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Requirements of the conflict in Bouthe~st; Afi i a ex.e rt.ed ever-

increasing pressures upon the Strategic Air Command. The command's

ability to carry out its primary mission, both immediately and in the

long term, was affected. Although less than 1) perl.!ent of SAC'B B-52

and KC-135 resources and none of its B-58s were actively engaged in

contingency operations, the effects of the war in Vietnam permeated

every activity. Most particularly, the increasing demand for pilots

in Southeast Asia caused a steady drain upon the aircrew resources of

_l I

all strategic aircraft units. An increasing proportion of training

and testing sorties supported the objectives of conventional rather

than nuclear operations. Economic considerations also exerted a

negative influence upon needed modifications and long-range improvement

.1 j

programs. Despite the influence of these problems and Secretary

McNamara's stated confidence in ballistic missiles, the SAC bombardment

alert forces still represented the most powerfUl element in the Single


Integrated Operational Plan.


• 4NucleariAlert Forces

Ground Alert

(8) The January--June 1967 period coincided with the life of

IRevision A of the Single Integrated Operational Plan-4 (s-rop-4). I

Early planning for Revision A had been based upon a continued SAC


gEe ft [ T



commitment of 348 bombardment aircraft (308 B-52s and 40 B-58s) on


ground alert. However, the directive to accelerate the inactivation

of three B-52 squadrons (two of the 6th Wing at Walker and one of the 484th Wing at Turner),l and the requirement to deploy a third cadre January 1967,2 effectively combined to reduce

the Revision A commitment by 32 B-52 sorties. As a result, the SAC

bombardment alert commitment during the first six months of 1967 totaled

316 (276 B-52s and 40 B-58s).3

(S) The conflict in Southeast Asia was not only instrumental

in reducing the number of required SAC alert sorties, it was also

responsible for most of the degradations in the programmed posture.

For example, on 30 June 1967, the actual SAC bombardment alert force

totaled 253 sorties (213 B-52 and 40 B-58) plus four B-52s on airborne

alert. Reasons for the 63 degraded B-52 ground alert sorties were as

0j$ wa§jdegraded because of the heavy demands for conventional sortiesj

crew shortages were responsible for 21 B-52 degradations in 19 unitsj

10 sorties at five ConUS bases were degraded because the applicable

wings were augmenting the

sorties of the 454th Wing were off alert because it was replacing the

461st Wing as one of the cadre unitsj and four sorties vrere off ground 4 alert because the applicable units were supporting airborne alert.

With the exception of the last four mentioned sorties, all the B-52

alert degradations on 30 June resulted directly or indirectly from the

demands of the war in Vietnamo Unscheduled deviations (resulting usually

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from an isolated materiel problem) continued to be extremely rare.

All 63 B-52 degradations on 30 June were authorized by Headquarters



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period, the combination of negative influences

the specific status on 30 June should not be construed as completely

typical of ~he six-month period. Authorized alert force degradations

resulted from conditions which could be roughly described as continuous,

periodic, or occasional. In the continuously degraded category during

the first six months of 1967 were the four sorties in airborne alert

(from various participating wings), ~he 9 or 10 home alert sorties

degraded in the Arc Light augmentation units (four or five wings),


unless SAC

"temporary degrade," in practice the Andersen nuclear alert force was

degraded continuously. The governing SAC policy was that whenever a

stand-down in Southeast Asia contingency operations of more than 48

hours was forecast, the

problem was

also continuous, but the number of B-52 alert sorties degraded for that

reason ranged from a low of one at the end of February to a high of 21

during the last days of June. Periodic disruptions occurred when a

at the end of March, when the 22d Wing (30 UE--double cadre) replaced the 91st and 306th Wings, as well as at the end of June, when the 454th




Wing replaced the 461st Wing. Alert force degradations which might

be characterized as occasional occurred whenever a unit performed an operational readiness inspection test (ORIT) or Bar None exercise06

(S) Perhaps a more basic problem than the reasons for !dev~ations

rom the SlOP alert


The last day of June was not only the final day of Revision A of SIop-4,

it also marked the end of the 50 percent ground alert posture (actually

53 percent in B-52 units). On 1 July 1967, the 40 percent ground alert

rate would go into effect.* As a result the B-52 ground alert commit-

ment would be reduced from 276 to 212 sortieso In early July, contin-


reduction in the crew-to-aircraft ratio from

108:1 to 1.5:1, which had been programmed to go into effect silliQlta-

neously with the alert rate reduction, was actually imposed by Head~uarters USAF on 1 May 196708 Therefore, throughout much of the April-

June ~uarter, SAC was attempting to maintain the standard alert rate

with inade~uate crew resources.


~ Normally the B-58 alert force was very stable. It was seldom

disrupted unless one of the units was undergoing an ORIT or Bar None

It is not meant to imply that the Vietnam conflict was responsible for lowering the alert rate and crew ratioo The DOD had been studying the .alert rate/crew ratio issue at least since

1965, primarily from the standpoint of monetary considerations and its assessment of strategic re~uirements.





exercise. However, a problem of cracked longerons was discovered

which by early March had been found to affect over three-~uarters

of the B-58 fleet. For a period of about three weeks in March, SAC was unable to maintain the re~uired 40 aircraft on alert.9 As many

as 17 sorties were degraded for a short time. Fortunately, repairs

were completed ahead of schedule, and all 40 sorties were back on 10

alert at the end of the day on 31 March 1967. There were no other

protracted degradations in the B-58 alert posture during the period.

(S) On ~9 ,June there were 233 KC-135 tankers on alert in support of the 1~2 a,:d'-B-58 SIOP alert forDe, I This was 35 less than the

re~uired alert of 268 sorties, but all degradations were scheduled.

Fourteen KC-135s were off alert because the EWO-mated bomber alert

sorties were degraded, 13 tankers were degraded because of Arc Light

augmentation, seven KC-135s were' off alert as a result of crew- shortages,

and one was degraded because its receiver was part~cipating in airborne

,- ""). '"

alert. In addition, although not part of~SI~P f rpes, th~re we~

chart illustrates the nunfuer of bomhers

and weapons re~uired and the megatonnage programmed for the day-to-day

L,I I'

alert posture !~~_, Revisions A andB of SIOP-4_~ For comparative purposes

-JE§f: 0 [ eRE T fi8f\1 tnt\' REOTRI CB DpI;TI\

~ ~E 5 [ eRE T


Aircraft Req_uired (Alert)
Weapons Req_uired (Alert)
Total 1,284 200 1,484

276 40 316

276 40 316

212 32 244

1,294 200


998 160


Megatonnage Programmed (Alert)
B-52 2,016 2,031 1,557
B-58 520 520 416
Total 2,536 2,551 1,973
ICBMs Targeted 951 879 928
Megatonnage Programmed (IqBM) 1,483 1,418 1,486
Force 4,019 3,969 3,459 Megatonnage

t~) The significant decrease in aircraft alert capability on 1 July 1967 reflected adoption of the 40 percent alert rate for all

SAC strategic aircraft. Despite the steady decline in the importance

L :programmes. to deliver more than one-half of' the megatonnage representedJ loy the SAC nuclear al~rt fO~ Another factor which should be considered is the significant follow-on capability of the aircraft forces--

sorties which could be placed on alert status in a period of extreme

tension. The total number of B-52s targeted


hand, the missile alert commitment Ii'epresented ihe total lJd$M force I ~geted in the SlOP. n

if -0 f? 5 [ G RET

~~I1boY Ptl!tTRI 6;T1![) B:AiTP:



~ In December 1966, Head~uarters USAF had provided SAC with

appropriate guidance for effecting the reduced crew ratio and decreased

alert rate ordered by the Secretary of Defense. It directed SAC to

adopt a 40 percent alert rate (down from about 50 percent) for all

strategic bombers and tankers on 1 July 1967, and to reduce the crew

ratio from 1.8:1 to 1.5:1 during the July-September quarter. The

11 B-52 C and D units were exempted from the crew ratio reduction as a result of a SAC-USAF appeal.13


,~ The alert posture studies in which SAC had participated

during the previous year had associated the 1.5:1 crew ratio with a

43 percent alert rate. In other wordS, a 30 u~ organization with a

crew-to-aircraft manning ratio of 105:1 and operating within the

standard SAC 74-hour crew duty week could produce 13 alert sorties.

However, a 43 percent alert rate could not be applied to 15 UE units

(6 1/2 alert sorties)--a category which currently included most of

SAC's B-52 organizations. A 15 UE unit could support Six alert sorties

(40 percent) with a 70-hour duty week, or seven (47 percent) with a 14

duty week in excess of the 74-hour SAC standard.


~ Thus it appeared, at least in theory, that authorized crew

resources on 1 July would be slightly more than ade~uate to support

the 40 percent alert rate ceiling finally established by the DOD and

USAF (specifically, six alert sorties per 15 UE, twelve per 30 UE, and

so forth). Conse~uently, General Nazzaro directed that the crew duty

week be thoroughly documented when the lower alert rate and crew ratio

actually went into effect. All duty re~uirements were to be considered to preclude additional crew force reductions in the future.15

-- ----- ---------------------------------------------------------

UMCl..AsStntu 5 E t R



j~- Such discussions were based upon earlier USAF assurances

that the crew ratio reduction would not begin until 1 July 1967, and

that actual withdrawals would take place during the July-September

~uarter. However, in March, the Air Staff informed SAC that General

McConnell approved accelerating the crew ratio reduction date from

1 July to 1 May 1967. The Air Staff expressed its rationale as

follows: trThe earlier availability of SAC pilots, as a result of the

advanced crew ratio reduction date, will provide for a better overall

utilization of pilot resources available for SEA assignment and will minimize personnel turbulence in the major commands.u16 It was then

anticipated that the resulting crew losses would take place during a three or four month period beginning in May.17 Head~uarters SAC directed

its units to compute alert force degradations resulting from this policy

in accordance with the guidance in SAC Manual 178-1, uSAC Planning Factors for Alert. u18


) \ ~ In a sense, the Air Staff action which established the crew

ratio reduction date _two months earlier than planned simply gave legal

sanction to developments which were already taking place. Crew shortages

had been responsible for several B-52 alert force degradations throughout much of 1966.19 However, the problem of aircrew shortages was magnified

by the number of personne~ actions re~uired to arrive at the 1.5:1 crew

ratio by 1 July 1967.


~ The effect of crew Shortages upon the aircraft alert posture

diminished early in 1967, and then sharply increased during the second

~uarter. The B-52 units were hardest hit, but KC-135 s~uadrons were

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also affected. At the end of January, there were six B-52 alert

sorties degraded because of crew shortages. The number dropped to

one at the end of February, and two at the end of March; it then increased to 13 on 30 April and 19 (in 17 units) on 31 May.20 By 1

early June, the Vice CINCSAC, Lieutenant General K. K. Compton, had

become concerned about the equitable distribution of alert degrada-

tions resulting from aircrew shortages. Possible solutions consid-

ered included reduction in the alert requirement to seven or six

sorties per B-52 squadron, adoption of SIop-4B earlier than planned,

and a modification in the planning factors for alert. General Compton 21

latter course.

selected the


. ' __ jJi1" As

mentioned previously, SAC Manual 178-1 ("SAC Planning

Factors for Alert") outlined the policy governing the inter-relation-

ship between crew availability and alert force degradations. The

current guidance was that useable crRW levels must be forecast to

reach and remain below a minimum standard for 15 days or more before

relief could be requested from the parent numbered air force. Such

relief might consist of providing temporary duty crew members from

other units, or it might involve a request to SAC for degradation of training requirements or alert commitments.22 However, the 15-day

requirement meant that a unit would have no recourse during the period

15-30 June because the minimum useable crew level would drop on 1 July

when the alert rate was reduced. {In other words, because of the

reduced ,alert commitment, a shortage on 15 June might not still be

a shortage on 1 July.)


--6 [ 6 RET



~ To help alleviate this potential problem during a period

of numerous personnel actions, General Compton approved an interim

amendment to SAC Manual 178-1 for the period 15 June to 1 July 1967.

Unit commanders were authorized to report inade~uate useable crew

levels directly to Head~uarters SAC, which would consider an alert

degradation. This temporary policy provided a method for reporting

crew shortages anticipated for a period less than 15 days and enabled SAC to act upon the r'eque s t more rapidly.23 Howeve.r , the major

impact of the crew shortage problem had apparently already been ex-

erted on the alert posture. At the end of June, there were 21 B-52

alert sorties (two more than at the end of May) and seven KC-135 sorties degraded because of various aircrew shortages.24 This problem

would "disappear" at least temporarily on 1 July when the S.IOP air-

~ As one means of offsetting the decreased EWO readiness

which would result from the alert force reduction on 1 July, SAC

gave some consideration to a Pregenerated Aircraft Concept

IJ¥0-ready, but cr~ not on aiert).f Subordinate SAC commanders generally preferred to have these aircraft available for daily

training. In late February, General Nazzaro decided

However, he did not completely dismiss the advantages of maintaining one or two l~generaT.ed aiJ..rc:Baf1] as an in-house procedure but I without including them ~n SlOP plann~ng.l The CINC also suggested that manning, workload, and cost requirements be

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computed in case higher headQuarters reQuested an increased capabilityat some later date.25 Somewhat later, when aircrew personnel

shortages began causing an increasing number of alert degradations

SAC staff again studied the

particular sortie was degraded because of a crew shortage.· . Although

....._.~ ..

the concept was the same, the purpose was not to provide for an Iladditional ::pabilit;y but to covide for rapid recovery of degraded 26

However, the procedure was not adopted.

Airborne Alert

~ The level of airborne alert indoctrination (Chrome Dome)

officially approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for fiscal

year 1967 was four B-52 sorties daily. Neither special funds nor

additional flying hours were provided for this effort. Although

SAC had flown only two daily sorties during the July-September

1966 Quarter, it began flying the four authorized daily sorties on lOctober.27 Airborne alert indoctrination continued at this same

level during the first six months of 1967 (See Table I on following

page). There were no significant changes in the program. Selected

units launched one B-52 sortie per day, the cycle length remained at

45 days, and the route structure was not changed. One sortie each

I to monitor the Thule slteJof the Ballistic Missile Early Warning

System (PMEWS).

E [ eRE T






1 January--14 February 1967 Cycle
42BW 8M' Loring 1 Monitor 4 MK-28
70BW 8AJi' Clinton-Sherman 1 vlest 2 MK-53
465BW 8M' Robins 1 North 4 MK-28
450BW 15M' Minot 1 Monitor 4 MK-28
15 February--31 March 1967 Cycle
7BW 2M' Carswell 1 North 2 MK-53
410BW 2M' K. 1. Sa-wyer 1 Monitor 4 MK-28
416BW 8AJi' Griffiss 1 Monitor 4 MK-28
5BW 15M' Travis 1 West 4 MK-28
1 April--15 May 1967 Cycle
96sAW 2M' Dyess 1 West 4 MK-28
319BW 2M' Grand Forks 1 Monitor 4 MK-28
449BW 2M' Kincheloe 1 Monitor 4 MK-28
17BW 8AJi' Wright-Patterson 1 North 4 MK-28
16 May--30 June 1967 Cycle
2BW 2M' Barksdale 1 North 4 MK-28
410BW 2M' K. 1. Sa-wyer 1 Monitor 4 MK-28
380SAW 8AJi' Plattsburgh 1 Monitor 4 MK-28
320BW 15M' Mather 1 West 4 MK-28 /'



Reports, SAC TS V-I, "Bomber/Tanker Sortie Listing,"

as of 31 Jan, 28 Feb, 31 Mar, 30 Apr, 31 May, and 30

Jun 1967; Fragmentary Order #3, Operations Order 23-67, "Chrome Dome," Hg_ SAC, 1 Jan 1967j Fragmentary Order #4, Operations Order 23-67, "Chrome Dome," Hg_ SAC, 1 Apr 19670

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~ Denial of the southern route seriously degraded SAC's

airborne alert capability) and most particularly the plans for one-

eighth or one-sixteenth level operations. In addition to this dip-

lomatic/political restriction) there were other inherent deficiencies

in SAC's airborne alert concept. Most significant were the lack of

immediate response capability (even assuming availability of the

southern route) a higher level operation had to be phased in over

a 24-28 hour period), the requirement to

and the fact that airborne alert damage

expectancy could not be considered

computati~ The first


of these disadvantages became more serious as the submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) threat increased.28

As a result of these deficiencies, the SAC Operations

Plans Directorate began developing a new concept of airborne dis-

persal to replace airborne alert. The objective

was "To provide a

("~' ,J ~

dispersal/of select-


secure deterrent aircraft force through airborne

ed SlOP sorties targeted on their SlOP assured destruction rOle.;'


Forces involved in the early plans consisted of 34 B-52s (two from

each of SAC's 17 B-52G and H wings), carrying up to 136 weapons, and

supported by 65 KC-135 tankers. The primary assignment would be

,"'>-0'" .,.\." '. -:

(Urban/Industrial (u/r}J targets, but the concept included the capabil-


ity to strike threat targets tn pre-emption., As initially envisaged,

...... _, J • ..,.)

the operation would consist of a positive control (PC) launch of two ~,

alert sorties from each B-52G and H wing. Each sortie would retain



the same targets and supporting tankers as aSSigned while on SlOP

if -0 p 9 [ G RET

R [ 3 T R leT [ D D,ol T A


fl-IP 9 E G RET

ground alert. Bombers would orbit near tanker staging bases and be

refueled as required to maintain SlOP target capability for up to

24 hours. Although basically designed for a 24-hour operation, it

could be maintained as a show of force for extended periods if de-

sired. Sustained airborne coverage (of the assured destruction role)

could be provided by augmenting tanker task forces and by launching

generated B-52 non-alert SlOP sorties as replacements on a planned rotatien schedlile.29

~s) When initially presented ~o General Ryan in early January , \

1967, the concept did not include definite plans for an indoctrination

level operation. Nevertheless, the CINC approved the concept for

inclusionl'in SIOP-4'=Revision B 1(1 July 1967), and requested that the briefing be presented to members of the Air Staff and JCS.30


~ In accordance with General Ryan's instructions, the air

dispersal concept was briefed to Major General W. P. Swancutt and

other members of the USAF Deputy Chief of Staff/Plans and Operations,

and Colonel F. E. Wikstrom, Chief of the Strategic Operations Divi-

sion, JCS (J-3), on 26 January 1967. The Air Staff and JCS personnel

generally endorsed the conceptj and General Swancutt suggested that

the indoctrination portion be prepared prior to presentation of the entire concept to General McConnell.31

apparent that an orderly

transition to the new air dispersal concept could not be effected on

Numerous involved



DI 0 F 9 R n


6 [ C RET

were necessary bafore

L- ~ ~~~

a peacetime indoctrination operation could be established. General

Nazzaro, who had succeeded General Ryan as CINC on 1 February, was

enthusiastic about the new concept, but wanted the capability to

accomplish all phases of air dispersal (EWO, indoctrination, and

show of force) Qefore replaoing the current airborne alert program.

He directed retention of the current airborne alert program into

fiscal year 1968, and delay of briefings to the USAF Chief of Staff

until detailed SAC planning had been completed. At the same time,

the CINC modified the original Planlby stating that' the did ndt

concept linked specifically to a positive control launch.


~ By the first of March SAC had established a working group

to develop a capability/feasibility study of the air dispersal con-

cept. Shortly thereafter, the name of the concept was changed from

air dispersal to Selective Employment of Air and Ground Alert (SEAGA).


The first phase of the project consisted of planning a universal sor-

tie for each of the 17 B-52G and H units and developing a draft con-

cept. The second phase included examination of the feasibility and

capability of employing Hound Dogs, using other model B-52s in SEAGA,

and expanding the number of sorties in the G and H model units. General Nazzaro approved the final study in early July. 33 It was published on 12 July, 34 and forwarded to the Air Staff shortly thereafter.

(S) In early March, when it had become apparent that the air

dispersal plans could not be fully developed~lnoQrporatea in t~J

1 SlOP by 1 July 1967JlSAC requested that the airborne alert indoctrination

t • ~ RET rJ B F B R fl


program for fiscal year 1968 continue at the currently approved

level or four sorties daily. In April, the Joint Chiefs of Stafr formally concurred with the SA~ request;35 and in late June, the

JCS notified SAC that the President had approved continuing the. current indoctrination program in fiscal year 1968.36

Dispersal Plans


-5 E -rT+=t


I l




1. Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 1966, pp 138-140; See also Chapter I, this history.

2. Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 1966, p 154.

3. Chart 11, "SAC Alert Status-January--June 1967," this history.

4. Ibid.; Report, "Weekly Alert Status Report (U),II (formerly CINC1s Weekly Recap), prep by DOCOCP, H~ SAC, 30 Jun 1967; Report, l-SACV1, as of 1100Z 30 Jun 1967.

5. Msg, DO 01085, SAC to 3ADIV, "Annex F to the SlOP (U), II 11/2100Z Apr 1967 (67-B-1085).

6. Chart 11, IISAC Alert Status-Janudry--June 1967,11 this history; Review of Weekly Alert Status Reports (formerly CINC's Weekly Recaps), prep by DOCOCP, H~ SAC, for the period January--June 1967.

7. Report, IIWeekly Alert Status Report (U),II prep by DOCOCP, H~ SAC, 7 Jul 1967, and 14 Jul 1967.

8. Msg, DP/DO/DPL 03321, SAC to 2AF et ala, "Advance SAC Crew Ratio Reduction Date (S),II 31/2225Z Mar19b7.

9. See Chapter IV, "Aircraft," this history.

10. Chart 11, IISAC Alert Status-January--June 1967,11 this history; Review of CINC!s Weekly Recaps for 9, 16, and 23 Mar 1967.

11. Chart 11, "SAC Alert Status-January--June 1967, II this history; Report, "Weekly Alert Status Report (U), II prep by DOCOCP, H~ SAC, 30 Jun 1967.

12. Ltr, Brig Gen P. K. Carlton, Dir Opns Plans, DCS/Ops, H~ SAC,

to DXIH, "Statistics for SAC History (U), II 20 Jan 1967 (67-B-0215), in DXIH TS Archives; Ltr, Col H. Rauch, DOPLP, Dir opns Plans, DCS/ Ops, H~ SAC, to DXIH, IIStatistics for SAC History (U),II 13 Jul 1967 (67-B-2273), in DXIH TS Archives.



13. Atch 1: Ltr, Maj Gen W. P. S"rancutt, DO, DCS/Plans and Ops, Hq USAF, to SAC et al., "System Management Letter for B-52/KC-135/ B-58/FB-lll/AGM-28 (U)," 14 Dec 1966, to Ltr, Brig Gen S. F. Martin, Asst DCS/Plans, Hq SAC, to DM et al., "System Management Letter for B-52/KC-135/B-58/FB-lll/AGM-28-ru~" 30 Dec 1966, Exhibit 1, Chapter IV, Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 1966.

14. Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 1966, pp 130-138; Ltr, Maj Gen A. C. Gillem II, DCS/Ops, Hq SAC, to DPL, "SEA Impacts on Strategic Bomber Force' (uL" 29 Oct 1966 (66-DOPLC-048), also controlled under 66-B- 3703, recontrolled under HA-0926 in DXIH TS Archives.

15. Memorandum for the Record, "CINCSAC Briefing on USAF Systems Management Letter (AFXOPFS Ltr, Subject: Systems Management Letter for B-52/KC-135/B-58/FB-lll/ AGM-28 (u), 14 Dec 1966 (U)," by Maj Gen

Jo Bo Knapp, CS, Hq SAC, 17 Feb 1967.

16. Quote from Air Staff Msg AFPDC AU~JCOM 727/67 in Msg, DP/DO/DPL 03321, SAC to 2AF et a.L, , "Advance SAC Crew Ratio Reduction Date (S) ,II 31/2225Z Mar 19b7 •

17. Msg, DP/DO 03061, SAC to 2AF et al., "Reasgmt of Pilots to Southeast Asia," 27/2130Z Mar 1967-.- -

18. Msg, DP/DO/DPL 03321, SAC to 2AF et al., "Advance SAC Crew Ratio Reduction Date (S)," 31/2225Z Marl9b7.

19. Hist of SAC, Jan--Jun 1966, p 80; Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 1966, p 112.

20. Chart 11, "SAC Alert Status-January--June 1967," this history.

21. Memorandum for the Record, "Alert Cre" Degrades (U)," by Maj Gen J. B. Knapp, CS, Hq SAC, 23 Jun 1967.

22. SACM 178-1, "SAC Planning Factors for Alert," 27 Jul 1966, as amended.

23. lJisg, VC 44586,. SAC to 2AF et a L, , "Crew Availability," 13/2150Z Jun 1967; Ltr, Maj Gen A. c: Gillem II, DCS/Ops, Hq SAC, to VC, "Crew Availability," 13 Jun 1967. '

24. Chart 11, "SAC Alert Status-January--June 1967," this history; Report, "Weekly Alert Status Report (U)," prep by DOCOCP, Hq SAC, 30 Jun 1967.

25. Memorandum for the Record, "Pregenerated Aircraft (U)~" by Maj Gen J. B. Knapp, CS, Hq SAC, 8 Mar 1967.

26. Memorandum for the Record, "Generation Priority Review (U)," by Maj Gen J. B. Knapp, CS, Hq SAC, 2 Jun 1967.

£ [ G RET

27. Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 1966, pp 114-119.

28. Memorandum. for the Record, "Airborne Dispersal (U)," by Maj Gen J. B. Knapp, CS, H~ SAC, 21 Jan 1967 (67-B-0168), in DXIH TS Archives.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. "Staff Note Items," DCS! Ops , H~ SAC, 2 Feb 1967.

32. Memorandum. for the Record, "Air Dispersal (U)," by Maj Gen J. B.

Knapp, CS, H~ SAC, 6 Mar 19670

33. Memorandum. for the Record, "Selective Employment of Air and Ground Alert (SEAGA) Capability/Feasibility Study (U)," by Brig Gen F. B. Elliott, for the Chief of Staff, Hq SAC, 21 Jul 19670

34. Study, "The Selective Employment of Air/Ground Alert (SEAGA) Capability/Feasibility Study (U)," prep by DCS/Ops, Hq SAC, 12 Jul 1967 (67-B-2249), in DXIH TS Archiveso

35. Msg, JCS 3328, JCS to CINCSAC, "SAC Airborne Alert Indoctrination Program (V)," 21/1911Z Apr 19670

36. Msg, JCS 9195, JCS to CINCSAC, "SAC Airborne Alert Program (U)," 29!2130Z Jun 1967.

37. Chart 2, "Head~uarters SAC and Major Subordinate Commands," 31 Dec 1963, in Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 1963.

380 Chart 2, "Bases, Units, and Resources," this history.

39. For examples, see Operations Plan 10-55, Hq SAC, 9 Dec 1954, Exhibit 26, Hist of SAC, Jul-Dec 1956; and Operations Plan lOA-55, Hq SAC,

3 Aug 1955, Exhibit 25, Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 19560

40. Ltr, Gen Co Eo LeMay, Vice Chief of Staff, USAF, to Gen T. S. Power, CINCSAC, nos., 31 Mar 1959, Exhibit 16, Chapter II, Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 1959.

41. Hist of SAC, Jan--Jun 1961, p 106.

42. Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 1963, pp 99-1010

43. Msg, VC 3045, SAC to CSAF, nos., 28/1500Z Apr 1964, Exhibit 10, Chapter VI, Hist of SAC, Jul--Dec 1964.


E [ g nET




(u) This chapter describes SAC's role in operating and maintaining

the nation's ICBM force. Discussed are flight testing, operational

readiness capability, maintenance of the alert force, planning for new

weapon systems, and the improvement of current systems. The command's

part tn the military space effort, during the entire fiscal year 1967,

will be covered in an additional special access document.


~ During the first half of 1967 SAC accepted the last of its

Alert Force

1000 Minuteman launchers. For the first time in a decade no new sites

were being constructed. Still, due mainly to extensive modification

programs and problems with the Minuteman F guidance and control unit,

both the number of ICBMs required on alert and those actually on alert was

lower on 30 June than it had been six months before.

(S) The last significant addition to the Minuteman force came with

the acceptance during the first four months of 1967 of five flights of

F missiles by the 564th Strategic Missile Squadron (341st SMW at Malmstrom, Wing 1).1 The squadron was declared combat ready as of 21 Apri1.2

SEC R is T

Eight flights of F missiles were returned from force modernization to

the 351st SMW (Wing IV, Whiteman AFB). The first squadron, the 509th,

was completed in Februaryj and the second, the 510th, was completed in


) i ~ RET

June. One flight of the 508th was completed by 30 June, but three

flights were still in the hands of the contractor at the end of the month.3 The total effect on the alert force of the arrival of these

13 F flights was considerably reduced by the removal from alert of

five flights at Grand Forks C321st SMW, Wing VI) for modifications.

Also, more Minuteman F missiles were taken off alert because of guidance

and control unit failures. But overall the Minuteman II alert require-

ment still rose from 174 to 245, and the actual alert force increased from lL30 to 181.'

(S) Force modernization also was responsible for the decline in

it slipged to

Minuteman B alert totals.

(S) The Minuteman A required alert force declined froml115 an 31 I

of up to 52 A models by Bs continued through mid-April. Because of

the maintenance effort required to support Minuteman F and some modifi-

cation programs, the 341st requested a halt to the forced recycles

because the remaining few Bs would soon be added as a result of normal

A model recycles.7


Ogden Air Materiel Area (OOAMA) agreed, and on

17 April, with 47 Bs installed and one spare on hand, the program was terminated. 9

(S) Overall, the Minuteman alert farce declined from 894 required

land 837 31 December 1966, to 869 required and 793 ~uall on

30 June 1967.10

5 [ C RET

(S) The increase in Titan II alert missiles was mOdest--fr0150: requi~ed and actual at the end of 1966 to 53 reguired and actuallat the end of June 1967.11 The increase was a result of the completion of the

6 [ C RET

Yard Fence modification at Little Rock and the assumption of an alert

commitment at Vandenberg AFB. The Vandenberg plan was to have one of

the three sites in the 395th Strategic Missile Squadron devoted to alert duty and one to the Follow-on Operational Test (FOT) program,

while the third alternated between the two. This second alert sortie

was to have part of the Instrumentation and Range Safety System (IRSS) installed so that only the reentry vehicle (R/V) need be removed to

prepare it for the FOT program. Although this would be a departure

from the FOT policy of random selection, there was the advantage of

launching a missile directly from a lengthy alert period without the

necessity of disturbing the propellant load, removing it from the silo, and transporting it elsewhere.12 On 10 January General Ryan reconfirmed his approval of the first alert sortie and authorized the second one.13

The next day USAF authorized the alert mission for Vandenberg in line with the OSD's approval of the nuclear safety rules.14 On 20 January

site 395D became Vandenberg's first alert sortie since the Atlas D phaseout on 1 May 1964.15 Late in March SAC asked USAF for permission

to place the partial IRSS configured missile on alert in 395C and launch it in March 1968.16 USAF promptly approved,17 and on 17 April the Air

Force Weapons Laboratory said that such an arrangement did not degrade nuclear safety.18 This second missile was placed on alert on 10 June.19

9 [ C RET

§ [ eRE T

(S) Theoretically, 100 percent of the ICBM force was required for alert, but since there would always be a need for maintenance recycles,

modifications, special tests, and training'La~~~~~~~~~ ___

a ways exempted from the SlOP.

(S) For Titan II a master recycle schedule was issued periodically.

It integrated Yard Fence, engine overhauls, Long Term Readiness Evalua- '

tion (LTRE), and Follow-on Operational Tests (FOT) into a single plan to keep Titan II scheduled alert degradations to a minimum.20 In the

Minuteman fleet, force modernization, Wing VI centrol center (ALec) UHF/hardness, high explosive simulation technique

electro-magnetic pulse (~W

and mai -


the peak activity of the Wing VI update program (March-August 1967) about

110 exemptions had been planned for. From November 1967 through 1968 about 70 such exemptions were expected.22

(S) There were also some degradations from the required alert force due, primarily, to unscheduled maintenance. Ever since the Titan II fuel and oxidizer tank leak problem Was brought under control, Titan II alert

degradations have been negligible.

major cause of alert degradation

in the Minuteman fleet was guidance and control unit malfunctions. The unexpectedly low reliability of the Minuteman F guidance and control unit (NS-17) had resulted in a severe loss of alert time. From 40 missiles down .

on 31 December 1966, the number

Although Minuteman I did

this reason rOse to 72 on

subsided to 0 on

§ [ eRE T



not have a

and cont~ol unit (NS-l0

failures still accounted for about 70 percent of that weapon system's

significant causes for Minuteman were

recycles and retargeting.23

Thus, out of a total of 1066 launchers at operational bases

Vandenberg on 30 June 922 were required for alert (86.5 percent) and

846 actually were on alert (79.4 percent). This was 22 fewer required

sorties and 41 fewer actual alert sorties than on 31 December 1966. The

reduction in the number of alert vehicles was naturally reflected in the

total weight of effort to be delivered by ICBMs in the SlOP. i:0tal ICBM megatonnage programmed in the SlOP rose slightly from 1476.B to 1478.4, ~G~

24 6(~

but the actual alert megatonnage fell from 1410 to 1389.8. . "

Operational Testing and Evaluation

, $


':r=tn EEEiRET









1. Memo for the Record, "20th Sqdn Turnover Dates" by Capt E J Lentz, DM7B, 3 May 67.

2. Msg, ro 04301, SAC to 15AF and 341SMW, "Combat Ready Date," 25/1745 Apr 67.

3· Memo, "Wing IV Force Modernization Schedule," by Capt E J Lentz, DM7B, 28 Dec 66, as updatedj Rpt, l-SAC-VI, 30 Jun 67.

4. Hist of SAC, Jul-Dec 66, pp 372-373, 427-430j Rpt, 1-SAC-VI, 30 Jun 67.

5. Ibid.


Rpts, I-SAC-VI, 31 Dec 66, 30 Jun 67.

Ltr, Maj Gen R 0 Hunziker, DCS/M to CINC, "LGM30A Missiles at Malmstrom," 5 Jan 67; Msg, OONC 45227.1 OOAMA to 34lSMW, "LGMJOB for LGM30A Recycles at W~ng I, II 30/2330 Mar 67; Msg , ICMC-J 50135, 341SMW to 15AF.1 "LGM30B for LGM30A Recycles at Wing I," 1/0200

Apr 67.


Msg, OONC 60154, OOAMA to 341SMW, "LGM30B for LGM30A Recycles at Wing I," 14/0016 Apr 67.

Ms&, DM7B-128957, SAC to 15AF, "LGM30B for LGM30A Exchange-Malmstrom," 17/1445 Apr 67.

Hist of SAC, Jul-Dec 66, pp 37~-373; Rpt, I-SAC-VI, 30 Jun 67.





Ltr, Col H H Baker, Ch, OOTM to roCEP, "Instrumentation and Range Safety System (msS), Titan II," 6 Jan 67.

Memo for the Record, "Vandenberg Alert," by Maj Gen J B Knapp, as, 16 Jan 67, ~.

Ms&, AFIIS 75598, CSAP to SAC, et al., "Nuclear Safety Rules," 11/2200 Jan 67.

Staff Note, "Titan II Alert-Vandenberg AFB," by Capt L F Sharp, roPLC, 24 Jan 67, atch to Itr, Lt Col A H James, roEX to OOPL,

et aI., "Staff' Note Items," 26 Jan 67; Hist of SAC, Jan-Jun 64, p 203.

Ms&,. ro 02960, SAC to CSAF, "Titan II Alext/FOT Configuration," 23/2135 Mar 67. .


17· Msg, AFXOPFS 75105, CSAF to SAC, "Titan II Alert/FOT Configuration," 27/2100 Mar 67.

18. Msg, WLAS 00484, AFWL to SAC, "Nuclear Safety Evaluation for Partial IRSS Installation for LGM-25C Operational Msl at Vandenberg," 17/2140 Apr 67; MEg, IX) 04074, SAC to Jl3AD, "Titan II Msl B-36," 18/2335

Apr 67.

19. Memo, "Vandenberg Alert (Titan)," by Capt N.E.Miner, Jr., roTMO, 12 Jun 67.

20. Ltr, Col R.W. Whipple, Dep Dir DM7, SAC to DM4C, AIG 667, et al., "Titan II Recycle Schedule," 17 Jan 67, W/3 atchs, Recycle Schedules, 308, 381, 390 SMWs, and Revision #1, 24 Mar 67, Ex 2j "Titan II Recycles, January-June 1967, in Chart 11, this history.

21. "Minuteman Extended Degradations,", in Chart 11 this history.

22. Brochure, "Missile Modification Program - Minuteman & Titan," DM7B, 8 Jun 67.

23· Rpt, I-SAC-VI, 31 Dec 66j "ICBM Alert Degrades," in Chart 11, this history.

24. Rpt, I-SAC-VI, 31 Dec 66j Charts 11 and 14, this history.

25· Rpt, "Evaluation of Weapon System Capabilities, Titan II, Vol II, BME, 1 Oct 67j Rpt, "SAC Quarterly ICBM Test Program Status, Third Quarterly FY 1967, BME-2 Res: AF-XDD-DB," BME, 31 Mar 67. Hereafter to be cited as "BME Quarterly Test Report," 31 Mar 67.

26. Msg, OONE 01218, OOAMA to SAC, "Quick Look Report for Titan II AFWTR Operation No 7995," 18/2145 Apr 67.

27. Msg, DM7C 04174, SAC to OOAMA, "Glamor Girl," 21/1610 Apr 67.

28. Mag, OONE 01442, OOAMA to SAC, "Preliminary Analysis of Glamor

Girl Failure," 9/1723 May 67.; 5th Ind (Ltr, Capt E. B. Willford, IS, ISAD to :OOSDM~ SAC) et a1., "Report of Missile Accident LGM-25C SN63-07736," n.d.) Col C. C. Pyle, Dir, roSD, SAC to Dir Aerosp Safety, AFIAS, 26 Jun 67.

29· Ltr, Col H. H. Baker, Ch DOTM, SAC to DOTM, AIG 667, "ICBM Opera-

tional Testing Objectives," 10 Jan 67j BME Quarterly Test Report, 30 Jun' 67

30. Memo for tbe Record, "Titan II Special Tests," by Maj Gen J. B.

Knapp, CS, 1 Feb 67j Ltr, Col J. J. Linck, Dep Ch, roT, SAC to OONBTG, OOAMA, et a1., "Feasibility Study for Titart II Special

Tests, II 6 Feb b7; w4 atrchs ; "


Excluded from Gm:cral Declu sincution Seheeule,

~[6ifRi S.TI!·. R. Q, ¢ / 8 Set' 1992






Added Effort, see Missiles, disposal of Atlas & Titan I sites Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft, 281, 286-287 Aeronautical Systems Division (AFSC), 189, 265, 266

Airborne Command Post, see Command Control Co~~nications, Post Attack Command Control System

Aircraft, inventory, 248-250; phaseout of, 251-252; accumulation of "s'' hours on, 252; modifications to, 256-270 (B-52s, 256-259; B-58, 259-269; KC-135, 269-270); engines, 277-281; advanced capability tanker; 287-288; FB-lll, 282-286

Air Defense Command, 376

Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), 8, 9, 249, 260, 264, 265, 272, 278,

279, 280, 281, 340, 421

Air Force Systems Command, 324, 331, 351, 357, 367 Air Proving Ground Center (AFSC), 189, 196

Air Training Command, 252

Alert forces, aircraft ground, 98-108; reduction of ere" r2tio, 104-108; pregenerated aircraft concept, 107; airborne 21ert, 108-113; miSSiles, 306-310

American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 75 Army Air Defense Command (ARAICOM), 350 Atomic Energy Commission, 192, 203, 340

Ballistic Missile Early Warning Site (Th~~S), 108, 115, 117, 118, 350 Ballistic Missile Evaluation [staff], 323, 324, 342, 353 .

Ballistic Systems Division (AFSC), 319, 322, 333, 345, 351, 358 ftnt, 359, 360, 366, 367, 370

Bar None Exercises, 125-126

Bases, numbers in use, 16-19, 408-409; changes in, 409-412; development in Southeast Asia, 414-462 (Andersen AFB, 415-426;"K2dena AEl 427-430; rO-1'apao ltB" 431-458; ITakhil ABL 458-460; tcF'Ing Chuan ~Emg ABJ 460-462); funding of construction in U.S., 462-470; plans for accommodating the FB-lll, 470-473; widening runways at B-58 bases, 473-474

Bendix Corporation, 348

B-58, conventional application, see Combat Bullseye I, II, and III, and

Combat Target Blanchard trophy, 340

Blue Scout Junior rockets (MER-6), 80 Boeing Company, 77, 274, 276, 349, 350, 358

Brown, Secretary of the Air Force Harold, 329, 361, 373 Buckle Game, tests of denuclearized warheads, 208-209, 210 Bug Screen Project, 420-422

Bug Tent Project, 422-423

Carlton, Brig Gen P. K.~ 177, 418

Combat Beaver interdiction plan, 164-165 Combat Bullseye I, II, and III, 177-202 passim Combat Target, 176-183


Comm2nder-in-Chief, Pacific, 130, 131, 133, 134, 137, 138, 139, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 164, 166, 167, 169, 431-462 passim Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces, 149, 150, 155, 164, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 196, 197, 432-462 passim

Commander, United States Military Assistance Command Vietnam, 132, 133, 137, 138, 147, 149, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451

Compton, Lt Gen K. K., 20, 106, 107 .

Continental Air Defens e Command (CONAD), 349

Contingency Operations, 128-174; B-52 basing in Thailand, 128-133; sortie rate increase proposed, 133-138; combat operations summary, 138-145; dangers of SA.\1 attacks on B-52s, 145-156;, interdiction strikes, 157-165; restriction on operations in Laos, 165-170; effects of operations, 170-174

Continuity of Operations Plan, changes in discussed, 22-24

Command Control Communications, defined, 46-47, objectives described, 47-49; organization of in SAC, 49; categories of pre- and post-attack defined, 50; pre-attack systems, )_j_-70 (primary alerting system, 51-52; teletype net, 52-55, telephone net, 55-60; hi3h frequency, single sideband radio system, 61-63; Green Pine ultra high frequency net, 64; SAC Automated Control System,' 64-74); Post-attack Command and Control System, 71-80; Emergency Rocket Communications Systems, 80-82; Survivable Low Frequency Communications System (4871), 82-89

Cost Reduction Program, 474-478 Cruikshank, Brig Gen A. W., 361

Cr~~, Maj Gen W. J., 22, 174, 416, 417, 436, 437

Defense Atomic Support Agency, 352 Defense Science Board, 353

Designated Systems Management Group, 373

Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Dr. John F. Foster, Jr.), 141, 345, 349

Dispersal (of aircraft), 113-121, policy background, 113-117, new emphasis on emergency dispersal, 117-121

Douglas Aircraft Corporation, 211

Dove, Mr. Bernard (AFOAPD, USAF), III

Eglin Gulf Test Range, 204, 214, 215 Electronics Systems Division (AFSC), 79, 87, 88

Foster, Dr. John F., Jr., see Director of Defense Research and Engineering


General Dynamics, 262, 264, 266, 276, 285, 471

General Services Administration, ,18, 19,411,412,413 Gillem, Maj Gen A. C., 79, 128, 178, 355

Heller, Col R. F., 181

Hound Dog (AFM-28) air-to-ground miSSile, 210-213, 271-274 Humfeld, Maj Gen H. E., 22


Incendiary missions, use of B-52s for, 140-141, 144

International Telephone and Telegraph, Federal Laboratories (ITTFL) , 70

Joint Aerospace Defense Integration Planning Staff, 350
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 147, 153, 340, 354
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, 2, 3, 8, 12, 13, 47, 48
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan, 8, 15, 16
Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, 3, 65, 350
Joint Technical Specifications Group, 66 Kieffer, Lt Gen W. B., 22, 313

Kyle, Air Chief Marshal (RAF) Sir Wallace, 127 Laos, see Contingency Operations Lead-the-Fleet program, 253-255 Ling-Temco-Vought, 69

Martensen, Brig Gen W. B., 186 Martin) Lt Gen W. K., 20 Matagorda Bombing Range, 199

McConnell, General J. P., 105, 111; 121, 136, 151, 173, 178, 202, 286,1

337, 357

McNamara, Secretary of Defense Robert S., 4, 5, 7, 9 ftnt, 114, 116, 117,

128, 133, 212, 213, 251, 259, 260, 272, 329, 349, 350, 412, 428, 440, 441, 444, 463

Military Aircraft Storage and Disposition Center, 252 Military Airlift Command, 416

Mission, defined, 1-4; as major air force command, 2; as JCS specified command, 2-4

Missiles: operational testing and evaluation, 310-340 (Titan II Fo.L'l.ow-On Operational Testing, 311-314; Minuteman B Follow-On Operational Testing, 314-319; Minuteman B additive launch programs, 319-320; Minuteman F fli&~t testing, 320-326); flight test problems, 327-331; development

of future test programs and ranges, 331-333; operational readiness inspection tests, 333-337; Team Play exercises, 337-339; unit competition, 339-340; reliability and accuracy of, 340-343; reentry systems development, 343-346; penetration aids development, 346-348; problems of vulnerability, 348-356; materiel problems of current forces, 356-370 (silo hardness and EMF testing, 357-358; electrical pouer, 358-359; radar surviellance system, 359-360; MinutellKln guidance and control units, 360-364; saturation of Minuteman F computer memory" 364; dovristag.:' components of flight CODtrol system, 365-366;"loss of tone!! in communications system, 366; Titan II modifications1 368-370); pla...'1s

for phaseout of Titan II, 371; Minuteman III, 371-372; budgeting future systems, 372-373; advanced ICBM, 374-376; plans for use of surplus Minuteman I, 376-377; disposal of Atlas and Titan I sites, 412-413

MITRE Corporation, 348

Mixed Marble I, II see Weapons tests, denuclearized



Nazzaro, General J. J., 20, 29, 104, 107, 112, 120, 121, 127, 131,

136, 173, 174{ 213, 312, 337, 354 ftnt, 361, 366, 447, 454 Newark AFS (rul.,C) , 360, 362

Nike-X antiballistic missile system, 349-351 oassim North American Aviation, 204, 206, 211, 271, 272

Office of the Secretary of Defense, see McNa~3ra, Secretary of Defense

Robert S.

Ogden Air Materiel Area, 307, 320, 330, 358, 360, 365, 366, 369, 370

Ok Lahoma City Air Materiel Area, 210-211, 213, 255, 269, 270, 271, 273, 279 Operational Readiness Inspections Tests (aircraft), 121-l25

Operational Testing, see Operational Readiness Inspections Tests and Bar None Exercises

Organization, areas of control of major subordinate co~nands, 25-26,

26 ftnt; wing level organization, 26-28; gr-oups and s quadr-oris , 29-30; detachments & operating locations, 30-32; standardization of organization, 32-36

Pacific Air Forces see COillIT3nder-in-Chief Pacific Air Forces

Payne, MY. F., 374 ftnt -

Petit, Brig Gen R. L., 181, 201

Poker Dice construction (U-Tapao AB), 442-458 passim Prime BE~' teams, 419, 420, 422, 436

Program 494L, 80

Quail (ADM-20C) air-launched decoy missile, 214-215

Radar Bomb Scoring Sites, use in Combat Bullseye tests, 183-185 Rader, Brig Gen W. A., 323

Radio Corporation of America, 78, 350 RAND Corporation, 375

Royal Air Force Bomber Command Bombing, Navigation, & Communications

Competition, 127-128

Russell, Lt Gen A. J., 20

Ryan, Gene ra.L J. D., 20, 50, 54, 111, 112, 115, 127, 129-130, 176, 201, 308

San Antonio Air Materiel Area, 261, 262, 279, 471 Sandia Corporation, 207

SA-2 missiles see Contingency operations dangers of SAM attacks on B-52s Secretary of Defense, see McNamara, Robert S.

Secretary of State (U.s:}, 169

Scientific Advisory Board (USAF), 324

Sharp, Admiral U. S. G. see Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) Short Range Attack Missi~(AFlvI-69A), 274-277

Simulated Air Defense System (SADS-I), 190


Strategic forces, planning for, 4-19 Strat-X Group, 374-375

Sullivan, U. S. Ambassador to Laos William, 160, 161, 163, 166, 168, 169-170

Swancutt, Maj Gen W. P., 111, 178

Tactical Air Command, 177, 178, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 193, 200, 409 ·Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, 183, 184, .186

Tanker operations, support in Southeast Asia, 174-176 Texas Instruments, 259

Thailand, release of B-52 strike information to, l67, l68, l69 Tiemann, Governor of Nebraska Norbert, 20

Tiny Tim anti-SAM support pJ,an, 149-156 passim Tonopah Bombing Range, 192, 204, 206, 207

TRW Inc., 324, 361, 365

Wade, Lt Gen David, 22

Weapons, conventional, 289-292; nuclear, 292 Weapons System Evaluation Group, 342

Weapons tests, denuclearized vaz-heads , 202-210

Westmoreland, General William, ~ Commander, United States Military

Assistance Command, Vietnam White Sands Missile Range, 206, 212 Wikstrom, Col F. E., 111

WS-l2A, see Missiles, advanced ICBM

Zuckert, Secretary of the Air Force Eugene, 7