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VOL. 95, JANUARY 22, 1980 437

Herico vs. Dar

*
No. L-23265. January 28, 1980.

MOISES HERICO, petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO DAR and

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

_____________

* FIRST DIVISION

438

438 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Herico vs. Dar

Civil Law; Free Patents; Administrative Law; Presumption of

regularity; The presumption of regularity by virtue of approval of
the application of free patent impaired by the applicant’s
admission of having been a tenant of the owner of the land; Case
at bar.—What led the Court of Appeals to find in favor of
respondent Dar is the fact that his application for a free patent
was approved after the requisite official investigation which
enjoys the presumption of regularity. This presumption however,
may be said to have been seriously impaired by respondent Dar’s
admission of having been a tenant to petitioner Herico, for by
such relationship, respondent Dar should not be beard to dispute
his landlord’s title, claim to which by the latter is strengthened by
the prompt filing of the present action, just months after the
issuance of the certificate of title sought to be cancelled, precisely
on the ground of fraud.
Same; Same; Land registration; Where title over the land has
vested on petitioner, possessor of the questioned property, the land
is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free
patent; Action to annul or cancel the certificate of title issued in
favor of another must be brought within one year from issuance
thereof.—Another obvious error of the respondent Court is in
holding that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens title,
the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and void,
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and has become absolute and indefeasible. In the first place, the
action to annul or cancel the certificate of title was brought within
one year as admitted by respondent in his brief. Secondly, under
the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent
court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner’s case, with the
latter’s proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-ininterest, title
over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate the land
from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable
under the Public Land Act as by free patent: This is as provided
in Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957,
amending Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act No. 141.
Same; Same; Same; Possessor land deemed to have acquired
by operation of law a right to a government grant without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued where the possessor or
his predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim for acquisition of
ownership for at least 30 years immediately preceding the
application for confirmation of title.—As interpreted in several
cases when the conditions

439

VOL. 95, JANUARY 22, 1980 439

Herico vs. Dar

as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the

possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right
to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a
certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of
the public domain, and beyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is a mere
formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title
to be issued upon the strength of said patent.

APPEAL by certiorari from the decision of the Court of

Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Pedro A. Venida for petitioner.
          Ricardo S. Heraldo & F.H. Geris for private
respondent.

DE CASTRO, J.:
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Appeal 1by certiorari from the decision of the Court of

Appeals reversing the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines
2
Norte in favor of the plaintiff,
Moises Herico, the petitioner 3 herein, and accordingly
dismissing the latter’s complaint.
The complaint filed on October 26, 1956 in the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Norte, sought the cancellation
of OCT No. P-506 of the Registry of Deeds of Camarines
Norte, issued on May 10, 1956 pursuant to Free Patent No.
V-36970 covering a parcel of land situated in Paracale,
Camarines Norte, in the name of respondent Cipriano Dar.
As recited in the appealed judgment the plaintiff-
petitioner’s evidence shows the following:

“The plaintiff’s evidence shows that the land in question is a part

of the public domain; that in 1914, when it was still within the
forest zone, it was occupied, together with the land adjoining it on
the North (now in the possession of Pedro Lamadrid); that
adjoining it on the East (now in possession of Maximino Andaya);
and that on the West, now in possession of the heirs of Adriano
Lopez, by Emilio,

_____________

1 Promulgated May 27, 1964.

2 Pp. XLIII-LIII, Record on Appeal.
3 Annex “A” to petition for certiorari, p. 5, Rollo.

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440 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Herico vs. Dar

Gregorio and Isidoro, all surnamed Andaya; that the Andaya

brothers gradually cleared the entire area by making caingin and
planting bananas, abaca and coconuts; that in 1918 when Isidoro,
who was the youngest among the Andaya brothers, was ready and
able to take care of and improve the land, it was ceded to him by
his two elder brothers, Emilio and Gregorio; that while in
possession he improved the land and incurred indebtedness from
his aunt, Martina Herico, in the amount of P60.00, representing
cash advances and cost of supplies given to him; that to guaranty
payment of the said amount he executed on March 12, 1925, a
private document purportedly mortgaging the land in question to
Martina Herico (Exhibit A); that in 1938, Martina Herico
demanded payment from him of the amount of indebtedness
which by this time had amounted to P130.00 but Isidoro Andaya,
instead of paying, transferred and assigned his right to the land
to plaintiff Moises Herico, a brother of Martina, in consideration
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of the sum of P130.00 which was paid by Moises Herico to

Martina Herico; that Moises Herico took possession of the land in
1939 and planted it with abaca and coconuts, although there were
coconut trees thereon previously planted by Isidoro Andaya; that
plaintiff declared the land for taxation purposes in 1940 and 1945;
that in 1943, he placed Maximino Andaya, a son of Emilio
Andaya, as tenant on the land who planted some coconut trees
and remained as such tenant until 1953; that in 1949 plaintiff
placed the defendant as his tenant on said land with the privilege
of gathering all the produce thereof provided he planted some
coconut trees for the plaintiff; that on December 12, 1955, while
he was still plaintiff’s tenant, defendant without the knowledge
and consent of the plaintiff filed a Free Patent application for said
land; that on April 7, 1956, the said application was approved and
an order for the issuance of a patent was issued; that on May 10,
1956, the corresponding certificate of title was issued in favor of
the defendant; that the adjoining owners of the land, including
the plaintiff himself, who is also the owner of the adjoining land
on the South, were not notified of the Free Patent application; and
that the defendant is a relative of the plaintiff’s wife who went to
reside in barrio Batobalane, municipality of Paracale, only after
the liberation, staying at first in a house near that of the plaintiff,
but out of charity plaintiff placed him as tenant on said land with
the privilege of harvesting for his benefit the produce of the land.”
(pp. 2-4, Petitioner’s Brief)

On the basis of the evidence of defendant-respondent which

the Court of Appeals recited as follows:
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VOL. 95, JANUARY 22, 1980 441

Herico vs. Dar

“On the other hand, the defendant sought to show that he took
possession of the land in question in 1922; that he cultivated the
same and possessed it continuously to the exclusion of all other
persons; that he declared the land for taxation purposes and paid
the taxes thereon; that on December 10, 1949, he entered into a
contract with Mrs. Victorina Salen and Mrs. Eufemia Salen to do
prospecting work on the land in question and for them to sell the
mining claims located thereon; that he also entered into a
contract with Vicente Inocalla giving the latter the right to
prospect, locate and carry out mining operations over said land;
that he filed his Free Patent application after occupying and
cultivating the land continuously since 1922; that nobody objected
or filed a protest against his application in spite of the fact that
notices of the application were posted in the various places

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required by law; that not being the owner of more than twenty-
four hectares of land and having cultivated the land in question
continuously since 1922, a report to that effect was submitted by
Junior Public Land Inspector Florencio Rosales who stated in his
report that the land is claimed by nobody and that the defendant
had totally cultivated the total area of 8.5973 hectares and
introduced improvements thereon consisting of 700 coconuts
ranging from twenty to thirty years old, and banana plants
scattered all over the land; that pursuant to said report, Free
Patent No. V-36970 was issued by authority of the President of
the Philippines and on the basis thereof Original Certificate of
Title No. P-508 was issued to him by the Register of Deeds of
Camarines Norte. (pp. V-VI, Petitioner’s Brief)

The Court awarded judgment in favor of defendant,

Cipriano Dar.
The decision of the respondent Court failed utterly to
pass on the question of whether respondent Dar was a
tenant of petitioner Herico on the land in question. It
proceeded on the assumption that there was no landlord-
tenant relationship between them, and came to the
conclusion that when respondent Dar applied for a free
patent over the land in question, he did so without
committing any fraud against petitioner or his landlord, or
to create a constructive trust in favor of the latter. Sole
basis of the conclusion was the approval of his application
for free patent by the land authorities and the granting of
the Torrens title thereafter.
The allegation of respondent Dar that be has never been
a tenant of the petitioner over the land in question is belied
by his

442

442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Herico vs. Dar

own statement which he signed on November 8, 1956 in

which he admitted that he has been petitioner’s tenant
since 1945 (Exhibit D). On the witness stand he also4
admitted that he has been making copra for the petitioner.
With these admissions, it is easier to believe the allegation
of petitioner that his possession dates back to 1914,
through that of his predecessors-in-interest, as recited
earlier, and declared the land for taxation purposes earlier
in 1940 than respondent Dar who declared it only in 1952
(Exhibit 3), after he had been allegedly placed as tenant in
the land in question in 1949.
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What led the Court of Appeals to find in favor of

respondent Dar is the fact that his application for a free
patent was approved after the requisite official
investigation which enjoys the presumption of regularity.
This presumption however, may be said to have been
seriously impaired by respondent Dar’s admission of
having been a tenant to petitioner Herico, for by such
relationship, respondent Dar should not be heard to
dispute his landlord’s title, claim to which by the latter is
strengthened by the prompt filing of the present action,
just months after the issuance of the certificate of title
sought to be cancelled, precisely on the ground of fraud. As
held by this Court:

“It is elementary that a tenant will not be heard to dispute his

landlord’s title, hence, the proceedings whereby the defendants
obtained free patents were fraudulent.
“We cannot concur with the distinguished trial judge that it is
necessary that the plaintiff ‘presente pruebas concluyentes o
titulos positivos que justifiquen con la claridad de la luz
meridiana el derecho de propiedad o dominio del demandante
sobre los terrenos cuestionados.’ By virtue of his possession since
1892, established by the preponderance of evidence, the plaintiff
is entitled to a certificate of title to the lands described in his
petition, under the provisions of section 45, paragraph (b), of Act
No. 2874, the Public Land Law, and he is conclusively essential to
a government grant. That being so, the original certificates of title
of free patent issued to the various defendants, as recited in the
agreed statement of facts, were unauthorized and void as against
this plaintiff.” (Lizada vs. Omanan, 59 Phil. 547, 555; See also
Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, G.R. No. 7745,

_____________

4 p. 170, tsn.

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VOL. 95, JANUARY 22, 1980 443

Herico vs. Dar

November 18, 1955, 51 O.G. 5590; Bancadren vs. Diones, et al.,

G.R. No. L-8013, December 20, 1955). (pp. 5-6, Petitioner’s Brief).

Another obvious error of the respondent Court is in holding

that after one year from the issuance of the Torrens title,
the same can no longer be reopened to be declared null and
void, and has become absolute and indefeasible. In the first
place, the action to annul or cancel the certificate of title
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was brought
5
within one year as admitted by respondent in
his brief. Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent court held to be
inapplicable to the petitioner’s case, with the latter’s
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years
since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest,
title over the land has vested on petitioner as to segregate
the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free
patent: This is as provided in Republic Act No. 1942, which
took effect on June 22, 1957, amending Section 48b of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which provides:

“ ‘(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.’ ” (p. 8, Petitioner’s Brief).
6
As interpreted In several cases when the conditions as
specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the
possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law,
a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land,
therefore, ceases to be of the public domain, and beyond the
authority of the Direc-

_____________

5 p. 1, Respondent’s Brief.
6 Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil. 424; Mesina vs. Pineda Vda. de Sonza,
G.R. No. L-14722, May 25, 1960.

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444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Herico vs. Dar

tor of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation

is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the
legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the
patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength
of said patent.

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On the ground, therefore, that there is evidence of fraud

in the filing of application for free patent over the land by
respondent Dar, and that the land applied for had ceased to
be part of the public domain by reason of the operation of
Republic Act No. 1942 in favor of petitioner, the decision
appealed from has to be reversed.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the respondent Court of
Appeals dismissing the complaint is hereby reversed, and
another one entered cancelling Original Certificate of Title
No. P-506 issued in favor of the defendant-respondent, for
being null and void, and declaring plaintiff-petitioner
entitled to either judicial confirmation or administrative
legalization of his incomplete or imperfect title under the
provision of the Public
7
Land Act, Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

          Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez,

Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Petition granted.

Notes.—Casual cultivation of land and raising cattle

thereon do not constitute possession under claim of
ownership. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177).
The appellants cannot claim to have obtained title by
prescription, inasmuch as the homestead application filed
by them necessarily implied an admission that the portions
applied for are part of the public domain, which cannot be
acquired by prescription. (Cano vs. De Camacho, 43 SCRA
390).
Public lands subject to homestead applications are
exempt from execution. (Figuration vs. Cortez, 55 SCRA
674).

_____________

7 See annotations, 31 SCRA 191.

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Herico vs. Dar

A possessor of public land may choose either the remedy of

judicial confirmation of imperfect title or issuance of a free
patent. (Kayaban vs. Republic, 52 SCRA 357).

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The main purpose of the Torrens System is to avoid

possible conflicts of title in and to real estate, and to
facilitate transactions relative thereto by giving the public
the right to rely upon the face of Torrens certificate of title
and to dispense with the need on inquiry further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that should impel a reasonable cautious
man to make such further inquiry. (Pascua vs. Copuyoc, 77
SCRA 78).
A torrens title is incontrovertible against any
“information possesoria” or title existing prior to the
issuance thereof not annotated on the title. (J.M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. Jurilla, 76 SCRA 346).
While an inherently defective Torrens title may not
ordinarily be cancelled even after of its effect, the law
nevertheless safeguards the rightful party’s interest in the
title land from fraud and improper use of technicalities by
allowing such party in appropriate cases, to judicially seek
reconveyance to him of whatever he has not been
transferred or conveyed to a purchaser in good faith.
(Pascua vs. Copuyoc, 77 SCRA 78).
Petition for cancellation of annotation and/or adverse
claim on Torrens title should carry the land registration
record of the lot in the original case. It is not and should
not be denominated “special proceedings”. (Cheng vs. Lim
Tan Kee, 77 SCRA 440).
A judgment that orders delivery of possession of a pro
indiviso portion contemplates symbolical or constructive
delivery of possession, not the material possession actually
held for one of the owners by other persons. (Gatchalian vs.
Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234).
Where petitioner’s contention that they should possess
the property pendente lite has no leg to stand on and where
the private respondent has in the meantime secured a writ
of possession from another court by virtue of the
redemption made by it of the property in question, the
orderly administration of justice requires that, pending
judgment in the three cases between the same parties over
the same property, the
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446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Boothe vs. Director of Patents

possession thereof should be given to respondent.

(Sambajon vs. Tutaan, 76 SCRA 87).

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A party’s mere refusal to believe that a defect or his

wilful closing his eyes to the possibility of the existence of a
defect in his vendor’s title will not make him an innocent
purchaser for value, if it afterwards develop that the title
was in fact defective. (Barrios vs. Court of Appeals, 78
SCRA 427).
Possession of property by a party is interrupted by
issuance of judicial summons. (Dacasion vs. Court of
Appeals, 80 SCRA 89).

——o0o——

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