NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR and ZAMBOWOOD MONTHLY EMPLOYEES

UNION, ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS vs. CARLITO A. EISMA, LT. COL. JACOB
CARUNCHO, COMMANDING OFFICER, ZAMBOANGA DISTRICT COMMAND, PC,
AFP, and ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS,

FACTS:
 petitioner National Federation of Labor, on March 5, 1982, filed with the Ministry of Labor
and Employment, Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City, a petition for direct certification
as the sole exclusive collective bargaining representative of the monthly paid employees of
the respondent Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. at its manufacturing plant in Lumbayao,
Zamboanga City
 Such employees, on April 17, 1982 charged respondent firm before the same
office of the Ministry of Labor for underpayment of monthly living allowances.
 May 3, 1982, from petitioner union, a notice of strike against private respondent,
alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of the said local union;
unfair labor practice, non-payment of living allowances; and "employment of
oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit.
 the strike began on May 23, 1982. 7 On July 9, 1982, private respondent
Zambowood filed a complaint with respondent Judge against the officers and
members of petitioners union, for "damages for obstruction of private property
with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order."
 It was alleged that defendants, now petitioners, blockaded the road leading to its
manufacturing division, thus preventing customers and suppliers free ingress to
or egress from such premises. 9 Six days later, there was a motion for the
dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining order and opposition to the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction filed by petitioners.
 a temporary restraining order was issued, "directing respondent Judge and the commanding
officer in Zamboanga and his agents from enforcing the ex-parte order of injunction dated July
20, 1982; and to restrain the respondent Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the until
otherwise case effective as of [that] date and continuing ordered by [the] Court
 On August 13, 1982, the answer of private respondent was filed sustaining the original
jurisdiction of respondent Judge and maintaining that the order complained of was not in
excess of such jurisdiction, or issued with grave abuse of discretion. Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza (i)ncluded that "the instant petition has merit and should be given due
course." He traced the changes undergone by the Labor Code, citing at the same time the
decisions issued by this Court after each of such changes. As pointed out, the original
wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdictional

ISSUE: whether or not it is a court or a labor arbiter that can pass on a suit for damages filed by the
employer, here private respondent Zamboanga Wood Products

RULING:

 Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded. The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor
arbiter is therein provided for explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first
instance judge then, a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the
 authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages, arising from
picketing that accompanied a strike. That was squarely within the express terms of the law. 
 On the precise question at issue under the law as it now stands, this Court has spoken in
three decisions. They all reflect the utmost fidelity to the plain command of the law that it is a
labor arbiter, not a court, that ossesses original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide a claim
for damages arising from picketing or a strike.
 The issuance of Presidential Decree No. 1691 and the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
130, made clear that the exclusive and original jurisdiction for damages would once again be
vested in labor arbiters.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas

GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)
Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring

 Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a

petition with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the
adoption of minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors
Roderick and Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad
litem, the petitioners herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They
contended that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate
daughter named Estrella Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1
March 1971, and therefore said spouses were disqualified to adopt under
Article 335 of the Civil Code, which provides that those who have
legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children or children by
legal fiction cannot adopt.
 Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.
 Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous.
When the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word
“descendant,” found in the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil
Code was patterned, to “children.” The children thus mentioned have a
clearly defined meaning in law and do not include grandchildren. Well
known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute
clear and unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted. The rule is
that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the
subjects of statutory construction. In the present case, Roderick and
Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and Amanda
Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and Wilson
Marcos by the Agonoys.
 The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37),
wthout pronouncement as to costs.
 Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and
unambiguous on its face need not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only
statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the subject of statutory construction.

Endencia v. David
GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)
En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur

 Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected

income taxes from Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals and Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
respectively.  The lower court held that under the doctrine laid down in
the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes
from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution
of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution
of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.  Respondent,
through the Solicitor General contended that the collection was done
pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress enacted to
authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of
judicial officers, if not to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.
 Issue:  Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of
income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer,
not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and
decided otherwise.
 Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax
on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a
decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided
otherwise. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of
statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally
provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not
violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts
in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the
interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a
previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the
land. In the case at bar, Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or
ascertained the meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished
during their continuance in office,” found in section 9, Article VIII of the
Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an
invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of
the Judiciary. The Legislature under our form of government is assigned
the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret
them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law,
 the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative
department. Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring
confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions.
 Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the
Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws.
The Executive department is charged with the execution or carrying out
of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of
said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this
authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution.
Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it
will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but
also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide
whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the
law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto
vs. Meer to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a
judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution, is
reiterated.
 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, affirming the ruling in Perferto
v. Meer and holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to
the Judiciary.