Reducing Juvenile Recidivism in the
United States
Jane Wilson, Stanford University
Executive Summary
The American juvenile justice system
desperately needs reform. Some 2.4 mil-
lion juveniles are charged with offenses
annually.1 An appalling 55 percent of
juveniles released from incarceration na-
tionwide are rearrested within one year.2
In urban centers, that percentage—
referred to as the rate of recidivism—
reaches up to 76 percent.3 High recidi-
vism is associated with increases in crime,
victimization, homelessness, family de-
stabilization, and public health risks.4
Government-sponsored correctional pro-
grams cost sixty billion dollars annually.5
Most tragically, high recidivism indicates
a failure to provide meaningful rehabili-
tation for offenders. Reducing recidivism
specifically among juveniles should be of
primary importance to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice and the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention. Our
government’s current approach to lower-
ing recidivism emphasizes the creation
and funding of rehabilitative programs.
While these initiatives have made mar-
ginal gains, efforts have been insufficient.
Substantial progress will only come by
eliminating recidivism-fostering features
of the juvenile justice system itself.
Proposed Solution
I propose three policy reforms to re-
duce juvenile recidivism. First, eliminate
unnecessary detention of juveniles. Sec-
ond, restrict the practice of transferring
juveniles to adult criminal courts. Third,
ensure the continuation of delinquents’
Medicaid benefits upon release.
• Eliminate unnecessary detention of
juveniles. Studies show that youths
placed in detention facilities are 4.5
times more likely to recidivate than
those placed in alternate programs—
even after controlling for offense.6
To reduce unnecessary detention, re-
quire all detention centers to inform
arrested juveniles of their roles dur-
ing detention hearings and establish
stricter guidelines for determining
which juveniles should be held in de-
tention centers.
• Restrict the practice of transferring
juveniles to adult criminal courts.
Research shows that juveniles con-
victed in adult courts are 50 percent
more likely to recidivate than those
convicted in juvenile courts.7 The
transfer of juveniles to the adult sys-
tem should be an option for only the
most serious offenders. To restrict
the number of juveniles waived on to
adult court, develop a specific list of
offenses and circumstances warrant-
ing transfer.
• Ensure the continuation of delinquents’
Medicaid benefits upon release. A de-
lay in receiving healthcare benefits
is linked to a significant increase in
recidivism. To avoid such a delay,
forbid Medicaid from terminating
contracts with delinquents entering
jail. Temporarily suspend all con-
tracts while delinquents are in jail
and immediately reinstate Medicaid
benefits to juveniles upon release.
49
 I. The Problem
Recidivism
In the United States, roughly 60 to
70 percent of all adult inmates reenter-
ing the community are rearrested within
one year of release.9 Precise recidivism
rates for juveniles, however, are difficult
to obtain at the national level; recidivism
is typically measured at the county and
state levels, and few states measure re-
cidivism by the same metric. Estimates
indicate that approximately 50 to 65
percent of juvenile offenders (hereafter
delinquents) are re-arrested within one
year of release.10 In the state of Califor-
nia, 74 percent of all delinquents are re-
arrested within one year of release.11 Re-
cidivism rates in urban centers tend to be
even higher. In Manhattan, 80 percent
of delinquents are rearrested within four
years of release.12
These numbers should be treated
with some degree of caution. Recidivism
itself results in part from actions taken by
the juvenile justice system, such as arrest,
incarceration, and release; without these,
recidivism figures would be much lower.
Furthermore, a high reincarceration rate
may merely demonstrate that police are
aware of released offenders and are more
likely to incarcerate juveniles they have
seen before. While these considerations
are valid, they do not entirely negate the
usefulness of recidivism as an indica-
tor of the degree to which ex-offenders
commit additional crime. Research con-
ducted using self reported incidence of
crime (as opposed to officially reported
crime) confirms that juveniles released
from incarceration still tend to commit
further crime.13
Effects of Recidivism
The effects of recidivism in the Unit-
ed States fall into four general categories.
First, recidivism imposes tremendous
50
public safety costs on American com-
munities; high recidivism rates indicate
additional victimizations (assuming that
the crime for which the juvenile was ar-
rested was in fact committed). Second,
increased recidivism results in extremely
destructive social costs; increases in vio-
lence, crime, homelessness, family desta-
bilization, and public health risks are all
associated with high recidivism rates.14
Third, recidivism imposes a consider-
able financial burden on the U.S. De-
partment of Justice and, more generally,
on American society; our government
spends an annual sixty billion dollars on
correctional programs.15 Fourth, high
recidivism indicates a failure to provide
meaningful rehabilitation for inmates re-
entering the community; recidivist juve-
niles lose out on crucial educational, so-
cial, and personal developments that can
rarely be regained. Additionally, studies
show that recurrent offenses during teen-
age years can provide a dangerous incul-
cation leading to adult criminality.16 The
tragedy of this cycle of criminality can-
not be understated.
Benefits of Reducing Recidivism
Lowering the rate of recidivism
will generate several positive outcomes.
First, the aforementioned public safety,
social, economic, and personal costs will
decrease. Second, young people who
otherwise would have been recidivists
will become economic assets. Instead
of draining resources, individuals who
would have been recidivists could im-
prove their communities. Third, a lower
recidivism rate will allow our govern-
ment to reallocate saved dollars from
correctional programs to other financial-
ly depressed sectors, such as education.
Finally, reducing juvenile recidivism will
send an important message that our gov-
ernment deeply cares about the welfare
of its adolescents and prisoners.
 II. Current Solutions
Government-Sponsored Programs
The government’s current attempts
at reducing juvenile recidivism include
a variety of strategies, including general
programs, multisystemic therapy (MST),
residential programs, and community
supervision. Taken together, these efforts
have produced mixed success.
Examples of programs include Scared
Straight (a deterrence-based program),
Life Skills classes, interpersonal skills
courses, counseling, the Family Home
Program, targeted interventions for seri-
ous offenders, and therapeutic wilderness
and challenge programs. Programs found
to be most effective at reducing recidivism
include individualized counseling, person-
al skills training, and behavior programs.
Other programs, such as deterrence-based
challenge and vocational programs, have
been shown to be ineffective at reducing
recidivism.17
Multisystemic therapy (MST) is a
rigorous treatment program designed to
provide a family-based approach to pre-
venting crime and recidivism. It encour-
ages youth to change in their natural
environment, strengthen their peer rela-
tionships and improve their school perfor-
mance, and it also empowers parents with
the skills necessary to raise a delinquent
adolescent. Though MST has successfully
reduced crime, there is little evidence that
it has reduced recidivism. (Although pre-
ventive policies may succeed in keeping
juveniles out of custody, they do little
about the way in which delinquents are
treated once incarcerated and once re-
leased from incarceration.)18
Residential programs are overnight
programs in which juveniles frequently
engage in structured rehabilitation-ori-
ented activities (including outdoor wil-
derness programs). The effectiveness of
residential programs at reducing recidi-
vism is ambiguous: while some studies
show a clear link between residential pro-
grams and lower recidivism, others reject
the correlations entirely.19
Community supervision provides
intense professional and governmental
supervision of delinquents reentering the
community. Probation is one of the ma-
jor types of community supervision used.
Studies have found no statistically signifi-
cant relationship between community su-
pervision and decreased recidivism.20
Nonprofit Programs
In addition to these government-
sponsored efforts, several nongovernmen-
tal organizations address the issue of juve-
nile recidivism. Dozens of nonprofits have
implemented various successful preven-
tive programs (such as the Children’s De-
fense Fund’s “Cradle to Prison Pipeline”
initiative). Others provide useful reentry
resources, courses, and support groups for
released delinquents (like the Street Law
Reentry Program). Several nonprofit or-
ganizations run their own incarceration
alternatives (such as the Andrew Glover
Youth Foundation). Many of these non-
profit alternatives to incarceration have
been successful at reducing recidivism.21
Research also supports the effectiveness
of nonprofit preventive and reentry pro-
grams in lowering recidivism rates.22
Failures of the Current Model
Effective governmental and non-prof-
it programs are invaluable instruments
needed to reduce recidivism. Though
this paper does not intend to provide
guidelines for creating better programs, it
should be noted that the programs most
effective at reducing recidivism have been
those respectful of youth; family-like in
size and setting; connected to the com-
munity during and following treatment;
empathy-developing; accountability-
oriented; and marked by efforts to teach
51
 juveniles cognitive skills (such as anger
management, decision-making, etc.).23
Effective programs are certainly worth-
while and should be continued.
Yet programs alone are insufficient.
Although the aforementioned initiatives
are effective in some cases and have made
improvements, they have done little to af-
fect recidivism on a national level. Even
with government-sponsored rehabilita-
tion programs and the emergence of an
army of nonprofits, the national recidi-
vism rate has hardly changed over the past
20 years.24
Suggestions for Improvement
To make significant advances in
reducing juvenile recidivism, our gov-
ernment must reform its structural and
procedural policies. Before external pro-
grams can make a considerable difference,
the juvenile justice system must undergo
rigorous internal reform. Substantial
progress will only come by eliminating
features of the system itself that foster
recidivism. Currently, three specific ele-
ments of the justice system—detention
centers, juvenile waivers, and health insur-
ance reapplication procedures—undercut
efforts at reducing recidivism by actually
increasing the likelihood that delinquents
will recidivate. Because of their negative
effects, these three practices must be al-
tered. Government officials should adopt
the following three policies:
1. Avoid holding juvenile delinquents
in detention unless absolutely neces-
sary.
2. Restrict the practice of transferring
juveniles to the adult justice system.
3. Forbid Medicaid from requiring all
reentering delinquents to reapply for
services.
Taking these steps will significantly re-
duce recidivism without disregarding the
other goals of these three practices.
52
It should be noted that these three
policies would be implemented most
logically and most feasibly at the state
level. They could also be recommended
to state governors by the Office of Juve-
nile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
and, if appropriate, made into federal law
(as an amendment to the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act, for ex-
ample).
1. Avoid Unnecessary Detention
The first proposed policy advises the
juvenile justice system to avoid holding
delinquents in detention unless absolute-
ly necessary. Because individuals placed in
detention are significantly more likely to
recidivate than their counterparts placed
elsewhere, detention must be reserved for
only those justifiably requiring it. Avoid-
ing unnecessary detention can be accom-
plished by educating juveniles about their
role in detention hearings and establish-
ing stricter guidelines detailing which de-
linquents should be detained.
Detention Hearings
After being accused of committing a
crime, delinquents can pass through up
to nine stages of case processing. First,
they are arrested and make initial con-
tact with law enforcement officers. After
taking the juveniles into custody, police
juvenile officers evaluate the delinquents
and decide whether or not they should
be sent to detention, probation intake,
home, or alternate educational and rec-
reational programs. Roughly 20 to 33
percent of all delinquents are sent into
detention, where their capacity to harm
themselves and others is supposedly de-
bilitated. Within 24 to 72 hours of being
held at the detention center, delinquents
participate in a detention hearing. Led by
a juvenile probation officer, these deten-
tion hearings determine whether or not
the juvenile should remain in detention
until adjudication. After briefly reviewing
the case, a judge decides if the juvenile
requires additional detention. If so, the
delinquent will remain in detention un-
til adjudicated, after which he or she may
be released, relocated to another facility,
or sentenced to additional time in deten-
tion. On any given day, some 27,000
adolescents are held in detention facilities
across the United States. Annually, some
600,000 delinquents will spend time in
detention.26
Detention Centers and Recidivism
Even though detention may be short
and used for less than half of delinquents,
its influence on juveniles can persist for
months and even years into their future.
Research shows that being held in deten-
tion is the number one predictor of recid-
ivism—beating out other likely predic-
tive variables such as gang membership,
gun ownership, and dysfunctional fam-
ily background.27, 28 This finding holds
true even after controlling for nature of
offense (and other potentially confound-
ing variables). A study conducted in New
York City found that the rate of recidi-
vism for juveniles sent to alternate pro-
grams ranged between 17 and 36 percent,
while their counterparts held in detention
facilities averaged 76 percent (again, even
after controlling for offense).29 As Lubow
explains, “Detention is the gateway to the
system’s deep end.”30. 31
Why is this so? Behavioral scientists
have found that grouping delinquent ju-
veniles together in a detention-like setting
can result in deleterious outcomes because
detained juveniles receive informal “peer
deviancy training.”32 Detention often ex-
poses first-time offenders to new criminal
friends, gangs, tricks, and “games.” As a
result of this exposure and learning, de-
tained juveniles are more likely than their
equivalents placed in alternate facilities
to commit future crimes, use violence,
become involved with drugs, struggle in
school, and have difficulty adjusting to
adulthood.33
Yet detention centers do serve a valu-
able purpose: they incapacitate juveniles
who otherwise would be a threat to them-
selves and those around them. Because
they serve this needed function, deten-
tion centers should not be eradicated en-
tirely. Rather, detention must be reserved
for only those delinquents who, if not
detained, present a real threat to society.
To reduce recidivism, detention must be
reserved only for those truly deserving
detention.
Inform Delinquents
First, ensure that all delinquents are
aware of their rights and role during the
detention hearing. As stated earlier, the
detention hearing is a preadjudication as-
sessment in which a judge decides where
to place a delinquent between arrest and
trial. In making their decisions, judges
review the facts of the case and act based
on their own personal judgment. Near
the end of the hearing, judges ask delin-
quents if there is any additional informa-
tion they would like to share. Unaware of
what information would be appropriate
to mention, delinquents almost always
decline to speak. Judges therefore base
their decisions solely on the facts of the
case, which rarely speak highly of delin-
quents.
Delinquents will be more apt to pro-
vide the judge with relevant information
if they are aware of what sort of informa-
tion they can and should provide during
their hearing. In this case, relevant infor-
mation might include: Do you have a
53
 job? Are you using your job to support
your family? Are you going to school?
Are you planning to graduate from high
school? What is your family situation
like? A judge understands that placing a
delinquent in detention will pull him or
her out of school for a month.
Answers to these questions could
have a marked effect on judges’ decisions.
For example, if the judge hears a delin-
quent say that he is trying to graduate,
the judge will be more likely to place him
in a non-residential program. Similarly, a
judge will likely avoid placing someone
in detention if the judge hears that delin-
quent’s job pays for 50 percent of his fam-
ily’s monthly rent.
In order to make delinquents aware
of the types of information worth shar-
ing in their detention hearing, require
detention facilities to inform all juveniles
what information is relevant. This can be
done in a simple way: distribute a single
sheet of paper to delinquents prior to
their detention hearing. This sheet should
contain an explanation of the detention
hearing; the order in which information
is presented during the hearing; possible
placement options; and various types of
information delinquents can share with
the judge. Delinquents should read the
information sheet carefully, and should be
able to receive answers to any additional
questions they might have from facility
officers. This information could also be
provided in video format.
After reading through such an infor-
mation sheet, delinquents will have a bet-
ter idea of the sorts of information that
might help judges make preadjudication
placement decisions. As juveniles under-
stand their rights and role in the deten-
tion hearing process, they will be more
likely to speak up when asked for addi-
tional information. By sharing pertinent
information with the judge, delinquents
will provide a more complete picture of
54
their situation. Their chances of receiv-
ing alternate placement will increase, and
ultimately the probability that they will
recidivate will decrease.
Establish Guidelines for Detaining
Delinquents
Second, establish stricter guidelines
for determining which juveniles should
be held in detention centers. Launch a
committee with the mandate of creating
a series of directives or rules delineating
which offenses require detainment and
which do not. A specific list of admis-
sible exceptions should be developed.
Committee members must be fully aware
of the negative effects detention has on
delinquents, and should formulate these
standards with a rehabilitative approach
in mind. Setting a clear standard of who
should be detained will eliminate the in-
dividual variance and prejudices that of-
ten result in unnecessary detention.
2. Restrict the Use of Waivers
The second policy proposal recom-
mends restricting the transfer of delin-
quents from the juvenile justice system to
the adult one. Though initially intended
only for the most serious offenders, the
waiver system is currently being used to
divert ten percent of all delinquents. Be-
cause delinquents held in adult facilities
are 50 percent more likely to recidivate
than those in juvenile facilities, only the
most severe cases should receive waivers.
The Waiver System
One of the founding tenets of the
juvenile justice system promises its occu-
pants a restraint from overly destructive
punishments. Unlike the adult court, the
juvenile court was established based on
rehabilitation-oriented principles. In sen-
tencing offenders, juvenile court judges
leave “room for reform.” The juvenile
system recognizes the biological and de-
velopmental differences between adoles-
cents and adults and, as a result, allegedly
adjudicates much less punitively than the
adult system. Juvenile judges are limited
in the extent to which they can incapaci-
tate defendants, with sentences rarely top-
ping 20 years.
With the crime surge of the 1980s
and early 1990s, however, rehabilitation
became less of a priority for communi-
ties and policymakers. The focus instead
shifted to keeping “dangerous” criminals
off the streets. In the name of public safe-
ty, legislators initiated the waiver system,
a method through which severe offenders
could be transferred from the juvenile sys-
tem to the adult one. Once in the adult
system, delinquents received longer and
harsher sentences—deserved punishment
according to victims.
Failures of the Waiver System
Since its inception, the waiver sys-
tem has been abused and has encouraged
recidivism; the use of the waiver has not
been restricted to the most severe cases.
Once the conduit between these two sys-
tems was opened, juvenile courts have ea-
gerly pushed disobedient, recidivist, and
older delinquents out of their own system
and into the adult one—regardless of the
crime they committed. Roughly ten per-
cent of all delinquents are now diverted
out of the juvenile system into the adult
one.35 The consequences for delinquents
unnecessarily placed in the adult system
have been tremendously unfortunate.
Due to their exposure with more sophisti-
cated and experienced adult criminals, de-
linquents spending time in adult facilities
are 50 percent more likely to recidivate
than those held in juvenile centers—even
after controlling for nature of offense.36
Restricting Waivers
To minimize the superfluous number
of delinquents receiving waivers, restrict
the granting of waivers to only the most
severe cases. According to the procedure’s
original design, only the most serious
offenses (such as intentional homicide)
merit transfer. Significant effort must
be spent to restrict unnecessary waivers.
Clarifying amendments should be adopt-
ed to establish firmer guidelines describ-
ing which crimes warrant transfer. Doing
so will vastly reduce the number of juve-
niles sent to the adult criminal system.
Ultimately, the likelihood of recidivism
will decrease significantly for delinquents
who otherwise would have been unneces-
sarily tried in adult courts.
3. Change Medicaid Reapplication
Requirements
The third recommended policy pro-
poses forbidding the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services from re-
quiring that all juveniles released from
jail reapply for Medicaid. Because a delay
in receiving healthcare benefits is associ-
ated with a significant increase in recidi-
vism, all Medicaid services to delinquents
should be reinstated immediately upon
release.
Health Insurance & Recidivism
Upon entering jail, delinquents fre-
quently lose their health benefits. By
federal law, the responsibility for an in-
carcerated delinquent’s health lies with
the detention facility in which he or she
is situated. Health insurance providers
therefore serve no purpose while their cli-
ent is in jail. Typically, health insurance
companies terminate their contracts with
individuals as soon their incarceration be-
gins (or as soon as their clients have been
in jail for a set period of time, such as
12 months). Once released, delinquents
must reapply for healthcare. This practice
holds true for Medicaid, the government-
sponsored healthcare plan for low-income
55
 individuals that serves a large portion of
delinquents. The reapplication process
for Medicaid often takes several months,
leaving reentering delinquents without
needed healthcare services.
Delinquents with mental health
problems are especially hard-hit by the
reapplication procedures, and often expe-
rience illness flare-ups as a result of the
delay.37 Because 70 percent of the juve-
nile delinquent population has a mental
disorder, receiving timely health services
is vital to their long-term health.38 Ad-
ditionally, orphaned delinquents some-
times wait up to a year before receiving
placement in a foster care home (a service
provided by Medicaid). In the meantime,
they must single-handedly find housing.
Confronted with these difficulties, delin-
quents often reoffend for the sole purpose
of reentering jail and receiving the health-
care services provided by incarceration
facilities. A delay in obtaining healthcare
benefits is linked to a significant increase
in recidivism.39
Recommendation
To avoid such a delay, immediately
reinstate all Medicaid benefits to juveniles
reentering the community. Medicaid
should not terminate its contracts with
incarcerated juveniles. Rather, it should
temporarily suspend benefits until the de-
linquent reenters the community. Abid-
ing by this policy will considerably lower
the probability of recidivism for portions
of the 70 percent of all delinquents with a
mental disorder.
Obstacles
Opponents of these three policy rec-
ommendations may argue that high re-
cidivism rates require longer and harsher
sentences, not rehabilitation-oriented re-
form. This argument could be based on
the fact that despite its being founded on
rehabilitative principles, the U.S. juvenile
56
justice system has an extremely high re-
cidivism rate. The rate of recidivism in
the adult justice system—an institution
not founded on rehabilitation—is also
around 65 percent. Rehabilitation has not
worked, the argument goes, and therefore
it should be abandoned in favor of a more
punitive approach, under the assumption
that longer and harsher sentences would
deter delinquents from recidivating.
This argument suffers from two main
flaws. First, it assumes that the U.S. ju-
venile justice system has been entirely
rehabilitative. As shown earlier, our gov-
ernment’s own internal procedures often
counteract its rehabilitative principles.
It is incorrect to assume that the juve-
nile justice system has been an exercise
in rehabilitation. Second, this argument
ignores the mounting evidence indicating
that punitive approaches increase recidi-
vism while rehabilitative ones decrease it.
The waiver system, for example, is entirely
punitive in nature, and has only increased
recidivism. Other deterrence- and pun-
ishment-based programs, such as Scared
Straight, have at best failed to affect re-
cidivism and at worst have increased re-
cidivism rates. Rehabilitative programs,
on the other hand, have often proven ca-
pable of reducing recidivism.40
Others may argue that decreasing the
number of delinquents held in detention
will fail to maximize full use of facilities,
thereby creating a gross economic ineffi-
ciency. The United States spends billions
of dollars erecting incarceration centers;
discouraging their filling would waste
valuable already-spent tax dollars. Reduc-
ing the number of occupants in a deten-
tion facility certainly would be a failure
to use the building to its full potential.
However, unfilled detention facilities can
easily be put to alternate use (for example,
detention wings can be turned into class-
rooms). In any event, the real economic
inefficiency in this case is recidivism, not
underutilized buildings. The purpose of
detention facilities is not to reach maxi-
mum capacity, but to provide a location
for the juvenile justice system to carry out
its mission.
A third counterargument points out
that restricting waivers will increase the
caseload of an already overburdened ju-
venile justice system. Confronted with
more cases than it can handle, the system
risks making administrative mistakes as
a result of the overload. This concern is
valid: juvenile courts can expect to see
an increase in the number of cases pro-
cessed once transfers to the adult system
are limited. In the long run, however, the
juvenile court caseload will decrease sig-
nificantly as recidivism decreases.
Conclusion
The statistics and policies presented
in this paper only narrowly describe the
issues facing America’s recidivist juveniles.
An unacceptable depth of heartache and
suffering plagues our delinquents, and
without significant effort these youth are
more likely to enter a pattern of criminal-
ity that hurts society as a whole. Vigorous
reformative efforts—including the rec-
ommendations herein outlined—must be
taken immediately before another genera-
tion of youth deteriorates beyond repair.
The awful realities of juvenile recidivism
demand those efforts.
Endnotes
1. Synder, Howard, Juvenile Arrests
2000 (Washington D.C.: Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Programs, 2002).
2. Synder, Howard, and Melissa
Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and
Victims: 2006 National Report
(Washington D.C.: Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Programs,
2006).
3. Calvin, Elizabeth, Legal Strategies to
Reduce the Unnecessary Detention
of Children (Washington D.C.:
National Juvenile Defender Center,
2004).
4. Travis, J. and A. L. Solomon, From
Prison to Home: The Dimensions
and Consequences of Prisoner
Reentry (Washington D.C.: The
Urban Institute, 2001).
5. Schuetz, Pam, “Employment for
Former Prisoners: Community,
Family and Individual Salvation?”
CELCEE Digest, (2005): http://
www.celcee.edu/publications/digest/
Dig05-07.html.
6. Calvin, Sims, Barbara, and Pamela
Preston, eds., Handbook of Juvenile
Justice Theory and Practice (Boca
Raton: Taylor & Francis Group,
2006).
7. “Appropriations Approves Bill
to Reduce Juvenile Recidivism
and Homelessness,” News from
the Twelfth Assembly District,
May 24, 2006, http://democrats.
assembly.ca.gov/members/a12/press/
p122006062.htm.
8. Various.
9. Various.
10. Bailey, Brandon, and Griff Palmer,
“High Rearrest Rate,” The Mercury
News, October 17, 2004.
11. Gerwitz, Marian, “Recidivism
Among Juvenile Offenders in New
York City,” New York City Criminal
Justice Agency, Inc., (2007):
http://www.cjareports.org/reports/
jorecid0407.pdf.
12. Hewitt, John D. and Robert M.
Regoli, Delinquency in Society (New
York: McGraw Hill, 2006).
13. Travis and Solomon.
14. Schuetz.
15. Dunham, Warren, and Chaitin
Mildred, “The Juvenile Court in Its
Relationship to Adult Criminality,”
Social Forces (1966): 114-119.
16. MacKenzie, Doris Layton, What
Works in Corrections: Reducing the
Criminal Activities of Offenders and
Delinquents (New York: Cambridge
University press, 2006).
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Pozen, David, “The Private,
Nonprofit Prison,” Boston Globe,
February 21, 2006.
21. See the websites of NGOs mentioned
(such as AGYF and CDF).
22. Various. Special thanks to Professor
Richard Johnson for compiling this
list.
23. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of
57
 Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice About the Author
Statistics, Reentry Trends in the U.S.,
October 25, 2002, http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/reentry/recidivism. Jane Wilson is a senior at Stanford
htm. University and majors in Political Sci-
24. Roberts. ence. Over the past several years, Jane has
25. Lubow, Bart, “Reducing
Inappropriate Detention: A Focus worked with inmates as a GED tutor, lit-
on the Role of Defense Attorneys,” eracy coach, and Life Skills instructor. She
Juvenile Justice Update 11, no. 4 has also worked with underprivileged ju-
(2005): 1-2, 14-16.
26. Ibid. veniles as a truancy counselor, ESL tutor,
27. Hollman, Barry, and Jason mediator, and music teacher. As Stanford’s
Ziedenberg, “The Dangers Strauss Scholar, she is currently develop-
of Detention: The Impact of
Incarcerating Youth in Detention ing educational programs for inmates in
and Other Secure Facilities,” Justice New York City, Chicago, San Diego, Salt
Policy Institute (2006). Lake City, and St. Louis. Jane intends to
28. Calvin.
29. Lubow pursue a law degree and eventually work
30. Dominguez, David, Personal in correctional legislation.
Interview, October 23, 2006.
31. Hollman and Ziedenberg.
32. Dominguez.
33. Zimring, Franklin E, American
Juvenile Justice, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2005).
34. Coalition for Juvenile Justice,
Trying and Sentencing Youth in
Adult Criminal Court, http://www.
juvjustice.org/resources/fs008.html.
35. Sims and Preston.
36. Cuellar, Alison, Kelly Kelleher,
Jennifer Rolls, and Kathleen Pajer,
“Medicaid Insurance Policy for
Youths Involved in the Criminal
Justice System,” Public Health
Consequences of Imprisonment 95,
no. 10 (2005): 1707-1711.
37. “News from the Twelfth Assembly
District.”
38. Ibid.
39. Calvin.

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