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Maintaining U.S. arms sales is crucial to retain power competition and avoid China or
Russia fill-in. Immediately wrecks the economy and power projection while increasing
sales in the long term to combat foreign offers. This link independently turns the case.
Dave Majumdar (defense editor for the National Interest) 8/9/ 2018 [“The Trump Administration Has
a Plan to Compete with Russia and China over Weapon Sales” online @
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/trump-administration-has-plan-compete-russia-and-china-over-
weapon-sales-28327, loghry]
The Trump Administration is hoping to boost the export prospects for American weapons systems to
allied countries by modifying policies and streamlining the bureaucratic process. The Trump
Administration announced a revised conventional arms transfer policy in April, but that is just the first
step. There are more policy changes coming down the line. “The new policy reflects the priorities of the
president’s National Security Strategy,” Ambassador Tina Kaidanow, Acting Assistant Secretary of State
for Political-Military Affairs, said on Aug. 8 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Which
are, namely, to preserve peace through strength by reforming regulations to facilitate the exports of
U.S. military equipment; to strengthen partners and allies; to facilitate U.S. economic security and
innovation.” Under the new policy, the United States hopes to make its export bureaucracy more
proactive and cut red tape in the process. “These steps are among the first in what we hope will be a
series of efforts to streamline the arms transfer process,” Kaidanow said. “I can assure you that my
colleagues and I at the State Department, but also again more broadly in the USG, will continue
exploring ways to cut red tape and give U.S. industry every advantage in an increasingly competitive
global marketplace, while continuing to ensure the responsible export of arms.” The United States is
making these policy changes with great power competition with China and Russia in mind. “We’re
trying to improve our ability to compete with our adversaries by providing our partners with viable
alternatives to foreign products in order to maintain influence in key regions throughout the world,”
Laura Cressey, Deputy Director for Regional Security and Arms Transfers at U.S. Department of State,
said. “We’re going to be working with our partners and allies to identify critical capability requirements
that they have and then trying to expedite transfers to support these essential foreign policy and
national security objectives.” However, writing the policy guidance is the easy part. Implementing the
policy will be far more challenging. “The release of the new policy was only the first step in a series of
what we believe will be very practical results-focused initiatives to transform the way that the U.S.
government works to support and grow our defense industrial base ,” Kaidanow said. “Through that
memorandum, the president also directed the secretary of state, in coordination with the secretaries of
defense, commerce, and energy, to submit an implementation plan within 60 days.” As part of the
effort, the United States is looking at reforming export hurdles such as the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations, which has been a vexing problem for the defense industry for decades. “We’ll look at
streamlining the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or ITAR, and also continuing to revise the U.S.
Munitions List and the Commerce Control List,” Cressey said. Additionally, the State Department and
Defense Department will try to speed up the bureaucratic processes involved in weapons exports.
“We will also be looking at the day-to-day processes to ensure that we are as efficient, as streamlined,
and as effective as possible,” Cressey said. “So some of the things that we’re looking at, and that folks in
industry and associations have asked us to look at, is: establishing milestones and timelines for the
foreign military sales process; improving and speeding up our contracting process – processes within the
Defense Department; trying to increase the competitiveness of U.S. defense items and systems by
building in exportability to the design and development; and also by expanding support for what we call
non-program-of-record systems. We’re looking into potential financing options that could make our
systems more attainable for our foreign partners. And we’re also examining existing polices to ensure
that they don’t unnecessarily detract from our ability to compete in international – in the international
marketplace.” Without the changes , the United States is increasingly in danger of losing its market
share as China, in particular, increasing develops and produces evermore-capable weapons for the
export market. One example is the Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) market, which the United States
dominates, but which is also threatened by Chinese competition and by Washington’s tight export
regulations. “By removing some of the previous administration’s artificial barriers to the transfer of
arms to critical partners, the UAS export policy being one example, this administration is both
strengthening our hand in the ongoing strategic competition while also stimulating economic growth
at home, as well as job creation,” Alex Gray, Special Assistant to the President for the Defense Industrial
Base, said. “It should be noted that the U.S. aerospace and defense industries contribute almost $1
trillion annually to the U.S. economy and they support about 2.5 million American jobs. Just as one
point, the international – UAS export market alone is estimated to be worth more than $50 billion a year
within the next decade. Those are the stakes we’re competing for.” Those nations that are unable to
purchase American weapons could find that China or Russia are more than willing to supply them
with comparable systems . “We are witnessing China – as an example, not alone – but China filling
voids the U.S. left with a denial to a friend or ally,” Keith Webster, president of the Defense and
Aerospace Export Council at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said. “The consequence of a denial filled
by China or others is as follows: The U.S. loses market share that is not easily recaptured, and in some
cases will never be recaptured. The U.S. loses control of the capability. The U.S. loses the opportunity
to train, influence, and maintain a military relationship with foreign forces, who now are introducing
into their inventory a Chinese – Korean, Israeli, et cetera – capability.” There are some immediate
examples that Webster said he could point to. “We never answered India’s request for ballistic missile
defense capability.” “That ask of the U.S. went unanswered for a number of years. And now, India has
been forced to consider and has – may potentially go buy, potentially, the Russian S-400 system.
Similar to what Turkey’s buying—or said they were going to buy. Now we are rushing to put together a
proposal for BMD for India to counter that situation.”
Failure to contain China and Russia sparks warfighting and nuclear proliferation that
results in extinction
Michael Mandelbaum (Christian A. Herter Professor Emeritus of American Foreign Policy at the Johns
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) March/April 2019 [“The New Containment” Foreign
Affairs. Mar/Apr2019, Vol. 98 Issue 2, p123-131. 9p, loghry]
The weakest link in the chain may be the most powerful country itself. There are reasons to expect the
American public to support a leading role in the containment of Russia, China, and Iran. The United
States has a long history with such a foreign policy. The approach has geopolitical logic behind it,
promising to protect American interests in crucial parts of the world at a reasonable price. But there
are also reasons for skepticism. Today’s threats appear less urgent, coping with them will be more
complicated, and the country’s attitude toward foreign entanglements has understandably soured over
the last two decades. The United States was pulled into both world wars by external attacks, and
Americans gave their support to a foreign policy of global reach during the Cold War because they were
persuaded it would head off yet another world war. After the Soviet collapse, many of the Cold War
arrangements persisted through inertia and gained support because they seemed to entail little expense
or risk. Now that the expenses and risks of such a policy have increased, many Americans may
reconsider their support. The skepticism has deepened because of the county’s recent misadventures
abroad. The interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya turned out poorly, and the public has little
taste for more. This view has much to recommend it. But it need not threaten the prospects of a new
containment, because that course is quite different from the failed crusades of recent decades. Those
involved efforts to transform the internal politics and economies of weak states. Containment involves
the opposite, checking the external conduct of strong states. If national leaders can appreciate and
explain the difference, they may be able to bring the public along. The resurgence of populism, finally,
makes any such project more difficult. The essence of populism is hostility to elites, and the design and
conduct of foreign policy are elite activities. The foreign policy establishment favors a robust American
role in the world. That may be a good enough reason for antiestablishment rebels, including the populist
in chief now residing in the White House, to oppose one. So the future direction of American foreign
policy is unclear. Washington might forgo leading coalitions to contain the three revisionist powers, in
which case their strength will increase . Emboldened by the American abdication, they may grow
aggressive and try to coerce their neighbors. Those neighbors currently rely on the American nuclear
arsenal to protect them; if they come to doubt the credibility of American security guarantees, they
may follow Israel and opt to develop or acquire their own arsenals in order to protect themselves. An
American retreat would thus make the world more dangerous and nuclear proliferation more likely .
Thanks to the size, geography, and power of the United States, Americans for many generations have
been able to pay less attention to American foreign policy than have the citizens of other countries,
whose lives and fortunes that policy has more immediately and directly affected. Should the country
turn decisively away from its global role and allow the revisionist challenges to advance unchecked,
however, Americans’ happy detachment from the world beyond their borders may disappear. And by
the time they realize what they need to protect, it may be too late to do so without great difficulty
and high cost .©
China fill-in collapses U.S. hege, risks rampant authoritarianism and human rights
abuses
Wendell Minnick (Taipei-based journalist who has spent two decades covering military and security
issues in Asia) 11/17/2018 [“Why Is China Building So Many Different Types of Weapons?” online @
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/why-china-building-so-many-different-types-weapons-36327,
loghry]
Even though the Chinese defense industry is “pretty monolithic” there is a “lot of competition inside
each sector,” Bitzinger said. As an example, within AVIC, there are two major combat builders, Shenyang
and Chengdu, and “they frequently compete with aircraft projects, such as the J-8 vs. J-10 and J-20 vs. J-
31.” This is China’s traditional approach to reducing the technological risks caused by the weakness of
the domestic industrial base, Kashin said, which has a history of simultaneously developing two systems.
Kashin said that the first one would be a high-risk project, usually expensive, innovative and involving
imported components. The second, a less ambitious low risk project suits the minimal requirements of
the PLA, which can be accomplished without external help. As a result, the PLA would get the new
systems even if the external supply chain is disrupted or the project fails. Even if the propagation of so
many weapons is a calculated government strategy or evidence that the military-industrial complex has
“run amok,” it has potential to cause chaos on the international scene, said Robert Haddick at the
Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, Air Force Association. Top Chinese government leaders see
themselves in competition with the United States for influence in key countries around the world.
They see the large U.S. presence in arms exports to vital countries in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin
America, and the Middle East, as a form of U.S. global influence that China needs to counter, he said.
If China displaces the United States as the preferred arms supplier that would shift economic and
diplomatic influence from Washington to Beijing. China’s military industry might think it is “mature
enough to take on the U.S. defense industry and prevail,” Haddick said. Chris Pocock, another Zhuhai
Airshow veteran and UK-based aerospace specialist, said the Chinese have no moral scruples about
exporting to renegade, corrupt and unstable states that the West will not supply. China is a dream for
despots, as China provides “low acquisition costs and, of course, cheap loans.” Giarra believes that
China is in a “race with the United States and the rest of the world.” In the past, this would have been
known as an arms race, but it really does take some competition for it to be a race, he said.
Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk were blown up in 1999, killing 300 people; the attack was blamed
on Chechen terrorists. In fact, there is overwhelming evidence that the bombings were carried out by
the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the successor to the Soviet-era KGB. This evidence includes the fact that FSB agents were caught after placing a
bomb in a fifth building in Ryazan southeast of Moscow and that Gennady Seleznev, the speaker of the Russian Duma, announced the bombing in Volgodonsk on September 16, 1999 — three
days before it occurred. The bombings were used to justify a new invasion of Chechnya and success in that war
brought Putin to power. In other words, there is overwhelming evidence that Putin rules as a result of an act
of terror against his own people. The leaders of post-Soviet Russia use wars to achieve internal political objectives. The war in Ukraine was
also a diversion. It was launched to distract the Russian people from the lessons of the Maidan revolt in Ukraine,
specifically that it is possible for a people to organize spontaneously and overthrow a kleptocratic regime. The war in Syria, in turn, was undertaken in order
to distract attention from the lack of success in Ukraine . The ambitious plans to carve out a “New Russia” from sovereign Ukrainian territory
were at least temporarily frozen in the face of Western sanctions and stiff Ukrainian military resistance. Trump’s call for a grand bargain with Russia is
therefore naïve and misguided. It will not inspire Russia to cooperate with the U.S. for the common
good but instead serve as an open invitation to further aggression with potentially serious
consequences. The following are a few of them: Ukraine : At the present time, Russian troops are massing in areas of occupied Crimea adjacent to
mainland Ukraine. The Ukrainians expect an offensive by the Russian Army at any time. Meanwhile, the Ukrainians report that the Russian-separatist forces in eastern Ukraine on August 8
attacked Ukrainian army positions 61 times in 24 hours. The Russian-separatist army, built up by Russia on Ukrainian territory, consists of an estimated 40,000 fighters — 12,000 of whom are
regular Russian troops. Leadership and coordination are provided by Russia. This force is equipped with multiple rocket launchers, anti-aircraft systems, and more tanks than many members of
NATO. It is supported by another 50,000 Russian troops stationed just over the border on the Russian side. There has been a lull in the fighting in recent months which removed Ukraine from
the world’s headlines. Butstatements by U.S. politicians that undermine faith in the American will to react to
aggression will encourage the Putin regime to intensify its efforts to destabilize Ukraine with a new offensive
whether Trump is elected or not. The Baltics : Russia cannot defeat the U.S. or NATO in an all-out war but it has strategic
superiority in the Baltics where it could provoke a conflict and then threaten to use nuclear weapons, presenting NATO
with a choice of escalation or backing down. The Russians are clearly ready to take risks . On April 14, a
Russian SU-27 fighter jet flew dangerously close to a U.S. RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft over the Baltic Sea. It came within 50 feet of the American
plane and conducted a barrel roll starting from the left side of the aircraft, going over the aircraft, and ending up on the aircraft’s right. This incident
came two days after a simulated Russian aerial assault against the guided-missile destroyer USS Donald Cook in the Baltic Sea.
One of the jets flew within 30 feet of the warship. This was the most reckless flyover of an American ship by a Russian jet since the
Cold War . The Russians are clearly ready to take risks . The Russian leaders are not fanatics. The effort that they have
invested in amassing personal fortunes attests to this. They will not risk their hold on power on behalf of a conflict they know
they will lose. But they could miscalculate, which is why statements such as Trump’s that question
U.S. treaty commitments are likely to invite a crisis rather than avoid one. Indiscriminate violence :
The Russian authorities act with a complete disregard for human life. In Syria, the Russian bombing is
indiscriminate. According to the Violations Documentation Center, which seeks to document the attacks by all sides, the civilian death toll from Russian strikes in six months until
mid-March was over 2,000. In January, according the Syria Network for Human Rights, another monitoring organization, Russian air strikes killed 679 civilians. This exceeded the number of
civilians killed during that period by the Syrian Army, which is also guilty of indiscriminate bombing, as well as by ISIS (98 killed) and the al-Nusra Front (42 killed). In light of the
dangers that the present Russian regime represents, what matters is deterrence . The bombing of civilian targets in Syria,
including bakeries and hospitals, also increases the flow of refugees toward Turkey and Europe, exacerbating internal tensions in those regions and creating pressure to accept a resolution of
the Syrian crisis on Russian terms. Americans have not been immune to Russian aggression. An American was among the victims when on July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot
down over eastern Ukraine killing all 298 persons on board. The Dutch Safety Board confirmed that MH17 was destroyed by a missile fired from a Russian made BUK anti-aircraft battery. The
Putin regime, in complete disregard for the safety of innocent international air travelers, had transferred missiles capable of shooting down planes flying at over 30,000 feet to a quickly
assembled army fighting in an area traversed by one of the busiest commercial air corridors in the world. There was also an American victim, Sandy Booker of Oklahoma, in the 2002 Moscow
theater siege in which the Russian authorities flooded a theater with lethal gas. In all cases, the Russian leaders will respect civilian lives, including those of Americans, only to the degree that
Trump responds to reports of Russian crimes by saying, “we kill plenty of people too,” he is removing
they fear that they may be called to account. If an American leader like
what little restraint Russians are likely to exercise in military conflicts and increasing the risks to
uninvolved Americans as well. COMMENTS Trump has expressed concern for Putin’s attitude for him. He said that he believes that Trump respects him and wonders
if Putin likes him, as if this was in some way relevant. Carter Page, an adviser to Trump on Russia policy, blamed the tensions between the U.S. and Russia on the “often hypocritical focus on
represents, however, what matters is deterrence , which always has a strong psychological element.
Restraining the behavior of the Putin regime requires creating the impression in both word and deed
that violations will meet with a serious response. If Trump becomes president, he will, of course, have access to intelligence information that
may change some of his impressions. But if he persists in his shallow opinions, the consequences could be felt by everyone .
Russia influence and arms sales massively declining, need new markets to shore up
dominance
Stratfor Worldview (geopolitical intelligence and advisory firm.) 5/5/ 2019 [“Russia Makes Some of
the Deadliest Weapons on Earth (But There Is a Problem)” online @
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-makes-some-deadliest-weapons-earth-there-problem-
55812, loghry]
Russia's defense industry is face to face with a major foe, but it's not a foreign military power. The
Kremlin has been striving to modernize all branches of the Russian military, but the country's defense
industry is struggling thanks to decreasing volumes of orders, difficulties in attracting high-skilled talent
and limits to its technological capabilities. According to recent figures, the performance of Russia's
aerospace sector is declining precipitously. In 2018, for instance, Russian aircraft and spacecraft makers
produced 13.5 percent less than in 2017. And there's been no letup in 2019 either: In the first two
months of the year, aerospace output plummeted 48 percent year on year.
The decline in Russia's defense output raises concerns about the competitive strength of Russia's
defense industry in general, whose health is critical if the country is to project itself as a military
power in the longer term. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov attributed the reduction in
output to a slowdown of orders for military systems, but projections suggest the slowdown is not just
a short-term fluctuation; in fact, it's expected to become even worse in the future. The downturn in oil
prices has taken a bite out of Russia's bottom line, squeezing spending for the military — all at a time
when the country's arms manufacturers have lost their competitive edge in the global arms market.
Together, these factors ensure that Russia's defense industry will struggle to get out of its funk.
Suffering From a Dearth of Funds
This dire picture stands in stark contrast to Russia's frequent presentation of sensational new platforms.
In reality, however, just a few of the big-ticket weapon systems — such as the T-14 main battle tank or
the Su-57 fighter aircraft — find buyers, as the rest remain mere prototypes. Russia has prioritized
some hardware, such as the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, due to their strategic relevance to
the country's overall military posture, but Moscow has failed to fully develop other programs or only
introduced them on a limited scale.
Under pressure from a limited government budget, the Kremlin even started reducing its military
spending in 2017 — a strong indicator that, despite the modernization push, Russia's financial
challenges are taking a toll on the country ambitions. Economically, the plunge in oil prices at the end of
2014 hurt Russia's bottom line, depriving the country of essential revenue and forcing it to dip into its
reserves to bridge the gap. Today, more than four years on, Russian oil revenues are rising, yet the
country is continuing to deal with the consequences of the lean years. Beyond that, low revenues
from taxes, which have forced Russia to raise taxes and the retirement age, and Western sanctions over
Moscow's activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, have shrunk the financial pool available to military
planners.
But the Kremlin's problems don't end there. In the past, Russia has benefited from its position as a
major global arms exporter to fuel further military development. During the 1990s, for example, such
sales were critical to the country as it faced severe economic hardship. While Russia remains the
world's second-largest arms exporter (only the United States sells more), the actual value of those
exports has been decreasing significantly . Between 2014 and 2018, their total value dropped by as
much as 17 percent. Again, budgetary limits are somewhat to blame: In the past, Russia frequently
used arms exports as a political tool, offering weapons at a heavy discount, if not entirely free. But
with Russia no longer able to offer customers a good deal on its fighter jets and other defense
products, the country is losing business.
And Russia's arms industry faces an even greater problem in the years to come: reduced
competitiveness. Russia has long dominated some of the market by offering affordable military
equipment without attaching any conditions regarding human rights, but the rise of China's military
industry, as well as several smaller producers around the world, has made it much more difficult to
compete for contracts.
Ultimately, the loss of export opportunities not only complicates Russia's efforts to finance its defense
industry, it also reduces the scale at which the defense industry produces, which, in turn, decreases
scale-dependent savings that accompany higher levels of production. In effect, this means that the
more Russia fails to find foreign customers for specific weapon systems, the more it will become
burdened with a higher relative cost per unit as it seeks to meet its own needs. The conundrum, in
turn, will further limit Russia's ability to competitively price weapons systems for export, thereby
perpetuating the effect.
Links
Both – Generic
The economics of arms sales insures client nations forego sales with hostile regimes
Jonathan Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research
Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 4/6/ 2018 [“AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY
ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-
policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, loghry]
U.S. arms exports rely on a simple bargain: Clients join an American-dominated global supply chain in
return for better value weapons, larger orders of subcomponents from local firms, and access to
leading-edge weapons technology. These smaller states, in turn, surrender to the United States large
swathes of their foreign and defense policies, including foregoing sales to regimes that threaten U.S.
interests . The process is characterized by hard bargaining and by a considerable degree of coercion by
the United States, such as when it temporarily kicked Israel out of the Joint Strike Fighter program for
selling unmanned aerial vehicle parts to China. Sovereign states are of course reluctant to hand over
their foreign policy, but the United States can use financial incentives (thereby reducing the economic
benefit at home) to convince countries to buy American. Consider the formidable missile defense
complex the United States is trying to create in South Asia among itself, Japan, and South Korea. Trump
has suggested that, contrary to current agreements, South Korea pay for the THAAD missile defense
system, at a billion dollars a battery, deployed in North Gyeongsang province: “We’re going to protect
them. But they should pay for that, and they understand that.” But South Korea has already paid a heavy
price for deploying THAAD due to Chinese economic retaliation. And there are massive security
spillovers if South Korea continues to participate. Japan and South Korea’s participation in the Aegis
system, for example, pulls two states loath to cooperate with each other bilaterally into something
resembling a collective-security network. If economic concessions on THAAD or a possible $1.7 billion
Aegis missile purchase are necessary to bring South Korea into this network, that may be a price worth
paying.
Both – Saudi Arabia
**Continued liberalized arms sales crucial to shoring up allies investments in the arms
market and choking Russia and China out. The plan sets an international precedent
and provides opportunities for hostile states to gain market strength and undermine
U.S. interests.
Jonathan Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research
Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 4/6/ 2018 [“AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY
ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-
policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, loghry]
A smart arms transfer policy would strangle both Russia, the number two exporter, and China, which is
trying to take its place. Russia in particular needs arms exports to fund its aggressive but underfunded
military modernization plans (not to mention hard currency for its weak economy). It is in America’s
interests to choke off as large a percentage of the Russian export market as possible in favor of the
products of more closely aligned countries. In terms of both American influence and curbing
proliferation, it is better for countries like Malaysia and Indonesia to buy German or South Korean
submarines than Russian. This will have the added benefit of diminishing the quality and, eventually,
raising the price of the products Russia will export to states, such as Syria, that cannot buy arms from
anywhere else. In the spirit of bolstering potential partners and limiting the reach of Russian weapons,
the United States can directly compete against Russia in one important market. India accounts for a
stunning 39 percent of Russia’s recent arms exports (SIPRI). Indian orders might be big enough to
provide some meaningful economic benefits to the United States, but more importantly, U.S. sales
would cut into Russia’s market share. Tying India and the United States closer, even if it means allowing
most production, jobs, and even some technology transfer to go abroad, should be a central goal of U.S.
arms transfer policy. Lockheed Martin’s offer to transfer the F-16 production line to India appears a step
in this direction. America should accept that Saudi Arabia is going to buy a lot of U.S. weapons, but
avoid coddling the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia (and its Gulf State allies) will remain an important customer
largely because the country is desperate to keep the United States involved in the region. The Saudi
military is almost entirely American equipped and trained and most of its military capability requires
continued American support to function for more than a couple of days. A few additional jobs may
result from selling more arms to the Kingdom, but this may not justify giving up the leverage over Saudi
and its allies’ policies towards Yemen, Syria, and Qatar that do not necessarily advance American
interests. The United States should encourage, but steer, Europe. Since the Cold War the United States
has used its economic and political clout to systematically inhibit an independent European defense
production capability. This has certainly increased U.S. market share, but continued efforts come at the
expense of more important political goals. It would be much easier to ask NATO allies to spend 2 percent
of their GDP on defense if more of this money would go into indigenous industries. The United States
should recognize that European global competitiveness in the arms trade can serve American interests
(and perhaps provide competition for its own sheltered defense industry). This will relieve pressure on
Europe to export to countries embargoed by the United States, which undermines the influence of U.S.
arms transfer policy. When the United States placed real restrictions on arms transfers to Egypt’s al-Sisi
regime, other states quickly attempted to fill this gap. As one French policymaker cynically noted,
“Obama was the [French fighter jet] Rafale’s best salesperson.” Overall, from 2012-2015 the export
agreements of major European sellers to Egypt have gone up forty-seven-fold over the previous four-
year period. That said, Europe has by and large cooperated with successful arms embargoes against
Russia and China (although Europe does sell nearly $400 million of dual use equipment to China each
year). Maintaining and even tightening these key sanctions must be the highest priority of any
defense cooperation policy with Europe. More broadly, fixation on “buying American” misses
tremendous opportunities for leading coordinated action with like-minded states in Europe and
elsewhere. This is feasible given that the United States, NATO members, South Korea, Israel, and a few
other allies account for a whopping 62 percent of total global arms exports (SIPRI). To this end, the
United States should liberalize its own market. Much as when “foreign” automotive firms build their
cars in the United States, acquiring products from abroad may create more jobs than selling weapons
internationally. The U.S. Air Force’s current $16 billion fighter-trainer contract has been largely
narrowed down to three candidates with foreign connections: a Lockheed Martin-Korea Aerospace
Industries version of Korea’s T-50; a new design from a Boeing-Saab team; and an entirely foreign
offering from Leonardo. Winning such a contract will give one of three like-minded states (South
Korea, Sweden, or Italy, respectively) a boost in other international competitions against less
scrupulous dealers. And the United States can still shape these exports for its political interests, such
as when it recently vetoed the T-50’s export to Uzbekistan. America is Like No Other Arms Exporter and
Should Act Like It The United States — by dint of its huge military budget, massive defense R&D, and
long dominance of the global arms market — can use arms transfers in ways beyond the dreams of its
competitors. Indeed, many competitors recognize this, albeit grudgingly. I have interviewed officials in
multiple countries (both clients and competitors of the United States) claiming they will defer to U.S.
wishes on arms exports if they trust it is done for political rather than economic reasons. Many of
America’s closest allies, who are also arms export competitors, look to the United States for leadership
on controversial importers such as Saudi Arabia. And, the Trump administration should be given due
credit for exercising discretion, given, for instance, its recent unilateral embargo on arms transfer to
South Sudan. In fact, one administration official stated flatly that sales “will not come at the expense of
human rights.” In no small part, U.S. domination of the global arms trade is based on the world’s belief
that the United States uses its clout to advance its political ends, not economic gain. Destroying this
reputation will do little to bring jobs to the United States, while doing much to damage American
influence abroad.
Ending sales to Saudi Arabia backfires – forces them to seek outside sources, current
regime locks out hostile states
Lt. Col. Ray Rounds (U.S. Air Force F-15E pilot and a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University in
International Relations. He is a U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies graduate and a
former Mirage 2000 exchange pilot with the French Air Force.) 4/16/ 2019 [“THE CASE AGAINST ARMS
EMBARGOS, EVEN FOR SAUDI ARABIA” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2019/04/the-case-against-
arms-embargos-even-for-saudi-arabia/, loghry]
One area in which U.S. President Donald Trump does not need to worry about making America great
again is international arms sales. The United States accounts for 34 percent of all global arms sales
(second place Russia remains a distant 23 percent), and has more than 40 defense companies in the top
100 globally. However, with civilian deaths caused by the Saudi-led war in Yemen estimated at between
16,000 and 50,000 by the end of 2018, calls for the United States to suspend arms sales to its largest
client — Saudi Arabia — have understandably gained traction in both Congress and the public. More
generally, several authors have penned articles in these virtual pages calling for more selective U.S. arms
export decisions or outright embargos, governed less by economic motivations and more by concern
about blowback, human rights, dispersion, and reducing technology transfer. I respectfully disagree with
all of these recommendations. Whether it is delayed approval, as in the recent Kuwaiti F-18 purchase,
an outright embargo, like Egyptian F-16s in 2013, or denial of technology transfer, as in the 2016
Turkish Patriot missile request, using the withholding of arms sales as a blunt force instrument of
coercion is unlikely to produce desired strategic benefits and often backfires. Arms exports are best
used for maintaining or strengthening relationships while limiting adversary access to client states ; a
tool of nuanced influence, not outright coercion. In fact, threatening to withhold arms sales to coerce a
state into changing its behavior often has the opposite effect, leading clients to diversify their arms
sourcing instead of shifting course. Similarly, calls to restrict technology transfer and worries about
demands for direct offsets mistake what is known as “design technology transfer” for the much more
difficult “capacity” level of transfer. Both are explained in more detail below, but for now it is worth
noting that design transfer, the level at which most of these offsets occur, does not lead to the creation
of an independent defense industry, but instead provides the United States with a source of political
power. The United States should not fear technology transfer, but with the appropriate end-user
controls, encourage it. Additionally, while a large domestic market provides the United States the luxury
of sacrificing financial gains for political influence, sometimes economics do matter; especially when it
comes to preserving complex production lines for future flexibility. Finally, the United States should not
look to use an arms embargo to coerce Saudi policy change, not for economic reasons, but simply
because it is unlikely to work. Greasing the Skids, Not Twisting Arms Arms sales are useful tools for
maintaining communication, strengthening relationships, and keeping potential adversary states at
bay. Conversely, as a blunt instrument of coercion (i.e. if you do not do X, we will suspend Y), they are
likely losers. Senior U.S. government officials involved in the arms transfer process that I interviewed
over the past year during the course of my research have echoed similar sentiments. This is also borne
out by previous research providing evidence that using arms transfers as situationally coercive tools is
rarely successful. Interestingly, coercion attempts using arms transfers are least likely to be successful
when used as a punishment or threat against an autocratic regime, such as Saudi Arabia. Instead,
punishments in the form of an embargo can often push a client to diversify sourcing rather than to
change behavior .
China – Generic
Decreasing arms sales opens a vacuum that China will fill in. Has the capability and will
use increased exports to further challenge the U.S.
Richard A. Bitzinger (Visiting Senior Fellow with the Military Transformations Program at the S
Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore) 4/16/ 2019
[“How China weaponizes overseas arms sales” online @
https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/opinion/how-china-weaponizes-overseas-arms-sales/, loghry]
Admittedly, China remains a smallish arms exporter, compared to the United States, which dominates
the global arms bazaar, typically capturing 35% to 40% of the market. Moreover, Beijing is still
overwhelmingly dependent on sales to just a few countries, such as Pakistan and Bangladesh. It also
still relies on countries either too poor to buy Western armaments or who have been subjected to
arms embargoes . Few big-spending arms importers – such as the oil-rich Gulf states – have ever been
interested in Chinese arms (other than armed drones). Iran used to be a major consumer of Chinese
arms, but it has not placed a new order with Beijing in several years. Nevertheless , China’s growing,
cumulative political, economic, and military rise is reshaping global as well as regional geopolitics,
including strategic alliances and balances of power – and arms exports are a critical ingredient in this
remaking. While Chinese arms exports may have had their beginnings in mostly economic rationales –
such as profits and support for the domestic arms industry – increasingly overseas arms sales are being
used as a tool to advance Beijing’s strategic interests . This is self-evident in the growing range of
Chinese arms sales – especially to Africa and Latin America – and in Beijing’s readiness to sell its most
advanced weapons systems with no political strings attached and generally at prices below those of
Western competitors. As such, arms exports will also increasingly figure in the growing strategic
competition with the United States. The arms competition between these two countries – both in East
Asia and increasingly globally as well – is synonymous with their emerging great-power rivalry. In this
regard, China has a growing capability to shape the direction and character of this arms competition –
not only through its military-technological development and diffusion of arms exports, but more
importantly, through its strategic choices that influence the contours of alliances and military
advantage in different geographic areas.
Russia is ready to fill in – they’re actively increasing dialogue and marketability as U.S.
alternative
Hashmi ’19 [Faizan Hashmi, senior News Editor at UrduPoint, 5/5/19, “Russia Does Not Set Extra
Political, Economic Conditions For Arms' Sales – Official,” UrduPoint,
https://www.urdupoint.com/en/world/russia-does-not-set-extra-political-economic-613358.html, cs]
MOSCOW (UrduPoint News / Sputnik - 05th May, 2019) Russia is the only country on the arms' market which does not set
additional political, or economic conditions for sales of weapons , Maria Vorobyeva, the spokeswoman of the Federal Service
for Military-Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), said on Sunday. "In the dynamically developing countries of Asia and Latin
America, the public now demands from its leadership transparency and independence in matters of
military-technical cooperation and national security... [Russia is] the only [country] among the leaders of [the arms' sales] market
which does not set additional political or economic conditions when striking contracts," Vorobyova said. According to the official, Russia is ready for an
open dialogue with all legitimate governments in all areas and formats .
Russia has the incentive to fill in – arms sales tied to Putin’s larger economic, foreign,
and domestic strategy
Denisentsey ’17 [Sergey Denisentsev is a visiting fellow with the Russia and Eurasia Program at CSIS.
In 2007, he became a regular contributor to publications of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and
Technologies (CAST), August 2017, “Russia in the Global Arms Market: Stagnation in a Changing Market
Landscape,” A Report of the CSIS RUSSIA AND EURASIA PROGRAM, https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/170816_Denisentsev_RussiaGlobalArmsMarket_Web.pdf?
VHDgCY.h54QWJm1lPCa2w1Lc.BjElJH_, cs]
Russia remains a major player in the global defense market . Various estimates are available on the size of Russian arms exports (more on
that later)—but all leading market monitors agree that Russia is currently the world’s second-largest arms
supplier after the United States. Arms exports are an important source of earnings for the Russian economy . In 2016, Russia exported
$285.7 billion1 worth of goods and services; according to the Federal Service for Military and Technical Cooperation (FSMTC), defense hardware and services accounted for 5.2 percent of that
figure ($15 billion in absolute terms).2 But Russia’s overall exports rely disproportionately on raw materials and minerals —
especially hydrocarbons, which account for 62 percent of the total.3 If we exclude energy from the tally, arms exports become even
more important for the Russian economy. For example, they make up over 60 percent of Russian machinery exports ($15
billion of $24.4 billion).4 In other words, arms exports are one of the very few success stories in the Russian high-tech
sector, along with the exports of nuclear technologies and materials. Arms exports are important to Russia not just economically, but also politically
and militarily. President Vladimir Putin once famously said at a sitting of the Commission for Military and Technical Cooperation5 : “Effective military and technical cooperation is a
potent instrument of promoting our national interests, political as well as economic.”6 The Kremlin may also see major arms contracts as part
and parcel of its long-standing and developing political and economic relationships, for instance with China, India,
Algeria, Kazakhstan, Venezuela, and many other countries . Another notable development in this
regard is the growing noncommercial arms deliveries to Russia’s allies in the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), especially Belarus and Armenia, and to non-CSTO member Syria. These deliveries are a major instrument of Russian foreign policy. They help to
strengthen Russia’s closest allies that serve as buffer states along its borders (Belarus, Armenia), and to suppress the terror
threat— mostly in Syria, but also in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Furthermore, arms exports are an important indirect factor contributing to
domestic stability. This is because, according to the Russian Ministry of Industry and Trade, the defense industry employs more than 1.3
million people.7 Since exports account for about a third of Russia’s defense output (more on that in the “Other factors of
stagnation” section), the livelihood of roughly 400,000 Russian engineers, scientists, and technicians, as well as
members of their families, directly depends on defense exports . As a rule, these people form a
conservative and patriotically minded electorate that is staunchly loyal to the Putin administration. As
an election strategy, the Russian president and his United Russia party indirectly support this
electorate through arms export stimulus packages (credit financing, government-issued guarantees, etc.). Russian arms exports
and defense relations with other countries also serve as important propaganda instruments . Russia’s state-owned and pro-government media outlets
offer regular and generous coverage of the latest achievements of Russian defense suppliers in foreign markets. Such achievements include large contracts signed with foreign customers and
highlighted as a major achievement of the Putin era.8 The media often emphasize the personal role played in that success story by President Putin
himself and by Sergey Chemezov, head of Rostec (the parent company of the Russian arms export intermediary Rosoboronexport), who has been a close friend of Putin since the latter’s days
as a Soviet agent in East Germany.9 Until recently, the upbeat picture painted by Russian propaganda was backed by figures. For example, during the Putin presidency, Russian arms exports
skyrocketed by 440 percent, from $3.4 billion in 1999 (when Vladimir Putin became acting prime minister) to a peak of $15.7 billion in 2013.10 In recent years, however, that growth has
slowed and then stalled completely. The focus of this paper is on the current dynamics of Russian arms exports, the reasons for their steady growth in the 2000s and early 2010s, their current
stagnation, and the outlook for the coming years.
Russia – Middle East
**Yes Russia will fill-in – they see arms control as key to regime survival**ME
specific**
Borshchevskaya ’17 [Anna Borshchevskaya is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing
on Russia's policy toward the Middle East and is also a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University; In
addition, she is a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy and was previously with the Atlantic
Council and the Peterson Institute for International Economics,“The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales
to the Middle East,” 12/13/17,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Borshchevskaya20171222-
Jamestown.pdf]
Russia is one of the world’s top arms exporters , second only to the United States since at least 1999.1 In recent years, the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) region emerged as Russia’s second most important arms market after Asia . From 2000 to 2016, almost a
fifth of Russia’s arms exports went to the MENA region.2 To put this in perspective, in 2009, Moscow sold approximately $9 billion worth of
arms to this region. In 2016, it sold $21.4 billion.3 Many of these sales are upgrades to existing
packages.4 Since 2000, Moscow also diversified from traditional Soviet-era regional clients . Since officially coming to power
in May 2000, if not before, Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia’s image as a Great Power in the context of zero-sum anti-Westernism— for Russia to win, the West had to
lose. His approach to the Middle East is the extension of former Russian prime minister Evgeniy Primakov’s vision of a “multipolar world,” driven by desire to prevent the West from
political influence and raise Russia to the status of a competitor to the United States by increasing
emphasis on Russia’s business interests—primarily arms, energy and high-tech goods such as nuclear reactors.5
Russia’s economy remains over-reliant on raw materials and natural resources, but the defense industry is one technology-intensive sector
where Russia holds an international leadership position. Domestically, Russia’s defense industry is a
major source of employment. Russian President Vladimir Putin renewed his emphasis on modernizing the armed forces, especially the navy, on May 7, 2012, on the
same day as he took office as president for a third time.6 Internationally, the Russian defense industry is a source of important
revenue. Thus, Putin lamented in February 2012 about Iraq and countries undergoing the Arab Spring, “Russian companies are losing their decades-long positions in local commercial
markets and are being deprived of large commercial contracts.”7 As Sergei Chemezov, chief of the powerful state industrial holding Rostec, said in February 2015, “As for the conflict situation
in the Middle East, I do not conceal it, and everyone understands this, the more conflicts there are, the more they [clients] buy weapons from us. Volumes are continuing to grow despite
arms sales entail far more to the Kremlin than mere financial
sanctions. Mainly, it is in Latin America and the Middle East.”8 Yet,
gains. They are also Moscow’s tactical foreign policy tool for wielding political influence and changing
power balance dynamics. Indeed, in July 2012, Putin said that arms exports are “an effective instrument for advancing [Moscow’s] national interests, both political and
economic.”9 In December 2013, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin said that Russia’s arms sales are the
most important element of Moscow’s relations with other countries. 10 And Moscow’s chief goal—
regime survival, which it hopes to achieve through reduction of Western influence—runs counter to
Western interests and values. Thus, in the MENA region, Moscow courts virtually everyone, and competes
with the West whenever an opportunity arises. Arms exports are a major component of these efforts.
****Russia can and will fill-in – they’ve solidified staying power in the Middle East***
Cook ’18 [STEVEN A. COOK is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at
the Council on Foreign Relations, 3/16/18, “Russia Is in the Middle East to Stay,” Foreign Policy,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/03/16/the-middle-east-needs-a-steady-boyfriend/]
Since Moscow’s demonstration of strength (with Iran’s help) in Syria, the Russians have asserted themselves as a
credible alternative to the Americans with traditional U.S. allies . With arms sales, economic deals, and
diplomatic maneuvering, Russia has been effective in pulling Turkey and Egypt away from the United
States, though not completely, and closer to Russia’s orbit. Saudi Arabia’s King Salman traveled to Moscow last
October — the first ever visit by a Saudi king — to talk oil prices and hedge against American retrenchment. And now that
the United States is the world’s leading producer of petroleum, there is likely to be more cooperation
between the Russians and the Arab Gulf states in an effort to ensure that global oil prices are favorable to their interests. Even the
Israelis have repeatedly beaten a path to Moscow over the last few years in hopes of persuading Putin to look
after their interests in Syria. This is a solid record of achievement . In the span of less than a decade, the Middle East
has gone from a region in which the United States was overwhelmingly predominant to one that
Washington and Moscow contest. In Syria, the Russians have demonstrated political will and staying
power. This is more important than, for example, the size of Russia’s economy, which has been used
as an indicator of Moscow’s weakness. To believe that Russian power is ephemeral risks instilling ideas and assumptions about the world
that breed complacency. Washington needs the exact opposite. So, what should the United States do about Russia in the Middle East? Before doing anything,
policymakers must recognize reality: The Russians are not going away, they have a strategy to weaken
the West, and it starts in the Middle East. Moreover, Moscow no longer has the ideological baggage of
communism, making it easier for it to make inroads in the region.
Russia – India
Continued sales to India crucial to lock out Russia over the long term, ending sales
now risks Russian dominance
The Economist (staff) 8/18/2018 [“The global arms trade is booming. Buyers are spoiled for choice”
online @ https://www.economist.com/international/2018/08/18/the-global-arms-trade-is-booming-
buyers-are-spoiled-for-choice, loghry]
As for Russia, SIPRI calculates that its share of the global market has slipped (to about 22% in 2013-17).
But it offers a blend of tried-and-tested hardware and, to a few customers, superb know-how, especially
in air defence. That creates a dilemma for America, which hopes soon to sell weapons worth $6bn to
India, but is dismayed by that country’s determination to acquire S-400 air-defence systems from
Russia: missiles that could ward off potential threats from China or Pakistan. Other countries intent on
continuing to buy Russian include Indonesia and Vietnam. Jim Mattis, America’s defence secretary, has
implored Congress not to be too harsh with Russia’s customers, so long as they pledge gradually to
reduce their reliance. In a letter leaked in July to Breaking Defense, a specialist news service, he told a
congressman: “We are faced with a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to decrease Russia’s dominance in
key regions.” But that could only happen if America were free to sell its own weapons. For customers,
that means that for the foreseeable future they can keep both American and Russian weapons in their
arsenals. It is telling that India has recently been admitted to the Missile Technology Control Regime, a
group of countries which promises not to help pariah states obtain ballistic missiles. That will make it
easier for both America and Russia to sell long-range rockets to India. The two arms-sales giants, who
do not agree on much else, have welcomed India into the club.
Answers
China – A2: No Capacity
China poised and capable of massive arms exports
Forecast International (Defence Web, defence news portal) 5/13/2019 [“China’s arms exports on
the rise” online @ https://www.defenceweb.co.za/daily-news/international-news/chinas-arms-exports-
on-the-rise/, loghry]
Beijing continues to build its stature as a global arms exporter, according to the Pentagon’s annual
report to Congress on the military and security developments of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
Per Department of Defense research, China completed over $25 billion worth of arms sales between
2013 and 2017, thereby rising to the level of world’s fourth-largest arms supplier. This largely mirrors
an earlier report released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in March
which noted that China ranked among the world’s top-five largest exporters of defense-related
hardware, behind the U.S., Russia, France and Germany, with 5.7 percent of the global total from 2013
to 2017. The rise of China’s defense budget, aided by decades of strong economic growth, has fed the
development of military industrial capabilities. This, in turn, has elevated the profile of China as a
regional and global arms supplier. For most of its history, the PRC has been a net importer of military
materiel, relying on the former Soviet Union to help it develop its own military-industrial complex in its
early years. As its defense industrial sector has matured, China has placed a premium on domestic
innovation and production. Over time this has allowed the country to reduce its dependency on arms
imports, the array of which remain limited due to bans enacted following the communist regime
crackdown on Tiananmen Square pro-democracy protesters in 1989.
**China poised to fill in any gaps in the arms market – weapons more likely to enter
third party conflicts
CSIS (Center for Strategic & International Studies – China Power Project) 4/26/ 2018 [“How dominant is
China in the global arms trade?” online @ https://chinapower.csis.org/china-global-arms-trade/, loghry]
That said, Chinese weaponry is becoming increasingly attractive due in part to its cost-effectiveness.
Although Chinese arms are often less advanced than those sold by other countries, the DOD notes that
“Chinese arms are less expensive than those offered by the top international arms suppliers… [but
still] have advanced capabilities.” For example, the low-cost K-8 jet trainer is estimated to make up 80
percent of all jet trainer aircraft in Africa. China is actively working to strengthen its foothold in certain
markets, such as Algeria. China’s exports to the North African country totaled $483 million between
2008 and 2014, but jumped to $247 million in 2015 alone and peaked at $499 million in 2016 as several
weapon orders were fulfilled. These procurements included three C-28A frigates, which were ordered by
Algeria in 2012. Although not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, a non-proliferation
agreement targeted at missiles and systems capable of delivery weapons of mass destruction, Beijing is
generally compliant with international protocols. The 2002 Regulations on the Export Control of Missiles
and Missile-related Items and Technologies, for instance, outlines measures to safeguard against
proliferation. In June 2017, China published a draft of the Export Control Law, which if enacted will
update existing legislation and establish a comprehensive export control regime. Beijing has been quick
to adapt its domestic regulations to account for emerging technology. This has enabled it to fill the
void left by other suppliers . The US, which has long been at the forefront of unmanned aerial vehicle
(UAV) development, has purposely restricted the export of its UAVs. Regulations that until recently
characterized long-range unmanned aerial systems as cruise missiles, have also limited overseas
access of American UAVs. These factors have created a ripe market opportunity for China , which has
made its UAVs available to countries such as Nigeria and Egypt. It is worth noting that Chinese
weapons have found their way into various conflict zones. Reports indicate that Chinese arms have
been used during conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and Somalia. In
July 2014, China North Industries Corporation delivered 100 guided missile systems, over 9,000
automatic rifles, and 24 million rounds of ammunition to the South Sudanese government, whose
actions have been widely criticized by the international community.
China – A2: Exports Inevitable
Chinese exports not inevitable
Forecast International (Defence Web, defence news portal) 5/13/2019 [“China’s arms exports on
the rise” online @ https://www.defenceweb.co.za/daily-news/international-news/chinas-arms-exports-
on-the-rise/, loghry]
That China should reach this level of global success may seem inevitable from a 21st century lens, but
during the embryonic stage of its military-industrial development in the 1950s, such a leap would not
have appeared foreordained. At that time, Chinese weapons exports were largely driven by ideological
concerns. China delivered low-tech, largely obsolete weaponry to strategically aligned communist
regimes and communist-inspired “national liberation” movements in the developing world. Because
China’s defense-industrial base was still primitive and reliant upon Soviet technological assistance and
weapons deliveries, communist China mainly acted as an intermediary for the Soviets in theaters of war
such as Vietnam. By the late 1960s, China had forged a close strategic alliance with Pakistan, with
massive Chinese arms sales and deliveries to Islamabad providing a crucial cornerstone for burgeoning
Sino-Pakistani ties. Through these weapons exports, China was able to cultivate a crucial regional
relationship that continues to this day (and Pakistan remains China’s largest weapons export market).
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) provided Beijing with yet another opening into new markets. With both
sides requiring fresh influxes of weapons and ammunition, China’s no-strings-attached export policy
suited both combatants as they increasingly found themselves marginalized on the international market.
The war marked the rise of China as a large weapons supplier on the global market and secured Iran as a
lucrative, long-term export market for Chinese defense products. Today China’s primary export market
remains Asia (including Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar, among others), but it has successfully and
steadily penetrated parts of the developing world, including Africa, Latin America, and the Middle
East.
Russia – A2: Training Barrier
**Russia tech in Middle East won’t cause training barrier
Borshchevskaya ’17 [Anna Borshchevskaya is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing
on Russia's policy toward the Middle East and is also a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University; In
addition, she is a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy and was previously with the Atlantic
Council and the Peterson Institute for International Economics,“The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales
to the Middle East,” 12/13/17,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Borshchevskaya20171222-
Jamestown.pdf]
Another practical consideration is thatmany local military personnel in the MENA region have trained on Russian
weaponry and feel comfortable operating it. As one American source familiar with the situation
explained it, “If you have an AK-47, why change to an M-16?” 16 For example, helicopters are especially
crucial to Egypt’s anti-Islamist campaign; and according to first-hand pilot accounts, Russia’ less
expensive helicopters fit Egypt’s needs well. Overall, Russian attack helicopters are not necessarily superior technologically, but they bring heavy
firepower to a fight. They may fare worse in a contested air space, but the Sinai airspace is not contested . The Russian MiG-29 is a highly advanced
aircraft, easier to maintain than an American one, and cheaper than an F-2217 (which the US is
currently not even exporting).
Russia – A2: No Demand
There will be demand for robust, innovative, and cost-effective Russian tech
Borshchevskaya ’17 [Anna Borshchevskaya is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing
on Russia's policy toward the Middle East and is also a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University; In
addition, she is a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy and was previously with the Atlantic
Council and the Peterson Institute for International Economics,“The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales
to the Middle East,” 12/13/17,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Borshchevskaya20171222-
Jamestown.pdf]
When countries prefer Russian weaponry over American systems, it is usually for evident reasons. The US will not sell weapons to many of
Russia’s clients for a variety of reasons. Russian weaponry is relatively inexpensive and, generally speaking, often more
robust than comparable American systems. In some areas, Moscow’s systems lag severely behind the US in terms of quality
and capabilities, but in others, it is a near-peer competitor . For instance, Moscow is quite good at building anti-aircraft
missiles, such as the S-300 and S-400 systems, based on lessonslearned from the Kosovo Air War. The American F-35 joint strike fighter can likely currently beat
an S-400 (although there is no way to know for sure unless they engage in direct combat). However, Moscow is developing the next
generation, the S-500, whose full capabilities are unknown. Russian current-generation aircraft and ballistic missile
defenses are on par with those of the US in terms of defense technology. Some Russian missiles have
as long a range as American missiles, a few of them even longer. 14 In addition, the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
system is very slow, bureaucratic and cumbersome, while Moscow takes less time to deliver after a
contract is signed. Moscow is weak when it comes to follow-up support of sales, and Russian weaponry is not always as technically advanced
as America’s, but it is good enough for the needs of many markets, and is often far better than what the
purchasing countries can build themselves. Russian weaponry is also a good choice for states on a
budget. Moscow advertises this fact. For example, in early October 2015, days after Russia’s Syria intervention, Moscow fired 26 cruise missiles from primarily
small corvettes in the Caspian Sea to hit targets in Syria.15 Moscow made a public display of the event, not only to demonstrate Russia’s own might but also to show
other countries they need not purchase a large expensive warship to achieve strong naval capabilities, and that Moscow would be happy to help them achieve this
goal.
Even if the tech is less desirable, demand will be high because Russia places far fewer
regulations and preconditions on its sale
Borshchevskaya ’17 [Anna Borshchevskaya is a Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing
on Russia's policy toward the Middle East and is also a Ph.D. candidate at George Mason University; In
addition, she is a fellow at the European Foundation for Democracy and was previously with the Atlantic
Council and the Peterson Institute for International Economics,“The Tactical Side of Russia’s Arms Sales
to the Middle East,” 12/13/17,
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/opeds/Borshchevskaya20171222-
Jamestown.pdf]
Beyond these advantages, Russian weaponry comes with few strings attached, in contrast to arms sales from
Washington. Moscow, unlike the US, does not prohibit secondary arms sales . This means, for example, that when the
US sells weapons to Egypt, the weapon must stay in Egypt.18 But in Egypt’s context, buying a Russian weapon it can easily
resell to someone else for profit may be a preferable option . Moscow also does not burden arms sales
with preconditions, such as mandated improvements of human rights. In addition, many in the MENA find Russia easier to
deal with—no one needs to worry about falling afoul of a theoretical Russian equivalent of the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, for example. Thus,
countries turn to Moscow when they wish to signal to Washington that they have other options if
they do not like the United States’ pre-conditions . At the same time, some Arab states are genuinely interested
in diversifying supplies away from the US. Indeed, after the 1991 Gulf War, several GCC states bought
Russian systems. The West should not discount Arab countries making such decisions. Russia, unlike the America, invests effort across the MENA region to
sell weapons systems. Western analysts tend to point out Russia could never replace the United States. Nevertheless, such views discount another option:
Moscow does not have to replace the US. Other authoritarian leaders can choose to move closer to
Russia because the Kremlim offers Arab states different advantages including quicker delivery and better
negotiating terms. When it comes to arms sales in the MENA region, Moscow has made major inroads during the Putin
era with Iran, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Algeria, and to a lesser extent with Turkey, Iraq, and elsewhere
in the Arab Persian Gulf. It is also making small inroads with Tunisia and Morocco.
Russia – A2: Sanctions Prevent Sales
Speaking to the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament, on April 17, Prime
Minister Dmitry Medvedev said the
international sanctions imposed on Moscow beginning in 2012 had no negative effect on the country’s
arms trade. He claimed Russia’s military exports totaled $54.5 billion and went to more than 100
countries. Medvedev is correct in stating that the arms industry is the sector of the Russian economy
least affected by sanctions , including the U.S. restrictions targeting Russia's Defense industry and EU
arms embargo imposed in 2014. Russia remains second largest seller of arms globally, with a 21 percent
share of the international market, behind the United States. Russia’s arms exports apparently benefited from a horrific act --the downing of
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) in July 2014, which killed all 298 civilians aboard the jetliner. The Joint Investigation Team said Russia was responsible, and
identified the Russian Buk missile, and the Russian military unit to which the individual missile was assigned. In the years following the 2014 downing, the maker of
the Russian Buk TELAR surface-to-air missile, enjoyed a boost in global sales. A Defense News ranking in 2018 found the maker of the missile, JSC Almaz-Antey,
scored a 39% increase from $6.58 billion in 2016 to $9.1 billion in 2018. Still, the numbers cited by Medvedev are not verifiable independently. The $ 54.5
billion, Medvedev cited as the value of Russia’s military exports -- is not confirmed by independent sources.
Impacts & Internals
China – Internal – Human Rights
Chinese arms exports net worse for human rights
Steven Aftergood (directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy) 5/3/ 2019 [“Rising China Sells
More Weapons” online @ https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2019/05/china-weapons/, loghry]
“In 2018, China’s arms sales increased, continuing a trend that enabled China to become the world’s
fastest-growing arms supplier during the past 15 years,” according to the 2019 China Military Power
report published by the Department of Defense. “From 2013 through 2017, China was the world’s
fourth-largest arms supplier, completing more than $25 billion worth of arms sales.” “Arms transfers
also are a component of China’s foreign policy, used in conjunction with other types of military,
economic aid, and development assistance to support broader foreign policy goals,” the Pentagon
report said. “These include securing access to natural resources and export markets, promoting political
influence among host country elites, and building support in international forums.” Needless to say, the
United States and other countries have long done the same thing, using arms exports as an
instrument of foreign policy and political influence. Up to a point, however, US arms sales are
regulated by laws that include human rights and other considerations. See U.S. Arms Sales and Human
Rights: Legislative Basis and Frequently Asked Questions, CRS In Focus, May 2, 2019.
China – Internal – Heg
Chinese exports to the middle east undermine U.S. power projection
Latifa A. Al Saud (graduate student in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University. She
specializes in International Relations and her research interests focus on the political and security factors
of East Asia-Middle East relations) 12/3/2018 [“China’s Arms Sales Philosophy in the Arab World”
online @ https://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online-articles/chinas-arms-sales-philosophy-arab-world, loghry]
China’s commercial motives do not suggest a complete lack of interest in influencing the region and
maintaining political stability. China is the world’s largest oil importer of Saudi oil, and as such, stability
in the Middle East is critical to China. Chinese arms sales to the region is arguably motivated to
maintain oil flows from friendly leaders from Arab oil exporting states and a necessary tool for China to
foster and enhance energy ties. It is no coincidence that the major oil exporting countries in the region,
including Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Iran, are all purchasing weapons from China. The commercial nature
of Chinese arms sales gives it short-term and long-term advantages. Commercially, arms sales not only
foster stronger economic ties with Arab states, to which China remains dependent on their oil exports,
but also give China a chance to ask for a decrease in the cost of importing energy from the region. China
has the ability to use arms sales as leverage to receive low oil prices and/or concessions, an important
tool given its significant growth in oil demand and dependency on imports. U.S. and Western
policymakers and scholars view increased Chinese arms sales to the region as not merely economically
motivated, but also intended for China’s own power projection and mitigation of U.S. power in the
region. China often criticizes U.S. interference in Middle East affairs, including the strong presence of
U.S. forces in the Gulf (and beyond). The primary objectives for the US, from China’s view, are to
maintain, control, and ensure access to energy resources in the region. Chinese actions to cooperate
with both U.S. and non-U.S. allies, like Iran and Syria, are intended to, at least in part, exert its own
influence. In 1991, the Chinese provided Iran with sophisticated dual use nuclear technology and natural
uranium under the umbrella of nuclear “cooperation.” This, among other factors, allowed China to build
up its image as an attractive and easy to deal with arms provider, serving an entry point to its long-term
strategic presence without appearing to have an interest in picking sides. Arms sales are part of China’s
win-win cooperation and strategy-based foreign policy. Doing so is a rather unconventional approach to
international arms sales, as they have traditionally been used as a political tool, with the United States
as the top player. China’s approach can help its long-term strategic posture in the region by promoting
stronger ties with the Arab states, ensuring oil flows, and opening a door to economic expansion in the
Middle East through investments and Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs). Although there are no recent
instances of China using arms sales to exert influence in the Middle East, this does not mean that the
commercial nature of Chinese arms sales is not also linked to national security interests. The Chinese
government’s arms exports philosophy stems from its interest to maintain strategic relations with the
Arab states in order to best increase its prospects for securing its business and energy interests in the
region, regardless of the recipients’ country’s intensions. It can therefore be said that PRC arms sales are
exemplified in Xi Jinping’s overall win-win, cooperation-based foreign policy and can in turn have key
implications to understanding the global arms trade of this century.
Russia – Impact – Baltics
If U.S. Leadership declines, Putin invades the Baltics
Wilson ‘15 – MPA @ Princeton, American foreign policy advisor and the current executive vice
president at the Atlantic Council of the United States, Deputy Director of the Private Office of the NATO
Secretary General, decorated by the Presidents of Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Poland for his efforts to
advance transatlantic relations (Damon, “A Transatlantic Strategy to Deter Putin’s Aggression,” US
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation,
Lexis)
This crisis began long before Crimea. Indeed, Russia's annexation of Crimea was the natural outcome of a clear,
consistent policy dating back years. I detail this record in my full testimony. Second, Putin will not stop until he
encounters serious pushback. Third, only the United States can galvanize Europe and the international
community around an effective strategy to deter Putin for the long term. Fourth, any strategy should urgently and
decisively back Ukraine, as well as other vulnerable states with significant economic and military assistance in the short term, while keeping the door open to the
European Union or NATO. And fifth, we should neither abandon the Russian people nor the vision that a democratic Russia one day can find its peaceful place within
a Europe whole and free. Putin's strategy has been to use this crisis to consolidate his own hold at home through greater
oppression of civil society and independent media even as he fuels nationalist fervor. He has created an environment of fear and intimidation fostering the
circumstances that led to the assassination of Boris Nemtsov. Putin, of course, is also seeking to dominate his neighbors, to drain them of resources to fuel his
kleptocracy, and to restore a sense of Russia's greatness in the only way a bully knows. He
aims to prevent his neighbors from joining
either NATO or the EU, achieving this through coercion when possible and by dismemberment and
occupation when necessary. Ultimately Putin knows that the best check on his power is a united
transatlantic community, and he has sought to divide Europe, undermining the resolve for sustained sanctions. But the
most tempting objective for Putin is to call into question the credibility of NATO's Article 5 mutual
defense commitment as doing so would effectively end NATO. A Russian move against an ally, such as a
Baltic State , cannot be ruled out. Putin has demonstrated time and again that if he senses an
opportunity to act he will , convinced that the West lacks the will or the ability to take decisive action.
That is why today's situation is dangerous. We have seen repeatedly that Putin's objectives expand with success and contract with
failure. This means that the best determinant of his action is Western action . There is a tendency, however, to argue that the
Europeans should take the lead on Ukraine. After all, we have our hands full with ISIS and other global responsibilities. But the Ukraine crisis is a Russia crisis, and
Without U.S. leadership , Europe may feel forced to
Russia is too big, too strong, and too scary for Europe to resolve this without us.
accommodate a revanchist Russia, and we have seen throughout history this is a dangerous formula .
The United States has the ability to rally its allies and international partners around a comprehensive
strategy that not only deters Putin's aggression, but avoids an unstable gray zone in Europe East . To do so,
we should begin by articulating what we want to achieve. We should more decisively increase the cost to Russia, including by enacting sectorial sanctions and
targeting Gazprom and Putin directly.
No risk of Russia or China catching up with the U.S. – ending sales to one country
doesn’t result in enough fill-in to trigger the impacts
RFE (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, RFE/RL journalists report the news in 26 languages in 22
countries where a free press is banned by the government or not fully established. We provide what
many people cannot get locally: uncensored news, responsible discussion, and open debate.)
3/11/2019 [“U.S. Remains World’s Top Arms Exporter, With Russia A Distant Second” online @
https://www.rferl.org/a/us-russia-lead-world-global-arms-exports/29814176.html, loghry]
WASHINGTON -- The United States remained far and above the rest of the world as the globe’s leading
arms exporter, with Russia a distant second, a leading research group says. The Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) said in a March 11 report that the gap between the
United States and the rest of the world widened further in the most recent five-year period of 2014-
18, with American exports rising to 36 percent of the global total from 30 percent in the previous period.
"The U.S.A. has further solidified its position as the world’s leading arms supplier,” said Aude Fleurant,
director of the SIPRI Arms and Military Expenditure Program. "[It] exported arms to at least 98
countries in the past five years; these deliveries often included advanced weapons such as combat
aircraft, short-range cruise and ballistic missiles, and large numbers of guided bombs." The report
highlighted the widening gap between Washington and Moscow in arms exports. “U.S. exports of major
arms were 75 percent higher than Russia’s in the 2014–18 period, while they were only 12 percent
higher in 2009-13,” SIPRI said in its report of global arms transfers. “More than half (52 percent) of U.S.
arms exports went to the Middle East in 2014-18,” it added. SIPRI said Russia’s arms exports fell 17
percent in the 2014-18 period, with a reduction in arms imports by India and Venezuela the major
factors in the decline. The report said France (6.8 percent of the world total) was the third-highest arms
exporter, followed by Germany (6.4 percent), and China (5.2 percent).
Both – Feasibility
Countries can’t just switch to new arms suppliers – transition costs in training and
materiel just too high
Terrence Guay (Clinical Professor of International Business, Pennsylvania State University) 10/19/ 2018
[“Arms sales to Saudi Arabia give Trump all the leverage he needs in Khashoggi affair” online @
http://theconversation.com/arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia-give-trump-all-the-leverage-he-needs-in-
khashoggi-affair-104998, loghry]
While it’s true that Russia and China are indeed major exporters of armaments, the claim that U.S.
weapons can easily be replaced by other suppliers is not – at least not in the short term. First, once a
country is “locked in” to a specific kind of weapons system, such as planes, tanks or naval vessels, the
cost to switch to a different supplier can be huge. Military personnel must be retrained on new
equipment, spare parts need to be replaced, and operational changes may be necessary. After being
so reliant on U.S. weapons systems for decades, the transition costs to buy from another country
could be prohibitive even for oil-rich Saudi Arabia. The second problem with Trump’s argument is that
armaments from Russia, China or elsewhere are simply not as sophisticated as U.S. weapons, which is
why they are usually cheaper – though the quality gap is quickly decreasing. To maintain its military
superiority in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase virtually all of its weapons from
American and European companies.
Both – No Econ Impact
No economic impact to arms sales
Jonathan Caverley (Associate Professor of Strategy, United States Naval War College and Research
Scientist, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) 4/6/ 2018 [“AMERICA’S ARMS SALES POLICY: SECURITY
ABROAD, NOT JOBS AT HOME” online @ https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/americas-arms-sales-
policy-security-abroad-not-jobs-at-home/, loghry]
However, the Trump administration’s new initiative threatens to disrupt this balance and undermine
the often useful role that arms sales have played in U.S. foreign policy. Tina Kaidanow, head of the
State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, recently testified that the Arms Transfer Initiative
not only “bolsters our ability to protect the United States by being a force multiplier for the U.S.
warfighter” but “ultimately benefits U.S. industry by driving new innovation and creating high-quality
American jobs.” But simultaneously linking U.S. security and American jobs through arms sales, while it
may seem intuitive, rarely works. Indeed, such a policy will carry few economic benefits , and, if done
indiscriminately, undermine what should be the central goal of the nation’s arms transfer policy:
advancing the national security of the United States and its partners. Many deals that advance U.S.
goals will create few jobs in the United States, while some of the most lucrative, job-creating arms
deals can undermine U.S. interests.
China – Post Brink
The U.S. has squandered its arms sales lead – China already cornering the market for
most sought after exports: drones.
Jakob Reinmann (contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus) 2/18/2019 [“China is Flooding the Middle
East With Cheap Drones” online @ 2, loghry]
The last great revolution on the world’s battlefields began with the advent of the drone era.
Particularly in the Middle East, the drone became the symbol of the U.S. empire operating in a legal
vacuum. In the first decade and a half of the “War on Terror,” the U.S. still had a virtual monopoly on
the risk-free execution from thousands of meters above — but once the genie is out of the bottle, every
attempt to squeeze it back in is notoriously doomed to failure. And so, quickly other countries in the
region aspired after the financially — and politically — cheap execution by drone. The number of
armies with their own drone fleet is growing rapidly. A multi-billion-dollar market with astronomical
growth rates opened up — demand that’s essentially served only by one actor: China. The U.S. has
squandered its lead The appearance of the Rainbow CH-4 — the driving force of Chinese combat
drones — is almost identical to the notorious Reaper drone of the U.S. arms manufacturer General
Atomics. While the CH-4 lags behind the Reaper in most performance parameters, it can keep up with or
even outperform its competitor in some of them. Also, the CH-4’s weaponry, the AKD-10 warhead, is
almost identical to the Reaper’s Hellfire missiles. The striking similarity follows a strategy of Chinese
engineering well-known from cell phones or cars: the look of a world-famous Western branded
product is copied with an inferior but sufficiently good quality compared to that of the original — but
at significantly less cost. Chinese drones are 50 to 75 percent cheaper than the originals from the U.S. A
late 2015 article published in the Asia Times suggests that this copying of U.S. technology is likely rooted
in Beijing’s data theft. According to records by world-famous NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, by
2010 alone “Chinese hackers had conducted more than 30,000 cyber attacks” on Pentagon computer
networks and other U.S. military agencies in order to “exfiltrate [data on] sensitive military technology.”
Although there is no final proof that data on drones were skimmed off too, Asia Times quotes then NSA
director Gen. Keith Alexander, who suggests that it is highly likely that the Reaper blueprints were part
of the Chinese data hack, while military experts and analysts largely share this view. With the latest
model — the CH-7, which is still in the development phase — China could possibly pull ahead the U.S.
for the first time, military journal Defense One explains. The CH-7 “will be the sole option for buyers
wanting to field stealth combat drones,” it predicts. “The United States had a decade-plus head start
on [drone] technology,” says military expert Paul Scharre, “and has unfortunately squandered that
lead .”
China – Alt Cause – Drones
China is the leader in armed drone sales already, which is sufficient to trigger the DA’s
impacts
Jakob Reinmann (contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus) 2/18/2019 [“China is Flooding the Middle
East With Cheap Drones” online @ 2, loghry]
China captures the market For a long time, it was only the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Israel that had combat drones and used them to execute alleged terrorists — something that has
changed dramatically in recent years. Meanwhile, the number of countries with combat drones has
swelled to at least 29, as research organization New America identifies. And 10 countries have
demonstrably used them to kill suspected enemies; in addition to the three mentioned, there is Iran,
Azerbaijan, the UAE, as well as Nigeria, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey (the last four countries drone-killed
people on their own soil). Historically, Israel is the largest drone exporter, with a market share of over 60
percent in the last three decades. More recently, from 2008-2017, China exported a total of 88 drones
to at least 12 countries, ranking third among the world’s drone exporters behind the United States (351)
and Israel (186). However, while the vast majority of U.S. and Israeli exports are made up of unarmed
reconnaissance drones, China’s sales focus on armed drones. During the mentioned period, China
exported 68 combat drones, putting it ahead of the U.S. (62) and Israel (56). Foreign Policy thus recently
titled rightly: “China Has Already Won the Drone Wars.” All of the armed forces of the Chinese military
have large fleets of various drones, but Beijing has used them so far only for disaster relief, surveillance
of domestic critics, and military reconnaissance — not to kill. (In 2013, Beijing considered executing by
drone a Myanmar drug baron wanted in the murders of 13 Chinese sailors, but eventually caught and
tried him.) Rather, Beijing appears to be establishing a norm permanently prohibiting lethal drone
strikes in East and South Asia. However, this no-shoot dogma does not prevent the Chinese arms
industry from exporting their drones to states that are patently using them for killing elsewhere.
Russia – Uniqueness Answers
UQ Overwhelms – Russia arms sales high globally now
Kruglov ’19 [ALEXANDER KRUGLOV, 4/21/19, “Business booming for Russia’s arms traders,” Asia
Times, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/article/business-booming-for-russias-arms-traders/, cs]
In a high-profile spat, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has acknowledged he is buying S-400 missile
defense systems, a deal that has put Ankara on a collision course with Nato and Washington and
complicated the country’s deal to buy F35 stealth jets from the United States.
This Ankara-Washington stand-off over the sale of Russian missiles and Erdogan’s obvious commitment to go ahead with the deal make clear how
Moscow’s aggressive arms trade is offering the Kremlin new opportunities to strengthen its position,
influence and foothold the world over. Turkey is only one of the markets for Moscow’s arms traders. According to the latest
annual report by The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) for 2018, Russia has surpassed Britain as the number two arms
producer and trader in the world, behind perennial number one, the US. Combined sales of Russia’s arms and
military services rose 8.5% from a year earlier, reaching an unprecedented US$37.7 billion. Also, according to SIRPI, the largest arms-producing
company in Russia, state-owned Almaz-Antey, for the first time entered the top 10 in the global arms sales
ranking. ‘Arsenal of communism’ Russia’s leading export is energy, its second is weaponry. The USSR, as the “arsenal of communism,” was long a maker of classic weapons, from the
T34 – the outstanding tank of World War II – and the Katyusha multiple rocket launcher to the Kalashnikov assault rifle and MIG and Sukhoi warplanes. Following the break-up of the USSR,
Russia’s military budget shrank six-fold. Potentially catastrophically, arms makers lost many of their top customers – the Eastern European member states of the Warsaw Pact. That forced
producers to refocus on global sales. Even so, old partnerships in other parts of the world endured. Russia’s manufacturers of effective and reliable arms have been given a powerful shot in the
arm by President Vladimir Putin. The macho national leader’s injection blends industrial policy, R&D policy and foreign policy with personal testosterone. With Putin an arms fetishist himself –
he has been filmed watching tanks going through their paces at proving grounds, firing pistols, visiting the Kalashnikov factory, interacting with fully geared-up special forces, even cruising in a
jet fighter in full paraphernalia – Russian arms manufacturers benefit from a highly prominent global marketer like no other. The main focus is on Asia and the Middle East. Russia
sells 43.1% of its weapons to Asia and more than 20% to the Middle East. Chinese market The top priority is China. While
Chinese troops used Russian arms as early as the Korean War in the 1950s, the roots of current Moscow-Beijing cooperation in the sector date back to the turbulent early 1990s. China was
negotiations,Beijing-Moscow cooperation ramped up a level when Russia finally agreed to sell China some
of its most advanced arms: 24 Sukhoi Su 35 combat aircraft and four S-400 SAM systems for
approximately $7 billion within the next five years. Then there’s Asia’s other rising demographic superpower, India, which acquires
62% of all its arms from Russia. Russia is providing a range of equipment, from tanks to fighter aircraft to frigates. India has now overtaken China as the largest buyer
of Russian weapons in the world, having purchased more than $4 billion worth of arms in 2017, according to Russia’s Oriental Studies Institute. But the emerging Asian
market for Russian hardware is Southeast Asia, where, from 2006 to 2015, military spending rose by
an average of 57%, according to Aseantoday website. Arms for Asean As soon as Air Marshall Yuyu Sutisna was sworn in as
Indonesia’s new Air Force Chief of Staff last year, he announced the purchase of 11 new SU-35s. And
that’s just the beginning. The Russians are anticipating future great deals. Vietnam, Indonesia and Cambodia more than
doubled their military purchases. Vietnam increased spending on arms seven-fold from 2006 to 2016. Now Hanoi is the eighth biggest arms importer globally. “All
that is a response to national security threats of countries in the region,” explained Petr Brigin, a Vietnam expert at Vostochnaya Politika, a Moscow think tank. “Vietnam, for example, is
“In Thailand, dealing with an insurgency in the south of the country, there’s a
spending heavily on naval weaponry – in response to China’s moves in the South China Sea.
strong demand for land-based arms – so the Royal Thai Armed Forces placed an order for new AK
rifles.” Between 2000 and 2016, Vietnam imported more than 80% of its arms from Russia, rejuvenating an old partnership – the country deployed Warsaw Pact weapons in its struggle
against the United States. The Vietnamese military, facing off against China in the South China Sea, recently purchased 12 SU-35 fighter-jets and boosted its navy with highly advanced Russian-
Myanmar and Laos bought between 60% and 80% of their weapons
Indian Brahmos cruise missiles and six diesel submarines.
from Russia. Why buy Russian? Because not only are these weapons technologically advanced, they are
cheaper and don’t require the political sign off that arms from Moscow’s main rival do. Human rights criteria must
be met before the US Congress approves arms sales, but Russian weapons come with no such baggage. In 2016, the Philippines placed an order for
26,000 automatic rifles from the US. Those rifles never arrived , as Congress refused to approve the sale over suspicions that President
Rodrigo Duterte might use the weapons against his own people in his war on drugs. As a result, Moscow stepped in and supplied the
Philippines with 5,000 AK-74M rifles, one million items of ammunition and 20 trucks. “Selling weapons to Asian
countries perfectly fits Putin’s foreign policy objectives,” said Alexei Sidorov, an independent Moscow-based analyst who specializes in Southeast Asia. “Putin is trading weaponry with rivals in
the South China Sea,” he added, a reference to the fact that both Hanoi and Beijing were customers of Moscow’s armorers. “This gives Moscow more leverage and political influence in the
The ever-troubled, oil-rich Middle East is also high on Moscow’s agenda. It is a promising market – arms
region.” The Syrian showcase
imports by Middle Eastern states rose 87% over the last four years , accounting for 35% of global arms imports, according to SIPRI.
Russia has been trying to make inroads into the prosperous Gulf states, a market dominated for decades by US arms producers. More than half of all US weapons sold go to the Middle East.
To win over new customers from the Gulf, Russian companies in recent years have boosted their
presence at the major airshows and defense exhibitions in the Middle East , like IDEX in Abu Dhabi and the Dubai Airshow. In
the region, Moscow deploys a special sales pitch. The Russian military has showcased the best it has to offer in its largely successful military intervention in Syria, a theater that has provided a
proving ground for the weaponry. Between 60 and 200 weapons have been tested in Syria in real combat. These include the supersonic strategic bomber the Tu-160, the Su-34 fighter-jet and
buyer of Russian arms. Moscow has actively sought to upgrade relations with Cairo, through subtle diplomacy and high-profile official visits – in 2015, Putin was the first
major leader to meet with President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi after he assumed office. During Putin’s second visit in 2017, several landmark agreements were signed. Nowadays, Cairo is the leading
Russian arms buyer in Africa, with annual weapons purchases estimated at more than $1.3 billion, according to data from Moscow University’s Asian-African Institute. Long-range arms sales
Moscow arms players also boast a strong foothold in Latin America . Many regional nations – particularly those aligned against the
United States – are familiar with Soviet weapons from the Cold War days and are drawn by low price tags. Cuba, Peru, Venezuela and Nicaragua are at
the top of the list for Russian arms sales companies. According to SIPRI, between 2000 and 2017, the Russian
share of arms sales to Latin America was about 20%, on par with the US share. Nicaragua is central. Since 2000, Russia has
supplied 100% of Nicaraguan weapons’ needs. Venezuela is also heavily dependent on Russian arms supplies, which make up about 69% of Venezuela’s arms purchases – aircraft, transport and
combat helicopters, anti-tank missiles, anti-aircraft systems, rocket artillery and mortars.Russia also has a foothold in Brazil , where about 7% of arms sales are
Russian. Since 2010, Russia has delivered Mi-35M combat helicopters and SA-24 portable surface-to-air missiles. Sometimes Russian arms sales are found in unexpected places. Recently,
following the ouster of Sudanese dictator Al-Bashir, it was reported in Moscow press that Russia had been selling arms to the regime for more than 20 years.
MOSCOW -- Russia is ramping up its weapons sales to Southeast and South Asia , with Moscow overtaking Britain
as the world's second-largest exporter. The Kremlin's aggressive sales campaign has raised fears of an
arms race in Canberra and Washington, where the Trump administration has unveiled its own "buy American" effort to sell more U.S. weapons systems worldwide. The
Asia-Pacific is a theater of intensifying rivalry between the two military superpowers , partly fueled by countries
buying arms to counter security threats from Chinese naval expansion in the South China Sea but also from international terrorist groups. Russia -- the largest arms
exporter to the region -- is supplying missile defense systems, tanks and fighter jets to countries
ranging from India to Laos and Vietnam. Russia was the largest supplier of arms for the region from 2013 to 2017, according to the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute. In January, Russia delivered four Yak-130 fighter jets to Laos based on a contract signed in 2017. In addition, Laos is being supplied with tanks, lightly armored vehicles
manufacturers in terms of sales in 2017, according to data released in December by SIPRI. Moscow's combined sales
amounted to $37.7 billion, an 8.5% rise from the previous year and representing 9.5% of overall global
arms sales, which totaled $398.2 billion. Russia's weapons shipments surpassed Britain's $35.7 billion, making it the second-largest arms seller, after the U.S.
Russia sold $19 billion worth of weapons in 2018, according to Sergey Chemezov, CEO of Rostec, the government-owned industrial group that includes Russia's monopoly arms exporter in its
vast portfolio. "Today Russia confidently holds second place in the world by volume of military and technical cooperation," Chemezov was quoted by Russia's Tass news agency as saying. He
lower price tags than those from their Western counterparts . It is believed that Russia's military intervention in the civil war in Syria was
partly motivated by Moscow's desire to test and demonstrate the performance of Russian arms. Even after international economic sanctions were
imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine in 2014, arms exports have remained a steady revenue source for Moscow.
Russia is prioritizing Asia in its arms export expansion drive. The region absorbs over 60% of Russia's arms shipments, with most of them going to Southeast Asia. Nguyen
Phu Trong, the general secretary of Vietnam's Communist Party, visited Russia in September and struck a $1 billion arms deal with Moscow. President Vladimir Putin met with Indian Prime
Minister Narendra Modi in India in October and agreed to sell the sophisticated S-400 surface-to-air missile defense system to the South Asian country in a deal worth $5 billion.
Washington is concerned that sales of Russian weapons systems, like the S-400 to India and other
countries in the region, could lead to U.S. military secrets being leaked to the Kremlin. The Countering America's Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act was introduced in 2017, aimed at punishing Russia for its alleged meddling in the 2016 U.S. elections and its actions in Ukraine. It prohibits any country from signing
"significant" defense deals with Russia. In September 2018, the U.S. imposed secondary sanctions on the Chinese military for buying fighter jets and S-400 system-related equipment from
Russia. The Trump administration's "buy American" policy aims to boost arms exports worldwide. American arms sales to foreign governments rose 13% to $192 billion in fiscal 2018 ended
Sept. 30, according to the State Department. Alexey Muraviev, associate professor of national security and strategic studies at Curtin University in Australia, discussed regional tensions in a
neglect, Russian military power in the Asia-Pacific region is making a major leap forward," Muraviev
wrote. "Russia is making its presence felt in the region for the benefit of its regional allies and clients, and as a form of deterrent to its geopolitical rivals," he said. "The time has come for
us to appreciate a power north of the Great Wall," Muraviev wrote.
Russia – Link Answers – Middle East
No risk of country fill-in in the middle east – too locked into particular systems
Bershidsky ’19 [Leonid Bershidsky is the founding editor of the Russian business daily Vedomosti and
founded the opinion website Slon.ru., 3/12/19, “Trump Is Winning, Putin's Losing in Global Arms Sales,”
Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-12/u-s-is-no-1-in-arms-sales-as-
russia-loses-market-share, cs]
Global arms sales are on the increase, consistent with the growing number of conflicts and deaths brought about by them. The U.S. and its
allies have been the main beneficiaries . Russia, by contrast, is on the decline, a sign that Vladimir Putin’s
geopolitical bets aren’t turning into long-term influence. The world has grown significantly less violent since 1950, but there has
been an marked uptick in the number of armed conflicts in recent years. The emergence of Islamic State, hostilities in eastern
Ukraine, and the persecution of the Rohingya in Myanmar are just some examples. The number of fatalities has increased even more dramatically, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data
the 7.8 percent increase in international arms transfers from 2014 to 2018 compared with the
previous five-year period seen in the latest data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the global authority on the weapons trade. The
Middle East has been absorbing weapons at an alarming pace: The flow of armaments to the region rocketed by
87 percent in the last five years. Russia took an active part in the bloodiest of the conflicts, but it
doesn’t appear to have been able to convert this into more sales . It was the only one of the world’s
top five exporters, which together account for 75 percent of the business, to suffer a major loss in market share. It remains the world’s second-
biggest arms exporter. SIPRI has its own, rather complicated, system for calculating transfer volumes based on the military value of the equipment traded rather than on its market price. But
in dollar terms, too, Russia trails the U.S. Yury Borisov, Russia’s deputy prime minister in charge of the
defense industry, said last month that Russia “steadily reaches” $15 billion in arms exports a year and hopes to retain
that amount. This suggests officials believe sales have hit a ceiling. By contrast, the U.S. closed $55.6 billion of arms deals in 2018, 33 percent
more than in 2017, thanks to the Trump administration’s liberalization of weapons exports. According to the SIPRI figures, U.S. exports were 75
percent higher than Russia’s in 2014 through 2018 – a far wider gap than in the previous five-year
period. For the U.S., Middle Eastern countries have been especially important – particularly Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest arms importer, and its major irritant, Qatar. Some 52
percent of U.S. weapons sales were to the Middle East in the last five years . Under President Donald Trump, the relationship
with Saudi Arabia became even more lucrative for the defense industry. For Russia, the Middle East accounted only for 16 percent of its
weapons exports over the same period, with most going to Egypt and Iraq. Its major trade partners were India, China and Algeria – but sales to India dropped
significantly as its government sought to diversify suppliers and bought more from the U.S., South Korea and, most painfully for the Kremlin, Ukraine. Russia has been losing
key aircraft tenders in India to the U.S. This, along with the economic collapse of another major client,
Venezuela, and the current potential for regime change in Algeria, all makes a rebound in Russian
sales look unlikely. Arms sales are perhaps the best reflection of a major military power’s
international influence. The market isn’t all about price and quality competition; it’s about permanent
and situational alliances. The growing gap between the U.S. and Russia in exports shows that Putin’s
forays into areas such as the Middle East are failing to translate into Russian influence in the region.
Although Putin’s warm relations with Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi and his alliance with Iran , which has a lot of
influence over Iraq, are paying off to some extent, they can’t quite compensate for ground lost elsewhere . The U.S.’s allies, France,
Germany and the U.K. among them, have been rapidly increasing their market share, too . That’s a rarely
mentioned way in which the security alliance with Washington is paying off for the Europeans. All the ethical objections to selling arms to countries such as Saudi Arabia notwithstanding,
European Union member states need markets for their defense industries, which employ about 500,000 people. Being under the U.S. umbrella opens doors where Russia and China are less
a proxy for influence, the U.S.’s global dominance looks to be resilient. In a more conflict-prone,
competitive world, America is doing rather well while its longstanding geopolitical rivals stumble.
Zero risk of Russia fill-in to Saudi Arabia
Thalif Deen (Inter Press Service, Staff) 4/28/2019 [“US and Western arms in Yemen conflict signal
potential war crime charges” online @ https://www.manilatimes.net/us-and-western-arms-in-yemen-
conflict-signal-potential-war-crime-charges/546239/, loghry]
Asked for a response, Pieter Wezeman, senior researcher, Arms and Military Expenditure Programme at
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Sipri), told IPS: “If, [very hypothetical] the USA
and the UK would stop supplying arms to Saudi Arabia, this would be a major problem for Saudi
Arabia, in military and financial terms.” He pointed out that Saudi Arabia would find it very hard to
maintain the US and UK weapons its armed forces largely rely on without the support of the large
numbers of US and UK service personnel in the country right now. The Saudi military might be able to
keep the weapons going for a while, but presumably at a much lower operational level. He said it will
not only be very costly for Saudi Arabia to replace the expensive existing equipment — which is
supposed to be in service for decades — but it also means that Chinese and Russian weapons will not
be of as high quality as what Saudis now receive from the US and Western Europe. And New York
Times roving correspondent Nicholas Kristof says, “some Saudis kept trying to suggest to me that if we
block weapons sales to Riyadh, the kingdom will turn to Moscow.” “That’s absurd. It needs our spare
parts and, more important, it buys our weapons because they come with an implicit guarantee that
we will bail the Saudis out militarily if they get into trouble with Iran.”
Russia – Impact Defence
Baltic Adventurism Defense – No WWIII
Stangl ’19 [Maxwell Stang is a research assistant in the Department of Military & Strategic Studies at
the U.S. Air Force Academy, 5/13/19, “Russia Won't Start a (Conventional) War in the Baltics,” National
Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia-wont-start-conventional-war-baltics-57317]
Hypothetically, if Russia
brigades and over 1,200 aircraft within the vicinity of the Baltics, making it a very capable force. However, these numbers do not tell the full story.
were to conduct a combined-arms invasion of the Baltic States tomorrow, only a small number of
forces would be properly positioned to attack. There are plenty of armored and mechanized units nearby, however, the only truly capable
and quick reaction military unit available for a surprise assault would be the 76th Guards Air Assault
Division (GAAD). Based in Pskov only twenty miles from the border of Estonia, they could utilize cargo aircraft (e.g. Il-76), and helicopters (e.g. Mi-8, Mi-17, and Mi-24) for airborne
operations, striking the Baltics with little warning. Additionally, it is reported that the GAAD has recent combat experience in Ukraine. This is an overlooked aspect when talking about the
effectiveness of armed forces. Size and equipment is not the only thing that determines a unit’s effectiveness. Recent tactical combat experience can also increase lethality, something the
Although speed and experience is great , especially in a hypothetical Baltic campaign, these air assault units
GAAD now excels in.
simply do not have the heavy weaponry, equipment, or logistics to maintain an offensive posture
against NATO combat units . They are outfitted for quick and rapid deployments rather than sustained
fighting with a superior force such as a U.S. Army Armored Brigade Combat Team. To counter this,
Russia would have to mobilize their armored and mechanized forces, turning the conflict into an even
bigger conventional conflict, something Putin knows would not fare well against American/NATO
airpower.