Brazil Related Research

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Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, High Representative for

Disarmament
On 2 July 2007, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon announced the
appointment of Sergio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil as the High Representative for
Disarmament at the Under-Secretary-General level.
Mr. Duarte is a career diplomat and holds the rank of Ambassador in the Brazilian
Foreign Service, where he has served for 48 years. His diplomatic appointments include
the Embassies of Brazil in Rome (1961-1963), Buenos Aires (1963-1966) and
Washington (1970-1974), in addition to the Permanent Mission to the United Nations in
Geneva (1966-1968), where he was a member of the Brazilian delegation to the 18-nation
Disarmament Committee.
Earlier in his career, Mr. Duarte served as Alternate Representative of Brazil, Office of
the Special Representative of Brazil for Disarmament Affairs in Geneva (1979-1986).
Upon his promotion to the most senior rank of the Brazilian Foreign Service, he served as
Ambassador to Nicaragua (1986-1991), Canada (1993-1996), China (1996-1999) and
Austria (1999-2002). At this latter post, he was concurrently Ambassador to Slovakia,
Slovenia and Croatia and was accredited Representative of Brazil before the international
organizations headquartered in Vienna (1999-2002) and Governor for Brazil at the Board
of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). His main assignments
at the Foreign Ministry in Brasilia were Head of Personnel (1975-1979), Secretary-
General for Budget Control and Inspector-General (1991), Executive Secretary-General
(1991-1992), Under-Secretary-General for the Foreign Service (1992-1993) and
Ambassador-at-Large for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (2003-2004).
In 1988, Mr. Duarte was elected President of the Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty Prohibiting the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons on the Seabed and the Subsoil
Thereof ( Geneva). He served a one-year term (September 1999-September 2000) as
Chairman of the Board of Governors of IAEA. In 2005, he was elected President of the
VII Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, in New York. During his career, he has attended 12 sessions of the First
Committee of the General Assembly in different capacities and 6 sessions of the United
Nations Disarmament Commission. Ambassador Duarte has represented his country at
many other international meetings and attended several seminars in the field of
disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation.
Mr. Duarte was born in Rio de Janeiro. He graduated in law from the Federal Fluminense
University (Niterói, Rio de Janeiro) in 1958, and in public administration from the
Brazilian School of Public Administration (Getúlio Vargas Foundation, Rio de Janeiro) in
1957. He attended the Brazilian Diplomatic Academy (Instituto Rio Branco, Rio de
Janeiro) for the regular course of two years (1956-1957)
before being appointed Third Secretary in the Brazilian
Foreign Service.
US 'sure' of Brazil nuclear plans

US Secretary of State Colin Powell has said he is confident Brazil
has no plans to develop nuclear weapons.
But Mr Powell, who is on a two-day visit, urged Brazil to allow the US-Brazilian ties have
UN's nuclear watchdog greater access to inspect its nuclear improved dramatically in
technology. recent years
Brazil wants to limit entry to a new uranium enrichment plant, saying it must protect its nuclear technology.
Despite nuclear concerns, Mr Powell's visit is firmly fixed on strengthening co-operation between the US
and Brazil.
Global role
Speaking to business leaders in Sao Paulo, Mr Powell said Brazil was an "important candidate" for a
permanent seat on an expanded UN Security Council, although he stopped short of directly backing the
country's long-held desire for the position.
He praised the growing global role of Brazil, the biggest country in

Latin America.
"Brazil is a nation the US values as a close partner in advancing

prosperity, democracy, and security, not only in the hemisphere but
around the globe," Mr Powell said.
Mr Powell also said the US was firmly committed to seeing a pan-

American free trade deal, known as the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), take effect early next year.
Brazil says it fears industrial
Brazil has voiced mixed feelings over the free trade moves, as well espionage at its nuclear plant
as complaining about US agricultural subsidies.
Mr Powell accepted that negotiations had been difficult but he expected progress.
"We hope that we will be able to complete the FTAA in the early part of 2005. That looks more difficult
now, but in no way could we move the commitment [President Bush] has," Mr Powell said.
Wrong message
Mr Powell travelled on from Sao Paulo to Brasilia for talks with President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and
Foreign Minister Celso Amorim.
The secretary of state's visit comes less than two weeks before a team from the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) arrives.
The IAEA wants unimpeded access to the Resende plant in Rio state but Brazil argues visual inspection
will result in the disclosure of its technological secrets.
US diplomats have warned that such a stance by Brazil will send the wrong message, at a time when there
is concern about the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea.
However, Mr Powell has said he expects Brazil and the IAEA will resolve their difference.
Brazil and The United Nations
The United Nations (UN), an intergovernmental and political organization founded in

1945 at the end of the Second World War, has as its main objectives the maintenance
of peace, the defence of human rights and fundamental liberty and the promotion of
development in countries world-wide. The UN operates chiefly via its General
Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Protection Council and
the International Court of Justice based in The Hague. The United Nations system also
includes specialized agencies, which are autonomous bodies, linked by special
agreements and set up at different times as a response to the various needs of the
international community.
In addition to the member states of the United

Nations, non-member countries may also
participate in the specialized agencies. As one of
the 51 founder members of the UN, Brazil is a
member of all the specialist agencies and plays a
prominent part in some of them, such as the
International Labour Organization (ILO) founded
in 1919 and concerned with labour issues,
becoming the first specialist agency to be
associated with the United Nations in 1946; and
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) which was set up in 1947 following
the reformulation of the 1934 organization of the same name.
The other agencies in which Brazil has been actively involved were founded after the
creation of the United Nations. The following are the most notable ones:
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO), based in Rome and set
up in 1945;
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD) - World Bank, both based in Washington and founded in 1945;
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), based

in Paris and created in 1946;
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), based in Montreal and founded in

1947;
World Health Organization (WHO), having its headquarters in Geneva and created in
1948, and its regional body, the Pan-American Health Organization
International Maritime Organization (IMO), with its headquarters in London and

founded in 1958;
World Trade Organization (WTO), based in Geneva and set up in 1995.
Because of what they offer to the international community, the United Nations
Programmes for Development, Habitat and for the Environment; which have emerged
from the major conferences organized by the UN to handle specific issues, are similar
to specialized organizations or agencies. Brazil has played an active role in these and
other international conferences on specific subjects, including the environment,
development, the position of women, transfer of technology, human rights, drug
trafficking and disarmament.
THE NUCLEAR NON PROLIFERATION TREATY

José Goldemberg
The nuclear activities in Brazil – as in other countries of the world – have
always had two derivations, civil and military. Like other technologies, nuclear energy
can be used for peaceful or military purposes. It is not easy to draw a clear line
separating them. For example, steel can be used for making daggers, that can kill, or
knives for cutting food. It is for this reason that passengers cannot go into an
airplane carrying knives, scissors or other objects of the same type, and inspections
are carried out to prevent this to happen because they could be used for
overwhelming the crew in case of highjacking.
Concerning nuclear energy, it is not too different: it was developed for
producing atomic bombs with a terrible explosive power, but soon it was realized that
it could also be used in nuclear reactors for the production electricity. How can these
activities be separated and how to limit its use for peaceful purposes, preventing its
use for military ends?
This challenge has been dealt with for almost 40 years through restrictions
imposed by the great powers that developed nuclear weapons to the other countries.
This was carried out through the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), signed in 1967, that
has legitimated the possession of nuclear weapons by the United States, Russia,
England, France and China, and tried to prevent other countries to develop them by
restricting access to technology.
The NPT was the result of a diplomatic bargain: countries have given up the
access to nuclear weapons in exchange of progressive disarmament of the great
powers that over time would lead to the banishment of these weapons as it has
occurred with bacteriologic weapons. Besides, they would benefit from the transfer of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
The NPT is actually an asymmetric treaty that divided the world in two groups:
those that “have” and those that “have not” nuclear weapons. For some, this solution
was considered equivalent to “disarming the unarmed” while the others armed
themselves without limit. Actually this is not the only existing asymmetry in the
world, evidenced by the fact that the average United States per capita income is
tenfold (or more) that of the Indians.
The NPT success relative to its objectives was mediocre because India, Israel
and Pakistan, that were no signatories to the Treaty, developed nuclear weapons.
North Korea is still a mystery concerning this question.
Nevertheless, the NPT restrictions have been voluntarily accepted by many
countries. Brazil is among them, as the Government decided in 1992 that the
possession of nuclear weapons would not bring any advantage to the country.
Developing weapons would cause restrictions to imports of certain materials
and equipment and more or less intense retaliatory measures from the great powers,
as it has happened to Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea.
Brazil and Argentina gave up nuclear weapons by signing a pioneer and
innovative bilateral cooperation agreement that created one agency – ABACC – that
made Latin America’s Southern Cone a weapon-free zone and without nuclear
menace. The two countries at the time have given a magnificent example of political
maturity.
However, to dominate the nuclear fuel cycle, from enrichment to the production
of weapons is not a very difficult task and the technical elite from different countries
could do it with their own means if this political decision would be taken.
After the development of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, the concern
that other countries would do the same have increased and for this reason the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) carries out inspections to confirm that
this is not happening.
The access to nuclear installations originated the recent Brazilian problems vis-
à-vis the IAEA and the Brazilian restrictions regarding inspections have given rise to
suspicions that the intentions of the Brazilian Government were not entirely pacific.
The arguments used, namely that these restrictions only aimed at protecting the
uranium enrichment national technology developed locally are not convincing.
This is an opportune occasion to deepen the discussion about the real NPT
implications because in 2005 it will take place an international conference – that
happens every five years – to revise its success and failures. Brazil has been one of
the most active countries in this debate, together with South Africa, Egypt, Ireland,
Mexico, New Zealand and Sweden that have made serious propositions to improve
and democratize the NPT. These seven countries have organized themselves in a
“New Agenda Coalition” in which our present Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, was
very active. The coalition has advanced the ideas that the control of access to
nuclear weapons regarding the countries that do not have them would be linked to
the disarmament of those that have them, making the world less dangerous than it
is today.
José Goldemberg is Secretary for the Environment of the State of São

Paulo - Brazil
The 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held from 2 to 27 May 2005 at the United Nations
Headquarters in New York. The President-elect of the Review Conference is Ambassador
Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil.
Ministry of External Relations (Brazil)

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Ministry of External Relations

Esplanada dos Ministérios, Bloco H
www.mre.gov.br
Established 28 July 1736 [1]

Current Minister Celso Amorim
Budget $1.9 billion (2007) [2]
The Ministry of External Relations (Abbreviation: MRE; Portuguese: Ministério das

Relações Exteriores) conducts Brazil's foreign relations with other countries. It is
commonly referred to in Brazilian media and diplomatic jargon as The Itamaraty, after
the palace which hosted the ministry (originally in Rio de Janeiro, and currently in a
second-named one in Brasília). The ministry is currently headed by Chancellor Celso
Amorim.
The ministry is headquartered in the Itamaraty Palace, located at the Monumental Axis in
the capital city of Brasília.
Contents
[hide] [hide]
• 1 Foreign policy
• 2 Diplomatic missions
• 3 See also
• 4 Notes and references
• 5 External links
[edit] Foreign policy
The Itamaraty Palace in Brasília is the headquarters of the Ministry of External Relations
Main article: Foreign relations of Brazil
The primary objective of the Brazilian foreign ministry is to increase the process of
regional integration with Mercosul and other regional and financial bodies. It has also
been heavily involved in the discussion of important topics on the international agenda
including issues such as the protection of human rights, environmental preservation and
the maintenance of peace. At the same time, it has strengthened its links with the
Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries and has structured itself in order to meet
the needs and ambitions of day to day foreign policy concerns. Brazil currently maintains
diplomatic relations with every country in the world, with the exceptions of Bhutan,
Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Marshall Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Tuvalu, and Taiwan
(Republic of China)[3].
[edit] Diplomatic missions

Main article: Brazilian diplomatic missions
Permanent diplomatic missions are meant to carry out representation, negotiation and
information activities, as well as the protection of Brazilian interests with governments of
other States and international organizations. Brazil has an extensive diplomatic network,
consisting of over 250 overseas missions:
• 94 Embassies
• 43 Consulates
• 19 Vice-Consulates
• 100+ Honorary Consulates
• 8 Delegations
Foreign relations of Brazil

Brazil
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Brazil is a significant political and economic power in Latin America.
Between World War II and 1990, both democratic and military governments sought to
expand Brazil's influence in the world by pursuing a state-led industrial policy and an
independent foreign policy. Brazilian foreign policy has recently aimed to strengthen ties
with other South American countries, engage in multilateral diplomacy through the
United Nations and the Organization of American States, and act at times as a
countervailing force to U.S. political and economic influence in Latin America.
Contents
[hide] [hide]
• 1 Foreign policy
• 2 Diplomatic relations
o 2.1 Relations with the United States
• 3 United Nations politics
• 4 International issues
• 5 Foreign aid
• 6 Participation in international organizations
• 7 See also
• 8 References
[edit] Foreign policy

Brazil's foreign policy is a by-product of the country's unique position as a regional
power in Latin America, a leader among developing countries, and an emerging world
power.[1] Brazilian foreign policy has generally been based on the principles of
multilateralism, peaceful dispute settlement, and non-intervention in the affairs of other
countries.[2] Brazil engages in multilateral diplomacy through the Organization of
American States and the United Nations, and has increased ties with developing countries
in Africa and Asia. Brazil is currently commanding a multinational U.N. stabilization
force in Haiti, the MINUSTAH. Instead of pursuing unilateral prerogatives, Brazilian
foreign policy has tended to emphasize regional integration, first through the Southern
Cone Common Market (Mercosul) and now the Union of South American Nations.
Brazil's political, business, and military ventures are complemented by the country's trade
policy. In Brazil, the Ministry of Foreign Relations continues to dominate trade policy,
causing the country's commercial interests to be (at times) subsumed by a larger foreign
policy goal, namely, enhancing Brazil's influence in Latin America and the world. [3] For
example, while concluding meaningful trade agreements with developed countries (such
as the United States and the European Union) would probably be beneficial to Brazil's
long-term economic self-interest, the Brazilian government has instead prioritized its
leadership role within Mercosur and expanded trade ties with countries in Africa, Asia
and the Middle East.
[edit] Diplomatic relations

Brazil has a large global network of diplomatic missions, and maintains diplomatic
relations with every United Nations member, with the exception of:
• Bhutan
• Marshall Islands
• Micronesia
• Tonga
• Tuvalu
In addition to that, Brazil does not recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan), but
maintains a special office in Taipei. Brazil does not recognize Kosovo as an independent
state and has no plans to do so without an agreement with Serbia.[4]
[edit] Relations with the United States

Main article: Brazilian-American relations
Lula da Silva and George W. Bush
Relations between the United States and Brazil are characterized as fairly warm and
friendly. The United States has increasingly regarded Brazil as a significant power,
especially in its role as a stabilizing force and a skillful interlocutor in Latin America.
U.S. officials tend to describe Brazil, like Chile, as a friendly country that shares the U.S.
commitment to democratic practices and prudent macroeconomic policies.
Although they share common goals for regional stability, Brazil's independent approach
to foreign policy has led to periodic disputes with the United States on trade and political
issues, including Brazil's vocal opposition to the war in Iraq. Despite these
disagreements, Brazil and the United States have worked closely on a wide range of
bilateral and regional issues. In addition to trade matters, these issues include counter-
narcotics and terrorism, energy security, human rights protection, environmental issues
and HIV/AIDS. Brazilian and U.S. officials recently signed an agreement on ethanol and
technology development.
[edit] United Nations politics

Main article: Brazil and the United Nations
Brazil is a charter member of the United Nations and participates in many of its
specialized agencies. It has contributed troops to UN peacekeeping efforts in the Middle
East, the former Belgian Congo, Cyprus, Mozambique, Angola, and more recently East
Timor and Haiti. Brazil has been a member of the UN Security Council nine times, most
recently 2004-2005.
Brazil is currently seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is
a member of the G4, an organization of Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India, all nations
who are currently seeking permanent representation. According to their plan the UN
Security Council would be expanded beyond the current fifteen members to include
twenty-five members. This would be the first time that permanent status has been
extended to a South American nation and supporters of the G4 plan suggest that this will
lead to greater representation of developing nations rather than the current major
participants.
[edit] International issues

• Two short sections of the border with Uruguay are in dispute - the Arroio
Invernada area of the Quaraí River, and the Brazilian Island at the confluence of
the Quaraí River and the Uruguay River[5].
• Brazil declared in 1986 the sector between 28°W to 53°W Brazilian Antarctica
(Antártica Brasileira) as its Zone of Interest. It overlaps Argentine and British
claims[6]
• In 2004, the country submitted its claims to the United Nations Commission on
the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to extend its maritime continental
margin[7].
[edit] Foreign aid

Brazil provides foreign aid to various countries in Africa and Latin America through the
Brazilian Agency of Cooperation (Abbreviation: ABC; Portuguese: Agência Brasileira
de Cooperação). In addition to offering scientific, economical, and technical support to
programs in various countries.
[edit] Participation in international organizations

ACTO • AfDB • BIS • CAN(Associate) • CPLP • FAO • G4 • G8+5 • G15 • G20 • G22 • G24 •
G77 • IADB • IDB • IAEA • IBRD • IBSA •ICAO • ICC • ICRM • IDA • IFAD • IFC •
IFRCS • IHO • ILO • IMF • IMO • Inmarsat • Intelsat • Interpol • IOC • IOM • ISO • ITU
• LAES • LAIA • Latin Union • Mercosur • MINUSTAH • NAM(Observer) • NSG • OAS •
OEI • OPANAL • OPCW • PCA • Rio Group • Rio Treaty • UN • UNASUR • UNCTAD
• UNESCO • UNHCR • UNIDO • UNITAR • UNMIL • UNMIS • UNMOVIC • UNOCI
• UNTAET • UNWTO • UPU • WCO • WHO • WIPO • WMO • WTO • ZPCAS
Disarmament Act (2003)

President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva sanctioned the Disarmament Act (No. 10,826) on 22
December 2003. The new law restricts the carrying, ownership and sale of firearms.
The main elements of the Act are as follows:
• International arms trafficking is considered a crime under penal law. Offenders are
liable to jail sentences ranging from 4 to 16 years.
• Commercialisation of firearms is prohibited. Firearms may only be sold to armed

forces personnel, police organizations, municipal guards, the Brazilian
Intelligence Agency, prison guards, coast-guards, private security firms, and firms
engaged in transporting valuables and authorized sports entities.
• Further restrictions are imposed on the private ownership of firearms. Applicants

for a gun permit are required to prove that the gun is necessary for their
profession or for personal protection against a credible threat. Applicants must not
be under police investigation or answering criminal proceedings. They are also
required to provide proof of residence and of employment; be able to handle guns;
and hold a certificate issued by the federal and state courts and by the military and
electoral authorities to the effect that they do not have a criminal record.
• Firearm permits will be issued by the Federal Police (state-level public security
authorities may also deliver permits under certain conditions).
• The minimum age for purchasing firearms is raised from 21 to 25 years.
• Carrying a firearm without a permit and/or firing a gun at random in a public

place is considered a criminal offence, without right to bail and subject to a two-
to four-year prison term.
• A gun permit will be permanently cancelled if the person to whom it was issued is
found to be carrying a gun while under the influence of alcohol or while suffering
from the effects of hallucinogenic drugs.
• Current gun permits will expire 90 days after the new law has been published
(renewal will depend on the fulfillment of the new requirements.
• Persons in possession of an unregistered gun may hand it to the Federal Police

within 180 days of the publication of the law. A receipt will be issued and
reimbursement paid to the gun owner.
• Decommissioned guns will be entered in a register and, after forensic

examination, destroyed by the Army. Re-use of decommissioned guns or their
conversion to any other use is prohibited.
• Fines ranging from R$100,000 to R$300,000 will be levied on firms which

undertake, promote, facilitate or allow the transportation of firearms or
ammunition without proper authorisation. The advertising of the manufacturing or
sale of firearms, outside specialised technical publications, will be penalised with
fines.
• A referendum will be held in October 2005 to decide whether the sale of weapons
and ammunition should be banned.
Brazil - Nuclear Programs

Free online information regarding Nuclear Programs, Brazil
Brazil's nuclear capabilities are the most advanced in Latin America; only Argentina has
provided serious competition. Brazil has one nuclear power plant in operation (Angra I)
and two under construction (Angra II and III). Its nuclear-enrichment program is
multifaceted, with the military services involved in separate projects: the navy, centrifuge
enrichment; the air force, laser enrichment; and the army, gas graphite enrichment.
The history of Brazil's nuclear programs can be traced back to the early 1930s, with the
initial research in nuclear fission. Much of that early research was conducted at the USP
(University of São Paulo), some by scientists who had been contracted from abroad. By
the mid-1930s, Brazil had discovered vast deposits of uranium. In 1940 President Getúlio
Vargas signed an agreement with the United States for cooperative mining, including
mining for uranium and monazite. During the 1940s, Brazil signed three additional
agreements with the United States. In exchange for monazite, the United States
transferred nuclear technology.
In the early 1950s, President Vargas encouraged the development of independent national
nuclear capabilities. He offered to sell uranium or thorium to the United States in
exchange for nuclear technology. Under Vargas Brazil sought to purchase three
ultracentrifuge systems for uranium enrichment from West Germany. After Vargas's
death, Acting President João Café Filho (1954-55) reversed the nationalistic nuclear
policy and allowed the United States to control uranium research and extraction for two
years.
President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61), a pro-Vargas politician, sought to develop

indigenous nuclear capabilities by appointing a Congressional Investigating Committee
(Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito--CPI) to examine United States nuclear ties with
Brazil. The CPI urged Brazil to adopt an independent nuclear posture. As a result,
Kubitschek in 1956 created the IPEN (Institute for Energy and Nuclear Research).
Kubitschek's successor, Jânio Quadros (president, January-August 1961), continued the
independent nuclear policy, which was based on natural uranium, as did his successor,
João Goulart (president, 1961-64).
As part of that independent nuclear policy, the CNEN (National Nuclear Energy
Commission) was created formally on August 27, 1962. The CNEN is under the direct
control of the Strategic Affairs Secretariat (Secretaria de Assuntos Estratégicos--SAE) of
the Brazilian presidency. According to the 1988 constitution, the CNEN is responsible for
the orientation, planning, supervision, and control of Brazil's nuclear programs.
The CNEN is located in Rio Janeiro, and is divided into three directorates: Directorate of
Research and Development (Diretoria de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento--DPD),
Directorate of Radiation Protection and Nuclear Safety (Diretoria de Radioproteção e
Segurança Nuclear--DRS), and Directorate of Logistical Support (Diretoria de Apoio
Logístico--DAL). The DPD is further subdivided into three scientific and technological
institutes: the IPEN, in São Paulo; the Center for Development of Nuclear Technology
(Centro de Desenvolvimento de Tecnologia Nuclear--CDTN), which was created in 1952
in Belo Horizonte as Brazil's first nuclear research institute; and the Nuclear Engineering
Institute (Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear--IEN), in Rio de Janeiro. The DRS is
composed of the Radiation Protection and Dosimetry Institute (Instituto de Radioproteção
e Dosimetria--IRD), in Rio de Janeiro; the Licensing and Control Superintendency
(Superintendência de Licenciamento e Contrôle--SLC), with its major laboratory in
Poços de Caldas, Minas Gerais State; and various regional units.
The most important of the CNEN's research institutes is the IPEN, a civilian agency that
is associated with the SCTDE (São Paulo State's Secretariat for Science, Technology, and
Economic Development), and linked to the USP (University of São Paulo) (the IPEN
provides teaching and graduate education). The IPEN has a broad infrastructure of
laboratories, a research reactor (IEA-R1), an industrial accelerator of electrons, and a
compact cyclotron of variable energy. The IPEN is involved primarily in conducting
research in the areas of nuclear materials and processes, nuclear reactors, applications of
nuclear techniques, and nuclear safety. The IPEN is noted for its production of
radioisotopes for nuclear medicine.
Despite Brazil's search for autonomy in the nuclear sphere, it continued to receive
technical assistance from the United States. In 1957 Brazil built the first of two nuclear
research reactors in São Paulo, with United States support under the Atoms for Peace
Program. That program had its origins in the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration
(1953-61). Under the program, the United States agreed to share nuclear technology for
peaceful purposes, but retained ultimate control over the processes. A second reactor was
developed in Belo Horizonte in 1960. In 1965 Brazil built its first indigenous research
reactor in Rio de Janeiro. The United States supplied the medium-grade enriched uranium
for the reactor.
The construction of these reactors was controlled strictly by the United States. Brazil
provided natural uranium to the United States and paid to have it processed. In turn the
United States supplied Brazil with the enriched fuel required for its reactors. As
envisioned by the Atoms for Peace Program, the United States retained control of the
technology and by-products created by Brazilian reactors.
Based on the success of these research reactors, plans were made for a nuclear reactor to
produce electricity. In 1968 the CNEN and Eletrobrás were tasked with building a nuclear
power plant at Angra dos Reis, Rio de Janeiro State. Three years later, the Westinghouse
Electric Corporation agreed to supply the technology for the power plant, and
construction of Angra I began. However, Brazilian authorities were dissatisfied with the
Westinghouse accord, because it barred the transfer of United States nuclear technology
to Brazil, made Brazil dependent on United States uranium for the reactor, and required
that all Brazilian nuclear facilities be safeguarded by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).
Brazil's military governments continued to assert autonomous nuclear strategies. These

regimes were frustrated by restrictions imposed by the United States on its nuclear
programs, concerned with Argentina's rapid nuclear development, and facing energy
shortages (accentuated by the petroleum crisis of October 1973). A turning point was the
inauguration of President Ernesto Geisel in March 1974. A former president of Petrobrás,
the petroleum monopoly, Geisel was concerned with the country's pressing energy needs.
In December 1974, he created the Brazilian Nuclear Corporations (Empresas Nucleares
Brasileiras S.A.--Nuclebrás), a state company tasked with expanding the nuclear
programs.
Brazil was faced with a technical dilemma: it could switch to natural uranium technology,
which could be pursued independently; or it could continue to pursue the more costly and
advanced enriched uranium technology, but with external assistance. Brazilian policy
makers opted for the latter, but given that the United States had been an unreliable
supplier, Brazil was forced to look elsewhere for assistance.
Brazil made a radical change in 1975, when it opted for nuclear technology from West
Germany, despite strong protests from the United States. The agreement, signed on June
27, called for West Germany to transfer eight nuclear reactors (each of which could
produce 1,300 megawatts), a commercial-scale uranium enrichment facility, a pilot-scale
plutonium reprocessing plant, and Becker "jet nozzle" enrichment technology. West
Germany's Kraftwerk Union, an affiliate of Siemens, was hired to construct the power
plants. The projected cost of the program was US$4 billion, to be paid over a fifteen-year
period. The most important element of the agreement was that it called for the first-ever
transfer of technology for a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and
reprocessing. The United States government opposed the accord vigorously. Although it
was unable to revoke the agreement, the United States convinced West Germany to enact
stringent safeguards.
Many experts have questioned the cost-effectiveness of Brazil's nuclear power plants.
The Angra I power plant cost US$2 billion to build, and it began to operate commercially
in 1983. When Angra I is in full operation, it produces 20 percent of the electricity used
in the city of Rio de Janeiro. From 1985 through 1993, however, Angra I was turned off
more than thirty times because of technical problems and legal challenges, earning it the
nickname "firefly." Furnas Electric Power Plants, Inc. (Furnas Centrais Elétricas S.A.--
Furnas), the state company that administers Angra 1, lost US$100 million in operating
costs in 1993 alone because the plant was closed down most of the year. The plant is
expected to be torn down in 2009, at a cost of US$200 million.
Angra II, under construction since 1977, was projected to be ready by 1993, but in early
1996 its completion date was still uncertain. The construction of Angra II had cost at least
US$4.6 billion through 1993, and it was estimated that at least an additional US.5 billion
would be necessary to complete the project. Various experts projected that the total cost
of the plant construction would exceed US$10 billion. Still in its early phases of
construction, Angra III cost US$1 billion through 1993. On October 18, 1994, President
Itamar Franco (1992-94) requested that US$400 million in funding that had been
allocated to Angra III be transferred to Angra II. Given the severe budget constraints, the
construction of Angra III and additional power plants appear doubtful.
West Germany did not require IAEA safeguards, and following the 1975 agreement
Brazil transferred technology from its power plant projects to a secret program to develop
an atom bomb. Code-named "Solimões," after a river in the Amazon, the secret program
was started in 1975 and eventually came to be known publicly as the Parallel Program. In
1987 José Sarney (president, 1985-90) announced that Brazil had enriched uranium
successfully on a laboratory scale to 20 percent. At that time, some observers predicted
that Brazil would have a nuclear-weapons capability by the turn of the century. President
Fernando Collor de Mello took bold steps to control and restrict Brazil's nuclear
programs. In September 1990, he symbolically closed a test site at Cachimbo, in Pará
State. That October, he formally exposed the military's secret plan to develop an atom
bomb.
Within Brazil's Congress, a CPI looked into the Parallel Program. Members visited
numerous facilities, including the Institute of Advanced Studies (Instituto de Estudos
Avançados--IEAv) at the Aerospace Technical Center (Centro Técnico Aeroespacial--
CTA) in São José dos Campos. They also interviewed key players in the nuclear program,
such as João Figueiredo (president, 1979-85) and retired Army General Danilo Venturini,
the former head of the National Security Council (Conselho de Segurança Nacional--
CSN) under Figueiredo. The CPI investigation exposed secret bank accounts, code-
named "Delta," which were managed by the CNEN and used for funding the program.
The most disturbing revelation in the CPI report was that the IEAv had designed two
atomic bomb devices, one weighing twenty to thirty kilotons and a second weighing
twelve kilotons. It was also revealed that Brazil's military regime secretly exported eight
tons of uranium to Iraq in 1981.
Through a series of agreements, Brazil and Argentina have defused the issue of nuclear
rivalry. On May 20, 1980, while under military rule, both countries signed the Brazilian-
Argentine Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, establishing technical
cooperation in developing the nuclear fuel cycle and coordination of nuclear policy.
President Sarney and Argentine president Raúl Alfonsín strengthened this cooperation in
1985, with the Joint Declarations on Nuclear Policy of Foz do Iguaçu. After the 1985
agreement, the presidents and technical staffs made reciprocal visits to nonsafeguarded
nuclear installations in both countries. The heads of state made subsequent joint
declarations in Brasília (1986); Viedma, Argentina (1987); Iperó, Brazil (1988); and
Buenos Aires (1990).
On November 28, 1990, Presidents Collor de Mello and Carlos Saúl Menem of Argentina
signed the second Foz do Iguaçu declaration (Argentine-Brazilian Declaration on
Common Nuclear Policy of Foz do Iguaçu), in which both governments pledged their
commitment to an exclusively peaceful use of nuclear energy and established a Common
System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (Sistema Comum de
Contabilidade e Contrôle de Materiais Nucleares--SCCCMN). On July 18, 1991,
Presidents Collor de Mello and Menem agreed to establish the Agreement on the
Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, which created the Brazilian-Argentine
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (Agência Brasileiro-Argentina
de Contabilidade e Contrôle de Materiais Nucleares--ABACC). That agreement entered
into force on December 12, 1991, after ratification by the legislatures in both countries.
With headquarters in Rio de Janeiro, the ABACC provides on-site inspections of nuclear
facilities in Argentina and Brazil and maintains an inventory of nuclear material in each
country.
The most important nuclear accord between Brazil and Argentina was signed on
December 13, 1991, in a meeting attended by Presidents Collor de Mello and Menem at
the headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna. The accord is referred to as the quadripartite
agreement, because it was signed by Brazil, Argentina, the IAEA, and the ABACC. The
agreement allows for full-scope IAEA safeguards of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear
installations. It also allows the two countries to retain full rights over any "technological
secrets" and to develop nuclear energy for the propulsion of submarines. Brazil's Senate
ratified the agreement on February 9, 1994, but only after considerable pressure by
Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty).
On May 30, 1994, Brazil ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco (see Glossary), following the
lead of Argentina and Chile, which had ratified it on January 18, 1994. In Brazil there
was an active lobby against the quadripartite agreement and the Treaty of Tlatelolco.
Indeed, it took Brazil considerably longer than Argentina to approve those pacts.
Brazilian diplomats have argued that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is
discriminatory because it excludes capabilities of those already in the club. Furthermore,
some Brazilians have argued that the NPT is an infringement on sovereignty and that the
current agreements are sufficient and even stronger than the NPT. Nevertheless, Brazil
finally agreed in 1997 to ratify the NPT.
Some observers have argued that Brazil is still seeking the technological capability to
produce a nuclear bomb, despite the 1991 quadripartite agreement, the full ratification of
the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and a provision in Brazil's 1988 constitution that bars the
development of nuclear energy for anything but peaceful purposes. They note that
Brazil's nuclear program is under the primary control of the military, which resents IAEA
inspections. Brazil's Senate required a "supplementary adjustment" to the treaty that
protects "industrial secrets," possibly the nation's Aramar centrifuge enrichment facilities,
from on-site inspections. The Aramar Experimental Center was inaugurated in 1988 and
is the only uranium enrichment plant in Brazil. It is located in the interior of São Paulo, in
the town of Iperó. A further amendment was added that bans IAEA inspections outside
the normal schedule. Finally, Brazil was allowed to provide an accounting of the uranium
that has already been enriched, but the IAEA and ABACC have no way to verify that
amount. The dual nature of nuclear energy allows it to be used for both peaceful and
military purposes. The military application of Brazil's nuclear programs, therefore,
depends less on technological considerations than on political will.
Most observers, however, are more optimistic about Brazil's nuclear intentions. Argentine
diplomat and nuclear expert Julio César Carasales has argued that Brazil's nuclear
programs need to be understood in the context of Brazil's rapprochement with Argentina.
In that context, he concluded that, "Extraordinary accomplishments already have been
achieved and have been generally welcomed; there is no danger that the process will be
reversed or undermined; the time has come to consolidate the bilateral arrangements; the
nuclear control agency, the ABACC, is performing in a satisfactory matter; new
substantial agreements are not to be expected; and some policy divergence is possible, as
in the case of the NPT, although there are reasons to predict that in the long run Brazil
will join that treaty." Indeed, in 1997 Brazil announced its adherence to the NPT.
Brazil's nuclear programs have experienced severe financial constraints since 1990, when
Collor de Mello was president. The Aramar Experimental Center dismissed 700 of its
1,600 employees between August 1994 and March 1995. The completion date for the
navy's nuclear-powered submarine was postponed several times, from 1995 to 2010.
Until 1995 that project had cost an estimated US$1 billion. The submarine program,
rarely scrutinized in the past, was the subject of scathing criticism by Veja , the leading
weekly news magazine, in December 1994. The magazine raised allegations of corruption
and exposed technical difficulties with the program.
Despite such financial and technical hurdles, it is likely that Brazil will continue to fund
efforts to develop more autonomous nuclear programs. Indeed, the administration of
Fernando Henrique Cardoso (president, 1995- ) in mid-1995 placed a high priority on
completing the Angra II nuclear power plant. Such programs will be pursued in a more
open environment, given the many bilateral and multilateral nuclear accords signed by
Brazil.
Data as of April 1997
Brazilian-American relations
This article or section is missing citations or needs footnotes.
Using inline citations helps guard against copyright violations and factual inaccuracies. (November
2007)
Brazilian-American relations
Brazil United States
Brazilian-American relations are characterized as fairly warm and friendly. The United
States has increasingly regarded Brazil as a significant power, especially in its role as a
stabilizing force and skillful interlocutor in Latin America.[1] As a significant political and
economic power, Brazil has traditionally preferred to cooperate with the United States on
specific issues rather than seeking to develop an all-encompassing, privileged
relationship with the United States [2].
Contents
[hide] [hide]
• 1 History
• 2 Current issues
• 3 Notes
• 4 References
• 5 See also
[edit] History
The United States was the first country to establish a consulate in Brazil in 1808,
following the transfer of the Portuguese royal court to Rio de Janeiro and the subsequent
opening of the ports to foreign ships. However, it was not until after World War II that the
United States became Brazil's most important trading partner and foreign investor.
During the presidency of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-51), Brazil's foreign policy was
aligned closely with that of the United States. Brazil outlawed the PCB (Brazilian
Communist Party) in 1947 and broke off relations with the Soviet Union. Getulio
Vargas's return to power in 1951 signaled a cooling of relations. Vargas blamed the U.S.
for his ouster in 1945 and appealed to Brazilian nationalism, which was growing in many
sectors, including the armed forces.
President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61) improved relations with the United States,
while strengthening relations with Latin America and Europe. His industrial development
policy attracted huge direct investments by foreign capital, much from the United States.
He proposed an ambitious plan for United States development aid in Latin America, the
Pan-American Operation. The outgoing administration of President Dwight Eisenhower
found the plan of no interest, but the administration of President John F. Kennedy
appropriated funds in 1961 for the Alliance for Progress.
Relations again cooled slightly after President Janio Quadros announced his new
independent foreign policy in January 1961. Quadros also made overtures to Cuba and
decorated Cuban revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara with Brazil's highest honor. In late
1963, Washington, alarmed that Brazil might become a hostile, nonaligned power like
Egypt, reduced foreign aid to Brazil.
In March 31, 1964 a military coup overthrew the government of President Joao Goulart.
The exact role of the United States in that event remains controversial, as the U.S.
immediately recognized the new interim government (before Goulart had even fled
Brazilian territory); a United States naval task force was anchored close to the port of
Vitoria; the United States government made an immediate large loan to the new Castelo
Branco government (1964-67); and the new military president adopted a policy of total
alignment with the United States. The presidents that followed pursued an independent
foreign policy while maintaining friendly relations with the Unites States.
The Nixon administration remained basically sympathetic to Brazilian hopes for growth
and world power status, and considered Brazil to be one of the developing nations most
sympathetic to the United States. In 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and
Minister of Foreign Relations Antonio Azeredo da Silveira signed a memorandum of
understanding that the two powers would consult on all issues of mutual concern and
would hold semiannual meetings of foreign ministers. Only the major Western allies had
such an agreement with the United States.
The Carter administration marked a definite cooling of the Brazilian-American relations.

The confrontation involved two very sensitive issues - human rights and nuclear
proliferation. In 1967 Brazil had signed a contract with Westinghouse to build a 626-
megawatt nuclear power plant at Angra dos Reis to be complete in 1977. However the
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission renounced its guarantee of delivery of
enriched uranium, and prohibited Westinghouse from constructing enrichment and
reprocessing plants in Brazil.
Brazil, desiring independent control of the full cycle from ore to kilowatts, signed a broad
nuclear agreement with West Germany in June 1975. It involved furnishing technology
and equipment for eight nuclear power plants, plus enrichment and reprocessing
facilities. Despite safeguard provisions, some thought this agreement opened the door for
Brazil to construct nuclear weapons, if desired. The Ford administration reacted mildly to
the agreement, but from his first day in office, President Carter sought to prevent its
implementation. In 1975 Brazil renounced the United States-Brazil Military Assistance
Agreement, which had been in effect since 1952, in a clear response to the position of the
Carter administration. Formal relations between the two armed forces have still not been
reestablished.
In the early 1980s, tension in the American-Brazilian relations centered on economic
questions. Retaliation for unfair trade practices loomed on the horizon and threatened
Brazilian exports of steel, orange juice, commuter aircraft, shoes and textiles. When
President Sarney took office in 1985, political issues, such as Brazil's arms exports to
Libya and Iran, again surfaced. Brazil's foreign debt moratorium and its refusal to sign
the Non-Proliferation Treaty caused the United States to put Brazil on its mandated
blacklist, thereby restricting Brazil's access to certain U.S. technologies.
On taking office in March, 1990 President Collor sought a quick reapproachment with the
United States in order to begin an aggressive policy of inserting Brazil into the world
economy and placing it at the negotiating table of world powers. The Franco
administration maintained an independent stance and reacted coolly to proposals by the
Clinton administration for a Latin American free-trade zone.
Relations with the Cardoso government in (1995-2003) were good. Cardoso made a very
successful trip to Washington and New York in 1995 and the Clinton administration was
very enthusiastic regarding the passage of constitutional amendments that opened the
Brazilian economy to increasing international participation.
[edit] Current issues
Presidents Lula and Bush in Brasília, Nov 6 2005
The Bush administration has come to view Brazil as a strong partner whose cooperation
must be sought in order to solve regional and global problems. Current issues of concern
to both Brazil and the United States include counter-narcotics and terrorism, energy
security, trade, environmental issues, human rights and HIV/AIDS.
The current bilateral relations are considered fairly close, despite the differing political
approaches of President Lula and President Bush on some issues. On June 20, 2003,
President Lula made an official visit to the United States, and he and President Bush
resolved "to create a closer and qualitatively stronger [bilateral] relationship." On
November 6, 2005, President Bush visited Brasilia and the two leaders reaffirmed the
good relations between the countries and pledged to work together to advance peace,
democracy, and a successful conclusion of the Doha round of global trade talks. President
Bush thanked Brazil for exercising leadership in the world and in the hemisphere,
including Brazil's role in the peacekeeping force in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and worldwide
efforts to control HIV/AIDS. [3]
Brazilian and American officials signed an agreement to promote greater ethanol

production and use throughout the world. The agreement was reached after President
Bush's visit to Brazil on March 9, 2007 and by a visit from President Lula to Camp David
on March 31, 2007.
Brazil and weapons of mass destruction

Weapons of mass
destruction
By type
Biological warfare
Chemical warfare
Nuclear weapons
Radiological weapons
Treaties
By country
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Argentina Australia
Brazil Bulgaria
Canada PR China
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Iraq Israel
Japan Netherlands
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(ROC)
United United States
Kingdom
This box: view • talk • edit
Based on Brazil's history, it is believed that the country does not possess any weapons of
mass destruction. Although a covert nuclear weapons program was pursued by Brazil
under a military government in the 1980s, it ended with the rise of an elected government
in 1985. José Sarney (President 1985-1990) is reported to have stated that the previous
military dictatorship had gone as far as preparing a nuclear weapon test site.
Brazil is among the powers which possess the ability to create nuclear weapons but has
agreed not to do so (under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as
reaffirmed by the Two Plus Four Treaty). Brazil has a program to produce enriched
uranium for power plants using Zippe-type centrifuges, officially opening the Resende
enrichment plant in May 2006[1]. Brazil's enrichment technology development, and the
plant itself, involved substantial discussions with the IAEA and its constituent nations.
The dispute came down to whether IAEA representatives (many from countries with their
own commercial enrichment programs) would be allowed to inspect the machines
themselves. The Brazilian authorities, at first, did not allow the inspection of the
centrifugal machines, arguing that this would reveal technological secrets (probably
relating to the use of electromagnetic levitation instead of fragile and unreliable bearings
to allow the rotor to spin in place). The Brazilian authorities said that, as Brazil is not part
of any axis of evil, the pressure for full access to inspection - inspection even in
universities - could be construed as an attempt to pirate industrial secrets[2]. They also
claimed that their technology is better than that of the USA and France, mainly because
the centrifugal axis is not mechanical, but electromagnetic. American authorities have
stated that a significant improvement using this technique is unlikely to be possible[citation
needed]
. They still believed the inspection should have been made to guarantee there are no
nuclear weapons being built. Eventually, after extensive negotiations, agreement was
reached that while not directly inspecting the centrifuges, the IAEA would inspect the
composition of the gas entering and leaving the centrifuge. US Secretary of State, Colin
Powell, stated in 2004 that he was "sure" that Brazil had no plans to develop nuclear
weapons[3].
If Brazil decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, the centrifuges at the Resende plants could
easily be reconfigured to produce enough highly enriched uranium to make a bomb quite
quickly - possibly around six bombs per year[4]. Brazil wishes to develop a nuclear
submarine fleet, and in 2007 authorised the construction of a prototype submarine
propulsion reactor[5].
Contents
[hide] [hide]
• 1 Facilities
o 1.1 Aramar Experimental Center
o 1.2 Cachimbo Test Site
o 1.3 Army's Technology Center (Guaratiba)
o 1.4 Air Force Technological Center (São José dos Campos)
o 1.5 Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory
• 2 Legislation and conventions
• 3 References
• 4 See also
[edit] Facilities
[edit] Aramar Experimental Center
23.397° S 47.601° W
President Lula visiting the Brazilian Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Development Facility in
July, 2007. This facility produces Uranium hexafluoride gas for Uranium enrichment.
The Aramar Experimental Center (Portuguese: Centro Experimental de Aramar) located

in Iperó in the State of São Paulo, was inaugurated in 1988 as the first uranium-only
enrichment plant in Brazil. The facility is run by the Brazilian Nuclear Energy
Commission (CNEN) and the Brazilian Navy. In addition to the Centrifuge Enrichment
Plant, the facility also hosts an Isotopic Enrichment Laboratory and several Small
Nuclear Centers (Portuguese: Pequenas Centrais Nucleares, or PCNs). The enrichment
laboratories are under the National Safeguards control and national inspections are
carried out by the Safeguards Division of CNEN.[6]
[edit] Cachimbo Test Site
9.3047° S 54.9464° W
The Cachimbo test site, officially the Brigadeiro Velloso Test Site (Portuguese: Campo de
Provas Brigadeiro Velloso), is located in the State of Pará and covers 45,000 square
kilometres, an area larger than the Netherlands. It is within this military area that a 320
meters-deep hole at the Cachimbo Mountain Range was site for nuclear explosives tests.
The shaft has been public knowledge since 1986 and was allegedly abandoned in
September 1990, when President Fernando Collor de Mello used a small shovel to
symbolically seal up the hole.[7]
[edit] Army's Technology Center (Guaratiba)
23.0124° S 43.5639° W
The Army's Technology Center (Portuguese: Centro Tecnológico do Exército, or CETEx)

located in Guaratiba in the State of Rio de Janeiro is the site of the plutonium-producing
reactor facility, known as 'The Atlantic Project', managed by the Brazilian Army's Special
Projects Institute – IPE. Reports indicate that the gas-graphite reactor would be capable
of producing plutonium for atomic bombs.[8]
[edit] Air Force Technological Center (São José dos Campos)
23.212290° S 45.875120° W
The Air Force Technological Center (Portuguese: Centro de Tecnologia da Aeronautica,

or CTA) is a research facility located in São José dos Campos, in the State of São Paulo
where nuclear research is also conducted.[9]
[edit] Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory
The Resende Nuclear Fuel Facility (Portuguese: Fábrica de Combustíveis Nucleares, or

FCN) is a nuclear enrichment facility located in Resende, in the State of Rio de Janeiro.
The plant is managed by the Nuclear Industries of Brazil (Portuguese: Indústrias
Nucleares do Brasil, or INB) and by the Brazilian Navy. Currently the plant produces
enough HEU for 26 to 31 implosion type warheads.[10]
[edit] Legislation and conventions

Brazil's 1988 Constitution states in Article 21 that "all nuclear activity within the national
territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the
National Congress".
Brazil acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on September 18, 1998, ratified
the Geneva Protocol on 28 August 1970, the Biological Weapons Convention on 27
February 1973 and the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 March 1996.
Brazil is also an active participant in the International Atomic Energy Agency and the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, multinational agencies concerned with reducing nuclear
proliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of materials that may be applicable
to nuclear weapon development.
Brazil and the United Nations
Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva delivers the opening speech at the 62nd
General Assembly
Brazil is a charter member of the United Nations and participates in all of its specialized
agencies [1]. It has contributed troops to UN peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East, the
former Belgian Congo, Cyprus, Mozambique, Angola, and more recently East Timor and
Haiti. Brazil has been a member of the UN Security Council nine times, most recently
2004-2005.
Contents
[hide] [hide]
• 1 Activities
o 1.1 UN General Assembly
o 1.2 UN Security Council
o 1.3 Financial contribution
• 2 Representation
• 3 References
• 4 See also
[edit] Activities
[edit] UN General Assembly
Brazil has traditionally played a relevant role in the United Nations General Assembly. In
1947, the foreign minister at the time, Oswaldo Aranha, chaired the First Special Session
of the General Assembly and the second Session of the General Assembly.
Since the Fourth Ordinary Session of the General Assembly, Brazil has been the first
country to speak at the General Debate. Five Brazilian presidents and 34 foreign
ministers have been the first speakers at the annual meetings of the General Assembly.
For this reason, speeches by the Brazilian representatives, who in general present an
assessment of the international situation as the backdrop to express the Brazilian point of
view on the main issues, are high profile [2].
[edit] UN Security Council
Brazil has been elected eighteen times to the UN Security Council, and is the country that
has served for the most number of years as an elected member.
List of terms as an elected member to the Security Council:
• 2004-2005 • 1988-1989 • 1954-1955

• 1998-1999 • 1967-1968 • 1951-1952
• 1993-1994 • 1963-1964 • 1946-1947
Brazil is currently seeking a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is
a member of the G4, an organization comprised of Brazil, Germany, Japan, and India, all
nations who are currently seeking permanent representation. According to their plan the
UN Security Council would be expanded beyond the current fifteen members to include
twenty-five members. This would be the first time that permanent status has been
extended to a South American nation and supporters of the G4 plan suggest that this will
lead to greater representation of developing nations rather than the current major powers.
[edit] Financial contribution
Brazil is one of the main contributors to the UN regular budget (USD $18 million for the
2007 Assessment)[3].
[edit] Representation
Brazil maintains a permanent mission to the UN, currently headed by Ambassador Maria
Luiza Ribeiro Viotti.
Brazil
This article is about the country. For other uses, see Brazil (disambiguation).
República Federativa do Brasil
Federative Republic of Brazil
Flag Coat of arms
Motto: "Ordem e Progresso"

(Portuguese)
"Order and Progress"
Anthem: Hino Nacional Brasileiro

(Portuguese)
"National Anthem of Brazil"
National seal
Selo Nacional do Brasil
(Portuguese)
"National Seal of Brazil"
Brasília
Capital 15°45′S 47°57′W / -
15.75, -47.95
Largest city São Paulo
Official languages Portuguese
Demonym Brazilian
Presidential
Government
Federal republic
- President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva

- Vice-President José Alencar
President of the Chamber

- Arlindo Chinaglia
of Deputies
- President of the Senate Garibaldi Alves Filho
- Chief Justice Gilmar Mendes
Independence from Portugal
- Declared September 7, 1822
- Recognized August 29, 1825
- Republic November 15, 1889
Area
8,514,877 km² (5th)

- Total
3,287,597 sq mi
- Water (%) 0.65
Population
- 2008 estimate 187,393,918 (5th)
- 2007 census 183,987,291
22/km² (182nd)
- Density
57/sq mi
GDP (PPP) 2007 estimate
- Total USD 1,804 trillion (9th)
- Per capita USD 11,873 (65)
GDP (nominal) 2007 estimate
- Total USD 1,313 trillion (10th)
- Per capita USD 6,842 (61st)
Gini (2008) ▼ 50.5 (high)

HDI (2005) ▲ 0.800 (high) (70th)
Currency Real (R$) (BRL)
Time zone BRT N1 (UTC-2 to -4[1])
- Summer (DST) BRST N2 (UTC-2 to -5)
Internet TLD .br
Calling code +55
Footnotes:[show][show]
Brazil (Portuguese: Brasil), officially the Federative Republic of Brazil (Portuguese:

República Federativa do Brasil) listen (help·info), is a country in South America.[2] It is the
fifth largest country by geographical area, the fifth most populous country, and the fourth
most populous democracy in the world.[2][3] Bounded by the Atlantic Ocean on the east,
Brazil has a coastline of over 7,491 kilometers (4,655 mi).[2] It is bordered on the north by
Venezuela, Suriname, Guyana and the overseas department of French Guiana; on the
northwest by Colombia; on the west by Bolivia and Peru; on the southwest by Argentina
and Paraguay and on the south by Uruguay. Numerous archipelagos are part of the
Brazilian territory, such as Fernando de Noronha, Rocas Atoll, Saint Peter and Paul
Rocks, and Trindade and Martim Vaz.[2]
Brazil was a colony of Portugal from the landing of Pedro Álvares Cabral in 1500 until
its independence in 1822.[4] Initially independent as the Brazilian Empire, the country has
been a republic since 1889, even though its bicameral legislature (now called Congress)
dates back to 1824, when the first constitution was ratified.[4] Its current Constitution
defines Brazil as a Federal Republic.[5] The Federation is formed by the union of the
Federal District, the 26 States, and the 5,564 Municipalities.[5][6]
Brazil is the world's tenth largest economy at market exchange rates and the ninth largest
in purchasing power.[7] Economic reforms have given the country new international
projection.[8] It is a founding member of the United Nations and of the Union of South
American Nations. A predominantly Roman Catholic, Portuguese-speaking and
multiethnic society,[3] Brazil is also home to a diversity of wildlife, natural environments,
and extensive natural resources in a variety of protected habitats.[2]
Contents
[hide] [hide]
• 1 History
o 1.1 Origins
o 1.2 Colonization
o 1.3 Empire
o 1.4 Republic
• 2 Government and politics
o 2.1 Law
o 2.2 Foreign relations and the military
• 3 Subdivisions
o 3.1 Regions
o 3.2 States
• 4 Geography
o 4.1 Climate
o 4.2 Wildlife
• 5 Economy
o 5.1 Components
o 5.2 Science and technology
• 6 Demographics
o 6.1 Education and health
o 6.2 Language
• 7 Culture
o 7.1 Religion
o 7.2 Sport
• 8 References
• 9 Further reading
History
Main article: History of Brazil
Origins
Main article: Indigenous peoples in Brazil
Brazilian natives, by Jean-Baptiste Debret.
Within Brazil's current borders, most native tribes who were living in the land by the year
1500 are thought to have descended from the first wave of migrants from North Asia
(Siberia), who are believed to have crossed the Bering Land Bridge at the end of the last
Ice Age, around 9000 BC. By the time Europeans arrived, the territory of modern Brazil
had as many as 2,000 nations and tribes, an estimated total population of nearly 3 million
Amerindians. A somewhat dated linguistic survey found 188 living indigenous languages
with 155,000 total speakers. On 18 January 2007, Fundação Nacional do Índio (English:
National Indian Foundation) reported that it had confirmed the presence of 67 different
uncontacted tribes in Brazil, up from 40 in 2005. With this addition, Brazil is now
confirmed as having the largest number of uncontacted peoples in the world, even more
than the island of New Guinea. When the Portuguese arrived in 1500, the Amerindians
were mostly semi-nomadic tribes, living mainly on the coast and along the banks of
major rivers.
Unlike Christopher Columbus who thought he had reached the East Indies, the
Portuguese, best known for Vasco da Gama, had already reached India via the Indian
Ocean route when they reached Brazil. Nevertheless, the word índios ("Indians") was by
then established to designate the peoples of the New World and stuck being used today in
the Portuguese language, while the people of India are called indianos in order to
distinguish the two peoples. Initially, the Europeans saw the natives as noble savages, and
miscegenation of the population began right away. Tribal warfare, cannibalism, and the
pursuit of brazilwood for its treasured red dye convinced the Portuguese that they should
"civilize" the Amerindians.[9]
Colonization
Main article: Colonial Brazil
Map of Brazil issued by the Portuguese explorers in 1519.
Initially Portugal had little interest in Brazil, mainly because of high profits gained
through commerce with Indochina. After 1530, the Portuguese Crown devised the
Hereditary Captaincies system to effectively occupy its new colony, and later took direct
control of the failed captaincies.[10][11] Although temporary trading posts were established
earlier to collect brazilwood, used as a dye, with permanent settlement came the
establishment of the sugarcane industry and its intensive labor. Several early settlements
were founded across the coast, among them the colonial capital, Salvador, established in
1549 at the Bay of All Saints in the north, and the city of Rio de Janeiro on March 1567,
in the south. The Portuguese colonists adopted an economy based on the production of
agricultural goods that were exported to Europe. Sugar became by far the most important
Brazilian colonial product until the early 18th century.[12][13] Even though Brazilian sugar
was reputed as being of high quality, the industry faced a crisis during the 17th and 18th
centuries when the Dutch and the French started producing sugar in the Antilles, located
much closer to Europe, causing sugar prices to fall.
During the 18th century, private explorers who called themselves the Bandeirantes found
gold and diamond deposits in the state of Minas Gerais. The exploration of these mines
were mostly used to finance the Portuguese Royal Court's expenditure with both the
preservation of its Global Empire and the support of its luxurious lifestyle at mainland.
The way in which such deposits were exploited by the Portuguese Crown and the
powerful local elites, however, burdened colonial Brazil with excessive taxes. Some
popular movements supporting independence came about against the taxes established by
the colonial government, such as the Tiradentes in 1789, but the secessionist movements
were often dismissed by the authorities of the ruling colonial regime. Gold production
declined towards the end of the 18th century, starting a period of relative stagnation of the
Brazilian hinterland.[14] Both Amerindian and African slaves' man power were largely
used in Brazil's colonial economy.[15]
In contrast to the neighboring Spanish possessions in South America, the Portuguese

colony of Brazil kept its territorial, political and linguistic integrity due to the action of
the Portuguese administrative effort. Although the colony was threatened by other nations
across the era of Portuguese rule, in particular by Dutch and French powers, the
authorities and the people ultimately managed to protect its borders from foreign attacks.
Portugal even had to send bullion to Brazil, a spectacular reversal of the colonial trend, in
order to protect the integrity of the colony.[16]
Empire
Main article: Empire of Brazil
Emperor Dom Pedro II of Brazil in 1873.
In 1808, the Portuguese court, fleeing from Napoleon’s troops who had invaded Portugal,
established themselves in the city of Rio de Janeiro, which thus became the seat of
government of Portugal and the entire Portuguese Empire, even though being located
outside of Europe. Rio de Janeiro was the capital of the Portuguese empire from 1808 to
1815. After that, the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves (1815-1825)
was created with Lisbon as its capital. After João VI returned to Portugal in 1821, his
heir-apparent Pedro became regent of the Kingdom of Brazil, within the United Kingdom
of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves. Following a series of political incidents and
disputes, Brazil achieved its independence from Portugal on September 7, 1822. On
October 12, 1822, Dom Pedro became the first Emperor of Brazil, being crowned on
December 1, 1822. Portugal would recognize Brazil as an independent country in 1825.
In 1824, Pedro closed the Constituent Assembly, stating that the body was "endangering
liberty". Pedro then produced a constitution modeled on that of Portugal (1822) and
France (1814). It specified indirect elections and created the legislative, executive and
judicial branches of government; however, it also added a fourth branch, the "moderating
power", to be held by the Emperor. Pedro's government was considered economically and
administratively inefficient. Political pressures eventually made the Emperor step down
on April 7, 1831. He returned to Portugal leaving behind his five-year-old son Pedro II.
Until Pedro II reached maturity, Brazil was governed by regents from 1831 to 1840. The
regency period was turbulent and marked by numerous local revolts including the Male
Revolt, the largest urban slave rebellion in the Americas, which took place in Bahia in
1835.[17]
On July 23, 1840, Pedro II was crowned Emperor. His government was marked by a
substantial rise in coffee exports, the War of the Triple Alliance, and the end of slave
trade from Africa in 1850, although slavery in Brazilian territory would only be abolished
in 1888. By the Eusébio de Queirós law,[18]Brazil stopped trading slaves from Africa in
1850. Slavery was abandoned altogether in 1888, thus making Brazil the last country of
the Americas to ban slavery.[19][20] When slavery was finally abolished, a large influx of
European immigrants took place.[21][22][23] By the 1870s, the Emperor's control of domestic
politics had started to deteriorate in the face of crises with the Catholic Church, the Army
and the slaveholders. The Republican movement slowly gained strength. The dominant
classes no longer needed the empire to protect their interests and deeply resented the
abolition of slavery.[24]Indeed, imperial centralization ran counter to their desire for local
autonomy. By 1889 Pedro II had stepped down and the Republican system had been
adopted in Brazil. In the end, the empire really fell because of a coup d'etat.
Republic
Main articles: History of Brazil (1889–1930), History of Brazil (1930–1945),
History of Brazil (1945–1964), History of Brazil (1964–1985), and History of
Brazil (1985–present)
The Chamber of Deputies of Brazil, the lower house of the National Congress.
Pedro II was deposed on November 15, 1889 by a Republican military coup led by
general Deodoro da Fonseca,[25] who became the country’s first de facto president through
military ascension. The country’s name became the Republic of the United States of
Brazil. From 1889 to 1930, the dominant states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais alternated
control of the presidency.[26][27] A military junta took control in 1930. Getúlio Vargas took
office soon after, and would remain as dictatorial ruler until 1945. He was re-elected in
1951 and stayed in office until his suicide in 1954. After 1930, successive governments
continued industrial and agricultural growth and the development of the vast interior of
Brazil.[27][28] Juscelino Kubitschek's office years (1956-1961) were marked by the political
campaign motto of plunging "50 anos em 5" (English: fifty years of development in
five).[29]
The military took office in Brazil in a coup d'état in 1964, and remained in power until
March 1985, when it fell from grace because of political struggles between the regime
and the Brazilian elites. In 1967 the name of the country was changed to Federative
Republic of Brazil. Just as the Brazilian regime changes of 1889, 1930, and 1945
unleashed competing political forces and caused divisions within the military, so too did
the 1964 regime change.[30] Democracy was re-established in 1988 when the current
Federal Constitution was enacted.[31] Fernando Collor de Mello was the first president
truly elected by popular vote after the military regime.[32] Collor took office in March
1990. In September 1992, the National Congress voted for Collor's impeachment after a
sequence of scandals were uncovered by the media.[32][33] The vice-president, Itamar
Franco, assumed the presidency. Assisted by the Minister of Finance at that time,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Itamar Franco's administration implemented the Plano Real
economic package,[32] which included a new currency temporarily pegged to the U.S.
dollar, the real. In the elections held on October 3, 1994, Fernando Henrique Cardoso ran
for president and won, being reelected in 1998. Brazil's current president is Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva, elected in 2002 and reelected in 2006.
Government and politics

Main articles: Government of Brazil and Politics of Brazil
The National Congress in Brasília, the capital of Brazil.
The Brazilian Federation is based on the union of three autonomous political entities: the
States, the Municipalities and the Federal District.[5] A fourth entity originated in the
aforementioned association: the Union.[5] There is no hierarchy among the political
entities. The Federation is set on six fundamental principles:[5] sovereignty, citizenship,
dignity of the people, social value of labor, freedom of enterprise, and political pluralism.
The classic tripartite branches of government (executive, legislative, and judicial under
the checks and balances system), is formally established by the Constitution.[5] The
executive and legislative are organized independently in all four political entities, while
the judiciary is organized only in the federal and state levels.
All members of the executive and legislative branches are directly-elected.[34][35][36] Judges
and other judicial officials are appointed after passing entry exams.[34] Voting is
compulsory for those aged 18 or older.[5] Four political parties stand out among several
small ones: Workers' Party (PT), Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB), and Democrats (formerly Liberal Front Party —
PFL). Practically all governmental and administrative functions are exercised by
authorities and agencies affiliated to the Executive.
The form of government is that of a democratic republic, with a presidential system.[5]

The president is both head of state and head of government of the Union and is elected
for a four-year term,[5] with the possibility of re-election for a second successive term.
The current president is Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. He was elected on October 27,
2002,[37] and re-elected on October 29, 2006.[38] The President appoints the Ministers of
State, who assist in governing.[5] Legislative houses in each political entity are the main
source of laws in Brazil. The National Congress is the Federation’s bicameral legislature,
consisting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Federal Senate. Judiciary authorities
exercise jurisdictional duties almost exclusively.
Law
Main articles: Law of Brazil and Crime in Brazil
The finance minister, Guido Mantega, and the former president of the Supreme Federal
Court, Ellen Gracie Northfleet.
Brazilian law is based on Roman-Germanic traditions.[39] Thus, civil law concepts prevail
over common law practices. Most of Brazilian law is codified, although non-codified
statutes also represent a substantial part of the system, playing a complementary role.
Court decisions set out interpretive guidelines; however, they are not binding on other
specific cases except in a few situations. Doctrinal works and the works of academic
jurists have strong influence in law creation and in law cases. The legal system is based
on the Federal Constitution, which was promulgated on October 5, 1988, and is the
fundamental law of Brazil. All other legislation and court decisions must conform to its
rules.[40] As of April 2007, there have been 53 amendments. States have their own
constitutions, which must not contradict the Federal Constitution.[41] Municipalities and
the Federal District do not have their own constitutions; instead, they have "organic laws"
(leis orgânicas).[5][42] Legislative entities are the main source of statutes, although in
certain matters judiciary and executive bodies may enact legal norms.[5]
Jurisdiction is administered by the judiciary entities, although in rare situations the

Federal Constitution allows the Federal Senate to pass on legal judgments.[5] There are
also specialized military, labor, and electoral courts.[5] The highest court is the Supreme
Federal Tribunal. This system has been criticised over the last decades due to the slow
pace at which final decisions are issued. Lawsuits on appeal may take several years to
resolve, and in some cases more than a decade elapses before definitive rulings are
made.[43]
Foreign relations and the military

Main articles: Foreign relations of Brazil and Brazilian Armed Forces
Brazilian Army troops before boarding for MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission in Haiti.
Brazil is sought to be a political and economic leader in Latin America[44][45], even though
this claim is partially contested by Argentina and Mexico, who oppose the country's aim
of obtaining a permanent seat as the representative of the region in the UN Security
Council. Social and economic problems prevent Brazil from effectively exerting global
power.[46] Between World War II and 1990, both democratic and military governments
sought to expand Brazil's influence in the world by pursuing a state-led industrial policy
and an independent foreign policy. More recently, the country has aimed to strengthen
ties with other South American countries, engage in multilateral diplomacy through the
United Nations and the Organization of American States.[47] Brazil's current foreign
policy is based on the country's position as a regional power in Latin America, a leader
among developing countries, and an emerging world power.[48] Brazilian foreign policy
has generally reflected multilateralism, peaceful dispute settlement, and nonintervention
in the affairs of other countries.[49] The Brazilian Constitution also determines the country
shall seek the economic, political, social and cultural integration of the nations of Latin
America.[5][50][51][52]
The Armed forces of Brazil comprise the Brazilian Army, the Brazilian Navy, and the
Brazilian Air Force.[5] The Military Police (States' Military Police) is described as an
ancillary force of the Army by constitution, but under the control of each state's
governor.[5] The Brazilian armed forces are the largest in Latin America. The Brazilian Air
Force is the aerial warfare branch of the Brazilian armed forces, being the largest air
force in Latin America, with about 700 manned aircraft in service.[53] The Brazilian Navy
is responsible for naval operations and for guarding Brazilian territorial waters. It is the
oldest of the Brazilian Armed forces and the only navy in Latin America that operates an
aircraft carrier, the NAeL São Paulo (formerly FS Foch of the French Navy).[54] Finally,
the Brazilian Army is responsible for land-based military operations, with a strength of
approximately 190,000 soldiers.
Subdivisions
Main article: Subdivisions of Brazil
Atlantic
Ocean
Pacific
Ocean
North Region
Northeast Region
Central-West Region
Southeast Region
South Region
Acre
Amazonas
Pará
Roraima
Amapá
Rondônia
Tocantins
Maranhão
Bahia
Piauí
Ceará
Rio Grande
do Norte
Paraíba
Pernambuco
Alagoas
Sergipe
Mato Grosso
Mato Grosso
do Sul
Federal
District
Goiás
Minas Gerais
São Paulo
Rio de Janeiro
Espírito Santo
Paraná
Santa Catarina
Rio Grande
do Sul
Argentina
Bolivia
Chile
Colombia
French Guiana
Guyana
Paraguay
Peru
Suriname
Uruguay
Venezuela
Politically, Brazil is a federation of 26 states (estados) and one federal district (Distrito
Federal) which contains the capital city, Brasília.[5] The states are subdivided into
municipalities. States are based on historical, conventional borders and have developed
throughout the centuries; though some boundaries are arbitrary. The federal district is not
a state on its right, but shares some characteristics of a state and some of a municipality.
The national territory was divided in 1969 by the Brazilian Institute of Geography and
Statistics (IBGE), for demographic and statistical purposes, into five main regions: North,
Northeast, Central-West, Southeast and South.
In 1943, with the entrance of Brazil into the Second World War, the Vargas regime
detached seven strategic territories from the border of the country in order to administrate
them directly: Amapá, Rio Branco, Acre, Guaporé, Ponta Porã, Iguaçu and the
archipelago of Fernando de Noronha. After the war, the first three territories were
retained as states, with Rio Branco and Guaporé being renamed Roraima and Rondônia,
respectively. Ponta Porã and Iguaçu resorted to territorial status. In 1988, Fernando de
Noronha became part of Pernambuco.
In 1960, the square-shaped Distrito Federal was carved out of Goiás in preparation for
the new capital, Brasília. The previous federal district became the state of Guanabara
until in 1975 it was merged with the state of Rio de Janeiro, becoming the municipality of
Rio de Janeiro.
In 1977, Mato Grosso was split into two states. The northern area retained the name Mato
Grosso while the southern area became the state of Mato Grosso do Sul, with Campo
Grande as its capital. The new Mato Grosso do Sul incorporated the territory of Ponta
Porã and the northern part of Iguaçu. Central Iguaçu went to Paraná, and southern Iguaçu
went to Santa Catarina. In 1988, the northern portion of Goiás became the state of
Tocantins, with Palmas as its capital.
Regions
Main article: Regions of Brazil
The five regions of Brazil.
The North region covers 45.27% of the land area of Brazil, and has the lowest number of
inhabitants. With the exception of Manaus, which hosts a tax-free industrial zone, and
Belém, the biggest metropolitan area of the region, it is fairly unindustrialized and
undeveloped. It accommodates most of the rainforest vegetation of the world and many
indigenous tribes. The Northeast region is inhabited by about 30% of Brazil's
population.[55] It is culturally diverse, with roots set in the Portuguese colonial period, and
in Amerindian and Afro-Brazilian elements. It is also the poorest region of Brazil,[56] and
suffers from long periods of dry climate.[57] The Central-West region has low
demographic density when compared to the other regions,[58] mostly because a part of its
territory is covered by the world's largest marshlands area, the Pantanal[59] as well as a
small part of the Amazon Rainforest in the northwest. However, much of the region is
also covered by Cerrado, the largest savanna in the world. The central-west region
contributes significantly towards agriculture.[60]
The Southeast region is the richest and most densely populated.[58] It has more inhabitants
than any other South American country, and hosts one of the largest megalopolises of the
world, and has the country's two largest cities; São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. The region
is very diverse, including the major business center of São Paulo, the historical cities of
Minas Gerais and its capital Belo Horizonte, the third-largest metropolitan area in Brazil,
the beaches of Rio de Janeiro, and the coast of Espírito Santo. The South region is the
wealthiest by GDP per capita,[56] and has the highest standard of living in the country.[61] It
is also the coldest region of Brazil,[62] with occasional occurrences of frost and snow in
some of the higher altitude areas.[63] It has been settled mainly by European immigrants,
mostly of Italian, German and Portuguese ancestry, being clearly influenced by these
cultures.
States
Main article: States of Brazil
The twenty-six states and the Federal District of Brazil.
The Equatorial line cuts through the state of Amapá in the north, and the Tropic of
Capricorn line cuts through the state of São Paulo. The southernmost state of Rio Grande
do Sul is further to the south than the entire European continent is to the north.[64] Acre is
in the far west side of the country, covered by the Amazon forest; Paraíba is the
easternmost state of Brazil; Cabo Branco, in the city of João Pessoa, is the easternmost
point of Brazil and the Americas. The states of Paraná, Rio Grande do Sul, and Santa
Catarina all have a temperate climate.
São Paulo is the economic center of Brazil. Agriculture, industry, commerce, and services
are the most diversified of Brazil. Although a large proportion is exported to other states
and other countries, the consumer market of the state is also the biggest in the country.
Different from other states, where settlement started in the coast and moved inwards, in
São Paulo the center of the economy was in a non-coastal city.
Rio de Janeiro, the most well known Brazilian city and with many famous landmarks, is
the capital of the state of Rio de Janeiro. Older books may still reference the state of
Guanabara: after the Federal District (capital of the Republic) was moved to Brasília in
1960, the city of Rio de Janeiro was elevated to the condition of state of Guanabara
(name of the large bay which washes the city or Rio); however, in 1975, Guanabara was
incorporated to the state of Rio and returned to the condition of municipality, with the old
name of city of Rio de Janeiro.
Geography
Main article: Geography of Brazil
The Amazon Rainforest comprises the largest and most species-rich tract of tropical
rainforest in the world.
Brazil occupies an immense area along the eastern coast of South America and includes
much of the continent's interior region,[65] sharing land borders with Uruguay to the south;
Argentina and Paraguay to the southwest; Bolivia and Peru to the west; Colombia to the
northwest; Venezuela, Suriname, Guyana and the overseas department of French Guiana
to the north; stretching from the North to the Southern Hemisphere.[2] The factors of size,
relief, climate, and natural resources make Brazil geographically diverse.[65] Brazil is the
fifth largest country in the world—after Russia, Canada, the People's Republic of China
and the United States—and third largest on the Americas; with a total area of
8,511,965 kilometers (5,289,090 mi), include 55,455 kilometers (34,458 mi) of water.[2] It
spans three time zones; from UTC-4, in the North (except Pará) and UTC-4, in the central
states;[66] to UTC-3, in the eastern states, the official time of Brazil, and UTC-2, in the
Atlantic islands.[1]
Brazilian topography is also diverse, including hills, mountains, plains, highlands, and
scrublands. Much of Brazil lies between 200 metres (660 ft) and 800 metres (2,600 ft) in
elevation.[67] The main upland area occupies most of the southern half of the country.[67]
The northwestern parts of the plateau consist of broad, rolling terrain broken by low,
rounded hills.[67] The southeastern section is more rugged, with a complex mass of ridges
and mountain ranges reaching elevations of up to 1,200 metres (3,900 ft).[67] These ranges
include the Mantiqueira Mountains, the Espinhaço Mountains, and the Serra do Mar.[67] In
north, the Guiana Highlands form a major drainage divide, separating rivers that flow
south into the Amazon Basin from rivers that empty into the Orinoco river system, in
Venezuela, to the north. The highest point in Brazil is the Pico da Neblina with
3,014 metres (9,890 ft), and the lowest point is the Atlantic Ocean with 0 metres (0 ft).[2]
Brazil has a dense and complex system of rivers, one of the world's most extensive, with
eight major drainage basins, all of which drain into the Atlantic Ocean.[68] Major rivers
include the Amazon, the largest river in terms of volume of water, and the second-longest
in the world; the Paraná and its major tributary, the Iguaçu River, where the Iguaçu Falls
are located; the Negro, São Francisco, Xingu, Madeira and the Tapajós rivers.[68]
Climate
Main article: Climate of Brazil
Cyclone Catarina, the first tropical cyclone in the South Atlantic Ocean, formed in 2004.
The climate of Brazil comprises a wide range of weather conditions across a large
geographic scale and varied topography, but the largest part of the country is tropical and
covered by the Amazon Rainforest.[2] Analysed according to the Köppen system, Brazil
hosts five major climatic subtypes: equatorial, tropical, semiarid, highland tropical, and
temperate; ranging from equatorial rainforests in the north and semiarid deserts in the
northeast, to temperate coniferous forests in the south and tropical savannas in central
Brazil.[69] Many regions have starkly different microclimates.[70][71]
A equatorial climate characterizes much of northern Brazil. There is no real dry season
but there are some variations in the period of the year when most rain falls.[69]
Temperatures average 25 °C (77 °F),[71] with more significant temperature variations
between night and day than between seasons.[70] Over central Brazil rainfall is more
seasonal, characteristic of a savanna climate.[70] This region is as large and extensive as
the Amazon basin but, lying farther south and being at a moderate altitude, it has a very
different climate.[69] In the interior Northeast, seasonal rainfall is even more extreme. The
semiarid climate region receives less than 800 millimetres (31 in) of rain, which falls in a
period of two or three months.[70] From the south of Bahía, near São Paulo, the
distribution of rainfall changes, here some appreciable rainfall occurs in all months.[69]
The South has temperate conditions, with average temperatures below 18 °C (64 °F) and
cool winters,[71] frosts are quite common, with occasional snowfalls in the higher
areas.[69][70]
Wildlife
Main article: Wildlife of Brazil
The Macaw is a typical animal of Brazil. The country has one of the world's most diverse
populations of birds and amphibians.
Brazil's large territory comprises different ecosystems, such as the Amazon Rainforest,
recognized as having the greatest biological diversity in the world;[72] the Atlantic Forest
and the Cerrado, which together sustain some of the world's greatest biodiversity.[73] In
the South, the Araucaria pine forest grows under temperate conditions.[73] The rich
wildlife of Brazil reflects the variety of natural habitats; however, remains largely
unknown, and new species are found on nearly a daily basis.[74] Scientists estimate that
the total number of plant and animal species in Brazil could approach two million.[73]
Larger mammals include pumas, jaguars, ocelots, rare bush dogs, and foxes. Peccaries,
tapirs, anteaters, sloths, opossums, and armadillos are abundant. Deer are plentiful in the
south, and monkeys of many species abound in the northern rain forests.[73][75]
Concern for the environment in Brazil has grown in response to global interest in
environmental issues.[76] It's natural heritage is extremely threatened due to cattle
ranching and agriculture, logging, mining, resettlement, oil and gas extraction, over-
fishing, expansion of urban centres, wildlife trade, fire, climate change, dams and
infrastructure, water contamination, and invasive species.[72] In many areas of the country,
the natural environment is threatened by development.[77] Construction of highways has
opened up previously remote areas for agriculture and settlement; dams have flooded
valleys and inundated wildlife habitats; and mines have scarred and polluted the
landscape.[76][78]
Economy
Main articles: Economy of Brazil and Economic history of Brazil
São Paulo, the wealthiest and largest city in South America.
Brazil is the largest national economy in Latin America, the world's tenth largest
economy at market exchange rates[79][80] and the ninth largest in purchasing power parity
(PPP),[81][82] according to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank; with large
and developed agricultural, mining, manufacturing and service sectors, as well as a large
labor pool.[7] The country has been expanding its presence in international financial and
commodities markets, and is regarded as one of the group of four emerging economies
called BRIC.[83] Brazilian exports are booming, creating a new generation of tycoons.[84]
Major export products include aircraft, coffee, automobiles, soybean, iron ore, orange
juice, steel, ethanol, textiles, footwear, corned beef and electrical equipment.[85] The
biggest investment boom in history is under way; in 2007, Brazil launched a four-year
plan to spend $300 billion to modernise its road network, power plants and ports.[86]
Brazil's booming economy is shifting into overdrive, with biofuels and deep-water oil
providing energy independence and the government collecting enough cash to irrigate the
desert and pave highways across the Amazon Rainforest.[87] Brazil had pegged its
currency, the real, to the U.S. dollar in 1994. However, after the East Asian financial
crisis, the Russian default in 1998[88] and the series of adverse financial events that
followed it, the Brazilian central bank temporarily changed its monetary policy to a
managed-float scheme while undergoing a currency crisis, until definitively changing the
exchange regime to free-float in January 1999.[89]
Brazil received an International Monetary Fund rescue package in mid-2002 in the

amount of $30.4 billion,[90] a record sum at that time. The IMF loan was paid off early by
Brazil's central bank in 2005 (the due date was scheduled for 2006).[91] One of the issues
the Brazilian central bank is currently dealing with is the excess of speculative short-term
capital inflows to the country in the past few months, which might explain in part the
recent downfall of the U.S. dollar against the real in the period.[92] Nonetheless, foreign
direct investment (FDI), related to long-term, less speculative investment in production,
is estimated to be $193.8 billion for 2007.[93] Inflation monitoring and control currently
plays a major role in Brazil's Central Bank activity in setting out short-term interest rates
as a monetary policy measure.[94]
Components
Main articles: Agriculture in Brazil, Industry in Brazil, and Energy policy of
Brazil
Itaipu Dam, the world's largest hydroelectric plant by energy generation.
Brazil's "investment grade" economy is diverse,[95] encompassing agriculture, industry,

and a multitude of services.[96][97] Brazil is finally punching its weight with a booming
economy and stronger global leadership.[98][84] The recent economic strength has been due
in part to a global boom in commodities prices with exports from beef to soybeans
soaring.[97][98] Its prospects have been helped by huge oil and gas discoveries.[99] A global
power in agriculture and natural resources, Brazil unleash the greatest burst of prosperity
has witnessed in three decades.[100]
Agriculture and allied sectors like forestry, logging and fishing accounted for 5.1% of the
gross domestic product in 2007.[101] A performance that puts agribusiness in a position of
distinction in terms of Brazil's trade balance, in spite of trade barriers and subsidizing
policies adopted by the developed countries.[102][103] The industry; from automobiles, steel
and petrochemicals to computers, aircraft, and consumer durables; accounted for 30.8%
of the gross domestic product.[101] Industry is highly concentrated geographically, with the
leading concentrations in metropolitan São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Curitiba, Campinas,
Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Salvador, Recife and Fortaleza. Technologically advanced
industries are also highly concentrated in these locations.[104]
Brazil is the world's tenth largest energy consumer. It's energy comes from renewable
sources, particularly hydroelectricity and ethanol; and nonrenewable sources, mainly oil
and natural gas.[105] Brazil will become an oil superpower, with massive oil discoveries in
recent times.[106][107][108]
Science and technology

Main article: Science and technology in Brazil
An Embraer E-175 jet airliner, developed in Brazil.
Brazilian science effectively began in the first decades of the 19th century, when the
Portuguese Royal Family, headed by John VI, arrived in Rio de Janeiro, escaping from
the Napoleon's army invasion of Portugal in 1807. Until then, Brazil was a Portuguese
colony, without universities, and a lack of cultural and scientific organizations, in stark
contrast to the former American colonies of the Spanish Empire, which although having a
largely illiterate population like Brazil and Portugal, had, however, a number of
universities since the 16th century.
Technological research in Brazil is largely carried out in public universities and research
institutes. Nonetheless, more than 73% of funding for basic research still comes from
government sources.[109] Some of Brazil's most notables technological hubs are the
Oswaldo Cruz Institute, the Butantan Institute, the Air Force's Aerospace Technical
Center, the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation and the INPE. Brazil has the
most advanced space program in Latin America, with significant capabilities to launch
vehicles, launch sites and satellite manufacturing.[110] On October 14, 1997, the Brazilian
Space Agency signed an agreement with NASA to provide parts for the ISS.[111] Uranium
is enriched at the Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory to fuel the country's energy demands.
Plans are on the way to build the country's first nuclear submarine.[112] Brazil is one of the
three countries in Latin America[113] with an operational Synchrotron Laboratory, a
research facility on physics, chemistry, material science and life sciences.
Demographics
Main article: Demographics of Brazil
Boa Viagem beach in Recife. Much of Brazil's population is concentrated across the
coastline.
Brazil's population comes from many racial and ethnic groups.[114] The last National
Research for Sample of Domiciles (PNAD) census revealed the following: 49.7% of the
population self-identified as White, about 93 million; 42.6% Pardo (literally meaning
brown in Portuguese), about 79 million; 6.9% Black, about 13 million; 0.5% Asian, about
1 million; and 0.4% Amerindian, about 519,000.[115] Most Brazilians can trace their
ancestry to the country's indigenous Amerindians, Portuguese colonists, or African
slaves, either alone, in combination with one or both of the others, and/or in combination
with other ethnic or racial groups. Since the arrival of the Portuguese in 1500s, this
miscegenation between the three groups has been a part of the evolution of the people of
Brazil. In the over three centuries of Portuguese colonization, Brazil received more than
700,000 Portuguese settlers and 4 million African slaves.[116]
Starting in the late 19th century, Brazil opened its doors to immigration: people of over
60 nationalities immigrated to Brazil. About 5 million European and Asian immigrants
arrived from 1870 to 1953, most of them from Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Germany. In the
early 20th century, people from Japan and the Middle-East also arrived.[114] The
immigrants and their descendants had an important impact in the ethnic composition of
the Brazilian population, and many diasporas are present in the country. Brazil has the
largest population of Italian origin outside of Italy, with over 25 million Italian
Brazilians,[117] the largest Japanese population outside of Japan, with 1.6 million Japanese
Brazilians,[118] as well the second largest German population outside of Germany, with
12 million German Brazilians.[119] A characteristic of Brazil is the race mixing.
Genetically, most Brazilians have some degree of European, African, and Amerindian
ancestry.[120] The entire population can be considered a single "Brazilian" ethnic group,
with highly varied racial types and backgrounds, but without clear ethnic sub-
divisions.[116]
The largest metropolitan areas in Brazil are São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Belo
Horizonte, respectively with 19.7, 11.4, and 5.4 million inhabitants.[121] Almost all the
capitals are the largest city in their corresponding state, except for Vitória, the capital of
Espírito Santo, and Florianópolis, the capital of Santa Catarina. There are also non-capital
metropolitan areas in the states of São Paulo (Campinas, Santos and the Paraíba Valley),
Minas Gerais (Steel Valley), Rio Grande do Sul (Sinos Valley), and Santa Catarina (Itajaí
Valley).[122]
Largest cities of Brazil view • talk • edit
Municipalit Federative Populatio Municipalit Federativ

Population
y unit n y e unit
1
1 São Paulo São Paulo 11,016,724 11 Belém Pará 1,428,368
Rio de Rio de
2 6,136,652 12 Guarulhos 1 São Paulo 1,283,253
Janeiro 2 Janeiro
3 Salvador Bahia 2,892,625 13 Goiânia Goiás 1,220,412
4 Fortaleza Ceará 2,416,920 14 Campinas São Paulo 1,059,420
Belo Minas
5 2,399,920 15 São Luís Maranhão 922,458
Horizonte Gerais
São Paulo
Distrito São Gonçalo Rio de
6 Brasília 2,383,784 16 2 973,372
Federal Janeiro
7 Curitiba Paraná 1,788,559 17 Maceió Alagoas 922,458
D. de CaxiasRio de
8 Manaus Amazonas 1,644,690 18 2 855,010
Janeiro Rio de Janeiro
Pernambuc Nova Iguaçu Rio de
9 Recife 1,515,052 19 2 844,583
o Janeiro
Rio Grande
10 Porto Alegre 1,440,939 20 Teresina Piauí 813,992
do Sul
Source: Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (2007 Demographic Census)
^1 Metropolitan region of São Paulo (São Paulo and Guarulhos)
^2 Metropolitan region of Rio de Janeiro (Niterói, Rio de Janeiro, São Gonçalo, Duque de Caxias and Nova
Iguaçu)
Education and health

Main articles: Education in Brazil and Health in Brazil
Federal University of Paraná, in Curitiba, is regarded as the oldest Brazilian university.
The Federal Constitution and the 1996 General Law of Education in Brazil (LDB)
determine how the Federal Government, States, Federal District, and Municipalities will
manage and organize their respective education systems.[5] Each of these public
educational systems is responsible for its own maintenance, which manages funds as well
as mechanisms and sources for financial resources. The new Constitution reserves 25% of
state and municipal taxes and 18% of federal taxes for education.[123][124]
Private school programs are available to complement the public school system. In 2003,
the literacy rate was 88% of the population, and the youth literacy rate (ages 15–19) was
93.2%.[123] Illiteracy is highest in the Northeast, around 27%, which has a high proportion
of rural poor.[125] Although at same year, Brazil's education had low levels of efficiency by
15-year-old students, particularly in the public school network.[126] Higher education starts
with undergraduate or sequential courses, which may offer different specialist choices
such as academic or vocational paths. Depending on choice, students may improve their
educational background with Stricto Sensu or Lato Sensu postgraduate courses.[127][124]
The public health system is managed and provided by all levels of government, whilst
private healthcare fulfills a complementary role.[5][128] There are several problems in the
Brazilian health system. In 2006, these were infant mortality, child mortality, maternal
mortality, mortality by non-transmissible illness and mortality caused by external causes:
transportation, violence and suicide.[129][128]
Language
Main articles: Languages of Brazil and Brazilian Portuguese
Museum of the Portuguese Language in São Paulo, the first language museum in the
world.
Portuguese is the official language of Brazil.[3] It is spoken by nearly the entire population
and is virtually the only language used in newspapers, radio, television, and for all
business and administrative purposes, with the exception of Nheengatu, an indigenous
language of South America which has gained the co-official status alongside Portuguese
in the municipality of São Gabriel da Cachoeira.[130] Moreover, Brazil is the only
Portuguese-speaking nation in the Americas, making the language an important part of
Brazilian national identity and giving it a national culture distinct from its Spanish-
speaking neighbors.[131]
Brazilian Portuguese has had its own development, influenced by the Amerindian and
African languages.[132] Due to this, the language is somewhat different from that spoken in
Portugal and other Portuguese-speaking countries, mainly for phonological and
orthographic differences. These differences are somewhat greater than those of American
and British English.[132] As of 2008, Portugal is considering reforming its own language to
accommodate linguistic developments in the Brazilian Portuguese since the two
languages diverged.[133]
Minority languages are spoken throughout the vast national territory. Some of these are
spoken by indigenous peoples: 180 Amerindian languages are spoken in remote areas.
Others are spoken by immigrants and their descendants.[132] There are important
communities of speakers of German (mostly the Hunsrückisch, part of the High German
languages) and Italian (mostly the Talian dialect, of Venetian origin) in the south of the
country, both largely influenced by the Portuguese language.[132][131]
Culture
Main article: Culture of Brazil
Brazilian Carnival parade in Rio de Janeiro, considered one of the greatest shows on
Earth.
A wide variety of elements create a society with considerable ethnic complexity.[116]

Brazilian culture has historically been influenced by European, African, and Indigenous
cultures and traditions.[116] Its major early influence derived from Portuguese culture
because of strong colonial ties with the Portuguese empire. Among other inheritances, the
Portuguese introduced the Portuguese language, the Catholic religion, and the colonial
architectural styles.[134] Other aspects of Brazilian culture are contributions of Italian,
German, and other European immigrants who came in large numbers, and their
influences are felt closer to the South and Southeast of Brazil.[114] Amerindian peoples
influenced Brazil's language and cuisine; and the Africans, brought to Brazil as slaves,
influenced language, cuisine, music, dance, and religion.[135][114]
Literature in Brazil dates back to the 16th century, to the writings of the first Portuguese
explorers in Brazil, such as Pêro Vaz de Caminha, writer of the fleet of navigator Pedro
Álvares Cabral.[136] Cuisine varies greatly by region and reflects the country's mix of
native and immigrants. This has created a national cooking style marked by the
preservation of regional differences.[137] Brazil's cultural tradition extends to its music
styles which include samba, bossa nova, forró, frevo, pagode, and many others.[138] Brazil
has also contributed to classical music, which can be seen in the works of many
composers.[138] In arts, important modern artists Anita Malfatti and Tarsila do Amaral
were both early pioneers in Brazilian art.[139] The cinema has a long tradition, reaching
back to the birth of the medium in the late 19th century, and gained a new level of
international acclaim in recent years.[140]
The festival of Carnival (Portuguese: Carnaval), with its spectacular street parades and
vibrant music, has become one of the most potent images of Brazil;[137] an annual
celebration held forty days before Easter and marks the beginning of Lent. Carnival is
celebrated throughout Brazil with distinct regional characteristics, but the most
spectacular celebrations outside Rio de Janeiro take place in Salvador, Recife, and
Olinda, although the nature of the events varies.[137] Other regional festivals include the
Boi Bumbá and Festa Junina (June Festivals).[138][137]
Religion
Main article: Religion in Brazil
Christ the Redeemer, one of the Seven Wonders of the World and symbol of Brazilian
Christianity.
Religion is very diversified in Brazil; the constitution provides for freedom of religion,
and the government generally respects this right in practice.[5] The Roman Catholic
Church is dominant, making Brazil the largest Catholic nation in the world.[141] The
formal link between the state and the Roman Catholicism was severed in the late 19th
century; however, the Catholic Church has continued to exert an influence on national
affairs.[142] Adepts of Protestantism are rising in number. Until 1970, the majority of
Brazilian Protestants were members of "traditional churches", mostly Lutherans,
Presbyterians and Baptists. Since then, numbers of Pentecostal and Neopentecostal
members have increased significantly.[142] Traditional African beliefs, brought by slaves,
have blended with Catholicism to create Afro-Brazilian religions such as Macumba,
Candomblé, and Umbanda.[141] Amerindians practice a wide variety of indigenous
religions that vary from group to group.[142] Islam in Brazil was first practiced by African
slaves. Today, the Muslim population in Brazil is made up of mostly Arab immigrants.
There are approximately fifty-five mosques and Muslim religious centers. A recent trend
has been the increase in conversions to Islam among non-Arab citizens.[143]
According to the 2000 Demographic Census, 73.9% of the population is Roman Catholic;
15.4% is Protestant; 0.91% from other Christian denominations; 1.33% follows Kardecist
spiritism; 0.31% follows African traditional religions; 0.01% follows Amerindian
traditions; 7.35% consider themselves agnostics, atheists or without a religion; and 0.81%
are members of other religions such as Buddhism, Judaism, Islam, and some practice a
mixture of different religions.[144][3]
Sport
Main article: Sport in Brazil
Maracanã Stadium, at the Brazilian Championship, highest division of Brazilian football.
Football (Portuguese: futebol) is the most popular sport in Brazil.[137] The Brazilian
national football team (Seleção) have been victorious in the FIFA World Cup tournament
a record five times, in 1958, 1962, 1970, 1994 and 2002.[145] Basketball, volleyball, auto
racing, and martial arts also attract large audiences. Though not as regularly followed or
practiced as the previously mentioned sports, tennis, team handball, swimming, and
gymnastics have found a growing number of enthusiasts over the last decades. Some
sport variations have their origins in Brazil. Beach football,[146] futsal (official version of
indoor football)[147] and footvolley emerged in the country as variations of football. In
martial arts, Brazilians have developed Capoeira,[148] Vale tudo,[149] and Brazilian Jiu-
Jitsu.[150] In auto racing, Brazilian drivers have won the Formula 1 world championship
eight times: Emerson Fittipaldi in 1972 and 1974;[151] Nelson Piquet in 1981, 1983 and
1987;[152] and Ayrton Senna in 1988, 1990 and 1991.[153]
Brazil has undertaken the organization of large-scale sporting events: the country
organized and hosted the 1950 FIFA World Cup[154] and is chosen to host the 2014 FIFA
World Cup event.[155] The circuit located in São Paulo, Autódromo José Carlos Pace, hosts
the annual Grand Prix of Brazil.[156] São Paulo organized the IV Pan American Games in
1963,[157] and Rio de Janeiro hosted the XV Pan American Games in 2007.[157] Brazil is
also trying for the fourth time to host the Summer Olympics with Rio de Janeiro's bid for
the 2016 games.[158]
Interview with Odair Gonçalves,

President of Brazil's Nuclear Energy
Commission
Interviewed by Miles A. Pomper and William Huntington
Odair Gonçalves is president of Brazil’s Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN), the

agency responsible for regulating and licensing all nuclear activity in Brazil. On Sept. 28,
Gonçalves spoke with Arms Control Today Editor Miles A. Pomper and Arms Control
Association Scoville Fellow William Huntington about Brazil’s nuclear programs in the
wake of new revelations about his country’s nuclear past.
ACT: As you know, the former president of Brazil, Jose Sarney, confirmed in August
what many around the world have long believed: that Brazil once had a secret nuclear
weapons program.[1] What is your estimate of when this program was dismantled?
Gonçalves: Sarney said that, but it is not completely clear that that program existed. For
example, the CNEN has made a scan of our documents to see if there is something
related to a nuclear weapons program or something like that. But there was not. So, it’s a
question because we had a military regime during a certain time. And in any regime, not
just in a military regime but in any regime, there are a lot of things that are secret. If there
were such a program it was secret and there is no document, in our institution at least. So,
we are not quite sure about this thing. But if it were [true], our constitution from 1988
said that such a program is forbidden. So from 1988 to now I don’t believe that there was
anything related to a nuclear weapons program.
ACT: As you know, one of your predecessors, Jose Luiz Santana, said in August that
when he took office [in 1990] the Brazilian military was in fact still working on a nuclear
bomb.[2] Was he wrong about that?
Gonçalves: Again, we don’t have any documentation. But, I may say that he also said
that we had some highly enriched uranium (HEU). In this case, I may say that it’s not
true. That is very clear to me. We know exactly what he was talking about. It was about a
stock we have of around 20 percent enriched uranium, which is for sure not possible to
make an atomic device with.
ACT: So you had HEU, but not weapons grade uranium.
Gonçalves: Oh, no. Weapons grade uranium must have at least 90 percent enrichment.
So, since this was not true, I’m not quite sure about the other statements. And this I know
for sure was a lie.
ACT: You say that there was some 20 percent enriched uranium. One of his claims also
was that this was not uranium that Brazil had produced itself.
Gonçalves: No, it was imported, clearly.
ACT: Where was it imported from, and when?
Gonçalves: Well, that is not quite clear but we have it under [International Atomic
Energy (IAEA)] safeguards. So, it’s public, the quantity. Where was it imported from?
We are not quite sure and perhaps it is not clear how the old government obtained it, or
under which agreement it was possible to acquire this uranium. But for sure, it’s now
under safeguards. It’s about 20 percent enrichment, which makes it clear that it’s nothing
related with any kind of bomb. It’s below 20 percent.
ACT: And it’s now, all the material, all the enriched uranium is now under safeguards.
Gonçalves: Under international safeguards, yes.
ACT: An August 29 CNEN statement maintained, as you’ve said here as well, that there
are no documents or information that can confirm Santana’s claims.[3]
Gonçalves: Yes, exactly.
ACT: But that denial did not definitively contradict his claims, on the other hand. Do
you possess any definitive proof that his statements are false?
Gonçalves: What we may say is that now there is no such plan. There is nothing that is
hidden or not under safeguards in Brazil. We can’t guarantee anything from the old
government because it was a different regime. Even our constitution was different. But
since 1988, it’s possible to say that there’s nothing going on. Everything in Brazil is very
clear. Our program is completely under safeguards. It’s difficult for any country to say
completely what happened in a former government. Especially if you have some kind of
military regime underway.
ACT: So it sounds to me that you would dispute his characterization that from 1988 to
1990 the program continued.
Gonçalves: Yes.
ACT: Either before 1988 or after that was the military preparing for a nuclear test
explosion?
Gonçalves: We have a hole, as you know.[4] It was just a hole. That is what it is. There
was a lot of media notice about that. From our point of view, some things are very easy to
guarantee. If the military regime intended somehow to make an atomic device, it was just
a plan because there is no way to get the fuel, the uranium, the nuclear material to make
such a device. So that’s completely clear now. Even if there was something, it was just in
the way of plans or studies or something like that. Even though we don’t have any kind of
document attesting such a thing. It is clear, our position, because we are the regulator
institution so we know quite well what is going on in the country.
ACT: But as you know, technically, if you could make 20 percent enriched uranium you
could make 90 percent enriched uranium.
Gonçalves: We could not. It was not ours, it was imported. That’s clear. We now are able
to perform enrichment, and just to 5 percent. And if you can enrich uranium, even if you
could go until let’s say 20 percent, it’s not the same thing to enrich to 90 percent. We
have to have another design, another approach, and so on. We have a license to do these
things and the licensing in Brazil is just for 5 percent for the new plant at Resende.
ACT: Brazil has not yet signed an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement.[5]
Why not?
Gonçalves: Because our position was that we were waiting for the results from the
review meeting of the [nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)] some months ago, and
now we are studying the thing to see what we are going to do. But until now, we were
waiting for the results of the conference.[6]
ACT: So you’re considering signing a protocol now?
Gonçalves: We are studying the thing.
ACT: Some outside experts might believe that one of the reasons you have not signed an
additional protocol is that it would require additional disclosures about, for instance,
these early programs. Are they linked in any way?
Gonçalves: No, it’s not true. They have nothing to do with each other. The position is
that we also think there are some issues about other countries’ compliance with the
traditional NPT. For example, about disarmament.[7] So, we understand that it’s not just
a question of providing compromises but you have also to commit yourself to
disarmament. We are arguing about that. But it’s not a closed position, anyway. There is
nothing in the additional protocol about disclosing former programs.
ACT: But when the South Koreans, the Taiwanese, and the Egyptians signed their
additional protocols, additional information about their past programs was released.[8]
And I assume that was because an additional level of disclosure was called for then.
Gonçalves: No, but we were not part of the NPT before 1994. And we are not committed
to give any information before that date. That’s the date when we signed the NPT.
ACT: I see. This may be somewhat of a speculative question, but since you acknowledge
that perhaps from 1985 to when the civilian government came in in 1988 the military
might have continued with a program, why might they have done that? After all, there
was an agreement in 1985 with Argentina to end these programs.
Gonçalves: Let me understand exactly what you said. You are talking about some
involvement in constructing a bomb or something like that, that’s what you said?
ACT: Right.
Gonçalves: The military developed, for example, centrifuges.
ACT: Well, it made some efforts to take the steps that are needed to construct a bomb.
Gonçalves: You are talking about the statements of Santana?

ACT: Right. As you said, you can’t really answer the question from 1985 to 1988
because you don’t have documentation.
Gonçalves: Oh, no, no. It’s hard to believe that after the constitution, something
happened. But before the constitution, there were no restraints. But we don’t know about
any project since.
ACT: Concerning the Resende facility, reportedly the first of its four modules is now
operational.[9]
Gonçalves:Yes.
ACT: Does Brazil still intend to complete the construction of all four modules?
Gonçalves: We intend to, naturally. And when everything is constructed, the provision is
that we will be able to provide at least 50 percent of the necessary fuel for the two power
plants in Brazil.
ACT: Do you have any idea of what the timeframe for finishing the construction of the
last three modules might be?
Gonçalves: If we have the money, which is still not clear, in about seven years.
ACT: Does Brazil plan, or are there discussions at all under way, on ever using the
Resende facility to enrich fuel for use in the Navy’s submarine reactor program?
Gonçalves: It is not possible because the license is just for 5 percent [enriched uranium
fuel], and the submarine will need about 18 percent to 19 percent.
ACT: President Silva commissioned the National Energy Policy Council to make
recommendations on Brazil’s nuclear program, and as far as I understand, he asked for
those recommendations by April 2005. Has the Council issued its recommendations?
Gonçalves: Yes, and it was a study not just from CNEN, but the industries and everyone
involved in nuclear activities in Brazil, and with other ministers and so on, including the
foreign minister.
ACT: I know that one of the questions under discussion was construction of the Angra-3
reactor. Is that happening, or not?
Gonçalves: That is the first step in our proposal.
ACT: So that’s been agreed to?
Gonçalves: Not yet.

ACT: There are reports that the Angra-3 reactor is somewhat controversial between
different Brazilian ministries because of its potential cost. Is that true?
Gonçalves: Well, it’s not exactly a controversy. It’s natural that different ideas come out
and we discuss them. But it’s not agreed completely at all, to answer your question.
ACT: Is it true that the Resende facility will not be commercially viable without the
completion of the Angra-3 reactor?
Gonçalves: It depends what you call commercially viable, because when you are
speaking about energy, to have some complete cycle, a closed cycle, completely
independent from other suppliers and so on, could be very important. And how to
appraise that, it’s not very easy. So it depends on what you are saying. We could also
export some uranium. Not just enriched uranium, but perhaps the yellowcake.[10] But
these are only possibilities to think about in the whole context of the program.
ACT: I don’t know if there was something that we didn’t touch on that you thought was
important to get across.
Gonçalves: It’s important to say that we are completely in accordance with the NPT. We
are one of the only countries in the world that has also the military installations under
safeguards. That’s very important to say. And everything we do is according to our
constitution, which says that every and all nuclear activities must be for peaceful
purposes.
The Future of the Nuclear

Nonproliferation Regime
Latest ACA Resources
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
• High-Level Panel Calls for Stronger IAEA

Arms Control Today (July/August 2008)
• LOOKING BACK: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Then and Now
Arms Control Today (July/August 2008)
• A Nonproliferation Disaster
Press Room (July 10, 2008)
Presentation to AAAS Panel Discussion, February 19, 2005

Daryl G. Kimball
Executive Director, Arms Control Association
As the old saying goes: “you don’t get something for nothing.” Thirty-five years ago, the
nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) set into place one of the most important
international security bargains of all time: states without nuclear weapons pledged not to
acquire them, while nuclear-armed states committed to eventually give them up. At the
same time, the NPT allowed for the peaceful use of nuclear technology by non-nuclear-
weapon states under strict and verifiable control.
The NPT is a good deal that must be honored and strengthened.
Since its inception, the NPT has helped to limit the number of nuclear weapon states to
the five with nuclear weapons at the time of its entry into force (U.S., U.K., France,
Russia and China) and the three other known nuclear weapon states (India, Israel, and
Pakistan), which have refused to join the treaty. Dozens of other states might have the
bomb today if not for the NPT and associated measures. Over the years, the NPT security
framework led several states to abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions, including
Argentina, Brazil, Sweden, South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan.
The NPT also makes it far more difficult for other non-nuclear-weapon states to acquire
the material and technology needed to build such weapons, and if they do, to do so
without detection. Intrusive international inspections and safeguards against diversion of
nuclear technology and material for weapons purposes is now standard practice.
The NPT process has also encouraged the United States and Russia to take action on
several nuclear arms control and arms reduction initiatives, from strategic nuclear
weapons reductions to a halt of nuclear weapons testing and the negotiation of the 1996
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. These arms control agreements have reduced U.S.-
Russian nuclear arms competition and increased transparency, thereby establishing
greater stability and predictability.
The NPT has also led the nuclear-weapon states to pledge not to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear NPT members, thereby reducing incentives for others to seek nuclear
arms for prestige or defense.
Several regional nuclear weapon free zones have been created which have reinforced the
norm against nuclear weapons possession and use. These include: the Treaty of Tlateloco,
which covers Latin America; the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty; the
Treaty of Pelindaba, which covers Africa; and the newly negotiated Central Asia nuclear
weapon free zone treaty.
Today’s Proliferation Challenges
Despite these very significant accomplishments, the nuclear nonproliferation system,

including the NPT, is under great stress. As the May 2005 NPT Review Conference nears,
it is evident that global security and proliferation challenges are as politically and
technically complex as they were in the 1960s when the NPT was conceived and created.
In the past few years, we have seen new and more deadly forms of terrorism, wars,
nuclear black markets, and states cheating on and even announcing their withdrawal from
the NPT.
There continues to be the danger that additional countries—such as North Korea and
Iran--could acquire sufficient fissile materials to be able to manufacture nuclear weapons
under the guise of “peaceful” nuclear endeavors. As the NPT has been interpreted,
countries can acquire technologies that bring them to the very brink of nuclear weapon
capability without explicitly violating the agreement, and can then leave the treaty
without automatic penalties.
Having been allowed to break out of a verifiable plutonium production freeze that was
established in 1994, North Korea may already have manufactured a small nuclear
weapons arsenal since it expelled IAEA inspectors in early 2003. Iran may soon have the
capacity to produce fissile material for weapons and may do so if current European
diplomatic efforts falter.
Adding to the danger posed by the possession of nuclear weapons by regional rivals India
and Pakistan, the existence of nuclear black market networks based out of Pakistan’s
government-run weapons laboratories has aided the nuclear programs of Libya, Iran,
North Korea, and perhaps others.
Perhaps today’s greatest threat stems from the existing global stockpiles of highly
enriched uranium and plutonium, the fissile materials that are the fuel of nuclear bombs.
Worldwide there are approximately 1855 metric tonnes of plutonium and 1900 metric
tonnes of highly enriched uranium worldwide in civilian and military stockpiles. These
materials have become more accessible to terrorists as a result of inadequate security and
accounting at nuclear facilities throughout the former Soviet republics and in dozens of
other countries. While U.S.-Russian nuclear threat reduction programs have been
working to secure and lock-down these stockpiles, there is much more left to be done in
the former Soviet Republics and elsewhere. Funding for these efforts, while significant, is
not enough to accelerate the program as rapidly as the threat should dictate.
Another problem is that the majority of countries also feel that the five original nuclear-
weapon states do not intend to fulfill their NPT pledge to eliminate nuclear weapons and
the five recognized nuclear-weapon-states still possess massive numbers of nuclear
weapons. The continuing possession of nuclear weapons by these states—reinforced by
lackluster progress on disarmament in the last five years—erodes the willingness among
certain states in the non-nuclear-weapon majority to fulfill their treaty obligations, much
less to agree to strengthen the regime.
The Bush administration opposes the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and negotiations on
an effectively verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty, which were both specifically tied to
the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. The United States and Russia have also
failed to capitalize on key opportunities to substantially and verifiably dismantle
significant portions of their still massive Cold War–era stockpiles of strategic and tactical
weapons.
For all these reasons and more, there are rising doubts about the sustainability of the
nonproliferation regime. Nations with ample technological ability to develop nuclear
weapons may be reconsidering their political decisions not to do so. As the UN’s recent
High-Level Panel report A More Secure World concludes: “We are approaching a point at
which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a
cascade of proliferation.”
What Can Be Done to Strengthen the Cornerstone of Nonproliferation: the NPT?
Although there is near universal international consensus on the need to strengthen and
preserve the NPT, there must also be agreement on how to do so. In the coming months
and years, the United States must pursue a more balanced, comprehensive, and credible
approach that addresses the fundamental obligations of all states. This requires that the
United States and other nations work together to achieve universal compliance with
strengthened rules against nuclear weapons possession, trade, development, and use.
Success also requires that nuclear-weapon states reduce the salience of nuclear weapons
by fulfilling their solemn disarmament obligations and give credible assurances to non-
nuclear-weapon states that they will not be subjected to nuclear attack.
Finally, it also requires something that the NPT cannot by itself deliver: the reduction of
the underlying tensions and conflicts that motivate states from acquiring nuclear weapons
or nuclear weapons capabilities.
The May 2005 Review Conference is a crucial forum for parties to measure progress – or
lack of progress – in implementing their mutual NPT obligations and commitments. It is
also an essential opportunity for the parties to demonstrate their political will to make
further tangible progress to meet all of the treaty’s objectives. The success of the
Conference should be judged by the ability of the parties to agree on specific, additional
steps that will strengthen the treaty regime.
Ideally, the states parties should agree to achieve progress in the following ways:
1. Forge agreement to establish more effective controls on technologies that can

be used to produce materials for nuclear weapons. One promising proposal
would be to suspend the construction of new uranium enrichment or plutonium
production facilities and, in exchange, guarantee nonnuclear states access to
nuclear fuel supplies for civilian purposes under an international mechanism.
2. Expand the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect and
monitor compliance with nonproliferation rules and standards through
existing authority and through the Additional Protocol, to which all states
should adhere. Today, only 62 states are states parties to the Additional Protocol,
while another 28 have signed it.
3. Accelerate implementation of the nuclear-weapon states’ solemn
disarmament obligations, including further reducing the alert status and size of
their strategic and tactical nuclear stockpiles, permanently barring nuclear test
explosions by ratifying the CTBT; barring the production of fissile materials for
weapons by negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, refraining from
development of new nuclear weapons, and issuing further, credible assurances to
non-nuclear-weapon states that they will not be subjected to nuclear attack. These
steps would reduce the risk of nuclear war and the allure of nuclear weapons.
4. Secure all weapons-usable fissile material to the highest standards to prevent
access by terrorists or other states by halting use of highly-enriched uranium in
civilian reactors and expanding programs and funding for programs to secure and
eliminate these materials. There are several proposals in the U.S. Congress that
would begin to address these needs. What’s more, the United States and others
can help the nonproliferation cause by strengthening national and
international export controls and material security measures as required by
UN Resolution 1540, which prohibits individuals from participating the
manufacture or trafficking of illegal WMD goods.
5. Clarify that no state may withdraw from the treaty and escape responsibility
for prior violations of the treaty or retain access to controlled materials and
equipment acquired for “peaceful” purposes; and finally,
6. Conduct vigorous diplomacy to halt dual-use nuclear activities in Iran and
dismantle North Korea’s nuclear weapons capacity, as well as diplomacy
designed to address the underlying regional security problems in Northeast
Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, which would facilitate nonproliferation
and disarmament efforts in those regions.
A More Balanced and Credible U.S. Nonproliferation Policy is Needed
Unfortunately, the current U.S. approach to the NPT will not likely help build agreement
on such a program of action. At the last three Preparatory Committee meetings for the
2005 NPT Review Conference, U.S. officials pushed for greater limitations on other
states while arguing the United States needs to do little or nothing more on disarmament.
As a result, states-parties are more divided than ever. Divisions at the 2004 NPT
Preparatory Committee Meeting prevented agreement on a basic agenda for the 2005
Review Conference.
Rather than propose a plan to strengthen all aspects of the NPT bargain, Bush
administration officials have used the NPT meetings to level a blunt critique of illicit
Iranian and North Korean nuclear activities. With Iran in mind, U.S. officials called on
others to support proposals to limit the sale of nuclear technologies that can be used to
make bomb material.
This initiative, or variations on it, could produce useful but hard-to-win additional
limitations on non-nuclear-weapon states’ access to some forms of “peaceful” nuclear
technology.
But achieving these outcomes involves heavy diplomatic lifting. Nonnegotiable U.S.
ultimatums, however justifiable, will not do the trick. Nor will they make it any easier for
an ongoing British-French-German initiative to convince leaders in Tehran that full
compliance with the NPT is in their best interest.
U.S. delegates to the NPT meeting also did their best to block discussion of further
disarmament measures, including the possibility of multilateral talks on weapons of mass
destruction issues in the Middle East.
U.S. officials, such as Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International
Security John Bolton have argued that “[W]e cannot divert attention from the violations
[of the NPT] we face by focusing on [disarmament] issues that do not exist.”
It is important to recall that, in 1995, the United States and the other nuclear-weapon
states pledged to a set of principles and objectives on nonproliferation and disarmament.
They did so in order to win an indefinite extension of the treaty. These goals were
reaffirmed and refined at the 2000 NPT conference in what is referred to as the “13 Steps
on Disarmament.” Though these commitments are political commitments, it is clear that
the extension of the NPT did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.
Surely, the United States and Russia have made steady progress in dismantling and
securing large portions of their Cold War nuclear stockpiles declared excess under treaties
signed more than a decade ago. With the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, the
two states have pledged to reduce deployed strategic nuclear forces to fewer than 2,200
warheads by 2012. Nevertheless, these actions are based on decisions taken years ago and
are woefully behind pace. The U.S. and Russia now deploy over 5,000 strategic nuclear
warheads each, nearly 2,000 of which on each side are maintained on hair-trigger alert
status. The U.S. and Russia maintain additional strategic warheads in reserve stockpiles,
and the two nations combined possess thousands of so-called tactical nuclear weapons.
The situation is even worse in other areas. In addition to stiff-arming the CTBT and
negotiations on a verifiable fissile material cutoff treaty, talks with Russia on verification
measures and tactical nuclear weapons remain on the backburner, and the administration
has initiated research on new types of more “usable” nuclear weapons. President George
W. Bush has also approved nuclear-use policies that undercut previous commitments to
nonuse of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states in the context of the NPT.
If the Bush administration tries to erase its earlier commitments to these and other
disarmament goals, leading non-nuclear-weapon states, including several U.S. allies, will
surely cry foul at the NPT Review Conference. If Arab states continue to be frustrated by
the failure to pursue a nuclear weapons free Middle East, they will likely continue to do
little to admonish Iran about its IAEA safeguards transgressions.
Conclusion
Earlier I said that it is clear that there is a global consensus on the need to strengthen and
preserve the NPT and the nonproliferation system. At the same time, it is also apparent
that there is not yet agreement among the major governments and groups of states on how
to do so.
Such consensus cannot be forged if the world’s leading nation, the United States, is does
not support a more balanced, effective, and
comprehensive nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation
strategy. Thank you for your time and attention, I would
be happy to take your questions.
Brazil claims backing on uranium

Brazil has announced it will begin enriching uranium officially,
saying it has received the approval of the United Nations'
nuclear watchdog.
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors paid a "successful"

Full production may not begin
visit to the Resende enrichment plant in October, a minister told until summer of 2005
reporters.
Science and Technology Minister Eduardo Campos said production of enriched uranium would start within
months.
However, an IAEA official told the BBC no final agreement had been reached.
The spokesman told the BBC the IAEA was still completing its assessment of Resende.
The BBC's Steve Kingstone reports from Sao Paulo that the agency is conscious of the need for consistency
in its work at a time when it is also dealing with Iran on the same issue.
Privately, agency officials say a deal with Brazil is close and could be announced in the next fortnight but it
seems that in its excitement the Brazilian government may have jumped the gun, our correspondent notes.
Espionage fears
Mr Campos said on Wednesday that an IAEA team had visited Resende to verify information on work at
the closely guarded plant.
"The visit was considered completely successful by both sides," he said.
"It means that from the point of view of international safeguards, the plant can start working."
He added that tests could start "immediately" though it could be eight months before production of fuel for
nuclear reactors would begin.
The government had been refusing to show all of its centrifuge technology responsible for enrichment.
It had argued that its hardware was more advanced than that of other countries and must be protected from
industrial espionage.
Brazil has two nuclear power reactors - Angra I and Angra II - and is considering constructing of a third.
There was speculation earlier in the week that visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin might offer some
nuclear deal but nothing was announced.
However, Mr Putin did pledge help for Brazil's oil sector, its space programme and its bid for a seat on the
UN Security Council.
Brazil joins world's nuclear club

By Steve Kingstone
BBC News, Sao Paulo
Brazil has joined the select group of countries with the capability
of enriching uranium as a means of generating energy.
A new centrifuge facility was formally opened on Friday at the

Resende nuclear plant in the state of Rio de Janeiro.
Brazil says its technology is
some of the most advanced in
The Brazilian government says its technology is some of the most the world
advanced in the world.
The official opening follows lengthy negotiations with the United Nations nuclear watchdog, the IAEA.
Brazil has some of the largest reserves of uranium in the world but until now the ore has had to be shipped
abroad for enrichment - the process which produces nuclear fuel.
In future some of that enrichment will take place in Brazil.
The government says that within a decade the country will be able to meet all its nuclear energy needs.
Brazilian scientists insist their technology is superior to that of existing nuclear powers. They claim the
type of centrifuge in use at Resende will be 25 times more efficient than facilities in France or the United
States.
Safeguards
Sensitivity over that technology led to a standoff two years ago with
the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN watchdog.
Keen to protect its commercial secrets, Brazil was reluctant to give

inspectors full access to its facilities and politically the negotiations
were complicated by simultaneous concerns about Iran's nuclear
plans.
But in the end Brazil and the IAEA agreed a system of safeguards to The move came after
ensure that the new facilities would not be channelled into weapons discussions with the IAEA
production.
Friday's opening at Resende is being hailed as a major step forward in Brazil's development and it comes
amid renewed concerns about energy supplies in South America.
Last week Bolivia announced plans to nationalise its gas reserves, prompting fears of price rises. As a big
importer of Bolivian gas, Brazil sees nuclear energy as one of several strategic alternatives.
World UNITED NATIONS
Chronicle
PROGRAMME: No. 974 recorded 22 April 2005
GUEST: Ambassador Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte

President-designate, NPT Review
Conference
JOURNALISTS: Erol Avdovic,

Deutsche Welle
Alan Capper of ITN, London
MODERATOR: Mary Alice Williams
Fighting the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

The landmark international treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) dates back to
1970, but is reviewed every five years. In 2005, some
observers say, it will face some of its toughest tests
ever.
Is the international framework for dealing with nuclear

threats in danger of erosion? What safeguards are there
for non-nuclear states to pursue nuclear technology for
peaceful use? Does the threat of nuclear terrorism call
for new initiatives?
These are the some of the questions addressed in this

episode of World Chronicle with the President of the
2005 NPT Review Conference, Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte.
WORLD CHRONICLE is produced by the News & Media
Division, Department of Public Information, United Nations,
New York, NY 10017, U.S.A.
Duration: 28:24"
Executive Producer: Michele Zaccheo
Director: Tony Marshall
Production Assistant: Sheila Poinesette
ANNOUNCER: From the United Nations in New York, an

unedited interview programme on global issues. This is
World Chronicle. And here is the host of today’s World
Chronicle.
WILLIAMS: Hello, I’m Mary Alice Williams. How do you

prevent the spread of nuclear weapons – and of the technology
to build them? How do you promote co-operation on the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while – simultaneously –
working toward nuclear disarmament? These are the basic
questions raised by the NPT – the landmark international
treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The
Treaty, which dates back to 1970, gets reviewed every 5 years
-- and this year, some observers say, it will face some of its
toughest tests ever. We’ll be talking about that today with the
President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Ambassador
Sérgio de Queiroz Duarte of Brazil. Mr. Ambassador, Welcome
to World Chronicle. Since September eleventh, we live in a
world where it seems a clear and present danger, the
possibility of a nuclear attack by terrorists who operate
outside any system of government. Can the NPT treaty review
address this concern?
DUARTE: I think it can but marginally because the NPT
really is not directed towards this kind of problem. In the UN
of course, there are other mechanisms that have been put
together recently to deal with the phenomenon of world
terrorism, like resolution 1540, like the convention that was
just adopted a couple of weeks ago on nuclear terrorism and
things of that sort. And also, some initiatives by groups of
nations to try to minimize the…. So, the NPT can deal with that
in its purview, but not in general as these instruments are
suppose to do.
WILLIAMS: So it remains a sward of Damocles hanging
over the world. Joining us in the studio for this interview are
Erol Avdovic of Deutsche Welle and Alan Capper of ITN,
London. Alan.
CAPPER: Mr. Ambassador, are you feeling optimistic

about the conference in view of the disappointments really,
from the previous conferences? Do you feel that the nation
states that are coming - are coming in the real spirit of co-
operation and consensus?
DUARTE: Well I feel moderately optimistic… of course I

am cognizant of the difficulties that lie in our path, and also
member states know of these difficulties. But I trust that all
the states that are member of the NPT – of which there are 187
– it’s almost the entirety of the world community. Realize that
the treaty must be strengthened and that the treaty is a plus
and has been acquired by the world community. So I am
confident that there will be an effort on the part of all parties
to make it possible for the conference to have a successful
outcome. But of course it will be difficult.
AVDOVIC: Mr. Ambassador, since the 1970s NPT was
promoted as a norm of multi-lateralism, on the eve of these
conference in Europe, review conference in Europe, keeping in
mind all of the achievements, what do you expect concretely
from these conferences? How can you bridge the differences
between various parties in the conferences?
DUARTE: Well the question of the bridging of the

differences is for the parties to do it’s, not really for the
President. I can be a facilitator for that, I can try to steer the
conference towards a successful outcome. But it will take of
course political will more than anything else. The treaty has
been quite successful I would say. If you look at its history - if
you remember correctly in the 1960s, I think it was President
Kennedy who said that in ten or fifteen years time, there
would be 25 or 30 nuclear weapon nations and this of course
did not materialize. And then I think in a large measure
because of the NPT, so I think that it is possible for the world
community to muster its political will to produce useful results
in this conference.
WILLIAMS: Nonetheless, there are many more countries in

the nuclear club than there were when President Kennedy
made that statement. Three nations with nuclear weapons
remain outside the treaty: India, Pakistan and Israel. Can the
export of nuclear technology from those countries be
controlled?
DUARTE: It would depend on those countries, I think

they are responsible countries, responsible members of the
international community and I think they have a responsibility
towards that. Even if you are not a member of the NPT, it is – I
think – possible for these countries to watch so that they do
not become proliferators in that sense, towards third nations
or groups. Of course, proliferation happens in the sense that
from the original five now, you have three more you have also
North Korea. But we are very far away from President
Kennedy’s prediction – I guess.
CAPPER: How do you feel about the intervention of the

United States in certain issues for example, the belief that Iraq
was building or had a nuclear arsenal? And the express
concern about what may be happening in Iran, intervention by
the United States or any other country. Does that undermine
everything that the treaty is setting out to do?
DUARTE: Well the treaty does not deal exactly with that
but in the Charter of the United Nations, you have the norm for
the conduct of countries, and the Charter tells countries how
they should behave in the face of emergency situations of that
sort. And I think that’s the norm that should be followed by
nations when they confront difficulties of that kind.
AVDOVIC: I think the implementation is a key word here.

How would you assess the implementation of the treaty so far?
Recently for example, as we had the opportunity to hear the
former Soviet president, Gorbachov here who said, that some
countries are implementing more than they promised to do.
Not giving real indictment, for example, of the government of
the United States they do not follow the implementation as
Russia would do. So how would you assess the
implementation?
DUARTE: The treaty has three pillars, generally…
considered as such. One is non-proliferation of nuclear
weapons, to prevent the acquisition of such weapons by any
country outside of the five that the treaty recognizes. The
other is nuclear disarmament, and it’s the responsibility of the
five armed countries to dismantle their arsenals eventually to
arrive at disarmament. And the third is the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy - the promotion of the peaceful uses. The
question is that the provisions that deal with proliferation are
much more explicit, there is a system of verification, there is a
system by the IAA to monitor compliance, and there’s even
eventually the possibility of bringing violators to the Security
Council for possible sanctions. But on the side of the nuclear
disarmament provision, that deals with it in a more general
and in a vaguer way. It leaves, more or less for the nuclear
countries to say in which way they will implement their
obligations and there is of course no verification of that. So
the implementation of course, is different on either side of the
equation. Finally on the peaceful uses of course, this is also
subject to verification by the IAA.
AVDOVIC: Can you put some specific requirements to the

weapon state countries and follow-up in that field of
implementation?
DUARTE: The treaty does not put any specific

requirements. It requires them to seek to achieve in good
faith negotiations that will be conducive to nuclear
disarmament, in the framework of general and complete
disarmament. So it is a very general formulation and this is
what they have accepted as their obligation.
WILLIAMS: One of the countries which is causing the world
at least the case of the jitters, is Iran, which has some nuclear
capability – we believe – and says it’s for peaceful uses.
Where’s the line? If you’re enriching uranium, if you’re getting
the fuels, if you are producing the fuels necessary to use
nuclear energy - both for peaceful means and for weaponry
how can even inspectors find the line? And should that be in
the treaty?
DUARTE: I don’t think there is any international system

that makes it possible to assess intentions. Countries that do
have nuclear weapons are considered – and I recognize they
are nuclear weapons countries – they have the weapons,
maybe they don’t have the intentions now on using them, so
it’s possible. So intentions…
WILLIAMS: So can….
DUARTE: So intentions are very difficult. But Iran is a

member of the NPT, it is subject to the system of verification,
it has signed the additional protocol which is a further system
of verification and so far, the International Atomic Energy
Agency has not found Iran to be in violation of the treaty.
WILLIAMS: Gotta make your job more difficult though.
DUARTE: Yes, but these are the facts and I’m not here to
judge any country.
CAPPER: Mr. Ambassador, North Korea’s withdrawal

from the NPT raises the whole issue of whether nation states
have any right to withdraw from the NPT. Do you have views
on that?
DUARTE: I think that as long as the principle of
sovereignty of nations is the norm in international relations,
there’s no way in which you can prevent any country from
withdrawing from any international instrument. The NPT itself,
like any other international instrument, has a clause that
provides for withdrawal. Now, having withdrawn from the NPT,
of course North Korea posed a very significant problem to the
community. It’s the first time that a country ever has
withdrawn, and the fact that a country by joining the NPT in
the first place, has taken unto itself not to develop nuclear
weapons. The fact that it has withdrawn and has said it is
developing the nuclear weapons, of course, poses a very case
of grave concern to the whole international community. The
conference of course will deal with that situation.
CAPPER: It’s a powerful political card to play isn’t it…
DUARTE: It is.
CAPPER: For a nation state like that.
DUARTE: Certainly, certainly.
AVDOVIC: Ambassador, in the year 2000 the review

conference strongly deplored the test bombing…the test of the
nuclear weapon of India and Pakistan. Is there is any issue
this year that should be deplored?
DUARTE: I think there will be several issues that

countries will deplore. They will deplore…some will say that
there has been proliferation in cases of some countries. Some
will say that the nuclear weapon countries have not completely
fulfilled their commitments. There will be of course complaints
about the fact that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty has not yet
come into force, so there will be plenty of material for
deploring things that should have happened, should have
materialized and fortunately did not.
AVDOVIC: Would you pick up one as…
DUARTE: I said a few, I think I said a few and I answered

your question.
WILLIAMS: In his recent report, entitled “The Larger

Freedom” the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan,
said, “…The international framework for dealing with nuclear
threats needed to be revitalized, they were in danger of
erosion”. Do you share his view?
DUARTE: I completely share his view. But I think this

conference of the NPT is one occasion, a very important
occasion for revitalizing and for trying to stem the erosion.
And the erosion is an erosion in my view, is an erosion of
confidence. In the instruments of the treaty, the mechanisms
of the treaty, to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
to promote…
WILLIAMS: So are you saying you don’t have to do

anything further? You simply have to implement what is
already there?
DUARTE: Well there are things that have been proposed

further in the case of proliferation, like the additional protocol
which is an additional system of additional constraints on non-
nuclear weapons countries not to produce nuclear weapons
under the verification by the IAA. This is one thing. There are
some other mechanisms that have been proposed that the
conference will examine. And also in the field of nuclear
disarmament, there are things that the nuclear weapon
countries could do if they wish to improve their record of
disarming themselves of nuclear disarmament.
WILLIAMS: This is World Chronicle and we’re talking about

how to fight the spread of nuclear weapons with Sérgio du
Queiroz Duarte, Ambassador Duarte heads the review process
on the NPT, the landmark international treaty dealing with this
issue. Let’s take a look at this clip from the UN Archives.
VIDEO BEGINS:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER: Atomic bombs today are more

than twenty-five times as powerful as the weapons with which
the atomic age dawns, while hydrogen weapons are in the
range of million of tons of TNT equivalent. Today, the United
States stockpile of atomic weapons which of course, increases
daily, exceeds by many times the total equivalent of the total
of all bombs and all shells that came from every plane and
every gun in every theatre of war in all of the years of World
War II.
VIDEO ENDS:
WILLIAMS: That of course – President of the United States,

Dwight David Eisenhower in 1953 speaking before the United
Nations General Assembly. That speech started this whole
movement towards guarding nuclear technology and
regulating it. What’s the major difference other than
additional countries, between the situation in 1953 and the
situation now?
DUARTE: Well now you have the NPT, now you have the
IAA, now you have commitments by the international
community regarding those issues. Now you have a movement
of public opinion against nuclear arsenals and nuclear
weapons. So there is, I think, a lot of difference between 1953
and now.
CAPPER: You gave a speech in Geneva fairly recently

where you said a lot of member states were questioning the
whole viability of the NPT but you surprisingly, you used the
word crisis. Are we actually in a crisis?
DUARTE: The word crisis was not used by me I made a

play of words if I remember that speech on that word crisis,
but I think there is a crisis of confidence on the NPT. I think
that many states parties feel that the treaty has not been able
to fulfill its promise to fulfill what it was meant to do. Both in
non-proliferation and in nuclear disarmament; and that’s why I
think the Secretary-General is perfectly right when he says
that we need re-vitalization of the NPT.
CAPPER: Yes, and they were very ambitious

expectations that were raised of course – originally with that.
DUARTE: We have to have ambitious expectations if we

want to do something that we need.
CAPPER: Right.
AVDOVIC: Ambassador, when you see from that

prospective, what would you actually expect? I’m asking you
as an expert not only as a chairman or presiding person of the
conference. Who would you like to see to move things
forward? Who should make that advance step forward just to
get out from the crisis? Because there are definitely people
who think that the treaty and the review conference itself is in
crisis.
DUARTE: I think all parties must do that. Specifically,
those that are more significant among the parties.
AVDOVIC: For example?
DUARTE: The five nuclear weapon countries recognize as

such those countries that have significant civilian industries,
atomic industries, and the international community as a whole.
I don’t think that we can pinpoint or singularize particular
nations. Of course, the ones that are more armed, the
countries that have the largest arsenals, the countries that
have more predominance in world affairs, of course the do
have special responsibilities and I’m sure they will exercise
their responsibilities.
AVDOVIC: But what kind of incentives you should go with

to outreach them more, those countries that you just
mentioned?
DUARTE: The incentives I think is to understand that a

world that is regulated by the will of the parties to that
instrument, which are almost all nations in the world, is
preferable to a world which is regulated by the whims and the
will of specific nations of specific parties. I think that is the
incentive, a world that is more orderly and is more democratic
in that sense – that everyone has participated in the
construction of that world.
WILLIAMS: But you do have rogue nations. Libya comes to

mind. Last year the International Atomic Energy Agency
confirmed that Libya has pursued a clandestine programme of
uranium conversion and enrichment. How concerned should
the world be about the likelihood of other states having hidden
programmes like this - hidden from view of the international
community?
DUARTE: I think the world should be concerned, I think

the world is concerned. One of the ways in which you can
prevent or at least help prevent things like what happened in
Libya from happening again, is to strengthen the system of
verification under the IAA. Libya was not a party to the NPT, it
only confirmed to what is known as the traditional system of
safeguards, and not the systems of safeguards that are being
proposed now that are more intrusive and more capable of
discovering whether there are prohibited activities. But again,
you can not be one hundred percent sure of anything in this
world – can you?
CAPPER: The United States has reneged on pledges to

negotiate for a comprehensive test ban treaty. What is to stop
other member nations taking such strong independent lines
and undermining the whole basis of the treaty?
DUARTE: First let me – to be fair, what the US did was

not to ratify the instrument, the US previous administration
did sign that instrument - it was the legislative branch at the
senate that did not ratify. So you cannot really say I think in
all fairness that the US did renege on anything. It simply did
not take the final step to make that treaty binding on the
United States. And most of other nations in the world are
party to that instrument, there are 120 parties that have
already ratified – including three nuclear weapon states,
Britain, France and Russia. And China is still waiting on the
sidelines just as the US is. So I think we should set the record
straight.
CAPPER: Although it does mean in reality the US is not a
signatory.
DUARTE: It is a signatory but not a ratifier.
CAPPER: Right.
DUARTE: The administration did sign the treaty.

Now the US has also observed, like the other four nuclear
powers, the US has also observed the moratorium on tests – of
course it is a voluntary moratorium. But it is a very significant
step that since I think 1992, no tests has been carried out by
the United States, or by any of the other four nuclear weapon
countries that are a party to the NPT. So this is significant this
is important. Now this does not mean that the international
community continues to prod both the US and China to become
ratifiers because it is one of the requirements of the treaty, is
that a number of states have to ratify and specifically, named
by name in the treaty, so the treaty can enter into force
regardless of how many have signed or ratified. There are still
eleven states that have not ratified the treaty, among those
the US and China, so it is something important but I think we
should put things in the proper perspective.
AVDOVIC: Just specifically in regard of that, there are 44

states necessary for those treaty to be ratified, and only 33
ratified it. Why is the ratification process delayed from your
point of view, or taking into account or the expert reports or
so?
DUARTE: Well it would be difficult for me to specify for

each country what the reasons are. I think that at least in the
more significant countries among those eleven that have not
ratified yet, the reason of course is concerns about national
security. Countries have predicated their security on their
military might…in other cases of course – of non ratifiers
among those eleven, there may be other difficulties. I know
that at least one country has a constitutional difficulty about
that, which is kind of a catch 22 thing that has nothing to do
with security or anything else. But it’s a problem of its non
constitutional process; for instance, one of those eleven. So
there are a variety of reasons basically for those that really are
in the forefront, the reasons have to do with their perceptions
of security.
WILLIAMS: Mr. Ambassador, I would like to return to the

subject of nuclear terrorism. It’s a likelihood – I think the
whole world probably acknowledges that that’s a likelihood -
as long as there are processes to enrich uranium. Is there any
way the United Nations or any nation can stop this threat?
DUARTE: Again, I don’t know if you can stop that threat

completely, absolutely, because there will always be ways…
WILLIAMS: Without just shutting down every nuclear

energy plant in the world, right?
DUARTE: You can always have a clandestine nuclear

energy plant somewhere. I mean the absolute guarantee I
think it is very hard. It’s like having any absolute guarantee
against crime or theft or things of that sort. There will always
be someone plotting some way of circumventing the law. But
the more stringent you make the international system, of
course, the less likely it is for these things to happen and I
think the UN is working on that as I said in the beginning.
There’s already a series of instruments that are being put into
place and hopefully, those will at least…at least, minimize the
threat to a reasonable level. But again, human beings are
what they are.
CAPPER: Just picking up on that question, the

breakdown of the former Soviet Union and the creation of the
new Soviet Republics. Russian Republics have created a great
deal of uncertainty about how those weapons, those arsenals
is controlled and do we know enough about that? Because in a
sense, that’s created proliferation all by itself.
DUARTE: Well I know that the US and Russia have been

cooperating very closely on trying to keep that arsenal under
control and not only the arsenal itself, or the things of that
type, but also the minds of the people who devised those
things, I’m not an expert on that. I don’t think I can make any
authoritative statement on this but one thing that I heard from
experts is that it is not only experts or scientists from the
former Soviet Union but also from other countries in this world
that might be tapped for money to do things for illicit
purposes. So, I think we should be concerned not only with
the former Soviet Union but with the rest of the international
scientific community.
WILLIAMS: Thank you very much Mr. Ambassador for being

with us on World Chronicle. Our guest has been the Sérgio de
Queiroz Duarte, President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference.
He was interviewed by Erol Avdovic of Deutsche Wella and Alan
Capper of ITN, London. I’m Mary Alice Williams thank you for
joining us we invite you to be with us for the next edition of
World Chronicle.
ANNOUNCER: Electronic transcripts of this programme may
be obtained free of charge by contacting World Chronicle at
the address on your screen:
World Chronicle
United Nations, Room S-827
New York, N.Y., 10017.
Or by email at: poinesette@un.org
This programme is a Public Affairs Presentation from

United Nations Television.
The views and opinions expressed on this programme are those of
the participants, and do not necessarily
reflect the official statements or views of
the United Nations.
Brazil allows nuclear inspection
Brazil has ended a row with the International Atomic Energy
Agency by allowing it to inspect a new uranium enrichment
plant.
Brazil said it feared industrial
The UN body wanted to check that Brazil was not breaking espionage
international accords on the spread of a chemical, which can be used
to make nuclear bombs.
Brazil had argued it needed to protect its nuclear technology.
The two sides agreed the IAEA would inspect pipes at the plant, without looking at the machines
themselves.
US diplomats had said Brazil's refusal to allow inspections would send a bad signal at a time of concern
about the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea.
The IAEA inspection of the Brazilian plant in the town of Resende will take place in October.
Brazil's constitution prevents the nation from owning nuclear weapons. It decided to abandon its nuclear
weapons ambitions in 1990.
Sixth Committee
"Measures to Eliminate Terrorism"
Statement by Ambassador Ronaldo Mot Sardenberg,
Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN
New York, 7 October 2005
Mr.Chairman,
At the outset, I would like to congratulate you on your election and reaffirm our full support and
cooperation for the work of the VI Committee during this 60th session.
My delegation associates itself with the statement made by Argentina on behalf of the Rio Group yesterday.
Brazil joins the international community in reaffirming its categorical and unequivocal condemnation of terrorism - in all
its forms and manifestations. Irrespective of political, ideological, ethnic or religious considerations, terrorist acts must be
seen for what they are: gross violations of the most fundamental human rights - the right to life and the freedom to live
without fear.
This year we were faced yet again with brutal acts of terrorism. Innocent civilians, women and children are today victims
of groups who stand as adversaries to the values we share. As a member of the United Nations and a country whose
identity cannot be dissociated from the notions of tolerance and diversity, Brazil rejects in the strongest terms these
abhorrent acts, which go against the very notion of humanity.
I therefore reiterate Brazil’s strong condemnation of the bombings that took place in Bali last weekend and once again
express our sincere condolences to the victims and their families, as well as to the Government of Indonesia.
Mr. Chairman,
We are all aware of the urgency of dealing forcefully and decisively with the menace of international terrorism. Yet we
must not let a heightened sense of vulnerability, given that terrorism can now threaten anyone anywhere, lead us to
forego fundamental principles and rights.
As stated by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim at the opening of this session’s general debate: “The fight against terrorism
cannot be viewed in terms of police repression alone. Neither can such repressive acts result in absurd, indiscriminate
deaths, similar to those caused by terrorism itself.”
Mr. Chairman,
The conclusion of the Convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism constitutes an additional significant
step in the fight against terrorism. I would like to thank Ambassador Mohamed Bennouna, President of 59a. Session,
whose efforts in conducting informal consultations in July were fundamental for the accomplishment of the draft
Convention. We would also like to thank Ambassador Rohan Perera for his report on the Special Committee on
international terrorism and the Coordinators - Carlos Fernando Díaz Paniagua, from Costa Rica, and Albert Hoffmann,
from South Africa - for their contributions to the work of the Committee.
Over the years, a network of interlocking conventions on judicial cooperation has been painstakingly crafted in order to
ensure that the perpetrators of terrorist crimes are brought to justice. Brazil has signed all legal instruments against
terrorism and has ratified ten of them. The instrument of ratification of the Convention against the Financing of Terrorism
was deposited during the Treaty Event, ten days ago. On that occasion, Brazil also signed the Convention for the
suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism.
We welcome the work of the Security Council Committee on counter-terrorism in coordinating international efforts to
combat this scourge. Brazil has already presented five reports to the Committee and will continue to collaborate with the
Council by adopting appropriate domestic legislation and procedures.
Brazil urges the international community to redouble the efforts to arrive at the conclusion of negotiations on a
comprehensive counter-terrorism convention. Such an instrument will certainly be a milestone in our endeavours to
establish a comprehensive régime for the application of the existing legal instruments, as well as for helping us come to
grips with a diffuse phenomenon that still eludes a generally agreed definition. Furthermore, its adoption would send a
powerful message of the international community’s determination to deal more coherently and effectively with this threat.
Brazil supports the proposal that, once this convention is concluded, an international conference be convened to
underscore our commitment to developing anti-terrorist strategies that are coordinated and comprehensive.
Mr. President,
The havoc and pain caused by terrorism is infinitely greater than our divergences concerning the comprehensive
convention. Last year, in this same room, we had before us a draft convention that seemed to be deadlocked, with
virtually no prospects of being concluded. One year later, the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism was concluded. It is now part of the counter-terrorist system of the United Nations and has already 89
signatures. Brazil hopes this unambiguous determination to fight against a common foe can again prevail in the
negotiations of the comprehensive convention, which will constitute a firm contribution to the counter-terrorism strategy,
as expressed in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document.
Thank you.
Sixth Committee - "Measures to Eliminate Terrorism"

Statement by the Brazilian Delegation
Mr. Chairman,
At the outset, I would like to thank Ambassador Rohan Perera foi his report on work of the Special
Committee on international terrorism.
The events of September 11 2001 underscored the growing realization that international terrorism
has taken on a new degree of organization and virulence, no longer being restricted to
traditionally volatile regions. Its greater sophistication and global scope are in a large measure
derived from the ever-closer links between terrorist groups and international criminal networks.
Brazil joins the international community is once again reaffirming its categorical and unequivocal
condemnation of terrorism - in all its forms and manifestations. Irrespective of political,
ideological, ethnic or religious considerations, terrorist acts must be seen for what they are: gross
violations of the most fundamental human rights - the right to life and the freedom to live without
fear.
Over the years we have painstakingly created a network of interlocking conventions on judicial
cooperation to ensure that the perpetrators of terrorist crimes are brought to justice. Brazil has
ratified 10 of these conventions and looks forward to quickly acceding to the remaining
instruments, all of which are presently before Congress. Furthermore, our national legislation is
presently under review with a view to enhancing Brazil’s contribution to this global struggle. In this
context, we welcome the work of the Security Council Committee on counter-terrorism in
coordinating international efforts to combat this scourge. Brazil has already presented two reports
to the Committee and will continue to collaborate with the Council by adopting appropriate
domestic legislation and procedures.
To this end, Brazil joins the international community in its determination to redouble efforts to
arrive at an early conclusion to the negotiations on a comprehensive counter-terrorism
convention. This instrument will be a milestone in our endeavors to establish a comprehensive
juridical regime for the application of the existing legal instruments, and helping us come to grips
with a diffuse phenomenon that still eludes definition. Furthermore, its adoption will send a
powerful message of the international community’s determination to deal forcefully and coherently
with this threat. Brazil supports the proposal that, once this convention is concluded, an
international conference be convened to underscore our commitment to developing anti-terrorist
strategies that are coordinated and comprehensive.
Brazil has also engaged in the fight against terrorism at the regional level. In October 2001, the
Inter-American Committee to Combat Terrorism was set up under the aegis of the Organization of
American States to foster regional action on two fronts: financial and border controls. This
initiative was underscored last June when the Organization’s General Assembly adopted an Inter-
American Convention against Terrorism, which, in line with the proposed comprehensive
convention being discussed here in New York, provides a general framework for judicial
cooperation on the basis of existing and future conventions on terrorism.
Mr. Chairman,
We are all aware of the urgency of dealing forcefully and decisively with the menace of
international terrorism. Yet we must not let our heightened sense of vulnerability, given that
terrorism can now threaten anyone anywhere, lead us to forego first principles. Nor should this
struggle prejudice other equally urgent battles we are presently engaged in.
We must reaffirm our conviction that the fight against terrorism is self-defeating if waged outside
established international human rights norms or in a manner incompatible with the Charter of the
United Nations or that detracts from the cohesion of the broad international coalition that was
forged after September 11. Equally important, the magnitude of the changes wrought by these
terrorist attacks must not blind us to the ongoing, daily drama of those who carry the burden of
the enormous social and economic inequalities around the world. During the Latin America,
Caribbean and European Union Summit, held last May, in Madrid, Brazil made the point that the
“security agenda”, which is largely centered on terrorism, must not be allowed to overshadow the
“agenda for hope”. Issues such as open trade, the international financial regime, and the fight
against poverty, on which the expectations and legitimate aspirations of many peoples hinge,
must not be forgotten or ignored.
The sense of solidarity which unites us now to combat terrorism must also guide our
endeavors to find long-lasting solutions to the underlying issues closely identified with the root
causes of terrorism – conflict, poverty, ignorance and racism. We know that terrorists often
find fertile ground amid civil strife and deprivation. So, while reaffirming our resolve to resist it,
let us recognize that terrorism thrives also on despair and frustration, manipulating the
anguish and sense of hopelessness of those left behind.
The United Nations is uniquely placed to meet this challenge. It provides the forum for
building a global coalition that can legitimately develop a long-term response to terrorism and
to its origins. Terrorism will fail when we establish the foundations of a global stability based
on prosperity, peace and a culture of human rights and tolerance for all.
Thank you.
First Committee - "Nuclear-Weapon Free

Southern Hemisphere and Adjacent Areas"
Statement by Ambassador Celina Assumpção do Valle Pereira
Deputy Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations in
Geneva
Mr. President,
I have the honor of introducing draft resolution L.34, on a "Nuclear-weapon-free southern

hemisphere and adjacent areas", on behalf of the following co-sponsors: (list).
I also wish to acknowledge that, after L. 34 was tabled, other countries also decided to co-
sponsor the draft resolution. I would point out that the majority of those countries are members of
the four existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zones.
This is the seventh consecutive year that a draft resolution on this important matter is introduced
to the consideration of the First committee. Once again, Brazil has the honor of being joined by
New Zealand as initiators of a resolution that last year gathered 148 votes in favor. This score
sustains the overwhelming majority of votes that has characterized the passing of this resolution
since 1996. We express the hope that the L.34 will enjoy the same broad support.
This year’s draft resolution has some changes relatively to resolution 56/24 G. Besides the
required actualizations, they allude to two particular important developments. First, it welcomes
the decision taken by Cuba to ratify the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which will fulfill the establishment of
the first inhabited Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, encompassing all States of Latin America and the
Caribbean. Second, it welcomes the ratification by the Kingdom of Tonga of the Treaty of
Rarotonga, which completes the list of original parties to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone.
These are important steps in our way towards the accomplishment of a Nuclear-weapon-free
southern hemisphere, which we warmly commend.
Mr. Chairman,
The further development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in some regions is one of the most
significant measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. Gradually, in various parts of the world,
the nuclear option is being ruled out. As a nuclear-weapon free world is an aspiration of our
peoples, the objective of eliminating nuclear weapons is reinforced by extending - through new
nuclear-weapons free zones - the geographical space where they are illegal.
The regional treaties, with the addition of the Antarctic Treaty, contribute to free from nuclear
weapons the Southern Hemisphere, as well as the adjacent areas north of the Equator where the
treaties apply. The States Parties to those treaties, in close consultation with their neighbors,
renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and accepted stringent verification commitments to
that effect.
Our initiative aims at achieving the recognition by the General Assembly, for the seventh
consecutive year, of the progressive emergence of a nuclear-weapon-free Southern Hemisphere
and adjacent areas. Such recognition should be considered as a confirmation of the commitments
of the international community towards non-proliferation and disarmament.
We want to reiterate that, as in previous years, our draft resolution does not create new legal
obligations. Neither does it contradict any norm of international law applicable to navigation, such
as those contained in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
We call upon States that have not yet done so to move towards ratification of the nuclear-
weapon-free zone treaties and their protocols.
The idea that most of the globe is nuclear-weapon-free is a powerful beacon. It adds momentum
to the process of nuclear disarmament and bolsters the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Mr. Chairman,
We wish to put on record our appreciation for all those who voted in favor of resolution 56/24 G
last year. We expect to continue deserving this support from all those States committed to nuclear
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
Thank you very much.

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senior management group

Sergio de Queiroz Duarte, High Representative for

US 'sure' of Brazil nuclear plans

He praised the growing global role of Brazil, the biggest country in

"Brazil is a nation the US values as a close partner in advancing

Mr Powell also said the US was firmly committed to seeing a pan-

Brazil and The United Nations

The United Nations (UN), an intergovernmental and political organization founded in

In addition to the member states of the United

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), based

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), based in Montreal and founded in

International Maritime Organization (IMO), with its headquarters in London and

World Trade Organization (WTO), based in Geneva and set up in 1995.

THE NUCLEAR NON PROLIFERATION TREATY

José Goldemberg is Secretary for the Environment of the State of São

Ministry of External Relations (Brazil)

Ministry of External Relations

Established 28 July 1736 [1]

The Ministry of External Relations (Abbreviation: MRE; Portuguese: Ministério das

[edit] Foreign policy

[edit] Diplomatic missions

Foreign relations of Brazil

This article is part of the series:

Brazil is a significant political and economic power in Latin America.

[edit] Foreign policy

[edit] Diplomatic relations

[edit] Relations with the United States

Lula da Silva and George W. Bush

[edit] United Nations politics

[edit] International issues

[edit] Foreign aid

[edit] Participation in international organizations

Disarmament Act (2003)

The main elements of the Act are as follows:

• Commercialisation of firearms is prohibited. Firearms may only be sold to armed

• Further restrictions are imposed on the private ownership of firearms. Applicants

• The minimum age for purchasing firearms is raised from 21 to 25 years.

• Carrying a firearm without a permit and/or firing a gun at random in a public

• Persons in possession of an unregistered gun may hand it to the Federal Police

• Decommissioned guns will be entered in a register and, after forensic

• Fines ranging from R$100,000 to R$300,000 will be levied on firms which

Brazil - Nuclear Programs

President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-61), a pro-Vargas politician, sought to develop

Brazil's military governments continued to assert autonomous nuclear strategies. These

Data as of April 1997

The Carter administration marked a definite cooling of the Brazilian-American relations.

[edit] Current issues

Presidents Lula and Bush in Brasília, Nov 6 2005

Brazilian and American officials signed an agreement to promote greater ethanol

Brazil and weapons of mass destruction

The Aramar Experimental Center (Portuguese: Centro Experimental de Aramar) located

[edit] Cachimbo Test Site

[edit] Army's Technology Center (Guaratiba)

The Army's Technology Center (Portuguese: Centro Tecnológico do Exército, or CETEx)

[edit] Air Force Technological Center (São José dos Campos)

The Air Force Technological Center (Portuguese: Centro de Tecnologia da Aeronautica,

[edit] Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory

The Resende Nuclear Fuel Facility (Portuguese: Fábrica de Combustíveis Nucleares, or

[edit] Legislation and conventions

[edit] UN Security Council

List of terms as an elected member to the Security Council:

• 2004-2005 • 1988-1989 • 1954-1955

• 1993-1994 • 1963-1964 • 1946-1947