly “accustomed to handling arms”. The author, no doubt reflecting the attitudes and

behaviors of young knights and arms bearers in Florence, has Tristan explain that he

wished to avoid “any other cares that might constrain [him], except those practices which

268
Villani, 404: “Simone di messer Corso Donati, nipote per madre del detto messer Niccola, sospinto e
confortate di mal fare, con suoi compagni e masnadieri segui a cavallo il detto messer Niccola, e
giugnendolo al ponte ad Africo l’assalì combattendo; per la qual cosa il detto messer Niccola sanza colpa o
cagione, né guardandosi di Simone, dal detto suo nipote fu morto e atterrato da cavallo. Ma come piacque a
dDio, la pena fu apparecchiata a la colpa, che fedito il detto Simone dal detto messer Niccola per lo fianco,
la notte presente morìo; onde tutto fosse giusto giudicio, fu tenuto grande danno, che ’l detto Simone era il
più compiuto e virtudioso donzello di Firenze, e da venire in maggiore pregio e stato, ed era tutta la
speranza del suo padre messer Corso”.
269
Georges Duby, The Chivalrous Society, trans. C. Postan (University of California Press, 1980), 112-122.
 104

might lead [him] to a life of chivalry”.270 This allowed him to become “a knight

resembling his father and all his kinsmen who had been the flowers of knighthood”.271

In another case, from La legenda e storia di messere Prodesagio, describes

Prodesagio’s reaction to the emperor’s challenge to prove his prowess and thus his worth

in front of the entire court. Prodesagio did this with aplomb defeating the Turkish knights

who were invading France, proving his great prowess and enhancing his honor in the

process.272 Indeed, when he returned to the emperor, he received considerable praise: “By

my faith, messere Prodesagio, [now] I can praise and honor you as the best knight in the

entire world”.273

Traditional historical evidence records conflicts among “gangs” of young knights

and arms bearers in the city streets; honor and precedence were constantly at stake. For

example, Villani writes that during a “dance of ladies that took place in the piazza of

Santa Trinita” two groups of young knights and arms bearers, the Cerchi and their allies

and the Donati and their allies, “began to spurn one another and then strike one another

270
La Tavola Ritonda, 41, 43: The author describes how, at the age of fifteen, Tristan “fenced and played at
arms and learned to ride, doing nothing else so that he developed his full prowess”.
271
La Tavola Ritonda, 43.
272
La legenda e storia di messere Prodesagio, 42: “E llo ’mperadore disse: “Io voglio sapere se ttu ssè mio
parente, io voglio sapere se ttu sè alla piccolo spade buono cavalieri”. Allora messer Prodesaggio trasse
fuori Mongrea e punse Quintabile, e fedie uno turchio in su l’elmo dinanzi e miseli la spade infino al
nasale, e morto l’abattè: e inanzi che tornasse allo ’mperadore uccise otto cavalieri turchi. E ppoi ritornò
allo ’mperadore; <e llo ’mperadore> disse: “Per mia fede, alla piccolo spade tu ssè buono cavaliere, ma io
ti voglio vedere co lla grande spade come tu ti porti: ch’io non posso credere che ttu la possi bene balire”…
E volse lo cavallo, e trasse fuori Gioiosa e fedì un turchio in su l’elmo, e tagliogli l’elmo e lla cuffia del
ferro e fesselo infino a’ denti e cacciollo morto a terra del cavallo. E poi fedì una schiera di saracini e
uccise inanzi che ristesse dodici cavalieri turchi
273
La legenda e storia di messere Prodesagio, 42: “E llo ’mperadore disse: “Per mia fede, messere
Prodesagio, io il ti posso lodare e pregiare per lo migliore cavaliere che ssia in tutto il mondo”.
 105

on horseback, so that a great skirmish began.”274 Dino Compagni adds that the young

men at arms of the Donati faction “used to ride around together” and, motivated by

typical noble arrogance, “they decided to confront the Cerchi band and use their fists and

swords against them”.275 To a popolani chronicler like Compagni, this violence no doubt

seemed fueled by noble arrogance and imperiousness; for the chivalric elite such conflict

established honor, precedence, and identity.

While tournaments and other formal war games, particularly popular during the

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, provided useful arenas for proving one’s prowess and

winning honor the stakes were almost certainly highest in the skirmishes and occasional

pitched battles waged by young knights and arms bearers in the city streets.276 Not

surprisingly, these violent encounters were often the result youthful impetuosity, as the

younger members of the warrior elite acted upon their great desire to prove their chivalry

and nobility. Indeed, young men were characteristically rash, lacking wisdom and

experience, and are often presented as more susceptible to their emotions than

experienced warriors.277 For example, when in the Tristano Riccardiano Tristan

challenges King Morholt to battle, the latter offers to forgive this challenge and spare

274
Villani, 395-397 (the quote is from page 397): “veggendo uno ballo di donne che si facea nella piazza di
Santa Trinita, l’una parte contra l’altra si cominciarono a sdegnare, e a pignere l’uno contro a l’altro i
cavagli, onde si cominciò una grande zuffa e mislea”.
275
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 25.
276
For tournaments in high and late medieval Tuscany and Italy, see the excellent study of Duccio
Balestracci, La festa in armi. Giostre, tornei e giochi del Medioevo (Rome: Laterza, 2003).
277
Trevor Dean, Crime and Justice in Late Medieval Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007),
131: “it is quite common for a cycle of revenge to be started by the hot-headed action of a youth… youths
are often found triggering vendettas or reviving family memories of old injuries”.
 106

Tristan’s life, believing that he has foolishly undertaken these actions because of his

youth.278

Again imaginative literature provides the most ready evidence of the desire of

young arms bearers to prove themselves, accumulate honor, and establish their reputation

in action. For example, in the Tristano Riccardiano a young Tristan travels through a

dense and dangerous forest with the express purpose of testing his prowess. When

confronted by a knight who inquires why he is in the dangerous forest, he replies “I have

come to these wilds to see whether I could find any adventure through which I could gain

renown for some act of prowess”.279 Tristan’s desire to prove himself despite his

impeccable royal lineage is notable, suggesting that the chivalric elite believed prowess

was the true proof of nobility, as Tristan declares: “for I am a very young knight, and

have never yet been known for any deed of prowess. So I set out adventuring, to see

whether I would ever be valiant in arms”.280

Since a knight or arms bearer proved himself through enacted prowess, which

earned the practitioner honor, tournaments and other war games no doubt provided ample
278
Tristano Riccardiano, 38/39: “E l’Amoroldo disse a Tristano: “Io ti voglio perdonare questa battaglia,
perké io veggio ke ttu ll’ài presa per giovanezza e per poco senno ke ttu ài”. Rustichello da Pisa, Il
Romanzo Arturiano, 311 (chapter 53, verse 4): Upon being challenged by a knight to joust, Tristan
“expressed great joy, because it had been a long time since he had last fought” (my translation); “Tristano,
sentendosi sfidare a duello, prova una grande gioia, perché da molto tempo che non si era battuto”. Tristano
Riccardiano, 338/339-340/341: After Tristan defeats Kay, Gareth, and Gawain in battle, Gawain swears he
will track down Tristan and make his acquaintance because he is such a great knight: “I tell you that I will
never give up until I find this knight, for it seems to me that he is the best knight I have ever met”.
Meanwhile in Rustichello da Pisa’s Il Romanzo Arturiano Tristan undertakes a similar journey (into the
Perilous Forest) for similar reasons: to prove his prowess and enhance his honor through armed combat.
Indeed, the close connection between honor, prowess, and reputation meant that most literary knights were
known primarily by their prowess, which was proven in armed combat.
279
Tristano Riccardiano, 322/323: “io sono venuto in questo diserto per sappere sed io pottesse avere
alcuna Aventura, laond’io potesse essere rinominato d’alcuna prodezza”.
280
Tristano Riccardiano, 322/323: “impercioe ch’io sono molto giovane cavaliere, né unqua a la mia vita
non fui rinominao di neuna prodezza. E impercioe sì mi sono messo inn Aventura per sappere sed io debo
valere neuna kosa d’arme”.
 107

opportunity for historical knights and arms bearers to assert their dominance during times

of peace. Unfortunately no contemporary accounts of the many tournaments held during

the thirteenth and first-half of the fourteenth century survive to the present. In literary

works, conflicts abound over which knight is best; these competitions for precedence

served as an important catalyst of chivalric violence. For example, in the Tristano

Riccardiano, Tristan is ecstatic when he finally has the opportunity to fight Percival,

having previously received a mighty blow from him: when Tristan saw the knight arrive,

fully-armed, at the fountain where he was resting, “he was very happy, and said to him,

“Knight, come to me, for you will not be able to leave without fighting me; the other day

you gave me one of the greatest blows I ever received in my life, and you immediately

went on your way. But now we shall see who is the better knight.””.281 Tristan’s

happiness stems not only from the opportunity to restore the honor he lost when he was

struck by Percival’s mighty blow, but also the chance to increase his honor by proving he

is the better knight.282

In La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, the eponymous hero seeks out

Balante, the leader of the Saracen army invading the Kingdom of Hungary, because of his

great reputation for prowess. Prodesagio says to Balante when they meet on the field of

battle: “Now turn your horse and I will turn mine…, I want to test your strength against

281
Tristano Riccardiano, 380/381: “fue molto allegro e disse [a llui]: - Cavaliere, tornate a mee, ché in tale
maniera non ne potrete voi anda[re] co’ noi non combat[tia]mo insieme, impercioe che [voi] mi donaste
l’altro giorno uno de’ maggiori colpi ch’io ricevesse a la mia vita e incontanente andaste a vostra via. Ma
ora si saprae chi fie buono cavaliere”.
282
In La Tavola Ritonda, 227, Palamedes pursues Briobris in order “to vindicate his shame, for Briobris
had knocked him down horse and all, even though Palamidesso [i.e. Palamedes] was by far a better knight
than he”.
 108

mine, and… see who is the most valiant”.283 Prodesagio kills Balante, saving the

Kingdom of Hungary from the Saracen invasion.284 Later in a similar incident in the same

text Prodesagio challenges the king of the Turks, Brunforte, to prove his prowess against

him in single combat.285 Once again Prodesagio is victorious and Brunforte flees, with

the victor in hot pursuit.286 After catching and killing Brunforte, Prodesagio returns to the

battle to fight Carbone, the king of the Saracens, who is killing the best Christian knights.

Prodesagio once again proves himself to be the best knight by defeating Carbone and

saving Christendom in the process.287

Likewise, in La Tavola Ritonda, an anonymous Arthurian work composed in

Florence around 1350, the greatness of a knight is once again closely associated with his

prowess. During one incident Tristan learns that Prince Galeotto has arrived with the

express intention of seeking vengeance against him.288 Rather than fearing for his life,

Tristan quite happily thinks about the benefits such an encounter might bring him, “Now

I am the luckiest knight in the world… [for] now I will encounter one of the bravest

283
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 16: “E poi li disse messere Prodesagio: “Or volgete il vostro
cavallo ed io volgerò i<l> mio e donianci del campo, imperò che lla vostra forza voglio provare co lla mia,
e quie si vedrà chi sarà più valente””.
284
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 16-18.
285
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 61: “E messere Prodesagio disse: “Saracino, troppo
m’adasti, ma io voglio che ttu pruovi la tua prodeza comeco”.
286
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 61: “E quando il saracino Brunforte si vide sanza spade
incontanente si mise a fugire verso la sua gente e messere Prodesaggio l’andava seguitando”.
287
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 62. Similarly in the Tristano Riccardiano, 224/225, Tristan
chooses to attack the company of Count Agrippe, as Agrippe is one of the greatest knights on the
battlefield.
288
La Tavola Ritonda, 92: Galeotto admits that he came to fight Tristan in order to “vindicate my shame…
courage for courage and strength for strength”.
 109

knights ever to bear arms, who through his excellence has already conquered more than

twenty-eight kingdoms”.289

A knight or arms bearer’s chivalry, at the same time the product of and

synonymous with his prowess and honor, must be constantly reaffirmed in the eyes of his

peers.290 This was best accomplished by testing oneself against the greatest knights or by

fighting from a position of disadvantage. For example, during the tournament at

Loverzep, described in great detail in the Tristano Panciatichiano, Tristan and Palamedes

choose to fight on the weaker side in order to better prove their chivalry against the very

best. Tristan’s rationale is telling:

“We’ll fight against King Arthur tomorrow. And do you know why? I’ll tell you:
because tomorrow there will be so many good and well-rested and fresh knights
on that side because they have waited for this assembly, and especially those of
King Ban of Benoich, who will do marvelous feats of arms tomorrow. Therefore
if we don’t oppose them with our strength, all our chivalry would be lost. And
despite all the things that we would do among them [if we fought on their side],
our chivalry would remain unnoticed and they will have the praise and esteem of
the morning. And so I say that we’ll fight against them. If we can do any good,
we’ll have esteem, but we wouldn’t have it in their company”.291

Likewise in the Tristano Panciatichiano, Tristan and Palamedes feel compelled to

fight King Ban and his men, who are among the greatest knights in the Arthurian world:

“When Sir Tristan, who is such a knight that there was no better knight in that place, saw
289
Tristan and the Round Table: A Tranlsation of La Tavola Ritonda, 89.
290
The centrality of prowess to chivalric identity, indeed the synonymity of them, is also suggested by
incidents in the Tristano Riccardiano, in particular 238/239-244/245.
291
Tristano Panciatichiano, 598/599: “Et Palamides dimanda messer Tristano, “Si[re], da quale parte
volete voi che noi partiamo di mattina arme?” Et elli risponde e dice, “Noi combatteremo contra lo re Artù
dim[an]e e sapete voi perché? Io vel dico: ché dimane arà da quella parte tanti di buoni cavalieri riposati e
sogiornati che ànno qui aspectato questo asembro e massimamente di quelli del re Bando di Benuic che
faranno meraviglia d’arme dimane; ché se noi non mettessimo nostre forze contra di loro, nostre cavalarie
serebeno tutte perdute. E tutte cose che noi faremo et intra loro non seremo noi conosciute nostre cavallarie
né vedute né riguardate. Elli arebeno lo lodo e lo pregio di mattina. Et dico che noi comattiamo contra di
loro. Se noi possiamo alcuno bene fare, noi n’aremo lo pregio; e di ciò non aremo noi in loro compagnia”.
 110

King Ban’s men coming in that fashion, he endeavors to maintain that encounter because

he clearly sees that it behooves him to do so”.292 In the same work Lancelot expresses

great desire to fight Palamedes because of the effusive praise he has received during a

tournament, knowing that if he is victorious he will gain significant honor and prestige:

“He had very clearly heard that the people had praised the knight with the green shield

and well he knew that this was Palamedes who had fought so energetically today.

[Lancelot thought] “Now it behooves me to go prove myself against him””.293

Due to the nature of the sources, historical examples are less thick on the ground

but they also show this attitude in action. While the Florentine Guelfs were in exile

during the 1260s they spent considerable time fighting alongside their fellow Italian

Guelfs elsewhere in the peninusla. Through a series of military victories this group

became renowned for its prowess, winning great honor as well as material wealth. Villani

and Bruni both refer to one particular incident when the Florentine Guelf exiles were in

Reggio fighting alongside their fellow Guelfs against the Ghibellines who ruled the city.

Leading the battle line of the Ghibellines of Reggio was a certain Caca of Reggio, a great

warrior who almost single-handedly held off the Guelfs. Villani writes,

“And when they were come to Reggio they joined the battle on the piazza, which
endured long time, forasmuch as the Ghibellines of Reggio were very powerful,
and among them was one called Caca of Reggio… This man was well-nigh as tall
as a giant, and of marvellous strength, and he had an iron club in his hand, and
none dared to approach him whom he did not fell to the earth, either slain or
maimed, and by him the battle was well-nigh wholly sustained. When the

292
Tristano Panciatichiano, 634/635: “Messer Tristano, ché tale cavalieri è che in quello luogo nonn à
nullo migliore, quando elli vide venire in tal guisa quelli del re Bando et elli si sforza di mantenere quello
fatto che bene vede che fare lil conviene”.
293
Tristano Panciatichiano, 626/627: “Elli avea udito tutto chiaramente che le genti avieno dato lodo alo
cavalieri co llo scudo verde e ciò sapia elli bene che questi era Palamides che oggi <a> s’avea bene
afannato di battaglia. “Ora conviene che io mi vada a provare co llui”.
 111

gentlemen in banishment from Florence perceived this, they chose among them
twelve of the most valiant, and called them the twelve paladins, which, with
daggers in hand, all set upon that valiant man, which, after a very brave defense,
and beating down many of his enemies, was struck down to the earth and slain
upon the piazza; and so soon as the Ghibellines saw their champion on the
ground, they took to flight and were discomfited and driven out of Reggio.”294

Indeed, during these years of exile the Florentine Guelfs won through their

prowess a laudable reputation in Italy, so much so that when Charles of Anjou, the future

Angevin king of Naples and Sicily, came south to win his kingdom in 1266, he welcomed

them with open arms: “they numbered more than 400 horsemen, good men-at-arms, well

mounted, and they came at great need to the succour of Charles, count of Anjou and

Provence, when he came into Apulia against Manfred… they were among the best

warriors and the most skilled in arms, of all those which King Charles had”.295 Villani

even claims that when the Florentine Guelf exiles met with their French counterparts, the

Florentine exiles “seemed to them such fine men, and so rich in horses and in arms, that

they marvelled greatly, that being in banishment from their cities they could be so nobly

accoutred, and their company highly esteemed our exiles”.296

294
Villani, 247: “E entrati in Reggio furono in sulla piazza alla battaglia, la quale molto durò, imperciocchè
e’ ghibellini di Reggio erano molto possenti, e intra gli altri v’avea uno chiamato il Caca da Reggio, e
ancora per ischerno del nome di lui si fa menzione in motti. Questi ara grande quasi com’nno gigante, e di
maravigliosa forza, e con una mazza di ferro in mano, nullo gli s’ardiva ad appressare che non abbattesse in
terra o morto o guasto, e per lui era ritenuta quasi tutta la battaglia. Veggendo ciò i gentiluomini di Firenze
usciti, si elessono tra loro dodici de’ più valorosi, e chiamaronsi gli dodici paladini, i quali colle coltella in
mano si strinsono addosso al detto valente uomo, il quale, dopo molto grande difesa, e molti de’ nemici
abbattuti, sì fu atterrato e morto in sulla piazza; e si tosto come i ghibellini vidono atterrato il loro
compione, si misono in fuga e in isconfitta, e furono cacciati di Reggio”.
295
Villani, 247-248, 254: “furono più di CCCC a cavallo di buona gente d’arme bene montati, e venono a
grande bisogno e sussidio di Carlo conte d’Angiò e di Proenza, quando passò in Puglia contra Manfredi… e
fu della migliore gente, e che più adoperarono d’arme, ch’avesse del tanto il re Carlo alla battaglia contro a
Manfredi”.
296
Villani, 257: “E quando i Franceschi si scontrarono con gli usciti guelfi di Firenze e di Toscana, parve
loro sì bella gente e sì riccamente a cavalli e ad arme, che molto si maravigliarono, che usciti di loro terre,
potessono essere così nobilmente addobbati, e la loro compagnia ebbono molto cara de’ detti nostri usciti”.
 112

In the minds of the chivalric elite, the demonstration of great prowess deserved

great rewards, especially in the form of honor and political power. Not surprisingly, the

competition for these rewards often led to violence among the chivalrous. Dino

Compagni provides the example of Baschiera della Tosa, “the young son of a [Guelf]

Party member- a knight named messer Bindo del Baschiera who suffered many

persecutions for the Guelf Party, lost an eye to an arrow at the castle of Fuecchio, and

was wounded and killed in the battle with the Aretines”.297 As a result of his father’s

service (pro patria mori was recognized and rewarded in fourteenth century Florence as

in later centuries) and reputation, Baschiera rightly expected to be shown honor and given

offices befitting that honor. Compagni writes with obvious sympathy that the young man

“should have held offices in the city since he was a young man who deserved them; but

he was deprived of them because the elders of his house took the offices and their income

for themselves and did not share them”. This denial was interpreted by Baschiera as an

affront to his honor, forcing him to take action: “He was an ardent supporter of the Guelf

Party… [but] when the city turned around at messer Charles’s [of Naples] arrival, he

vigorously armed himself and fought his kinsmen and adversaries with fire and sword,

with the troop of infantry he had with him”.298

Although Villani felt the need to defend Baschiera’s actions and reaffirm his

loyalty to the Guelf Party, a chivalric audience would have understood his action. Offices

and income should have been his just reward for his father’s loyal military service, as

297
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 52.
298
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 52. Jansen, “Peacemaking in the Oltrarno”, 337: As Jansen
points out “familial ties, even blood ties, were no protection against intra-familial violence”.
 113

well as his own qualities. Since Baschiera was denied these just rewards, his honor was

impugned, requiring violent action. Furthermore, hostility between members of the della

Tosa family suggests that when honor was on the line family solidarity did not preclude

“divisiveness or outright hostility among people who otherwise share a common name,

coat of arms, ancestry and even dwelling”.299 Of course, political and economic concerns

are certainly present and play an appreciable role, but honor always lurks behind the

scene, motivating the chivalric elite to use violence to solve their problems. As Richard

Kaeuper has argued, “we cannot ignore the terrifying reality of feud and warfare fueled-

or at least catalyzed- by strong emotions as well as close political calculation”.300 Indeed,

it is crucial to recognize that power politics, acquisitiveness, and the dictates of honor

were all blurred in the minds of the warrior elite.301

The Defense and Vindication of Honor

Chivalry, honor, and violence combined most prominently in the context of

vengeance. Strenuous knights and arms bearers believed their honor was constantly at

299
Kuehn, “Inheritance and Identity in Early Renaissance Florence”, 139. Larner, Italy in the Age of Dante
and Petrarch, 87: Larner points out that one of the primary functions of the consorteria is to neutralize the
development of vendettas between members.
300
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 265. Kuehn, “Inheritance and Identity in Early Renaissance Florence”,
138: Kuehn makes the important point that “participation in civic politics for Florentines was fired by the
requisites of family honor”, which demanded “wealth, social connections, and political participation”.
Vigueur, Cavalieri e Cittadini, 73-74: Maire Vigueur points out that in the minds of strenuous knights
(milites), the spirit of vendetta mixed easily with the lure of profit, especially in times of war. Martines,
“Introduction: The Historical Approach to Violence”, 14: Martines argues that “when principal families
and government were not divisible, political violence was profound, men overturned the governments and
the streets were delivered to lawlessness”. Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 180: Lansing observes that
contemporaries often depicted political struggles as based on private vendettas and family quarrels dressed
up in political trappings.
301
Richard Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 311.
 114

stake, requiring hyper vigilance and violence.302 Feeling this deep aversion to dishonor

and shame, which stained reputation and threatened identity, the chivalric elite exercised

very public and bloody violence to cleanse its deleterious effects and restore their

damaged honor.303 The great desire to protect and vindicate honor was absolutely central

to chivalric identity.

Given their prickly sense of honor and the widely recognized sociocultural

imperative to vindicate dishonor and cleanse the stain of shame through violence, there is

a clear expectation in literary and historical works that the chivalrous will quickly employ

armed force in order to restore balance when personal or familial honor was impugned.

Sir Oris’s powerful line in La Tavola Ritonda nicely embodies this sentiment: “A sharp

sword is all that can make peace between you and me”. This attitude accords with the

important observation made by Julian Pitt-Rivers about Mediterranean honor-cultures,

like that of late medieval Florence, in which “the ultimate vindication of honour lies in

physical violence”.

302
Strocchia, “Gender and the Rites of Honour in Italian Renaissance Cities”, 40: Strocchia observes that
“within the fray of everyday life one’s personal and family honour was subject to repeated attacks and
might be won, lost or exchanged with remarkable speed”. The chivalric elite’s prickly sense of honor meant
that contests of honor could revolve around any number of issues, including women. In 1376 a certain
Bartolommeo di Niccolò Ridolfi, a Florentine knight and grandi, fought with and wounded a knight of the
vicar of Valdinievole over a young woman (femmina): Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina,
303: “quando andò Bartolommeo a essere Grande, come detto è, fece uno suo cavalierei, compagno, a
Pescia quistione per una femmina con uno soldato di messer Bernabò, ch’era là; onde in zuffa fu’ ferito
quello cavalieri di Giovanni di Luigi de’ Mozzi, vicario”. Other examples include Bondelmonte de’
Bondelmonti’s repudiation of a noblewoman of the Amidei family in 1215 was interpreted by her family as
a great dishonor, leading them to take great vengeance. To this could be added the abovementioned
example of the war between Florence and Pisa which began over a lap dog. These issues may seem trivial
to a modern reader, but for members of the chivalric elite, they were all interpreted as matters of honor, and
thus necessitated the use of violence.
303
McGrath, “The Politics of Chivalry”, 57: McGrath argues that expressions of anger “are necessary for
the maintenance of personal honor and authority”. The warrior elite, in Italy as elsewhere in Europe, felt a
sense of entitlement, perhaps even obligation, to exercise very public wrath and anger in the pursuit of
vengenace.
 115

Guido della Colonna also captures traditional chivalric attitudes toward honor,

violence, and vengeance in his Historia Destructionis Troiae. In one illuminating case,

Priam, the king of Troy, explains to his court that the dishonor done to him and to Troy

by the Greeks must be avenged through violence. Indeed, Priam nicely captures the

mental framework of the chivalric elite: “…because wounds, which do not feel the

benefits of medicine, must be cured by iron.”304 Unpacking this statement provides useful

insight: “wounds, which do not feel the benefits of medicine” are those done to one’s

personal or familial honor, resulting in dishonor and shame. The wounds of dishonor

“must be cured by iron”, which means quite literally the very personal and bloody

violence referred to in this chapter as “honor-violence”.

This prickly sense of honor and obsession with violence appears with great

regularity in other works of imaginative literature.305 In Dante’s Inferno the Centaurs who

guard the violent prisoners of Hell show a particular sensitivity about their honor that is

strikingly reminiscent of the chivalric elite.306 When the King of Norgales wounds

Lancelot’s honor in the Tristano Panciatichiano by claiming that he is “not so valiant”

and that he (the King) and his knights could defeat him in single combat, Lancelot shows

an intense desire to avenge this slight to his prowess and honor.307 Later in the same

304
Guido delle Colonne, Historia Destructionis Troiae, 63 (lines 337-338).
305
Numerous examples of the connection between violence and the cleansing of dishonor (i.e. vengeance)
can be found in Rustichello da Pisa’s Il Romanzo Arturiano, including pages 324 (chapter 99, verse 8), 325
(chapter 101, verses 30-33), 353 (chapter 207, verse 13), 356 (chapter 215, verse 4), 357 (chapter 217,
verses 5, 8).
306
Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy, “Inferno”, 93-97.
307
Tristano Panciatichiano, 335: “Then the abbot told about the great wonders that Sir Lancelot was doing.
And the king contradicted him, saying that he was not so valiant, and he even said, “I have in my badn and
in my company five [knights], any one of which would be able to give Lancelot a good fight and defeat
him.” And Sir Lancelot heard all these words and was very angry about them and thinks all night long
about getting up early to be able to test himself with those knights of the king. But he stayed awake so long
 116

work a group of random knights demand that Tristan and Palamedes divulge the identity

of the lady (Queen Iseut/Isolde) whom they were escorting. When they refuse the knights

accuse Tristan of being discourteous in his reply and prepare to force the issue through

violence.308 Meanwhile in the Tristano Riccardiano, Lamorak’s stubborn refusal to

accept defeat and his subsequent determination to kill Tristan highlights the chivalric

obsession with violence in matters related to honor.309

Indeed, the evidence suggests that the chivalric believed that the greater the

dishonor suffered the greater the vengeance required to cleanse its deleterious effects.

This is particularly prevalent in imaginative literature. For example, a chivalric audience

would not be surprised that Prodesagio’s private pursuit of vengeance became a massive

war with far-reaching and devastating consequences: families are destroyed, cities are

ruined, and Christendom itself is nearly overrun by Saracens. In the face of these terrible

consequences, which the author unhesitatingly delineates, his positive judgment of

Prodesagio’s vengeance is striking: “it seems to me that [Ciattivo] is well avenged”

(parmi che ssia bene vendicato).310 The author stresses that Prodesagio achieved a good

and praiseworthy vengeance, and in this case, his violence did not take away from this. In

thinking about this that it was terce before he got up. And then when he saw the time, he got really angry
again and felt cheated, and he goes quickly and arms himself to catch up with the king.”; “In tanto disse
l’abate delle grandi meraviglie che faceva messer Lancialotto e lo re li li contendeva e diceva che non era
così pro e anche disse, “Io òe in mia masnada e in mia compagnia .v. che qualunque fusse l’uno elli
derebbe a fare a Lancialotto et lo metterebbe al di sotto.” E tutte queste parole udiva messer Lancialotto e
funne tutto adirato e pensa tutta la notte di levarsi per tempo per potersi provare con quelli cavalieri del re.
Ma elli vegghio tanto sopra quello pensieri ch’elli fue terza anzi ch’elli si levasse. Et allora quando vide
l’otta ch’era si riebbe grande ira e tennesi ingannato e va tosto e armasi per giugnere lo re.”.
308
Tristano Panciatichiano, 566/567.
309
Tristano Riccardiano, 156/157-158/159.
310
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 75.
 117

the intricacies of chivalric mentalité, such an important end more than justified the

bloody means.

Likewise, in the Tristano Riccardiano when Tristan avenged the murder of his

father, his vengeance was accomplished not simply by killing all eight of the knights

directly responsible for his father’s murder, but also by killing all of the men and women

in the city from which these knights came. Moreover, the author praises Tristan after he

successfully avenges his father’s death: the hero “avenged his father very nobly, for he

killed all eight of the knights who had been present at the king’s death”.311 What is most

striking about this literary example of vengenace is the degree of violence employed by

Tristan. Indeed, the author tells us that Tristan “still did not deem himself satisfied with

this vengeance. So he rode to the city from which these knights came, which was called

Bresia (sic.), and he killed all the men and women there, and destroyed the city and its

walls down to the foundations”.312 Though a modern audience will find Tristan’s second

act of honor-violence excessive and unjustified, the author’s approval of the hero’s

conduct tells us a great deal about the mentality and operating assumptions of the

chivalric elite that are mostly absent from traditional historical sources: “All this Tristan

did to avenge King Meliadus his father, and no greater revenge was ever taken by any

knight, than the one Tristan took for his father’s death”.313

311
Tristano Riccardiano, 18/19: “egli sì fece la vendetta del suo padre molto altamente, ké uccise tutti e
otto li kavalieri li quale fuerono a la morte de lo ree”.
312
Tristano Riccardiano, 18/19: “e anche non si kiama kontento di questa vendetta. E allora sì cavalkoe a la
cittade onde ierano questi cavalieri, la quale cittade si chiamava Bresia, e uccise tutti igl’uomini e le femine
e la cittade disfece e le mura infino ne’ fondamenti”.
313
Tristano Riccardiano, 18/19: “E ttutto quest sì fece Tristano per vendetta de lo ree Meliadus suo padre;
né unque maggiore vendetta non si fece mai per neuno cavaliere, se nnoe kome fece Tristano del suo
padre”.
 118

The willingness to travel great distances or wait long periods of time in order to

secure vengeance also speaks to a deep aversion to dishonor and shame felt by the

chivalric elite. For example, in La Tavola Ritonda King Mark discovers that Tristan and

Isolde have entered into an adulterous and traiterous relationship. The king laments “Now

I am deeply disgraced, and finally I see that these two have brought me much shame…

Be certain that I must at once take high vengeance for this”.314 Dishonor suffered requires

violent vengeance. Similarly, in the same work, Palamedes chased Briobris over a great

distance with the sole purpose of vindicating “his shame, for Briobris had knocked him

down horse and all, even though Palam[edes] was by far the better knight than he”.315

Imaginative literature and traditional historical sources alike link the honorable

and licit pursuit and securing of vengeance through violence with the dignity of

knighthood. In La Legenda e Storia di Messere Prodesagio the eponymous hero is only

nine years old when his father is treacherously killed by a fellow knight. Despite his

young age, Prodesagio immediately expresses desire for vengeance: “Go and bring me

my arms, because I do not want to linger any longer”.316 Prodesagio’s guardian and tutor,

Leodicio, convinces the young hero to delay his vengeance until he becomes a knight:

“My boy, leave those arms: you are still too young to have the vendetta that you seek.

Thanks to God you shall be a brave man, but you are not yet nine years old, and brave

men and valiant knights are thirty six years old before they can prove themselves”.317

314
La Tavola Ritonda, 107.
315
La Tavola Ritonda, 227.
316
La Legenda e storia di messere Prodesagio, 8: “Andate e recatemi la mia arme, ch’io non mi voglio pìu
indugiare”. For the debate surrounding the date of composition, see page xci.
317
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 8-9: “Bello figliuolo, lascia stare ancora queste armi: tu sé
ancora sì giovane che la vendetta non t’è ancora richiesta. Grazia di Dio tue sarai prode uomo, che ttu nonn
 119

When finally knighted on the eve of battle only three years later, at the tender age of

twelve, Prodesagio’s first words are telling: “this blow against the traitors will be sweet

vengeance”.318 Unfortunately the author does not make the reason for this association

explicit. Leodicio’s emphasis upon age likely reflects a societal concern with the often

reckless violence of young arms bearers. Leodicio’s point also serves to reinforce the idea

that knights exercised a privileged practice of violence. Thus, despite his immediate

desire to cleanse the stain of dishonor and shame, Prodesagio cannot properly and

honorably pursue vengeance for his father’s death until he becomes a knight.319

This same connection between vengeance and knighthood is drawn in Rustichello

da Pisa’s Il Romanzo Arturiano. At one point, the Vecchio Cavaliere (the Old Knight),

Branor il Bruno, rescues a knight who had been held prisoner by four evil knights. The

newly liberated man tells Branor how he had made a trip to Camelot in order to be made

a knight, before he was ready or worthy, so that he could take vengeance upon his

father’s murderers.320 The knight recounted to Branor: “I was still a valet, and not being

able, in that condition, to attack a knight, I went, still a very young man, to the court of

King Arthur, where I had myself made a knight before I should have, so that I could

avenge the death of my father. Once I became a knight, I did so much that I killed one of

ài ancora più di nove anni, e i prodi uomini e i valenti cavalieri ànno .xxxvi. anni inanzi ch’ellino possano
bene provare loro persone”.
318
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 13: “questa gotata sopra i traditori sarà cara vendetta”.
319
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 13: The association between knighthood and the privileged
practice of violence, both honor-violence (vengeance) and external warfare, is reinforced when Prodesagio
asks to be made a knight so he can carry his father’s sword and fight: “Io voglio che voi mi facciate
cavaliere, sicch’io possa portare allato la mia spade Gioiosa”.
320
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 307 (chapter 36, verses 17-18): “Sappiate che due dei
Quattro cavalieri che avete visto, sono fratelli di sangue, e ne avevano anche un altro. E quando erano
ancora in tre, uccisero mio padre senza alcun motive”.
 120

the three brothers”.321 These two literary examples suggest that in matters of honor,

especially the almost sacred task of vengeance, the chivalrous believed, or at least

entertained the notion, that they were the only men allowed to engage in honorable,

proper, and “licit” honor-violence.

There is little evidence that historical figures waited until they became knights to

seek and secure vengeance. Instead, the importance of this connection lies in the fact that

the chivalric elite, both strenuous knights and arms bearers believed that their privileged

practice of violence afforded them the right to pursue private justice through honor-

violence (vengeance, feud, vendetta, etc.). This privilege was, in their estimation,

exclusive to strenuous knights and arms bearers, not to be shared by those below them in

the social hierarchy. As a result, chivalric honor-violence in all its bloody, showy

excesses, helped distinguish the warrior elite from other Florentines who also engaged in

feuding and vendetta.

Historical examples confirm the wide acceptance of this obligation in late

medieval Florentine and Italian chivalric societies. The manuscript of Giovanni Villani’s

Nuova Cronica includes a striking miniature of a group of armed, mounted men fighting

321
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 307 (chapter 36, verses 19-20), my translation: “Io a quel
tempo ero ancora valletto, e non potendo, in quella condizione, attaccare un cavaliere, mi recai, ancora
molto giovane, alla corte del re Artù, dove mi feci investire cavaliere molto prima del dovuto, proprio per
vendicare la morte di mio padre. Una volta divento cavaliere, tanto feci che uccisi uno dei tre fratelli”.
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 307 (chapter 36, verses 21): Not surprisingly the three brothers
in response to the death of their brother sought vengeance against the liberated knight, highlighting the
cyclical nature of honor-violence: “Dopo che mi fui vendicato, avevo intenzione di fare pace con gli altri
due, ma quelli non ne vollero sapere, e mi minacciarono di morte”. Two more of many other possible
examples of honor-violence begetting more honor-violence can be found on pages 317 (chapter 75, verses
16ff.) and 319 (chapter 81, verse 2).
 121

one another.322 Depicted front and center charging into the fray with his sword held high

is one young Florentine arms bearer, Ricoverino de’ Cerchi, who had just lost his nose to

an enemy sword stroke.323 Such demonstrations of bravery are quite common in

imaginative literature, yet Ricoverino was a historical figure. Ricoverino’s actions as he

sought to restore his honor through prowess, at the very real risk of his life, suggests that

Florentine knights and arms bearers, like their historical counterparts across the Alps and

throughout the Italian peninsula, felt strongly enough about their honor to defend it with

their lives. For many members of the Florentine chivalric elite, “life without honor [wa]s

a living death”.324

Another historical example comes from the year 1308, when the Florentines

feared that Corso Donati would install himself as lord (signore) of Florence. He was

condemned as a rebel and traitor, and forced to flee the city after fighting a desperate

battle in the streets. During his retreat, he was caught and killed by a Catalan knight in

the service of the Florentine communal government. Of particular importance to our

present purpose is a second contiguous incident which appears in a miniature found in

Villani’s chronicle. Alongside the depiction of Corso’s gory death is the portrayal of the

322
C. Frugoni, ed., Il Villani illustrato: Firenze e l’Italia medievale nelle 253 immagini del ms. Chigiano L
VIII 296 della Biblioteca Vaticana (Vatican City: Biblioteca apostolica vaticana, 2005).
323
Villani, 397: “On the evening of the first of May, in the year 1300, while [two groups of young knights
and arms bearers] were watching a dance of ladies which was going forward on the piazza of Santa Trinita,
one party began to scoff at the other, and to urge their horses one against the other, whence arose a great
conflict and confusion, and many were wounded, and, as ill-luck would have it, Ricoverino, son of M.
Ricovero of the Cerchi, had his nose cut off his face”; “la sera di calen di maggio anno 1300, veggendo uno
ballo di donne che si facea nella piazza di Santa Trinita, l’una parte contra l’altra si cominciarono a
sdegnare, e a pignere l’uno contro all’altro i cavalli, onde si cominciò una grande zuffa e mislea, ov’ebbe
più fedite, e a Ricoverino di messer Ricovero de’Cerchi per disavventura fu tagliato il naso dal volto”.
324
F.W. Kent, Household and Lineage in Renaissance Florence: The Family Life of the Capponi, Ginori,
and Rucellai (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 201: in 1475, Piero di Giovanni, a member of
the distinguished Capponi family, wrote to Lorenzo de’ Medici that “la vita sanz’onore è un vivermorto”.
 122

demise of another knight, Gherardo Bordoni, Corso’s close friend. Although Gherardo

participated in Corso's desperate defense, he is the victim of an act of honor-violence not

directly related to Donati's alleged uprising. In the miniature Boccaccio Cavicciuli, a

Florentine knight, is shown cutting off Gherardo’s hand, which Villani tells us he

subsequently nailed to the door of Messer Tedici degli Adimari’s palace. Tedici was

Gherardo’s close companion, and Boccaccio did this “because of enmity between”

Boccaccio and Tedici.325 This twin-killing not only reinforces the assertion that honor

formed a crucial part of the cultural fabric of Florence, but also that acts of honor-

violence were regularly subsumed into larger conflicts, serving to intensify the tension

and violence naturally present in Florentine politics and society.326

Given the importance of honor, literary and historical works suggest that a

deceased knight’s honor was also held dearly by his friends and family. As a result, the

obligation felt by members of the chivalric elite to avenge dishonor extended to honor of

others. Indeed, numerous examples can be found in literary works of family members or

friends undertaking the task of restoring their honor and avenging their death. Florio, the

hero of Boccaccio’s prose romance Il Filocolo, encapsulates the traditional chivalric

attitude toward the necessity of avenging the death of a loved one when he argues that “a

325
Villani, 458: “E per Boccaccio Cavicciuli fu giunto Gherardo Bordoni in sull’Affrico, e morto, e
tagliatogli la mano e recata nel corso degli Adimari, e confitta all’uscio di messer Tedici degli Adimari suo
consorto, per ministade avuta tra loro”.
326
Cronica di Paolino Pieri Fiorentino delle cose d’Italia, dall’anno 1080 fino all’anno 1305, ed. A.F.
Adami (Rome: Multigrafica Ed., 1981): The Cronica mentions a vendetta between Tommasino de’
Mandelli and Fornaino del Rosso de’ Rossi which raged under the cover of the larger Guelf-Ghibelline
conflict in 1266. It seems reasonable to assume that many similar acts of honor violence were subsumed
into larger conflicts.
 123

just revenge… will satisfy the souls of those who suffer[ed]”.327 In the Tristano

Panciatichiano, the faithful men of a dead knight, the king of the Vermillion City, set out

to find a champion who will restore the king’s honor by killing his murderers, two former

serfs who had been made knights by the very man they treacherously killed.328 In another

example from the same text, Tristan is forced to fight a man who claims that the hero

killed his brother. The man is so determined to secure vengeance that he refuses Tristan’s

apologies and requests for mercy. When Tristan knocks the man from his horse, he stands

up and attacks Tristan with his sword, obsessed with killing him.329 This same insatiable

desire for vengeance also animates Percival when he learns that his brother, Lamorat of

Gaul, has been killed.330

327
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filocolo, 401.
328
Tristano Panciatichiano, 476/477-478/479.
329
Tristano Panciatichiano, “The man, who is already so very irate that he just barely keeps from going
mad with pain, doesn’t answer a single word; rather, he comes to his horse and mounts up as nimbly as he
can. He doesn’t remember his wound or any pain that he has. When he has mounted his horse, he grabs his
sword and comes toward Tristan and gives him such a great, heavy blow on his helmet, the greatest blow
he can with all his might. Sir knight,” said Sir Tristan, “you do wrong to assail me for no reason… I’m just
barely restraining myself from causing you great dishonor because you well deserve it since you are
assailing me even though I have no desire to fight.”"; “L’uomo, che tanto è adirato duramente che per poco
ch’elli non arabbia di duolo, non risponde a nulla parola; anzi viene a suo cavallo et montavi suso lo più
asnellamente ch’elli puote. Di sua piaga no lli soviene né di nullo male ch’elli abbia. Quando elli è a
cavallo montato et elli mette mano alla spada et viene inverso Tristano et si li dona sopra l’elmo sì grande
colpo et pesante come puote maggiore di tucta sua forza. “Siri cavalieri,” disse messer Tristano, “voi fate
male che m’andate asaggiando per niente… Per poco mi tengo che io non vi faccio uno grande disnore, ché
troppo l’avete bene servito quando voi m’andate asagliendo non volendo io combatere.”.
330
Tristano Panciatichiano, 414/415: “When Percival hears these words, that is, such great praise for Sir
Lamorat, he doesn’t say anything; instead, tears fall very tenderly from his eyes for a long time. Then he
speaks and says, “Woe, alas! He who killed my brother did a great wrong to our whole lineage.” And then
he said, “Palamedes, my fine, sweet friend, for courtesy’s sake, would you be able to tell me news about
who killed Lamorat my brother?… For God’s sake, Palamedes, tell me who killed him, if you know.””;
“Quando Prezzivalle intende queste parole, cioè di lodare sì forte messer Lamorat, elli non dice niente, anzi
piange molto teneramente cogli occhi per grande pezza. Allora parla e dice, “Oimé, lasso! quelli che uccise
mio frate com’elli fece grande dannaggio a tutto lo nostro lignaggio.” Et poi disse, “Palamides, bello dolce
mio amico, ditemi per vostra cortesia, saperestemi voi dire novelle chi uccise Lamorat mio frate, ché più mi
duole dela sua morte, se Dio mi salvi, che non fece di quella di mio padre, né di quella di tutti gli altri mieri
amici. Per Dio, Palamides, ditemi chi lui uccise se voi lo sapete.””.
 124

In Rustichello da Pisa’s Il Romanzo Arturiano, Lancelot (Lancillotto) recognizes

the obligation, as a strenuous, chivalric knight, to avenge the disgrace suffered by his

companions, all of whom have been defeated by Branor il Bruno, the Old Knight

(Vecchio Cavaliere). He also realizes that if he refuses to fulfill the obligation to avenge

kindred, he will be considered a coward and thus suffer the ignominy of dishonor and

shame. Rustichello describes the scene:

“Lancelot, after having seen his companions fall to the ground, and now also
Tristan, his dear friend, he lay on the ground as if dead… And he said that,
although [Branor il Bruno] was the most powerful and formidable in the world, he
would similarly expose himself to the risk, in order to vindicate the shame
suffered by his companions; [realizing] that if he did not do everything possible,
he could be considered [by his peers] a coward”.331

In yet another incident later in this work a knight explains matter of factly that he

must kill a certain knight because that knight killed his brother.332 Meanwhile in the

Tristano Panciatichiano, Hector warns Palamedes that if he kills Bliobleris, he will have

to deal with the dead knight’s entire lineage.333 In preaching prudence and restraint,

Hector does not deny Palamedes’s right to seek vengeance against Bliobleris or suggest

that he is a coward, but rather warns him of the serious consequences of attacking a

member of his family: war with Lancelot and many other great knights. Palamedes

331
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 299 (chapter 9, verses 1-2), my translation: “Lancillotto,
dopo aver visto tanti suoi compagni cadere a terra, ed ora anche Tristano, il suo caro amico, giacere al
suolo come morto… E dice che, nonostante quell cavaliere sia l’uomo più potente e più temibile del
mondo, ugualmente egli si esporrà al rischio, pur di vendicare l’onta subita dai compagni; che, se egli non
facesse tutto il possibile, lo potrebbero considerare un codardo”.
332
Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 333 (chapter 131, verses 8): “se l’ho ucciso, sono stato
costretto a farlo: egli aveva ucciso un mio fratello!”. A third example (361 (chapter 231, verses 3-4)) is the
author’s certainty that someone will come and avenge Tristan’s treacherous murder at the hands of King
Mark: “ma sapevano anche che qualcuno sarebbe venuto a vendicare la morte di Tristano”.
333
Tristano Panciatichiano, 410/411-412/413.
 125

response is typically chivalric, defending his honor while acknowledging the wisdom of

Hector's warning:

“Now know that by my will I would never willingly fight with the knights of
King Ban, except for Bliobleris, because he has wronged me in so many ways, as
well he knows. And therefore I would willingly vindicate myself, but not for this
reason do I want to put him to death, because he is too good a knight. But if
fortune gives me the power, I would willingly dishonor him and thereupon I
would then bear it. But since I see that this battle [with Bliobleris] is called off, I
will bear it. But the great desire I have to fight with him moves me because he has
unhorsed me just now, and I want to remove this shame from myself”.334

The desire to cleanse the stain of shame and dishonor is more important to Palamedes

than his life. In the end, he gives up this quest for vengeance, but only because of his

respect for Hector and the knights of King Ban’s lineage.

Likewise in the Tristano Riccardiano, when Galehaut expresses great desire to go

to the Island of Giants to fight Tristan, his explicit motivation is to avenge the death of

his father and mother, whom Tristan killed. When the two knights come face-to-face,

Galehaut informs Tristan bluntly, “My name is Galehaut, lord of the Far Isles, whose

father and mother he [Tristan] killed. Therefore I am here to take revenge upon him”.335

In Bocaccio’s Il Filocolo, Florio, the hero of the work, fears that the relatives of Lelio,

whom his father killed many years before, would seek to exact vengeance upon him.

Florio recognized as legitimate the obligation of Lelio’s relatives to pursue vengeance

334
Tristano Panciatichiano, 412-413: “Ora sappiate che unqua per mia volontà non mi combaterò
volentieri con cavalieri del re Bando, se non se con Briobreis, perciò ch’elli m’à misfatto in molte maniere
sicome elli sa bene. Et perciò io mi vendichere’ volentieri, ma non perciò che io abbia volontà di lui
mettere a morte, ché troppo è buono cavalieri. Ma se ventura mi donasse lo podere, volentieri lo mecterei
ad oltraggio et poi me ne soffrei a tanto. Ma poiché io veggio che questa battaglia rimagna, io me ne
sofferò, ma la grande volontà ch’io avea di combattere co llui mi moveva a cciò ch’elli m’aveva abattuto
ora indiritto et questa onta mi voleva io levare”.
335
Tristano Riccardiano, 112/113-116/117: “Egl’àe nome Galeotto, lo sire de le Lontane Isole, e dice ke si
èe venuto per prendere veggianza di voi”.
 126

against his family, for as long as it took. Vengeance had to be secured to prevent

permanent damage to personal and familial honor.336 Similarly in the Tristano

Riccardiano, Gedis and King Mark assemble all of the relatives of two knights killed by

Tristan earlier in the work, knowing that they desired above all else to avenge their

relatives.337

Not surprisingly the chivalric elite had a long memory when it came to

vengeance. Quick and bloody revenge was always preferable, of course, but if this was

not possible, the aggrieved knight or arms bearer was expected to remain steadfast in his

pursuit of revenge, biding his time until an opportunity presented itself. This accords with

contemporary advice, which encouraged the aggrieved individual or party to “bide their

time, plan quietly and seize the opportunity with whatever means are then at hand to

enjoy their revenge”.338 No doubt the counsel of prudence and restraint offered by would-

336
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filocolo, 443: “More than anything else, he [Florio] desires to make your
acquaintance [Lelio’s brother]; and he would especially like to have peace with you, and he would
willingly come to see you if he thought he might have it. But knowing of your power, he rightly fears that
you might want to take vengeance on him for the death of your brother [Lelio]”. The consequences of
failing to defend or appearing ambivalent about familial honor are suggested by the strong reaction of
Palamedes in the Tristano Panciatichiano (510/511), who after agreeing to undertake the task of securing
vengeance for a dead knight, discovers that this knight has a brother, who is supposedly a valiant knight.
Palamedes confusion stems from the apparent disconnect between the brother’s reputation as a valiant
knight and his apparent ambivalence about vindicating his brother’s honor: “Et Palamides disse, “poich’elli
è cosi pro’ come voi dite, perché non à elli inpresa questa battaglia per vendicare la morte di questo suo
frate?””.
337
Tristano Riccardiano, 168/169: “Allora Ghedin sì aunoe tutti li parenti di kolore ke Tristano avea morti,
e komandoe loro ke incontanente fosserono armati e apparecchiati a lo palagio dappoi che la note venisse;
ed egli disserono ke questo faranno eglino volontieri per [vengi]anza de’ loro parenti”. Another example
(pages 176/177) from this work of the expectation and obligation of the chivalrous to exact vengeance
comes when Tristan is captured and brought before King Mark, who is upset because he knows he must
take vengeance upon Tristan for the dishonor he has done to him: “Since you [i.e. Tristan] have betrayed
me, I must avenge myself on you”. This same obligation to secure vengeance against Tristan is found in L a
Tavola Ritonda, 107: “Now I [i.e. King Mark] am deeply disgraced, and finally I see that these two have
brought me much shame.” Then he spoke, “Be certain that I must at once take high vengeance for this”.
338
Kuehn, Law, Family, and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy, 79.
 127

be reformers had the secondary goal of dampening the chivalric elite’s quick resort to

violence in the pursuit of vengeance.339

The example of Prodesagio’s reaction to the news of his father’s murder is worth

revisiting here. Despite his young age, Prodesagio immediately armed himself with the

intention of avenging his father. As we know, Morganza escaped that day, but over the

next twenty years Prodesagio showed not only great patience, but also active persistence

in the pursuit of vengeance. The importance of this example lies in the suggestion that

while a knight does not suffer dishonor by choosing to delay vengeance, he must show a

continued intention and active progress toward this end.

This applied to historical knights and arms bearers who risked dishonor if they

waited too long or appeared uninterested in securing revenge.340 Of course, in reality

vengeance was not always immediately possible, forcing the aggrieved party to wait to

satiate their desire for revenge. For example, three years after the death of Corso Donati

(1311), messer Pazzino de’ Pazzi, a close ally of the former leader of the Black Guelfs

and a continued supporter of his lineage, was murdered while out hunting. Passiera de’

Cavalcanti, Pazzino’s falconer, along with messer Betto Brunelleschi, a powerful

Florentine knight, carried out this act of honor-violence. Villani tells us this was done as

part of “a vendetta of Masino de’ Cavalcanti and of Messer Betto Brunelleschi” with the

339
McGrath, “The Politics of Chivalry”, 64-65: McGrath argues that desmesure, or a lack of restraint, led
to excessive anger, and the combination of desmesure and excessive fury was often the cause of public
disorder.
340
Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 14: “Potential dishonor becomes more and more real the
longer vengeance is delayed: therefore the time-lag between the offense and the reparation must be as short
as possible”. Dean, “Marriage and Mutilation”, 28: Dean points out that the Italians practiced
“improperation”, as a result of which the aggrieved party was reminded of an unavenged death or dishonor,
which provoked them into action.
 128

Pazzi dating back several years and that Betto “g[ave] a blow to the said Messer Pazzino

which killed him”.341

The reaction of the Florentine government to this act of honor-violence highlights

both the expectation that the Pazzi would seek swift and violent vengeance, as well as the

attempt of the popular government to provide public justice (i.e. public vengeance) as an

alternative to honor-violence, a topic discussed below in chapter three. According to

Villani the government of Florence moved quickly to defuse the situation: “[The murder

of Pazzino] did great dishonor to the Cavalcanti, the city was put into disorder and

everyone armed themselves, and the gonfalone of the people in fury went to the house of

the Cavalcanti and set it on fire and drove the Cavalcanti out of Florence”.342 In addition,

the “Popolo of Florence at the cost of the commune made knights four of the Pazzi,

giving them the goods and income from the commune”.343 Despite the commune’s efforts

to enact public vengeance and offer compensation, thereby preempting the desire of the

Pazzi to secure revenge, many members of the chivalric elite did not accept public justice

as sufficient to cleanse the stain of dishonor and shame.344

341
Villani, 480: “e ciò fece per vendetta di Masino de’ Cavalcanti e di messer Betto Brunelleschi, dando
colpa al detto messer Pazzino gli avesse fatti morire”. Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina,
107: Marchionne adds the interesting detail that Pazzino was killed in revenge for the death of Masino
Cavalcanti, who had been executed by the Popolo.
342
Villani, 480: “Per la qual cosa, recato il corpo suo morto al palagio de’ priori per più infamare i
Cavalcanti, la città si mosse tutta a romore e ad arme, e col gonfalone del popolo in furia si corse a casa i
Cavalcanti, e misevisi fuoco, e da capo furono cacciati di Firenze i Cavalcanti”.
343
Villani, 480: “Per questa cagione il popolo di Firenze alle spese del comune fece quattro de’ Pazzi
cavalieri, donando de’ beni e rendite del comune”.
344
P.J. Jones, The Italian City-State, 376-377: Jones argues that replacing private with “public vengeance”
was part in parcel of the nature and original spirit of the communes, which were engaged in a “sustained
campaign to combat all kinds of private or group violence”. Kuehn agrees, observing that while the
Florentine government tried to set limits on the practice of vendetta and other acts of honor-violence,
Florentines recognized the undisputed right one had to “seek redress or revenge against perceived
injuries… Urban communes, families, the church, and others could all seek to discourage violent self-help
 129

Donato Velluti’s Cronica Domestica and Buonaccorso Pitti’s Cronica both

provide rare glimpses at honor violence from the perspective of the chivalric elite, with

Donato’s work in particular containing plentiful evidence for the long memories of

knights and arms bearers when it came to matters of honor. Although Donato himself was

not a warrior, he was very proud of his many ancestors who were. As a result, Velluti’s

chronicle includes a great deal of information about acts of honor-violence which

involved members of his family, much of it not appearing in other historical accounts.345

In one incident, occurring sometime before 1348, Sandro di Lippaccio di Velluti made a

vendetta on behalf of Simone di Taddeo di Velluti against Simone di messer Berto

Frescobaldi, striking him with a blow (with his sword) in the face.346 Velluti provides the

background to Sandro’s act of honor-violence, writing that Sandro’s father, Tommasso di

Lippaccio, had previously assaulted messer Filippo di messer Berto with a lance at

Montespertoli. Messer Filippo was on horseback, but the lance still struck his flesh.347

Messer Filippo subsequently returned to Florence where he rode into the Piazza de’

Frescobaldi and found Simone di Taddeo, striking him in the head with his sword, but

because Simone was wearing a helmet, he was not badly injured and began to flee.

in the visible and dangerous form of armed vendetta, but they could not deny one’s ultimate right to it”: see
Kuehn, Law, Family, and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy, 78.
345
Donato Velluti, Cronica Domestica, 63ff: Velluti provides a long narrative about a vendetta waged by
his ancestors.
346
Donato Velluti, Cronica Domestica, 83: “Fece la vendetta di Simone di Taddeo in messer Simone di
messer Berto Frescobaldi, d’uno colpo gli diè nel viso”.
347
Donato Velluti, Cronica Domestica, 87: “Che avendo Tommaso di Lippaccio, a Montespertoli o in
quelle parti, assalito messer Filippo di messer Berto predetto, piovano di San Piero in Mercato, e gittattoli
una lancia, essendo a cavallo, gli giunse la lancia nella sella, e toccogli, parme, le carni”.
 130

Messer Filippo pursued Simone, striking him with a mortal blow in the side with a

lance.348

Another example from Velluti's Cronica Domestica, illuminates a complex web

of honor-violence centering on the death of Dino, son of Lambertuccio, who was only

twenty years old when he was attacked and left to die at his house in Montelupo. Velluti

tells us that members of the Bostichi family had entered Dino’s house to secure

vengeance against him on behalf of the Frescobaldi family. Velluti again fills in the

context, explaining how Buco Bostichi had been killed earlier by Tomasso di Lippaccio

di messer Lambertuccio. Even more striking is the revelation that the decision to kill

Dino was made by his cousins, Napoleone and Sandro di Lippaccio, who bore him a

mortal hatred.349 In 1348, Napoleone and Sandro were again involved in an act of honor-

violence, this time against Berto di messer Giovanni, whom they wounded at night time.

Velluti described this action as “a great act of treachery”.350 The negative judgment of

this act of violence suggests that honor-violence had to be done openly in public, rather

than in secret.351 Of course, such ideal behavior was not always realized. Chivalry and the

348
Donato Velluti, Cronica Domestica, 87: “Fuggì il detto messer Filippo verso Firenze; e sanza ismontare
da cavallo, ne venne su per la Piazza de’ Frescobaldi… e trovò il detto Simone, e con una spade gli diè in
su la testa. Avea la cervelliera, non gli fece male: cominiciò a fuggire; e fuggendo, il fante era col detto
messer Filippo gli gittò una lancia dietro, a diègli per lo fianco, e stettene in fine di morte”.
349
Donato Velluti, Cronica Domestica, 94: “Dino, figliuolo del detto Lambertuccio, era di età di xx anni o
più, quando morì… fu lasciato per morto a Montelupo, essendo entrati in casa loro i Bostichi, i quali
s’aveano a vendicare de’ Frescobaldi per la morte di Buco Bostichi, il quale fu morto da Tommaso di
Lippaccio di messer Lambertuccio. E questo fu fatto, di vendicarsi sopra il detto Dino, con ordine e trattato
di Napoleone e Sandro di Lippaccio: e questo mi disse il detto Lambertuccio; e loro tenea per mortali
nimici, avvegnadio che fossono cugini”.
350
Velluti, Cronica Domestica, 99-100: “Fu in prima fedito da Napoleone e Sandro di notte tempo a grande
tradimento, per male che gli voleano, e vogliendolo apporre a’ Bostichi ch’avessono fatto loro vendetta”.
351
Waley, “A Blood Feud with a Happy Ending”, 47: Waley points out that a “man who took revenge on
his known enemy culd not be accused of murder: laws recognized the privileged position of the man
committing homicide in the pursuance of feud”. This meant, however, that both the animosity and the
violent reprisal needed to be carried out in public. Dean, “Marriage and Mutilation”, 16: Dean argues
 131

powerful forces of honor-shame created a need to avenge dishonor through violence. It is

plausible that rather than seeking to kill Berto through treacherous means, these two arms

bearers were caught up by the powerful emotions of anger and the strong desire for

immediate vengeance. The result, as we have seen in other examples, is a self-

perpetuating cycle of violence: each victim creates a new victim, because by vindicating

one’s own honor, one dishonors another.352

While the imperative to vindicate honor through physical violence was deeply

embedded in the sociocultural fabric of late medieval Florence, violence was not the only

option available to the chivalric elite. Indeed, Thomas Kuehn has argued that public

courts and justice were always treated as an option, but stressed that the decision to use

them “did not preclude the subsequent use of violence”.353 Indeed, if we return to the

earlier example of the honor killing of Pazzino de' Pazzi, we see that the Donati and Pazzi

kept alive the desire for vengeance, despite the abovementioned public remedies, biding

although vendetta could be accomplished by a variety of means and at any time, some ways of securing
vengeance could lead to disgrace, even if the act of vengeance restored lost honor.
352
Wickham, Courts and Conflicts in Twelfth-Century Tuscany, 221: Wickham observes that in the game
of vengeance, reprisal was necessary to preserve honor. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 12:
Bourdieu argues that by responding to a challenge to one’s honor, you are in turn issuing a new challenge.
Accordingly the game of honor can go on forever. Zorzi, “Legitimation and Legal Sanction of Vendetta in
Italian Cities from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth Centuries”, 49: Zorzi admits “the logic of vendetta [as a
constitutionally recognized tool for dealing with conflict] held out as long as it was able to guarantee a
balance”. Of course, when emotions and issues of honor were at stake, rational thinking and restraint were
often far removed from the decision making process. The need and desire to defend familial and personal
honor through violence, if not visceral, was certainly a dominant element of the mentality of the chivalric
elite. The nature of honor violence meant that each act created the need for a response, making an absolute
final balance difficult, if not impossible to achieve. Indeed, the idea that these men would simply accept
violence perpetrated against one of their members without responding because this act restored balance
seems unlikely.
353
Kuehn, Law, Family, and Women: Toward a Legal Anthropology of Renaissance Italy, 99. Vigueur,
Cavalieri e Cittadini, 421, 424: Conflict was also decided through reason and compromise, and it was
wrong to see the milites as only capable of understanding and mastering the exercise of arms, as they were
also able to use and abuse the legal system. I plan to look in the future at the pace accords recorded in the
notarial archives.
 132

their time until the opportunity for revenge presented itself. Later that same year the

Pazzi and Donati, longtime allies and determined enemies of the Cavalcanti and

Brunelleschi, finally secured vengeance, expunging the stain of dishonor first suffered

when Corso Donati was killed back in 1308. Villani writes that members of the Donati

lineage and their friends, ostensibly the Pazzi numbering among them, “slew M[essere]

Betto Brunelleschi”. The greater significance of this act of vengeance is made clear when

the Donati and their kinsfolk and friends “a little while after [the slaying of

Brunelleschi]… assembled at San Salvi and disinterred M. Corso Donati, and made great

lamentation, and held a service as if he were only just dead, showing that by the death of

M. Betto vengeance had been done”.354 Given the close friendship of Pazzino and Corso

during the latter’s lifetime and the recent murder of the former, Betto Brunelleschi’s

death likely served as vengeance for Pazzino de’ Pazzi as well.

Numerous other examples drawn from available historical sources confirm the

long-term memory of strenuous knights and arms bearers in matters relating to honor. In

1304, the papal legate Cardinal Niccolo of Prato came to Florence in an attempt to pacify

the factional warfare and violence which plagued the city. He invited many of the leaders

of the exiles (White Guelfs and Ghibellines) to return to the city from exile. Among those

who returned was Lapo di messer Azzolino, member of the venerable Uberti family who

had been in exile for several generations. Dino Compagni records that “old Ghibelline

354
Villani, 474: “uccisono messer Betto Brunelleschi”; “e poco appresso i detti Donati e’ loro parenti e
amici raunati a San Salvi disotterraro messer Corso Donati, e feciono gran lamento e l’uficio come allora
fosse morto, mostrando che per la morte di messer Betto fosse fatta la vendetta, e ch’egli fosse stato
consigliatore della sua morte, onde tutta la città ne fu quasi ismossa a romore”. Bourdieu, Outline of a
Theory of Practice, 12: Bourdieu suggests that the function of honor-shame meant that “as soon as
vengeance [is] taken, [a] family [would] rejoice at the ending of dishonor”.
 133

men and women kissed the Uberti arms” when the exiles entered the city. Less enthused

were many “Guelf citizens” who bore “a mortal hatred” for the Uberti. As a result, Lapo

was “closely guarded by [his] magnate friends”.355

Indeed, honor-violence remained an important characteristic of the chivalric

lifestyle well into the fourteenth century, even after the traditional chivalric lifestyle came

under severe attack in the city of Florence (see chapter three below).356 Leonardo Bruni’s

History of the Florentine People confirms this, providing numerous examples of acts of

honor-violence and a general sense of the antagonistic culture that thrived during this

century.357 Likewise, the personal writings of another strenuous warrior, Buonaccorso

Pitti, a Florentine exile, highlights the continued importance of honor-violence into the

last years of the century.358 In April 1380, Pitti had an altercation with another Florentine,

355
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 69.
356
Christaine Klapisch-Zuber has also reinforced this assertion in her excellent study Ritorno alla politica:
I magnati fiorentini, 1340-1440, trans. Isabelle Chabot and Paolo Pirillo (Rome: Viella, 2009). Klapisch-
Zuber argues that the gradual reintergration of the Florentine magnates after 1340 was slowed by the
continued refusal of some magnates to give up their violent lifestyles. Likewise, Najemy argues (A History
of Florence, 16) that fourteenth century court records and elite memoirs confirm “the picture of the elite
families as a generally unruly and violent group”. Other examples of the continued exercise of honor-
violence can be found in Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. II, 381: Bruni
describes the Ricasoli, a Florentine “noble” family, as “abounding with men and riches”, but “divided
because of the numerous discords and factions among the male members of the clan, leading to fighting
and their exile” in 1351. Becker, “A Study in Political Failure”, 273: In the early decades of the fourteenth
century the Signorie regularly distinguished bteween law abiding and lawless magnates. Cf. Najemy, A
History of Florence, 95, 124: Najemy argues despite occasional serious conflicts and conspiracies within
the political elite, these men were generally not inclined to engage in the same sort of honor-violence as
their predecessors, in the process suppressing their old addiction to violent factionalism.
357
Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. II, 263-265.
358
Najemy, A History of Florence, 11: The existence of men like Buonaccorso Pitti is crucial, because, as
Najemy argues by the end of the fourteenth century, the great political families were for the most part no
longer a knightly (i.e. chivalric) elite.
 134

Matteo del’ Ricco Corbizi, who was infamous for insulting Florentine exiles. Pitti made it

clear to him that if Corbizi offended his honor, he would exact revenge through force.359

Sixteen years later (1396) Pitti was forced into action once again to defend his

honor against the Viscount of Monlev, a French nobleman. Pitti’s response to this

challenge was immediately to grab his sword while the Viscount’s son tried to murder

him with a knife. The matter was brought before the king of France who determined that

the Viscount had acted wrongly and that Pitti had defended his honor, as he should, less

he risk dishonoring himself.360 This example has the added importance that in a matter of

honor brought before the King of France, the honor of a member of the Florentine

chivalric elite, and his right to defend that honor through violence, were recognized.

Florentine and Italian knights played second-fiddle to no one, but were accepted

members of a pan-European chivalric culture.361

Shamed: The Loss of Honor

The crucial importance of honor to chivalric identity meant that when a member

of the chivalric elite was dishonored and shamed, he temporarily lost his status, becoming

the object of derision and mockery. The message seems clear: dishonor and shame

resulted in a loss of reputation and status, perhaps even the belief that one is not worthy
359
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, in Two Memoirs of Renaissance Florence: The Diaries of
Buonaccorso Pitti and Gregorio Dati, ed. Gene Brucker and trans. Julia Martines (Prospect Heights, IL:
Waveland Press, Inc., 1991), 32.
360
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 52, 53: “the King replied: “The Viscount acted and spoke wrongly
and Buonaccorso could not, without loss of honor, do less than answer him”.”.
361
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, 511-513: In a really striking example the
author records an incident in 1376 when “two Breton knights were given parole to enter Bologna, where
they made offensive remarks of military nature against the Italians, challenging them to single combat; two
youths of high station, the Florentine Betto Biffoli and Guido of Asciano, volunteered to fight; a duel was
offered and accepted and the four champions came together to fight”.
 135

of being a member of the chivalric elite. As a result, knights and arms bearers felt an

obligation to cleanse the stain of dishonor and shame through violence. Once again this is

particularly clear in imaginative literature. In the Tristano Riccardiano, Sir Kay the

Seneschal mocked the reputation of the knights of Cornwall, labeling them cowards,

unable to defend their own honor, insinuating they were unworthy of being considered

among the chivalric elite.362 Literary knights, just like their historical counterparts, sought

to avoid these real and devastating consequences whenever possible.

On occasion, the dishonor and shame suffered was so great, or circumstances

conspired to prevent the usual immediate recourse to vengeance, that the chivalrous were

left listless and defeated, robbed of their very identity. For example, when Tristan

defeated Palamedes at a tournament, Palamedes was so ashamed that he “began to make

the greatest lament that any knight ever made, and began to call himself a miserable

wretch”. Palamedes’s distress was directly related to what he interpreted as the complete

loss of his honor, and thus his identity, which obliged him to repudiate his membership

among the chivalric elite, a repudiation that took the form of refusing to bear arms: “Now

the story tells that when Palamedes was beaten by Tristan with the sword blow, he began

to make the greatest lament that any knight ever made, and began to call himself a

miserable wretch, “for now I will never be able to bear arms here…, though if by some

362
Tristano Riccardiano, 328/329: “Knight, I see very well that you are one of the knights of Cornwall,
since you are so afraid to fight. But by my faith, I have never heard of such craven knights as those of
Cornwall, when it comes to avenging their shame”; “Certo io [veggio ben]e ke voi siete de li cavalieri di
Cornovaglia, quando voi [avete] cosie grande paura di combattere, ma per mia fé io nonn-udii unqua
parlare di kosie malvagi kavalieri sì come sono tutti quegli di Cornovaglia per vengiare loro onta”.
 136

chance I could bear arms I would fight him again””.363 The author informs the audience

that Palamedes threw down his arms “and said that he would never wear those arms

again, because it had gone so ill with him. With these words Palamedes left and went on

his way, lamenting greatly”.364 Later in the same text, two knights-errant feel similarly

ashamed when Tristan defeats them. When they discover he is from Cornwall, the land of

the basest knights, they lament that their “shame was [now] so great that they declared

they could not bear arms until their fellow knights-errant were also defeated by such base

knights”.365

Given the real social and cultural consequences of failing to properly avenge

dishonor and the honor to be gained from securing vengeance, it is not surprising that

knights on occasion express fear that they will be unable to secure vengeance and thus

restore personal or familial honor. Given the nature of our traditional historical sources, it

is not surprising that literary examples are much more prevalent.366 In one incident from

La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, Prodesagio is trapped in a Saracen prison

363
Tristano Riccardiano, 53: Tristano Riccardiano, 56/57: “incomincioe a ffare lo maggiore pianto ke
unque mai fosse fatto per neuno cavaliere e incominciossi a chiamare oissee lasso taupino”; “Ke oramai
non potroe portare arme per Aventura ankora kombatterei ko llui.
364
Tristano Riccardiano, 56/57: “e dice ke giamai quella arme egli non porterae, dappoi ke cosie
malamente igl’èe menosvenuto. E appresso a queste parole si parte Pallamides e vae suavia, faccendo
grande pianto”.
365
Tristano Riccardiano, 84/85: “Oramai siemo noi più ke vitoperati, dappoi che noi siamo abbattutti da
cosie vile gente komoe sono quegli di Cornovaglia. E impercioe noi <non> porteremo giamai più arme
infin a tanto ke noi nonn-uderemo dire ke li nostri kompagnoni, cioè de la Tavola Ritonda, siano abbattuti
per cosie vile gente, sì come sono quegli di Cornovaglia”. A very similar thing happens later in the text
when Tristan once again defeats a number of knights who, after discovering he is from Cornwall, swear to
never bear arms again because of the magnitude of their shame (92/93).
366
Pursuing and achieving vengeance was not only an obligation, but a source of honor in its own right.
Giovanni Boccaccio, The Book of Theseus: Teseida delle Nozze d’Emilia, trans. Bernadette Marie McCoy
(New York: Medieval Text Association, 1974), 41: Theseus summarizes the traditional chivalric attitude
when he claimed that it does one “great honor to take up arms in wreaking vengeance”. Tristano
Panciatichiano, 478/479: Tristan makes the same point when he praises Palamedes for undertaking a quest
to avenge the murder of the king of Vermillion City: ““Palamedes,” said Tristan, “now know that this
vendetta will bring you great honor if you carry it out”.”.
 137

without his arms and equipment. Rather than grieving over his captivity and impending

death, he expresses a striking sentiment: he cares less about his own life than the fact that

his death would mean that he failed to avenge his father’s murder. He laments that if he

“had a sword in his hand and a shield on his arm” he could not have been prevented by

anyone from securing vengeance.367 In La Tavola Ritonda, Sir Oris swears he will avenge

the death of his brother, “for it would be a great dishonor to [him] not to do so”.368

III. Conclusions

In late medieval Florence as elsewhere in Italy and Europe, strenuous knights and

arms bearers were strongly influenced by chivalric ideology, which encouraged them to

employ violence in order to assert, defend, and vindicate personal and familial honor.

Chivalry embraced the powerful socio-cultural forces of honor-shame to greatly intensify

this violence among the warrior elite, an intensification that made their violence so

different in degree from that of other citizens as to be different in kind.

While traditional historical accounts confirm through a veritable deluge of

incidents the pervasiveness of chivalric violence, they often fail to provide insight into

the mentality of the strenuous knights and arms bearers who comprise the chivalric elite.

This is largely because they were composed by Florentines of more humble origin,

proponents of a lifestyle that contrasted in many ways with that of the chivalric elite. As a

result, motivations and justifications must be discerned from imaginative chivalric

367
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 26: “Oimè, che di mia morte non mi pesa, ma pesami della
morte della mio padre che ffu morto a così gran tradimento e non sia mai vendicato per mano di niuno
uomo terreno. E promettovi per mia fede sse io ò una spade in mano e uno scudo in braccio io mi partirei e
non ci ricevrei impedimento da’ saracini, almeno da niuno di quelli che ssiano qua dentro nella terra”.
368
La Tavola Ritonda, 180.
 138

literature, which allows historians to make small windows into the minds of these

warriors. This need to look beyond traditional historical sources will be particularly

important in the next chapter when we consider violence aimed at non-chivalric

Florentines.
 139

Chapter III:
Chivalry and Social Violence

I. Introduction

Giovanni Villani’s fourteenth-century Nuova Cronica and Leonardo Bruni’s

early-fifteenth century History of the Florentine People both describe a striking incident

involving messer Tegghiaio Aldobrandi degli Adimari and a commoner (popolano) by

the name of Spedito, who engage in a tense debate in 1260 about a proposed military

campaign against Siena and the Florentine Ghibellines in exile there. During the course

of the debate, Spedito questions Tegghiaio’s courage, “bidding him to look at his

breeches if he was afraid”.369 In Bruni’s rendition Spedito (Expeditus in Bruni’s text),

whom the author describes as “a fierce and shameless fellow… the sort of person

unrestrained liberty can sometimes produce”, lambasts Tegghiao asking him: “What are

you after Tegghiaio? Have you turned into a filthy coward? This magistracy isn’t going

to pay any attention to your fears and quakings. It’s going to consider the dignity of the

Florentine people. If you’re paralyzed with fear, we’ll let you off military service”.370

These attacks upon some of the most sensitive elements of chivalric identity,

courage, vigor, and military expertise, would seemingly warrant a violent response from

the strenuous knight. And yet, according to Villani, Tegghiaio responded by pointing out

that Spedito, as a commoner with no military expertise or experience, “would not dare to

follow him into battle where he would lead”, a sentiment seconded by a fellow warrior,

369
Villani, 238: “dicendo, si cercasse le brache, s’avea paura”.
370
Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. I, 159.
 140

Cece de Gherardini.371 Bruni’s account is very similar, with Tegghiaio replying bluntly to

Spedito (Expeditus), stating “he was sure that the man who had insulted him would never

venture in battle where he himself would venture”.372 In both versions, Tegghiaio does

not react with violence to the provocations and insults of Spedito, a commoner.

This incident, although likely apocryphal, is important because it presents an

ideal, that of the noble knight who exercises restraint even in the face of insults and

aspersions cast by a social inferior, which is not reflected in the evidence provided by

contemporary and near contemporary historical accounts.373 Instead the historical record

demonstrates convincingly that the Florentine chivalric elite eagerly and joyfully

employed extreme violence against fellow citizens, especially those below them in the

social hierarchy or any who challenged their superiority.374 In one particularly

illuminating episode, Compagni describes a conversation between members of the

Florentine chivalric elite about how to restore their fortunes. As a well-informed

contemporary it is possible that Compagni was privy to the details of the debate, but

regardless of the accuracy of particular exchanges, the author succeeds in shedding light

on chivalric mentality.

371
Villani, 238-239: “che al bisogno non ardirebbe di seguirlo nella battaglia colà ov’egli si meterebbe”.
372
Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. I, 159.
373
Bernadette McCoy, the translator of Giovanni Boccaccio’s Teseida della Nozze d’Emilia, argues that
Boccaccio envisioned the miles mavortis or political man as a “gentled knight who has established harmony
in himself, who rights wrongs against the natural order, who champions the weak, who dispenses justice
temperately, bravely, and wisely, who abhors the careless shedding of human blood”- Giovanni Boccaccio,
The Book of Theseus, 16. This conception accords with the ideal presented in this example by our authors.
374
Najemy, A History of Florence, 17: Najemy argues that one of the primary catalysts of elite violence
was “the growing conflict between an elite attempting to hold on to its preeminent position and the popolo,
which was creating law, institutions, and forms of public coercion with a primary purpose of controlling the
turbulent elite”.
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The first speaker is messer Berto Frescobaldi, a strenuous knight (d.1310) from a

powerful Florentine family, who arguably represents the traditional chivalric attitude

toward the non-chivalric. According to Compagni, the knight “spoke of how these dogs[,

the popolani,] had stripped them of honors and offices, and how they did not dare to enter

the public palace”. Frescobaldi’s solution is typically chivalric as he impassionedly

exhorts his fellow knights and arms bearers to use extreme violence to meet this

challenge: “If we beat one of our servants, we are undone. And therefore, lords, I

recommend that we escape from this servitude. Let us take arms and run to the piazza.

Let us kill as many of the popol[ani] as we find, whether friends or enemies, so that never

again shall we or our sons be subjugated to them”.375 This promotion of unconstrained

violence (“Let us kill as many of the popol[ani] as we find, whether friends or

enemies”) is no doubt Compagni’s critique of the dark side of chivalric culture. Indeed,

even if Compagni fabricated the details of this dialogue, he has succeeded in highlighting

an important element of chivalric mentality which is consistently confirmed in

contemporary and near-contemporary chronicles: the loss of political power and social

prestige was interpreted as a source of dishonor, requiring knights and arms bearers to

use violence to cleanse the stain on their honor and restore their traditional superiority.376

375
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 17.
376
Zorzi, “Legitimation and Legal Sanction of Vendetta in Italian Cities from the Twelfth to the Fourteenth
Centuries”, 52: Zorzi makes the important point that “the new “popular” governments… turned the politics
of pacification into the symbol of a renewed ideology of governance which began to identify the social
group of the milites as being responsible for urban violence”. Ricciardelli, “Violence and Repression in
Late Medieval Italy”, 65: Ricciardelli also examines the efforts of the popular governments to restrict the
violence of the warrior elite. Indeed, Ricciardelli highlights the popolo’s use of the metaphor of the wolf
(magnates) and lamb (popolani), “identifying the wolves as aggressive, ferocious and rapacious animals
that corrupted the sacred space of the city-state… social behavior and [an] inability to respect the good and
peaceful state of the city”, which allowed the popolani to justify banishing the magnates from public
offices.
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Messer Baldo della Tosa, the second knight to speak, offers further confirmation

that violence was considered the preferred solution to such challenges. Unlike messer

Berto Frescobaldi, however, della Tosa advocates prudence and restraint to ensure not

just vengeance, but also the successful destruction of the popolani and the permanent

restoration of the chivalric elite’s superiority and autonomy: “Lords, the advice of this

wise knight is good- except that if our plan fell short we would all be killed. But let us

first conquer them with cunning and sow discord among them with pious words… And

once they are divided, let us thrash them so that they will never rise again”.377 While the

accuracy of Compagni’s dialogue is surely open to debate, the author once again captures

an important point about chivalric mentality: violence is deemed central to any response,

a necessary weapon in the struggle to restore traditional and natural order of society. The

author’s version of della Tosa’s proposal also touches upon a reform theme emphasized

by both “internal” and “external” reformers of chivalric culture: the exercise of prudence

and restraint is crucial to controlling reckless and extreme violence (see chapters 5 and 6

below). According to Compagni, della Tosa’s advice was very well received. Yet the

pervasive violence delineated in this and other chronicles suggests that the promotion of

reform virtues such as restraint and prudence must have been largely ignored or negated

by the deeply ingrained need for knights and arms bearers to answer challenges to their

autonomy and superiority with violence.

It is not surprising therefore that famous Florentine chroniclers like Giovanni

Villani, Dino Compagni, and Leonardo Bruni all spent considerable space in their works

377
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 17-18.
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delineating the bloody details and consequences of social violence, which ranged in

degree from isolated encounters between individuals to massive pitched battles in the

streets and piazzas of Florence, which threatened, on occasion, to engulf the entire city.378

The political, social, and economic causes of this violence, especially between the grandi

(magnates) and the popolo grasso, have received significant scholarly attention, with

firmly established schools of historiography offering different interpretations of the

causes of social conflict in late medieval Florence. This debate tends to divide over

whether or not this violence was based on conflicting class interests, mainly economic in

origin.379

One important catalyst of social violence that has been largely overlooked by

scholars is the influence of chivalric ideology. Chivalry informed the mentality of

strenuous knights and arms bearers, encouraging and valorizing social violence as an

honorable means to defend their traditional autonomy/independence from any external

authority, as well as the integrity of the chivalric lifestyle from unwelcome reforms and

restrictions.380 Indeed, chivalry reinforced the warrior elite’s inherent sense of social,

378
Villani, 369: For example, Villani wrote that in 1292 “the nobles known as magnates and potentates,
alike in the country and in the city, wrought upon the people who might not resist them, force and violence
both against person and goods, taking possession thereof”; “e’ cittadini di quella grassi e ricchi, e per
soperchio tranquillo, il quale naturalmente genera superbia e novità, sì erano i cittadini tra loro invidiosi e
insuperbiti, e molti micidii e fedite e oltraggi facea l’uno cittadino all’altro, e massimamente i nobili detti
grandi e possenti, contra i popolani e impotenti, così in contado come in città, faceano forze e violenze
nelle persone e ne’ beni altrui, occupando”.
379
The complexities of intention and causation are the subject of significant historiographical trends and
thus fall outside of the scope of this chapter. For a useful overview of the historiographical debates, see the
introduction to Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 3-26. See also the studies cited therein, as well as in
Najemy, A History of Florence. See also the studies in Violence and Civil Disorder in Italian Cities, 1200-
1500, ed. Lauro Martines.
380
M. Becker, “A Study in Political Failure”, 253: Becker argues that there was a long struggle in late
medieval Florence to establish public over private. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 28: “The medieval
problem of order took on its particular contours because the lay elite combined autonomy and proud
violence in the defence of honour”. La Tavola Ritonda, 23: A useful illustration of chivalric autonomy is
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political, and juridical superiority, which they believed stemmed from their noble or

distinguished lineages and long traditions of military service and leadership in the

communal army as strenuous knights and arms bearers. As status in late medieval

Florentine society derived from function, at least before social mobility in the city

became exceptionally fluid, such military service and leadership earned these warriors

social prestige (honor, fama), access to political power, and the belief that they were a

law onto themselves, exercising a privileged practice of violence. As the exercise of

political power and judicial independence were sources of honor, the chivalric elite

demonstrated an almost visceral desire to defend their superiority through force. This

obligation was interpreted by non-chivalric contemporaries as an expression of noble

pride.381

As a result, social violence posed a significant threat to peace, public order, and

stability in late medieval Florence. The autonomy and superiority of Florentine knights

and arms bearers came increasingly under attack during the course of the thirteenth and

fourteenth centuries. The main challengers to the predominance and independence of the

chivalric elite were the so-called “new men” (nova gente), beneficiaries of a booming

King Meliadus’s response to King Arthur’s demand that he swear allegiance: “In good faith, Sire, I would
first have all my lands burnt and all my people killed before I would surrender to anyone through fear or
cowardice; but if I myself choose it, I will serve you or any person. For I am determined to live and die
free, and after my death come what may!”.
381
Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. II, 289 and 293: Leonardo Bruni noted “the
nobles, leaders of great families, were already formidable by themselves without any public power” and
efforts by popolani-led governments to remove fellow nobles from positions of political power, and thus
sully their honor, leading them “to take up arms”. Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 211-
212: Marchionne blames noble pride for the conflict between the Popolo and the Grandi in 1343- “e dissesi
che questo pacifico stato doveano li Grandi più magnificare… che superbia non volesse essere quieta”.
Martines, “Political Violence in the thirteenth century”, 336: Martines observes that chronicle evidence is
full of references to the arrogance and violence of noblemen.
 145

economy based on industry, commerce, and banking who desired to translate their newly

acquired and extensive wealth (they were known to contemporaries as the popolo grasso,

or “fat men”) into political power and social prestige. Not surprisingly the meteoric rise

of these new men upset the traditional social order of medieval Florence, causing

considerable consternation among contemporaries.

Dante reflects upon the rise of these new men in his Inferno, Canto XVI. In this

canto Dante speaks with Tegghiaio Aldobrandi, who implores the author to tell him “if

courtesy and courage still / Live in our city as they used to do, / Or whether all that has

gone away”, before lamenting with sudden realization that “New families, who have

made sudden gains, / Have generated pride and immoderate ways / … [so that] you weep

for it already”.382 Later in Paradiso, Canto XVI Dante, through the guise of his crusading

ancestor Cacciaguida, laments one of the most serious consequences of the rise of these

new families: the decline of chivalry in Florence, especially the fate of “distinguished

Florentines / Whose names are now hidden under time”. Not only have they faded into

obscurity, but even worse, they have been replaced by “Florentine bankers and merchants

/ [who] would have been sent [in his time] back to Simifonte / Where their grandfathers

went around as beggars”.383 Accordingly, some late medieval Florentines, including

Dante, the anonymous author of the thirteenth-century collection of tales entitled Il

Novellino, and the late-fourteenth century social critic, Franco Sacchetti, blamed these

382
Dante, The Divine Comedy, “Inferno”, XVI, (lines 67-69).
383
Dante, The Divine Comedy, “Paradiso”, XVI, 419, (lines 61-63).
 146

wealthy “new men” for infecting Florentine culture in general and that of the elite in

particular with greed, luxury, and idleness.384

In addition, this period witnessed increased initiative among the popular classes,

known to contemporaries as the popolani, to organize themselves and assert their

collective interests. The popolani were the most common victims of elite violence, so

cooperation within the group also provided the best means to protect themselves. Indeed,

both the “new men” of the popolo grasso and the popolani gradually, although not

always in conjunction with one another, supplanted the chivalric elite at the helm of the

communal government, working to fashion a centralized government capable of

increasing public order, peace, and stability. For these men peace was the desired and

natural state, but for the chivalric elite, peace and order challenged the violent and

independent lifestyle of strenuous knights and arms bearers. The result of this contrast of

lifestyles, not surprisingly, was the pervasive violence alluded to above.385 This attitude is

nicely encapsulated in one of Franco Sacchetti’s anecdotes in his Trecentonovelle, the

story of two mendicant friars who meet the famous mercenary captain John Hawkwood.

The friars greet Hawkwood, offering their customary “God give you peace”, to which

384
Dante, The Divine Comedy, “Paradiso”, XV, 416, (lines 97-99): When Dante speaks to his ancestor
Cacciaguida, who was supposedly a strenuous knight and crusader, the latter laments the changes that have
occurred in Florence, most notably the decline of the chivalric lifestyle and the rise of a new civic culture
centered on luxury and greed: “Florence within the ancient circle / From which tierce and nones are still
rung, / Lived in peace, soberly, decently”.
385
Examples of social violence abound in Florentine history: in 1248 intense fighting occurred in the city
between the Guelfs and Ghibellines; in 1255 the popolani fought pitched battles in the streets of Florence
against the grandi (magnates); in 1266 the Ghibelline rulers of Florence attacked the popolani within the
city; in 1295, Giano della Bella and many of his supporters were driven out of the city by the magnates who
arrayed themselves mounted and in full battle gear; in June 1300 tension between the elite factions of the
Donati and Cerchi exploded into violence against the popolani. Marchionne Coppo Stefani, Cronaca
Fiorentina, 56: In 1279, Florence was completely divided with nearly all of the citizens participating in the
war between the Adimari and the Donati, Pazzi, and Tosinghi.
 147

Hawkwood allegedly responded “God take from you your alms”. When the friars took

offense, Hawkwood explains, “Why do you come to me and pray that God would make

me die of hunger? Do you not know that I live by war and that peace would undo

me?””.386

Contrasting Ideologies

As we have seen above in chapter two, the chivalric elite thrived in a competitive,

Hobbesian environment, regularly using violence to pursue their ambitions and to assert,

defend, and vindicate honor. The importance of honor was readily observed by

contemporaries, such as Leonardo Bruni who wrote that the Florentine “nobility [of the

thirteenth and fourteenth centuries] bore death and wounds and the loss of their

patrimonies and endless strife for the sake of their dignity and preeminence”. 387 Despite

the violence inherent in chivalric culture, strenuous knights and arms bearers should not

be considered blood-thirsty berserkers, incapable of controlling their emotions, craving

only chaos and war. They were also interested in wielding political power and enjoying

economic prosperity, both of which brought them honor, but they insisted on their own

terms. Indeed, their approach to civic life was quite different from that of the non-

chivalric elements of Florentine society, a difference stemming at least in part from the

386
Franco Sacchetti, Trecentonovelle, clxxxi, 528: “Monsignore, Dio vi dia pace”; “Dio vi tolga la vostra
elemosina”; “Anzi voi perché ci dite voi cosí a me?”; “Come credete dir bene che venite a me, e dite che
Dio mi facci morir di fame? Non sapete voi che io vivo di guerra, e la pace mi disfarebbe?”.
387
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, vol. I, 369-371.
 148

contrasting ideologies which informed, to varying degrees, each group’s mentality:

chivalry and a nascent civic ideology of the popolani.388

Proponents of civic ideology embraced, at least in theory, the common good and

subordinated or, ideally, realized personal ambitions and interests through service to the

“state”.389 For these men service to the state brought honor, wealth, social status, and

political power, with “the state alone serving as the font of honor”.390 Florentines were

encouraged to settle their disputes peacefully through public courts and arbitration. They

desired more than anything else stability and order essential to the peace-requiring

occupations of trade and commerce.391 These were crucial because by Leonardo Bruni’s

388
I thank Dr. Sarah Blanshei for emphasizing this crucial point in her useful feedback on a different
version of this chapter. This differentiation in mentality also extended to definitions/interpretations of
honor-shame. For example, Moxnes, "Honor and Shame", 27: Moxnes observes that “different groups and
classes struggle[d] over the definition of honor and shame, and power struggles [brought] with them
continual redefinition of these concepts”. Moxnes argues that noble families had a concept of honor that
was based on conquest, competition and revenge, while merchants and industrialists developed their own
concept of honor centered on “virtue and efficiency in work, utility, and the general good”. This certainly
seems to provide some insight into the efforts of the popolo to redefine the ideological underpinnings of the
newly reformed social institution of knighthood in late medieval Florence. Najemy, A History of Florence,
31: Najemy argues that violence between the popolo and elite was caused by tension between two political
cultures.
389
Skinner, Visions of Politics, Volume 2: “Renaissance Virtues”, 19-20; James Hankins argues usefully in
the introduction to volume I of Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People that from the perspective
of the popolani, “the desire for honor is a poor excuse to undertake war; the aristocratic code of honor,
however, is admirable in certain respects, but destructive when it issues in factionalism”. See Sarah
Blanshei’s useful discussion of the conflict between popolo ideology and the vita honorabilis in the context
of medieval Bologna: Politics and Justice in Late Medieval Bologna and idem, “Habitus: Identity and the
Formation of Hereditary Classes in Late Medieval Bologna,” in Bologna. Cultural Crossroads from the
Medieval to the Baroque: Recent Anglo-American Scholarship, eds. Gian Mario Anselmi, Angela De
Benedictis, and Nicholas Terpstra (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2013), 143-157. For the common
good, see M.S. Kempshall, The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999). Cf. Najemy, A History of Florence, 58: Najemy highlights a universal
condemnation among writers of elite factionalism, singling out the Dominican Remigio de’ Girolami as a
particularly sincere proponent of the common good.
390
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, vol. I, xix. For a discussion of the Florentine
commune’s desire to act as the sole font of honor, see Dean, “Knighthood in later medieval Italy”, 148.
391
Larner points out that in towns of great mercantile wealth, like Florence, “the needs of commerce
produced among the nobility a greater need and instict for compromise and peace, a new spirit transcending
the old chivalric ideal of the vendetta”. We must be careful, however, to avoid imputing to the popolo
grasso a Weberian bouregois ethic: see Larner, Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch, 102.
 149

time, “the citizen who is interested in business rather than conflict [had proven himself]

readier to put the good of the state ahead of private honor”.392

This is not to say that the non-chivalric were immune to the demands of asserting,

defending, and vindicating honor.393 Indeed, one of the great accomplishments of civic

ideology was the development of collective honor, which in theory encouraged

Florentines to serve the common good rather than their own interests.394 The closer one

got to the pinnacle of society and the reins of political power the more predominant

personal and familial honor became. As one descended down the ladder of society395

personal and familial honor became, in theory, increasingly invested in or replaced by

392
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, vol. I, xix: The editor of this work, James Hankins,
makes this interesting point when discussing Bruni’s mental framework.
393
The important scholarship of Andrea Zorzi, along with several other scholars, has demonstrated
conclusively that even the practitioners of this burgeoning civic ideology engaged in vendetta and feuding:
Zorzi, “‘Ius erat in armis’”, 612: Zorzi argues that as the power of the “state” increased, the private and
public spheres did not simply become immersed. Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 164: Lansing argues
that public and private loyalties were blurred so that family vendetta was indistinct from factional war. Cf.
Dean, “Marriage and Mutilation”, 15, 18. See also: Zorzi, La trasformazione di un quadro politico:
Ricerche su politica e giustizia a Firenze dal comune allo Stato territoriale (Florence: Firenze University
Press, 2008); idem, “La cultura della vendetta nel conflitto politico in età comunale”, in Le storie e la
memoria. In onore di Arnold Esch, eds. Roberto Delle Donne and Andrea Zorzi (Florence: Firenze
University Press, 2002), 135-170. Waley, “A Blood Feud with a Happy Ending”, 49-50: Waley concurs
with Zorzi, arguing that individuals at all levels of Sienese society engaged in feuding. (NB: Most scholars
now use the term grandi or magnate to describe a group that is roughly synonymous with the chivalric elite,
although the strong political connotations attached to the term magnate decrease its usefulness. See chapter
1 above for issues with using this terminology).
394
Becker, “A Study in Political Failure”, 275, 298: Becker argues that the popolani were not immune to
the call of honor, but despite these similarities “the violence and discord endemic among the magnates
created significant distinctions”.
395
The problem of establishing definitive borders for what in reality were very fluid social groups is a
major one for historians of late medieval Florence and Italy. The popolo grasso was comprised primarily of
“new men” who had enjoyed incredible social mobility as a result of the monumental profits of an economy
based on mercantile, banking, and industrial endeavors. While some of these men formed a new elite,
underpinned by a competing civic ideology centered on public order, economic prosperity, and the
common good. Some of these new men eagerly joined the ranks of the chivalrous, while others straddled
the line with some members on either side. The extreme fluidity of these social categories highlights the
real danger of attempting to equate the socio-juridical group known as the grandi (magnates) with the
chivalric elite.
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collective/corporate honor.396 In Florence, this collective/corporate honor could be

associated with or invested in a specific social group (e.g. the popolo grasso) or in a

larger supra-social, political entity like the Florentine commune. As the non-chivalric

social elite increasingly invested their personal and familial honor in the collective honor

of the commune, these two forms of honor became inextricably intertwined so that the

collective honor of the popolo and commune became nearly synonymous with the

personal and familial honor of the ruling elite.397

In contrast, the ideology of chivalry encouraged attitudes and behaviors that were

in many ways antithetical to civic life. Chivalry exhorted knights and arms bearers to

defend their autonomy and superiority with bloody violence, making subservience to a

centralized government and cooperation with the non-chivalric elements of society very

396
Every medieval Tuscan had a sense of honor that required action when sullied or threatened. The nature
and degree of the reaction varied greatly based on social status and mentality, as did contemporary
reception of/reaction to this violence, with the most egregious offenders undoubtedly the warrior elite.
Wickham, Courts and Conflicts in Twelfth-Century Tuscany, 221: Wickham encourages historians to be
careful not to assume that peasants or urban artisans did not value honor, but acknowledges that it was
different from that of the aristocracy. Waley, “A Blood Feud with a Happy Ending”, 50: Despite arguing
for the ubiquitous practice of feuding among social classes in late medieval Italy, Waley admits that “on
account of their political implications and the threat of public order presented by… great men, [their]
vendettas were a matter of greater moment”.
397
Villani, 354-355: The Florentines took great exception to the arrogance and disrespect of the Lucchese,
who in 1303, sent troops to the city to help restore order. Villani writes that one Florentine, Ponciardo de’
Ponci (Ponziardo de’ Ponzi, Da Ponte) di Vacchereccia, took the defense of the collective honor of the city
into his own hands, “str[iking] the herald from Lucca in the face with his sword” while he read out a
proclamation; “onde uno Ponciardo de’ Ponci di Vacchereccia diede d’una spada nel volto al banditore di
Lucca”. Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 90: Marchionne, writing from the late 1370s
added to his chronicle the likely apocryphal detail that Ponciardo subsequently told the herald to “carry this
[i.e. the blow] back to Lucca and offer it to S. Zita [i.e. the patron saint of the city of Lucca]”. Not much is
known about Ponciardo, but his violent reaction to the dishonor done to the honor of Florence, and by
extension to his personal honor, suggests that he was among the social elite, if not a member of the
chivalric elite. Furthermore, this example suggests that when collective honor was impugned, it could quite
easily translate into or be interpreted as personal dishonor. As a result, Ponciardo’s violence seems to have
been a personal act of vengeance aimed at vindicating the collective honor of Florence. In contrast, the
chivalric elite were hesitant to attach themselves too closely to the communal government of Florence,
which was actively persecuting them, but there is some evidence that suggests the chivalric elite were still
sensitive to the dictates of the collective honor of their patria.
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difficult and often undesirable. Chivalry and the powerful influence of honor-shame

demanded that these warriors eschew public courts in favor of pursuing private, violent

means of settling their many disputes.398 Indeed, civic ideology increasingly treated the

internecine violence so characteristic of the chivalric elite as a regrettable diversion that

created instability, threatened prosperity, and drained precious resources away from

economic interests.399

Moreover, from the perspective of the chivalric elite, civic ideology promoted

ideals that were in many cases diametrically opposed to the virtues advocated by the

ideology of chivalry. For example, the insatiable desire to accumulate wealth contrasted

sharply with the chivalric virtue of largesse, while the valorization of luxury and a life of

ease (at least in terms of military activity) conflicted with the ideal asceticism of chivalry

and centrality of military vigor and skills. In other words, strenuous knights and arms

bearers argued that civic ideology promoted avarice, sloth, idleness, and cowardice.

As a result, men reared in families with long traditions of exercising political

power, providing military leadership, and solving disputes through personal justice were

not inclined to concede peacefully to the demands of popular governments, especially

arguments promoting the interest of the collective good over that of the individual.400 Not

398
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 64: Dino Compagni touches upon this chivalric self-perception
of superiority and its real-life consequences in the political context of a commune in his description of
Corso Donati who, “because of his great spirit did not deign to attend to petty things; and because of his
scornfulness, he did not retain the affection of such citizens [i.e. the popolo grasso]”.
399
Lauro Martines, Power and Imagination: City-States in Renaissance Italy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins
University Press, 1988), 72-78.
400
For chivalric autonomy and leadership in the realm of warfare, see Vigueur, Cavalieri e Cittadini, 65-
174. A few examples will here suffice: Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 132-133:
Marchionne writes that in 1323 the grandi were particularly upset with the popolo because they would not
let the grandi have a captain of their choosing for the war against Castruccio; Villani, 217: in 1251, the
Ghibelline nobles of Florence refused to follow the people and the commonwealth on an expedition against
 152

surprisingly, the early-fifteenth century Florentine humanist historian and politician,

Leonardo Bruni, considered chivalric violence to be antithetical to civic life because it

challenged the stability and prosperity of the Florentine state.401 Furthermore he

considered internecine violence for personal and familial gain to be behavior unbefitting

of a republic.402 The actions taken by the Florentine government and other interested

groups during the course of the second-half of the thirteenth century confirms that

Bruni’s concerns were shared by many Florentines well before the fifteenth century. As a

result, various institutions, groups, and individuals took an array of approaches to dealing

with the problem of social violence, a danger made all the more serious by the significant

private military power at the disposal of strenuous knights and arms bearers, and their

inherently prickly sense of honor.403

These measures ranged from the promulgation of repressive legislation (e.g. the

Ordinances of Justice (1293) and other anti-magnate legislation)404 aimed at forcing the

Pistoia, with Villani, a member of the popolo, claiming that “both in word and in deed [they] oppose[d] it
through factious hatred”; “anzi in detto e in fatto la contradiaro per animosità di parte”. Ibid, 467-468: in
1310, Villani blames certain members of the chivalric elite, again using the term grandi, for refusing to
take the city of Arezzo after a long siege, because they wished to see the war continue; ibid, 565-567: A
final example can be drawn from the events of 1323, when a massive Florentine army, comprised of both
the chivalric elite and the popolo, marched on Prato, but while there disorder broke out within the army.
Villani not surprisingly blames this on the chivalric elite, who “through the[ir] vice… did not want to win
the war for the honor and state of the popolo”.
401
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 315: Bruni identifies arrogance and ambition
as the characteristic vices of the nobility. Later (vol. 1, 359), Bruni argues that this arrogance was unsuited
to a free city, lamenting that the “nobility” could only be “restrained from committing unjust acts only with
the greatest of difficulty”.
402
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, vol. I, 221.
403
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 7-8.
404
For the 1293 edition: F. Bonaini, “Gli Ordinamenti di Giustizia del Comune e Popolo di Firenze
compilati nel 1293”, Archivio Storico Italiano, n.s., 1 (1855): 37–71; reprinted in Ordinamenti di Giustizia,
1293–1993, ed. F. Cardini (Florence, 1993). Revised 1295 redaction in Salvemini, Magnati e popolani
(1899), pp. 384–423. On the Ordinances, see: Zorzi, “Politica e giustizia a Firenze al tempo degli
ordinamenti antimagnatizi,” in Ordinamenti di giustizia fiorentini. Studi in occasione del VII centenario,
 153

knightly elite to abandon their violent lifestyles through the threat of harsh punishment, to

the imposition of heavy financial penalties in the form of sureties to ensure good

behavior, as well as the creation of popular military companies to provide an independent

military force to defend the commune and Popolo and have received extensive attention

elsewhere. 405 Some Florentines, particularly members of the popolo grasso who had

business and marriage ties with the chivalric elite, took a different approach, favoring

peaceful settlement and the redirection of chivalric energies toward shared interests.406

Despite these different measures and approaches, chivalric violence did not disappear,

but continued, until at least the mid-fourteenth century, to pose a serious threat to the

stability and prosperity of the Florentine state.

Despite the contrasting lifestyles and mentalities of these groups and the efforts

made by the non-chivalric to control the violent excesses of the chivalric elements of

Florentine society, cooperation did occur. Not surprisingly, cooperation was forthcoming

only when the chivalric elite were forced to do so by the threat or use of violence, or

when they were presented with the immediate and significant advantages of such

ed. Vanna Arrighi (Florence: Ministero per beni culturali e beni ambientali, 1995), 105-147; Lansing, The
Florentine Magnates, 192-212; Najemy, A History of Florence, 81-87.
405
See the studies listed immediately above in n.395. Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 13ff: Lansing
argues that anti-magnate legislation in Florence was part of a transition to guild rule. Becker, “A Study in
Political Failure”, 266: Becker argues that the Ordinances of Justice created a new nobility in Florence, one
based upon knighthood and violence.
406
The popolo grasso were joined in their leadership of the commune by their allies among the knightly
elite who shared many of the same ambitions. See Becker, “A Study in Political Failure”, 252: Marvin
Becker observes that those magnates who were brought into the government were the ones who were
sympathetic to the aims of the popolo grasso. He also notes the existence of other magnates who “were not
content to live la vita civile”. These “dissident elements” within the magnate class have been largely
overlooked. This group also included magnates who were eager to receive the protection of the commune
from the violence of the lawless members of their class. Eventually these men would coopt the traditional
social institution of knighthood, composed of strenuous martial men, and refashion it into a service
knighthood: see Salvimini, La dignita cavalleresca nel comune di Firenze.
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collaboration (i.e. an injection of much needed wealth made possible by a marriage

alliance with a wealthy merchant family). This hesitation was at least partly the result of

strenuous knights and arms bearers interpreting loss of political power and social

preeminence as a source of dishonor and shame, stimulating an almost visceral need to

violently resist and avenge such challenges.407 Unlike the horizontal honor violence (both

personal and familial) at stake in conflicts between members of the chivalric elite,

however, in social violence knights and arms bearers risked what scholars have termed

“vertical honor”, the respect and precedence shown to them by their social inferiors.408

Moreover, incidents of social violence by their nature posed a threat to the traditional

lifestyle and identity of the chivalric elite, as defeat in an armed conflict against the

popolo minuto could have catastrophic political and social consequences.409

407
Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 17: Lansing argues that one of the primary functions of the
Ordinances of Justice was to end magnate oppression of the popolani, violence, no doubt, stemming from
the challenge presented by these new men. Najemy, A History of Florence, 24: Najemy points out that
families with long traditions of political leadership and military service, like the Donati, resented the
meteoric rise of new men, and the power and influence wealth could buy. George Holmes, Florence, Rome
and the Origins of the Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 34: George Holmes has
argued that the nobility’s declining economic and political power combined with their traditional capacity
for physical violence made them a very hostile and dangerous force.
408
Given the centrality of honor in chivalric culture, especially in relation to honor violence discussed in
chapter two above and warfare discussed in chapter four below, it is useful to briefly consider its role in the
context of social violence. Acts of social violence certainly involved honor, although its nature differed
from that of the other two contexts. Honor-violence and warfare both involved horizontal honor, the
recognition of personal honor among equals (i.e. members of the chivalric elite), while social-violence
involved vertical honor, honor enjoyed by all members of an exalted rank in relation to their social
inferiors. While both forms of honor had both individual and collective aspects, the collective side of
verticle honor had much higher stakes than the individual. As a result, members of the chivalric elite were
required to defend not only personal vertical honor, but also that of the group because the consequences of
dishonor included the downfall of the entire group, not just the individual or family. Furthermore, vertical
honor’s collective side allowed knights and arms bearers to react violently against attacks from social
inferiors without risking their horizontal honor, which could be damaged if a member of the chivalric elite
interpreted the actions of an inferior man as of sufficient worth to cause him dishonor.
409
Honor was on the line during these conflicts, not in the same way as in the acts of honor-violence
discussed in the previous chapter. The primary difference is the type of honor involved. When a knight was
attacked or insulted by a fellow knight, horizontal honor was at stake, requiring a violent response in order
to defend and/or vindicate that honor. In the context of social violence, the popular classes of Florentine
 155

Florentine knights and arms bearers were forced to negotiate social terrain quite

different from that of their transalpine counterparts. The challenge posed by the

increasingly intrusive and repressive authority of the Florentine communal government,

which came to represent the interests of the popular classes and non-chivalric elites,

would have been quite foreign to other medieval knights. Despite these differences, the

Florentine chivalric elite’s response to this challenge highlights the transalpine continuity

of chivalric culture, as they employed the same bloody, showy violence as their knightly

counterparts across medieval Europe to restrain and overawe those whom they

considered to be social inferiors.410 When push came to shove, the chivalric elite used

overwhelming violence to overcome the resistance of those who would dispute their

claims to exalted status, for as anthropologist Julian Pitt-Rivers has argued “[r]espect and

precedence [were] paid to those who claim[ed] it and [were] sufficiently powerful to

enforce their claim… The de facto achievement of honor depend[ed] on the ability to

silence anyone who would dispute the achievement”.411 Moreover, challenges to the

social preeminence and political power of the Florentine chivalric elite served to

society were not accorded the respect necessary to place in jeopardy the horizontal honor of the chivalric
elite. Instead, vertical honor was on the line, a form of honor that tended to be more collective than
horizontal honor. As a result, social violence tended to be intense affairs, because the honor, i.e. prestige
and status, of the chivalric elite as a whole was often on the line.
410
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 336. Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 170, 178:
Marchionne writes that in the 1330s the power of the Bondelmonti family was significant and that everyone
suffered in Florence: “E tanto fu la potenza de’ Buondelmonti, che si sofferse in Firenze”; “ed ogni uomo
tremò di lui di poi, perchè la casa dei Buondelmonti era in grande stato a quelli tempi”.
411
Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status”, 24. Wickham, Courts and Conflicts in Twelfth-Century
Tuscany, 284: Violence was understood in medieval Florence as a claim to rights.
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strengthen connections with the foreign nobles and knights with whom they shared a

common culture, a point that is emphasized in imaginative literature.412

II. Chivalric Attitudes toward the Non-Chivalric

Despite the prevalence of violent conflict between the chivalric and the non-

chivalric elements of Florentine society and the transalpine continuity of chivalric

culture, imaginative literature, an important medium for the transmission of chivalric

attitudes and ideas, does not spend much time discussing non-members of the warrior

elite. This is because the ideology of chivalry had very little to do with the non-chivalric.

This is a crucial point, one that reveals a great deal about the chivalric elite’s perception

of their social inferiors who are deemed unworthy of notice.

What we can discern tends, as north of the Alps, to reinforce the self-perceived

superiority of strenuous knights and arms bearers. The chivalrous are depicted in these
412
Numerous examples can be drawn from Florentine history to demonstrate not only this affinity, but also
the expectation that this shared culture, and the ideology underpinning it, would translate into tangible
foreign assistance in the warrior elite’s struggle to maintain their superiority. Dino Compagni’s Chronicle
of Florence, 16: For example, in 1293 when the Ordinances of Justice struck a major blow to the power and
ambitions of the chivalric elite, the magnates and other powerful citizens “brought from Champagne a
brave and bold knight named Messer Jean de Chalons, a man more powerful than loyal… [who] came to
Tuscany allied with the magnates of Florence”. Likewise, in 1342, when the famous French noble Walter
IV of Brienne, the duke of Athens, was made signore of Florence, the chivalric elite fully expected to enjoy
the favor of their new signorie, and to be restored to their former power and prominence: Marchionne di
Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 195: “Nel detto anno veggendosi lo Duca favoreggiare a’ Grandi di
Firenze, li quali sempre, si dicea, essergli agli orechi, perrocchè, dipoi che furono fatti Grandi, non furono
mai amici de’ popolani grassi”. It is notable that Marchionne differentiates between grandi and popolani
grassi. Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 204-205: Many members of the grandi would
join with the popolani grassi to drive out the duke of Athens in 1343, with a few notable exceptions.
Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 265: Bruni claims that the “Duke of Athens
was raised up by the favor of the nobility and his own reputation for courage and ability”, and like the
nobles of his native France, considered common people “to be almost slaves”.
 157

works as great lords and warriors dominating courts and battlefields alike, while the non-

chivalric are portrayed as cowards, merchants (these terms are often interchangeable),

and/or individuals plagued by the social and moral iniquities of luxury, sloth, and greed,

all of which constitute attacks upon the great wealth of these social elites. Perhaps the

strongest messages emerging from imaginative literature are, as we shall see below, 1)

the encouragement given to the Florentine chivalric elite to assert and to defend their

superiority and autonomy through force, and 2) the valorization of private justice not only

as a right belonging to these warriors, but as a manifestation of their superiority and

autonomy.

Since the chivalric elite believed that their social and political superiority

stemmed primarily from their function as strenuous warriors who provided military

leadership abroad and exercised a privileged practice of violence at home, the non-

chivalric are often depicted as the opposite: base commoners, utterly lacking in martial

vigor and skill.413 For example, in Giovanni Boccaccio’s Il Filocolo, Filocolo and his

knightly friends incite two groups of peasants to fight one another while they watch and

laugh. Boccaccio describes at great lengths the peasants’ lack of vigor and skill, which he

clearly intended to contrast with the prowess and bravery of the noble heroes of his work:

“Going to [the peasants], [Filocolo] stirred them up with words so that they
became bold and undertook to cross the river… But they were not arrived at the
other bank when their armed adversaries attacked them, and they began their
battle haphazardly in the midst of the river, severely lacerating their rough arms
and backs with the heavy staves. Because of the close quarters, there was no room
for bow or sling; and if there were any sword used, it either missed or was twisted

413
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filocolo, 419 (book 5, chapter 47): In fact, Filocolo and his contemporaries
among the chivalric elite thought of them as “disorderly and gross”, consistently inciting their superiors “to
wrath”.
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as it struck. They were much impeded by the water… and at times it made the
most cowardly into valiant combatants, holding their feet in the soft sand when
they would have fled if they were on hard field. But after they had gone on
fighting for a long time, and many from both sides had returned in bad shape,
Filocolo and his companions had laughed enough at the bizarre behavior of these
folks”.414

In this way Boccaccio reflects upon one aspect of contemporary chivalric opinion of the

non-chivalric, especially relevant to the peasants and artisans who filled in the lower

echelons of society. Indeed, later in this same incident Filocolo sums up this traditional

chivalric attitude telling the peasants “You unhappy people, poor in men and in wealth,

why do you fight... It should suffice you to follow the doctrine of Saturn, without wanting

to usurp the office of Mars, since that it is silly for them to fight since dwells in you

neither nobility of spirit, nor system, nor sense, nor skills at arms”.415

Sometimes the criticism and mockery related to a lack of martial skill and bravery

is trumped by accusations of cowardice, which were leveled primarily at the pseudo-

knights of the non-chivalric social elite. A common theme in imaginative chivalric

literature is the idea that a true, strenuous knight would prefer to die in battle with his

honor, pride, and courage intact rather than avoid battle or run away to live another day.

For the chivalric elite a life without honor, one stained by the ignominy of cowardice is

not worth living.416 In one telling example drawn from the Tristano Panciatichiano, the

author describes the valiant deeds of arms done by knights and arms bearers at a

414
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filocolo, 410-411 (book 5, chapters 39-40). It is important to note that L.B. Hall,
the translator of another of Boccaccio’s works, The Fates of Illustrious Men, argues (vi) that middle-class
persons made bad rulers and invariably returned to their “natural” level.
415
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filocolo, 411-412 (book 5, chapter 41).
416
La Tavola Ritonda, 125: Tristan argues that for true knights it is better to die with pride and courage
than to live as cowards.
 159

prestigious tournament. Their vigor, valor, and prowess are sharply contrasted with

numerous men who attend, but do not participate in the combat. Although these men are

ostensibly warriors, the author likens them to merchants, who unlike the strenuous

knights and arms bearers risking their lives to demonstrate prowess and win honor on the

field of battle, lounge about at ease watching the tournament from the safety of the

sidelines. According to the author, these men were not attending the tournament as

knights, but “rather as… merchant[s]… still bearing their lances which are not yet

broken.””.417 Given this work’s date of composition (the late-thirteenth century), this may

have been a thinly veiled criticism aimed at the many Florentine “knights” who bore the

dignity, but eschewed the martial elements traditionally associated with knighthood and

chivalric identity.418 Similar criticism of the non-chivalric can be found in La Tavola

Ritonda when the author describes a land filled with unchivalrous men, who are

“handsome but cowardly, unskilled at arms and without valor, but… very arrogant and

greedy”.419

The disdain and contempt shown by the chivalric elite for these social and moral

shortcomings also extends to warriors who failed to live up the ideals of chivalry laid out

in imaginative literature. For example, Guido delle Colonne’s Historia Destructionis

Troiae, a late-thirteenth century romance (completed in 1287) centered on the Trojan

War and very popular in Dante’s Florence, depicts Ulysses as “lack[ing] all valor of

knighthood… flourish[ing] and surviv[ing] by the eloquence of his speech alone”.

417
Tristano Panciatichiano, 598/599: ”Et come?” disse la reina, “non vi fu lo re?” “Dama sì, fu, ma non
come cavalieri, ma come mercatanti e ancora recarono ellino loro lancie che non sono anco’ rotte”.
418
Tristano Panciatichiano, 4: The editor and translator, Gloria Allaire, notes that the manuscript appearing
in her volume was an early fourteenth century copy of an existing manuscript.
419
La Tavola Ritonda, 103.
 160

Ulysses’s fellow Greeks, especially the warriors who are depicted as medieval knights,

held nothing but contempt for his “treacherous and deceiving words”, which they believe

sullied the Greek victory over the Trojans with the “taint of infamy among all nations”,

because while they should have defeated the Trojans through deeds of arms, instead they

“conquered the Trojans through deceptions of maneuvering and through guile”.420

Likewise in Giovanni Boccaccio’s Teseida della Nozze d’Emilia Theseus is able to

distinguish between “the man who wielded his weapons with a trembling hand, and the

man who boldly showed outstanding valor in fighting the enemy, and who the laggards

were who dallied uselessly and accomplished nothing”. This last group, men who were

lazy and thought more of their safety than their honor, “he reviled, shouting scornfully,

while praising the others”.421

These criticisms would be more fully elaborated by the late-fourteenth century

when social critics lashed out at the Florentine merchant-knights who purchased the

trappings of chivalry, but failed to embrace the traditional military nature of its tenets.

For example, in Novelle XLI of Franco Sacchetti’s Trecentonovelle, the Florentine

commander in the war against Pisa (1362), Messer Ridolfo da Camerino, mocks the

Florentine “knights” (Sacchetti identifies them as merchants or cloth makers) who were

sent by the government to serve as his advisers. Sacchetti describes how when the

Florentine advisers attempted to tell Ridolfo where to make camp, the famous knight

“laughed at them in derision and told them, “Go you, go! Get to your shops and sell

420
Guido delle Colonne, Historia Destructionis Troiae, 229 (lines 31-46).
421
Giovanni Boccaccio, The Book of Theseus, 64 (book 2, chapter 57).
 161

cloths!””.422 Sacchettti concluded that “he spoke the truth, it must be plain to every man

how little trade or merchandise have to do with the business of war”.423 Indeed, Sacchetti

is convinced that by the late-fourteenth and fifteenth centuries “every wretch wanted to

have a coat-of-arms and to found a noble house, even those whose fathers were

foundlings of the hospital”.424

Another element of the chivalric perspective on/attitude toward the non-chivalric

that can also be found in imaginative literature is the criticism of the greed and luxury

supposedly at the center of the merchant lifestyle. Indeed, depictions of commoners,

especially merchants, are painted with the brush of avarice, as these individuals are

seemingly only motivated only by the accumulation of wealth and the luxurious lifestyle

these riches afforded. For example in Il Novellino, a thirteenth century collection of tales

composed anonymously in Florence, there is a story about a poor knight and a jongleur

who both ask for a gift from Alexander the Great. The knight wishes only for certain

modest gifts that will allow him to return home with his honor intact. The jongleur, on the

other hand, asks for the city of Gaza. Alexander grants the knight his request, but rejects

the commoner’s greedy demand. The author in turn praises the knight for his wisdom in

422
Franco Sacchetti, Il Trecentonovelle, 115: “Iate, iate, iate sì alle botteghe a vennere i panni”.
423
Franco Sacchetti, Il Trecentonovelle, 115: “Se dicea il vero ogni uomo il pensi, quello che ha fare la
mercatanzia o l’arte meccanica con la industria militare”.
424
Franco Sacchetti, Il Trecentonovelle, 163: “ché ogni tristo vuol fare arma e far casati; e chi tali, che li
loro padri seranno stati trovati agli ospedali”. Sacchetti tells the story of “an artificer of little skill” (un
grossolano artefice) who went to the famous Italian painter, Giotto, to have his shield painted with his coat
of arms because he was being made castellan of a Florentine castle. Giotto criticizes his presumptuousness,
telling him that “if he was of the house of Bardi his behavior would have been acceptable” (Se tu fussi stato
de’ Bardi, serebbe bastato).
 162

recognizing that a commoner cannot possibly aspire to rule and that his true motivation

must be the desire for money.425

No doubt this emphasis upon the evils of greed and luxury is at least partly the

result of the number of poor knights who struggled to maintain their dignity in late

medieval Europe and especially those in Florence who faced legal and social troubles

because of their lack of wealth.426 Greed and a penchant for luxury often led to idleness

or sloth, as wealthy individuals sought to enjoy their wealth by living leisurely. Once

again this stands sharply in contrast with the ascetic and active lifestyles of the chivalric

elite. Indeed, chivalric ideology considered sloth to be an insult, even capable of

destroying chivalry.427 A powerful example appearing in numerous contemporary works

is the self-destruction of Arthur’s Round Table because of the idleness and pursuit of

luxury among his knights during a period of peace and inactivity.428

In another example, this time from the Historia Destructionis Troiae, Theseus

praises Palaemon and his fellow arms bearers for their bravery and prowess, emphasizing

how different their conduct is from the laziness and cowardice traditionally associated by

strenuous warriors with the non-chivalric:

“I admired your valor and your every deed, and how you gave and received blows
and endured the shock of the outcry without becoming deafened. And I tell you
truly that in all my life I have never seen such fine people gathered together, nor
people who were so daring… and so strong, undergoing such harassment; nor
people who were less slothful and so vivacious, or less wary of endangering
themselves, caring only to show their prowess and perform well, as I have seen

425
Il Novellino, ed. Valeria Mouchet (Milan: Bureau Biblioteca Univ. Rizzoli, 2008), Canto IV, 48-50:
“Alessandro e’ suoi baroni prosciolsero il cavaliere, e commendarlo di grande sapienzia”.
426
Il Novellino, Canto XX, 68-70.
427
La Tavola Ritonda, 223.
428
La Tavola Ritonda, 334: That inactivity can destroy will destroy warrior virtue is echoed by Boccaccio
in his chapter on King Arthur: Giovanni Boccaccio, The Fates of Illustrious Men, 215.
 163

and appreciated in all of you today… I would like to describe those feats of daring
one at a time, for I know them well; but it would take too long”.429

This sharp contrast between the valor and prowess of the warrior elite and the

cowardice and idleness of the non-chivalric would have been familiar to the Florentine

warrior elite, who as we have seen in the previous chapter, were animated by a desire to

constantly pursue, assert, and defend their honor. In story XIII of Il Novellino, Antigonus

reproves Alexander the Great for his penchant for luxury, stating clearly that “luxury

debases the body” and that men should be ashamed who “should reign in virtue, and

instead delight in luxury”.430 In his Teseida della Nozze d’Emilia, Giovanni Boccaccio

argues, through the guise of Theseus, that a man who cares about his honor will avoid

idleness at all costs: “In this world, each man is as valiant as the worthy deeds it pleases

him to perform, so let everyone who desires to rise to fame keep himself form a life of

idleness”.431 Likewise in his The Fates of Illustrious Men, Boccaccio criticizes the

negative impact of luxury and sloth on the chivalric lifestyle: “How very shameful is an

effeminate man! With these degradations he destroyed the reputation he had gained with

his earlier deeds”.432 This criticism served as an important warning to knights and arms

bearers to avoid those “mercantile” qualities that ultimately threatened traditional

chivalric virtues. It also offered a means to distinguish strenuous warriors from their

peers among the social elite who were wealthy and powerful, but lived lifestyles of

luxury and sloth.

429
Giovanni Boccaccio, The Book of Theseus, 251 (book 9, chapter 56).
430
Il Novellino, Canto XIII, 62-63: “E cosi si può dire: il corpo è regno e vil cosa è la lussaria e quasi a
modo di cetera. Vergognisi dunque chi dee regnare in virtude, e diletta in lussuria”.
431
Giovanni Boccaccio, The Book of Theseus, 61 (book 2, chapter 44).
432
Giovanni Boccaccio, The Fates of Illustrious Men, 27.
 164

The important connection between action and honor in Florentine chivalric

culture is confirmed by Folgore da San Gimignano, a contemporary of Dante, whose

poetry is generally considered to be an accurate reflection of chivalric culture in Tuscany

during the late-thirteenth and fourteenth century. In his sonnet about prowess, one part of

a larger cycle of works dedicated to the education of a new knight, Lady Prowess

instructs the new knight to “strain yourself and sweat; if this you do you will be among

my vassals”.433 Likewise, in Folgore’s “Sonnets on the Week”, the poet assigns a

different noble activity to each day of the week, exhorting knights and arms bearers to

remain active: Tuesdays were to be dedicated to war, Thursdays for participating in

tournaments, Fridays for hunting, and Saturdays for hawking and falconing.434 Thus,

action, especially military service, was a crucial means of distinguishing strenuous

knights and arms bearers from the pseudo-knights among the wealthy popolo grasso who

aped their lifestyle, but failed to embrace the martial, ascetic ideals central to chivalric

identity.

This criticism of luxury, sloth, and the pursuit of pleasure is echoed in one of

Boccaccio’s last works, De casibus virorum illustrium (The Fates of Illustrious Men,

ca.1358). In a chapter on Sardanapalus, king of Assyria, and his family, Boccaccio

spends considerable space criticizing the king’s pursuit of easy pleasure, concluding this

criticism by drawing a sharp contrast between that lifestyle and the lifestyle of the

chivalric elite: “There is a great difference between enduring for a very long time to

433
Le Rime di Folgore da San Gemignano, ed. Giulio Navone (Bologna: Presso Gaetano Romagnoli,
1880), 46: “E lascia ogni costume che far soglia / e nuovamente t’affatichi e sudi; / Se questo fai tu sarai
de’ miei drudi”.
434
Le Rime di Folgore da San Gemignano, 35-43.
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delight in pleasure, and enduring to strive ardently that we might make our fame known

throughout a great many centuries”.435 The main point here is that the chivalric elite

toiled in order to earn honor and create a reputation that would survive in perpetuity,

while the non-chivalric elite, especially merchants and bankers, worked tirelessly to

accumulate wealth and enjoy lives of luxury. Boccaccio reinforces this point again later

in the story of the Athenian nobleman, Alcibiades, in which he argues “But no one,

unless he was torpid and dull, would prefer to live in idleness and calm in preference to

fighting the continual tempest of the ocean waves… For sloth extinguishes both strength

of mind and body… Sloth, with a kind of rust, dulls anything that was once bright.

Activity brightens anything that was dull”.436 Of course, this idealistic view of chivalry

did not always match up with reality, but it is important that this message was promoted

among the warrior elite.437

Even when the non-chivalric avoided the infamy of cowardice and could not be

accused of greed or idleness, chivalric authors found ways to distinguish these men from

strenuous knights and arms bearers. In one striking example from the Tristano

Panciatichiano, two peasants were raised to the dignity of knighthood by the King of

Vermillion City. When these peasant-knights later treacherously kill their liege,

435
Giovanni Boccaccio, The Fates of Illustrious Men, 62.
436
Giovanni Boccaccio, The Fates of Illustrious Men, 103. Later (page 109-110) Boccaccio argues: “Do
you think those who spend their time at great banquets and drinking are happy? Far from it. They are weak
and soft in their indolence. After suffering from various and continual diseases, they bury their enfeebled
youth in a premature grave… Wealth is glittering and in the eyes of fools seems very attractive. They do
not want to recognize that the wealthy are agitated, hemmed in, miserable, and melancholy”.
437
See chapter five below for the failure of literary flowers of chivalry to live up to the ideal standards
established by proponents and reformers of chivalry. In addition, see the biting criticism offered by the
French knight, Geoffroi de Charny, who attacks the luxury and sloth plaguing French knighthood during
the first phase of the Hundred Years’ War: Geoffroi de Charny, A Knight’s Own Book of Chivalry, ed.
Richard Kaeuper and trans. Elspeth Kennedy (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2005).
 166

Palamedes accepted responsibility for securing vengeance on behalf of the murdered

king. Palamedes is ultimately successful, but only after he overcome their surprising

prowess.438

Prima facie this example seems counterproductive to the important role played by

imaginative literature in reinforcing chivalric identity and distinguishing strenuous

knights and arms bearers from the multitude of competitors and imitators that emerged in

the strikingly fluid society of late medieval Florence, because the two peasants

demonstrate considerably prowess, the foundational pillar of chivalry. As discussed

above in chapter one, the Florentine chivalric elite faced a monumental and, perhaps,

singular struggle to maintain the integrity of their identity and the composition of their

membership. The social mobility of “new men” and the growing collective power of the

popular classes saw more Florentines become involved in the urban militia, providing the

non-chivalric with opportunities to demonstrate their bravery and military skill in battle.

This reality, like the peasant-knights demonstrating prowess, no doubt presented a

challenge to the warrior elite’s monopoly on warfare, their raison d'être.

This incident then is likely a reflection of the unique social terrain which

Florentine knights and arms bearers were forced to navigate, which renders all the more

important the efforts made by the author to draw distinctions and to reinforce social

boundaries. Indeed, the author makes the important point that while Palamedes’s enemies

show great prowess, as commoners they fail to demonstrate the other important tenets of

chivalry, most notably loyalty and courtesy. Earlier in the story the brother of the

438
Tristano Panciatichiano, 516/517, 524/525-530/531.
 167

murdered king had described the peasants to Palamedes in the following way: “For I tell

you faithfully that the knights are valiant men and if they were such gentlemen in loyalty

and goodness as they are in their physical abilities, they would be highly praised and

esteemed, but [their] great disloyalty and wickedness and cruelty greatly hurts their

chivalry”.439 This great disloyalty and wickedness was clearly demonstrated when the

peasant-knights murdered the king who had raised them to knighthood. Meanwhile, their

lack of courtesy and treacherous conduct in battle no doubt confirmed, at least in the

minds of the chivalric audience of this work, that the peasants were not true knights:

“When Palamedes saw himself knocked to the ground, it’s no wonder if he’s
sorrowful and ashamed about this. And he gets up quickly and says to himself,
“What a good knight this is who has unhorsed me! I haven’t found anyone who
unhorsed me for a long time, except for Tristan, nor anyone who gave me such a
forceful blow as this one.”… Then [the peasant-knight] touches his horse with his
spurs and gallops toward Palamedes, even though he was mounted. And
Palamedes was not at all afraid of this because he had been in many other worse
adventures many other times. He said chivalrously, “If you don’t get off, I’ll kill
the horse and you’ll have dishonor and shame.””.440

The author’s depiction of two peasant-knights as disloyal and discourteous

accorded with the belief among contemporaries at all levels of Florentine society that

439
Tristano Panciatichiano, 516/517: “Che io vi dico lealmente che li cavalieri sono produomini et s’elli
fussero si produomini di leelta e di bonda come sono delle persone, bene doverebero essere pregiati e
lodati, ma la grande disleelta e malvagita e fellonia fa grande noia alla loro cavallaria”. Moreover, the only
reason Palamedes was involved with these two peasant-knights was because he had accepted the almost
sacred task of righting a wrong: avenging the treacherous murder of the King of the Vermillion City at the
hands of the very peasants he had raised to the dignity of knighthood: see ibid, 516/517, 524/525-530/531.
440
Tristano Panciatichiano, 526/527: “Quando Palamides si vide abattuto in terra, s’elli è dolente o
vergognoso di questo non è mica meraviglia. Elli si rileva vistamente et dice infra sé medesimo, “Che
buono cavalieri è questi che cosi m’àe abattuto! Io non trovai già grande tempo chi cosi m’abatesse, se
Tristano non fusse, né che si forte colpi mi desse come à fatti questi.”… Allora toccha lo cavallo degli
sproni e corre inverso Palamides tutto così a cavallo com’elli era. Et Palamides, che di ciò non è mica
spaventato, ché molte altre fiate è stato in molte altre aventure maggiori. Elli disse da cavalieri, “Se voi non
discendete, io ucciderò lo cavallo e si arete onta e vergogna.””. Of course, even the greatest knights, the
literrary flowers of chivalry, fail on occasion to live up to the ideal standards laid out in imaginative
chivalric literature: see chapter 5 below.
 168

loyalty and courtesy were traditionally associated with nobility of the blood.441 This is not

reflected, surprisingly, in imaginative literature. For example, in La Tavola Ritonda,

Tristan, arguably the most popular figure in the works of imaginative chivalric literature

produced in the Italian peninsula, is described as the “flower of all knights in prowess, in

loyalty, and in courtesy”.442 In fact, the author writes that “As the world is sustained by

four columns, so Tristano (sic.) had in himself four strengths, from which comes the

honor and the great worthiness of chivalry… the world… is sustained by four columns;

that is, loyalty, prowess, love, and courtesy”.443

When Giovanni Boccaccio emphasized the centrality of courtesy to chivalric

identity in his Teseida della Nozze d’Emilia (ca.1340-1342) by describing Arcites,

Palaemon, and Theseus as “display[ing] such courtesy that all the people were marveled”,

he was recognizing the contemporary attitude that such extreme and consistent courtesy

distinguished the chivalric elite from their social peers and inferiors.444 Thus, an

honorable and strenuous knight of noble origin who never, in theory, impugned his own

honor through treacherous or discourteous conduct could contrast himself with pseudo-

knights of common origin who did not possess loyalty and courtesy. Indeed, the

demonstration of all of the major tenets of chivalric ideology provided a measure of

441
Tristano Panciatichiano, 516/517: “For I tell you faithfully that the [peasant] knights are valiant men
and if they were such gentlemen in loyalty and goodness as they are in their physical abilities, they would
be highly praised and esteemed, but [their] great disloyalty and wickedness and cruelty greatly hurts their
chivalry”; “Che io vi dico lealmente che li cavalieri sono produomini et s’elli fussero si produomini di
leeltà e di bondà come sono delle persone, bene doverebero essere pregiati e lodati, ma la grande disleeltà e
malvagità e fellonia fa grande noia alla loro cavallaria”.
442
Tristano Riccardiano, 262/263: “lo quale voi siete lo fiore degl’altri cavalieri, di prodezza e di lealtade e
di cortesia”.
443
La Tavola Ritonda, 76/77-78/79.
444
Giovanni Boccaccio, The Book of Theseus, 146 (book 6, chapter 7).
 169

social distinction and prestige that could not be purchased, even with the fabulous wealth

possessed by many nova gente.445

These efforts to erect boundaries and reinforce distinctions between the chivalrous

and non-chivalrous reflect the challenges posed to the warrior elite by the incredible

fluidity of late medieval Florentine society. Such intellectual and cultural efforts were

coupled with more tangible measures, especially violent ones. Indeed, the chivalric elite

regularly eagerly and joyfully employed violence to defend and restore their superiority

and autonomy.

III. Social-Violence: Defending and Asserting Superiority

Historians interested in studying social violence in late medieval Florence are

hampered by various limitations related to available evidence. The primary limitation is

the destruction of the criminal records kept by the Florentine government for the years up

to 1342, a casualty of the coup which toppled the Duke of Athens in that year. As a

result, much of the violence perpetrated against the popolani no doubt remains hidden in

the lacuna of history. A second limitation is the popolani origin and perspective of the

majority of contemporary and near-contemporary chronicles. As a result of these two

factors, the social violence recorded tends to be only the most egregious examples, while

the discussion/explanation of this violence betrays the popolani biases of the authors.

445
La Tavola Ritonda, 196: The author suggests that commoners and merchants were seen by the chivalric
elite as lacking the quality of largesse: “As they rode along, they heard the whirr of a windmill, and turned
toward it. When they got there, they found the place was kept by three churlish and villainous millers.
Tristano greeted them courteously, asking them to share their roof and their bread, and give fodder to the
horses, but they said they didn’t want to, because they had earned that day only enough for themselves, and
had none to give to the horses”.
 170

Despite these limitations, some popular chronicles do provide some insight,

although the evidence must be considered with caution. For example, Dino Compagni has

clear popolani biases and on numerous occasions eagerly condemns the violent excesses

and failures of the practitioners of chivalry. However, alongside this criticism and his

agenda of moral reform, he reveals a great admiration for chivalric culture, which was

shared by many of his contemporaries. As a result, Compagni pays significant attention

in his chronicle to the chivalric elite and their actions.

The privileged practice of violence at home and a monopoly on military

leadership and warlike skills abroad were fundamental to chivalric identity. Not

surprisingly given the centrality of violence, Florentine knights and arms bearers reacted

with great anger and deadly force to attacks on their personal and collective honor and to

challenges to their social superiority, control of political power in the commune, and

autonomy. For example, in 1289 on the eve of the feast day of St. John (June 24) when

the guilds were going in a procession to make their customary offerings with their

consuls, Dino Compagni records that “some magnates laid hands on them and struck

them saying: “We are the ones who were responsible for the victory at Campaldino, yet

you have taken from us the offices and honors of our city””.446

The above example refers to a particularly contentious time in Florentine history

when the chivalric elite were treated in a seemingly contradictory manner, receiving

praise for the leading role they played in the victory at the battle of Campaldino (1289),

while at the same time, subjected to severe repression by the popular government of

446
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 24.
 171

Giano della Bella, which promulgated the Ordinances of Justice in 1293. This

contradictory treatment no doubt highlighted the challenge posed to the traditional modus

operandi of Florentine society: in the past the chivalric elite were rewarded for successful

military leadership and victory with honor, as well as social prestige and political power.

The emergence of Florentine governments animated by civic ideology, however, saw

honor and prestige bestowed on those who provided other forms of service, mostly

administrative and diplomatic in nature. These new governments also rewarded

individuals who eschewed the disruptive violence traditionally associated with the

chivalric elite.

Even the most cursory examination of contemporary and near-contemporary

chronicles confirms the desire of strenuous knights and arms bearers to utilize violence

against the non-chivalric, especially when popular governments ruled Florence. For

example, in 1250, one faction of the chivalric elite (the Ghibellines) armed themselves

and gathered at the house of the Uberti, one of the most powerful traditional Florentine

noble families, prepared to make war on the popolani who had recently succeeded in

forming the first popular government in Florentine history (the Primo Popolo, 1250-

1260). Marchionne di Coppo Stefani writes that the nobles only hesitated to attack the

popolani out of fear that a rival faction of the chivalric elite (the Guelfs) might side with

the popolani against them. In the end, the visceral need to defend their social and political

supremacy and independence meant that violence was unavoidable.447

447
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 37: The nobles supposedly decide “andiamo a
provare se vogliono zuffa con noi; se la vogliono, diamala loro”.
 172

In 1295 a mutual experience of oppression at the hands of the popolani-controlled

government induced the various factions of the chivalric elite to finally make peace

among themselves, albeit only temporarily, in order to better resist this popular

government (the Secondo Popolo). Villani describes scenes in the city streets that are

reminiscent of a battlefield: “whereupon all the people in the city of Florence rose in

tumult and rushed to arms; the magnates, on armored horses themselves, and with their

retainers from the country and other troops on foot in great numbers… [moved] with the

intent to overrun the city”.448 Many more examples can be provided: In 1323, after

conflict between the popolani and chivalric elements of a Florentine army led to a retreat

from the siege of Prato, to the “great shame and disgrace of Florence”, exiles tried to take

advantage of the political disorder to force their way into the city with the assistance of

the nobility. Although they were repulsed, Villani claims that these exiles continued to

plot with members of certain noble houses to make war against the popolani in order to

secure restoration. In February of 1324, a number of grandi and other powerful houses in

Florence “armed themselves in an alliance with twenty-five noble houses from the

contado”, with the intention of returning to power through violence.449

When in November 1334 the government of Florence created a new office out of

fear of the grandi and exiles who filled the countryside, two social groups that embodied

the chivalric lifestyle (see chapter one), this official began to harass Florentine knights

and arms bearers who were perceived as a threat to the government and public order in

448
Villani, 378: “onde nella città di Firenze fu tutta gente a romore e al’arme; i grandi per se a cavalli
coverti, e con loro seguito di contadini e d’altri masnadieri a pié in grande quantità”.
449
Villani, 595: “si trassono del numero de’ grandi e potenti dieci casati minimi e impotenti di Firenze, e
venticinque schiatte de’nobili di contado, e recargli a popolo”.
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the city. According to Villani, this official arrested “Rosso son of Gherarduccio de’

Bondelmonti, who was exiled because he had served in the retinue of the Tolomei of

Siena”, a powerful noble family with many estates and castles in the countryside between

Florence and Siena.450 In addition, military service in the retinue of a foreign noble was

likely interpreted by the ruling popolo grasso and popolani alike as an unacceptable

assertion of chivalric autonomy and thus a challenge to the authority of the communal

government. When this same official later opened an inquisition against messer Pino

della Tosa, he drew “the ire of many powerful families of Florence, who thought the

official was trying to destroy the family and memory of Pino, who had since passed

away”.451 The chivalric elite did not stand idly by while their personal and familial honor,

their very lifestyle and identity, were challenged by men they perceived to be their social

inferiors.

The stakes involved in most incidents of social violence were high, as the

momentum and power gained or lost in these conflicts between the chivalric elite and the

popolani could ultimately lead to significant changes in the city, the rise and fall of

governments, and the exile or death of Florentine citizens. As a result, social violence

tended to be extreme, capable of engulfing the entire city.452 Even when the popolani

held the reins of government they lived in constant fear of a violent uprising by the

chivalric elite. Leonardo Bruni claimed that “fear of the nobility was the one bond of

450
Villani, 813: “perocchè prese Rosso figliuolo di Gherarduccio de’ Bondelmonti, il quale avea bando di
contumace della testa per certa riformagione, e non per istatuto nè micidio per lui fatto, ma per una
cavalcata ch’egli con certi avea fatta a Montalcino in servigio de’ Tolomei di Siena”.
451
Villani, 814: “e funne costretto e martoriato il figliuolo di messer Pino per farlo confessare ciò, ed altri
gentili uomini di Firenze amici di messer Pino, per disfare la sua memoria e distruggere i suoi amici; e ciò
fu fatto per invidia, e chi disse per operazione d’alcuno consorto del detto messer Pino”.
452
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 213-218.
 174

harmony that united the people”.453 Villani also touches upon this fear and the high level

of distrust between popolani and the chivalric elite in his description of the events of

November and December 1325. Earlier that year a Florentine army had been routed at the

Battle of Altopascio by Castruccio Castracani, the lord of Pisa and Lucca, leaving many

noble and knightly Florentines in Lucchese prison. As a result, in November 1325 “the

Florentines were greatly disturbed by fears of treachery from among their own, especially

the grandi and the powerful popolani, many of whom had sons, brothers, or fathers in

Lucchese prison; it became so bad that the Florentine government decreed that no man

who had someone in Lucchese prison could be castellan of any castle, or vicar”.454

According to Villani in December 1325, these fears still had not subsided: “the

Florentines lived in fear of trouble at home, especially on the part of the powerful grandi

and popolo who had brothers and sons in Lucchese prison”.455 Many additional examples

can be found in the works of Villani, Compagni, Bruni, and others.456

453
Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 351.
454
Villani, 617-618: “i Fiorentini furono in grande sospetto dentro tra loro, temendo l’no dell’altro di
tradigione, e spezialmente di certi grandi e popolani possenti, i quali aveano loro figliuoli e fratelli in
pregione a Lucca, si feciono uno dicreto sotto grande pena, che nullo cittadino che avesse pregione a Lucca
potesse essere castellano di nullo castello, o vicario di lega o di gente, o richiesto a nullo consiglio di
comune”.
455
Villani, 620: “vivendo in paura grande di tradimento, temendo di coloro ch’aveano i loro figliuoli e
fratelli pregioni in Lucca, i quali erano possenti e grandi in comune”. Villani thought in terms of social
class/groups, but the chivalric elite as a social group transcended traditional social boundaries (see chapter
1 above).
456
Villani, 704-705: “Ugolino di Tano degli Ubaldini with certain lesser men in Florence attempted to
commit treachery in Florence”; “fu menato unto trattato per Ugolino di Tano degli Ubaldini con certi
uomini di piccolo affare di Firenze di tradire la città di Firenze in questo modo”. Ibid, 791: In 1333, certain
grandi sought to move once again against the popolani, trying to block off the bridges so that the popolo
couldn’t cross. Ibid, 909: Villani notes that in this year there were machinations among the grandi to
lordship of the city. Ricordi Storici di Filippo di Cino Rinuccini dal 1282 al 1460 colla continuazione di
Alamanno e Neri suoi Figli fino al 1506, ed. G. Aiazzi (Florence: Stamperia Piatti, 1840), xxii: the Grandi
of Florence, led by the Bardi and Frescobaldi plotted to overthrow the Popolo.
 175

The high stakes also meant that those members of the chivalric elite who went

“all-in” in the game of power politics risked their property, exile, and even death. One of

the best examples is the fall from grace of Corso Donati in 1308. In that year, after over a

decade as one of the leading figures in Florence, Donati was accused of conspiring to

take control of the city. When he refused to submit himself to the authority of the

communal government, a typically chivalric action, he was condemned in absentia.

Corso and his allies, including the Bordoni, a powerful Florentine family of knights and

arms bearers, prepared to defend themselves in Piazza San Piero Maggiore. Dino

Compagni describes the events:

“Messer Corso was badly afflicted with gout and could not bear arms, but he
urged his friends on with his tongue, praising and inspiring those who bore
themselves valiantly. But he had few men… The attackers were numerous, for
all the banners of the popolo were there alongside the mercenaries and men at
arms, attacking the barricades with crossbows, stones, and fire. Messer Corso’s
few soldiers defended themselves vigorously with lances, crossbows, and stones,
waiting for those in the conspiracy to come to their aid… but none of them
showed any sign of coming… Seeing that he could no longer defend himself,
messer Corso decided to leave. The barricades were broken; his friends fled
through the houses… Messer Rosso, messer Pazzino, messer Geri, and many
others fought vigorously on foot and horse... Messer Corso, ill with gout, fled
towards the abbey of San Selvi… The men at arms [of the commune] caught
him and recognized him, and wanted to lead him off; he defended himself with
fine words like a wise knight. Meanwhile, the marshal’s young brother-in-law
arrived. Though urged by the others to kill messer Corso, he refused to do it and
turned back. He was sent again, this second time he struck messer Corso in the
throat with a Catalan lance and another blow in the flank, and knocked him to the
ground. Some monks carried messer Corso to the abbey, and there he died”.457

Despite his obvious disapproval of Corso’s ambitions, Compagni clearly admired the

bravery and vigorous deeds of the Donati, Pazzini, and Bordoni in this battle. Indeed,

457
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 84.
 176

most popolani admired and praised chivalric bravery and prowess when they were

directed at the enemies of Florence (see chapter 4) or when used in the best interest of the

commune. Unfortunately, historical accounts strongly suggest, as we have seen, that the

chivalric elite took out these aggressive energies on the popolani, at first because they

made easy and convenient targets, but later because they posed a threat to the traditional

superiority and autonomy of Florentine knights and arms bearers.

The Conflict over Private Justice

The use of violence to protect the traditional autonomy and superiority of the

Florentine chivalric elite also extended to the realm of justice. The popolani, who,

according to Leonardo Bruni, “could not equal the greatness of the nobility and often

suffered injury and insult”, sought instead to exact “public vengeance for private

offenses”.458 This reliance upon public justice contrasted sharply with the chivalric elite’s

belief in their inalienable right to private justice, especially in matters relating to personal

and familial honor, because private justice was determined ultimately by prowess, a gift

bestowed by God.459 In their estimation divine will in the form of prowess trumped the

arbitrary judgment of public courts, especially courts staffed by social inferiors.

Literary works provide plentiful evidence for the traditional chivalric belief that

justice should be determined through prowess. For example, in La Tavola Ritonda, Sir

Brunor (Brunoro) the Red, nephew of King Ban (Bando) of Benoich, insists that he will

458
Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 349.
459
Pitt-Rivers, “Honour and Social Status”, 31: The aristocracy claims the right to honor and precedence by
the tradition which makes them leaders of society, arbiters rather than “arbitrated” and therefore “a law
onto themselves”.
 177

prove King Languis’s guilt through his prowess.460 When Tristan challenges King

Morholt on behalf of King Mark in the Tristano Riccardiano, he has undertaken the task

of proving through his prowess that Morholt has illegally forced the people of Cornwall

to pay a steep tribute. Not surprisingly Tristan is victorious, proving the justice of King

Mark’s claim.461 Later, when Tristan is accused of killing Morholt through treacherous

means, he swears before King Anguin and his court that he wounded Morholt fairly in

combat and was justified in doing so. More importantly, he challenges anyone to prove

him wrong in single combat.462 The King decides the case in Tristan’s favor, citing his

desire not “to destroy the finest knight in all the world” and the fact that he would be

acting very treacherously if he condemned Tristan to death after saving his life.463 Once

again justice and the truth are proven through (the threat of) violence. Tristan would later

return the favor, serving as King Anguin’s champion against charges that he

treacherously killed an unnamed knight.464

Likewise in La Tavola Ritonda King Languis comes before King Arthur to defend

himself against accusations of treachery, claiming “to defend myself as a knight who is

not guilty”. The author writes that “At these words a bold and eager knight came forward,

460
La Tavola Ritonda, 71: “I will prove by force of arms that you are guilty”.
461
Tristano Riccardiano, 37-39.
462
Tristano Riccardiano, 65: “Then the king said to Tristan, “Tell me, Tristan, did you kill Morholt of
Ireland by treachery?” Tristan answered and said, “Sire, I woulded him in combat like a knight. But if there
be any knight in your court who claims or wishes to claim that I killed him treacherously, I summon him to
combat at the court of King Arthur.””; “E lo ree disse a Tristano: -- Dimi, Tristano, uccidestue l’Amoroldo
d’Irlanda a ttradimento?—E Tristano rispuose e disse: --- Messer, io lo feretti a la battaglia sì kome
kavaliere. Ma sse alkuno cavaliere àe in vostra korta ke voglia dire o ke dika k’io l’uccidesse a ttradimento,
io sì l’apello a la battaglia a la korte de lo ree Artue--”.
463
Tristano Riccardiano, 65: “E lo ree a queste kose non rispuose, ma guardando a Tristano disse: --
Cavaliere, per tre kose le quali io ti diroe, sono quelle per le quali io non prendo vendetta di voi: … e l’altra
si è perch’io sì tti trovai ne la navicella <quasi come> morto e ne la mia kasa rikoversati guarigione, e
l’altra si è perk’io ti kampai da morte. E dunqua sed io a morte ti menasse, sì fare’io grande tradimento”.
464
Tristano Riccardiano, 95-101.
 178

Sir Brunoro the Red… He said, “How can you say this, King Languis, and deny that you

had killed, or killed yourself, a knight in your court who was our companion. I will prove

by force of arms that you are guilty.”” Sir Tristan, who had agreed to serve as King

Languis’ champion, then stepped forward and replied, “My lords, I am a knight from a

distant country who is very displeased to see one knight accusing another without just

cause. Thus I will take King Langui’s battle upon myself and will show by force of arms

that he is guilty of no treachery, and that he has been falsely accused”. The author

concludes by stating that “Thus the two knights came to accord, and exchanged gloves in

front of the two kings. The kings then decreed that they should be on the field before

Camellotto in three days, to decide the question by combat”.465

Of course this reliance upon the use of prowess to determine justice through

violence left considerable room for individuals to exploit their superior martial skills and

capacity to turn illicit actions into licit ones, to prove their innocence when their guilt is

all but certain. As Bruni points out, “the common people went in fear of the nobles with

their retinues”, making the enforcement of the law difficult, even after the creation of

military companies in the second-half of the thirteenth century as part of the legislation

aimed at controlling the grandi.466 This concern about the chivalric elite employing the

mindset “might makes right” is highlighted in La Tavola Ritonda, when Tristan counsels

Amoroldo to follow the rule of justice and right rather than force: “We would rather

observe the law of God which rules not through force but justice and right, not through
465
La Tavola Ritonda, 71.
466
Leonardo Bruni, History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 351. Franco Sacchetti, Il Trecentonovelle, 321:
Sacchetti comments on the ability of the chivalric elite to avoid justice in novella CXXII, when messer
Giovanni da Negroponte, after murdering a dice maker, is brought before the lord of the land to allow
justice to be done, but Giovanni is able to avoid punishment because of his friendship with the lord.
 179

war and rapine”.467 Amoroldo’s response represents the traditional chivalric attitude

toward justice: “Such words mean nothing to me. The good point of my sword will

decide right and wrong”.468 This tension pervades many works of imaginative chivalric

literature, as well as late medieval Florentine society.

In another example from La tavola Ritonda, Tristan is rescued from his justified

punishment for his affair with Queen Isolde (Isotta) by “the good and faithful Governale

and the four friendly knights errant armed themselves and went secretly to the edge of the

sea to rescue Tristano from death”.469 The anonymous author of La Tavola Ritonda,

writing from the late-fourteenth century, seems justified in his concern that the chivalric

elite might abuse their prowess and superior military capacity to subvert justice. Indeed,

the author writes after almost a century of intense violence in Florence. By the mid-

fourteenth century, the Florentine government was also in a position to challenge the

social violence of the chivalric elite. As a result, this text more than any of the others

examined in this chapter constantly promotes the idea that knights should be the strong

arm of justice, upholding the rule of law and maintaining public order. Tristan’s prayers

during his vigil the night before being made a knight include several references to justice

and confirm that in the author’s estimation, one of the primary functions of knighthood

was to uphold justice. Tristan prayed that “God might give him the grace to carry his

knighthood with justice, loyalty, and prowess; a knight must be brave, bold and sure,

loyal, courteous and just”.470 Likewise, King Mark wished Tristan “to have ardor,

467
La Tavola Ritonda, 46.
468
La Tavola Ritonda, 47.
469
Tristan and the Round Table, 107.
470
La Tavola Ritonda, 45.
 180

prowess, and courtesy, so that he can live according to right, with courtesy and justice,

defending right from wrong”.471 Tristan, for the most part, lives up to the billing, being

described at one point in the text as “the knight most well known for defending

justice.”472

Despite this insistence upon knighthood serving as the strong arm of the law,

justice in La Tavola Ritonda is ultimately determined by private violence. The version of

chivalry which comes through the pages of this work is entirely contradictory, much like

the ideology of chivalry itself. Violence and the flaunting of justice are combined with a

concept of knighthood in which deeds of arms are performed so that wrong might not be

done to others. Perhaps this is reflection of the Florentine commune’s struggle during the

author’s lifetime to impose its authority (i.e. public justice) upon the chivalric elite.

Plentiful evidence can be drawn from both literary and historical sources to

validate his anxiety about the chivalric elite subverting justice.473 For example, when

Tristan is caught red-handed in his illicit love affair with Isolde, King Mark is quite

justified and indeed obliged to challenge him to single combat. King Mark fulfills this

obligation despite the fact that Tristan is a far superior knight. When Tristan handily

defeats King Mark, a chivalric audience would have known that justice has not been

done, although they likely would have appreciated Tristan’s ability to subvert justice

471
La Tavola Ritonda, 45.
472
La Tavola Ritonda, 68.
473
Becker, “A Study in Political Failure”, 254: “The arrest and condmenation of a great magnate would be
enough to trigger public rioting”.
 181

through his prowess.474 Earlier in the same text, Tristan once again exploits his superior

prowess to escape justice when he defeats Lambegues, the husband of the lady of

Thornwood, with whom Tristan had recently slept, thus denying this knight his deserved

vengeance.475 Rather than being punished for his adultery and the dishonor he did to

Lambegues, Tristan escapes unscathed because of his prowess. Another literary flower of

chivalry, Lancelot, likewise utilizes his prowess to subvert justice, escaping the clutches

of King Arthur and saving the Queen after their adulterous affair is discovered.476

Other times the friends of a knight or arms bearer facing justice save him from

punishment. In the Tristano Riccardiano, the eponymous hero’s friends plan to rescue

Tristan from King Mark’s justice through force after he is caught engaging in an

adulterous affair with Isolde. According to the author, when Governal found out that

Tristan had been condemned by King Mark, he assembled four of Tristan’s knightly

companions, instructing them that “As soon as Tristan appears we will attack the men

who are escorting him, so fiercely that we will rescue the lady Isolde and my lord Tristan.

For it is better to die with honor than to live with shame, and have my lord Tristan die in

such a way”; all of the knights readily agreed.477 A similar incident can be found in the

Tristano Panciatichiano: Tristan once again resists arrest through his prowess, but

474
Tristano Riccardiano, 75. See also La Tavola Ritonda, 107: “Then the good and faithful Governale and
the four friendly knights errant armed themselves and went secretly to the edge of the sea to rescue Tristano
from death”.
475
Tristano Riccardiano, 79-81.
476
La Tavola Ritonda, 119
477
Tristano Riccardiano, 177: “E dappoi ke Covernale seppe ke Tristano iera giudicato, sì disse a li iiii
cavalieri, I qualie ierano kompagnoni di Tristano… E questi si raunarono insieme e ssì preserono loro arme
e ppartirsi de la terra e andarsine a lo diserto, e dicìeno insieme l’uno all’altro: - Dappoi ke Tristano verrae,
e nnoi sì fediamo adosso a ccoloro ke lo menano e arditamente, sì che noi diliveriamo madonna Isotta e
messer Tristano; ké meglio ci èe di morire ad onore ke vivere a vitoperio e ke messer Tristano morisse in
kotale maniera”.
 182

perhaps the most striking thing about this example is that the king and his knights are

amazed by Tristan’s great deeds of arms, lavishing praise upon the very prowess Tristan

uses to subvert justice.478

Historical examples confirm that many members of the chivalric elite used their

prowess and superior capacity for martial action to subvert the attempts of the popolani to

force them to utilize the nascent public courts to solve internecine conflicts or subject

them to public justice.479 For example, in 1287 Corso Donati and his retinue attempted to

rescue through armed force a certain Totto de’ Mazzinghi da Campi, “a great warrior and

leader”, who was condemned to be beheaded for murder.480 Likewise, in 1258 when it

was discovered that the Uberti were planning to attack and overthrow the popular

government in power in Florence (1250-1260), they were summoned to appear before the

magistrates. Rather than humbling themselves to popular power, they used their prowess

to subvert justice, “grievously wound[ing] and smit[ing]” the staff of the podestà. Not

surprisingly, the popular government reacted to this challenge with violence; the popolani

armed themselves and attacked the Uberti houses. Villani writes that “they slew

Schiattuzzo degli Uberti and many of the followers and retainers of the Uberti, and they

478
Tristano Panciatichiano, 294/295-296/297: “And the king and the other knights who saw that blow were
greatly amazed by it”; “Et lo re e gli altri cavalieri che videro quello colpo si se ne fero grande meraviglia”.
479
Najemy, A History of Florence, 17, 19: Najemy argues that “the pursuit of vendetta can be seen as a
politically motivated rejection of the popolo’s emerging norms of the supremacy of law and internalized
discipline of the good citizen”. In fact, Najemy goes so far as to assert that “circumventing the courts and
the criminal justice system must have been at least as important to these families in preserving their honor
as the actual vendetta”.
480
Villani, 341: “uno grande guerriere e caporale”; “avendo preso e condannato nella testa per micidio
fatto”. Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronica Fiorentina, 63.
 183

took Uberto Caini degli Uberti and Mangia degli Infangati” who were subsequently

beheaded.481

On occasion, the chivalric elite successfully subverted justice. In November 1301,

Corso Donati liberated through force all of the noble and knightly prisoners held in the

city’s prison.482 In 1304, Talano di messer Boccaccio Cavicciuli degli Adimari was

condemned for evil committed, but before he could be delivered to justice, “his consorts

assailed with arms the podestà who [was traveling] from the palace of the Priors with his

family, and wounded them badly, and his family was put to death and severely wounded;

and the said Cavicciuli entered into the palace, and through force rescued the said Talano

without any resistance”.483 While Villani lamented the lack of justice and the pervasive

corruption in the Florentine state, members of the chivalric elite likely would not have

considered this resistance to a public authority imposed by their inferiors as evidence of

injustice and corruption, but rather as an affirmation of their inherent superiority and the

exercise of their traditional right to private justice. Indeed, the chivalric elite believed that

their superior social status, predicated upon traditions of military service and political

leadership, placed them above the authority of the laws and courts which bound other,

481
Villani, 230: “uccisorvi Schiattuzzo degli Uberti”. See also “Annali di Simone della Tosa”, in
Cronichette antiche di vari scrittori del buon secolo della lingua italiana, ed. Domenico Maria Manni
(Milan: Giovanni Silvestri, 1844), 183-240 [cited hereafter as Gli Annali di Simone della Tosa]. ibid, 197-
198/209-210: “il popolo di Firenze, sentendo di volere essere rotto per gli Uberti, si trassono loro alle case,
e disfecero le case loro, e cominciossene a fare le mura a San Giorgio, e morivvi lo Schiattuzzo Uberti, e
presono Uberto Caini, e mozzarongli la testa, e gli altri sen’andaro con alquanti Ghibellini fuori di
Firenze”. Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 133: Bruni also emphasizes the fact
that the Uberti and their allies among the chivalric elite “began to defy the magistracy”, forcing the
“Florentine commonwealth [to] ma[k]e war against the [Uberti] family in the city streets”.
482
Villani, 403.
483
Villani, 434: “I suoi consorti, tornando la podestade con sua famiglia furono morti e fediti assai; e’ detti
Cavicciuli entrarono in palagio, e per forza ne trassono il detto Talano sanza contasto niuno, e di questo
malificio non fu giustizia ne punizione niuna”.
 184

lesser men.

Numerous additional examples can be offered: during the chaos following the

removal of the Duke of Athens from power in 1343, Corso di messer Amerigo Donati

and many others gathered together and broke into the prison (Stinche), freeing the noble

prisoners therein, before proceeding throughout the city burning and fighting.484 Even

more striking is the reference made in the “Pseudo-Brunetto Latini” to the actions of the

Florentine exile messer Tosolato dell Uberti who cut off the head of the Judge of Alborea

in 1296, taking all of his wealth as his own. Rather than being condemned for his actions,

he was made a knight in Sardigna shortly thereafter.485 The importance and celebrated

status of social violence within chivalric circles could not be more clear: such violence

was crucial not only to defending social status and political power, but was also central to

the very identity of the warrior elite.

484
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 205-206: “Mentrechè le predette cose si faceano,
Corso di messer Amerigo Donati con molti altri, li quali aveano in pregione loro amici e parenti, si
ragunarono, e con molto popolazzo corsero alle Stinche, e quelle coll’aiuto di quelli dentro ruppono, e
cavaronne tutti I prigioni”.
485
“Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 78: “Ed in questo anno messer Tosolato delli Uberti di Firenze talglò la tessta
al Giudice d’Alborea, e tutto il suo tesoro, ch’ era i grande quantitade si fece venire alle mani; e a di xv di
gennaio si fece chavaliere in Sardingna”.
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Chapter IV:
Chivalry and Warfare

I. Introduction: Warfare and Chivalric Identity

The ideology of chivalry exercised an important and interminable influence on

warfare in medieval Europe.486 Late medieval Florence and Italy were certainly no

exception, as the practice of war among strenuous knights and arms bearers was informed

by the ideas, ideals, and attitudes of chivalric ideology.487 In fact, war offered the best

opportunity for knights and arms bearers to demonstrate their prowess and win honor. In

contrast, defeat or cowardice in battle promised dishonor and shame.488 In this regard,

war-like violence had much in common with the honor and social violence examined in

previous chapters (two and three above respectively). In some cases wars were

undertaken “with bitter vengeance” to avenge dishonor suffered or to inflict dishonor and

shame. Indeed, honor, dishonor, and shame were always at stake in war.

486
The scholarship is extensive on this topic, including numerous studies introduced in previous chapters:
Strickland, War and Chivalry; Keen, Chivalry; Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe; idem,
Holy Warriors: The Religious Ideology of Chivalry; idem, Medieval Chivalry; and Craig Taylor, Chivalry
and the Ideals of Knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War.
487
Informative studies of warfare in late medieval and early renaissance Italy include: Michael Mallett,
Mercenaries and their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Military, 2009
reprint); Vigueur, Cavalieri e Cittadini; William Caferro, John Hawkwood: An English Mercenary in
Fourteenth-Century Italy (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 2006); idem, Mercenary Companies and the
Decline of Siena (John Hopkins Press, 1998); A.A. Settia, De re militari: Pratica e teoria nella guerra
medievale (Rome: Viella, 2008); idem, Rapine, assedi, battaglie. La guerra nel Medioevo (Rome: Laterza,
2009); idem, Tecniche e spazi della guerra medievale (Rome: Viella, 2006); idem, Comuni in guerra. Armi
ed eserciti nell’Italia della città (Bologna: CLUEB, 1993); Duccio Balestracci, Le armi, i cavalli, l’oro.
Giovanni Acuto e i condottieri nell’Italia del Trecento (Rome: Laterza, 2009); Fabio Bargigia, Gli eserciti
nell’Italia comunale. Organizzazione e logistica (1180-1320) (Milan: Unicopli, 2010); Grillo, Cavalieri e
popoli in armi.
488
Richard Trexler, recognizing the importance of the dichotomy of honor and dishonor in the context of
war, has argued “humiliation inflicted on the adversary [during war] was a source of pride [and thus honor]
for the winner”: as quoted in Taddei, “Recalling the Affront: Rituals of War in Italy in the Age of the
Communes”, 84-85.
 186

Warfare, along with honor- and social violence, were fundamental to knights and

arms bearers seeking to assert and defend a chivalric identity that was increasingly under

attack during the course of the late-thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. War itself was the

raison d’etre of the warrior elite and widely considered to be an ennobling enterprise,

while expertise in the profession of arms and traditions of military service translated into

social prestige, economic wealth, and political power. Indeed, in a world in which

function still correlated with status, elite families proudly touted their long histories of

military leadership and service as strenuous knights and arms bearers as proof of their

nobility, or at least of a superiority and distinction that separated them from the mass of

other families in the Florentine commune. By the end of the thirteenth and particularly

during the course of the fourteenth century a close association between the profession of

arms and the chivalric ideology that underpinned it served as a crucial means of asserting

a nobility far older and superior to that which came from new and extensive wealth.489

This chapter will examine both the practitioners and the practice of war in late

medieval Florence, arguing that not only was the profession of arms central to the

identity of strenuous Florentine knights and arms bearers, but that their martial conduct

was influenced by the powerful ideology of chivalry. Indeed, chivalric ideology

encouraged demonstrations of prowess and valor in the pursuit of honor, a pursuit, which

if left uncontrolled, led to autonomous action and reckless bravado that could ultimately

cost an army victory or other larger goals. As a result, contemporaries in both chivalric

489
It is worth noting here that Dante’s celebrated, and likely fictional, ancestor, Cacciaguida, is a valorous,
ascetic knight, not a wealthy patrician. For Cacciaguida, see Dante Alighieri, The Divine Comedy,
“Paradiso”, canto XIV.
 187

and non-chivalric circles advocated the exercise of reformative virtues like prudence and

restraint, which offered balance to the powerful desire among knights and arms bearers to

win personal honor through prowess and valor. In addition, this chapter will consider the

other aspects of war, including: raiding, pillaging, and burning; the practice of capturing

and ransoming enemy warriors; and the employment of ruses, trickery, and treachery.

Florentine Knights and Arms Bearers and the Profession of Arms

As we have seen above in chapter one, Florentine knights and arms bearers

interacted with a multitude of strenuous warriors of foreign and Italian origin, who

brought with them chivalric values and behaviors that were deeply influential in their

native lands. Many of these foreign warriors were great lords, nobles, and knights with

martial reputations won previously on the battlefields of Europe and even in the Holy

Land. As a result, Florentine knights and arms went to war alongside and fought against

numerous practitioners of chivalry. No doubt such encounters encouraged cultural

exchange and facilitated the trans-alpine continuity of chivalric culture in Florence,

Tuscany, and Italy.

Given both the quantity and quality of these foreign and Italian knights and arms

bearers, there can be no doubt that during these periods of extensive interaction and

exposure Florentine chivalric culture was invigorated and fortified. More importantly, the

many Florentine knights and arms bearers who continued to provide military service into

the fourteenth century no doubt sought to emulate these foreign and Italian warriors
 188

whose battlefield prowess, valor, and vigor were worthy of praise. These foreign and

Italian warriors found in Florence a vibrant chivalric culture that was already deeply

rooted by the mid-thirteenth century, as exemplified by the preceding discussions of

chivalric honor-violence and social-violence, as well as by the military careers of

numerous Florentine knights and arms bearers like Farinata degli Uberti (d.1264), Corso

Donati (d.1308), Amerigo Donati (dca.1331), and Buonaccorso Pitti (d.1430), examined

below. Indeed, the Florentine warrior elite resembled their transalpine and fellow Italian

peers in many ways.

The Florentine Chivalric Elite, I: Individuals and Families

The traditional historiography has long argued that the profession of arms among

native Italians declined and eventually fell into abeyance during the course of the

fourteenth century, replaced by foreign mercenaries until a slow, but steady revival began

in the final decades of the century.490 This was supposed to have been particularly true of

the city of Florence, whose ruling elite increasingly abandoned the militaristic and violent

lifestyle associated with traditional knighthood and chivalry in favor of the wealth and

ease promised by careers in banking and commerce. As a result, it follows that social

designations like knighthood and nobility became increasingly detached from the

profession of arms.

490
Prominent works include: E. Ricotti, Storia delle compagnie di ventura in Italia, 2 vols. (Turin: G.
Pomba, 1845-1847) and G. Canestrini, “Documenti per servire della milizia italiana del secolo XIII al
XVI”, Archivio Storico Italiano, 1st Series, 15 (1851), 1-550. For an excellent survey of this historiography
and an important corrective, see Caferro, John Hawkwood, 6-7, 62-94 and idem, Mercenary Companies
and the Decline of Siena, xiii-xx.
 189

Leonardo Bruni from his scholarly perch in the early-fifteenth century bears

witness to the impressive circulation of foreign warriors into and around the Italian

peninsula during the fourteenth century, writing: “men who were noblemen in their own

country came to Italy, leading companies of horsemen, to fight at a price for cities or

princes. So considerable numbers came from Germany, France, Spain, Britain, and

Hungary to fight in Italy. Among these, knightly prowess was cultivated”.491 It is

important to note that Bruni was not only observing a phenomenon, but also using this to

promote a very clear program of reform for his own day, one which required him to

revise or provide a new perspective on certain events in his city’s history in order to

highlight the prowess and valor of Florentine knights and arms bearers.492

Indeed, Bruni sought in his History of the Florentine People to contrast this influx

of foreign strenuous knights and arms bearers with the decline of the profession of arms

among Italians, especially Florentines, up until the last quarter of the fourteenth century.

Bruni first lamented that “very few of our own people adopted the profession of arms”,

but quickly reassured his audience that things had improved “when [he] was a boy”

(b.1370) as Italians “recovered their traditional esteem for knightly glory”.493 Bruni’s

ultimate desire, of course, was that the Florentine ruling elite of his own time would

continue and enhance this reputation for “knightly glory”.

491
Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, 319.
492
For an excellent study of Bruni’s uses of the past, see Gary Ianziti, Writing History in Renaissance Italy:
Leonardo Bruni and the Uses of the Past (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012). For Bruni and
“civic knighthood”, see James Hankins, “Civic Knighthood in the Early Renaissace: Leonardo Bruni’s De
militia (ca.1420)”, Working Paper (Faculty of Arts and Sciences: Harvard University, 2011), 1-21. I am
currently working on a project that examines Bruni’s connection with chivalric culture and his promotion
of the tenets of the ideology of chivalry through his use of historical Florentine knights and arms bearers as
exemplars.
493
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, 319.
 190

While Bruni’s claim that the profession of arms was in decline in Italy, especially

his native Florence, during most of the fourteenth century is not completely inaccurate,

the significant evidence available in Florentine archives and numerous historical accounts

suggest that many continued to cultivate military careers. Indeed, Daniel Waley’s

groundbreaking study of the communal army of Florence from the twelfth to the

fourteenth centuries has already gone a long way in correcting this interpretation of

Florentine history.494 Waley argues convincingly that while the Florentine government

did employ mercenaries, these foreign soldiers never completely replaced citizen

participation, as “the Florentines did not employ mercenaries on the same scale as their

foes”.495 Furthermore, during the period 1270-1305 “military service continued to be due

from the Florentines themselves and to be performed by them, and all campaigns of these

years were fought by mixed forces”.496 Perhaps more importantly, Waley argues that

“there is no evidence that the Florence of 1300 was a city of soft, decadent businessmen

who preferred to pay others to fight on their behalf”.497 Waley continues by stressing that

even with the universality of mercenary warfare in Italy by 1325, Florentines continued

to cultivate careers in the profession of arms, and cannot accurately be described as “a

race of decadent and sendentary businessmen”.498 Waley concludes aptly by stating that

mercenaries were seen by contemporaries as important reinforcements, rather than

replacements for native Florentine warriors, as Florence’s great wealth was “used to

494
Waley, “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, 70-108.
495
Waley, “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, 73.
496
Waley, “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, 94.
497
Waley, “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, 98-99.
498
Waley, “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, 107.
 191

reinforce its own citizens, not to supercede them so they could concentrate on gathering

still more wealth”.499

More recent scholarship by John Najemy has confirmed that the ruling elite in the

thirteenth century participated in war (especially before 1250),500 but Najemy has

qualified this by asserting that the Florentine elite were never a professional warrior class,

and the martial element was slowly transformed into an elite that “combined the

ceremonial and cultural trappings of knighthood, and occasional participation in actual

warfare, with more prosaic business careers as merchants or bankers”.501 Carol Lansing

also recognizes the connection between the Florentine elite in the thirteenth century and

warfare, describing these men as a “brotherhood of warriors”, whom contemporaries

believed were more experienced and better at the profession of arms than other

Florentines.502 Jean Claude Maire Vigueur, meanwhile, has added to this argument by

emphasizing the monopoly and independence enjoyed by the Florentine nobility in all

aspects of warfare up into the mid-thirteenth century.503 Importantly Vigueur has stressed

that this leadership and participation began before and continued through the period of

“hired military service”, which in the early-thirteenth century at least, was dominated by

knights from communal Italy, not abroad.504

This section will contribute to this discussion by demonstrating that Florentine

knights and arms bearers who saw military service and leadership as central to their

499
Waley, “The Army of the Florentine Republic”, 96.
500
Najemy, A History of Florence, 11, 65: Najemy argues that the thirteenth century elite families, both the
newer and older lineages, actively cultivated the practice and culture of war.
501
Najemy, A History of Florence, 12, 76.
502
Lansing, The Florentine Magnates, 91, 97.
503
Vigueur, Cavalieri e Cittadini, 108-110.
504
Vigueur, Cavalieri e Cittadini, 126-127.
 192

identity continued eagerly to participate in the profession of arms. This is especially true

of Florentines from traditional military families like the Donati, Adimari, Bardi, della

Tosa, Uberti, Ubaldini, Counts Guidi, and others (defined above in chapter one as a

“chivalric elite”). Whether in the service of the Florentine government or abroad these

individuals and families continued to cultivate their martial skills and lived lifestyles that

can rightly be considered chivalric.505 This association with the profession of arms

became increasingly important during the course of the late-thirteenth and fourteenth

centuries when the ruling elite, a conglomerate of merchant, banking, and industrial

families, largely disassociated their identities from the profession of war. For families in

exile or outside of the circle of political power in late medieval Florence, warfare offered

an opportunity to assert one’s nobility, a nobility more ancient and venerable than that

which new and excessive wealth provided. It also provided these families the chance to

exercise a measure of power and to prop up their often flagging fortunes. What follows is

a brief survey of these Florentine families and their traditions of military service both on

behalf of the Florentine government and abroad.

THE DONATI

The Donati were a prototypical Florentine chivalric family, as far as a single

model can be used as a paradigm for a unique group of individuals and families. Villani

described the family as comprised of “gentlemen and warriors, and of no superabundant

505
Dean, “Knighthood in later medieval Italy”, 153: Dean offers the important observation that the
connection between knighthood and “military practice, and with individual and collective feats of arms,
was still very much alive” in fourteenth century Tuscany and Florence.
 193

riches”, while Bruni wrote they were of “ancient origin, [but] only moderately wealthy

and naturally more given to the arts of war than of peace”.506 Chief among the Donati

was Corso (d.1308), who Villani described as “of the greatest renown and of the greatest

courage and enterprise of any one of his time and in Italy, and a handsome and gracious

knight in his person”.507 Corso’s example was followed by less illustrious and polemical,

but still renowned descendents who continued to serve Florence as strenuous knights and

arms bearers well into the fourteenth century. Prominent among them is Corso’s son,

Messer Amerigo Donati (dca.1331), who followed in his father’s footsteps by serving the

Florentine government as a strenuous knight for several decades. In 1324 Amerigo was

captain of 340 knights sent by Florence to fulfill its quota for the Guelf Taglia (a league

of cities, each contributing cavalry or infantry),508 while in 1325 he served as captain of

200 Florentine knights sent to Bologna to help the city fight the lords of Mantova and

Modena.509 Similar military commands were forthcoming in 1326, 1329, 1330, and

1331.510 Amerigo’s standing and honorable reputation were confirmed when he was

accorded the honor of ransom after being captured during the failed defense of

Montecatini (1329) by Castruccio Castracani, the Ghibelline lord of Pisa and Lucca

506
Villani, 396: “quelli di sua casa erano gentili uomini e guerrieri, e di non soperchia ricchezza, ma per
motto erano chiamati Malefami”. Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 393.
507
Villani, 459: “Questo messer Corso Donati fue de’ più savi, e valente cavaliere, e il più bello parlatore, e
’l meglio pratico, e di maggiore nominanza, e di grande ardire e imprese ch’al suo tempo fosse in Italia, e
bello cavaliere di sua persona e grazioso, ma molto fu mondano”.
508
For the Guelf Taglia, see: William Bowsky, A Medieval Italian Commune: Siena Under the Nine, 1287-
1355 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 168, 173-174, 237; Caferro, Mercenary Companies
and the Decline of Siena, 99; Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters, 9, 13, 14, 16, 21.
509
Villani, 616.
510
Villani, 634-635, 718-719, 746. Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 77. Marchionne di
Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 170.
 194

(d.1328), which was paid by the Florentine government in 1330.511 In addition to serving

the Florentine government, the Guelf exiles of Lucca chose Amerigo as their captain in

1318 and he also participated in a conspiracy against the Florentine state, which resulted

in his exile from the city in 1323.512

Another important Donati, Messer Manno Donati, was described by one

chronicler as “brave and wise in war”, Manno had a long and storied military career that

took him all over the Italian peninsula in the service of the Florentine government.513 In

May 1342, Manno served alongside one hundred French knights in the force of Walter of

Brienne, the Duke of Athens, which helped lift the Pisan siege of Lucca.514 Nearly thirty

years later he served as captain of the Florentine force sent to fight the Visconti of Milan.

In one particularly illuminating incident during this campaign, Manno left the city of

Modena late one night with his Florentine troops and 300 knights and rode to Reggio,

where he won a great victory.515 Manno ended his long and distinguished career in an

honorable fashion when he was killed fighting the Visconti in September 1370, receiving

an honorable burial by Francesco “il Vecchio” da Carrara (d.1393), the lord of Padova.516

THE ADIMARI

511
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 163.
512
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 132-133.
513
“Cronichetta d’Incerto”, in Cronichette antiche di vari scrittori del buon secolo della lingua italiana, ed.
Domenico Maria Manni (Milan: Giovanni Silvestri, 1844), 256: “valenti e savi di guerra”.
514
Villani, 904-906.
515
“Cronichetta d’Incerto”, 270-272.
516
Villani, 385. The date of Manno’s death is now debated by scholars, with some arguing that he was only
seriously wounded in 1370. They suggest 1374 as the most likely date of his death, probably in battle
against the Visconti.
 195

The Adimari, an ancient family of Guelf nobles, produced numerous strenuous

knights and arms bearers who played important military roles both in the service of and

against the Florentine state over the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.

Villani describes the Adimari as “very great and powerful”517 and a brief survey of some

of the house’s most notable descendants confirms the exalted reputation of the family not

only in Florence, but also throughout the Italian peninsula. Messer Buonaccorso

(Bonaccorso) degli Adimari (d.1294) is one of the better known members of the family,

enjoying a prominent place in Dino Compagni’s chronicle. Compagni described him as

“a noble Guelf and knight” who married his son to a daughter of the ancient and

venerable house of the Counts Guidi, one of the most distinguished Florentine families.

Not surprisingly as a leading member of the prominent Adimari family, Bonaccorso was

intimately involved in the turmoil which wrecked Florence in the second-half of the

thirteenth century.518

Messer Tegghiao Aldobrandi (dca.1266), a strenuous knight of great reputation

who famously represented the nobles in a heated debate with the Popolo over the

decision to attack the Sienese and the Florentine Ghibelline exiles at Montaperti in 1260,

in many ways was an exemplar of the Florentine chivalric elite. Villani described

Tegghiaio as “a wise knight and valiant in arms, and of great authority”, while

Marchionne di Coppo Stefani wrote that he had “great wisdom and expert[ise] in arms

more than any other Florentine”.519 Bruni, motivated by a desire to demonstrate the

517
Villani, 301: “molto grandi e possenti”.
518
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 7.
519
Villani, 176: “cavaliere savio e prode e di grande autoritade”. Marchionne di Coppe Stefani, Cronaca
Fiorentina, 46-47: “uomo di grande senno ed in arme sperto più che altro da Firenze”. Ricordano
 196

merits of prudence and restraint (possessed by the military experts of the nobility) over

the reckless pursuit of glory in war (a trait he associated with the inexperienced and

unqualified commoners of the Popolo), presents Tegghiaio as a warrior of great

experience and expertise who counsels the Florentine government to take the prudent

course of action.520

Other noteworthy Adimari who served the Florentine government include Messer

Tedici, who led the defense of Montemurlo during Castruccio’s siege in November

1325521 and Giovanni Adimari, who commanded 150 soldiers near Prato in 1325.

Giovanni in particular was praised for showing “such great foresight and strength of

character that the enemy’s endeavors were long frustrated”.522 In 1343 Messer Antonio

degli Adimari led the forces of the commune against those grandi who plotted to restore

themselves to power in Florence through force. Villani records that this was done “much

to the displeasure of [Antonio’s] consorts and other grandi”.523 Finally, there is Messer

Antonio di Baldinaccio Adimari, described by the anonymous author of a chronicle

composed in nearby Pistoia as “the wisest and bravest young Florentine arms bearer

[(donzelli)]”.524 Antonio di Baldinaccio was also involved in the political and social

turmoil of the fourteenth-century, helping to overthrow the duke of Athens in 1343.525

Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, 387: Malispini likewise praised him for his bravery and wisdom calling him a
“cavaliere savio e prode”.
520
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 151-153.
521
Villani, 618; Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina.
522
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 105.
523
Villani, 934: “a’ quali dispiacea i modi di tali di loro consorti e degli altri grandi contro al popolo”.
524
“Anonimo Storie Pistoresi”, in Storie Pistoresi (MCCC-MCCCXLVIII), ed. S.A. Barbi, Rerum
Italicarum Scriptores, new series, vol.16, pt.5 (Città di Castello: Tipi della Casa editrice S. Lapi, 1907),
188: “lo più pregiato e de’ più savi e più gagliardi donzelli di Firenze” [cited hereafter as Anonimo Storie
Pistoresi].
525
Anonimo Storie Pistoresi, 188-189.
 197

Antonio continued over the next few decades to serve the Florentine state militarily: in

1354, Antonio was sent to Rome with 500 barbute (each barbuta comprised a knight and

a sergeant) and the banner of the commune of Florence.526

In addition, numerous Adimari appear among the ranks of the grandi or exiles

who were often at war with the city of Florence. For example, Messer Bonaccorso

Bellincioni was chosen in 1261 by the Guelf exiles of Florence, along with Messer

Simone Donati, to serve as ambassador to Conradino, the legitimate son of Emperor

Frederick II, whom they hoped to stir up against his uncle, King Manfred of Sicily.527

Messer Forese Adimari meanwhile was chosen as captain of the Florentine Guelf exiles

when they fought the Ghibellines of Reggio, a battle during which they performed many

deeds of arms. Indeed, Villani writes that the Guelf exiles chose from among their group

“twelve of the most valiant, and called them the twelve paladins” and that these men were

responsible for defeating the champion of the Ghibellines, Casca (Caca) of Reggio, in a

fight worthy of chivalric romance.528 Bruni, in contrast, singles out the Adimari captain,

526
Donato Velluti, Cronica Domestica, 216: “Andonne a Roma, e nello ’ntrare e accompagnare vi fu
continuo messer Antonio di Baldinaccio Adimari con Vc barbute, e sempre colla ’nsegna del Comune
diritta, ove tutte l’altre abbassarono”. This Antonio Adimari had been knighted in by the famous Aretine
lord, Saccone: Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 279.
527
Villani, 187.
528
Villani, 247: “And when they were come to Reggio they joined the battle on the piazza, which endured
long time, forasmuch as the Ghibellines of Reggio were very powerful, and among them was one called
Caca of Reggio… This man was well-nigh as tall as a giant, and of marvellous strength, and he had an iron
club in his hand, and none dared to approach him whom he did not fell to the earth, either slain or maimed,
and by him the battle was well-nigh wholly sustained. When the gentlemen in banishment from Florence
perceived this, they chose among them twelve of the most valiant, and called them the twelve paladins,
which, with daggers in hand, all set upon that valiant man, which, after a very brave defense, and beating
down many of his enemies, was struck down to the earth and slain upon the piazza; and so soon as the
Ghibellines saw their champion on the ground, they took to flight and were discomfited and driven out of
Reggio”; “Veggendo ciò i gentili uomini di Firenze usciti, si elessono tra lloro XII de’ piu valorosi, e
chiamaronsi gli XII paladini, i quali colle coltella in mano si strinsono adosso al detto valente uomo, il
quale dopo molto grande difesa, e molti de’ nimici abattuti, si fu aterrato e morto in su la piazza; e sì tosto
come i Ghibellini vidono aterrato il loro compione, si misono in fuga e in sconfitta, e furono cacciati di
 198

writing: “Casca was cut down by the hand of Foresi (sic.) in a brilliant single combat in

the middle of the forum, with their troops looking on”.529 Some years later Forese led part

of the grandi army that made war against the Popolo in 1295 in an attempt to force them

to repeal the Ordinances of Justice.530

Other Adimari exiles who appear in the historical record include: Nerlo Adimiari

who was taken prisoner in March 1303 after being defeated by a Florentine army in the

Mugello while fighting alongside other exiles in a Bolognese army; Nerlo di messer

Goccia Adimari, “a valiant youth”, who was captured by the Black Guelfs of Florence

while retreating with an army of White Guelf and Ghibelline exiles;531 and Baldinaccio

Adimari, “a famous knight”532 who rose up in rebellion after the Florentine defeat at the

battle of Mantecatini (August, 1315), taking possession of Cerreto Guidi on behalf of

Castruccio Castracani.533 As late as the 1390s we find Adimari knights and arms bearers

continuing to play a leading role among Florentine exiles: Papino and Porcelana Adimari

are recorded as leading over one hundred Florentine exiles who were riding toward their

native city in June of 1396 with the intention of entering and raising a rebellion therein.534

Reggio”. Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, vol. 2, 408-409: “i gentiluomini di Firenze e usciti, sì
elessono tra loro dodici de’ più valorosi uomini, i quali colle coltella in mano sì si strinsono addosso al
detto valente uomo, e sì lo uccisono in sulla piazza”.
529
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 189-191.
530
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 74.
531
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 57.
532
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 401: Bruni lists Baldinaccio Adimari among the
“famous knights” who comprised the White Guelfs of Florence.
533
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 118: “Era uno Baldinaccio Adimari rubello di
Firenze, e avea molte amicizie in Cerreto Guidi, trovò modo d’entrarvi, ed entrovvi, e tennelo per sè ed a
posta di Uguiccione”; Villani, 501: Villani associates this incident with 1316, not 1315- “Baldinaccio degli
Adimari rubello di Firenze rubellò il castello di Cerreto Guidi di Greti”.
534
Alle Bocche della Piazza: Diario di Anonimo Fiorentino (1382-1401), eds. Anthony Molho and Franek
Sznura (Florence: Leo S. Olschki, 1981), 199: “A dì XII di giugnio ci ebe novelle come cento sbanditi e più
di Firenze s’erano partiti da Bolognia eve[n]uti versso Firenze”.
 199

THE DELLA TOSA

The della Tosa are another Florentine noble family with a distinguished history of

military service on behalf of the Florentine government, as well as abroad. Ricordano

Malispini includes the della Tosa among the Florentine noble houses that sent knights

and arms bearers on the Fifth Crusade in 1215, proudly touting their distinguished service

during the siege of Damietta.535 Many members of this Florentine noble family are

singled out in traditional historical sources for their martial skills and expertise. For

example, Messer Pino della Tosa (d.1337) led the 600 Florentine knights sent by the

government in 1336 to the Romagna.536 Pino’s contemporary, Donato Velluti, described

him as “a wise, brave, and valiant knight”.537 Dino Compagni, meanwhile, depicts

Baschiera della Tosa (Tosinghi, d.1323) as possessing the primary characteristics of

chivalry, most notably an insatiable desire to secure the honor and glory of victory and to

demonstrate personal bravery and prowess: “[Baschiera] who was more or less the

captain [of the Florentine White Guelf exiles], was won over more by desire than by

reason, just like a youth. Finding himself with a good troop and under strong pressure to

act, he thought that he could win the prestige of victory and so swooped down on the city

535
Malispini claims that the banner of the Florentine commune was one of the first to appear above the
walls of Damietta- Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, 228-229: “E assediarono la città di Damiata, e
molti nobili da Firenze andarono in questo passaggio, e molti altri cittadini e popolani… ed ebbono la detta
Damiata per forza. E l’ insegna del comune di Firenze, cioè il campo rosso e il giglio bianco, fu la prima
che si vedesse in sulle mura di Damiata per virtù de’ pellegrini fiorentini”.
536
Villani, 823: “che fuoro da VIC cavalieri, ond’era capitano messer Pino de la Tosa”.
537
Donato Velluti, Cronica Domestica, 84: “d’uno savio e ardito cavaliere e valentre”.
 200

[of Florence] with his knights, so that they were in open view”.538 In this regard he no

doubt is representative of many of his fellow Florentine practitioners of chivalry.

Other notable members of the della Tosa family include: Giovanni di messer

Rosso della Tosa (d.1343), who carried the Florentine banner for the 300 knights sent by

the commune to Bologna in 1325, as well as being captured by Castruccio Castracani

during the Battle of Altopascio (1325);539 Feo di messer Odaldo della Tosa, who is

recorded as serving in the army of Mastino II della Scala (d.1351), lord of Verona, in

1334;540 Messer Bindo del Baschiera della Tosa (d.1289), who Compagni praised for his

service to the Guelf Party and records as providing military service at the military

engagement near the castle of Fucecchio, as well as the battle of Certomondo (1289) in

Casentino, where he was killed along with his kinsman, Messer Bindo della Tosa;541 and

finally, Francesco and Guido del Baschiera della Tosa were both killed in the famous

battle of Campaldino, fought against the Aretines in that same year.542

Perhaps the best-known member of the della Tosa family, however, is Messer

Simone (d.1380). Not surprisingly for a member of the chivalric elite whose identity was

closely tied to his expertise and skill in the profession of arms, Simone sought to

emphasize his own personal prowess and bravery, comparing himself favorably to the

Greek warrior-hero, Achilles, who “showed more attention to the shield and to the
538
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 73.
539
Villani, 724: “avea la ’nsegna del Comune di Firenze messer Giovanni di messere Rosso de la Tosa”.
Villani suggests that Giovanni was killed at the battle of Altopascio (pp. 604-605), but he resurfaces in
other historical accounts, which place his death in December of 1343.
540
Villani, 814.
541
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 52: “a knight named messer Bindo del Baschiera who suffered
many persecutions for the Guelf Party, lost an eye to an arrow at the castle of Fucecchio, and was wounded
and killed in the battle with the Aretines”; Villani, 290. For the death of Messer Bindo della Tosa, see: Gli
Annali di Simone della Tosa, 218.
542
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 65-66.
 201

trumpet of war than to feminine ornaments”.543 Indeed, Simone shows considerable pride

in highlighting his many martial achievements. For example, while serving as Florentine

ambassador to Volterra in 1330, Simone writes that “he won military honor through his

conduct [in battle]”.544 Likewise, he proudly records his role in defending the important

castle of Carmignano in that same year as well as being chosen to command the

Florentine forces in the war (1336-1339) against Mastino II della Scala.545

Many of the important historical works from this period echoe this focus on

Simone’s martial attributes. Leonardo Bruni describes Simone as “a distinguished knight

from the highest nobility”,546 while Marchionne di Coppo Stefani touts Simone’s

leadership of a political faction comprised of the traditional warrior elite of Florence, men

who “were members of neither the Arti nor merchants” that asserted itself in Florentine

politics during the early 1320s.547 Villani likewise highlights Simone’s prestige in Italy,

which is perhaps best exemplified by the request of Charles, duke of Calabria (d.1327),

that he serve as godfather for his son in 1326.548

543
Gli Annali di Simone della Tosa, 9: “siccome dall’avere lo sconosciuto giovanetto Achille mostrato più
attenzione allo scudo, e alle trombe guerriere, che agli ornamenti femminili”. No doubt the celebration of
the aescetic lifestyle of the warrior over the idleness and luxury of those who sought only to enoy the finer
things in life was a criticism of his fellow elites, many of whom had moved away from the martial
traditions of their class.
544
Gli Annali di Simone della Tosa, 8: “andò nel 1330 ad esercitare impiego, che conducendo assai per
tempo ad onor militare”.
545
Gli Annali di Simone della Tosa, 8.
546
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 131.
547
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 120: “la sètta di messer Simone della Tosa era sì
grande… e con lui teneano molti Ghibellini, ch’erano in Firenze e tutta gente che non aveano nè arte, nè
mercatanzia”. This faction sought to distance Florence from the Angevin rulers of Naples who had recently
provided ineffective leadership in the commune’s wars- see Villani, 502: “e dell’una parte che dismavano
la signoria del re Ruberto erano capo messer Simone della Tosa con certi grandi”.
548
Villani, 644-645.
 202

THE BUONDELMONTI (BONDELMONTI)

The Buondelmonti family produced many warriors who eagerly provided military

service for the commune. In fact, the Buondelmonti family included many strenuous

practitioners of the profession of arms, dating back to their early days as castellans in the

Florentine contado.549 Though the family eventually became active in mercantile

endeavors, a factor that was not entirely antithetical to chivalry in late medieval Italy,

they never lost their close connection to the profession of arms.

Among those who offered their service to the commune was Gherarduccio di

messer Buondelmonte (Bondelmonte), a young arms bearer of the Black Guelf Party

who, according to Compagni, was killed because in his desire to demonstrate his prowess

and valor he pursued the retreating White Guelfs too vigorously: “Gherarduccio…

pursued the Whites so closely that one of them turned back and awaited him, and leveled

his lance and struck him to the ground”.550 Messer Cece de’ Bondelmonti also served his

patria in battle against the Lucchese and the Guelf exiles of Florence at Castiglione in

1263, where he was captured and honorably held by Messer Farinata degli Uberti, a

famous Florentine knight and leader of the Ghibelline exiles of Florence. Unfortunately

he was killed shortly thereafter by Farinata’s brother, Messer Piero Asino, in an act of

honor-violence (see chapter two above).551 Villani meanwhile mentions Messer Benghi

549
Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, 137: “i Bondelmonti, ch’ erano gentiluomini cattani di
contado”.
550
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 74-75.
551
Villani, 246: “Messer Piero Asino degli Uberti gli diede d’una mazza di ferro in testa, e in groppa del
fratello l’uccise”; Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, vol. 2, 405: “E messer Cece Bondelmonti vi fu
preso: e miseselo in groppa messer Farinata degli Uberti, che disse per scamparlo. Ma messer Piero Asino
degli Uberti gli diede d’una mazza di ferro in testa, e in groppa del fratello l’uccise: onde ne furono assai
ripresi”.
 203

Bondelmonti, who served as podestà of Montepulciano in 1289 and captain of a force of

foot and horse sent to help the Guelfs of Chiusi in that same year.552

Uguiccione de’ Bondelmonti served in the force of the duke of Athens with 100

French knights, which had been sent to raise the Pisan siege of Lucca in 1343553 and also

came to the duke’s aid that year when many Florentines rose up in rebellion and sought to

remove him.554 Marchionne di Coppo Stefani and Bruni both mention Guelfo di messer

Bindo de’ Buondelmonti who, as the Florentine castellan of Arezzo, held the castle when

the city rose up in rebellion against Florence in 1343.555 Dino Compagni meanwhile

describes a certain Messer Rinieri Buondelmonti as a “great and powerful… and noble

Florentine knight”, noting his service to Florence as podestà of Cremona, which he was

instructed to defend against Emperor Henry VII.556 Rinieri also appears in the Anonimo

Storie Pistoresi where he is identified as the Pistoian captain of war in 1307.557

Also illuminating is the life of a second Messer Benghi Bondelmonti (d.1381),

who after being chosen as captain of Barga, won a great victory over the Pisans, a victory

for which he was made a knight upon his return to Florence.558 His distinguished military

service on behalf of the commune ultimately earned him the reward of being made a

popolano in 1363 (for the socio-juridical designation of magnate or grande and the

552
Villani, 358.
553
Villani, 904-906.
554
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 204-205: “salvochè messer Uguccione de’
Buondelmonti e la maggior parte de’ suoi consorti”.
555
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 207; Bruni, The History of the Florentine People,
vol. 2, 281.
556
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 90.
557
Anonimo Storie Pistoresi, 43: “e fecono loro capitano di guerra messer Ranieri Bondelmonti”.
558
“Cronichetta d’Incerto”, 255.
 204

associated political, social, and legal disadvantages, see chapter one above).559 Unlike

most magnates who had managed to shed the stigma of the label, Benghi refused to

change his coat of arms or give up his consorts despite regaining access to political

power, suggesting that he maintained a decidedly chivalric lifestyle, one centered on war,

which he had cultivated for his entire life.560

Of course, the family did not always use their martial skills in the service of

Florence. Indeed, several Bondelmonti actively challenged the Florentine government at

various points during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.561 For example, the sons of

Messer Rinieri Zingane de’ Bondelmonti were the only Florentines who did not consent

to the peace negotiated by Cardinal Latino in 1277 between the Guelfs and Ghibellines,

resulting in their exile.562 Likewise, in 1334, Rosso, son of Gherarduccio de’

Bondelmonti, was arrested after providing military service in the retinue of the noble

Tolomei family of Siena while in exile. Villani reveals during this time that Rosso

committed certain unknown, but ostensibly violent, actions at Montalcino.563

BUONACCORSO PITTI

559
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 297-298.
560
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 277: “perocchè chiunque si facea di popolo mutava
arme, e rifiutava la consorteria, e messer Benghi non mutò arme, nè rifiutò consorteria”.
561
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani claims that the power of the Bondelmonti family was so great in the 1330s
that everyone in Florence suffered: Cronaca Fiorentina, 170, 178: “E tanto fu la ptoenza de’
Buondelmonti, che si sofferse in Firenze”; “perchè la casa dei Buondelmonti era in grande stato a quelli
tempi”.
562
Villani, 301: “salvo che’ figliuoli di messer Rinieri Zingane de’ Bondelmonti no llo assentiro, e furono
scomunicati per lo legato, e isbanditi per lo Comune”.
563
Villani, 813-814: “però che prese Rosso figliuolo di Gherarduccio de’ Bondelmonti, il quale avea bando
di contumace de la testa per certa riformagione, e non per istatuto né micidio per lui fatto, ma per una
cavalcata ch’elli con certi avea fatta a Monte Alcino in servigio de’ Tolomei di Siena”.
 205

The life and career of the strenuous arms bearer Buonaccorso di Neri Pitti

(dca.1430), who cultivated the profession of arms both in the service of the Florentine

commune and while in exile, is in many ways representative of another possible model of

chivalric practitioner in late medieval Florence. Scholars have traditionally lumped Pitti

into the category of merchant, but thanks to Pitti’s personal journal, which provides

considerable insight into his private life, as well as major historical events in Italy and

France during this period, it is possible to observe the centrality of the profession of arms

to his identity.564

Indeed, Pitti demonstrates a consistent desire to cultivate the profession of arms.

His identity, as presented in the text, centers on chivalric activities such as war,

tournaments, gambling, and attending events at the finest courts in France and Italy. One

of his first entries (1381) describes how upon learning of the intention of Charles of

Durazzo, king of Naples and Hungary, to march south into Italy in order to claim his

southern kingdom, Pitti “bought five excellent horses and a quantity of arms” and also

lent money to his friend, Niccolò, so he could arm himself and buy a pair of horses, in

hopes of securing restoration to his native Florence through military service.565 Although

restoration was not forthcoming, Pitti continued to seek opportunities to utilize his

military skills.

For example, in September of 1382, Pitti records that he was present with the

King of France at the battle of Ypres, which was fought against the Flemings.566 A year

564
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, op. cit. n.359. For the Italian text, see: Cronica di Buonaccorso Pitti,
ed. A. Bacchi della Lega (Bologna: Romagnoli dall’Acqua, 1905).
565
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 34-35
566
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 38.
 206

later (1383) when Pitti heard that the English had landed in France and that the King of

France was preparing a campaign to drive them out, he expressed great desire to

participate: “being eager to partake once more in such great doings, I pooled resource

with a man from Lucca and a Sienese. When we had equipped ourselves at our own

expense with arms and with thirty-six horsemen, we enrolled in the army under the flag

and captaincy of the Duke of Burgundy who commanded 20,000 horse”.567 Unfortunately

both Pitti and the French “withdrew with great loss and little honor” after defeat in battle.

Even more striking is the insight we gain into Pitti’s mentality, as he expresses great

regret at the loss of so many of his men, as well as admitting that “in truth I was hardly

able to look for [my men] but lay exhausted in a ditch until daybreak”.568

In September of 1386, Pitti once again geared up for war, this time making

preparations to participate in the proposed French invasion of England that was set to

leave from Flanders under the King of France. In order to do this, Pitti and a few of his

colleagues equipped themselves and hired a ship in the French fleet for themselves.569

Although Pitti was once again disappointed by the failure of the campaign, he continued

to perform military service on behalf of great lords from across Europe. In August of

1400, Pitti was travelling in the company of the Emperor Wenceslaus who wanted to use

him as a special envoy to the Florentine Signoria (government) in order to secure certain

funds that were promised to him. Pitti’s journal gives us important insight into his mental

framework, revealing a striking sentiment when he wrote that “a more glorious memory

567
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 42.
568
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 43.
569
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 43.
 207

would survive me and more honor [would] reflect on my family if I were to die bearing

arms in [the emperor’s] service than if I were to be killed as an agent on my way to pick

up funds”.570 Pitti was forced in the end to relent after the emperor insisted he perform

this task, but he wrote with great pride that as a reward for going to Florence on the

emperor’s behalf and for giving up the opportunity to win glory and honor by through

military service, the emperor gave him the right to bear the golden lion from his own coat

of arms, as well as ennobling him.571

In one of Pitti’s final entries relating to military service, he offers to take

command of the Florentine government’s military efforts to prevent Paolo Guinigi, lord

of Lucca (1400-1430), from attacking Florence. Pitti’s plan was typically chivalric: “if

the Commune [of Florence] preferred not to assume over responsibility for this

enterprise, they could let me proceed by myself. All they need do was to discreetly

convey enough money to me to raise 50 cavalry and 200 foot-soldiers and archers, and I

would declare war and offer shelter to rebels and deserters from the other side. Should the

Commune wish to dissociate themselves more completely from my undertaking, I was

willing to let them banish me and imprison my wife and child”.572 While nothing

ultimately came of this plan, Pitti did manage to campaign in Italy in May of 1403 during

Florence’s war with Pisa. He participated in the attack on Livorno, which again ended in

defeat. Pitti describes the attack, recalling vividly the large number of skilled archers in

the city and lamenting that even though the Florentines gave battle “after a number of our

570
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 70-71.
571
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 71-72.
572
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 76-77.
 208

men had been killed by crossbow bolts and artillery, [we] gave up and returned to

Florence with little honor”.573

THE UBERTI

As a result of the constant factional violence within and between Tuscan cities, as

well as the continuous expansion of communal power into the contado, the countryside

swarmed with exiles (fuorusciti). These exiles were encouraged to come together to form

communities (i.e. armies) and to hone their martial skills in the hope of restoring

themselves to their native cities through force.574 Indeed, for these individuals and

families, warfare and the loss of status and power were all everpresent realities. As a

result, they were particularly attracted to a chivalric ideology that privileged warfare as

an ennobling enterprise and encouraged these warriors to recover their former positions

and honor through violence.

Like the numerous exiles examined above, the Uberti family enjoyed a

tumultuous and often violent relationship with the commune of Florence during the

course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. The family enjoyed a prestigious,

although notorious reputation among Florentines, one centered on their ancient and noble

lineage, as well as traditions of knighthood and violence, which dated back to the twelfth

and early-thirteenth century when its members dominated the society and politics of

573
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 79.
574
For an important study of the practice of “exile” in Florence, see: Fabrizio Ricciardelli, The Politics of
Exclusion in Early Renaissance Florence (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007).
 209

Florence.575 Indeed, Schiatta degli Uberti was one of the men who infamously dragged

Bondelmonte de’ Bondelmonti from his horse on Easter Day 1215 and killed him at the

foot of the statue of Mars in the city of Florence (see chapter two above).576

Forced into exile in 1258, the Uberti continued to cultivate the profession of arms

and to live a chivalric lifestyle, both as the leaders of the Florentine exiles, as well as in

foreign courts across the Italian peninsula and abroad. The Florentine chronicler Dino

Compagni (d.1324), who was very familiar with certain members of the Uberti family,

wrote of them that “for more than forty years [they] had been rebels against their country,

and found neither mercy nor peace. [But e]ven in exile they kept great state and never

diminished their honor, for they always associated with kings and lords and dedicated

themselves to great undertakings”.577 This reputation resonated even in their native city,

for in 1303, when the family along with other exiles returned to Florence, “they were

greatly honored by the common people. Many old Ghibelline men and women kissed the

Uberti arms”.578

The descriptions in contemporary and near-contemporary historical accounts

highlight the military skill and reputations of many Uberti knights and arms bearers. For

example, Dino Compagni describes Messer Tolosato degli Uberti (d.1310) as “a noble

575
Malispini claims that a certain Schitta degli Uberti was made a knight by Charlemagne himself-
Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina: 146: “Ora ci resta a dire e tornare alla nobile cavalleria, la quale
fece il nobilissimo Carlo Magno imperatore, il quale alla tornata che fece in Francia fece molti cavalieri…
Il primo cavaliere che fece in Firenze, fu il buono messer Otto de’ Figiovanni, e messer Corrado
Figiovanni, messer Anselmo de’ Fighineldi, e messer Arnaldo Fifanti, e Schiatta degli Uberti”.
576
Villani, 182-183.
577
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 56.
578
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 69.
 210

Florentine knight and very valiant man of arms”.579 Messer Neri Piccolino degli Uberti,

meanwhile, is praised by the author of the “Pseudo-Brunetto Latini” as “the most wise

and best knight in the province of Italy”.580 Messer Tolosato, in particular, was a thorn in

the side of the Florentines, receiving begruding respect from Villani and others on such

occasions as his valiant defense of Pistoia against the Florentines in 1302 and his

leadership of Pistoian troops tasked with helping Baschiera della Tosa recover the city of

Florence for the White Guelf and Ghibelline exiles.581

Messer Farinata degli Uberti, a strenuous Florentine knight who led the

Ghibelline exiles of Florence during the 1260s, is perhaps the best known member of the

family. Villani described him as a “valiant and wise knight”, while Bruni referred to him

as “an exceedingly noble Florentine knight of the Uberti family” and a “prudent and

high-minded man”.582 In line with Compagni’s praise of the Uberti family’s resilience

and faithfulness to their chivalric identities is Bruni’s description of Farinata as a “man of

lofty spirit who always kept his eye fixed on nobler things”.583 In addition to being a

great warrior, however, Farinata was also singled about by chroniclers for his prudence

and wisdom, virtues demonstrated above all when he stopped his fellow Ghibellines from

579
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 61.
580
“Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 46: “del più savio e milglore chavaliere della provincia d’Italia, cioè messer
Neri Piccolino delli Uberti di Firenze”.
581
Villani, 407; Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 74.
582
Villani, 243: “il valente e savio cavaliere messer Farinata degli Uberti”; Bruni, The History of the
Florentine People, vol. 1, 135, 141.
583
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 183.
 211

destroying the city of Florence following their victory over the Guelfs at the battle of

Montaperti (1260).584

Other Uberti of note include Messer Piero, a Florentine knight who fought for the

Ghibellines against Charles of Anjou at the battle of Benevento (1266), where he was

captured along with Count Giordano and subsequently imprisoned in Provence.585 Lupo

degli Uberti meanwhile led the defense of the castle of Laterino, which was besieged by

the Tuscan Guelfs in 1288. According to Villani, Lupo “refused to be held captive in

Laterino by the besieging army”.586 In 1289, Messer Lapo Farinata degli Uberti led the

Ghibellines of Chiusi against the Tuscan Guelfs, while Count Scalore degli Uberti, a

Florentine exile, served as captain in 1342 for King Robert during his military campaigns

in Sicily.587

A multitude of additional examples could be provided to futher illustrate the

continued importance of the profession of arms and desire to cultivate military careers

among traditional Florentine families like the Pazzi, Bonsguisi, Gherardini, Visdomini,

Cerchi, Brunelleschi, and others. These individuals and families constructed their

identities, reputations, and power around military service, expertise, and skill as

strenuous knights and arms bearers. Even when social prestige and political power was

584
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 141-143. Farinata’s martial skill is suggested on
numerous occasions, such as when the Ghibellines exiles of Florence and their Sienese allies entrusted the
war against the Florentine Guelfs to Farinata and Messer Gherardo Ciccia de’ Lamberti who possessed the
necessary “skill and subtlety of war”- Villani, 238: “maestria e inganno di guerra, la quale industria fu
commessa in messer Farinata degli Uberti e messer Gherardo Ciccia de’ Lamberti”.
585
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 207.
586
Villani, 345: “Ma Lupo si scusava per motti, che nullo lupo nonn-era costumato di stare rinchiuso”.
587
Villani, 358, 924.
 212

no longer directly related to their function as strenuous warriors, they continued to live

the chivalric lifestyle, especially when cut off from the reins of government or in exile.

The Florentine Chivalric Elite, II: Chivalric Communities at Home and in Exile

In addition to the abovementioned families and individuals who exemplify the

continued cultivation of military careers and association with the culture of chivalry,

Florentine history provides us with important examples of “chivalric communities”,

groups of knights and arms bearers who were forced by external circumstances to form

“private armies” to wage war on behalf of or against the city of Florence. These “private

armies”, comprised of strenuous warriors who were themselves steeped in the culture of

chivalry, served to help spread the influence of chivalric ideology. Two of the better

documented communities will be examined briefly below: the Florentine Guelf exiles and

the Cavalieri della Banda.

FLORENTINE GUELF EXILES

When Messer Farinata degli Uberti and the Florentine Ghibelline exiles, along

with their Sienese and German allies, won a decisive victory at Montaperti in 1260, many

of the leading Guelf families abandoned the city of Florence. Villani writes that some

went to France to earn a living, ostensibly through military service, as is suggested by the

author’s use of the proverb “necessity makes a brave man” (bisogno fa prod’uomo) to

describe their activities there.588 Other Guelf exiles travelled to nearby Bologna where

588
Villani, 246.
 213

they also offered their martial skills in exchange for refuge and sustenance. According to

Villani, “they abode there [for a] long time in great want and poverty, some receiving pay

to serve on foot, and some on horse, and some without pay”.589

Despite their desperate situation, these knights and arms bearers succeeded, over

the next several years, in coming together to form a military community that not only

restored the material fortunes of its members, but also allowed them to carve out a

considerable martial reputation. The honor and status earned by these warriors was such

that they made a marked impression on the French knights who accompanied Charles of

Anjou when he descended into Italy in 1260. Indeed, Villani writes that when the

Florentine Guelf exiles met with the French knights of Count Guy of Montfort, Charles’s

marshal, “the [exiles] seemed to [the French knights] such fine men, and so rich in horses

and arms, that they marvelled greatly, that being in banishment from their cities they

could be so nobly accoutred, and their company highly esteemed our exiles”.590 Villani

claims even Manfred, king of Sicily, was impressed by the Florentine Guelf exiles when

they lined up against him at the battle of Benevento (1266): “more than 400 horse,

whereof many of the greater houses in Florence received knighthood from the hand of

King Charles upon the commencement of batle; and of these Guelfs of Florence and of

Tuscany Guido Guerra [of the Counts Guidi] was captain… And King Manfred seeing

the bands formed, asked what folk were in the fourth band, which made a goodly show in

589
Villani, 188-189: “più tempo stettono in Bologna con grande soffratta e povertà, chi a soldo a piè, e chi
a cavallo, e chi sanza soldo”.
590
Villani, 257: “E quando i Franceschi si scontrarono con gli usciti guelfi di Firenze e di Toscana, parve
loro sì bella gente e sì riccamente a cavagli e ad arme, che molto si maravigliarono che usciti di loro terre
potessono esser così nobilemente adobbati, e la loro compagnia ebbono molto cara de’ detti nostri usciti”.
 214

arms and in horses and in ornaments and accoutrements: answer was made him that they

were the Guelf refugees from Florence and from other cities of Tuscany”.591

This lofty reputation of prowess and bravery was the result of successful

encounters with Ghibellines first in Modena and then later in Reggio, where the 400

“good men-at-arms” of “gentle lineage and proved in arms” quickly asserted themselves

as master practitioners of the profession of arms.592 Bruni claims that the Florentine Guelf

exiles “saw service in the army of the Guelfs of Modena as a means to acquire both

riches and glory”,593 while Villani describes the valor and prowess of the Florentine

Guelfs who “as brave men and used to arms and to war… attacked the Ghibellines [of

Modena], which could not long endure, but were defeated and slain and drive[n] out of

the city”.594 After defeating the Ghibellines of Modena, the Florentine Guelf exiles

“furnish[ed] themselves with horses and with arms, whereof they were in great need”.595

Just as in imaginative literature, the demonstration of valor and prowess resulted in honor

and glory.

A short time after their victory in Modena, the strenuous knights and arms bearers

of the Florentine Guelf exiles received a request for assistance from the Guelfs of Reggio.

As we have seen above in the discussion of Messer Forese degli Adimari, the Florentine

591
Villani, 260-261: “e furono più di CCCC cavalieri, de’ quali molti di loro delle maggiori case di Firenze
si feciono cavalieri per mano del re Carlo in su il cominciare della battaglia; e di questa gente, Guelfi di
Firenze e di Toscana, era capitano il conte Guido Guerra… E veggendo il re Manfredi fatte le schiere,
domandò della schiera quarta che gente erano, i quali comparivano molto bene inn-arme e in cavagli e in
arredi e sopransegne; fugli detto ch’erano la parte guelfa usciti di Firenze e dell’altre terre di Toscana”.
592
Villani, 254: “e feciono più di CCCC buoni uomini a cavallo gentili di lignaggio e provati in arme”.
593
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 189.
594
Villani, 247: “come gente virtudiosa, e disposta ad arme e a guerra, si misono a la battaglia contro a’
Ghibellini, i quali poco sostennero, che furono sconfitti, e morti, e cacciati della terra, e rubate le loro case,
e beni”.
595
Villani, 247: “delle quali prede i detti usciti di Firenze guelfi e dell’altra Toscana molto ingrassaro, e si
forniro di cavagli e d’arme, che n’aveano grande bisogno”.
 215

exiles engaged in a battle in the streets of that city that seem to be a scene right out of

chivalric romance, achieving a decisive victory. By the time they returned to their native

city of Florence in 1267 after serving Charles bravely in his conquest of Southern Italy,

Bruni proudly describes them as “a great band of powerful men, hardened in numerous

wars. The People cheered enthusiastically when they caught sight of the horses and arms

and other military gear of the youths who had returned, regarding them as the bulwark of

the commonwealth”.596 Moreover, “many were eager to join [with them] in order to share

their fame”.597

KNIGHTS OF THE STRIPE (CAVALIERI DELLA BANDA)

Related to the formation of exile communities is the creation of chivalric

companies by groups of young knights and arms bearers. Most often these groups limited

themselves to participating in tournaments or other chivalric festivities in the cities of

Tuscany and Italy, but on occasion we come across evidence that a few played important

roles in the wars fought by or against Florence. The best example is certainly the Knights

of the Stripe (Cavalieri della Banda), “a company of volunteers, with a captain, their

banner bearing a red stripe on a green field… [composed] of the most famous young men

of Florence”, that did many deeds of arms.598 These young Florentine warriors showed

great desire to demonstrate their prowess and bravery in order to win honor on the field

of battle. Indeed, the exemplary conduct of this voluntary military company in the first
596
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 215.
597
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 189.
598
Villani, 488: “ch’erano d’una compagnia di volontà a una insegna campo verde e banda rossa con
capitano, e chiamavansi i cavalieri della Banda, de’ più pregiati donzelli di Firenze, e assai feciono
d’arme”.
 216

decade of the fourteenth century strongly suggests that traditional conceptions of chivalry

and knighthood still resonated with some elements of the Florentine elite. In fact, the

members we can identify travelled in the same circles as the families and individuals

introduced above, including the Bostichi, Guadagni, and Spini.599

The Knights of the Stripe were particularly prominent in the defense of Florence

and King Robert of Naples during the descent into Italy of Emperor Henry VII in 1312.

These young Florentine knights and arms bearers played an important role in the battle

which took place between King Robert and the emperor in the streets of Rome in 1312,

where they showed “great prowess and accomplished great deeds of arms”.600 In one

particularly bitter battle, the Knights of the Stripe attacked the bishop of Liege, who had

with him “all the flower of Germany”, an engagement which the Florentines won,

capturing the bishop in the process.601 Likewise, the Knights of the Stripe participated in

the defense of Siena in 1313 “sall[ying] forth from the Cammollia Gate to skirmish, [but]

were worsted and driven back into the city”602, as well as San Gimignano when the

emperor went to Colle (January, 1313).603 Later at the siege of Florence in 1313, the

Knights of the Stripe were among the only Florentines and Tuscan Guelfs to leave the

safety of the walls to the emperor’s army, engaging in skirmishes usually against far

greater numbers. Unfortunately for the company, these “wise and brave” warriors were

599
Marchionne di Coppe Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 111.
600
Marchionne di Coppe Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 108: “feciono di belle prodezze e assai”.
601
Marchionne di Coppe Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 109: “ma pure alla per fine i cavalieri della Banda
un dì assaliro il vescovo di Leggi, che avea seco, per assalire la ruga e le torri de mercantanti, tutto il fiore
della Magna. I cavalieri della Banda percossero di traverso, e ruppero i Tedeschi, e fu preso il vescovo di
Leggi, e poi fu d’uno stocco ucciso”.
602
Villani, 490: “e cavalieri di Firenze alquanti per badalucchi uscirono per la porta di Cammollia, ed
ebbonne il peggiore, e furono ripinti”.
603
Marchionne di Coppe Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 111.
 217

defeated by the imperial troops and among the dead were “three young men of great

daring”, identified as members of the noble Bostichi, Guadagni, and Spini families.604

After this flurry of action over the course of a year and a half, the Knights of the Stripe

disappear from the historical record.

As this deluge of evidence strongly suggests, many Florentines continued to

cultivate martial careers during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, regardless of their

access to or control of political power. The result was the solidification of a warrior elite

that while not always completely distinct from the ruling political elite of Florence,

nonetheless built identities based upon the profession of arms. Indeed, the chivalric

lifestyle, centered on honor, prowess, and voluntary military service as knights and arms

bearers, was absolutely central to the identity of these strenuous warriors. In this regard

the Florentine chivalric elite were very similar to their trans-Alpine counterparts.

III. Chivalry and the Practice of Warfare

Having confirmed the continued vitality and importance of the profession of arms

to the identity of the Florentine warrior elite, it is important to turn our attention to the

ideology that animated and informed this group and profession in warfare. Indeed,

chivalric ideas, attitudes, and behaviors exercised a powerful influence among Florentine

knights and arms bearers, especially in the context of warfare. Chivalry encouraged

practitioners to demonstrate prowess and valor in battle, with honor as the glittering

reward. Given the emphasis on individual demonstrations of military skill and bravery

604
Marchionne di Coppe Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 111; Villani, 488: “e morì uno degli Spini, e uno de’
Bostichi, e uno de’ Guadagni per loro franchezza in questa stanza”.
 218

among knights and arms bearers, military discipline was often a serious problem in

medieval armies and larger objectives like victory were often sacrificed in the personal

pursuit of honor. The historical accounts provide numerous examples of what might be

termed “chivalric autonomy”, or independent action during battle. In order to combat

chivalric autonomy and the reckless pursuit of honor, contemporaries promoted the

exercise of reformative virtues such as prudence and restraint, which provided balance to

the all-powerful “demi-god prowess”.605 In addition, the most prominent knights, whether

determined by social pedigree or martial reputation, were expected to provide leadership,

demonstrating through example prudence and restraint.

Chivalry and War, I: Prowess, Valor, and Honor

War was welcomed by the practitioners of chivalry because it gave them an

opportunity to distinguish themselves from many of their fellow Florentines. Strenuous

knights and arms bearers believed they possessed a monopoly on the military experience

and expertise needed to wage a successful war, as well as on the martial skills necessary

for victory in individual combat. For much of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the

Popolo also recognized this to be true. As a result, in times of armed conflict, many of

members of the warrior elite found themselves restored to positions of power or took it

upon themselves to demand its restoration. For example, in 1323 the knights and arms

bearers of the Florentine chivalric elite caused considerable consternation and fear by

refusing to pursue the war against Castruccio Castracani because the Popolo would not

605
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 129-160.
 219

rescind the Ordinances of Justice. These Florentine knights and arms bearers believed

that their traditions of military service and possession of martial skills entitled them to

hold positions of power and authority that were commensurate with their nobility and

prominence. When these rights were not recognized and oppressive legislation remained

in place, the warrior elite refused to continue the war, leaving the Florentine campaign to

collapse in disorder and ignominy.606

As we have seen above, many families held fast to their traditions of military

service and leadership, the product of a personal and familial identity centered on

chivalry and the profession of arms. Exile or marginalization served only to reinforce

these connections and this element of their identity, leading men like Buonaccorso Pitti

and Farinata degli Uberti, among others, to maintain their honor through careers in the

profession of arms. Instructive is Compagni’s commentary about the Uberti, introduced

above, which confirms the desire of exile families to maintain their reputations and honor

through the profession of arms: “for more than forty years [the Uberti] had been rebels

against their country, and found neither mercy nor peace. [But e]ven in exile they kept

great state and never diminished their honor, for they always associated with kings and

lords and dedicated themselves to great undertakings”.607

For the less idealistic and more practical exiles, military service offered the

possibility of restoration, whether through distinguished and loyal service on behalf of

the commune or through military action against their native city. The events of 1323 are

instructive: in this year Castruccio Castracani threatened Prato, forcing a desperate

606
Villani, 565-567.
607
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 56.
 220

Florentine government to offer restoration to those exiles who came to the defense of the

commune and its allies; no less than 4,000 proud warriors responded.608 While most of

these exiles did not realize their goal of returning to Florence, many families who

provided exemplary service were rewarded by the Florentine government with the

restoration of their former status, allowing them to participate more fully in politics.609

Prowess, Bravery, and Honor

Richard Kaeuper has argued persuasively that prowess was the key to honor and

that both were at the very center of chivalric identity. The very best knights, both literary

and historical, are celebrated above all for their prowess and valor. Guido delle Colonne’s

Historia Destructionis Troiae is replete with praise for knights who show great prowess

and bravery. For example, Guido lauds King Laomedon, a Trojan knight, who “like a

roaring lion, rushed up swiftly; he did many deeds of valor in his own person and killed

some, wounded some, and cut some to pieces, and he strove with all eagerness to attack

the Greeks and defend his men”.610 A knight’s prowess became, in many literary cases,

synonymous with his identity. The depiction of the Trojan prince Hector in the Historia

Destructionis Troiae supports this assertion: “Then [Hector] manfully attacked the

Greeks, scattered them, wounded them and killed them, and the Greeks then recognized

608
Villani, 565-567: “che i IIIIM e più erano isbanditi, molto fiera gente”.
609
A useful example is Messer Benghi Buondelmonti who was rewarded for his military service in the war
against Pisa (1370) with reentry into Florentine political circles- Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca
Fiorentina, 277: “Di che per questo diguazzare messer Benghi Buondelmonti’ cavaliere del popolo, avea
ricevuto essere popolano per la guerra de’ Pisani”.
610
Guido delle Colonne, Historia Destructionis Troiae, 37, (lines 185-188).
 221

him on account of the deadly blows of his sword”.611 Similarly in Giovanni Boccaccio’s

Il Filocolo (ca.1335-1340), the author explains Julius Caesar’s greatness in terms that his

medieval knightly audience would have understood: “[Caesar] had more boldness and

prowess than any other Roman has ever possessed”.612 In the minds of the practitioners of

chivalry valor and prowess are the ingredients of a type of nobility that does not always

correspond perfectly with its rather more rigid social counterpart.

Works of imaginative literature portray war as the greatest arena for the

expression of prowess and the best opportunity to assert and earn honor. Illuminating in

this regard is the reaction of Troilo, in Boccaccio’s Il Filostrato (ca.1335-1340), upon

learning that the war against the Greeks was to begin anew: “As a famished lion who

rests himself wearied with searching for prey suddenly starts up, shaking his mane, if he

perceives a stag, or a bull… desiring only that, such was Troilo when he heard that the

dubious war was to begin again; vigor suddenly ran through his inflamed heart”.613

Therefore, it is not surprising that historical knights and arms bearers, including those of

the Florentine chivalric elite, actively cultivated careers in the profession of arms, even

after the traditional connection between function and status had been broken in the late-

thirteenth and early-fourteenth century.614

611
Guido delle Colonne, Historia Destructionis Troiae, 167, (lines 137-140).
612
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filocolo, 25, book 1, chapter 23.
613
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filostrato, 379, book 7, chapter 80.
614
The Ordinances of Justice and other anti-magnate legislation meant that those who were dubbed knights
(or who had ancestors within two generations who had been dubbed knights) or lived the “noble” lifestyle
(i.e. one characterized by honor-violence, social-violence, and autonomy) were not only required to pay
massive surieties, but were also legally and politically disadvantaged. Pursuit of the chivalric lifestyle no
longer provided access to or ensured a hand on the reins of government or a position in the upper-echelons
of Florentine society. More often holding on to the more violent and martial tenets of the chivalric lifestyle
led to exile or marginalization. See chapter one above for more discussion.
 222

As we have seen, the pursuit of honor through demonstrations of prowess and

valor remained at the forefront of the minds of Florentine knights and arms bearers,

whether in exile or at home. The attitudes, models, and values contained in imaginative

literature no doubt reinforced the centrality of prowess and valor in the minds of the

Florentine warrior elite. Less useful to the historian of chivalry in Florence are traditional

historical sources, which have certain limitations, most notably their lack of interest and

insight into the motivations and mentality behind chivalric action. Despite these

limitations they do call to our attention many incidents during which knights and arms

bearers demonstrate their prowess and valor.

The History of the Florentine People is particularly useful in this task, as Bruni

focused his attention on the prowess and valor of Florentine knights and arms bearers.

For example, when describing the young Florentine noblemen Francesco di Palla Strozzi

and Ugo di Vieri Scali, who led 400 picked knights from Florence against the troops of

the future Charles IV, known as Wenceslaus, in 1333, Bruni writes that they “earned

exceptional praise for their prowess in battle, as both men with equal ardor were found in

that front rank”.615 The author confirms that their prowess and valor were recognized

widely by contemporaries, describing them as “military men of great fame at home [(i.e.

in Florence)]”, while also claiming that they “made haste to extend the glory of their

deeds abroad, exhorting their troops more by example than by words”.616

Since Bruni’s program in The History of the Florentine People sought to

encourage a revival of martial vigor and prowess among the ruling elite of Florence in his

615
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 193.
616
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 193.
 223

own day, a revival catalyzed by emphasizing the prominence and positive benefits of

these chivalric virtues in the past, his account of Florentine history on occasion pushes

beyond mere description to offer greater insight into mentality and motivation. For

example, Bruni imputes a desire to demonstrate prowess and win honor to the Ghibelline

exiles of Florence, who armed themselves in 1260 and “boast[ed] of the great deeds they

would perform that day against the enemy”.617 A similar emphasis on prowess and valor

appears in the pre-battle speech crafted by Bruni for Count Giordano, during which he

asserts that victory will go to “those who swing their swords the more stoutly”.618

Additional cases abound in The History of the Florentine People. In one, Bruni

singles out Giovanni Visdomini, a Florentine noble and knight “of high spirit and

experience in war”, for his prowess and valor, writing that he “dared to volunteer first to

help those trapped in Scarperia [in 1291] and [through his prowess] made it successfully

into the besieged town with thirty men”.619 Also present at Scarperia was another

Florentine arms bearer, Giovanni de’ Medici, who was similarly motivated by the dictates

of honor to prove his prowess and honor. Bruni records that Giovanni believed “it would

be dishonorable for himself to wander about, safe and free, not rendering due service to

his country in its time of need, when some of his fellow citizens were trapped and in

danger”.620 Despite Bruni’s fifteenth century emphasis on service to the res publica, the

importance of honor to Giovanni is clear and accords with the evidence provided by

contemporary imaginative literature.

617
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 143.
618
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 163.
619
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 357-359.
620
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 359.
 224

Similarly useful are Bruni’s descriptions of the prowess and valor of the

Florentine knights and arms bearers who “distinguished themselves [outside of Pescia in

1395] in defense [of their Lucchese allies]… even ma[king] sorties from Lucca and

engag[ing] in several quite successful battles”621 and the “prodigious deeds of courage”

performed by Casca, leader of the Ghibellines of Reggio, which prompted the Florentine

Guelf exiles to send their “most powerful young men against him”.622 The latter example

touches upon a popular trope in imaginative literature: that of the desire of knights and

arms bearers to prove themselves against the very best practitioners of their profession.

Bruni’s striking claim that Casca was cut down by the hand of the captain of the exiles,

the Florentine knight Forese Donati, in a brilliant single combat in the middle of the

forum with their troops looking on, adds weight to assertion that the chivalric virtues of

prowess and valor were of paramount importance to thirteenth and fourteenth century

knights and arms bearers.623

As we saw earlier in the chapter, the Guelf exiles of Florence built a reputation

based on “loyalty and prowess” during their exploits throughout the Italian peninsula

between 1260-1267. According to Bruni, when Charles of Anjou made his way south to

conquer the kingdom of Sicily, the Florentine Guelfs told the king that they were willing

to “risk wounds and cold steel on his behalf”.624 Similarly chivalric were the actions and

motivations of those Florentine warriors who “striving to win military glory for

themselves and show their courage”, stormed and captured the castles in which the

621
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, 199.
622
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 189-191.
623
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 189-191.
624
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 197-199.
 225

Ghibelline exiles of Florence took refuge in 1267.625 Likewise, Bruni’s account of the

Florentine knights and arms bearers who fought the Florentine Ghibelline exiles and their

Sienese allies outside the Coll Val d’Elsa in 1269 highlights the prominence of these

chivalric virtues. According to Bruni, the Florentine Guelfs sought to “accomplish great

deeds. So, seizing their weapons, they decided not to wait any longer for the infantry, but

went out with high spirit and attacked the timorous and retreating enemy”.626 Not only

are the Florentine Guelfs motivated by the chivalric desire to accomplish great deeds of

arms, that is, to demonstrate their prowess, but their valor is also strongly contrasted with

the temerity of the Sienese and exiles.627

Bruni’s desire to revive the martial virtues of traditional chivalry among the ruling

elite of early-fifteenth century Florence makes his The History of the Florentine People

unique, as the author explores the motivation and mentality behind the chivalric actions

of Florentine knights and arms bearers in the past. Indeed, most of his fellow authors of

traditional historical works, mainly members of the popolani, generally do not touch on

mentality or motivation, recording instead only what happened and not why. This lack of

detail is most likely the consequence of distance, disinterest, or a lack of understanding

and appreciation of chivalry and the profession of arms. Despite this limitation,

traditional historical works provide important evidence for the study of chivalry and

warfare in late medieval Florence.

625
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 227.
626
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 253.
627
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 143. Likewise, the desire to demonstrate bravery
and prowess is the understood, but not explicitly stated purpose of the conflict between the Florentines and
Sienese in 1260: Bruni praises “the keenest cavalry and infantry skirmishers on both sides engaged in
frequent minor clashes in the area between the camp and the city gate [of Siena]”.
 226

Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence provides numerous examples of

prowess, including that performed by Nerone Cavalcanti against Messer Rossellino della

Tosa: “In that crush Nerone Cavalcanti came against messer Rossellino; he leveled his

lance and struck messer Rossellino on the chest, knocking him off his horse”.628 The

anonymous author of the Cronichetta d’Incerto, meanwhile, offers a similarly useful, but

barren account of great deed accomplished by Count Robert, son of Count Simone da

Poppi da Battifolle, captain of the Florentine troops, when in 1370 he “broke through the

gates of Samminiato at midnight and entered with sword in hand, fighting those inside,

driving out the enemy and capturing prisoners”.629

Likewise Villani readily praises the valor and prowess of Florentine knights and

arms bearers and their allies, but does not give as much attention to motivation and

mentality as Bruni. Instructive is the example of the Guelf exiles of Florence who, under

the leadership of Count Guido Guerra (counts Guidi) and Messer Stoldo Giacoppi de’

Rossi, fought their way into San Germano in 1265; Villani writes that they “bore

themselves marvellously and like good men”.630 Similar are Villani’s account of the

Florentine defense against the attacking Aretines in 1289, when they “received the enemy

with constancy and fortitude”631 and his praise of the prowess of Florentine knights and

628
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 70. Compagni similarly praises the prowess and bravery of the
men of Pistoia as “men of great personal valor… [who] often sailed out to come to blows with their
enemies and performed great deeds of prowess”: Ibid, 76.
629
“Cronichetta d’Incerto”, 269: “Ruppono le porte, entrarono dentro colla spada in mano, combatterono
insino a terza, e cacciarono fuori la gente… e’ prigioni mandarono a Firenze”. This same work also records
the bravery of the Florentine knight Manno Donati, who left Modena one night in August 1370 with his
Florentine troops and 300 knights, and after riding all night, attacked the city of Reggio, winning a great
victory. The anonymous chronicler also reports that Manno died in September of that year from the wounds
he had received in the battle for Reggio and was buried honorably the Lord of Padova- ibid, 270-272.
630
Villani, 259: “si portarono maravigliosamente e come buona gente”.
631
Villani, 353: “ma costanti e forti ricevettono i nemici”.
 227

arms bearers who fought against the count of Armagnac in April 1333, accomplishing

“wondrous deeds of arms”.632 While these examples suggest the importance of prowess

and valor among the Florentine warrior elite, they don’t provide much insight into

mentality and motivation.

Villani also writes of the knights and arms bearers who were sent in 1272 to help

King Charles in Sicily, stating that they showed great prowess and bravery in winning the

gates of the city of Messina, but unfortunately offers no other details.633 Similarly terse

are his account of the 200 Florentine knights who showed great prowess in helping

capture the city gates of Modena in March 1326634 and his account of the “deed of

chivalry” performed by Messer Giovanni d’Appia (Jean d’Eppe) in 1283 before being

killed by Baldo da Montespertoli, a “worthy exile of Florence who was within

Meldola”.635 While Villani describes the single combat between the two knights, once

again he does not delve beyond the descriptive. Indeed, the majority of Villani’s evidence

632
Villani, 766: “Alla fine per la nostra buona gente e buoni capitani, i quali ciascuno fece il dì maraviglia
in arme, ebbono la vittoria, e que’ dell’oste della schiera del conte furono sconfitti e rotti”.
633
Villani, 311: “e assai era possibile di poterla vincere per battaglia, che cominciandovisi uno badalucco, i
nostri Fiorentini aveano gia vinte le sbarre e entrati dentro alquanti; e se que dell’oste avessono seguito,
s’avea la terra per forza. Ma sappiendolo il re Carlo, fece suonare le trombe alla titratta, e disse che non
volea guastare sua villa, onde avea grande rendita, nè uccidere i fantini (fanciulli), ch’erano innocenti, ma
che la voleva per affanno d’edificii, e per assedio aseccargli (prosciugarli) di vivanda, vincere. Ma non fece
ragione di quello che potea avenire nel lungo assedio, e bene gli avenne. Ma al fallo della guerra
incontanente v’è la disciplina e penitenzia apparecchiata”. Villani’s description of the White Guelf exiles
conquering the gate of Florence through force and their push into the city proper is similarly lacking in
detail- Villani, 433: “si partirono di Cafaggio dalla schiera, e vennero a la porta delli Spadari, e qualla
combattero e vinsono, e entraro delle loro insegne e di loro infino presso a la piazza di San Giovanni”.
634
Villani, 623: “e’ cavalieri de’ Fiorentini furono de’ primai ch’entrarono a l’antiporta, e poco fallì che
non ebbono la città”.
635
Villani, 320-321: “uno valente uomo uscito di Firenze, il quale era dentro, ch’avea nome Baldo da
Montespertoli, sì pensò d’uccidere messer Gianni d’Epa, e armossi di tutte armi a cavallo, e a corsa
coll’elmo in capo e colla lancia abassata si mosse per fedire messer Gianni, il quale s’avide della venuta del
cavaliere, ma però non si mosse, ma attese; e come s’apressò, diede del bastone che portava in mano nella
lancia del giostratore e levollasi da dosso, e passando oltre, il prese a braccia, e levollo dalla sella del
cavallo in terra, e di sua mano col suo spuntone l’uccise; e così quegli che credea uccidere, da colui
medesimo fu morto”.
 228

is cursory, praising the bravery and prowess of Florentine warriors, but not offering us

any significant detail or insight into why they risked their lives to demonstrate their

prowess and bravery.636

On a few occasions, however, Villani does provide glimpses into the mental

framework of the warrior elite. For example, Villani writes that in 1260 the Ghibelline

exiles of Florence believed that “if they attacked [the Florentine Guelfs] boldly, they

would certainly be discomfited”.637 In other words, Villani suggests that the warrior elite

believed that their valor and boldness would lead them to victory, a decidedly chivalric

point of view which accords with much of the evidence provided by both Bruni and

imaginative literature. Likewise, Villani claims that the Knights of the Stripe were

induced by their great valor and boldness to attack the troops of the emperor in 1312, an

attack during which they did many “feats of arms”.638 In yet another instructive case,

Villani informs us that certain Florentine warriors on horse “sallied forth from the

Cammolllia Gate to skirmish [the troops of the emperor who were marching against

Siena], and were worsted and driven back into the city”.639

636
Another useful example from Villani features the prowess and bravery of the Florentine and Tuscan
Guelf knights who served King Robert on the beaches near the village of Sesto where he attacked the
Ghibelline exiles of Genoa. Villani writes that in February of 1319 the army of King Robert “fought hand
to hand with the enemy, chief of them being Florentines and other Tuscans, which first descended from the
galleys under the protection of bowmen of the galleys… and by force of arms they landed, and broke up
and discomfitted the forces of the exiles upon the shore of Sesto, and many thereof were slain and taken
prisoners “- Villani, 444: “combattendo co’ nimici manescamente, onde i principali furono i Fiorentini e gli
altri Toscani che prima scesono di galee sotto la guardia de’ balestrieri delle galee ch’erano a la riva, e per
forza d’arme presono terra, e la gente degli usciti ruppono e sconfissono in su la piaggia di Sesto, e assai ne
furono morti e presi”.
637
Villani, 240: “che assalendogli francamente, di certo erano sconfitti”.
638
Villani, 488: “feciono d’arme”.
639
Villani, 490: “e cavalieri di Firenze alquanti per badalucchi uscirono per la porta di Cammollia, ed
ebbonne il peggiore, e furono ripinti per forza nella città”.
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Although knights and arms bearers were expected consistently to show great

valor, vigor, and prowess in battle, this did not mean that fear was absent. As Richard

Kaeuper has aptly pointed out, while fear is certainly present and real, “knights strove to

replace fear with gritty endurance and courage”.640 Indeed, strenuous knights and arms

bearers were expected to demonstrate bravery, which was central to their identity, so

incidents of cowardice that appear in these works are instructive. Particularly illuminating

in this regard is the example of Giovanni Malatacca of Reggio, the Florentine captain of

war in 1369, who refused to be considered a coward by his contemporaries. Marchionne

di Coppo Stefani writes that Giovanni was “one of the bravest men in Italy”, who led the

Florentines into battle through fear of the shame that stemmed from cowardice. This

desire was so strong that Giovanni led his men into an untenable situation which resulted

in their defeat and capture.641 The consequences of cowardice are clear from the sources.

When Messer Malatesta Malatesti showed cowardice he was replaced as Florentine

captain of war by Walter IV, Count of Brienne and the Duke of Athens, who is described

as “a man of great heart and noble blood”.642 When strenuous knights and arms bearers

failed to show bravery, they came under scathing criticism from authors of both

genres.643

640
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 165.
641
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 271: “di che quello capitano udendo questo,
sdegnato essere tenuto vile, che per certo era de’ gagliardi uomini di sua persona che fosse in Italia, pure
per vergogna si condusse alla battaglia… E presono battaglia; e combattendo fu sconfitto, e preso messer
Giovanni Malatacca, e molti Fiorentini, ch’erano con lui”.
642
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 193-194: “ed a noi non era pervenuta per difetto
della viltà, od altro difetto di messer Malatesta, ch’egli’ avieno provato e veduto messer Gualtieri duca
d’Ateni, uomo di gran cuore e sangue, e che per sua provvidenza tosto recherebbe a fine la guerra”.
643
Villani, 619: Villani provides the example of the 300 Angevin knights who arrived in Florence in
December 1325. Villani and the Florentines considered them “evil men” and useless, for “if they had been
valiant, then with the help of the Florentine citizens they could have lifted the siege of Montemurlo, but
 230

The evidence of imaginative literature is again instructive. Giovanni Boccaccio no

doubts reflects contemporary opinion when he has Lelio, a character in his Il Filocolo,

give a stirring battlefield speech in which he makes explicit that a warrior’s reputation

would be utterly ruined by acts of cowardice: “you are not men who are accustomed to

sully your reputations through cowardice. You and your ancestors have always in the past

devoted yourselves body and soul to eternal honor”.644 In another of Boccaccio’s works,

Il Filostrato, a character’s bravery or cowardice is discernable in his countenance and

body language: “Pandaro found Troilo again deep in thought and so strongly downcast in

appearance that for pity he became sorrowful for it, saying to him, “Now, brave youth,

have you become such a coward as you appear?””.645

Other literary works contrast the cowardice and baseness of certain characters

with the bravery and nobility of others, usually the heroes of the text. In La legenda e

storia di Messere Prodesagio, Riccieri is criticized for baseness and cowardice, earning

him a reputation as an evil, treacherous, and disloyal knight.646 In the Roman de

Palamedes (ca.1240) demonstrations of cowardice by his men convinces Febus that they

are unworthy of bearing the dignity of knighthood.647 This is important because the

because of their cowardice or because of the commandment of the king, they did not want to ride to the aid
of Montemurlo, but rather stayed in the city”.
644
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filocolo, 22, book 1, chapter 21.
645
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filostrato, 243, book 4, chapter 109.
646
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 54, 55: “E Ricceri vide che non poteva guadagnare sopra
Rinieri quella battaglia, anzi ne scapitava; allora si mise a fuggire verso lo castello, e Rinieri gli andava
correndo dietro e diceva: “Ai cavaliere cattivo, di cattivo legnaggio sè nato e ttu fugi”.”.
647
Dal Roman de Palamedes al Febus-el-Forte, ed. Alberto Limentani (Bologna: Commissione per i testi
di lingua, 1962): 85-87: “Signori cavalieri, or sapiate certamente che infine a questo punto sono io stato
ingannato di voi: se Dio mi dia buona ventura, io credea certamente che in voi fusse tanta bontà e tanto
valore e prodessa e ardimento, che tutto lo mondo non vi potesse, spaventare, s’elli vennisse contra voi in
un campo; ma poi ch’io veggio la vostra volontà e la vostra viltà sì apertamente come voi me la mostrate, io
rifiuto da ora inanti la vostra volontà e la vostra compagnia. Or vi ne andate oraindiritto, e lassatemi in
 231

implication is that cowardice is incompatible with a strenuous warrior’s chivalric

identity; in essence cowardice strips the offending individual of his membership in the

ordo militum. It is worth noting that this sentiment is echoed across the corpus of

imaginative literature.

An important historical case, meanwhile, is that of Guido Count Novello, of the

Counts Guidi (d.1293), who the anonymous author of the “Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”

criticized as “cowardly and base” because he retreated rather than attacking the

Florentines at the battle of Campaldino (1289).648 Compagni likewise castigates Novello

and other cowards writing “many who were considered brave were proven to be cowards

and many who were unkown won great esteem”.649 Both Villani and Marchionne di

Coppo Stefani also point out that Guido Novello was not killed in the Aretine defeat at

Campaldino because he fled from the battle out of cowardice, unlike many other

noblemen who fought and died on both sides.650 Leonardo Bruni takes this comparison

even further, contrasting the cowardice of Count Guido Novello with the bravery of

Messer Corso Donati.651 Indeed, as a member of an ancient noble family and a knight,

there was an expectation among contemporaries that Novello would demonstrate bravery,

as this should have been central to his identity.652

questa piassa: ché già non voglia Dio che codardia sia in mia compagnia: ch’io non venni di mia terra in
questa contrada per rifiutare battaglia” [cited hereafter as Roman de Palamedes].
648
“Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 63: “E Guido conte Novello, esendo in s’uno poggio con uno drappello di
ccc. chavalieri, tantosto che lla battalgla fosse coninciata, dovea fedire sopra i Fiorentini; elli sicome vile e
codardo tantosto si partio e andò sua via”.
649
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 12.
650
Villani, 289; Marchionne di Coppe Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 65-66: “ed il conte Guido Novello non
vi volle morire, perocchè si fuggì”.
651
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 339-341.
652
Villani, 618: Villani writes that in November 1325 when Montemurlo was put under siege, the
Florentines did not send help and Villani wonders whether this was the result of cowardice or discord.
 232

Traditional historical sources offer numerous additional examples.653 Compagni

records the contemporary feeling in 1303 that the Cavalcanti family were cowards

because they lost their courage to fight, fleeing the city after a devastating fire destroyed

their palaces and shops.654 Villani in particular does not hold back from criticizing

Florentines warriors who fail to conquer their fear and demonstrate bravery. In one case,

Villani condemns the Guelfs who, when attacked by the Florentine Ghibelline exiles and

their Sienese and German allies in 1260, “made a sorry show in [a] sudden assault, and

fled in terror, supposing that the assailants were more in number”.655 Likewise he

excorated the Florentine Guelfs who abandoned the city of Florence after that defeat

when it could have been easily defended,656 as well as Bolognese cowardice for the

failure of the White Guelf and Ghibelline exiles to recover Florence in 1302.657

Since warfare was the ideal stage for demonstrating prowess and valor, it

naturally follows that it was also the ultimate fount and arbiter of honor. The most

obvious source of honor for historical knights, as we have seen from the discussion of

prowess and bravery above, is that which is earned by personally defeating enemies in

armed combat and/or comporting oneself in a valorous and honorable fashion on the

battlefield.

Similarly in July 1325 the Florentines were accused of cowardice when they sent only 200 knights to help
the Bolognese.
653
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 49: “i Guelfi erano tanto inviliti che non ardivano a
guerreggiare”.
654
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 71-72.
655
Villani, 172-173.
656
Villani, 182.
657
Villani, 341. Villani does not hesitate to praise those Florentines who show bravery, as when he
contrasts the cowardice of the Pisans with the valor of their Florentine enemies- Villani, 367. See also Dino
Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 80.
 233

Despite making clear his personal belief that honor alone is not sufficient

rationale for going to war, because honor and loyalty demand that a strenuous knight or

arms bearer abandon reason and political calculation in favor of “charg[ing] faithfully

into battle to save allies”,658 Bruni seems most attuned to the power of honor among

Florentine knights and arms bearers. Bruni aptly illustrates this point when he writes

about the Florentine Guelf exiles belief that fighting on behalf of the Guelfs of Modena

would offer them an opporutnity to acquire “both riches and glory”, as well as when he

describes how these exiles won “reputation and glory through their courageous feats of

arms” in 1264.659 Indeed, alongside imaginative literature, Bruni’s History of the

Florentine People is replete with examples of the importance of battlefield honor to

Florentine knights and arms bearers. One important case is another battlefield speech

crafted for Count Giordano, leader of the Florentine Ghibelline exiles at the battle of

Montaperti (1260), during which he claims that fame and glory… [are] of enormous

importance to brave men”.660 Bruni attaches a similar importance to honor when he

describes the mentality of the Florentine Guelfs, who in that same year, exhorted one

another not to retreat in shame, but to stay and fight.661

The honorable conduct and death of King Manfred of Sicily during the battle of

Benevento in 1266 also exemplifies the importance attached to honor by this practitioner

of chivalry, an exemplar very familiar to Florentine knights and arms bearers. Indeed,

most late medieval Florentine chroniclers offer commentary on this watershed event and

658
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 153.
659
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 189, 197.
660
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 163.
661
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 167-169.
 234

notably most lavish praise on a king who posed a real and determined threat to their

native city. Ricordano Malispini describes Manfred’s valorous conduct after most of his

army abandons him, writing that with the few brave men left to him he charged into

battle wishing to die honorably in battle rather than flee in shame.662 Likewise Villani’s

account highlights Manfred’s valor and honorable conduct: “being left with few

followers, did as a valiant lord, who would rather die in battle as King than flee with

shame… as a valiant lord he took heart, and immediately entered into the battle, without

the royal insignia, so as not to be recognized as king, but like any other noble, striking

bravely into the thickets of the fight”.663

This desire to die honorably rather than flee in shame or shamefully is echoed by

the Florentine knight and Ghibelline exile, Farinata degli Uberti, who advocated

attacking the Guelfs in 1260 even if it led to their deaths: “for if we do not fight while we

have these German[ knights] we are dead men, and shall never return to Florence, and for

us death and defeat would be better than to crawl about the world any longer”.664 Dino

Compagni likewise highlights the bravery of the men of Pistoia who planned to “all take

arms and like desperate men fling themselves on their enemies with their swords in

hand”.665

The Florentine strenuous knight and chronicler, Simone della Tosa, does not

hesitate to connect prowess and valor with honor, stating that while serving as

662
Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, vol. 2, 434: “Manfredi rimaso con pochi fede come valente
signore, che anzi volle in battaglia morire che fuggire con vergogna”.
663
Villani, 214-215.
664
Villani, 179.
665
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 78.
 235

ambassador to Volterra “he won military honor through his conduct”.666 Another

Florentine knight, Manno Donati, was also honored for his exemplary conduct in armed

combat in 1370, so much so that when he died a month later from wounds received in the

battle, he received an honorable burial by the Lord of Padova.667 The reward of the

dignity of knighthood were forthcoming for two relatives of Messer Pino de’ Rossi as a

result of his labors (i.e. valor and prowess) at the siege of Brescia in 1311.668 Likewise

the Florentine arms bearer Benghi Buondelmonti was made a knight upon his return to

Florence in 1363 after securing victory over the Pisans in his capacity as captain of the

town of Barga.669

Given the high stakes of war, victory and/or meritorious conduct in battle earned

strenuous warriors honor just as easily as defeat and/or poor personal conduct resulted in

dishonor and shame. Rosso, the Florentine military captain of the Mugello in 1352, was

dishonored and shamed when he led his men into a trap and suffered defeat. This shame

was sufficient to motivate the Florentine government to send a new captain and more

troops to “wipe out [the] stain caused by the inexperience of [their former] captain”.670

As we have seen above, the late-fourteenth century strenuous Florentine arms bearer

Buonaccorso Pitti discusses on a very personal level the dishonor and shame he incurred

666
Gli Annali di Simone della Tosa, 8: “andò nel 1330 ad esercitare impiego, che conducendo assai per
tempo ad onor militare”.
667
“Cronichetta d’Incerto”, 271-272: “Anni 1370. In calen di settembre, messer Manno Donati s’andò al
Paradiso per l’affanno ch’avea auto nella battaglia, sendo capitano de’ Fiorentini. Il signore di Padova il
fece mettere nella sua sepoltura”. As discussed above, the exact date of his death has been debated with
some suggesting that the reports appearing in contemporary historical accounts were based on rumors
which were later proven to be wrong.
668
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 95.
669
“Cronichetta d’Incerto”, 255: “Benghi Buondelmonti compiè l’uficio suo a Barga, e ritornossi a Firenze.
I Fiorentini li feciono onore, e fecionlo cavaliere”.
670
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 383.
 236

as a result of defeat in battle. Particularly enlightening is Pitti’s account of the French

army’s defeat at the hands of the English in 1382 after which he and the French

“withdrew with great loss and little honor”.671 Later in 1403, Pitti’s Florentine forces

failed in their attack on Livorno, after which they “gave up and returned to Florence with

little honor”.672

Numerous additional examples can be procurred to support the claim that

contemporaries assigned honor to the victor and dishonor to the defeated party. When the

Pisans captured both Ponte ad Era and the two Florentine castellans who were charged

with guarding it, Coppo Stefani writes that the government of Florence was greatly

shamed.673 Similarly shamed was the count of Squillaci who rode with many Florentine

knights and arms bearers to Pistoia in an attempt to rescue it from Castruccio Castracani:

when he failed Coppo Stefani claims that they returned to Florence “with little honor”,

while in contrast Castruccio was honored for his successful defense of the city.674

Despite these and other examples,675 defeat or failure to secure victory in battle

did not always result in dishonor and shame. In one illuminating incident, Bruni writes

671
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 43,
672
“The Diary of Buonaccorso Pitti”, 79.
673
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 68: “I Fiorentini erano malmenati da’ Grandi tutto
dì e male guidati, e per la vergogna ricevuta’ voleano bandire l’oste a Pisa”.
674
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 150-151: “Di che convenne che tornassero in
Firenze con poco onore; e ’l Marchese Spinetta abbandonò la ’mpresa, e Castruccio con onore rientrò in
Lucca”.
675
“The Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 47: The anonymous author describes how the Florentines defeated the
Pisans in 1221, doing them great dishonor- “donde li Pisani ne portarono grande invidia, usando contra i
Fiorentini oltragiose parole e fatti. Onde i Fiorentini conbattero co lloro, e fedirlli e ucciserli con grande
danno e disonore di Pisani”; “Cronichetta d’Incerto”, 291-292: the author of the Cronichetta d’Incerto
records how the Florentine army sent home the Papal troops in defeat and shame in 1377- “anche si
tornarono addietro con vergogna”; Villani, 430: Villani writes that the haste of the Florentines and the lack
of prudence of Duke Philip of Taranto resulted in “much harm and loss of renown”; Villani, 571: In
September 1323 the Florentines were forced to abandon their siege of Trappola “much to the shame of the
Florentines”.
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that Uguccione della Faggiuola believed “honor was satisfied by maintaining the siege

[of Montecatini] against the will of his enemies”, despite the ultimate failure of the

enterprise.676 A second important case is that of Messer Robert, Count of Flanders, who

fought in the service of Emperor Henry in Italy (1312-1313). Villani writes that despite

being defeated near Castelfiorentino in 1313 and having a great part of his men killed or

captured, “he had held the field well, and had given them which attacked much to do,

which were four to his one”, so that the victorious Florentines “were much shamed”.677

These examples suggest that even in defeat exemplary conduct could result in honor

gained, or at least maintained.

All Florentine chroniclers were in agreement, however, that warriors who failed

to utilize their valor and prowess to protect their city and contado, but instead chose to

hide in strongholds and allow the enemy to to pillage and burn their lands, were greatly

dishonored and shamed.678 These men were the recipients of harsh censure in historical

accounts. A particularly illuminating example is Bruni’s judgment of the Florentine

Guelfs present at the battle of Montaperti in 1260. According to Bruni, those who

sacrificed themselves defending the honor of Florence were praised and honored, but

those who refused to fight or those who fled “were forced to face the mockery of their

adversaries” and live in shame.679

676
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 31.
677
Villani, 421.
678
Also useful in a broader context is Matthew Strickland, “Provoking or Avoiding Battle? Challenge,
Duel, and Single Combat in Warfare of the High Middle Ages”, in Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in
Medieval Britain and France: Proceedings of the 1995 Harlaxton Symposium, ed. Matthew Strickland
(Stamford: Paul Watkins, 1998), 317-343.
679
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 169.
 238

Traditional historical accounts are filled with such cases.680 Ricordano Malispini

notes how the Ghibellines of Florence returned to their native city with shame after

abandoning their siege of Figline in 1250.681 In 1342 the Florentines are greatly shamed

when they failed to put down an uprising by the Ubaldini and Pazzi di Valdarno, who

took a number of castles and towns and caused great damage in the contado of Arezzo,

which was under Florentine control.682 Villani records how in 1321 the Florentines were

shamed because they failed to come out of their castles to defend the lands of their ally,

the Marquis Malaspini, which were destroyed by Castruccio Castracani.683 Likewise

shame was incurred when the Florentines refused in August 1323 to defend their castles

in the Valdarno against Castruccio’s army.684 Multiple similar examples are offered by

Villani who condemns the Florentines in 1325 and 1333 for failing to defend the honor

and lands of Florence against Castruccio, Azzo Visconti, and King Giovanni.685 Villani

680
Villani, 522-523: Villani tells us that the Florentines gained little honor from their standoff with
Castruccio, implying that by not engaging in battle honor was likely lost; idem, 634-635: Villani laments
that the Florentine army that was assembled to fight Castruccio returned home with disgrace and shame.
681
Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, vol. 2, 316: “E subitamente assalendo la detta gente per la notte,
che era senza nulla difensione, i ghibellini furono sconfitti, e gran parte morti e presi per le case: e la
mattina vegnente si levò l’oste da Ostina con vergogna, e tornò in Firenze”. Bruni, The History of the
Florentine People, vol. 1, 359: Bruni was similarly critical of the Pisans who refused to engage the
Florentines in battle, but rather allowed them to burn their contado. Bruni says they were considered losers
and were shamed.
682
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 192: “gli Ubaldini e Pazzi di Valdarno si
rubellarono, e presono Castiglione e Campogiallo e la Treggiaia, e corsero faccendo gran danno ad Arezzo,
ed al nostro Comune gran vergogna”.
683
Villani, 528.
684
Villani, 570.
685
Villani, 611: in October 1325 Castruccio marched his army near Florence and ran the palio three times
“in order to disgrace and shame the Florentines”; Villani laments that no brave men came out of Florence
to stop Castruccio, saying that the Florentines were “very cowardly and stunned by fear and instead stood
guard, day and night, waiting for treachery from within or an attack from without”; ibid, 612: when in 1325
Azzo Visconti of Milan marched to Signa and ran the palio outside its gates in revenge for the Florentine
actions at the siege of Milan, the Florentine captain of war and gaurdian of the city decided to stay within
the walls and guard the city rather than attacking the enemy or preventing the burning of the contado- as a
result, “they abandoned all honor”; ibid, 742: in March 1333 the Florentines were shamed when the men of
King Giovanni cavalcaded in the contado of Florence without being attacked by the many knights that were
 239

no doubt echoes the sentiments of his contemporary Florentines when he castigated

Count Novello, the erstwhile captain of war for the city of Florence, for his lack of

martial vigor, writing that he returned to Naples in June 1323 with “little honor and less

fortune in war”.686

The numerous accounts of Florentine military activity undertaken to avenge

dishonor provides further evidence of the weight of shame following defeat or ignoble

conduct. Collective military dishonor and shame had to be remedied, no less than that of

individuals. When these attempts to cleanse the stain of shame and dishonor failed, the

ignominy increased markedly. For example, when Count Guido Novello and the

Florentine Ghibellines failed to restore themselves to the city of Florence and had to

retreat in haste and disorder in 1266, they attempted to avenge the shame of their failure

by attacking the fortress of Capalle. When this failed as well “they came to Prato… [and]

bitterly reproached each other”.687 Villani attributes a similar desire for vengeance to

King Charles and the Florentine Guelfs who prepared to go to war with Siena in 1267 in

order to revenge the offense given at the battle of Montaperti.688

Given the centrality of prowess and honor to chivalric identity and the powerful

desire to cleanse dishonor and shame through warlike violence, it is not surprising that

the strenuous practitioners of chivalry and the profession of arms used battles and

in Florence. Ilaria Taddei argues chroniclers in communal Italy established a “code of insult” and recorded
these types of events to “ensure that the [battle or siege would] be remembered”, see: idem, “Recalling the
Affront: Rituals of War in Italy in the Age of the Communes”, 84. Also useful is her discussion (p. 93) of
the “code of derision” and “rituals of siege” created in communal Tuscany, both the result of “the intense
rivalries among the principal communes of Tuscany”.
686
Villani, 581.
687
Villani, 224. ibid, 451-452: Villani provides an addition example of the shameful and disorganized
retreat of the Florentine army that was raiding the contado of Arezzo in 1307.
688
Villani, 273.
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skirmishes as platforms/opportunities to enhance or defend their personal and familial

honor. The powerful influence of the demi-god prowess and the absolute importance of

honor meant that the personal desires of strenuous knights and arms bearers were often

enacted by the decision to act autonomously.

Chivalric Autonomy

As we have seen above in chapters two and three, chivalry encouraged knights

and arms bearers to prioritize personal and familial interests, especially related to honor,

above those of the state or common good. This attitude was reinforced by the belief that

their function as warriors gave them the right to a superior position in society and access,

if not control of, the reins of political power. After all, war was an ennobling enterprise,

and thus as expert practitioners, the warrior elite believed they not only deserved social

prominence, but also had a monopoly on violence which would allow them to take it, at

least until the creation of the communal military companies by the Primo Popolo in

1250.689

One consequence of these attitudes was an independence of action among the

warrior elite, both in Florence and elsewhere in the Italian peninsula, especially as power

became increasingly centralized (see chapters 2 and 3 above).690 This dangerous attitude

in the context of war as well, as knights and arms bearers disobeyed orders and pursued
689
Najemy, A History of Florence, 39-40, 64, 66-68, 93-95.
690
This is a phenomenon strikingly reminiscent of the autonomy demonstrated by their trans-Alpine peers
during a period of growing royal power. Particularly useful studies for northwestern Europe include
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 11-30, 89-120 and idem, War, Justice, and Public Order: England and
France in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).
 241

private goals during battle. This perhaps explains why Donato Velluti wrote that while

the sons of messer Piero de’ Bardi were an important source of military manpower for the

commune of Florence in the 1350s, they were never fully trusted by the government.691

Florentine knights and arms bearers were certainly not alone in maintaining this attitude.

In fact, they were no doubt influenced by the prominent examples of chivalric autonomy

during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. One important case is that of Bartolomeo

of Prato, who “made an incursion into Pisan territory without Bernardone’s knowledge

and against his orders”, an act of independence motivated by Bartolomeo’s belief in his

superiority over Bernardone (the Florentine captain of war), which was based on what he

considered to be his “superior… warlike virtue and ability”.692

This chivalric attitude undoubtedly manifest itself in nearly every stage of the

enterprise of war in late medieval Florence: from the decision to go to war to command

decisions on the field of battle to the desire to demonstrate personal prowess and win

honor, even at the expense of military objectives or victory. In the matter of going to war,

the chivalric elite are presented as providing a contrasting or descenting view, especially

from the second-half of the thirteenth century when the decision to go to war was taken,

first temporarily and later permanently, from their hands by the Popolo. On occasion this

resulted in independent military action, that is, action unsanctioned by the Florentine

government. One such case occurred in 1255 when Guido Guerra of the Counts Guidi,

captain of a force of 500 knights sent to Orvieto, took it upon himself to stop in Arezzo

where he incited an uprising against the Ghibellines of that city. Both Villani and Bruni

691
Velluti, La Cronica Domestica, 201.
692
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, 221-223.
 242

stress that Guido’s actions were not endorsed by the Florentine government, but were

rather those of a knight acting autonomously. Indeed, the city of Florence, ruled by the

Guelfs, went so far as to send a second army to restore the Ghibellines.693

Chivalric autonomy also took the form disobeying commands and/or pursuing

personal honor and distinction in battle. A striking example of this manifestation is

provided by the actions of Messer Corso Donati (d.1308), a famous Florentine knight and

leader of the Black Guelf faction, who refused in 1289 to follow strict orders to not

engage the enemy. Villani writes Donati “had been commanded to stand firm, and not to

strike [the enemy] under pain of death, [but] when he saw the battle begun, said, like a

valiant man: “If we lose, I will die in the battle with my fellow-citizens; and if we

conquer, let him that will, come to us at Pistoia to exact the penalty [for my

disobedience]”; and he boldly set his troop in motion, and struck the enemy in the flank,

and was a great cause of their rout”.694 Bruni, with obvious admiration, adds that Donati

was not only responsible for saving the Florentine army, but also for securing victory.695

The actions in April 1324 of Count Novello, the Florentine captain of war, who

took Carmignano along with the Pisan exiles “without the knowledge of the Florentine

government in retribution for shame the Pisans had done to the vicar of the king and his

men” also show chivalric autonomy at work.696 Messer Piero di Narsi, the Florentine

captain of war in May 1326, motivated by the dictates of honor and shame and “without

693
Villani, 228: Villani writes that Guido’s actions were undertaken “without the permission or the blessing
of the Florentine government”; Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 125.
694
Villani, 290.
695
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 339-341.
696
Villani, 579.
 243

the knowledge of anyone in Florence, gathered his best 200 knights and 500 foot and

immediately departed for Prato” to make war against Castruccio Castracani.697

As a result of this belief that their military expertise and experience made them

superior to the inexperienced and unwarlike popular classes, Florentine knights and arms

bearers often advocated different courses of action from that of their fellow citizens or

refused to follow orders given to them. In one incident reported by Marchionne di Coppo

Stefani in his Cronaca Fiorentina, members of the chivalric elite (Marchionne uses the

term grandi) counseled the Florentine captain of war, Messer Ramondo di Cardona, to go

to Lucca in 1325 to fight Castruccio, ostensibly without the permission of the Popolo.698

In another, Villani blames the Florentine “nobility” for the debacle at Prato in 1323,

writing that Castruccio was allowed to escape certain defeat “through the vice of the

nobility, that did not want to win the war for the honor and state of the Popolo”. Villani

not surprisingly identifies the Ordinances of Justice as the main reason for the nobility’s

unwillingness to lend their service and expertise to the war.699

Chivalric autonomy was often the result of the intense desire of knights and arms

bearers to demonstrate their prowess and bravery, in the process asserting and enhancing

their personal and familial honor. These very personal desires, however, were often in

conflict with the immediate goals of the captain, whether victory or strategic retreat, as

well as the larger military objectives of the “state”. Ideally, chivalric autonomy and its

component parts, the pursuit of honor through the demonstration of prowess and valor,
697
Villani, 626: Villani laments that the Florentine army was subsequently defeated outside of Prato and
Messer Piero captured.
698
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 142: “I Grandi consigliavano messer Ramondo
andasse a Lucca”.
699
Villani, 565-567.
 244

would be controlled by the reformative virtues promoted by chivalric ideology: prudence,

restraint, discipline, and leadership (see chapter five below). While this attitude was

promoted by the ideology underpinning the martial profession, the single-minded pursuit

of personal advantage and recognition often conflicted with the need for discipline,

restraint, and prudence during the course of a campaign, virtues which made military

victory or strategic retreat, among other larger military objectives, more attainable.

Chivalry and War, II: Prudence, Restraint, and Leadership

Given the centrality of prowess and honor to chivalric identity, knights and arms

bearers were naturally focused during battle on demonstrating the former in order to

increase the latter. This desire, when left unrestrained, often resulted in chaos and

uncontrolled violence. Such conduct was encouraged further by a self-perception among

knights and arms bearers of their own superiority in battle. Not surprisingly the

confidence that emerged from this self-assurance often registered among contemporaries

as arrogance. Dino Compagni provides an example of the Florentine knights and arms

bearers who in 1311 “blinded by their presumption, behaved not like wise warriors, but

like arrogant ones”.700 As a result, contemporaries in both chivalric and non-chivalric

circles advocated reformative virtues like prudence and restraint that were intended to

provide balance to the powerful desire to show prowess and valor.

700
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 95.
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Prudence and Restraint

While the authors of imaginative literature eagerly promote the reform virtues of

prudence and restraint as important, they were almost always subordinate to prowess and

valor (see chapter five below). In contrast, the authors of traditional historical sources

commonly praised prudence and restraint as equal, or even superior, to the martial

virtues. Leonardo Bruni’s History of the Florentine People provides important evidence

in this regard. Although Bruni singles out many strenuous knights and arms bearers as

models for the ruling elite of Florence in his own day, he does not indiscriminantly praise

all aspects of chivalry. Rather Bruni is invested in promoting the exercise of prudence

and restraint alongside prowess, valor, and the pursuit of personal honor. Importantly, for

Bruni the exponents and practitioners of these reformative virtues were the nobility, who

unlike the Popolo, combined obvious prowess and bravery with prudence and restraint.

Bruni’s set of council-room speeches before the ill-fated Florentine campaign

which ended in defeat at Montaperti in 1260 are instructive. Bruni, through the guise of

Tegghiaio Aldobrandini degli Adimari, a strenuous Florentine knight and noble who

represented the warrior elite of the city at that time, promotes the idea that victory is more

often obtained through prudence than reckless bravery, for “to prefer danger to victory is

sheer madness”,701 while also stressing that while danger presents the opportunity to

demonstrate valor and prowess, courage may be “overwhelmed by the sheer inequality of

circumstances”.702 This attitude is reinforced throughout this incident with Tegghiaio

701
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 157; 171-173: Bruni promotes the exercise of
prudence and restraint over reckless abandon saying that “to withdraw and preserve oneself for a better fate
seemed to be a course of action that was at once prudent and bold”.
702
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 155-157.
 246

labelling the proposed expedition against the Ghibelline exiles of Florence and their

Sienese allies “dangerous and useless”703 and the desire of the Popolo to make war “more

audacious than prudent”.704

Bruni spends considerable space emphasizing the importance of prudence and

restraint during the course of battle as well, as the lack thereof led to bravado and

recklessness. Bruni utilizes numerous incidents to illustrate this point, including praise of

Florentine discipline in 1329 when the warriors stayed in their siegeworks rather than

engaging the enemy in battle, even though the enemy sought to goad them into an ill-

advised attack through “noisy braggadocio”.705 The actions of the Florentine army

outside Lucca in 1325, are also noteworthy here, because they attacked the walls of that

city as a result of a lack of restraint: “bravado led a more bellicose and boastful, but less

wise view to prevail”.706 Similar criticism is levelled at the Florentine leadership at the

siege of Pisa in 1341, who led 300 knights and 500 infantry to attack the fortifications

rather than maintaining the siege. Bruni writes that “rash and arrogant counsel won the

day” as the Florentines chose to use force rather than wisdom “.707 Bravado and

recklessness led the Florentine knights and arms bearers in the first rank to separate from

703
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 150 and 153-155: Tegghiaio explains to the council
that a military expedition is not necessary given the impending departure of Manfred’s German knights
who are providing important support for the exiles and their Sienese allies.
704
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 153 and 159: Bruni imputes a traditional chivalric
attitude to the Popolo arguing that “proud of its many victories… [the Popolo] wished to march out
fearlessly and expose themselves voluntarily to battle, not so much out of concern for their allies’ perils,
nor led by any particular goal, but simply to avoid the appearance of being afraid of their enemies”.
705
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 171.
706
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 89.
707
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 249.
 247

the main army in 1341 and chase the retreating Pisans, allowing the enemy to recover and

drive the Florentines back.708

In the same vein Bruni contrasted the troops of Conradin and those of Charles of

Naples at the battle of Tagliacozzo (1268). Bruni criticizes the ill-discipline of the

German troops who thought they had won the day and gave themselves over to chasing

the enemy. As a result of their lack of order, restraint, and prudence, they were also

fooled by a clever ruse into believing they had captured Charles.709 In sharp contrast

Charles maintained order and discipline among his men even after they had defeated

Conradin’s army.710 Bruni levels similar criticism at the Florentine army whose ill-

discipline in the battle against Uguccione della Faggiuola in 1315 resulted in over 2000

killed.711 Bruni’s message is clear: a lack of disipline and uncontrolled bravado and

recklessness cost the Florentines many military victories.

Villani likewise promotes the virtues of prudence and restraint, which he

associates with divine approval of the Florentines. For example, Villani claims that

Manfred’s rashness, described as a lack of wisdom, and defeat at the battle of Benevento

(1266) are proof of God’s disapproval of the natural son of Emperor Frederick II.712

Villani precedes Bruni in highlighting the lack of discipline among Conradino’s troops

which led them to rush headlong into a trap and ultimately their defeat.713 Despite

Villani’s praise, like other contemporaries he recognizes the complexity of the

708
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 251-253.
709
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 249-251.
710
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 251.
711
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 33.
712
Villani, 210-211.
713
Villani, 236-238.
 248

relationship between prowess and valor on the one hand and prudence and restraint on the

other. Indeed, while those who show prudence and wisdom are praised, such as the papal

legate Nepoleone Orsini who in 1307 demonstrated great prudence and wisdom in his

attack on Florence which forced the Florentines to retreat at night and in disorder,714

knights who showed too much prudence and restraint risked opening themselves up to

questions about their vigor, perhaps even about their bravery. The actions of King

Charles outside Messina in 1282 are an important example, for Villani criticizes the king

for being too prudent or too slow to take advantage of the opening created by the prowess

and bravery of Florentine knights who fought and won the gates of the city.715

Marchionne di Coppo Stefani notes a similar situation when the Florentines refused to

accept a challenge to do battle issued by the Emperor Henry after he had marched into

Tuscany in 1312.716

Contemporaries often associated bravado and recklessness with youth. Dino

Compagni provides the example of Baschiera della Tosa, a young Florentine knight, who

was de facto captain of the White Guelf and Ghibelline exiles of Florence when they tried

to retake the city in 1304. As we have seen earlier in this chapter, Compagni blames

Baschiera’s youth for the failure of this enterprise writing that the Florentine knight,

writing that he “was won over more by desire than by reason, just like a youth. Finding

himself with a good troop and under strong pressure to act, he thought that he could win

the prestige of victory and so swooped down on the city with his knights, so that they

714
Villani, 451-452.
715
Villani, 311.
716
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 109.
 249

were in open view”.717 As a result of his lack of restraint and prudence, Baschiera and his

men rashly entered Florence before their allies and friends were prepared to support

them, leading to a disastrous defeat. Compagni hammers home the consequences of such

reckless behavior when he describes the reaction of the famous Florentine exile and

knight, Messer Tolosato degli Uberti, who upon arriving near Florence with

reinforcements from Pistoia and learning of Baschiera’s reckless action, “returned to

Pistoia with great sorrow… well aware that Baschiera’s childishness had cost him the

city”.718 Compagni likewise blamed youth for the recklessness of Gherarduccio di messer

Buondelmonte de’ Buondelmonti, who in his desire to demonstrate his prowess and strike

the enemy, “pursued the White [Guelfs] so closely that one of them turned back and

awaited him, and level his lance and struck him to the ground”.719

The authors of traditional historical sources often suggest that bravado and

recklessness were caused by poor or non-existent leadership. Leonardo Bruni connects

Count Novello’s (Lando d’Agobbio) great bravado and lack of prudence in 1327 with the

actions of the Florentine and French troops who attacked Castruccio “with total disregard

for their own safety [as] they crossed trenches and broken ground, thr[owing] ladders

against the walls and wounded the enemy with a thunderstorm of arrows”.720 Villani

meanwhile blamed the poor leadership of Messer Ramondo di Cardona, the Florentine

captain of war, for the defeat of Florence and its allies at the battle of Altopascio (1325).

According to Villani, Ramondo’s poor personal conduct, especially his failure or refusal

717
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 73.
718
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 74.
719
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 74-75.
720
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 117.
 250

to follow the first battleline, resulted in disorder and retreat.721 Villani also records the

blame that was levelled by contemporaries at the Florentine “experts of war” who failed

to maintain order among the Florentine knights and troops who responded to Castruccio’s

raid on the contado of Florence in 1325.722

Leadership

The ideal knight and arms bearer is often depicted in traditional historical sources

and imaginative literature alike as combining prowess, valor, prudence, and restraint.

Both genres also suggest that knights showing this combination should be chosen to serve

in positions of leadership. In works of imaginative literature in particular the very best

knights are chosen to lead. For example, in the Tristano Panciatichiano, the King of

Ireland is chosen to lead King Arthur’s men based upon his “good chivalry and the great

and good courtesy and widom that people saw in him”.723 Equally distinguished are other

literary knights who serve as leaders, warriors like Tristan, Prodesagio, Florio, Scipio

Africanus (in Petrarch’s Africa) and Branor il Bruno (in Rustichello da Pisa’s Il Romanzo

Arturiano), among others.

If we shift our attention to more traditional historical sources, we find a similar

emphasis upon the personal virtues of the knight or arms bearer who is entrusted with a

position of leadership. According to Simone della Tosa, a strenuous Florentine knight,

721
Villani, 606-607.
722
Villani, 619-620: Villani writes that “the concourse of men was brave and voluntary, but also poorly
ordered, and for this the experts of war were strongly blamed”- “La tratta fu gagliarda e di volontà, ma
male ordinata, e per gli savi di guerra fu forte biasimata”.
723
Tristano Panciatichiano, 640-641: “per la bu[o]na cavallaria et la buona e grande cortesia e per lo senno
<e per lo senno> che l’uomo”.
 251

leadership required both wisdom and maturity, ostensibly in conjunction with the martial

virtues of chivalry.724 Bruni likewise connects all of these chivalric virtues in his praise of

Guido Guerra, of the Counts Guidi, who he described as “outstanding for his physical

strength and his good judgment”.725 The possession of chivalric virtues such as prowess

and valor, generally associated with nobility of the blood or a distinguished family, was

thought by contemporaries to promise competent leadership.

The inclination to lead was in many ways natural to the warrior elite whose

traditions of military leadership, both on behalf of and against the Florentine government,

had long been central to their identity. For example, Messer Gianni de’ Soldanieri, a

Florentine noble, knight, and Ghibelline, took it upon himself to provide order and

leadership to the popular resistance in Florence against the rule of his own party in 1266.

Villani emphasizes that he did this “even though he was only harming himself”.726

Indeed, the popular classes looked to the nobility, both native and foreign knights, for

leadership even against fellow elites.727

Florentine chroniclers from Dino Compagni to Leonardo Bruni are quick to praise

the leadership of knights and arms bearers, both native and foreign. For example, Dino

Compagni singles out the leadership of Messer Barone de’ Mangiadori of San Miniato, “a

knight bold and expert in deeds of arms”, who was demonstrated a good grasp of the

724
Gli Annali Simone della Tosa, 8: “attività nonpertanto, e senno e maturità richiede”.
725
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 197.
726
Vilani, 268: “che dovea riuscire a sconcio di parte ghibellina e suo dammaggio”.
727
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 59: Bruni suggests that when the warrior elite failed
or chose not to provide leadership, the result was disorganization and rash action on the part of the Popolo.
The example of Giano della Bella (d.1305) is instructive here: despite being a wealthy Florentine noble, he
led the popular government which put into place extremely repressive legislation, the Ordinances of
Justice, aimed at his fellow elite.
 252

tactics of war.728 Likewise, the leadership of two Florentine nobles, Giovanni Adimari

and Rinieri de’ Pazzi, who commanded 150 soldiers near Prato in 1325, was lauded by

Bruni, who wrote that these knights “possessed such great foresight and strength of

character that the enemy’s endeavors were long frustrated”.729 Villani meanwhile holds

up both Messer Uberto Spiovanato de’ Pazzi of the Valdarno whose “judgment and

warrior guile” allowed the Guelf exiles of Florence to withstand the Florentine

Ghibellines in 1266730 and Messer Piero Rosso de’ Rossi of Parma whose leadership as

the Florentine captain of war allowed the Florentine army to sustain “the battle

vigorously and in the end turn defeat into victory against the marshal of messer Mastino

de la Scala (sic.)”.731

When a military captain failed to offer sufficient leadership, bravado and

recklessness was often the result. According to Villani, when Philip, duke of Taranto, the

brother of King Robert of Naples, came to Florence in 1315 to lead them in their war

against Uguccione della Faggiuola, it was “against the will of King Robert, who knew his

brother to be more headstrong than wise, and also not very fortunate in battle, but the

contrary”.732 Marchionne di Coppo Stefani blames Philip’s lack of leadership skill and

his bravado for the Florentine troops failing to maintain order and racing into a trap set by

728
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 12: According to Compagni, Barone recognized that tactics
had changed from “the good charge” and taking of prisoners to “standing firm”.
729
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 105.
730
Villani, 265: “se non fosse il senno e sagacità di guerra ch’uso messer Uberto Spiovanato de’ Pazzi di
Valdarno”.
731
Villani, 825-826: “ma per buona capitaneria di meser Piero, e per la franca gente ch’era co llui,
sostennero combattendo vigorosamente, per modo che in poco d’ora la gente di meser Mastino furono
messi inn isconfitta”. Villani similarly praises Piero’s brother, Marsilio, whose “wisdom and valor”
allowed the Florentines to escape defeat against Mastino della Scala in 1336- ibid, 828: “Ma il senno e
ardimento di mesere Marsilio Rosso colla grazia di Dio gli scampò”.
732
Villani, 499: “contro voglia del re Ruberto, conoscendo il suo fratello per più di testa che savio, e con
questo non bene aventuroso di battaglie, ma il contradio”.
 253

Uguccione at the battle of Montecatini (1315).733 Given the outcome of this battle, a

decisive Florentine defeat, it’s not surprising that Villani expressed regret that the

Florence did not wait for Robert to send his son, Charles, duke of Calabria, “with more

order and more preparation, and a better following”.734

Messer Aldobrandini of the Pazzi provides another instructive case, because while

he is recongized by Villani as a valiant and skilled knight, he is criticized for his poor

leadership in 1269: “[Aldobrandini] struck boldly into the ranks of the Sienese; and albeit

it was not held to be very wise and prudent leadership, yet as it please God these bold and

courageous folk with good success broke up and defeated the Sienese and their allies,

which numbered well-nigh twice as many horse and a great number of foot”.735 As we

have seen above, Count Guido Novello was widely condemned for his cowardice at the

battle of Campaldino (1289). Marchionne di Coppo Stefani also singles him out for his

733
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 117-118: “Al prenze fu detto, e sanza nissuno ordine
gli si misse di dietro dicendo: A loro, a loro, che se ne vanno. I Fiorentini dissero al prenze ch’era meglio,
poichè si partìa, mandare per la vettovaglia dello fornimento, che dovea a vespro intrare, e sollicitarla, e
seguire poi l’oste. I prenze sanza nullo ordine si mosse, e andò dietro a Uguccione… Uguccione vinse, ed il
prenze vi fu sconfitto”. Villani, 499-500: Villani stresses how little prudence and discipline existed among
the troops of Duke Philip, writing they “showed but little foresight, nor kept good order in the troops… but
they confronted the enemy, thinking to turn them to flight”; “e ’l prenze malato di quartana, con poca
provedenza non tenendo ordine di schiere per lo sùbito e improviso levamento di campo, s’affrontarono
con i nimici, credendogli avere in volta”. Villani continues writing that Uguccione took advantage of the
“ill-ordered host” of the Florentines and their weak front line: “Uguiccione veggendo non potea schifare la
battaglia, fece assalire le guardie dello spianato… ruppero e trascorsono infino a la schiera di messer Piero
ch’era colla cavalleria de’ Fiorentini”.
734
Villani, 499: “e se’ Fiorentini avessono voluto più indugiare, il re Ruberto mandava a Firenze il duca
suo figliuolo con più ordine e con più consiglio e migliore gente”.
735
Villani, 283: “e tutto che non fosse tenuta troppo savia e proveduta capitaneria di guerra, come ardita e
franca gente, bene aveturosamente come piacque a dDio, ruppono e sconfissono i Sanesi e loro amistà,
ch’erano quasi due cotanti cavalieri e popolo grandissimo, onde molti ne furono morti e presi”. Villani also
provides the example of Messer Amerigo de’ Donati, a famous Florentine knight and military captain, who
is criticized when he does not take proper precautions while racing to help lift the siege of Barga in 1331, a
failure in leadership that leads to the defeat of his 300 knights- ibid, 746: “Ma le masnade di Lucca di notte
vennono a Buggiano, da VC cavalieri. Messere Amerigo e sua gente isproveduti di tale avenimento, e non
prendendosi guardia, furono assaliti subitamente sul Brusceto sotto Montecatini, e rotti e sconfitti”.
 254

lack of leadership, which allowed the other Ghibelline exiles to “run into madness”.736

Also coming under criticism by Villani is Orland de’ Rossi of Parma, who unlike his

brothers Pietro and Marsilio, is described as “rough and foolish” and the Florentine army

under his command was “poorly ordered and led”.737 Similarly disastrous were the

actions of the Aretines, who because they had no leader or battle order, chased the

Florentines who been sent to help the people of Città di Castello in 1309. As a result

“everyone simply went as fast as he could [after the Florentines]… without preparation

and in isolation from each other”.738

Of course when a knight failed to show the tenets of chivalry he was roundly

condemned by contemporaries, just as Villani attacks Malatesta II Malatesta, the

Florentine captain of war in 1342, not only for failing to lead, but also for failing to

demonstrate valor and prowess.739 Obviously, this evidence confirms that even if the

warrior elite possessed the desire to lead and the belief in their inherent right to take on

this responsibility, this did not mean that a strenuous knight or arms bearer necessarily

made a good captain. Villani provides the additional example of Messer Maffeo da Ponte

Carradi of Brescia, the Florentine captain of war in 1340, who despite being “a valiant

and good knight” was not “suitable to guide such a great army”.740 Similarly unsuited

was Messer Bino de’ Gabbiegli d’Agobbio, Florentine captain of war in 1332, who “did

736
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 52: “Quando il Conte fu in Prato, e praticata la viltà
sua e degli altri Grandi ghibellini essere lasciati incorrere in tanta follìa”.
737
Villani, 837-838: “uomo grosso e materiale”; “male ordinata, però che fu sanza ordine e male
capitanata”.
738
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 459.
739
Villani, 903: “non faccendo pruova o valoria alcuna, come potea e dovea avendo tanta buona gente a
ccavallo e a pìe”.
740
Villani, 891-892: “meser Maffeo fosse un valente e buono cavaliere, non era sofficiente duca a guidare
sì grande esercito”.
 255

not have [sufficient] experience in war or in leading many gentlemen, knights, and

barons”.741 A third illuminating case comes from Florence’s change of captain in that

same year when it was determined that the current captain “was not used to or capable of

guiding such an army, as there were in the army more than 300 noblemen more grand and

more expert and more worthy than him”.742

Contemporaries were equally quick to condemn poor leadership or highlight the

consequences of the lack of a suitable captain.743 Not only did poor leadership represent a

personal failing on the part of the knight or arms bearer in question, but also could lead to

significant, potentially fatal problems for military campaigns.744 Bruni makes this clear

when he blames a lack of leadership for the many mistakes that occurred during the

White Guelf and Ghibelline attack on Florence in 1304, writing that in “military affairs

where there is no single commander, but only a number of different condottieri and

where a soldier does not follow a standard… there is only a motley mob unused to the

741
Villani, 736-737: “i Fiorentini elessono per loro capitano Cantuccio di messer Bino de’ Gabbriegli
d’Agobbio, la quale lezione fu fatta più per ispezialtì di setta, che ragionevole, a fare capitano uno scudiere
non uso di guerra a guidare tanti gentili uomini e cavalieri e baroni, onde male n’avenne, che se difetto fu
nella detta oste ne la capitaneria di messer Alamanno Obizzi, maggiore avenne per quella del detto
Cantuccio”.
742
Villani, 740: “e come uomo poco iscorto e uso a guidare sì fatta oste, che v’avea CCC gentili uomini più
grandi e più maestri e degni di lui”.
743
Bruni, The History of Florentine People, vol. 2, 27: Bruni claims that in their search for a competent
military leader, the Florentines looked to King Robert of Naples to send a suitable captain.
744
Villani laments on numerous occasions the lack of competent military leadership in Florence during the
fourteenth century- Villani, 486: the lack of leadership among the Florentines resulted in the decision not to
“try the fortune of battle” in 1312- “I Fiorentini non sentendosi di numero di cavalieri guari più che quegli
dello ’mperadore, e erano sanza capitano, non si vollono mettere a la ventura de la battaglia”. Also ibid,
418-419: Villani laments the lack of leadership or the cowardice of the Florentines who did not sally forth
to battle- “they would in no wise trust to the fortune of combat, alebit they had greatly the advantage, had
they but had a good captain, and been more united among themselves”; “Dell’uscire fuori i Fiorentini a
battaglia, o per viltà o per senno di guerra, o per non avere capo, in nulla guisa si vollono mettere a la
fortuna del combattere, che assai aveano il vantaggio, s’avessono avuto buono capitano, e tra lloro più uniti
che non erano”.
 256

command of a single individual”.745 Villani stresses the lack of clear leadership among

the Florentines who faced Uguccione della Faggiuola in 1315, contrasting the chaos of

the Florentine army with the order and discipline of their enemy.746 Similar chaos

plagued the Florentine army sent in 1323 to defend Prato from Castruccio Castracani,

with Villani writing that “there was discord in the Florentine army, and the Florentines

remained at Prato in disorder and with an incapable captain”.747

The most prominent and celebrated martial tenets were prowess and valor, which

if left uncontrolled, often resulted in bravado and recklessness on the part of strenuous

knights and arms bearers. In order to combat this potentially fatal combination,

contemporaries in chivalric and non-chivalric circles promoted the reformative virtues of

prudence and restraint. In addition, they expected knights who possessed all of these

chivalric virtues to serve as models and leaders. While all of these virtues were central to

chivalric identity, especially prowess and valor, and incredibly important during armed

combat on the field of battle, it is important to note that large-scale battles and cavalry

charges were not the most common element of medieval warfare, an honor held by raids

during which an enemy’s lands were pillaged and burned.

745
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 435-437.
746
Villani, 409: “The Florentines, with many captains and little order”; this is contrasted sharply with the
army of Uguiccione which “kept strict guard and wise generalship”- “I Fiorentini con molti capitani e con
poca ordine”; “Uguiccione e sua gente con tema grande, e per quella faceano grande guardia e savia
condotta”.
747
Villani, 566: “I Fiorentini rimasi in Prato con poca ordine e con difettuoso capitano”.
 257

Rapine, Pillage, and Burn: Chivalry and the Reality of Medieval Warfare

Warfare in late medieval Tuscany and Italy, as elsewhere in medieval Europe,

was the ideal stage for demonstrating prowess and bravery, winning honor and glory in

the process. In addition to honor, war also offered knights and arms bearers the chance to

secure material benefits, especially the spoils of war.748 Despite the inordinate focus on

battles and skirmishes in our sources, scholars like Aldo Settia, Michel Mallett, and

Maire Vigueur have argued that medieval warfare was dominated by raiding, pillaging,

and burning.749 Maire Vigueur argues that raiding (with the associated activities of

pillaging and burning), skirmishes (scaramucce), and brief incursions into enemy

territory were annual occurences.750 While our modern sensibilities lead to judgments

about the dishonorable nature of such conduct, pillaging and burning are such an

omnipresent aspect of medieval warfare that it would have been impossible for secular or

religious authorities to condemn them outright.751

A survey of contemporary and near-contemporary historical texts confirms that

these practices were commonplace in the Florentine context as well. In 1229, Florentine

748
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 161-188.
749
A.A. Settia, Rapine, assedi, battaglie, 3-76; Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters, 6-50, 181-206;
Maire Vigueur, Cavalieri e Cittadini, 21-108. Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 162: Kaeuper points out that
not only was “the common medieval military technique conducted day by day[ the] ravaging [of] an
enemy’s land”, but that men-at-arms also “burned villages and towns, ruined monasteries and churches,
broke bridges, sank or burned shipping, and destroyed stores of harvested crops or even those standing in
the fields by torching or trampling them; sometimes they destroyed vineyards by hacking vines at their
roots”.
750
Maire Vigueur, Cavalieri e cittadini, 70: “Cavalcate, scaramucce, colpi di mano, brevi incursioni in
territorio nemico si ripetono così ogni anno”.
751
Strickland, War and Chivalry, 325-326; Kaeuper, Medieval Warfare, 155. Giovanni Boccaccio, The
Fates of Illustrious Men, 126: Boccaccio offers one exceptions when he castigates his contemporaries “who
think it is virtuous to go out on some military expeditions only for the profit they will get from pillaging,
from sacking both holy places and unhallowed ones, from plundering anything that has been destroyed, and
all the while thinking they are above punishment”.
 258

knights cavalcaded in the Sienese contado, destroying the countryside as they rode

against the castle of Asciano.752 Over a century later in August 1336, the Florentine

captain of war, Messer Orlando de’ Rossi of Parma, pillaged and burned the contado of

Lucca.753 In June of 1337, the Florentines once again pillaged and burned the countryside

around Lucca.754 Likewise, Malispini describes Florentine armies cavalcading near

Perugia in 1230, where they pillaged and burned the countryside.755

The pursuit of profit (i.e. the spoils of war) is also highlighted in historical

accounts. It should be noted that going to war in order to secure profit was not in itself

antithetical to chivalry.756 Marchionne di Coppo Stefani records that in October 1336,

Messer Orlando de’ Rossi of Parma, a captain of the Florentine army, took great spoils

after cavalcading near Prato and Lucca.757 Villani records how after the Guelf victory at

the battle of Campaldino, the Florentines took Bibbiena, “plunder[ing] and despoil[ing] it

of all its wealth and much booty”.758 Likewise, after the Florentines burned the

752
“Pseudo-Brunetto Latini”, 50: “i Fiorentini cavalcarono popolo e chavalieri nelle terre di Sanesi, sopra il
castello d’Asciano, e tutto il contado di Siena da quella parte guastarono”.
753
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, 182: “messer Piero de’ Rossi da Parma… andando predando e guastando
il contado di Lucca infino in sul Prato ed in quel terreno stettono cinque dì, e con preda e con vittoria se ne
vennono”.
754
Marchionne di Coppe Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 184: “e tutto guastarono, e posto il campo al
Ceruglio scorsono lo contado di Lucca, e guastarono il biado e le vigne, ma niuna terra o castello presono,
perocchè non intesero i Lucchesi se non alla difesa, e bene avieno guarnito i loro castelli. E così guasto
ogni cosa, tornarono con preda, e vittoriosamente in Firenze a’ dì primo d’agosto 1337”.
755
Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, 251-252: “E poi andarono per Val d’Orcia infino a Radicofani,
e passarono le Chiane per guastare nel contado di Perugia”.
756
The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de Charny: Text, Context, and Translation, ed. Richard Kaeuper and
trans. Elspeth Kennedy (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996), 93-95: Charny lists “deeds
performed outside one’s locality for pay or other rewards” and “deeds undertaken from rewards” in his
hierarchy of honorable chivalric action.
757
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 182: “in Firenze Orlando de’ Rossi da Parma per
capitano di guerra, e a’ dì 25 di novembre del detto anno uscì fuori con 1200 uomini da cavallo e 5000
pedoni, e andonne a Lucca. E tra stare nel contado di Lucca e scorrere infino in sul Prato di Lucca ed ardere
con gran preda e con onore si tornarono in 20 dì in Firenze”.
758
Villani, 354: “e rubata e spogliata d’ogni sustanzia e di molta preda”.
 259

countryside around Arezzo “so that nothing was left within six miles”, they also spoiled

the lands of Count Guido Novello and destroyed the castle of Poppio.759 Meanwhile, after

the Florentine Guelf exiles defeated the Ghibellines of Modena in 1263, the Guelfs

spoiled their houses and goods, “furnish[ing] themselves with horses and with arms”.

They were similarly enriched after defeating the Ghibellines of Reggio.760 For obvious

reasons this tactic was a particularly popular and effective weapon in the arsenal of

exiles. In 1306, Florentine exiles rode through the contado of their native city, pillaging

and burning.761 Likewise, in 1238 Tuscan exiles, including those from Florence, took

refuge in castles and estates in the contado. Bruni writes that from these locations they

“spread war, slaughter, and plunder through[out] the countryside”.762

The cavalcade was also employed to force an army to come out of their castles

and fortified cities and defend their lands. By failing to do so, as we have seen above, the

defending force incurred great shame and dishonor. A few examples will suffice to

illustrate this reality. In 1253, an army from Florence marched against Pistoia, but when

the Pistoiese wouldn’t meet them in battle, the Florentines “laid waste to the land around

the city”.763 Later in 1267, the Florentines “laid waste with great ferocity” to the lands

around Siena in hopes of forcing them to give battle.764 Another related aspect of

cavalcading was the capture of prisoners. Indeed, the capture of noble and knightly

759
Villani, 360: “e guastarlo da capo: intorno intorno ad Arezzo VI miglia non vi rimase né vigna, né
albero, né biada”.
760
Villani, 189-190.
761
Marchionne di Coppe Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 97: “In quello tutti i Ghibellini ed i Bianchi usciti di
Firenze v’erano ridotti, e guastavano tutto il contado di Firenze”.
762
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 105.
763
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 115.
764
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 228-231.
 260

prisoners was not only a lucrative business, but also crucial to the solidity of chivalric

culture.765

Honorable Captivity: The Capture and Treatment of Prisoners

Chivalry did not make war a game for strenuous knights and arms bearers, let

alone for the majority of men who fought on medieval battlefields. It did, however,

encourage certain “honorable behaviors” that were intended to ameliorate the worst

horrors of war for the warrior elite. Foremost among them was the practice of taking

enemy knights and arms bearers captive and holding them honorably for ransom. This

practice required a practitioner of chivalry to show mercy, an act predicated on a mutual

recognition of each party’s honor or membership in a “brotherhood of arms”. Indeed, the

custom of capture and ransom not only helped develop a “brotherhood of arms” which

transcended political and even social boundaries, but it also provided strenuous knights

and arms bearers on both sides of a battle with a means of separating themselves from the

mass of commoners who were not accorded the same privileged treatment.

Furthermore, the practice of capture and ransom also promised certain material

benefits, most notably the windfall of a significant ransom, which could greatly

supplement the spoils of war.766 Vigueur argues that one of the primary reasons knights

765
A useful study of the treatment of noble prisoners is Jean Dunbabin, Captivity and Imprisonment in
Medieval Europe, 1000-1300 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002).
766
As we have seen above, the pursuit of profit during war is not antithetical to chivalry and honor. Indeed,
they are part and parcel: warriors expected not only the intangible social and political rewards of military
service (honor, prestige, political power), but also tangible economic benefits. See Kaeuper, Medieval
Chivalry, 17: “in most cases winning and carting off wagonloads of loot and a cohort of profit-yielding
prisoners seemed more important than merely playing the game whatever the outcome”; idem, Chivalry
 261

in the thirteenth century chose to organize themselves into societas and engage in raiding

was to provide a better chance of securing honorable prisoners from which to collect a

profitable ransom.767 Aldo Settia agrees, citing significant ransoms as a motivation for

engaging in incursions (scorreria) into enemy territory.768 Finally, this custom contained

an element of self-preservation, as those knights and arms bearers who enjoyed long

careers could expect, at one time or another, to be on both ends of this practice. As a

result, it behooved the captor to treat prisoners well, even if only to ensure that he

received the same treatment in return should he ever be taken prisoner.769

Despite the obvious social and economic benefits for the elite of capturing and

ransoming prisoners, the actual motivations behind the practice were quite complex,

especially in the closely-knit social world of late medieval Florence and Tuscany where

important families enjoyed marriage and business connections with their peers in other

cities, as well as in the countryside. As a result, it is not surprising that Villani identifies

the important role of friendship and ties of kinship in this custom. Particularly

illuminating are the events in 1289, when after the Florentines defeated the Aretines they

took almost 2000 prisoners “whereof many of the best were smuggled away, some for

friendship, some in return for ransom; but there came of them bound to Florence more

and Violence, 169-170, 178, 185; Matthew Strickland, War and Chivalry, 153-158, 183-203; A.A. Settia,
Rapine, assedi, battaglie, 5-6, 21-22, 30.
767
Vigueur, Cavalieri e cittadini, 161: “Scegliendo nel corso del Duecento di organizzarsi sul modello
della societas per promuovere spedizioni da cui si aspettano profitti economici sotto forma di cavalli, di
prigionieri e di bottino”.
768
A.A. Settia, Rapine, assedi, battaglie, 5; idem, Comuni in guerra, 86, 138: Settia aruges that one of the
most common forms of warfare were raids into enemy territory, called gualdana, that were motivated by
the desire to capture prisoners; these prisoners offered the greatest profit in the context of war.
769
Sidney Painter, French Chivalry: Chivalric Ideas and Practices in Mediaeval France (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1940; reprint, 1969), 7.
 262

than 740”.770 Also instructive is the release of the Florentine knight Rainaldo

Gianfigliazzi by the Visconti lords of Milan because of ties of friendship.771 No doubt

those warriors who freed their captives, whether out of friendship or after collecting a

ransom, fully expected to be shown the same courtesy and honorable treatment if the

roles were ever reversed.772

The nature of the traditional historical sources available to those interested in

studying the practice of capture and ransom in late medieval Florence and Italy means

that much of the relevant evidence is limited to terse statements detailing the number and,

on occasion, the quality of the prisoners taken. Specifics about the actual individuals or

how they were treated are often lacking. For example, the author of the “Pseudo-Brunetto

Latini” records that the Florentines took 1500 prisoners after victory of a Pisan army in

1222, while also writing that many prisoners, including noblewomen, were taken back to

Florence after victory over the Sienese in 1230.773 Likewise, Ricordano Malispini writes

tersely that after the Florentine victory outside Castel del Bosco (1223) “1300 of the best

citizens of Pisa were taken prisoner”.774 Further examples of a similarly limited nature

abound in the sources.775

770
Villani, 353-354: “presi più di MM, onde molti ne furono trabaldati pur de’ migliori, chi per amistà, chi
per ricomperarsi per danari; ma in Firenze ne vennero legati VIICXL”.
771
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, 177.
772
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 147: “Capturing and ransoming prisoners offered lucrative practices as
well as prudent practices for warriors who in a long career could expect to be both captors and prisoners. A
captor who treated his prisoner badly, as Sidney Painter pointed out many years ago, could expect the same
treatment when he fell into his opponent’s hands.”
773
“Pseudo Brunetto Latini”, 47, 50-51. Villani, 189: Villani puts the number of Pisan prisoners taken in
1222 at 1300.
774
Ricordano Malisipini, Storia Fiorentina, vol. 2, 249: “e molti ne furono morti e presi: ne vennono in
Firenze circa a 1300 de’ migliori di Pisa”.
775
Ricordano Malisipini, Storia Fiorentina, vol. 2, 252: 1200 Sienese prisoners were taken by the
Florentines- “menaronne presi in Firenze circa a 1200 uomini”; Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca
 263

On occasion, however, the historical accounts contain more information about

both the captors and the captives, which lends weight to the idea that this practice was

limited to the elite. For example, Marchionne di Coppo Stefani notes that in January of

1252, many noble Ghibellines were taken prisoner when the castle of Monte di Valdarno

was captured by the Guelfs of Florence and Tuscany.776 He also writes that at the battle

of Montecatini, every Florentine noble house had someone who had been either killed or

taken prisoner.777 The author of the Cronichetta d’Incerto meanwhile indicates that

during the War of the Eight Saints (1375-1378), a Florentine army captured 200 knights

of the golden spur (cavalieri a spron d’oro) and eighty noblemen after defeating the

pope’s army at Viterbo in 1377.778 The same work also notes the capture of messer Rosso

de’ Ricci, captain of the Florentine troops in Lombardia, by the Milanese.779 Villani

provides significant detail in his description of the aftermath of the battle of Altopascio

(1326), writing that among the prisoners were “Messer Ramondo di Cardona, the captain-

general of the Florentine army, and his son, as well as many French barons and forty of

the best of the Florentine grandi and popolani, and fifty other foreigners of renown from

Fiorentina, 89: Florentine exiles, Ghibellines and White Guelfs, were taken prisoner after they were
defeated fighting alongside the Bolognese in the Mugello; ibid, 143: Many Florentines were taken prisoner
after their army was defeated by Azzo Visconti in 1325; Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol.
1, 115: Bruni writes that when a Pisan army fled defeat on the banks of the river Era, the Florentine army
took upwards of 3,000 men prisoner; ibid, vol. 1, 253: Bruni describes how the Florentine Guelfs were
“able to take a few prisoners despite the great slaughter they had caused among the enemy”.
776
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 40: “prigioni vi furono di nobili ghibellini”.
777
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 117-118: “d’ogni casa di Firenze quasi di nome vi
rimasono morti e presi e degli altri paesi amici de’ Fiorentini. Furonne morti in tutto del lato de’ Fiorentini
circa 1900 e presi 1400, ed il prenze si fuggì”.
778
“Cronichetta d’Incerto”, 287.
779
“Cronichetta d’Incerto”, 272.
 264

other lands in Tuscany”.780 Leonardo Bruni also provides the example of the aftermath of

a battle near Pulicciano when “many exiles were captured, among them Donato Alberti

and Nanni Ruffoli, and men from other distinguished families”.781

On rare occasions the sources offer more details about the prisoners and even

their treatment during captivity. Perhaps the most illuminating case is Castruccio

Castracani’s treatment of his Florentine prisoners after his victory at Altopascio, whom

he treated honorably, even throwing a feast for them.782 Captured at the same battle was

Messer Piero di Narsi of France, who was later ransomed by the Florentine government

for 1,000 gold florins.783 Later when Castruccio took Montecatini (1315) the Florentine

knight M. Amerigo Donati was among those taken prisoner and held until ransomed by

the commune of Florence.784 Likewise when Messer Rosso de’ Ricci, captain of the

Florentine forces in the war against the Visconti, was captured in 1370, he was also

ransomed for the not inconsiderable sum of 3,000 gold florins.785 Donato Velluti provides

the example of his ancestor, Mico del Velluto (sic.) “a wise and valorous man”, who was

captured at the battle of Montaperti (1260) and later ransomed for a large sum.786 Finally,

780
Villani, 606-607: “morti e presi ne furono in tutto intorno di… intra’ quali fue messer Ramondo di
Cardona capitano dell’oste, e ’l figliuolo, e più baroni franceschi, che alquanto ressono la battaglia; ebbevi
da XL de’ migliori di Firenze grandi e popolani a cavallo, e da L oltramontani buona gente e di rinnomo, la
maggior parte cavalieri, e da XX uomini di rinnomo d’altre terre di Toscana”. For further examples, see
Villani, 180, 231-232, 626.
781
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 145.
782
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 145.
783
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 147: “messer Piero di Narsi di Francia ed un suo
figliuolo con bella compagnia, alle sue spese volle essere alla battaglia. Di che Castruccio sconfisse i
Fiorentini all’Altopascio, ove il detto messer Piero fu preso ed il figliuolo morto; ed egli si ricomperò
fiorini 1000 d’oro”; Villani, 621.
784
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 163: “per messer Amerigo Donati furon presi e
menati”.
785
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 274.
786
Donato Velluti, Cronica Fiorentina, 27: “Mico fu uno savio e valoroso uomo”.
 265

the Cronichetta d’Incerto informs us that when the Florentines captured Giovanni d’Azzo

degli Ubaldini and one of his sons, Meo, they released both after the latter surrendered a

castle to the commune as ransom.787

Despite the multitude of examples provided above and the prevalence of this

practice in imaginative literature, if we look at the evidence as a whole, it seems clear that

this practice was followed too inconsistently and opportunistically to be considered a law

of war followed by all chivalric warriors.788 Sometimes it proved impractical to stop a

battle and take one’s enemy into captivity.789 Compagni provides one such situation in

which the Black Guelfs of Florence captured the castle at Pian di Scio in the Valdarno

(1302). During the battle, “they killed some of the men inside, but let the rest be

ransomed, including Alberto, a son of messer Donato di messer Alberto Ristori”.790 This

mix of death and honorable captivity was not uncommon, especially when the enemy was

routed and in flight, and most likely corresponded to the particular circumstances of the

battle.

In other cases, the failure to take enemy knights and arms bearers into honorable

captivity was explained away as a consequence of the low social status or of the

dishonorable nature of the offending warriors. For example, Dino Compagni records an

incident in which the mercenary and rural troops fighting in a Florentine army in 1289
787
“Cronichetta d’Incerto”, 275.
788
Taylor, Chivalry and the Ideals of Knighthood in Medieval France: Taylor argues that in late medieval
France that basic rules about ransom of prisoners remained flexible and negotiable. In fact, the rules put
forth by Christine de Pisan and Honore de Bouvet should not be read as “straightforward expositions of the
law of arms”.
789
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 17: “Losing could be fatal (even if capture of live enemies worth
ransoming remained a goal); hand to hand fighting with edged weaponry amid flights of bolts and arrows
did indeed produce casualties, even among those well cased in armor; and defeat easily became rout, a
disaster in which the death toll climbed steeply off the scale of any game board.”
790
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 55.
 266

“showed no mercy, slaughtering the routed Aretines”. In contrast, “others”, ostensibly the

Florentine chivalric elite, “captured banners from their enemies and took many

prisoners”.791 Again proponents and would-be reformers of chivalry undoubtedly

promoted the idea that the practitioners of chivalry should recognize the honor of their

opponents, honor which made them worthy of mercy, and thus take them into honorable

captivity. Reality, of course, did not always live up to the ideals of imaginative literature

and other reform works.

Even more striking is the inconsistent treatment of Florentine exiles who often

were not accorded the honor of captivity and ransom, despite their social standing. This is

most likely because they were not treated as prisoners of war by the government of their

native city, but rather as rebels and criminals. This is particularly true for those exiles

who were taken prisoner during the many battles between the completing political

factions which plauged Florence from the mid-thirteenth century. Villani discusses a

particularly telling incident, when the White Guelf and Ghibelline exiles of Florence

were taken prisoner after the failed attempt to reclaim Florence in 1304. He writes that

these men were “hanged in the piazza of San Gallo and along the road, on the trees”.792

Compagni comments on the same incident, noting that after Baschiera della Tosa failed

in his attack on Florence, many exiles, as well as their Bolognese and Aretine allies, were

captured and hung by the Black Guelfs.793 Meanwhile in 1302, Messer Donato Alberti

Ristori, a White Guelf exile of Florence, was captured and executed by Florentine

791
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 12.
792
Villani, 433: “e certi presi furono impiccati nella piazza di San Gallo, e per la via in su gli alberi”.
793
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 74.
 267

authorities.794 The same practice continued into the second-half of the fourteenth century

when, in 1360, fourteen Florentine exiles and the Count of Monte Carelli were captured

and executed by the government of Florence.795

War offered many opportunities to settle scores or secure vengeance. The decision

to kill an enemy warrior no doubt was influenced by this consideration. Even after being

taken prisoner, a knight or arms bearer might be the target of honor-violence. As a result,

it was not unheard of for prisoners to be executed, murdered, or mistreated. For example,

Villani writes that the Florentine Guelf knights made “great slaughter of their enemies

[during a skirmish at the foot of the Colle di Valdelsa in 1269] to avenge their kinsfolk

and friends which were slain at the defeat of Montaperti; and none, or scarce any, did

they lead to prisoner, but put them all to death and to the sword”.796 In another case

described by Villani, the Florentine knight Messer Cece de’ Bondelmonti was captured

and held honorably by Farinata degli Uberti, only to be killed by Farinata’s brother,

Messer Piero Asino, shortly thereafter, ostensibly in an act of honor violence related to

the Bondelmonti-Uberti feud that dominated Florentine politics in the middle of the

thirteenth century.797

794
Gli Annali di Simone della Tosa, 223: “1302. Del mese di marzo cavalcaro i Fiorentini a Pulciano in
Mugello, che v’erano certi de’ Bianchi raunati per fare guerra, e fu preso messer Donato Alberti Ristori, e
fugli mozzo il capo”.
795
“Cronichetta d’Incerto”, 251: “Anni 1360. Del mese d’agosto i Fiorentini mandarono l’oste al conte da
Monte Carelli; adì 9 di settembre ebbono Monte Carelli, e Monte Vivagno per battaglia, e fu preso il conte,
e 14 sbanditi furono menati a Firenze: al conte fu tagliato la testa, e gli altri impiccati”.
796
Villani, 283-284: “faccendo grande uccisione de’ nimici per vendetta di loro parenti e amici che
rimasono alla sconfitta a Monte Aperti; quasi nullo o pochi ne menarono a pregioni, ma gli misono a morte
e alle spade”.
797
Villani, 246: “Messer Piero Asino degli Uberti gli diede d’una mazza di ferro in testa, e in groppa del
fratello l’uccise”.
 268

Villani also tells us that after the bishop of Liege had been taken prisoner by the

forces of King Robert during a battle in the streets of Rome (1312), he was killed in an

act of honor violence. Villani describes how “while a knight was bringing [the bishop of

Liege] behind him disarmed on his horse to Messer John, brother of King Robert, a

Catalan, whose brother had been slain… thrust at him in the back with his sword;

wherefore, when he came to the castle of Sant’Angelo, in a short time he died”.798

Finally, Leonardo Bruni writes that those Guelf exiles who were captured by the

Florentine Ghibellines and their German mercenaries during a battle near Lucca in 1262

suffered “acts of cruelty” in the hands of their captors.799

When Messer Giambertaldo, King Charles’ captain in Florence, defeated the

Sienese in 1267, he took Messer Provenzano Salvani prisoner. Provenzano had been the

captain of the Sienese army, including Ghibelline exiles from Florence, who had defeated

the Florentines at Montaperti in 1260. In an act of vengeance, Giambertaldo “cut off

[Provenzano’s] head and carried it around on the tip of a lance”.800 Villani mentions a

similarly striking incident during which Castruccio Castracani executed the Florentine

captain of war, Messer Piero di Narsi, in 1326, because when Castruccio had allowed

Piero di Narsi to be ransomed at the battle of Altopascio in 1325, the latter had sworn an

798
Villani, 484: “e menandolo uno cavaliere in groppa di suo cavallo disarmato a messer Gianni fratello de
re Ruberto, uno Catalano a cui era stato morto il fratello in quella caccia il fedì dietro a le reni d’uno stocco,
one giugnendo a Castello Santangiolo, poco stette morì”.
799
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 187.
800
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 54: “e fece tagliare la testa a Provenzano Salvani, e
fu portata in su una lancia per tutta l’oste”. See also Villani, 283: Villani claims that Provenzano’s head
was paraded around the Florentine camp- “e tagliatogli il capo, e per tutto il campo portato fitto in su una
lancia”.
 269

oath to never again fight against the Ghibelline lord. As a result of violating his sworn

oath, he was executed in an act of vengeance.801

Finally, executing or holding prisoners indefinitely could also be a matter of

political expediency. After his victory over King Manfred at the battle of Benevento

(1266), Charles sent Count Giordano, Manfred’s commander, and the Florentine knight,

Messer Piero degli Uberti, to Provence, where they died after many years in prison.802

Villani alleges that in 1270 several members of the Florentine noble family of the Uberti

were taken prisoner and executed by the order of King Charles because of the threat they

posed to Florence.803 Political expediency might also explain the alleged cruelty of

Emperor Frederick II, who supposedly “put out the eyes of the Guelf prisoners who came

to him at Fuccecchio” in 1248 and then “drowned them in the sea”.804

Of course, such practices did not meet with unanimous approval among

contemporaries, especially when noble or knightly captives had been captured during

battle. Very illuminating is the reaction of the Pope and his cardinals, “as well as all wise

men”, to Charles’ decision following the battle of Tagliacozzo (1268) to execute

Conradino and many of his nobles, including the Duke of Austria, for “as much as he had

taken Conradino and his followers by chance of battle, and not by treachery… it would

801
Villani, 626: “Castruccio… venne in Pistoia e fece tagliare la testa al detto messere Piero, opponendogli
come gli avea giurato, quando si ricomperò di sua pregione, di non essergli incontro”. See also Marchionne
di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 148: “messer Piero, e preso e menato in Pistoia, e quivi’ Castruccio
gli fece tagliare la testa”.
802
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 207. See also Villani, 215.
803
Villani, 285.
804
Villani, 212: “a tutti quegli delle gran case nobili di Firenze fece trarre gli occhi, e poi mazzerare in
mare”.
 270

have been better to keep him prisoner than to put him to death”.805 Even more striking is

the fact that Charles’ son-in-law, Robert, the heir to the county of Flanders, struck with

his sword the judge who issued the death sentence, calling him unworthy to condemn

such noble men, and left the Angevin court in protest. Villani records that not only did

Robert do this in the presence of the king, but that “it seemed to the king and to all the

barons that he had acted like a worthy lord”.806 This incident suggests that many

contemporaries assumed that honorable treatment would and should be forthcoming

when an enemy knight or arms bearer was captured during battle. To deviate from this

was to risk dishonor and shame.

Indeed, unlike the decision of whether to kill or take prisoner an enemy warrior,

which was often dictated by the circumstances of battle, once the choice had been made

to take a knight or arms bearer into captivity, honorable treatment was expected.807 When

such treatment was not forthcoming, as we saw above with the execution of Conradino

and the duke of Austria, the perpetrators were often criticized. Dino Compagni writes that

after Messer Donato Alberti and a number of others were captured by the Florentines, the

podestà of Florence “worked it so he was allowed to cut off Messer Donato’s head. He

did this because war was good for him and peace harmful; and he did this with all of the

captives. This was not a just decision”.808 A similar concern likely prompted Villani to

805
Villani, 281: “però ch’egli avea preso Curradino e’ suoi per caso di battaglia, e non per tradimento, e
meglio era a tenerlo pregione che farlo morire”. See also Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol.
1, 251.
806
Villani, 242: “e parve al re e a tutti i baroni ch’egli avesse fatto come valente signore”.
807
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 17: Kaeuper offers a different perspective on the issue, arguing that “a
change toward more humane treatment of prisoners need not be thought a universal or permanent feature of
all warfare throughout the later phases of chivalric development”.
808
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 58.
 271

criticize Castruccio for poorly treating Messer Ramondo di Cardona, the Florentine

captian of war, before his ransom.809

Despite these inconsistencies, the influence of chivalric ideology in this context

remains powerful. Chivalry was an imminently practical and flexible ideology, which

encouraged the warrior elite to see such treatment as a source of honor and a means of

separating themselves from other warriors. This, in conjunction with the obvious element

of self-preservation inherent in such practices, meant that the benefits, both material and

intangible, of taking a fellow knight or arms bearer prisoner were always prominent in

the minds of the chivalric elite.

Chivalrous Conduct? The uses of Ruses and Strategems in war

Even when we successfully discard romanticized notions that chivalric ideology

encouraged knights and arms bearers to see war as a game, we must still confront the idea

that any conduct considered unfair by our modern standards must be ipso facto

unchivalric. Richard Kaeuper has argued persuasively that a victorious campaign often

necessitated an army using ruses and trickery, including ambush, deception, and

nighttime (i.e. surprise) assaults.810 The validity of utilizing such measures was generally

not challenged by either secular or religious authorities as unfair or in violation of laws of

809
Villani, 615: “dietro al carro i migliori pregioni di Firenze, e messer Ramondo con torchietti accesi in
mano ad offerere a sa Martino. E poi a tutti diede desinare, che furono da cinquanta de’ maggiorenti, e le
’nsegne reali del Comune di Firenze a ritroso in su il detto carro: e poi gli fece rimettere in pregione,
gravandoli d’incomportabili taglie, faccendo loro fare tormenti e grandi misagi sanza niuna umanità; e
alquanti de’ più ricchi per fuggire i tormenti si ricomperarono grande somma di moneta”.
810
Even the concept of fairness could be used as a strategem: Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 145: “When
warriors self-consciously invoked fairness in fighting they might be employing a tactic of their own to
throw an enemy off balance or gain an advantage.”
 272

war. More importantly, “all of these actions were carried out with minimal worry whether

they were truly chivalric”.811 The only stipulation seems to be that a knight or arms bearer

does not break his sworn word, although even when this happened biting criticism or

explicit condemnation was not always forthcoming in traditional historical sources.812

Indeed, authors of both imaginative literature and more traditional historical

sources offer praise when knights and arms bearers demonstrate wisdom alongside their

prowess.813 While wisdom included knowing when to use means other than brute force to

accomplish military goals, imaginative literature undoubtedly prioritized the

demonstration of prowess and valor in individual combat. In fact, knights are praised

more often for recognizing and avoiding ambushes, ruses, and other attempts at trickery,

than for their use. Illuminating is the advice given by the wise old knight Ascalion to

Florio, the hero of Boccaccio’s Il Filocolo, who says “beware of hidden tricks: your eyes

and your good sense should constantly be in control”.814 Not surprisingly, Prodesagio, the

eponomyous hero of La legenda e storia di Prodesagio is praised for foreseeing the

trickery of Andrea de Morganza that results in his father’s murder.815 King Richard the

811
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 146: “Flexibility in concepts and an undoubted desire to win seem better
explanations for all such military ruses than any moral weakness or violations to be charged against them
on the basis of an absolute and universally-agreed code.”
812
For example, when The Pistoiese surrendered Serravalle to King Charles of Naples and his Florentine
and Lucchese allies, Compagni simply tells us that these terms were not kept and the Pistoiese were taken
captive: Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 54-55.
813
Kaeuper, Medieval Chivalry, 145: Kaeuper argues that the chivalric ideal involved knights using both
cunning and prowess.
814
Giovanni Boccaccio, Il Filocolo, book 2, chapter 45, 102.
815
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 6: “Padre mio, se voi farete al mio senno bene ve ne’
ncoglierà: che voi andiate con diecimila cavalieri, ch’i’ ò ’nteso che nella corte dello imperadore àe molti
traditori ed èvi spenta tutta la buona gente, e llo ’mperadore medesimo è traditore e vuolvi mortale male.
Ond’io vi priego che voi dobiate andare con diecimila cavalieri tutti armati di buone armi”.
 273

Lionheart is similarly praised in Il Novellino for his wisdom and prudence, by which he

avoided being captured through a ruse.816

For Florentine authors like Bruni, Villani, Compagni, and others, wisdom often

meant knowing when to employ traditional brute force and when to resort to more subtle

or creative means of defeating an enemy.817 Indeed, the very best practioners of the

profession of arms demonstrated both. Villani praises this ideal combination in the efforts

of the Florentines who captured of the castle of Mortenana in the contado of Siena

“through strength and ingenuity” in 1255.818 Ricordano Malispini meanwhile records an

incident in which the Florentine Ghibellines and their German allies were defeated by the

Guelf exiles of Florence in the outskirts of Figline when the latter launched a surprise

attack at night.819

Another use of stratagems is demonstrated by Conradin, the eldest son of former

Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen who descended into Italy in order to retake his

kingdom from Charles. The Ghibelline exiles of Florence helped him set up an ambush

outside Arezzo. The ambush successfully trapped the king’s Angevin knights, leading to

their defeat.820 A similar success was achieved by the Ghibelline exiles of Florence and

816
Il Novellino, novella LXXVI, 139-140.
817
Compagni goes so far as to advocate a nighttime surprise attack by Baschiera della Tosa and the White
Guelfs in 1303- Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 73.
818
Villani, 164: “sì ebbono il castello di Poggibonizzi a patti, e poi il castello di Mortenana degli
Isquarcialupi ebbono per forza e per ingegno”.
819
Ricordano Malispini, Storia Fiorentina, vol. 2, 316: Malispini writes that many Ghibellines were killed
or taken prisoner- “E subitamente assalendo la detta gente per la notte, che era senza nulla difensione, i
ghibellini furono sconfitti, e gran parte morti e presi per le case: e la mattina vegnente si levò l’oste da
Ostina con vergogna, e tornò in Firenze”; Villani, 213.
820
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 245: Bruni writes that the royal knights were trapped
in a place “ill-suited for the display of courage”.
 274

their Aretine allies in 1286, when they set a successful ambush for the Sienese Guelfs.821

Perhaps even more striking is the successful ruse carried out by Messer Uberto

Spiovanato de’ Pazzi of the Valdarno in 1266, when he forced the Ghibellines to retreat

“in disorder and haste” because they believed that the bishop of Arezzo was on his way

with 800 French knights to provide succor.822 This was accomplished by circulating

among the Ghibellines a fabricated letter promising the aforementioned aid and because

of his success Villani praised Messer Uberto for his “judgment and warrior guile”.823

The nearly ubiquituous praise in our historical accounts of Castruccio Castracani

(as discussed above), a determined and dangerous enemy of Florence during the first-

quarter of the fourteenth century, is instructive because Castruccio employed many

stratagems and ruses during his career. Castruccio used such measures not just to ensure

victory, but also the safety of his army, allowing him to fight another day. For example,

in 1323, Castruccio sent the Florentines a formal challenge to do battle, but snuck away

that same night with his army. The Florentines had employed a similar stratagem against

him a few years earlier in 1321.824 Castruccio’s brilliantly-conducted siege of Pistoia in

1328, successful despite the presence of a large Florentine relief force at his back, was

821
Villani, 346.
822
Villani, 265-266: “fece fare una lettera, dicendo come francamente si dovesse tenere, imperciò che di
presente avrebbono soccorso di VIIIC cavalieri franceschi del re Carlo… In contanente presono partito di
levarsi da oste, e per la fretta si partiro a modo di sconfitta, co lloro danno e vergogna tornaro in Firenze”.
823
Villani, 265: “il senno e sagacità di guerra”.
824
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, 132: “Castruccio mandò il guanto della battaglia, e la notte si fuggì da
campo”. For the Florentine stratagem in 1321, see Villani, 528: “La notte vegnente, dì VIII di giugno,
accesono molti fuochi e faccelline, faccendo sembiante d’assalire i nemici, e per questo modo lasciando i
falò e luminare nel campo accesi, si levarono da campo salvamente con tutta sua oste, e si ridusse in
Fucecchio e a Carmignano e a l’altre castella; e vennegli bene, che una grande acqua da cielo venne la
notte, per che Castruccio non sentì la partita, e fu gabbato”. This tactic was later made famous by Sir John
Hawkwood (Giovanni d’Acuto) in his famous escape from certain defeat in Lombardia during the
Florentine war with the Visconti of Milan: see Caferro, John Hawkwood, 303-305.
 275

accomplished at least partly because he successfully tricked the captain of that force,

Prince Philip of Taranto, into thinking that he was going to attack, all the while buying

time to fortify his camp. When the Florentines finally discovered the ruse, their ill-

conceived attack on Castruccio’s newly-reinforced position failed miserably.825

The general acceptance of such measures within both chivalric and non-chivalric

circles in late medeval Italy is confirmed by the praise of other exemplars who also used

ruses and stratagems. Important examples include King Charles of Naples (r.1266-1285),

Uguccione della Faggiuòla (active ca.1292-1319), and Guido di Montefeltro (active

ca.1268-1298). Charles, as we have seen, was widely recognized as a master of war and a

great knight, but he also used stratagems and ruses throughout his reign to achieve

military goals. In this Charles benefited from the guidance of Messer Alardo di Valleri

(d.1277), a French knight “of great wisdom and prowess”, who famously instructed the

King to “use stratagems of war rather than force” to defeat Conradino Hohenstaufen in

1268.826 Following Alardo’s advice, Charles sent a force dressed in royal attire to confuse

the enemy into thinking the king was with them, thus diverting their attention away from

his main force.827 Even before the arrival of Messer Alardo, however, Charles had

successfully employed such measures, as Bruni reveals when he records King Charles’

capture of the castle of Mutrone “through ruse rather than by force” in 1267-1268.828

Uguccione della Faggiuola, at the battle of Montecatini (1315), combined the

traditionally and non-traditionally chivalric when he issued the Florentine army a formal
825
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 2, 139.
826
Charles would go on to defeat Conradino at the battle of Tagliacozzo: Bruni, The History of the
Florentine People, vol. 1, 249.
827
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 249.
828
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 235.
 276

challenge to do battle, which was accepted. The night before the engagement, however,

the Ghibelline lord pretended to flee, a stratagem with the goal of drawing the Florentine

army, led by Philip I, Prince of Taranto (d.1331), into a trap. Indeed, Uguiccione’s army

had not fled in disorder, but had maintained its ranks and was ready to attack when Philip

and the Florentines followed without order, resulting in a decisive victory for the

Ghibelline commander.829 Earlier, in 1310, Uguccione had attempted to use the element

of surprise to his advantage when he led an army of Florentine and Aretine exiles in an

ill-fated attack on a Florentine army. Villani writes that Uguccione and the exiles

believed they had surprise on their side so “they tried to assault the[ Florentines] with the

feritore, or front line of knights, the which was broken and defeated”.830

Treachery

In addition to the abovementioned ruses and strategems, late medieval Florentines

and Italians seemed to have engaged in a certain amount of “treachery”, that is, securing

an objective through means of bribery and turncoattery. The prevalence of these practices

is striking, but their reception among contemporaries is often mixed. No doubt the

prevalence of treachery goes some way to explaining the desire of a revisionist historian

like Leonardo Bruni to move his narrative away from such conduct, writing, as he did,

that it was “not the custom of the Florentine people to kill their adversaires with poison,

but openly, with arms, making war when necessary”, approaching war, which was

829
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 117-118.
830
Villani, 467: “Gli Aretini, popolo e cavalieri, e usciti di Firenze, con Uguiccione da Faggiuola loro
capitano sotto Cortona si pararono loro dinanzi credendogli avere sorpresi, gli assaliro per loro feditori, i
quali dal detto maliscalco e Fiorentini furono rotti”.
 277

approached with “a noble boldness and high spirits”.831 Despite being condemned in

Bruni’s History of the Florentine People, knights like Geoffroi de Charny, who was

widely recognized as a paragon of chivalry in late medieval Europe, did not shy from

employing bribery and other means to secure military objectives.832

Despite criticism and condemnation from some circles, there is plentiful evidence

of the use of treachery. For example, Compagni laments the treachery of “certain traitors

who took money from their enemies” in exchange for speaking against the desire of the

White Guelf exiles to give battle in 1302, a battle the author was certain they would have

won.833 In that same year, Carlino de’ Pazzi of the Valdarno secretly sold his castle to the

Black Guelfs of Florence, betraying the White Guelfs and Ghibellines who had taken

refuge therein. According to both Villani and Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, many of the

exiles were captured or killed.834 A few decades later in 1323 the exiles and their allies

among the rural nobility returned the favor when the Pazzi and Ubertini entered the castle

of Trappola through treachery, killing many members of the Guelf garrison, some even

while they lay in their beds.835 Castruccio likewise took Montecatini through treachery836

831
Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 3, 97, 103. Contrast this view with that of Mallett
(Mercenaries and their Masters, 203-204) who argues that the use of poison was quite common.
832
For Charny’s attempt to win control of Calais through bribery, see The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de
Charny, 10-11.
833
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 59.
834
Villani, 407-408: Villani writes “as a result of treachery, many of the best exiles of Florence were
captured or killed”- “A la fine per tradimento del sopradetto Carlino di fuori, fece a’ suoi fedeli dare
l’entrata del castello, onde molti vi furono morti e presi, pure de’ migliori usciti di Firenze”; Marchionne di
Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 87: “Esso fece di notte a’ suoi fedeli aprire le porte alla gente del
Comune di Firenze, ed a patti entrarono dentro e uccisono e presono dimolti buoni Bianchi”.
835
Villani, 571: “e quanti Guelfi vi trovarono in su le letta gli uccisono”; Marchionne di Coppo Stefani,
Cronaca Fiorentina, 134: “Li Pazzi e gli Ubertini di Valdarno intrarono di furto e per alcuno tradimento
nel castello della Trappola, e quanti Guelfi vi trovarono ne uccisero nelle letta, perocchè in sulla mezza
notte v’entrarono”.
836
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 163.
 278

and attempted to secure the city of Pisa in October 1323 in the same way after hatching a

conspiracy with two Florentine exiles who were residing in that city.837

While the authors of our traditional historical sources usually do not make explicit

their feelings about the use of treachery, the general tone of their commentary conveys

the sense that they felt a measure of regret and outrage. Instructive in this regard are the

observations of the Florentine Franco Sacchetti, who lamented in his Trecentonovelle

(composed in the last decades of the fourteenth century) “it doth truly appear that

nowadays there is no hesitation, especially in soldiers, in doing, either by means of

treachery or deception or any other way, all the evil they possibly can”.838 It is clear that

Sacchetti, like many authors of imaginative chivalric literature, pined for a return to a

“golden age” in which soldiers, strenuous knights and arms bearers foremost among

them, conducted themselves honorably. For Sacchetti, like Bruni, such honorable action

was worthy of study and emulation. Indeed, Sacchetti writes that “great are their

[warriors’] deeds, and when they deal not with deception or treachery they are worthy of

being heard and likewise of being understood, that they may be made use of when

occasion requireth”.839

The writers of imaginative literature, however, leave no doubt that treachery was

not only dishonorable conduct, but a source of shame that could stain the reputation of an

837
Villani, 573.
838
Franco Sacchetti, Trecentonovelle, novelle CCXXIV, 688: “Ben pare che oggi niuna coscienza si faccia,
e spezialmente nella maestria dell’arme, di fare, e con tradimenti e con inganni e con ogni modo, quello
male che si puote”; English translations of many of the novelle can be found in Mary G. Steegmann, trans.,
Tales from Sacchetti (London: J.M. Dent & Co., 1908), 291.
839
Franco Sacchetti, Trecentonovelle, novelle CCXXIV, 688: “Molto sono strani gli avvisi degli uomeni
dell’arme, e grandi sono le industrie, e dove non giucassono l’ingani o’ tradimenti, care sono a udirle, e
ancora a comprenderle, per poterle usare quando il caso avvenisse”; Tales from Sacchetti, 291.
 279

entire family for generations. The treatment of the Morganza family in La Legenda e

Storia di Messere Prodesagio is particularly instructive. As we have seen in previous

chapters, Andrea di Morganza (Maganza) treacherously killed the father of the work’s

protagonist, Prodesagio. This dishonorable conduct is utterly condemned and Prodesagio

spends the next twenty years (i.e. the rest of the text) attempting to secure vengeance

against Andrea. More importantly, the author connects Andrea’s conduct to his family’s

repuation for treachery which dates back to the time of Charlemagne.840 Indeed, the black

stain of treachery utterly sullied the family’s reputation and negated every other positive

quality associated with the family: “the house of Maganza, who were great and noble

barons, and whose members were all the strongest and bravest men-at-arms, if only they

did not have the evil defect that they were all traitors”.841

Treachery is often conceptualized in works of imaginative literature not only as

incompatible with chivalry, but often a threat to its very survival. This seems to have

been the point made by various authors of the story of Tristan’s death, who as the flower

of chivalry, could only be killed through treachery.842 Indeed, in La Tavola Ritonda,

Tristan seems to be the very embodiment of chivalry in the minds of his fellow Knights

of the Round Table. For example, Lancelot refers to Tristan as the “fountain of prowess”

840
In fact, the anonymous author of this work informs us that Andrea’s uncle was Ganellone (Ganelon) di
Maganza who famously betrayed Roland- La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 8: “il quale Andrea
fu nipote di Ganellone di Maganza, che a Orlando fece la tradigione”.
841
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, 3: “quelli della casa di Maganza, i quali erano una grande e
nobile baronia di gente, ed erano tutti la magiore parte fortie e arditi uomini dell’arme, se none ch’elli
avevano la maladetta magagna ch’egli erano tutti traditori”.
842
For one version of this story, see Rustichello da Pisa, Il Romanzo Arturiano, 358, chapter 222 (lines 2-
4).
 280

and “the honor and champion of all [the world’s] chivalry”.843 His death through

treacherous means foreshadowed, in many ways, the demise of chivalry, embodied by the

Knights of the Round Table, which followed in this and other works.

Also useful is Achille’s dishonorable treatment of Hector’s body in Historia

Destructionis Troiae. A fellow Greek, King Memnon, associates Achilles’s actions with

treachery, which is incongruous with chivalry. King Memnon condemns Achilles saying

“o wretched traitor, by what cruelty were you provoked so that you tied such a very

noble, such a valiant son of a most noble king to the tail of your horse and did not shrink

from dragging him along the ground as if he were of the lowest rank? Because of this you

will not be able to withdraw further without losing your life”.844 A similar association

between dishonorable conduct and treachery, and thus incongruity with chivalry, is made

in the Tristano Panciatichiano when King Arthur castigates Agravain for his ill counsel

to kill Lancelot, which if Arthur had followed it, would have resulted in “great villainy

and great treachery and the entire world would have called him traitor because he had

killed such a gentleman and put to death one of the best knights in the world”.845

Works of imaginative literature often treat treachery like a cancer, the spread of

which can only be stopped with the edge of a sword employed skillfully in pursuit of

honorable vengeance. Perhaps the most powerful example is that of Prodesagio who

spent two decades pursuing vengeance against Andrea de Morganza not only for the

murder of his father, but also to end the tradition of treachery that runs in the Morganza
843
La Tavola Ritonda, 326.
844
Guido delle Colonne, Historia Destructionis Troiae, 197 (lines 302-306).
845
Tristano Panciatichiano, 362, 363: “io l’averei fatto uccidere et are’ fatto grande villania e grande
dislealtade sie che tutto ’l mondo m’averebbe chiamato traditore ad avere morto uno così produomo come
elli è e avere fatto ucidere uno delli migliori [cavalieri] del mondo con tutte bontadi e cortesie”.
 281

family.846 In one incident in La Tavola Ritonda, King Meliadus puts this attitude into

practice when he cut off the heads of two knights who had earlier in the story spread

treacherous lies about the death of the queen and the king’s fate in an attempt to increase

their own power. The author aptly sums up the chivalric attitude toward treachery,

writing: “Thus the king rewarded [with death] the two treacherous knights for their

treachery”.847 In the Tristano Panciatichiano meanwhile, treachery is the province of

peasants who cannot win through the honorable exercise of arms.848 Indeed, the reality of

warfare in late medieval Europe does not always accord with the chivalric ideal, which

sought the best possible circumstances for showing individual prowess and valor.

Petrarch’s Africa nicely sums up this ideal when the author explicitly promotes warfare

without treachery: “Let honest arms / be marshaled in array; in open field / let battle join.

And if a mother’s love / deceive me, then shall you look upon / most wondrous clash of

arms and countless wounds”.849

IV. Conclusions

As strenuous knights and arms bearers, the Florentine chivalric elite were strongly

influenced by the ideology of chivalry. This influence was particularly powerful in the

context of warfare, the raison d'être of traditional noble and distinguished Florentine

846
La legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio. For specific references, see the discussion in chapter two
above.
847
La Tavola Ritonda, 33.
848
Tristano Panciatichiano, 509: When Palamedes takes on the task of avenging the King of Vermillion
City, its citizens worry that the peasant knights who are his enemies might resort to treachery; “But in truth
I’m very worried about you because if the serfs can’t overpower you, they could hurt you by treachery or in
another manner”; “Ma certo io abbo di voi grande dottanza ch’e’ servi non vi possaro a poderare, ché tosto
vi potrebero daneggiare o per tradimento o per altra maniera”.
849
Francesco Petrarch, Africa, 163 (lines 832-836).
 282

families. Indeed, chivalry exhorted warriors to demonstrate prowess and valor in pursuit

of honor, a reward that often trumped, in the minds of knights and arms bearers, larger

military objectives and even victory. This almost single-minded pursuit of honor led to

recklessness and bravado, as well as demonstrations of chivalric autonomy, or

independent action. As a result, the reformative virtues of prudence and restraint were

promoted by contemporaries in both chivalric (see chapter five below) and non-chivalric

circles. In addition, chivalric ideology, as well as more tangible material benefits,

encouraged members of the warrior elite to take one another captive, holding them

honorably for ransom.While such honorable conduct was not always upheld, it was

common enough to reinforce a sense of “brotherhood” among the warrior elite on both

sides of a fight.

Since war was comprised of much more than just independent combats between

knights, the chivalric and the non-chivalric were forced to come to terms with a number

of practices that might seem prima facie dishonorable or unchivalric to a modern

audience. For example, war commonly consisted of raids into enemy territory, where

warriors pillaged and burned the countryside. Likewise the use of ruses, trickery, and

surprise during war were not uncommon. Less acceptable, however, was the use of

treachery, which was surprisingly common in late medieval Florence and Italy and no

doubt reflected the prioritization of military objectives over the conduct of war.
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Chapter V:
Reformative Virtues and Themes
in Imaginative Chivalric Literature

The transalpine continuity of chivalric culture in violent and competitive societies

meant that the warrior elite of late medieval Florence lived a violent and warlike lifestyle

similar to that of their counterparts across the Alps.850 Florentine knights and arms

bearers851 were drawn to a similar corpus of imaginative chivalric literature, prose

romances in particular, accessing these works as they circulated medieval Italy in a

variety of languages and forms.852 For modern historians, these works provide essential

insight into the mentality of the chivalric elite and, as discussed above, offer considerable

850
P.J. Jones was among the first scholars to argue for the transalpine continuity of chivalric culture,
although his conception of chivalry was limited by the lack of scholarship on the general European
phenomenon: P.J. Jones, “Economia e società nell’Italia medievale: Il mito della borghesia”, in Economia e
società nell’Italia medievale, ed. P.J. Jones (Turin: Giulio Einaudi editore, 1980), 4-189.
851
The term arms bearer is intentionally broad so as to include wealthy citizens who served in the
communal militia as cavalry, but were not dubbed or strenuous knights. See chapter one above for a
discussion of social definitions and military terminology related to knighthood.
852
Larner, “Chivalric culture in the age of Dante”, 118: Larner makes the important point that “whatever its
origins, chivalric literature in Dante’s lifetime must be seen as a fully naturalized and domesticated
product”. Useful studies of chivalric literature in Italy include: Daniela Delcorno Branca, Il romanzo
cavalleresco medievale (Florence: Sansoni, 1974); idem, I Romanzi italiani di Tristano e la Tavola Ritonda
(Florence: Leo S. Olschki Editore, 1967; idem, “Dante and the Roman de Lancelot”, in Text and Intertext in
Medieval Arthurian Literature, ed. Norris J. Lacy (New York: Routledge, 2012), 133-146; idem, Tristano e
Lancilotto in Italia; Fabrizio Cigni, “La ricezione medievale della letteratura francese nella Toscana nord-
occidentale”, in Fra toscanità e italianità, eds. Edeltraud Werner and Sabine Schwarze (Gottingen: Hubert
& Co., 2000), 71-108; Marco Praloran and Nicola Morato, “Nostalgia e fascinazione della letteratura
cavalleresca,” Il Rinascimento Italiano e l’Europa, 2 (2007): 487-512; Franco Cardini, “La letteratura
cavalleresco,” Quaderni medievali, 37 (1994): 84-91; idem, L’Acciar de’ cavalieri; idem, Guerre di
Primavera; Antonio Pasqualino, Le vie del cavaliere: Epica medievale e memoria popolare (Milan:
Bompiani, 1992); F.R. Psaki, “Chivalry and Medieval Italian Romance”; Aldo Scaglione, Knights at Court:
Courtliness, Chivalry, & Courtesy From Ottonian Germany to the Italian Renaissance (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991); Donald L. Hoffman, “Lancelot in Italy”, in A Companion to the
Lancelot-Grail Cycle, ed. Carol Dover (D.S. Brewer, 2003), 163-172; Jane E. Everson, “The epic tradition
of Charlemagne in Italy,” Cahiers de recherches médiévales et humanistes 12 (2005), 45-81; Marco
Villoresi, La letteratura cavalleresca: Dai cicli medievali all’Ariosto (Rome: Carocci editore, 2000); idem,
La Fabbrica dei Cavalieri: Cantari, peomi, romanzi in prosa fra medioevo e rinascimento (Rome: Salerno
Editrice, 2005).
 284

evidence about chivalric attitudes toward honor-violence (chapter two), social violence

(chapter three) and warfare (chapter four). Whereas the previous chapters focused on the

ideological underpinnings of such violence, most notably gushing praise for knightly

prowess and bravery and effusive exultations of bloody victories on the field of battle and

honor defended with the sword, this chapter instead surveys the multitude of reform

messages aimed at these privileged practitioners of violence in imaginative chivalric

literature.

The popularity of imaginative literature among the chivalric elite of Florence and

Italy meant that these works were among the most effective means of disseminating both

subtle and overt messages of reform. They also served as an important forum to both

praise and criticize different aspects of the chivalric lifestyle, reflecting a deep

ambivalence within elite warrior circles about the consequences of chivalric violence and

the conduct appropriate to those bearing the dignity of knighthood. Indeed, chivalric

literature served an important social and didactic purpose in late medieval Italy, as

elsewhere in Europe, engendering debate and promoting reformative virtues, such as

courtesy, prudence, and mesure (restraint), which were inherent, but often unrealized in

the ideology of chivalry.853 Since the chivalric identity was arguably under significantly

more pressure in late medieval Florence (see chapter one above) than elsewhere in

Europe, debate, while still present, is minimized in favor of presenting a united set of

ideals in opposition to the emerging culture of the gente nova, one characterized

853
Richard Kaeuper has examined the important role of imaginative literature in Western Europe in his
Chivalry and Violence, as well as in a number of articles. His scholarship is fundamental to understanding
the similar role played by chivalric literature in late medieval Florence and Italy.
 285

overwhelmingly by the accumulation of wealth and the trappings, but not essence, of

chivalry.854

The works surveyed in this chapter, all composed, adapted, or compiled between

1250 and 1350 in Tuscany (see the introduction to Part III above for a discussion of the

authorship of these works), employed a variety of methods to encourage debate and

inculcate messages of reform. Two methods in particular stand out and will be examined

below: the use of famous literary knights as exemplars, providing models of both ideal

and corrupted knighthood, and the presentation of numerous stock situations and stock

reactions with accompanying analysis and criticism. This chapter investigates the nature

of these reformative messages and debates, and, following in the footsteps of the

preceding chapters, draws some general conclusions about their applicability to the

realities of armed combat between members of the chivalric elite.

Honor and Chivalry’s Reformative Virtues

Alongside prowess, honor, courage, and other martial virtues in the pantheon of

chivalry resided several reformative virtues, including mercy, courtesy, prudence, and

restraint (mesure). The chivalric elite’s ambivalent attitude toward the consequences of

their violence, on the one hand honor and power and on the other destruction and death,

left room for reformers of a variety of stripes to promote the proper and controlled use of

violence. The goal was never to eliminate knightly violence altogether. One of the
854
I plan to develop this line of inquiry further in the future. In addition, I think there is much to be said for
the argument of John Larner and others that the “late medieval Italian commercial capitalism is quite
wrongly interpreted as being primarily a bourgeois or middle-class phenomenon” and that the “first age of
commercial capitalism was never created by ‘bourgeois’ virtues, but rather chivalric ideals”: see Larner,
“Chivalric Culture in the Age of Dante, 128-129.
 286

primary means employed by reformers to encourage the chivalric elite to exercise control

was to emphasize reformative virtues, which because they were inherent in chivarlic

ideology did not register in the knightly mind as a measure of repression or control

imposed externally and thus was not perceived as a threat to their traditional autonomy.

In order to understand the function of these reformative virtues it is essential to

first understand the role of honor. As has been stressed throughout this study, honor was

the veritable currency of chivalric society in Florence and Italy, as elsewhere in Medieval

Europe. While the nature of honor has been discussed periodically above, it is profitable

to examine here three compatible aspects of honor that are particularly relevant to the

concept of chivalric reform: these could be termed horizontal, vertical, and reflexive

honor. Horizontal honor meant respect owed to an equal, which presupposes the

existence of an “honor group”, or a set of people who subscribe to the same “code of

honor” and who recognize each other as doing so. While the concept of a “code of honor”

is problematic, the definition provided by anthropologist Frank Henderson Stewart is

useful in the study of chivalric culture: Stewart defines a code of honor as “a set of

standards that has been picked out as of particular importance, that measures an

individual’s worth along some profoundly significant dimensions”.855

This study has discussed above the standards that were of particular importance in

chivalric society and the criteria used by members of the chivalric elite when judging one

another. Likewise, the important role of shame and dishonor, discussed above, accords

with Stewart’s observation that members of the honor group who fail to meet the

855
Frank Henderson Stewart, Honor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 54.
 287

standards outlined in the code of honor are “viewed not just as inferior but often as

despicable”.856 Thus in our particular context, the code of honor was chivalric ideology

and the honor group was the Florentine iteration of a larger pan-European chivalric

society, which transcended traditional political and cultural boundaries.

Horizontal honor is naturally associated with vertical honor shown to superiors,857

but this relatively simple schema proves much more complex in the context of chivalric

society. Indeed, chivalric society should be seen as a large honor group comprised of

smaller honor groups with fluid membership, showing horizontal honor to their peers, as

well as vertical honor to members of superior honor groups. Superiority was determined

especially by a combination of social, political, and economic factors, including honor,

employed in a similar way to Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of social and cultural capital,858

earned through the demonstration of prowess and other chivalric traits.859 In chivalric

society, vertical honor was a two-way street, as individuals in upper echelons were
856
F.H. Stewart, Honor, 55.
857
F.H. Stewart, Honor, 59, 61: Stewart argues that horizontal and vertical honor are compatible with each
other.
858
For a useful introduction to the concept of social and cultural capital, see M. Grenfell, Pierre Bourdieu:
Key Concepts (Stocksfield: Acumen Publishing, 2008).
859
Examples abound in both historical documents and literature of men of higher social standing, even
kings and princes, deferring to men of lower, but still substantial rank, because of their exalted position in
the hierarchy of chivalry. The best example is that of William Marshal (d.1219), who came from a family
of minor nobility, but experienced incredible upward social mobility, receiving the title of Earl of
Pembroke from King John in 1199. He also served as tutor for the Young King Henry of England and
regent for Henry III of England during his minority. Despite being a landless knight from a minor family,
William Marshal enjoyed the respect of his social superiors thanks to his considerable chivalric reputation.
Another excellent example is the French knight Geoffroi de Charny (d.1356), who came from a minor
noble family, but because of his chivalric reputation was given the distinct honor of carrying the Oriflamme
into battle and was asked by King John of France to write the official treatises for the royal chivalric Order
of the Star. In Italy, Giovanni Acuto (John Hawkwood), an English mercenary of low social standing who
rose to great power through his martial prowess and acumen during the Hundred Years’ War and, more
importantly, in the service of various Italian powers, exemplifies this phenomenon. Despite his family’s
low social status, Giovanni Acuto enjoyed great respect from his fellow knights and mercenaries of high
social standing, as well as from noble Florentines (who accorded him the great honor of a public funeral
and monument in the form of a massive painting by Paolo Uccello (1436)) and other noble Italians (most
notably, the Visconti of Milan).
 288

expected to conduct themselves in a certain way in their interactions with fellow

members of the chivalric elite, even if they were lower on the social or chivalric

hierarchy. For example, by showing an enemy knight courtesy and mercy, a knight

properly observed the obligations of horizontal and vertical honor. In doing so, the

chivalric elite reinforced their group identity and constructed useful bulwarks against the

rapid rise of ‘new men’ who often wealthier and wielded more political power.

Reformers, as we shall see, also tried to inculcate these reformative virtues by

framing them as a means to increase the honor of both parties. This process of

reciprocation essentially required the demonstration of reflexive honor. Reflexive honor

required a member of an honor group, in our case the chivalric elite, to reciprocate

demonstrations of horizontal or vertical honor, or incur dishonor. This meant that in the

ideal a request for mercy must be met or a demonstration of courtesy reciprocated. To do

so earned an individual or family honor; failure to do so led to dishonor. Unfortunately,

reflexive honor was a slippery slope, because this obligation to reciprocate

demonstrations of honor extended to dishonor as well: any affront to an individual’s or

family’s honor required that individual and/or family to respond appropriately (i.e. with

violence), or face the ignominy of having one’s honor diminished or destroyed.860

Naturally, the violent response of the aggrieved party perpetuated further violence by

obliging the victims of this new violence to respond in kind in order to avoid dishonor

and shame.

860
F.H. Stewart, Honor, 64.
 289

Thus, reformers faced a difficult task convincing members of the chivalric elite to

overlook this aspect of reflexive honor when personal or familial honor was impugned.

The models of knighthood and reform themes (centered on these concepts of honor and

the reformative virtues inherent in chivalric ideology) discussed below in this chapter are

examples of the efforts made by reformers to define and valorize the proper use of

violence. Ultimately the failure of knights and arms bearers to properly observe the

dictates of horizontal and vertical honor and the negative consequences of the darker side

of reflexive honor would help create the conditions that led to the exile and repression of

many members of the Florentine chivalric elite during the course of the late-thirteenth

and first-half of the fourteenth centuries.

Models of Knighthood

Learning from the example of more experienced knights was an important aspect

of the initial and continuing education of the warrior elite in late medieval Europe.861

This form of training was common enough to appear widely in chivalric literature,

usually in the guise of a young knight seeking out the mentorship of a famous knight.862

For example, in the anonymous Tristano Panciatichiano, an anthology of Arthurian tales

861
See David Crouch, William Marshal: Knight, War and Chivalry, 1147-1219 (New York: Longman,
2002) for the historical examples of William Marshal in his youth, who attended the ‘school of chivalry’ at
the court of William de Tancarville (pp. 24-28), and also Henry the Young King, who received his chivalric
training under William Marshal (pp. 39-56).
862
Knights and arms bearers represent agents of a sort of distilled chivalric wisdom, but they are not the
only instructors of chivalry in imaginative literature.
 290

composed in the first-half of the fourteenth century,863 Sir Lamorat comes across

Lancelot and asks permission to ride in his company. When Lancelot inquires why

Lamorat has been looking for him, Lamorat replies “Because of your valor and honor,

and so that you would help me to improve and teach me with your goodness because I am

a new knight, as you know”.864 Lancelot is recognized by chivalric society as a great

knight and thus young knights seek him out in order to profit from his example.

Since the transalpine nature of chivalric culture ensured that Florentine knights

and arms bearers were part of a shared milieu with the chivalric elite across medieval

Europe, it follows that cultural models influential north of the Alps would retain their

authority in Tuscany and Italy. Indeed, circulating along with the original French

romances were a large number of vulgarizzamenti, works that show a striking continuity

in chivalric values and themes: warfare and honor-violence remain central themes.865 As

a result, the exemplars provided in chivalric literature of French provenance retained their

didactic purpose and were easily consumed and digested by Florentine and Italian

863
The Tristano Panciatichiano includes parts of La queste del Saint Graal, the story of Tristan’s life from
birth to the false rumors of his death, episodes drawn from La mort le roi Artu, Le roman de Tristan en
prose, and the prose Tristan, and finally the epiloge by Helie de Boron. These works were circulating
Tuscany and the Italian peninsula in French by the end of thirteenth century, eagerly consumed by the bi-
lingual culture of late medieval Italy. For the bi-lingual culture of late medieval Italy, see Tristano
Riccardiano, ix.
864
Tristano Panciatichiano, 326/327: “Per vostro pro’ e honore e perché voi m’amendaste e m’insegnaste
di vostra bontà, ché io sono novello cavaliere, come voi sapete”.
865
This observation is critical given the recent argument made by Alison Cornish in Vernacular
Translation in Dante’s Italy: Illiterate Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) that the
act of vernacularization “effectively muted the fundamental cultural differences between the Italian
republics and the French courts” (5). Larner made a similar point when he argued that “the values to be
found within [Italian chivalric literature] are those familiar from French chivalric literature”: Larner,
“Chivalric culture in the age of Dante”, 119.
 291

chivalric elites.866 Moreover, the use of exemplars, in theory, helped to reinforce both the

compatability and the desirability of combining the reformative virtues of courtesy,

prudence, and mercy with the more traditional martial virtues of prowess and bravery.

These literary heroes, for the most part, properly observed the dictates of horizontal and

vertical honor, and made use of the concept of reflexive honor to limit the degree of

violence and, on occasion, to create peaceful solutions to conflicts.

Lancelot the Courteous

While there is no ‘Italian’ version of the Lancelot prose romance, Florentines and

Italians were familiar with the French romance, which was circulating Italy by the late

thirteenth century.867 In addition, Lancelot plays an important role in the Florentine

Tristan romances, Tristano Panciatichiano, Tristano Riccardiano (1280-1300), and Il

Tavolo Ritonda (1325-1350), joining the eponymous hero as an exemplar of chivalry.

Indeed, Lancelot consistently demonstrates great loyalty, wisdom, courtesy, bravery, and

prowess despite being portrayed in the Italian Tristan romances as inferior to the knight

from Cornwall.868

866
Barbero observes that the French nobility played an important role in elaborating and exporting the
noble lifestyle, particularly in Italy, where French nobles were the model to which all gentlemen should
aspire: A. Barbero, “I modelli aristocratici”, in Ceti, modelli, comportamenti nella societa
medievale (secoli XIII-meta XIV). Convegno internazionale, Ceti, modelli, comportamenti nella societa
medievale (secoli XIII-meta XIV) (Pistoia: Centro Italiano di studi di storia e d’arte, 2001), 240.
867
Late medieval Tuscans, most notably Dante, were familiar with the prose Lancelot, which circulated the
Italian peninsula in its original French during the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. See in
particular Daniela Delcorno Branca, Tristano e Lancillotto in Italia; idem, “Tradizione italia dei testi
arturiani: Note sul Lancelot,” Medioevo romanzo 17 (1992): 215-250; idem, “Dante and the Roman de
Lancelot”.
868
Tristan’s superiority is acknowledged by Lancelot himself in the Tristano Panciatichiano (292/293)
when he refers to Tristan as “the best knight in the world, and the most valiant and most handsome and
most joyful and the wisest that one can find”. In contrast, Tristan referred to Lancelot (288/289) as “lord of
 292

For example, in the Tristano Panciatichiano Lancelot serves as the very model of

chivalric courtesy, with his great courtesy during the tournament at Loverzep in particular

recognized and praised by fellow knights.869 Tristan and Palamdes, both excellent judges

of a knight’s chivalry, laud Lancelot’s great courtesy in allowing Palamedes to remount

his horse after Hector knocked him to the ground during the tournament. Tristan

succinctly sums up Lancelot’s credentials as the champion of chivalric courtesy, saying

“I very truly believe that Sir Lancelot is such a one who knows how to behave

courteously to a gentleman at the proper time and place. And this [allowing Palamedes to

remount in the middle of a battle] is not even the first favor he has done to a knight out of

courtesy nor will it be the last, if he lives a long life”.870 The recognition of peers is

crucial in a culture structured around the subjective interpretation of whether an

individual has gained or lost honor: Lancelot’s courtesy only counts (ie. earns him honor)

when it is recognized by other members of the chivalric elite.

Lancelot also takes on the important role of recognizing the courtesy of other

knights, always reciprocating in kind.871 For example, later in the same tournament, when

noble deeds and not the worst knight in the world and the wisest and most courteous and of the highest
nobility of any man and fortunate above all other knights”. See also the important scholarship of Delcorno
Branca listed earlier in the chapter.
869
A profitable comparison can be made between the models of knighthood embodied by Lancelot and
Dinadan in the Tristano Panciatichiano: both demonstrate great wisdom, prudence, and restraint, but while
the former is widely considered to be a great knight, the latter is not. The difference between the two
knights resides primarily in their respective prowess and bravery- Lancelot’s great prowess and bravery
prevents chivalric society from misinterpreting his prudence and restraint as cowardice. The opposite is true
for Dinadan, who is often the target of derision and is accused, on occasion, of cowardice. This comparison
is at the center of a conference paper currently in progress.
870
Tristano Panciatichiano, 642/643: “io vel credo molto bene che messer Lancialotto è tale che sae fare
cortesia a uno produomo quando vede luogo e tempo. E questa non è mica la prima bontà ch’elli à fatta a
cavalieri per cortesia e non s’era la diretana, s’elli vive lungamente”.
871
The King of Ireland is another knight in the same work who is similarly praised for his “good chivalry
and the great and good courtesy and wisdom that people s[ee] in him”; as a result of his exemplary virtues,
 293

Tristan returns to Lancelot his horse so that he does not have to remain on foot in the

middle of the melee, despite being on opposite sides of the battle, Lancelot immediately

recognizes Tristan’s great courtesy.872 Lancelot responds in kind, suggesting a solution

that will allow both knights to maintain their honor and continue to participate in the

tournament: “Then he (Lancelot) makes no delay… and he lets himself charge to the

other side of the assembly, not at all in the area where he could encounter Sir Tristan.

Thus the two companions recommence the battle, one on one side [of the field] and the

other on the other”.873 The role of recognizer is crucial in promoting the demonstration of

courtesy.

Lancelot is also celebrated as an advocate of wisdom and prudence.874 As one of

the undisputed ‘flowers of chivalry’, Lancelot’s advocacy and championing of courtesy,

restraint, and prudence provides a powerful boost to the legitimacy of these reformative

he is given command of the ‘foreign’ team that faces Arthur and his allies at the tournament at Loverzep:
see Tristano Panciatichiano, 640/641.
872
Tristano Panciatichiano, 666/667: “Quando Tristano è rimontato e elli se ne va in quella parte dove è lo
cavallo di messer Lancialotto e elli lo prende per lo freno perciò ch’elli non vuole che messer Lancialotto
rimanga quivi a piedi, ché tosto potrebbe essere ingombrato. Et inmantenente li mena lo cavallo et disse,
‘Siri, rimontate tostamente, ché a stare qui vi potrebbe essere noia.’” [“When Tristan is mounted again, he
goes over to where Sir Lancelot’s horse is and takes it by the rein because he doesn’t want Sir Lancelot to
remain on foot here since he could quickly be overcome. And he immediately leads the horse to him and
said, ‘Sir, mount up again quickly because staying here could become tedious for you.’”]. Later, Lancelot
shows similar courtesy in restoring King Arthur to horseback when he sees him fighting on foot in the
middle of a melee (688/689).
873
Tristano Panciatichiano, 666/667: “Allora non fa altra dimoranza… et lassasi correre dal’altra parte
del’asembro, non mica in quella parte ove possa trovare messer Tristano. Cosi ricominciano la mislea li due
compagni, l’uno dal’una parte e l’altro dal’altra”.
874
For example, the first part of the Tristano Panciatichiano draws upon the Quest for the Holy Grail
(pages 26/27-120/121), during which, at least initially, Lancelot demonstrates his humility and wisdom
when he refuses, in contrast to Perceval and Gawain, to attempt to pull the sword from the stone found
outside Camelot (page 32/33). When Galahad successfully removes the sword, Lancelot humbly accepts
that he is no longer considered the greatest knight in the world, maintaining that, in fact, he never had
thought of himself as the best (page 34/35).
 294

virtues, which are tasked with controlling knightly emotions and prowess.875 In one

especially revealing incident in the Tristano Panciatichiano, Lancelot counsels King

Arthur to exercise restraint and prudence when the king expresses his desire to see Queen

Iseut up close, despite the opposition of the Queen and her companions. Lancelot is quick

to advise the king that his is a foolish desire, saying “Sire… I don’t see how you could be

able to see her now as openly as you would like becausue such knights are escorting her

that we would have no power over them at this point, therefore we wouldn’t be able to

see her against their will”.876 The king’s obstinance certainly manifests traditional

knightly belief that might makes right, an arrogance that necessarily ignores the

reformative influence of prudence and the dictates of chivalric courtesy in favor of

realizing individual desires immediately through violence.877 This is precisely why

Lancelot’s counsel of prudence and restraint is so important: “Sire for God’s sake… let’s

not start something that ends up bringing us disgrace… It behooves us to forbear going

closer to her at this point. [But] when the tournament has concluded… I’ll endeavor so

much that I’ll find out where Tristan’s pavilions are… And thus you’ll be able to see

875
Tristano Panciatichiano, 702/703: In one illuminating example, Tristan’s desire to avoid a conflict with
Erdes, fueled by his reason and prudence, is overruled by the dictates of honor and the fear of being
considered a coward.
876
Tristano Panciatichiano, 644/645: “Siri… io non veggio come voi la poteste vedere ora cosi
apertamente come voi vorreste, che tali cavalieri la conducono che intra loro non aremmo a questo punto
podere di ciò, perciò no la potremmo noi vedere se non fusse di loro volere”.
877
Tristano Panciatichiano, 644/645: King Arthur ignored Lancelot’s advice saying “Let’s go closer…
We’ll see how courteous they are… Sir, may God help me… let happen what may to me about it, I want to
see her closer up.” [“Andiamo più presso… Si vedremo loro cortesia… Siri, se m’aiuti Idio… che ciò che
me ne puote avenire, io la voglio di più presso vedere”].
 295

Queen Yseut… And know that monsieur Tristan will be happy and joyous about your

coming”.878

King Arthur remains unswayed by Lancelot’s counsel, wishing only to see Queen

Iseut without any thought of the consequences. King Arthur responds to Lancelot, saying

“You are not speaking as well as I would like, but that doesn’t matter because it’s

necessary that I see her now right away… if I possibly can”.879 When Palamedes saw

King Arthur moving toward the Queen,

he consider[ed] him not very bright… [and] he said to himself, ‘That knight is
not at all very wise or courteous since he is intruding upon that lady,’ so that
[Palamedes] move[d] forward all ready to strike him if the king doesn’t answer
courteously and if he doesn’t turn back; thus he would do unto that man as to
someone who has no business doing that’. The king who was staring fixedly at
Queen Yseut doesn’t hear Palamedes at all… And Tristan shouts at [Palamedes]
in a loud voice, ‘Knock down that foolish knight!’ And he let himself go
unrestrainedly, happy about that command, and strikes King Arthur in the middle
of his chest so hard that he makes him hit the ground.880

In this way the author uses King Arthur as an example of knightly intransigence and

reveals the difficult task facing would-be reformers. Indeed, it is only when King Arthur

is shamed through Palamedes’s violence that he realizes the error of his ways: “When

[the king] had mounted again, he said to Lancelot, laughing the whole time, ‘So it goes

with he who is a fool, but who doesn’t realize his folly until someone makes him; since I

878
Tristano Panciatichiano, 644/645: “Siri per Dio… non incominciamo cosa che ci torni ad onta…
Sofferire ci converà a questo punto d’andare a llei. E quando lo torniamento serà parto… E tanto farò che
io saprò là dove sono li padiglioni di Tristano… E così potrete voi vedere tutto discoperta la reina Ysotta…
E sappiate che monsignore Tristano serà lieto e gioioso di vostra venuta”.
879
Tristano Panciatichiano, 646/647: “Voi non dite sì bene come io vore’ ma ciò non vale, ch’elli è misteri
che io la veggia ora indiritto… se io unqua potrò”.
880
Tristano Panciatichiano, 646/647: “elli no llo tiene a troppo grande senno… Disse in sé medesimo,
‘Quello cavalieri non è mica troppo savio né cortese che così si mette sopra quella dama,’ sich’elli si mette
tutto inanzi aparecchiato per lui ferire se lo re no li risponde cortesemente e s’elli non torna arieto, si
farebbe come a quello huomo che di quello non à che fare”.
 296

didn’t want to listen to your words, but Palamedes made me understand them. You were

speaking very wisely.’”.881 The ironic use of violence in order to teach the lesson of

restraint is prevalent in chivalric literature.

The dominance of prowess and honor-violence over the reformative virtues

becomes even more clear from Lancelot’s actions. Indeed, this episode provides the

opportunity to see Lancelot put into practice the reformative virtues of prudence and

restraint in a situation requiring him to respond to the shame suffered by his liege lord.

When Lancelot saw Palamedes knock Arthur down,

he is so sorrowful that he doesn’t know what he should say or do. ‘But since,’ he
said to himself, ‘I will certainly not even be able to endure a battle against these
two knights, the effort wouldn’t do me any good, but yet I will throw myself into
battle even though I am certain that he is Palamedes, because I owe more loyalty
to King Arthur than to Tristan or to Palamedes.’ And for this reason, he will do
everything in his power to vindicate the king and in doing everything in his power
about it ‘because evading that deed would bring very great shame and cowardice
upon me if I didn’t vindicate him.’ And then he pricks his horse with his spurs
and directs himself at Palamedes, and in the clash he strikes him… and Palamedes
fell down off his horse’s croup to the ground.882

While Lancelot’s initial thoughts show prudence and restraint at work in the knightly

mind, his actions suggest that ultimately the dictates of honor were more powerful.

881
Tristano Panciatichiano, 648/649: “Quando fu rimontato, elli disse a Lancialotto tutto ridendo, ‘Così va
chi è folle, ma non conosce sua follia infino a che l’uomo no gl’è fatta conoscere, sichè io non volli
conoscere le parole vostre e Palamides me l’à fatte conoscere. Voi diciavate grande senno.’”.
882
Tristano Panciatichiano, 646/647: “elli è tanto dolente che non sa che si debbia né dire né fare. ‘Ma
ciò’, disse elli, ‘certamente che incontra a questi due cavalieri no potrò io mica durare la mislea, ma lo
isforzo non mi varrebbe mica. Ma tuttavia io mi metterò ala mislea, perciò che io sono certo ch’elli è
Palamides, perché io sono più tenuto alo re Artù che a Tristano o a Palamides.’ Et perciò farà tutto suo
podere di vendicare lo re. Ma si vuole esse[re] vilato di volere vendicare lo re di ciò fare suo podere,
‘perciò che schifare quello fatto, troppo mi serebbe recato a grande viltà e di falta di cuore se io no llo
vendicasse.’ E a tanto broccha lo cavallo degli sproni e dirizzasi inverso Palamides e fierlo… Palamides si
ne venne a terra per la groppa giù del cavallo”.
 297

Yvain the Prudent and Disciplined

In the Tristano Panciatichiano Yvain the Bastard, like Lancelot, puts into practice

the reformative virtues of courtesy, prudence, and restraint alongside his great prowess

and bravery. Yvain’s reputation is much more modest than that of Lancelot, which

arguably makes him a more effective model for an audience of Florentine knights and

arms bearers. In this work Yvain is placed in circumstances that not only challenge his

commitment to these reformative virtues, but also force him to defend their validity

against the criticism of other knights. One revealing incident takes place when Yvain is

traveling with a group of knights, including King Arthur’s nephew Gauvain (Gawain)

and Sagramor ‘the Rash’, and they come across Queen Yseut (Isolde). Gauvain greatly

desires to meet her, but is prevented from doing so by Isolde’s knightly escort, comprised

of Tristan, Palamedes, and Dinadan, who wish to keep their charge’s identity secret.883

Gauvain interprets this rejection as a great discourtesy and in typical knightly fashion

wishes immediately to use violence to both vindicate the (perceived) dishonor done to

him by these knights and to force a meeting with Isolde.884

In these tense circumstances, Yvain provides a voice of wisdom, emphasizing

prudence and restraint. The author tells us that Gauvain and his companions desired to

attack Tristan and the other knights escorting Yseut, all except “Sir Yvain who is a wise

883
Tristano Panciatichiano, 572-573.
884
Tristano Panciatichiano, 572-573: Gauvain responds to Dinadan’s perceived lack of courtesy saying
“you are not as courteous as you should be”, before moving on to speak with Tristan, who likewise refuses
to divulge the identity of the Queen. Gauvain’s response to Tristan shows his increasing frustration and
eventually his decision to resort to violence to achieve his ends: “Indeed, you are hardly a courteous knight
nor are you very wise… In truth… you have spoken to me very arrogantly. But it behooves me to find out
who the lady is in the end and it really grieves me that it constrains me to commit a foolish act; and I’m not
grieved because of you, but for the lady’s sake, who seems a lady of worth; but you don’t seem a well-
intentioned knight nor one of worth”.
 298

knight and very disciplined”.885 Indeed, Yvain exhorts his companions to exercise

prudence and restraint, thus not only avoiding violence that he considered unwarranted,

but also the discourteous action of securing through force something against the will of

its possessor: “May God save me, this doesn’t seem very wise, that you want to lay hands

upon these knights, and I would not like us to perpetrate this outrage, and it would be a

great folly. And since we want to find out by force who the lady is, let’s avoid this folly

because nothing good can come to us from it; and it’s not even courteous to ask about a

lady’s identity against her will”.886 This seems to be a clear message of reform aimed at

the traditional knightly belief that might makes right.

This situation is particularly illuminating because Yvain’s knightly companions

misinterpret his advocacy of restraint as cowardice, especially Sir Gauvain: “Sir Yvain…

now I see clearly that your courage is failing you. I have certainly found so much

boorishness in these knights that it behooves me to make them realize what fools they

are”.887 Gauvain’s misinterpretation of Yvain’s prudence and restraint as cowardice

underscores one of the great fears of the chivalric elite and an important cause of knightly

violence: a desire to protect one’s reputation, particularly from accusations of

cowardice.888 This is particularly relevant in late medieval Florence and Italy, where

885
Tristano Panciatichiano, 574-575: “messer Yvano el quale è savio cavalieri et molto amisurato”.
886
Tristano Panciatichiano, 574/575: “Se Dio mi salvi, questo non mi risembra grande senno, che voi
volete manimettere questi cavalieri e di che volere che noi nol pigliamo per oltraggio e troppo serebbe
grande follia. E perché voliamo noi sapere chi la dama sia a forza, lasiamo stare questa follia, ché nullo
bene ce ne potrebbe avenire; e non è mica cortesia di dimandare del’essere d’una dama contra sua
volontate”.
887
Tristano Panciatichiano, 574/575: “Messere Yvano… or veggio io bene che ’l cuore vi falla. Certo io
abbo tanto trovato in questi cavalieri di villania ch’elli conviene che io li faccia folli riconoscere”.
888
Tristano Panciatichiano, 598/599: It is interesting that later in this same work the author compares,
through the guise of Sir Gariet, knights who avoid combat to merchants: “not as a knight, rather as a
 299

cowardice increasingly became associated with merchants and new men, groups that

slowly appropriated power from the chivalric elite in Florence.889 Surely the fear of being

considered a coward and thus associated with the merchant profession motivated many

Florentine knights and arms bearers to perpetrate the violence that was at the center of the

chivalric identity.

The touchy sense of honor and quick resort to violence traditionally demonstrated

by the chivalric elite makes Yvain’s measured response to Gauvain’s accusation all the

more striking: “Sir Gauvain, good cousin… now know well that I’m not saying these

words to you at all out of cowardice; instead, I say it to you because of what could

happen. I’ve already seen it happen that from the smallest deed, great shame came to a

gentleman and a good knight. Go ahead and start this enterprise since it pleases you and

if some great shame should come to me because of it, neither will it fail to come to

you”.890 A great knight exercises restraint and courtesy, even when his very identity is

challenged.

Given the valorization of violence in chivalric culture, it is not surprising that

Yvain’s counsel is ignored by Gauvain and his companions who rush off to attack

merchant; and they are still bearing their lances which are not yet broken” [“non come cavalieri, ma come
mercatanti e ancora recarono ellino loro lancie che non sono anco’ rotte”].
889
Dino Compagni’s Chronicle of Florence, 30: Compagni higlights the association between cowardice
and the mercantile profession when he relates that wise Florentines realized in the early fourteenth century
that despite being “rich and powerful and wise”, the Cerchi are “merchants and so they are cowards by
nature”. In contrast, the Donati and their allies “are masters of war and ruthless men.” This association also
made its way into chivalric literature.
890
Tristano Panciatichiano, 574/575: “Messer Gavan, bello cugino… ora sappiate bene che io non vel dico
mica per codardia queste parole che io vi dico, anzi vel dico per quello che ne puote avenire. Io ò gia
veduto avenire di più picciolo fatto grande onta a produomo e a buono cavalieri. Incominciate sicuramente
possa che questa impresa vi piace; et se me ne dovesse avenire grande onta, non ve ne fallirò di niente”.
 300

Yseut’s champions, only to be defeated and shamed.891 This veiled critique of knightly

obstinance and lack of foresight is indicative of the ambivalent attitude toward knightly

violence that is never far below the surface. Indeed, Yvain’s own prudence and discipline

are soon challenged by powerful emotions (anger foremost) and the desire and necessity

to avenge the shame suffered by his companions: “When Sir Yvain saw these two

companions of his thus defeated, he is so very irate that he doesn’t know what to say or

do and is having a complete change of heart from what he had wanted to do earlier”.892

Yvain demonstrates considerable restraint, scolding Gauvain instead for his lack of

prudence and restraint: “Sir… now we have more shame than before. And if you had

heeded my advice, these two knights who are unhorsed would not have received the

shame that they have”.893 Gauvain, confronting an obstacle likely very familiar to a

chivalric audience, recognizes the truth of Yvain’s words, but feels compelled to

vindicate his shame through further violence rather than acknowledging and learning

from his mistakes. Not surprisingly, this only serves to compound his shame and

dishonor.894

891
For the skirmish, see Tristano Panciatichiano, 574/575-576/577.
892
Tristano Panciatichiano, 576/577: “Quando messer Yvano vidde questi due suoi compagnoni così uniti,
elli è tanto irato che non sa che si debbia né dire né fare et tutto lo cuore se li va rimovendo dela volontà
che avea dinanzi”.
893
Tristano Panciatichiano, 576/577: “Siri… ora avemo noi più onta che davanti. Et se voi vi fuste atenuto
al mio consiglio, questi due cavalieri che sono abattuti non arebeno ricevuta l’onta ch’elli ànno”.
894
Tristano Panciatichiano, 576/577: “And Sir Gauvain, who is a good knight, but not as good as people
think- when he hears Sir Yvain’s words, even though he knows that he is speaking the truth, he doesn’t
reply at all, not little nor much. Instead, he directs himself at Palamedes… and they strike each other so
hard that both lances fly to pieces… But thus it happened at that point in the joust that the weaker fell- that
is, Sir Gauvain”; “Et messer Gavan, che buono cavalieri è (ma non sicome huomo lo tiene), quando elli
intende le parole di messer Yvano perciò ch’elli sa che dice verità, no lli risponde mica né poco né assai.
Anzi si dirizza inverso Palamides… trafieronsi si duramente che ambo le lancie volaro in pezzi… ma della
giostra avenne così a quel punto che ’l più fraile è caduto, cioè messer Gavan”.
 301

In a telling commentary on contemporary knighthood, eventually even Yvain is

worn down by the obligations of honor and fear that his inaction might be misinterpreted

as cowardice: “When Sir Yvain saw that blow [which sent Gauvain crashing to the

ground], [if] he was dismayed before, now he is much more; and he doesn’t know what

he should do, either to quit the joust or take it up. He knows in truth that the knight who

has unhorsed his companions is very powerful. And yet he admits that, even though he

doesn’t want to be unhorsed to find out if he could vindicate his companions, the joust

could not be called off: ‘It would bring too great shame and humiliation upon me.’”.895

The failure of prudence and restraint to ultimately prevent knightly violence in this

situation, as with Lancelot, hints at the difficulty facing reformers who wished to promote

the role of these reformative virtues. Indeed, even those knights who are successfully

inculcated with these virtues (Yvain, Lancelot) are never peace-loving knights ruled

entirely by reason, completely free from the powerful influences of honor, shame, and

emotion.896 Therefore, it is more profitable to see the role of these reformative virtues as

limiting or guiding knightly violence rather than replacing or eliminating it.

895
Tristano Panciatichiano, 576/577: “Messer Yvano, quando vide quello colpo, elli era davanti tutto
ismagato e ora è assai più e non sa che si debbia fare, o di lassare la giostra o di prenderla. Elli conosce per
verità che di grande forza è lo cavalieri che così à ’battuti li suoi compagnoni. Et tuttavia s’acorda che anzi
vuole elli essere abattuto e sapere se potesse vendicare suoi compagni che la giostra non rimanga: ‘elli mi
serebbe troppa onta e viltà.’”.
896
The most striking example of chivalric reform in action is the redemption of Bruce in the Roman de
Palamedes (see below). A useful example is also provided in the Tristano Panciatichiano with Palamedes,
who is convinced by Hector’s exhortations toward prudence and criticism of his pride and leaves off his
pursuit of revenge against Bliobleris, a vendetta which would have led to a war with the lineage of King
Ban (which includes Lancelot and Hector): see pages 412/413-414/415.
 302

Bruce, the Anti-Hero

It is profitable to contrast the above romanticized models of knighthood with their

opposite on the spectrum of reality, a knight who exemplifies the greatest dangers of

chivalry and as such, encourages the audience to draw powerful connections to the

problems caused by knightly violence in their own society. The Tristano Panciatichiano

provides just such a model, in the form of Sir Bruce without Pity (Brius seza Pietà).897

Examples abound in this romance of Bruce’s dishonorable conduct, disloyalty, and

treachery. In one such incident, Sir Bruce incurs great dishonor when he treats a wounded

knight discourteously. The wounded man had just been defeated by another knight, the

Page with the Slashed Surcoat (lo valletto dela Cotta Mal Tagliata), and was, as a result,

unable to defend himself. Bruce, mounted on his destrier, charged down the injured

knight, who was on foot, with the intention of killing the defenseless man.898 The Page

with the Slashed Surcoat, demonstrating his great chivalry (in this context, courtesy and

honor), protests against Bruce’s dishonorable conduct: “And the Page got up with great

difficulty and said, ‘Knight, what’s this that you want to do, put to death such a fine

knight?’ ‘That’s it exactly,’ said Bruce, ‘because he is my mortal enemy.’ And the Page

said, ‘Don’t do it because it is villainy, since the knight cannot get up because he is

897
This contrasts with the redeeming treatment of Bruce in the story of Febus in the Gyron le Coutroys
(Girone il cortese. Romanzo cavalleresco di Rustico o Rusticiano da Pisa, ed. Francesco Tassi (Florence:
Logge del Granco, 1855)), part of Rustichello da Pisa’s thirteenth century Compilation, and in the Roman
de Palamedes. I have not had the opportunity to compare the two versions of the story of Febus, but it
seems likely that Rustichello had access to the Roman de Palamedes, and adapted his own version of the
Febus story from it for the Compilation. The Roman de Palamedes was likely his source for many of the
stories of Palamedes in the Compilation.
898
Tristano Panciatichiano, 320/321: “Et istando in tale maniera, vi venne Brius seza Pietà sopra lo
cavalieri che lo valletto avea vinto e si li venne adosso co llo cavallo e metteli suso per lo dosso et volevalo
mettere ala morte” [“Meanwhile, Bruce without Pity came upon the knight that the Page had defeated and
charged at him with his horse and knocked him onto his back and wanted to put him to death”].
 303

wounded.’”899 In theory the pursuit of revenge or the desire to destroy one’s enemies

should be controlled by certain strictures that ensure that the privileged status of the

chivalric elite is acknowledged and protected by notions of horizontal honor during

violent conflict. Once again, theory does not always translate to practice.

Bruce’s refusal to observe the unwritten rules of chivalric honor stands in stark

contrast to the Page’s great bravery in defending the life and honor of the wounded

knight, despite his own injuries. Unfortunately, he is on foot, allowing Bruce easily to

ride him down.900 At that moment Sir Palamedes, the great Arthurian knight and

eponynmous hero of his own prose romance, comes along and witnesses Bruce’s

villanious conduct. Palamedes echoes the Page’s criticism and exhorts Bruce to behave in

a manner befitting a knight engaged in an armed conflict with another knight: “‘Sir, you

are a knight and so am I and so is he. Let him mount his horse and he will defend himself

as best he can’”.901 Not surprisingly Bruce refuses to desist, forcing Palamedes to

challenge him: “This you shall not do [kill the injured knights]; instead, I will fight with

you so that he [the Page] may mount because you are acting like a disloyal knight”.902

899
Tristano Panciatichiano, 320/321: “Et lo valletto si levò a grande pena et disse, ‘Cavalieri, che è quello
che voi fate, ché mettete a morete uno così buono cavalieri?’ ‘Et che è ciò,’ disser Brius, ‘perch’elli è mio
nimico mortale.’ E lo valletto disse, ‘Non fate, ch’elli è villania, chè lo cavalieri non si puote levare perciò
ch’elli è ferito”.
900
Tristano Panciatichiano, 320/321: “et Brius li diede di petto col petto del cavallo si forte che ’l fece
distendere in terra tutto dirotto” [“and Bruce struck him on his chest with his horse’s chest so hard that he
stretched him out on the ground, all smashed up”].
901
Tristano Panciatichiano, 320/321: “Et a tanto vi s’avenne messer Palamides et disse a Brius, ‘Siri, voi
sete cavalieri e io altresi e cotesti simigliante: lasciatelo montare a cavallo et elli si difenderae lo meglio che
potrà”.
902
Tristano Panciatichiano, 320/321: “Et Brius disse a Palamides che none farà altro. Et Palamides disse,
‘Questo non farete voi, anzi mi combatterei io con voi che ciò fusse, perciò che voi vi portate come disleale
cavalieri’”.
 304

Palamedes subsequently defeats Bruce without much effort, but the question of how to

deal with him becomes moot when Bruce escapes.

Bruce’s dishonorable conduct is intended to generate discussion among the

work’s knightly audience. Indeed, the knights in the work engage in such a discussion

when Sir Bors of Gaul arrives on the scene. When Bors learned the extent of Bruce’s

villainy he became very angry and said, “O God! If I could ever get my hands on him, I

would kill him… Oh, God! I will not live long enough to vindicate the knights and ladies

and damsels whom he has harmed – and is harming – so I don’t want anything else in the

world as much as to put him to death”.903 The Page readily agrees that some conduct is

disloyal and dishonorable enough to deserve death.904

Bruce’s dishonorable conduct resurfaces later in the Tristano Panciatichiano

when Bruce, hiding his true identity in an effort to escape Sir Bliobleris, convinces Erec,

Hector, and Perceval that he is in fact an innocent knight fleeing Bruce. The three

Knights of the Round Table, who had previously expressed their great desire to kill

Bruce, are tricked and immediately prepare to do battle.905 Bliobleris is an excellent

903
Tristano Panciatichiano, 320/321, 322/323: “Et incominciarono a parlare d Brius et contarono ciò
ch’elli avia fatto, siché Biordo ne fu troppo currucciato et disse, ‘O idio! No llo potrò io avere tra le mie
mani che io l’uccidesse’… Et Biordo disse, ‘Ai, Dio! Non viverò io tanto che io ne vendichi cavalieri et
donne e damigelle a’ quali elli à fatto e fa tanto di noia, ché io non disidero così cosa alcuna c’al mondo sia
come di lui mettere ala morte.’”.
904
Tristano Panciatichiano, 400/401: Sir Hector, Lancelot’s brother, also argues for the validity and need
to kill Bruce, going so far as to say that even King Arthur could not stop him from killing Bruce if he had
the opportunity: “Now know that we have a lot against Breus for many reasons so that even if King Arthur
were present here, we wouldn’t quit on his account because we would put him to death, provided that we
could hold onto him.”; Lancelot, as one of the paragons of chivalry, had earlier in the same text
demonstrated his greater courtesy and nobility (gentility) by sparing Sir Bruce’s life: see Tristano
Panciatichiano, 330/331.
905
Tristano Panciatichiano, 400/401-402/403.
 305

knight, however, and he manages to defeat both Erec and Perceval before finally

succuming to defeat against Hector.906

The real Bruce, having already demonstrated his disloyalty and lack of courtesy

by impersonating Bliobleris and convincing the three Knights of the Round Table to

attack an innocent knight, now attempts to take advantage of Bliobleris’s defeat to exact

vengeance upon him. When Bruce “saw Sir Bliobleris on the ground, unhorsed, it

seem[ed] to him that he could vindicate himself well since hw as on the ground and

Bruce was on his horse: it didn’t in any way trouble him. Then Bruce – the felon –

spur[red] his horse at Bliobleris and struck him so harshly that he knocked him to the

ground – tumbled over, stretched out, and so dazed that he didn’t have any strength to lift

himself up”.907 While Bruce “the felon” has no qualms about his treacherous conduct,

when “Erec, who was knocked down, saw that Bruce on horseback had struck the one

who was on his feet, he didn’t want to permit that at all because Erec was a very

courteous knight, of very great lineage, and bold”.908 For this reason Erec upbraided

Bruce for his conduct saying, “Sir Knight, peace be with you. You are committing

villainy, may God save me, and a great disloyalty since you assail form your horse this

knight who is on foot”.909 Erec continues his criticism of Bruce’s conduct, leaving no

doubt in the audience’s mind about the author’s stance on such treacherous action: “I
906
Tristano Panciatichiano, 402/403-404/405.
907
Tristano Panciatichiano, 404/405: “vidde messer Briobreis in terra di cavallo, a lui pare ch’elli si possa
bene vendicare di lui poich’elli è in terra et Brius era a cavallo; non docta di lui in nulla maniera. Allora
Brius lo fellone fiere lo cavallo degli sproni incontra Briobreis e fierlo sì duramente ch’elli lo fece venire in
terra riverto, disteso, e sì stordito ch’elli non à podere alcuno di rileversi”.
908
Tristano Panciatichiano, 404/405: “Erec, ch’era abatto, vidde Brius ch’era a cavallo c’avea percosso
quello ch’era a piedi, elli no llo volle niente sofferire, ch’elli era molto cortese cavalieri, Erec, ch’era
cavalieri di molto grande lignaggio e ardito”.
909
Tristano Panciatichiano, 404/405: “Sire cavalieri, state in pace. Voi fate villania, se Dio mi salvi, et
grande disleeltà, ché voi asagliate a cavallo questo cavalieri ch’è a piedi”.
 306

could in no way suffer anyone to put him to death by such a great felony as you want to

do, because a knight could do no greater treachery and felony than to assail this knight on

foot while being on horseback”.910

Bruce continually proves to be obstinate and immune to the reform ideas exhorted

and demonstrated by his fellow knights. Immediately after Erec’s upbraiding, Bruce

tricks the honorable knight into releasing him before “charg[ing] another time into

Bliobleris who had already risen, but he was completely stunned”.911 Erec is

understandably angry at Bruce’s blatant treachery, calling him a “disloyal and wicked”

(disleale e fellone) knight, and he (and probably the audience) are stunned into disbelief

when Bruce proceeds to ride him down as he prepared to mount his horse.912 These

dishonorable and disloyal actions confirm the villainous nature of Bruce and draw the

ready condmenation of Perceval in the text.

Bruce’s conduct and the negative reactions of the knightly heroes in this work

were intended to play a didactic role, encouraging a knightly audience to condemn and

avoid such conduct in their own lives. For historians, this example provides useful insight

into the workings of chivalry. First, Hector’s difficulty in believing that the “most vile

and wicked knight in the world” could possess enough prowess to defeat Erec and

Perceval, both recognized as valiant knights, reinforces the idea that the chivalric elite

made a connection between prowess and nobility, the latter demonstrated through a

910
Tristano Panciatichiano, 404/405: “non potrei sofferire in nulla maniera che huomo lo mettesse a morte
per così grande fellonia come voi li volete fare, che più grande tradigione e fellonia non potrebbe cavalieri
fare, cioè d’asaglire questo cavalieri a piedi essendo voi a cavallo”.
911
Tristano Panciatichiano, 404/405: “Brius corse un’altra volta adosso a Briobreis, che già era rilevato,
ma elli era tutto istordito”.
912
Tristano Panciatichiano, 404/405.
 307

knight’s courtesy and honorable conduct. A knight who lacked courtesy and acted

dishonorably demonstrated his baseness and lack of nobility, thus the shock that such an

individual could show prowess.913 Second, the author’s belief that a courteous, valiant,

and noble knight such as Erec would find Bruce’s conduct to be dishonorable and

despicable is crucial to understanding the tensions and reformative debates inherent

chivalric ideology and culture.

The exemplars discussed above offered Florentine knights and arms bearers

models of knightly conduct, both proper and improper, which encouraged discussion and

emulation. The fame attached to a literary figure like Lancelot added weight to the effort

of reformers to promote among real knights the proper conduct he exemplified. In

addition, the examples of Lancelot and Yvain demonstrated both the compatability and

the desirability of combining the reformative virtues of courtesy, prudence, and mercy

with the more traditional martial virtues of prowess and bravery. By doing so, these

models also highlight many of the reform themes to be explored below.

913
This concept of nobility accords in many ways with the concept of gentility, or nobility of the soul/heart,
championed by Dante and other Italians in the Due- and Trecento. For a general study, see Claudio Donati,
L’Idea di Nobiltà in Italia: Secoli XIV-XVIII (Rome: Laterza, 1988). See also idem, “L’Epistola di Lapo da
Castiglionchio e la disputa sulla nobiltà a Firenze fino al consolidamento del principato,” in Antica
possession con belli costumi: due giornate di studio su Lapo da Castiglionchio il Vecchio (Firenze-
Pontassieve, 3-4 ottobre 2003), ed. Franek Sznura (Florence: Aska, 2006), 30-45, and the essays in Ernesto
Sestan, ed., Nobiltà e ceti dirigenti in Toscana nei secoli XI-XIII: strutture e concetti (Florence: Francesco
Papafava editore, 1982). More specifically related to Florence are Enrico Pispisa, “Lotte sociali e concetto
di nobiltà a Firenze nella seconda metà del Duecento,” Studi medievali 38 (1997): 439-43 and Vincenzo
Borghini, Storia della Nobiltà Fiorentina: Discorsi inediti o rari (Pisa: Edizioni Marlin, 1974). For the
Quattrocento, see Albert Rabil, ed. and trans., Knowledge, Goodness, and Power: The Debate over Nobility
among Quattrocento Italian Humanists (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).
 308

Chivalry’s Reformative Virtues

The ideal conduct of the literary heroes discussed above is often associated in

works of imaginative literature with reformative virtues inherent in chivalric ideology.

Prominent among these reformative virtues are mercy, and magnanimity, and courtesy.

These virtues played an important role in shaping ideal chivalric conduct in war as

presented by reformers in imaginative literature, particularly in the treatment of defeated

or defenseless knights and arms bearers, and in ensuring equitable conditions during

combat. These aspects of idealized warfare naturally accord with the concepts of honor

discussed above: to show a defeated or defenseless knight mercy was to show him

horizontal honor and thus to recognize his membership in the chivalric elite. The same

can be said for ensuring equitable conditions during armed combat between two elite

warriors: to run down a knight who is on foot is to fail, or more likely, refuse, to

recognize his honor. Leaving aside for moment the question of whether idealized conduct

translated into actual practice, the popularity of imaginative chivalric literature in late

medieval Florence and Italy ensured that these ideas were consumed by the chivalric

elite, informing their mentalité and influencing, for better or worse, their conduct in

warfare.

Mercy and Magnanimity: the Treatment of Defeated Knights

An important aspect of this ideal honorable conduct was the demonstration of

mercy and magnanimity by a victorious knight, which resulted in either the liberation of a

defeated enemy or in his honorable captivity. Not surprisingly, the merciful sparing of a
 309

defeated enemy or the act of taking him captive and subsequently treating him honorably

is a constant theme in chivalric literature and knights who fail to do so are often strongly

criticized. For example, in the Tristano Panciatichiano the author criticizes the extreme

violence and lack of courtesy shown by Agravain and Gariet, King Arthur’s nephews,

who “killed the knight of Joyous Guard for a very small thing: simply because he had

said that Tristan was a better knight than Lancelot”.914 The killing of a noble knight for

such a “small thing” is portrayed as a shameful and perhaps dishonorable incident.

Indeed, while the taking of noble and knightly prisoners was an element of contemporary

military practice, it was also decidedly chivalric, as Florentine knights and nobles were

encouraged to solidify the bonds of a brotherhood of arms by taking their social

counterparts into honorable captivity rather than killing them indiscriminantly, although

as we have seen above in chapter three, this unwritten rule was not always observed.915

For example, in the Tristano Riccardiano Tristan demonstrates great mercy and

magnanimity by sparing the life of first Sir Bruce Sans Pitie (Breus-senza-pietà) and later

Sir Blanor of the house of King Ban (he is Lancelot’s cousin). The merciful treatment of

Sir Bruce is particularly notable because, as discussed above, he represents in the various

Tristan romances all that is wrong with knighthood. In this specific episode, Tristan

jousts against Sir Bruce because he had stolen a shield from a maiden through force:

Then the maiden departed… and rode to the entrance of the wood.
She met a knight who said to her, ‘Maiden, give me the shield.’ And
she said, ‘Knight, I certainly will not.’ And the knight took the shield
914
Tristano Panciatichiano, 430/431: “Et assai per poca di cosa avieno ucciso lo cavalieri dela Gioiosa
Guardia, pur per tanto solamente che elli avea decto che Tristano era migliore cavalieri che Lancialotto”.
915
For a recent study of the practice of taking prisoners, see Remy Ambuhl, Prisoners of War in the
Hundred Years War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Examples of this practice abound in
contemporary and near-contemporary accounts: see chapter three above for Florentine examples.
 310

and gave the maiden many great blows. The maiden returned… to
Tristan, and when Tristan saw her he said, ‘Maiden, what is wrong?’
And she told him the entire affair. Tristan called on Governal to bring
his arms; he brought them at once and said, ‘Tristan, if you want to
fight all the knights of the kingdom of Logres, you will be very busy.’
Tristan answered and said, ‘This fight cannot be avoided.’916

Such behavior is not unusual for Sir Bruce, who has a reputation for attacking maidens

and treacherously killing unarmed knights. Indeed, when Tristan discovers Sir Bruce’s

identity, he greatly lamented his promise to show the defeated knight mercy.917 It is all

the more important then that Tristan stands by this promise, thus demonstrating his great

courtesy and loyalty (in this context defined as keeping one’s word). Like the exempla of

Yvain and Lancelot discussed above, Tristan serves as an excellent model of the

constancy required to be a good knight.918

Later in the same work Tristan, serving as King Anguin of Ireland’s champion

tasked with defending him against an accusation of treachery, engages in single combat

with Sir Blanor.919 Both knights show considerable prowess, but Tristan is ultimately

916
Tristano Riccardiano, 94/95-96/97: “A ttanto sì si parte la damigella… e cavalkoe infino a l’entrante del
bosco. Ed ebbe trovato uno cavaliere, ed egli sì disse: ‘Damigella, dami lo scudo.’ Ed ella disse: ‘Cavaliere,
certo non faroe.’ Allora sì le tolse lo cavaliere lo scudo e diede a la damigella molto grandi colpi. E la
damigella si tornoe… a Tristano. E Tristano, quando la vide, disse: ‘Damigella ke ài?’ ed ella sì gli disse lo
fatto. E Tristano sì chiamoe Governale e ffassi venire l’arme, ed egli sì glila portoe tantosto e dissegli:
‘Tristano, se ttue vuogli kombattere kon tutti li cavalieri de rreame di Longres, assai avrai ke ffare.’ E
Tristano rispuose e disse: ‘Questo non si puote vietare.’”.
917
Tristano Riccardiano, 96/97: Tristan said to Sir Bruce “’Kavaliere, egli conviene ke ttue sì mi dichi tuo
nome.’ E lo cavaliere rispuose e disse: ‘Fidatemi voi la persona ed io il vi diroe.’ Tristano disse: ‘Ed io sì tti
la fido.’ E lo cavaliere disse: Io sono Brius sen<s> Pi<t>ié (sic.).’ E quando Tristano udio suo nome, no lo
vorrebe avere affidato per una cittade“; “‘Knight, you must tell me your name.’ The knight answered and
said, ‘Will you spare me? If so, then I will tell you.’ Tristan said, ‘Then I will spare you.’ And the knight
said, ‘I am Sir Bruce Sans Pitié.’ When Tristan heard his name, he would not have wanted to spare him, not
even for a city!’”.
918
Tristiano Riccardiano, 355 (211.15), 356 (211.38): In stark contrast to Tristan is the behavior of Sir
Bruce, who only shows courtesy when he is forced to through fear or the threat of violence.
919
Tristano Riccardiano, 96/97: “E lo ree Languis disse: ‘Io sono venuto a difendermi de lo tradimento
ond’io sono appellate, e sie kome leale cavaliere, impercioe k’io nonn-ebi colpa de la morte di quello
cavaliere, di cu’io sono incolpato.’ E Tristano sì rispuose e disse: ‘Ed io per lo ree Languis kosie ricevo la
 311

victorious over the other knight.920 Tristan follows this display by demonstrating great

courtesy and mercy in sparing Blanor’s life, a decision that demonstrates the hero’s

recognition of the defeated knight’s honor, demonstrated through his great prowess and

courtesy:

At this Tristan gave Blanor such a great blow on the head that
he fell to his knees at Tristan’s feet and then fell flat on his back.
Tristan said, ‘How is this, comrade, shall we fight no longer?’ And
the knight said, ‘By my faith, no, for I cannot.’ At this Tristan went
before King Acanor and the king of the Hundred Knights and said,
‘Lords, the knight has fought so well that no one can blame him.
For this reason I pray you to make peace between the knight and
me, and release King Anguin from the accusation that was made
against him.’921

Tristan, often the paradigm of ideal knighthood, exemplifies in this episode the desired

combination of reformative virtues alongside prowess and bravery. As a result, he is

singled out for significant praise by the two kings who judged the single combat: “Then

the two kings took counsel with each other and said, ‘Behold the best and most courteous

knight in the world, who seeks peace with a defeated man’”.922 The reform message

could not be any clearer.

battaglia, sì com’egli nonn-ebe kolpa a la morte de lo kavaliere’“; “King Anguin said,’I have come to
defend myself from the accusation of treachery made against me, and to act as a loyal knight, because I am
not guilty of that knight’s death for which I am blamed.’ Tristan spoke up and said, ‘And I for King Anguin
accept the battle, since he is not guilty of the knight’s death’”.
920
Tristano Riccardiano: The single combat is described on pages 98/99.
921
Tristano Riccardiano, 98/99-100/101: “A ttanto dà Tristano uno grande colpo a Blanor in su la testa, sì
ch’egli igli viene gionocchione a ppiede e pposcia vae rivescione in terra. E Tristano dice: ‘E come èe,
kompagnone, e non kombatteremo noi più?’ E lo cavaliere disse: ‘Per mia fé non, c<h>’io (sic.) non
posso.’ A tanto si ne viene Tristano dinanzi a lo ree Acanor ed a lo ree di Cento Cavalieri e dice: ‘Segnori,
lo cavaliere l’à sì bene fatta ke non si puote biasimare. Ed accioe vi priego ke voi dobiate mettere pace da
mee a lo cavaliere e deliberate lo ree Languis de la querella ke aposto igli fue.’”
922
Tristano Riccardiano, 100/101: “Allora si trasserono a cconsiglio li due ree e disserono: ‘Eco lo più
kortese cavaliere e lo migliore del mondo, ke vuole pace koll’uomo vinto.’”
 312

Another example from the Tristano Riccardiano of Tristan’s great magnanimity

and mercy occurs when he asks the King of Brittany to spare the lives of the knights and

inhabitants of the city of Agrippe, despite the King having to take the city by force. The

author tells us that the King spared them “for the sake of the knight (Tristan) who has

defeated Count Agrippe and taken this city through his prowess” [“per amore de lo

kavaliere, lo quale àe messo inn-isconfittura lo konte d’Agippi ed àe préssa questa cittade

per sua prodezza”].923 Tristan’s request is then an act of great courtesy and mercy, as the

laws of war gave the King of Brittany every right to destroy the city and kill the

inhabitants.

Likewise in the Tristano Panciatichiano Lancelot shows great magnanimity and

courtesy by sparing the lives of two knights whom he has defeated through his great

prowess. These knights “asked Lancelot for mercy, for the sake of his courtesy and his

923
Tristano Riccardiano, 234/235: “E quando fue a la cittade, e Tristano si andoe a lo ree e dissegli: ‘Ree,
ora prendete l’omaggio e la fedaltade da ttutta questa gente, la quale dee essere vostra per ragione. E io sì vi
priego ke voi sì dobiate loro perdonare quello ke ffato ànno incontra di voi.’ E quando lo ree de la Pititta
Brettagna intese queste parole, fue molto allegro e disse: ‘Kavaliere, questo faro io volentieri.’ E a ttanto si
andarono tutti li cavalieri d’Agippi a lo ree e ttutti igl’incominciarono a cchiedere mercede, k’egli dovesse
loro perdonare de la grande affensione, la quale eglino igl’avea fatta inkontra di lui per la loro follia. E
quando lo ree intese queste parole, fue molto allegro e ddisse: ‘Per mia fé, io non voglio già guardare alla
vostra follia, ma io sì vi voglio perdonare tutto quello ke voi fatto m’avete per amore de lo kavaliere, lo
quale àe messo inn-isconfittura lo konte d’Agippi ed àe pressa questa cittade per sua prodezza.’ E quando li
k[av]alieri d’Agippi inteserono queste parole, fuorono molto allegri e incominciarono molto a ringraziare lo
ree e Tristano di questo dono”; “When he reached the city, Tristan went to meet the king and told him,
‘King, accept now the homage and fealty of all these men, for it is rightly yours. And I pray you to forgive
them for what they have done against you.’ When the king of Brittany heard these words, he was very
happy, and said, ‘Knight, this I will gladly do.’ At this all the knights of Agippi went to the king and all
began to ask him for mercy, for his pardon for the great offenses which they had committed against him
through their own folly. When the king herad these words he was greatly cheered, and said, ‘By my faith, I
no longer wish to remember your folly; rather I forgive you everything you have done against me, for the
sake of the knight who has defeated Count Agrippe and taken this city through his prowess.’ When the
knights of Agrippi heard these words they were very relieved, and began to thank the kin and Tristan
heartily for this gift”.
 313

gentility, not to kill them”.924 The author tells us Lancelot “took great pity on them

because they were such valiant knights”.925 Again we see knights calling upon the honor

and courtesy of their fellow knight to encourage the victorious party to act in a proper and

honorable fashion. Lancelot for his part recognizes the bravery and honor of the defeated

knights and shows them mercy.926

In Rustichello da Pisa’s Il Vecchio Cavaliere (part of Il Romanzo Arturiano)927

the Old Knight shows mercy after defeating the cruel knight Karacados, sparing his life

in exchange for the return of a maiden he holds captive.928 The Old Knight also wishes to

know Karacados’s identity because he found him to be a knight of great power and

strength.929 When the Old Knight learns his name, they end their enmity and become fast

friends, as the Old Knight had long desired to joust against Karacados who was known

924
Tristano Pancitichiano, 332/333: “sich’ elli dimandano mercé a Lancialotto che no lli uccida per sua
cortesia e per sua gentilezza”.
925
Tristano Pancitichiano, 332/333: “Et Lancialotto n’ ebbe pietade perch’ ellino erano così pro’ cavalieri
ch’ elli perdonò loro”.
926
Lancelot shows great courtesy, magnanimity, and mercy several times in the text: see Tristano
Panciatichiano, 334/335 for Lancelot’s mercy toward the host (the knight who guards the bridge) and
384/385 for the mercy he shows Mador. Tristan likewise demonstrates his great courtesy and mercy
throughout the text: see 314/315 and 546/547, among other examples.
927
Rustichello da Pisa’s great work the Compilation, surviving only in fragments, included editions in
French with emendations of Il Vecchio Cavaliere, Gli Egregi Fatti del Gran Re Meliadus (Roman de
Meliadus), and Il Girone il Cortese (Guiron le Courtois). References in this chapter to Il Vecchio Cavaliere
and the Roman de Meliadus come from the combined edition edited and translated by Fabrizio Cigni under
the title Il Romanzo Arturiano di Rustichello da Pisa, op. cit. n.135. Cigni’s edition is based on the
manuscript fr. 1463 of the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris which appears to contain only part of Gli Egregi
Fatti del Gran Re Meliadus and none of Il Girone il Cortese. These two lengthy texts are available thanks
to slightly later manuscripts and will be included in a later version of this project.
928
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 306 (336.6-7): “Karacados, vedendosi così a mal partito, ebbe una grana paura di
morire, e disse: ‘No, nobile cavaliere, per pietà! Non mi uccidete, ma lasciatemi in vita, e vi renderò la
damigella.’ ‘Vassallo’, fece l’altro, ‘se mi consegnate la damigella, vi salverò la vita’”; “Karacados, seeing
how badly it was going for him, had a great fear of death, and said: ‘No, noble knight, for pity! Do not kill
me, but let me live, and I will return the damsel to you.’ ‘Vassal’, said the other, ‘if you hand over the
damsel, I will allow you to live”. NB: all English translations from this work are my own.
929
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 306 (33.7): The Old Knight asked Karacados “Ma voglio anche sapere chi siete,
perché in voi ho trovato una potenza e una forza straordinarie”; “But I would also like to know who you
are, because in you I have found extraordinary power and strength”.
 314

for his great prowess.930 Clearly the path to an honorable peace and perhaps a friendship

is the demonstration of courtesy and mercy after the conclusion of armed combat

between two knights.

In another of Rustichello’s works, the Roman di Meliadus (Il Romanzo

Arturiano), Galahad (Galeat) agrees to spare the life of Elis il Rosso in exchange for the

release of several Knights of the Round Table and Elis’s promise to never again attack

Arthur’s knights: “‘Elis’, said Galahad, ‘I want to tell you this: if you want to save your

life, you must immediately free Lamorat and Blioberis, and you must swear to us

solemnly on the words of the Lord that you will never vex the knights of Arthur”.931 Elis

quickly agreed, settling the emnity between them and allowing for the release of the

captive knights. Another example of mercy from the same text is provided by Perceval,

who spares the life of Argondres after the latter begs for mercy and offers his sword to

the victorious knight, an act of ritual surrender: “Argondes, seeing himself so close to

death, was taken by a great fear. And he said, ‘Noble knight, don’t kill me, but have pity

on me! I consider myself defeated, and I offer you my sword: take it”.932 In a formula that

is consistently repeated in these works, Perceval demonstrates his bravery and prowess

930
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 306 (33.9-10): “‘Signore,’ rispose, ‘mi chiamo Karacados, e sono un cavaliere di
infimo rango, né so se mai udiste parlare di me.’ ‘Sì, signor Karacados, di voi ho già sentito parlare molte
volte’, fece il Vecchio Cavaliere”; “’Lord’, he responded, ‘My name is Karacados, and I am a knight of
very low rank, I don’t know if you have ever heard anyone speak of me.’ ‘Yes, Sir Karacados, I have heard
speak of you already many times,’ said the Old Knight”.
931
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 316 (70.21): “‘Elis’, fece Galeat, ‘voglio dirti questo: se vuoi salva la vita, devi
liberare subito Lamorat e Blioberis, e ci devi giurare solennemente sulla parola del Signore che mai più
darai fastidio ai cavalieri del re Artù.’”.
932
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 339 (147.5-7): “Argondes, vedendosi così vicino a morire, viene preso da una
granda paura. E gli dice: ‘Nobile cavaliere, non uccidetemi, ma abbiate pietà di me! Mi ritengo sconfitto, e
vi offro la mia spada: prendetela”.
 315

before showing great courtesy and mercy: “Perceval decides to spare him, therefore he

takes his sword and makes him [stand up]”.933

Indeed, the very best knights show courtesy and mercy even when they have the

opportunity to punish a mortal enemy. For example, in the Tristano Panciatichiano

Palamedes makes clear his great courtesy and respect for Tristan when he tells a knight-

errant (who actually happens to be Tristan) that even if he had a chance to kill the

eponymous hero he wouldn’t do it, despite his mortal hatred. Palamedes tells the knight-

errant, “In truth… I’ll tell you a marvel that Tristan would not believe: know that if I had

him right where I have you now and if I had the power to put him to death, so help me

God, I would not do anything to him. Instead, I would let him live because of the great

deeds of chivalry that are in him”.934 Palamedes great respect for Tristan’s chivalry

overrides his animosity, providing a control on his violence. Again, the reform currents at

work here do not seek to delegitimize knightly violence, but rather to limit its excesses.935

Condemning Dishonorable Conduct

A parallel reform theme consistently appearing in chivalric literature is the

condemnation of dishonorable conduct in armed combat. Knights often fail to show the

933
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 339 (147.8): “Perceval al vedere ciò decide di risparmiarlo, quindi prende la sua
spada e lo fa rialzare”.
934
Tristano Panciatichiano, 464/465: “Certo… io vi dirò già una meraviglia che Tristano no llo
crederebbe. Sappiate che s’io tenesse lui sicome io tengo voi et io avesse podere di lui mettere a morte, cosi
m’aiuti Idio, come io non vel metterei niente, anzi lo lasserei vivo per le grandi cavallarie che sono in lui”.
935
The reform efforts discussed in this chapter are focused primarily upon the excessive violence of the
knightly elite. Other ‘reformers’ concerned themselves with different kinds of excess. For example,
Giovanni Boccaccio criticized the profligacy of the knightly class in his Decameron, see A. Barbero, “I
Modelli Aristocratici”, 239-255.
 316

courtesy and restraint required to temper their prowess.936 Such dishonorable conduct,

usually fueled by uncontrolled pride, can be defined broadly as any action that takes

unfair advantage of another member of the chivalric elite, even if he is your enemy. Most

often this takes the form of a mounted knight riding down an enemy who is on foot,

attacking an unarmed enemy knight, and striking a knight from behind or in a manner

that does not allow the enemy to properly defend himself.

Reformers considered the act of riding down an enemy on foot while mounted to

be improper conduct caused by a lack of courtesy, as courtesy presupposes a recognition

of the honor of both parties in a conflict. As a result, demonstrating the dishonor attached

by the chivalric elite to such conduct is one of the reformative themes prevalent in works

of imaginative literature. For example, when Sir Agravain challenges Tristan in the

Tristano Panciatichiano to “at least do as an errant knight should and descend to the

ground, because no armed [and mounted] knight should fight with one who is on foot”,

Agravain is echoing a reform theme that appears consistently in chivalric literature.937

The message is clear: an honorable knight will dismount and ensure a fair fight against a

fellow member chivalric elite. As the eponymous hero of this romance, Tristan

immediately complies.

Indeed, later in this same work Tristan’s reaction upon seeing Palamedes knocked

from his horse by Hector essentially encapsulates reform doctrine in chivalric literature:

936
In Italian chivalric literature the character Breus-senza-pieta is most often associated with great prowess
but a distinct lack of courtesy. See… For an interesting exception to this rule that sees a reformed Bruce,
see the Roman de Palamedés, which circulated Italy by 1240 in French and received a Tuscan vulgarization
later in the century. Only part of the original French text and accompanying Italian vulgarization survives:
Dal Roman de Palamedés ai cantari di Febus-el-Forte, op. cit. n.647.
937
Tristano Panciatichiano, 430/431: “ma tanto fate come cavalieri errante che voi ascendiate in terra, ché
nullo cavalieri armato non de’ combattere con quello che sia a piedi”.
 317

“And when [Tristan] sees the blow with which Hector had unhorsed [Palamedes], he said

to himself that he would not allow any villainy to be done to him nor that he would stay

long on the ground without a horse, nor should any gentleman have to suffer staying on

the ground [during combat]”.938 Examples of honorable conduct provide a useful contrast

to the scalding criticism leveled at the preponderance of instances of treachery and

villainy. A powerful example appears in the same work (Tristano Panciatichiano) when,

during the tournament at Loverzep, the King of Gaul sacrificed himself in order to save

Tristan from being captured or trampled in the middle of the melee. With the King of

Gaul’s horse Tristan was able to escape the fray and the clutches of Lancelot and King

Arthur.939 The audience is left with no doubt that the King of Gaules did a “thing that was

held to be of great worth”.940 Through this courageous act King Gaul shows his great

courtesy and wins much praise and honor.

Rustichello da Pisa’s Il Vecchio Cavaliere provides a knight who shares many

similarities with the model knights discussed above. Indeed, the honorable conduct of

Branor (the Old Knight) is striking. For example, his great courtesy leads him to give up

his advantage in battle by dismounting after knocking his opponent, Karacados, from his

horse. Rustichello writes,

The Old knight, when he saw that he could not go forward without hitting

938
Tristano Panciatichiano, 630/631: “E quando elli vede lo colpo onde Estor l’avea abattuto, elli disse a
sé medesimo ch’elli non sofferà che villania li fusse fatta né non dimora guari a terra da cavallo, né nullo
produomo non doverebbe sofferire di stare a terra”.
939
Tristano Panciatichiano, 616/617: “ch’elli discese inmantenente del suo destrieri in mezzo della
battaglia e dise a messer Tristano, ‘Sire, montate su questo cavallo ché io non vi posso fare altro bene a
questo punto che questo’”; “he immediately descended from his charger in the middle of the battle and said
to Sir Tristan, ‘Sir, mount up on this horse because I cannot do anything else to help you at this point,
except this.’”.
940
Tristano Panciatichiano, 616/617: “fece un facto che li fu recato a grande bontà”.
 318

him (i.e. riding him down), said that God never permitted that he ride down
a knight that was on foot, when he was on horse (i.e. mounted). Therefore he
dismounted immediately… The Old Knight, after dismounting from his horse,
grabbed his shield and grasped his sword, and directed himself toward
Karacados who waited for him.941

Rustichello emphasizes the praise and honor associated with ensuring a fair fight between

the two knights, even if one of the parties did not seem to deserve such honorable

treament because of his own prior conduct (as was the case here with Karacados or

elsewhere with Bruce). The very best knights in chivalric literature refuse to deviate from

the proper conduct outlined by reformers: Branor goes so far as to argue that God forbids

a mounted knight to fight against one who is on foot.942

In the Roman de Meliadus Palamides and Beord demonstrate great courtesy by

dismounting from their horses after knocking their enemies from their saddles:

Just as you heard the jousts took place between all those knights. Those that
were unseated then lifted themselves up, put hand to sword and took up the
shield. Palamedes and Beord, remained on horseback, until they saw that their
companions were going to fight… they did not want to remain in the
saddle, and so they dismounted instantly putting forward their shields and
raising their swords.943

941
Il Romanzo Arturiano di Rustichello da Pisa, 305 (32.10-12): “Il Vecchio Cavaliere, quando vide che
non poteva andare avanti se non battendosi, disse che mai Dio avrebbe permesso che egli si battesse contro
un cavaliere che fosse a piedi, stando lui a cavallo. Perciò smontò subito… Il Vecchio Cavaliere, dopo
essere sceso da cavallo, imbracciò lo scudo e impugnò la spade, e si diresse verso Karacados che lo stave
aspettando.”.
942
Il Romanzo Arturiano di Rustichello da Pisa, 305 (32.10-11): “Il Vecchio Cavaliere, quando vide che
non poteva andare avanti se non battendosi, disse che mai Dio avrebbe permesso che egli si battesse contro
un cavaliere che fosse a piedi, stando lui a cavallo”.
943
Il Romanzo Arturiano di Rustichello da Pisa, 335 (136.1-3): “Così come avete udito si svolsero le
giostre di tutti quei cavalieri. Coloro che erano stati disarcionati poi si rialzarono, misero mano alla spade e
imbracciarono lo scudo. Palamides e Beord, rimasti a cavallo, quando videro che i compagni avevano
intenzione di combattere, non vollero rimanere in sella, e smontarono all’istante mettendosi davanti gli
scudi e alzando le spade”.
 319

This author clearly agrees with his counterparts that honorable and courteous knights

should always seek to ensure a fair fight with their enemies.

Such examples of honorable conduct provide a stark contrast to the dishonorable

actions of many knights in chivalric literature. In a telling episode of the Tristano

Panciatichiano Palamedes is forced to defend himself on foot against a mounted knight:

“Then he (the knight) touches his horse with his spurs and gallops toward Palamedes,

even though he was mounted… [Palamedes] said chivalrously, ‘If you don’t get off, I’ll

kill the horse and you’ll have dishonor and shame.’”.944 When the knight refuses to show

the expected courtesy and dismount, Palamedes kills his horse. His subsequent berating

of the offending knight is worth examining: “Ah, Knight! You have made me act

villainously and dishonorably, may God save me, because you made me kill your horse.

The blame is not mine at all; instead, it is yours. But nonetheless, it turned out well for

me so that because of this deed you have as little honor as I, nor do you have a greater

advantage over me. You are on foot and so am I. Now let’s see how you do”.945

Palamedes reaction shows first that killing a horse is normally considered

dishonorable; knights are encouraged to respect the majestic (and expensive) animals that

are perhaps the greatest manifestation of the social and physical dominance of knights.

Second, to ride down an unhorsed knight is considered villainous and dishonorable

because it provides the attacker with a significant advantage. It is also important to note

944
Tristano Panciatichiano, 526/527: “Allora toccha lo cavallo degli sproni e corre inverso Palamides tutto
così a cavallo com’elli era… Elli [Palamides] disse da cavalieri, ‘Se voi non discendete, io ucciderò lo
cavallo e si arete onta e vergogna.’”.
945
Tristano Panciatichiano, 526/527: “Ai, cavalieri! che voi m’avete fatto fare villania, se Dio mi savli, e
disnore, ché vostro cavallo m’avete fatto uccidere. Lo biasimo non è mica mio, anzi è vostro. Ma di tanto
m’è bene avenuto che voi di questo fatto avete così poco honore com’io né maggiore avantaggio di me. Voi
sete a pidi e io altresì. Ora si parà come voi farete”.
 320

that Palamedes’s adversary was of humble origin (he was a serf), having been raised to

knighthood along with his brother by the king of the Vermillion City. Over time these

former serfs drove from the king’s service all of the noble knights of the kingdom, before

treacherously killing the king and claiming lordship for themselves.946 The base origin of

these evil knights suggests an important connection between a lack of nobility and

discourteous and dishonorable conduct.947 A noble knight is expected to dismount and

ensure a fair fight against another honorable and worthy knight. The very best knights,

like Tristan and Lancelot, even do this for the knights who would never reciprocate.948

A second theme prevalent in chivalric literature is the honor earned by a knight

who refuses to attack an unarmed enemy. The very best knights (eg. Tristan, Lancelot,

Febus-el-Forte) rarely fail to demonstrate great courtesy in refraining from such

despicable conduct. Honorable conduct is greatly praised by other knights. More

importantly, they serve as exemplars for real knights who are encouraged to follow their

model conduct.

In the Roman de Palamedés, Febus-el-Forte, one of the best knights of the golden

age of knighthood (pre-Arthurian), refuses to attack an enemy knight (the King of

946
For the story of the serf knights and the king of the Vermillion City, see Tristano Panciatichiano,
504/505-534/535.
947
Despite their lack of courtesy and history of treacherous and dishonorable conduct, Palamedes readily
admits that the serf knight and his brother are valiant and full of prowess: see Tristano Panciatichiano,
528/529-530/531.
948
For example, in Tristano Panciatichiano (552/553-554/555), Tristan asks Palamedes to spare the life of
Bruce, despite his incredibly villainy and history of dishonorable conduct, for “the honor of chivalry”- “per
honore di cavallaria”. This should be contrasted with the observation that men of humble origin often show
great prowess: See Dinadan’s argument with Gariet about lineage and knighthood: Tristano
Panciatichiano, 542/543: Dinadan rebukes Gariet saying, “Et di ciò che voi avete parlato che voi sete
migliore cavalieri di me, voi non dite mica verità. Ma sicome io credo voi sete di migliore lignaggio che io
non sono, ma migliore cavalieri non sete voi micha”; “And what you said aboutbeing a better knight than I
– you haven’t even said the truth even though I believe that you are of a better lineage than I am, but you
are not at all a better knight”.
 321

Organia) because he is unarmed. Febus recognizes that to do so would be to commit a

dishonorable action and thus incur shame. He is quick, however, to inform his enemy that

if he had been armed, he would be dead: “King of Organia, know that if you were armed,

I would have killed you right now: but because I have found you disarmed, I will not kill

you immediately, because it serves me; great shame comes from killing an unarmed

man“.949 It is not lost on the discerning reader of the Roman de Palamedés that Febus’s

honorable treatment of the King of Organia is later held up to Bruce as an example of the

noble conduct becoming of a great knight by a former knight-turned-hermit.950

Likewise, in the Tristano Riccardiano, Tristan show his great understanding of

proper knightly conduct by explaining to his guardian and tutor (Governal) that he would

be on the side of justice if he sought vengeance against two knights who attacked Gedis,

a knight of Cornwall, while he was unarmed. The anonymous author writes,

“Then Governal said, ‘By my faith, Gedis, you were not wise, when you
tried to lead off the knights errant by force. And therefore, Tristan, I do
not advise you to fight with the knights, for you must fight on the side of
right, and if you fight the knights for this reason, it seems to me that you
will be fighting on the side of wrong.’ And Tristan said, “I would not be
fighting on the side of wrong, since he (one of the kngihts) wounded Gedis,
who was unarmed.’”.951

949
Roman de Palamedes, 125: “Re d’Organia, or sappi che se ttu fussi armato, io t’ucidrei oraindiritto: ma
però che t’ò trovato disarmato, non ti ucidrò cussi tosto, ché troppo mi sere; onta grande d’ucidere homo
disarmato”.
950
Roman de Palamedes, 127: “e perch’elli lo trovò disarmato, non lo volse elli ucidere a quell punto”;
“and because he found him disarmed, he did not want to kill him at that point“.
951
Tristano Riccardiano, 82/83: “Allora disse Governale: ‘Per mia fé, Ghedin, tu nonn-ieri ben savio,
quando tue per forza volei menare li cavalieri erranti. E impercioe Tristano io non ti consiglio ke ttue
kombatti co li cavalieri, impercioe che tue dèi combattere la ragione, e sse tue per questa cagione combatti
co li kavalieri, a mee pare che tue combatti lo toro.’ E Tristano disse: ‘Io non kombatto lo torto, dappoi
k’egli <à> (sic.) e fedito Ghedin k’iera disarmato.’”.
 322

While it is true that Gedis had provoked the attack by trying to lead the two knights by

force to King Mark’s court, the shame incurred by attacking an unarmed knight far

outweighed Gedis’s own discourtesy and presumption. Again, the reform message is

clear.

In the early-fourteenth century Tuscan prose romance La Legenda e Storia di

Messere Prodesagio (ca.1315-1340)952 we see the same ideal emphasized when

Filippone d’Ungheria, the younger brother of King Ugo of Hungary, traveled unmolested

across the battlefield in search of Prodesagio. He was left alone because “this was

custom, that the Saracens and the Christians did not hurt any nobleman that travelled

unarmed through a battle”.953 This practice is presented as so widely recognized that even

Saracen knights and nobles treated unarmed knights honorably.

In Il Vecchio Cavaliere the Old Knight (Branor il Bruno) halts the march of his

army and refuses to lead them into battle when he learns that the enemy troops are not

armed and prepared. As one of the flowers of the golden age of chivalry and knighthood

(i.e. the generation before Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table), Branor knows

that a knight should be courteous and ensure that all conditions are equal before battle is

initiated. Indeed, Branor considered it “a great cowardice” (una gran viltà) to enter the

field of battle while the enemy was still unarmed. The didactic purpose of this episode is

highlighted when the author asks rhetorically why Branor did not exploit his advantage to

952
For the debate on the date of composition, see La Legenda e Storia di Messere Prodesagio, vii, xci-xciv.
953
La Legenda e Storia di Messere Prodesagio, 43: “era questa usanza, che lli saracini e gli cristiani non
facevano male a niuno donzello che andase disarmato per la battaglia”.
 323

attack his unarmed enemy.954 Branor’s courtesy is so great that he waited to join the

battle until all of the enemy knights were engaged.955 The lesson to be learned, of course,

is that the greatest knights extend courtesy to their peers, even among the enemy. Such

courtesy prevents an honorable knight from taking undue advantage of a fellow knight.

Again it is useful to contrast the above positive examples with an example of the

great dishonor incurred by a knight who fails to demonstrate proper conduct. In La

Legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio the main antagonist of the work, Andrea da

Pontieri, committs the first of a series of dishonorable actions when he ambushes Ciattivo

da Inamieri, the duke of Vienna. While there seems to be a certain ambivalence in

chivalric literature toward ambushes, which were common in actual warfare, Andrea’s

conduct in riding down and killing the unarmed and dismounted Ciattivo is clearly

dishonorable.956 Indeed, this act of treachery and impropriety initiates the cycle of

vengeance and violence that dominates the rest of the romance. The connection between

dishonorable conduct and the desire or need to secure vengeance is clear.

954
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 303 (22.8-10): “E sapete perché il Vecchio Cavaliere li fece fermare in tal modo?
Perché volle essere generosos; egli aveva visto infatti che né la sua gente erano ancora pronti, e gli sarebbe
parsa una gran viltà entrare in campo mentre gli avversari erano ancora disarmati. Per questo motive il
cavaliere li aveva fatti fermare, perché quelli potessero prepararsi”; “And do you know why the Old Knight
made his men stop in this way? Because he wanted to be generous [i.e. courteous]; he had seen in fact that
[the enemy] was not yet ready, and it seemed to him a great cowardice to enter the [battle]field while the
adversary was still unarmed. For this reason [Branor] stopped [his men], so that those men [of the enemy]
could prepare themselves“.
955
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 303 (22.20): “Il Vecchio Cavaliere aspettava a buttarsi nella mischia, perché
voleva che vi fossero coinvolti tutti i cavalieri del conte”; “The Old Knight waited to throw himself into the
fight, because he wanted [to make sure] that all of the knights of the count were engaged”.
956
La Legenda e Storia di Messere Prodesagio, 7: “e quando [Ciattivo] Inamieri volea scendere del
palafreno e voleva montare in sullo destriere, inanzi che discendesse Andrea giunse e fedillo dinanzi, sì che
lli passò la giuba e lla camicia e andò per lo petto sì velenosamente che llo battè in terra morto dello
palafreno”; “and when Inamieri wanted to dismount from the palfrey and wanted to mount the destrier, so
that he descended before Andrea arrived and struck him down, so that is passed through the tunic and the
shirt and went into his chest venomously so that he fell to the ground from the palfrey dead“.
 324

The difficulties facing individuals invested in reforming real knights and arms

bearers have been stressed throughout this chapter. These difficulties often appear in

efforts to reform literary knights, such as Bruce, as well. On occasion, however, chivalric

literature provides an example of a knight who has been successfully reformed. In the

Romanzo Arturiano of Rustichello da Pisa, Tristan seeks to reform a certain Signore della

Rocca. In this exchange Tristan, representing ideal knighthood, instructs the other knight

how he should comport himself. Tristan begins by criticizing the Signore della Rocca for

his desire to attack his enemy who is unarmed: “So I want to tell you that this time you

better not involve yourself [i.e. meddle] in this matter; he is unarmed, and you are armed,

therefore you cannot touch him without receiving dishonor, if you claim to be a knight

errant. Indeed you know how true is that which I say”.957 Tristan immediately points out

the great dishonor the Signore della Rocca will receive if he engages in such base

conduct.

The Signore della Rocca, who perhaps represents a more realistic brand of

knighthood, responds to Tristan by asserting his right to attack and kill an enemy

wherever he meets him: “If he is my enemy, it is necessary for me to attack him wherever

I meet him, and put him to death, if I can”.958 Tristan bluntly replies that such

dishonorable behavior will have serious consequences as any knight errant who sees

another knight treacherously attack an unarmed enemy will be required to help the latter

957
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 323 (94.5-6): “Allora voglio dirvi che per questa volta fareste meglio a non
immischiarvi in questa faccenda; egli è disarmato, e voi avete le armi, perciò non potete toccarlo senza
riceverne dionore, se dite di essere un cavaliere errante. Sapete bene infatti quanto è vero ciò che dico”.
958
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 323 (94.7): “Se egli è mio nemico, è mio dovere assalirlo in qualsiasi luogo io lo
incontri, e metterlo a morte, se mi riesce”.
 325

and dishonor the former.959 When the Signore della Rocca persists in his defense of the

practicality of attacking and killing an unarmed knight, Tristan is left in disbelief: “But

how could you be so felonious as to kill an unarmed knight errant, when you are

armed?... In truth, this is not loyal [i.e. courteous] conduct, but very dishonest [i.e.

dishonorable]! And when I see that you are dishonest, I do not consider you a knight”.960

The intransigence of the Signore della Rocca is finally overcome by a

demonstration of force and courtesy on the part of Tristan, Palamedes, and a knight of

Leonis who take it upon themselves to defend the Signore della Rocca from a group of

six knights who are his mortal enemies. Rustichello regales the audience with details of

the heroes’ comprehensive victory before returning to the important reform theme. Once

Tristan and his friend have defeated the knights through their prowess, Tristan turns to

the Signore della Rocca and asks him what he would like them to do with his enemies.

The Signore della Rocca is surprised by Tristan’s courtesy and replies that because of

Tristan’s great example he has changed his ways and wishes for peace to be made

between him and his enemies.961 Moreover, he wishes to become a knight in the model of

959
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 323 (94.8): “Non lo farete, salva la vostra grazia, perché se un qualsivoglia
cavaliere errante vede che un cavaliere armato ne assale un altro disarmato per un motive qualsiasi, è suo
dovere correre in aiuto di colui che non ha armi, e disonoravi“; “Don’t do it, save your grace, because if
any knight errant sees that an armed knight is assailing another knight who is unarmed for any reason, it is
necessary for him to run to help he who is not armed, and to dishonor the armed knight ”.
960
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 323 (94.11, 94.13): “Ma come sareste davvero così fellone da uccidere un
cavaliere errante disarmato, quando voi siete armato?... In verita questo non è un comportamento leale, ma
molto disonesto! E quando vedo in voi la disonestà, non vi consider un cavaliere”.
961
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 323 (95.9-12): “Quando arrivarono al punto di averli sconfitti completamente,
Tristano si rivolse all’ospite: ‘Cosa volete che facciamo, signore, dei vostri nemici?’. Quello, felice in
sommo grado da non sapere quasi che cosa rispondere, riuscì solo a dire: ’Siano sottoposti al vostro volere,
non al mio’. ‘Tuttavia,’ chiese ancora Tristano, ‘che cosa vi piacerebbe che ne facessimo?’. ‘A dire il vero,
dal momento che avete fatto per me molto di più di quanto mi sarei meritato, vorrei, se vi aggrade, che
metteste pace tra noi, di modo che possiamo rimanere amici, e che la discordia che per tanto tempo ha
regnato tra noi abbia fine, dato che abitiamo nella stessa contrada“.
 326

Tristan,962 a theme repeated by the author throughout the work with both Tristan and

Lancelot held up as ideal knights.963

A third theme considers the criticism and dishonor leveled at knights who attack

an opponent from behind or in a manner in which he is unable to defend himself. This

theme appears consistently in the literary evidence. Among the best known examples is

King Marco’s treacherous and cowardly attack on Tristan which ultimately leads to the

knight’s death and a cycle of vengeance that signals the end of chivalry.964 In the Roman

de Meliadus, King Marco strikes an unarmed Tristan in the back while the he is in Queen

Iseut’s room listening to her play the harp.965 Speaking through the mortally wounded

Tristan, the author roundly condemns the treacherous and dishonorable nature of the

attack and informs the audience that such conduct is punishable by the forfeit of a

knight’s chivalry and honor.966

962
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 323 (95.16, 95.18-20): “Per nulla al mondo mi converrebbe là tacere della mia
onta, e almeno sarò in grado di dire davanti al re chi è stato colui che mi ha sconfitto. E sapete perché
preferisco chiederlo a voi piuttosto che ai vostri compagni? Perché il danno che ci avete arrecato è stato più
grande di quello dei vostri due compagni; ciò mi dimostra il vostro valore di cavaliere, e mi rende più
desideroso di conoscervi!””.
963
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 332 (126.3): Rustichello, in reference to Tristano, writes “Il cavaliere che si
dimostrava così esparto e coraggioso nella battaglia, come vi ho appunto narrato, andava comportandosi in
modo esemplare”. Ibid, 349 (189.16): speaking of Lancelot to King Arthur King Karados says “Sire, anche
second me quel cavaliere oggi ha compiuto la più grande meraviglia che sia mai avvenuta ai nostri tempi.
Ci è stato oggi da guida e da modello”.
964
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 362 (235.7): When Lancelot learned of the death of Tristano he “impazziva dal
dolore, proclamò che quella sarebbe stata la fine del mondo. La morte di Tristano significava la morte della
stessa cavalleria”.
965
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 358 (222.2-4): “Un giorno Tristano era entrato nella sua camera, e la regina con
l’arpa suonava e cantava un lai che egli aveva compost. Ma Audret riuscì a sentirlo e andò a riferirlo al re
Marco, il quale non ebbe pace fino a che non colpì Tristano con una lancia avvelenata, che un tempo
Morgana gli aeva affidato. Tristano non aveva indosso armi, e il re poté colpirlo a morte alla schiena. E
appena l’ebbe colpito, fuggi, e non osò attenderlo”.
966
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 360 (227.8): “Terribile e atroce è stato il colpo che il re mi ha scagliato; tutto il
mondo ne è fatto vile, ed è stato privato di ogni cavalleria”.
 327

In the Tristano Riccardiano we learn that King Marco’s treacherous attack on

Tristano was not the first time he committed such a dishonorable action. Indeed, King

Marco killed his brother Pernehan in a similarly unchivalrous manner:

King Mark, seeing his brother go to the fountain and get off his horse to
drink, drew his sword and struck Pernehan on the head. Pernehan then
began to cry out for mercy, and even as he asked for mercy King Mark
killed him. King Mark returned to his lords at Tintagel in Cornwall. In
this way King Mark treacherously killed his brother Pernehan.967

This tradition of treachery is not unique to King Marco, as we have seen with Andrea da

Pontieri in La Legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio. King Marco, unlike Andrea da

Pontieri, comes to realize the great error of his ways when he is informed that Tristano

will never recover from his treacherous blow.

Tristan is the victim of another treacherous attack in the Tristano Riccardiano,

this time at the hands of Morholt, the King of Ireland. Morholt’s treachery is even more

egregious than that of King Marco because it occurred almost immediately after Tristan’s

victory in single combat and his gracious extension of mercy: “When Tristan pulled back

on his sword Morholt fell to the ground. He said to Tristan, ‘Do not kill me, for I admit

defeat. But I pray you to help me get into my boat.’ And Tristan said, ‘That I will gladly

do.’ Then Tristan took him and led him to the boat... [and] pushed it out into the water.

Then Morholt remembered a poisoned arrow which he had, and he turned and struck

967
Tristano Riccardiano, 2/3: “E lo ree Marco, vedendo andare lo fratello a la fonte, e vide Pernam lo quale
ismontoe a la Fontana per bere e lo re mise mano a la spade e ddiede a Pernam nel kapo. Allora Pernam
inkomincioe a chiamare mercede e, chierendo mercede, lo ree Marco l’uccise. E lo ree Marco tornoe a li
suoi baroni a tTintoil in Cornovaglia e in tale maniera uccise Pernam lo suo fratello lo ree Marco a
ttradimento”.
 328

Tristan in the thigh with it.”968 The audience is left with no doubt that Morholt’s

treacherous attack earned him great shame and dishonor, even more so because it was

committed after every courtesy and honor had been extended to him by Tristan.

In La Legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, Rinieri, king of Hungary, is the

victim of dishonorable and treacherous conduct when Ricceri, a Saracen knight whom

Rinieri has just defeated in single combat, uses magic to defeat Rinieri.969 While Rinieri

is ultimately saved from the magic, Prodesagio’s anger at the vile and treacherous

conduct of Ricceri is clear.970 As one of the greatest knights in the world, Prodesagio’s

aversion to such conduct is as good as an official condemnation. Moreover, the

description of Ricceri as a “uno disleale cavaliere” [“a disloyal knight”] suggests that

treachery and dishonorable behavior made a knight disloyal to chivalry itself.971 This, of

course, is not surprising when we learn that Ricceri is a member of the Maganza, a family

with a history steeped in treachery.

In the Romanzo Arturiano of Rustichello da Pisa, Elis il Rosso, nearly crazy with

rage after witnessing the defeat of his men, attacks Tristan treacherously from behind:

968
Tristano Riccardiano, 40/41: “E a lo tirare ke Tristano fece de la spada, e l’Amoroldo kadde a tterra. E
disse a Tristano: ‘No m’uccidere, k’io mi chiamo vinto. Ma io ti prieco ke tue m’aiuti andare ne la
navicella.’ E Tristano disse: ‘Questo farò io volontieri.’ Allora lo prese Tristano e menollo a la nave… e
Tristano sì lo spingea in mare. E l’Amoroldo si rikordoe d’una saetta atoscata k’egli avea e volgisi e
fferìone Tristano ne la koscia”.
969
La Legenda e Storia di Messere Prodesagio, 54: “E Ricceri vide che non poteva guadagnare sopra
Rinieri quella battaglia, anzi ne scapitava; allora si mise a fuggire verso lo castello, e Rinieri gli andava
correndo dietro e diceva: ‘Ai cavaliere cattivo, di cattivo legnaggio sè nato e ttu fugi’. E Ricceri sì mise
mano in una grande borsa ch’elli aveva allato e cavonne fuori una grandissima serpe ch’elli portava per
incantamento. E lla serpe andò inverso Rinieri gittando per la bocca fuoco; e se non fosse la buona arme
che Rinieri aveva, sarebbe morto del veleno che lla serpe gittava…”.
970
La Legenda e Storia di Messere Prodesagio, 54: “Quando messere Prodesagio vide che Rinieri none
aveva acquistato nulla di quella battaglia si fu molto adirato per la malvagità di quello cavaliere, che non
tradimento l’aveva vinto, ma non per sua bontà che in sé avesse”.
971
La Legenda e Storia di Messere Prodesagio, 55.
 329

“Then Elis, seeing his men so broken-down [defeated], nearly went mad with rage. With

a good lance in his hand, short and strong, he launched himself against Tristano and

struck him in the back so violently that he was carried to the ground”.972 While Tristan is

left unharmed, the knightly audience surely would have empathized with the anger and

outrage of Galeat [Galahad] and Palamedes, who witness this disloyal and cowardly

attack. Galeat was so moved by anger that “without delay he launched himself in that

direction [toward Tristan] with sword raised, and threw himself in the middle of them

[the enemy] like a lion among smaller animals”.973 Meanwhile Palamedes, “after having

seen the disloyal way Elis had struck Tristano, went forward until he reached him (Elis),

and with a blow so strong that it passed through the helm, the sword piercing his head

more than two inches”.974 The angry reaction of Tristan’s knightly friends is more than

justified given Elis’s treacherous and dishonorable conduct.

In some literary works, the best knights demonstrate an instinctual knowledge of

chivalry, allowing them to know the correct (ie. honorable) behavior required in a certain

circumstance despite a lack of training (as is the case with Prodesagio who demonstorates

a great knowledge of chivalric matters at the tender age of nine) or the temporary loss of

one’s faculties. At one point in the Tristiano Panciatichiano the epononymous hero is

wandering around the woods naked and seemingly insane after Isolde is taken away from

972
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 316 (70.5-6): “Allora Elis, vedendo i suoi uomini così malridotti, quasi non
impazzì dalla rabbia. Con in mano una buona lancia, corta e massiccia, si lanciò contro Tristano e lo colpì
alla schiena in modo così violento da portarlo a terra”.
973
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 316 (70.8): “L’ira di Galeat, al vedere Tristano a terra in tale pericolo, andò al
colmo; senza indugiare oltre si lanciò in quella direzione con la spada alzata, e si gettò in mezzo a loro
come un leone tra gli animali più piccoli”.
974
Il Romanzo Arturiano, 316 (70.13): “Palamides, dopo aver visto in che modo sleale Elis aveva abbattuto
Tristano, andò Avanti fino a raggiungerlo e con un colpo così forte gli trapassò l’elmo, infilandogli la spada
nella testa per più di due dita“.
 330

him and secured in a prison.975 Despite the loss of his faculties, Tristan is still very much

aware of the difference between honorable and dishonorable conduct. After watching Sir

Lamorat defeat five knights, a battle that has left him gravely wounded,976 Tristan

witnesses the base conduct of Sir Gawain, Lamorat’s mortal enemy, who prepares to

attack the wounded knight, despite his inability to defend himself.

In that moment, Sir Gauvain, who only wanted him dead… came along
and said, ‘Defend yourself, because it behooves you to die.’ And Lamorat
said, ‘I certainly cannot if I am not first healed of my wounds, and I pray
you not do me villainy.’ And Sir Gauvain said, ‘I have found you right
where I wanted you.’ ‘This would be great villainy,’ said Lamorat, ‘and
well you know it.’ Sir Gauvain said, ‘Now you will surely die!’ and
Lamorat defends himself as best he can and knows that he is about
to die”.977

Sir Gawain’s discourtesy is all the more striking in this case because, as Lamorat points

out to the dishonorable knight, “many, many times I would have been able to kill you, but

I spared you from death, you and your brothers. You know that I am not deserving of

death and whoever finds this out will hold you in low esteem”.978

Indeed, Lamorat fully expects the chivalric elite to find great fault with Gawain’s

dishonorable conduct. This accords with the functioning of honor in elite Florentine

society, as actions are judged by the collective based on an ideal model of behavior that

all knights should aspire to emulate. Tristan, who witnesses this exchange, instinctively
975
Tristiano Panciatichiano, 312/313-314/315.
976
Tristiano Panciatichiano, 314/315.
977
Tristiano Panciatichiano, 314/315: “A tanto vi venne messer Calvano che male di morte li volea… et
disse, ‘Difendetevi, ché morire vi conviene.’ Et Lamoratto disse, ‘Certo io non posso sé primo io non
guarisco di mie piaghe, e pregovi che villania non mi facciate.’ Et messere Calvano disse, ‘Io v’ò trovato
com’io voleva.’ ‘Questo serebbe grande villania,’ disse Lamoratto, ‘e vio lo sapete bene.’ Disse messer
Calvano, ‘Morto sete veramente!’ et vàlli sopra. Et Lamoratto si difende lo meglio che puote et conoscie
che morire li convenia”.
978
Tristiano Panciatichiano, 314/315: “Voi sapete che io sono istato più e più volte per voi potere uccidere,
e si v’ò perdonato la morte, et voi e li vostri fratelli. Sapete che di morte io non so colpevole, et chi lo
saperà lo vi porà in grande disnore”.
 331

knows despite his insanity that Gawain is in the wrong. When Sir Gawain lifted off

Lamorat’s helmet to cut off his head,

Tristan – who had seen this outrage done by Sir Gauvain wanted to do
to him, not because he recognized either of them – Tristan came with the
naked sword in his hand and gives him such a strong blow with the
sword on the helmet that he makes him fall to the ground so hard that
he doesn’t know if it is day or night, and he pulled off the helmet in
order to chop off his head. And Sir Gauvain saw that he was about to
be killed by a madman and screamed, ‘Have mercy! Don’t kill me!’
And Tristan didn’t know what he was saying. And Lamorat comes
to Tristan and bows to him and pays him great homage, begging him
to please give him that knight, for God’s sake and for love’s sake. And
Tristan left immediately, running off like lightning.979

While Tristan continues to serve as a model of ideal chivalry, in spite of his mental

infirmities, Lamorat also plays the role of exemplum in this incident when he shows

Gawain his great magnanimity and mercy.

Indeed, Lamorat is thought deserving of special praise because he has chosen to

show mercy to a knight who moments before had refused to do the same for him:

And Lamorat helps Sir Gauvain get up and said, ‘Be loyal, knight,
because you see that God has in this way shown you a great wonder,
and now I could do to you what you wanted to do to me.’ And Sir
Gauvain, who knows that [Lamorat] speaks truly and realizes his
plight and recognizes Lamorat’s goodness and courtesy, wanted to pay
him honor; but Lamorat didn’t want him to. And then they embraced
each other and made peace and went to an abbey.980
979
Tristiano Panciatichiano, 314/315: “Tristano (che questo oltraggio aveva veduto di messer Calvano, e
avea veduto la prima battaglia e vide questo grande oltraggio che messer Calvano li voleva fare, non perciò
ch’elli ne riconoscesse alcuno di loro), Tristano venne co lla spada nuda in mano et dàlli tale della spada
sopra l’elmo sì forte che lo fa cadere in terra sì grande che non sa s’è giorno o notte et trasi l’elmo di testa
per mozarli il capo. Et messer Calvano vide ch’elli era venuto a morte per uno pazzo e si grida, ‘Mercé!
non m’ucidere!’ Et Tristano non sapeva che si dicea. Et Lamoratto viene a Tristano e inchinalo e fàlli molto
honore che pregalo ch’elli piaccia di donarli quel cavaliere per Dio e per amore. Et Tristano si partìo
incontenente fuggendo come folgore”.
980
Tristiano Panciatichiano, 314/315: “Et Lamoratto rileva suso messer Calvano e disse, ‘Siate leale,
cavalieri, ché vedete che Dio v’à mostrato così grande meraviglia et ora potre’ io fare di voi quello che voi
volavate fare di me.’ Et messer Calvano che conosce che dice vero et conosce suo male inconcio e conosce
 332

In this way Lamorat demonstrates his great courtesy, recognizing Gawain’s honor which

makes him deserving of the special mercy which is reserved for members of the chivalric

elite.

Fighting Fairly

When a single combat has been agreed between two or more knights, there is an

expectation that the conditions of the formal combat will not change. The desire to ensure

a fair fight is less about turning warfare into a series of ceremonial single combats and

more about providing the ideal conditions for demonstrating a knight’s prowess and

eliminating any unfair advantages which would violate the honor of one or both of the

participants. Indeed, a fair fight is in many ways a manifestation of the mutual courtesy,

if not honor, recognized by each knight in the other. If another knight interrupts, he is

acting discourteously and dishonorably. Obviously ensuring a fair fight is not always

practical, or even desired by both participants, but nonetheless this idea circulated

chivalric circles. The willingness to fight fairly against one’s peers played an important

role in solidifying the chivalric identity and in theory created a privileged status for the

chivalrous during battle.

The Tristiano Riccardiano provides a useful example when Tristan expresses his

disbelief that Galehaut would allow his knights to intervene in their single combat.

Galehaut’s desire for revenge and the legitimacy of that vengeance are not in question, as

la bontà de Lamoratto e la cortesia sua, volleli fare honore; ma Lamoratto non volle sofferire. Et allora
s’abracciano e fanno buona pace et vannone ad una badia”.
 333

Tristan had some time earlier killed Galehaut’s parents after being forced to fight them

because of a local custom. Tristan believes Galehaut is far too noble to allow any

dishonorable or treacherous action to violate their fair fight:

When Galehaut saw his banner and his knights, he began to cry loudly
to Tristan, ‘By my faith, you are a dead man now, and cannot escape my
hand alive, for here are my knights come to kill you.’ Then my lord Tristan
answered him, saying, ‘I know very well that you are only saying
these words to frighten and unnerve me, for you are a knight so noble
and so valiant, that you would never by any means allow our battle to
be finished by any knights other than our two selves. Between the two
of us it was begun and by the two of us it must be finished; nor shall I
be on guard against any other knight but yourself’.981

Galehaut, who is recognized by Tristan as a very valiant and noble knight, immediately

takes these words to heart and orders his men to stay out of the contest.982 Tristan in turn

immediately acknowledges Galehaut’s great courtesy and apologizes for killing his

parents, explaining that while justified, he deeply regrets the event.983 The two knights

981
Tristano Riccardiano, 120/121: “E quando Galeotto vide la sua insegna e lli suoi cavalieri, sì
incommincioe forte a sgridare Tristano ed a dicegli: ’Per mia fé, or se’ tuo morto e di mia mano, né non
puoi kampare, ed eco li miei kavalieri che vegnono per ucciderti.’ Allora sì rispuose monsegnore Tristano e
dissegli: ‘Io soe ben eke voi non dite queste parole se nnoe per ispaventarmi e pper mettermi paura, ché voi
siete sì alto kavaliere e ssì prode, ke voi non soffereste per alkuna maniera di mondo ke <n>ostra battaglia
si disfinisse per altri cavalieri ke per noi due. E intra noi due fue incominciata e per noi due dee essere
disfinita; né già d’altro kavaliere io non prendere’ guardia se nnoe da voi.’”.
982
Tristano Riccardiano, 120/121: “Allora sì comandoe Galeotto a lo ree ke di queste kose e’ non si debia
intramettere più: ‘Lasciate finire la battaglia a noi due’”; “Then Galehaut commanded the king to meddle
no more in these things: ‘Let the two of us finish the battle.’”.
983
Tristiano Riccardiano, 120/121: “E ttanto vedendo Tristano la cortesia di Galeotto e ppensando la
grande affensione ch’egli avea fatta a llui, sì come d’uccidere suo padre e ssua madre, sì si fece innanzi
Tristano e ssì prese la spade e pporsela per lo tenere a Galeotto e dissegli: ‘Io vi priego, Galeotto, sì come
buono e leale kavaliere e ssie kome lo più alto principe del mondo, che voi mi dobiate perdonare vostro
maltalento. Impercioe ke cciò ch’io feci, sì lo feci per diliverare mee e la mia kompagnia’”; “When Tristan
saw Galehaut’s courtesy, and thinking of the great offense which he had done him in killing his father and
mother, he came forward and took his sword and held it out by the hilt to Galehaut, saying, ‘I pray you,
Galehaut, as a good and loyal knight and the noblest prince in the world, to forgive me your great anger.
For what I did, I did to free myself and my people’”.
 334

recognize one another’s great courtesy and bring their single combat to an amiable

conclusion.984

The Tristiano Riccardiano provides another example of this theme when Lancelot

interrupts the single combat contested between Maleagant and Lamorak. When

Maleagant saw Lancelot intervene, “he was very displeased, and said, ‘By my faith,

knight, you are not acting courteously, in not letting me conclude the battle I undertook

with this knight.’”.985 When Maleagant learned that the discourteous knight was Sir

Lancelot of the Lake, “he was very angry, and said, ‘By my faith, Knight, you are doing

the basest thing any knight ever did, in taking away my adventure. Therefore I pray you

to leave our battle to us’”.986 Lamorak likewise finds Lancelot’s intervention to be

dishonorable and discourteous: “By my faith, Lancelot, you are acting very basely in not

letting the two of us conclude the battle which we had begun. Now, by your courtesy, let

just the two of us fight, as we began the battle”.987 Even though Lancelot’s motivation for

intervening is praiseworthy (he sought to save the life of Lamorak), both of the

984
Tristiano Riccardiano, 120/121: “E Galeotto, intendendo queste parole e intendendo la cortesia di
Tristano e cconsiderando che avea lo peggio de la battaglia, disse Galeotto a Tristano: ‘Per tanto ti perdono
io, perch’io veggio ke ttu ssee di li mig[lio]ri cavalieri del mondo, e cconsiderando <tua> prodezza, sì tti
perdono tutto mio maltalento, sì come tu ài morto mio padre e mia madre.’ Allora sì si gittano ciasceduno
le targie di dietro a le spalle… e bracciansi insieme di grande amore intra ambi li cavalieri”; “When
Galehaut heard these words, and heard Tristan’s great courtesy, and reflected that he was getting the worst
of the battle, he said, ‘I forgive you, for I see that you are one of the best knights in the world. And in light
of your prowess I forgive you my grudge, for your killing of my father and mother.’ Then each threw his
shield behind his back… and the two knights embraced with great affection”.
985
Tristiano Riccardiano, 318/319: “fue molto doloroso e disse: ‘Per mia fé, cavaliere, voi non fate
kortesia, quando voi non mi lasciate menare a ffine mia battaglia, la quale io abo presa kon questo
cavaliere.’”.
986
Tristiano Riccardiano, 318/319: “fune molto dolente e disse: ‘Per mia fé, cavaliere, voi fatte la
maggiore villania ch’unqua fosse fatta per uno cavaliere, quando voi m’avete tolta mia Aventura, e
imparcioe vi priego che voi sì dobiate lasciarne nostra battaglia’”.
987
Tristiano Riccardiano, 318/319: “’Per mia fé, Lansalotto, voi fate molto grande villania, quando voi non
ci lasciate menare a ffine nostra battaglia, la quale noi avemo incominciata intra noi due. Ma ora lasciate
kombattere per vostra kortesia noi due, sì come noi avemo incominciata nostra battaglia.’”.
 335

participants in the single combat criticize the intervention as discourteous and

dishonorable.988

In the Tristano Panciatichiano we find an ideal single combat, organized and

undertaken by two honorable and courteous knights, Palamedes and Bliobleris. Despite

their deep animosity for one another, both knights ensure that all things are equal before

they fight.989

And the two knights agree to this because they were such gentlemen at arms
that at that time one could hardly have found two such good knights. Then
Bliobleris speaks and says, ‘Palamedes, which do you prefer, that we fight
on foot or on horseback?’ ‘In truth,’ replies Palamedes, ‘it’s better that we
fight on foot because we are not well-mounted.’ And Bliobleris says, ‘And
I completely agree with you; and so let’s get on with the battle because I
have seen no treachery here.’990

Again, it must be stressed that reformers were not seeking to delegitimize violence as a

means of deciding disputes or to turn combat on the battlefield into a series of staged

single combats. Rather, reformers sought to encourage knights to recognize and respect

988
For the battle between Lamorak and Maleagant, and Lancelot’s concern for Lamorak’s safety, see
Tristiano Riccardiano, pages 316/317-318/319.
989
Tristano Panciatichiano, 410/411: “Quando Palamides intende suo nome, elli si trae indirieto e molto si
meraviglia, et disse, ‘Briobreis, ora sappiate che io non vadi dimandando altro che voi. Et quando io qui
v’abbo trovato, io non vi dimando altro solamente che la battaglia.’ Disse Briobreis, ‘et so bene che voi sete
uno de’ buoni cavalieri del mondo. Et quando elli è sì che l’aventura n’à quie manati a trovare insieme,
giamai non dimandiamo che noi ci partiamo infino a tanto che l’uno di noi non è morto overo aontato oggi.
Questo giorno serà bataglia recata a fine’”; “When Palamedes hears his name, he steps backward, greatly
amazed. And he said, ‘Bliobleris, now you know that I wasn’t going around asking for anyone other than
you. And since I’ve found you here, I’m not asking you for anything except battle.’ Bliobleris said,
‘Certainly Palamedes, I ask nothing of you except battle, and I clearly know that you are one of the good
knights in the world. And since fortune has brought us together here, let’s never ask that we leave here until
one of us is dead or defeated today. This day out battle will be brought to an end’”.
990
Tristano Panciatichiano, 410/411: “Et a questo s’acordarono li due cavalieri, ché tanto erano
produomini d’arme che apena si serebero trovati a quel tempo così buoni due cavalieri. Allora parla
Briobreis e dice, ‘Palamides, quale ti piace più, o che noi combattiamo a pié o a cavallo?’ ‘Certo,’ risponde
Palamides, ‘meglio è che noi combattiamo a pié, che noi non siamo bene a cavallo.’ Et Briobreis dice, ‘Et
mio mi v’acordo molto volentieri. Et già fussimo noi ala battaglia che qui non abbo io veduto nullo
tradimento.’”.
 336

the privileged status and reciprocate the horizontal honor of their chivalric opponents by

fighting fairly. Only under these conditions could a dispute between two knights be

honorably resolved through violence and the privileged position of chivalric elite in battle

be protected.

The Failure to Live up to Ideal Standards

The high standards set by the literary exemplars of knighthood and explored in

our reform themes were based upon ideals that were often impossible to meet for literary,

let alone historical knights. As Richard Kaeuper has argued, any study of chivalry “takes

as a given the yawning gap between a knightly practice that is recoverable (if we only

look diligently) and the impossibly high ideals expressed for it in one major text after

another. This gap is unsurprising”.991 Nevertheless, as has been suggested throughout this

chapter and will be discussed in greater detail below in the conclusion, these reformative

ideas and romanticized ideals were current in the minds of the chivalric elite and those

who put them into practice received high praise from their peers and chroniclers. In

addition, their realization helped to solidify the corporate identity of the chivalric elite

and ensure a privileged position in combat.

In La Legenda e storia di Messere Prodesagio, the eponymous hero fails on

occasion to live up to the high ideals promoted by the author throughout the text. For

example, during single combat with Brunforte, king of the Turks, Prodesagio desires to

991
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 3.
 337

ride down his enemy who is fleeing on foot after his horse is killed: “the which horse

immediately fell down dead; and the Saracen Brunforte remained on foot, and Messere

Prodesagio wanted to run him down in order to kill him“.992 As we have seen above in

chapter three, riding down the enemy who is on foot is not all that uncommon,

particularly during the heat of battle. The authors of chivalric literature, however, are in

consensus that such behavior is unbecoming of a flower of chivalry.

Likewise in the Tristiano Riccardiano, the epononymous hero on occasion fails to

match the high ideals promoted in the text. For example, after Tristan and his companions

fled King Mark’s court into the wilds outside Tintagel, Tristan waited beside one of the

main roads for a Cornish knight to travel by. When two rode past on their way to

Tintagel, Tristan challenged them to a joust. After defeating the first knight, however,

Tristan refused to extend the expected courtesy and mercy to the defeated knight, instead

exercising extreme violence against him: “When Tristan had unhorsed him he

dismounted, cut off the knight’s head, and then mounted his horse again.”.993 While

Tristan perhaps tries to justify this dishonorable action by sending the other knight back

to King Mark’s court with his brother’s head in his hands as a message of defiance, this

hardly seems to be proper conduct from a model knight.994

992
La Legenda e Storia di Messere Prodesagio, 61: “…il quale cavallo immantanente cadde morto; e ’l
saracino Brunforte rimase a piede, e messere Prodesagio sì gli volle correre adosso per ucciderlo”.
993
Tristiano Riccardiano, 164/165: “E quando l’ebe abbattuto Tristano in terra del kavalo, e Tristano
ismontoe e ttagliògli la testa al cavaliere e pposcia rimonta a ccavallo.“.
994
Tristano Riccardiano, 164/165-166/167: “E quando Tristano vide quel kolpo, dissegli: ‘Cavaliere,
arenditi a mee.’ E lo cavaliere rispuose e disse ke ssì farà egli volontieri. E Tristano igli disse: ‘A ttee
konviene andare là dov’io ti manderoe.’ Ed egli disse ke ssì farae egli volontieri. Allora sì gli komanda
Tristano ked egli prenda la testa di suo frate in mano, e lo cavaliere la prende. E Tristano igli dice: ‘Vattine
a lo ree Marco e ssalutalo sì come [mio] mortale nemiko, e digli ke kosie kom’i’òe fatto di kostui, kosie
faroe di lui’”; “When Tristan saw that blow he said, ‘Knight, surrender to me.’ The knight said that he
would gladly do so. Tristan told him, ‘You will have to go where I send you.’ The knight said he would
 338

Later in the same text we find another example of Tristan’s failure to live up to

the lofty ideals he embodies earlier in the work when he refuses to show Lamorak of

Gaul (the knight at the fountain) courtesy, instead trying to force Lamorak to fight him to

the death. Lamorak has no desire to fight and immediately concedes the battle to Tristan,

but Lamorak’s surrender is refused: “When Tristan heard these words, he said, ‘By my

faith, Lamorak, your refusal will avail you nothing, for our fight is not over; therefore I

tell you to be on your guard, for I challenge you. I tell you this because I do not want you

to be able to say that I attacked you dishonorably.’”.995 When Lamorak continued to

refuse to fight:

Tristan struck Lamorak on the helm and gave him such a great
blow that Lamorak lost his sight, and did not know whether he was
alive or dead… After a pause, Lamorak said to Tristan, ‘By my faith,
Tristan, you do very wrong to attack me, for I no longer wish to fight.
Therefore I pray you not to strike me again, for I concede this battle to
you.’… Then Tristan at once struck him another blow with his sword
on Lamorak’s left shoulder… Seeing that he was losing all his blood,
[Lamorak] said, ‘By my faith, Tristan, I see now that you have struck
me twice when you should not; I never saw any knight who wanted
to kill all other knights, as you are doing. I want you to know, and I
tell you, that I will complain of you to King Arthur and to all the
worthy knights, that you wanted to kill me even as I was asking for
mercy.’.996

gladly do so. Then Tristan ordered him to take his brother’s head in his hand, and the knight took it. Tristan
told him, ‘Go to King Mark and greet him as my mortal enemy and tell him that I will do to him what I
have done to this man here’”.
995
Tristiano Riccardiano, 292/293: “E quando Tristano intese queste parole, disse: ‘Per mia fé, Amoratto, a
voi non vale neente vo[str]o disdire, ke noi non kompiamo nostra battaglia; e impercioe [vi dico] ke voi sì
vi guardiate da mee, impercioe k’io vi disfido, e impercioe il ti dico perch’io non voglio che [ttue possi
dire] k’io ti feggia [a ttra]dimento.’”.
996
Tristiano Riccardiano, 292/293-294/295: “Ed allora inco[ntane]nte Tristano [sì fedio] l’Am[oratto
so]pra l’elmo, e diedegli si gran[de co]lp ke l’Amoratto perdeo lo vedere e nnon sapea se fosse kamp[ato o
no]… E istando per uno poco, e l’Amoratto disse a Tristano: ‘Per mia fé, Tristano, voi avete troppo fallito
quando voi mi ferrite, dappoi ked io non voglio piue combattere, i impercioe vo priego ke voi non mi
dobiate piue fedire, impercioe ked io sì vi lascio questa battaglia.’ Ed allora incontanente Tristano sì ’l ferio
un altro kolpo de la spada sopra la sp<alla> sin[est]ra… vedendos’egli sì com’egli perdea tutto il sangue, sì
disse: ‘Per mia fé, Tristano, ora conosco io ben eke voi sì m’avete ferito due fiate e ssì kome voi non
 339

The author defends Tristan’s seemingly dishonorable conduct by reminding the

audience that Lamorak had earlier in the story betrayed the hero by sending King Mark

an enchanted drinking horn that allowed the king to discover Tristan’s affair with

Isolde.997 To make matters worse, this happened after Tristan had previously shown

Lamorak great mercy and courtesy.998 In the end, Tristan accepts Lamorak’s surrender

and peace is made between the two knights. There is even a suggestion that Tristan

regretted his earlier discourteous behavior, for when Lamorak learned of Tristan’s desire

for peace to be made between them:

he was quite overjoyed, and wanted to kneel at once before Tristan,

and offered him his sword by the hilt. But when Tristan saw that
Lamorak wanted to kneel before him and was offering him his sword,
he embraced him and said, ‘By my faith, Lamorak, you are not acting
courteously when you do me such honor, for it is not due to me. I pray
you for your own sake that from now on we should be comrades in
arms, and do our deeds of chivalry together.999

dovete, impercioe k’io non vidi unqua neuno kavaliere il quale volesse menare a morte tutti li cavalieri, sì
come fate voi. Ma io voglio che voi sappiate e ffovi assapere ked io sì mi richiameroe di voi a lo ree Arturi
ed a ttutti li buoni cavalieri, sì come voi mi volete menare a ffine, chiamandov’io mercede.’“.
997
For the story of the enchanted drinking horn, see Tristiano Riccardiano, 76/77-78/79.
998
Tristiano Riccardiano, 290/291-292/293: “… quando Tristano intese queste parole, fue molto allegro,
impercioe k’egli avea molto grande volontade di vederlo per amore del korno aventuroso, lo quale egli avea
mandato a ccorte, laonde la bella Isotta e molte altre dame e damiscelle ebero molto grande vercogna e
onta… Tristano disse a l’Amoratto: ‘Amoratto, per mia fé, ora se’ tue morto né da mee non puo’ tue
kampare in nessuna maniera… Impercioe ke ttue mandasti lo corno aventuroso a ccorte per mio dispetto,
ed io sì tti lasciai a li paviglioni de rree per kortesia, k’io non volli allora kombattere teco, impercioe ke a
mee parea ke ttue avessi fatto troppo d’arme… E ssì tti dico ked io ora non ti lasceroe più per cortesia in
nessuna maniera’”; “when Tristan heard these words [i.e. Lamorak’s name] he was overjoyed, for he was
very eager to see this knight on account of the enchanted drinking horn which he had sent to court, which
had brought such humiliation and shame to Isolde and to many other ladies and maidens… Tristan said to
Lamorak, ‘Lamorak, by my faith, you are a dead man now, nor will I let you live for any reason… for you
sent the enchanted horn to court to spite me, and I left you at the king’s tents out of courtesy, for I did not
want to fight you when it seemed to me that you had fought too much already… And I tell you that I will
by no means let you off out of courtesy now’”.
999
Tristiano Riccardiano, 294/295: “fue molto allegro a ddismisura e incontanente sì si volle inginochiare
davanti da llui, e pporsegli la spada per lo tenere. Ma quando Tristano vide ke l’Amoratto si volea
inginochiare davanti da llui e pporgiagli la spade per lo tenere, [e] Tristano lo prese in braccio e dissegli:
‘Per mia fé, Amoratto, v<oi> no fatte kortesia, quando voi mi fate tanto d’onore, impercioe che a mee non
 340

Tristan’s refusal to accept the honor done to him by Lamorak is a recognition by the hero

that his earlier dishonorable conduct did not warrant such displays of courtesy and honor.

It also suggests that Tristan had learned an important lesson, perhaps an exhortation to

Florentine knights and arms bearers to swallow their pride and do the same.

Another example drawn from the Tristiano Riccardiano confirms that also

Lancelot, on occasion, fails to live up to the high standards of reformed knighthood he is

supposed to embody. In this particular episode, Lancelot has intervened discourteously in

a single combat between Lamorak and Maleagant (as discussed above), which is being

fought to decide which lady is more beautiful between the lady of Orcanie and Queen

Guinevere.1000 When Lancelot discovers that Lamorak has identified the lady of Orcanie

as more beautiful, Lancelot’s self-control disappears in the face of extreme anger:

When Sir Lancelot heard these words he was very displeased and
said, ‘How is it, Lamorak, that you disparage my lady in this way?
By my faith, you have offended me very seriously.’ At once he
dismounted from his horse, took up his shield and drew his sword,
saying, ‘Knight, leave this battle to me, and I will fight it to the end,
for it is I who must defend my lady from all knights.’ When Lancelot
had spoken these words he went toward Lamorak with his sword
unsheathed and struck him… When Lamorak had received the great
blow that Lancelot had given him he was utterly furious… [Lancelot]
went to Lamorak again and struck him such a great blow on the
shield.1001

si konviene, ma io vi priego per amore di voi ke noi da ora innanzi noi sì dobiamo essere kompagnoni
d’arme e ffaremo nostre kavalerie insieme.”.
1000
Tristiano Riccardiano, 318/319: Maleagant informs Lancelot, “Cavaliere, noi sì combattiamo
impercioe ke l’Am<orat> sì dice ke la dama d’Orcania èe più bella dama ke nonn-èe madama la reina
Ginevra, ond’io kombatto ko llui per questa cagione”; “’Knight, we are fighting because Lamorak said that
the lady of Orcanie is a more beautiful lady than my lady Queen Guinevere. That is why I am fighting
him’”.
1001
Tristiano Riccardiano, 318/319: “Quando monsignore Lancialotto intese queste parole, fue motlo
dolente e disse a l’Amorat: ‘E ccome èe, Amorat, e andate voi dispregiando mia dama in cotale maniera?
Per mia fé, voi avete molto fallito e molto malvagiamente contra mee.’ E incontanente ismontoe da cavallo
 341

The base and discourteous nature of Lancelot’s attack is quickly criticized by Lamorak.

When Lamorak discovered that Lancelot still wanted to fight him, he quickly said, “‘By

my faith, Lancelot, these blows you have given me will surely be told before King

Arthur, for you have treacherously struck me twice.’”.1002 Lancelot’s cousin, Sir Ector,

confirms Lamorak’s judgment, telling Lancelot, “‘By my faith, cousin, you are not

courteous in fighting Lamorak over this adventure. I want you to drop the battle and fight

no more with him’”.1003 Lancelot eventually recognizes the wisdom of Ector’s counsel

and apologizes to Lamorak for his dishonorable conduct.1004 Lamorak in turn forgives

Lancelot, exhorting him not to “do such a base thing another time”.1005

As discussed above, Lancelot serves in the Tristano Panciatichiano as a model of

knighthood, surpassing Bors, Palamedes, and the Page with the Slashed Surcoat in his

courtesy and gentility, particularly in his treatment of Sir Bruce without Pity. Despite this

e imbraccioe lo scudo e mise mano a la spada e disse: ‘Cavaliere, ora lasciate a mee questa battaglia,
impercioe ch’io la voglio menare a ffine, perch’io debo difendere madama da tutti li cavalieri.’ E
quand’egli ebe dette queste parole, ed egli si andoe inverso l’Amorat ko la spada isguainata e ffedilo…
quando l’Amorat ebe ricevuto lo grande kolpo, lo quale Lancialotto igl’avea dato, fue molto doloroso a
dismisura… Ed allora incontanente si andoe inverso l’Amorat e ffedilo sopra lo scudo uno molto grande
colpo”.
1002
Tristiano Riccardiano, 318/319-320/321: “Per mia fé, Lancialotto, questi kolpi che voi m’avete dati
siranno ricontati davanti a lo ree Artù, sì come voi m’avete ferito molto malvagiamente per due fiate.”.
1003
Tristiano Riccardiano, 320/321: “‘Per mia fé, cuscino, voi non fate kortesia, quando voi kombattete ko
l’Amorat per questa Aventura. Ond’io voglio che voi sì lasciate questa battaglia e nnoe kombattete piue ko
llui”.
1004
Tristiano Riccardiano, 320/321: “E ora sì dice lo conto che, quando Lansalotto intese queste parole, si
fue molto allegro, impercioe k’egli sappea ben eke messer Estore dicea ve[rita]de di tutto quello k’egli
dicea e ssapea bene che e[gli era] molto savio cavaliere”; “Now the tale tells that when Lancelot heard
these words he was quite appeased, for he knew well that Sir Ector was speaking the whole truth, and he
knew him to be a very wise knight”; “E istando per uno [poco], Lansalotto disse a l’Amorat: ‘Am[orat, io
vi prie]go [che voi mi dob]iate perdonare di tutto quello [che io v’]òe fatto, im[percioe che voi] sappete
bene ked io sì debo difendere mada[ma in tu]tte parte a mio podere. Ed accioe voi non devetevi do[lere e]
crucciare per questa aventura’”; “After a moment, Lancelot said to Lamorak, ‘Lamorak, I pray you to
forgive me for all I have done to you; for you know very well that I must defend my lady everywhere, to
the best of my ability. Therefore you must not be angry with me over this adventure’”.
1005
Tristiano Riccardiano, 322/323: “per un’altra fiata voi non dobiate <fare> quella villania.”
 342

exemplary conduct, in the very same text Lancelot fails, on occasion, to live up to the

high standards he sets for his fellow knights. In one such episode, the King of Norgales

and his knights, passing the night at the same abbey as Lancelot, belittle Lancelot’s

prowess and claim that they can defeat him in combat.1006 When Lancelot learns of their

boasts and scorn he “was very angry about them and thinks all night long about getting

up early to be able to test himself with those knights of the king”.1007 Lancelot was so

angry, in fact, that he killed many of the king’s knights during the battle. The author tells

us that Lancelot “routed them all, and he who could best flee and escape was the

wisest”.1008 Later during the tournament at Loverzep, Lancelot once again fails to control

his anger charging “at Sir Tristan as fast as his horse [could] go, and he [was] completely

unrestrained in this joust because he believed in all certainty that this was Palamedes”.1009

The possible consequences of uncontrolled knightly violence can be easily

discerned from this and other similar examples, even if these episodes are concerned

exclusively with acts of violence perpetrated by members of the warrior elite against one

another. Indeed, in the very same tournament, both Palamedes and Lancelot show a lack

of restraint when they meet one another on the field of battle, motivated by “great anger

1006
Tristano Panciatichiano, 334/335: “e lo re li li contendeva e diceva che non era così pro e anche disse,
‘Io òe in mia masnada e in mia compagnia .v. che qualunque fusse l’uno elli derebbe a fare a Lancialotto et
lo metterebbe al di sotto’”; “And the king contradicted him, saying that he was not so valiant, and he even
said, ‘I have in my band and in my company five [knights], any one of which would be able to give
Lancelot a good fight and defeat him’”.
1007
Tristano Panciatichiano, 334/335: “funne tutto adirato e pensa tutta la notte di leversi per tempo per
potersi provare con quelli cavalieri del re”.
1008
Tristano Panciatichiano, 334/335-336/337.
1009
Tristano Panciatichiano, 614/615: “Allora si lassa correre messer Lancialotto a messer Tristano tanto
come il cavallo ne puote andare. E elli è tutto abandonato a quella giostra ch’elli credeva tutto veramente
che questi fusse Palamides”.
 343

and great rancor”.1010 Palamedes also shows a decided lack of mesure when, “enraged

with great ardor”, he charged Lancelot without a lance.1011 Despite this lack of prudence

and restraint Palamedes manages to hold his own, cutting off Lancelot’s lance with his

sword, a blow that also kills his horse.1012

This incident serves as a useful example of the ambivalence and tensions within

chivalric ideology, as the impact of the exhortation to exercise restraint and prudence is

somewhat diminished by the fact that not only does Palamdes manage to survive, but he

actually thrives. This contradiction is not exceptional in imaginative chivalric literature of

Italian (and indeed, European) provenance. It also speaks to one of the larger themes that

has been discussed throughout this chapter: the complex relationship between the

reformative ideals and romanticized behaviors promoted in chivalric literature and the

reality of knightly combat in the historical world. It is to this relationship we now turn in

the conclusion.

1010
Tristano Panciatichiano, 628/629: “Cosi s’asembrarano li due cavalieri l’uno incontra l’altro per
grande ira e per grande rancura”; “So the two knights draw together, one against the other, from great anger
and great rancor”.
1011
Tristano Panciatichiano, 628/629: “Ma così avenne a quella ora che Palamides non avea punto di
lanci[a] e Lancialotto n’aveva una et grossa. Palamides, che a quello punto era tutto come arabbiato di
grande ardimento, non à nulla dottanza di lancia”; “But it happened at that time that Palamedes didn’t even
have a lance, but Lancelot had one and it was big. Palamedes, who at that point was all enraged with a great
ardor, didn’t worry at all about lances”.
1012
Tristano Panciatichiano, 628/629: “ché quando Lancialotto crede portare a terra, Palamides alza la
spada e tagliali la lancia. Lo colpo fu grande e venne da grande forza et ciò ch’elli trova allora lo cavallo in
quello luogo e dàlli per mezzo la testa un si grande colpo ch’elli lo fa cadere ala terra ferito a morte”;
“when Lancelot thinks he would carry him to the ground, Palamedes raises his sword and cuts off the lance.
The blow was great and came with great force so that it found the horse at that spot and let it have such a
great blow in the middle of its head that he makes it fall to the ground, mortally wounded”.
 344

Conclusions: Ideal vs. Reality

The gap between the romanticized ideals and behavior of chivalric literature and

knightly conduct in the historical world is not surprising. It would be a mistake, however,

to conclude that this gap meant that these ideals and behaviors were never realized by

knights or to dismiss reform efforts as the fanciful attempts of outsiders to impose

restrictive reforms upon an unruly and unreceptive chivalric elite. The goal of the reform

messages embedded in imaginative chivalric literature was never to delegitimize or

eliminate the violence of knights and arms bearers, but rather to encourage these warriors

to exercise restraint and to respect the honor of their peers. Indeed, the ideal behaviors

and the reformative virtues inherent in chivalric ideology did influence the conduct of

many knights and arms bearers, even if they often failed, like the literary heroes of

romance and chanson de geste, always to put them into practice.1013 These were working

ideals for the warrior elite, but not a set of laws of war that were followed without

question by all practitioners. Furthermore, war was not a game that could be halted to

ensure all participants enjoyed a level playing field, while the powerful emotions of fear

and anger, as well as the intense desire for self-preservation and material gain, made it

difficult to put these reformative virtues into practice at all times.

With that being said, chivalric ideology and its practitioners were imminently

practical, and a knight was no doubt forgiven by his peers for failing to uphold the lofty

1013
I take for granted here John Larner’s (“Chivalric culture in the age of Dante,” 126) useful observation
that “no doubt the bond between sentiments of literature and the manner of seeing life varied a great deal
from person to person. Certainly in some men the link seems very strong”. I argue that this link was
especially potent with the knights and arms bearers who comprised the chivalric elite. Likewise, Larner is
quite right in observing (ibid, 120) that “there is surely a certain inner harmony to be discerned between
chivalric literature and Italian life.”
 345

ideals of reformers in the heat of battle. When possible, however, putting the reformative

virtues and behaviors of chivalry into practice not only allowed the chivalrous to

demonstrate their membership among a privileged warrior elite, but also offered the

opportunity to gain significant honor and praise, and in some cases, wealth. The tangible

benefits of honor and praise aside (i.e. social capital), the realization of ‘reformed

conduct’ was also motivated, at least partly, by self-interest: every knight and arms bearer

hoped to be shown lifesaving courtesy by an enemy when his horse was killed beneath

him and he was left stranded on foot in the middle of a fray, and all members of the

chivalric elite maintained an expectation that they would be taken prisoner and treated

honorably, rather than killed outright by the enemy. In other words, putting these

reformative virtues and ideal behaviors into practice, when practical, was crucial to

chivalric identity because it involved the recognition and reciprocation of horizontal

honor, an acknowledgment that one’s enemy was also one’s peer, and thus deserving of

special treatment.1014

While it is true that the chivalric elite failed to consistently put the reformative

virtues and ideal behaviors discussed above into practice, it would be wrong to interpret

this failure as proof that reforms had little to no impact upon elite warriors. These were

working ideas for knights and warriors, but as practitioners of an imminently practical

ideology, the chivalric elite were forgiven (perhaps it was taken for granted) when, in the

heat of battle, they failed to match the lofty ideals established in imaginative literature.

Indeed, while these reformative ideas and virtues were always present in their minds, the

1014
I recognize the considerable ambiguity surrounding the phrase “when practical”, but I think this is an
accurate reflection of that fact that these issues are by no means cut-and-dry.
 346

chivalric elite put them into practice, for the most part, when circumstances allowed or

when such honorable conduct could be noted by their peers.

 347

Chapter VI:
Brunetto Latini’s Il Tesoretto-
A Case Study in Chivalric Reform

Brunetto Latini’s Il Tesoretto (The Little Treasure, ca.1267)1015 provides

important evidence for the transalpine nature of chivalric ideology and reform themes.1016

In Latini’s native Florence, as elsewhere in Europe, chivalry helped to create an identity

among the lay warrior elite based on the enthusiastic and skillful demonstration of

prowess on the field of battle and in the violent pursuit and defense of honor.1017 The

violence inherent in the chivalric lifestyle was a source of considerable anxiety for

contemporary Florentines at all levels of society: the great merchant and banking families

1015
All references to the poem will be from the following edition: Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto (The Little
Treasure), ed. and trans. Julia Bolton Holloway (New York and London: Garland, 1981) [cited hereafter as
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto].
1016
The available scholarship on chivalry in Italy is useful, but largely does not take into consideration the
significant insight provided by the most recent work on the general phenomenon of chivalry in medieval
Europe, especially the connections between chivalric ideology, honor-shame, and violence (both internal
and external). See the scholarship of Richard Kaeuper in particular: idem, Holy Warriors: The Religious
Ideology of Chivalry; idem, Chivalry and Violence in Medieval Europe. Studies on Italian knighthood and
chivalry include: Stefano Gasparri, I Milites Cittadini: studi sulla cavalleria in Italia (Rome: Istituto storico
italiano per il Medio Evo, 1992); Settia, Comuni in Guerra; Grillo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi; Vigueur,
Cavalieri e Cittadini; Renato Bordone, ed., Le aristocrazie dai signori rurali al patriziato (Rome: Laterza,
2004); Cardini, L’acciar de’ cavalieri; idem, Guerre di Primavera; and the study of Salvemini, La dignità
cavalleresca nel comune di Firenze e altri scritti.
1017
Latini would have been aware of the considerable continuity in the lifestyles of French and Florentine
knights, despite the different social terrain in Florence, and it is therefore not surprising that his reform
program shows very similar concerns and solutions to those offered across the Alps. This transalpine
continuity has not gone unnoticed by some Italophone and Anglophone scholars, but most consider
chivalry to be an instrument of civility and generally a positive force in society: in addition to the works
cited immediately above, see also P.J. Jones, “Economia e società nell’Italia medievale: il mito della
borghesia”, op. cit. n.850. Jones argues that the Italian nobility continued to be a class that maintained a
unique noble identity in the face of increased commercialization and urban expansion. Jones’s work to
dispel the myth of the embourgeoisement of the Italian nobility is important, but he is not interested in
chivalric ideology. Richard Kaeuper has argued against the more romanticized version of chivalry that
informs many scholarly works and provides a new understanding of chivalric ideology, one centered on
prowess and honor, which gives appropriate attention to chivalry’s role in propagating the knightly
violence and public disorder which plagued medieval society. See Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence; idem,
Holy Warriors; idem, “Chivalry and the Civilizing Process,” in Violence in Medieval Society, ed. Richard
Kaeuper (Rochester, New York, 2000), 21-39. Larner (Italy in the Age of Dante and Petrarch) provides an
important discussion of the transalpine continuity and hints at the link between chivalry and violence in
medieval Italy, but this argument is not fully developed.
 348

lamented the disruption to business caused by wide-scale internecine fighting and, on

occasion, outright civil war, while those lower in the social hierarchy were commonly the

victims of the violent aggression of the warrior elite.1018 This violence posed a real and

serious threat to public order and civic concord in late medieval Florence, so much so that

concerned individuals like Brunetto Latini sought to reform the chivalric lifestyle.

Latini, a notary by profession, was well-versed in general European concepts of

chivalry after spending six years in exile in France after the defeat of the Florentine

Guelfs at the battle of Montaperti in 1260.1019 During these years, he was immersed in the

chivalric culture of France, no doubt well aware of the perceived failures and excesses of

French knighthood.1020 Since the powerful influence of chivalric ideology was not

contained by traditional political and cultural boundaries in late medieval Europe, but

was shared by knights and arms bearers on both sides of the Alps and beyond, Latini

likely adapted many of the reform ideas circulating in France for use in his native

Florence.

1018
Despite the close connection between knighthood and chivalry, the ideology of chivalry should be seen
as free-floating from the social institution of knighthood. The influence of chivalry was felt well beyond the
upper crust of the social elite. Plentiful evidence for the descending influence of chivalry can be found in
the treatise of Geoffroi de Charny, a famous fourteenth-century French knight: The Book of Chivalry of
Geoffroi de Charny, op. cit. n.756. For other recent studies on chivalry and knighthood in medieval Europe
see: Matthew Strickland, War and Chivalry; David Crouch, The Birth of Nobility: Constructing Aristocracy
in England and France, 900-1300 (New York: Pearson-Longman, 2005); and Keen, Chivalry.
1019
The Battle of Montaperti was fought on 4 September 1260 between the Guelfs and Ghibellines of
Tuscany and their respective allies. The Guelfs ruled Florence at the time, while the Ghibellines ruled
Siena. The defeat of the Guelfs led to a regime change in Florence and the exile of most of the leading
Guelf families. Contemporary and near contemporary accounts of the battle can be found in: Villani, 239-
41; Leonardo Bruni, The History of the Florentine People, vol. 1, 143-69; Ricordano Malispini, Storia
Fiorentina, vol. 2, 159-61.
1020
Peter Armour, “Brunetto Latini’s Poetry and Dante,” Journal of the Institute of Romance Studies 2
(1993), 85: Armour argues that Il Tesoretto was “the principal work which mediated between the French
romances and Florentine culture”.
 349

Upon his return to Florence in 1267 Latini wrote two treatises. The first, Li Livres

dou Trésor, was composed in French and was addressed to the “rhetoricians and rulers in

the government of the Italian communes, the class that provided the podestà”.1021 Not

surprisingly given the audience, Li Livres discussed the appointment, qualifications,

duties, and comportment of a podestà (among a variety of other topics) and other leading

officials. The second treatise, Il Tesoretto, in contrast, was composed in the Italian

vernacular with a very specific audience in mind. Indeed, Florentine strenuous knights

and arms bearers form the desired and anticipated audience of Il Tesoretto, perhaps the

only treatise of its kind circulating Florence during this period.1022

Brunetto Latini’s great admiration for the chivalric lifestyle and its practitioners,

like that of many of his contemporaries, was naturally tempered by a healthy dose of fear.

Both emotions are quite understandable given that the chivalric elite during Latini’s

lifetime comprised many of the leading men of Florence, men of distinguished lineages

who were the proprietors of great landed estates and urban possessions, the leaders of

sizable bodies of armed men, and the possessors of the military experience and leadership

necessary to protect and expand the interests of the state. As a result of this social

prestige and power, the chivalric lifestyle had numerous admirers and imitators. Many

1021
For the content of the poem, see John Najemy, “Brunetto Latini’s ‘Politica’,” Dante Studies 112 (1994),
34. For a discussion of the audience, see Armour, “Brunetto Latini’s Poetry and Dante,” 87-8.
1022
The argument for a knightly audience is supported by several observations: Latini wrote Il Tesoretto
around the same time as Li Livres dou Trésor, but the content of the two works differs markedly,
suggesting that the Italian poem was meant to complement the French work by addressing a different
segment of the Florentine elite. This argument is reinforced by the fact that the protagonist of the
allegorical poem is a knight. Peter Armour also contrasts Il Tesoretto with Li Trésor, arguing that the
former was intended to be more accessible, while the latter was tailored to the magisterial and podestà
class: Armour, “Brunetto Latini’s Poetry and Dante”, 87-8.
 350

who aspired to the social benefits of chivalry, however, were deeply concerned with the

consequences of chivalric violence on public order and civic concord.

Latini’s Il Tesoretto directly reflects this combination of admiration and fear. His

goal was to mold these elite warriors into productive members of Florentine society

without fundamentally redefining the ideology (chivalry) that informed their lifestyle.

This effort involved promoting certain traditional chivalric virtues, often with language

drawn from newly available classical sources, that were inherent, but often unrealized, in

the ideology of chivalry.1023 Like reformers across the Alps, Latini attached great

importance to the idea of balancing the vigorous and even joyous exercise of prowess

with prudence, restraint, and wisdom. It is crucial to recognize that he did not seek to

delegitimize knightly violence, but rather to promote its proper and controlled use.1024

Latini sought to combat the traditional autonomy of the chivalric elite by advocating a

hierarchical concept of loyalty to a sovereign power (in our case, the communal

1023
Becker, “A Study in Political Failure”, 247: Becker argues that the renewed interest in classical works
was part of a “thirteenth century classical revival.” For medieval editions, commentaries, and translations
of classical works, see: Leighton D. Reynolds, Texts in Transmission: A Survey of the Latin Classics
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) and Joseph Canning, A History of Medieval Political Thought,
300-1450 (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 125ff. For an excellent study of the revival of
classical works in Late Medieval and Early Renaissance Europe, see: See Ronald Witt, In the Footsteps of
the Ancients: The Origins of Humanism from Lovato to Bruni (Leiden: Brill, 2003).
1024
We can see similarities between Latini’s Il Tesoretto and other contemporary works in a variety of
genres, including chronicles: see Rolandino of Padua, The Chronicles of the Trevisan March, ed. and trans.
Joseph R. Barrigan (Lawrence, Kansas, 1980) and The Chronicle of Salimbene de Adam, ed. and trans.
Joseph L. Baird, Giuseppe Baglivi, and John R. Kane (Binghamton: Medieval and Renaissance Texts &
Studies, 1986) in particular for the thirteenth-century. Rolandino of Padua, The Chronicle of the Trevisan
March, 1: Rolandino states explicitly that the purpose of his chronicle is reformative: “All of this [i.e. the
honorable deeds and wise deeds of our ancestors] should be a mirror and a lantern to prudent and wise
men.” For Tuscany, the chronicles of Giovanni Villani (and his continuators) and Dino Compagni include
reformative elements. Leonardo Bruni’s long history of Florence, dating from the early fifteenth-century,
also offers a clear reform program.
 351

government of Florence). He also encouraged these warriors to utilize their considerable

martial experience and expertise in the service of that power.1025

The reforms advocated in Il Tesoretto reveal much about contemporary Florentine

culture and reflects Latini’s serious concerns about the violence plaguing his city,

especially the factional wars that led to his exile in 1260 after the Ghibelline victory at

the battle of Montaperti.1026 For Latini, the violence of the Florentine chivalric elite,

considered by his contemporaries to be the greatest threat to civic peace, did not need to

be eliminated, but rather controlled by inculcating knights and arms bearers with a

message of reform aimed at tempering the more violent aspects of their lifestyle, allowing

them to become peaceful and productive members of Florentine society.1027 Latini,

adapting a classical concept, conceived of knighthood as a profession or art (arte) that

could not only be taught and learned, but also reformed. Indeed, the use of the knight as

student of the Virtues indicates that Latini thought the institution and its members were

not only capable, but also worthy of being reformed. Latini’s goal was therefore not to

excise the chivalric elite from the civic body or to demilitarize the institution of

knighthood, but rather to encourage them to exercise proper and controlled violence, and

1025
This stubborn autonomy was also manifest in the knightly penchant for pursuing personal interests over
those of the communal government (or common good). Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina,
42: Marchionne touched upon this when he praised the Guelfs (in 1253) under whose rule the Popolo was
very strong and honored, claiming that this was a time when everyone sought to honor and magnify the
Commune, rather than pursue his own interests as had happened in the past: “In questo tempo che i Guelfi
reggevano Firenze si era il Popolo molto forte e onorato poichè ogni uomo attendea ad onorare e
magnificare il comune, e non ad ogni suo proprio come oggi si fa”- “During the time when the Guelfs ruled
Florence the Popolo was very strong and honored since every man sought to honor and extol the commune,
and not to each his own as is done today”. Some knights already fulfilled the role promoted by Latini, such
as Messer Tegghiaio Aldobrandini degli Adimari, who advised the popolo to not attack the Florentine
exiles and their Sienese and German allies at Montaperti in 1260.
1026
Armour, “Brunetto Latini’s Poetry and Dante,” 84; Najemy, “Brunetto Latini’s ‘Politica’,” 42.
1027
Najemy, “Brunetto Latini’s ‘Politica’,” 44: As Najemy observes, “no Florentine reader of the Tesoretto
would have failed to note that Latini’s choice of a knight in the role of the disciple of the Virtues.”
 352

to exhort them to prioritize the public interest over their own private interests and accept

an important role in society.

Reform within Il Tesoretto

Brunetto Latini’s Il Tesoretto contains a strong message of reform aimed directly

at the chivalric elite of mid-thirteenth-century Florence. The author sought to balance

respect for the traditional nature of knighthood with an emphasis on the reformative

strands inherent in the ideology itself. Critical to this reform message is the author’s

discussion of the nature of true nobility, which includes qualities and virtues incorporated

from both chivalric and the classical currents (especially Aristotle’s Ethics).1028 For

Latini, there was a clear difference between nobility and gentility: nobility was a product

of lineage and tradition, and thus was inherited; gentility was something demonstrated.

Latini writes, “For I hold him to be genteel / Who seems to take the mode / Of Great

valor / And of good rearing / Such that beyond his lineage / He does things of profit /

1028
An excellent recent translation and study of Aristotle’s Ethics is Robert Bartlett and Susan Collins,
trans., Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012). The scholarship on
Aristotle’s Ethics in the context of late medieval Europe is extensive: see Cecilia Iannella, “Civic Virtues in
Dominican Homiletic Literature in Tuscany in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries,” Medieval Sermon
Studies, 51 (2007): 22-32; J. Hodge, “The Virtue of Vice: Preaching the Cardinal Virtues in the Sermons of
Remigio dei Girolami,” Medieval Sermon Studies, 52 (2008): 6-18; Kempshall, The Common Good in
Medieval Political Thought; J. Coleman, “Some Relations between the study of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Ethics
and Politics in late thirteenth century and early fourteenth century university art courses and the
justification of contemporary civic activities (Italy and France),” in Political Thought and the Realities of
Power in the Middle Ages, eds. J. Canning and O.G. Oexle (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998),
127-157; the essays in I.P. Bejczy, ed., Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, 1200-1500 (Leiden: Brill, 2008); the essays in I.P. Bejczy and C.J. Nederman,
Princely Virtues in the Middle Ages, 1200-1500 (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007).
 353

And lives honorably, / So that he is pleasing to the people.”1029 Gentility is nobility of

personal action, the demonstration of the positive attributes traditionally associated with

the ideal version of the nobility of the blood (valor and bravery in war, courtesy,

leadership, generosity) by individuals regardless of their lineage. More importantly, a

person who demonstrates gentility does not fall into the excesses associated by most

Florentines with nobility of the blood, especially violence against the common man and

internecine conflict with others within the elite. The traditional nobility is clearly

connected to civic discord and was considered a threat to the successful rule of the

Florentine government. Instead, a man of gentility “is pleasing to the people” and a

productive member of society. Virtuous acts done in the interest of the commonweal earn

him praise and honor.1030

More traditional concepts of nobility, especially nobility of the blood, remained

important to Latini and many of his contemporaries, despite the threat nobles posed to

civic concord and the growth of central power. This is true at least partly because of the

powerful influence of honor in late medieval Florentine society. Moreover, Florentines at

all levels of the social hierarchy maintained a deep-seated respect for the distinguished

1029
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 86/87 (lines 1725-32): “Ch’io gentil tengo quelgli / Che par che modo
pilgli / Di grande valimento / E di bel nudrimento, / Si [sic] c’oltre suo lengnaggio / Fa cose d’avantaggio /
E vive oratamente, Si [sic] che piace a la gente.” The debate about the nature of nobility is prevalent in late
medieval Italy and the scholarship is likewise extensive: see N. Rubinstein, “Dante on Nobility, 1973
(unpublished),” in Studies in Italian History in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, vol. I: Political
Thought and the Language of Politics (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2004), 165-201; Lansing,
The Florentine Magnates, 212-228; C.T. Davis, “Brunetto Latini and Dante,” Studi medievali 3, no. 8
(1967): 421-450; and M. Keen, Nobles, Knights and Men-at-Arms in the Middle Ages (London, 1996), 187-
222.
1030
For a useful anthropological study of honor and shame in Mediterranean society, see: Julian Pitt-River,
“Honour and Social Status,” 19-77.
 354

lineages of their city.1031 As a result, Latini acknowledges that if two men are equally

“gentle” (i.e. demonstrate the same level of gentility), the man with a better lineage is

customarily considered by society to be superior: “I admit: if in good deeds / One man

and another are equal. / He who is better born / Is held to be more gracious,… because it

is custom”.1032 This view on nobility and gentility is reflected in Latini’s reform program,

which encourages knights and arms bearers of exalted noble lineage to demonstrate their

gentility. In this way, a nobleman of distinguished lineage and demonstrated gentility

would serve as a model for his fellow citizens and arms bearers, and become a productive

member of Florentine society.

Latini and other reformers held up certain great knights as models of reformed

knighthood. These models were drawn from a myriad of sources, both historical and

literary (especially chivalric romance and epic), and included men contemporary or near-

contemporary to the audience of these works, as well as famous figures from

Antiquity.1033 Latini’s model knight is also likely the dedicatee of Il Tesoretto, possibly a

Florentine, who served Charles of Anjou (king of Naples, 1266-1285) during his

conquest of the Kingdom of Sicily in the mid-1260s. This knight is described by Latini as

a “worthy lord” of noble birth (alto legnaggio) and demonstrated gentility, having “no

1031
Becker, “A Study in Political Failure,” 255, 292: Becker argues that the knightly elite “evoked fear,
respect, and hatred, as well as pity when they fell on hard times.” This was true among the popolani, as
well as the popolo grasso (Becker describes this group as a “guild aristocracy”). Many members of the
popolo grasso actively sought to emulate the lifestyle of the nobility.
1032
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 86/87 (lines 1733-36, 1738): “Ben dico, se’n ben fare / Sia l’uno e l’altro
pare, / Quelli ch’è melglio nato / È tenuto più a grato, / … perchè sia usanza.”
1033
Filippo Ceffi offers Charles, Duke of Calabria (d.1328) as his model for the traits of an honorable lord
and knight: Luigi Biondi, ed., Le Dicerie di Filippo Ceffi (Turin: Tipografia Chirio e Mina, 1825), 15-17.
The fourteenth-century imaginative work Conti di Antichi Cavalieri provides a number of historical and
fictional knights, ranging from Saladin and Julius Caesar to Hector of Troy and Galahad, as models for
contemporary knighthood: Pietro Fanfani, ed., Conti di Antichi Cavalieri (Florence: Baracchi, 1851).
 355

equal either in peace or war.”1034 Thus, Latini’s model knight demonstrates his great

nobility and gentility in both civic life and warfare, the two arenas in which a Florentine

knight was expected to “[do] things of profit” and “[live] honorably.”

Not surprisingly, Latini’s knight excels by demonstrating both gentility and

nobility. It is important to note, however, that Latini’s reform program inextricably

intertwines the two concepts (gentility and nobility) and their concomitant virtues.

Therefore, virtues traditionally associated with gentility, especially wisdom and

prudence, are also associated by Latini with nobility as he addresses his ideal knight:

“We can see so much / Sense and wisdom in you / In every situation” and “[s]uch a high

intellect / [that] You have in every respect / That you wear the crown / and mantle of

nobility.”1035 Likewise, Latini connects to gentility the chivalric and noble virtues of

courtesy, largesse, and prowess. He writes,

Where everyone else is false, / That you nevertheless improve / And

continually are refined; / Your worthy heart / Rises so high / Toward
every goodness / That you have all / The appearance of Alexander /
Because you consider of no account / Land, gold, and silver;…
And fine prowess, / So that Achilles the brave, / Who acquired such praise,
/ And the good Trojan Hector, / Lancelot, and Tristan / Were not more
1034
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 2/3 (lines 4-5): “non avete pare / Né in pace né in guerra.” This is not
unique to Florence or even to Italy. For example, knights in England were also expected to participate in
the governance of the English realm, responsibilities which were deemed so onerous that many declined to
be formally made knights in order to avoid the duties attached to the dignity. For the reign of Henry III of
England, see Michael R. Powicke, “Distraint of Knighthood and Military Obligation under Henry III,”
Speculum: A Journal of Medieval Studies 25, n.4 (Oct., 1950): 457-70. This article examines part of a
larger debate over the decline of knighthood in thirteenth-century England.
1035
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 2/3, 4/5 (lines 15-17, 32-35): “Potén tanto vedere / In voi senno e savere /
Ad ongne condizione… Sì alto intendimento / Avete d’ogni canto, / Che voi corona e manto / Portrate di
franchezza.” The association of wisdom and prudence with traditional nobility and chivalry connects
Latini’s reform message to reform themes found in such works as The Song of Roland, which encouraged
knights and arms bearers to debate whether Olivier or Roland was the better knight. Olivier demonstrated
prowess tempered by prudence and wisdom, while Roland demonstrated uncontrolled prowess and reckless
bravery. The implication is that Olivier is the ideal knight, but Roland seems to have been the more popular
cultural model. For a good translation of the work, see Dorothy L. Sayers, trans., The Song of Roland
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957).
 356

worthy than you, / Whenever there was need.1036

The inclusion of prowess in this constellation of virtues in the galaxy of gentility-nobility

is, as we shall see, critical to Latini’s reform message. Any reading of contemporary

chivalric literature, especially romance or chanson de geste (with which Latini would

have been familiar given his time spent in France and the popularity of such literature in

Florence),1037 leaves no doubt about the preeminent position of prowess in the ideology

of chivalry. Richard Kaueper has argued that knights worshiped “the demi-god

prowess”, and this seems to hold true for Florentine knights as well.1038 Thus, Latini, like

other reformers, had to balance the need to valorize chivalry with the desire to reform it.

As a result, his model knight is praised wholeheartedly not only for his prowess, but also

his wisdom and prudence.

This ideal combination of wisdom, prudence, and prowess is buttressed in Latini’s

text by two strands of reform, one more traditionally chivalric, and the other classical. In

Latini’s mind, and that of other reformers in thirteenth-century Italy, traditional chivalric

motifs and characters (Lancelot and Tristan) could be easily reconciled with classical

1036
For courtesy and largesse, see Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 2/3-4/5 (lines 22-31): “Ov’ ongn’ altro sé
mente, / Che voi pur melgliorate / E tuttor’ affinate; / El vostro cor Valente / Poggia sì altamente / In ongni
beninanza / Che tutta la sembianza / D’alexandro tenete, / Ché per neente avete / Terra, oro e argento.” For
prowess, see Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 4/5 (lines 36-42): “di Armour fina prodezza / Sì ch’ acillòs il
prode, / Ch’ aquistò tante lode, / E’ l buono hettòr troiano, / Lancialotto e tristano / Non valser me’ di voe, /
Quando bisongno fue.”
1037
Armour, “Brunetto Latini’s Poetry and Dante,” 85: If one reflects upon the time Latini spent in exile in
France and the significant cultural exchange which occurred between France and Florence during this
period, especially following the intervention of the Angevins in the peninsula (ca.1262), it seems quite
plausible that Il Tesoretto was “the principle work which mediated between French romances and
Florentine culture.” Additional scholarship on imaginative chivalric literature in late medieval Italy
includes: G. Allaire, ‘A Fifteenth-Century Florentine Community of Readers and the Romances of
Chivalry,” Essays in Medieval Studies, 15 (1998): 1-8; P. Brand and L. Pertile, eds., The Cambridge
History of Italian Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
1038
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, chapter 7 in particular.
 357

history and mythology (Hector and Achilles), and thus be attached to the burgeoning

movement to revive classical knowledge.1039 Traditional chivalric qualities had their

counterparts (albeit not always direct equivalents) in classical texts.1040 Moreover, the

classical intellectual tradition lent authority to such reform efforts.

After the dedicatory message, Latini assumes the role of narrator and witnesses

the reformation of a Florentine knight by a series of personified virtues. It is important

that Latini chooses a knight (‘bel cavalero’) as the recipient of explicit messages of

reform in Il Tesoretto, rather than the public servant and good popolani of Li Livres dou

Tresor.1041 The message promoted by the virtues is intended to re-educate (i.e. reform)

the knight in his profession and send him home “ben apreso di guerra.”1042 Latini clearly

adapts to a contemporary chivalric context the classical idea that the practitioners of a

profession can be reformed. As such, Il Tesoretto should be considered neither an

antecedent nor a direct contribution to the efforts of some members of the popolo grasso

to create a de-militarized service knighthood. Instead, Il Tesoretto is about the honor,

1039
This amalgamation appears with regularity in later chivalric reform, especially north of the Alps, as the
influence of the revival of antiquity spread over time. Both Rolandino of Padua and Salimbene de Adam
use classical references in their late thirteenth-century chronicles.
1040
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 34: For example, Richard Kaeuper has argued that the classical virtue
of courage was likely employed and interpreted by reformers in this context as a sanitized version of
knightly prowess and bravery.
1041
Armour, “Brunetto Latini’s Poetry and Dante,” 89.
1042
Latini seems to conceive of arms as an arte, i.e. a set of practices that could be taught and learned,
matters in which one could give good instruction or advice based on experience. Of course, all instruction
is prescriptive by its very nature. For Latini’s treatment of politics as an arte in Li Livres dou Tresor, see
Najemy, “Brunetto Latini’s ‘Politica’,” 40. Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 69: knighthood is generally
recognized by medievals, especially clerics, as an ordo, one of the divisions of medieval society ordained
by God with a specific role and set of responsibilities. See also the classic study of G. Duby, The Three
Orders: Feudal Society Imagined (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) and J. Flori, L’Idéologie du
Glaive: Préhistoire de la Chevalerie (Geneve: Droz, 2010). For a contemporary Majorcan (Iberian) knight
turned friar who wrote a famous chivalric treatise in which he treats knighthood as a profession in need of
reform, see B.R. Price, trans., Ramon Lull’s Book of Knighthood & Chivalry & The Anonymous Ordene de
Chevalerie (Union City, CA: The Chivalry Bookshelf, 2001). Ramon Lull lived from 1232 to 1315.
 358

behavior, and worldly success of an active knight (miles strenuus) within Florentine

society.1043 Again, Latini’s goal is to soften the rough edges of the knightly lifestyle in

order to allow these arms bearers to become model knights: productive (and subordinate)

members of Florentine society and military leaders who focus their violent energies on

external enemies rather than their fellow citizens. Latini does not seek to end violence,

but rather to define proper ways of using it, thus engaging with a major theme found in

chivalric literature across Europe.1044

The knight and the personified virtues come together at an imagined noble court

presided over by an “Empress” named Virtue. Latini describes the Empress Virtue as the

“chief and savior / Of refined custom / And of good usage / And good behavior / By

which people live.”1045 This Empress has several daughters, including three which

represent important tenets of chivalric ideology: Prudence, “Whom men in the vernacular

/ Call simply Good Sense”;1046 Temperance, “Whom people at times / Are accustomed to

call Measure”;1047 and finally Fortitude, “Who at times by custom / Is called Power of

Courage / By some people.”1048 The identity of these three figures, blending chivalric and

1043
Armour, “Brunetto Latini’s Poetry and Dante,” 89.
1044
Richard Kaeuper makes this important argument in “Chivalry and the Civilizing Process”, op. cit.
n.1017.
1045
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 64/65 (lines 1240-1244): “capo e salute / D’ adorna costumanza / E de la
buona usanza / E de buon reggimenti, / A che vivon le genti.”
1046
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 66/67 (lines 1273-4): “Cui la gente in volgare / Suole senno chiamare.”
For the intellectual virtue of prudence (phronesis) which allows an individual to always choose the correct
action in a given circumstance and to perform it well, see Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book VI,
Chapter 5, 120-121 in particular.
1047
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 66/67 (lines 1285-6): “Cui la gente talora / Suole chiamare misura.” For
the classical virtue of temperance (sometimes appearing as moderation (sophrosune)) which allows an
individual to have the proper disposition toward bodily desires and pleasures (including honor and glory),
see Bartlett and Collins, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, Chapter 10, 62-63 in particular.
1048
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 66/67 (lines 1297-98): “Cui talor per usaggio / Valenza di coraggio / La
chiama alcuna gente.” For the classical virtue of fortitude (often appearing as courage (andreia)), see
Bartlett and Collins, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, Chapter 6, 54-56 in particular. See also,
 359

classical virtues, is critical: fortitude (i.e. courage or bravery) was closely connected to

prowess, the sine qua non of chivalry, and of the utmost importance to prowess, at least

in the ideal, was the practice of temperance (i.e. restraint or mesure) and prudence,

virtues which allowed a knight to know when, where, and how to demonstrate his

prowess to achieve the greatest success. Thus, Latini stresses the ideal combination of

fortitude (again closely associated with prowess), tempered by restraint and prudence.

The emphasis upon these tenets of chivalric ideology and the balance they provide, are

also recurrent in chivalric reform literature outside of Italy.1049

Latini’s message of reform is clearest when his knight meets four grand

mistresses present at the Empress’s court: Ladies Courtesy, Generosity, Loyalty, and

Prowess. These four figures again represent important tenets of chivalry and will be

responsible for reforming the knight. The importance attached to the cooperation of the

personified virtues is made clear by Latini, who writes when discussing the four grand

mistresses that “their working together / Seems to me very gracious / And useful to

people.”1050 Latini’s reform message is consistent: the ideal combination of prowess,

prudence, and restraint is necessary to temper the violence and martial ardor of the

knightly lifestyle and make them productive members of Florentine society.

David Pears, “Courage as a Mean,” in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amelie O. Rorty (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980), 171-187.
1049
Examples include Charny and Lull, as well as a plethora of works of imaginative literature and other
treatises which are discussed at length in Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence.
1050
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 68/69 (lines 1340-1343): “Perché lor convenente / Mi par più gratioso / E
a la gente in uso.”
 360

It is useful to consider each of the knight’s instructors in turn. The first is Lady

Generosity.1051 The virtue of generosity likely played two roles in Latini’s reform

program. The first is a moral one, promoting in the minds of the audience the virtues of

generosity and charity in contrast to the sins of avarice and envy. The second is social, as

generosity, particularly in the extravagant form known in chivalric circles as largesse,

was widely recognized as an important means of differentiating knights and arms bearers

from wealthy merchants who actively pursued the social benefits and trappings of

chivalry.1052 Naturally the moral and social roles were intimately connected. While

merchants were often associated with greed and envy and knights were traditionally

associated with extreme generosity, Latini employed this moral differentiation as a means

of buttressing the claims of social superiority made by the chivalric elite.

Another important contribution made by Lady Generosity is the identification of

knighthood as a profession (mestero) or art (arte). This is important because professions

were taught and accordingly their practitioners were capable of being re-taught, or

reformed. Latini, in his role as narrator, writes that Lady Generosity “show[ed] with great

clarity / To a handsome knight / How in his profession / He should comport himself.”1053

This is a clear statement of Latini’s goal for Il Tesoretto, to reform the way in which

Florentine knights comported themselves in their profession.

1051
For the interaction between Lady Generosity and Latini’s knight: Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 68/69-
78/79 (lines 1364-1550). For Aristotle’s magnificence (megaloprepeia), a term with a number of meanings
but roughly defined in this context as the proper spending of money on a grand scale, see Aristotle’s
Nicomachean Ethics, Book IV, Chapter 1-2, 67-75 in particular.
1052
For largesse in the general context of European chivalry, see: Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 193-199
and Keen, Chivalry, especially chapters 1 (pp. 1-18) and 2 (pp. 18-44). See also the interesting study by
Andrew Cowell, The Medieval Warrior Aristocracy: Gifts, Violence, Performance and the Sacred
(Woodbridge: D.S. Brewer, 2007).
1053
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 70/71 (lines 1366-69): “Mostrar con gran pianezza / Ad un bel cavalero /
Come nel suo mestero / Si dovesse portare.”
 361

Lady Courtesy, “In whom always rests / Every prize of worthiness,” is the next

grand mistress who imparts instruction to Latini’s knight.1054 Lady Courtesy tells him that

“In acts, do not be too bold, / But gain for yourself from others / To whom your deeds are

pleasing.”1055 What is gained is honor, the result of fellow arms bearers recognizing not

just a knight’s prowess, but also its proper exercise. Critical then is the belief that

prowess must be exercised with humility. To praise one’s own prowess or honor is

dishonorable and shows a distinct lack of courtesy. Some contemporary chivalric texts go

so far as to suggest that to praise oneself negates the praise of others.1056

Honor is also intimately connected to courtesy when it is shown to a worthy

recipient. In this vein, Lady Courtesy instructs the knight to “always bear in mind / To

associate with good people” and to “Honor the truly good friends / As much as yourself, /

On foot and on horse.”1057 Indeed, courtesy informs how a knight should interact with

others, whether they be his social equals and superiors (“on horse”), or inferiors (“on

foot”):

And watch that you do not err / If you stand or move / With ladies and lords
/ Or with other great ones; / And although you may be their equal, / You
should know how to honor them, / Each one according to his state. / And so
be in this way mindful / Of the greater and the lesser, / So that you do not lose

1054
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 80/81 (lines 1576-77): “In cui ongnora posa / Pregio di valimento.”
1055
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 84/85 (lines 1668-70): “Di gir non sie più oso, Ma d’ altra ti procaccia / A
cui’ l tuo facto piaccia.” It seems clear that Latini thinks that honor is gained from accomplishing such
deeds.
1056
For example, see the fourteenth-century chivalric work La Tavola Ritonda, 260-261, in which the
author tells us that Tristano boasted and spoke highly of himself, but only out of necessity, and not for the
wrong reasons: “E, nel vero, messer Tristano fece qui con la dama uno grande vantarsi e dire molto alto,
acciò che la dama avesse sicurtà, e si movesse a metterlo a questa avventura; chè per altra cosa nollo
faceva”- “And, in truth, messer Tristano praised himself greatly and spoke very highly of himself there
with the dame, so that the dame felt secure, and would take him on this adventure; he did this for no other
reason”.
1057
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 82/83 (lines 1649-50, 1643-5): “E abbie sempre a mente / D’ usar con
buona gente”; “Che l’amico da bene / Innora quanto téne / A piede e a cavallo.”
 362

control; / And to those lesser than you / Do not render more honor / Than what
is fitting for them, / Lest they hold you vile; / And [if] they are more base, /
Always go ahead a step.1058

Closely related to this discussion, and an important element of Latini’s reform program,

is the connection made by Lady Courtesy between courtesy and self-control, especially in

social or public situations. Lady Courtesy instructs the knight to go “Very courteously”

(molto cortesemente) if he rides through the city, “Rather than going unreined / With

great wildness.”1059 She continues by exhorting the knight to move confidently among the

people: “Watch that you don’t move / Like a man who is from the country; / Do not slide

like an eel, / But go confidently / On the way and among the people.”1060 In doing so a

knight projects his knightly state or franchise, a term that lacks a precise definition but is

generally considered the attitude and comportment befitting a free and noble man. More

specifically this implies the self-confidence and social grace that befits a man of nobility

and gentility. Accordingly, Lady Courtesy instructs the knight to “be generous and

courteous, / So that in every country / Your entire condition / May be considered

pleasing.”1061

There can be no doubt that Latini was aware of the great desire among Florentine

knights and arms bearers to be acknowledged both at home and abroad as members of the
1058
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 90/91 (lines 1787-1802): “E guarda non errassi / Se tu stessi o andassi /
Con donna o con sengnore / O con altro maggiore; / E benché sia tu pare, / Che lo sappie innorare, /
Ciasscuno per lo su’ stato. / Sia ne sì appensato / E del più e del meno, / Chet u non perde freno; / Ma già a
tuo minore / Non render più honore / C’allui si ne convengna, / Nè c’ a vil ti ne tengna; / Va sempre innanzi
un passo.”
1059
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 90/91 (lines 1810-11): “C’ andar così in disfreno / Per gran
salvatichezza.”
1060
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 90/91 (lines 1814-18): “Guarda che non ti move / Com’ uom che sia di
villa; / Non guizzar come anguilla, / Ma va’ sicuramente / Per via e fra la gente.”
1061
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 92/93 (lines 1853-7): .E sie largo e cortese, / Sì che n’ongni paese / Tutto
tuo convenente / Sia tenuto piacente.”
 363

order of knighthood (ordo militum). This acknowledgment would have served as a

validation of their lifestyle and as a bulwark against the rise of ‘new men’ who threatened

their social superiority.1062 Latini was also cognizant of the violent consequences of

conflict between the Florentine knightly elite and these ‘new men’.1063 Latini therefore

sought to appease his knightly audience by acknowledging the validity of franchise,

while also promoting a message of reform by connecting franchise to gentility. Latini

wanted these men of noble lineage and franchise to demonstrate their gentility and

become productive, leading members of Florentine society. This would eliminate the

need of the chivalric elite to prove their superiority through violence.

Lady Loyalty, the third grand mistress who undertakes the task of instructing

Latini’s knight, represents one of the central elements of chivalric ideology and a virtue

used by those seeking to temper the customary autonomy of the knightly elite. While

traditionally loyalty had the meaning of faithfulness to one’s word or reliability, Lady

Loyalty instead emphasizes a hierarchical meaning of loyal service to one’s patria.1064

This is a concept of loyalty and service drawn from classical works, one that was

developing in chivalric circles during this period and could be applied to either a

commonweal or a sovereign lord. In the case of Florence, it would have been critical to

promote loyalty among its greatest citizens to the communal government in order to

successfully establish a sovereign territorial state and maintain civic concord and public

1062
These ‘new men’ experienced incredible upward social mobility as a result of the acquisition of
immense wealth in a relatively short period of time. See M. Becker, “An Essay on the ‘Novi Cives’ and
Florentine Politics, 1343-1382,” Mediaeval Studies 24 (1962): 35-82.
1063
Perhaps the most famous example is the conflict between the Donati and Cerchi families. The Donati
were of more ancient lineage, but the Cerchi were wealthier.
1064
For a discussion of the changing definition of loyalty, see Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 185-9.
 364

order. Not surprisingly then, Lady Loyalty exhorts Latini’s knight to risk his life in the

service of his patria: “I hope that to your city, / With every other motive removed, / You

will be true and loyal, / And never for any evil / That can happen to it / Allow it to

perish.”1065 The difficulty facing Latini and other reformers who advocated this concept

of loyalty is that while such service promised honor and prestige, it might also mean

having to serve against family or friends.1066

Finally, the knight comes to Lady Prowess, who cuts a striking figure in her

boldness and confidence, echoing contemporary depictions of knights across a variety of

genres.1067 It is notable that Lady Prowess most forcefully conveys Latini’s reform

message promoting prudence and restraint. Given the centrality of prowess to the

ideology of chivalry, the knight’s interaction with this grand mistress deserves special

attention. Not surprisingly, her praise of prowess is matched by her insistence on its

proper (restrained and acceptable) use. She instructs the knight, saying “you should not

be rash / In doing or saying folly, /... He has not taken my art / Who is thrown on folly’s

side.”1068 The dangers of failing to temper prowess with prudence and restraint is

hammered home when Lady Prowess tells the knight that “He whom madness troubles /

1065
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 96/97 (lines 1939-44): “E volglio c’ al tuo comune, / Rimossa ongni
cagione, / Sie diritto e leale, / E già per nullo male / Chenne possa avenire / Ne lo lasciare perire.” For a
useful study of death in the service of one’s patria, see Norman Housley, “Pro deo et patria mori:
Sanctified Patriotism in Europe 1400-1600,” in War and Competition between States, ed. Philippe
Contamine (Oxford and New York, 2000), 221ff.
1066
This would have been particularly relevant in the case of Florence, as many among the Florentine elite
maintained close connections to exiles and nobles in other regions of northern and central Italy. For exiles
and Florence, see Ricciardelli, The Politics of Exclusion in Early Renaissance Florence.
1067
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 98/99 (lines 1982-3).
1068
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 98/99 (lines 1986-90): “Chet u non sie corrente / Di far né dir follia, / …
Nonn’a presa mi’ arte / Chi si getta in folle parte.”
 365

Will not rise to such heights / That he will not tumble to the depths.”1069 The parallels

with chivalric literature are instructive: Raoul de Cambrai, an anti-hero of his eponymous

epic, serves as the greatest example of a great knight who is utterly destroyed, physically

and more importantly in terms of his honor, because of his lack of prudence and

restraint.1070 Raoul and other figures of chivalric literature would have been familiar to

the Florentine knightly elite and would have served as models or warnings for them.1071

The importance of the proper exercise of prowess must be seen in two contexts,

first in warfare proper and second in other forms of (social) violence. In the context of

war proper, Lady Prowess emphasizes the exercise of restraint, wisdom, and prudence in

the decision to go to war or confront the enemy in battle: “do not rush / Into war or battle,

/ And do not be a creator of war.”1072 Once war has been undertaken and battle engaged,

Lady Prowess instructs the “bel cavalero” that “self-control / Refines the ardor more /

than does mere striking. / He who strikes boldly / Can in turn be boldly struck; /... But

self-control crowns / Force and strength, / And makes /… rash haste protracted / And

1069
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 98/99 (lines 1991-94): “A chi briga mattezza / Non fie di tale altezza /
Che non rovini affondo.”
1070
For the importance of chivalric literature in general, see Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence; idem,
“William Marshal, Lancelot, and the issue of chivalric identity,” Essays in Medieval Studies 22 (2005): 1-
19; idem, “The Societal Role of Chivalry in Romance: Northwestern Europe,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Medieval Romance, ed. Roberta Krueger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000),
97-114.
1071
For chivalric literature in Italy, in addition to the works listed in the previous chapters, see: Leslie
Zarker Morgan, ed., La Geste Francor: Chansons de geste of Ms. Marc. Fr. XIII (256), 2 vols. (Tempe,
AZ: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2009); idem, Franco-Italian and Italian
Romance Epic (Special Issue Olifant, 21) (1996-7); Jane Everson, The Italian Romance Epic in the Age of
Humanism: The Matter of Italy and the World of Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Gloria
Allaire, Andrea da Barberino and the Language of Chivalry (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida,
1997); Juliann Vitullo, The Chivalric Epic in Medieval Italy (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida,
2000). C. Klapisch-Zuber and D. Herlihy, Tuscans and Their Families: A Study of the Florentine Catasto
of 1427 (New Haven: Yale University Press,1985; reprint, 2008) demonstrates the popularity in Tuscany of
names drawn from chivalric literature.
1072
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 106/107 (lines 2143-46): “non ti calglia / D’ oste né di battallia, / Né non
sie trovatore / Di guerra.”
 366

placed in oblivion, / And foolishness extinguished.”1073 This is a message that is also

echoed in reform literature on both sides of the Alps, including in imaginative literature.

One need only think of the famous examples of Raoul de Cambrai and Roland to

understand the negative consequences of failing to balance bravery and prowess with

prudence and restraint.

Lady Prowess continues her discussion of knightly conduct in battle, instructing

the knight:

But if it should happen / That your city forms / An army or cavalcade, / I want
you in that event / To carry yourself with nobility, / And make a greater show /
Than your state bears; / And on every side / Show your courage / And be of good
prowess. / Do not be either slow or tardy, / For never did a cowardly man / Gain
any honor / Or become greater for it. / And you by no chance / Should ever fear
death, / For it is much more pleasing / To die honorably / Than to be vituperated /
On every side, while living. / And now return to your land, / And be valiant and
courteous; / Do not be woolly or soft, / or rash or mad.1074

This long quotation repays closer examination. The first portion of Lady Prowess’s

instruction certainly would have fallen on receptive ears: knights throughout medieval

Europe, including those in Florence, were the traditional champions of warfare and the

driving force behind the martial activities of the annual campaign season. The advice to

“make a greater show / Than your state bears; And on every side / Show your courage /

And be of good prowess” echoes a trope recurrent in chivalric literature and would have

1073
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 104/105 (lines 2093-96, 2099-2104): “maestria / Affina più l’ardire / Che
non fa pur ferire. / Chi fiede bene ardito, / Può bene esser fedito; / … Ma maestria conchiude / La forza e la
vertute, / E fa… / allungare la fretta / E mettere in obria, / E atutar follia.”
1074
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 106/107 (lines 2147-70): “Ma se pur avenisse / Che ‘l tuo comun facesse /
Oste o cavalcata, / Volglio che ‘n quell ‘andata / Ti porti con barnaggio, / E dimostrati maggio / Che non
porta tu ‘stato; / E déi in ongni lato / Mostrar la tua franchezza / E far buona prodezza. / Non sie lento né
tardo, / Ché già omo codardo / Non conquistò honore / Né divenne maggiore. / E tu, per nulla sorte, / Non
dubitar di morte, / C’ assai è più piagente / Morire oratemente / Ch’ esser vituperato, / Vivendo, in ongni
lato. / Or torna in tuo paese, / E sie prode e cortese; / Non sie lanier, né molle, / Né corrente né folle.”
 367

been commonplace also in a Florentine knightly culture heavily influenced by the

ideology of chivalry. Indeed, the best way for a knight to maintain and increase his honor

was by demonstrating his prowess in battle, as war was considered an ennobling

enterprise. Geoffroi de Charny, perhaps the most prominent French knight of the

fourteenth-century, said it best when he reiterated tirelessly in his treatise on chivalry the

maxim “He who does most is best.”1075

Following the exhortation to demonstrate nobility and prowess in battle, Lady

Prowess continues to preach to the choir of knights by attacking cowardice: “Do not be

either slow or tardy, / For never did a cowardly man / Gain any honor / Or become

greater for it. / And you by no chance / Should ever fear death, / For it is much more

pleasing / To die honorably / Than to be vituperated / On every side, while living.”1076

This attack upon cowardice and promotion of bravery and prowess in battle is repeated

across Europe in chivalric works, both imaginative literature and treatises, like that of

Charny. Again, this message would have resonated with the martial ardor and honor-

driven culture of the Florentine knightly elite. If war was recognized throughout the

medieval world as an ennobling activity, surely the Florentine knightly elite used it, as

with generosity, to further differentiate themselves from a ruling elite that was often

wealthier and usually more powerful, at least politically.

The emphasis upon prudence and restraint applies not only to the battlefield, but

also to altercations in the streets and in the halls of government during which the honor of
1075
The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de Charny, 91/92: Charny expresses this sentiment in a variety of
ways, including “he who does more is of greater worth”- “qui plus fait, miex vault”.
1076
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 106/107 (lines 2157-66): “Non sie lento né tardo, / Ché già omo codardo /
Non conquistò honore / Né divenne maggiore. / E tu, per nulla sorte, / Non dubitar di morte, / C’ assai è più
piagente / Morire oratemente / Ch’ esser vituperato, / Vivendo, in ongni lato.”
 368

the participants is at risk. When conflict arises away from the field of battle, Lady

Prowess advocates first seeking redress through the courts, which is not surprising given

the profession of the author: “Of this much I advise you, / That if wrong is done to you, /

Ardently and well / Hold on to your reason; / I counsel you this well: / That, if with a

lawyer you can help yourself out, / I want you to do it, / For it is the better deed / To

restrain madness / With words sweet and slow / Than to come to blows.”1077 Indeed,

Lady Prowess warns the knight to be cautious before resorting to violence in such a

conflict: “if they are stronger than you, / Use reason if you can endure it / And give way

in conflict, / For he is a fool who risks himself / When he is not powerful.”1078 Prudence

may necessarily replace a resort to violence.

While Lady Prowess includes a plea for the knight to endure stoically challenges

to his honor or person, especially if he is in a disadvantageous position, there is an

implicit acknowledgement of the difficulty of this request, given the touchy sense of

honor inherent in knightly culture. Not surprisingly therefore, Lady Prowess hints

immediately after that such challenges might be difficult to endure and that a knight

might be required to respond through force: “But if through its furor / One does not

release you, / Wishing to injure you, / I counsel and command you: / Do not go away

smoothly; / Have your hands ready; / Do not fear death, / For you know for certain / That

with no shield / Can a man cover himself / So that he will not go to his death / When the

1077
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 100/101 (lines 2003-14): “Di tanto ti conforto, / Che, se t’è facto torto, /
Arditamente e bene / La tua ragion mantene; / Ben ti consilglio questo: / Che, se colo legisto / Atartene
potessi, / Vorrei che lo facessi, / Ch’ elgli è maggior prodezza / Rinfrenar la matezza / Con dolzi motti e
piani / Che venire a le mani.”
1078
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 100/101 (lines 2021-25): “Ma s’è di te più forte, / Fai senno se’ l
comporte / E dai luogo a la mischia, / Ché foll’è chi s’arischia / Quando nonn’è potente.”
 369

moment arrives; / And so he makes it a great good / Who risks himself to the death /

Rather than suffer / Shame and grave dishonor.”1079 If force is required, it should be

undertaken with bravery and without fear of death. Again, this is a message that would

not have been out of place in imaginative literature or chivalric treatises, and the parallels

between Latini’s work and that of Charny are many and instructive.1080

The strong message of reform offered by Lady Prowess is explicit, but it is not an

all or nothing proposal. The tensions in Latini’s instruction suggests that the author was

well aware that the courts could not solve every problem and that some offenses could

only be rectified through violence.1081 First Lady Prowess tells the knight “if an offense is

made to you / In words or in deeds, / Do not risk your person, / Or be more hasty / In

what carries the situation further.”1082 She goes on to contradict herself, however, when

she states that “if you are indeed offended, / I say to you in every way / That you must

not mope, / But night and day / Think of vengeance, / And do not make such haste / That

1079
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 100/101-102/103 (lines 2028-43): “Ma se per suo furore / Non ti lascia
partire, / Volendoti ferire, / Consilglioti e commando: / Nonne vada di bando; / Abbie le mani accorte; /
Non dubitar la morte, / Ché tu sai per lo fermo / Che già di nullo schermo / Si puote huomo coprire / Che
non vada’ l morire / Quando lo punto vene; / Però fa grande bene / Chi s’arischia al morire / Anzi che
sofferire / Vergongna né grav’onta.”
1080
A close reading of Il Tesoretto supports this assertion. The poem itself is one of the best examples of an
‘Italian’ reform work aimed directly at the knightly elite, one which shares many similarities with the
chivalric treatises of northwestern Europe. See the examples of Charny and Lull above.
1081
Florence and medieval Italy both had a well-developed practice of vendetta. The scholarship on this
topic is extensive: for the criminal law system in Medieval and Renaissance Florence, see Laura Stern, The
Criminal Law System of Medieval and Renaissance Florence (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1994).
For vendetta and blood-feud, see: T. Dean, “Italian medieval vendetta,” in Feud in Medieval and Early
Modern Europe, eds. Jeppe B. Netterstrom and Bjorn Poulsen (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2007),
135-145; idem, “Marriage and Mutilation: Vendetta in Late Medieval Italy”, op. cit. n.167; the essays in A.
Zorzi, ed., Conflitti, paci e vendetta nell’Italia comunale (Florence: Firenze University Press, 2009); the
works cited in A. Zorzi, “I conflitti nell’Italia comunale. Riflessioni sullo stato degli studi e sulle
prospettive di ricerca,” in Conflitti, paci e vendetta nell’Italia comunale, 7-43; Anna Maria Enriques, “La
vendetta nella vita e nella legislazione fiorentina,” Archivio storico italiano, 7th series, xix (1933): 103-13.
1082
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 104/105 (lines 2106-10): “Che se ti fosse offeso / Di parole o di detto, /
Non rizzare lo tu’ petto, / Né non sie più corrente, / Che porti il convenente.”
 370

you worsen the shame.”1083 Beneath the seemingly contradictory advice is the same

reform message one detects throughout the text: Lady Prowess exhorts the knight to

exercise prudence when dealing with such situations and restraint when the decision has

been made to resort to violence.

Conclusions

By emphasizing reformative virtues inherent in chivalric ideology, Latini

constructed a multifaceted reform message that sought to temper knightly violence and

ardor by promoting restraint and prudence, while still respecting the traditional lifestyle

of knighthood. As a result of the growing influence of Aristotle’s Ethics in late medieval

Florentine society, Latini utilized some terminology for these virtues that is different

from other contemporary reformers who were active north of the Alps, but the content is

strikingly consistent. Indeed, the revival of classical ideals and ideas should not be seen

as conflicting with extant chivalric culture. For example, Richard Kaeuper has argued

that Aristotelian courage could easily be (and was) perceived by chivalric culture as a

sanitized form of prowess.1084 Thus, the content of Latini’s reform in Il Tesoretto clearly

parallels that which is current across the Alps, albeit sometimes couched in somewhat

different terms: the virtue of courage (in chivalric terms: fortitude or prowess) must be

tempered by other virtues, primarily temperance (i.e. mesure or restraint) and prudence.

1083
Brunetto Latini, Il Tesoretto, 104/105-106/107 (lines 2121-2127): “Se offeso t’è di facto, / Dicoti ad
ongni patto / Chet u non sie musorno, / Ma di nocte e di giorno / Pensa de la vendetta, / E non aver tal fretta
/ Che tu ne peggiori onta.”
1084
Kaeuper, Chivalry and Violence, 34.
 371

In addition, through the use of this classical language, the reform message

embodied in Il Tesoretto predates the chivalric reform movements that developed in the

late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries in both Italy and France. Despite these

similarities, it is important to place Latini’s chivalric reform program in its proper

context. For example, if we compare Il Tesoretto with Leonardo Bruni’s De militia (On

Knighthood, ca.1420) we can detect an important difference: Latini and Bruni moved in

different directions as they confronted different problems. James Hankins has argued that

Bruni’s De militia functioned as a reform text aimed at re-militarizing the pusillanimous

“carpet knights” seen by contemporaries as staining the former glory of Florence. This re-

militarization was to be accomplished by “co-opt[ing] the most glamorous of medieval

ideals, the ideal of chivalry, and… re-interpret[ing] it in terms of Graeco-Roman ideals of

military service.”1085 Thus, Bruni sought to reinvigorate a Florentine knighthood

seemingly bereft of courage, prowess, and martial experience.1086 Latini, on the other

hand, dealt with an overly stimulated, excessively violent, and highly militarized knightly

elite fiercely protective of their perceived honor, prestige, and autonomy. As a result, he

sought to curb the violent excesses of the knightly elite through reform that was aimed at

curing the disorder and violence plaguing Florence in the middle of the thirteenth-

century, but without drastically redefining the ideology that underpinned the institution of

knighthood or altering its membership.

1085
Hankins, “Civic Knighthood in the Early Renaissance,” 5.
1086
Marchionne di Coppo Stefani, Cronaca Fiorentina, 237-8: Marchionne laments that Florentines around
1350 were more merchants than warriors: “non sono uomini di guerra, ma di mercanzia, ed a quel tempo
meno erano, perocchè erano stati gran tempo senza guerra”- “they are not warriors, but merchants, and at
that time there were less, because they were a long time without war”.
 372

The comparison of these two different attempts to reform the Florentine knightly

elite highlights the critical importance of context. While reforms emphasizing ideals such

as loyalty, service to the commonweal, and discipline might be considered classical in

their origins reformers who operated in more traditional chivalric milieu easily adopted

them. Again, this should not be surprising, as the ideology of chivalry was eminently

practical, capable of taking root in a variety of social terrains and of being fed by a

variety of traditions.

Finally, Il Tesoretto reveals a great deal about contemporary Florentine culture

and reflects Latini’s serious concerns about the tumultuous politics of his city, especially

the factional wars that led to his exile in 1260. For Latini, the violence of the Florentine

chivalric elite needed to be reformed so that these knights and arms bearers could become

productive members of Florentine society.1087 Latini sought to accomplish this goal by

conceiving of knighthood as a profession or art (arte) that could be reformed through

reeducation. Indeed, the use of the knight as student of the Virtues indicates that Latini

thought the institution and its members were not only capable, but also worthy of being

reformed. Latini’s goal was therefore not to detach the chivalric elite from the larger civic

body, to eliminate knightly violence altogether, or to demilitarize the institution of

knighthood, but rather to encourage the proper and controlled exercise of violence, and to

make them prioritize the public interest over their own private interests and accept their

important role in society.

1087
Najemy, “Brunetto Latini’s ‘Politica’,” 44: As Najemy observes, “no Florentine reader of the Tesoretto
would have failed to note that Latini’s choice of a knight in the role of the disciple of the Virtues.”
 373

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