KANTIANISM

Deontology

As we saw, consequentialism is indifferent to the way in which the consequences are brought about. And it is
also indifferent to the special significance we assign to ourselves and our close personal ties.

One idea, then, is to develop a non-evaluative-first theory. By eschewing the relentless promotion of the good,
we seem well position to secure Constraints and Options.

Evaluative Issues

There are two very important questions concerning value.

• Substantive Question: What items are of value? What things are good and what things are bad?
• Response Question: What is the proper response to items of value? How should we respond to the things
that are good and the things that are bad?

Utilitarians take a rather straightforward response to these questions. The answer to the Substantive Question,
they claim, is welfare. And the answer to the Response Question, they claim, is promotion.

One of the most vexing interpretative issues is how exactly to understand the evaluative claims Kant makes.
Here are two examples, and how I think we should proceed.

Good Will. We can understand this as making a claim about attributive goodness – good of a kind (e.g., a
good eye).

Value of Humanity: This is the more troubling case. I think we can interpret Kant as offering radically
different answers to the Substantive Question and the Response Question: namely, what is of value is
rational agency, and the proper response to rational agency is to respect it.

Accordingly, Kant’s theory is not an Evaluative-First theory. It does not try to promote the good.
Nonetheless, it is not as though Kantianism is entirely devoid of evaluative claims.

Kant’s Strategy

One important thing to flag before turning to the details of the Groundwork is Kant’s ingenious argumentative
strategy. He’s first going to identify the general features that any “supreme principle of morality” must possess.
Then he’s going to claim that these general features alone are sufficient to bring us to a particular principle.

GROUNDWORK: SECTION ONE

Background

Section I is meant to be an analysis of commonsense morality – in particular the notion of the good will –
showing that it assumes the Categorical Imperative. Kant aims to discover the supreme principle of morality by
working from our everyday moral judgments.

Kant is going to argue for the unconditional goodness of the good will, and then discuss what it takes for a will
to qualify as good. But why does he do this?

Because he thinks that one of the criteria for the supreme principle of morality is that it must be whatever
principle governs the choices of the morally good will. And why does he think this?

Because he thinks that the reason why a good-willed person does an action, and the reason why the
action is right, are the same. The good willed person does the right thing because it is the right thing, so
 if we can discover why the good-willed person does the right thing, we will have also discovered why it
is the right thing.

Willing: To have a will is to have a capacity for choice. We exercise this capacity by giving
ourselves principles (or maxims). To will an end is to make a rational commitment to realize that
end through one’s actions.

Maxim: A general principle you choose for yourself, stating what you are going to do and why you
are going to do it.

Some features of maxims Kant highlights are the following:

• They are subjective in the sense that they are principles that one makes for oneself.
• They are practical principles, or principles on the basis of which a person chooses
and acts – her reason for acting.
o They are part of the psychological explanation of a person’s behavior.
o We can home in on a person’s maxim by asking: Why did you do that?
o They underpin all of our voluntary behavior.
• They are not one-off principles, applying to a single act taken in isolation. Rather
they are rules for the general determination of the will.
o They generalize across time.
• Usually they take the form: I will do act A in circumstances C to achieve end E.

As we shall see, the deontic status of an action is grounded in deontic status of willing its
maxim.

Confusion to Avoid: Kant is not proposing that only those with a good will can act rightly.

Highest Good

Criteria: The highest good is non-diminishable and non-increasable.

Eliminates: Gifts of Nature—judgment, intelligence. And Gifts of Fortune—power, riches, happiness.

Because each of these are not good in themselves, they require other goods to make them good.

What Satisfies the Criteria: Nothing in the world – indeed nothing even beyond the world – can possibly be
conceived which could be called good without qualification except a good will.

The domain of final value is the domain of rational agency. Willings are the bearers of final value.

• States of affairs are not bearers of final value. They can be thought of as good only in virtue of
being the ends of rational willing.
• Actions as events (as effects of willing) are not the bearers of final value. They can be thought of as
good only in virtue of the manner in which they are willed.
• Faculties, traits, and character are not the bearers of final value. They can be thought of as good
only in virtue of being conducive to action or choice judged to be good (as willed).

What is a Good Will?

For a will to be good, it needs to ensure right action. A good will must, in other words, guarantee that the right
action will be done.

Shopkeeper: The shopkeeper does not overcharge because it would be bad for business. She acts honestly
only because she is compelled to do so by distant inclination. However if that inclination disappeared she
would overcharge.
 Verdict: Not a good will. His action is merely in conformity with duty but it is not an action from duty.
The fault with the profit motive is that it is unreliable. When it leads to dutiful actions, it does so for
circumstantial reasons. Honesty is not always the best policy.

Sympathetic Temper: You are concerned only with helping others. That is, your only motive is the desire
to help. You would not be concerned with or deterred by the fact that helping is morally wrong.

Verdict. Not a good will. The morality of an action is no part of what brings you to act.

Philanthropist: A philanthropist preoccupied with his own troubles, lacking a desire to give, nonetheless
gives because she holds it is her duty.

Verdict: Here is an action of “genuine moral worth.” A case of a good will. The morally good will does
what it morally ought to do from a recognition that it morally ought to do it.

Good Will: Being disposed to act from the sole motive of duty whenever duty calls. Good willing is the activity of
adopting normative principles (or maxims) for one’s conduct that are the morally right ones.

For a will to be good, it must not only perform an action that is in conformity with duty, but must perform
the action from duty. That is, Kant thinks that what has moral worth is acting from duty, and that there is
no moral worth in acting on the basis of an inclination, even when that inclination is virtuous (e.g.
benevolence).

Key Passage: A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain
some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself ... Even if, by a special disfavour of
fortune or by the niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry
out its purpose – if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the good will were left... – then,
like a jewel, it would shine by itself, as something that has full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitfulness can
neither add anything to this worth nor take anything away from it. (4:394)

A good will “shines like a jewel” not because it actually achieves some end, for if this were the case then if a
situation went awry we could blame an agent due to no fault of her own. So its utility or ineffectuality would
neither diminish or increase its worth. A person with a morally good will may act but suffer a “special
disfavour of fortune” – i.e., bad luck – that prevents her from achieving (or fully achieving) her purpose.
Still this does not diminish the goodness of her will.

Non-Consequentialist: The goodness of a good will does not depend on the consequences it brings
about. Accordingly, since whatever principle governs the choices of a good will is also the supreme
principle of morality, the supreme principle of morality cannot be a consequentialist principle.

Our ability to conform to morality’s supreme principle must not be a matter of luck. If moral goodness
depended on consequences one could not control or was available only to a fortunate few with the proper
upbringing or temperament, then morality would have a certain kind of injustice built into it.

Moral Worth

An act has moral worth if and only if it is done in accordance with duty from the motive of duty. More precisely,
an action has moral worth if it is required by duty and has as its primary motive the motive of duty. The motive
of duty need not reflect the only interest the agent has in the action (or its effect); it must, however, be the
interest that determines the agent's acting as he did.

Moral worth turns on the agent’s maxim as a determining ground of action. An agent’s motives reflect his
reasons for acting. If the motive of the agents action is respect for the moral law, then the action has moral
worth.
 Inclination is any motive of action besides the motive to do what duty requires.

This definition ensures that right action is not merely accidental. To say that an action had moral worth we
need to know that it was no accident that the agent acted as duty required. That is, what really matters to Kant
is that the agent is guaranteed to act rightly regardless of inclination.

Action performed from a nonmoral motive (i.e., not for the sake of duty alone) may well lead to dutiful
actions. But the problem is that these actions being dutiful is merely a product of a fortuitous alignment of
motives and circumstances. Consider

Grass. Suppose the following rule was imposed on campus: “Don't walk on the grass.” Both person A
and person B refrain from walking on the grass. But A stays on the sidewalk because she knows the rule
and recognizes that it’s her duty to follow it. She would love to walk on the plush grass, but does not act
on this inclination. B, on the other hand, may or may not know about the rule, but the reason why he
walks on the sidewalk instead of the grass is that he just doesn't like walking on the grass. If he did like
walking on it he would walk on It. Rule or no rule.
Supreme Principle of
The Kantian intuition is this: Person A deserves our admiration for not Morality…
walking on the grass, while Person B does not. And the same applies to
following the moral law • is the principle that
governs the choices of a
Notice how the above features of Kant’s view ensure that it is immune from the good will.
problems Williams’ levels against utilitarianism in the Ushering from the Scene • is non-consequentialist – it
Argument. must not make the
permissibility of actions
depend on the value of the
Good Will-Moral Worth Link outcome brought about.

Now we can see why good willing is found in actions that have moral worth: in
them, the agent need not be concerned with anything other than the morality of what he does in order to have
sufficient motive to act. If the maxim of an action is an expression of an agent's will in acting, to say that the
maxim of a dutiful action done from the motive of duty has moral content is to say of the agent's will that it is
ultimately determined by “that preeminent good which we call moral.”

The Categorical Imperative

Remember Kant’s strategy is that, given that a good will is unconditionally good, it will choose and act
permissibly. Hence, we can infer from the motivational structure of the good will the content of the supreme
principle of morality. Because the morally good will necessarily acts rightly, the principle governing its choices
will be an infallible guide to what morality demands. The supreme principle of morality will be whatever
principle governs the choices of the morally good will.

Question: But what kind of law can that be, the representation of which must determine the will, even without
regard for the effect expected from it, in order for the will to be called good absolutely and without limitation?

Kant’s Argument

1. A morally worthy action is from duty not from inclination.

2. “An action from duty has its moral worth not in the purpose to be attained by it but in the maxim in
accordance with which it is decided upon, and therefore does not depend upon the realization of the
object of the action but merely upon the principle of volition in accordance with which the action is
done without regard for any object of the faculty of desire.” (399-400)

Kant thinks (1) and (2) follows from his discussion of acting from duty and his examples.
Inclination cannot explain morally worthy action directly; it must be explained by the motive of
duty. The second proposition tells us that when acting from duty our reasons are not the
consequences of so acting.
 3. “Duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law.” (400)

By ‘necessity’ Kant means what explains an action. So he is saying that, in acting from duty, your
reason for the action must be that it is following the moral law. That is, when you act morally,
your only reason for acting as you do can be that your action is in accordance with the moral law.

Answer: Since I have deprived the will of every impulse that could arise for it from obeying some law, nothing
is left but the conformity of actions as such with universal law, which alone is to serve the will as its principle,
that is, I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.
 GROUNDWORK: SECTION TWO, PT.1
Background

In Section II, Kant analyses the concept of the supreme principle of morality. He argues that it must be
categorical, and this takes him to universalizability. Section II also attempts to show that the supreme principle
of morality is a law that agents give themselves, if they have any ends at all.

Supreme Principle of Morality is a Categorical Imperative

Kant attempts to derive the content of our moral duties from the very concept of a moral duty. Kant thought
that we can figure out what we are obligated to do by analyzing the very idea of being obligated to do something
at all.

Key Passage: “Unless we want to deny to the concept of morality any truth and any relation to some possible
object, we cannot dispute that its law is so extensive in its import that it must hold not only for human
beings but for all rational beings as such, not merely under contingent conditions and with exceptions but
with absolute necessity.” (408).

Two Kinds of Imperatives (commands of reason): If the action would be choiceworthy merely as means to
something else the imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as in itself choiceworthy, hence as
necessary in a will in itself conforming to reason, as its principle, then it is categorical.

Hypothetical Imperatives: Represents the necessity of an action as a means to achieving something else that one
wills (or that it is at least possible for one to will). If you will end E, then do act A (as a means to E).

Instrumental Rationality: Whoever wills the end also wills (insofar as reason has decisive influence on his
actions) the indispensably necessary means to it that are within his power.

E.g., If I will to scuba dive and buying a tank is a necessary means to scuba diving, then I ought to
will to buy a tank.

What’s important to notice is the source of a hypothetical imperative’s functioning as a rational

command. A given hypothetical imperative is rational for someone only due to its serving to realize the
end that she has willed. (If you don’t will to scuba dive, your under no obligation to will to buy a tank.)
The ends a person has antecedently willed are what render acting on that imperative rational. But you
need not will the end in the first place.

Categorical Imperative: Represents an action as necessary of itself, without reference to another end.

A categorical imperative is a rational command whose rational force does not rest on any of our
particular commitments, ends, desires or purposes. A categorical imperative expresses a principle that
is necessitating for a will.

E.g., I simply ought to will so-and-so, full stop. Supreme Principle of

Morality …
Kant believed that the supreme principle of morality must be a categorical
imperative. Why? • is the principle that
governs the choices of a
Because a merely hypothetical imperative would not capture the rational good will.
force that underlies moral obligation. If the supreme principle were a • is non-consequentialist – it
hypothetical imperative, then it would not generate unconditional must not make the
permissibility of actions
obligations; it would generate conditional obligations based on what one wills
depend on the value of the
as an end. Hypothetical, unlike categorical, imperatives, are escapable in the outcome brought about.
sense you can gain exemption from it by giving up the relevant end. But • is categorical – it must be
morality is not like scuba diving. Morality has categorical force – i.e., we an imperative that it is
rationally necessary for all
to adopt.
 ought to fulfill its demands even if doing so would not serve our particular commitments, ends, desires
or purposes. Morality’s demands are inescapable

Categorical Imperative à FUL

Key Passage: If I think of a hypothetical imperative in general, then I do not know beforehand what it will contain
until the condition is given to me. But if I think of a categorical imperative [in general], then I know directly what
it contains. For since besides the law, the imperative contains only the necessity of the maxim, that it should
accord with this law, but the law contains no condition to which it is limited, there remains nothing left over with which the
maxim of the action is to be in accord, and this accordance alone is what the imperative really represents.

If the supreme principle of morality is a categorical imperative, morality must not rest on any contingent or
idiosyncratic features of those to whom it applies. It cannot rest on any particular commitment, ends,
desires, or interests. The authority backing a moral duty is never open to question. In other words, it must
be a universal law.

Formula of Universal Law (FUL): “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time
will that it should become a universal law.”

Rationality à Freedom

Key Passage: Everything in nature works according to laws, and only a rational being has the power to act
according to his conception of laws, i.e., according to principles. An imperative is a ‘practical law’ that represents
a possible action as good and thus as necessary for a subject practically determinable by reason. […] Only a
rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the representation of laws, that is, in accordance with
principles, or has a will.

Running throughout Kant’s philosophy is a fundamental contrast between nature and reason. The natural
world is essentially passive, a domain in which things are changed but do not change via their own activity.
Reason, in both its theoretical operations (whereby it seeks to acquire belief and knowledge) and its
practical operations (whereby it engages in choice and action), is an active capacity.

What is it to be rational?

Theoretical Rationality: The capacity to examine my beliefs and see whether it makes sense for me to hold
them.

• We have standards for evaluating beliefs, which tell us whether or not we are justified in holding
them. E.g., various principles of logic, rules of scientific inquiry.
• We can change our beliefs in light of our judgments concerning the extent to which they meet (or
fail to meet) the relevant standards.

Practical Rationality: The capacity to examine my various desires, intentions and actions to see which of these
make sense in the circumstances.

• We have standards for evaluating our desires, intentions and actions to see if they are justified.
• We can change our desires, intentions and actions in light of our judgments concerning the extent
to which these meet (or fail to meet) the relevant standards.

Rational creatures are free in the sense that we can step back from our desires or intentions and refuse to act on
them. But more than that we are capable of articulating (and rejecting) the standards of evaluation themselves.
That is, we are also free to alter the standards as we see fit. No standard is itself forced upon us.

First-Order Question: Does a certain belief or action live up to the relevant standard?
 Second-Order Question: Does the given standard itself meet the standards (whatever they are) relevant for
evaluating standards.

The principles of rationality are not forced upon us from the outside. Rather as rational beings we are free to
reject those standards (at whatever order) that do not make sense to itself. Your reason is its own last court of
appeal.

Freedom à Formula of Universal Law

1. To act freely is to act for reasons.

Unfree actions, like involuntary coughing or accidently tripping, are not done for reasons. Accordingly,
they do not possess deontic properties.

Kant agrees with Mill that all deontically assessible actions are taken for ends. Agents, through their
actions, aim to make the world a certain way. The action is the means by which this change is made;
it’s the way the end is brought about.

2. To act for reasons is to act on the basis of a rational principle.

This principle is the agent’s maxim: “Under such-and-such circumstances there is reason to act in
such-and-such a way.”

3. Universalizability is a constitutive principle of rationality.

Regulative Principle: Principles that constrain an antecedently existing activity.

E.g., Principles (or rules) of the road. The activity of driving exists independently of a rule
regulating which side of the road to drive on.

Constitutive Principle: Following the rule is part of what it is to be engaged in the activity. If you don’t
follow the rule, you are not participating in the activity in question.

E.g., Principles (or rules) of chess. If you start moving the rook diagonally, you are simply not
playing chess.

Part of what it is to be rational is to follow principles that treat as reasons only those considerations that
you can coherently see others, in relevantly similar circumstances, treating as reasons as well. To
reason is to think systematically in ways that anyone looking over my shoulder ought to be able to
recognize as correct.

The point is easiest to see in the theoretical domain. Insofar as we are rational, we cite reasons for
our beliefs. I don’t simply believe, for example, that the gas in my car is low. Rather, if I am to
rationally form a belief concerning how much fuel my car has, I look for reasons. For instance, I
see that my car’s reliable gaslight is on, and this justifies my belief that the gas is low. Notice an
interesting feature concerning the evidence that my gaslight provides: it is not person specific. If,
based on the gaslight, it’s rational for me to believe that the gas is low, then, based on this same
reason, were you in my situation, it would also be rational for you to believe the gas is low. I don’t
have a monopoly on gaslight reasons.

4. I should act only on those principles that I can also will to be universal laws.

Formula of Universal Law: Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you at the same time
can will that it become a universal law.
 If (1) – (4) are correct, FUL is a requirement that is categorical. It is inescapable, binding on all rational beings.
All should obey FUL: they have reason to do so, based on the mere fact that they are rational. Suppose we
attempted to question the authority of rationality. “Why should I act for reasons?” Shouldn’t this question open
up a route of escape from all requirements?

But, as soon as we ask why we should act for reasons, we can hear something odd in our question. To ask “Why
should I?” is to demand a reason; and so to ask “Why should I act for reasons?” is to demand a reason for acting
for reasons. So there is something self-defeating about asking for a reason to act for reasons.

Rationality- Morality Link

When I tell a lie or make a promise I don’t intend to keep or butt in line, or kill someone for personal gain, I am
adhering to principles that I don’t favor others acting on as well. Here what I want is that everyone else should
follow by one set of principles while I alone get to act on a different set of principles. I am proposing to act in a
certain way, in a certain situation, but it is perfectly clear that I cannot rationally (based on reasons) will that
everyone act in the same way in similar situations.

To act for reasons is to act on the basis of considerations that would be valid for anyone in similar
circumstances; whereas immoral behavior involves acting on considerations whose validity for others we
aren’t willing to acknowledge. Reasons for one must be reasons for all.

This is also the telltale sign of immorality – I want to treat myself differently than everyone else gets treated; I
want one set of principles for myself, and another set of principles for everyone else.

Universalizability Test

FUL: Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law.

The fundamental idea behind the FUL is that rational maxims are maxims that can be willed as universal laws.
And this takes us to the

Universalizability Test: Willing a maxim is permissible if and only if this maxim can also be will as a universal
law without contradiction.

Now the trouble is interpreting exactly what “can” means in this formulation. I am going to proceed on
the assumption that the kind of possibility that Kant is interested in must give us a plausible
explanation as to why willing a non-universalizable maxim is morally objectionable. And so I am going
to assume, given what else we know about Kant, that this is something that is linked to rational agency.
In other words, the trouble with failing the Universalizability Test reveals something rationally
defective about an agent’s will. More precisely, when an agent wills a morally impermissible maxim,
there is something inconsistent about the attitudes that constitute the act of willing that maxim. So we
can think of the test as asking: Can you rationally will the maxim and will its universalized counterpart
without a clash in attitudes?

In short, I’ll take the sense of ability in question to be rational ability. An impermissible maxim is one
that cannot be rationally endorsed in a consistent or non-self-contradictory way.

Applying the Universalizability Test

Step #1: Imagine a full compliance world in which everyone acts in accordance with the maxim in
question. That is, if the maxim enjoins you to perform a certain act, in such-and-such circumstances, then
you imagine a world in which everyone performs this act when in circumstances of that sort.

Step #2: Consider whether such a world is practically self-defeating.

 The maxim, when universalized, destroys so acting as the means to achieving the end in question.
à Perfect Duties, duties which must be done completely and admit of no exception. In such cases,
the law tells us exactly how we are to carry out the duty. (Prescribe actions)

Your maxim, if everyone used it, would render your action ineffectual for the achievement of
your purpose. That is, the maxim contains an end, and (in these circumstances) the
universalization of the maxim would make it impossible to achieve the end through the action.

Step #3: Consider if acting in such a world defeats any essential commitment a rational agent must have.

The maxim, if universalized, conflicts with what by nature humans must also will. à Imperfect
Duties, duties where we cannot specify precisely the way one should act. In such cases, the law does
not tell us exactly how we are to carry out the duty in question. (Prescribes goals/policies)

If the maxim fails at either Step #2 or #3, you have a duty (perfect or imperfect) not to will the maxim.

Note: From the mere fact that the maxim fails FUL, all that immediately follows is that one should not
will the maxim. This does not entail that it is forbidden to do the action contained in the maxim. There
may be other reasons to do the action in this very situation. This makes possible acting in conformity
with the moral law, but not acting for the sake of the moral law – doing the right thing for the wrong
reasons.

Application of the Formula of Universal Law

The duty to not tell a false promise (perfect)

Maxim: When I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even
though I know this will never happen.
Universalization à Contradiction: The universality of a law that everyone, when he believes himself to
be in need, could promise whatever he pleases with the intention of not keeping it would make the promise
and the end one might have in it itself impossible, since no one would believe what was promised him but
would laugh at all such expressions as vain pretenses.

But why exactly does this generate a clash? Because the false promisor is both subject to the
requirement of instrumental rationality – that acting on a maxim is rational only if it is possible to
achieve that maxim’s end by so acting – and rationality’s demand for universalizability.

Promise-Breaker: When I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to
repay it, even though I know this will never happen.

But Universalized Promise-Breaker would create a world in which false promises would not be
believed. The false promise thus could not achieve its intended effect. So is rational for the false
promisor to act on his maxim only if, by acting on it, he can achieve the end he seeks by so acting,
namely, to secure money under false pretenses. But a condition of his being able to achieve that end is
that others not share his maxim with him. So, when it comes to universalization, he must will
 Negation of Universalized Promise-Breaker: Anyone who believes herself to be in need of money shall not
borrow money and promise to repay it when she knows this will never happen.

The false promisor’s willing Negation of Universalized Promise-Breaker is a necessary condition of its
being rational to act on Promise-Breaker. But willing Negation of Universalized Promise-Breaker
implies

Promise Keeper: When I believe myself to be in need of money I shall not borrow money and promise
to repay it, even though I know this will never happen.

But Promise-Breaker and Promise Keeper are contradictory and hence willing both is irrational.

The duty of benevolence (imperfect)

Maxim: When others are in need, out of self-love, I will not trouble myself to help.
Universalization à Contradiction: A will that decided this would conflict with itself, since many cases
could occur in which one would need the love and sympathy of others, but under universalization one
would rob himself of all hope of the assistance he wills for himself.

But why exactly does this generate a clash?

Non-Benevolence: When others are in need, out of self-love, I will not trouble to help.

Universalized I would also need to accept

Universalized Non-Benevolence: When others are in need, out of self-love, everyone will not trouble
themselves to help.

Although Universalized Non-Benevolence does not destroy the very means of non-assistance as an end
to self-love, it nevertheless cannot be rationally willed. Why? Because there will inevitably be instances
in which a I need others’ help.

Remember, from our discussion of hypothetical imperatives, in particular the principle of

Instrumental Rationality, that: If we will some end, we are necessarily committed to securing the
means to that end.

In being rationally committed to the end of self-love, I am thereby rationally committed to making use
of the best means to those ends, even if those means are provided by others. I am thus rationally at
odds with myself.

Difference between Rational Clashes

The false promisor’s rational contradiction: Universalized Promise-Breaker blocks the very end contained
within Promise Breaker.

Accordingly, the false promisor can only achieve the specific end found in his maxim if he rationally
wills that maxim for himself while rationally willing the contrary maxim for others.

Non-beneficent person’s rational contradiction: Universalized Non-Benevolence blocks the realization of

other ends that the agent has (ends that may or not be contained within Non-Benevolence).

Accordingly, the non-beneficent person may be able to achieve his end of enjoying his own welfare
without cost to himself while willing that others adopt his maxim of non-beneficence. Nevertheless,
given his commitment to achieving his ends in general, it would be instrumentally irrational for him to
will a maxim that will deny himself means he may need in order to achieve other ends he may have.
Objections to FUL

Sometimes the test tells us we are required to refrain from certain acts when intuitively performing them is
permissible.

When it’s time to decide whether to have children, I will instead spend my life making the world better for
future generations.

When the Stock Market Index reaches 1000, I shall withdraw all my money from the bank.

These are maxims that, intuitively, are permissible to act on but, due to some quirk, not everyone could
act on them.

Sometimes the test seems to tell us that we are required to perform certain acts when intuitively refraining from
them is permissible.

Out of romantic honor, were I to fight in a duel, I would aim to miss.

This is a maxim that, intuitively, it is permissible to refrain from acting on. But not everyone could act
on it. For then, like the institution of property in the case of stealing, the institution of dueling would
break down.

Sometimes the test seems to tell us that a certain action is permissible when intuitively they are impermissible.

When it’s convenient, I will kill others for fun.

This is a maxim that, intuitively, is impermissible to act on. However, it seems to pass the
universalizability test.

All maxims that fail the universalizability test are equally stringent. And failing this test is all or nothing; it does
not admit of degrees. Hence there seem to be a problem accounting for varying levels of stringency.

Murdering for fun is impermissible and promise-breaking for fun is impermissible. But there seems to be
nothing for the Kantian to point to in order to justify a difference in the strength of our reasons to refrain
from each.
 GROUNDWORK: SECTION TWO, PT 2
Formula of Humanity

Recall from our discussion on categorical versus hypothetical imperatives that if there was going to be a
categorical imperative it would need to be such that the end is unconditional. It would have to be an end that,
no matter what other ends we rationally will for ourselves, we must also value as an end.

Recall also from our discussion of the good will that the supreme principle must not be consequentialist. So
Kant needs to identify some end that we are required to value, but valuing that end appropriately does not
amount to trying to bring about that end.

Question: What end does Kant think all rational beings must necessarily will?

If we assume the existence of a categorical imperative, then, since certain actions are unconditionally
necessary, certain ends must be unconditionally necessary. But what is this thing that is unconditionally and
necessarily good?

Criteria for answering the question: “But suppose there were something whose existence in itself had an
absolute worth, something that, as an end in itself, could be a ground of determinate laws; then in it and only in
it alone would lie the ground of a possible categorical imperative, i.e., of a practical law” (428).

If we can find something of absolute worth – i.e., something unconditionally and necessarily good – then we
could know it would be valued by all rational beings. Hence we could provide the value to motivate respect
for the categorical imperative.

Answer: “Now I say that the human being [rational agency], and in general every rational being, exists as an
end in itself” (428). For “[r]ational nature is distinguished from the rest of nature by this, that it sets itself an
end” (437).

Driving idea: If there is a categorical imperative, something must have a value that doesn’t depend on
inclinations. And the only candidate for this is rational nature itself. Why?

Simple Answer: Because rational nature is the only thing that is in common between all rational beings.

Complicated Answer: Process of elimination. In searching for what is unconditionally and necessarily
good, Kant moves from the objects of our desires, to the desires themselves, and ultimately stops with
our humanity itself.

Problem with the objects of our desires: Suppose you desire a chocolate and so go to the store to get
one. Here you’ve set yourself an end (the chocolate), presumably because you think it is good. But
how can you justify this chocolate’s goodness? Well, it’s hard to maintain that the chocolate is good
in and of itself. For in a world without chocolate eaters, chocolate is valueless. Accordingly, it
appears that the chocolate is good because you desire it.

Problem with our desires: Many of our desires (e.g., addictions) we want to be rid of. We thus
cannot maintain that our desires, as such, are good.

We are thus left with one option: What makes the chocolate good is that it is the object of a rational
choice. That we, qua rational beings, set it as an end.

The unconditioned condition of the goodness of anything is humanity. In virtue of your rational
nature, you have unconditional value. You can confer value on anything – chocolate bars,
coconuts, or cabbages – simply by rationally choosing it.

Humanity is an end in itself because it is the ‘end of the line’ from the standpoint of moral
justification: Nothing explains its value, but it in turn explains all other value.
Freedom à Formula of Humanity

1. I value the ends I rationally set myself, and take myself to have reason to pursue them.

For example, why did you come to class today? Either you think this class is valuable or you think this
class is a means to some other end you think is valuable. When you choose this end is an exercise of
your humanity because you choose it as a result of rationally endorsing it or finding it good. As Kant
might put it, your choosing this end is an example of exercising your capacity to set ends according to
reason.

2. But I recognize that their value is only conditional: if I did not freely set them as my ends, I would have no
reason to pursue them.

Imagine a zombie world where no one set any ends. This world would be a world without value.
If correct, we must be able to generate reasons to promote some end just by adopting it. We must, that
is, think that we have the power to confer value on our ends by rationally choosing them.

All value is conferred through acts of rational choice. Whenever we act, we take the object of choice to
be good or worthy of pursuit despite the fact that these objects do not have intrinsic value. Because we
still take ourselves to make rational choices, we must be taking choice itself to be the sufficient condition
of the goodness of the objects of choice. In this way, we place or set a value on ourselves whenever we
act.

3. So I must see myself as having a worth-bestowing status.

We take things to be important because they are important to us. We must therefore take ourselves to
be important. In this way, the value of humanity itself is implicit in every human choice. We must
accord ourselves unconditional worth.

4. In virtue of my capacity to bestow worth on my ends by rationally choosing them, I must see myself as
having an unconditional value as being an end in myself.

According to (1)-(4): I value, therefore I have value. But I recognize that the same argument holds from
your perspective, and for your rational nature, and so consistency requires that I attribute the same
worth-bestowing status, and so the same unconditional value, to you, and to any other rational being.

5. I must similarly accord any other rational being the same unconditional value I accord myself.
6. Hence, Formula of Humanity: I should act in a manner that respects this unconditional value. I should use
humanity, whether in my own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end,
never merely as a means.

What (6) demands is that one never behave towards another person in a way that fails to respect the
capacity for rational choice in which her humanity consists. For to neglect in one's actions to treat
humanity – i.e., the capacity for rational choice – as an end would be to disregard the very thing that
gave those actions, and the personal ends at which they aim, their value.
 Each rational being, as such, is thus the author of the moral law, (6), but this law turns out to be the same for all;
it is categorical. Unlike requirements that depend for their force on some external source of authority, we
cannot escape the force of the obligation by giving up some particular desires, interests, or aims. When I fail to
act according to this law I do so on pain of my own rationality.

Humanity is thus an objective end, not an end whose value derives from its being a discretionary effect of our
actions. The rejection of humanity as an end in itself presupposes the very sort of valuing of humanity that the
Formula of Humanity requires. Skepticism about the respect for humanity is thus supposed to be incoherent,
for the cogency of the denial that humanity is a distinctive source of moral reasons for action implies that
humanity is a distinctive source of moral reasons for action. The Formula of Humanity thus appears to
represent a rationally inescapable categorical imperative. For even in questioning it, we affirm its rational
authority

So whereas welfare is the central value for Utilitarians, rational agency is the central value for Kantians.
And whereas Utilitarians think that the only proper response to value is to promote it, respect is seen as the
proper response to value by Kantians. For Kant, humanity is an end in itself; it alone is a final end or an
end in its own right. And all other ends acquire their significance by virtue of the fact that we rational
agents exercise our humanity and choose those ends.

No Trade-Offs: To respect something is to treat it as a boundary, as something with an authority to

which one must show deference. Respect is therefore the sort of attitude that blocks trade-offs of the
sort that consequentialism permits. To respect a person’s humanity is to see it as imposing an inviolable
limit on how she may be treated as a rational agent.

No Aggregation: Kantian value is also non-additive. More instantiations of rational nature do not
enhance the overall value of the world, and more instances of respect for rational nature do not move
anything or anyone along a scale of dignity.

Clarification of Formula of Humanity

FH: Act in such a way that you always treat humanity (rational nature), whether in your own person or in the person
of any other, never as a mere means but always as an end.

Rational agents have ends to which they are committed, as well as the capacity to choose those ends and the
best means through which to pursue them. What the formula of humanity captures is that each one of us should
respect the free exercise of rational agency for everyone, and therefore act only on maxims that could be
accepted by everyone else as preserving and promoting this capacity (for this is what respecting this capacity
involves). That is, the Formula of Humanity directs us to treat rational agents as authorities over their own
choices and affairs.

Failing to preserve (treating as a mere means) à Perfect duties. Respect is manifested here as an attitude of
deference, acknowledging the boundaries between rational agents.

Treating as a Means v. Mere Means: Treating people in ways they could not rationally consent to – i.e., where
rational consent is made impossible.

Others are permitted to benefit from making use of your rational agency, thus making use of your humanity
as a means to their ends. However, they show respect for your rational agency by enlisting your agency in
the service of their ends only with your rational authorization.

E.g., I use the cashier as a means to buy food but not as a mere means, since the transaction is
consented to. Whereas, if I kill you to acquire your inheritance I used you as a mere means, in the same
way I might use an inanimate object or tool (an ATM machine might be an apt example).

E.g., If we coerce or deceive others their genuine consent is in principle ruled out. Here we use others,
treating them as mere props or tools in our own projects. Treating humanity merely as a means, that is,
 involves treating a person’s capacity for choice, either of ends or of means, not as worthy of respect but
simply as an instrument.

In short: I treat a person merely as a means when I act towards her in a way that blocks her ability
to form her own ends and act on them. I do this when I make it impossible for her to assent to my
action towards her, impossible for her to share the goal I have in acting, in a way that prevents her
from choosing whether to contribute to the realization of my end. So, when we use others as mere
means, we exert authority over another rational agent who, concerning her own choices at least,
has a form of authority to which we are morally obligated to defer.

Failing to promote (failing to treat as an end) àImperfect duties: Respecting here is manifested in facilitating a
rational agent’s their morally acceptable plans. In promoting your ends, I respect your choice to pursue these ends.

Application of the Formula of Humanity

The duty to not tell a false promise

Maxim: When I believe myself to be in need of money I shall borrow money and promise to repay it, even
though I know that repayment will never happen.
Consistent with humanity as an end in itself? No. This is to use someone merely as a means because
the recipient of the false promise could not consent to this deception. It is to use one as a mere instrument
for receiving money since it blocks one’s rational nature from engaging the actual situation. My lie thus
treats the other’s rational agency – her capacity to set ends and identify the means to those ends – as a
causal capacity existing solely to serve my ends.

The duty of benevolence

Maxim: Because of self-love, I will not trouble myself with the welfare of others.
Consistent with humanity as an end in itself? No. This would prevent the development and exercise
of others’ rationality. “It is not enough that the action does not conflict with humanity in our person as an
end in itself; it must also harmonize with it.” The ends of others must “as far as possible be also my ends,”
so that everyone endeavors “to further the ends of others.” Actively seeking to advance one another’s ends
brings those ends into a state of harmony wherein the value of each rational agent is recognized through the
promotion of her ends.

When we seek to advance another person’s ends, we value those ends inasmuch as those ends express
the rational commitments of that person; her ends are, after all, the ends she has rationally chosen as
the objects of her pursuits. Hence, our advancing a person’s ends amounts to valuing her as a person,
and because those ends are the ends of a rational agent, promoting those ends respects the value of a
rational agent.

How Strong is this Obligation?

Remember that one problem with the Formula of Universal Law is that it seems unable to capture the plausible
idea that acting on some impermissible maxims are more morally objectionable than others – e.g., lying for fun
is less morally objectionable than murdering for fun. The Formula of Humanity seems to proffer a solution.

Notice that how, and how much, such acts affect rational agency can vary. And so Kantians can claim we have
stronger moral reasons to object to having our rational agency disrespected based on how it is disrespected, and,
in particular, based on how different forms of treatment undercut or thwart our rational agency.

Usually, lying for fun undercuts another’s rational agency to a far lesser extent than murdering for fun.
Lying undercuts my ability to properly recognize and respond to the part of the world the lie concerns as it
truly is. Murdering undercuts my ability to recognize and respond altogether. The former, that is, disrupts
my agency; the latter ends it.
 We can thus say that the strength of the objection is modulated by the extent to which one’s rational agency is
disrespected. The greater the disrespect the stronger the objection to refrain.

Objections to FH

Promoting Welfare: Using someone as a mere means always trumps the promotion of welfare. But clearly there
seem to be cases, when enough welfare is at stake, where is it permissible to use someone as a mere means.
Consider

False Promise for Good: Unless you tell a false promise – any will do – the devil will make everyone
experience endless, slight discomfort. Enough discomfort to hurt but not enough to undermine their
rational abilities.

Animals: We can perform impermissible actions toward non-rational animals – e.g., torturing one for fun.
However, it is not clear that Kant can locate the explanation for why these acts are impermissible in the right
place.

Equivalence of FUL/FH

FUL: Reflects the formal constraints of reason. Deals with the form the categorical imperative must take to
conform to rationality. (Captures: Fairness)

FH: Reflects the value of reason, requiring that our maxims have a certain end. Deals with the motivation of the
categorical imperative for all rational wills. (Captures: Respect)

The Formula of Humanity asks us to respect rational agency, whereas the Formula of Universal Law asks
us to manifest rational agency Actions and ends are not good if the agent’s principles of choice (willing) are
such that they could not be accepted as choiceworthy by all rational beings.

Actions and ends willed not in conformity with FUL and FH are unconditionally bad.

Here is one way to see how FUL and FH are united.

Recall that rationality demands consistency. And, to state the obvious, much of our ethical lives consist of
interactions with other people – i.e., other rational agents. When interacting with a person could you,
without inconsistency, use your rational agency to undercut theirs? To answer this question, return to what
using your rational agency involves: the capacity to recognize and respond to reasons.

Take any action. You see, for example, the beautiful rose, and think that having this beautiful rose would be
nice. The rose then becomes your end, and you set off for some scissors. Though done a hundred times a
day, this ability to set ends is a striking phenomenon. By setting ends, you seem to be able to generate
reasons for yourself. But how could you have this reason-generating ability? One way – perhaps the only
way – is if you yourself were an end. Yet does your being an end depend on anything else?

Presumably not. You – as a rational agent – are thus an end in itself. Notice, however, that this same
progression of thought applies to anyone with this capacity for rational agency. Accordingly, we arrive
at the idea that all rational beings are ends in themselves simply by reflection on what it takes to act as
a rational agent.

We now have an answer to the question whether you could, without inconsistency, use your rational agency
to undercut the rational agency of another. When you act in this way, you are using a rational agent as a
mere means to one of your ends. Yet, as we just saw, to act at all you are committed to treating rational
agents as ends in themselves. But, if you undercut the rational agency of another, you are not treating a
rational agent as an end in itself. So your action is inconsistent. Thus, to act in this way is to act irrationally,
and hence unethically.
Decision Procedure v. Criterion of Right Action?

Another proposal is to hold that FH serves as the criterion of right action (and explains why right actions
are right) while FUL serves as a decision procedure.

The fact that FUL is incapable of capturing the stringency of our obligations but FH is capable leans
some credibility to this idea.