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pose of carrying out that testamentary provision, James Madison Ross was
appointed trustee by the New York County Surrogate's Court on February 4, 1948. Once
1. LEON v MANUFACTURERS LIF INSURANCE CO. appointed, and with the beneficiary signing the application with him, Ross bought an
G.R. No. L-3677 annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. at its head office in Toronto, Canada,
paying in advance $17,091.03 as the combined premiums. The contract stipulates for a
This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila which denied a motion of the monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her lifetime, with the proviso that in
administratrix in the matter of the testate estate of Basil Gordon Butler (Special Proceedings the event of her death, the residue, if any, of the capital sum shall be paid in one sum to
No. 6218). The motion prayed for the citation of the Manager of the Manila Branch of the James Madison Ross or his successor as trustee. And beginning May 27, 1948, Mercedes de
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. of Toronto, Canada, to appear and under a complete Leon has been receiving the stipulated monthly allowance through the Insurance Company's
accounting of certain funds the said Branch allegedly has in its possession and claimed to Manila Office.
belong to the estate. His Honor, Judge Rafael Amparo of the court below, held that these
funds "came into the possession of the Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., Inc., regularly and With the object, so it would seem, of getting hold at once of the entire amount invested in
in due course and, therefore, sees no justifiable ground to require said company to render the annuity, Mercedes de Leon on September 4, 1948, presented Butler's will for probate in
an accounting thereon." the Court of First Instance of Manila, and secured the appointment of Ada Loggey Ghezzi as
administratrix with the will annexed early in 1949. (James Madison Ross and Ewald E. Selph
The essential facts are that Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident of the Philippines, died had expressly declined appointment as executors "on the ground that the probate
in Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving a will which was duly probated in the proceedings of the above estate were terminated by the Surrogate's Court of the County of
Surrogate's Court of New York County on August 3 of the same year, and of which James New York, New York City, U. S. A., and that there are no properties of the estate left to be
Ross, Sr., James Madison Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The estate administered.") After having qualified, the administratrix filed the motion which Judge
having been settled, the proceedings were closed on July 17, 1947. Amparo has denied; and as the party most if not solely interested in that motion, Mercedes
de Leon has joined Ghezzi in this appeal.
The will contained this residuary clause:
The administration of Butler's estate granted in New York was the principal or domiciliary
After payment of these legacies and my just debts, including funeral expenses, I devise, give administration (Johannes vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 175), while the administration taken out in the
and bequeath all of my remaining estate and personal effects of which I may die possessed Philippines is ancillary. However, the distinction serves only to distinguish one
to Mercedes de Leon, of Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, to wit: the personal effects to be administration from the other, for the two proceedings are separate and independent. (34
delivered to her for her use and profit; the moneys, securities and other valuable property, C.J.S. 1232,1233).
not personal effects, to be held in trust for her benefit by my executors, at their absolute
discretion, to be administered for her permanent benefit in whatever way they may The important thing to inquire into is the Manila court's authority with respect to the assets
consider most advantageous in the circumstances existing. Since the said Mercedes de Leon herein involved. The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends only
is not of sound judgment, and discretion in the handling of money, it is not my wish that she to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, so that
be given any sums of money other than for her current needs, except as my executors in an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over property in another
their judgment deem advantageous to her. In case the amount available for this bequest be state or country. (Keenan vs. Toury, 132 A.L.R. 1362; Nash vs. Benari, 3 A.L.R. 61; Michigan
sufficient to purchase an adequate annuity, the executors in their discretion may do so. And Trust Co. vs. Chaffee, 149 A.L.R. 1078).This principle is specifically embodied in section 4 of
I attest and direct that I do not wish to intend that the action of my executors upon their Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
discretion in this matter be questioned by anyone whatsoever.
Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters The appellant administratrix did not entrust to the appellee the money she wants the latter
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the to account for, nor did the said money come to the appellee's possession in trust for the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration, administratrix. In other words, the administratrix is a complete stranger to the subject of the
shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the motion and to the appellee. There being no creditors, the only subject of the motion, we
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the incline to believe, is to enable Mercedes de Leon to get the legacy in a lump sum in
Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. complete disregard of the wishes of the testator, who showed deep concern for her welfare,
and of the annuity contract which the annuitant herself applied for in conjunction with the
It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the trustee.
jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada
under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party whose All in all, from every standpoint, including that of the annuitant's financial well-being, the
appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which holds the motion and the appeal are utterly groundless and ill-advised.
funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant
the checks made out and issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that The appealed order therefore is affirmed with costs against the appellants.
the funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila Branch.
2. VDA. DE PEREZ v HON. TOLETE
Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part of G.R. No. 76714; June 02, 1994
butler's estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the
hands of the company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly executed. Whether This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside the
considered as a trust or as simple consideration for the company's assumed obligation, Order dated November 19, 1986 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Bulacan presided by
which it has been religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant, respondent Judge Zotico A. Tolete, in Special Proceedings No. 1793-M.
the proceeds of the sale can not be withdrawn without the consent of the company, except,
upon the death of the annuitant, the residuary legatee may claim the remainder, if there be We grant the petition.
any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor the
annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amounts and except upon the II
conditions agreed upon in the contract for annuity.
Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens,
In the third place, the power of the court to cite a person for the purpose stated in the established a successful medical practice in New York, U.S.A. The Cunanans lived at No. 2896
administratrix's motion is defined in section 7 of Rule 88, which provides. Citation Drive, Pompey, Syracuse, New York, with their children, Jocelyn, 18; Jacqueline, 16;
and Josephine, 14.
Person entrusted with estate compelled to render account.—The court, on complaint of an
executor or administrator, with any part the estate of the deceased to appear before it, and On August 23, 1979, Dr. Cunanan executed a last will and testament, bequeathing to his
may require such person to render a full account, on oath, of the money, goods, chattels, wife "all the remainder" of his real and personal property at the time of his death
bonds, accounts, or other papers belonging to such estate as came to his possession in trust "wheresoever situated" (Rollo, p. 35). In the event he would survive his wife, he bequeathed
for such executor or administrator, and for his proceedings thereon; and if the person so all his property to his children and grandchildren with Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee.
cited refuses to appear to render such account, the court may punish him for contempt as He appointed his wife as executrix of his last will and testament and Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan,
having disobeyed a lawful order of the court. Jr. as substitute executor. Article VIII of his will states:
If my wife, EVELYN PEREZ-CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is Counsel for the Philippine American Life Insurance Company then filed a manifestation,
not sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that stating that said company then filed a manifestation, stating that said company had
I predeceased her, and my estate shall be administered and distributed, in all respects, in delivered to petitioner the amount of P49,765.85, representing the proceeds of the life
accordance with such presumption (Rollo, p. 41). insurance policy of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan.
Four days later, on August 27, Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan executed her own last will and In a motion dated May 19, 1983, petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be ordered to
testament containing the same provisions as that of the will of her husband. Article VIII of deliver to her a Philippine Trust Company passbook with P25,594.00 in savings deposit, and
her will states: the Family Savings Bank time deposit certificates in the total amount of P12,412.52.
If my husband, JOSE F. CUNANAN, and I shall die under such circumstances that there is not On May 31, Atty. Federico Alday filed a notice of appearance as counsel for the heirs of Dr.
sufficient evidence to determine the order of our deaths, then it shall be presumed that he Jose F. Cunanan, namely, Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., Priscilla Cunanan Bautista, Lydia Cunanan
predeceased me, and my estate shall be administered and distributed in all respects, in Ignacio, Felipe F. Cunanan and Loreto Cunanan Concepcion (Cunanan heirs). He also
accordance with such presumption. (Rollo, p. 31). manifested that before receiving petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983, his clients were
unaware of the filing of the testate estate case and therefore, "in the interest of simple fair
On January 9, 1982, Dr. Cunanan and his entire family perished when they were trapped by play," they should be notified of the proceedings (Records, p. 110). He prayed for deferment
fire that gutted their home. Thereafter, Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. as trustee and substitute of the hearing on the motions of May 19, 1983.
executor of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate thereof with the
Surrogate Court of the County of Onondaga, New York. On April 7, these two wills were Petitioner then filed a counter manifestation dated June 13, 1983, asserting: (1) that the
admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor. "Cunanan collaterals are neither heirs nor creditors of the late Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" and
therefore, they had "no legal or proprietary interests to protect" and "no right to intervene";
On February 21, 1983, Salud Teodoro Perez, the mother of Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan, and (2) that the wills of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, being American
petitioner herein, filed with the Regional P. Cunanan, and petitioner herein, filed with the citizens, were executed in accordance with the solemnities and formalities of New York
Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan a petition for the reprobate of the two bills ancillary laws, and produced "effects in this jurisdiction in accordance with Art. 16 in relation to Art.
to the probate proceedings in New York. She also asked that she be appointed the special 816 of the Civil Code"; (3) that under Article VIII of the two wills, it was presumed that the
administratrix of the estate of the deceased couple consisting primarily of a farm land in San husband predeceased the wife; and (4) that "the Cunanan collaterals are neither
Miguel, Bulacan. distributees, legatees or beneficiaries, much less, heirs as heirship is only by institution"
under a will or by operation of the law of New York (Records, pp. 112-113).
On March 9, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Malolos, Bulacan, presided by Judge
Gualberto J. de la Llana, issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special On June 23, the probate court granted petitioner's motion of May 19, 1983. However, on
administration in favor of petitioner upon her filing of a P10,000.00 bond. The following day, July 21, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion to nullify the proceedings and to set aside the
petitioner posted the bond and took her oath as special administration. appointment of, or to disqualify, petitioner as special administratrix of the estates of Dr.
Jose F. Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan. The motion stated: (1) that being the
As her first act of administration, petitioner filed a motion, praying that the Philippine Life "brothers and sisters and the legal and surviving heirs" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, they had
Insurance Company be directed to deliver the proceeds in the amount of P50,000.00 of the been "deliberately excluded" in the petition for the probate of the separate wills of the
life insurance policy taken by Dr. Jose F. Cunanan with Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan and their Cunanan spouses thereby misleading the Bulacan court to believe that petitioner was the
daughter Jocelyn as beneficiaries. The trial court granted the motion. sole heir of the spouses; that such "misrepresentation" deprived them of their right to "due
process in violation of Section 4, Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court; (2) that Dr. Rafael G. Petitioner asked that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. be cited for contempt of court for failure to
Cunanan, Jr., the executor of the estate of the Cunanan spouses, was likewise not notified of comply with the Order of June 23, 1983 and for appropriating money of the estate for his
the hearings in the Bulacan court; (3) that the "misrepresentation and concealment own benefit. She also alleged that she had impugned the agreement of November 24, 1982
committed by" petitioner rendered her unfit to be a special administratrix; (4) that Dr. before the Surrogate Court of Onondaga, New York which rendered a decision on April 13,
Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had, by virtue of a verified power of attorney, authorized his father, 1983, finding that "all assets are payable to Dr. Evelyn P. Cunanan’s executor to be then
Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr., to be his attorney-in-fact; and (5) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. is distributed pursuant to EPTL4-1.1 subd [a] par [4]" (Rollo, p. 52).
qualified to be a regular administrator "as practically all of the subject estate in the
Philippines belongs to their brother, Dr. Jose F. Cunanan" (Records, pp. 118-122). Hence, On their part, the Cunanan heirs replied that petitioner was estopped from claiming that
they prayed: (1) that the proceedings in the case be declared null and void; (2) that the they were heirs by the agreement to divide equally the estates. They asserted that by virtue
appointment of petitioner as special administratrix be set aside; and (3) that Dr. Rafael of Section 2 of Rule 77 of the Rules of Court, the provisions of Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 76
Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular administrator of the estate of the deceased spouses. on the requirement of notice to all heirs, executors, devisees and legatees must be complied
with. They reiterated their prayer: (1) that the proceedings in the case be nullified; (2) that
Thereafter, the Cunanan heirs filed a motion requiring petitioner to submit an inventory or petitioner be disqualified as special administratrix; (3) that she be ordered to submit an
accounting of all monies received by her in trust for the estate. inventory of all goods, chattels and monies which she had received and to surrender the
same to the court; and (4) that Dr. Rafael Cunanan, Sr. be appointed the regular
In her opposition, petitioner asserted: (1) that she was the "sole and only heir" of her administrator.
daughter, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan to the exclusion of the "Cunanan collaterals"; hence
they were complete strangers to the proceedings and were not entitled to notice; (2) that Petitioner filed a rejoinder, stating that in violation of the April 13, 1983 decision of the
she could not have "concealed" the name and address of Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. because American court Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. made "unauthorized disbursements from the
his name was prominently mentioned not only in the two wills but also in the decrees of the estates as early as July 7, 1982" (Records, p. 231). Thereafter, petitioner moved for the
American surrogate court; (3) that the rule applicable to the case is Rule 77, not Rule 76, suspension of the proceedings as she had "to attend to the settlement proceedings" of the
because it involved the allowance of wills proved outside of the Philippines and that estate of the Cunanan spouses in New York (Records, p. 242). The Cunanans heirs opposed
nowhere in Section 2 of Rule 77 is there a mention of notice being given to the executor this motion and filed a manifestation, stating that petitioner had received $215,000.00
who, by the same provision, should himself file the necessary ancillary proceedings in this "from the Surrogate’s Court as part of legacy" based on the aforesaid agreement of
country; (4) that even if the Bulacan estate came from the "capital" of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, November 24, 1982 (Records, p. 248).
he had willed all his worldly goods to his wife and nothing to his brothers and sisters; and (5)
that Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. had unlawfully disbursed $215,000.00 to the Cunanan heirs, On February 21, 1984, Judge de la Llana issued an order, disallowing the reprobate of the
misappropriated $15,000.00 for himself and irregularly assigned assets of the estates to his two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner as special administratrix, requiring the
American lawyer (Records, pp. 151-160). submission of petitioner of an inventory of the property received by her as special
administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic. Judge de la Llana
In their reply, the Cunanan heirs stressed that on November 24, 1982, petitioner and the reasoned out that petitioner failed to prove the law of New York on procedure and
Cunanan heirs had entered into an agreement in the United States "to settle and divide allowance of wills and the court had no way of telling whether the wills were executed in
equally the estates," and that under Section 2 of Rule 77 the "court shall fix a time and place accordance with the law of New York. In the absence of such evidence, the presumption is
for the hearing and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented that the law of succession of the foreign country is the same as the law of the Philippines.
for allowance" (Records, pp. 184-185). However, he noted, that there were only two witnesses to the wills of the Cunanan spouses
and the Philippine law requires three witnesses and that the wills were not signed on each
and every page, a requirement of the Philippine law.
On August 27, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated Thereafter, the Cunanans heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of August 19,
February 21, 1984, where she had sufficiently proven the applicable laws of New York 1985, alleging lack of notice to their counsel.
governing the execution of last wills and testaments.
On March 31, 1986, respondent Judge to which the case was reassigned denied the motion
On the same day, Judge de la Llana issued another order, denying the motion of petitioner for reconsideration holding that the documents submitted by petitioner proved "that the
for the suspension of the proceedings but gave her 15 days upon arrival in the country wills of the testator domiciled abroad were properly executed, genuine and sufficient to
within which to act on the other order issued that same day. Contending that the second possess real and personal property; that letters testamentary were issued; and that
portion of the second order left its finality to the discretion of counsel for petitioner, the proceedings were held on a foreign tribunal and proofs taken by a competent judge who
Cunanans filed a motion for the reconsideration of the objectionable portion of the said inquired into all the facts and circumstances and being satisfied with his findings issued a
order so that it would conform with the pertinent provisions of the Judiciary Reorganization decree admitting to probate the wills in question." However, respondent Judge said that the
Act of 1980 and the Interim Rules of Court. documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills
(Records, p. 381).
On April 30, 1985, the respondent Judge of Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos,
to which the reprobate case was reassigned, issued an order stating that "(W)hen the last On April 9, 1986, petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the
will and testament . . . was denied probate," the case was terminated and therefore all foreign law. After the hearing of the motion on April 25, 1986, respondent Judge issued an
orders theretofore issued should be given finality. The same Order amended the February order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a
21, 1984 Order by requiring petitioner to turn over to the estate the inventoried property. It fatal defect and was curable by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days
considered the proceedings for all intents and purposes, closed (Records, to submit the evidence to that effect.
p. 302).
However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent
On August 12, petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final Judge ruled in his order dated June 20, 1986 that he found "no compelling reason to disturb
settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Three days later, petitioner its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate
filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the Order of April 30, 1985 on the strength proceedings for each of the testator" (Records, p. 391).
of the February 21, 1984 Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country
within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses. On August The Order dated June 20, 1986 prompted petitioner to file a second motion for
19, respondent Judge granted the motion and reconsidered the Order of April 30, 1985. reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining
in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present
On August 29, counsel for petitioner, who happens to be her daughter, Natividad, filed a evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of
motion praying that since petitioner was ailing in Fort Lee, New Jersey, U.S.A. and therefore wills" (Records, p. 393).
incapacitated to act as special administratrix, she (the counsel) should be named substitute
special administratrix. She also filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of On July 18, respondent Judge denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two
February 21, 1984, denying probate to the wills of the Cunanan spouses, alleging that wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode of
respondent Judge "failed to appreciate the significant probative value of the exhibits . . . probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York
which all refer to the offer and admission to probate of the last wills of the Cunanan spouses "where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in
including all procedures undertaken and decrees issued in connection with the said separate proceedings" (Records, p. 395).
probate" (Records, pp. 313-323).
On August 13, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the Order of July 18,
1986, citing Section 3, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court, which provides that no party may (c) two certificates of Judge Reagan and Chief Clerk Donald E. Moore stating that they have
institute more than one suit for a single cause of action. She pointed out that separate in their records and files the said wills which were recorded on April 7, 1982 (Exhs. "F-2" and
proceedings for the wills of the spouses which contain basically the same provisions as they "G-2");
even named each other as a beneficiary in their respective wills, would go against "the grain
of inexpensive, just and speedy determination of the proceedings" (Records, pp. 405-407). (d) the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose (Exhs. "F-3", "F-6" and Exh. "G-3" — "G-6");
On September 11, 1986, petitioner filed a supplement to the motion for reconsideration, (e) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk certifying to the genuineness and
citing Benigno v. De La Peña, 57 Phil. 305 (1932) (Records, authenticity of the exemplified copies of the two wills (Exhs. "F-7" and "F-7");
p. 411), but respondent Judge found that this pleading had been filed out of time and that
the adverse party had not been furnished with a copy thereof. In her compliance, petitioner (f) two certificates of authentication from the Consulate General of the Philippines in New
stated that she had furnished a copy of the motion to the counsel of the Cunanan heirs and York (Exh. "H" and "F").
reiterated her motion for a "final ruling on her supplemental motion" (Records, p. 421).
(g) certifications from the Secretary of State that Judge Reagan is duly authorized to grant
On November 19, respondent Judge issued an order, denying the motion for exemplified copies of the decree of probate, letters testamentary and all proceedings had
reconsideration filed by petitioner on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of two and proofs duly taken
or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a (Exhs. "H-1" and "I-1");
single petition" (Records, pp. 376-378).
(h) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk that letters testamentary were issued to
Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the Rafael G. Cunanan (Exhs. "H-2" and "I-2");
hearing of April 11, 1983 sufficiently proved the laws of the State of New York on the
allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated (i) certification to the effect that it was during the term of Judge Reagan that a decree
in separate proceedings. admitting the wills to probate had been issued and appointing Rafael G. Cunanan as
alternate executor (Exhs. "H-3" and
II "I-10");
Petitioner contends that the following pieces of evidence she had submitted before (j) the decrees on probate of the two wills specifying that proceedings were held and proofs
respondent Judge are sufficient to warrant the allowance of the wills: duly taken (Exhs. "H-4" and "I-5");
(a) two certificates of authentication of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose by the (k) decrees on probate of the two wills stating that they were properly executed, genuine
Consulate General of the Philippines (Exhs. "F" and "G"); and valid and that the said instruments were admitted to probate and established as wills
valid to pass real and personal property (Exhs. "H-5" and "I-5"); and
(b) two certifications from the Secretary of State of New York and Custodian of the Great
Seal on the facts that Judge Bernard L. Reagan is the Surrogate of the Country of Onondaga (l) certificates of Judge Reagan and the Chief Clerk on the genuineness and authenticity of
which is a court of record, that his signature and seal of office are genuine, and that the each other’s signatures in the exemplified copies of the decrees of probate, letters
Surrogate is duly authorized to grant copy of the respective wills of Evelyn and Jose testamentary and proceedings held in their court (Exhs. "H-6" and "I-6") (Rollo, pp. 13-16).
(Exhs. "F-1" and "G-1");
Petitioner adds that the wills had been admitted to probate in the Surrogate Court’s couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be
Decision of April 13, 1983 and that the proceedings were terminated on November 29, separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and
1984. simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to
The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of determination of every action and proceeding."
the Philippines:
A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only result in the delay in
Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100 [1987];
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.
What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for the testator’s
Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article
Philippine laws is imperative. 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills
contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated conjugal in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held
outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with a number of times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding
the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the SCRA 743 [1990]).
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact —
Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of
and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence. Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F.
Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215
them (Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]). SCRA 876 [1992]).
Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more time to submit The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice
the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of
Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad
should relax the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the
matter is susceptible before a purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require
v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]). publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are
There is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses required.
should be probated jointly. Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is
The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to
notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to
Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for respondent, save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left
proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and to Kyle.6 The will was also admitted to probate by the Orphan’s Court of Ann Arundel,
devisees of the testator, . . . " Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise appointed as executor, who in turn,
designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena &
WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.
reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of
the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are Richard’s will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings. Branch 138, docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.7 Atty. Quasha was appointed as
ancillary administrator on July 24, 1986.8
SO ORDERED.
On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare
Richard and Kyle as heirs of Audrey.9 Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of
partition of Audrey’s estate, with Richard being apportioned the ¾ undivided interest in the
3. ANCHETA v CANDELARIA Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P9,313.48 from the Citibank
G.R. No. 139868; June 08, 2009 current account; and Kyle, the ¼ undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111 shares in
A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.10
Spouses Audrey O’Neill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens
who have resided in the Philippines for 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order
Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her dated February 12, 1988.11 The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing
entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor.1 The will was admitted to the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue
probate before the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N. a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey (¾ undivided interest) and
Phillips as executor due to Richard’s renunciation of his appointment.2 The court also Kyle (¼ undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to transfer 48.333
named Atty. Alonzo Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the
Law Offices as ancillary administrator.3 Citibank to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution
to the heirs.12
In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two
children, namely, Kimberly and Kevin. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in
the names of the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.13
On October 12, 1982, Audrey’s will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.4 Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project
As administrator of Audrey’s estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and of partition wherein 2/5 of Richard’s ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property was
appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audrey’s conjugal share in real estate with allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated to Richard’s three children. This
improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila, valued at was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, "a
P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audrey’s name with a cash balance legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the
of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.5 legacy."14 Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and
interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire ¾ undivided interest in the (b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry and
Makati property should be given to respondent. the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.
The trial court found merit in respondent’s opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, SO ORDERED.18
1991, disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial
court also adjudicated Richard’s entire ¾ undivided interest in the Makati property to Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution
respondent.15 dated August 27, 1999.19
On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
complaint for the annulment of the trial court’s Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, alleging that the CA gravely erred in not holding that:
1988, issued in Special Proceeding No. 9625.16 Respondent contended that petitioner
willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO.
on the distribution of Audrey’s estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that 9625 "IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED
since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be AUDREY GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR", ARE VALID AND
wholly adjudicated to him, and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, BINDING AND HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND
except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire EXECUTED AND CAN NO LONGER BE ANNULLED.
Makati property should now pertain to respondent.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT
Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondent’s allegations. Petitioner contended that he FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS
acted in good faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY O’NEIL GUERSEY’S ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES,
Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of the State of Maryland’s laws on testate AND THAT NO FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN
and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed that it is to the "best interests PROCURING SAID ORDERS.20
of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their just
shares." Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988
executory, and cannot be set aside. and April 7, 1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is
"conclusive upon the administration as to all matters involved in such judgment or order,
On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial court’s Orders and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to the proceedings are
dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.17 The concerned, all matters therein determined," and the same has already been executed.21
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:
Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an
WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are hereby ancillary administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition,
ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering: he was not aware of the relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was
made in accordance with Philippine laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey O’Neill Guersey in favor of the estate of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubrey’s will, stating that as early as 1984, he
W. Richard Guersey; and already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be
divided.22
Respondent argues that petitioner’s breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of
Aubrey’s estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty- Petitioner contends that respondent’s cause of action had already prescribed because as
bound to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws early as 1984, respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audrey’s will,30 and the
of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm and complaint was filed only in 1993. Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of
it was his duty to know the relevant laws. immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts since
she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed
Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the
partition because she was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubrey’s estate of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.31
will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of
partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richard’s estate. It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is
estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.23 However, in pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission,
exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period
jurisdiction or fraud.24 Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,25 the Court ruled that a party should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out
by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richard’s estate, the
imputable to negligence.26 opposition thereto, and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in
Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in 1991.32 Respondent cannot be faulted for
The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through Special Proceeding
issuance of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Obviously,
Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case.
filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a judgment is void for want of Since the action for annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.
jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.27 For fraud to become a
basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,28 and must be brought Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of
within four years from the discovery of the fraud.29 Appeals,33 the Court stated that "man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always
contrive new schemes to fool the unwary."
In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondent’s cause There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is one
and found that petitioner’s failure to follow the terms of Audrey’s will, despite the latter’s the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from presenting
declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the
the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable, hence, petitioner judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
should have distributed Aubrey’s estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of
also found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audrey’s estate in accordance with the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
Philippine laws in order to equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guersey’s adopted daughter, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by
Kyle Guersey Hill. fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where
compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in it is situated.
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority
connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there has never been a real However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing.34 testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.35
Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that "capacity to succeed is governed by the
Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audrey’s estate. As such, he occupies a position of law of the nation of the decedent."
the highest trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act
in entire good faith in the performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved
insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected to be infallible, yet the same degree of Outside the Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and ability exercises
in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.—When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
judged.36 testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audrey’s estate according to Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
the terms of her will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and the
Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the
must be upheld. Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.
During the reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
others, that at the time of Audrey’s death, she was residing in the Philippines but is authorized to take judicial notice of them;37 however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator
domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated August 18, 1972 was of Audrey’s estate, was duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State
executed and probated before the Orphan’s Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was of Maryland.38
duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by
the Chief Judge of said court; the will was admitted by the Orphan’s Court of Baltimore City Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland
on September 7, 1979; and the will was authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as
and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy. the Philippine law on wills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied
Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audrey’s will. The obvious result was
Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audrey’s will, especially with regard as to that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious
who are her heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as appreciation of the evidence presented.
provided in Article 16 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court citizenship and the avowed domicile of the decedent, it goes without saying that the
cannot accept petitioner’s protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent laws of Maryland on the matter.
Philippine laws apply when as early as the reprobate of Audrey’s will before the trial court in
1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S. citizen, domiciled in the State of The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of
Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious law firm, Audrey O’Neill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim
with a "big legal staff and a large library."39 He had all the legal resources to determine the of good faith in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the
applicable law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary defendant appears to put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his
administrator with reasonable diligence, and to discharge the trust reposed on him direct examination, to wit:
faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.
xxx
Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court
failed to consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey O’Neill
and April 7, 1988, declaring Richard and Kyle as Audrey’s heirs, and distributing Audrey’s Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s concern that the subject realty
estate according to the project of partition submitted by petitioner. This eventually equally benefit the plaintiff’s adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to the Makati
property. Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s action appears to have
breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate.
In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,40 the Court held that when the rule that the While such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
negligence or mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendant’s position, as well as the resultant
and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit frustration of the decedent’s last will, combine to create a circumstance that is tantamount
exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the court has the power to to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Ancheta’s omission to prove the national laws of the
except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice decedent and to follow the latter’s last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the
require it. subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.41 (Emphasis
supplied)
The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of Audrey’s estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total
petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle, whom petitioner believed should equally disregard of the law as a result of petitioner’s abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties.
benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court adopts, thus: It does not rest upon petitioner’s pleasure as to which law should be made applicable under
the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus excluded from enjoying full rights
In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant to the Makati property through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioner’s omission
Alonzo H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of
same as the foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced petitioner’s omission and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the
to prove the latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions same. The end result was a miscarriage of justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal
in the light of the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are deprived of their rights.42
the fact that his primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the
subject estate in accordance with the will of Audrey O’Neill Guersey. Considering the The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted
principle established under Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, as follows:
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the
Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws Compiled Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such
of Maryland on Estates and Trusts, "all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.
of decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who
shall hold the legal title for administration and distribution," while Section 4-408 expressly In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to
provides that "unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to record before the CA, and the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took
the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the note of the same in disapproving the proposed project of partition of Richard’s estate, not
legacy". Section 7-101, Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that "a personal to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter, does not dispute
representative is a fiduciary" and as such he is "under the general duty to settle and the existence or validity of said law, then Audrey’s and Richard’s estate should be
distribute the estate of the decedent in accordance with the terms of the will and the estate distributed according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition
of decedents law as expeditiously and with as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under submitted by petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent.
the circumstances".43
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,45 wrote:
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1)
Audrey’s conjugal share in the Makati property; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same force
64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making the
on to Richard upon Audrey’s death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his will, bequeathed his entire declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of
estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, the law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished
which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should to speak after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted
have then passed on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of them to do so x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just
the State of Maryland which allows "a legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the what he said.
testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy," was sufficiently proven in Special
Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in view of the Honorable as it seems, petitioner’s motive in equitably distributing Audrey’s estate cannot
ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.44 Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada prevail over Audrey’s and Richard’s wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:46
despite failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it
that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the
withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled decedent's national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.47
Nevada Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See
pp. 77-79, Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American
presented by the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during citizens who owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when
the hearing of the case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court and how the Guerseys acquired the Makati property.
of First Instance, Vol. 1).
Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted exploit lands of the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to
provision of the laws of the State of Nevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are operate public utilities, were reserved to Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them.
In Republic v. Quasha,48 the Court clarified that the Parity Rights Amendment of 1946,
which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in the acquisition of
lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of
natural resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of
private agricultural lands. The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was
carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of
private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a
former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article
XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring
or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal
succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.
In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who
subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.49 In this
case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent who is a Filipino, then
whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property
is now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in
Filipino hands has been achieved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution
dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
question (annuity) are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been
invested in an annuity in Canada under a contract executed in that country, Canada is the
situs of the money. There is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred
or removed to the Manila branch. Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila
branch, yet it no longer forms part of Butler’s estate and is beyond the control of the court
because it has passed completely in the hands of the company by virtue of the contract of
annuity.
1. LEON v MANUFACTURERS LIF INSURANCE CO. FACTS: Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American
G.R. No. L-3677 citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing
provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of
FACTS: Basil Gordon Butler, a resident of the Philippines, died in New York leaving a will the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later,
which was duly probate in the Surrogate’s Court of New York country on August 3. The the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named
estate having been settled, the proceedings were closed. The dispute arose when a clause in trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.
the will of the testator stated that all the remaining properties of Butler will be given to one
Mercedes de Leon but, however, since she was of unsound mind, the former instructed the Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael
executor to handle the money in his discretion. Subsequently, the executor bought an opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that
annuity from the Manufacturer’s Life Insurance Co. at its office in Toronto, Canada which, in since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued
turn, gave Mercedes monthly allowance through the Insurance Company’s Manila office. that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled
to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.
On September 4, 1948, Mercedes presented Butler’s will for probate in the CFI of Manila.
Ada Loggey Ghezzi accepted the appointment as administrator while the Ross and Seph For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills
declined because the probate was already settled. were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the
law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.
Mercedes and the appointed administrator (Ghezzi) filed a motion for the citation of the
manager of Manufacturer’s Life Insurance, Manila Branch to render a complete accounting ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed
of certain funds. (Basically Mercedes filed this petition for probate so that she can get hold
at once of the entire amount invested in the annuity.) The court denied the motion. HELD:
The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner
outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of
the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.
foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and
allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; 3. ANCHETA v CANDELARIA
Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first G.R. No. 139868; June 08, 2009
and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.
FACTS: Spouses Audrey O’Neill and W. Richard Guersey were American citizens who have
The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the resided in the Philippines for 30 years. On July, 29, 1979, Audrey died, and
foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard through a will. In 1981, Richard
them. married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon. On July, 20, 1984, Richard died; leaving a will
wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, save for his rights and interests
On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle, his daughter with Audrey. The will
was admitted to probate by the Court of Maryland, USA, and Atty. William Quasha of the
This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Peña and Nolasco Law Offices was appointed as ancillary
petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and administrator.
because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed
to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No.9625 before the Makati RTC,
impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a motion to declare Richard and Kyle as heirs of Aubrey and apportioned to them¾ and ¼ of
a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]). all the estate, respectively. This motion and project of partition was granted and approved
by the trial court in its Order dated February 12, 1988. This was opposed by respondent on
The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice the ground that under the law of the State of Maryland, “a legacy passes to the legatee the
thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of entire interest of the testator in the property subject of the legacy.” Respondent argued that
Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then it should be wholly adjudicated to
should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the him and not merely ¾ thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate to the respondent,
first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require except for the A/G Interior Inc. shares, then the entire property should now pertain to
respondent. The Court of Appeals annulled the trial court’s Orders in Speacial Proceeding
No. 9625 abd later denied the appeal of the petitioner, thus the petition for review on
certiorari.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he
disregarded the laws of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s estate
in accordance with her will.
2. Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the
property is situated
HELD:
2. Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is
situated. However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of
her will is governed by her national law. The national law of the person who made
the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the nature of
the property and regardless of the country where the property maybe found (Art 16
CC). The first wife's properties may be found in the Philipppines, however the
successional rights over those properties are governed by the national law of the
testator.