UNITEDWORLD SCHOOL OF LAW

TOPIC: Common Intention under Criminal Law

SUBMITTED BY:

MAHEK RAVAL

ROLL NO. 20190401058

SUBJECT: Law of Crime-1

SECTION: 3(B)

SUBMITTED TO:

Dr. Sanjay Pandey

 Declaration
The text reported in the project is the outcome of my own efforts and no part of
this project assignment has been copied in any unauthorized manner and no part
of it has been incorporated without due acknowledgement

____________________

Mahek Raval
Table of Contents
Introduction:...........................................................................................................................4

Explanation with Case Laws..................................................................................................4

Basic Intention And specific Intention:..................................................................................6

Conclusion:............................................................................................................................7
Introduction:

Criminal Intention is the highest form of blameworthiness of mind or mens rea. Intention
occupies a symbolic place in criminal law1. As the highest form of the mental element, it
applies to murder and the gravest form of crimes in the criminal justice system 2. The term
‘intention’ is not defined in Indian Penal Code but section 34 of IPC deals with common
intention. The intention made among several people to do something wrong and act done in
that manner in which it was formulated comes under the sanction of Section 34 of IPC.3

Section 34 deals with a situation, where an offence requires a particular criminal intention or
knowledge and is committed by several persons. Each of them who join the act with such
knowledge or intention is liable in the same way as if it were done by him alone with that
intention or knowledge4. The liability of individuals under this circumstance is called Joint
Liability5. The principle of Joint Liability defined in section 34 is as follows:

Section 34: Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention – When a
criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of common intention of all, each of
such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.6

Common intention implies a prearranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan.
Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act, which need not be a
long gap. To bring this section into effect a pre-concert is not necessarily be proved, but it
may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons and could be inferred from
facts and circumstances of each case.7

Explanation with Case Laws

In Amrik Singh’s Case it has been further held that though the common intention may
develop in course of the fight but there must be clear and unimpeachable evidence to justify
that inference. In the case Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad 8, Supreme court emphasized on
this point that prior concert need not be something always very much prior to the incident,
but could well be something that may develop on the spot, on the spur of the moment. In this

1
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/common-intention-common-object/
2
https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/common-intention-common-object/
3
https://advocatespedia.com/Ipc_149
4
https://www.studymode.com/essays/Comparison-Between-Sec-34-And-Sec-626800.html
5
https://www.scribd.com/document/432395805/Moot-Court-Problem-3
6
https://www.priyasepaha.com/post/2018/03/30/common-intention-and-common-object-lecture-series-4
7
https://www.casemine.com/judgement/in/5609aef3e4b014971141542e
8
1955 AIR 216
case deceased with his wife’s sister went to the field. While Ramchander went to the river
side the five persons including three appellant attacked him.

According to eyewitnesses, Pandurang, Tukia, and Bhilia were holding axes and other two
accused Tukaram and Nilia had stuck in their hands. The deceased died on the spot. In this
case, different eyewitnesses told a different story. The trial court convicted each of accused of
charge S.302 with S. 34 and sentenced to death. Appeal lied in High court and conviction of
Pandurang, Tukia, Bhilia was maintained but other two accused person sentence was
commuted to transportation for life. When the matter came up to the Supreme Court, the
learned judge said that each is liable for their own act. The Apex Court set aside the death
sentence of Pandurang and convicted him instead under S.326, and sentenced for 10 years
rigorous imprisonment. The Supreme Court altered the sentence of Tukia and Bhilia to
transportation for life. The Supreme Court elaborated in this case that:

“In a case like that, each would be individually liable for whatever injury he caused but none
would be vicariously convicted for the acts of any of the others; if the prosecution cannot
prove that his separate blow was a fatal one, he cannot be convicted of the murder, however
clearly an intention to kill could be proved in this case.”9

The essence of liability to be found in the existence of common intention is that the criminal
act complained against was done by one of the accused persons in furtherance of common
intention of all, if this is shown, then the liability for the crime may be imposed on any one of
the persons in the same manner as if the act were done by him alone.10

In the case of Mahboob Shah v. Emperor11, the appellant Mahboob Shah was of age 19 and
was convicted by Session Judge of the charge s.302 with s.34 for the murder of Allah Dad.
The Session court sentenced him for death. The High Court of Judicature also confirmed the
death sentence. On appeal before Lordship, the conviction for murder and sentence of death
was quashed. It was contended before appellant that –  “when Allah Dad and Hamidullah
tried to run away, Wali Shah and Mahboob Shah Came in front of them and fired shots” and
so there was evidence of forming common intention at the spur of the moment. Their
Lordship was not satisfied upon this view and humbly advised His Majesty that the appellant

9
https://www.jusprudentia.com/single-post/2017/06/28/Section-34-v-149-IPC
10
https://www.lawbulls.in/common-intention-prior-concert/
11
MANU/MH/0050/1945
has succeeded in his appeal, his appeal should be allowed and his conviction for murder and
the sentence of death set aside.12

Basic Intention And specific Intention13:

In some states, a distinction is made between an offense of basic intent and an offense of
specific Intent.

Offenses requiring basic intent specify a mens rea element that is no more than the intentional
or reckless commission of the Actus Reus. The actor either knew (intended) or deliberately
closed his mind to the risk (recklessness) that his action (actus reus) would result in the harm
suffered by the victim. The crime of battery, for example, only requires the basic intent that
the actor knew or should have known that his action would lead to harmful contact with the
victim.

A limited number of offences are defined to require a further element in addition to basic
intent, and this additional element is termed specific intent. There are two classes of such
offences:
(a) Some legislature decide that particular criminal offenses are sufficiently serious that the
mens rea requirement must be drafted to demonstrate more precisely where the fault lies.
Thus, in addition to the conventional mens rea of intention or recklessness, a further or
additional element is required. For example, in English law, s18 Offences against the Persons
Act 1861 defines the actus reus as causing grievous bodily harm but requires that this be
performed:
1. unlawfully and maliciously – the modern interpretation of "malice" for these purposes is
either intention or recklessness, "unlawfully" means without some lawful excuse (such as
self-defence); and with the intent either to cause grievous bodily harm or to resist lawful
arrest.

The rule in cases involving such offenses is that the basic element can be proved in the usual
way, but the element of specific intent must be shown using a more subjective than objective
test so that the legislature's express requirement can be seen to be satisfied.

(b) The inchoate offenses such as attempt and conspiracy require specific intent in a slightly

12
https://www.scribd.com/document/428559159/Ingredients-of-Section-34-of-IPC
13
https://articlesonlaw.files.wordpress.com/2015/09/ebook-ysrao.pdf
different sense. The rationale for the existence of criminal laws is as a deterrent to those who
represent a danger to society. If an accused has actually committed the full offense, the reality
of the danger has been demonstrated. But, where the commission of the actus reus is in the
future and the accused is merely acting in anticipation of committing the full offense at some
time in the future, a clear subjective intention to cause the actus reus of the full offense must
be demonstrated. Without this specific intent, there is insufficient evidence that the accused is
the clear danger as feared because, at any time before the commission of the full offense, the
accused may change his or her mind and not continue. Hence, this specific intent must also be
demonstrated on a subjective basis.

At times a forensic psychiatric examination may be helpful in ascertaining the presence or

absence of mens rea in crimes which require specific intent. In R v Mohan (1975) 2 All ER
193 it was held that direct intention means, "aim or purpose" - "a decision to bring about,
insofar as it lies within the accused's power, the commission of the offence. No matter
whether the accused desired that consequence of his act or not." In Holloway vs United
States, the United States Supreme Court case upheld the use of "conditional intent" as a
necessary element of the crime of carjacking.

In India, the common intention is dealt under section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860. Section
34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention. When a criminal act is
done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is
liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

Conclusion:

Intention is defined in R. v Mohan as “the decision to bring about a prohibited consequence”.

the important conception of the section thirty four of IPC is that if 2 or additional persons
purposely do AN act put together, the position in law is simply a similar as if every of them
has done it separately by himself. One shouldn't forget that section thirty four doesn't speak
“the common intentions of all” nor will it speak “an intention common to all”. below the
provisions of Section thirty four the essence of the liability is to found within the existence of
a standard intention invigorating the defendant resulting in the doing of a criminal act in
furtherance of such intention.