PATRICIA SIBAYAN v. EMILIO COSTALES, et al.

G.R. No. 191492

JULY 4, 2016
PEREZ, J.

DOCTRINE: The right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege,
and it may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.

FACTS: Patricia Sibayan is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an

area of 5,726 square meters located in Brgy. Catablan, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan and registered under Transfer Certificate of Titile (TCT) No,
180130. Respondents Emilio Costales, Susana Isidro, Rodolfo Isidro, Marcelo
Isidro, and Roberto Cerane then intruded the property of the petitioner,
particularly Lot Nos. 5 and 7 thereof. Thus, petitioner was forced to file a case
to protect her rights thereon. Petitioner supported her claims by attaching in
her complaint a copy of relocation survey showing that said lots are within the
boundary of TCT No. 180130. Respondents, in defense, asserted that they are
the lawful owners as they were in possession of the property for over 80 years
already.

RTC dismissed the case as the action of the petitioner is already barred by
laches. Motion for Reconsideration was also denied which made the petitioner
elevate the matter to the CA.

CA ordered petitioner to file Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from receipt of the
copy of the notice. The petitioner’s counsel received notice on November 17,
2008. However, the petitioner was only able to file the brief on June 19, 2009
or 139 days after the lapse of reglementary period.

CA dismissed the case on the ground of the petitioner’s failure to file her
Appellant’s Brief on time. Motion for Reconsideration was also denied. Hence,
here comes the filing of a petition for review on Certiorari. Petitioner alleged
that dismissal of the case was erroneous as she should not be bind by the
gross negligence of his counsel in filing the Appellant’s Brief. He also further
claimed that denial of appeal would be tantamount to deprivation of her
property without due process of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal is considered dismissed or abandoned by

the failure to file appellant’s brief.

RULING: YES.
Rule 44, Sec 7 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure provides that, it shall be the
duty of the appellant to file the brief with the court, within 45 days from receipt
of the notice of clerk. Furthermore, Rule 50, Sec 1 (e) provides that the failure
of the appellant to file the required number of copies of brief on time would be
grounds for dismissal of appeal, subject to the discretion of the CA. Further,
right to appeal is not a natural right but a statutory privilege, and it may be
availed only upon compliance of the Rules. Otherwise, the right to appeal is
abandoned and lost. Sibayan’s counsel was not able to file the brief on the
reglementary period which consequently results in the abandonment of the
appeal and dismissal of the case. Hence, the appeal is considered dismissed or
abandoned by the failure to file appellant’s brief.
 AILEEN ANGELA S. ALFORNON v. RODULFO DELOS
SANTOS AND EDSEL A. GALEOS
G.R. No. 203657
July 11, 2016
BRION, J.

DOCTRINE: A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the
correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the
issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted.

The essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. Due

process – in administrative proceedings – is satisfied when a person is notified of
the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.

FACTS: Alfornon worked as a casual employee for the Municipality of Argao,

Cebu. When she applied for the position, she indicated in her Personal Data
Sheet (PDS) that she has not been formally charged despite remembering that
she was previously charged with the crime of estafa before the RTC of
Lapu-Lapu City because she was advised by her co- employees that it did
not matter if she denied having a case against her because the case was
dismissed before she even entered government service. Later on, Mayor
Galeos of Argaon issued Memorandum Order No. 2009-23 informing
Alfornon that a copy of her warrant of arrest in the estafa case had been
forwarded to his office and required her to show cause why she should not
be dismissed from the service.

After considering the affidavits and documents filed, the LGU-Argao

issued a report recommending that Alfornon be dismissed from the service.
Mayor Galeos ordered Alfornon’s dismissal. Upon appeal, the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) reversed Mayor Galeos and found that Alfornon’s right
to due process was impaired because a formal investigation was
immediately conducted without Galeos – as the disciplining authority – issuing
any formal charge. This procedural lapse, according to the Commission, was
not in accordance with Sections 15 & 16, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (URACCS).

The CA reversed the CSC and found that the dismissal was in order.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not the Petition for Review involves a question of law.
(2) Whether the CA erred in finding that Alfornon’s right to due process was not
 violated.

RULING:
(1) YES, it does. A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy
concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set
of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted. Alfornon essentially questions the application of the
law and jurisprudence on the issues of (1) whether she was afforded due
process before she was dismissed from the service, and (2) whether she
committed a lesser degree of dishonesty, warranting a less harsh penalty
than dismissal. No further examination of the truth or falsity of the
facts is required in this case because Alfornon admitted that she
failed to disclose in her PDS that she had been previously charged with
estafa.

The Supreme Court’s review of the case is limited to the determination of

whether the CA and the administrative tribunals correctly applied the
law and jurisprudence based on the facts on record.

(2) YES. The CA correctly ruled that there was substantial compliance with
the procedure laid down in the URACCS (now RRACCS) before Alfornon’s
dismissal was resolved. Memorandum No. 2009-23 WAS in sufficient
compliance of the notice rules, since Alfornon was apprised of the
charges against her and the requirement for submission of her written
explanation, which she was actually able to submit.

There is no requirement in the administrative determination of contested

cases for strict adherence to technical rules in the manner observed in
judicial proceedings. Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural requirements,
subject to the observance of fundamental and essential requirements of
due process, in justiciable cases presented before them.

For as long as the right to due process is recognized and respected,

administrative tribunals may relax the technical rules of procedure. The
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. Due
process – in administrative proceedings – is satisfied when a person is
notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or
defend himself.

The filing of charges and a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain

one’s side suffice to meet the minimum requirements of due process. In
the present case, Alfornon was given every opportunity to face the
charges of dishonesty against her. She was able to give her answer
during the initial investigation before Galeos and before the formal
investigation conducted by the LGU-Argao Fact-Finding Committee.
 BARRIO FIESTA RESTAURANT, et al. v. HELEN C. BERONIA
G.R. No. 206690
JULY 11, 2016
BRION, J.

DOCTRINE: For purposes of determining its timeliness, a motion for

reconsideration may properly be treated as an appeal. As a step to allow an
inferior court to correct itself before review by a higher court, a motion for
reconsideration must necessarily be filed within the period to appeal. When filed
beyond such period, the motion for reconsideration ipso facto forecloses the right
to appeal.

FACTS: Beronia filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, praying for backwages,
damages, and attorney’s fees against Barrio Fiesta Restaurant. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in Beronia’s favor. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter on
appeal. Beronia appealed the NLRC’s Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). In
the June 21, 2012 decision, the CA reinstated the LA’s decision, declaring that
Beronia had been dismissed without just cause and without the observance of
due process.

On November 29, 2012, the petitioners, through new counsel, filed with the
CA an Entry of Appearance with Manifestation and Motion for
Reconsideration. The CA denied the motion for reconsideration for being 138
days late.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was timely filed.

RULING: NO, the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was filed well beyond
the fifteen-day reglementary period. There is no question that the
petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of the CA’s decision 138
days beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing the motion. The
records show that petitioner the petitioners’ counsel of record (prior to new
counsel) has received a copy of the CA’s June 21, 2012 decision on June 29,
2012, even though, subsequently, petitioners manifested that they had
terminated their counsel of record’s services on February 19, 2013.

Under Section 1, Rule 52 of the Rules of Court, a motion for

reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution should be filed within fifteen
(15) days from notice. If no appeal or motion for reconsideration is filed
within this period, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be
entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgment. The fifteen-day
reglementary period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.

In Ponciano Jr. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, et al., the Court

refused to admit a motion for reconsideration filed only one day late, pointing
out that the Court has, in the past. Without a timely motion for reconsideration
filed against the CA’s decision, the petitioners lost their right to assail the CA
decision before this Court. For purposes of determining its timeliness, a motion
for reconsideration may properly be treated as an appeal. As a step to allow an
inferior court to correct itself before review by a higher court, a motion for
reconsideration must necessarily be filed within the period to appeal. When
filed beyond such period, the motion for reconsideration ipso facto forecloses
the right to appeal

The supposed negligence of the petitioners’ former counsel was the result of
their actions and inactions, hence, is binding on the petitioners. In the
petitioners’ case, they were themselves aware that Beronia sought
reconsideration of the NLRC decision as they had, in fact, personally opposed
this motion instead of through their counsel on record, Ligon, et al. Had they
still been represented by their counsel, through Atty. Chuas they claim, the
latter would have signed and filed the opposition in their behalf. Viewed in this
light, the petitioners must have known that Ligon, et al.no longer represented
them in this case; this was true even at the NLRC level and before the case
reached the CA.

Considered together, the January 5, 2011 opposition and the February 25,
2013 letter of Atty. Chua more than sufficiently show that there could
not have been any miscommunication between the petitioners and
their former counsel that could have reasonably prevented the petitioners
from immediately acting on Beronia’s certiorari petition before the CA.
Their failure to act on Beronia’s certiorari petition, therefore, was due solely to
their own fault or negligence, not to their former counsel’s as they claim.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. The COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS
of MANUEL BOLAÑOS
G.R. No. 221636
JULY 11, 2016
JARDELEZA, J.

DOCTRINE: Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has

been held, time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of
due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding appeal
will render the judgment final and executory.

FACTS: The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) subjected the land of the
private respondents to the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). Private respondents rejected the valuation of the petitioner
but the latter still deposited the amount of the valuation in their favor. Private
respondents filed before Branch 23 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City,
sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC), a case for determination of just
compensation. The SAC ordered the petitioner to re-value the property, which
it did, but the new valuation was still rejected by the private respondent. A
notice of appeal under Rule 41 was filed by the private respondent. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that private respondents availed a
wrong mode of appeal. The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion to
dismiss on grounds of liberality in the construction of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not appeals from the decision of the SAC must be via a
petition for review under Rule 42 and not by an ordinary appeal.

RULING: YES.

The proper mode of appeal from the decisions of RTCs sitting as SACs is by
petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court and not through an
ordinary appeal under Rule 41. Section 60 of R.A. No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law clearly and categorically states that said
mode of appeal should be adopted.

Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a
notice of appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is
submitted. A petition for review hastens the award of fair recompense to
deprived landowners for the government-acquired property, an end not
foreseeable in an ordinary appeal.
Considering, therefore, that private respondents resorted to a wrong mode of
appeal, their notice of appeal did not toll the running of the reglementary
period under Section 60 of RA No. 6657. Consequently, the decision of the SAC
became final and executory.

Although appeal is an essential part of our judicial process, it has been held,
time and again, that the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due
process but is merely a statutory privilege. Thus, the perfection of an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional and failure of a party to conform to the rules regarding
appeal will render the judgment final and executory.

While it is true that we have applied a liberal application of the rules of

procedure in a number of cases, we have stressed that this can be invoked only
in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. 25 We agree
with petitioner's contention that the CA and private respondents did not proffer
a reasonable cause to justify non-compliance with the rules besides the
exhortation of circumspect leniency in order to give private respondents a day
in court. Private respondents failed to specifically cite any justification as to
how and why a normal application of procedural rules would frustrate their
quest for justice. Indeed, private respondents have not been forthright in
explaining why they chose the wrong mode of appeal. 26 The bare invocation of
"the interest of substantial justice" line is not some magic wand that will
automatically compel us to suspend procedural rules. Procedural rules are not
to be belittled, let alone dismissed simply because their non-observance may
have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Utter disregard of the
rules cannot be justly rationalized by harping on the policy of liberal
construction.
 HAMBRE J. MOHAMMAD v. GRACE BELGADO-SAQUETON
G.R. No. 193584
JULY 12, 2016
SERENO, CJ.

DOCTRINE: The dismissal of a petition for mandamus is warranted by the

doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies when the issue raised by
petitioner is not a purely legal question.

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer II

(PARO II) of the Department of Agrarian Reform in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (DAR- ARMM). His appointment was temporary as he had no
Career Service Executive Eligibility (CSEE). Petitioner requested the regional
secretary of DAR-ARMM to change his appointment status from temporary to
permanent pursuant to an RTC decision in Special Civil Action No. 2005-0857
concerning the change in status of division superintendents. Respondent,
Director IV of CSCRO No. XVI, denied the request on the ground of the
inapplicability of the RTC Decision, which was binding only on the parties to
that case, and the case is still under appeal.

Petitioner did not elevate the case to the Civil Service Commission proper.
Instead, he filed a special civil action for mandamus before the RTC. He
invoked an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies:
when the question is purely legal. He argued that because the PARO II position
did not require CES eligibility and was not declared to be a CES position,
respondent can be compelled through mandamus to change his status from
temporary to permanent. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground
of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

The RTC dismissed the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the petition for mandamus was proper.

RULING: YES. Before parties are allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
it is a precondition that they must have availed themselves of all the means of
administrative processes afforded to them. Where the enabling statute
indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of
administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts -for reasons of law, comity,
and convenience -will not entertain a case unless the available administrative
remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum.

Here, petitioner admits that while administrative remedies were available to

him, he had invoked an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. However, the dismissal of the petition for mandamus
was warranted by the doctrine because the issue raised by petitioner is not a
purely legal question.

The Court has laid down tests to distinguish questions of fact from questions of
law: when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts, or when it
becomes clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the
question is one of fact. It was grave error for the trial court to have ignored the
red flags raised by both parties.

Respondent has repeatedly asserted that the PARO II position is a third-level

position requiring CES or CSEE. Petitioner himself raised an issue of fact when
he posited that there was no position in the ARMM that had been declared to
be a CES position. To disprove this allegation, respondent presented the
Qualification Standards prescribed for the position which shows that it is a
third-level position requiring CES or CSEE. Since doubt has risen as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged fact, it cannot be said that the case presents a
purely legal question.

This case is different from Buena, Jr. v. Benito, wherein the issue of whether
the position for which the respondent therein was appointed required career
service eligibility was held to be a purely legal question. In that case, the direct
recourse to the courts from the Decision of the CSCRO fell under an exception
to the doctrine. There are at least three material differences between this case
and Buena.

First, in Buena, the question was whether the position is in the CES. In this
case, the question is whether petitioner was eligible for a permanent
appointment to the PARO II position, which had already been classified as a
third-level position requiring CSEE or CES.

The issue is therefore not one of law, but of the merit and fitness of the
appointee, which is a question of fact.

Second, in Buena, no evidence was presented to the trial court that could have
created doubt as to the truth or falsity of the allegation. In this case, the
qualification standards for the position were presented, but were
unacknowledged as a matter of fact by the trial court.
Third, in Buena, the petition for mandamus was filed after the appointment
had been issued by the regional governor. The element of a clear legal right
was met in Buena because Section 19, Art. VII of Republic Act No. 9054
(Organic Act for the ARMM) designated the regional governor as the
appointing authority in the ARMM. In this case, petitioner had no clear
legal right to compel respondent to attest to his appointment, because at
the time of filing, he had no appointment to a permanent position.

Hence, the Petition should have been dismissed outright.

SPS. ARCHIBAL LATOJA AND CHARITO LATOJA v. HON. ELVIE LIM, et al.
G.R. No. 198925
JULY 13, 2016
SERENO, CJ

DOCTRINE: A Writ of Possession issued as part of the execution process is

subject to the rule that a writ of execution must conform to the dispositive portion
of the decision it seeks to enforce and cannot vary the terms thereof. Otherwise,
the execution is void. A judgment for consolidation of ownership does not, of
itself, include the right to a writ of possession unless the issue of possession was
expressly tackled and ruled upon.

FACTS: Respondent Cabe and Cardona II (Cardona II), executed a Deed of Sale
with Pacto de Retro over a parcel of land. For failure of Cardona II to
repurchase the property from her within one year as agreed upon in the deed,
Cabe filed a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership. The trial court granted the
Petition through a Decision dated 20 May 2002. Cardona II questioned the trial
court's Decision by filing with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Rule 65 Petition for
Certiorari which was dismissed by the CA. The Supreme Court also denied
Cardona’s appeal. An Entry of Judgment was issued.

Accordingly, respondent Cabe filed a motion for execution of the RTC Decision.
The RTC issued a Writ of Execution.

Thereafter, Cabe prayed for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, which Judge
Lim, as acting Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 2, granted.

Petitioner-spouses Archibal and Charito Latoja (Spouses Latoja) now come to

us alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Lim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Lim committed grave abuse of discretion in

granting the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession.

RULING: YES. Jurisprudence provides only these four instances when a writ of
possession may issue: ( 1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property,
provided that the mortgagor has possession, and no third party has
intervened; and ( 4) execution sales.
Here, respondent Cabe sought the writ as a consequence of the trial court's
Decision ordering the consolidation of the title over the subject property and
vesting absolute ownership thereof in her name. Since the instant case clearly
does not fall among the four instances enumerated above, the issuance of the
Writ of Possession was not proper.

The consolidation of title prescribed in Article 160743 of the Civil Code is

merely for the purpose of registering and consolidating title to the property in
case of a vendor a retro's failure to redeem. Here, the trial court's Decision
(affirmed by both the CA and the SC) merely resolved the issue of
consolidation of ownership over the subject property.

Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. A judgment in favor of

ownership, therefore, does not necessarily include possession as a necessary.
To further seek possession of the land would violate the established rule that a
writ of execution must conform to the dispositive portion of the decision it
seeks to enforce and cannot vary the terms thereof. Otherwise, the execution is
void.

Since the Writ of Possession in this case was issued as part of the execution
process, it is likewise subject to this rule. Consequently, as the judgment being
executed does not involve a disposition on Cabe's right of possession, the Writ
of Possession itself is a patent nullity. Deprived of possession, Cabe's remedy is
not a Writ of Possession, but any of the available actions for the recovery of
possession of real property, specifically the following: accion interdictal, when
the dispossession has not lasted for more than one year; accion publiciana,
when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year; or accion
reinvindicatoria, which seeks the recovery of ownership.
FELICISIMO FERNANDEZ, et al. v. SPS. ISAAC AND CONCEPCION RONULO
G.R. No. 187400
JULY 13, 2016
SERENO, CJ

DOCTRINE: Rules of procedure are construed liberally in proceedings before

administrative bodies.

FACTS: Fernandez filed a Free Patent Application over a land located in

Sitio Kuala, Barangay Wawa in Nasugbu, Batangas. When he died, his son
Felicisimo (herein petitioner) pursued the application. In 1985, respondents
asked the Office of the President (OP) to investigate their claim that the
approved Survey Plan in the name of Tomas Fernandez included the
1,000 square meters of land they had been occupying since the 1950s. The OP
referred the matter to the Bureau of Lands (BoL), which then referred it to the
DENR Region IV Office for appropriate action. Meantime, petitioner Fernandez
sold the property to Spouses Ligon.

Regional Executive Director Principe subsequently issued an Order finding that

petitioner Fernandez failed to establish his claim of ownership over the land in
question and was found to have never occupied or possessed even a portion
thereof. Petitioner Fernandez moved for reconsideration, which was later on
denied.

On appeal, the DENR Secretary reversed the ruling and deemed respondent’s
claims as a collateral attack against the title of the spouses Ligon. Respondents
moved for the reconsideration of the Decision, but the DENR Secretary denied
their motion.

On 16 January 2000, respondents filed a second Motion for

Reconsideration, in which they presented the Resolution of the Court in the
ejectment case filed by Spouses Ligon. Respondents claimed that the Court's
denial of the Petition in that case in effect sustained the findings of the MTC,
the RTC, and the CA that petitioner Fernandez had never been in actual
occupation and possession of the subject property, consistent with the findings
of Director Principe.

The DENR Secretary issued an Order denying respondents' second Motion

for Reconsideration. The Order underscored the point that the motion did not
toll the time to appeal, since it was a prohibited pleading. Respondents
received the Order on 05 September 2000. Appeal to the OP and its Ruling
On 28 September 2000, the counsel of petitioners received the Appeal
Memorandum filed by respondents with the OP where the appeal was
docketed as O.P. Case No. 00-1-9241. On 10 October 2000, petitioner
Fernandez filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the OP, citing respondents'
failure to perfect the appeal. The movant claimed that the appeal was time-
barred, as the DENR had ruled that the filing of respondents' second Motion
for Reconsideration did not toll the period of appeal.

ISSUES: Whether or not the second Motion for Reconsideration filed by

respondents before the DENR Secretary was valid and thus tolled the period of
appeal to the Office of the President.

RULING:
The appeal may be given due course on the basis of the second Motion for
Reconsideration.
Both parties presented allegations that the other committed technical
procedural lapses in the course of this case. However, in some cases, it is a far
better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical
lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice. In
those cases, in which technicalities are dispensed with, the courts do not mean
to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law.

Public interest and the interest of substantial justice require that the instant
case be resolved on the merits, and not on mere technical grounds, for the
following reasons:
1. DENR Regional Director Principe's findings are in direct conflict
with those of the DENR Secretary; hence, there is a need to review the
arguments raised and evidence submitted by the parties.
2. Petitioners benefitted from the relaxation of the rules when they
were able to file a Motion for Reconsideration before the DENR Regional Office
and an appeal before the DENR even after the prescribed period had lapsed;
they cannot question the same liberality afforded to respondents by the OP.
3. The present controversy involves both parties' sacrosanct right to
property, which is protected by the constitutional provision that "[n]o person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Moreover, it bears stressing that rules of procedure are construed liberally in
proceedings before administrative bodies.
 WILFRED GACUS YAMSON, et al. v. DANILO C. CASTRO AND GEORGE F.
INVENTOR
G.R. Nos. 194763-64
JULY 20, 2016
REYES, J.

DOCTRINE: The rule on litis pendentia as a mode of committing forum shopping

does not require absolute identity of parties; only substantial identity of parties
is sufficient to qualify under the first requisite that there must be an identity of
parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions.

FACTS: Petitioners and respondents are all officials and employees of the
Davao City Water District (DCWD). Petitioners were charged for anomalies
surrounding the drilling contracts for two related projects named VES 15 and
21.

The bids and awards committee (PBAC-B) issued Resolution No. 05-97 to
dispense with the advertisement requirement in the conduct of the bidding
and instead, opted to send letters to accredited well drillers and invited their
participation in the VES 15 and VES 21 WELL drilling projects. Thereafter, in
Resolution No. 06-97, PBAC-B resolved, "due to the urgency, importance and
necessity of the well drilling project," to endorse the matter to the head of
agency for approval, with a "recommendation that the project be pursued by a
negotiated agreement contract with [HYDROCK] taking into account its
track record, efficiency of performance, and quoted price." The DCWD Board of
Directors approved the recommendation and directed a notice of award to
issue.

After more than six years, the respondents filed a joint Affidavit-Complaint
with the Ombudsman, charging the petitioners with Violation of Section 3( e) of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for
the alleged non-observance of the proper bidding procedure in the VES 21
Project and for allegedly giving Hydrock unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the "surreptitious" grant of the contract to it. The case was
docketed as OMB-M-C-05-0051-A.

Two weeks after, the respondents filed another joint Affidavit-Complaint with
the Ombudsman, likewise charging the petitioners with Violation of Section 3(
e) of R.A. No. 3019, this time for the VES 15 Project, docketed as OMB-M-C-
05-0054-A.
Less than two months later, the respondents filed two separate Joint
Affidavit- Complaints with the Ombudsman, administratively charging the
petitioners with Grave Misconduct, Grave Abuse of Authority, Dishonesty and
Gross Negligence. The respondents adopted the allegations in the
separate criminal complaints they filed with the Ombudsman against
the petitioners in OMB-M-C-05-0051-A and OMB-M-C-05-0054-A as bases for
the administrative charges.

Subsequently, the Ombudsman found the petitioners administratively

liable for grave misconduct and ordered their dismissal from service. The
Ombudsman's findings and conclusion on the petitioners' accountability under
the VES 15 Project are similar to its discussion regarding the petitioners'
liability under the VES 21 Project. Thus, it ruled that the VES 15 Project did
not fall under the exceptions to competitive bidding in Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1594,35 and that the VES 15 Project was riddled with irregularities.

On appeal, petitioners argued that respondents committed forum shopping by

the filing of the separate complaints filed against them in the Ombudsman,
given that these arose from the same set of facts involving identical rights
asserted and prayed for the same relief, and thus, entitling the dismissal of the
cases. The petitioners also decry the splitting of the prosecution for the VES
15 and VES 21 Projects, arguing that the essence of the respondents'
complaint is based actually on the same set of facts. The CA rejected
this contention, ruling that the rule on forum shopping applies
exclusively to judicial cases/proceedings and not to administrative cases,
and as such, the filing of the identical complaints with the Ombudsman does
not violate the rule.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation on the rule against forum shopping.

Ruling: YES. The rule on forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or
proceedings, and not to administrative cases. Nonetheless, A.O. No. 07, as
amended by A.O. No. 17, explicitly removed from the ambit of the rule the
administrative cases filed before it when it required the inclusion of a
Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping in complaints filed before it. Thus, Section
3 of Rule III (Procedure in Administrative Cases) provides:
Sec. 3. How initiated. -An administrative case may be initiated by
a written complaint under oath accompanied by affidavits of witnesses and
other evidence in support of the charge. Such complaint shall be
accompanied by a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping duly subscribed
and sworn to by the complainant or his counsel. An administrative
proceeding may also be ordered by the Ombudsman or the respective
Deputy Ombudsman on his initiative or on the basis of a complaint originally
filed as a criminal action or a grievance complaint or request for assistance.

The respondents in this case attached a Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping to

their separate Affidavit-Complaints,45 which amounts to an express admission
on their part of the applicability of the rule in the administrative cases they
filed against the petitioners.

But compliance with the certification requirement is separate from, and

independent of, the avoidance of forum shopping itself. Both constitute
grounds for the dismissal of the case, in that non-compliance with the
certification requirement constitutes sufficient cause for the dismissal without
prejudice to the filing of the complaint or initiatory pleading upon motion and
after hearing, while the violation of the prohibition is a ground for summary
dismissal thereof and for direct contempt. The respondents' compliance, thus,
does not exculpate them from violating the prohibition against forum shopping.

The rule against forum shopping prohibits the filing of multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Forum
shopping may be committed in three ways: (1) through litis pendentia -filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer,
the previous case not having been resolved yet; 2) through res judicata -filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the
previous case having been finally resolved; and 3) splitting of causes of
action -filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with
different prayers -the ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res
judicata.

Common in these is the identity of causes of action. Cause of action has been
defined as "the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another."
In this case, a review of the Affidavit-Complaints separately filed by the
respondents in OMB-M-A-05-104-C and OMB-M-A-05-093-C reveals the
respondents' violation of the prohibition via the first mode, that is, through
litis pendentia. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties,
or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) the
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and ( c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in
one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata
in the other.

The identity of parties in OMB-M-A-05-104-C and OMB-M-A-05-093-

C is undeniable. Save for the inclusion of petitioner Guillen in OMB-M-A-05-
093-C, the parties in these two cases are all the same, viz.: herein
respondents as complainants, and petitioners Yamson, Laid, Chavez,
Navales. nd Almonte as respondents, together with Carbonquillo. On this
score, the non-inclusion of Guillen in OMB-M-A-05-104-C is
inconsequential because the rule does not require absolute identity of
parties; only substantial identity of parties is sufficient to qualify under the
first requisite. There is also no denying the identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for in these cases. The administrative complaint filed in OMB-
M-A-05-093-C was based on the criminal complaint filed in OMB-M-C-05-
0051-A for the VES 21 Project. On the other hand, the administrative
complaint filed in OMB-M-A-05-104-C was based on the criminal complaint
filed in OMB- M-C-05-0054-A for the VES 15 Project. These two criminal
complaints alleged exactly the same set of antecedent facts and circumstances.

The actions on these two projects were contained in the same

resolutions -the PBAC-B's Resolution No. 05-97 approved on November 25,
1997 resolved to dispense with the advertisement requirement and opted to
send letters to well drillers "for the proposed Well Drilling Projects in
Communal and Cabantian;" the PBAC-B's Resolution No. 06-97 dated
December 16, 1997 recommended the negotiated procurement of the VES 15
and VES 21 Projects to Hydrock; and pursuant to the PBAC-B 's
recommendation, the DCWD Board of Directors issued Resolution No. 98-27
dated February 13, 1998, awarding the VES 15 and VES 21 Projects to
Hydrock. Clearly, the identity of these two cases is such that judgment in one
administrative case would amount to res judicata in the other administrative
case.

At the most, OMB-M-A-05-104-C (VES 15 Project), which was filed

subsequent to OMB-M-A-05-093-C (VES 21 Project), should be, and is hereby,
dismissed.
 JULIUS BAUTISTA, et al. v. LT. COL. BENITO DONIEGO, JR., et al.
G.R. No. 218665
JULY 20, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

DOCTRINE: For appellate jurisdiction to attach, the following requisites must be

complied with: (a) the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of the CA
within the time for doing so; (b) he must have filed his petition for review within
the reglementary period; ( c) he must have paid the necessary docket fees; and
(d) the other parties must have perfected their appeals in due time.

FACTS: Bautista filed a complaint for forcible entry with prayer for the
issuance of a TRO and award of damages before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities 11 of Palayan City (MTCC) against respondents. They alleged that
respondents, with the help of soldiers from Fort Magsaysay, by means of
stealth, strategy, force, threat, and intimidation, entered the parcels of
land which they have been occupying in the concept of owner for more than
ten ( 10) years. After proceedings, the MTCC ruled in Bautista’s favor and
ordered respondent to vacate the subject land.

On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the MTCC Decision. Finding
respondents to be the lawful possessors of the subject land.

Bautista filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, and

thereafter, a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review (Motion
for Extension) before the CA, copy furnished the RTC. In his motion, J.
Bautista alleged that the RTC's Decision was received by Bautista, et al. 's
counsel on January 16, 2015 and that they had until January 31, 2015 within
which to file a petition for review. However, because of their counsel's illness,
they prayed for an additional period of thirty (30) days to secure a new counsel
and to file their petition for review.

The RTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and thereafter granted
respondents' motion for the issuance of a writ of execution from which
Bautista, et al. sought reconsideration. The CA, meanwhile, denied Bautista's
Motion for Extension, for failure to pay the required docket fees.

Subsequently, Bautista filed a Petition for Review before the CA, with
appropriate payment of the prescribed docket fees, assailing the RTC Decision
and the Order denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.

The CA issued its assailed Resolution merely noting Bautista’s

Petition, in connection with its earlier Resolution dated March 9, 2015
denying J. Bautista's Motion for Extension and consequently, expunged the
case from the records.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in merely noting without action Bautista,
et al.' s Petition for Review and other subsequent pleadings, thus, denying
them due course.

RULING: YES. For appellate jurisdiction to attach, the following requisites

must be complied with: (a) the petitioner must have invoked the jurisdiction of
the CA within the time for doing so; ( b) he must have filed his petition for
review within the reglementary period; (c) he must have paid the necessary
docket fees; and ( d) the other parties must have perfected their appeals in due
time.

In this regard, the Rules of Court require that in an appeal by way of a petition
for review, the appeal is deemed perfected as to the petitioner upon the timely
filing of the petition and the payment of docket and other lawful fees. To perfect
the appeal, the party has to file the petition for review and to pay the docket
fees within the prescribed period. The law and its intent are clear and
unequivocal that the petition is perfected upon its filing and the payment of the
docket fees. Consequently, without the petition, the CA cannot be said to have
acquired jurisdiction over the case.

Applying the foregoing parameters, the appellate jurisdiction did not attach
with the filing of J. Bautista's Motion for Extension. Notably, the pleading filed
was a mere motion for extension and not a petition for review, and there was
no payment of the required docket fees.

Besides, J. Bautista filed the motion ostensibly on behalf of the rest of the
petitioners in the courts a quo but records are bereft of evidence to show that
they had authorized him to do so. Thus, in CA-G.R. SP No. 139159-UDK, the
CA did not acquire appellate jurisdiction for two (2) reasons: one, it was merely
a Motion for Extension and not a proper Petition for Review, and two, there was
no payment of the required docket fees.
 GRACE PARK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND WOODLINK REALTY
CORP v. EAST WEST BANKING CORP.
G.R. No. 210606
JULY 27, 2016
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.

DOCTRINE: What is important in determining whether [forum shopping) exists is

the vexation caused the courts and parties-litigants by a partv who asks
different courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or related
causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the process
creating the possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different for
a upon the same issues.

FACTS: Petitioners Grace Park International Corporation (Gracepark) and

Woodlink Realty Corporation (Woodlink; collectively, petitioners) filed an
Amended Complaint for Injunction and Annulment of Foreclosure Sale against
respondents Eastwest Banking Corporation (EBC), Allied Banking Corporation
(Allied), and Security Banking Corporation (Security), EBC Trust Division,
Sheriff Emmanuel L. Ortega, and Sheriff Edric C. Estrada before the RTC-
Malolos, docketed as Civil Case No. 543-M-2010. In their Answer and Motion to
Dismiss, EBC, Allied, and Security contended that the complaint before the
RTC-Malolos should be dismissed on the grounds of forum shopping and litis
pendentia. The RTC-Malolos dismissed Civil Case No. 543-M-2010 on the
ground of forum shopping. It found that several similarities existed between the
complaint filed before it and that in Civil Case No. 10-323 pending in the RTC-
Makati. The CA upheld the RTC-Malolos's dismissal of Civil Case No. 543-M-
2010 on the ground of forum shopping.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld the dismissal of Civil Case No.
543-M-2010 pending before the RTC-Malolos on the ground of forum shopping
in the concept of litis pendentia.

RULING: NO, the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 543-M-
2010 on the ground of forum shopping and/ or litis pendentia.

Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several

judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all
substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to increase his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another.
 Here, it cannot be said that there is an identity of parties between Civil
Case No. 10-323 pending before RTC-Makati and Civil Case No. 543-M-2010
pending before RTC-Malolos because the plaintiffs in the former,herein
Sherwyn, et al., represent substantially different interests from the plaintiffs in
the latter, herein petitioners. The underlying circumstances surrounding the
causes of action in both cases are likewise substantially different in that: (a) in
Civil Case No. 10-323, the cause of action arose from EBC's alleged unjust
refusal to subrogate Sherwyn, et al. to the rights of BDO; while ( b) in Civil
Case No. 543-M-2010, the cause of action stemmed from EBC's purported
breach of Section 6.0536 of the MTI which provides that it should first secure a
written instruction from the Majority Creditors 37 before commencing
foreclosure proceedings against the collaterals. Finally, a judgment in Civil
Case No. 10-323 will not necessarily result in res judicata in Civil Case No.
543-M-2010. Being principally a subrogation case which is an action in
personam, 38 a judgment in Civil Case No. 10-323 will not bind any non-
parties to it, such as the corporation plaintiffs and the other defendants (aside
from EBC) in Civil Case No. 543- M-2010 that represent interests separate and
distinct from the parties in Civil Case No. 10-323.39.
 HEIRS OF BABAI GUIAMBANGAN v.. MUNICIPALITY OF KALAMANSIG,
SULTAN KUDARAT, et al.
G.R. No. 204899
JULY 27, 2016
DEL CASTILLO, J.

DOCTRINE: The failure to implead the respondent trial court in a Rule 65

Petition for Certiorari is not fatal, although violative of Section 5, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Court.

FACTS: Petitioners filed before the Regional Trial Court of Isulan, Sultan
Kudarat a case against herein respondents for recovery of possession of real
property, rentals, damages, and attorney's fees, with an additional prayer for
injunctive relief, in connection with a 422,129-square meter parcel of land.
After obtaining a favorable judgment, petitioners executed the same.
Respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Issue an Order to the Sheriff
Prohibiting Him from Executing an Alleged Judgment in the Above-Entitled
Case, seeking to restrain petitioners from enforcing the decision on the
ground that since the record thereof was not reconstituted, then there is no
judgment in said case to be enforced; and that for failure to reconstitute the
record, petitioners have no other recourse but to file the case anew, as Act
No. 311017 requires. The trial court granted the motion, and denied
petitioners’ subsequent Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioners filed an original Petition for Certiorari before the CA, which was
denied on various procedural grounds.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed petitioners’ Petition for

Certiorari on three grounds: first, for failure to implead the trial court as
required under Rule 65; second, for failure to serve a copy of the Petition upon
respondents, instead of their previous counsel; and, third, for having been
verified by only one of the co-heirs/petitioners.

RULING: NO, the CA should not have dismissed the Petition.

First, petitioners’ failure to implead the trial court is not fatal, although
violative of Section 5, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules, which states as follows:
Sec. 5. Respondents and costs in certain cases. – When the petition filed
relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, court, quasi-judicial agency,
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, the petitioner shall join, as
private respondent or respondents with such public respondent or
respondents, the person or persons interested in sustaining the proceedings in
the court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondents to appear and
defend, both in his or their own behalf and in behalf of the public respondent
or respondents affected by the proceedings, and the costs awarded in such
proceedings in favor of the petitioner shall be against the private respondents
only, and not against the judge, court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person impleaded as public respondent or
respondents. Unless otherwise specifically directed by the court where the
petition is pending, the public respondents shall not appear in or file an
answer or comment to the petition or any pleading therein. If the case is
elevated to a higher court by either party, the public respondents shall be
included therein as nominal parties. However, unless otherwise specifically
directed by the court, they shall not appear or participate in the proceedings
therein.

In Abdulrahman v. The Office of the Ombudsman, this Court held that “neither
the misjoinder nor the non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an
action,” particularly a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.

Second, on the lack of appropriate service of the Petition for Certiorari

on the respondents as required by Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997
Rules, although the record indicates that a copy thereof was served upon
respondents’ counsel of record, while this is not sanctioned by the 1997
Rules, this Court has excused it in the past. While Rule 46, Section 3
mandates that a copy of the petition should be served on the other party, the
rule was substantially complied with when service was made to the latter’s
counsel. In another case, the Court held that without the benefit of a proper
notice of petitioner’s substitution of counsel, respondent had no recourse but
to serve the copy of its petition to whom it knew and perceived as being
petitioner’s counsel of record.

Third, 0n the argument that only one of the heirs, Saya Guiambangan Darus,
verified the CA Petition for Certiorari, without proof of authority to file the same
obtained from the other heirs, this is not fatal. As heirs, they all share a
common interest; indeed, even if the other heirs were not impleaded, the
Petition may be heard, as any judgment should inure to their benefit just the
same. As co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for
ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of
possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an
action, even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because
the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.