Defense Industrial Base DA - Emory 2019

DIB DA and Answers ENDI 2019
Table of Contents
1NC (3).....................................................................................................................................3
Uniqueness...................................................................................................................................5
US industry Strong...................................................................................................................6
Arms sales high........................................................................................................................8
Taiwan Sales.............................................................................................................................9
AT domestic industry.............................................................................................................10
AT Thumpers.........................................................................................................................11
Links...........................................................................................................................................12
Taiwan- industry links............................................................................................................13
Taiwan- Econ Links...............................................................................................................14
Link—Generic........................................................................................................................15
Link- Cancelations.................................................................................................................16
link—fill in.............................................................................................................................17
AT sales to X country are small.............................................................................................18
Spending Uncertainty.............................................................................................................19
Impacts.......................................................................................................................................20
Heg—DIB k2 heg...................................................................................................................21
Heg-- 2NC/1NR—dib deterrence/war—................................................................................23
Climate Change- 1NC............................................................................................................27
2NC/1NR Warming = ext.......................................................................................................30
2NC/1NR Solves climate change ext.....................................................................................31
Economy- 1NC.......................................................................................................................32
2NC/1NR K2 growth ext........................................................................................................34
Aff Answers...............................................................................................................................36
Uniqueness.............................................................................................................................37
Thumpers................................................................................................................................38
No Link- specific countries....................................................................................................40
No Internal link......................................................................................................................41
Allies Solve............................................................................................................................42
1
AT econ internal link..............................................................................................................43

AT econ impact......................................................................................................................46
AT climate change internal link.............................................................................................47
at: warming impact.................................................................................................................50
AT Heg Impact.......................................................................................................................51
2
1NC (3)
Defense industrial base strong – Trump is restoring certainty
Duesterberg 10-16-18 Thomas J., is a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. Previously, Dr. Duesterberg
was executive director of the Manufacturing and Society in the 21st Century Program at the Aspen
Institute, Trump Administration Gets Serious About Defense Industrial Base,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasduesterberg/2018/10/16/trump-administration-gets-serious-
about-defense-industrial-base/#6749d9114bdb
Throughout the 20th century, the U.S. manufacturing sector was the defining pillar of the “Arsenal of Democracy.”
The size, technological superiority and continuous innovation in this sector allowed not only the preservation of democracy in the
great conflagrations of the past century, but also the creation of the global Pax Americana that underlies one of the longest
periods of peace and unprecedented prosperity in world history. The slow decline of that industrial superiority , however,
is beginning to undermine U.S. economic vitality , as President Trump keeps reminding us, and our ability to support the national security dominance which has
been the backbone of global stability for over a century. A long-awaited report from the Administration released earlier this month is the most
comprehensive overview of this growing problem and begins to outline a systematic response to the
challenge it represents. The much-anticipated reckoning is among the more significant government
reports in generations . It also provides important guidance for the emerging trade and industrial renewal
policies of the Trump Adminis tration. The document states at the outset that “…the erosion of American manufacturing over the last two decades has had a negative
impact on these [defense] capabilities…and threatens to undermine the ability of U.S. manufacturing firms to meet security requirements.” The report goes into considerable detail about the
loss of U.S. technological leadership and production infrastructure in such critical sectors as robotics, electronics, semiconductors, advanced communications, quantum computing,
shipbuilding, some elements of aerospace technology, advanced metal forming, nuclear power, and access to critical raw materials. Another growing concern across many industries is the
shortage of skilled production workers and STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) experts. While many of these issues have been chronicled before, the study marks the
first systematic effort to link the growing global competitive environment to the national security needs of the world’s leading superpower. The report minces no words that the rise of China,
with its mercantilist and often illegal actions (in terms of agreed international trade rules), is one of the most important factors behind the looming loss of technical leadership so vital to
national security. The text states quite unambiguously: China’s capture of foreign technologies and intellectual property, particularly the systematic theft of U.S. weapons systems and the illicit
and forced transfer of dual-use technology, has eroded the military balance between the U.S. and China…. China’s aggressive industrial policies have already eliminated some capabilities with
The Administration’s report helps gives substance and

critical defense functions…. China’s actions seriously threaten other capabilities…."
specificity to its trade policy. It identifies key sectors and key technologies important to defense capabilities, and the actions by the Chinese which threaten them. The
catalogue of industries and technologies also provides guidance to the recently strengthened CFIUS (Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States) law which allows U.S. authorities
to review and block, if necessary, foreign acquisitions of key parts of the defense industrial base. The report’s emphasis on skills training in both the scientific and production jobs in industries
The group is charged

like nuclear power, shipbuilding and large metal forging also is helpful to the work of the President’s new National Council for the American Worker.
with leading an interdepartmental, government-wide effort to find ways to overcome gaps in essential
skills. Finally, the report outlines a series of additional Federal actions to address the problems outlined in the report. These
include improving procurement strategies , strengthening and broadening the domestic supply chain
for domestic production , and using Department of Defense programs to support specific defense-
critical industrial production and technology development . In an opinion piece accompanying the release of
the report, Assistant to the President for Trade and Manufacturing Policy Peter Navarro rightly argued that the President’s tax reform and
deregulatory agenda is also important in helping renew American manufacturing . There is always some
danger that the clarion call to rebuild specific industries , especially in a time of heightened global
competition from a rising superpower, will be carried too far and the hand of government will weigh too
heavily on the traditional dynamism of the American private sector . Finding the right balance among all the government tools—
including trade, education, regulation and industrial support programs—is never easy, but the new report gives urgency to addressing the problems and clarity about the industries that are
The complacency of recent decades needs to be replaced by a new determination to

essential to national security.
find the right balance of more activist policies in support of a 21st-century Arsenal of Democracy.
3
Arms sales are key to defense industry innovation

United States Department of State, 5-21-2019, "U.S. Arms Sales and Defense Trade,"
https://www.state.gov/u-s-arms-sales-and-defense-trade/
Properly regulated defense transfers support the U.S. defense industrial base and reduce the costs of
procurement for our own military. The U.S. defense industry directly employs over 2.4 million peopl e
across our nation. These individuals and the companies they work for represent a key part of American entrepreneurship
and innovation, as they help to maintain the United States as the world leader in the defense and aerospace
sectors and ensure our armed forces sustain their military edge.
WW III
Helprin 2015 Mark, senior fellow of the Claremont Institute, Indefensible Defense, 6/22/15
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/419604/indefensible-defense-mark-helprin
Continual warfare in the Middle East, a nuclear Iran, electromagnetic-pulse weapons, emerging
pathogens, and terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction variously threaten the United States,
some with catastrophe on a scale we have not experienced since the Civil War. Nevertheless, these are phenomena that
bloom and fade, and that, with redirection and augmentation of resources we possess, we are equipped to face, given the wit and will to do so.
But underlying the surface chaos that dominates the news cycle are the currents that lead to world
war . In governance by tweet, these are insufficiently addressed for being insufficiently immediate. And yet, more than anything else, how
we approach the strength of the American military, the nuclear calculus, China, and Russia will
determine the security, prosperity, honor, and at long range even the sovereignty and existence of this country. THE AMERICAN
WAY OF WAR Upon our will to provide for defense, all else rests . Without it, even the most brilliant innovations and
trenchant strategies will not suffice. In one form or another, the American way of war and of the deterrence of war has
always been reliance on surplus. Even as we barely survived the winter of Valley Forge, we enjoyed immense and forgiving strategic
depth, the 3,000-mile barrier of the Atlantic, and the great forests that would later give birth to the Navy. In the Civil War, the North’s
burgeoning industrial and demographic powers meshed with the infancy of America’s technological ascendance to presage superiority in mass
industrial — and then scientific — 20th-century warfare. The way we fight is that we do not stint. Subtract the monumental preparations,
cripple the defense industrial base, and we will fail to deter wars that we will then go on to lose .
4
Uniqueness
5
US industry Strong
Defense industry is strong
John Keller, 3-26-2019, (editor-in-chief of Military & Aerospace Electronics magazine) "Good times
continue for the U.S. defense industry, as Pentagon budget money continues to roll-in," No Publication,
https://www.militaryaerospace.com/articles/2019/03/good-times-pentagon-budget-money-continues-to-
roll-in.html
Remember last year when we considered the 2019 Pentagon budget request to be one of the biggest of all
time? Well fast-forward a year, and the 2020 military budget request is even bigger. Last spring when top Pentagon leaders
were asking Congress for $686.1 billion, many of us thought it would be the largest U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) budget we might ever
see. At the time it was a breath of fresh air, after what seemed like years of sequestration , congressional continuing
resolutions, and other sources of uncertainty, thingsfinally were looking up. Now comes the 2020 DOD budget request, and the
news for the nation's defense industry just keeps looking better . The Pentagon is asking for $718.3 billion next year,
which is up 4.7 percent over the 2019 request -- promising another record year for U.S. defense spending .
Trump investments reinvigorate the defense industrial base

Dan Gouré, 8-8-2018, (Ph.D., is a vice president at the public-policy research think tank Lexington
Institute. Goure has a background in the public sector and U.S. federal government, most recently serving
as a member of the 2001 Department of Defense Transition Team) "Increasing U.S. Tank Production
Helps National Security and the Industrial Base," No Publication,
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/08/08/increasing_us_tank_production_helps_national_se
curity_and_the_industrial_base_113695.html
To meet the twin goals of addressing current military capability gaps and reinvigorating the defense industrial
base, the Trump administration’s two-year defense budget makes major investments in the procurement of
military hardware, including armored fighting vehicles, fighter aircraft, helicopters and missiles. It does so with an eye towards
investing in critical portions of the defense industrial base .
US defense industry is strong, profitable

Mark Karlin, 12-17-2015, "Weapons Sales to Taiwan Show That for the US, Arming the World Is
Profitable," Buzzflash, http://buzzflash.com/commentary/latest-weapons-sales-to-taiwan-symbolize-that-
arming-the-world-is-profitable-us-export
Also in April of this year, a Fiscal Times article succinctly stated that the
"US defense industry outperforms S&P by 100
percent." The Fiscal Times cites a recent increase in the defense budgets of many nations : In the Middle East in
particular, defense spending has continued at a strong pace, with several countries in the region dedicating more than 5 percent
of their GDP to defense spending, while Oman and Saudi Arabia both spend more than 10 percent of GDP on national security.
US DIB is ahead now but fragile

Jerry Hendrix & Robert C. O’Brien, 7-26-2017, (Hendrix, a retired U.S. Navy captain and award-
winning naval historian-strategist, is a naval expert at the Center for a New American Security. O’Brien is
partner at Larson O’Brien LLP, served as a national security advisor to Scott Walker, Mitt Romney, and
Ted Cruz during their presidential campaigns) "Trump Acts To Revitalize America’s Defense Industrial
Base," Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2017/07/trump-acts-to-revitalize-americas-
defense-industrial-base/
Only America has the
That he chose to sign the executive order on the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier Friday carries real symbolism.
capacity to build a super carrier. The Russians want such ships but cannot construct them and even the
6
Chinese, with all of their recently-acquired shipbuilding prowess, are years away from replicating the Ford-
class carriers that will soon enter America’s fleet. But this technological and manufacturing edge can no longer be taken
for granted as the nation’s DIB becomes increasingly fragile .
DIB is profitable
DOD, March 2017, (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy)
REPORT TO CONGRESS Fiscal Year 2016 Annual Industrial Capabilities,
https://www.businessdefense.gov/Portals/51/Documents/Resources/2016%20AIC%20RTC%2006-27-
17%20-%20Public%20Release.pdf?ver=2017-06-30-144825-160
The broader Aerospace and Defense (A&D) sector has outperformed the market since 2006, with the gap
widening significantly since 2012. By most financial standards and metrics, the defense industrial base is financially
healthy, but there are weaknesses inside the numbers. The companies that make up the defense industrial base can be segregated into four
distinct tiers: system integrators, major subsystem suppliers, significant component suppliers, and pure play service providers. Major platform
prime contractors are Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon, BAE Systems, General Dynamics, and Boeing. DoD’s major subsystem
suppliers such as General Electric, Rockwell Collins, and Rolls-Royce provide vital subsystems including propulsion, command and control,
electronic warfare, and structural subsystems to DoD’s primes. Significant component suppliers such as Kirkhill and Amphenol provide
component parts including energetic and structural materials, microelectronics, cables, and connectors for prime and major subsystem
providers. Pure play service suppliers such as Microsoft, CACI, Range Generation Next, and Engility Corporation provide a wide variety of
services from janitorial and maintenance to advanced analyses and design engineering. As presented in Figure 1, all tiers of the defense
industrial base are profitable.1 Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization (EBITDA) is a standard financial
measure of a company’s structural health. By excluding expenses such as taxes and interest, it focuses on core business expenses and revenues,
and all tiers show positive margins.
7
Arms sales high

Arms sales are growing
Samuel Stebbins, 2-21-2019, "Military spending: 20 companies profiting the most from war," USA
TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2019/02/21/military-spending-defense-contractors-
profiting-from-war-weapons-sales/39092315/
There was a 1.1 percent increase in global military spending in 2017 , according to the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute. The global rise was driven partially by a $9.6 billion hike in U.S. arms expenditure – the United States is the world’s largest
defense spender by a wide margin. Though it is yet unclear what the growing arms investments will mean for international relations, major
defense contractors around the world stand to benefit. Total
arms sales among the world’s 100 largest defense contractors topped $398
billion in 2017 after climbing for the third consecutive year . Notably, Russia, one of the countries with the fastest growing
militaries over the last decade, became the second largest arms-producing country, overtaking the United Kingdom for the first time since 2002.
The United States’ position as the top arms-producing nation in the world remains unchanged, and for now unchallenged. The United States is
home to five of the world’s 10 largest defense contractors, and American companies account for 57 percent of total arms
sales by the world’s 100 largest defense contractors, based on SIPRI data.
Arms sales are at record highs

A. Trevor Thrall and Caroline Dorminey, March 13, 2018 (associate professor at the Schar School
of Policy and Government at George Mason University and a senior fellow at the Cato Institute. Caroline
Dorminey is a policy analyst at the Cato Institute) Risky Business The Role of Arms Sales in U.S.
Foreign Policy, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa-836.pdf
U.S. arms sales policy is out of control. Since
2002, the United States has sold more than $197 billion worth of
major conventional weapons and related military support to 167 countries . In just his first year in office, President
Donald Trump inked arms deals at a record pace, generating hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of
potential sales
Exports up – bosting the defense industrial base

McBride 18 Courtney McBride. Wall Street Journal (Online); New York, N.Y. [New York, N.Y]08
Nov 2018: n/a. U.S. Weapons Transfers, Pushed by Trump, Rise by 13%; State Department: U.S. sold
$192 billion in arms in fiscal 2018
Exports of U.S.-made weapon systems increased 13% over the last year following a concerted effort by the
Trump administration to boost the transfers in support of the defense industrial base, the State
Department said Thursday. While not the highest sales figures ever posted, officials said they expected sales to continue
rising as the U.S. links its economic and security policies. "We're very happy with these numbers, and we expect
significant momentum and an upward trajectory of these numbers, given that a lot of these
reforms will continue over the next years," a senior State Department official told The Wall Street Journal.
8
Taiwan Sales
Sales to Taiwan are growing
Colby Goodman, 3-1-2017, (director of the Security Assistance Monitor at the Center for International
Policy where he leads research and analysis on U.S. foreign security assistance around the world.)
"Commerce Department Boosts Arms Sales Deliveries to Record High," LobeLog,
https://lobelog.com/commerce-department-boosts-arms-sales-deliveries-to-record-high/
The major jump in U.S. commercial arms sales deliveries from FY 2014 to FY 2015 comes in part from noticeable
increases to the Asian countries of Australia, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. In FY 2014, for instance, U.S.
companies delivered $8.8 million worth of arms to Taiwan through the Direct Commercial Sales program. In
calendar year 2015, U.S. companies delivered a total of $127 million in arms to the country through the 600 Series program, according to data
released by the Commerce Department. U.S. companies also delivered relatively high-dollar amounts of arms through the 600 Series program to
Germany, Israel, Iraq, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates in 2015.
9
AT domestic industry
Taiwan’s defense industry won’t trade off
J.R. Wu, 5-12-2017, "Taiwan to continue buying arms from United States, boosting U.S. jobs," U.S.,
Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-usa/taiwan-to-continue-buying-arms-from-united-
states-boosting-u-s-jobs-idUSKBN1880AL
Taiwan said that despite its own efforts to build up an indigenous defense, “this will not affect our
military procurement from the U.S.” and that it would continue to procure goods, including military
hardware.
10
AT Thumpers
NDAA solves raw material dependence
Jeffery A. Green, 1-24-2019, (president of J.A. Green & Company, a government relations firm based
in Washington, D.C. He previously served with the House Armed Services Committee and the Defense
Department.) “Industrial Base Gears Up for Great Power Conflict" National Defense,
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2019/1/24/viewpoint-industrial-base-gears-up-for-great-
power-conflict
The push to secure the defense industrial base was advanced greatly by the recently-passed National Defense
Authorization Act. For example, section 871 of the NDAA prohibits the Defense Department and its contractors from acquiring certain sensitive
materials, including rare earth magnets, from non-allied foreign nations including China, Russia and Iran. Once fully implemented in
regulations, this language will help catalyze a resurgence in U.S. domestic production of critical minerals and
components.
US manufacturing sector is resurgent

Positive trends for the U.S. industrial base may indicate a resurgence in investment in U.S.
manufacturing. According to a recent Boston Consulting Group survey, 31% of senior U.S executives reported their
companies were “most likely” to add U.S. production capacity within the next five years. 3 Chinese
manufacturing wages have grown an average 12% annually since 2001 which when combined with U.S. labor productivity gains, is
making U.S. labor rates more competitive relative to its competitors .4 As indicated in Figure 2 it appears the
“offshoring” trend is declining and reshoring of jobs is on the rise . Of the 76% who reported likely reshoring, their primary
reason was to “shorten our supply chain.” The U.S. corporate income tax is by far the most uncompetitive factor cited by chief financial officers
in the 2016 Insourcing Survey.
US has enough skilled workers

A&D companies operating in the United States have a large high-skill talent pool upon which to draw .
These companies compete with other sectors of industry for the best talent. The U.S. student population interest in the A&D
market is positive. In 2016, 75% of engineering students surveyed by Aviation Week indicated an interest in A&D
careers due to the technological challenge and overall interest in the aircraft, defense, and space sectors .7 The
Department is continuing to address talent needs through its strong support of initiatives such as the
Manufacturing USA Institutes, 8 Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx), 9 and the MD510 National Security Technology
Accelerator.11 These initiatives provide a place for talent to gain government experience in environments
similar to industry.
11
Links
12
Taiwan- industry links
Taiwan arms sales are key to the defense industrial base

Tucker and Glaser 11 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Bonnie Glaser. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker is
Professor of History at Georgetown University and at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service.
She also is a Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the author of
Strait Talk. Bonnie Glaser is a Senior Fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS and also a
Senior Associate with the CSIS Pacific Forum. Should the United States Abandon Taiwan? The
Washington Quarterly https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/legacy_files/files/publication/twq11autumntuckerglaser.pdf
Various U.S. interests support continuing arms sales to , and close economic relations with, an autonomous Taiwan. For
instance, the U.S. defense industry profits from, and so encourages, Taiwan’s
weapons procurement. Diplomats, the Pentagon, scholars, and other analysts have argued that arms sales help Taiwan
defend itself, strengthen morale among Taiwan’s population, deter Beijing, insure Taipei has the confidence to negotiate with China, and that—if
talks go wrong—Taiwan could fight until U.S. forces arrived. Weapons
manufacturers also focus on the money and the
jobs to be had for Americans. F-16 fighter aircraft illustrate the critical significance of defense
contractors in sustaining the Taiwan relationship. George H. W. Bush, ignoring commitments to Beijing as well as objections
from within his administration, decided to sell 150 fighters to Taipei during the 1992 presidential election campaign, hoping to insure re-election
by providing a $4 billion contract and 5,800 jobs to General Dynamics’ operations in Texas.7 In 2011, a bipartisan group of 45
U.S.
senators advocating new F-16 sales and upgrades of existing aircraft not only warned President Obama that
Taiwan would be forced to ground some 70 percent of its fighters by 2020 without U.S. action, but that Lockheed Martin’s F-16
production line would shut down without orders for Taiwan. Industry analysts estimate
this would mean the loss of some 11,000 jobs in 43 states.8
13
Taiwan- Econ Links

Taiwan arms sales are key to US defense industry, jobs
J.R. Wu, 5-12-2017, "Taiwan to continue buying arms from United States, boosting U.S. jobs," U.S.,
Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-usa/taiwan-to-continue-buying-arms-from-united-
states-boosting-u-s-jobs-idUSKBN1880AL
Taiwan will continue to buy arms from the United States with its purchases boosting employment in at least six U.S. states and
narrowing the bilateral trade gap, the government has told the United States, in rare public comment sure to anger China, which claims the island
as its own. Taiwan’s military purchases “have boosted the local economy of and employment in states such
as Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Utah, Ohio and Pennsylvania,” the government said as part of the public comment process
for a 90-day trade review being conducted by the United States. Companies like Raytheon Co, Lockheed Martin Co,
Boeing Co, Sikorsky and BAE Systems PLC have benefited from Taiwan’s purchases of missile defense systems,
attack helicopters, fighter jets, and other amphibious assault vehicles, it said.
14
Link—Generic
Arms sales are key to defense industry innovation

United States Department of State, 5-21-2019, "U.S. Arms Sales and Defense Trade,"
https://www.state.gov/u-s-arms-sales-and-defense-trade/
Properly regulated defense transfers support the U.S. defense industrial base and reduce the costs of
procurement for our own military. The U.S. defense industry directly employs over 2.4 million peopl e
across our nation. These individuals and the companies they work for represent a key part of American entrepreneurship
and innovation, as they help to maintain the United States as the world leader in the defense and aerospace
sectors and ensure our armed forces sustain their military edge.
Military aid ensures the defense-industrial base

Merighi and Walton 12 Matthew Merighi is an executive officer working in the Office of the Under-
secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA). He holds a B.A. in Government and History from
Georgetown University. AND Timothy A. Walton is an associate of Delex Consulting, Studies, and Analysis and
specializes in Sino-American reciprocal force dynamics. He previously served at CSIS’ Defense-Industrial
Initiatives Group, the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project, and as a Carroll Fellow of
Georgetown University One Team, One Fight: The Need for Security Assistance Reform
http://www.delex.com/data/files/Merighi-Walton.pdf
The Value of Security Assistance Security assistance is a form of security cooperation that contains programs through which the
United
States provides defense articles and services to international organizations and foreign governments in
support of US policies and objectives. Although usually administered by the Department of Defense (DOD), specifically the Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA), these programs are legally under the control of the Department of State. Major security assistance categories
include Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Direct Commercial Sales (DCS), and International Military Education and Training. Through the FMS
process, the US government procures defense articles, services, and training on behalf of the foreign customer country, under the auspices of the
DSCA. Sizable sales also occur through the DCS process between a foreign country and a US contractor. The strategic rationale for increased
security assistance is two-fold: it empowers regional partners and allies, and it sustains the defense-industrial
base through increased US exports. US efforts during the Second World War and the US security architecture throughout the
Cold War utilized security assistance funding to bolster the defenses of regional allies against the spread of fascism and communism. Although
the Cold War has ended, US support of strategic “strong points” continues as an economical means to check power imbalances among countries
and counter state instability. Although security assistance consists of much more than arms sales, the transfer of major weapons systems does
permit the United States to access and influence various nations. For example, a
nation will not simply buy a squadron of F-16
fighters. It will send its pilots to the United States for training, bring in US contractors to conduct
maintenance and logistics activities, and engage in a strategic dialogue with the United States on the
employment of assets. Common technology and materiel builds similar Concepts of Operations (CONOPS), promoting interoperability
with nations that may later become coalition partners.
Key to defense industrial base innovation

Bureau of Political-Military Affairs 19 February 4, 2019 U.S. Arms Sales and Defense Trade
Share Fact Sheet https://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/fs/2019/288737.htm
transfers support the U.S. defense industrial base and reduce the costs of
Properly regulated defense
procurement for our own military. The U.S. defense industry directly employs almost 2.5 million people across our nation. These
individuals and the companies they work for represent a key part of American entrepreneurship and
innovation, helping to maintain the United States’ status as the world leader in the defense
and aerospace sectors and ensuring our armed forces maintain their military edge.
15
Link- Cancelations
The plan cancels a contract – that signals uncertainty which makes industry planning
impossible – raises costs of other programs which eats up R&D capital and forces
future tradeoffs by making every other procurement more expensive
Vallone, Defense Platforms manager at Avascent Analytics, 15
(Matt, HOW CONGRESS IS HAMSTRINGING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR, War on the Rocks 3-24-
15, http://warontherocks.com/2015/03/how-congress-is-hamstringing-the-defense-industrial-sector/)
What it means for industry The

combination of budget cuts and erratic budgeting has created significant
challenges for industry planning . New contracts don’t move forward , planned cancellations may live
on in limbo and costs can be driven up as schedules are stretched to reflect new timelines . Smaller firms
that may contribute parts to larger platforms are particularly at risk , as delays in orders might deprive
them of necessary revenue to maintain operations . Beyond the damage to the industrial base, these
recurring failures impose real , meaningful costs on the government, as per unit costs increase and
uncertainty makes reforms and efficiencies difficult to implement . Systems and platforms that might benefit forces
in the field take longer to reach the soldiers, sailors and airmen who need them. According to statistics from a February 28th, 2013 House
Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, hearing on the Impacts of a Continuing Resolution and
Sequestration on Acquisition, Programming, and the Industrial Base, Army procurement programs experienced a 9 percent reduction across the
board under sequestration, while the continuing resolution prevented beginning any new programs or planning any multi-year procurement.
Similarly, the Navy testified that the sequestration cuts could potentially impact over 100,000 private sector jobs. The Air Force faced delays in
starting a number of projects, such as modifications to key platforms (B-2, C-5, F-15). Lt. Gen. Charles Davis and Lt. Gen. Michael Moeller also
noted in their testimony the potential damage to the defense industrial base from all this uncertainty ,
particularly to smaller firms more vulnerable to lost revenue from delays or postponed starts. These
numbers were backed up by reporting from outside sources; the Center for Strategic and International Studies produced a report, “U.S.
Department of Defense Contract Spending and the Industrial Base, 2000-2013,” which noted that “Between 2012 and 2013, with the impact of
sequestration, defense-funded contract obligations declined by 16 percent to $314 billion.” Further on, the report notes that, “The
data
show that a disproportionate share of the budget reductions under both the BCA and sequestration has
been borne by contracts and by the defense industrial base.”
16
link—fill in
China or Russia fill in collapses the US defense industrial base
Gould 17 Joe Gould, defense news, March 13, 2017 White House plan to gut foreign military financing
would cost defense jobs, senators warn https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2017/03/13/white-house-
plan-to-gut-foreign-military-financing-would-cost-defense-jobs-senators-warn/
Andrew Shapiro, an Obama administration chief of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which has policy
authority over FMF, called
the broader State Department cuts "ill-advised" and argued for preserving FMF . If
the U.S. were to pull the grants, not only would relationships with recipient countries suffer, but defense business might go
to U.S. rivals, who offer less expensive alternatives. In Asia , where the U.S. uses FMF to promote maritime security for
may step in, and Russia and others "may try to fill the gap" in the Middle East,
allies, China
Shapiro said. "In effect, we are cutting money that would go to U.S. defense companies ," Shapiro said of the
helps maintain the U.S. defense-industrial base , it helps lower the
proposed FMF change. "It
cost for the U.S. to buy systems if there is a broader base of sales, and that impacts jobs and
communities."
17
AT sales to X country are small
DIB profit margins are small- any cut makes it harder to bounce back when needed
MICHAEL O’HANLON, February 2011, (senior fellow Brookings Institution, director of research, in Foreign
Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national
security policy. He co-directs the Security and Strategy team, the Defense Industrial Base working group, and the Africa Security
Initiative within the Foreign Policy program. Adjunct professor at Columbia, Georgetown, and Syracuse universities, and a
member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies) The National Security Industrial Base: A Crucial Asset of the United
States, Whose Future May Be in Jeopardy, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/02_defense_ohanlon.pdf
Yet theprofit margins of the defense and aerospace sectors of the economy , while hardly bad, are often only
about half of what is commonly believed due to certain costs that cannot be billed to the government and
related matters. In fact, the sector averages profit margins of five to nine percent, less than many industries that
tend to achieve margins in the teens.40 It is perhaps partly for this reason (and partly out of expectations of coming defense budget cuts) that
defense stocks are underpriced in the eyes of many. Whether this is a reasonable and fair state of affairs or not is debatable. Some suggest that
companies with a sure customer and dependable market (the U.S. government) should not be entitled to as much profit as those operating in a
more unpredictable marketplace, whereas others counter that the U.S. government is hardly a consistent customer or an easy customer to work
with. The
stakes here are high. Restoring lost assets or capabilities within the defense industrial base , while
generally feasible, can
be a slow and uncertain process. It can also be much harder than enlarging the size of a
given military service by a certain percentage. In other words, the loss of key industrial capabilities may be a greater
worry than having a force structure that proves temporarily too small . (This is not to argue for either a weak industrial
base or an inadequate force structure, only to frame the issue in terms of possible tradeoffs.) The above concern is reinforced by the fact that,
today, many companies are showing greater interest in the most lucrative and least capital-intensive parts of the DoD acquisition agenda—service
contracting, information technology, cybersecurity, and so on. To the extent they can make money in these areas, they may have less incentive
than before to sustain inherently expensive production facilities and related hardware.41
R&D depends on capital from weapons procurement projects that the plan would cut
– destroys the entire investment strategy of the defense industrial base
Erwin, editor of National Defense Magazine, 1-7-16 (Sandra, “Defense 2016: A year of big decisions”
Bloomberg Government, http://about.bgov.com/blog/defense-2016-a-year-of-big-decisions/)
The industry’s “core strategy” of boosting stock prices by returning cash to shareholders and
Investment Dilemmas
holding back on R&D investment may be sustainable for the next 18 to 24 months , after which companies may have to
reassess their options, says Pierre Chao, of Renaissance Strategic Advisors. There is a chance the Defense Department could introduce new procurement reform measures that may undermine
the industry’s current strategy by discouraging share buybacks, Chao says during a panel discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The idea that defense contractors’
financial practices are to blame for the Pentagon’s innovation shortfalls ignores economic realities, he says. “There is a misconception of what the big guys are supposed to do. Big guys are not
traditionally the sources of raw technology.” Prime contractors often wait for the innovation to come from small tech companies and then move to acquire them. The question for defense
CEOs is whether their companies can survive in the long term as “pure play” military contractors. Being entirely dependent on the government severely restricts a company’s access to capital,
Chao says. “You can’t get the debt financing that is more accessible to the larger innovation economy.” Among the few sources of cash available for defense-centric companies, other than
government contracts, are angel investors who understand the defense market, a handful of venture capitalists who are still bullish on government work, or the spin off of parts of their
The calculus in the past

business. Chao points out that the defense market today offers scant incentive to put money into independent research and development, or IRAD.
has been to “take it on the chin” on low-margin R&D work on the assumption that double-digit profits
would come later in production deals. That approach no longer works as there are fewer programs to
bid for. The recent Air Force award of a $21 billion R&D contract for a new long-range strike bomber is a once-in-a-generation opportunity, as was the joint strike fighter two decades
ago. This creates huge dilemmas for companies that have to figure out how to play in a market with
declining high-margin hardware contracts and more low-margin services . In today’s defense market, companies see few places to
put IRAD and at the same time they are compelled to cut cost to compete more aggressively. That is difficult to do when a company must maintain the
infrastructure to be a defense contractor , Chao says. These demands are going to motivate companies to
consolidate and grow larger to gain economies of scale. Mid-tier contractors in the $50 million to $3
billion range are facing the brunt of this, he says . “They need to attract capital.”
18
Spending Uncertainty
Even small cuts create uncertainty- that undermines R&D and overall DIB
DOD September 2018, (Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy)
Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency
of the United States, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-
STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-
RESILIENCY.PDF
At the macroeconomic level, defense

spending uncertainty makes predicting the overall market size difficult,
impeding forecasting across every tier in the supply chain. Uncertainty in spending inhibits investment in
capabilities even where the overall sector market size is increasing, impacting defense suppliers and
leading to revenue fluctuation, capital investment shortfalls, and suboptimal investment in R&D. Over time,
spending instability also creates peaks of surge and valleys of drought – a pernicious, ambiguous pattern
in which suppliers who build for scale production are left with excess capacity when programs end,
creating long-term market distortion.
19
Impacts
20
Heg—DIB k2 heg
Defense industrial base is key to hegemony

Daniel Gouré, 10-4-2018, (PhD, Vice President of the Lexington Institute, a thinktank, and an analyst
on national security and military issues) "Winning Future Wars: Modernization and a 21st Century
Defense Industrial Base," Heritage Foundation, https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/topical-
essays/winning-future-wars-modernization-and-21st-century-defense
The U.S. military’s ability to defeat its opponents in battle depends largely, though not exclusively, on the
equipment, weapons, and supporting capabilities that it possesses . In turn, these depend on an industrial base
that is viable and healthy enough to produce them and the relative effectiveness of new capabilities that
spring from competition in design. All of this implies some level of competitive redundancy among manufacturers that can come
only from a defense funding stream that is large enough and consistent enough to keep companies that produce the wherewithal of America’s
military power in business. To be clear: This is not some form of corporate welfare. It
is an investment in the nation’s
fundamental security. Modernization requires the ability of the military to keep place with the
technological evolution of the battlefield. A force able to modernize in turn requires an industrial base
healthy and diverse enough to develop and apply emerging technologies that are relevant to war. Failure
in either area—a weak, moribund defense industrial base or obsolete forces—means failure in war and the
fatal compromise of the nation’s security. Conversely, a healthy and effective force, made possible by a
healthy and relevant industrial base, means a secure and prosperous country .
DIB is key to military readiness

DOD September 2018, (Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Industrial Policy)
Assessing and Strengthening the Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency
of the United States, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Oct/05/2002048904/-1/-1/1/ASSESSING-AND-
STRENGTHENING-THE-MANUFACTURING-AND%20DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE-AND-SUPPLY-CHAIN-
RESILIENCY.PDF
To provide for our national security, America’s manufacturing and defense industrial base must be
secure, robust, resilient, and ready. To ensure taxpayer dollars are frugally and wisely spent, the defense industrial base
must be cost-effective, cost-efficient, highly productive, and not unduly subsidized. In the event of contingencies, the industrial
base must possess sufficient surge capabilities . Above all, America’s manufacturing and defense industrial
base must support economic prosperity, be globally competitive, and have the capabilities and capacity
to rapidly innovate and arm our military with the lethality and dominance necessary to prevail in any
conflict. As President Trump stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy: “A healthy defense industrial base is a critical
element of U.S. power and the National Security Innovation Base.† The ability of the military to surge in response to
an emergency depends on our Nation’s ability to produce needed parts and systems , healthy and secure supply
chains, and a skilled U.S. workforce.” 2
21
Strong DIB is key to global stability

Thomas Duesterberg, 10-15-2018, (PhD Indiana University, senior fellow at Hudson Institute.) "Trump
Administration Gets Serious About Defense Industrial Base," Forbes,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasduesterberg/2018/10/16/trump-administration-gets-serious-
about-defense-industrial-base/
Throughout the 20th century, the

U.S. manufacturing sector was the defining pillar of the “Arsenal of
Democracy.” The size, technological superiority and continuous innovation in this sector allowed not only the preservation
of democracy in the great conflagrations of the past century, but also the creation of the global Pax Americana that underlies one of
the longest periods of peace and unprecedented prosperity in world history. The slow decline of that
industrial superiority, however, is beginning to undermine U.S. economic vitality , as President Trump keeps reminding
us, and our ability to support the national security dominance which has been the backbone of global
stability for over a century.
22
Heg-- 2NC/1NR—dib deterrence/war—

DIB key to deterrence – solves multiple war scenarios
Watts 08 - Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (Barry, “The US
Defense Industrial Base, Past, Present and Future,”
http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20081015._The_US_Defense_In/R.20081015._T
he_US_Defense_In.pdf__)
Since the 1950s, the
US defense industrial base has been a source of long-term strategic advantage for the
United States, just as it was during World War II. American defense companies provided the bombers and
missiles on which nuclear deterrence rested and armed the US military with world-class weapons ,
including low-observable aircraft, wide-area surveillance and targeting sensors, and reliable guided
munitions cheap enough to be employed in large numbers. They also contributed to the development of modern digital
computers, successfully orbited the first reconnaissance satellites, put a man on the moon in less than a decade, and played a pivotal role in
developing the worldwide web. Critics have long emphasized President Eisenhower’s warning in his farewell television address that the nation
needed to “guard against the acquisition of undue influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.” Usually forgotten
or ignored has been an earlier, equally important, passage in Eisenhower’s January 1961 speech: A
vital element in keeping the
peace is our military establishment. Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no
potential aggressor may be tempted to risk his own destruction . Eisenhower’s warning about undue influence, rather
than the need to maintain American military strength, tends to dominate contemporary discussions of the US defense industrial base. While the
percentage of US gross domestic product going to national defense remains low compared to the 1950s and 1960s, there is a growing list of
defense programs that have experienced problems with cost, schedule, and, in a few cases, weapon performance. In fairness, the federal
government, including the Department of Defense and Congress, is at least as much to blame for many of these programmatic difficulties as US
The main focus of
defense firms. Nevertheless, those critical of the defense industry tend to concentrate on these acquisition shortcomings.
this report is on a larger question. How prepared is the US defense industrial base to meet the needs of the
US military Services in coming decades? The Cold War challenge of Soviet power has largely ebbed, but new challenges
have emerged. There is the immediate threat of the violence stemming from SalafiTakfiri and Khomeinist terrorist
groups and their state sponsors, that have consumed so much American blood and treasure in Iraq; the longer-term challenge of
authoritarian capitalist regimes epitomized by the rise of China and a resurgent Russia; and, not least, the worsening
problem of proliferation, particularly of nuclear weapons. In the face of these more complex and varied challenges,
it would surely be premature to begin dismantling the US defense industry . From a competitive perspective, therefore,
the vital question about the defense industrial base is whether it will be as much a source of long-term
advantage in the decades ahead as it has been since the 1950s .
23
Conflict breakout is inevitable which flips try or die calculus negative – maintaining
stable defense budgets ensures we can control impact escalation – now is the key
time to fund the industrial base
Hudson and Gerard 13 Linda P. Hudson is president and CEO of BAE Systems Inc. Leo W. Gerard
is international president of United Steelworkers. Keep BAE's Bradley program rolling in York (column)
Linda P. Hudson and Leo W. Gerard UPDATED: 10/09/2013 11:50:47 AM EDT
As the past decade has shown, the
United States can be quickly drawn into conflicts around the world. To be
prepared, our country must maintain a strong and skilled defense manufacturing industry to
support the production of the equipment our troops need. But this defense base and the skilled jobs it
provides are in grave danger. Between 1998 and 2010, the country lost 57,000 manufacturing facilities and 6 million manufacturing jobs.
If this trend continues, there is a very real risk that we will permanently lose the skills required to make
much-needed equipment for the U.S. military and will need to look overseas for suppliers. As former Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta warned earlier this year, "The last damn thing we need if we face a crisis is to somehow contract out that responsibility to
another country. So we
have to maintain the core industrial base that we need. The skills are essential to our
ability to maintain a strong national defense." A prime example of this danger to both our economy and national security is
the threatened shutdown of the Bradley Industrial Base, consisting of the York, Pa., facility where BAE Systems manufactures the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle and the suppliers that support the program. Built to protect and transport troops, the armored vehicle is the workhorse of the
U.S. Army and the embodiment of American defense industrial base know-how and engineering: The vehicle's advanced aluminium armor and
weapons systems are produced by 7,000 skilled workers in 586 businesses across 44 states. Now, in an attempt to modernize the Bradley Fighting
Vehicle, and lasting at least three years. With production halted, the businesses that make up the Bradley Industrial Base will be unable
to employ the highly skilled workers who produce the specialized parts that keep these vehicles running. Thousands of workers will
lose their jobs, and some will move on to other fields, while their skills - unique to building combat
vehicles - will become lost or obsolete. As a result, our armed forces may end up going into harm's way
without equipment manufactured in America and ready for today's battlefield . Since World War II, our
military - and all Americans - have relied on a highly skilled, dedicated and engaged civilian defense
labor force of engineers, designers, welders, electricians, machinists and pipe fitters . Like a well-prepared combat
team, this labor force - nearly 625,000 people - is continuously training in order to maintain their technological
superiority. As new technologies are developed to address the ever-changing threats from our enemy, this
labor force acquires new skills to keep pace and meet the military's needs . Now these workers, the products
they make, the incomes their families and communities depend on and America's ability to defend itself are all at risk . As a
nation, we must make it a priority to ensure the strength of the Army's combat vehicle program and the
skilled defense industrial base jobs that support this crucial capability. The Army can help the Bradley
Industrial Base in the near term simply by spending the $288 million provided last year to allow industry to
perform its requirements, which ensure that older vehicles are upgraded with the latest technology our troops need. In
the longer term, the Army should work with industry to ensure that our troops can meet the missions they
might face, while providing industry with the stability to sustain the skilled jobs needed to respond to
future. Dwindling budgets and the desire for short-term financial gains are threatening America's
"arsenal of democracy" and with it our economy. The skilled men and women of the defense manufacturing industry do
work that allows us to fly the red, white and blue, and they must not be pink-slipped. Equipping our military is too important to
outsource - our economy, our national security and our fellow Americans count on it .
24
Defense industrial base is deterrence

O’Hanlon et al 12 (Mackenzie Eaglen, American Enterprise Institute Rebecca Grant, IRIS Research
Robert P. Haffa, Haffa Defense Consulting Michael O'Hanlon, The Brookings Institution Peter W.
Singer, The Brookings Institution Martin Sullivan, Commonwealth Consulting Barry Watts, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments “The Arsenal of Democracy and How to Preserve It: Key Issues in
Defense Industrial Policy January 2012,”
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2012/1/26%20defense%20industrial
%20base/0126_defense_industrial_base_ohanlon)
The current wave of defense cuts is also different than past defense budget reductions in their likely industrial impact, as the
U.S. defense
industrial base is in a much different place than it was in the past. Defense industrial issues are too often
viewed through the lens of jobs and pet projects to protect in congressional districts . But the overall
health of the firms that supply the technologies our armed forces utilize does have national security
resonance. Qualitative superiority in weaponry and other key military technology has become an essential
element of American military power in the modern era—not only for winning wars but for deterring them.
That requires world-class scientific and manufacturing capabilities—which in turn can also generate
civilian and military export opportunities for the United States in a globalized marketplace.
Defense industrial base is a prerequisite to all forms of deterrence

Eaglen and Sayers 09 (Mackenzie M. Eaglen and Eric Sayers, “Maintaining the Superiority of
America’s Defense Industrial Base,” pg online Heritage Backgrounder, No. 2276 May 22, 2009)
The Foundation of American Military Strength
Since World War II, the United States has benefited from the skills of a robust defense industrial and
manufacturing workforce. Over six decades, various U.S. defense strategies have emphasized the benefits of
a technologically superior military to help deter and win wars. This “technical overmatch” has been
pursued by the U.S. military for decades in an attempt to deter potential enemies from engaging the
U.S. in conflict and to reduce risk and the loss of life on the battlefield . The ability to maintain
America’s military technological edge reflects the superior efficiency of America’s defense industry .
America’s capital-intensive Air Force and Navy operate the world’s best fighter aircraft, long-range bombers, aircraft carriers, destroyers,
cruisers, and submarines. Similarly, the Army is building a host of next-generation platforms, including tanks and attack helicopters, that will
allow it to complete its missions. This is also the case in platform systems and areas such as lowobservable and very-low-observable
technologies, submarine quieting, acoustic detection, digital-signal processing for a range of applications, active electronically scanned arrays,
near-real-time sensorto-shooter targeting connectivity, and allweather guided munitions.2 Although
technology alone has not
assured American military superiority, the defense industry has nevertheless been a potent enabler of
American military might. The base of this power can be found in a series of core capabilities that the
U.S. has been able to maintain and continue to modernize over recent decades. These include, among
others, air dominance, strategic lift, the ability to project power throughout and beyond the world’s
oceans, counterinsurgency proficiency, and the ability to seize and control land. Maintaining these
capabilities has enabled the soldier, sailor, airman, and Marine to remain adequately prepared for a full
spectrum of potential operations.
25
Defense industrial growth controls all aspects of relevant power

Taylor 04 (Mark, Professor of Political Science – Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “The Politics
of Technological Change: International Relations versus Domestic Institutions”, 4-1,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/46554792/Taylor)
Technological innovation is of central importance to the study of international relations (IR), affecting almost
every aspect of the sub-field. 2 First and foremost, a nation’s technological capability has a significant effect on
its economic growth, industrial might, and military prowess; therefore relative national technological
capabilities necessarily influence the balance of power between states , and hence have a role in
calculations of war and alliance formation. Second, technology and innovative capacity also determine a nation’s trade profile,
affecting which products it will import and export, as well as where multinational corporations will base their production facilities. 3 Third,
insofar as innovation-driven economic growth both attracts investment and produces surplus capital, a nation’s technological ability
will also affect international financial flows and who has power over them. 4 Thus, in broad theoretical terms,
technological change is important to the study of IR because of its overall implications for both the relative and absolute power of states. And if
theory alone does not convince, then history
also tells us that nations on the technological ascent generally
experience a corresponding and dramatic change in their global stature and influence , such as Britain
during the first industrial revolution, the United States and Germany during the second industrial revolution, and Japan during the twentieth
century. 5 Conversely, great powers which fail to maintain their place at the technological frontier generally
drift and fade from influence on international scene . 6 This is not to suggest that technological innovation alone determines
international politics, but rather that shifts in both relative and absolute tech nological capability have a major impact
on international relations, and therefore need to be better understood by IR scholars. Indeed, the importance of technological
innovation to international relations is seldom disputed by IR theorists . Technology is rarely the sole or overriding
causal variable in any given IR theory, but a broad overview of the major theoretical debates reveals the ubiquity of technological causality. For
example, from Waltz to Posen, almost all Realists have a place for technology in their explanations of international politics. 7 At the very least,
they describe it as an essential part of the distribution of material capabilities across nations, or an indirect source of military doctrine. And for
some, like Gilpin quoted above, technology
is the very cornerstone of great power domination , and its transfer
the main vehicle by which war and change occur in world politics. 8 Jervis tells us that the balance of
offensive and defensive military technology affects the incentives for war. 9 Walt agrees, arguing that
technological change can alter a state’s aggregate power, and thereby affect both alliance formation and the
international balance of threats. 10 Liberals are less directly concerned with technological change, but they must admit that by raising
or lowering the costs of using force, technological progress affects the rational attractiveness of international cooperation and regimes. 11
Technology also lowers information & transactions costs and thus increases the applicability of
international institutions, a cornerstone of Liberal IR theory. 12 And in fostering flows of trade, finance, and information,
technological change can lead to Keohane’s interdependence 13 or Thomas Friedman et al’s globalization. 14 Meanwhile, over at the “third
debate”, Constructivists cover the causal spectrum on the issue , from Katzenstein’s “cultural norms” which shape security
concerns and thereby affect technological innovation; 15 to Wendt’s “stripped down technological determinism” in which technology
inevitably drives nations to form a world state. 16 However most Constructivists seem to favor Wendt,
arguing that new technology changes people’s identities within society , and sometimes even creates new cross-
national constituencies, thereby affecting international politics. 17 Of course, Marxists tend to see technology as
determining all social relations and the entire course of history, though they describe mankind’s major fault lines as
running between economic classes rather than nation-states. 18 Finally, Buzan & Little remind us that without advances in the technologies of
transportation, communication, production, and war, international systems would not exist in the first place
26
Climate Change- 1NC

Defense industrial base is key to clean, renewable energy
Hendricks et al. 11 Bracken Hendricks is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress who works at the
interface of global warming solutions and economic development. Hendricks served as an advisor to the campaign and transition
team of President Barack Obama and was an architect of clean energy portions of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
He also served in the Clinton administration as special assistant to the Office of Vice President Al Gore, with the Department of
Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and with the President’s Council on Sustainable Development.
AND Sean Pool is an Assistant Editor at the Center for American Progress at the Center’s Science Progress project. Sean’s policy
work has focused on how regional- and state-level climate change policies and existing federal authority can be leveraged to
drive demand for clean energy technologies and grow the clean economy. He also recently authored a report on the processes and
participants of environmental technology innovation and opportunities for federal involvement. Before coming to CAP Sean
researched voluntary and policy-driven carbon markets at the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy, the Yale Office of
Sustainability, and the Australia National University Green Office in Canberra. AND Lisbeth Kaufman is a Special Assistant at
the Center for American Progress, where she works with the Energy Opportunity team on issues of technology deployment and
innovation in clean energy markets. She joined CAP after working as a consultant, researcher, and policy analyst for private-
sector clients, specializing in the financial services and energy industry. She also worked for a venture capital firm directing
programming on investment in sustainable agriculture. Lisbeth graduated from Yale University in 2008 with a B.A. in East Asian
Studies and served as a fellow in Tibet, focusing on education policy . Low-carbon Innovation A Uniquely American
Strategy for Industrial Renewal https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-
content/uploads/issues/2011/05/pdf/gcn_low_carbon.pdf
Leverage our defense industrial base and research infrastructure for clean energy The Department of
Defense, which includes America’s armed services as well as our military technology research operations under the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or DARPA, is the largest consumer of energy in the world. The DOD spent $3.4
billion on energy in fiscal year 2007, the most recent year complete data are available.53 This means the military has a big stake
as a consumer of energy in creating the opportunity to drive demand for cleaner technologies.
What’s more, the Department of Defense for many years has been the one part of the U.S. government that has actually
conducted what could be viewed as coordinated industrial policy, and this should inform any technology-
driven innovation strategies in clean energy. For the first time, the military identified addressing climate
change as a critical priority for reducing “instability and conflict” in the Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010.54 The Air
Force, Army, Navy, and Marines have all undertaken programs to increase installation of energy-
efficiency systems and to utilize emerging renewable energy technologies in military facilities.55 A report put out by the Pew
Charitable Trusts observed that Navy officials are planning for half of the service’s fuel to come from non-fossil-fuel sources by 2020.56
Meanwhile, the Army is constructing a 500-megawatt solar power generation plant in California, and the Marine Corps has launched a campaign
aimed at reducing energy intensity and water consumption, and increasing the use of renewable energy.57 These efforts will not only help
create market pull for clean energy technologies but will also help build new strategic capabilities
for our fighters abroad by reducing their dependence on petroleum supply lines. Congress should maintain
funding for these efforts as well as ensure the services share ideas and successes. The Department of Defense has a long history
of successfully connecting researchers, manufacturers, and investors with customers for strategically
important technology. The DOD Manufacturing Technology Program, or “ManTech” for short, identifies strategically important
technologies that need scale and skilled workers in order to attract private investments, and it connects the dots to help drive
priority technologies through the innovation lifecycle.58’
27
Warming causes extinction

Pachauri and Meyer 15 (Rajendra K. Pachauri Chairman of the IPCC, Leo Meyer Head, Technical Support
Unit IPCC were the editors for this IPCC report, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report”
http://epic.awi.de/37530/1/IPCC_AR5_SYR_Final.pdf IPCC, 2014:
Climate projected rates of climate change in most landscapes; most small mammals and freshwater molluscs will not be able to
keep up at the rates projected under RCP4.5 and above in flat landscapes in this century (high confidence). Future risk is indicated to be high by
natural global climate change at rates lower than current anthropogenic climate change
the observation that
caused significant ecosystem shifts and species extinctions during the past millions of years . Marine
organisms will face progressively lower oxygen levels and high rates and magnitudes of ocean
acidification (high confidence), with associated risks exacerbated by rising ocean temperature extremes
(medium confidence). Coral reefs and polar ecosystems are highly vulnerable . Coastal systems and low-lying areas are at
risk from sea level rise, which will continue for centuries even if the global mean temperature is stabilized (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, Figure
2.5} Climate change is projected to undermine food security (Figure SPM.9). Due to projected climate change by the
mid-21st century and beyond, global marine species redistribution and marine biod iversity reduction in sensitive
regions will challenge the sustained provision of fisheries productivity and other ecosystem services (high
confidence). For wheat, rice and maize in tropical and temperate regions , climate change without
adaptation is projected to negatively impact production for local temperature increases of 2°C or more above late 20th
century levels, although individual locations may benefit (medium confidence). Global temperature increases of ~4°C or more
13 above late 20th century levels, combined with increasing food demand, would pose large risks to food security
globally (high confidence). Climate change is projected to reduce renewable surface water and groundwater
resources in most dry subtropical regions (robust evidence, high agreement), intensifying competition for water among
sectors (limited evidence, medium agreement). {2.3.1, 2.3.2} Until mid-century, projected climate change will impact human
health mainly by exacerbating health problems that already exist (very high confidence). Throughout the 21st century,
climate change is expected to lead to increases in ill-health in many regions and especially in developing
countries with low income, as compared to a baseline without climate change (high confidence). By 2100 for RCP8.5, the
combination of high temperature and humidit y in some areas for parts of the year is expected to compromise
common human activities, including growing food and working outdoors (high confidence). {2.3.2} In urban
areas climate change is projected to increase risks for people, assets, economies and ecosystems , including
risks from heat stress, storms and extreme precipitation, inland and coastal flooding, landslides, air
pollution, drought, water scarcity, sea level rise and storm surges (very high confidence). These risks are
amplified for those lacking essential infrastructure and services or living in exposed areas. {2.3.2} Rural areas are
expected to experience major impacts on water availability and supply, food security, infrastructure and
agricultural incomes, including shifts in the production areas of food and non-food crops around the world (high confidence). {2.3.2}
Aggregate economic losses accelerate with increasing temperature (limited evidence, high agreement), but global
economic impacts from climate change are currently difficult to estimate. From a poverty perspective, climate change
impacts are projected to slow down economic growth , make poverty reduction more difficult, further
erode food security and prolong existing and create new poverty traps, the latter particularly in urban areas and
emerging hotspots of hunger (medium confidence). International dimensions such as trade and relations among states are also important for
understanding the risks of climate change at regional scales. {2.3.2} Climate
change is projected to increase displace ment
of people (medium evidence, high agreement). Populations that lack the resources for planned migration
experience higher exposure to extreme weather events, particularly in developing countries with low income .
Climate change can indirectly increase risks of violent conflicts by amplifying well-documented drivers
of these conflicts such as poverty and economic shocks (medium confidence). {2.3.2} Change 2014: Synthesis Report.
Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing
Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pp) SPM 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate
28
Climate change will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human systems . Risks
are unevenly distributed and are generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all
levels of development. {2.3} Risk of climate-related impacts results from the interaction of climate-related
hazards (including hazardous events and trends) with the vulnerability and exposure of human and natural systems ,
including their ability to adapt. Rising rates and magnitudes of warming and other changes in the climate system,
accompanied by ocean acidification, increase the risk of severe, pervasive and in some cases irreversible
detrimental impacts. Some risks are particularly relevant for individual regions (Figure SPM.8), while others are global. The overall risks
of future climate change impacts can be reduced by limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change , including
ocean acidification. The precise levels of climate change sufficient to trigger abrupt and irreversible change remain
uncertain, but the risk associated with crossing such thresholds increases with rising temperature
(medium confidence). For risk assessment, it is important to evaluate the widest possible range of impacts,
including low-probability outcomes with large consequences . {1.5, 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, Box Introduction.1, Box 2.3, Box 2.4} A
large fraction of species faces increased extinction risk due to climate change during and beyond the 21st century,
especially as climate change interacts with other stressors (high confidence). Most plant species cannot naturally
shift their geographical ranges sufficiently fast to keep up with current and high
29
2NC/1NR Warming = ext

Warming assures extinction – only clean energy can solve
The Guardian 18 Fossil fuel dependence poses 'direct existential threat', warns UN chief This article
is more than 6 months old A rapid global shift to clean energy is needed to prevent runaway climate
change, says António Guterres https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/11/fossil-fuel-
dependence-poses-direct-existential-threat-warns-un-chief
United Nations secretary general António Guterres has warned that the world is facing “a direct
existential threat” and must rapidly shift from dependence on fossil fuels by 2020 to prevent
“runaway climate change”.
Guterres called the crisis urgent and decried the lack of global leadership to address global warming.
“Climate change is moving faster than we are,” Guterres said on Monday. “We need to put the brake on
deadly greenhouse gas emissions and drive climate action.”
He said people everywhere are experiencing record-breaking temperatures and extreme heatwaves,
wildfires, storms and floods “are leaving a trail of death and devastation”.
As examples, Guterres pointed to Kerala, India’s worst monsoon flooding in recent history, almost 3,000
deaths from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico last year, disappearing Arctic sea ice, some wildfires so big
that they send ash around the world, oceans becoming more acidic threatening food chains, and high
carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere threatening food security for billions of people.
Guterres said scientists have been warning about global warming for decades, but “far too many leaders have refused to listen, far too few have acted with the vision the science demands”.
When some 190 nations signed the 2015 Paris agreement on climate change they agreed to limit the global temperature increase by 2100 to less than 2C and as close as possible to 1.5C.
“These targets were the bare minimum to avoid the worst impacts of climate change,” Guterres said. “But scientists tell us that we are far off track.”
“According to a UN study, the commitments made so far by parties to the Paris agreement represent just one-third of what is needed,” the secretary general said.
Guterres said the mountain that needs to be climbed is very high but not insurmountable.
“We need to rapidly shift away from our dependence on fossil fuels,” he said. “We need to replace them
with clean energy from water, wind and sun. We must halt deforestation, restore degraded forests
and change the way we farm.”
30
2NC/1NR Solves climate change ext

US defense industry is key to cutting emissions
AIA, 5-5-2017, (Aerospace Industries Association) "Aerospace and Defense Industry Remains a Leader
on Environmental Stewardship," https://www.aia-aerospace.org/aerospace-and-defense-industry-remains-
a-leader-on-environmental-stewardship/
Nearly a decade ago, in 2009, the aviation
sector led an unprecedented effort to voluntarily agree to significantly cut
its carbon dioxide emissions, including carbon neutral growth. Thanks to years of work by experts from across governments, industry, and NGOs, the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and its 191-member countries were the first in the transportation sector to set international climate goals and
establish a strategy for achieving those ambitions. Targets from this effort included improving fuel efficiency by an average of 1.5
percent per year from 2009 to 2020; stabilizing emissions from 2020 with carbon-neutral growth; and reducing
net carbon emissions from aviation by 50 percent by 2050 compared to 2005 levels – all of which are especially
significant when considering the relatively small contributor the A&D industry is (3 percent) of global emissions. In that same article, readers were reminded
that, “This assurance demonstrates that our industry is thoroughly committed to reducing our impact on the environment
and the international body of ICAO is the venue where global aviation agreements and action can be accomplished.” In the last year, significant global agreements
have been cemented at ICAO, representing not only important milestones for our environmental protection, but illustrating our tremendous technological
improvement, and solidifying these commitments to our global partners. Today, American manufacturers are leading the way , again
capitalizing on their innovative nature to identify other opportunities to shrink our footprint and drive increased efficiency. We continue to focus on new design
advancements that will lead to reduction in noise and other emissions. And we continue to partner with airlines, operators, and federal agencies to incorporate new
technologies and systems into flight operations and navigation systems that will drive further fuel-efficient advancements in air travel. Fuel-efficiency
is a
driver for our industry, but environmental stewardship is a driver for our world. Whether making our country more secure and globally
competitive, enhancing aviation safety, extending the horizons of exploration and research, or driving the edge of innovation, America’s Aerospace and
Defense industry is at the core of the nation’s economic strength and prosperity . As a leader in the American economy,
we take our responsibility to also leading the way on sustainability and innovation seriously. Our leadership on those issues and to
our global commitments remain unwavering.
Defense industry climate innovation spills over to commercial markets

Eugene Gholz, Fall 2014, (associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame. He works
primarily at the intersection of national security and economic policy, on subjects including innovation, defense
management, and U.S. grand strategy. From 2010-2012, he served in the Pentagon as Senior Advisor to the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base Policy.) "Military Innovation and the
Prospects for Defense-Led Energy Innovation," Issues in Science and Technology, https://issues.org/military-
innovation-and-the-prospects-for-defense-led-energy-innovation/
Fortunately, the U.S. government has a track record of success with developing technologies to address another public good. Innovation is a hallmark
of the U.S. military. The technology that U.S. soldiers, sailors, and airmen bring to war far outclasses adversaries’. Even as Americans complain
about challenges of deploying new military equipment, always wishing that technical solutions could do more and would arrive faster to the field, they also take
justifiable pride in the U.S. defense industry’s routine exploitation of technological opportunities . Perhaps that
industry’s technology savvy could be harnessed to develop low-emissions technologies . And perhaps the
Defense Department’s hefty purse could purchase enough to drive the innovations down the learning
curve, so that they could then compete in commercial markets as low-cost solutions, too. That potential has
attracted considerable interest in defense-led energy innovation. In fact, in 2008, one of the first prominent proposals to use defense acquisition to reduce energy
demand came from the Defense Science Board, a group of expert advisors to the Department of Defense (DOD) itself. The DSB reported, “By addressing its own fuel
demand, DoD can serve as a stimulus for new energy efficiency technologies…. If DoD were to invest in technologies that improved efficiency at a level
commensurate with the value of those technologies to its forces and warfighting capability, it would probably become a technology incubator and provide mature
technologies to the market place for industry to adopt for commercial purposes.” Various think tanks took up the call from there, ranging from the CNA Corporation
(which includes the Center for Naval Analyses) to the Pew Charitable Trusts’ Project on National Security, Energy and Climate. Ultimately, the then–Deputy
Assistant to the President for Energy and Climate Change, Heather Zichal, proclaimed her hope for defense-led energy innovation on the White House blog in 2013.
These advocates
hope not only to use the model of successful military innovation to stimulate innovation for
green technologies but to actually use the machinery of defense acquisition to implement their plan . They
particularly hope that the DOD will use its substantial procurement budget to pull the development of new energy technologies. Even when the defense budget faces
cuts as the government tries to address its debt problem, other kinds of government discretionary investment are even more threatened, making defense ever more
attractive to people who hope for new energy technologies.
31
Economy- 1NC
Taiwan sales are key to narrowing the trade deficit- key to the economy
Mark Karlin, 12-17-2015, "Weapons Sales to Taiwan Show That for the US, Arming the World Is
Profitable," Buzzflash, http://buzzflash.com/commentary/latest-weapons-sales-to-taiwan-symbolize-that-
arming-the-world-is-profitable-us-export
Before returning to the
sales of weapons - including two warships - to Taiwan, it's telling to look at the US
export/import gap. Although the trade deficit narrowed in September, the ongoing large trade gap that the US has
experienced for years is likely to increase in the long run , according to The Wall Street Journal: "The broader trend
in the real goods deficit points to the likelihood that net trade will be a drag on growth in coming
quarters," Barclays economist Jesse Hurwitz said in a note to clients. "With slower growth abroad dampening demand for U.S. exports and
solid domestic consumption supporting imports, we do not expect the deficit to continue to narrow in the coming months." The US government
Bureau of Economic Analysis issued a news release on December 4 that offered insight into the gaping US trade chasm: "The average goods and
services deficit increased $0.5 billion to $45.1 billion [per month] for the three months ending in October." Given this economic context, the
US government sees the domestic armaments industry as one of the few "stars" in keeping the import/export
deficit from widening even more. As a result, it's basically official US policy to assist US "defense contractors" in selling weapons of
war abroad, thus inflaming the potential for conflict. Although there are certainly political advocates for arming Taiwan, dating back to the days
when China was touted as a Communist foe - before it became a one-party capitalist provider of inexpensive labor and products to the United
States - it is certain that the cash that will be paid by the island nation is a key factor in the arms sales
32
Econ decline causes global wars

Liu 18 Qian Liu, China-based economist. “From economic crisis to World War III.” Project Syndicate.
11/8/2018. https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/economic-crisis-military-conflict-or-
structural-reform-by-qian-liu-2018-11
The next economic crisis is closer than you think. But what you should really worry about is what comes after: in
the current social,
political, and technological landscape, a prolonged economic crisis, combined with rising income
inequality, could well escalate into a major global military conflict . The 2008-09 global financial
crisis almost bankrupted governments and caused systemic collapse . Policymakers managed to pull the
global economy back from the brink, using massive monetary stimulus, including quantitative easing and near-zero
(or even negative) interest rates. But monetary stimulus is like an adrenaline shot to jump-start an arrested heart; it can revive the
patient, but it does nothing to cure the disease. Treating a sick economy requires structural reforms, which can cover everything from financial
and labour markets to tax systems, fertility patterns, and education policies. Policymakers have utterly failed to pursue such reforms, despite
promising to do so. Instead, they have remained preoccupied with politics. From Italy to Germany, forming and sustaining governments now
seems to take more time than actual governing. Greece, for example, has relied on money from international creditors to keep its head (barely)
above water, rather than genuinely reforming its pension system or improving its business environment. The lack of structural reform has
meant that the unprecedented excess liquidity that central banks injected into their economies was not allocated to its most efficient uses.
Instead, it raised global asset prices to levels even higher than those prevailing before 2008. In the United States, housing prices are now 8%
higher than they were at the peak of the property bubble in 2006, according to the property website Zillow. The price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio,
which measures whether stock-market prices are within a reasonable range, is now higher than it was both in 2008 and at the start of the Great
Depression in 1929. As monetary tightening reveals the vulnerabilities in the real economy, the collapse of asset-price bubbles will trigger
another economic crisis – one that could be even more severe than the last, because we have built up a tolerance to our strongest
macroeconomic medications. A decade of regular adrenaline shots, in the form of ultra-low interest rates and unconventional monetary
policies, has severely depleted their power to stabilise and stimulate the economy. If history is any guide, the
consequences of this
mistake could extend far beyond the economy . According to Harvard’s Benjamin Friedman, prolonged
periods of economic distress have been characterised also by public antipathy toward minority
groups or foreign countries – attitudes that can help to fuel unrest, terrorism, or even
war. For example, during the Great Depression, US President Herbert Hoover signed the 1930 Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act, intended to protect American workers and farmers from foreign competition. In the subsequent five years, global trade shrank by two-
thirds. Within a decade, World War II had begun. To be sure, WWII, like World War I, was caused by a multitude of factors;
there is no standard path to war. But there is reason to believe that high levels of inequality can play a significant role in stoking conflict.
According to research by the economist Thomas Piketty, a spike in income inequality is often followed by a
great crisis. Income inequality then declines for a while, before rising again, until a new peak – and a new disaster. Though causality has yet
to be proven, given the limited number of data points, this correlation should not be taken lightly, especially with wealth and income inequality
at historically high levels. This is all the more worrying in view of the numerous other factors stoking social unrest and diplomatic tension,
including technological disruption, a record-breaking migration crisis, anxiety over globalisation, political polarisation, and rising nationalism. All
are symptoms of failed policies that could turn out to be trigger points for a future crisis. Voters have good reason to be frustrated, but the
emotionally appealing populists to whom they are increasingly giving their support are offering ill-advised solutions that will
only make matters worse. For example, despite the world’s unprecedented interconnectedness,
multilateralism is increasingly being eschewed, as countries – most notably, Donald J. Trump’s US – pursue
unilateral, isolationist policies. Meanwhile, proxy wars are raging in Syria and Yemen. Against this background,
we must take seriously the possibility that the next economic crisis could lead to a large-scale
military confrontation. By the logic of the political scientist Samuel Huntington, considering such a scenario could help us
avoid it because it would force us to take action. In this case, the key will be for policymakers to pursue the structural reforms that they have
long promised while replacing finger-pointing and antagonism with a sensible and respectful global dialogue. The alternative may well be global
conflagration.
33
2NC/1NR K2 growth ext
Technological innovation and corresponding private sector multiplier effect

Saluja 8/17/15 – Kulwant, staffwriter for MarketWatch, “Cutting defense spending could hurt
economy, Bernanke warns” http://www.marketwatch.com/story/cutting-defense-spending-could-hurt-
economy-bernanke-warns-2015-08-17
WASHINGTON — Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke

warned Monday that reduced defense spending could
have adverse long-term economic impacts , including undermining tech nological innovations that
ultimately produce jobs in the private sector . Speaking at a Brookings Institution event, Bernanke said, “By far the most
important (impact), certainly in the U nited S tates, has been the linkage between defense military
appropriations and broader technological trends . “That is one of the major sources of U.S. growth
over time. We remain a technological leader. That’s one of our national strengths .” Bernanke cited as
examples the Manhattan Project and the creation of the D efense A dvanced R esearch P rojects A gency, the precursor to
the Internet. “One innovation I really like is laser surgery ,” Bernanke said. “There has since been something like
55,000 patents related to laser technology . Things that have come out have been laser surgery, DVDs, barcodes.” “If the
same money had been spent on basic science that would have probably been an even better strategy ,
that would be even better … but the political system is not good at making long-run investments with
uncertain impacts, ” he said.
Defense cuts are a negative on economic growth trends

Burke 8/18/15 – Alison, Brookings – Office of Communications, “Ben Bernanke, Michael O’Hanlon, and
Mark Muro on the future of defense spending and its economic impacts”
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/brookings-now/posts/2015/08/defense-funding-event-recap
Cuts to defense funding were not motivated by defense needs and slowed the economic recovery Ben Bernanke kicked
off the event by arguing that while defense spending is closely connected to economic growth, “generally speaking, it’s
best to keep military preparedness goals separate from the short-run cyclical [economic]
considerations.” Moreover, when it comes to the defense budget cuts made during the recent period of economic
recovery, he believes mistakes were made . Outside of the drawdown in forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Bernanke
said the cuts in military spending were not motivated by changes in defense needs and “were actually
a negative in terms of our economic recovery.”
34
Provides economic stimulus in labor and consumer markets

Feldstein 8 – Martin, of the Council of Economic Advisers under President Reagan, is a professor at
Harvard, “Defense Spending Would Be Great Stimulus”
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123008280526532053
The Department of Defense is preparing budget cuts in response to the decline in national income. The DOD budgeteers and their counterparts in the White
House Office of Management and Budget apparently reason that a smaller GDP requires belt-tightening by everyone. That logic is exactly backwards . As
President-elect Barack Obama and his economic advisers recognize, countering a deep economic recession requires an increase in
government spending to offset the sharp decline in consumer outlays and business investment that is now under
way. Without that rise in government spending, the economic downturn would be deeper and longer . Although
tax cuts for individuals and businesses can help, government spending will have to do the heavy lifting. That's why the Obama team will propose a package of about
$300 billion a year in additional federal government outlays and grants to states and local governments. A temporary rise in DOD spending on supplies, equipment
and manpower should be a significant part of that increase in overall government outlays. The same applies to the Department of Homeland Security, to the FBI,
and to other parts of the national intelligence community. The increase in government spending needs to be a short-term surge with greater outlays in 2009 and
2010 but then tailing off sharply in 2011 when the economy should be almost back to its prerecession level of activity. Buying
military supplies and
equipment, including a variety of off-the-shelf dual use items, can easily fit this surge pattern. For the military, the
increased spending will require an expanded supplemental budget for 2009 and an increased budget for 2010. A 10% increase in defense outlays
for procurement and for research would contribute about $ 20 billion a year to the overall stimulus budget. A
5% rise in spending on operations and maintenance would add an additional $10 billion . That spending
could create about 300,000 additional jobs . And raising the military's annual recruitment goal by 15%
would provide jobs for an additional 30,000 young men and women in the first year. An important challenge for
those who are designing the overall stimulus package is to avoid wasteful spending. One way to achieve that is to do things during the period of the spending surge
that must eventually be done anyway. It is better to do them now when there is excess capacity in the economy than to wait and do them later. Replacing the
supplies that have been depleted by the military activity in Iraq and Afghanistan is a good example of something that might be postponed but that should instead be
done quickly. The same is true for replacing the military equipment that has been subject to excessive wear and tear. More generally, replacement schedules for
vehicles and other equipment should be accelerated to do more during the next two years than would otherwise be economically efficient. Industry experts and
DOD officials confirm that military suppliers have substantial unused capacity with which to produce additional supplies and equipment. Even those production lines
that are currently at full capacity can be greatly expanded by going from a single shift to a two-shift production schedule. With industrial production in the economy
as a whole down sharply, there is no shortage of potential employees who can produce supplies and equipment. Military
procurement has the
further advantage that almost all of the equipment and supplies that the military buys is made in the U nited
S tates, creating demand and jobs here at home. Increased military spending should involve more than just accelerated replacement
schedules. Each of the military services can identify new equipment and additional quantities of existing equipment that can improve our fighting ability in
Afghanistan and our ability to protect our military forces while they are in combat. Military planners must also look ahead to the missions that each of the services
may be called upon to do in the future. Additional funding would allow the Air Force to increase the production of fighter planes and transport aircraft without any
delays. The Army could accelerate its combat modernization program. The Navy could build additional ships to deal with its increased responsibilities in protecting
coastal shipping and in countering terrorism. And all three services have significant infrastructure needs. Although some activities like ship building cannot be
completed in the two year stimulus period, the major part of the expenditures can be brought forward in time by acquiring components and materials quickly and
holding them in inventory until they are needed in the ship building process. Such a departure from just-in-time inventory management would be wasteful under
normal conditions, but makes economic sense when there is temporary excess capacity. Now
is also a good time for the military to
increase recruiting and training. Because of the current very high and rising unemployment rates among young men and women, it would make
sense to depart from the military's traditional enlistment rules and bring in recruits for a short, two-year period of training followed by a return to the civilian
economy. As a minimum this would provide education in a variety of technical skills -- electronics, equipment
maintenance, computer programming, nuclear facility operations , etc. -- that would lead to better civilian
careers for this group . It would also provide a larger reserve force that could be called upon if needed by the military in the future.
35
Aff Answers
36
Uniqueness
Defense industry lags behind foreign competitors

James Clad, 11-26-2018, (former deputy assistant Secretary of Defense, current Senior Fellow at the
American Foreign Policy Council) "The Perilous State of America’s Defense Industry – InsideSources,"
InsideSources, https://www.insidesources.com/the-perilous-state-of-americas-defense-industry/
Here’s the ‘BLUF’ — Pentagonese for “bottom line up front.” Put bluntly, U.S. military manufacturing and the military
materials supply chain have succumbed to a crippling dependence on overseas imports. There’s also too
much acquiescence in supply chain choke points. Entire critical industries either have disappeared or are
hanging on by a thread. As is often the case, the challenges faced by our defense industrial base and supply chain can largely be traced
back to successive missteps and omissions. For example, Washington gridlock routinely produces unpredictable federal
budgeting. Lacking reliable payments means perilous uncertainty for defense suppliers. That’s just one example.
Overall, the erosion of industrial capability and capacity has led to a ceding of place to foreign competitors,
a slow-motion decline of domestic strength mirroring the wider phenomenon of offshoring manufacturing.
Within the defense industrial subsector of our overall manufacturing base, foreign competition has not elicited a domestic
response sufficient to halt the erosion of U.S. industrial capacity . While too often a one-size-fits-all excuse for failure, a
combination of mercantilist trade practices, dumping, and intellectual property theft (overwhelmingly from China)
has eroded our industrial primacy. Yet it has all happened under our noses, with our “eyes wide shut.” Buttressed by
mountains of state bank investment cash, Beijing’s state planners have positioned a range of industries at
the core of China’s strategic ambition. Largely unencumbered by market undulations, the favored Chinese companies
have full backing from their government — extra financial leeway for undercutting rivals, and for capturing full or
near- monopolies. This thrust reaches into a large swath of the global economy. From dumping excess capacity steel
production, to monopoly mining, and to lithium-ion battery manufacturing, China has seized and won
formidable market share. It continues to make further investments to hold that position . The erosion of our
mining sector makes the point with vengeance. Once as robust as our manufacturing, the impediments to U.S.
domestic mining offers a prime example of what the Defense report now deems unacceptable . The tech-driven
economy seems quintessentially and primarily American in origin and impact, but its dependence on esoteric minerals and metals from all
corners of the Periodic Table has become glaring. Rare
earth mineral imports by the United States have soared in recent
years — with customers forced to deal with Chinese production and export monopolies .
37
Thumpers
Industry consolidation thumps
Col. Wesley Hallman, 6-13-2018, (senior vice president of policy at the National Defense Industrial
Association. He served in the U.S. Air Force for 27 years) "Defense and delusion: America‘s military,
industry are falling behind," Defense News,
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/06/13/defense-and-delusion-americas-military-
industry-are-falling-behind/
Finally, most American’s believe our nation enjoys the same defense-industrial base that served as the “arsenal of
democracy” in World War II, capable of scaling up production and innovation when truly needed , or the so-called
military-industrial complex that powered the United States through the Cold War. Today, instead of a robust bench of large and
mid-sized companies and their myriad small-business suppliers competing and producing new capabilities
at the speed of information-age innovation, our defense industry has shrunk to a few standout corporations . This has
obscured fragile supply chains that are hampered by a risk-averse government acquisition system that
takes 10 years to field a replacement handgun for the services . Should a real national emergency occur,
our industrial base does not have the capacity to surge, leaving our defense at significant risk .
US acquisition system thumps

Col. Wesley Hallman, 6-13-2018, (senior vice president of policy at the National Defense Industrial
Association. He served in the U.S. Air Force for 27 years) "Defense and delusion: America‘s military,
industry are falling behind," Defense News,
https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/06/13/defense-and-delusion-americas-military-
industry-are-falling-behind/
Perhaps more dangerously, in
some critical emerging technologies such as hypersonics, the United States finds
itself behind. Both in terms of innovation and fielding existing technology, our sclerotic acquisition
system has throttled our industrial base, increasing the rate at which our military superiority erodes .
Deindustrialization kills the defense base

The impact of declining defense spending on the output of defense-related goods and products has been exacerbated by
the overall deindustrialization of the U.S. economy. From basic commodities such as steel and aluminum
to the major subsectors such as shipbuilding and even textiles, the United States has seen the decline of
domestic production and increased reliance on offshore suppliers , including such competitors as China.42 Survival of
the commercial U.S. shipbuilding, ship repair, and maritime workforce now depends almost entirely on
the requirements imposed by the Jones Act.43 The globalization and offshoring of critical industries
challenge the U.S. industrial base to produce sufficient quantities of major end items even in peacetime . In
the event of war, the U.S. military could rapidly run out of munitions, spare parts, and even critical
consumables. Even in major industrial sectors such as automobiles, there is no longer the domestic
capacity to support a major, protracted high-end conflict . “In not just World War II, but Korea and Vietnam and the Cold
War, you were able to draw from this manufacturing industrial base that was dual use. You had a vibrant automotive industry
for instance,” an Administration official has said. “Today, the manufacturing capacity is just not there on the civilian
side.”44
38
Labor shortages thump

Finally,the defense acquisition system and companies engaged in defense-related production and sustainment face a
critical workforce shortage. The secular decline in manufacturing has resulted in a loss both of aerospace
and defense workers and of the skilled technicians and artisans that produce the machines and tools
needed to construct next-generation weapons systems . DOD’s Fiscal Year 2017 Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to
Congress identifies weaknesses in the workforce as a serious threat to the ability of the aerospace and
defense industrial base to support military requirements : A&D [aerospace and defense] companies are being faced
with a shortage of qualified workers to meet current demands as well as needing to integrate a younger
workforce with the “right skills, aptitude, experience, and interest to step into the jobs vacated by senior-
level engineers and skilled technicians” as they exit the workforce .61 The retirement of the Baby Boomer
generation and the lack of sufficient opportunities for technical education are also exacerbating the
workforce problem. “Throughout our defense industrial base, talented workers in these critically important
trades are retiring and not being replaced in sufficient numbers to support our defense needs ,” according to
White House National Trade Council Director Peter Navarro. “Shipyards, vehicle manufacturing and aircraft facilities are
particularly hard-hit. Training the next generation of skilled trade workers will be essential to our military’s future success.”62 An
additional workforce issue is the backlog in security clearances . The number of engineers, scientists, and
even procurement officers awaiting clearances has grown exponentially over the past several years. Major
defense programs are being hampered by the inability to get critical technical personnel cleared
expeditiously. As one longtime observer of the aerospace and defense industry has observed, this shortfall also acts like a tax on defense
procurement: The government is not keeping up with the demand for clearances. As of last month [April 2017], the
National Background Investigations Bureau within the Office of Personnel Management—which performs 95% of federal background checks—
had accumulated a backlog of 570,000 applications. Delays in granting initial Top Secret clearances are averaging over
500 days. Average time required to receive an initial Confidential/Secret clearance, one of the least demanding in terms of required
background checks, is 262 days. These delays have been particularly hard on industry, because it is difficult to
attract and retain talent when new employees may have to cool their heels for a year or longer before
beginning work on classified programs. One big contractor reports that as of April, 72% of the clearances it has requested since January of
2016 were still awaiting initial clearance determinations. Another contractor reported 75% of requests for background checks or periodic
reinvestigations were still pending after 18 months; 10% were still pending after 24 months. The hidden cost to taxpayers of these long delays is
huge. An engineer hired at a defense contractor for $100,000 per year will cost the company $725 per day in salary and benefits, which gets
added to overhead if they cannot work on the project for which they were hired. If the wait to receive an initial clearance determination is 300
days, it will cost the company $217,500—which then gets billed to the government as a price of doing business…. But the waste does not end
there. When clearances take a year or longer to process, programs
are delayed, workers are under-employed, and holding
on to the people who are most in demand becomes a challenge . Nobody rigorously tracks what all this inefficiency costs
the government, but over time it is undoubtedly in the billions of dollars….63
39
No Link- specific countries

Domestic industry and diversified exports outweigh the link
Jonathan Caverley, 4-6-2018, (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and
Research Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) "America's Arms Sales Policy: Security
Abroad, Not Jobs at Home," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-
policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/
The United States has the most diverse export portfolio in the world . In the past five years, it has delivered
weapons to nearly 100 countries. Its best customer over this period, Saudi Arabia, only bought 13 percent of all
U.S. arms exports (all data from SIPRI). By contrast, 58 percent of Russia exports go to just three countries (India, China, and Vietnam).
For China, it’s 64 percent (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Algeria). Strong domestic demand also mitigates the pressure on a
country to export. From 2010 to 2015 the United Kingdom, France, and Germany all exported about half of their defense production, while
Russia exported 39 percent. The United States on average exports only a quarter of the arms produced by its
firms. This combination of strong domestic demand and a diverse portfolio of client states makes
America’s market power stronger than that of any other exporter. The United States is so economically
advantaged in making and selling weapons that it can limit conventional-weapons proliferation , technology
diffusion, and corruption in contracting arrangements (and maintain a robust defense industrial base) while retaining its
commanding market position. Less powerful exporting states are generally too constrained by the economics of production to pursue
any goals besides increased sales. There are a number of ways in which America’s leverage in the area of arms sales — and, therefore, its ability
to exercise restraint — can further its foreign policy goals.
40
No Internal link
Profit caps mean companies don’t want to work with the DOD, don’t invest profits
in R&D
The constraints of profits imposed on government contracts is a major barrier to commercial firms doing
business with the Pentagon. For many high-tech commercial companies, particularly those involved in IT and software,
pretax profits can be twice what is earned in the aerospace and defense sector .103 By many standard measures,
private companies have little incentive to do business with the Defense Department . Every company that
innovates, from the “lowly” inventor of an app for a smartphone to biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies looking for the next
breakthrough drug and the makers of vehicles, ships, airplanes, and satellites, invest in new products or
processes for one reason only: to make money. Wall Street severely punishes publicly held companies
that behave in any other way. Then there is the practice of structuring contracts based on the standard of the Lowest Price Technically
Acceptable (LPTA) proposal.104 Companies bidding on LPTA-type contracts have to demonstrate only the
minimum level of proficiency. Providing a better product and high-quality service or proposing a more
innovative solution does not increase a bidder’s chance of success . In fact, any investments made to attract highly
qualified personnel or expenditures made to develop a new solution increase costs for the vender, and thus for the product offered, and reduce the
chances of winning. The
combination of declining defense budgets and increasing regulation and oversight has
had a suffocating effect on the propensity of defense and aerospace companies to spend on R&D or
infrastructure. Without procurements (in other words, purchases by the government), companies have struggled just to
recover their costs and earn profits. It makes no sense for them to invest more in R&D when there is no
prospect of increased revenues. As the head of a major profit and loss center for one of the largest U.S. defense companies made
clear, “I cannot convince my senior management to invest any of our money without the clear prospect of a procurement program at the end of
the day and incoming revenues.”105
41
Allies Solve
Allies fill in us DIB weaknesses
William Greenwalt, April 2019, (Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Brent Scowcroft Center for
International Security, former staff member on the Senate Arms Services Committee) LEVERAGING THE
NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIAL BASE TO ADDRESS GREAT-POWER COMPETITION: The
Imperative to Integrate Industrial Capabilities of Close Allies,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Leveraging_the_National_Technology_Industrial_Base_to_Ad
dress_Great-Power_Competition.pdf
The NTIB offers the opportunity to immediately add 40 percent in capacity to the US industrial base . If done
right, this can provide additional scale and fill some of the manufacturing holes that currently exist . Most
importantly, the UK, Canada, and Australia have not yet created the types of disincentives for the commercial
industrial base to work on defense matters that the US has created . This offers them a significant comparative advantage to the
United States when trying to tap into the more innovative solutions now coming out of that industrial base. Each country has its industrial weaknesses, but also
maintains a series of defense-unique specialties and a growing commercial base to work with its military-unique base. It will be important for the United States to
leverage these capabilities.
Allies solve
In part, this also reflects the reality that many
foreign countries, particularly U.S. allies in Europe and Asia, now possess
critical design skills, production capabilities, and products. For example, several of the teams competing for the
new Air Force trainer are offering a foreign-designed or foreign-made airframe . The two teams that competed for the
Marine Corps’ Amphibious Combat Vehicle 1.1 were providing a vehicle made overseas. U.S. Army tanks are being equipped with an Israeli-made active protection
system. In
many areas, including night vision systems, naval radar, sonar, air-to-air missiles, and even space
systems, foreign companies’ technologies and products are equal to or better than those provided by U.S.
companies.
Cooperating with allies solves

Stephen Rodriguez, Frank Brundtland Steder and Leo Blanken, 12-26-2018, (Stephen Rodriguez is
a managing partner at One Defense, senior adviser at the Atlantic Council, and senior innovation adviser at the
Naval Postgraduate School. Frank Brundtland Steder is principal scientist at the Norwegian Defense Research
Establishment (FFI). Leo Blanken is an associate professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School and
a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council.) "To Shore Up the Defense-Industrial Base, Look to Norway,"
National Review, https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/12/us-norway-relationship-important-defense-partnerships/
The American economy is intimately entwined

But a look at today’s national-security landscape shows that none of these three conditions currently holds.
with that of China, technology is changing extremely rapidly, and many private firms have R&D budgets
larger than that of the Pentagon. The result is that the U.S. government may no longer have the luxury of understanding, let alone
unilaterally controlling, the current challenges and future needs of the defense-industrial base . This raises the question: If America
cannot control its industrial destiny, who can it rely on? The answer may lie with our allies . Why Norway? America’s allies bring
disparate resources to the table for mutual defense. Some have very capable military forces (United Kingdom),
geostrategic locations (Djibouti), or shared regional concerns (Canada). We are concerned with partner nations that have the
capacity to make significant contributions to the industrial-base issue , due to deeply aligned geopolitical
interests, rich human capital, niche high-tech industrial capabilities, and the complementary desire for
advanced weapons systems. There are a number of such nations, but here we explore one: Norway. Its internal capacity, relationship with the
U.S. defense community, and involvement in previous “big wins” help make the case that many current industrial-base shortfalls could be addressed through the development of coordinated
engagement with such partner nations.
42
AT econ internal link

Arms sales have almost no effect on the labor market
Bryan Schatz, 4-4-2019, (reporter) "Trump hyped defense jobs while many were offshored," Mother
Jones, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/04/defense-industry-arms-weapons-jobs-trump/
When President Donald Trump tried to justify selling American weapons to Saudi Arabia last year, he claimed that
arms sales to the kingdom would create “hundreds of thousands of jobs” and bring “much additional wealth to the United
States.” Defense analysts have knocked down his shifting claims that that these deals could create as many as a million jobs. Now a new report
finds that not only were Trump’s
numbers grossly inflated but that American defense companies are increasingly
sending jobs overseas while helping other countries expand their capacity to build weapons systems. “One
of the biggest claims that Trump makes is that this is a huge job creator,” said William Hartung, the director of the Arms and Security Project at
the Center for International Policy and a coauthor of the report, in a call with reporters. According to the newly released report, the Trump
administration inked $78.8 billion in international arms deals in 2018, a slight drop from the year before. “One of the most interesting things
we’ve found is that about 25
percent of the $78.8 billion in deals were for licenses to manufacture US weapons or US
weapons’ components overseas—40 licenses worth over $19 billion,” Hartung said. Agreeing to let countries manufacture American
arms has become “a way to close a deal,” Hartung said. “When you’re making a foreign sale, [defense companies] may say, ‘We’ll let you build
this thing there if you buy it from us’… It is a substantial practice. It’s one that’s not discussed when President Trump brags about jobs.” The
number and value of licenses granted to manufacture US weapon s and weapons components overseas increased
by more than 50 percent from 2017 to 2018. In 2018, there were six arms licensing deals with Japan, five with the United Kingdom,
three with Israel, and three with South Korea. Some of these agreements to make American weapons overseas involve “substantial
numbers of jobs,” Hartung said. For example, “if they’re assembling F-35s in Italy and they built a factory for that, it would not only
assemble the planes bought by Italy, but the ones going to Europe.” Similarly, engines and completed F-35s will be made in Japan, likely not just
for Japan but other Asian countries purchasing the next generation of American jet fighter. “That’s a significant export of jobs just in those two,”
says Hartung. Even before accounting for the potential of offshoring defense jobs, the
total number of jobs provided by arms
sales are less than two-tenths of one percent of the US labor force , according to Hartung. A White House statement
released in May 2017 when the US signed a major arms deal with Saudi Arabia noted that it would “potentially” support “tens of thousands of
new jobs in the United States”—a far cry from as many as 1 million Trump later claimed. But exporting
jobs could pose long-term
challenges to the arms industry. “In some cases, these deals are actually building up potential
competitors,” Hartung says. “It’s not just jobs in the moment, but possibly jobs in the future.”
Arms sales are a tiny portion of the economy

The arms market is a surprisingly tiny portion of world trade. Annual estimates range from $86 to 105
billion dollars. Compare this to the global markets for cars ($1.35 trillion), pharmaceuticals ($613 billion), and
even “human or animal blood” ($252 billion) and the international arms industry begins to look paltry.
43
Defense industry is not key to the economy

The decline of the defense industrial base as a driver of the overall economy is reflected in the Fortune
500 listings. In 1961, 15 defense companies were among the top 100 companies listed. In 2017, only four aerospace and
defense companies were ranked above 100. Of these, only two—Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics—were
primarily defense companies. The other two—Boeing, the highest ranking of the four at 24, and United Technologies—are
major providers of defense products but receive a large percentage of their total revenues from
commercial sales.40
Arms sales don’t help the economy

One reason defense exports appear to be inefficient employment generators is that states that spend their own
money on buying American weapons also care about “jobs, jobs, jobs” for their own people , as well as
supporting their own aspirational defense industries. Most countries require “offsets,” mandating that a
percentage of any arms deal (often 50 to 100 percent) must be re-invested in the importing state’s economy. Between
2013 and 2015, these offsets, had the work been performed in the United States, would have created or
sustained over 46,000 jobs. In publicizing a recent Saudi deal for 150 S-70 Black Hawk utility helicopters at roughly $6 billion, Lockheed Martin predicted
that it would “support” 900 jobs. But half those jobs would be in Saudi Arabia. Yet another reason that arms exports are an inefficient
employment mechanism: Any additional U.S. market share is likely to be heavily subsidized . In 2016, the
United States spent $10 billion buying weapons for other countries , roughly 10 percent of the entire global
arms export market, equivalent to Singapore’s or Algeria’s defense budget. Moreover, over the past six years, the Defense Department waived another $16
billion in normally mandatory fees for Foreign Military Sales — including $3.5 billion for a $15 billion Saudi agreement — largely to close deals that may have gone
to other suppliers. In short, when
it comes to boosting the domestic economy, arms sales contain relatively little
juice. And, as we shall see, it may not be worth the squeeze.
44
Defense industry is bad for jobs

William D. Hartung, 11-1-2018, (director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for
International Policy ) "The Military Is the Ultimate Special-Interest Group," Nation,
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-military-is-the-ultimate-special-interest-group/
Where could alternatives to Pentagon job-creation programs come from? The short answer is: Invest in virtually anything but
buying more weapons and waging more wars and Americans will be better off. For instance, Pentagon spending
creates startlingly fewer jobs per dollar than putting the same taxpayer dollars into infrastructure repair
and rebuilding, alternative energy creation, education, or health care . A study conducted by University of Massachusetts
economist Heidi Garrett-Peltier for the Costs of War Project at Brown University found that, had the government invested in
civilian activities the $230 billion per year wasted on America’s post-9/11 wars, that sum would have
created 1.3 million additional jobs. A more equitable tax policy that required wealthy individuals and corporations to pay their fair
share could similarly fund a $2 trillion infrastructure program that would support 2.5 million new jobs in its first year, according to a proposal put
forward by the Congressional Progressive Caucus. As for the president’s much-touted, dramatically overblown claims about the jobs to be had
from arms exports, the global arms market represents only a tiny fraction of the growing market for renewable
energy technologies. If the goal is to produce jobs via exports, developing technologies to tap the huge
future market in renewables, which one study suggests could hit $2.1 trillion by 2025, would leave weapons systems in
the dust. After all, that’s about 20 times the current size of the total global arms trade, which clocks in at about $100
billion annually. But an analysis by Miriam Pemberton and her colleagues at the Institute for Policy Studies indicates that the United States
spends 28 times as much on its military as it does on genuinely job-creating programs designed to address the threat of climate change.
Arms sales don’t create jobs in the US

William D. Hartung, 11-1-2018, (director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for
International Policy ) "The Military Is the Ultimate Special-Interest Group," Nation,
https://www.thenation.com/article/the-military-is-the-ultimate-special-interest-group/
But let’s give the weapons sector some credit. Its CEOs are working assiduously to build up local economies—overseas.
Saudi Arabia’s long-term economic plan, for instance, calls for 50% of the value of its weapons purchases to
be spent building up its own military industry. US weapons giants like Raytheon and Lockheed Martin have been quick
to pledge allegiance to that plan, setting up subsidiaries there and agreeing to have systems like helicopters assembled in
Saudi Arabia, not the United States. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin is helping the United Arab Emirates develop the capability to
produce robot-controlled machine tools that are in great demand in the defense and aerospace industries. And the F-35 program is creating
production jobs in more than a dozen countries, including assembly plants in Italy and Japan. Raytheon CEO Thomas Kennedy summed up this
approach when he discussed his company’s growing partnership with Saudi Arabia: “By working together, we can help build world-class defense
and cyber capabilities in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.” And keep in mind that these are the jobs from so many of those Saudi
weapons sales that President Trump keeps bragging about. Of course, while this may be bad news for American
jobs, it works just fine as a strategy for keeping the profits of US arms-makers stratospheric.
45
AT econ impact
Economic collapse doesn’t cause war
Drezner 14 Daniel Drezner, professor of International Law at Tufts, The System Worked: Global
Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014
The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and
violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead
states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic
downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms
races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict . Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and
even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest
otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in
2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007 ."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the
start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that
the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict , as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen
conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in
violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed . Rogers Brubaker observes that "the
crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might
have been expected."45
Collapse won’t cause war

Jervis 11 Robert Jervis, Department of Political Science and School of International and Public Affairs,
Columbia University Force in Our Times
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0047117811422531
Even if war is still seen as evil, the security community could be dissolved if severe conflicts of interest were to arise. Could
the more
peaceful world generate new interests that would bring the members of the community into sharp
disputes?45 A zero-sum sense of status would be one example, perhaps linked to a steep rise in nationalism. More likely would be a
worsening of the current economic difficulties, which could itself produce greater nationalism, undermine democracy and bring back old-
fashioned beggar-myneighbor economic policies. While these dangers are real, it is hard to believe that the conflicts could be
great enough to lead the members of the community to contemplate fighting each other . It is not so
much that economic interdependence has proceeded to the point where it could not be reversed – states
that were more internally interdependent than anything seen internationally have fought bloody civil wars. Rather it is that even if
the more extreme versions of free trade and economic liberalism become discredited, it is hard to see
how without building on a preexisting high level of political conflict leaders and mass opinion would
come to believe that their countries could prosper by impoverishing or even attacking others . Is it possible
that problems will not only become severe, but that people will entertain the thought that they have to be solved by war? While a pessimist
could note that this argument does not appear as outlandish as it did before the financial crisis, an
optimist could reply (correctly,
in my view) that the very fact that we have seen such a sharp economic down-turn without anyone
suggesting that force of arms is the solution shows that even if bad times bring about greater economic
conflict, it will not make war thinkable.
46
AT climate change internal link

Single sector innovation can’t solve climate change
Eugene Gholz, Fall 2014, (associate professor of political science at the University of Notre Dame. He
works primarily at the intersection of national security and economic policy, on subjects including
innovation, defense management, and U.S. grand strategy. From 2010-2012, he served in the Pentagon as
Senior Advisor to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing and Industrial Base
Policy.) "Military Innovation and the Prospects for Defense-Led Energy Innovation," Issues in Science
and Technology, https://issues.org/military-innovation-and-the-prospects-for-defense-led-energy-
innovation/
Almost all plans to address climate change depend on innovation , because the alternatives by themselves—reducing
greenhouse gas emissions via the more efficient use of current technologies or by simply consuming less of everything—are either insufficient,
intolerable, or both. Americans are especially proud of their history of technology leadership, but in most sectors of the economy, they assume
that private companies, often led by entrepreneurs and venture capitalists, will furnish the new products and processes. Unfortunately,
energy innovation poses exceptionally severe collective action problems that limit the private sector’s
promise. Everyone contributes emissions, but no one contributes sufficient emissions that a conscious
effort to reduce them will make a material difference in climate change, so few people try hard. Without a
carbon tax or emissions cap, most companies have little or no economic incentive to reduce emissions
except as a fortuitous byproduct of other investments . And the system of production, distribution, and use
of energy creates interdependencies across companies and countries that limit the ability of any one actor
to unilaterally make substantial changes.
Profit doesn’t drive defense industry innovation

innovation/
In the more important cases of customer-driven military innovations, military
customers are used to making investment
decisions based on interests other than the pure profit motive . Defense acquisition requirements derive
from leaders’ military judgment about the strategic situation, and the military gets the funding for needed research,
development, and procurement from political leaders rather than profit-hungry investors . This process, along with
the military’s relatively large purse as compared to even the biggest commercial customers, is precisely
what attracts the interest of advocates of defense-led energy innovation : Because of the familiar
externalities and collective action problems in the energy system, potential energy innovations often do
not promise a rate of return sufficient to justify the financial risk of private R&D spending , but the people who
make defense investments do not usually calculate financial rates of return anyway.
47
Defense industry innovation can’t be commercialized

innovation/
The implication is that the
military has to work with companies that are comfortable with the terms and
conditions of working for the government. That constraint limits the pool of potential defense-led energy
innovators. It would also hamper the ability to transfer any defense-led energy innovations to the
commercial market, because successful military innovations have special design features and extra costs
built into their value chain.
Energy innovation will either fail or is inevitable because of DOD demand

innovation/
The appeal of successful military innovation is seductive, but the
military’s mixed experience with high-tech investment
should restrain some of the exuberance about prospects for energy innovation . We know enough about why
some large-scale military innovation has worked, while some has not , to predict which parts of the effort to encourage
defense-led energy innovation are likely to be successful; enough to refine our expectations and target our investment strategies. This article
carefully reviews the defense innovation process and its implications for major defense-led energy innovation. De fense
innovation works
because of a particular relationship between the DOD and the defense industry that channels investment
toward specific technology trajectories. Successes on “nice-to-have” trajectories, from DOD’s perspective, are
rare, because the leadership’s real interest focuses on national security . Civilians are well aware of the national security
and domestic political risks of even the appearance of distraction from core warfighting missions. When it is time to make hard
choices, DOD leadership will emphasize performance parameters directly related to the military’s critical
warfighting tasks, as essentially everyone agrees it should. Even in the relatively few cases in which investment to
solve the challenges of the energy sector might directly contribute to the military component of the U.S.
national security strategy, advocates will struggle to harness the defense acquisition apparatus . But a focused
understanding of how that apparatus works will make their efforts more likely to succeed.
48
Innovations will be too small to matter

innovation/
But most technology-push projects that succeed yield small-scale innovations that can matter a great deal at
the level of local organizations but do not attract sufficient resources and political attention to change
overall national capabilities. In energy innovation, an equivalent example would be a project to develop a
small solar panel to contribute to electricity generation at a remote forward operating base, the sort of
boon to warfighters that has attracted some attention during the Afghanistan War but that contributes to a relatively low-profile
acquisition program (power generation as opposed to, say, a new expeditionary fighting vehicle) and will not even command
the highest priority for that project’s program manager (who must remain focused on baseload power generation rather than
solar augmentation).
Defense industry won’t work on climate change unless it is politically popular

innovation/
This need for political appeal presents a major challenge to advocates of defense-led energy innovation ,
because the political consensus for energy innovation is much weaker than the one for military
innovation. Some prominent political leaders, notably Sen. John McCain, have very publicly questioned whether it
is appropriate for the DOD to pay attention to energy innovation , which they view as a distraction from
the DOD’s primary interest in improved warfighting performance . McCain wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy, Ray
Mabus, in July 2012, criticizing the Navy’s biofuels initiative by pointedly reminding Secretary Mabus, “You are the Secretary of the Navy, not the Secretary of
Energy.” Moreover, although almost all Americans agree that the extreme performance of innovative weapons systems is a good thing (Americans expect to fight with
the very best equipment), government
support for energy innovation, especially energy innovation intended to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, faces strong political headwinds. In some quarters, ideological
opposition to policies intended to reduce climate change is as strong as the historically important
ideological support for military investment in areas like missile defense. The defense industry also provides
a key link in assembling the political support for military innovation that may be hard to replicate for
defense-led energy innovation. The prime contractors take charge of directly organizing district-level
political support for the defense acquisition budget. To be funded, a major defense acquisition project needs to fit into a contractor-led
political strategy. The prime contractors, as part of their standard responsiveness to their military customers, almost instantly develop a new set of briefing slides to
tout how their products will play an essential role in executing whatever new strategic concept or buzzword comes from the Pentagon. And their lobbyists will make
sure that all of the right congressional members and staffers see those slides. But those trusted
relationships are built on understanding
defense technology and on connections to politicians interested in defense rather than in energy . There
may be limits to the defense lobbyists’ ability to redeploy as supporters of energy innovation .
49
at: warming impact

Warming won’t cause extinction – IPCC proves
Daily Caller 14 MICHAEL BASTASCH 2:40 PM 03/24/2014 http://dailycaller.com/2014/03/24/ipcc-runs-
from-claims-that-global-warming-will-cause-mass-extinctions/
The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change is distancing itself from past claims that
global warming could cause mass extinctions. A leaked IPCC draft report says that there is “ very little
confidence that the models currently predict accurately the risk of extinction .” The leaked report, obtained by
Germany’s Der Spiegel newspaper, says that an “acute lack of data” have added to doubts over past claims made by
climate scientists of mass extinctions in the future. “[B]iological findings have increased doubt over the
expected species extinction,” says the IPCC. In its 2007 climate assessment, the IPCC said that there was a “medium confidence” that
20 to 30 percent of plant and animal species were at risk of going extinct if global temperatures rose between 1.5 and 2.5 degrees Celsius this
century. If temperatures rose by 3.5 degrees Celsius the IPCC predicted “significant extinctions” would occur — between 40 and 70 percent of
species. Environmental groups have also warned of mass extinctions due to global warming. The Nature Conservancy says that “one-fourth of
Earth’s species will be headed for extinction by 2050 if the warming trend continues at its current rate.” The group adds that “polar bears may
be gone from the planet in as little as 100 years and that several “U.S. states may even lose their official birds as they head for cooler climates
— including the Baltimore oriole of Maryland, black-capped chickadee of Massachusetts, and the American goldfinch of Iowa.” But Der
Spiegel reports that the IPCC is shying away from such claims and gives no concrete numbers for how
many plant and animal species could be at risk if global temperatures increased. While the IPCC does
say that the pace of global warming is making it hard for some species to adapt, the lack of basic data
makes it impossible for there to be any hard evidence to back up this claim.
Won’t cause extinction

Sandberg 14 Anders Sandberg, researchers at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University,
What Could Cause Humanity's Extinction?
http://www.realclearscience.com/articles/2014/05/12/what_could_cause_humanitys_extinction_10865
2.html
Is climate change a danger to our lives or only our way of life? Sandberg: Climate change is unlikely to wipe out the human
species, but it can certainly make life harder for our civilisation. So it is more of a threat to our way of life than to our
lives. Still, a world pressured by agricultural trouble or struggles over geoengineering is a world more likely to get in trouble from other risks.
50
AT Heg Impact
DIB can’t prevent great power conflict
William Greenwalt, April 2019, (Senior fellow at the Atlantic Council Brent Scowcroft Center for
International Security, former staff member on the Senate Arms Services Committee) LEVERAGING
THE NATIONAL TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIAL BASE TO ADDRESS GREAT-POWER
COMPETITION: The Imperative to Integrate Industrial Capabilities of Close Allies,
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Leveraging_the_National_Technology_Industrial_B
ase_to_Address_Great-Power_Competition.pdf
The difficulty with this problem set is that the current, dedicated US defense-industrial base and the US acquisition system are
not prepared for a great-power war, nor the innovation necessary to compete in all five things the United
States must do to meet its national security needs. Nor has it geared up to deliver the significant
innovation in capability and doctrinal development to deliver a sufficient deterrent effect to prevent that
war in the first place For the last seventeen years, the United States has been equipped to conduct current
operations against insurgencies and terrorism in the arc of instability running through Central Asia to Northern Africa.
Because of the constant threat of budget sequestration, wars have been fought on the cheap and readiness
levels have fallen. Modernization is being conducted at non-economic order-of-production levels.
Disruptive innovation has been practically nonexistent, as research funding has historically stopped at the
6.3, or advanced-technology, development level, leaving most innovations stuck in the so-called “valley of death .”
Prototyping, or 6.4, funding has been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. Science and technology (S&T) communities are
addicted to the existing peacetime way of doing research by doling out funds in single million-dollar
increments, and the budget reflects that. Business reform is further constrained by the inability to address the costs of
socioeconomic requirements placed on the Pentagon by Congress and past administrations. Large-scale technological and business-process
disruption will be needed to meet the great-power threat. While Congress took the first step in passing new-acquisition reforms in 2015 and 2016,
much more needs to be done to implement these reforms and reform other business practices. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, since the
end of the Cold War the United States and its allies seem to have subconsciously forgotten the
requirements of deterrence, as there was no great-power rival to deter. With the resurrection of great-power challenges, the atrophy
of US and allied capabilities during that period now appears to be a huge vulnerability .
51
US military superiority fails

Fitzsimmons 17 (Michael, analyst in the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division at the Institute for
Defense Analyses, where he works on multidisciplinary studies for sponsors in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Joint Staff, with a focus on defense strategy and force planning, 11-
16-2017, "The False Allure of Escalation Dominance", War on the Rocks,
https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/false-allure-escalation-dominance/, Accessed: 3-15-2018)
Indeed, escalation dominance is superficially appealing . Its deterrent logic is easy to grasp. What could dissuade a regional challenger
more effectively than comprehensive superiority? And it comports well with the strategic habits of mind ingrained in a generation of U.S. policy makers by unrivaled
post-Cold War military superiority. Nevertheless, the
concept has always suffered from serious flaws and is particularly
poorly suited to the regional deterrence challenges the United States faces in the 21st century. At least five problems are
cause for concern. Asymmetric stakes. As already noted, one of the key sources of escalation risk is the
asymmetry of interests between prospective combatants . The most plausible scenarios of escalation
involve core, vital interests of the challengers juxtaposed with American extended deterrence
commitments to allies and partners. For instance, the United States seeks to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. But under extreme
circumstances, Chinese leaders may well see the survival of their regime riding on a military victory, while U.S. stakes in protecting Taiwan lie in more abstract goals
of maintaining stability, order, and deterrent credibility. Will the United States really engage in nuclear war over Taiwan? Or, in a NATO-Russia conflict, risk trading
Virginia Beach for Vilnius? Such potential imbalance of interests is a long-standing problem of extended deterrence . Thomas Schelling famously observed that
escalation may take the form of a “competition in risk taking,” and therefore may be governed at least as much by “balance of resolve” as by balance of capabilities.
This poses a challenge for any escalation management strategy, but is especially problematic for escalation dominance, which relies heavily on superiority in
capabilities. While theoretically plausible, establishing “dominant” resolve as well as dominant capabilities is a difficult standard to meet in a conflict where a
capable, nuclear-armed rival has already gambled great stakes. Conventional
balance. For escalation dominance to produce the desired deterrent
effect, both parties must recognize one side’s superiority at multiple levels of escalation, below and above the
nuclear threshold. Superiority itself is of no use if it goes unrecognized or doubted. On this point, escalation dominance faces another formidable obstacle. As
alluded to above, the
longstanding conventional capability gap between the United States and both China and
Russia has shrunk in recent years. The match-ups are becoming too closely balanced to confidently
predict that one side will prevail, especially in those fait accompli scenarios in which an adversary seeks
a quick victory enabled by local tactical advantages . Even analysts who believe that relative regional shortfalls in U.S. conventional
strength have been exaggerated could readily agree that America’s ability to dictate the pace and intensity of a conventional war has diminished. Information and
decision-making challenges. Crisis decision-making is subject to a host of extra-rational factors and information limitations, which makes it difficult for actors to
precisely evaluate their rivals’ escalation thresholds. In a crisis involving nuclear weapons, factors like time pressures, risk tolerance, incomplete or conflicting
intelligence, and psychological stress are a few of the unpredictable elements that complicate fine-tuned chess moves of escalation. This is true regardless of one’s
escalation management strategy, but its pathologies may be magnified by a strategy that depends on establishing and communicating superiority at every turn. The
party asserting dominance may be more apt to underestimate its adversary’s resolve, while the ostensibly “dominated” party may become more risk-tolerant in the
face of a tempting but fleeting opportunity for successful escalation of its own. Similarly, misperception of adversary behavior, intent, and communication is a
common feature of international affairs and military history, including in cases of crisis escalation. Even if U.S. decision makers are confident of their own
information and analysis, it is not possible to reliably discern adversary values and interpretations of thresholds. In a seminal 2008 study of escalation, RAND
Corporation analysts concluded that, relative to the Cold War, “predicting how [U.S. opponents] will perceive U.S. actions is not dramatically easier and, in some
cases, can be even more challenging.” Influence of new technologies. Rapidly improving and proliferating capabilities in long-
range precision strike, and cyber and space operations have complicated the concept of an escalation
“ladder.” Kahn’s original ladder with 44 rungs spanning conventional and nuclear war was already quite complex. Today, the menu of non-nuclear options
available to strategic competitors to signal or attack each other has expanded dramatically. Whether the proper metaphor for 21st-century escalation is a ladder or
a vortex or something else entirely, there is little doubt that contingency planning for escalation is harder than ever.
Where in the hierarchy of escalation does a disabling but reversible Chinese attack on U.S. military satellites belong? Is a Russian cyber attack on the U.S. electrical
grid more or less escalatory than missile strikes on European bases? This
kind of complexity also compounds the challenges of
misperception. If a shared framework among potential adversaries for understanding escalation thresholds was elusive in the Cold War, it is only farther
from reach today.’
52

Defense Industrial Base DA - Emory 2019

Загружено:

Сведения о документе

Оригинальное название

Авторское право

Доступные форматы

Поделиться этим документом

Поделиться или встроить документ

Параметры публикации

Этот документ был вам полезен?

Это неприемлемый материал?

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

Defense Industrial Base DA - Emory 2019

Загружено:

Авторское право:

Доступные форматы

DIB DA and Answers ENDI 2019

AT econ internal link..............................................................................................................43

The Administration’s report helps gives substance and

The group is charged

The complacency of recent decades needs to be replaced by a new determination to

Arms sales are key to defense industry innovation

Trump investments reinvigorate the defense industrial base

US defense industry is strong, profitable

US DIB is ahead now but fragile

Arms sales high

Arms sales are at record highs

Exports up – bosting the defense industrial base

US manufacturing sector is resurgent

US has enough skilled workers

Taiwan- industry links

Taiwan arms sales are key to the defense industrial base

Taiwan- Econ Links

Arms sales are key to defense industry innovation

Military aid ensures the defense-industrial base

Key to defense industrial base innovation

What it means for industry The

AT sales to X country are small

The calculus in the past

At the macroeconomic level, defense

Defense industrial base is key to hegemony

DIB is key to military readiness

Strong DIB is key to global stability

Throughout the 20th century, the

Heg-- 2NC/1NR—dib deterrence/war—

Defense industrial base is deterrence

Defense industrial base is a prerequisite to all forms of deterrence

Defense industrial growth controls all aspects of relevant power

Climate Change- 1NC

Warming causes extinction

2NC/1NR Warming = ext

2NC/1NR Solves climate change ext

Defense industry climate innovation spills over to commercial markets

Econ decline causes global wars

2NC/1NR K2 growth ext

Technological innovation and corresponding private sector multiplier effect

WASHINGTON — Former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke

uncertain impacts, ” he said.

Defense cuts are a negative on economic growth trends

Provides economic stimulus in labor and consumer markets

Defense industry lags behind foreign competitors

US acquisition system thumps

Deindustrialization kills the defense base

Labor shortages thump

No Link- specific countries

Cooperating with allies solves

The American economy is intimately entwined

AT econ internal link

Arms sales are a tiny portion of the economy

Defense industry is not key to the economy

Arms sales don’t help the economy

Defense industry is bad for jobs

Arms sales don’t create jobs in the US

Collapse won’t cause war

AT climate change internal link

Profit doesn’t drive defense industry innovation

Defense industry innovation can’t be commercialized

Energy innovation will either fail or is inevitable because of DOD demand

Innovations will be too small to matter