G.R. No.
202426 Atilano, an educated and successful businessman, could have
GINAENDAYA, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNESTO V. VILLAOS, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assails: 1) the January
2, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing
petitioner's Petition for Review in CA-G.R SP No. 110427 and
affirming the April 11, 2008 Decision3 and May 29, 2009
Resolution4 of the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa
City, Branch 49 in RTC Case No. 4344; and 2) the CA's June
11, 2012 Resolution5 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Factual Antecedents
The CA is succinct in its narration of the facts:
Gina Endaya (hereinafter petitioner) and the other heirs of
Atilano Villaos (hereinafter Atilano) filed before the RTC,
Branch 52, Palawan City, a complaint for declaration of
nullity of deeds of sale, recovery of titles, and accounting of
income of the Palawan Village Hotel (hereinafter PVH)
against Ernesto V. Villaos (hereinafter respondent). Docketed
thereat as Civil Case No. 4162, the complaint sought the
recovery of several lots, including that on which the PVH and
Wooden Summer Homes6 are located.
The complaint in the main said that the purported sale of the
affected lots, from Atilano to respondent, was spurious.
Subsequently or on 10 May 2006, respondent filed an
ejectment case with preliminary mandatory injunction7 against
petitioner Gina Endaya and Leny Rivera before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Puerto Princesa City, docketed
as Civil Case No. 1940.
According to respondent, he bought from Atilano eight (8)
parcels of land,8 including those where PVH and WSH stood.
Respondent then took possession of the lots and started to
manage and operate the said hotels. Upon taking possession of
the said lots, he told petitioner and the others who live in
residential houses in the lots in question, to vacate the
premises, giving them a period of six (6) months to do so.
However, instead of leaving, petitioner even participated in a
violent and unlawful take-over of portions of PVH and WSH,
thus, the filing of the ejectment case.
Denying that Atilano, during his lifetime, had executed deeds
of sale involving the subject lots in favor of respondent,
petitioner stated that during the alleged execution of said
deeds, Atilano was no longer ambulatory and could no longer
talk and give assent to the deeds of sale. She added that
affixed his [signature] to the documents and not merely put his
thumbmark on it. She claims that the deeds of sale were forged
and could not have been executed with Atilano’s consent.
Petitioner further contended that the deeds of sale could not
have been properly notarized because the same were notarized
in Palawan at a time when Atilano was purportedly confined at
a hospital in Quezon City. Finally, petitioner questioned the
propriety of the ejectment case since according to her, they
already have filed Civil Case No. 4162 precisely to nullify the
deeds of sale.
In its decision,9 the MTCC held that an action questioning the
ownership of a property does not bar the filing of an ejectment
case since the only issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer
case is the physical or material possession of the property
independent of any claim of ownership. Such being the case,
the MTCC had jurisdiction to decide as to who is entitled to
the possession of the residential house. It ruled that respondent
had the right to the possession of the residential house subject
of the instant case and ordered the petitioners to vacate the
same and pay attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.
Aggrieved by the decision, petitioners appealed before the
RTC of Palawan, docketed thereat as RTC Case No. 4344.
On 11 April 2008, the RTC promulgated its
decision10 affirming the ruling of the MTCC, holding that the
pendency of Civil Case No. 4162 could not be considered as
ground for the dismissal of the present ejectment case under
the principle of litis pendentia because the parties therein
assert contrasting rights and prayed for different reliefs. It
further ruled that the MTCC simply took cognizance of the
existence of the deeds of sale in favor of respondent without
passing judgment as to whether these deeds were valid or not.
According to the RTC, the questioned deeds of absolute sale,
being notarized documents, are considered to be public
documents and carry with them the presumption of regularity.
However, the RTC deleted the award for attorney's fees,
saying that there was no factual and legal basis to justify the
same.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the
RTC should pass judgment on the legality of the deeds for the
purpose of deciding who between the parties has a better right
to possession even if the same issue is pending before another
court.
The RTC denied the motion in its Resolution11 dated 29 May
2009 x x x.
The RTC held in its May 29, 2009 Resolution that –
Appellants’12 insistence that this Court pass judgment on the
legality or illegality of the deeds of sale if only for the limited
purpose of deciding who between the parties herein has the
better right to possession of the properties subject hereof, even
if the same issue is pending before another branch of this
Court, is as highly improper as it is subversive of orderliness
in the administration of justice, as it would put the presiding
judges of both this and Branch 52 of this Court in a most
inconvenient bind.
One cannot begin to think what consequences such suggested
action shall spawn. Whichever way this Court decides the
matter of the validity of the deeds of sale, not only shall the
same be without any final weight and binding effect but it is
likewise bound to slight, irate and/or humiliate either or both
judges involved, and/or otherwise to adversely impact on
judicial capacity to decide finally the issue with utmost
freedom, which is indispensable to a fair and orderly
administration of justice.
xxxx
In the end, it can even be added that when appellants decided
to lodge civil case no. 4162, even while the ejectment case
was pending with the court a quo, they have empowered
Branch 52 of this Court, to which the former case was
assigned, to decide squarely and bindingly the issue of the
validity or invalidity of the deeds of sale. Consequently, they
must have known and understood the legal and practical
impacts of this decision of theirs on the capacity of the court a
quo, and of this Court eventually, to make a similar
determination even for a limited, and especially for a limited,
purpose only.
For appellants, now, to ask both concerned branches of this
Court to decide on one and the same issue, when the latter
were compelled, by the former’s aforesaid filing of action, to
limit themselves only to the issue directly affecting the
particular aspect of the controversy between the same parties-
in-litigation that they are specifically handling, could be
considered a myopic regard for the legal system that everyone
should try to edify and sustain.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review14 before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 110427. Petitioner later filed an
Amended Petition for Review, with Supplement.15 She
claimed that the RTC erred in affirming the MTCC; that the
MTCC and RTC erred in not passing upon the issue of validity
of the deeds of sale executed by Atilano in favor of respondent
and declaring that said issue should be resolved in Civil Case
No. 4162 for declaration of nullity of said deeds of sale,
recovery of titles, and accounting before the Palawan RTC
Branch 52; that it was necessary to pass upon the validity of
the deeds of sale even if the same is the main point of
contention in Civil Case No. 4162, because the question of
possession in the ejectment case cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership;16 that while respondent
claimed that the subject lots were sold to him, title to the same
remains in the name of Atilano even up to this day; and that
the MTCC had no jurisdiction over the case.
In a January 2, 2012 Decision, the CA denied the Petition,
stating thus:
The petition is devoid of merit.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that the only issue for
resolution in an ejectment case is the question of who is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the property
in dispute which is independent of any claim of ownership
raised by any of the parties. If the question of ownership is
linked to the issue of possession, then the MTCC may pass on
the question of ownership only for the purpose of determining
the issue of possession. Such determination is not final and
does not affect the ownership of the property. This is clearly
set forth in Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. – When the
defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and
the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding
the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
In this case, the MTCC was correct in refusing to dismiss the
ejectment case despite the pendency of Civil Case No. 4162
which is an action for declaration of nullity of the deeds of
sale in another court. The case then pending before the MTCC
was concerned only with the issue of possession, or to be
exact, who between petitioner and respondent had the better
right to possess the properties in question.
Respondent has in his favour the deeds of sale which are
notarized documents and hence, enjoy the presumption of
regularity. Based on the said deeds of sale, the MTCC
correctly awarded the possession of the properties in question
to respondent. In effect, the MTCC provisionally ruled on the
ownership of the subject properties, contrary to petitioner’s
insistence that said court completely avoided the issue.
It cannot also be said that the RTC likewise refused to rule on
the issue of ownership, or on the validity of the deeds of sale.
The RTC was one with the MTCC in ruling that the deeds of
sale are presumed to be valid because these were notarized.
While it categorically refused to rule on the validity of the
deeds of sale, it may be considered to have ruled on the
ownership of the properties on the basis of the presumption of
regularity that attaches to the notarized deeds.
The RTC is justified in refusing to rule on the validity of the
deeds of sale since this is a matter that pertains to Civil Case
No. 4162. x x x
xxxx
To reiterate, the only duty imposed upon the RTC in resolving
questions of possession where the issue of ownership is raised
is to touch on said subject matter provisionally. When it ruled
on the issue of possession on the basis of the aforesaid
presumption, it cannot be said to have been remiss in its duty.
As to petitioner’s argument that the MTCC should have
dismissed the ejectment case for lack of jurisdiction since the
present case was a forcible entry case and not an unlawful
detainer case, this Court likewise finds it to be lacking in
merit.
Records will show that petitioner never raised the said issue in
the court below. In fact, it was raised only for the first time on
appeal before this Court. Hence, petitioner cannot now impugn
for the first time MTCC’s lack of jurisdiction based on the rule
that issues not raised or ventilated in the court a quo cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. To do so would offend the
basic rules of fair play and justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated 11 April 2008 and
Resolution dated 29 May 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 49, in RTC Case No. 4344, are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.17
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but in its assailed June 11,
2012 Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the present
Petition.
Issues
Petitioner submits that –
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in
affirming the findings of the MTCC of Puerto
Princesa City and RTC Branch 49 on the issue of
ownership of the subject properties.
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that the issue of jurisdiction, or lack of it, of the
MTCC over the complaint for ejectment filed by the
Respondent cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.18
Petitioner’s Arguments
Praying that the assailed CA dispositions be reversed and set
aside and that the ejectment case – Civil Case No. 1940 – be
dismissed, petitioner essentially insists in her Petition and
Reply19 that the MTCC and RTC should have resolved the
issues of ownership and validity of the deeds of sale despite
the pendency of Civil Case No. 4162 because these issues will
settle the question of who between the parties has the better
right of possession over the subject properties; that it was error
for the MTCC and RTC to declare that respondent had the
better right of possession based on the supposed deeds of sale
in disregard of the successional rights of the Atilano heirs; that
the CA erred in declaring that the MTCC possessed
jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 1940; that the issues raised in
her Petition involve questions of law which thus merit
consideration by this Court and the exercise of its
discretionary power of review; and that the ejectment case
should be dismissed while Civil Case No. 4162 is pending
since a determination of the issue of ownership therein will
likewise settle the question of possession.
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment,20 respondent maintains that the CA
committed no error in its appreciation of the case; that the
question of ownership involves a factual issue which cannot
be raised before this Court; that consequently, the Petition
should be dismissed; and that since the issue of jurisdiction
was first raised only before the CA, it does not merit
consideration by this Court as well.
Our Ruling
The Petition must be granted.
In resolving the Petition for Review, the CA lost sight of the
legal principle that in resolving the issue of possession in an
ejectment case, the registered owner of the property is
preferred over the transferee under an unregistered deed of
sale. In Co v. Militar,21 this Court held that –
In the instant case, the evidence showed that as between the
parties, it is the petitioner who has a Torrens Title to the
property. Respondents merely showed their unregistered deeds
of sale in support of their claims. The Metropolitan Trial Court
correctly relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name
of petitioner.
In Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of Appeals, it was held that the
Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once
the claim of ownership is established and recognized.
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is indefeasible
and binding upon the whole world unless and until it has been
nullified by a court of competent jurisdiction. Under existing
statutory and decisional law, the power to pass upon the
validity of such certificate of title at the first instance properly
belongs to the Regional Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for
cancellation of title.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right to the
possession of the property, which is one of the attributes of his
ownership. x x x22
The same principle was reiterated in Pascual v.
Coronel,23 which held thus -
In any case, we sustain the appellate court’s finding that the
respondents have the better right to possess the subject
property. As opposed to the unregistered deeds of sale, the
certificate of title certainly deserves more probative value.
Indeed, a Torrens Certificate is evidence of indefeasible title
of property in favor of the person in whose name appears [sic]
therein; such holder is entitled to the possession of the
property until his title is nullified.
The petitioners, however, insist that the deeds of sale deserve
more credence because they are valid contracts that legally
transferred ownership of the property to Melu-Jean. They
argue that (a) the 1975 Deed, being a public document, is
presumed to be valid and there was no evidence sufficient to
overturn such presumption or show that it was simulated; (b)
the fact that the person who notarized the said deed of sale is
not commissioned as a notary public has no bearing on its
validity; (c) registration of the deed of sale was not necessary
to transfer ownership; (d) Melu-Jean is not guilty of laches in
asserting her ownership over the property since she is actually
in possession of the property through the petitioners; and (e)
the filing of the annulment case is an admission that the two
deeds of sale are merely voidable, or valid until annulled.
However, it should be noted that the CA merely affirmed the
power of the trial court to provisionally resolve the issue of
ownership, which consequently includes the power to
determine the validity of the deeds of sale. As previously
stated, such determination is not conclusive, and the issue of
ownership and the validity of the deeds of sale would
ultimately be resolved in the case for annulment of the deeds
of sale.
Even if we sustain the petitioners’ arguments and rule that the
deeds of sale are valid contracts, it would still not bolster the
petitioners’ case.1âwphi1 In a number of cases, the Court had
upheld the registered owners’ superior right to possess the
property. In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted with a
similar issue of which between the certificate of title and an
unregistered deed of sale should be given more probative
weight in resolving the issue of who has the better right to
possess. There, the Court held that the court a quo correctly
relied on the transfer certificate of title in the name of
petitioner, as opposed to the unregistered deeds of sale of the
respondents. The Court stressed therein that the Torrens
System was adopted in this country because it was believed to
be the most effective measure to guarantee the integrity of
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of
ownership is established and recognized.
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court
declared that the trial court did not err in giving more
probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-
a-vis the contested unregistered Deed of Sale. Later
in Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered
owner is preferred to possess the property subject of the
unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who
has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.24
Later, in Vda. de Aguilar v. Alfaro,25 a case decided by
this ponente, the following pronouncement was made:
It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of indefeasible title
to property in favor of the person in whose name the title
appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the
ownership of the land described therein. It is also settled that
the titleholder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of
the property, including possession. Thus, in Arambulo v.
Gungab, this Court declared that the age-old rule is that the
person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof.
In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioner is the
holder of a Torrens title over the entire Lot 83. Respondents
have only their notarized but unregistered Kasulatan sa
Bilihan to support their claim of ownership. Thus, even if
respondents’ proof of ownership has in its favor a juris
tantum presumption of authenticity and due execution, the
same cannot prevail over petitioner’s Torrens title. This has
been our consistent ruling which we recently reiterated
in Pascual v. Coronel, viz[.]:
Even if we sustain the petitioners’ arguments and rule that the
deeds of sale are valid contracts, it would still not bolster the
petitioners’ case. In a number of cases, the Court had upheld
the registered owners’ superior right to possess the property.
In Co v. Militar, the Court was confronted with a similar issue
of which between the certificate of title and an unregistered
deed of sale should be given more probative weight in
resolving the issue of who has the better right to possess.
There, the Court held that the court a quo correctly relied on
the transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner, as
opposed to the unregistered title in the name of respondents.
The Court stressed therein that the Torrens System was
adopted in this country because it was believed to be the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and
to protect their indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is
established and recognized.
Likewise, in the recent case of Umpoc v. Mercado, the Court
declared that the trial court did not err in giving more
probative weight to the TCT in the name of the decedent vis-
a-vis the contested unregistered Deed of Sale. Later
in Arambulo v. Gungab, the Court held that the registered
owner is preferred to possess the property subject of the
unlawful detainer case. The age-old rule is that the person who
has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof.
As the titleholder, therefore, petitioner is preferred to possess
the entire Lot 83. x x x26
Then again, in Manila Electric Company v. Heirs of
Deloy,27 the Court held:
At any rate, it is fundamental that a certificate of title serves as
evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to the
property in favor of the person whose name appears therein. It
bears to emphasize that the titleholder is entitled to all the
attributes of ownership of the property, including possession.
Thus, the Court must uphold the age-old rule that the person
who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to its possession.
In Pascual v. Coronel, the Court reiterated the rule that a
certificate of title has a superior probative value as against that
of an unregistered deed of sale in ejectment cases.28
While respondent has in his favor deeds of sale over the eight
parcels of land, these deeds were not registered; thus, title
remained in the name of the owner and seller Atilano. When
he died, title passed to petitioner, who is his illegitimate child. SO ORDERED.
This relationship does not appear to be contested by
respondent – in these proceedings, at least. Under Article 777
of the Civil Code, “[t]he rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.”
Thus, applying the principle enunciated in the above-cited
cases, petitioner and her co-heirs should have been favored on
the question of possession, being heirs who succeeded the
registered owner of the properties in dispute. Clearly, the
MTCC, RTC, and CA erred in ruling in favor of respondent.

Besides, if there are strong reasons of equity, such as when the

execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case would
result in the demolition of the premises such that the result of
enforcement would be permanent, unjust and probably
irreparable, then the unlawful detainer case should at least be
suspended, if not abated or dismissed, in order to await final
judgment in the more substantive case involving legal
possession or ownership.29 The facts indicate that petitioner
and her co-heirs have established residence on the subject
premises; the fact that they were given a long period of six
months within which to vacate the same shows how deep they
have established roots therein. If they vacate the premises,
serious irreversible consequences – such as demolition of their
respective residences – might ensue. It is thus more prudent to
await the outcome of Civil Case No. 4162.

In Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendaño, the Court suspended the

enforcement of a writ of demolition rendered in an ejectment
case until after a case for annulment of title involving the
property to be demolished was decided. The Court
ratiocinated:

x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as

distinguished from one of forcible entry, and the right of the
plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in
a proper judicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and
less productive of confusion and disturbance of physical
possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and
expenses. For the Court in which the issue of legal possession,
whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain,
should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the
effects of any order or decision in the unlawful detainer case
in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive
case involving legal possession or ownership. It is only where
there has been forcible entry that as a matter of public policy
the right to physical possession should be immediately set at
rest in favor of the prior possession regardless of the fact that
the other party might ultimately be found to have superior
claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any
attempt to recover possession thru force, strategy or stealth
and without resorting to the courts.30

With the foregoing pronouncement, the Court finds no need to

tackle the other issues raised by the parties.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed

January 2, 2012 Decision and June 11, 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R SP No. 110427
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 1940 for
ejectment is ordered DISMISSED.

G.R. No. 198594
HELEN CALIMOSO, MARILYN P. CALIMOSO and
LIBY P. CALIMOSO, Petitioners,
vs.
AXEL D. ROULLO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the
December 15, 2010 decision2 and the August 23, 2011
resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Cebu City, in CA-
G.R. CEB CV No. 00834. The CA affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, Iloilo City,
in Civil Case No. CEB-23858 that ordered the establishment
of an "easement of right of way" in favor of respondent Axel
D. Roullo.
Facts of the Case
In his Complaint4 for Easement of Right of Way, the
respondent mainly alleged: that he is the owner of Lot 1462-C-
15 situated in Brgy. Sambag, Jaro, Iloilo City; that his lot is
isolated by several surrounding estates, including Lot 1454-B-
256 owned by petitioners Helen, Marilyn, and Liby, all
surnamed Calimoso; that he needs a right-of-way in order to
have access to a public road; and that the shortest and most
convenient access to the nearest public road, i.e., Fajardo
Subdivision Road, passes through the petitioners’ lot.
The petitioners objected to the establishment of the easement
because it would cause substantial damage to the two (2)
houses already standing on their property. They alleged that
the respondent has other right-of-way alternatives, such as the
existing wooden bridge over Sipac Creek bounding the
respondent’s lot on the northeast; that the bridge, if made
concrete, could provide ingress or egress to the Fajardo
Subdivision Road.
Due to the respondent’s allegedly malicious and groundless
suit, the petitioners claimed entitlement to the following
awards: P100,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages, P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, P1,000.00
as appearance fee, and P15,000.00 as litigation expenses.
In a decision dated September 29, 2003, the RTC granted the
respondent’s complaint and ordered the petitioners to provide
the respondent an easement of right-of-way "measuring 14
meters in length and 3 meters in width (42 square meters,
more or less) over Lot 1454-B-25, specifically at the portion
adjoining the bank of Sipac Creek." Accordingly, the RTC
ordered the respondent to pay the petitioners proper indemnity
in the amount of "Php1,500.00 per square meter of the portion
of the lot subject of the easement." The petitioners appealed
the RTC’s decision to the CA.
The CA, in its assailed December 15, 2010 decision,
affirmed in toto the RTC’s decision and held that all the
requisites for the establishment of a legal or compulsory
easement of right-of-way were present in the respondent’s
case: first, that the subject lot is indeed surrounded by estates
owned by different individuals and the respondent has no
access to any existing public road; second, that the respondent
has offered to compensate the petitioners for the establishment
of the right-of-way through the latter’s property; third, that the
isolation of the subject lot was not caused by the respondent as
he purchased the lot without any adequate ingress or egress to
a public highway; and, fourth and last, given the available
options for the right-of-way, the route that passes through
the petitioners’ lot requires the shortest distance to a
public road and can be established at a point least
prejudicial to the petitioners’ property.
The petitioners moved to reconsider the CA’s decision arguing
that, while the establishment of the easement through their lot
provided for the shortest route, the adjudged right-of-way
would cause severe damage not only to the nipa hut situated at
the corner of the petitioners’ lot, but also to the bedroom
portion of the other concrete house that stood on the property.
The CA, however, did not consider the petitioners’ arguments
on the ground that the matters alleged were not raised or
proven before the trial court, thus, it denied the petitioners’
motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners filed the present petition for review
on certiorari raising the issues of: (a) whether the respondent
has met all the requisites for the establishment of a legal
easement of right-of-way on Lot 1454-B-25 owned by the
petitioners, (b) whether the establishment of the right-of-way
on the petitioners’ lot is at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and (c) whether a right-of-way can be
established through other lots surrounding the respondent’s
property other than through the petitioners’ property.
OUR RULING
We disagree with the CA finding that all the requisites for
the valid establishment of an easement of right-of-way are
present in this case.
To be entitled to an easement of right-of-way, the following
requisites should be met:
"1. The dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public
highway;
 2. There is payment of proper indemnity;
3. The isolation is not due to the acts of the proprietor
of the dominant estate; and
4. The right-of-way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate; and insofar as
consistent with this rule, where the distance from the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the
shortest."7
The immovable in whose favor the easement is established is
called the dominant estate, and the property subject to the
easement is called the servient estate.8 Here, the respondent’s
lot is the dominant estate and the petitioners’ lot is the servient
estate.
That the respondent’s lot is surrounded by several estates and
has no access to a public road are undisputed.1âwphi1 The
only question before this Court is whether the right-of- way
passing through the petitioners’ lot satisfies the fourth
requirement of being established at the point least
prejudicial to the servient estate.
In this case, the establishment of a right-of-way through the
petitioners’ lot would cause the destruction of the wire fence
and a house on the petitioners’ property.10 Although this right-
of-way has the shortest distance to a public road, it is not the
least prejudicial considering the destruction pointed out, and
that an option to traverse two vacant lots without causing any
damage, albeit longer, is available.
We have held that "mere convenience for the dominant estate
is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a
compulsory easement;"11 that "a longer way may be adopted to
avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are
constructions or walls which can be avoided by a round-about
way."12
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the present petition for
review on certiorari and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
decision dated December 15, 2010, and resolution dated
August 23, 2011, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB
CV No. 00834. The complaint for the easement of right- of-
way is DISMISSED without prejudice to another complaint
that the respondent may file against the proper party or parties
based on the terms of this Decision.

Three options were then available to the respondent for the Costs against respondent Axel D. Roullo.
demanded right-of-way: the first option is to traverse directly
through the petitioners’ property, which route has an SO ORDERED.
approximate distance of fourteen (14) meters from the
respondent’s lot to the Fajardo Subdivision Road; the second
option is to pass through two vacant lots (Lots 1461-B-1 and
1461-B-2) located on the southwest of the respondent’s lot,
which route has an approximate distance of forty-three (43)
meters to another public highway, the Diversion Road; and
the third option is to construct a concrete bridge
over Sipac Creek and ask for a right-of-way on the property of
a certain Mr. Basa in order to reach the Fajardo Subdivision
Road.

Among the right-of-way alternatives, the CA adopted the first

option, i.e., passing through the petitioner’s lot, because it
offered the shortest distance (from the respondent’s lot) to the
Fajardo Subdivision Road and the right-of-way would only
affect the "nipa hut" standing on the petitioners’ property. The
CA held that the establishment of the easement through the
petitioners’ lot was more practical, economical, and less
burdensome to the parties.

Article 650 of the Civil Code provides that the easement of

right-of-way shall be established at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate, and, insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public
highway may be the shortest. Under this guideline, whenever
there are several tenements surrounding the dominant estate,
the right-of-way must be established on the tenement where
the distance to the public road or highway is
shortest and where the least damage would be caused. If these
two criteria (shortest distance and least damage) do not concur
in a single tenement, we have held in the past that the least
prejudice criterion must prevail over the shortest distance
criterion.9

G.R. No. 161589               November 24, 2014
PENTA PACIFIC REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is determined
from the allegations of the initiatory pleading.
The Case
Under review is the decision promulgated on October 9,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
judgment rendered on June 10, 2002 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 58, in Makati City2 nullifying for lack of
jurisdiction the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 64, in Makati City.3
Antecedents
The petitioner owned the 25th floor of the Pacific Star
Building located in Makati City with an area of 1,068.67
square meters. The respondent leased 444.03 square meters of
the premises (subject property) through the petitioner’s
authorized agent, Century Properties Management, Inc.
(Century Properties). Under the terms of the contract of lease
dated January 31, 1997, the petitioner gavethe respondent
possession of the subject property under a stipulation to the
effect that in case of the respondent’s default in its monthly
rentals, the petitioner could immediately repossess the subject
property.
On March 19, 1997, the respondent expressed the intention to
purchase the entire 1,068.67 square meters, including the
subject property. The parties executed a contract to sell,
denominated as a reservation agreement, in which they set the
purchase price at US$3,420,540.00, with the following terms
of payment: 20%down payment equivalent of US$684,108.00
payable within eight months; and US$85,513.00/monthly for
eight months with interestof 9.75%, commencing on the 6th
month. The 80% balance was to be paid in 13 installments
beginning on March 1, 1997 until March 1, 1998. The
reservation agreement contained the following cancellation or
forfeiture provision, viz:
Any failure on [the respondent’s] part to pay the full
downpayment, or deliver the post-dated checks or pay the
monthly amortization on the due date, shall entitle [the
petitioner], at its option, to impose a penalty interest at the rate
of three percent (3%) per month on the outstanding balance or
to cancel this agreement without need of any court action and
to forfeit, in its favor, any reservation deposits or payments
already made on the unit, without prior notice.4
After paying US$538,735.00, the respondent stopped paying
the stipulated monthly amortizations. An exchange of letters
ensued between Janet C. Ley, President of the respondent, or
Efren Yap, Assistant to the President of the respondent, on one
hand, and Jose B.E. Antonio, ViceChairman of the petitioner,
and the petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Reynaldo Dizon, on the
other. In the September 23, 1997 letter,5 the respondent asked
the petitioner to modify the terms of the reservation agreement
to allow it to purchase only the subject property. In the
February 5, 1998 letter,6 the petitioner’s counsel reminded the
respondent of its US$961,546.50 liability to the petitioner
under the terms of the reservation agreement. In another letter
dated February 5, 1998,7 the petitioner’s counsel informed the
respondent of its failure to pay its amortizations since August
1997, and demanded the payment of US$961,564.50.
Through its letter of February 17, 1998,8 the respondent
submitted the following proposals, namely: (1) that the
US$538,735.00 paid under the reservation agreement be
applied asrental payments for the use and occupation of the
subject property in the period from March 1997 to February
28, 1998; (2) that the balance of US$417,355.45 after
deducting the rental payments from March 1997 to February
28, 1998 should be returned to it; and (3) that the respondent
be allowed to lease the subject property beginning March
1998.
The petitioner, through its counsel’s letter of March 9,
1998,9 rejected the respondent’s proposals, and demanded the
payment of US$3,310,568.00, representing the respondent’s
unpaid balance (as of March 2, 1998) under the reservation
agreement. The petitioner further evinced its intention to
cancel the contract to sell, and to charge the respondent for the
rentals of the subject property corresponding to the period
from August 1997 to March 1998, during which no
amortization payments were made.
In the letter dated February 4, 1999,10 the petitioner’s counsel
informed the respondent of the cancellation of the reservation
agreement and the forfeiture of the respondent’s payments;
and demanded that respondent pay the rentals of
₱9,782,226.50 and vacate the subject property.
In its letter of May 25, 1999,11 the petitioner’s counsel wrote to
the respondent thuswise:
We write in behalf of our client, Penta Pacific Realty
Corporation, regarding the Reservation Agreement and/or sale
between you and our client over the latter’s unit located at the
25th Floor, Pacific Star Building, Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue
corner Makati Avenue, Makati City.
We regret to inform you that inview of your continued refusal
and/or failure to pay to our client the balance of the agreed-
upon purchase price of the office unit you are currently
occupying, our client is constrained to make a notarial
cancellation of the Reservation Agreement and/or sale of the
above-mentioned unit and to forfeit the payments you made in
favor of our client.
In this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to
continue occupying the subject premises. Hence, final and
formal demand is hereby made upon you to peacefully and
quietly vacate the same within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof. Otherwise, we shall be constrained to file the
appropriate legal action to protect our client’s interests.
Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be
constrained to charge you the amount of ₱9,782,226.50
corresponding to reasonable rentals and other charges as of
January 22, 1999.
Trusting that you are guided accordingly.
On July 9, 1999, the petitioner filed the complaint for
ejectment in the MeTC following the respondent’s failure to
comply with the demands to pay and vacate.
The respondent resisted the complaint,12 arguing that the
contract of lease dated January 31, 1997 had been simulated
or, in the alternative, had been repealed, negated, extinguished
and/or novated by the reservation agreement; that the
petitioner had failed to observe its undertaking to allow the
respondent to collect rentals from the other lessees of the
subject property; that the petitioner had unjustifiably refused
to renegotiate or to amend the reservation agreement; and that
the petitioner had violated the rule on non-forum shopping
considering the pendency of another case between the parties
in Branch 57 of the RTC in Makati City.13
Decision of the MeTC
On January 12, 2000, the MeTC, ruling in favor of the
petitioner, found that the respondent’s lawful possession of the
property had been by virtue of the contract of lease, but had
become unlawful when the respondent had failed to comply
with its obligation to pay the monthly rentals for the subject
property; and that, in any event, the reservation agreement
proved that the petitioner had held the better right to possess
the subject property as the owner thereof. The MeTC
disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered ordering defendant Ley
Construction and Development Corporation and all persons
claiming rights under it to vacate and surrender the possession
of the Property to the plaintiff; to pay the sum of
₱32,456,953.06 representing unpaid rentals and other charges
as of June 23, 1999; the further amount of ₱443,741.38
starting July, 1999, and the same amount every month
thereafter as reasonable compensation for the continued and
illegal use and occupancy of the Property, until finally
restituted to the plaintiff; the sum of ₱100,000.00 for as (sic)
attorney’sfees plus cost of suit.14
The respondent appealed to the RTC.
In the meantime, on November 6, 2001, the respondent turned
over the possession of the leased premises to the petitioner.
Judgment of the RTC
On June 10, 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment nullifying
the MeTC’s decision on the ground of lackof jurisdiction,
holding that the appropriate action was either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria over which the MeTC had
no jurisdiction. It found that the basis of recovery of
possession by the petitioner was the respondent’s failure to
pay the amortizations arising from the violations of the
reservation agreement; that the complaint did not specifically
aver facts constitutive of unlawful detainer, i.e., it did not
show how entry had been effected and how the dispossession
had started; and that the requirement of formal demand had
not been complied with by the petitioner.
Decision of the CA
The petitioner appealed to the CA.
By its decision promulgated on October 9, 2003, the CA
affirmed the judgment of the RTC,15 declaring that the
respondent’s possession was not by virtue of the contract of
lease but pursuant to the reservation agreement, which was
more of a "contract of sale."16 It concluded that the petitioner’s
action was not unlawful detainer, but another kind of action
for the recovery of possession.17
Not in agreement with the decision of the CA, the petitioner
filed the present petition.
Issue
The decisive question is whether the complaint was for
unlawful detainer, or accion publiciana, or accion
reivindicatoria.
The petitioner submits that the MeTC had jurisdiction because
its complaint made out a clear case of unlawful detainer,
emphasizing that the basis of the complaint was the failure of
the respondent to pay the stipulated monthly rentals under the
revived contract of lease; that even if the cause of action was
upon the nonpayment of the purchase price under the
reservation agreement, the MeTC still had jurisdiction over the
action because an unlawful detainer case could also arise from
a vendor-vendee relationship; and that, accordingly, the
nonpayment ofrentals or of the purchase price sufficiently
established its better right to possess the subject property.
In contrast, the respondent maintains that it had not violated
any existing contract of lease with the petitioner because the
contract of lease dated January 31, 1997 was based on the
agreement between the respondent and Century Properties;
that it had entered into the possession of the subject property
as the buyer-owner pursuant tothe reservation agreement; and
that the recovery of possession should have been by accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria, not unlawful detainer.
Ruling
The appeal has merit.
1. Kinds of Possessory Actions
There are three kinds of real actions affecting title to or
possession of real property, or interest therein, namely: accion
de reivindicacion, accion publiciana and accion interdictal.
The first seeks the recovery of ownership as well as possession
of realty.18 The second proposes to recover the right to possess
and is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding. 19 The
third refers to the recovery of physical or actual possession
only (through a special civil action either for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer).
If the dispossession is not alleged totake place by any of the
means provided by Section 1,20 Rule 70, Rules of Court, or, if
the dispossession allegedly took place by any of such means
but the action is not brought within one year from deprivation
ofpossession, the action is properly a plenary action of accion
publiciana or accion de reivindicacion. The explanation is
simply that the disturbance of the peace and quiet of the local
community due to the dispossession did not materialize;
hence, the possessor thus deprived has no need for the
summary proceeding of accion interdictal under Rule 70.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has exclusive original
jurisdiction over accion interdictal. Until April 15, 1994, the
MTC had no original jurisdiction over the other possessory
actions. By such date, its jurisdiction was expanded to vest it
with exclusive original jurisdiction over the other possessory
actions ofaccion publiciana and accion de reivindicacion
where the assessed value of the realty involved did not exceed
₱20,000.00, or, if the realty involved was in Metro Manila,
such value did not exceed ₱50,000.00. The expansion of
jurisdiction was by virtue of the amendment by Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 769121 to make Section 19 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 pertinently provide thusly:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. — Regional Trial
Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession
of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos
(₱20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) except
actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or
buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
xxxx
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7691 similarly revised Section
33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the provision defining the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC over civil actions)
to make the latter provision state, pertinently, thus:
Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in
Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which
involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest
therein where the assessed value of the property or interest
therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (₱20,000.00)
or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value
does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (₱50,000.00) exclusive
of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees,
litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land
not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property
shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.
xxxx
As can be seen, the amendments have made the assessed value
of the property whose possession or ownership is in issue, or
the assessed value of the adjacent lots if the disputed land is
not declared for taxation purposes determinative of
jurisdiction. The allegation of the assessed value of the realty
must be found in the complaint, if the action (other than
forcible entry or unlawful detainer) involves title to or
possession of the realty, including quieting of title of the
realty. If the assessed value is not found in the complaint, the
action should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the
trial court is not thereby afforded the means of determining
from the allegations of the basic pleading whether jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action pertains to it or to another
court. Courts cannot take judicial notice of the assessed or
market value of the realty.22
2. MeTC had jurisdiction over
the complaint of the petitioner
The settled rule is that the nature of the action as appearing
from the averments in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading determines the jurisdiction of a court; hence, such
averments and the character of the relief sought are to be
consulted.23 The court must interpret and apply the law on
jurisdiction in relation to the averments of ultimate facts in the
complaint or other initiatory pleading regardless ofwhether or
not the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to recover upon all or
some of the claims asserted therein.24 The reliefs to which the
plaintiff or petitioner is entitled based on the facts averred,
although not the reliefs demanded, determine the nature of the
action.25 The defense contained in the answer of the defendant
is generally not determinant.26
Is this present action onefor unlawful detainer?
A suit for unlawful detainer is premised on Section 1, Rule 70,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, of which there are two kinds,
namely: (1) that filed against a tenant, and (2) that brought
against a vendee or vendor, or other person unlawfully
withholding possession of any land or building after the
expiration or termination of the rightto hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.
"In an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer, the main
issue is possession de facto, independently of any claim of
ownership or possession de jurethat either party may set forth
in his pleading."27 The plaintiff must prove that it was in prior
physical possession of the premises until it was deprived
thereof by the defendant.28 The principal issue must be
possession de facto, or actual possession, and ownership is
merely ancillary to such issue. The summary character of the
proceedings is designed to quicken the determination of
possession de factoin the interest of preserving the peace of
the community, but the summary proceedings may not be
proper to resolve ownership of the property. Consequently,
any issue on ownership arising in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer is resolved only provisionally for the purpose of
determining the principal issue of possession.29 On the other
hand, regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property and whatever may be the character of the plaintiff’s
prior possession, if it has in its favor priority in time, it has the
security that entitles it to remain on the property until it is
lawfully ejected through an accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria by another having a better right.30
In unlawful detainer, the complaint must allege the cause of
action according to the manner set forth in Section 1, Rule 70
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. –
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a
person deprived of the possession of any land or building by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession
of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration or termination of the rightto hold possession, by
virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal
representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring
an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of
possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for
the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs. (Emphasis supplied)
The complaint must further allege the plaintiff’s compliance
with the jurisdictional requirement of demand as prescribed by
Section 2, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand.
— Unless otherwise stipulated, suchaction by the lessor shall
be commenced only after demand to pay orcomply with the
conditions of the lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee,
or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person
found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the
premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to
comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in the case of land or
five (5) days in the case of buildings.
For the action to come under the exclusive original jurisdiction
of the MTC, therefore, the complaint must allege that: (a) the
defendant originally had lawful possession of the property,
either by virtue of a contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
(b) the defendant’s possession of the property eventually
became illegal or unlawful upon notice by the plaintiff to the
defendant of the expiration or the termination of the
defendant’s right of possession; (c) the defendant thereafter
remained in possession of the property and thereby deprived
the plaintiff the enjoyment thereof; and (d) the plaintiff
instituted the action within one year from the unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession.31
The complaint herein sufficientlyalleged all the foregoing
requisites for unlawful detainer, to wit: x x x x
3. On January 31, 1997, the defendant and the plaintiff’s
authorized agent, Century Properties Management Inc.
(CPMI), a corporation duly organized and existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the x x x Philippines x x x entered into
a Contract of Lease whereby the latter leased from the former
a portion of the 25th Floor of the PSB (hereinafter referred to
as the PROPERTY). x x x.
4. On March 19, 1997, the defendant decided to purchase from
the plaintiff the 25th Floor of the PSB by virtue of a
Reservation Agreement of the same date. x x x.
5. However, on August 1997, the defendant started to default
in its amortization payments on the above-mentioned
purchase. x x x.
xxxx
8. Sometime in March 1999, the defendant requested from the
plaintiff and CPMI that the Reservation Agreement be
cancelled and in lieu thereof, the above-mentioned Contract of
Lease be revived. The plaintiff and CPMI acceded to such
request x x x.
9. However, contrary to the express provisions of the Contract
of Lease, the defendant failed to pay to the plaintiff the rentals
for the use of the PROPERTY when they fell due.
10. x x x the plaintiff also formally made a notarial
cancellation of the aforementioned purchase and demanded
that defendant peacefully vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.
11. However, despite such demand, the defendant has failed
and/or refused and continues to refuse and fail to peacefully
vacate the PROPERTY. x x x.32
As earlier shown, the final letter dated May 25, 1999 of the
petitioner’s counsel demanded that the respondent vacate the
subject property,33 to wit:
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE and SET ASIDE the decision
promulgated on October 9, 2003 by the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision rendered on June 10, 2002 by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 58; REINSTATE
the decision rendered on January 12, 2000 by the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 64, of Makati City; and ORDER the
respondent to pay the costs of suit.

In this connection, there is no more valid reason for you to SO ORDERED.

continue occupying the subject premises.1âwphi1 Hence,final
and formal demand is hereby made upon you to peacefully and
quietly vacate the same within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof. Otherwise, we shall be constrained to file the
appropriate legal action to protect our client’s interests.

Lastly, we would like to inform you that our client will also be
constrained to charge you the amount of ₱9,782,226.50
corresponding to reasonable rentals and other charges as of
January 22, 1999.

After the demand went unheeded, the petitioner initiated this

suit in the MeTC on July 9, 1999, well within the one-year
period from the date of the last demand.

The aforequoted allegations of the complaint made out a case

of unlawful detainer, vesting the MeTC with exclusive
original jurisdiction over the complaint. As alleged therein,the
cause of action of the petitioner was to recover possession of
the subject property from the respondent upon the latter’s
failure to comply with the former’s demand tovacate the
subject property after the latter’s right to remain thereon
terminated by virtue of the demand to vacate. Indeed, the
possession of the latter, although lawful at its commencement,
became unlawful upon its non-compliance with the former’s
demand to vacate.

The jurisdiction of the MeTC was not ousted by the fact that
what was ultimately proved as to how entry by the respondent
had been made or when the dispossession had started might
have departed from that alleged in the complaint. As earlier
stated, jurisdiction over the subject matter was determined
from the allegations of the complaint, which clearly set forth a
cause of action for unlawful detainer.34

The MeTC correctly exercised its authority in finding for the

petitioner as the plaintiff. In unlawful detainer, the possession
was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration
or termination of the right to possess; hence, the issue of
rightful possession is decisive for, in the action, the defendant
is in actual possession and the plaintiffs cause of action is the
termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.35

A defendant's claim of possession de Jure or his averment of

ownership does not render the ejectment suit either accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The suit remains an
accion interdictal, a summary proceeding that can proceed
independently of any claim of ownership.36 Even when the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership is to be resolved
only to determine the issue of possession.37

G.R. No. 187633
HEIRS OF DELFIN and MARIA TAPPA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD, HENRY CALABAZARON
and VICENTE MALUPENG, Respondents.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Decision2 dated
February 19, 2009 and Resolution3 dated April 30, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 90026, which
reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated July 6, 2007 of
Branch 5, Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofTuguegarao City,
Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5560 for Quieting of Title,
Recovery of Possession and Damages.
The Facts
On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin)5 and
Maria Tappa (Spouses Tappa) filed a complaint6 for Quieting
of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages (Complaint)
against respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud),7 Henry Calabazaron
(Calabazaron), and Vicente Malupeng (Malupeng).8 The
property subject of the complaint is a parcel of land identified
as Lot No. 3341, Pls-793 with an area of 21,879 square
meters, located in Kongcong, Cabbo, Pefiablanca, Cagayan
(Lot No. 3341).9
In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the
registered owners of Lot No. 3341, having been issued an
Original Certificate of Title No. P-69103 (OCT No. P-69103)
on September 18, 1992, by virtue of Free Patent No. 021519-
92-3194. 10 Delfin allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341 from his
father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa claimed that
both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open, continuous, notorious,
exclusive possession of the lot since time immemorial. 11
In their Answer, 12 respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and
Malupeng claimed that the original owner of Lot No. 3341
was Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo
and Irene. Upon Genaro's death, the property passed on to
Lorenzo and Irene by operation of law; and they became ipso
facto co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and
Irene each owned 10,939 square meters of the lot as their
respective shares. Lorenzo had children namely, Delfin,
Primitiva, and Fermina. Upon the death of Irene, her share in
tum passed to her heirs, Demetria, Juanita, Pantaleon and Jose
Bacud. 13
Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit dated
April 29, 1963 (1963 Affidavit) signed by Delfin, his sisters,
Primitiva and Fermina, and their mother, Modesta
Angoluan. 14 The 1963 affidavit stated that Genaro originally
owned Lot No. 3341. It further stated that one-half (Yz) of the
property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole property
was declared as his, only for taxation purposes.
Calabazaron claimed that he became the owner of 2,520
square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of two Deeds of Sale
executed in his favor, one dated October 12, 1970 executed by
Demetria, and another dated August 22, 1971 executed by
Juanita. 15 After the sale, Calabazaron entered into possession
of his portion and paid the real property taxes. 16 He remains in
possession up to this date. 17
Malupeng, on the other hand, claimed that he became the
owner of 210 square meters of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of a
Deed of Sale executed on November 30, 1970 by Pantaleon in
his favor. 18 After the sale, Malupeng entered into possession
of his porcion of propeny and paid the real property
taxes. 19 He remains in possession up to this date. 20
Bacud claimed ownership over 1,690 square meters of Lot No.
3341 in his own right as heir of Irene.21
Respondents started occupying their respective portions after
the sale made to each of them. They continued to occupy them
despite several demands to vacate from Spouses Tappa.22
Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed
through force and intimidation.23 Bacud and Malupeng denied
this allegation.24
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC issued its Decision,25 the decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiffs and the Court hereby orders:
1. Plaintiffs to be the owners of Lot 3341, Pls 793
and unqualifiedly vests in them the full and
untrammeled rights of ownership:
 2. All the defendants must, if still in possession of
portions of the lot in issue, convey the same to the
plaintiffs;
3. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.26
The R TC ruled that the basic requirement of the law on
quieting of title under Article 447 of the Civil Code was met,
thus:
Delfin and Maria's title is clear and unequivocal, and its
validity has never been assailed by the defendants – nor
has any evidence been adduced that successfully
overcomes the presumption of validity and legality that the
title of Delfin and Maria enjoys.27 (Emphasis in the original.)
The RTC ruled that there was no document in the hands of
respondents as strong and persuasive as the title in the name of
the Spouses Tappa that will support respondents' claim of
ownership and Irene's antecedent ownership. 28 The RTC stated
that the 1963 Affidavit contains nothing more than the
allegations of the affiants and does not, by itself, constitute
proof of ownership of land, especially as against documents
such as titles.29
Respondents appealed to the CA, raising the following
arguments:
First, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa fraudulently
applied for, and were issued a free patent over Lot No. 3341,
and eventually OCT No. P-69103 dated September 18,
1992.30 They alleged that Spouses Tappa committed fraud
because they were not in possession of the lot since 1963,
which possession was required for an applicant for a free
patent under the law. 31
Second, respondents argued that the complaint should be
dismissed because both extinctive and acquisitive prescription
have already set in.32 Respondents claimed that both ordinary
acquisitive prescription of 10 years, and extraordinary
acquisitive prescription of 30 years in claiming ownership of
immovable property apply in the case.33 They argued that
more than 30 years have already lapsed from the time they
entered possession of the subject lot in 1963 up to the filing of
the complaint on September 9, 1999.34 They also pointed out
that Spouses Tappa admitted in their complaint that
respondents were in possession of the lot since 1963. 35
Particularly, Calabazaron argued that the 10-year prescriptive
period under Article 1134 of the Civil Code applies to him by
virtue of the two duly executed Deeds of Sale in his favor. 36 It
was never alleged that he had any participation in the alleged
duress, force and intimidation in the execution of the 1963
Affidavit.37 Hence, he is a purchaser in good faith and for
value. Calabazaron entered possession of the lot after the sale
to him in 1970, thus, the prescriptive period of l0 years had
long lapsed. 38
Bacud and Malupeng claimed that, even assuming that the
execution of the 1963 Affidavit was attended with force and
intimidation, the complaint against them should have been
dismissed because the extraordinary acquisitive prescriptive
period of 30 years under Article 1137 of the Civil Code
applies to them.39 They also argued that the action for quieting
of title had already prescribed since the possession of Bacud
and Malupeng started in 1963, which fact was allegedly
admitted by Spouses Tappa in their complaint.40 Thus,
Spouses Tappa had only until 1993 to file a complaint, which
they failed to do.
All respondents claimed that from the start of their possession,
they (1) have paid real taxes on the lot, (2) have planted crops,
and (3) have continued to possess the lot in the concept of
owners. 41
Third, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa failed to prove
their right over the subject lot because they cannot rely on the
certificate of title issued to them on September 18, 1992 by
virtue of a free patent.42 They asserted that Spouses Tappa
fraudulently obtained the free patent on Lot No. 3341 by
concealing material facts; specifically the fact of not being in
possession of the lot since 1963. 43
The Ruling of the CA
The CA set aside the decision of the RTC. 44 The relevant
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision dated July 6, 2007
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint.
SO ORDERED.45
On the issue of prescription, the CA ruled in favor of
respondents and explained that their possession over Lot No.
3341 already ripened into ownership through acquisitive
prescription.46 The CA noted that Spouses Tappa
acknowledged in their complaint that they have not been in
possession of the lot, and that respondents have been
continuously occupying portions of it since 1963. 47 It
explained:
The substantial length of time between 1963, up to the time of
filing of the present complaint on September 9, 1999, which is
more than 30 years, should be considered against [S]pouses
Tappa, and in favor of defendants-appellants. Settled is the
rule that an uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for
more than 30 years could ripen into ownership of the land
through acquisitive prescription, which is a mode of acquiring
ownership and other real rights over immovable property.
Hence, appellants' possession of the land has ripened into
ownership by virtue of acquisitive prescription.48 (Citation
omitted.)
On the merits of the case, the CA ruled that the two
indispensable requisites for an action to quiet title under
Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code were not met. 49
The first requisite is absent because Spouses Tappa do not
have a legal or an equitable title to or an interest in the
property. The CA explained that the free patent granted to
Spouses Tappa produced no legal effect because Lot No. 3341
was a private land, thus:
As heretofore discussed, the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession by appellants of the subject parcel of
land within the period prescribed by law has effectively
converted it into a private land. Consequently, the registration
in the name of Maria Tappa on September 18, 1992 under
OCT [No.] P-69103, by vi1iue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-
3194, produces no legal effect. Private ownership of land-as
when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly
registered possessory information or a clear showing of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or
previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free
patent over the same land, becam,e the Public Land [L]aw
applies only to lands of the public domain.50 (Citation
omitted.)
The CA further stated that while Spouses Tappa were able to
obtain a free patent over the property, and were able to register
it under the Torrens system, they have not become its owners.
The CA said that "[r]egistration has never been a mode of
acquiring ownership over immovable prope1ty---it does not
create title nor vest one but it simply confirms a title already
vested, rendering it forever indefeasible."51
The second requisite that the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on the title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity is likewise unavailing. The CA
ruled that no other evidence (aside from Delfin's own
testimony) was presented to prove the allegation of fraud and
intimidation, making the testimony self-serving.52 The CA
further noted that Delfin's own sister, Fermina, one of the
signatories of the 1963 Affidavit, belied his testimony.
Fermina testified that they went to the house of one Atty.
Carag to sign the affidavit and they did so, on their own. 53
54
Spouses Tappa filed a Motion for Reconsideration,  which the
CA denied.55
Hence, spouses Tappa filed a petition for review
on certiorari before this court, raising the following issues:
I. Whether the CA erred in dismissing Spouses
Tappa's complaint for quieting of title against
respondents;56
II. Whether the CA erred in not finding that Spouses
Tappa's certificate of title cannot be collaterally
attacked in this case;57 and
III. Whether the CA erred in finding that respondents
have acquired the property through acquisitive
prescription. 58
The Ruling of the Court
We affirm the decision of the CA.
The action for quieting of title
should not prosper.
The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title
and recovery of possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,  59 an action for quieting of title is essentially a
common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit:
x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to
secure"... an adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest
in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is invalid, so
that the complainant and those claiming under him may be
forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim." In an
action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other
claimants, "... not only to place things in their proper place, to
make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect
and not disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so
that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt
over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without
fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use, and
even to abuse the property as he deems best. x x x.
"60 (Emphasis in the original.)
In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Article 476 and
477 of the Civil Code, which state:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or
any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid
or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective,
voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said
title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being
cast upon title to real property or any interest therein.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or
interest in the real property which is the subject-matter of the
action. He need not be in possession of said property.
From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an
action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites
must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a
legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be
shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.61
Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites.
First, Spouses Tappa's claim of iegal title over Lot No. 3341
by virtue of the free patent and the certificate of title, OCT No.
P-69103 issued in their name cannot stand. The certificate of
title indjcates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No.
021519-92-3194. We agree with the CA that at the time of the
application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had already become
private land by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had
been removed from the coverage of the Public Land
Act,62 which governs public patent applications.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land
is null and void, and produces no legal effects.
whatsoever.1awp++i1 Private ownership of land-as when
there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered
possessory information or a clear showing of open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or
previous occupants-is not affected by the issuance of a free
patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law
applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of
Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have
ceased to be public in character and have passed to private
ownership.63
In Magistrado v. Esplana,  64 we cancelled the titles issued
pursuant to a free patent after finding that the lots involved
were privately owned since time immemorial. A free patent
that purports to convey land to which the Government did not
have any title at the time of its issuance does not vest any
title in the patentee as against the true owner. 65
In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341
was occupied by, and has been in possession of the Tappa
family, even before the 1963 Affidavit was executed. After the
execution of the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their
respective portions of the property. Delfin testified that before
his father, Lorenzo, died in 1961, Lorenzo had been occupying
the lot since before the war, and that Delfin was born there in
1934.66
Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation
purposes as early as 1948, and paid the real property taxes
(evidenced by real property tax payment receipts in the name
of Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961).67 Spouses
Tappa were likewise shown to pay the real property taxes from
1961 to 2000.68 Similarly, respondents also declared their
respective portions of Lot No. 3341 for taxation in their names
in 1994, and paid real property taxes on those portions from
1967 to 2004.69 Although tax declarations or realty tax
payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. 70
Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime
in 1963, Bacud and Malupeng started occupying portions of
Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property, while
Calabazaron did the same on another portion of the lot in the
1970's.71 The complaint stated further that since 1963. the
respondents "continuously occupied portion of the subject
land." 72
In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of Lot No. 3341, the property had been segregated
from the public domain. 73 At the time the patent and the
certificate of title were issued in 1992, Spouses Tappa and
their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession, at
least to the half of the lot, since 1934; and respondents were
also in possession of the other half since 1963. Therefore, the
free patent issued covers a land already segregated from the
public domain.
In Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E.
Santiago,74 we ruled, thus:
Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land by respondents and their
predecessors in interests, they are deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a government grant without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land was
thus segregated from the public domain and the director of
lands had no authority to issue a patent. Hence, the free patent
covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title
issued pursuant thereto, are void.75
Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of
respondents' possession of the disputed portions of Lot No.
3341. They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by
respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this,
Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a free patent of
the whole property even if they were not in possession of
some of its portions. Therefore, Free Patent No. 021519-92-
3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are void not only because it
covers a private land, but also because they fraudulently
included76 respondents' portion of the property. In Avila v.
Tapucar,  77 we held that "[i]f a person obtains a title under the
Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which can no longer be registered under the system, he does
not, by virtue of the said certificate alone, become the owner
of the lands illegally included."78
In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered
ownership, while equitable title means beneficial
ownership. 79 As discussed, the free patent and the certificate
of title issued to Spouses Tappa could not be the source of
their legal title.
The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise
wanting. We find that although an instrument (the 1963
Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses
Tappa's title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or
ineffective against Spouses Tappa's rights to the property.
A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed,
or contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding;
(2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth
and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or
extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive
prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.80
The 1963 Affidavit it is no doubt an instrument, which
appears to be valid. It is dated and appears to be executed and
signed by Delfin, his mother, and sisters. It is also notarized by
a public notary. It states that Genaro originally owns the land
described, and that one-half (l/2) of which is actually owned
by Irene as a co-heir. This is contrary to the claim of
Spouses Tappa that the property was solely Lorenzo's.
Respondents' argue that this affidavit evidences the title of
their predecessor-in-interest over Lot No. 3341 and
effectively, theirs.81
The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, or
extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive
prescription. The CA correctly found that Spouses Tappa's
claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the 1963
Affidavit was "unsubstantiated."82 The CA pointed out that,
"[a]side from the testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other
evidence was presented to prove the claim of force and
intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving."53 Also, the
1963 Affidavit was duly notarized and, as such, is considered
a public document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as
to its authenticity and due execution.
Thus, we affirm the ruling of the CA that the requisites for an
action to quiet title are wanting in this case.84
There is no collateral attack
on the Certificate of Title.
Spouses Tappa argue that respondents collaterally attacked the
certificate of title of Lot No. 3441 when they raised the issue
of its validity. Spouses Tappa used the same argument against
the CA when it declared the certificate of title to be without
legal effect. 85
Spouses Tappa's argument is without merit. The certificate of
title was not collaterally attacked. Section 48 of PD
1529,86 provides that "[a] certificate of title shall not be subject
to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law." This
rule is not applicable in this case.
We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of
Appeals,87 where we stated that, "[ w ]hat cannot be
collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title.
The certificate referred to is that document issued by the
Register of Deeds x x x. By title, the law refers to ownership
which is represented by that document."88 Ownership is
different from a certificate of title, the latter being only the
best proof of ownership of a piece of land. 89 Title as a concept
of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of
title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.90
In Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-
Gerilla,  91 citing Lacbayan v. Samay, Jr.,  92 we reaffirm this
ruling, and stated that:
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any
person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property
may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the
certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that
other parties may have acquired interest over the property
subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. Stated
differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no
longer be disputed. The certificate cannot always be
considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.93
In this case, what respondents dispute, as raised in their
Answer, is Spouses Tappa's claim of sole ownership over Lot
No. 3341. As affirmative defense, respondents claimed that
Spouses Tappa were owners of only one-half (1/2) of the lot
since it was originally owned by Genaro, the father of Lorenzo
and Irene. 94 Respondents claim that Lorenzo and Irene
became ipso facto co-owners of the lot. 95 Thus, respondents
claim that, by virtue of a valid transfer from Irene's heirs, they
now have ownership and title over portions of Lot No. 3341,
and that they have been in continuous, exclusive, and
uninterrupted possession of their occupied
portions.96 Malupeng and Calabazaron claim ownership and
title over their respective portions by virtue of a valid sale.
Bacud claims ownership and title by virtue of succession.
Therefore, it is the ownership and title of Spouses Tappa
which respondents ultimately attack. OCT No. P-69103 only
serves as the document representing Spouses Tappas' title.
Respondents cannot likewise argue that the certificate of title
of Spouses Tappa is indefeasible. 97 We have already ruled that
the one-year prescriptive period does not apply when the
person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in
possession of the property.98 This is because the action
partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is imprescriptible.99 In
this case, respondents have been proved to be in possession of
the disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. Thus, their claim
against Spouses Tappa cannot be barred by the one-year
prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 90026 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.