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FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes

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INTRODUCTION

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

What is Legal Ethics?


It is the embodiment of all principles of morality and refinement that should govern the
conduct of every member of the bar.
Specifically, it refers to that branch of moral science which treats of the duties which an
attorney owes to the court, to his client, to his colleagues in the profession and to the public.
(Malcom)

TERMS
Amicus curiae – an experienced and impartial attorney invited by the court to appear and help in
the disposition of the issues submitted to it (Rule 168, Section 36 Rules of Court)

Attorney – a person who is a member of the Philippine Bar and who, by the warrant of another,
practices law, or who acts professionally in legal formalities, negotiations or proceedings, by
authority of his client.

Attorney ad hoc – a person appointed by the court to defend an absentee defendant in the suit in
which the appointment was made

Attorney-
Attorney-at-
at-law - that class of persons who are licensed officers of the court empowered to
appear, prosecute, and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities, and liabilities are
developed by law as consequence

Attorney-
Attorney-in-
in-fact – an agent whose authority is strictly limited by the instrument appointing him.
His authority is provided in the special power of attorney or general power of attorney or letter of
attorney. He is not necessarily a lawyer.

Attorney of record – attorney whose name, together with his address, is entered in the record of a
case as the designated counsel of the party litigant in the case and to whom judicial notices
relative thereto are sent (Rule 7, Section 5 Rules of Court)

Bar – the legal profession

Bar association – an association of members of the legal profession like the IBP where membership
is integrated or compulsory

Bench – the judiciary

Client – one who engages the services of a lawyer for legal advice for purposes of prosecuting or
defending a suit in behalf and usually for a fee.

Counsel – is an adviser, a person professionally engaged in the trial or management of a cause in


court; a legal advocate managing a case at law (Villegas v. Legaspi, 113 SCRA 39, 1982)

Counsel de parte – an attorney retained by a party litigant, usually for a fee, to prosecute or defend
his cause in court

Counsel de oficio – an attorney appointed by the court to defend an indigent defendant in a


criminal action or to represent a destitute party in a case. (Rule 138, Section 31 Rules of Court)
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House counsel – one who acts as attorney for business though carried as an employee of that
business and not as an independent lawyer

Lawyer – general term for a person trained in the law and authorized to advice and represent
others in legal matters

Lawyer “of
“of counsel”
counsel” – an experienced lawyer, who is usually a retired member of the judiciary,
employed by law firms or consultant

Lead counsel – the counsel of either side of a litigated action who is charged with the principal
management and direction of a party’s case, as distinguished from his juniors or subordinates.

Notary public
public – appointed by a Court whose duty is to attest to the genuineness of any deed or
writing in order to render them available as evidence of facts therein and who is authorized by the
statute to administer oath

Practicing lawyer – one engaged in the practice of law who by license are officers of the court and
who are empowered to appear, prosecute, and defend a client’s cause

Pro-
Pro-se – an appearance by the lawyer on his own behalf

Public prosecutor – He is a quasi-judicial officer and as such, he should seek equal and impartial
justice. He should be as much concerned with seeing that no innocent man suffers as in seeing
that no guilty man escapes. His primary duty is not to convict but to see to it that justice is done.
He should see to it that the accused is given fair and partial trial and not deprived of any of his
statutory or constitutional rights. Consequently, the suppression of facts or the concealment of
witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause
for disciplinary action. He should recommend the acquittal of the accused whose conviction is on
appeal, if he finds no legal basis to sustain the conviction.

Private prosecutor – A private prosecutor may intervene in the prosecution of a criminal action
when the offended party is entitled to indemnity and has not waived expressly, reserved or
instituted the civil action for damages. All criminal actions commenced by complaint or
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the prosecutor. In case of
heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of public prosecutors, the
private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the
Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the Court. Once so
authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the
case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of the public prosecutor, unless the authority is
revoked or otherwise withdrawn

Trial lawyer – one who personally handles cases in court, administrative agencies or boards which
mean engaging in actual trial work, either for the prosecution or for the defense of cases of clients

SOURCES OF LEGAL ETHICS


ETHICS
1. The 1987 Philippine Constitution
2. Applicable jurisprudence
3. Code of Professional Responsibility
4. New Civil Code
5. Rules of Court
6. Revised Penal Code
7. Local Government Code
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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NATURE OF OFFICE OF ATTORNEY (Agpalo)


• The title “Attorney” is reserved to those who has:
1. obtained the necessary degree in the study of law;
2. Successfully taken the bar exams;
3. admitted to the IBP;
4. Remain members thereof in good standing;
5. Been authorized to practice law in the Philippines.

• The practice of law is not a natural property or constitutional right but a mere privilege. It is
not a right granted to anyone who demands it but a privilege to be extended or withheld in
the exercise of sound judicial discretion.
• It is in the nature of a franchise conferred only for merit which must be earned by hard study,
learning and good conduct.
• It is a privilege accorded only to those who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental
and moral fitness. Those standards are neither dispensed with nor lowered after admission.
• The attorney’s continued enjoyment of the privilege conferred depends upon his complying
with the ethics and rules of the profession.
• Law is a profession and not a trade because its basic ideal is to render public service and secure
justice for those who seek its aid. The gaining of a livelihood is only a secondary consideration.

PRIVILEGES OF AN ATTORNEY (Agpalo)


1. Privilege and right to practice law during good behavior before any judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative tribunal.
2. Attorneys enjoy the presumption of regularity in the discharge of his duty. (His statements, if
relevant or material to the case, are absolutely privileged regardless of their defamatory tenor. He
can speak freely and courageously in proceedings without the risk of criminal prosecution.)
3. Other privileges inherent in his status as quasi-judicial officer:
a. Passing the bar is equivalent to First-grade Civil Service eligibility for any position in the
classified service of the government, the duties of which require knowledge of law.
b. Second-grade eligibility for any other government position not requiring proficiency in the
law.
4. The court, in admitting him to practice, presents him to the public as worthy of its confidence and
as a person fit and proper to assume and discharge the responsibilities of an attorney.
5. Has the privilege to set the judicial machinery in motion.
• He can stand up for his right or the right of his client even in the face of a hostile court.
• He has the right to protest, in respectful language, any unwarranted treatment of a witness or
any unjustified delay.
• The rights and privileges which they enjoy as officers of the court are necessary for the proper
administration of justice as for the protection of attorney and his client.
• There can be no strong bar without courageous and fearless attorneys.
• As a man of law, his is necessarily a leader in the community, looked up to as a model citizen.
• Integrity, ability, and learning often make him qualified to administer the Executive
Departments or the Legislative bodies.

STATE REGULATION

The power of admission to the practice of law is vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court:

1987 Philippine Constitution, Article VIII, Section 5 (5)


The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx… 5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law,
law the
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integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified
and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of
special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
Court.

The constitutional power to admit candidates to the legal profession is a judicial function and
involves exercise of discretion (In re: Almacen 31 SCRA 562).

The power of the Supreme Court to regulate the practice of law includes:
1. authority to define the term
2. prescribe the qualifications of a candidate to and the subjects of the bar examinations
3. decide who will be admitted to practice
4. discipline, suspend or disbar any unfit and unworthy member of the bar
5. reinstate any disbarred or indefinitely suspended attorney
6. ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar
7. punish for contempt any person for unauthorized practice of law and
8. in general, exercise overall supervision of the legal profession

1987 Philippine
Philippine Constitution, Article XII, Section 14 (2)
xxx… The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino
citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.

IN THE MATTER OF INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, 1973

FACTS: In 1970, convinced that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of
ascertaining the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. In September, 1971, Congress
passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar,
and Appropriating Funds Therefor." There were oppositions on the integration on the grounds
among others, of (1) its constitutionality and (2) the same being outside the power of the Court
to do so.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the integration of the Bar is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the Court has the power to integrate the Bar.

HELD:
1. The constitutionality of the Bar Integration hinges on its effects on the lawyer's
constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech, and on the nature of
the dues exacted from him. Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification
of the entire lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial
support (in reasonable amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice
of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of
Law, integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized
action and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to
the principle of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the
Supreme Court. It does not in any manner violate the lawyer’s freedom of association and
freedom of speech.

2. The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its
power, under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law."
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May the legislature enact laws to regulate the practice of law?


Generally, the legislature cannot enact laws to regulate the practice of law. The Legislature, in
the exercise of its police power, may however, enact laws regulating the practice of law to protect the
public and promote the public welfare.. But the legislature may not pass a law that will control the
Supreme Court in the performance of its function to decide who may enjoy the privilege of practicing
law, and any law of that kind is unconstitutional as an invalid exercise.
Any legislative or executive judgment substituting that of the Supreme Court in matters
concerning the admission to the practice of law or the suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of an
attorney infringes upon and constitutes an invalid exercise of the legislative or executive power.
The legislature may pass a law prescribing additional qualifications for candidates for
admission to practice or filling up deficiencies in the requirements for admission to the bar. Such a law
may not, however, be given retroactive effect so as to entitle a person, not otherwise qualified, to be
admitted to the bar, nor will such a law preclude the Supreme Court from fixing other qualifications
or requirements for the practice of law. (In re Cunanan, 94 Phil 543)

REQUIREMENTS TO THE ADMISSION


ADMISSION TO PRACTICE LAW

Citizenship,
Citizenship, Residence,
Residence, Age,
Age, Good moral character,
character, Legal education

RULE 138, RULES OF COURT, Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar —
Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against
him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

IN RE ARTHUR CASTILLO REYES, 1993


(Citizenship)

Petitioner graduated from UP College of Law in 1939, passed the bar in 1939, inducted to and
served in the US Armed Forces in the Far East during WWII and thus became eligible
for citizenship under the 1990 US Immigration Act, became a naturalized citizen of the US in
1993. His name was struck from the Roll of Attorneys. Only Filipino citizens may practice law
in the Philippines. This requirement is prescribed by the Constitution, XII 14, and the ROC, 2
Rule 138

REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR

1. must be a citizen of the Philippines;


2. At least 21 years of age;
3. of good moral character;
4. must be a resident of the Philippines;
5. Must produce before the Supreme Court a satisfactory evidence of good moral character;
6. And that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any
court in the Philippines (Sec. 2, Rule 138, RRC);
7. Must have complied with the academic requirements;
8. Must pass the bar examinations
9. Take the lawyer’s oath; and s
10. sign the Roll of Attorneys
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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What is good moral character?

No definition and criteria in law for “good moral character” (Agpalo)

Good moral character is the absence of a proven conduct or act which has been historically and
traditionally considered as a manifestation of moral turpitude. The act or conduct showing moral
turpitude need not amount to a crime; and even if it does constitute an offense, a conviction upon a
criminal charge is not necessary to demonstrate bad moral character although it may show moral
depravity. (Agpalo)

Question of moral turpitude is for Supreme Court to decide which is why applicants are required to
disclose any crime which they have been charged. Concealment or withholding from the court
information about charges and indictments is a ground for disqualification of applicant or for
revocation of license. Even if the crime concealed does not involve moral turpitude, the act of
concealment makes him/her unfit to be a lawyer. (Agpalo)

Applicant assumes burden of proof to establish qualifications in asking admission. But after having
presented prima facie evidence, burden to overcome the prima facie showing shifts to those objecting
his/her admission. (Agpalo)

An applicant must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude have been filed or
pending in court in the Philippines. The concealment or withholding from the court of the fact that
an applicant has been charged with or indicted for an alleged crime is a ground for disqualification
(Agpalo)

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING


IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS
(Good Moral Character)

FACTS: In his failure to disclose in his application that he has pending criminal cases, Haron S.
Meling was disqualified from taking the bar examination, was not be allowed to take the
Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys should he passes the Bar Examinations, and his
membership in the Shari’a Bar was suspended. Meling averred that he did not disclose of the
criminal cases filed against him since the retired judge advised him of settlement of the case
which would result in its termination.

ISSUE: Whether or not Haron S. Meling is qualified to take the Bar Examination.

HELD: Haron S. Meling is not qualified to take the Bar Examination. The practice of law, in any
court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege which requires that an applicant not only
has knowledge of the law but is also of good moral character as a requisite to the admission to
the practice of law. It is a standard that in the application for bar examination, the applicant is
required to declare under oath that “there is no any pending case or charge against him/her.”
This requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence
of good moral character of the applicant. In the case at bar, Meling however, did not disclose
that he has pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment. This
concealment of Meling’s reflects of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in
the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a Bar.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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QUINGWA V. PUNO
(A.C. 389, February 28, 1967)
(19 SCRA 439)

FACTS: Flora Quingwa filed a complaint against Atty. Armando Puno charging him with gross
immorality and misconduct. Quingwa alleged that Atty. Puno succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her through a promise of marriage but refused to comply upon learning that
she was pregnant. Atty. Puno denied having sexual intercourse with Quingwa and refused to
acknowledge Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. as his child. The Court finds for Quingwa and ruled
in her favor.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Puno be disbarred.

HELD: Yes. One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the
applicant must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral
character. If good moral character is a qualification for the privilege to enter upon the practice
of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege.
When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs
that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of him. Atty. Puno did not present evidence to defeat the allegations against him.

Rule 138 SEC. 6 of the Rules of Court Pre-Law.—No applicant for admission to the bar examination
shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that,
before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and
recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with
any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, English,
Spanish, history and economics

IN RE: TELESFORO A. DIAO


(Pre-law)

FACTS:
FACTS: About two years after being admitted to the bar, Telesforo Diao was charged due to
false representation in his application for the Bar examination, that he had the requisite
academic qualifications. The Solicitor General, after investigation, recommends that Diao's
name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because he (Diao) had not completed his high school
training and never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma there
from, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Education.

Issue: Whether or not Diao should be disbarred due to his false representations on his academic
qualifications.

Held: Diao should be disbarred due to his false representations on his academic qualifications.
He was not definitely qualified to take the bar exam because he never completed his high
school training and never obtained his A.A diploma, violating Section 6 of Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court which provides —" No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be
admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that,
before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized
and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-
year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences with any of the following subjects as major or field of concentration: political science,
logic, English, Spanish, history and economics."
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Rule 138 SEC. 5 of the Rules of Court Additional requirements for other applicants.—All applicants
for admission other than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted
to the examination, satisfactorily show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and
successfully completed all prescribed courses, in a law, school or university, officially approved and
recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate
from the university or school of law, shall be filed as evidence of such facts, and further evidence may
be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examination unless he has satisfactorily completed the
following courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law,
commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor
and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

RE: APPLICATION OF ADRIANO HERNANDEZ, 1993


(Law Proper)

An applicant who desires to take the bar examinations must not only have studied law in a local
school but must be able to present the certifications required under sections 5 and 6 of Rule
138. Since graduates of foreign law schools cannot submit said certifications, they shall not be
allowed to take the bar examinations.

CUI V.
V. CUI
(G.R. No. L-18727, August 31, 1964)

FACTS: The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and
Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased. When the spouses died, the administration passed to
Mauricio Cui. When the latter died, Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the
administrator. Thereafter, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the
position of administrator. Dr. Teodoro resigned. Jesus Cui and Antonio Cui averred among
themselves that they shall be the rightful administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de Barili as
provided in Section 2 of the Deed of Donation in the order of preference. It stated that the
administrators shall have the qualification of que posea titulo de abogado among others.
Petitioner contended that having the degree of Bachelor of Laws constitute “titulo de abogado”
while the respondent Romulo cui who also claimed to be the administrator contended that it
shall mean a member of the bar.

ISSUE:
ISSUE Whether or not “titulo de abogado” means a member of the bar.

HELD:
HELD The Court ruled in affirmative. Whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de
abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. The
English equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general
signification, and has reference to that class of persons who are by license officers of the courts,
empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities
and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority
of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar
examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this
certificate being his license to practice the profession. Possession of the degree itself is not
indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown in some other way. Indeed
there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who
had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar
examinations and to qualify as lawyers. Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such
persons do not possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Rule 138 SEC. 10 of the Rules of Court Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing.—
Persons taking the examination shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms.
The questions shall be the same for all examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be
given to each examinee. Examinees shall answer the questions personally without help from anyone.

Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be
difficult to read his answers without much loss of time, the Supreme Court may allow such examinee
to use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.

The committee of bar examiners shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the
substitution of papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the
examination papers. No oral examination shall be given.

IN RE AMPARO
(Bar Examination)

FACTS: Amparo is a bar examinee who was caught by the head watcher reading a piece of
paper during the bar examination in Criminal Law. He refuses to surrender the paper until the
head watcher threatened to report him to the authorities. The paper contains the list of
duration of penalties and formula computing them, which Amparo justifies as just a piece of
paper that fell out of his pocket as he tried to get his handkerchief. A report was filed and an
investigation ensued.

ISSUE: Whether or not Amparo is guilty for his actions.

RULING: He violated Rule 133, Section 10 of the Rules of Court on prohibiting examinees from
bringing papers, books, or notes into the examination room. Amparo committed an overt act
indicative of an attempt to cheat by reading notes. The report of the bar showed that he did not
passed the bar thus the court ordered he will not be allowed to re-take the bar the following
year.

IN RE VICTORIO D. LANUEVO
(Bar Examination)

FACTS: An administrative case of disbarment is filed against Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, a Bar
Confidant for having took advantage of his position and manoeuvred the passing of an
examinee in the bar examinations and his admission to the bar. Atty. Lanuevo allegedly
deceived bar examiners to re-evaluate and/or re-correct the answers of an examinee, claiming
that he acted in good faith believing that the same is worthy of re-evaluation and that the
matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision.
Petitioners on the other hand maintained that Atty. Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, cannot initiate
actions for re-evaluation of answers of any bar examinees.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, a Bar Confidant, has authority to initiate steps
towards re-evaluation of the answers of bar examinees.

HELD: Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, a Bar Confidant, had no authority to initiate steps towards the
re-evaluation of the answers of bar examinees. The Office of the Bar Confidant has nothing to
do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the
passing mark before or after their notebooks is submitted to it by the Examiners. After the
corrected notebooks are submitted to Atty. Lanuevo by the Examiners, his only function is to
tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the
general average. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same
should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. Thus, the Court ruled
that Atty. Lanuevo be disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of attorneys.
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RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH


(Lawyer’s Oath)
(G.R. No. 712, March 19, 1997)
(270 SCRA 26)

FACTS: In 1991, Al Caparros Argosino was convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide where he was sentenced with two years imprisonment. He was later granted by the
court with 2-years probation. In 1993, Argosino passed the bar examinations. The Court
however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not Argosino be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.

HELD: The lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every
lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes
when taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned. The Court however, allow
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession
give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the youth’s tendency to be rash and
uncalculating.

OLBES V. ATTY. VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE


(A.C. 5365, April 27, 2005)
(457 SCRA 341)

FACTS: Atty. Victor V. Deciembre was given five blank checks by Spouses Olbes for security of
a loan. After the loan was paid and a receipt issued, Atty. Deciembre filled up four of the five
checks for P50, 000 with different maturity date. All checks were dishonoured. Thus, Atty.
Deciembre filed a case for estafa against the spouses Olbes. This prompted the spouses Olbes to
file a disbarment case against Atty. Deciembre for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Deciembre was in accord with his fault.

HELD: YES. “A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly


circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
crusader.” By taking the lawyer’s oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule of
law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of justice.
Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond
reproach, in order to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. It is also glaringly clear
that the Code of Professional Responsibility was seriously transgressed by his malevolent act.
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CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

PRACTICE OF LAW

1. CONCEPT
It is a privilege.
It is a profession, not a business

ESSENTIAL CRITERIA IN DETERMINING ENGAGEMENT IN THE PRACTICE PRACTICE OF LAW


A. Compensation
- implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active practice and that his
professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a source of livelihood or
in consideration of his said services

B. Applicat
Application
ion of law, legal principle, practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training
and experience;

C. Habituality
- Implies customary or habitually holding oneself out to the public as a lawyer. Practice of law
is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action; and

D. Attorney
Attorney--Client relationship
- Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of a lawyer-client relationship.
Thus, activities like teaching of law or writing law books or articles which involve no
attorney-client relationship do not qualify a lawyer as being engaged in the practice of his
profession as a lawyer

WHO MAY PRACTICE LAW


Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in
accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to
practice law. [Sec. 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court]

CAYETANO V. MONSOD
(G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991)
(201 SCRA 210)

FACTS: Christian Monsod was nominated by the then President Corazon C. Aquino as
Chairman of the COMELEC. Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination alleging that Monsod
does not possess the constitutional requirement of having been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years. Monsod maintained that he is a member of the Philippine bar and has
practiced the law in various sectors.

ISSUE: Whether or not Christian Monsod possesses the constitutional requirement for
appointment of having been engaged in the practice of law.

HELD: YES. Practice of law has been defined as any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal principle, practice or procedure, and calls for legal knowledge,
training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession.” Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist,
a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor - verily satisfy the constitutional requirement —
that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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AGUIRRE V. RANA
(B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003)
(403 SCRA 342)

FACTS: Edwin Rana is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign
the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the Donna Marie Aguirre who
charges him with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation. Apparently, Rana appeared as counsel to an election candidate before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Masbate before he took his oath and
signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment, Rana alleges he only provide specific assistance
and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. He contends that he did not sign
the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant finds that Rana actively participated
in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as counsel for the candidate.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.

HELD: The court held that Rana did engage in unauthorized practice of law. It held that all the
activities he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that he is
not yet a member of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended to
those morally upright and with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation,
one of which is on the moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential
requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be
administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds
respondent not morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already
took his oath, he was denied admission to the bar.

ALAWI V. ALAUYA
(A.M. SPC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997)

FACTS: Sophia Alawi is a sales representative of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao
City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of
court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be
friends. Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on instalments by
Alauya of a housing unit. A housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC). Subsequently, Alauya wrote a letter to the President
of Villarosa advising termination of his contract on the grounds that his consent was vitiated by
gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by Alawi and
proceeded to expound using acerbic language. Alauya also wrote the NHMFC repudiating as
void his contract with Villarosa and asking for cancellation of his loan. Finally, Alauya wrote 3
other letters to officers of the SC to stop deductions from his salary regarding the loan from
NHMFC. NHMFC also wrote the SC requesting it to stop said deductions. Learning of the
letters, Alawi filed a complaint alleging that Alauya committed malicious and libellous charges
and usurped the title of attorney.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alauya being a member of SHARI’A BAR can use the title
“ATTORNEY”.

HELD: NO. The title “ATTORNEY” is reserved only for those who have been admitted as
members of the Integrated Bar. Court has already had an occasion to declare that persons who
pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and may practice law
only before Shari’a courts Alauya’s wish of not using “counsellor” because of confusion with
“councilor” is immaterial because disinclination to use said title does not warrant his use of the
title “attorney”.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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2. QUALIFICATIONS (See discussions, pages 2-5)

3. RIGHT OF PARTY TO REPRESENT HIMSELF


A. Natural Person
a. A Layman – may or may not
 In Civil Cases before the MTC
- Has the right to conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent or a friend
appointed by him (Sec. 34 Rule 138 of the Rules of Court)

 In Civil Cases before any other court


- Has the right to conduct his litigation personally but if he gets someone to aid him,
that someone must be an authorized member of the Bar
- If so, he will be bound by the same rules of procedure and evidence as those
applicable to a party appearing through counsel; otherwise, ignorance will be
unjustifiably rewarded
- He may not be heard to complain later that he has been deprived of the right to the
assistance of counsel.

 In Criminal Cases
- Involving grave and less grave offenses, an accused who is a layman must always
appear by counsel
- He cannot conduct his own defense as his right to counsel may not be waived
without violating his right to due process of law.
- in a locality where a duly licensed member of the Bar is not available, the judge
may appoint a non-lawyer who is a resident of that province, of good repute for
probity and ability to the accused in his defense. [Sec. 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court]

b. A Lawyer
 In Civil Cases – may or may not
- Has the right to conduct his litigation personally
- If so, he will be bound by the same rules of procedure and evidence as those
applicable to a party appearing through counsel; otherwise, ignorance will be
unjustifiably rewarded
- He may not be heard to complain later that he has been deprived of the right to the
assistance of counsel.

 In Criminal Cases – may or may not

B. Juridical Person
- Must always appear in court by a duly licensed member of the bar except in MTC
where it may be represented by its agent or officer who need not be a lawyer. The
reason is that, by its very nature, a juridical person cannot appear except through an
agent, and an agent is prohibited from representing another in court other than in the
municipal trial court unless that agent is a duly licensed member of the Bar
- Reasons are: (1) Nature of the privilege and on the confidential and trust relation
between attorney and client; (2) A corporation cannot perform the conditions required
for membership in the bar, such as the possession of good moral character and other
special disqualifications, the taking of an oath and becoming an officer of the court,
subject to its discipline, suspension or removal; (3) The relation of trust and confidence
cannot arise where the attorney is employed by a corporation to practice for it, his
employer and him owing, at best, a secondary and divided loyalty to the clientele of
his corporate employer; and (4) The intervention of the corporation is destructive of
that confidential and trust relation
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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C. Legal Aid Program


- A senior law student, who is enrolled in a recognized law school’s clinical education
program approved by the Supreme Court may appear before any court without
compensation, to represent indigent clients, accepted by the Legal Clinic of the law
school. The student shall be under the direct supervision and control of an IBP
member duly accredited by the law school.

D. Under the Labor code, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any Labor Arbiter, if
a. they represent themselves, or if
b. They represent their organization or members thereof (Art 222, PO 442, as amended).

E. Under the Cadastral Act, a non-lawyer can represent a claimant before the Cadastral Court
(Act no. 2259, Sec. 9).

CRUZ V.
V MINA
(G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007)

FACTS: Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor in a Criminal Case for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the
complaining witness. The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his
appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
and jurisprudence that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend
of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior
conformity of the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to
be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case. However, the MeTC denied permission
for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing
limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court should take
precedence over the ruling of the Court in jurisprudence and set the case for continuation of
trial.

ISSUE:
ISSUE Whether or not the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant.

HELD:
HELD The Court ruled in affirmative. Section 34, Rule 138 provides that in n the court of a
justice of the peace,
peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be
either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. Thus, a law student may appear
before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a member of
the bar. The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior
institution of the civil aspect in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect
arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted with the criminal action, and, hence, the
private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil aspect.

LIMITATIONS IN THE APPEARANCE OF A LAYMAN ON BEHALF OF ANOTHER


1. Layman should confine his work to non-adversary contentions. He should not undertake purely
legal work such as examination of witnesses or presentation of evidence.
2. Services should not be habitually rendered.
3. Should not charge or collect attorneys’ fees. (PAFLU v. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Central, 42 SCRA
302)
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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4. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PRACTICE OF LAW


A. Public Officials who cannot engage in the private practice of Law in the Philippines:
a. Judges and other officials as employees of the Supreme Court (Rule 148, Sec. 35, RRC).
b. Officials and employees of the OSG(Ibid.)
c. Government prosecutors (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109).
d. President, Vice-President, members of the cabinet, their deputies and assistants (Art. VIII
Sec. 15, 1987 Constitution).
e. Members of the Constitutional Commission (Art IX-A, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution)
f. Ombudsman and his deputies (Art. IX, Sec. 8 (2nd par), 1987 Constitution)
g. All governors, city and municipal mayors (R.A. No. 7160, Sec. 90).
h. Those prohibited by special law

B. Public Officials With Restrictions In The Practice Of Law


a. No Senator as member of the House of Representative may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice as before the Electoral Tribunals, as quasi-judicial and other
administration bodies (Art. VI, Sec. 14, 1987 Constitution).

b. Under the Local Government Code (RA 7160, Sec. 91) Sanggunian members may practice
their professions provided that if they are members of the Bar, they shall not:
• appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit
or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;
• appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national
or local government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;
• collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official;
• use property and personnel of the government except when the Sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the government.

c. Under RA 910, Sec. 1, as amended, a retired justice or judge receiving pension from the
government, cannot act as counsel in any civil case in which the Government, or any of its
subdivision or agencies is the adverse party or in a criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the Government is accused of an offense in relation to his office.

5. LAWYERS AUTHORIZE TO REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT


Any official or other person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear
for the Government of the Philippines:
a. Solicitor General
b. Assistant Solicitor General
c. Solicitors and Trial Attorneys
d. State Prosecutors or special counsel in the DOJ
e. Provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants
f. Other attorneys in other legal offices of the government

6. LAWYER’S OATH

“I,__________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the


Republic of the Philippines; I will support its constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; I will not willingly nor wittingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.” (Form 28,
RRC)
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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7. LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

RULE 138-
138-A of the Rules of Court

IN RE: NEED THAT LAW STUDENT


STUDENT PRACTICING UNDER RULE 138-
138-A BE ACTUALLY
SUPERVISED DURING TRIAL (BAR MATTER NO. 730)

FACTS: Plaintiff in civil Case was represented by Mr. Cornelio Carmona, Jr., an intern at the
Office of Legal Aid; UP-College of Law Mr. Carmona conducted hearings and completed the
presentation of the plaintiff's evidence-in-chief without the presence of a supervising lawyer.
Justice Barredo questioned the appearance of Mr. Carmona during the hearing because the latter
was not accompanied by a duly accredited lawyer. Justice Barredo asserts that a law student
appearing before the trial court under Rule 138-A should be accompanied by a supervising
lawyer. On the other hand, UP-OLA, submits that "the matter of allowing a law intern to
appear unaccompanied by a duly accredited supervising lawyer should be . . . left to the sound
discretion of the court after having made at least one supervised appearance."

For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court hold that a law student appearing before the
Regional Trial Court under Rule 138-A should at all times be accompanied by a supervising
lawyer. Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides:

2 Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be
Section 2.
under the direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
duly accredited by the law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other
papers to be filed, must be signed the by supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal
clinic.

The matter of allowing a law student to appear before the court unaccompanied by a
supervising lawyer cannot be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. The phrase "direct
supervision and control" requires no less than the physical presence of the supervising lawyer
during the hearing. This is in accordance with the threefold rationale behind the Law Student
Practice Rule, to wit:
1. to ensure that there will be no miscarriage of justice as a result of incompetence or
inexperience of law students, who, not having as yet passed the test of professional competence,
are presumably not fully equipped to act a counsels on their own;
2. to provide a mechanism by which the accredited law school clinic may be able to protect
itself from any potential vicarious liability arising from some culpable action by their law
students; and
3. to ensure consistency with the fundamental principle that no person is allowed to practice a
particular profession without possessing the qualifications, particularly a license, as required by
law.

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34 Rule 138 provides;
Section 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without
the supervision of a member of the bar.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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PROCEEDINGS WHERE LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM APPEARING

1. Proceedings before the Small Claims Court


No attorney shall appear in behalf of or represent a party at the hearing, unless the
attorney is the plaintiff or defendant (Sec. 17, Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases)

However, if the court determines that a party cannot properly present his/her claim or
defense and needs assistance, the court may, in its discretion, allow another individual who is not
an attorney to assist that party upon the latter’s consent (Sec. 17, Rule of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases).

2. Proceedings before the Katarungang


Katarungang Pambarangay
During the pre-trial conference under the Rules of Court, lawyers are prohibited from
appearing for the parties. Parties must appear in person only except minors or incompetents who
may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers. (Formerly Sec. 9, P.D. No. 1508; Sec.
415, Local Government Code of 1991, R.A. 7160)

REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW OF NON- NON-LAWYERS


1. Declaratory relief;
2. Petition for Injuction;
3. Contempt of court;
4. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a person who falsely represented himself to be an attorney to
the damage of a party;

8. DUTIES OF A LAWYER

Rule 138 SEC. 20 of the Rules of Court. Duties of attorneys.—it is the duty of an attorney:

(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines.
(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;
(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just,
and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law;
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means
only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial
officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business
except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which
he is charged;
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or
proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless
or oppressed;
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means,
regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the
law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of
law.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A LAWYER

1. To society
a) Respect for law and legal processes
b) Efficient and convenient legal services
c) True, honest fair, dignified and objective information on legal services
d) Participation in the improvement and reforms in legal system
e) Participation in legal education program
f) Lawyers in Government Service

2. To the legal profession


a) Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(i) Membership and dues
b) Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession
c) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues
d) No assistance in unauthorized practice of law

3. To the courts
a) Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
b) Respect for courts and judicial officers
c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice
d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to influence
or gives the appearance of influence upon the courts

4. To the clients
a) Availability of service without discrimination
(i) Services regardless of person’s status
(ii) Services as counsel de officio
(iii) Valid grounds for refusal

b) Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients


(i) Confidentiality rule
(ii) Privileged communications
(iii) Conflict of interest
(iv) Candid and honest advice to clients
(v) Compliance with laws
(vi) Concurrent practice of another profession

c) Client’s moneys and properties


(i) Fiduciary relationship
(ii) Co-mingling of funds
(iii) Delivery of funds
(iv) Borrowing or lending

d) Fidelity to client’s cause

e) Competence and diligence


(i) Adequate protection
(ii) Negligence
(iii) Collaborating counsel
(iv) Duty to apprise client

f) Representation with zeal within legal bounds


(i) Use of fair and honest means
(ii) Client’s fraud
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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(iii) Procedure in handling the case

g) Attorney’s fees
(i) Acceptance fees
(ii) Contingency fee arrangements
(iii) Attorney’s liens
(iv) Fees and controversies with clients
(v) Concepts of attorney’s fees
(a) Ordinary concept
(b) Extraordinary concept

h) Preservation of client’s confidences


(i) Prohibited disclosures and use
(ii) Disclosure, when allowed

i) Withdrawal of services

TERMS:
Acceptance fee – It is an absolute fee arrangement which entitles a lawyer to get paid for his
efforts regardless of the outcome of the litigation (Funa, 2009).

Ambulance chasing – is an act of chasing victims of accidents for the purpose of talking to the said
victims (or relatives) and offering his legal services for the filing of a case against the person(s)
who caused the accident(s)

Attorney’s lien – a type of lien referring to a right to retain the funds, documents, and papers
against the client until the attorney’s fees is fully paid

Barratry – an act of frequently exciting and stirring up quarrels and suits, either at law or
otherwise; lawyer’s act of fomenting suits among individuals and offering his legal services to one
of them.

Champertous contract – It is one where the lawyer stipulates with his client in the prosecution of
the case that he will bear all the expenses for the recovery of things or property being claimed by
the client, and the latter agrees to pay the former a portion of the thing or property recovered as
compensation. It is void for being against public policy.

Charging lien – the right of a lawyer to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments which he has secured in a litigation
of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such
lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such
execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the
adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as
his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his fees and disbursements.
(Sec. 37, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court)

Collaborating counsel – Is one who is subsequently engaged to assist a lawyer already handling a
particular case for a client. (Pineda, 2009)

Conflict research – It is examining the causes of action between the prospective client and the
lawyer’s current clients.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Contingency fee arrangement


arrangement – Contingent fee where the lawyer is paid for his services
depending on the success of the case. This applies usually in civil suits for money or property
where the lawyer’s fee is taken from the award granted by the court.

Contingent fee – conditioned on securing a favourable judgment and recovery of money or


property and the amount of which may be on percentage basis

Crime of maintenance – A lawyer owes to society and to the court the duty not to stir up
litigation.

Deceitful conduct – an act that has the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation,
artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the fact, to the prejudice and
damage of the party imposed upon. (CPR Annotated, PhilJA)

Defenseless persons – those who are not in a position to defend themselves due to poverty,
weakness, ignorance or other similar reasons.

Dishonest conduct - the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud, or betray; be untrustworthy;
lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness.

Doctrine of imputed knowledge – The knowledge acquired by an attorney during the time that
he’s acting within the scope of his authority is imputed to the client. It is based on the assumption
that an attorney, who has notice of matter affecting his client, has communicated the same to his
principal in the course of professional dealings.

Fiduciary duty – The principle that an attorney derives no undue advantage that may operate to
the prejudice or cause an occasion for loss of a client. The relationship between the lawyer and
client is one of mutual trust and confidence of the highest degree.

Forum shopping – prohibited act of filing repetitious suits in different courts. It may take any of
the following forms:
• Going from one court to another in the hope of securing a favorable relief in one court,
which another court has denied.
• Filing repetitious suits and proceedings in different courts concerning the same subject
matter after one court has decided the suit with finality; or
• Filing a similar case in a judicial court after receiving an unfavorable judgment from an
administrative tribunal.

Gross ignorance – transgression of any provision of law which need not be a penal law

Grossly immoral conduct – one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree, and committed under such
scandalous and revolting circumstances (Figueroa v. Barranco, SBC Case No. 519, July 31, 1997)

Gross misconduct – any inexcusable, shameful, or flagrant, unlawful conduct on the part of the
person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or
to the right determination of cause, a conduct by a predetermined, obstinate, or intentional
purpose

Hot potato doctrine – It refers to the prohibition from dropping smaller clients (like hot potatoes)
in order to pick up more lucrative clients.

Immoral conduct – a conduct which is wilful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Influence peddling – an act taken against the lawyer that, he shall not state nor imply that he is
able to influence any public official, tribunal, or legislative body

Integrated Bar of the Philippines – an official national body composed of all persons whose names
now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. (Sec. 1,
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court)

Integration of the Bar – The Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the
entire lawyer population, and this requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court (Pineda).

Mandatory continuing legal education – the means to ensure that throughout the lawyer’s career,
they keep abreast with the law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and
enhance the standards of the practice of law

Moral turpitude – imports an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the duties which one person
owes to another or to society in general which is contrary to the usual accepted and customary
rule of right and duty which a person should follow. The question as to whether an offense
involves moral turpitude is for the Supreme Court to decide.

Oppressed persons – those who are the victims of the cruelty, unlawful, exaction, domination or
excessive use of authority.

Quantum meruit – means "as much as he deserves",, and is used as the basis for determining the
lawyer's professional fees in the absence of a contract, but recoverable by him from his client

Retainer – It may refer to two concepts:


1. Act of a client by which he engages the services of an attorney to render legal advice or to
defend or prosecute his cause in court; or
2. Fee which a client pays to the attorney.

Retaining lien – the right of an attorney to retain the funds, documents and papers of his client
which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.

Unlawful conduct – It refers to a transgression of any provision of law which need not be a penal
law. The presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential in order to bring his act
or omission within the terms of this Rule.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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1. To society

a) Uphold the Constitution, Obey the laws of the land, Respect for law and legal processes

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

BAUTISTA V. GONZALES
(A.M. No. 1625, February 12, 1990)
(182 SCRA 161)

FACTS: Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales was suspended for having violated the provision on Article
1491 of the New Civil Code which expressly prohibits a lawyer from acquiring his client's
property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his
profession. This is in view of Atty. Gonzales’ transferred to himself one-half of the properties of
his client which are the subject of litigation, while the case was still pending.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ramon Gonzales committed the act of misconduct, hence his
suspension.

HELD: YES. The Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process." Moreover, Rule 138,
Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to obey the laws as
well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein. Any violation of this oath,
constitute act of misconduct which may result to the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer by
the Supreme Court. Atty. Gonzales violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from
acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part
by virtue of his profession.

REDDI V. SEBRIO
(A.C. No. 7027, January 30, 2009)

FACTS: Tanu Reddi asked for the disbarment of Atty. Diosdado C. Sebrio, for having
committed unlawful, dishonest and deceitful conduct act of misconduct which constitute
violations of the lawyer’s oath and provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)
when he offered properties for sale to Reddi on the misrepresentation that Reddi was dealing
with the true owners thereof. It turned out however, that said properties were either fictitious,
not susceptible to sale, simulated, or inexistent. Sebrio admitted having received the sum
amount of money for the purchase of real estate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Diosdado Sebrio has committed act of misconduct, a valid ground
for disbarment.

HELD: YES. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that “a member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, xxx or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, xxx. In the instant case, Atty. Sebrio’s
admission that he received a sum of money from Reddi which he could not properly account
for and his taking advantage of the latter’s ignorance of the real estate business in the
Philippines, constitutes gross misconduct and depicts his character short of the standards
required of him as a member of the bar and an officer of the court.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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ZALDIVAR V. GONZALES
(G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988)
(166 SCRA 316)

FACTS: Enrique Zaldivar filed a complaint against respondent Raul M. Gonzales for having
issued allegedly scornful statements to the media in relation to the proceedings of the former.
The Court, in its Resolution, requires Gonzales to show cause why he should not be punished
for contempt and be subjected to administrative sanctions for making said public statements.

ISSUE: Whether or not lawyers are entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of speech
towards the Court.

HELD: Lawyers are not entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of speech towards the
Court. While the Court may allow criticism it has ruled that intemperate and unfair criticism is
a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer
to disciplinary action. The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is
essential to the orderly administration of justice.

ROBERTO SORIANO V. ATTY. MANUEL DIZON


(AC 6792, January 25, 2006)

FACTS: In one traffic incident Atty. Manuel Dizon shot one Soriano, a taxi driver for no
justifiable reasons. Consequently, Atty. Dizon was convicted for frustrated homicide but was
allowed probation, conditioned on payment of civil liabilities. However, four years after
judgment was rendered, Dizon has not yet fulfilled his civil obligation. Soriano filed complaint
before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP for Dizon’s disbarment. CBD
recommended that respondent be disbarred for having been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude and for violating Rule. 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The IBP adopted the recommendation of the CBD and sent their resolution to
the Supreme Court for review.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime of frustrated homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved
moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not Atty. Dizon’s guilt warrants his disbarment.

HELD:
1. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the CBD that the crime of frustrated
homicide committed by Atty. Dizon involved moral turpitude. The court defined moral
turpitude as “everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.” Moral turpitude was shown when Atty. Dizon shot a taxi driver for no
justifiable reason. His act definitely did not constitute self-defense. It was he who was
the aggressor because he first tried to punch Soriano. The latter was merely defending
himself when he counter-punched Dizon. Dizon’s violent reaction to a simple traffic
incident indicated his skewed morals.

2. The Supreme Court held that Dizon also violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that “A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.” Dizon failed to obey
the laws of the land through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm. He failed to
respect legal processes through his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities, the
condition for his probation.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Canon 1, Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct

Rule 138, Sec. 20 (d) of Rules of Court - Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honour, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law

What is unlawful, dishonest, immoral,


immoral, or deceitful conduct?
Unlawful conduct is defined as an act or omission which is against the law. Dishonesty involves lying
or cheating. (Agpalo)

Immoral or deceitful conduct is that which is willful, flagrant or shameless and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community. (Aguirre)

Instances of Dishonesty and Deceit which Resulted to Discipline by the Supreme Court:
1. Misappropriation of client’s funds
2. Act of fraudulently concealing dutiable importation or smuggling
3. Giving false statements under oath in an Information Sheet submitted in connection with the
lawyer’s application for the position of Chief of Police
4. Wanton falsehood made in an ex parte petition in court wherein the lawyer attached affidavit of
his grandfather and which affidavit he notarized knowing that the supposed affiant is already dead
5. Maneuvering re-conveyance of property in the name of a lawyer instead of the client – in a case
involving sale with pacto de retro
6. Submission or presentation of mutilated copies of certain documents to court for the purpose of
deceiving and misleading it
7. Falsification of grades in the Bar Examinations
8. Collecting several thousand pesos on the pretense that counsel would allegedly appeal the
complaint’s case to the Supreme Court of the United States, and that it was necessary to him to go
to Washington, D.C. which he did, knowing that the decision could no longer be appealed because
it is already final
9. Introducing someone to buy a piece of land knowing that it is not for sale
10. Delayed failure to account money collected for the client
11. Stealing evidence attached to the court records

Cases of Gross Immorality and the Resulting Consequences

1. Abandonment of wife and cohabiting with another woman. DISBARRED (Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,
Adm. Case No. 1392, April 2, 1984)
2. A lawyer who had carnal knowledge with a woman through a promise of marriage which he did
not fulfill. DISBARRED (In re: Disbarment of Armando Puno, A.C. No. 389, February 28, 1967)
3. Seduction of a woman who is the niece of a married woman with whom respondent lawyer had an
adulterous relation. DISBARRED (Royong v. Oblena, A.C. No. 376, April 30, 1963)
4. Lawyer arranging marriage of his son to a woman with whom the lawyer had illicit relations.
DISBARRED
DISBARRED (Mortel v. Aspiras,A.M. No. 145, December 28, 1956)
5. Lawyer inveigling a woman into believing that they have been married civilly to satisfy his carnal
desires. DISBARRED (Terre v. Terre, A.M. No. 2349, July 3, 1992)
6. Lawyer taking advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine and asked a lady
student to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under threat that if she
refused, she would flunk in all her subjects. DISBARRED (Delos
( Reyes v. Aznar, A.M. No. 1334
November 28, 1989)
7. Bigamy perpetrated by the lawyer. DISQUALIFIED FROM ADMISSION TO THE BAR (Royong
vs. Oblena, A.C. No. 376, April 30, 1963)
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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8. Concubinage coupled with failure to support illegitimate children. SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY


(Laguitan v. Tinio, A.M. No. 3049, December 4, 1989)
9. Maintaining adulterous relationship with a married woman. SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY
(Cordova v. Cordova, A.M. No. 3249, November 29, 1989)
10. A retired judge who penned a decision 7 months after he retired, antedating the decision and
forcing his former court staff to include it in the expediente of the case. DISBARRED (Radjaie v.
Alovera, A.C. No. 4748, August 4, 2000)
11. Forging a Special Power of Attorney. SUSPENDED FOR 3 YEARS (Rural Bank of Silay, Inc. v.
Pilla, A.C. No. 3637, January 24, 2001)
12. Attempting to engage in an opium deal SUSPENDED FOR 1 YEAR ( Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350,
September 1, 1933)
13. Facilitating the travel of a person to the U.S. using spurious travel documents. DISBARRED
(Sebastian v. Calis, A.C. No. 5118, September 9, 1999)

NUNEZ V. ATTY. RICAFORT


(A.C. No. 5054, May 29, 2002)

FACTS: Soledad Nunez authorized Atty. Romulo Ricafort to sell her parcels of land. After
having sold the lots, Nunez demanded from Atty. Ricafort the proceeds of the sale but the latter
failed to deliver the money. Atty. Ricafort paid only a partial amount and issued post-dated
checks to cover the balance. Said checks however, were dishonoured because the account
against which they were drawn was closed. Consequently, Nunez filed a motion to cite Atty.
Ricafort for contempt for his acts of misconduct and for his acts unbecoming of a lawyer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Romulo Ricafort has committed acts of misconduct in his dealings
with Nunez.

HELD: YES. Rule 1:01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct”. In the case
at bar, Atty. Ricafort gravely abused the confidence that his client has given in him and
committed dishonesty when he did not turn over the proceeds of the sale of her property. He
even closed the account against which the checks for the payment of unpaid balance were
drawn, which depicts that he never had the intention of paying his obligation.

CORDON V.
V. ATTY. BALICANTA
(A.C. No. 2797, October 4, 2002)

FACTS: Atty. Bacalinta helped settle the estate of Rosaura Cordon’s husband and entice Rosaura
to organize a corporation known as Rosaura Enterprise which develops real properties into a
high scale commercial complex. Thereafter, the Atty. Bacalinta single-handedly ran the affairs
of the corporation. Using spurious resolution, Atty. Bacalinta contracted a loan from the LBP
and because of its failure to pay, the bank foreclosed the property and sold the corporation’s
right to redeem the property mortgaged to a third person through a fake board resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bacalinta may be disbarred.

HELD: YES. Atty. Bacalinta’s actions clearly violated Canon 15 to 16 of the same Code. The
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates upon each lawyer, the obligation to obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Specifically, he is forbidden to
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Lawyers are expected to abide by
the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honoured fraternity .
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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MECARAL V. VELASQUEZ
(A.C. No. 8392, June 29, 2010)

FACTS: Atty. Danilo Velasquez was charged before IBP Committee on Bar Discipline with
Gross Misconduct and Gross Immoral Conduct by Mecaral. Mecaral was his secretary and she
became his lover and common-law wife. Atty. Velasquez then brought her to the mountainous
area of San Agustin in Caibiran, Biliran. She was left there with a religious group, of which
Atty. Velasquez was the leader. At first, he visited her daily, but later the visits became scarce.
This prompts Mecaral to return home to Naval, Biliran. Angered, Atty. Velasquez brought her
back to San Agustin where, on his instruction, his followers tortured, brainwashed and injected
her with drugs. When she tried to escape, the members of the group tied her spread-eagled to a
bed. Made to wear only a T-shirt and diapers and fed stale food, she was guarded 24 hours a day
by the women members. Her mother sought the help of the Provincial Social Welfare
Department which immediately dispatched two women volunteers to rescue her. The religious
group refused to release her, however, without the instruction of Atty. Velasquez.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Velasquez guilty of gross immoral conduct and violated Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: Yes. Atty. Velasquez’ act of converting his secretary into a mistress is grossly immoral
which no civilized society in the world can countenance. The subsequent detention and torture
of the complainant is gross misconduct that only a beast may be able to do. Therefore, the Atty.
Velasquez had violated Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

FIGUEROA V. BARRANCO JR.


(S.B.C. 519, July 31, 1997)

FACTS: Patricia Figueroa and Simeon Barranco were town-mates and teen sweethearts. Their
intimacy yielded to a child Simeon. Subsequently, Simeon first promised he would marry her
after he passes the bar examinations. Their relationship continued and Simeon allegedly made
more than twenty or thirty promises of marriage. Patricia learned that Simeon married another
woman. Meanwhile, Simeon successfully passed the 1970 bar examinations. But before he could
take his oath, Patricia filed a petition to disqualify Simeon to take the Lawyer’s Oath on the
ground of gross immoral conduct.

ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Simeon in engaging in premarital relations with Patricia and
making promises to marry her constitute gross immoral conduct?

HELD: The SC ruled that the facts do not constitute gross immoral conduct warranting a
permanent exclusion of Simeon from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual
relations with complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his
part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The Court has held that to
justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. It is wilful, flagrant, or
shameless act, which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the
community.
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BARRIOS V. MARTINEZ
(A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004)
(442 SCRA 324, 2004)

FACTS: Atty. Martinez was convicted of the crime for violation of BP 22. He was also involved
in another estafa case pertaining to his legal services rendered on the victim of Dona Paz
tragedy when Atty. Martinez keep for himself the sum of money that the victim get from
Sulpicio as compensation for himself. Consequently, Atty. Martinez is subject to disbarment.

ISSUE: Is the act of Atty. Martinez considered to be a ground for disbarment?

HELD: YES. Atty. Martinez is guilty of violation of BP 22 which imports deceit and violation of
his attorney’s oath and his duty under the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires
lawyers to refrain from engaging into any unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.

RE: A.C. NO. 44 OF THE RTC BRANCH 4 TAGBILARAN


TAGBILARAN CITY AGAINST ATTY. OCCENA
(A.C. No. 2841, July 3, 2002)

FACTS: Under the terms of the Last Will and Testament of the late William Ogan, the residue
of his estate was divided among his seven children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occeña, was
named in the will as executrix of the estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C.
Occeña, as her lawyer. The settlement of the estate have been pending for thirteen (13) years
when it was transferred under the sala of Judge Ruiz who found out that the principal cause of
delay was the failure of Atty. Occeña to obey lawful court orders such as the submission of the
latest inventory of all securities of the estate, take possession of all certificates of stocks or the
replacements belonging to the estate and as well as its inventory, and by willfully prolonging
the litigation through his various maneuvers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Occeña’s acts constitute a gross violation of his oath as a lawyer?

HELD: Not only did Atty. Occeña commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral conduct and
wilful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these transgressions, he violated the lawyer’s
oath by his acts of disobeying lawful court orders and willfully prolonging the litigation
through his maneuvers.

FOODSPHERE INC. V.
V. MAURICIO JR
(A.C. 7199, July 22, 2009)

FACTS: Foodsphere Inc. was found liable for damages to its customer when its liver spread sold
turned out to contain worms. Foodsphere refused to pay, instead offered to return actual
medical and incidental expenses supported by receipts. Atty. Mauricio, a writer/ columnists,
proposed to Foodsphere to settle the matter for a certain sum part of which would go to his
Batas Foundation, and directed them to place paid advertisements in his tabloids and radio and
television programs. Otherwise, he threatened them to proceed with the publication of articles
maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to Foodsphere and its products.
Foodsphere filed a complaint for disbarment and criminal complaints against Mauricio for libel
and threatening to publish libel

ISSUE: Can Atty. Mauricio be disbarred in the instant case?

HELD: YES. The acts of Atty. Mauricio are a violation of Rule 1.01 of Code of Professional
Responsibility which requires lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct. He engaged in deceitful conduct by taking advantage of the complaint
against Foodsphere Inc. to advance his interest – to obtain funds for his Batas Foundation and
seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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SALVACION DELIZO CORDOVA V. ATTY.


ATTY. LAURENCE D. CORDOVA
(A.M. 3249, November 29, 1989)
(179 Phil 680)

FACTS: Salvacion Delizo charged her husband, Atty. Laurence D. Cordova, with immorality
and acts unbecoming a member of the Bar. Later, in a telegraphic message, Salvacion informed
the Commission that she and her husband had already “reconciled”. The Commission required
the parties to appear before it for confirmation and explanation but neither party responded
and nothing was heard from either party since then. Thus, the IBP reprimand Atty. Cordova
for his acts, admonish him that any further acts of immorality in the future will be dealt with
more severely, and order him to support his legitimate family as a responsible parent should.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against the respondent for immorality and acts
unbecoming a member of the Bar will be continued despite the fact that the complainant and
the respondent have already reconciled?

HELD: The complaint against the Respondent for immorality and acts unbecoming a member
of the Bar will continue because the most recent reconciliation between complainant and
respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not excuse and wipe away the misconduct and
immoral behavior of the respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting
upon him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant for admission
to membership in the bar is required to show that he is possessed of good moral character. That
requirement is not exhausted and dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On
the contrary, that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the Bar in
good standing.

ADVINCULA V. ATTY. MACABATA


(A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007)

FACTS: Cynthia Advincula filed a disbarment case Atty. Ernesto Macabata on the grounds of
Gross Immorality. Cynthia sought for legal advice from Atty. Macabata regarding her
collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. In a couple meetings they have, Atty. Macabata
gave Cynthia a ride home. As the she gets off the car, Atty. Macabata allegedly held her arm,
kissed her cheek and embraced her tightly and in some other time he forcefully held her face,
kissed her lips and held her breast. Cynthia hires another lawyer for her case. They had
exchange of messages thru sms where the Atty. Macabata apologized. Atty. Macabata admitted
kissing Cynthia on the lips however countered that there was no harassment, intimidation or
lewdness instead everything was spontaneous.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral, or which
constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law

HELD: The acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks are mere gestures of friendship and
camaraderie, form of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of Atty. Macabata, though, in
turning the head of the complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful.
However, such act, even if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly
immoral. The complainant miserably failed to establish the burden of proof required of her.
However, her efforts are lauded to stand up for her honor. The complaint for disbarment
against the respondent, Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality is dismissed. However,
he is reprimanded to be more prudent and cautious in dealing with his clients.
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UI V. BONIFACIO
(A.C. No. 3319, June 8, 2000)
(333 SCRA 28, 2000)

FACTS: A case for disbarment was filed against Atty. Bonifacio on grounds of immoral conduct
for allegedly having an illicit relationship with Carlos Ui, husband of Leslie Ui. Atty. Bonifacio
contended (1) that when she met Carlos Ui, she had known him to be a bachelor but with
children to an estranged Chinese woman who is already in Amoy, China; (2) that they got
married in USA therefore legalizing their relationship; (3) that when she knew of the real status
of Carlos Ui, she stopped their relationship; and (4) that she and Carlos Ui never lived together
as the latter lived with his children to allow them to gradually accept the situation.

ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Bonifacio be disbarred.

HELD: The practice of law is a privilege. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the
mandate of due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. A
lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to
professional probity. In the case at bar, Atty. Bonifacio was not proven to have conducted
herself in a grossly immoral manner. Thus, she may not be disbarred in this case.

IN RE GUTIERREZ, 1962
1962
(G.R. L-363, July 31, 1962)

FACTS: Attorney Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956.
After serving a portion of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President.
He was released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the widow
of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latter’s conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was granted
pardon.

HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely remitted
his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his
conviction for murder without regard to the pardon. The degree of moral turpitude involved is
such as to justify his being purged from the profession.

Canon 1 Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

IN RE: TERRELL
(G.R. No. 1203, May 15, 1903)
(2 Phil 266)

FACTS: Howard D. Terrell was ordered to show cause in the Court of First Instance, in the city
of Manila, why he should not be suspended as a member of the bar. Allegedly, he assisted in
the organization of the “Centro Bellas Artes” Club, after he had been notified that the said
organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in said city and for
acting as attorney for said “Centro Bellas Artes” during the time of and after its organization,
which organization was known to him to be created for the purpose of evading the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Terrell should be suspended from the practice of law.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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HELD: YES. He violated Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that
prohibits lawyer to counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. He should not allow his services to be engaged by an
organization whose members are violating the law, to defend them when they get caught.

ESTRADA V. SB
(G.R. No. 159486-88, November 25, 2003)
(416 SCRA 465)

FACTS: Atty. Alan F. Paguia, as counsel for Estrada, averred that the respondent justices have
violated the Code of Judicial Conduct by attending the ‘EDSA 2 Rally’ and by authorizing the
assumption of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to the Presidency in violation of
the 1987 Constitution. Unable to get a favourable action, Atty. Paguia made his criticisms and
comments using the media. The Court warned Atty. Paguia to refrain from doing such
malicious acts and conduct himself in the manner accorded to a professional lawyer.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Paguia committed a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court will not denounce criticism made by anyone against the Court
for, if well founded, can truly have constructive effects in the task of the Court, but it will not
countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the erosion of our people’s faith in the judicial system,
let alone, by those who have been privileged by it to practise law in the Philippines.

RENERIO SAMBAJON, et at. V. ATTY. JOSE A. SUING


(A.C. No. 7062, September 26, 2006)

FACTS: Renerio Sambajon filed a complaint before the NLRC for ULP and illegal dismissal
against the client of respondent Atty. Jose A. Suing. The NLRC ordered the respondent’s client
to pay Sambajon however, on the basis of the Waiver and Quitclaims purportedly signed a
sworn to by the seven complainants in the ULP and Illegal Dismissal case before the Labor
Arbiter in the present of respondent, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the said case insofar as the
seven complainants were concerned. Herein complainants four of the seven who purportedly
executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims, denied having signed and sworn to before the
Labor Arbiter the said documents or having received the considerations. In related move,
petitioner also filed a criminal complaint for Falsification against respondent lawyer together
with its client-employer of herein complainants. In his Report and Recommendation, the IBP
Commissioner, who conducted an investigation of the administrative complaint at bar,
recommended that respondent be faulted for negligence and that he be reprimanded therefor
with warning.

ISSUE: whether or not respondent can be disbarred for his alleged manipulation of four alleged
RELEASE WAIVER AND QUITCLAIM by herein complainants who subsequently disclaimed
the same as bogus and falsified.

HELD: As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of
justice. He is an instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct,
perverts or impedes the administration of justice constitutes misconduct. Besides, by
respondent's own information, Labor Arbiter Santos was entertaining doubts on the true
identity of those who executed the Release Waiver and Quitclaims. That should have alerted
him to especially exercise the diligence of a lawyer to protect his clients' interest. But he was
not and he did not. While the disbarment of respondent is, under the facts and circumstances
attendant to the case, not reasonable, neither is reprimand as recommended by the IBP. This
Court finds that respondent's suspension from the practice of law for six months is in order.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Canon 1 Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

Rule 138 SEC. 20 of the Rules of Court Duties of attorneys.—it is the duty of an attorney:
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or
delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest

Among the unprofessional acts which come within the prohibition include the lawyer’s: (Agpalo)
a. Volunteering advice to bring lawsuit, except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or
trust make it his duty to do so;
b. Hunting up defects in titles or other causes of action and informing thereof in order to be
employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those claims
for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as
clients;
c. Employing agents or runners for like purposes;
d. Paying reward, directly or indirectly, to those who bring or influence the bringing of such
cases to his office;
e. Remunerating policemen, court or prison officials, physicians, hospital attaches or others who
may succeed, under the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the
criminal, the sick and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek professional services;
f. Searching for unknown heirs and soliciting their employment of him;
g. Initiating a meeting of the members of club and inducing them to organize and contest
legislation under his guidance;
h. Purchasing notes to collect them by litigation at a profit;
i. Furnishing credit reports in expectation of possible employment; and
j. Agreeing with a purchase of future interests to invest therein in consideration of his services

Purpose of the Prohibition


To prevent ambulance chasing,
chasing, this refers to solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by
laymen employed by an attorney for the purpose or by the attorney himself.

ONG V. ATTY. UNTO


(A.C. No. 2417, February 6, 2002)

FACTS: This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong against Atty. Elpidio D. Unto, for
malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. It is evident from the records that he
tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various
charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his
threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant. They,
however, did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client. The
records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him
any information against the complainant just so he would have leverage in his actions against
the latter.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Unto’s act constitute act unbecoming of a lawyer.

HELD: YES. His action is malicious as the cases he instituted against the complainant did not
have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian. Clearly, Atty. Unto
violated the proscription in Rule 1.02 which requires that lawyer shall not, for any corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause. His behavior is
inexcusable.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Canon 1 Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement.

CASTANEDA V. AGO
(G.R. No. L-28546, July 30, 1975)
(65 SCRA 506)

FACTS: Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against the Agos to recover certain
machineries. Judgment was made in their favor. Levy was made on Ago’s house and lots. Ago
moved to stop the auction but the same was dismissed. Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of
preliminary injunction to restrain sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution but his motions
were denied. Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in the replevin
suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife ½ share in their conjugal house could
not legally be reached by the levy made. The same was dismissed. Agos filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it.
Agos filed a similar petition with the CA which also dismissed the petition. Agos appealed to SC
which dismissed the petition. Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
CA which gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Agos’ lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy

HELD: No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the annulment of the
sheriff’s sale, justice demands that the petitioners, long denied the fruits of their victory in the
replevin suit, must now enjoy them, for, the Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the satisfaction of the
judgment, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted position as an
officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to become an instigator of controversy
and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise, a
virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of
truth and moral justice.
A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s cause must
be encouraged and is to be commended. What the SC does not and cannot countenance is a
lawyer’s insistence despite the patent futility of his client’s position. It is the duty of the counsel
to advice his client on the merit or lack of his case. If he finds his client’s cause as defenseless,
then he is his duty to advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the
incontrovertible.

b) Efficient and convenient legal services

CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN EFFICIENT


AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE, INTEGRITY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.

Canon 2 Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the defenseless or
the oppressed.

Rule 138 Sec. 31 of the Rules of Court – A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid free
of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable
to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and
to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required
service, unless he is excused there from by the court for sufficient cause shown.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Legal aid is not a matter of charity. It is a means for the correction of social imbalance that may and
often do lead to injustice, for which reason it is a public responsibility of the Bar. The spirit of public
service should, therefore, underlie all legal aid offices. The same should be administered to indigent
and deserving members of the community on all cases, matters and situations in which legal aid may
be necessary to forestall an injustice. (IBP Handbook, Guidelines Governing the Establishment and
Operation of the Legal Aid Office, Art. 1, Sec. 1)

LEDESMA V. CLIMACO
(G.R. No. L-23815, June 28, 1974)
(57 SCRA 473)

FACTS:
FACTS: Atty. Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case pending in the
sala of Judge Climaco. Atty. Ledesma was appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of
Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He commenced discharging his duties, and filed a motion to
withdraw from his position as counsel de parte. Judge Climaco denied him and also appointed
him as counsel de oficio for the two defendants. Atty. Ledesma filed a motion to be allowed to
withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the COMELEC requires full time service which could
prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge denied the motion. So Atty. Ledesma
instituted this certiorari proceeding.

ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not a member of the bar may withdraw as counsel de oficio due to
appointment as Election Registrar

HELD:
HELD: NO. There was no incompatibility between duty of Atty. Ledesma to defend the
accused, and his task as an election registrar. Atty. Ledesma's withdrawal would be an act
showing his lack of fidelity to the duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have
known that membership in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is
dedicated to the ideal of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer may be required to act as
counsel de officio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such
services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyer's zeal.
The Constitution provides that the accused shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel. "Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel..." ---manifest the indispensable role of a member of the
Bar in the defense of an accused. The right to be assisted by counsel is so important that it is not
enough for the Court to apprise the accused of his right to an attorney, but is essential that the
court assign on de officio for him if he desires/ is poor. Thus, Ledesma should exert himself
sufficiently, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of the
profession in good standing.

Canon 2 Rule 2.02


2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not refuse to
render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent necessary to safeguard the latter’s
rights.

Canon 14 Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client unless:
a) he is in no position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a present
client and the prospective client;

A valid reason to refuse is when the lawyer is not in a position to carry out the work effectively and
competently. However he shall still render legal advice (such as those pertaining to preliminary steps a
person can take). But he shall refrain from giving legal advice if the reason for not accepting the case is
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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that there involves a conflict of interest (between him and a prospective client or between a present
client and a prospective client). In the case mentioned above, rendering legal advice to the prospective
client will establish an attorney-client relationship between them and this will constitute a violation
of the rule prohibiting a lawyer from representing conflicting interests. (Agpalo)

Canon 2 Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit
legal business.

Reason for Prohibition: (Agpalo)


• The general rule is that a lawyer cannot advertise his talent as a shopkeeper advertises his wares. A
lawyer is a member of an honourable profession whose primary purpose is to render public service
and help secure justice and in which remuneration is a mere incident. Such professional
consideration makes a lawyer radically different from a shopkeeper, a trader, a manufacturer or a
money lender whose primordial aim is private gain and whose principal tool, to sell his product or
service, is advertising. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the
practice of law, lower the profession in public confidence and lessen its ability to ren render
der
efficiently that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.
called

• Advertising inescapably involves self-praise or puffing

• Advertising may lead to assertion of fraudulent claims, corruption of public officials, and attacks
on marital stability

• It may encourage lawyers to engage in overreaching, overcharging, under representation and


misrepresentation

• It will increase lawsuits and result in needless litigations and inciting to strife otherwise peaceful
citizens

Exceptions to this Rule: (Agpalo)


- publication in reputable law list with brief biographical and other informative data which may
include name, associates, address, phone numbers, branches of law practiced, birthday, day
admitted to the bar, schools and dates attended, degrees and distinctions, authorships, teaching
positions, associations, legal fraternities and societies, references and regularly represented clients
must be published for that purpose;
- an ordinary, simple professional card;
- publication of simple announcement of opening of law firm, change of firm;
- telephone directory (but not under designation of special branch of law);
- if acting as an associate (specializing in a branch of law), may publish a brief and dignified
announcement to lawyers (law list, law journal);
- working in a public office (which can be filled only by a lawyer);
- full time position as corporate counsel;
- if in media, those acts incidental to his practice (i.e., not his own initiative);
- write articles for publication giving information upon the law (and not individual rights or
advising through column/ TV broadcast, lest such be considered indirect advertising);
- If entering into other businesses (which are not inconsistent with lawyer’s duties) then it is
advisable that they be entirely separate and apart such that a layman could distinguish between
the two functions.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Canon 2 Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily prescribed unless
the circumstances so warrant.

What the rule prohibits is the competition in the matter of charging professional fees for the purposed
of attracting clients in favor of the lawyer who offers lower rates. The rule does not prohibit a lawyer
from charging a reduced fee or none at all to an indigent or to a person who would have difficulty
paying the fee usually charged for such services. (Agpalo)

c) True, honest fair, dignified and objective information on legal services

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE,
HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Section 27 of Rule 138 of Rules of Court - The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

IN RE LUIS B. TAGORDA
(53 Phil 37, March 23, 1929)

FACTS: Luis B. Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela,
admits that previous to the last general elections he made use of a card written in Spanish and
Ilocano that states what he can do for the people as a lawyer and as a notary public. Also, he
wrote a letter to a lieutenant of his barrio asking him to inform the people in any town
meetings that he will still exercise his profession as a lawyer and notary public despite his
election as a Board member, even adding that he will only charge three pesos for registration of
their land titles.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice for soliciting employment.

HELD: Tagorda is guilty of malpractice, for soliciting employment when he used card that states
his capabilities as a lawyer and a notary public and writing a letter informing the people that he
still exercises his profession despite election as a board member. This violates Canon 3 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states: "A lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statements of facts." and
Section 27 of Rule 138 which states: "The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." Tagorda
stands convicted of having solicited cases in defiance of the law and those canons.

DIRECTOR OF LEGAL
LEGAL AFFAIRS V. BAYOT
(A.C. No. L-1117, March 20, 1944)
(74 Phil 579)

FACTS: Atty. Bayot is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in
Sunday Tribunal on June 13, 1943 which reads as follows:

“Marriage license promptly secured thru our assistance and the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired and marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free
for the poor. Everything confidential”
“Legal assistance service
12 Escolta, Manila
Room 105, Tel. 2-41-60”
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ISSUE: Whether or not the act of Atty. Bayot constitute act unbecoming of a lawyer.

HELD: YES. The advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by Atty. Bayot of the ethics
of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule
127 expressly provides among other things that “the practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.” It
is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practice of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as
the money-changers of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. “The most worthy and effective
advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer is the establishment of a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but must be the
outcome of character and conduct.” (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

ULEP V.
V. LEGAL CLINIC
(A.C. No. L-553, June 17, 1993)
(223 SCRA 378)

FACTS: The Legal Clinic was organized by Nogales. It is composed mainly of paralegals. It
makes ads which pertain to the practice of the law profession such as:

SECRET MARRIAGE? P560 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.


ANNULMENT. VISA. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Pls call: 5210767, 5217232, 5222041 8:30am-6pm 7F Victoria Bldg., UN Ave, Mla

Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because (1) it is engaged in the
practice of law but its people are not lawyers and (2) its advertisements are unethical.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law
2. Whether or not their services can be advertised.

HELD:
1. Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being
offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.
Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

2. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of
facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents
or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the
advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous
marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly
reprehensible. The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are
allowed. The best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of
character and conduct.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Canon 3 Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.

Canon 2 Rule 2.02 of Code of Judicial Conduct-


Conduct A judge should not seek publicity for personal
vainglory.

KHAN V. SIMBILIO,
SIMBILIO,
(409 SCRA 229, 2003)

FACTS: Atty. Simbillo advertised his services in a Philippine Daily Inquirer ad which read
“Annulment of Marriage Specialist 532-433/521-2667.” Atty. Ismael Khan, Jr., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information Office filed an
administrative complaint against Atty. Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation in
violation of Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. The Court held that the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed.
However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the
legal profession. The use of simple signs stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office,
and the residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisements in legal periodicals
bearing the same brief data and the use of calling cards are permissible. The publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon,
of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowed.

Canon 3 Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name shall be used.
The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible provided that the firm indicates in
all its communications that said partner is deceased.

DACANAY V BAKER & MCKENZIE


(A.M. 2131, May 10, 1985)
(136 SCRA 349)

Filipino lawyers cannot practice law under the name of a foreign law firm, as the latter cannot
practice law in the Philippines and the use of the foreign law firm is unethical.

FACTS: Dacanay seeks to enjoin Torres and nine other lawyers from practicing law under
Baker & McKenzie (a law firm organized in Illinois, USA). Torres used the letterhead of Baker
& McKenzie on a letter to Rosie Clurman that asks her to release 87 shares of Cathay Products
Int’l., Inc. to Gabriel (a client). Dacanay denied any liability of Clurman and asked whether she
is being represented by Baker & McKenzie as counsel as well as the purpose of the letterhead.
No reply coming from Clurman thus this administrative case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lawyers should be enjoined from practicing law under Baker &
McKenzie.

HELD: Yes, they should be enjoined. Baker & McKenzie is an alien law firm and cannot
practice law in the country. Using the name constitutes representation that being associated
with the firm they could render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investments. This is unethical because
Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice in the Philippines.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FI FIRM
RM
NAME – OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, ETC. AND PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO
CONTINUE USE OF FIRM NAME – SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, ETC. (1979)

FACTS: Two separate Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip
and that of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta who died, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in
the names of their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. They contended that the
continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom, is
not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use. They further contended that no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased
partner's name in a professional firm's name.

HELD: Surviving partners cannot continue to use the names of the deceased partners.
Continued use will run counter to Art. 1815 CC which tacitly provides that names in a firm
name of a partnership must be those of living partners and, in case of non-partners, should be
living persons who can be subject to liability. The public relations value of the use of an old
firm name can create undue advantage and disadvantage in the practice of the profession.

Note:
This ruling has been abandoned by a new ruling in the latest jurisprudence decided by the
Supreme Court. It is said that the continued use of the name of a deceased partner is
permissible provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is
deceased. The reason for allowing the continued use of the name of the deceased partner is that
all of the partners by their joint efforts over a period of years contributed to the goodwill
attached to the firm name, and this goodwill is disturbed by a change in firm name every time a
partner dies. The name of a law firm may not necessarily identify the individual members of
the firm, and consequently, the continued use of the firm name after the death of one or more
partners is not a deception.

Canon 3 Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his
name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently.

Rule 138 Sec. 35 of the Rules of Court - No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts
or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advice to clients.

No Senator or member of the House of Representative may personally appear before any court of
justice or before the Electoral Tribunal, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies xxx
(1987 Philippine Constitution Article VI, Sec 14)

The President, Vice-President, the members of the cabinet and assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall
not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any profession xxx
(1987 Philippine Constitution Article VII, Sec 13)

No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession xxx
(1987 Philippine Constitution Article IX, Sec 2)
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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SAMONTE V. GATDULA
(A.M. No. P-99-1292, February 26, 1999)
(303 SCRA 756)

FACTS: Julieta Borromeo Samonte charged Rolando R. Gatdula with grave misconduct
consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which is in conflict with his
official functions as Branch Clerk of Court. Samonte represents her sister as plaintiff in a civil
case for ejectment. Contrary to their expectation that execution will proceed, they instead
received a temporary restraining order. Samonte contends that the order was hasty and irregular
as she was never notified of the application for preliminary injunction. Gatdula blamed
Samonte’s lawyer for writing the address in the complaint for ejectment and told her that if she
wanted the execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain his law office, at the
same time giving his calling card with the name “Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and
Celera.”

ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not Gatdula is guilty of infraction

HELD:
HELD: Yes. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card constitutes an act of
solicitation which violates Section 7, subpar. (b)(2) of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which declares it unlawful for a public official or
employees to, among others: “(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict with official
functions.” Respondent is reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law. He is further
ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in the firm name of any office engaged in the private
practice of law.

Canon 3 Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass
media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.

Media publicity,
publicity as a normal by-product of efficient legal service, is not improper. What is
improper is for a lawyer to resort to adroit propaganda to secure media publicity for the
purpose of attracting legal business. The purpose of the rule is to prevent some lawyers from
gaining an unfair advantage over others through the use of gimmickry, press agentry, or
other artificial means. (Agpalo)
(Agpalo)

CRUZ V. SALVA
(G.R. No. L12871, July 25, 1959)
(105 Phil 1151)

FACTS: Fiscal Salva conducted the investigation of the case concerning the killing of Monroy, in
the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City to accommodate the public and members
of the press. Also, he told the press that “if you want to ask question, I am allowing you to do so
and the questions will be reproduced as my own”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the fiscal in sensationalizing the case unethical?

HELD: Yes. Fiscal Salva should be publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled and wide
publicity and sensationalism that he had given to and allowed in connection with his
investigation, whatever be his motive, which is considered and found to be contempt of court.
Canon 3 Rule 3.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall
not pay or give anything of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in
return for, publicity to attract legal business.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Notarial Law

ANGELES V. IBAÑEZ
(A.C. No. 7860, January 15, 2009)

FACTS: A complaint was filed against Atty. Amado O. Ibañez for disbarment for notarizing the
“Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale” in the absence of the affiants, relying merely on the
representation of his confidential secretary Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing on
the “Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale” subject of the present complaint are those of
her co-heirs.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ibanez violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional
Responsibility when he notarized the “Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale” in the
absence of the affiants.

HELD: YES. Respondent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his recklessness
and his failure to comply with the requirements of the law by relying on his confidential
secretary. Section 2(b) of Rule IV of the Rules on Notarial Practice of 2004 reads: A person shall
not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or document -
(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) Is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules. The physical presence
of the affiants enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the
acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act and deed.

SPOUSES SANTUYO V. HIDALGO


(A.C. No. 5838, January 17, 2005)
(448 SCRA 282)

FACTS: This is an administrative case against Atty. Hidalgo for being negligent in his notarial
duty when he allowed his secretaries by themselves affix the dry seals of the junior associates
on documents relating to cases handled by the firm. It turned out that in one instant, Spouses
Santuyo was able to notarize their Deed of Sale making it appear that it was signed by Atty.
Hidalgo and carrying with it the firm’s dry seal.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was negligent in his notarial duty

HELD: The SC found a notary public negligent in his duty for allowing office secretaries to
perform his notarial functions, i.e., safekeeping of his notarial dry seal and notarial register.
The Court held that “considering that the responsibility attached to a notary public is sensitive,
respondent should have been more discreet and cautious in the execution of his duties as such
and should not have wholly entrusted everything to the secretaries; otherwise he should not
have been commissioned as notary public.”

SICAT V. ARIOLA
(A.C. No. 5864, April 15, 2005)
(456 SCRA 93)

FACTS: This is a disbarment case against Atty. Gregorio Ariola for violating Rule 1.01 of
Canon1 by notarizing an SPA purportedly executed by a certain Benitez at a time when
Benitez was already dead.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Ariola guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility?


FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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HELD: YES. The Court held that a notary public should not authenticate documents unless the
persons who signed them are the very same persons who executed them and personally
appeared before them to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated therein.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routinary act. It converts a private document
into a public instrument, making it admissible in evidence without the necessity of preliminary
proof of its authenticity and due execution

SANTIAGO V. RAFANAN
(A.C. No. 6252, October 05, 2004)

FACTS: This is a disbarment case against Atty. Edison Rafanan filed by Jonar Santiago, an
employee of the Bureau of Jail Management & Penology (BJMP). It charged Atty. Rafanan
with violation of the Rules on Notarial Practice, among others. Complainant alleged, among
others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on different dates failed and/or
refused to: a) make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of
the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make
and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had
notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.
Respondent claimed that he believed that the non-notation of their Residence
Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed. He opined that the
notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public
and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other
government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to
before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the
affiants.

ISSUE: Did Atty. Rafanan violate the Notarial Law?

HELD:
HELD Yes, the Court held that Atty. Rafanan violated the Notarial Law.
The Court in its Decision stated:
“The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are
required to certify that the party to every document acknowledged before them has presented
the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number,
place of issue and date as part of such certification. They are also required to maintain and
keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to “give to each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the
one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the
same is recorded.” Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their
commission as notaries public.
These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the
degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public
entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.”
In Vda. De Rosales v. Ramos, the Court explained the value and meaning of
notarization as follows:
“The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is
invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a
public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without further
proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit
upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to
rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument.”
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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d) Participation in the improvement and reforms in legal system

CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM


BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE IMPROVEMENT OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

While the lawyer’s task in contributing to the improvement of the legal system is not a matter of strict
duty, it is a duty nevertheless that flows from the lawyer’s sense of public responsibility. The
improvement of the legal system cannot, however, be done by dreaming in a vacuum. The lawyer
must recognize that the law is a part of vast social network and whether he likes it or not, he has to
interact with the rest of society. There is thus the need on the part of the lawyer to transcend the
narrow limits of technical law. Intricately woven is the law with the social fabric that the legal
profession cannot afford to confine itself to narrowly technical legal questions. A lawyer must broaden
out and continue to grow in knowledge and competence in order to be able to make the law socially
responsive. (Agpalo)

e) Participation in legal education program

CANON 5 - A LAWYER
LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS; PARTICIPATE IN
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE HIGH
STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL TRAINING OF LAW
STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING INFORMATION REGARDING THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE.

OGKA-
OGKA-BENITO V. JUDGE BALINDONG
(A.M. No. RTJ-08-2103, February 23, 2009)

FACTS: Dr. Benito obtained a favourable judgment from the Ombudsman in an administrative
complaint she filed against the municipal treasurer of Balabagan, Lanao Del Sur for grave
misconduct. To implement said judgment, the Regional Director of the DILG-ARMM issued
Department Order. Meanwhile, respondents in the administrative case above-mentioned filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition in the RTC of Malabang, Lanao Del Sur. The petition was
raffled to the sala of Judge Balindong. The latter rendered an “order”/decision annulling the
Department Order and issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Dr. Benito charged Judge
Balindong with gross ignorance of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent be held administratively liable for gross ignorance of the
law.

HELD: YES. A patent disregard of simple, elementary and well-known rules constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with
laws and procedural rules. They must know the law and apply it properly in good faith. They
are likewise expected to keep abreast of prevailing jurisprudence. For a judge who is plainly
ignorant of the law taints the noble office and great privilege vested in him. Judge Balindong’s
gross ignorance of the law constituted inexcusable incompetence which was anathema to the
effective dispensation of justice. Since the Department Order was issued merely to implement
the decision of the Ombudsman, respondents in administrative case were actually questioning
this decision and seeking to enjoin its implementation by filing a petition for certiorari and
prohibition in the RTC. This is not allowed under the law, rules and jurisprudence. Judge
Balindong’s act of taking cognizance of a case which was plainly not within his court’s
jurisdiction failed to meet the high standards of judicial conduct.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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THREE-
HREE-FOLD OBLIGATION OF A LAWYER
1. First, he owes it to himself to continue improving his knowledge of the laws;
2. Second, he owes it to his profession to take an active interest in the maintenance of high standards
of high education.
3. Third, he owes it to the law public to make the law a part of their social consciousness.

BAR MATTER 850: MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)


(Adopting the Rules on the Continuing Legal Education for Members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines) August 8, 2000

Purpose: To ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.

Requirements of Completion
Completion of MCLE
Members of the IBP, unless exempted under Rule 7, shall complete every three (3) years at
least 36 hours of continuing legal education activities.
The 36 hours shall be divided as follows:
a. 6 hours – legal Ethics
b. 4 hours – trial and pretrial skills
c. 5 hours – alternative dispute resolution
d. 9 hours – updates on substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence
e. 4 hours – writing and oral advocacy
f. 2 hours – international law and international conventions
g. 6 hours – such other subjects as may be prescribed by the Committee on MCLE

Parties Exempted from the MCLE


1. The President, Vice-President, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of executive
departments;
2. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
3. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the SC, incumbent and retired justices of the
judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers
covered by the Philippine Judicial Academy Program of continuing legal education;
4. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Justice;
5. The Solicitor-General and the Assistant Solicitor-General;
6. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
7. The Chairman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
8. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsman and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
9. Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
10. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at
least 10 years in accredited law schools;
11. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professional Lecturers of the
Philippine Judicial Academy; and
12. Governors and Mayors

Other Exempted Parties


1. Those who are not in law practice, private or public
2. Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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f) Lawyers in Government Service

CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE


DISCHARGE
DISCHARGE OF THEIR OFFICIAL TASKS.

MACOCO V. DIAZ
(A.C. No. 853, June 22, 1940)
(70 Phil 97)

FACTS: This is a disbarment case against Fiscal Diaz. In order to redeem a property belonging to
his wife's father, which had been levied upon sold at public auction; Marcelino Macoco
deposited with the provincial sheriff the sum of P380. As no redemption could be done, the
money was returned by the sheriff to one Alberto Suguitan, then counsel for Marcelino Macoco.
Suguitan used the money according to himself and failed to turn it over to Macoco; whereupon,
the latter entrusted its collection to Fiscal Esteban B. Diaz. It appears that Diaz succeeded in
collecting P300 from Suguitan, but he also misappropriated this amount.

ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not Fiscal Diaz be disbarred

HELD: YES. Whatever might have been the agreement and with whomsoever Fiscal Diaz might
have entered it into, the undeniable fact remains that he misappropriated the money in breach
of trust. This makes him unfit for the office of an attorney-at-law. And his being a deputy fiscal
and not law practitioner at the time of the misappropriation, far from mitigating his guilt,
aggravates it. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office.

COLLANTES V. ATTY. RENOMERON


(A.C. No. 3056, August 16, 1991)
(200 SCRA 584)

FACTS: This complaint for disbarment is related to the administrative case which complainant
Attorney Fernando T. Collantes, house counsel for V & G Better Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V &
G for short), filed against Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City,
for the latter's irregular actuations with regard to the application of V & G for registration of 163
pro forma Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in its subdivision. The respondent was
found guilty in the investigation conducted in its agency hence, the petitioner filed for
disbarment against respondent.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by for his
malfeasances as a public official.

HELD: Yes. The lawyer's oath (Rule 138, Section 17, Rules of Court; People vs. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968), imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The
lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action. The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to
lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Just as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials requires public officials and employees to
process documents and papers expeditiously and prohibits them from directly or indirectly
having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office,
and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of any
transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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DIANA RAMOS V. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG


(A.C. No. 6788, August 23, 2007)

FACTS:
FACTS Diana Ramos sought the assistance of Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal
actions against the spouses Jovellanos. Ramos tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases
against the Jovellanos. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always
told her to wait outside. He would then come out after several hours to inform her that the
hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each "appearance"
in court, respondent charged her P350. After six consecutive postponements, the complainant
became suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the trial courts. She
was shocked to learn that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanos and that he was
in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).

ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not, the respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility sufficient to warrant disbarment.

HELD:
HELD YES. Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity. More
specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to be more conscientious of their
actuations as they are subject to public scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also
public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public service. Government employees are expected
to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the private practice of
profession is prohibited. Section 7(b) (2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public
officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared unlawful:
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees
during their incumbency shall not:
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict with their official function.

Canon 6 Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but
to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

PEOPLE V. PINEDA
(20 SCRA 748)

FACTS: Teofilo Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza and their 3 children were killed
by respondents. The respondent Judge directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal
cases, and to file single information and drop the other four cases. The City Fiscal sought
reconsideration thereof. The respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider.

ISSUE: May a City Fiscal be compelled to file a single information in this case.

HELD: NO. The benefit of the doubt belongs to the prosecuting attorney. The prosecuting
attorney is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not
convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand
points to a different conclusion.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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SUAREZ V. PLATON
(G.R. No. 46371, February 7, 1940)
(69 Phil 556)

FACTS: Atty. Fortunato Suarez was riding a train on his way to Calauag, Tayabas. Apparently he
was very vocal and he was despising the abuses made by government officers. Incidentally,
Lieutenant Vivencio Orais was aboard the train. Orais arrested Suarez and charged him with
sedition. Orais however later moved for the dismissal of the case upon the instruction of his
superior. Thereafter, Suarez filed a case against Orais for arbitrary detention. The Fiscal
handling the case dismissed it on the ground that there is insufficient evidence to prosecute the
case. Eventually, the case was dismissed by Judge Servillano Platon. Suarez wants the case
reinstated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be reinstated.

HELD: No. The fiscals are well within their rights not to push through with the case if they find
the evidence to be insufficient. The prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a
peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt
shall not escape or innocence shall suffer.

Canon 6 Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote
or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

ALI V. BUBONG
(A.C. No. 4018, March 8, 2005)

FACTS: It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case
earlier filed by complainant Omar P. Ali against respondent Atty. Musib Bubong. In said case,
which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA), complainant
charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
and manipulating the criminal complaint filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for
violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the records that the Baudali Datus are
relatives of respondent.

ISSUE: Did atty. Bubong violate Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD: YES. In the case at bar, respondent’s grave misconduct, as established by the Office of
the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer.
By taking advantage of his office as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his
knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives, respondent
had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil servant but
also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 requires that a lawyer in the government
service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow
the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondent’s conduct manifestly undermined the people’s confidence in the public
office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-
conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of the law calls for nothing less than the
withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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MISAMIN V. SAN JUAN


(A.M. 1418, August 31, 1976)
(72 SCRA 491)

FACTS: Atty. Miguel San Juan is a Captain of the Metro Manila Police and a member of the Bar.
He was charged for coercing an employee Jose Misamin to agree to drop the charges file by him
against his employer for violation of the minimum wage law whom Atty. San Juan is allegedly
representing. The said matter was referred to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. The solicitor-general dismissed the charges against Atty. San Juan for lack
of evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal was proper.

HELD: The conclusion arrived at by the solicitor-general was in accordance with the Tionko
Doctrine which states that “The serious consequences of disbarment or suspension should
follow only where there is a clear preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The
presumption is that the attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty
as an officer of the court in accordance with his oath”. Wherefore the administrative case
against the respondent is dismissed for not having been duly proved.

Canon 6 Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

PNB V. ATTY. CEDO


(A.C. No. 3701, March 28, 1995)
(243 SCRA 1)

FACTS: PNB filed a complaint against Atty. Cedo for violation of Rule 6.03 that states:
A lawyer shall not, after leaving Government Service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter which he had intervened within said service. Cedo was the former
Asst. Vice-President of the Asset management Group of PNB. During Cedo’s stint with PNB, he
became involved in 2 transactions: 1.) sale of steel sheets to Ms. Ong; and 2.) Intervened in the
handling of a loan of spouses Almeda. When a civil action arose because of #1, Cedo, after
leaving the bank appeared as one of the counsel of Ms. Ong. Also, when #2 was involved in a
civil action, the Almedas were represented by the law firm Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates
of which Cedo was a Senior Partner. Cedo claims that he did not participate in the litigation of
Ms. Ong’s case. He also claims that even if it was his law firm handling the Almeda case, the
case was being handled by Atty. Ferrer.

ISSUE: Whether or not violated Rule 6.03.

HELD: YES. In the complexity of what is said in the course of dealings between the atty. and
the client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the trial,
of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainant cause. Whatever may be said
as to w/n the atty. utilized against his former client information given to him in a professional
capacity, the mere fact that their previous relationship should have precluded him from
appearing as counsel for the other side.
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all the parties
concerned after the disclosure of facts. A lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf
of one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to
oppose.
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OLAZO V. TINGA
(A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010)

FACTS: The complainant Jovito Olazo filed a sales application covering a parcel of land in
Taguig. The land was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that was segregated and declared
open for disposition.

The Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03


The second charge involves a parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded
Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. In
addition, the complainant alleged that the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of
nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant
claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo,
the Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an
"Assurance" where he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach of the standard ethical conduct -
when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who represented a client before
the office he was previously connected with.

HELD: R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose
certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in private practice after their separation
from the service.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency. By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in
the practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is
authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with his or her official functions. The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an
exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the government service who are
covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is
imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits
lawyers, after leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword
in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term “intervene” which we
previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings. Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter
which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the
outcome of the proceedings.

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously
interfered with the sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a
member of the Committee on Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that
the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by
the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single document.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) V. SANDIGANBAYAN


(G.R. Nos. 151809-12, April 12, 2005)

FACTS: In herein case, PCGG questions the ethical propriety of a former Solicitor General, in
the person of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who now stands as the private lawyer of the Lucio Tan
group who was benefitted in the liquidation proceeding of GENBANK which was declared
insolvent. PCGG filed motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et
al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil and counsel to Central
Bank, “actively intervened” in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired
by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting “engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Mendoza violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: The Court ruled in the negative reasoning that the advice given by respondent Mendoza
on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. It grounded its determination on ABA Formal Opinion No.
342 which clearly stresses that the “drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law” are acts which do not
fall within the scope of the term “matter” in Rule 6.03 and therefore cannot be a ground for
disqualification.
Moreover, it explained that the term intervention in Rule 6.03 cannot be insubstantial
and insignificant. Given that the 1969 Code restricted the latitude of the term intervention,
hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the lawyer, while in
the government service, had “substantial responsibility.” The 1983 Model Rules further
constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that “a lawyer shall not represent a
private client in connection with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and
substantially as a public officer or employee.”

2. To the legal profession


a) Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(i) Membership and dues

CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

IN RE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR

FACTS: The oath-taking of the newly elected officers of the 1989 election of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) was suspended by the Supreme Court due to the widespread reports
about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates. Among the allegations
were the use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws. There was also
the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly “wined and
dined continuously, womanized, and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes
for the national positions in the Integrated Bar.

ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not the elected officers conducted their campaign preparatory to the
elections in violation of the IBP By-laws and made a travesty of the idea of a “strictly
nonpolitical”
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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HELD: The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-
Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a
corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the laws, duty to promote
respect for law and legal processes, abstain from activities aimed at defiance of law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS


EXAMINATIONS
(B.M. 1222, February 4, 2004)
(421 SCRA 703)

FACTS: The Supreme Court, after inquiry and investigation, found out that there had been a
leakage of the questions in the 2003 Mercantile Law Bar Examination. The Court, therefore,
nullified the results in the examination on the said subject. The investigation revealed that a
certain Atty. Danilo de Guzman, one of the assistant attorneys at the Balgos and Perez Law
Firm, was responsible for the leakage. Atty. Marcial Balgos, a senior partner in the firm,
happened to have been commissioned by Justice Jose Vitug to prepare questions in mercantile
law. Atty. de Guzman admitted to downloading the questions from Atty. Balgos' computer and
distributing the same to two of his fraternity brothers. From that point, the leaked questions
spread and an unknown number of examinees were able to obtain copies thereof. Atty. de
Guzman was thus disbarred, while Atty. Balgos was reprimanded for his negligence and lack of
due care in safeguarding the proposed questions in mercantile law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the disbarment of Atty. de Guzman was proper.

HELD: The disbarment was proper. Atty. de Guzman, by transmitting and distributing the
stolen test questions to some members of the his fraternity, possibly for pecuniary profit and to
give them undue advantage over the other examinees in mercantile law, abetted cheating and
dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 as well as Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Atty. de Guzman was
guilty of misconduct unbecoming a member of the bar. He violated the law instead of
promoting respect for it and degraded the noble profession instead of upholding its dignity and
integrity.

LETTER OF
OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR. REQUESTING EXEMPTION
EXEMPTION FROM
PAYMENT OF IBP DUES
(B.M. 1370, May 9, 2005)
(458 SCRA 209)

FACTS: In his letter, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues allegedly unpaid
for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he
became part of the Philippine Civil Service, then migrated to, and worked in, the USA until his
retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years
that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the
practice of one's profession while in government service, and neither can he be assessed for the
years when he was working in the USA.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the
time that he was inactive in the practice of law

Held: NO. The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population. This requires membership and financial support of every attorney as
condition sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court. It must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a
privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure
to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such
drastic move.
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b) Upholding the dignity and integrity of the profession

Canon 7 Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.

LEDA V. TABANG
(A.C. No. 2505, February 21, 1992)

FACTS: Evangeline Leda challenges Atty. Trebonian Tabang’s good moral character. It appears
that the two contracted marriage under as one of the exceptional character under Article 76 of
the Civil Code. The parties agreed to keep their marriage a secret until Tabang had finished his
law studies and had taken the Bar examinations. After Tabang’s law studies and bar
examinations, Leda blocked his oath-taking claiming that Tabang had acted fraudulently when
he filled out his application declaring he was single and is thus unworthy to take the lawyer’s
Oath for lack of good moral character.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Trebonian Tabang violated Rule 7.01 of Canon 7 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: YES. The Court held that Atty. Tabang’s declaration in his application for Admission to
the 1981Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact
made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter
II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable
for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his
application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have
disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack
of good moral character.

Canon 7 Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person
known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.

A lawyer should not readily execute an affidavit of good moral character in favor of an applicant who
has not live up to the standard set by law. He should volunteer information or cooperate in any
investigation concerning alleged anomaly in the bar examination. This is to help guard the profession
from candidates who are unfit or unqualified. He should expose without fear or favor before the SC
corrupt or dishonest conduct in the profession and should not hesitate to accept professional
employment against a lawyer who has wronged his client. (Agpalo)

Canon 7 Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

Gross immorality reflective of unfitness to practice


A grossly immoral act is one that is as corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
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TAN V. SABANDAL
(B.M. No. 44, February 24, 1992)
(206 SCRA 493)

FACTS: Sabandal passed the 1987 Bar Examination. He was not allowed to take his oath by the
Supreme Court, in view of the finding by the latter of that he is guilty of unauthorized practice
of law. In his application for admission, Sabandal claimed that there is no pending case against
him. It was later found out that he has a pending civil case in his court for
cancellation/reversion proceedings when the same was still working as Investigator in the
Bureau of Lands, wherein he was able to secure a free patent and later a Certificate of Title over
a swampland, which was later mortgaged to a bank and was foreclosed, although, the case was
amicably settled.

ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent can still be admitted to the Practice of Law?

HELD: No. Time and again, it has been held that the practice of law is not a matter of right but
is a privilege bestowed upon those who are not only leaned in the law but also those who
possess good moral character. The acts of the respondent when he was still working with the
Bureau of Land is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the public service which cannot
be erased by the dismissal of the case. His failure to reveal the pendency of the said case in his
petitions reveals his lack of candor and truthfulness. The term “good moral character” admits
broad definitions, including even common dishonesty.

SABURNIDO
SABURNIDO V. MADRONO
(A.C. No. 4497, September 26, 2001)
(366 SCRA 1)

FACTS: Spouses Venustiano and Rosalia Saburnido filed an administrative complaint for
disbarment against Atty. Florante Madrono. Saburnido allege that Atty. Madrono has been
harassing them by filing numerous complaints against them in addition to committing acts of
dishonest. Previous to this case, Saburnido also filed 3 separate administrative cases against Atty.
Madrono, which led to the latter’s dismissal from the judiciary and forfeiture of his retirement
benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Madrono’s act of filling multiple complaints constitute gross
misconduct that will warrant the imposition of administrative sanctions.

HELD: YES. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct, in his professional or private capacity
that renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the court. Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to at all times uphold the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession. Clearly, Atty. Madrono’s act of filing multiple complaints
against the Saburnido reflects on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His act
evinces vindictiveness, a decidedly undesirable trait whether in a lawyer or another individual,
as Saburnido were instrumental in Atty. Madrono’s dismissal from the judiciary. There is in
Atty. Madrono’s tenacity in pursuing several cases against the Saburnido not the persistence of
one who has been grievously wronged but the obstinacy of one who is trying to exact revenge.
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ZAGUIRRE V. CASTILLO
(A.C. No. 4921, March 6, 2003)
(398 SCRA 659)

FACTS: Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair
with Carmelita Zaguirre. This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while Castillo was
reviewing for the bar and before the release of its results. Zaguirre then got pregnant allegedly
with Castillo as the father. The latter, who was already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit
recognizing the child and promising for her support which did not materialize after the birth of
the child.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and should be
punished with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension.

HELD: The Court meted respondent the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of
law. The attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and
undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his
part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to
self-stultification. His repeated sexual congress with a woman not his wife and now refuses to
recognize and support a child whom he previously recognized and promised to support is a
clear violation of the standards of morality required of the legal profession. The rule is settled
that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or
good demeanor.

c) Courtesy, fairness and candor towards professional colleagues

CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND


AVOID
CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AV OID HARASSING
TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.

JAVIER V. CORNEJO
(A.C. No. 778, August 14, 1936)
(63 Phil 293)

FACTS: Atty. Javier was the lawyer of Severina Teodoro in a civil case where Severina won.
The monetary award was delivered by the opposing party to Javier as Severina’s lawyer. Javier
however failed to deliver said amount to her. Subsequently, Severina hired the services of
another lawyer, Atty. Cornejo who sent a demand letter to Javier. Javeir failed to pay yet again
so Atty. Cornejo assisted Severina in filing an administrative complaint against Javier. The
administrative complaint against Javier was eventually dismissed. After said dismissal, Javier
filed an administrative case against Cornejo accusing the latter of threatening him and
instigating Severina to file an administrative case against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the administrative complaint of Atty. Javier has merit.

HELD: No. The language used in the demand letter is not threatening. It was an honest effort
on the part of Cornejo to serve the interest of his client. The lawyer owes entire “devotion to
the interest of his client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and exertion of
his utmost learning and ability”, to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save
by the rules of law, legally applied. Cornejo could not have instigated Severina to file the
administrative complaint. Severina already knew of what remedy to seek against Javier if he
fails to deliver what’s due her even before she hired Cornejo. The Supreme Court also stated:
“…mutual bickering and unjustifiable recrimination, between brother attorneys detract from
the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any sympathy from this court.”
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Canon 8 Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

The fact that one of the lawyers conducts him/herself improperly does not relieve the other from
professional obligation in his relation with him/her. (Agpalo)

FOODSPHERE V. MAURICIO, SUPRA

HELD: To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to
use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However,
while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not
justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not
offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party
or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.

CRUZ V. ATTY. CABRERA


(AC No. 5737, October 25, 2004)

FACTS: An administrative complaint filed by Ferdinand A. Cruz charges respondent Atty.


Stanley Cabrera with misconduct in violation of the code of Professional Responsibility. The
complainant, a fourth year law student, appears in court in his own behalf as he instituted a
case against his neighbour who is represented by the respondent as counsel. During a hearing,
the respondent engulfed with anger in a raising voice to the complainant saying “appear ka ng
appear, pumasa ka munsa”, wherein the manner, substance and the tone of voice and how the
words were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign,
ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public. The respondent uttered
remarks that the complainant finds arrogant and misconduct in the performance of his duties
as a lawyer. The complaint was referred to the IBP commissioner who recommended
suspension of respondent in the practice of law which was annulled by a resolution of the IBP
Board recommending dismissal of the case for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the manner of respondent may constitute misconduct?

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals has opted to resolve the case in the interest of justice and
speedy disposition of cases. The Court held that respondent’s outburst of “Appear ka ng appear,
pumas aka muna” does not amount to violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The court ruled that although the outburst of the respondent is uncalled for, it
is not to such a magnitude as to warrant his suspension in the practice of his profession. The
court thereby dismissed the case due to lack of merit.

Canon 8 Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give
proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

A lawyer should not steal the other lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by promise of
better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Neither should he disparage another, make
comparisons or publicize his talent as a means to further his law practice. (Agpalo)
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He may accept employment to handle a matter previously handled by another lawyer, provided that
the other lawyer has been given notice of termination of service. Without such notice, he shall only
appear once he has obtained conformity or has, at the very least, given sufficient notice of
contemplated substitution. A lawyer’s appearance in the case without notice to the first lawyer
amounts to an improper encroachment upon the professional employment of the original counsel.

A lawyer should not, in the absence of the adverse party’s counsel, interview the adverse party and
question him as to the facts of the case even if the adverse party was willing to do so. Neither should
he sanction the attempt of his client to settle a litigated matter with the adverse party without the
consent nor is knowledge of the latter counsel. (cf. Canon 9) (Agpalo)

A client’s proffer of assistance of additional counsel should not be regarded as evidence of want of
confidence but the matter should be left to the determination of the client. The 2nd lawyer should
communicate with the 1st before making an appearance. Should the 1st lawyer object, he should
decline association but if the 1st lawyer is relieved, he may come into the case. (Agpalo)

When there is conflict of opinions between two lawyers jointly associated in a case, the client should
decide. The decision should be accepted unless the nature of the difference makes it impracticable for
the lawyer whose judgment has been overruled to cooperate effectively. In this event, it is his/her
duty to ask client to relieve him/her. (Agpalo)

REYES V. CHIONG
(A.C. No. 5148, July 1, 2003)

FACTS: Atty. Ramon Reyes is the counsel for Xu. Atty. Victoriano Chiong, Jr. is the counsel for
Pan. Xu went into a business venture with Pan. Pan was supposed to set up a Cebu-based fish
ball, tempura and seafood products factory. He did not establish it, and so Xu asked that his
money be returned. Xu then filed a case of estafa against Pan. Prosecutor Salanga then issued a
subpoena against Pan. Atty. Chiong then filed a motion to quash, but he also filed a civil
complaint for the collection of a sum of money and damages against Xu and Atty. Reyes. Atty.
Reyes was allegedly impleaded because he allegedly connived with Xu in filing the estafa case
which was baseless. IBP recommended that Chiong be suspended for 2 years.

ISSUE: Whether or not Chiong should be suspended.

Held: YES. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall
conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. If Chiong believed that the two had
conspired to act illegally, he could have instituted disbarment proceedings. As a lawyer, Chiong
should have advised his client of the availability of these remedies. Thus the filing of the cases
had no justification. Lawyers should treat their opposing counsels and other lawyers with
courtesy, dignity and civility. Any undue ill feeling between clients should not influence
counsels in their conduct and demeanor toward each other.

ANTONIO A. ALCANTARA V. ATTY. MARIANO PEFIANCO


(A.C. No. 5938, December 3, 2002)

FACTS: While Atty. Ramon Salvani III was conferring with a client in the Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) at the Hall of Justice in San Jose, Antique, a woman approached them. Atty.
Alcantara saw the woman in tears, whereupon he went to the group and suggested that Atty.
Salvani talk with her amicably as a hearing was taking place in another room. At this point,
Atty. Mariano Pefianco, who was sitting nearby, stood up and shouted at Atty. Salvani and his
client, saying, “Nga-a gina-areglo mo ina, ipapreso ang imo nga kliyente para mahibal-an na
anang sala.” (“Why do you settle that case? Have your client imprisoned so that he will realize
his mistake.”)
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ISSUE: did atty. Pefianco violate canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?

HELD:
HELD: YES. Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility admonishes lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty
bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession. They must act honorably, fairly and
candidly toward each other and otherwise conduct themselves without reproach at all times. In
this case, respondent’s meddling in a matter in which he had no right to do so cause the
untoward incident. He had no right to demand an explanation from Atty. Salvani why the case
of the woman had not or could not be settled. Even so, Atty. Salvani in fact tried to explain the
matter to respondent, but the latter insisted on his view about the case.

ATTY. DELA ROSA


ROSA V. CA
(A.M. No. CA 03-35, July 24, 2003)

FACTS: In a criminal case, the Court of Appeals issued a TRO directing the trial court and the
City Prosecutor to refrain from conducting any further proceedings until further orders. The
Court of Appeals further directed complainant to file his comment to the petition for
review. Instead of filing the required comment, complainant filed a motion to quash the
TRO. The three accused through their respective counsels filed written oppositions to the
motion. Complainant then filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent Justices
for ignorance of the law and inexcusable negligence when they issued the TRO without basis.
Complainant in his pleadings to the three respondent lawyers described them as “brilliant
lawyers”, “legal supermen” or “sages,” which amounted to sarcasm. This statement the Court did
not countenance and consider it to be an act unbecoming of a lawyer.

ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Dela Rosa is guilty of act unbecoming of a lawyer.

HELD: YES. It is the duty of a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues. As officers of the court, lawyers are mandated to conduct
themselves honorably, fairly and candidly toward each other. Though a lawyer’s language may
be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of
the legal profession. Obviously, complainant’s use of sarcasm in calling the three respondent
lawyers “brilliant lawyers”, “legal supermen” and “sages” fell short of this mandate. It served no
useful purpose. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the
dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured
tradition that must at no time be lost to it.

d) No assistance in unauthorized practice of law

CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE


UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

Canon 9 Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Purpose of the Rule


To protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court.
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PAFLU V. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR


(G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1971)
(42 SCRA 302)

FACTS: In one labor case involving the above-mentioned parties, Cipriano Cid and Associates,
counsel of record for the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney’s lien equivalent to
30% of the total back wages. Atty. Atancio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable
amount. Quintin Muning also filed a “Petition for the Award of Services Rendered” equivalent
to 20% of the back wages. Muning’s petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid and Associates the
ground that he is not a lawyer. The records show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid and
Associates through Atty. Pacis. All the appearances made in behalf of the complainants were at
first by Atty. Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.

ISSUE: Whether or not a non-lawyer like Quintin Muning can recover attorney’s fees for legal
services rendered.

HELD: No, awarding of attorney’s fees to a non-lawyer is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal


Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. There should be an attorney-client relationship
as a condition to the recovery of attorney’s fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the
client’s representative in court is a lawyer. Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot
establish an attorney-client relationship; therefore, he cannot recover attorney’s fees. The
reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that acting as an
attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act
done in violation of law; and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the
public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in
chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amendable to disciplinary
measures.

IN RE FELIPE DEL ROSARIO


(52 Phil 399, 1928)

FACTS: Felipe Del Rosario was a candidate in the bar examination who failed twice.
Subsequently, he was authorized the filing of a motion for the revision of his papers for 1925
based on an alleged mistake in the computation of his grades. The court, acting in good faith,
granted this motion, and admitted Felipe Del Rosario to the bar. Thereafter, it was found out
that he has pending criminal case. He however was acquitted. It is recommended by the city
fiscal that Felipe del Rosario be ordered to surrender his certificate of attorney and that he be
forever prohibited from taking the bar examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felipe Del Rosario shall surrender his certificate of attorney.

HELD: YES. The acquittal of Felipe Del Rosario upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these
proceedings. It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that
Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the
falsification of public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary. To admit Felipe Del
Rosario again to the bar examination would be tantamount to a declaration of professional
purity which we are totally unable to pronounce. The practice of the law is not an absolute
right to be granted everyone who demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in
the exercise of a sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be a
disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of the court,
to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself out
as a duly authorized member of the bar.
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OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR V. LADAGA


(A.M. No. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001)
(350 SCRA 326)

FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of Court, acted as pro bono counsel for a relative in
a criminal case, without the previous authority from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as
required by the Administrative Code. An administrative complaint was filed against Atty.
Ladaga for practicing law without permission from the Department Head (CJ) as required by
law. Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance as he merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative
and that he was on an approved leave of absence during his appearances as such counsel.
Moreover, the presiding judge of the court to which he is assigned knew his appearances as
such counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as a pro bono counsel for a relative
constitutes practice of law as prohibited by the Administrative Code.

HELD: Atty. Ladaga’s appearance as a pro bono counsel for a relative constitutes practice of law
as prohibited by the Administrative Code. Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of the
statute should be customarily or habitually holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. It does not pertain to isolated court appearances as in this
case. Nevertheless, for his failure to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department
(CJ) as required by law, respondent was reprimanded.

Canon 9 Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with
persons not licensed to practice law, except:
a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latter’s death,
money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to persons specified in the
agreement; or
b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or
c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is
based in whole or in part, on a profitable sharing arrangement.

FIVE J TAXI V. NLRC


(G.R. No. 111474, August 22, 1994)
(235 SCRA 556)

FACTS: In a labor case for illegal dismissal and illegal deductions, private respondents obtained
favorable judgment and awarded of their back wages and the amount deducted from them.
They were represented by one Guillermo Pulia, a non-lawyer. The latter claimed for attorney’s
fee for the legal services he rendered.

ISSUE: Whether or not Guillermo Pulia as authorized representative of private respondents be


allowed attorney's fees or service fees.

HELD: NO. Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1691 states that, non-lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only: (1) if they
represent themselves, or (2) if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While
it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of private
respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the foregoing categories. Hence,
by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees. Furthermore, the statutory
rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client a reasonable
compensation for his services necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot
exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer.
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PACANA V. LOPEZ
(A.C. No. 8243, July 24, 2009)

FACTS: Pacana, being the trustee of the Multitel’s fund, sought the legal advice of Atty. Lopez
at the time Multitel had a problem due to failure of investment schemes. Pacana said a lawyer-
client relationship was established between them although no formal document was signed.
When Pacana requested for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her,
Lopez explained that all the properties had been returned to her clients who had money claims
against Multitel, in exchange for quitclaim documents clearing Pacana from any liability.
Pacana then filed a complaint against Lopez. The latter insisted that she represented the group
of investors of Multitel and that she merely mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients
had against the Pacana, thus no attorney-client relationship that exist between her and
petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not there exist an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Maricel Lopez
and Rolando Pacana.

HELD: There exist an attorney-client relationship between Atty. Maricel Lopez and herein
petitioner Rolando Pacana. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. The
most upright and ethical thing which Atty. Lopez should have done was either to advise
complainant to engage the services of another lawyer since she was already representing the
opposing parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and stand as
counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to
double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.

IN RE CUNANAN
(94 Phil 534, March 18, 1954)

FACTS: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.”
By virtue of the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those
candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. Many of the
unsuccessful post war candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking the provision
of the said law. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners and to clear the doubts have been
expressed as to its validity for being contrary to public interest, the court resolved to review the
validity of the said Act in question.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA No. 972 is contrary to public interest.

HELD: RA No. 972 is contrary to public interest. The public interest demands of legal
profession adequate preparation and efficiency especially because the legal problems evolved by
the times become more difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for
the practice of law that should be maintained firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the
protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately
prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious
social danger. By its declared objective, the law in question is contrary to public interest
because it qualifies law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice
of the profession.

3. To the courts
a) Candor, fairness and good faith towards the courts
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CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.

A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court.


court His duties to the court are more significant than
those which he owes to his client. His first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice;
to that end, his client’s success is wholly insubordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the profession.

COBB-
COBB-PEREZ V. LANTIN
(G.R. No. 22320, July 29, 1968)
(24 SCRA 291)

FACTS: The court ordered an execution sale of the properties in question of Mercedes Ruth
Cobb-Perez and her spouse. They and their counsel assailed the execution in a piecemeal
fashion unduly delaying the projected execution sale many times. The court assessed treble costs
against the petitioners to be paid by their counsels. Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas,
counsels for the petitioners, seek reconsideration of the decision contending that if there was
delay it was because they happened to be more assertive, a quality of lawyers which is not to be
condemned.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas used tactics to delay the
execution of the judgment.

HELD: YES. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client to the intricacies and vagaries of the
law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. When he finds his client’s cause to be defenseless,
then it is his duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior to his duty to his
client; its primacy is indisputable. In the case at hand, despite their knowledge that their prayer
would only be denied, counsel for petitioners still pursue their claim before the court who has
no jurisdiction over the case; a clear tactic to unduly delay the execution of judgment.

ATTY. VAFLOR-
VAFLOR-FABROA V. ATTY. PAGUINTO
(A.C. No. 6273 March 15, 2010)

FACTS: Complainant, Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa, who was Chairperson of the General
Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO), was removed as a member of the Board
of Directors (the Board) and thereafter, respondent, Oscar Paguinto and his group took over the
GEMASCO office and its premises, the pump houses, water facilities, and operations.
Complainant thus filed a complaint for annulment of the proceedings of her removal as well as
other members of the Board and a complaint against respondent for disbarment alleging that
respondent had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly, among others,
Canon 10 – A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court, when having ordered to
submit position papers and despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did not file any
position paper and further ignored the Court’s subsequent show cause order. Moreover,
respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent’s acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly, Canon 10.

HELD: Yes, lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s
deference is underscored by the fact that wilful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not
only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and
to show respect to their processes. The Court further noted that respondent had previously been
suspended from the practice of law for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
however, that respondent has not reformed his ways. Hence, a more severe penalty is thus
called for; respondent was subjected to suspension for two years.
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ISDRA TING-
TING-DUMALI V. ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES
(A.C. No. 5161, April 14, 2004)

FACTS: The complainant was among the heirs of Julita and Vicente Ting. The respondent was
the brother-in-law of the complainant .The case stemmed from the execution of the deed
of extra judicial settlement and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting
from such forgery. The wife of the respondent as well as another sister executed an affidavit
stating that they are the only heirs of the Ting spouses and falsify the signature of the
complainant. The defense of the respondent was anchored on a clear oversight of non-inclusion
the name of the complainant as heirs.

ISSUE: Whether the act of the respondent violative of his oath of profession as well as the
canons of professional ethics.

RULING: The court resolved the issue as violations of the lawyer's oath and the code
of professional responsibility. Respondent's acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and
doubtless bring the intolerable dishonor to the legal profession. The Court found the
respondent guilty of the provision of the lawyer's oath and code of professional responsibility
thereby rendering the latter unworthy to remain member of the legal profession. He is thus
ordered barred from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken off the roll
of attorneys.

Canon 10 Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court;
nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

CUARESMA V. DAQUIS
(G.R. No. 35113, March 25, 1975)
(63 SCRA 257)

FACTS: Marcelo Daquis entered into a conditional contract of sale of lot. Eugenio Cuaresma is
one of the occupants in the said lot in question. Later, Marcelo Daquis instituted a Civil Case for
writ of possession. Judge Pacifico de Castro issued an order of demolition of the house of
Eugenio Cuaresma. Atty. Macario Directo, on behalf of Eugenio Cuaresma filed a petition for
certiorari alleging that Cuaresma has no knowledge of the existence of the Civil Case. On the
other hand, Daquis maintained that Cuaresma was fully aware of the existence of said civil case
having filed a motion for intervention thereof. When asked by the Court to show cause why no
serious disciplinary action should be taken against him for deliberately making false allegations
in such petition, Atty. Directo contends that all he wanted to convey was that the petitioner’s
knowledge of the aforesaid civil case came only after the decision was issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not a serious disciplinary action should be taken against Atty. Marcelo
Directo.

HELD: YES. The Canon of Professional Responsibility commands every lawyer not to do
falsehood nor mislead or allow court to be misled in making their pleadings. Any violation of
this canon is a ground for disciplinary action. In the instant case, in as much as the assumption
goes with good faith, Atty. Directo is deemed to have acted with such. However, a reprimand
would suffice that Atty. Directo should be much more careful in the preparation of his pleadings
so as not to cast doubt to his honesty. Every member of the bar should realize that candor in the
dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honourable membership in the profession.
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DIRECTOR OF LANDS V. ADORABLE


(A.C. No. 8197, October 2, 1946)
(77 Phil 468)

FACTS: With the belief that the case pending decision in the Court of Appeals remained
unacted upon by the said Court, Miguel Penaranda filed a motion for reconstitution. Instead of
taking advantage of Penaranda’s lack of knowledge of what really happened in the Court of
Appeals, Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, counsel for complainant and appellees acting under the
highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility as member of the bar, informed the
Supreme Court that the case had been decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by the
Court of Appeals. Thereafter, claimant-appellant's attorneys filed a petition with the
commissioner for reconstitution to make a report to this Court that the records be declared
reconstituted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Zamora has acted under the highest standards required of a
member of the bar.

HELD: YES. Attorney Manuel F. Zamora, instead of taking advantage of Peneranda’s lack of
knowledge of what really happened in the Court of Appeals informed the Supreme Court that
the case had been decided in favor of said claimant and appellant by the Court of Appeals. This
not only to save the appellant the trouble of waiting for the reconstitution of this case, it also
save the tribunal the trouble of deciding again a case already decided. Acting with truthfulness,
fair play and nobility, these make Atty. Zamora an example worthy to be remembered by all
members of the bar.

YOUNG V. BATUEGAS

FACTS: Atty. Walter Young is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case for Murder sought the
suspension from the practice of law of Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino. Batuegas and Llantino,
as counsel for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the “accused has
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention.” Upon
personal verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana
allegedly surrendered, Atty. Young learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000.
Batuegas and Llantino claimed that on December 13, 2000, upon learning that a warrant of
arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail with the
trial court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and brought him to the NBI to
voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the NBI at 2:00 a.m. the
next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused surrendered on
December 14, 2000.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Batuegas and Atty. Llantino be suspended.

HELD: YES. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the Bar that
he will “do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court” and he shall “conduct himself
as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to his clients.” He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to
expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a
lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client’s rights and is expected to display the utmost
zeal in defense of his client’s cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
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HELD: Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from
them as members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court
if it found that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the
truth by alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was
under detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby
contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted
to deception.

SOME CASES
CASES OF FALSEHOODS WHICH MERITED DISCIPLINE
1. Lawyers falsely stating in a deed of sale that property is free from all liens and encumbrances
when it is not so (Sevilla vs. Zoleta, 96 Phil. 979);

2. Lawyers making it appear that a person, long dead, executed a deed of sale in his favor
(Monterey vs. Arayata, 61 Phil. 820);

3. Lawyer, encashing a check payable to a deceased cousin by signing the latter’s name on the
check (In re: Samaniego, 90 Phil. 382);

4. Lawyer falsifying a power of attorney and used it in collecting the money due to the principal
and appropriating the money for his own benefit (In re: Rusina, 105 Phil. 1328);

5. Lawyer alleging in one pleading that his clients were merely lessees of the property involved,
and alleged in a later pleading that the same clients were the owners of the same property
(Chavez vs. Viola, G.R. 2152, 19 April 1991) where there are false allegations in pleadings.

6. Lawyer uttering falsehood in a Motion to Dismiss (Martin vs. Moreno, 129 SCRA 315).

7. Lawyer denying having received the notice to file brief which is belied by the return card
(Ragacejo vs. IAC, 153 SCRA 462).

8. Lawyer presenting falsified documents in court which he knows to be false (Bautista vs.
Gonzales, 182 SCRA 151) or introducing false evidence (Berrenguer vs. Carranza, 26 SCRA
673).

9. Lawyer filing false charges or groundless suits (Retuya vs. Gorduiz, 96 SCRA 526).

REQUIREMENTS OF CANDOR
1. A lawyer shall not suppress material and vital facts which bear on the merit or lack of merit of
complaint or petition.
2. A lawyer shall volunteer to the court any development of the case which has rendered the
issue raised moot and academic.
3. Disclosure to the court of any decision adverse to his position of which opposing counsel is
apparently ignorant and which court should consider in deciding a case.
4. He shall not represent himself as a lawyer for a client, appear in court and present pleadings in
the latter’s behalf only to claim later that he was not authorized to do so..
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Canon 10 Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper,
the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that
which has not been proved.

Rationale:
If not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of the court may lose their
proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may
thereby be misled. A mere typographical error in the citation of an authority is not contemptuous.

THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. THE INSULAR LIFE
ASSURANCE CO
(G.R. No. L-25291, January 30, 1971)
(37 SCRA 244)

FACTS: In a labor case involving the parties above-mentioned, petitioner Union’s complaint
was dismissed by Presiding Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations for lack
of merit. Petitioners sought to cite for contempt the respondent Judge on the ground that the
former’s citation of law to support his decision is different from the original text. On the other
hand, respondent Judge maintained that although there has been a clerical error in citation, still
the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation is substantially the same as, and
faithfully reflects, the particular ruling of the Court's decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge Arsenio Martinez shall be held in contempt.

HELD: NO. In citing Supreme Court's decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts,
judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-
punctuation mark. Lawyers and courts take their bearings from the Higher Court’s decisions
and rulings. This is in accord with article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines." If not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may
lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public
who may thereby be misled. In the instant case, although the respondent Judge and the
respondents' counsels committed mistake in the citation used in their decision, there was
however no substantial change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited.
For this reason, the punishment of contempt of court would be too much; hence, it does not
apply.

In citing the SC decisions and rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to
reproduce or copy the same word-for-word and punctuation-mark-for-punctuation-mark (Agpalo)
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ADEZ REALTY V. CA
(G.R. No. 100643, December 12, 1995)
(215 SCRA 301)

FACTS: Atty. Benjamin M. Dacanay was disbarred from the practice of law for having found
guilty of intercalating a material fact in a decision of the Court of Appeals thereby misleading
the Court in order to obtain a favorable judgment. During the three years of his disbarment,
Atty. Dacanay admitted his guilt for the offense committed and repeatedly pleas for compassion
from the court with a prayer that he be reinstated, asserting his readiness to meet the standards
of the legal profession.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dacanay shall be reinstated for the practice of law.

HELD: Dacanay shall be reinstated for the practice of law. The practice of law is a privilege
burdened with conditions. Obedience to the standards of mental fitness and morality and
faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the conditions required for
remaining a member of good standing of the bar. The disbarment of Atty. Dacanay for three (3)
years has given him to reflect on his professional conduct, redeem himself and proves once
more that he is worthy to practice law and be capable of upholding the dignity of the legal
profession. His admission of guilt and repeated pleas for compassion and reinstatement show
that he is ready once more to meet the exacting standards the legal profession demands from its
practitioners. Hence, the Court ruled that the disbarment of Atty. Dacanay be lifted.

RIVERA V. ATTY. CORAL


(A.C. No. 3548, July 4, 2002)

FACTS: A “NOTICE OF APPEAL” from a decision of the court in an ejectment suit received by
him was filed in court by Atty. Napoleon Corral. The next day, Atty. Napoleon Corral came to
the Office of the Clerk of Court, and changed the date from February 23, 1990 to February 29,
1990. Realizing later that there is no 29th in February 1990, he claimed that he received the
Decision on the 28th of February 1990. Jose A. Rivera alleged that Atty. Napoleon Corral
violated the proper ethics as a lawyer by tampering and manually changing entries in the
court’s record without the Court’s prior knowledge and permission, conduct unbecoming of a
member of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Napoleon Corral shall be suspended from the practice of law for
conduct unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar.

HELD: YES. Atty. Napoleon Corral shall be suspended from the practice of law for having
tampered and changed entries in the court’s record without the Court’s prior knowledge. Rule
10.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A lawyer shall not knowingly
misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper xxx or the text of a decision or authority xxx.”
By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed,
respondent committed an act of dishonesty.

Canon 10 Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to
defeat the ends of justice.

Procedural rules are instruments in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. They should not
be used to derail such ends. They should not misuse them, as by filing multiple petitions regarding the
same cause of action of by deliberately misreading the law to seek a reopening of a case long decided.
(Agpalo)
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QUE V. REVILLA
REVILLA
(A.C. No. 7054, December 4, 2009)

FACTS: In an unlawful detainer case, a decision was rendered by the RTC against respondent
Atty. Anastacio Revilla Jr.’s clients. Thereafter, Atty. Revilla filed series of petition all
containing a prayer for injunctive relief. Conrado Que, accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
before the IBP of committing abuse of court remedies and processes, a violation of Rule 10.03
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to
"observe the rules of procedure and. . . Not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Anastacio Revilla has violated Rule 10.03 Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for committing abuse of court remedies and processes.

HELD: YES. Rule 10.03 Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it
obligatory for a lawyer to "observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice." The successive filings of petitions all containing a prayer
for injunctive relief, reveal the respondent’s persistence in preventing and avoiding the
execution of the final decisions of the lower courts against his client. The respondent violated
Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

b) Respect for courts and judicial officers

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.

Canon
Canon 11 Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.

IN RE VICENTE SOTTO,
SOTTO, 82 Phil 595 (1949)

FACTS: Atty. Vicente Sotto issued a written statement in connection with the decision of the
Supreme Court in “In re Angel Parazo” which statement was published in the newspapers. Atty.
Sotto said that the Court has not only erroneously interpreted the law, but that it is once more
shows the incompetency of narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. He threatened
to pass a bill reorganizing the Supreme so as to change the members who decided the Parazo
case. The court required Atty. Sotto to show cause why he should not be charged with
contempt of court. Atty. Sotto contends in the exercise of the freedom of speech guaranteed by
the Constitution, he made his statement in the press with the utmost good faith and with no
intention of offending any of the members of the Court and that he has not attacked the
honesty or integrity of any one.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Vicente Sotto shall be held liable for contempt of Court.

HELD: YES. Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, of the decision of the
court in a pending case made in good faith may be allowed because if well founded it may
contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is done in bad faith, it should not
given any merit. Atty. Sotto does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo
case; he also intends to intimidate the members of this Court by threatening to pass a bill
reorganizing the Supreme so as to change the members who decided the Parazo case. As a
member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, is in duty bound to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity, and not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice. An attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation
to be respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts.
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GUERRERO V. VILLAMOR
(A.M. No. RTJ-90-483, September 25, 1998)
(179 SCRA 589)

FACTS: Consequent to the dismissal for Qualified Theft against one Gloria Naval by respondent
Judge Adriano R. Villamor, the offended party, George D. Carlos, thru his lawyer Antonio T.
Guerrero filed an action for damages, against respondent judge for knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment. Respondent Judge issued an Order of Direct Contempt of Court against
Guerrero for degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and
contemptuous language before the court. Petitioners assert that no direct contempt could have
been committed against respondent judge in the complaint for damages because whatever was
mentioned therein was not made "before" respondent judge while in session or in recess from
judicial proceedings or in any matter involving the exercise of judicial function of the Court
while it is at work on a case before it. Furthermore, petitioners contend that the words used in
the subject complaint were merely words descriptive of plaintiff's cause of action based on his
reaction and remorse and the wilful infliction of the injury on him and that the same are all
privileged communications made in the course of judicial proceedings because they are relevant
to the issue and therefore cannot be contemptuous.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge can issue an Order of Contempt against petitioner by
reason of the alleged contemptuous language in the complaint for damages against respondent.

HELD: Negative. The alleged derogatory language employed in the complaint did not constitute
direct contempt but may only, if at all, constitute indirect contempt subject to defenses that
may be raised by said, petitioners in the proper proceedings. Stress must be placed on the fact
that the subject pleading was not submitted to respondent judge nor in the criminal cases from
which the contempt order was issued but was filed in another court presided by another judge
and involving a separate action, the civil case for damages against respondent judge. However,
lawyers should bear in mind their basic duty "to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others. Observance of
the respect due to the courts and judicial officers is best demonstrated by the lawyer’s use of
respectful language.

Courts have ordered a male attorney to wear a necktie and have prohibited a female attorney from
wearing a hat. However, the prohibition of a dress whose hemline was five inches above the knee was
held to be acceptable as such “had become an accepted mode of dress even in places of worship.”
(Aguirre)

Respect begins with the lawyer’s outward physical appearance in court. Sloppy or informal attire
adversely reflects on the lawyer and demeans the dignity and solemnity of court proceedings. (Agpalo)

SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION


RESERVATION BOARD V. HON. CLORIBEL
(G.R. No. L-27072, January 9, 1970)
(31 SCRA 1)

FACTS: The Supreme Court decided against Mac Arthur International Minerals Co., client of
counsels involved in this case. Counsels Santiago, Uy, Regala & Sotto purportedly set forth a
memoranda personally signed by Santiago on his behalf and purportedly for Uy, Regala &
Associate, and Sotto claimed that the SC overlooked the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation & obfuscation of petitioners’ counsel and that never has any civilized
democratic tribunal ruled that such gimmick can be used by vulturous executives to cover up
and excuse losses to the public. They enumerated certain incidents which according to them
were proof of unjudicial prejudice, with unjudicial favouritism in favor of petitioners. They
claimed that he needed to make those statements lest his client be deprived of due process.
Consequently, the counsels were charged with contempt of court.
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ISSUE: Whether or not counsels for Mac Arthur Int’l Minerals Co. shall be held guilty of
contempt of court.

HELD: YES. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court mandates every lawyer to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. It is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. The Court
finds in the language of counsels the style that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice. A lawyer’s language should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as
befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.

TIONGCO V. AGUILAR
(G.R. No. 115932, January 25, 1995)
(240 SCRA 589)

FACTS: A decision was rendered against herein petitioners spouses Atty. Jose Tiongco and
Leticia Tiongco in their case for recovery of possession and damages. Atty. Jose Tiongco as
counsel for the petitioners contested alleging that the Court did not at all read the petition in
their case before it concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently show that the respondent
court had committed a grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, he described the respondent judge
as a "liar," "thief" perfidious," and "blasphemer". He also called the respondent judge a "robber,"
"rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eyed." Atty. Jose Tiongco was
held in contempt of court for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which provides that a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jose Tiongco has violated Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD:
HELD: Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “a lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.” Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in
making the false and malicious insinuation against the Court and his scurrilous
characterizations is, indeed, all too obvious. Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after
he was not given what he wanted. When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or
arrogance as when he even pointed out other intemperate words in his petition is a gross
violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional Responsibility.

NG V. ALAR
A.M. No. 7252, November 22, 2006

FACTS: Atty. Benjamin Alar is the counsel for the complainants in a labor case filed with the
Labor Arbiter which dismissed the complaint. On appeal, NLRC’s First Division upheld the
dismissal. In his Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Inhibit (MRMI), Atty. Alar used
improper and abusive language full of diatribes castigating the Labor Arbiter and the ponente of
the NLRC decision. Johnny Ng, one of the respondents, filed a disbarment case against Alar
before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline for such misbehavior. Alar contended that the
Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility does not apply to lawyers practicing at the
NLRC, the latter not being a court and that LAs and NLRC Commissioners are not judges nor
justices and the Code of Judicial Conduct similarly do not apply to them, not being part of the
judiciary.

ISSUE: Is a lawyer’s misbehavior before the NLRC susceptible of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Conduct?
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HELD: The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC, attacking both its moral and
intellectual integrity, replete with implied accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of
diligence. Respondent used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does not
admit any justification. The assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its commissioners, not
being judges or justices and therefore not part of the judiciary and that consequently, the Code
of Judicial Conduct does not apply to them, is unavailing. The Court held that respondent
became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member
of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of
law and ethics.

Canon 11 Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.

DE GRACIA V. WARDEN OF MAKATI


(G.R. No. L-42032, January 9, 1976)
(69 SCRA 4)

A writ of habeas corpus was filed for the production of the body of Manuel De Gracia.
The hearing for the issuance of the writ has been delayed due to a series of postponement. De
Gracia was released from custody even before the proper hearing making the petition for the
writ moot and academic.
The Supreme Court however take note that there was a lapse in judicial propriety by
counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did not even take the trouble of appearing in Court on the
very day his own petition was reset for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, by his
comparative inexperience and paucity of practice before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his
attention to such failing by way of guidance for his future actuations as a member of the bar.

Canon 11 Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.

Canon 8 Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

FERNANDEZ V. HON. BELLO


(G.R. No. 14277, April 30, 1960)
(107 Phil 1140)

FACTS: Timotea Perreyras, the guardian over the persons and properties of her brothers, with
the help of herein petitioner Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez as her counsel, asked the court for
authority to sell a nipa land owned in common by the wards to pay for the debts owed to
Maximiano Umañgay. The request was granted and a valid sale was made in favor of the latter.
The interest in the land of Maximiano Umañgay was in turn sold to Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez.
Part of the purchase price was given to Atty. Fernandez in payment for the services rendered by
him as counsel of the deceased father of the wards in a civil case. The record does not show that
these payments were authorized by the court. An investigation was conducted, thereafter,
herein respondent Judge Bello found Atty. Manuel L. Fernandez guilty of contempt for having
taken a certain amount from the proceeds of the sale without court approval, finding this
conduct of counsel to be anomalous and unbecoming for the reason that he instituted the
guardianship proceedings only to enable him to collect unpaid attorney's fees due him from the
father of the wards. Atty. Fernandez sought to annul said order alleging that that he acted in
good faith believing that he is entitled to receive the fees due him.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Miguel Fernandez is guilty for contempt for having taken a
certain amount from the proceeds of sale of the wards’ property as payment for the legal
services rendered by him.

HELD: Atty. Miguel Fernandez is not guilty for contempt for having taken a certain amount
from the proceeds of sale of the wards’ property as payment for the legal services rendered by
him. The duty of courts is not just to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is
also their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Atty. Fernandez was
entitled to receive payment for services rendered by him, which services are admitted to have
been due from the father of the wards. Meanwhile, respondent Judge wanted to strike out
portions of petitioner's motion for reconsideration for employing strong language. The language
used by the judge in characterizing the act of the petitioner as "anomalous and unbecoming"
and in charging petitioner of obtaining his fee "through manoeuvres of documents from the
guardian-petitioner" must have provoked petitioner to use strong language and the judge has
nothing to blame but himself. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using
temperate language himself.

SANGALANG V. IAC
(G.R. No. 71169, December 22, 1988)
(177 SCRA 87)

FACTS: Atty. J Cezar Sangco, counsel for Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang, was charged for
contempt for using intemperate and accusatory language, when the former assailed the decision
of the Court against his client. Atty. Sangco alleged that said ruling “is the most serious
reflection on the Court's competence and integrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality and
the extraordinary efforts exerted to justify such arbitrariness and the very strained and
unwarranted conclusions drawn therefrom, are unparalleled in the history of the Court ...” On
his part, Atty. Sangco assert that he was merely defending the interests of his clients.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. J. Cezar Sangco shall be held guilt in contempt of court for using
intemperate and accusatory language.

HELD: YES. A lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that
end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics." Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that “A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or
behavior before the Courts.” Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which
he deserves the Court's rebuke.

MONTECILLO V. GICA
(G.R. No. L-36800, October 21, 1974)
(60 SCRA 234)

FACTS: In a criminal case for slander, Atty. Quirico Del Mar was able to obtain favorable
judgment for his client Jorge Montecillo. On appeal of the case, the Court of Appeals reversed
the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he made a veiled threat
against the CA judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices “knowingly rendered an unjust
decision” and “judgment has been rendered through negligence” and that the CA allowed itself
to be deceived. The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone
with the court. He is charged for suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.


FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the courts.
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to the proper
administration of justice. It is manifest that Del Mar has scant respect for the two highest
Courts of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case; he proceeded
to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust
judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross
ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.

POBRE V. SENATOR SANTIAGO


(A.C. NO. 7399, August 25, 2009)

FACTS: An administrative case and disbarment proceeding was filed against Senator Meriam
Defensor Santigo for uttering in her privilege speech delivered in the Senate floor where she
was quoted as saying that she wanted “to spit on the face of Chief Justice and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court,” and calling the Court a “Supreme Court of idiots.” She alleged that it was
considered as part of her Parliamentary immunity as such was done during the session.

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of Senator Santiago is correct?

HELD: Yes, because her statements, being part of her privilege speech as a member of Congress,
were covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity. Indeed, her privilege
speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
However, as a member of the Bar, the Court wishes to express its deep concern about
the language Senator Santiago used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice.
To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good
professional conduct. It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate
and highly improper in substance. Senator Santiago should have taken to heart in the first place
the ensuing passage in In Re: Vicente Sotto that “if the people lose their confidence in the
honesty and integrity of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos would be
the result.”
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Canon 11 Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge, motives not supported by the record or
have no materiality to the case.

The rule allows such criticism so long as it is supported by the record or it is material to the case. A
lawyer’s right to criticize the acts of courts and judges in a proper and respectful way and through
legitimate channels is well recognized. The cardinal condition of all such criticism is that it shall be
bona fide, and shall not spill over the wall of decency and propriety. (Agpalo)

The cardinal condition of all such criticism is that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the wall
of decency and propriety. (Agpalo)
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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IN RE FELICIANO GOMEZ
(43 Phil 376, May 16, 1922)

FACTS: Feliciano Gomez and Juan Cailles were rival candidates at the election in 1919, for the
position of provincial governor of Laguna. Gomez was proclaimed elected. Cailles contested the
election successfully. At a public meeting held to celebrate the fiesta of the municipality of
Lumban, Laguna, Gomez is charged with having said, in effect, that the Supreme Court had
decided the election protest in favor of Cailles, because Governor-General Wood, out of
friendship for Cailles, had invited the members of the court to Malacañang previous to
formulating the decision, and there, following a secret conference, had offered them a banquet.
These remarks of Gomez were published in La Nacion, a newspaper of the City of Manila and
are substantiated by four affidavits.

ISSUE: Whether or not Feliciano Gomez is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD:
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court felt at that time that declaring Gomez in contempt will only
seem to vindicate his accusations against the high court. The Supreme Court said “litigants and
lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment,
because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even
contemptuous language.” The rule in the more progressive jurisdictions is that courts, when a
case is finished, are subject to the same criticism as other people. Judges may not vindicate a
private wrong by a public method. Although the honor and integrity of the court may be
assailed, judges, like other persons, are relegated to the courts for redress.

Canon 11 Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

1987 Philippine Constitution Article VIII, Sec.


Sec. 6.
The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

WHO ARE CONSIDERED AS PROPER AUTHORITIES


1. If administrative in nature
- To be filed with the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court

2. If criminal and not purely administrative in nature


- It shall be filed with the Office of the Ombudsman

3. If it involves a justice of the Supreme Court based on impeachable offenses


- It must be coursed through the House of Representatives and the Senate in accordance
with the Rules on Impeachment

*** An administrative complaint is not an appropriate remedy where judicial recourse is still available,
such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari, unless the assailed order or
decision is tainted with fraud, malice, or dishonesty. (Santiago III v. Justice Enriquez, Jr. A.M. No. CA-
09-47-J, February 13, 2009)
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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CABANSAG V. FERNANDEZ
(G.R. No. L-8974, October 18, 1957)
(102 Phil 152)

FACTS: Apolonio Cabansag filed a complaint against Geminiana Fernandez, et al. seeking to
eject them from a portion of land covered by a Torrens title. For almost five years, a decision
has not yet been reached due to the fact that the transcript of the records has not yet been
transcribed and the Judge could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said
notes. The stenographers who took the notes are now assigned in other courts. Thereafter,
Cabansag sent a letter to the Chief Executive requesting the latter through its Presidential
Complaints and Action Commission (PCAC), to act upon the case which had long been pending
thru the careful manoeuvres of a tactical lawyer. Atty. Manuel Fernandez, counsel for
defendants, filed a motion praying that Apolonio Cabansag be declared in contempt of court for
an alleged scurrilous remark he made in his letter to the PCAC. On the other hand, Cabansag
and his counsels maintained that the letter is not contemptuous. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Cabansag is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD: NO. Any act which tends to belittle or degrade or embarrass the court in its
administration of justice constitutes contempt of court. In the instant case, the criticism of
Cabansag is directed, not to the court, but to opposing counsel whose tactical manoeuvres has
allegedly caused the undue delay of the case. While it would have been proper for Cabansag to
have his letter addressed to the Secretary of Justice or to the Supreme Court rather than to the
President, such act alone would not be contemptuous. His conduct is justified considering that,
being a layman; he is unaware of the technical rules of law and procedure which may place him
under the protective mantle of our constitution. But the same does not apply with regard to his
counsels. Being learned in the law and officers of the court, they should have acted with more
care and circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue embarrassment to the court or
unnecessary interference with the normal course of its proceedings. Their duty as lawyers is
always to observe utmost respect to the court and defend it against unjust criticism and
clamour. However, there is no proof that they acted in bad faith, hence a warning that a
commission of a similar misstep in the future would render them amenable to a more severe
disciplinary action would suffice.

MAGLASANG
MAGLASANG V. PEOPLE
(G.R. No. 90083, October 4, 1990)
(190 SCRA 306)

FACTS: Upon conviction of Khalyxto Maglasang, his counsel, Atty. Castellano, filed for a
petition for certiorari through registered mail. Due to non-compliance with the requirements,
the court dismissed the petition and a motion for reconsideration. Atty. Castellano then sent a
complaint to the Office of the President where he accused the five justices of the 2nd division,
with biases and ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments. He accused
the court of sabotaging the Aquino administration for being Marcos appointees, and robbing
the Filipino people genuine justice and democracy. He also said that the SC is doing this to
protect the judge who was impleaded in the petition and for money reasons. He alleges further
that the court is too expensive to be reached by ordinary men. The court is also inconsiderate
and overly strict and meticulous. He was then charged for violation of the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Atty. Castellano’s acts constitute a violation of the provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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HELD: YES. In filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division with
the Office of the President, even the most basic tenet of our government system-the separation
of powers between the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches-has been lost on
Atty. Castellano. The Supreme Court is supreme-the third great department of government
entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes,
public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare
them 'unjust.' Atty. Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the
Justices of the Second Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render
justice according to law.

MACEDA V. VASQUEZ
(G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993)

FACTS: Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Abiera alleged that Maceda has falsified his
certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted
for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31,
1989, when in truth and in fact, Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5 civil and
10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Abiera alleged that Maceda falsified his
certificates of service for 17 months.

ISSUE: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an


encroachment into the SC’s constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

HELD: In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard
to his certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches
into the Court’s power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution
exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this
power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all
laws, and takes the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from
their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the
same to the SC for determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within
the scope of their administrative duties.

c) Assistance in the speedy and efficient administration of justice

CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO
ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

Rule 138 SEC. 20 (g) of Rules of Court — It is the duty of an attorney:


(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or
delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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ALONTO V. HON. MEMORACION


(Forum shopping)
(G.R. No. 83614, May 7, 1990)
(185 SCRA 73)

FACTS: Eldigario D. Gonzales is suspended from office as Vice-President of the Mindanao State
University, Tawi-Tawi College of Technology and Oceanography (MSU-TCTO). He then filed a
petition compelling Ahmad Alonto, Jr. and the MSU Board of Regents (BOR) to allow him to re-
assume his position. Accordingly, the lower court issued a restraining order in his favor.
However, Alonto did not comply with the said order; instead they issued a Resolution placing
Gonzales under preventive suspension. The lower court found Alonto guilty of contempt of
court. After having denied their motions for reconsideration of the order, Alonto made an
appeal. Despite the action taken on their notice of appeal, Alonto filed the instant petition
alleging that their appeal was not prosecuted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ahmad Alonto Jr., et al is guilty of contempt of court.

HELD: YES. Forum-shopping, an act of malpractice that is proscribed and condemned as trifling
with the courts and abusing their processes, is a ground for holding a lawyer in contempt of
court. Petitioners have not been candid with the Court. In their manifest, they maintained that
the appeal was not prosecuted which is an outright falsehood, a tactic to conceal from the Court
the practice of forum-shopping in seeking relief from the assailed orders of the trial court. These
acts of petitioners constitute an improper conduct that tends to degrade the administration of
justice and this violation constitutes contempt of court.

PENTICOSTES vs. HIDALGO


(A.M. No. RTJ-89-331, September 28, 1990)
(190 SCRA 165)

FACTS: Prudencio S. Penticostes has filed a series of administrative charges against Judge Rafael
B. Hidalgo of Regional Trial Court Branch 68 of Tarlac, Tarlac which were unsubstantiated
charges and done in pursuit of “a desire to unjustifiably bring respondent to public disdain and
ridicule" as determined by the Office of the court Administrator. Despite the stern warning of
the OCA, Penticostes persisted.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the Penticostes’ action is consistent with the Code of Professional
Conduct.

HELD: The Court ruled that considering the nature, frequency and indiscriminate filing of
groundless charges and despite the admonition previously given by resolution of the Court,
which Penticostes wilfully ignored and disobeyed by manifesting the intent to file more of the
same, he imposed upon the time, resources and forbearance of the Court and diverted the
energies of the respondent judge who has been called upon to comment and defend his every
action. This is not to say that a judge may not be answerable for violation of the law and the
Code of Judicial Conduct, but not every order or ruling adverse to a party can be made the basis
for an administrative charge.
As a member of the bar, Penticostes has responsibilities to the judiciary. The Code of
Professional Responsibility and the rules there under impose obligations on the lawyer in
relation to the court: Canon 12 mandates that a lawyer shall exert very effort and consider it his
duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Through his imprudent filing
of administrative cases against respondent judge, Penticostes has transgressed the provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and miserably failed to observe conduct expected of a
member of the bar under the Code and in accordance with his lawyer's oath.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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GABIONZA V. CA
(G.R. No. 112547, July 18, 1994)
(234 SCRA 192)

FACTS: Dennis T. Gabionza was a defendant in a civil case but the case was dismissed by the
lower court. An appeal before the Court of Appeals was then instituted. The appellate Court
dismissed the petition for being violative of the provision of Circular No. 28-91 for having failed
to indicate in the caption thereof the docket number of the case in the trial court whose orders
are sought to be reviewed. Gabionza admits that the docket number had not been set forth in
the caption of his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the Court of Appeals, however, he
maintains that his Petition should nevertheless have been deemed in substantial compliance
with Circular No. 28-91, for the reason that the docket number of the case pending before the
trial court was in fact set out in the body of his Petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Dennis T. Gabionza is in substantial compliance with Circular No. 28-91
in so far as the requisite for caption of petition or complaint is concerned.

HELD: YES. Circular No. 28-91 was designed to promote and facilitate the orderly
administration of justice and should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to
undermine its own ultimate and legitimate objective which is to achieve substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible. In the instant case, Gabionza has substantially complied with the
original requirements of Circular No. 28-91 Caption of petition or complaint and that the
objectives of that Circular were not being subverted by Gabionza's Petition in as much as the
docket number of the case pending before the trial court was in fact set out in the body of his
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

TAKE NOTE: (Agpalo)


Agpalo)
• The first duty of a lawyer is not to his client but the administration of justice. As an officer of
the Court, it is the duty of the lawyer to advance the Court’s objective of having a speedy,
efficient, impartial, correct, and inexpensive adjudication of case and the prompt satisfaction
of final judgments.
• The duty to assist in the administration of justice may be performed by doing no act that
obstructs, perverts, or impedes the administration of justice and by faithfully complying with
all his duties to the court and to his client. Examples of the former would include the duty to
inform the court of any change of his address or of the death of his client.
• Acts that amount to obstruction of the administration of justice may take many forms. They
include such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal case not to appear at the
scheduled hearing so that the case against his client, the accused, would be dismissed

Canon 12 Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared himself on
the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the order of its preferences. He
should also be ready with the original documents for comparison with the copies.

A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. (Rule 18.02)

Without adequate preparation, the lawyer may not be able to effectively assist the court in the
efficient administration of justice. Non-observance of this rule might result in:
1) The postponement of the pre-trial or hearing, which would thus entail delay in the early
disposition of the case;
2) The judge may consider the client nonsuited or in default or
3) The judge may consider the case deemed submitted for decision without client’s evidence, to
his prejudice. (Agpalo)
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Canon 12 Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.

MASINSIN V. THE HON. ED VINCENT


VINCENT ALBANO
(G.R. No. 86421, May 31, 1994)
(232 SCRA 192)

FACTS: In an ejectment suit against the spouses Masinsin, the lower court ruled against them.
No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. Later, the
Masinsins through different counsels tried to nullify the same MTC decision before different
branches of the court. They file pleadings, one after another. The Court took notice of the filing
of series of unsubstantiated petitions by the Masinsins through their counsels which is a
delaying tactic. The Court finds the counsels guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer; hence
they are censured and warned.

ISSUE: Whether or not the counsels of the Masinsins are guilty of conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer.

HELD: YES. The utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions simply evinces the
deliberate intent of the Masinsins to prolong and delay the inevitable execution of a decision
that has long become final and executory. In no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a
lawyer, an officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the
administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and
warranting application of the contempt power. Petition is dismissed. Petitioner’s counsel of
record is strongly CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer’s oath in
the future will be dealt with most severely.

Canon 12 Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for
his failure to do so.

MARIVELES V. MALLARI
(A.C. No. 3294, February 17, 1993)
(219 SCRA 44)

FACTS: Mario S. Mariveles filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against his former
counsel, Attorney Odilon C. Mallari, whose legal services he had engaged to handle his defense
in Criminal Case where he was charged with violation of B.P. Blg. 22. After an adverse decision
was rendered, Mariveles instructed Attorney Mallari to appeal the trial court's decision to the
Court of Appeals, which the respondent did. However, in the Court of Appeals, despite
numerous extensions of time, which he obtained from the Court, Attorney Mallari failed to file
the appellant's brief, resulting in the dismissal of the appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mallari be disbarred.

HELD: YES. What was committed by Atty. Mallari is a blatant violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Rule 12.03 — a lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time
to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or
offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Rule 18.03 — a lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Suffice it to state that a lawyer has no business practicing his profession if in the course of
that practice, he will eventually wreck and destroy the future and reputation of his client and
thus disgrace the law profession. Disbarment is the only recourse to remove a rotten apple if only
to instil and maintain the respect and confidence of all and sundry to the noble profession.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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Canon 12 Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgement or
misuse Court processes.

PLUS BUILDERS INC. VS REVILLA


(A.C. No. 7056, February 11, 2009)

FACTS: The Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a decision in favor of Plus
Builders, Inc. and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de Guzman, et.al, who were the clients
of Atty. Revilla, Jr. The PARAD found that the farmers were mere tenants and not rightful
possessors/owners of the subject land. The case reached the Supreme Court which sustained
Plus Builders Inc.’s rights over the land. Atty. Revilla, Jr. was found to have committed
intentional falsehood and misused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of
the decision through the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary restraining orders,
and the last, an action to quiet title despite the finality of the decision. Atty. Revilla, Jr.
maintains that the courses of action he took were not meant to unduly delay the execution of
the DARAB Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Revilla, Jr. is guilty of gross misconduct.

HELD: YES. In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every
remedy or defense within the authority of the law. This obligation, however, is not to be
performed at the expense of truth and justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice, and is
enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing
court processes.

AGUINALDO V. AGUINALDO
(36 SCRA 137)

FACTS: A writ of execution is issued in favor of Victoria Aguinaldo and Simeona Aguinaldo for
the reconveyance of a part of the property in litigation. An appeal was made by Segundo
Aguinaldo but the same was denied. Cecilio Aguinaldo contested the writ alleging that his
father Segundo Aguinaldo died during the pendency of such appeal. Thereafter, the petitioners,
in order not to render nugatory a decision, final and executory in character, ask the court to
have the heirs of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo substituted as defendants. The lower court
granted them favor and substituted respondents in place of the deceased Segundo Aguinaldo
citing the provision of Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court to the effect that whenever a party
to a pending case dies, xxx it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of
such death, xxx and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or
other legal representative. Respondents contested saying it’s too late to apply said provision of
the Rules.

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court erred in granting favor to petitioners.

HELD: NO. Defendant’s reliance that it is too late to apply the provision of Sec 16, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court is untenable. To cause plaintiffs to suffer for such neglect of duty is to cast an
underserved reflection on the law. The judgment had become final and the stage of execution
reached. The Court said “litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be not, through a mere artifice, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.”
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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MALONZO V. PRINSIPE
(A.C. No. 6289, December 16, 2004)
(447 SCRA 1)

FACTS: In expropriation proceedings by the NAPOCOR against several lot owners in Bulacan,
the president of an organization of the lot owners entered into a contract for legal services with
Atty. Pete Principe. Complainant Julian Malonso, a member of the same organization,
appointed on the other hand a certain Danilo Elfa as his attorney-in-fact on the matter of
negotiation with NPC. Thereafter, there was an amicable settlement between NAPOCOR and
the lot owners. More than two years after the expropriation cases were instituted; Atty.
Principe filed his motion to separate legal fees and filed his “Notice of Entry of Appearance”
claiming that he is the legal counsel of the lot owners. The other lot owners including Malonso
wrote a letter to NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized Sandama’s President
to hire the services of Atty. Principe’s law firm to represent them. Atty. Principe filed several
motions to ensure his claim to the 40% of the selling price of the properties being expropriated.
An investigation conducted by the IBP recommended Atty. Principe’s suspension from the
practice of law

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Prinsipe be suspended from the practice of law.

HELD: YES. Atty. Principe had violated among others Rule 12.04 which says that “a lawyer
shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.”
In its Resolution, the IBP Board ordained his suspension from the practice of law. The SC
however found that formal requisites of the investigation and resolution had not been complied
with and dismissed the case requiring the IBP to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule
139-B in all cases involving disbarment and discipline of attorneys.

Canon 12 Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or recess in
the trial, while the witness is still under examination.

The purpose of this rule is to avoid any suspicion that he is coaching the witness what to say during
the resumption of the examination. (Agpalo)

Canon 12 Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself or to
impersonate another.

A lawyer may interview witnesses in advance of trial or attend to their needs if they are poor but he
should avoid any such action as may be misinterpreted as an attempt to influence the witness what to
say in court. Court will not give weight on a testimony of a witness who admits having been
instructed. A lawyer who presents a witness whom he knows will give a false testimony or is an
impersonator may be subjected to disciplinary action. (Agpalo)

Canon 12 Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly
inconvenience him.

• The lawyer has a duty to always treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due
consideration (Agpalo)
• The client cannot be made the keeper of the lawyer’s conscience in professional matters. He has
no right to demand that his counsel abuse the opposite party and the latter’s witnesses or indulge
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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in offensive personalities. Improper speech is not excusable on the ground that it is what the client
would say if speaking in his own behalf
• If it is the judge who subjects the witness to harsh treatment, the lawyer has the right to protest in
a respectful and dignified manner the action of the judge and to make the incident of record
without being held liable administratively or for contempt of court

Canon 12 Rule 12.08


12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument, and the like, or
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

The underlying reason for the impropriety of a lawyer acting in such dual capacity lies in the
difference between the function of a witness and that of an advocate. The function of a witness is to
tell the facts as he recalls then in answer to questions. The function of an advocate is that of a partisan.
It is difficult to distinguish between the zeal of an advocate and the fairness and impartiality of a
disinterested witness (Agpalo)

PNB V. UY TENG PIAO


(G.R. No. L-35252, October 21, 1932)
(57 Phil 337)

FACTS: The lower court rendered a judgment in favor of the Philippine National Bank (PNB)
and against Uy Teng Piao in one civil case. Upon failure by Uy Teng Piao to pay, its mortgaged
land was sold at public auction to the PNB. Later, the PNB secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver
of his right to redeem the property in question and sold the same to a third person. In his answer
Uy Teng Piao alleged that he waived his right to redeem the land upon an agreement that the
bank would not collect from him the balance of the judgment. It was on this ground that the
trial court released PNB from the complaint. One of the attorneys for the PNB testified that Uy
Teng Piao renounced his right to redeem the parcel of land, because a friend of the respondent
was interested in buying it. The testimony of the attorney was questioned from the fact of his
being a witness and an attorney at the same time in a cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the counsel for the respondent PNB could be a witness and at the same
time an attorney in the instant case.

HELD: The counsel for the respondent PNB, could not be a witness and at the same time an
attorney in the instant case. Canon 19 of the Code of Legal Ethics provides that when a lawyer is
a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the attestation or custody of
an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case to other counsel, except when
essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.
With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, it is observe that although the law does not
forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the courts prefer
that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they should withdraw
from the active management of the case.

d) Reliance on merits of his cause and avoidance of any impropriety which tends to influence
or gives the appearance of influence upon the courts

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS


MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM
ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT
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NESTLE V. SANCHEZ
(G.R. No. 75209, September 30, 1987)
(154 SCRA 542)

FACTS: Two unions with pending cases before the Supreme Court had intermittent pickets in
front of the Padre Faura gate of the SC building, obstructing access to and egress from the
Court’s premises. They also constructed provisional shelters, set up a kitchen, littered the area
causing it to be unhygienic and un-sanitized, waved their red streamers and placards with
slogans, and harangued the court with the use of loud speakers. Two justices called the leaders
of the unions and their counsel to inform them that the pickets constitute direct contempt
of court, and that their petitions could not be heard until the pickets stop. Atty. Espinas, the
counsel for the unions, apologized and assured that the acts would not be repeated.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Espinas guilty of contempt of court.

HELD: YES. Grievances must be ventilated through proper channels (appropriate petitions,
motions or other pleadings) in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial
administrators of justice entitled to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice; for though the rights of free speech and of assembly are
constitutionally protected, an attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice is no longer
within the ambit of constitutional protection.
However, Atty. Espinas, the counsel for the unions, apologized and assured that the acts

Canon 13 Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek
opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.

LANTORIA V. BUNYI
(A.M. No. 1769, June 8, 1992)
(209 SCRA 528)

FACTS: In an ejectment case handled by Atty. Irineo Bunyi pending before the Municipal
Court, it is contended by Cesar L. Lantoria that Atty. Bunyi was the one who prepared the
decisions and the judge simply signed them. This is predicated on the letters sent by Atty. Bunyi
to Lantoria. Thereafter, the latter filed a complaint against Atty. Bunyi for conduct unbecoming
of a member of the Bar. The case was referred to the Solicitor General who found that
respondent is guilty of highly unethical and unprofessional conduct required of a member of the
Bar and consequently recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law.
Atty. Bunyi manifested that he did not offer the Judge any gift or consideration to influence the
latter in allowing him to prepare the draft decisions. He also offered his apology to the Court for
all the improprieties which may have resulted from his preparation of the draft decisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Irineo Bunyi shall be suspended from the practice of law for
conduct unbecoming of a member of the Bar.

HELD: YES. CANON 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall
rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or
gives the appearance of influencing the court. Rule 13.01 further provides that a lawyer shall
not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for, cultivating
familiarity with judges. In the case at hand, Atty. Bunyi is guilty of unethical practice in
attempting to influence the court where he had pending civil case by preparing the draft
decision. These acts of respondent amounted to conduct unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer
of the Court.
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Canon 13 Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.

CRUZ V. SALVA
See Canon 3, Rule 3.04

MARTELINO V. ALEJANDRO
(G.R. No. L-30894, March 25, 1970)
(32 SCRA 106)

FACTS: Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles
of War, as a result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then
undergoing commando training on the island of Corregidor. Later, Martelino sought the
disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission
that he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case
had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was
being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November
11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the
challenge. Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no
proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality
have been impaired.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publicity given to the case prejudice Martelino’s right to fair trial.

HELD: NO. Televising a court trial would amount to a violation of due process. A
carnival atmosphere would be created. Jurisprudence also states that there is nothing that
proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But there is a
reasonable likelihood that the prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial. If publicity
during the proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial shall be ordered. However,
the case at bar is different. The publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners
but rather on the responsibility of the government for what was claimed to be a “massacre” of
Muslim trainees. If there was a “trial by newspaper” it was not of the petitioner but of the
government. There is no showing that the courts martial failed to protect the accused from
massive publicity. Protection would include: controlling the release of information; change the
venue or postpone trial until the deluge of prejudicial publicity has subsided. Even granting hat
there is massive and prejudicial publicity, the petitioners do not contend that the respondents
have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be.

IN RE ALMACEN
(G.R. No. L-27654, February 18, 1970)
(31 SCRA 562)

FACTS: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of
Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal “peopled
by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He also expressed strong words as
against the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” The petition
rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial
court. His appeal was dismissed in the Court of Appeals. In a petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he
thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in
trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice
system.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.
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RULING: YES. Every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. The Court also treats with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously
assails their actuations, provided it is done in respectful terms and through legitimate channels;
for courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of
justice. The reason is that an attorney does not surrender his right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the court in fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the Bar, as well as
the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. Criticism has been an important part
of the traditional work of a lawyer. As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected
not only to exercise his right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. But the
cardinal condition of all such criticism is that is shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety.

Canon 13 Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency of
the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.

4. To the clients

NATURE OF ATTORNEY-
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
1. Strictly personal
2. Highly confidential
3. Fiduciary

ATTORNEY-
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP, HOW FORMED
1. Oral – when the counsel is employed without a written agreement, but the conditions and amount
of attorney’s fees are agreed upon.

2. Express – when the terms and conditions including the amount of fees are explicitly stated in a
written document, which may be a private or public document. Written contract of attorney’s fees
is the law between the lawyer and the client.

3. Implied – When there is no agreement, whether oral or written, but the client allowed the lawyer
to render legal services not intended to be gratuitous without objection and client is benefited by
reason thereof.

*** While a written agreement for professional services is the best evidence to show the relation,
formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The absence of a written
contract will not preclude a finding that there is a professional relationship.

ADVANTAGES OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT BETWEEN THE LAWYER LAWYER AND THE CLIENT
1. It is conclusive as to the amount of compensation.
2. In case of unjustified dismissal of an attorney, he shall be entitled to recover from the client full
compensation stipulated in the contract
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RULES PROTECTING ATTORNEY-


ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
RELATIONSHIP
1. Best efforts must be exerted by the attorney to protect his client’s interest;
2. The attorney must promptly account for any fund or property entrusted by or received for his
client;
3. An attorney cannot purchase his client’s property or interest in litigation;
4. The privacy of communications shall at all times upheld;
5. An attorney cannot represent a party whose interest is adverse to that of his client even after the
termination of the relation.

THREE PRINCIPAL TYPES OF PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITY THAT A LLICENSED


ICENSED ATTORNEY
ATTORNEY AT
LAW GENERALLY ENGAGES IN THE PRACTICE OF HIS PROFESSION

1. Legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations;
2. Appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to determine
rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law; and
3. Preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by
ordinary layman. (CPR Annotated, PhilJA)

a) Availability of service without discrimination

CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.

(i) Services regardless of person’s status

Canon 14 Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of the latter’s
race, sex, creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.

(h-i) of the Rules of Court. Duties of attorneys.—It is the duty of an attorney: (h)
Rule 138, Sec. 20 (h-
Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed. (i)
In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his personal
opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to the end that no
person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law

Canon 14 Rule 14.01 makes it his duty not to decline to represent the accused regardless of his opinion
as to his guilt. Note that in criminal cases,
cases it is easy to take accused because of presumption of
innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt.

It is the lawyer’s duty to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be
just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under law. He is not to encourage
the commencement or the continuance of an action or delay any man’s cause, for any corrupt motive
or interest. He must decline to conduct a civil case or to make a defense when convinced that it is
intended merely to harass or injure the opposite party or to work oppression or wrong. If he were to
take a bad civil case for a plaintiff, it will only be to advise him not to file the action or to settle it with
the claimant. If he were to accept the defense of a bad civil case against a defendant, it will either be to
exert his best effort toward a compromise or, to tell his client to confess judgment. In criminal cases:
easy to take accused because of presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt.
(Agpalo)
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(ii) Services as counsel de officio

Canon 14 Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an
appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal aid.

Rule 138, sec. 31 of the Rules of Court Attorney’s for destitute litigants.—A court may assign an
attorney to render professional aid free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears
that the party is destitute and unable to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are
necessary to secure the ends of justice and to protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the
attorney so assigned to render the required service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for
sufficient cause shown.

Rule 138, Sec. 36 of the Rules of Court —Amicus curiae.— Experienced and impartial attorneys may
be invited by the Court to appear as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Who is an Amicus curiae?


curiae
A friend of the court; a “bystander” (usually a counselor) who interposes or volunteers information
upon some matter of law in regard to which the judge is doubtful or mistaken. (Agpalo)

(iii) Valid grounds for refusal

Canon 14 Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client unless:
a) he is in no position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client or between a present
client and the prospective client.

(iv) Same standard of conduct for paying and non-paying clients

Canon 14 Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his professional fees
shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his relations with paying clients.

b) Candor, fairness and loyalty to clients

CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.

(i) Confidentiality rule

Canon 15 Rule
Rule 15.01 - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his own interest, and if
so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
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HORNILLA V. SALUNAT
(A.C. No. 5804, July 1, 2003)

FACTS: Hornilla filed a complaint against Atty. Salunat with the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline for unethical practice regarding conflict of interests. Atty. Salunat is a member of the
ASSA Law Office and acted as the legal counsel for the Philippine Public School Teachers
Association. In a quarrel between the PPSTA and some of its board members pending SEC
resolution for unlawful spending and undervalued sale of real properties, Atty. Salunat appeared
as counsel for said board members. Atty. Salunat avers that he only appeared in behalf of ASSA
since he was a partner. Moreover, he only filed a Manifestation for extreme urgency.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salunat is guilty of unethical behavior as a member of the IBP.

HELD: YES. A lawyer engaged as counsel for a corporation cannot represent members of the
same corporation’s board of directors in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would
be tantamount to representing conflicting interests which is prohibited by the Code of
Professional Responsibility. There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent
interest of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is
the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.
Also, if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether
he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquired
through their connection. Another test is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.

DEE V. CA
(G.R. No. 77439, August 24, 1989)
(176 SCRA 652)

FACTS: Donald Dee and his father engaged the services of Atty. Mutuc regarding the problem
of the alleged indebtedness of petitioner’s brother Dewey to Caesar’s Palace. Atty. Mutuc went
to the casino to negotiate with its president to let Dewey off the hook, and go after the real
debtor Ramon Sy. The president of the casino then told Mutuc that if he can make Ramon Sy
acknowledge the debt, then Dewey would be exculpated. Thereafter Mutuc was able to
convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the debt and brought a letter to the casino asking for a
discount, which resulted to the clearing of Dewey’s name in the casino. Having resolved the
problem, Mutuc proceeded to collect from Dee the remaining balance of their agreed
professional fee. However despite several letter of demand respondent Mutuc never received
his fees. This prompted Mutuc to file an action for collection of the fees. Dee alleged that Mutuc
at the time when he was rendering the alleged services for the petitioner was actually working
for the interest and to the advantage of the casino, and that Mutuc is not justified to claim
professional fees considering that there was conflict of interest involved.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Mutuc is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

HELD: No. Generally, an attorney is prohibited from representing parties with contending
positions. However, at a certain stage of the controversy before it reaches the court, a lawyer
may represent conflicting interests with the consent of the parties. A common representation
may work to the advantage of said parties since a mutual lawyer, with honest motivations and
impartially cognizant of the parties' disparate positions, may well be better situated to work out
an acceptable settlement of their differences, being free of partisan inclinations and acting with
the cooperation and confidence of said parties. Here, even indulging petitioner in his theory
that private respondent was during the period in question an agent of Caesar's Palace, petitioner
was not unaware thereof, hence he actually consented to and cannot now decry the dual
representation that he postulates.
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(ii) Privileged communications

Canon 15 Rule 15.02 - A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect of
matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.

REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(G.R. No. 105938, September 20, 1996)
(262 SCRA 122)

FACTS: This case emerges from the institution of the Complaint before the Sandiganbayan by
the Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., as one of the principal defendants, for the recovery
of alleged ill-gotten wealth which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in a
PCGG Case.
The partners of the law firm Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz Law Offices
(ACCRA Law Firm) performed legal services for its clients. One of the firm’s clients is Mr.
Cojuanco. The members of the law firm delivered to its client documents which substantiate the
client's equity holdings. In the course of their dealings with their clients, the members of the
law firm acquire information relative to the assets of clients as well as their personal and
business circumstances. It is in this regard that the PCGG required the firm to disclose the
identity of its client and the documents and information related to its client’s case. The law firm
contest claiming that they cannot be compelled to disclose their client’s information by virtue of
the lawyer-client privilege communication.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ACCRA lawyers be compelled to disclose the identity of their clients
and the information related to their client’s case.

HELD: NO. The general rule is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge
the name or identity of his client. The reasons for this are that:
- The Court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is sought to
be protected is flesh and blood.
- The privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The privilege does not attach until there is a client.
- The privilege pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.
- Due process considerations require that the opposing party should know his adversary.

The general rule is however qualified by some exceptions. Client identity is privileged:
- Where a strong probability exists that revealing the client’s name would implicate the
client in the very activity for which he sought the lawyer’s advice.
- Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability.
- Where the government’s lawyers have no case against an attorney’s client unless by
revealing the client’s name, the said name would furnish the only link that would form
the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime.

Information relating to the identity of the client may fall within the ambit of the privilege when
the client’s name itself has an independent significance, such that disclosure would then reveal
client confidences.
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PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION
One that refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney
and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware discloses the information to
no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.

PURPOSE OF MAKING THE COMMUNICATION PRIVILEGED


1. To encourage a client to make a full disclosure of the facts of the case to his counsel without fear
2. To allow the lawyer freedom to obtain full information from his client.

TEST IN DETERMINING WHETHER A COMMUNICATION TO AN ATTORNEY IS COVERED BY


THE RULE ON PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION
Whether the communications are made to an attorney with view of obtaining from him
personal assistance or advice regardless of whether there is a pending or merely impending litigation
or any litigation.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS TO ESTABLISH THE EXISTENCE OF THE ATTORNEY ATTORNEY--CLIENT


PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION
COMMUNICATION
Where the legal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such, the communications relating to that purpose made in confidence by the client are at his instance
permanently protected from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor except if the protection be
waived. (Hadjula v. Madianda, A.C. No. 6711, July 3, 2007)

REQUISITES OF PRIVILEGE COMMUNICATION


1. There is attorney-client relationship or a kind of consultancy requirement with a prospective
client;
2. The communication was made by the client to the lawyer in the course of the lawyer’s
professional employment;
3. The communication must be intended to be confidential.

*** The privilege continues to exist even after the termination of the attorney-client relationship. It
outlasts the lawyer’s engagement. The privileged character of the communication ceases only when
waived by the client himself or after his death, by the heir or legal representative. (Baldwin v. CIR, 94
F. 2d 355, 20 AFTR 940)

*** The party who avers that the communication is privileged has the burden of proof to establish the
existence of the privilege unless from the face of the document itself, it clearly appears that it is
privileged. The mere allegation that the matter is privileged is not sufficient. (People v. Sleeper, No.
22783, December 3, 1924)

(iii) Conflict of interest

Canon 15 Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
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PORMENTO V. ATTY. PONTEVEDRA


(A.C. No. 5128, March 31, 2005)
(454 SCRA 167)

FACTS: Atty. Alias Pontevedra is the family’s legal counsel of Pormento. In one civil case
involving the latter, Pormento averred that the same was dismissed because Atty. Pontevedra
deliberately failed to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim, as a result of which,
Pormento was deprived of his right to appeal said order. Pormento also claims that in order to
further protect his rights and interests over the said parcel of land, he was forced to initiate a
criminal case for qualified theft against the relatives of the alleged new owner of the said land.
Atty. Pontevedra is the counsel of the accused in said case. Pormento claims that as part of his
defense in said criminal case, Atty. Pontevedra utilized pieces of confidential information he
obtained from him while he is still his client.
In a separate incident, Pormento claims that he bought a parcel of land. Since there was
another person who claims ownership of the property, Pormento alleges that he heeded
respondent’s advice to build a small house on the property and to allow his (complainant’s)
nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for complainant to establish his possession
of the said property. Subsequently, complainant’s nephew refused to vacate the property
prompting the former to file an ejectment case. Respondent acted as the counsel of
complainant’s nephew.
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of malpractice and misconduct by
representing clients with conflicting interests and should be disbarred by reason thereof.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Pontevedra violates the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting claims for his clients.

HELD: NO. Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “A
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts.”
There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer will
require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in
which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use
against his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test to
determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
thereof.
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when
the subject matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject
matter of the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. The reason for the
prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence
of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s
case. He learns from his client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given
him to take advantage of the client’s secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his
client; for if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
In the present case, the Court finds no conflict of interests when Atty. Pontevedra
represented herein complainant’s nephew and other members of his family in the ejectment case
and in the criminal complaint filed by herein complainant against them. The only established
participation respondent had with respect to the parcel of land purchased by complainant, is
that he was the one who notarized the deed of sale of the said land. On that basis alone, it does
not necessarily follow that respondent obtained any information from herein complainant that
can be used to the detriment of the latter in the ejectment case he filed.
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RUTHIE LIM-
LIM-SANTIAGO V. ATTY. CARLOS SAGUCIO
(A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006)

FACTS: Respondent, Atty. Sagucio was a former Personnel Manager and Counsel of Taggat
Industries Inc. Thereafter in 1992, he was appointed as Asst. Provincial prosecutor of
Tuguegarao Cagayan. Employees of Taggat Industries, through their counsel Atty. Sagucio filed
criminal charges against it for withholding the payment of their wages and salaries without a
valid cause. Taggat Industries through complainant Ruthie-Lim charges respondent with
engaging in private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor and for violation
of Rule 15.03 of CPR.

ISSUES: Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat posits conflict of interests with his
work as Asst. Provincial Prosecutor.

HELD: NO. The issue of the matter of the criminal complaint was pertaining to the withholding
of the wages and salaries of the Taggat employees which occurred from April 1, 1996 to July 15,
1997. Evidently, the respondent was no longer connected with the Taggat Industries during
such period since he is working as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor since 1992. Should there be
apparent conflict of interest, it must be supported by sufficient evidence that Atty. Sagucio used
any confidential information from his preceding employment with Complainant in resolving
the filed criminal complaint.
One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be asked to use against
his former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment. In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the
client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any
matter in which he previously represented him.

GONZALES V. CABUCANA
(AC No. 6836, January 23, 2006)

FACTS: Leticia Gonzales was the complainant in a case for sum of money and damages where
she was represented by the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND
CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar Cabucana handling the case and herein
respondent as an associate/partner. A decision was rendered in the civil case ordering the losing
party to pay Gonzales. Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of execution
issued in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a complaint against
the said sheriff. Notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case where respondent’s law firm was
still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the Gatchecos in the cases filed by
Gonzales. Complainant contended that the respondent’s acceptance of the cases of the
Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainants and respondent’s law
firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent should be disbarred from the practice of law for
representing conflicting interest.

HELD: Affirmative. It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting


interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Such prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of the
lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. Lawyers are
expected not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets
to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. Rule 15.03
– A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned
given after a full disclosure of the facts.
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TESTS TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF CONFLICTING INTERESTS


1. Conflicting Duties - When, on behalf of one client, it is the attorney’s duty to contest for that
which his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when possibility of such situation will
develop.

2. Invitation of Suspicion - Whether the acceptance of the new relation will prevent a lawyer from
the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or will invite suspicion
of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance thereof.

3. Use of Prior Knowledge Obtained - Whether a lawyer will be called upon in his new relation to
use against the first client any knowledge acquired in the previous employment.

INSTANCES WHEN A LAWYER MAY NOT REPRESENT CONFLICTING INTERESTS DESPITE


CONSENT OF BOTH PARTIES CONCERNED
Where the conflict is:
1. Between the attorney’s interest and that of a client; or
2. Between a private client’s interests and that of the government or any of its instrumentalities.

EFFECTS OF REPRESENTING ADVERSE INTERESTS


1. Disqualification as counsel of new client on petition of former client.
2. Where such is unknown to, becomes prejudicial interests of the new client, a judgment against
such may, on that ground be set aside.
3. A lawyer can be held administratively liable through disciplinary action and may be held
criminally liable for betrayal of trust.
4. The attorney’s right to fees may be defeated if found to be related to such conflict and such was
objected to by the former client, or if there was a concealment and prejudice by reason of the
attorney’s previous professional relationship with the opposite party.

(iv) Mediator, Conciliator, Arbitrator of settling disputes

Canon 15 Rule 15.04 - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as mediator,
conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.

(v) Candid and honest advice to clients

Canon 15 Rule 15.05 - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on
the merits and probable results of the client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects
of the case.

Choa vs. Chiongson, 253 SCRA 371 (1996)


His client is entitled to and he is bound to give a candid and honest opinion on the merit or lack of
merit of his client’s case, neither overstating nor understating the prospect of the case. It is likewise
incumbent upon him to give his client an honest opinion on the probable results of the case, with the
end in view of promoting respect for the law and the legal processes.
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Periquet vs. NLRC, 186 SCRA (1990)


As officers of the court, counsels are under obligation to advise their clients against making untenable
and inconsistent claims. Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must unquestionably do the
bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by their own expert appreciation
of the facts and applicable law and jurisprudence.

GILLEGO V. DIAZ
(G.R. No. L-27428, May 29, 1971)
(39 SCRA 88)

The case at bar recalls to mind the Court admonition, in a similarly unmeritorious
case that "The circumstances surrounding this litigation definitely prove that appeal is frivolous
and a plain trick to delay payment and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves
severe condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts could well devote to
meritorious cases." In Lopez vs. Aquino, the Court exhorted counsel that "the cooperation of
litigants and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with
unmeritorious cases may be avoided. There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5
of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is interposed for delay' and expressly
admonishes that 'for a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
action'."

(vi) Non-influential to public official, tribunal, or legislative body

Canon 15 Rule 15.06 - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official,
tribunal or legislative body.

CJC Rule 2.03 - A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private
interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special
position to influence the judge.

This rule protects against influence peddling. Some prospective clients secure the services of a
particular lawyer or law firm precisely because he can exert a lot of influence on a judge and some
lawyers exact big fees for such influence (Agpalo)

(vii) Compliance with laws

Canon 15 Rule 15.07 - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles
of fairness.

Art. 19 of NCC. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

TAKE NOTE: (Agpalo)


• A lawyer is required to represent his client within the bounds of the law. The CPR enjoins him to
employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and warns him not
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to allow his client to dictate procedure in handling the case. He may use arguable construction of
the law or rules which are favorable to his client. But he is not allowed to knowingly advance a
claim or defense that is unwarranted under existing law.
• A lawyer should comply with the client’s lawful requests. But he should resist and should never
follow any unlawful instructions. In matters of law, it is the client who should yield to the lawyer
and not the other way around.
• A lawyer must also observe and advice his client to observe the statute law, thought until a statute
shall have been construed and interpreted by competent jurisdiction, he is free and is entitled to
advice as to its validity and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning and extent

(viii)Concurrent practice of another profession

Canon 15 Rule 15.08 - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently
with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity.

CJC RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a judge may hold and manage
investments but should not serve as officer, director, manager or advisor, or employee of any business
except as director of a family business of the judge.

NAKPIL V. VALDES
(A.C. No. 2040, March 4, 1998)
(286 SCRA 758)

FACTS: Atty. Carlos Valdes was the lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils. Jose Nakpil wanted
to buy a summer residence in Baguio City but because of lack of funds, he agreed that Atty.
Valdes would keep the property in trust until the Nakpils could buy it back. Atty. Valdes took
out two loans to purchase the property. Later, Jose Nakpil died. The ownership of the Baguio
property became an issue in the intestate proceedings as Valdes excluded it from the inventory
of Jose’s estate. Valdes then transferred his title to the property to his company. The
administratrix filed an administrative case to disbar Valdes for (1) maliciously appropriating the
property in trust to his family corporation (2) including in the claims against the estate the
amounts of the two loans which he claimed were Jose’s loans and (3) for conflict of interest,
since his auditing firm prepared the list of claims of creditors who were also represented by his
law firm.

ISSUE: May Atty. Valdes be disbarred in this case.

HELD: The Court suspended Atty. Valdes. Business transactions between an attorney and his
client are disfavored and discouraged by policy of law because by virtue of a lawyer’s office, he
is an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, there is
no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing in favor of lawyers.
MOREOVER, the proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application
where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable
however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies although the attorney’s intentions and
motives were honest and he acted in good faith. Representation of conflicting interests may be
allowed where the parties give an informed consent to the representation after full disclosure of
facts. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of the conflict and the
possible adverse effects must be thoroughly understood by his clients. The test to determine
whether there is conflict of interest in the representation is the probability, not the certainty of
conflict.
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c) Client’s moneys and properties

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS
CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Art. 1491 of the NCC. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession.

Effects of Prohibited Purchase - A prohibited purchase is null and void ab initio; public interest and
public policy dictate that its nullity is definite and permanent and cannot be cured by ratification. The
lawyer will be deemed to hold the property in trust for the client. The client is therefore entitled to
recover property and interest from his attorney with the fruits. The client should, however, return the
purchase price and the legal interests.

ORDONIO V. EDUARTE
(A.M. No. 3216, March 16, 1992)
(207 SCRA 229)

FACTS: In one civil case, Antonia Ulibari through her counsel Atty. Josephine Eduarte, obtained
a favourable decision from the RTC. While the case was pending appeal, Antonia Ulibari
conveyed 20 hectares of land to Atty. Eduarte as her Attorney's fees for legal services rendered.
All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute sale and the deed of conveyance
however remained in the name of Antonia Ulibari. Later, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed a
complaint for disbarment against Atty. Eduarte on the basis of an affidavit executed by her
mother Antonia Ulibari stating that affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of land to Atty.
Eduarte as her attorney's fees. The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, to which the case
was referred for investigation, found Atty. Eduarte guilty of violation of Article 1491 of the Civil
Code and part of the Oath of Office.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Eduarte has violated the law in this case.

HELD: YES. Even if Antonia Ulibari knowingly and voluntarily conveyed the subject property
in favor of Atty. Eduarte, the latter, in causing the execution of the Deed of Conveyance during
the pendency of the appeal of the case involving the said property, has violated Article 1491 of
the Civil Code which prohibits lawyers from "acquiring by assignment property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession."
In the case at bar, the property was already in actual litigation first in the lower court
and then in the Court of Appeals. Whether the deed of conveyance was executed at the instance
of the client driven by financial necessity or of the lawyers is of no moment. In either case, an
attorney occupies a vantage position to press upon or dictate his terms to a harassed client, in
breach of the rule so amply protective of the confidential relations, which must necessarily exist
between attorney and client and of the rights of both. The act constitutes malpractice, even if
the lawyer had purchased the property in litigation.
For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the foregoing
circumstances, Atty. Eduarte has violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but also Rule 10
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that "the lawyer should not purchase any
interest in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting."
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DAVID L. ALMENDAREZ, JR. V. ATTY. MINERVO T.LANGIT


T.LANGIT
(A.C. No. 7057, July 25, 2006)

FACTS: David L. Almendarez, Jr. filed a complaint before the IBP seeking the disbarment of
Atty. Minervo T. Langit for acts unbecoming a lawyer. Complainant was the plaintiff in an
ejectment case. Respondent served as complainant's counsel. While the case was pending,
defendant in ejectment case Roger Bumanlag deposited monthly rentals for the property in
dispute to the Branch Clerk of Court. The trial court rendered a decision in the ejectment case
based on a compromise agreement executed by complainant and Bumanlag. The court granted
the Motion for Execution and Withdrawal of Deposited Rentals filed by respondent as
complainant's counsel. Complainant learned that respondent was able to withdraw the rentals
deposited by Bumanlag but respondent did not inform complainant. Complainant, through his
new counsel Atty. Miguel D. Larida, sent a final demand letter for the accounting and return of
the amount. Respondent failed to reply. The IBP found that respondent failed to account for
money he held in trust for complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross misconduct for acts unbecoming of a lawyer
and betraying the confidence of his client.

HELD: YES. Respondent committed a flagrant violation of his oath when he received the sum of
money representing the monthly rentals intended for his client, without accounting for and
returning such sum to its rightful owner. Respondent received the money in his capacity as
counsel for complainant. Therefore, respondent held the money in trust for complainant. The
Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code") states:
CANON 16 — A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND
PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01—A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for
or from the client.
Rule 16.03—A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property to his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice
promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

Respondent should have immediately notified complainant of the trial court's approval
of the motion to withdraw the deposited rentals. Upon release of the funds to him, respondent
could have collected any lien which he had over them in connection with his legal services,
provided he gave prompt notice to complainant. A lawyer is not entitled to unilaterally
appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact that the client owes him attorney's
fees. In this case, respondent did not even seek to prove the existence of any lien, or any other
right that he had to retain the money.
Respondent's failure to turn over the money to complainant despite the latter's demands
gives rise to the presumption that he had converted the money for his personal use and benefit.
This is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional ethics, impairing public
confidence in the legal profession. More specifically, it renders respondent liable not only for
violating the Code but also for contempt, as stated in Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt — When an attorney
unjustly retains in his hands money of his client after it has been demanded he may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the Court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a bar to a criminal
prosecution.
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LOURDES R. BUSIÑOS V. ATTY. FRANCISCO RICAFORT


(A.C. No. 4349, December 22, 1997)

FACTS: Complainant Lourdes R. Busiños filed a case of estafa against Respondent Atty.
Francisco Ricafort for misappropriating the sum of P32,000.00, of which P30,000.00 was
entrusted to respondent for deposit in the bank account of complainant’s husband
while P2,000.00 represented the amount respondent demanded from complainant supposedly
for a bond in Civil Case but it was subsequently dropped upon payment of the respondent of the
amount allegedly owed to the complainant. However, the administrative case was pursued by
the complainant claiming gross misconduct on the part of the respondent as to the delayed
payment of his despite several demands from her and her lawyer, in addition to the asking of
P2,000.00 abovementioned, for which stated purpose such was not even required.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Francisco Ricafort is guilty of gross misconduct for his delayed
payment of his debt (the amount he illegally used and fraudulently obtained) despite several
demands.

HELD: Atty. Francisco Ricafort is guilty of gross misconduct for his delayed payment of debt.
His belated payment of the amount he illegally used and fraudulently obtained do not relieve
him from any liability if only to impress upon him that the relation between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in its nature and of a very delicate, exacting and confidential character,
requiring high degree of fidelity and good faith. In view of that special relationship, lawyers are
bound to promptly account for money or property received by them on behalf of their clients
and failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. Moreover, the Respondent, by
converting the money of his clients to his own personal use without their consent, and by
deceiving the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used as a
bond which was not required, is, undoubtedly, guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross
misconduct. By so doing, he betrays the confidence reposed in him by his clients. Not only has
he degraded himself but as an unfaithful lawyer he has besmirched the fair name of an
honorable profession.
Plainly, respondent breached Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

(i) Fiduciary relationship

Canon 16 Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client.

PARIŇAS V. PAGUINTO
(AC No. 6297, July 13, 2004)

FACTS: Dolores Parińas engaged the services of Atty. Oscar Paguinto to annul her marriage to
Danilo Soriano. Parińas paid Atty. Paguinto P10, 000.00 in cash as partial payment of the
acceptance fee. An acknowledgment receipt evidenced this payment. Before the end of
December 2001, Parińas gave Atty. Paguinto P2, 500.00 for the filing fee. Atty. Paguinto led
Parińas to believe that he had filed the annulment case. Atty. Paguinto informed Parińas that
the case was filed with the RTC-Manila before Judge Ricaforte. However, Parińas later found
out that Atty. Paguinto never filed the annulment case in court. Parinas demanded the return of
the filing fee given but Paguinto did not return the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Paguinto violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD: Yes, Atty. Paguinto violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
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HELD: Yes, Atty. Paguinto violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected for or from the client.
Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to
the duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose,
such as for filing fee, but not used for failure to file the case must immediately be returned to the
client on demand. Atty. Paguinto returned the money only after Parińas filed the
administrative case for disbarment.

LEMOINE V. BALON
(A.C. No. 5829, October 28, 2003)
(414 SCRA 511)

FACTS: Daniel Lemoine filed a car insurance claim with the Metropolitan Insurance
Company (Metropolitan Insurance), the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As he
encountered problems in pursuing his claim, his friend, a certain Jesus Garcia (Garcia), arranged
for the engagement of Atty. Amadeo Balon’s services. Balon was charging 25% of the amount
actually recovered payable upon the successful recovery, among others. The said attorney’s fee
was not agreed to by Lemoine. Lemoine left for France but before he left he signed an undated
special power of attorney allowing Lemoine to bring any action against Metropolitan Insurance
for the satisfaction of the complaint as well as to negotiate, sign and compromise, encash and
receives payment. Metro Insurance issued a check worth 525k as full settlement. Garcia told
Lemoine that Balon had told him that the claim was still pending and that it was subject to
negotiation and that it had offered 350k or 50% of the policy. When Lemoine returned to the
Philippines and paid a visit to the Metro Insurance he was informed that the claim had been
settled a year prior. He then proceeded to the office of Balon to demand an explanation,
however Balon was not there. They had a phone conversation where he demanded the return of
the proceeds of the claim. Balon claimed that he had in his possession the proceeds but that
there was a lien for his fees on pending payment of his attorneys fees at 50% of the amount
collected. In a letter, there were threats at deportation and investigation by the NBI, DOLE and
BIR where Balon is supposedly well connected.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Balon violated the CPR?

HELD: Canon 16 Rule 16.01 of the CPR states that a lawyer shall account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client. This commandment entails certain specific
acts to be done by a lawyer such as rendering an accounting of all money or property received
for or from the client as well as delivery of the funds or property to the client when due or upon
demand. Atty. Balon breached this Canon when after he received the proceeds of complainant’s
insurance claim, he did not report it to Lemoine. By Atty. Balon’s failure to promptly account for
the funds he received and held for the benefit of his client, he committed professional
misconduct. Such misconduct is reprehensible at a greater degree, for it was obviously done on
purpose through the employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept in the
dark about the release of the check, until he himself discovered the same, and has to date been
deprived of the use of the proceeds thereof.
A lawyer who practices or utilizes deceit in his dealings with his client not only violates his
duty of fidelity, loyalty and devotion to the client’s cause but also degrades himself and
besmirches the fair name of an honorable profession.
That Atty. Balon had a lien on complainant’s funds for his attorney’s fees did not relieve
him of his duty to account for it. The lawyer’s continuing exercise of his retaining lien
presupposes that the client agrees with the amount of attorney’s fees to be charged. In case of
disagreement or when the client contests that amount for being unconscionable, however, the
lawyer must not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees. He can
file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or proper motion with the proper court to
fix the amount of such fees.
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LEONILA J. LICUANAN V. ATTY. MANUEL L. MELO


(A.M. No. 2361, February 9, 1989)
(170 SCRA 100)

FACTS: A complaint was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the Office of the Court
Administrator against Atty. Manuel L. Melo, for breach of professional ethics, alleging that the
latter who was her counsel in an ejectment case, failed to remit to her the rentals collected by
him on different dates over a twelve-month period, much less did he report to her the receipt of
said amounts. It was only after approximately a year from actual receipt that Atty. Licuanan
turned over his collections to her after demand. Atty. Licuanan admitted having received the
payment of rentals from complainant's tenant but explained that he kept this matter from the
complainant for the purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals.

ISSUE: Whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of Atty. Licuanan in accounting for
the funds collected by him for his former client for which unprofessional conduct respondent
should be disciplined.

HELD: Yes. The conduct of Atty. Licuanan is a breach of the Lawyer's Oath to which he swore
and an evident transgression of the Canons of Professional Ethics. Under the Canon, money of
the client or collected for the client of other trust property coming into the possession of the
lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly, and should not under any circumstance
be commingled with his own or be used by him. Indeed, by his professional misconduct, Atty.
Licuanan has breached the trust reposed in him by his client. He has shown himself unfit for
the confidence and trust which should characterize an attorney-client relationship and the
practice of law.

DUMADAG V. LUMAYA
LUMAYA
(A.C. No. 2614, June 29, 2000)
(197 SCRA 303)

FACTS: In one civil case involving a sale of a parcel of land filed by Maximo Dumadag through
his counsel Atty. Ernesto Lumaya, a compromise agreement has been reached whereupon the
Avellanosas are to pay Dumadag the amount of Php 4,644.00. The Avellanosas paid the said
amount to Dumadag through the latter’s counsel. However, Atty. Lumaya failed to deliver to
Dumadag the said money despite the latter’s demand. Thus, the administrative charge for
unethical practice was filed by Dumadag against Atty. Lumaya.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lumaya is guilty of unethical practice.

HELD: YES. Canon 16 Rule 16.01 of the Canons of Professional Responsibility requires a
lawyer to account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
This rule Atty. Lumaya has violated making him guilty of unethical practice of law.

(ii) Co-mingling of funds


Canon 16 Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own
and those of others kept by him.

(iii) Delivery of funds


Canon 16 Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon
demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be
necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all judgements and executions he has secured for his
client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
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Rule 138 SEC. 37 of the Rules of Court —an attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his
lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.
He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client,
from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered
upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have
the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his
lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements.

QUILBAN V. ROBINOL
(A.M. No. 2144, April 10, 1989)
(171 SCRA 768)

FACTS: Congressman Luis R. Taruc broached the idea of donating or selling a parcel of land
somewhere in Quezon City to the squatters. Following such advice, the squatters formed the
“Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala,” with Bernabe Martin as President. However, Martin
sold the said land to Maximo Rivera, a realtor, to the exclusion of the other Samahan members.
The members of the Samahan filed a civil case against Rivera but were dismissed. On appeal,
they hired Atty. Santiago R. Robinol. The latter was able to obtain a reversal of the said
decision. The Court of Appeals ordered that Rivera be reimbursed the amount of P41,961.65 for
the expenses he incurred for the land. The officers of the Samahan raised a total amount of
P75,000.00 and gave it Atty. Robinol. However, he made no payment to Rivera. As a
consequence, complainants filed an administrative case against him for unethical practice. On
the other hand, Atty. Robinol claims lien over the subject money in lieu of the services
rendered by him invoking the principle of quantum meruit.

ISSUES: Whether or not respondent can be held guilty of ethical infractions and grave
misconduct

HELD: YES. His violation was that he retained in his possession his clients’ funds intended for
a specific purpose. His act, under the circumstances, was highly unjust for him to have done so.
His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence. Atty. Robinol he is
bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose the purchase
of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners. The
principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed upon for his
services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as much
as he has earned. In this case, however, there was an express contract and a stipulated mode of
compensation. The implied assumption quantum meruit therefore, is inapplicable.

If client agrees with lawyer as to the amount of attorney’s fees and as to the application of the client’s
fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursement, a lawyer may deduct what is due him and remit the
balance to his client. If no such agreement or consent or if there is dispute or disagreement as to the
fees, he should return everything to client without prejudice to his filing a case to recover his
unsatisfied fees. (Agpalo)

This rule grants the lawyer a lien over the client’s funds in his possession as well as on all judgments
and executions he has secured for his client, to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements. (Agpalo)
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(iv) Borrowing or lending

Canon 16 Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.

Art. 1491 of the NCC. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or judicial
auction, either in person or through the mediation of another:

(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or levied
upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their
respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession.

RUBIAS V. BATILLER
(G.R. No. L-35702, May 29, 1973)
(51 SCRA 120)

FACTS: Francisco Militante claimed that he owned a parcel of land located in Iloilo. He filed
with the CFI of Iloilo an application for the registration of title of the land but the same was
denied. He appealed to the Court of Appeals. Pending that appeal, he sold to Rubias (his son-in-
law and a lawyer) the land.
The CA rendered a decision, dismissing the application for registration. Rubias filed a Forcible
Entry and Detainer case against Batiller. In that case, the court held that Rubias has no cause of
action because the property in dispute which Rubias allegedly bought from Militante was the
subject matter of a land case, in which case Rubias was the counsel on record of Militante
himself. It thus falls under Article1491 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rubias may purchase the land subject of the case he handles.

Held: NO. Article 1491 says that “The following persons cannot acquire any purchase, even at a
public or judicial auction, either in person or through the mediation of another…. (5) Justices,
judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and rights in litigation or
levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise
their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall
apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their profession.” The present case clearly
falls under this, especially since the case was still pending appeal when the sale was made.

IN RE RUSTE,
RUSTE, 70 Phil 243 (1973)

FACTS: Atty. Melchor Ruste appeared as counsel for the San Juan spouses in a cadastral
proceeding. An
11/12 share of the estate was adjudged in her favor. Atty. Ruste demanded for his fees. The
couple did not have enough money to pay him, so he asked them to execute in his favor a
contract of sale of their share of Lot No. 3764, intending to apply a portion of the would-be
proceeds as payment for his fees. The spouses complied. The land was sold but the proceeds was
kept by Ruste and never reached the hands of the San Juan couple.

ISSUES: Whether or not Ruste committed malpractice.


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HELD: YES. Whether the deed of sale in question was executed at the instance of the spouses
driven by financial necessity (as contended by Ruste) or at their behest (as contended by the
couple) is immaterial. In either case, the lawyer occupies a vantage position to press upon or
dictate his terms to a harassed client in breach of the "rule so amply protective of the
confidential relations, which must necessarily exist between attorney and client and of the
rights of both."

What is a Champerty?
Champerty?
A bargain by a stranger (the lawyer) with a party to a suit (the client) by which such third person
undertakes to carry on the litigation at his own expense and risk, in consideration of receiving, if
successful, a part of the proceeds or subject sought to be recovered.

What is a Champertous Contract?


Contract?
Where the lawyer assumes all expenses of litigation and reimbursement is contingent on outcome of
case is prohibited. Champertous contracts are like wagers—the lawyer gets paid and reimbursed if he
wins the case and loses even what he had spent on the case if he loses.

d) Fidelity to client’s cause

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE
MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANTILLER V. POTENCIANO
(A.M. No. 3195, December 18,1989)
(180 SCRA 246)

FACTS: Humberto V. Potenciano is a lawyer. He is charged with deceit, fraud, and


misrepresentation, and also with gross misconduct, malpractice and of acts unbecoming of an
officer of the court. In an action for ejectment filed against Peregrina Cantiller, the latter lost
and was ordered to vacate. Cantiller then asked Atty. Potenciano to handle their case. She was
made to sign by Atty. Potenciano of what she described as a "hastily prepared, poorly
conceived, and haphazardly composed petition for annulment of judgment”. It was filed with
the RTC however the judge of the said court asked Atty. Potenciano to withdraw as counsel by
reason of their friendship. Later, Cantiller paid Potenciano P2,000.00 as demanded by the latter
which was allegedly needed to be paid to another judge who will issue the restraining order but
eventually Potenciano did not succeed in locating the judge. Contrary to Potenciano’s promise
that he would secure a restraining order, he withdrew his appearance as counsel for Cantiller.
The latter was not able to get another lawyer as replacement. Hence, the order to vacate was
eventually enforced and executed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Potenciano breached his duties as counsel of Cantiller.

HELD: YES. When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he thereby covenants that he will exert all
effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to exercise due diligence or the
abandonment of a client's cause makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had
reposed on him. A lawyer has a duty to protect with utmost dedication the interest of his client
and of the fidelity, trust and confidence which he owes his client. More so where by reason of
his gross negligence his client thereby suffered by losing all her cases. Lawyers should be fair,
honest, and respectable, above suspicion and beyond reproach in dealing with their clients. The
profession is not synonymous with an ordinary business proposition. It is a matter of public
interest.
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ROLLON V. ATTY. NARAVAL


(A.C. No. 6424, March 4, 2005)
(452 SCRA 675)

FACTS: Consorcia Rollon, together with her son, went to the office of Atty. Camilo Naraval to
seek his assistance in a case filed against her for Collection of Sum of Money. After going
through the documents, Atty. Naraval agreed to be Rollon’s lawyer and required her to pay
P8,000 as filing and partial service fee. As per instruction of Atty. Naraval, Rollon’s son
returned to his office to follow up however the former told the son that he was not able to act
on the case because he was busy. After several follow-ups and still no action, Rollon decided to
withdraw the amount paid to Atty. Naraval for failure of the latter to comply with their mutual
agreement. Atty. Naraval said that he could not return the documents because the same were in
his house and the P8,000 paid by Rollon because he has no money. Rollon thus files an
administrative charge against Atty. Naraval for unethical practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Naraval is guilty of unethical practice of law.

HELD: YES. Canon 17 requires that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall
be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Hence, practising lawyers may accept
only as many cases as they can efficiently handle. Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced.
Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care.
If they do any less, then they fail their lawyer’s oath.
The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount
of P8,000 as filing and partial service fee, Atty. Naraval failed to render any legal service in
relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated follow-ups from
her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his client’s cause, in brazen
disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Atty. Naraval clearly fell short of the demands required of
him as a member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes
him answerable not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal profession, and to the general
public.

SUAREZ V. CA
(G.R. No. 91133, March 22, 1993)
(220 SCRA 274)

FACTS: In criminal cases for violation of BP 22 of the Bouncing Check Law against Romina
Suarez, she had for her counsel Atty. Vicente San Luis. At the trial of the case, when it is the
defense turn to offer evidence, Atty. San Luis did not appear. He left for good to USA without
formally withdrawing himself from the case neither did he inform Suarez that he would be
leaving. Trial ensued and judgment was rendered against Suarez. Thereafter, Suarez filed an
admin case against Atty. San Luis for conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for having abandoned
her in court which results to her being prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting her
defense.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. San Luis is guilty of conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.

HELD: The legal difficulty Suarez finds herself in is imputable to the negligence of her de parte
counsel, Atty. Vicente San Luis, in abandoning the conduct of the case without formally
withdrawing or at least informing petitioner that he would be permanently staying in the
U.S.A. so that petitioner could appoint another counsel. A lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the
cause of his client. He owes his client full devotion to his genuine interests, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability. A
lawyer is required to exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill
having reference to the character of the business he undertakes to do. Among his duties to his
client is attending to the hearings of the case.
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SOLATAN V. INOCENTES
(A.C. No. 6504, August 9, 2005)
(466 SCRA 1)

FACTS: The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office were retained by spouses Genito,
owners of an apartment complex. They represented the spouses in ejectment cases against non-
paying tenants occupying the Genito Apartments. Complainant’s sister was a tenant of the
Genito Apartments. A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against her
and a decision was rendered in a judgment by default ordering her to vacate the premises.
Complainant informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire to arrange the execution of a new lease
contract by virtue of which he would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty. Inocentes
referred him to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against tenants of the
Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty. Camano, a verbal agreement was made in
which complainant agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded
attorney’s fees and costs of suit. Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano
representing half of the attorneys’ fees. Complainant failed to make any other payment. The
sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano enforced the writ of execution and levied the
properties found in the subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano agreed
to release the levied properties and allow complainant to remain at the apartment. Acting on
Atty. Camano’s advice, complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the sheriff who
released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to the complainant but was
kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying.
Complainant filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty. Camano and Atty.
Inocentes.

HELD: The fidelity lawyers owe their clients is traditionally characterized as “undivided.” This
means that lawyers must represent their clients and serve their needs without interference or
impairment from any conflicting interest. Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a
party with an interest conflicting with that of his client resulting in detriment to the latter may
be held guilty of disloyalty. However, far be it that every utterance of an attorney which may
have afforded an individual some relief adverse to the former’s client may be labeled as a
culpable act of disloyalty. While the levy was made on chattel found in the apartment of the
judgment debtor, Gliceria Solatan, the complainant was the true owner of the properties.
Consequently, the latter had a right to recover the same. In fact, considering the circumstances,
the questioned statement is in consonance with complainant’s foremost duty to uphold the law
as an officer of the court. The statement of Atty. Camano in such a context should not be
construed by this Court as giving advice in conflict against the interest of the spouses Genito as
in fact the latter have no interest over the incorrectly levied properties.
We, thus, note that the act of informing complainant that the levied properties would be
returned to him upon showing proof of his ownership thereof may hint at infidelity to the
interest of the spouses Genito, but, in this circumstance, lacks the essence of double dealing and
betrayal of the latter’s confidence so as to deserve outright categorization as infidelity or
disloyalty to his clients’ cause.

IN RE SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW,


LAW, 435 SCRA 417

FACTS: Atty. Leon G. Maquera was admitted to the Philippine Bar on February 28, 1958. On
1974, he was admitted to the practice of law in the territory of Guam. He was suspended from
the practice of law in Guam for misconduct, as he acquired his client's property as payment for
his legal services, then sold it and as a consequence obtained an unreasonably high fee for
handling his client's case. The District Court of Guam would want the IBP to look into this case
for appropriate action (suspension or disbarment). On the basis of the Decision of the Superior
Court of Guam, the IBP concluded that although the said court found Maquera liable for
misconduct, "there is no evidence to establish that [Maquera] committed a breach of ethics in
the Philippines."
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ISSUE: May a member of the Philippine Bar who was disbarred or suspended from the practice
of law in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney be meted the
same sanction as a member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the
foreign jurisdiction?

HELD: Maquera's acts in Guam which resulted in his two (2)-year suspension from the practice
of law in that jurisdiction are also valid grounds for his suspension from the practice of law in
the Philippines. Such acts are violative of a lawyer's sworn duty to act with fidelity toward his
clients. They are also violative of the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically, Canon 17
which states that "[a] lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful the
trust and confidence reposed in him."

Rule 138, Sec. 20 (e) of the Rules of Court


Court: To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to
himself, to preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his
client's business except from him or with his knowledge and approval.

Rule 138, Sec. 20 (f) of the Rules of Court:


Court To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witnesses, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged.

NGAYAN V. TUGADE
(G.R. No. 1991)
(193 SCRA 779)

FACTS: Ngayan asked Tugade to prepare an affidavit to be used as basis for a complaint against
Soriano and Leonido as a consequence of the latter’s entry into complainants’ dwelling. Ngayan
signed the affidavit without thoroughly reading it but she noticed one paragraph which did not
mention that Leonido was with Soriano when they both barged into complainant’s residence.
Upon being informed of this omission, Tugade crossed out the said paragraph. Ngayan asked
Tugade to make another affidavit and the latter promised to do so. For some reason, Ngayan
discharged Tugade as their counsel. He also found out that Tugade did not include the name of
Leonido in the criminal case filed. When the omission was remedied by their new counsel, the
adverse parties filed a motion for reinvestigation through their counsel, Atty. Gaminda, who
was a former classmate of Tugade. Tugade was also the lawyer of the brother of Leonido in an
insurance company. In the hearing for the motion for reinvestigation, the adverse parties in
affidavit which Tugade prepared for Ngayan, with one paragraph crossed out, Tugade himself
presented an affidavit controverting the discarded affidavit which he prepared for Ngayan. Thus
Ngayan charged Tugade for violation of paragraphs (e) and (f), Sec.20, Rule 138 Rules of Court
(e) to maintain inviolate the confidence…and to preserve the secrets of his client… (f) to abstain
from all offensive personality..against a party or witness…

ISSUE: Whether or not Tugade must be disciplined for violation of the said Rule.

HELD: YES. When Tugade furnished the adverse parties with a copy of the discarded affidavit,
thus enabling the adverse parties to use it as evidence against complainants, he betrayed the
trust and confidence of his clients in violation of paragraph (e) Sec.20 Rule 138. Tugade’s
actuations from the beginning show that he was partial to the adverse parties. This could be
explained by the fact that he was a former classmate of Atty. Gaminda, the adverse parties’
counsel, and also by the fact that he was the lawyer of Leonido’s brother in an insurance
company. Tugade submitted an affidavit containing facts prejudicial to his former client such as
the fact that the crime charged by Ngayan had already prescribed, and that Ngayan asked him to
make the offense graver to prevent the offense from prescribing. This constitutes an act of
offensive personality against complainants, violative of par. (f) Sec.20 Rule 138.
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BUN SIONG YAO V. ATTY. LEONARDO A. AURELIO


(A.C. No. 7023, March 30, 2006)

FACTS: The complainant, Bun Siong Yao, is a majority stockholder of Solar Farms & Livelihood
Corporation and Solar Textile Finishing Corporation. He alleged that since 1987, he retained
the services of another stockholder, Atty. Leonardo Aurelio, as his personal lawyer, who also
happened to be the brother-in-law of his wife. In 1999, they had a disagreement. Atty. Aurelio
then filed cases against Yao and his wife. Yao alleged that the series of suits filed against him and
his wife is a form of harassment and constitute an abuse of the confidential information which
Atty. Aurelio obtained by virtue of his employment as counsel. The Complainant further argued
that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he filed several suits not
only against the complainant and the other officers of the corporation, but also against the two
corporations which he is both a stockholder and retained counsel. Atty. Aurelio, on the other
hand, claimed that he handled several labor cases in behalf of Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation; that since 1999 he was no longer the counsel for complainant or Solar Textile
Finishing Corporation; that he never used any confidential information in pursuing the criminal
cases he filed but only used those information which he obtained by virtue of his being a
stockholder of Solar Textile Finishing Corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Aurelio violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

HELD: Atty. Aurelio has violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He took
advantage of his being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has
inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with complainant and
complainant’s companies for his own end.

It is essential to note that the relationship between an attorney and his client is a
fiduciary one as Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides, “a lawyer owes
fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on
him.” The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications
made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation
to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship.
The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another,
or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.

Lawyers must conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. Lawyers cannot be
allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool for
instigating hostility against any person—most especially against a client or former client. As the
Court stated in Marcelo v. Javier, Sr.:

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. The trust and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the
attorney a high standard and appreciation of his duty to his clients, his
profession, the courts and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. Generally speaking, a
lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing should
be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any
degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the
profession.
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e) Competence and diligence

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Competence
It is that sufficiency of lawyer’s qualifications to deal with the matter in question and includes
knowledge and skill and the ability to use them effectively in the interest of the client

Diligence
It is “the attention and care required of a person in a given situation and is the opposite of
negligence”. It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal diligence to the
cause of the client.

Lawyer impliedly represents that:


• he possesses requisite degree of learning, skill, ability which is necessary to the practice of his
profession and which other similarly situated possess;
• he will exert his best judgment in the prosecution or defense of the litigation entrusted to him;
• he will exercise reasonable and ordinary care and diligence in the use of his skill and in the
application of his knowledge to his client’s cause;
• He will take such steps as will adequately safeguard his client’s interest. A client may
reasonably expect that counsel will make good his representations. (Agpalo)

(i) Collaborating counsel

Canon 18 Rule 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know
that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his
client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.

However well meaning he may be, a lawyer cannot ask another lawyer to collaborate with him in a
particular case without the consent of the client. The fiduciary nature of attorney-client relationship
prohibits this. (Aguirre)

Some cases involve specialized fields of law and require special training. A lawyer should not accept
an undertaking in specific area of law which he knows or should know he is not qualified to enter.
(Agpalo)

(ii) Adequate protection

Canon 18 Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation.

Lawyer should safeguard his client’s rights and interests by thorough study and preparation; mastering
applicable law and facts involved in a case, regardless of the nature of the assignment; and keeping
constantly abreast of the latest jurisprudence and developments in all branches of the law (Agpalo)
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SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION V. LAGUESMA


(G.R. No. 100485, September 21, 1994)

FACTS: The North Luzon Magnolia Sales Labor Union filed with the DOLE a petition for
certification election among all the regular sales personnel of Magnolia Dairy Products in the
North Luzon Sales Area. San Miguel Corporation (SMC) opposed the petition and questioned
the appropriateness of the bargaining unit sought to be represented by respondent union. The
petition was heard with petitioner being represented by Atty. Alvin C. Batalla of the Siguion
Reyna law office. Atty. Batalla withdrew petitioner's opposition to a certification election and
agreed to consider all the sales offices in northern Luzon as one bargaining unit. At the pre-
election conference, the parties agreed inter alia, on the date, time and place of the consent
election. Respondent union won the election. Thus, respondent union became the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent for all the regular sales personnel in all the sales offices of Magnolia
Dairy Products in the North Luzon Sales Area. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor
claiming that Atty. Batalla was merely a substitute lawyer for Atty. Ona and was allegedly
unfamiliar with the collective bargaining history of its establishment. Petitioner claims it should
not be bound by the mistake committed by its substitute lawyer.

ISSUE: Whether or not SMC should not be bound by the mistake committed by its substitute
lawyer in this case.

HELD: The collective bargaining history of a company is not decisive of what should comprise
the collective bargaining unit. Insofar as the alleged "mistake" of the substitute lawyer is
concerned, we find that this mistake was the direct result of the negligence of petitioner's
lawyers. It will be noted that Atty. Ona was under the supervision of two (2) other lawyers.
There is nothing in the records to show that these two (2) counsels were likewise unavailable at
that time. Instead of deferring the hearing, petitioner's counsels chose to proceed therewith.
Indeed, prudence dictates that, in such case, the lawyers allegedly actively involved in SMC's
labor case should have adequately and sufficiently briefed the substitute lawyer with respect to
the matters involved in the case and the specific limits of his authority. Unfortunately, this was
not done in this case. The negligence of its lawyers binds petitioner.

(iii) Negligence

Canon 18 Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection there with shall render him liable.

DINOY V. ROSAL
(Admin Case No. 3721, August 17, 1994)

FACTS: Mr. Julian C. Dinoy sent the Secretary of Justice an unverified letter charging Atty.
Jesus Rosal with having notarized a Special Power of Attorney in favor of one Estela
Gentacutan, at a time when some of the principals mentioned in the document were already
dead. The matter was referred to the IBP which finds the charge duly substantiated and
recommends the suspension of Atty. Rosal from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Jesus Rosal be suspended from the practice of law.

HELD: Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one and
renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Consequently, it is the
duty of the notarial officer to demand that a document be signed in his presence by the real
parties thereto; the notarial officer must observe "utmost care" to comply with the elementary
formalities in the performance of his duties. This, the respondent fails to observe, thus, his
suspension.
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LEGARDA V. CA
(G.R. No. 94457, June 10, 1992)
(209 SCRA 722)

FACTS: Atty. Antonio Coronel is the counsel of one Victoria Legarda in a civil case for specific
performance filed against the latter by the New Cathay House Inc. When asked by Court to file
their answer, Legarda through Atty. Coronel ask for an extension of time which was granted.
Thereafter, Atty. Coronel did not lift a finger to file an answer. Neither did he file a motion for
reconsideration after judgment by the trial court; nor did he initiate moves towards an appeal of
the decision which was adverse and prejudicial to his client. Consequently, Atty. Coronel was
required by the Court to show cause why he should not be liable administratively for his acts
and omissions which resulted in grave injustice to his client.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Coronel be liable administratively for his acts and omissions in this
case.

HELD: YES. The facts of the case clearly show that Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandates that "a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence." He failed to observe particularly Rule 18.03 of the same Code which
requires that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable." Undoubtedly, Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise
due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of his client caused the latter material
prejudice. It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause; he
covenants that he will exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who
fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause makes him unworthy of the trust
reposed on him by the latter. Moreover, a lawyer owes fealty, not only to his client, but also to
the Court of which he is an officer. Atty. Coronel failed to obey this Court's order even on a
matter that personally affects him, such that one cannot avoid the conclusion that he must be
bent on professional self-destruction.

ATTY.
ATTY. SOLIDON V. ATTY. MACALALAD
(A.C. No. 8158, February 24, 2010)

FACTS: Macalalad is the Chief of the DENR Legal Division and that while he is in public service
he was allowed by the DENR Secretary to practice law. While in Samar, he was introduced to
Atty. Solidon who asked him to handle the titling of a land located there, the entire task was to
be completed within 8 months. Initial payment has been made. To date, Macalalad has not filed
any petition for registration over the property. Solidon allegedly followed up with Macalalad
through text and calls. Macalalad on the other hand, claims that the failure was due to Solidon’s
lack of communication with him in addition to the lack of documentary evidence. IBP found
that Macalalad failed to present any reasonable excuse for the filing of the application; that this
was a violation of 18.03, thus, his suspension.

ISSUE: Was the suspension of Atty. Macalalad proper?

HELD: Yes. A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states: Rule 18.03 – “A lawyer shall not
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render
him liable.” The mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is
considered per se a violation. A certain Cabo-BOrata in an affidavit said that she was able to
contact Macaladlad easily and that when asked about progress of the case he was vague. Saying it
was in process. Macaladlad never contested this claim. Because of the time period fixed by the
parties, he should have taken prompt action to communicate with his clients. He should have
initiated contact with them. He had already been paid and thus he should have at least taken
some steps toward the fulfilment of his task.
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BARBUCO V. ATTY. BELTRAN


(A.C. No. 5092, August 11, 2004)

FACTS: Lucila S. Barbuco filed a Sworn Complaint against Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran for
malpractice of law, negligence and dishonesty. It appears that complainant, through her son,
Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of filing an appeal before the
Court of Appeals. Complainant’s appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for failure to file
Appellant’s Brief, pursuant to Rule 50, Section 1(e) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Complainant found out that her appeal had been dismissed only when her son went to the Court
of Appeals to verify the status of the case. Respondent Beltran averred that the docket fees were
paid on time and that he filed the Appellant’s Brief with the Court of Appeals. However, the
appeal was dismissed. Respondent then alleged that he filed a motion for reconsideration, on the
ground that he received the notice to file brief on June 25, 1998; however, on June 26, 1998, he
met a vehicular accident which physically incapacitated him for several days; and that as a result
of the accident, he suffered head injuries which caused him to lose track of deadlines for the
filing of pleadings.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Beltran be suspended for failing to file appellant’s brief resulting to
the dismissal of his client’s case?

HELD: Yes. Lawyer suspended for failing to file appellant’s brief resulting to the dismissal of his
client’s case. Rule 18.03 provides that: “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable”.
An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with
utmost diligence. Failure to file brief within the reglementary period certainly constitutes
inexcusable negligence, more so if the delay of forty-three (43) days resulted in the dismissal of
the appeal.
That Respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injuries as a
result thereof cannot serve to excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he
was a member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer. Respondent could have asked any
of his partners in the law office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him or, at least, to file a Motion
for Extension of Time to file the said pleading. Failure to timely file a pleading is by itself
inexcusable negligence on Respondent’s part.

RIZALINO FERNANDEZ V. ATTY. REYNALDO NOVERO, JR


(A.C. No. 5394, December 2, 2002)

FACTS: Rizalino Fernandez and others filed a disbarment case against Atty. Reynaldo Novero,
Jr. for alleged patent and gross neglect in the handling of their civil case against the Bacolod City
Water District. The complainants imputed that the respondent did not attend the scheduled
hearing nor seek a postponement, for which reason the trial court considered respondent to have
waived further presentation of his evidence and directed him to formally offer his exhibits.
However, respondent failed to formally offer his exhibits, prompting the trial court to order the
dismissal of the case. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal
however he did not file his motion within the reglementary period. He even tried to shift the
blame on complainant by claiming that the latter insisted on presenting his sister from Manila as
their last witness. The truth was that complainant’s sister had already testified. The respondent
contended that complainant engaged his legal services after the first counsel had withdrawn and
he had no knowledge of what had happened in the case before he handled it because
complainant did not furnish him with the records and stenographic notes of the previous
proceedings despite his repeated requests. He alleged that he failed to formally offer the exhibits
because complainant tried to take over the handling of the case by insisting on presenting more
witnesses who failed to appear during trial. The Office of the Bar Confidant submitted a report
finding respondent guilty of violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommending his suspension.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross neglect in the handling of the civil case?

HELD: The Supreme Court held that a counsel must constantly keep in mind that his actions or
omissions, even malfeasance or nonfeasance would be binding on his client. A lawyer owes to
the client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability in that representation. The respondents
attempt to evade responsibility by shifting the blame on complainant due to the latter’s failure to
turn over to him records and stenographic notes of the case only highlights his incompetence
and inadequacy in handling the complainants case. The respondent Atty. Novero is found guilty
of neglect of his client’s case.

(iv) Duty to apprise client

Canon 18 Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall
respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.

BLANZA V. ARCANGEL
(A.C. No. 492, September 5, 1967)
(21 SCRA1)

FACTS: Atty. Agustin Arcangel volunteered to be the counsel of Olegaria Blanza and Maria
Pasion in a labor case for pension claims. Later, the two ask the Court to take disciplinary action
against Atty. Arcangel for professional non-feasance on the following grounds: (1) his failure to
attend to complainant’s pension claims for six years; (2) his failure to immediately return the
documents despite repeated demands upon him; and (3) his failure to return to complainant
Pasion, allegedly all of her documents. Atty. Arcangel contended that the complainants failed to
cooperate and pay for the Photostat services and that there were no agreements as to his
compensation as counsel. These the complainants did not controvert.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Arcangel is liable as charge.

HELD: No. The Court ruled in this case that the evidence presented by the complainants is
insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary action against Atty. Arcangel. The Court is
constrained to dismiss the charges against Atty. Arcangel for being legally insufficient, yet, the
court must counsel against his acts as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and
positive role in the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the
statute. As a man of law her is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model
citizen. Atty. Arcangel here has not lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have
complainants wait and hope for 6 long years. Upon their refusal to cooperate, Atty. Arcangel
should have terminated the professional relationship, instead of keeping them hanging.

The standard of diligence required of a lawyer is that of a good father of a family. He is not
bound to exercise extraordinary diligence. There is want of required diligence when a lawyer fails
without sufficient justification to bring an action immediately, to answer a complaint within the
reglementary period, to notify his client of the date of the date of hearing, to attend the scheduled
pre-trial conference, to inform the client of an adverse judgment within the reglementary period to
appeal, to take steps to have the adverse decision reconsidered or appealed, to ascertain the correct
date of receipt of decision, to acquaint himself with what has happened to the litigation, to pay docket
fee on appeal, to claim judicial notice sent to him by mail or to file the appellant’s brief.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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OFELIA R. SOMOSOT V. ATTY. GERADO F. LARA


(A.C. No. 7024, January 30, 2009)

FACTS: In support of her complaint for disbarment, the complainant alleged that she retained
the services of the respondent as her counsel in a collection case filed by Golden Collection
Marketing Corporation against her and other co-defendants. Her defense was that it was the
corporation who actually owed her. The respondent agreed to handle the case and duly entered
his appearance as counsel after securing his acceptance fee. However, that after filing the
Answer to the Complaint, the respondent lawyer fails to informed her of the developments in
the case. She only heard about the case when there was already a decision against her and her
co-defendants. She even belatedly learned that the respondent had sought his discharge as
counsel without her knowledge and consent. Contrary to the respondent's claim that he could
no longer locate her, she claimed that the respondent knew all along where she lived and could
have easily contacted her had he been in good faith. Respondent denied that he failed to exercise
the diligence required of him as counsel.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Lara is deemed incompetent in his services to Mrs. Ofelia
Somosot.

DECISION: YES. He violated the basic rule under Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." While it may
be said that the respondent did not completely abandon the case, his handling of the
complainant's defense left much to be desired. The complainant was never informed the
development of the case and the omission eventually led to the grant of the plaintiff's motion for
judgment on the pleadings, which in turn led to the decision against the defendants. The
respondent failed to provide details on the developments that led to the adverse rulings on the
interrogatories/admissions and the judgment on the pleadings.

f) Representation with zeal within legal bounds

CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS
OF THE LAW.

(i) Use of fair and honest means

Canon 19 Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

Rule 138 SEC. 20 (d) of the Rules of Court — It is the duty of an attorney:
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law

The rule is that in espousing his client’s cause, a lawyer should not state his personal belief as to the
soundness or justice of his case. The reasons: the lawyer’s personal belief has no real bearing on the
case; if expression of belief were permitted, it would give improper advantage to the older and better
known lawyer whose opinion would carry more weight; If such were permitted, omission to make
such assertion might be taken as an admission of the lack or belief in the soundness of his client’s
cause. (Agpalo)
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PENA V. ATTY. APARICIO


(A.C. No. 7298 Formerly CBD Case No. 05-1565)

FACTS:
FACTS: In herein case, respondent lawyer, in the exercise of his zeal to defend the interest of his
client sent a letter to the company who was his client’s employer. Unfortunately, the said
demand letter included “threats” amounting to blackmail, specifically the words were: BUT if
these are not paid on August 10, 2005,
2005 we will be constrained to file and claim bigger amounts
including moral damages to the tune of millions under established precedence of cases and laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not the abovementioned words violated Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

HELD: The Court ruled in the affirmative ratiocinating that Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility states that “a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the
bounds of the law,” reminding legal practitioners that a lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In particular,
Rule 19.01 commands that a “lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.”
Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal
case or cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure leverage to compel the
adversaries to yield or withdraw their own cases against the lawyer’s client. In the case at bar,
respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened
complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would
file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax
evasion, falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to
violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating Canon 19, but they also
amount to blackmail.

(ii) Client’s fraud

Canon 19 Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to
rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance
with the Rules of Court.

(iii) Procedure in handling the case

Canon 19 Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure on handling the
case.

A lawyer should seek instruction from his client on any substantial matter concerning the litigation,
which requires decision on the part of the client. In procedural matters, the client must yield to the
lawyer. (Agpalo)

The rule is that in matters of law, it is the client who should yield to the lawyer and not the other way
around. The reason for this is that lawyer’s duty to the court is foremost. The dignity of the legal
profession may be compromised.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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g) Attorney’s fees

Right to Attorney’s Fees (Agpalo)


• The practice of law is a profession and not a money-making trade. It does not operate to deny
a lawyer the right to attorney’s fees for his professional services. He has the right to have and
recover from his client a fair and reasonable compensation for his services, except in cases
where he has agreed to render service gratuitously or has been appointed counsel de oficio.

• Lawyers should avoid controversies concerning compensation so far as shall be compatible


with self-respect and with right to receive a reasonable recompense for services. Resort to law
suits with clients should only be done to prevent injustice, imposition or fraud. The
impression is that those instituting suits are mercenaries.

• As a general rule, a right of lawyer to reasonable compensation for services requires the
following:
1. that attorney-client relationship exists; and
2. that he rendered services to the client.

• A written agreement is not necessary to establish a client’s obligation to pay attorney’s fees. As
long as the lawyer is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and represent the interest of his
client, an absence of express undertaking does not defeat recovery of fees.

• Client’s obligation to pay attorney’s fees arises from the inanimate contract of facis ut des (I do
and you give) which is based on the principle that no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another.

• Generally, a person who had no knowledge of, or objected to, the lawyer’s representation may
not be held liable for attorney’s fees even though such representation redounded to his
benefit. The objection should be raised before and not after beneficial services shall have been
rendered by the lawyer; otherwise, the party who benefited may be required to pay counsel
fees. For it is neither just that client who retained lawyer should alone pay nor is it fair that
those who, investing nothing and assuming no risk, received benefits should not contribute
their proportionate share to counsel fees (based on equity).

• Non-lawyer cannot recover attorney’s fees even if there is a law authorizing him to represent
a litigant in court because basis of reasonable compensation is the existence of attorney-client
relationship and the rendition of services.

• Lawyer who is absolutely disqualified from engaging in private practice of law by reason of his
government position may neither practice law nor, should he do so illegally, charge attorney’s
fees for such services. Exception: fees for services already performed before lawyer qualified
for public office even though payment is made thereafter.

• Lawyer designated by court to render professional services, in the absence of law allowing
compensation, cannot charge government nor the indigent litigant for his professional
services. Appointment neither violates constitutional restriction against taking of property
without just compensation or the due process of law nor imposes upon the government the
obligation to pay him his fees because one of the obligations of an attorney willingly assumed
when he took his oath as lawyer is to render free legal services whenever required by the
court to do so.

• Although a client has right to discharge lawyer anytime, dismiss or settle action or even waive
the whole of his interest in favor of adverse party, he cannot, in the absence of lawyer’s fault,
consent or waiver, deprive the lawyer of his just fees already earned.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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What is Quantum Meruit?


Meruit?
It is when no price is stipulated for lawyer’s service, courts will fix amount on quantum meruit
basis, or such amount which his service merits.

The requisite for the principle is that there is an acceptance of the benefits by one sought to be
charged for the services rendered under circumstances as reasonably to notify him that the lawyer
performing the task is expecting to be paid compensation.

It is a device to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable postulate that it is unjust for
a person to retain benefit without paying for it.

The doctrine is also applicable where amount stipulated in written agreement is found to be
unconscionable or where client dismissed counsel before termination of case or where the lawyer
withdrew there-from for valid reasons.

Concepts of attorney’s fees (Compania Maritima v. CA, 318 SCRA 169)


(a) Ordinary concept
This refers to the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services he has rendered the latter.

(b) Extraordinary concept


It is the amount of damages which the court may award to be paid by the losing party
to the prevailing party.

Instances when Court will fix Amount of Attorney’s Fees based on Quantum Merui Meruitt
1. agreement is invalid for some reason other than illegality of object of performance
2. amount stipulated is unconscionable
3. no agreement as to fees existed between parties
4. client rejects amount fixed in contract as unconscionable and is found to be so
5. lawyer, without fault, was unable to conclude litigation

CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.

Rule 138 SEC. 24 of the Rules of Court Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.—An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the
opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.

RA 5185 Section 6. Prohibition Against Practice. A member of the Provincial Board or City or
Municipal Council shall not appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein the province,
city or municipality, as the case may be, is the adverse party…xxx…… nor shall he collect any fee for
his appearance in any administrative proceedings before provincial, city or municipal agencies of the
province, city or municipality, as the case
case may be, of which he is an elected official.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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EMILIANO COURT TOWNHOUSES HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION V. ATTY. MICHAEL


DIONEDA
(A.C. No. 5162, March 20, 2003)
(399 SCRA 296)

FACTS: ETCHA and Atty. Michael Dioneda entered into a Retainer's Agreement wherein
respondent lawyer agreed to handle the case of ETCHA against LVF Realty, Mr. Tinsay and
BPI Family Savings Bank by way of filing a complaint - in - intervention. ETCHA alleged that
after respondent received the amount of Php 20,000.00, he did nothing for the development
of the case and to update the complaint – in - intervention. ETCHA then demanded the
return of the amount received by respondent since he did nothing to protect the interest of
the complainant. Respondent promised to return the amount but after deducting therefrom a
reasonable fee for the efforts exerted by him. He averred that the agreement also included an
earlier case with the HLURB where he was able to obtain a favorable judgment for the
complainant.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Dioneda is entitled to compensation based on the Retainer's
Agreement? If not, is he entitled to compensation based on quantum meruit?

HELD: He is not entitled to compensation neither based on the Retainer's Agreement nor on
quantum meruit. Generally, a valid written agreement fixing attorney's fees is conclusive as
between the parties. And when both parties are deemed to have impliedly repudiated the
contract and placed themselves in the position as though there was no express stipulation as to
the attorney's fees, the lawyer's compensation shall be determined on the basis of quantum
meruit. Here, the Supreme Court considered the demand of ETCHA for the refund of the
entire amount received as attorney's fees and the counter - proposal of respondent to deduct
reasonable fees for the efforts exerted by him as implied repudiation of the contract by both
parties. However, to deserve compensation based on quantum meruit the lawyer must prove
by substantial evidence that he is entitled to a reasonable fee for his efforts in pursuing his
client's case with the court taking into account certain factors in fixing the amount of his fees.
It is noteworthy to point out respondent's failure to attend any hearing of his disbarment case
before the IBP without presenting any reason. Respondent's lamentable attitude towards his
client's case is clearly evident from his apparent disinterest in his own case for disbarment.
Therefore, for having missed the opportunities to present evidence in his favor without any
satisfactory explanation as to his non-appearance, he should be denied compensation based on
quantum meruit due to the lack of any factual basis to determine the value of his work as
complainant's counsel.

ANGEL ALBANO vs. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA


(A.C. No. 528, October 11, 1967)
(21 SCRA 411)

FACTS: This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against
respondent Atty. Perpetua Coloma. In a letter addressed to the Court, complainant alleged that
during the Japanese occupation his mother, Delfina Aquino, and he retained the services of
respondent as counsel for them in one Civil Case. After which came the accusation that after
liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized, respondent failed to expedite the
hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by
another lawyer. This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case to
collect her attorney's fees. It was then alleged that during the hearing they were surprised when
respondent presented in exhibit a document showing that they promised to pay her a contingent
fee of 33-¹/3% of whatever could be recovered whether in land or damages.

ISSUE: May Atty. Coloma be removed for her failure to comply with her obligations as counsel
as she served faithfully, efficiently, continuously and to the best of her knowledge and capacity?
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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HELD: No. If there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case it is complainant who, after
benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to renege on their
agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their
counsel after she had already won for them said case in the trial court and the Court of Appeals.
Any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With
his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only
in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any
judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is
indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he
represents, he himself would not get his due.

QUIRANTE V. IAC
(G.R. No. 73886, January 31, 1989)
(169 SCRA 769)

FACTS: Atty. John Quirante represented Dr. Casasola in a case filed against Guerero for failure
of the latter to comply with his obligations as building contractor. The trial court rendered
judgment in favor of Casasola who was already dead when the court’s decision came. Pending
petition for review filed by the adverse party, Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for
the confirmation of his attorney’s fees pending adverse party’s filing of a petition for review on
certiorari. He claims that he and Dr. Casasola had an agreement that in case the court award
damages to Casasola in excess of the 120,000 pesos bond of the building contractor, such amount
shall be divided equally between the Casasola and Quirante.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled to the attorney’s fees pending petition for
review filed by the adverse party of the case filed by Casasola.

HELD: Atty. Quirante is not entitled to his attorney’s fees as of that time because a petition for
review on certiorari was still pending in court involving the same case in which Casasola was
granted award of damages. Since the main case from which Atty. Quirante’s claims for attorney’s
fees is based has not yet become final, the determination of the propriety of said fees and the
amount thereof should be held in abeyance. This procedure gains added validity in the light of
the rule that the remedy for recovering attorney’s fees as an incident of the main action may be
availed of only when something is due to the client.

TANHUECO vs. DE DUMO


(A.M. No. 1437, April 25, 1989)
(172 SCRA 774)

FACTS: Hilaria Tanhueco filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Justiniano de Dumo for
his refusal to remit her money collected from debtors and refusal to return documents entrusted
to him as a counsel in certain collection cases. Tanhueco allegedly offered De Dumo 15% of
what he may be able to collect from debtors but De Dumo responded that in their agreement he
gets 50% of what he may be able to collect as contingent fee. De Dumo also admitted he did not
turn over the P 12, 000.00 he collected and applying it instead as part of his attorney’s fee.

ISSUE: Whether or not De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive.

HELD: De Dumo’s contingent fee is grossly excessive because 50% is more than half of the total
amount due from Tanhueco’s debtors. His action is believed to be fraudulent because he took
advantage of his client who is an old and sickly woman. Canon 20 of the CPR states that: A
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. Attorney’s fee which is found out to be
unconscionable or unreasonable is subject to court’s modification. A lawyer as an officer of the
court has the duty to assist in the impartial administration of justice between parties, and hence,
the fees should be subject to judicial control.
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RAMOS V. ATTY. NGASEO


(A.C. No. 6210, December 9, 2004)

FACTS: This is a complaint for suspension of respondent Atty. Patricio A. Ngaseo for violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Article 1491 of the Civil Code by demanding
from his client, complainant Federico N. Ramos, the delivery of 1,000 square meters of land, a
litigated property, as payment for his appearance fees. Atty. Ngaseo agreed to handle the case of
complainant Ramos, involving recovery of a piece of land, for an acceptance fee of 20,000 pesos,
appearance fee of 1,000 pesos per hearing, and in case of a favorable decision, to give 1,000 sq.
m. of the land to Atty. Ngaseo. The Court of Appeals rendered a favorable decision ordering the
return of the 2-hectare land to Ramos, and said decision became final and executory. Atty.
Ngaseo, thereafter, sent a letter to his client, Ramos, for the delivery of the 1,000 sq. meter
portion of the land which Ramos promised to him as payment for his appearance fees. Ramos
filed a complaint with the IBP charging his former counsel, Atty. Ngaseo, of violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding the delivery of 1,000 sq. m. parcel of land
which was the subject of litigation, and Art. 1491 of the Civil Code prohibiting lawyers from
acquiring property or rights which are object of their litigation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Ngaseo should be suspended for violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Art. 1491 of the Civil Code.

HELD: The prohibition under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code applies only if the sale or assignment
of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation involving the client’s property.
Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. In the instant case, there was already a final
and executory order made by the CA, hence, Art. 1491 no longer applies. Also, there was no
actual acquisition of the property in litigation since Atty. Ngaseo only made a written demand.
Nevertheless, Atty. Ngaseo violated Rule 20.04 of Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation.
He is, therefore, reprimanded for his act.

Canon 20 Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
c) The importance of the subject matter;
d) The skill demanded;
e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP chapter to which he
belongs;
g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client form the service;
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

A valid written contract is conclusive as to amount of compensation. Unless both parties set aside
contract and submit question of reasonableness of amount of fees for court to resolve on quantum
meruit basis, neither client nor lawyer may disregard amount fixed (Agpalo)
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METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. V. COURT OF APPEALS


(G.R. No. 86100-03, January 23, 1990)
(181 SCRA 367)

FACTS: Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari when the CA affirms the decision of
the trial court expressing its view that it should pay the charging lien on the civil case filed
against them which result into a dismissal. Based upon subsequent dismissal of the said case,
private respondents filed a motion to fix its attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit, resulting
to an exchange between the parties. Petitioners aver that they have paid services of its lawyers
in full but the latter contends that partial amounts forwarded to them did not consist of
payment. To avoid adverse confrontation, Metrobank offered to pay P600,000 in which case
respondents refused. Both trial court and appellate court commanded petitioner to pay the
amount of P936,000 based on the charging liens of the dismissed civil case against them.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for
payment of its attorney's fee.

2. Whether or not a separate civil suit is necessary for the enforcement of such lien.

3. Whether or not private respondent is entitled to twenty-five (25%) of the actual and current
market values of the litigated properties on a quantum meruit basis.

HELD: The Court holds that respondent cannot charge a lien due to the dismissal of the civil
case. Such enforceability is only applicable to money claims and only to dismissed judgments if
there is an applicable law or pre-existing agreement between the parties. In addition, the fixing
of attorney’s fees is determined in a separate civil action. Accordingly, in fixing compensation
based on quantum meruit, three conditions are to be considered: (1) the importance of the
subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of the services rendered, and (3) the professional
standing of the lawyer.
Likewise, the Court reiterates the legal profession’s manifest mandate for public service
instead of capital gain. Its aim is to uphold public interest and not profiteering. Appropriate
proceedings may be commenced by respondent to establish attorney’s fees.

Canon 20 Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in cases of referral, with the consent of the client, be entitled to
a division of fees in proportion to work performed and responsibility assumed.

URBAN BANK, INC. V. ATTY. MAGDALENO PEÑA


(A.C. No. 4863, September 7, 2001)

FACTS: Isabel Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI) sold a parcel of land to Urban Bank, Inc. (UBI) for
P240 million.
million As the land was occupied by unauthorized sub-tenants, ISCI’s lawyer, Atty.
Magdaleno Peña had to negotiate with them for them to relocate but the said occupants,
knowing that the land was already transferred to UBI, refused to recognize Peña. Peña then had
a phone conversation with Teodoro Borlongan, president of UBI, where Peña explained to him
the situation. In said conversation, Peña asked authorization from Borlongan to negotiate with
the tenants. Peña also asked that he be paid 10% of the purchase price or (P24
P24 million)
million for his
efforts. Borlongan agreed over the phone on the condition that Peña should be able to settle
with the tenants otherwise he forfeits said 10% fee. Peña also asked that said authorization be
put into writing. The authorization was put into writing but no mention was made as regards
the 10% fee. Peña was able to settle and relocate the tenants. Peña began sending demands to
UBI for the latter to pay him the P24 million fee agreed upon but UBI refused to make payment
hence Peña filed a complaint for recovery against UBI.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Magdaleno Peña is entitled to receive the P28 million.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that said amount is unconscionable. Peña is entitled to
payment for compensation for services rendered as agent of Urban Bank, but on the basis of the
principles of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. In the first place, other than the self-
serving testimony of Peña, there was no other evidence presented to support his claim that
Borlongan agreed to pay him that 10% over the phone. The written authorization later issued
merely confirms the power granted him to negotiate with the tenants. The written
authorization proved the existence of agency but not the existence of any agreement as to how
much Peña should be paid. The Supreme Court emphasized that lawyering is not a business; it is
a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration.

Canon 20 Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the client,
accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding allowance or other
compensation whatsoever related to his professional employment from anyone other than the client.

Rule 138 SEC. 20 of the Rules of Court Duties of attorneys.—It is the duty of an attorney:
(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or
with his knowledge and approval

This rule is intended to ensure protection of lawyers in collection of fees. Moreover, it is


designed to secure the lawyer’s wholehearted fidelity to the client’s cause and to prevent that situation
in which the receipt by him of a rebate or commission from another in connection with the client’s
cause may interfere with the full discharge of his duty to the client. The amount received by lawyer
from opposite party or third persons in the service of his client belongs to the client except when the
latter has full knowledge and approval of lawyer’s taking (Agpalo)

Canon 20 Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation
and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice of fraud.

Rule 138 SEC. 24 of the Rules of Court Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees.—An attorney
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his
services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the
services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the
opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such
testimony and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services
shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or
unreasonable.

138 SEC. 32 of the Rules of Court Compensation for attorneys de oficio.—Subject to availability
Rule 138
of funds as may be provided by law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as
counsel de oficio to be compensated in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of
this rule. Whenever such compensation is allowed, it shall not be less than thirty pesos (P30) in any
case, nor more than the following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred
pesos (P100) in less grave felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital
offenses; (4) Five hundred pesos (P500) in capital offenses.
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CORPUS V. COURT OF APPEALS


(G.R. No. 40424, June 30, 1980)
(98 SCRA 424)

FACTS: Atty. David rendered legal services to Mr. Corpus for his reinstatement in the Central
Bank. They have no agreement as to amount for the attorney’s fees. When they won the case,
Atty. David demanded for 50% of the amount awarded to Corpus. The demand of Atty. David
was largely objected by Mr. Corpus. Marino Corpus contends that David is not entitled to
attorney's fees because there was no contract to that effect. On the other hand, David contends
that the absence of a formal contract for the payment of the attorney's fees will not negate the
payment thereof because the contract may be express or implied, and there was an implied
understanding between the petitioner and private respondent that the former will pay the latter
attorney's fees when a final decision shall have been rendered in favor of the petitioner
reinstating him to -his former position in the Central Bank and paying his back salaries. The
lower court as affirmed by the Court of appeals awarded 30,000 to Atty. David, in which the
latter did not accept.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Juan T. David is entitled to attorney’s fees to 50% of the amount of
the award recovered by Mr Marino Corpus?

HELD: No. While there was express agreement between Corpus and David as regards attorney's
fees, the facts of the case support the position of David that there was at least an implied
agreement for the payment of attorney's fees. Moreover, the payment of attorney's fees to David
may also be justified by virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give
which is based on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another." And such being the case, David is entitled to a reasonable compensation. In
determining a reasonable fee to be paid to David as compensation for his services, on a quantum
meruit basis, it is proper to consider all the facts and circumstances obtaining in the case. The
Court ruled that the reasonable compensation of David in this case should be P20,000.00.

h) Preservation of client’s confidences

CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS CLIENT
EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED

Court. Duties of attorneys.—It is the duty of an attorney: (e) To


Rule 138, 20 (e) of the Rules of Court.
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client,
and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or with his
knowledge and approval…

court Privileged communication. —An attorney cannot, without


Rule 130, sec. 21 (b) of the Rules of court.
the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by the client to him, or his
advice given thereon in the course of professional employment; nor can an attorney's secretary,
stenographer, or clerk be examined, without the consent of the client and his employer, concerning
any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.

What is confidential communication?


communication?
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure
between attorney and client in confidence and by means which so far as the client is aware, discloses
the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the
information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. Covers all actions, signs,
means of communication.
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GENATO V. SILAPAN
(A.C. No. 4078, July 14, 2003)
(406 SCRA 75)

FACTS: Atty. Essex Silapan borrowed money from William Genato for a purchase of new car.
His car and house and lot were being mortgaged by Atty. Silapan as security for the loan. The
latter issued post-dated checks in return. When Genato encashed the checks, the same were
dishonoured for the account has been closed already. Despite repeated demands, Atty. Silapan
failed to make payments; thus, Genato filed a criminal case for violation of BP 22 against Atty.
Silapan and a civil case for judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage. Atty. Silapan made an
allegation that Genato engages into illegal practices and even discloses Genato’s alleged intention
to bribe government officials in connection with a pending case.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent committed a breach of trust and confidence by imputing to
complainant illegal practices and disclosing complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government
officials in connection with a pending case.

HELD: The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications
made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation
to preserve the confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship.
The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the
litigation, nor is it affected by the party’s ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another,
or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
It must be stressed, however, that the privilege against disclosure of confidential
communications or information is limited only to communications which are legitimately and
properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made
in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in
this case, the complainant’s alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case,
the communication is not covered by the privilege as the client does not consult the lawyer
professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to how he may
commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not
attach, there being no professional employment in the strict sense.
Be that as it may, Atty. Silapan’s explanation that it was necessary for him to make the
disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy the Court. The disclosures were not indispensable to
protect his rights as they were not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for him to
use it against Genato in the foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein
and Atty. Silapan’s professional competence and legal advice were not being attacked in said
case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in
a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by
the highest degree of good faith and fairness.

REGALA V. SANDIGANBAYAN
(262 SCRA 112, 1996)

See Canon 15 on privileged communication


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Canon 21 Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client except:
a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of the disclosure;
b) When required by law;
c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or associates or by judicial
action.

Exceptions to the General Rule (Agpalo):


(Agpalo)
• In cases of contemplated crimes or perpetuation of fraud because a lawyer-client relationship
should only be for lawful purposes
• in case client files complaint against his lawyer or unreasonably refuses to pay his fees, the
lawyer may disclose so much of client’s confidences as may be necessary to protect himself or
to collect fees

Canon 21 Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired
in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person,
unless the client with full knowledge of the circumstances consents thereto.

Canon 21 Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give information
from his files to an outside agency seeking such information for auditing, statistical, bookkeeping,
accounting, data processing, or any similar purpose.

Canon 21 Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or associates
thereof unless prohibited by the client.

Canon 21 Rule 21.05


21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent those whose
services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or secrets of the client.

Canon 21 Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client’s affairs even with
members of his family.

Canon 21 Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a particular case
except to avoid possible conflict of interest.
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i) Withdrawal of services

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND
UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRTUMSTANCES.

Canon 22 Rule 22.01 -A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following cases:
a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with the matter he
is handling;
b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and rules;
c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the client;
d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to carry out the
employment effectively;
e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply with the retainer
agreement;
f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
g) Other similar cases.

CENIZA V. RUBIA
RUBIA
(A.C. No. 6166, October 2, 2009)

FACTS:
FACTS Ma. Earl Beverly Ceniza charged Atty. Vivian Rubia with grave misconduct, gross
ignorance of the law and falsification of public documents. Ceniza engaged the services of Atty.
Rubia with regard to the share of her mother-in-law in the estate of her husband Carlos Ceniza.
Allegedly, Atty. Rubia misrepresented to her that the complaint was already filed in court when
in fact, upon verification, it was not. But upon the IBP investigation, the allegations filed by
Ceniza have no factual basis. However, IBP found that Rubia committed some acts for which
she should be sanctioned, she leave Ceniza with no representation and failed to maintain open
communication regarding the status of the said complaint due to overwhelming workload
demanded by her new employer Nakayama Group of Companies.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Rubia’s withdrawal of service is reasonable.

HELD: Rubia’s withdrawal of service is unreasonable because when she accepted to handle the
case of Ceniza she is expected to do her duties with utmost attention, skill and competence,
despite other workloads to do with other client. This is a violation of Canon 22 of the CPR that
states: A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for god cause and upon notice appropriate to
the circumstances. Being an officer of the court, who is task to assist in the administration of
justice, a lawyer is not permitted to withdraw his services if it will cause injustice to client.
Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of services.

Causes of Termination of Attorney-


Attorney-Client Relation (Agpalo)
• Withdrawal of the lawyer under Rule 22.01
• Death of the lawyer
• Death of client
• Discharge or dismissal of the lawyer by the client
• Appointment or election of a lawyer to a government position which prohibits private practice
of law
• Full termination of the case
• Disbarment or suspension of the lawyer from the practice of law
• Intervening incapacity or incompetence of the client during pendency of case
• Declaration of presumptive death of lawyer
• Conviction of a crime and imprisonment of lawyer
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Note: Except for items 2 and 6, the lawyer has duty to notify the court in case of termination of
attorney-client relationship.

PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORP V. DE DIOS TRANSPORTATION CO


(G.R. No. 147010, July 18, 2003)
(406 SCRA 639)

FACTS:
FACTS De Dios Transportation Co.(DDTC) and De Dios Marikina Transportation Corp.
(DMTC) executed a Deed of Conditional sale covering 58 buses and its franchise in favor of
Coyukiat and Goldfinger and later on failed to follow the contract which both parties agreed
upon. Coyukiat and Goldfinger through its counsel Padilla Reyes and De la Torre Law office
filed a complaint against DDTC and DMTC for rescission of contract and posted Bond issued by
Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corp. the Trial Court ruled in favour of DDTC and DMTC.
Aggrieved, Coyukiat and Goldfinger filed their brief through counsel Atty. Ronaldo Reyes with
the Court of Appeals but before the adverse party can file their brief, Padilla Reyes and De la
Torre Law office filed its withdrawal of appearance as counsel and on the same day Luis Q.U
Uranza, Jr. and Associates filed its appearance as counsel for Coyukiat and Goldfinger. It filed a
notice of withdrawal of appeal but did not bear the conformity of their client and the adverse
party were served copies via registered mail thru their counsel. DDTC and DMTC contend that
the filing of withdrawal of appeal of Coyukiat and Goldfinger through new counsel without the
client’s conformity to the substitution and to such withdrawal of appeal was not self-executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not Luis Q.U Uranza, Jr. and Associates as counsel failed to submit the
proper substitution requirements.

HELD: Yes. A proper substitution of counsel requires: written application for substitution,
written conformity of client and written consent of attorney to be substituted. In such case the
written consent cannot be secured, there must be filed with the application proof of service of
notice of the application upon the attorney to be substituted. A substitution which does not
comply with the required formalities is ineffective to effect a change of counsel or to terminate
his authority

Who may Terminate Attorney-


Attorney-Client Relation
1. Client
Client has absolute right to discharge his attorney with or without just cause or even against
lawyer’s consent. Existence or nonexistence of a just cause is important only in determining
right of an attorney to compensation for services rendered. Discharge of an attorney or his
substitution by another without justifiable cause will not operate to extinguish the lawyer’s
right to full payment of compensation as agreed upon in writing.

2. Attorney
3. Court
4. Circumstances beyond control of parties

Canon 22 Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien,
immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with
his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all information necessary for the proper
handling of the matter.
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Kinds of Liens
1. Retaining Lien (general lien)
The right of an attorney to retain the funds, documents and papers of his client which
have lawfully come into his possession until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid
and to apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof.

Reason and essence of lien:


Inconvenience or disadvantage caused to the client because of exercise of such lien
may induce client to pay the lawyer his fees and disbursements.

It is a general lien for the balance of the account due to the attorney from client for
services rendered in all matters he may have handled for the client, regardless of outcome.

It is dependent upon and takes effect from time of lawful possession and does not
require notice thereof upon client and the adverse party to be effective.

Passive right and cannot be actively enforced; amounts to a mere right to retain funds,
documents and papers as against the client until the attorney is fully paid his fees. However,
lawyer may apply so much of client’s funds in his possession to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client.

Requisites
Requisites for validity (of retaining lien)
1. attorney-client relationship
2. lawful possession by lawyer of the client’s funds, documents and papers in his professional
capacity
3. unsatisfied claim for attorney’s fees or disbursements

2. Charging Lien (special lien)


A charging lien is a right which the attorney has upon all judgments for the payment
of money and executions issued in pursuance thereof, secured in favor of his client. Covers
only services rendered by attorney in the action in which the judgment was obtained and
takes effect only after a statement of claim has been entered upon record of the particular
action with written notice to his client and adverse party.

Requisites for validity of charging lien


1. attorney-client relationship
2. attorney has rendered services
3. money judgment favorable to the client has been secured in the action
4. attorney has a claim for attorney’s fees or advances
5. statement of his claim has been duly recorded in the case with notice thereof served upon
the client and adverse party
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DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS

NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS AGAINST LAWYERS

PURPOSE OF DISCIPLINING
DISCIPLINING LAWYERS
To ascertain that a lawyer still possesses those qualifications which are conditions precedent
for the continuous practice of law and; to deter others from similar misconduct, to protect the court
and the public from the misbehavior of its officers.

NATURE
NATURE OF THE POWER TO DISCIPLINE
The power to discipline a lawyer is judicial in nature and can be exercised only by the courts.
It cannot be defeated by the legislative or executive departments.

POWERS OF THE SUPREME COURT TO DISCIPLINE LAWYERS


1. Warning
2. Admonition
3. Reprimand
4. Censure
5. Disbarment
6. Suspension[Sec. 27, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court (RRC)]
7. Interim suspension
8. Probation (IBP Guidelines)

POWERS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO DISCIPLINE
LAWYERS
1. Warning
2. Admonition
3. Reprimand
4. Suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in Sec 27, Rule 138 until further
action of the Supreme Court in the case; (Sec. 16, Rule 139-B) and
5. Probation (IBP Guidelines)

OTHER SANCTIONS AND REMEDIES


1. Restitution
2. Assessment of costs
3. Limitation upon practice
4. Appointment of a receiver
5. Requirement that a lawyer take the bar examination or professional responsibility examination;
6. Requirement that a lawyer attend continuing education courses
7. Other requirements that the highest court or disciplinary board deems consistent with the
purposes of the sanctions

FORMS OF DISCIPLINARY MEASURES


1. Warning – an act of putting one on his guard against an impending danger, evil, consequence or
penalty;

2. Admonition – a gentle or friendly reproof, mild rebuke, warning, reminder, or counseling on a


fault, error or oversight; an expression of authoritative advice;
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3. Reprimand
eprimand – a public and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person at fault by
his superior officer or the body to which he belongs;

4. Censure – official reprimand;

5. Suspension – temporary withholding of a lawyer’s right to practice his profession as a lawyer for a
certain period or for an indefinite period of time:
a. Definite;
b. Indefinite – qualified disbarment; lawyer determines for himself how long or how short his
suspension shall last by proving to court that he is once again fit to resume practice of law.

6. Disbarment – it is the act of the Supreme Court of withdrawing from an attorney the right to
practice law. The name of the lawyer is stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys;

7. Interim Suspension – it is the temporary suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law pending
imposition of final discipline; Includes:
a. Suspension upon conviction of a “serious crime”;
b. Suspension when the lawyer’s continuing conduct is or is likely to cause immediate and
serious injury to a client or public

8. Probation – it is a sanction that allows a lawyer to practice law under specified conditions.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS (SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT)


1. Neither a civil action nor a criminal proceeding;
2. SUI GENERIS, it is a class of its own since it is neither civil nor criminal
3. Confidential in nature
4. Defense of double jeopardy is not available
5. Can be initiated by the SC, motu proprio, or by the IBP. It can be initiated without a
complaint.
6. Can proceed regardless of interest of the complainants
7. Imprescriptible
8. It is itself due process of law
9. Whatever has been decided in a disbarment case cannot be a source of right that may be
enforced in another action;
10. In pari delicto rule not applicable;
11. No prejudicial question in disbarment proceedings;
12. Penalty in a disbarment case cannot be in the alternative; and
13. Monetary claims cannot be granted except restitution and return of monies and properties of
the client given in the course of the lawyer-client relationship.

OBJECTIVES OF SUSPENSION AND DISBARMENT:


1. To compel the attorney to deal fairly and honestly with his clients;
2. To remove from the profession a person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney;
3. To punish the lawyer;
4. To set an example or warning for the other members of the bar;
5. To safeguard the administration of justice from dishonest and incompetent lawyers;
6. To protect the public;

OFFICES
OFFICES AUTHORIZED TO INVESTIGATE DISBARMENT CASES
1. Supreme Court
2. IBP through its Commission on Bar Discipline or authorized investigators
3. Office of the Solicitor General
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GROUNDS

GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION OR DISBARMENT


1. Deceit
A fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device used by one or more
persons to deceive and trick another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage
of the party upon which it was imposed. There must be false representation as a matter of fact.

2. Malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office –any malfeasance or dereliction of duty


committed
committed by a lawyer
Malpractice refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Legal
malpractice consists of failure of an attorney to use such skill, prudence and diligence as a lawyer
of ordinary skill and capacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of tasks which
they undertake, and when such failure proximately causes damage, it gives rise to an action in tort.
(Tan Tek Beng v. David, A.C. No. 1261, Dec. 29, 1983)

3. Grossly immoral conduct


Grossly immoral conduct is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act
or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. (Vitug v. Rongcal, A.C.
No. 6313, Sept. 7, 2006)
Gross Misconduct is any inexcusable, shameful or flagrant unlawful conduct on the part of
the person concerned in the administration of justice which is prejudicial to the rights of the
parties or to the right determination of a cause, a conduct that is generally motivated by a
predetermined, obstinate or intentional purpose. (Yumol Jr. v. Ferrer, Sr., A.C. No. 6585, April 21,
2005)

4. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude


Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything that is done contrary to justice, honesty,
modesty, or good morals, an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a
man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty modesty, or good
morals. (Soriano v. Dizon, A. C. No. 6792, Jan. 25, 2006) (e.g. estafa, bribery, murder, bigamy,
seduction, abduction, concubinage, smuggling, falsification of public document, violation of BP
22)

5. Violation of oath of office


The specific grounds that would constitute violation of the lawyer’s oath are:
a. Commission of falsehood
b. Instituting baseless or unfounded complaints
c. Engaging in dilatory actions for an ulterior motive
d. Malpractice or reprehensible conduct in dealing with the court of his client. (Lapena, Jr., 2009)

6. Willful
Willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court

7. Corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to case without an authority to do so.
(see Sanctions to Practice of Law without authority)

*** Disbarment and suspension of a lawyer, being the most severe forms of disciplinary sanction,
should be imposed with great caution and only in those cases where the misconduct of the lawyer
as an officer of the court and a member of the bar is established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. (Vitug v. Rongcal, A.C. No. 6313, Sept. 7, 2006)
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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THE GROUNDS FOR


FOR DISBARMENT ARE NOT EXCLUSIVE
A lawyer may be removed from office or suspended from the practice of law on grounds other
than those specifically provided in the law. The statutory enumeration is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of SC to suspend or disbar a lawyer. (In Re: Puno, A.C. No. 389, Feb.
28, 1967)

QUINGWA V. PUNO, A.C. No. 398, February 28, 1967


The statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the
court over its officers cannot be restricted.

STA. MARIA V. TUAZON, A.C. No. No. 396, JULY 31, 1964
The Supreme Court has disbarred or suspended lawyers for reasons not found in the statute as when
their acts are contrary to honesty and good morals or do not approximate the highest degree of
morality and integrity expected of the members of the bar.

AQUINO V. MANGAOANG, 425 SCRA 572


In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes his case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
evidence.

DANIEL S. AQUINO V. ATTY. MARIA


MARIA LOURDES VILLAMAR-
VILLAMAR-MANGAOANG
(A.C. No. 4934, March 17, 2004)

FACTS: Complainant avers that prior to his present assignment, he was a Special Investigator of
the Legal and Investigation Staff of the Bureau of Customs, Customs Police Division, Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District Command, Pasay City, headed by
respondent. Complainant claims that prior to or during the preliminary investigation of the case,
NAIA Customs Police Officer Apolonio Bustos and respondent ordered the transfer of the gun
parts inside Gomez’s balikbayan box to another box. She then ordered Office Messenger Joseph
Maniquis to deliver to the State Prosecutor the balikbayan box without the gun parts.
According to complainant, respondent did this because Gomez was a close friend. The
switching of the balikbayan boxes and the substitution of the evidence resulted in the dismissal
of the criminal charges against Gomez. Complainant argues that respondent exercised
dishonesty, committed acts of legal impropriety, and compromised her duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer, an officer of the court and a public official, thereby causing damage
and prejudice to the government. In her Answer respondent avers that she could not have
switched the contents of the balikbayan box of Gomez because she was not in charge of the
physical disposition of the evidence. She pointed out that if complainant’s allegations were true,
he should have filed a complaint against her after the case against Gomez was dismissed.
However, he waited more than two years before bringing these unfounded and false accusations
against her.

ISSUE:
ISSUE Whether or not respondent be disbarred for allegedly introducing false evidence in a
case and or breaching her duties to the legal profession.

HELD: Respondent should not be disbarred for allegedly introducing false evidence in a case
and for breaching her duties to the legal profession. The duty of the Court towards members of
the bar is not only limited to the administration of discipline to those found culpable of
misconduct but also to the protection of the reputation of those frivolously or maliciously
charged In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this Court
will exercise its disciplinary power only if the complainant establishes his case by clear,
convincing and satisfactory evidence. In the case at bar, complainant failed to meet the required
evidentiary standard. In the absence of convincing or clearly preponderant evidence, as in this
case, the complaint for disbarment against respondent should be dismissed.
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AMAYA V. TECSON, 450 SCRA 510


Disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension
or fine would accomplish the end desired.

MARIO S. AMAYA V. ATTY. DELANO A. TECSON


(A.C. No. 5996, February 07, 2005)

FACTS: Mario S. Amaya sought the disbarment of Atty. Delano A. Tecson for “highly irregular
actuations and/or grave negligence in handling an appeal with the Court of Appeals.” The
complainant alleged that he retained the services of the respondent to handle the said appeal
when his former counsel suffered a stroke due to acute hypertension. The respondent
demanded P20,000.00 for the filing of the notice of appeal, which the complainant immediately
paid but was dismissed because of untimely filing of the Tecson of the Notice of Appeal. The
latter then requested another amount for the filing of motion for reconsideration which was also
eventually dismissed because of non-filing of Tecson of the prescribed docket fee. Tecson then
returned the money for litigation expenses to Amaya after such denial.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tecson be disbarred.

HELD: Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives
rise to the similar duty of fidelity to the client’s cause. The Court rules that in failing to zealously
attend to a legal matter entrusted to him, the respondent failed to live up to the duties and
responsibilities of a member of the legal profession. It must be stressed however that disbarment
is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be
exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court
and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any
punishment less severe – such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end
desired. Considering that the respondent in this case returned the money for litigation expenses
to the complainant after the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the Court sees fit to
reprimand the respondent for his actuations.

DEFENSES

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN DISBARMENT


1. Good faith in the acquisition of a property of the client subject of litigation (In Re: Ruste, A.M.
No. 632, June 27, 1940);
2. 2. Inexperience of the lawyer (Munoz v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, Sept. 28, 1973);
3. Age (Santos v. Tan, A.C. No. 2697, Apr. 19, 1991);
4. Apology (Munoz v. People, G.R. No. L-33672, Sept. 28, 1973);
5. Lack of Intention to slight or offend the Court (Rheem of the Philippines, Inc. v. Ferrer, G.R. No.
L-22979, Jan. 27, 1967);
6. Absence of prior disciplinary record;
7. Absence of dishonest or selfish motive;
8. Personal or emotional problems;
9. Timely good faith effort to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct;
10. Full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward the proceedings;
11. Character or reputation;
12. Physical or mental disability or impairment;
13. Delay in disciplinary proceedings;
14. Interim rehabilitation;
15. Imposition of other penalties or sanctions;
16. Remorse; and
17. Remoteness of prior offenses. (IBP Guidelines 9.32)
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AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN DISBARMENT DISBARMENT


1. Prior disciplinary offenses;
2. Dishonest or selfish motives;
3. A pattern of misconduct;
4. Multiple offenses;
5. Bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules
or orders of the disciplinary agency;
6. Submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the disciplinary
process;
7. Refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct;
8. Vulnerability of victim;
9. Substantial experience in the practice of law; and
10. Indifference to making restitution. (IBP Guidelines 9.22)

CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ARE NEITHER MITIGATING NOR AGRAVATING


1. Forced or compelled restitution;
2. Agreeing to the client’s demand for certain improper behavior or result;
3. Withdrawal of complaint against the lawyer;
4. Resignation prior to completion of disciplinary proceedings;
5. Complainants recommendation as to sanctions; or
6. Failure of injured client to complain. (IBP Guideline 9.4)

READMISSION TO THE BAR

Reinstatement, Defined
It is the restoration in disbarment proceedings to a disbarred lawyer the privilege to practice law. The
power of the Supreme Court to reinstate is based on its constitutional prerogative to promulgate rules
on the admission of applicants to the practice of law. (Sec. 5[5], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

Conditions for Reinstatement


The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the Bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character – a fit and proper person to practice law.

Guidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the
practice of law

1. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

2. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel; and

3. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension
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ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN SUSPENDED

ENRIQUE ZALDIVAR V. RAUL GONZALEZ


(G.R. No. 80578, February 1, 1989)
(166 SCRA 316)

FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique. He was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who
was investigating the case. Zaldivar then filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the Tanodbayan to investigate. The
Supreme Court, acting on the petition issued a Cease and Desist Order against
Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and filing informations
against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed criminal
informations against Zaldivar. Gonzalez even had a newspaper interview where he proudly
claims that he scored one on the Supreme Court. Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt
against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain his side. Gonzalez stated
that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom of
speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the
Court may have lapsed into error. He also said, even attaching notes, that not less than six
justices of the Supreme Court have approached him to ask him to “go slow” on Zaldivar and to
not embarrass the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: Yes. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call
for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. His statements necessarily
imply that the justices of the Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements
constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Supreme Court. Such statements very clearly
debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system
of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of
free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like
all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to
be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.
One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice.

Guidelines to
to be observed in Case of Lifting an Order Suspending a Lawyer from the Practice of Law
The following guidelines were issued by the Supreme Court, the same to be observed in the
matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law:
1. After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;

2. Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of
said motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3. Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

4. Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;
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5. The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension;

6. Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground
for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

READMISSION TO THE BAR


BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN DISBARRED

Considerations for Reinstatement


1. The applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment;
2. The nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred;
3. His conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment
and the application for reinstatement; (Prudential Bank v. Benjamin Grecia, A.C. No. 2756, Dec.
18, 1990)
4. His efficient government service; (In re: Adriatico, G.R. No. L-2532, Nov. 17, 1910)
5. Applicant’s appreciation of the significance of his dereliction and his assurance that he now
possesses the requisite probity and integrity; and
6. Favorable endorsement of the IBP and pleas of his loved ones. (Yap Tan v. Sabandal, B.M. No. 144,
Feb. 24, 1989)

Effects of Reins
Reinstatement
nstatement
1. Reinstatement to the roll of attorneys wipes out the restrictions and disabilities resulting from a
previous disbarment (Cui v. Cui, G.R. No. L-18727, Aug. 31, 1964);
2. Recognition of moral rehabilitation and mental fitness to practice law;
3. Lawyer shall be subject to same law, rules and regulations as those applicable to any other lawyer;
and
4. Lawyer must comply with the conditions imposed on his readmission.

Effect of Executive Pardon pending Disbarment Proceeding


If during the pendency of disbarment preceding the respondent was granted executive pardon,
the dismissal of the case on that sole basis will depend on whether the executive pardon is absolute or
conditional.
1. Absolute or unconditional pardon - the disbarment case will be dismissed.
2. Conditional pardon - the disbarment case will not be dismissed on the basis thereof.

An absolute pardon by the President is one that operates to wipe out the conviction as well as
the offense itself. The grant thereof to a lawyer is a bar to a proceeding for disbarment against him, if
such proceeding is based solely on the fact of such conviction. (In re: Parcasio, A.C. No. 100, Feb. 18,
1976)
But where the proceeding to disbar is founded on the professional misconduct involved in the
transaction which culminated in his conviction, the effect of the pardon is only to relieve him of the
penal consequences of his act and does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as
the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not possess good moral
character. (In re: Lontok, 43 Phil. 293, Apr. 7, 1922)

READMISSION TO THE BAR OF LAWYERS WHO HAVE BEEN REPARTRIATED

Effects of Loss and Re-


Re-acquisition of Filipino Citizenship
General Rule: The loss of Philippine citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in
the Philippines.
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Exception:
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be
limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement
for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently,
the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure
terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to R.A. 9225. This is because “all Philippine
citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship under the conditions of R.A. 9225.” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of
another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in
accordance with R.A. 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in
the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.
Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from the SC the authority to do so, conditioned on:
1. The updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
2. The payment of professional tax;
3. The completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education, this is
especially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update
him of legal developments; and
4. The retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities
as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. (Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law of Benjamin Dacanay,
B.M. No. 1678, Dec. 17, 2007)

LIABILITIES OF A LAWYER

CIVIL LIABILITY
1) Client is prejudiced by lawyer’s negligence and misconduct
2) Breach of fiduciary obligation
3) Civil liability to third persons
4) Libelous words in pleadings; violation of communication privilege
5) Liability for costs of suit (treble costs) – when lawyer is made liable for insisting on client’s
patently unmeritorious case or interposing appeal merely to delay litigation

CRIMINAL LIABILITY
1) Prejudicing client through malicious breach of professional duty
2) Revealing client secrets
3) Representing adverse interests
4) Introducing false evidence
5) Misappropriating client’s funds (Estafa)

REMEDIES AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW OF LAWYERS


1. Declaratory relief;
2. Petition for Injuction;
3. Contempt of court;
4. Criminal complaint for Estafa against a person who falsely represented himself to be an attorney to
the damage of a party;
5. Disqualification and complaints for disbarment; or
6. Administrative complaint against the erring lawyer or government official.
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CONTEMPT OF COURT

A. Nature
It is exercised on preservative and not on vindictive principles and on corrective rather than
the retaliatory idea of punishment. It is criminal in nature.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts. It is essential in the observance of
order in judicial proceedings and to enforcement of judgment, orders and writs.

B. Kinds of Contempt

1) Direct Contempt
It consists of misbehavior in the presence of or near a court or judge as to interrupt or obstruct
the proceedings before the court or the administration of justice.

2) Indirect or Constructive Contempt


One committed away from the court involving disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment or command of the court, tending to belittle, degrade, obstruct, interrupt or
embarrass the court.

a) Civil contempt – failure to do something ordered by the court which is for the benefit of the
party.
b) Criminal contempt – consists of any conduct directed against the authority or dignity of the
court.

C. Acts of a Lawyer Constituting Contempt


1. Misbehavior as officer of court
2. Disobedience or resistance to court order
3. Abuse or interference with judicial proceedings
4. Obstruction in administration of justice
5. Misleading courts
6. Making false allegations, criticisms, insults, veiled threats against the courts
7. Aiding in unauthorized practice of law (suspended or disbarred)
8. Unlawful retention of client’s funds
9. Advise client to commit contemptuous acts

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL


LEGAL EDUCATION
B.M. No. 850 August 22, 2000

PURPOSE
Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain
the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.

REQUIREMENTS OF COMPLETION OF MCLE

Members of the IBP, unless exempted under Rule 7, shall complete every 3 years at least 36
hours of continuing legal education activities. The 36 hours shall be divided as follows:
1. 6 hours – legal ethics
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2. 4 hours – trial and pretrial skills


3. 5 hours – alternative dispute resolution
4. 9 hours – updates on substantive and procedural laws and jurisprudence
5. 4 hours – legal writing and oral advocacy
6. 2 hours – international law and international conventions
7. Remaining 6 hours – such other subjects as may be prescribed by the Committee on MCLE.

Classes of Credits
1. Participatory credit – Attending approved education activities like seminars, conventions,
symposia, and the like; speaking or lecturing, or assigned as panelist, reactor, or commentator, etc.
in approved education activities; teaching in law school or lecturing in bar review classes.

2. Non-participatory – Preparing, as author or co-author, written materials (article, book or book


review) which contribute to the legal education of the author member, which were not prepared
in the ordinary course of his practice or employment; editing a law book, law journal or legal
newsletter.

COMPLIANCE
What constitute non-compliance?
1. Failure to complete education requirement within the compliance period;
2. Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
3. Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status)
within the prescribed period;
4. Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within 60
days from receipt of non-compliance notice;
5. Failure to pay non-compliance fee within the prescribed period; or
6. Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.

EXEMPTIONS

1. The President, Vice-President and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executive Departments;
2. Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
3. The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of
the judiciary, incumbent members of Judicial Bar Council, incumbent members of the MCLE
Committee, incumbent court lawyers who have availed of the Philippine Judicial Academy
programs of continuing judicial education (Amendment to Bar Matter 850, Resolution of the
Court En Banc, July 13, 2004);
4. The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Dept. of Justice;
5. The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
6. The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;
7. The Chairman and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
8. The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;
9. Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
10. Incumbent deans, bar reviewers and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least 10
years in accredited law schools;
11. The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professional and Professorial
Lecturers of the Philippine Judicial Academy; and
12. Governors and Mayors.
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CONSEQUENCES OF NON-
NON-COMPLIANCE

A member who fails to comply with the requirements after the 60-day period shall be listed as
delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors upon recommendation of the Committee on
MCLE.

SOME JURISPRUDENCE ON DISCIPLINE OF LAWYER

IN RE MARCIAL EDILLON
(A.M. No. 1928, August 3, 1978)
(84 SCRA 554)

FACTS:
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the
Philippines. The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to
the IBP since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice. Edilion contends that the
provision providing for the IBP dues constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Edillon may be removed from the Rolls of Attorney for non-
payment of IBP dues suffers constitutional infirmity.

DECISION: YES. The payment of IBP dues does not suffer constitutional infirmity. All
legislation directing the integration of the Bar has been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a
vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the
courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State —
the administration of justice — as an officer of the court.
When the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and
his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the
power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established
by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of
his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation,
he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
— the lawyers. Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.
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YUSECO V. BERNAD
(A.M. No. 94-1-061-SC March 29, 1995)
(243 SCRA 19)

FACTS: A complaint for disbarment was filed by Atty. Joaquin Yuseco and Benjamin Grecia
against Deputy Court Administrator Juanito A. Bernad, charging him with suppressing facts and
making false statements in his report to the Court in the disbarment case against complainant
Grecia for the purpose of causing injury to him (Grecia). The complaint for disbarment against
Benjamin Grecia was filed by Doctors Alberto Fernandez, Isabelo Ongtengco and Achilles
Bartolome and the St. Luke's Medical Center who charged him with dishonesty and grave
misconduct in connection with the theft of some pages of a medical chart used in evidence in a
damage suit filed by Grecia's clients against the doctors and the hospital. The disbarment
case was assigned to respondent Deputy Court Administrator Bernad for investigation, report
and recommendation. Respondent submitted report in which Bernad found therein respondent
Benjamin Grecia guilty of the charges. Bernad refrained from recommending the penalty but
instead left the matter to the Court to determine, observing that whether the penalty should be
disbarment or suspension, the two are "severe forms of disciplinary action [which] should be
resorted to only in cases where a lawyer demonstrates an attribute or course of conduct wholly
inconsistent with approved professional standard."

ISSUES:
ISSUES: Can respondent be disbarred on the following grounds:

(1) submitting a report and recommendation to the Supreme Court in the disbarment
case without furnishing complainant Grecia with a copy thereof;

(2) falsifying his written report by narrating facts which are absolutely false;

(3) deliberately not revealing his relationship with former Chief Justice Marcelo Fernan,
whose brother-in-law, Atty. Pompeyo Nolasco of the Quasha law firm, is the counsel for
complainant-doctors in the disbarment case as well as in Civil Case No. 3548-V-91 which Grecia
had filed against the doctors and the hospital.

HELD: First. Respondent had no duty to complainant to furnish him a copy of his report in the
HELD:
disbarment case. That report was solely for Court’s use. What was important was that he was
given a copy of the Court's decision ordering his disbarment.

Second. The fourteen (14) cases or instances in which respondent allegedly made false
statements in his report to the Court are the same ones cited in complainant Grecia's motion for
new investigation and reconsideration which this Court denied way back on August 12, 1993.

Third. The Court agreed with the findings of respondent, his findings became those of the Court
and complainants have no basis for charging suppression of material facts. Indeed, "the Court
assumes full responsibility for all its acts.

Fourth. Atty. Nolasco is a brother-in-law of former Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan. However
respondent points out that the disbarment case was assigned to him three months after Chief
Justice Fernan had retired from the Court. Indeed, aside from this allegation, there is no
evidence in the record to support the charge of complainants.
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TAN V. BALAJADIA
(G.R. No. 169517, March 14, 2006)

FACTS: Rogelio, Normal all surnamed Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan (petitioners) in their
petition alleged that Bendicto Balajadia (respondent) filed a criminal case against them for
usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged
illegal collection of parking fees by petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the
complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer."However, certifications
issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that
respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that
respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-
affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of
Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty.
Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-
affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject matter. Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s
secretary, executed an affidavit admitting the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-
affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed
that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations with respect to his occupation
and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a
practicing lawyer.
In their Reply, petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect
contempt for having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot
shift the blame to Atty. Aquino’s secretary.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent is liable for indirect contempt.

HELD: SC ruled in the negative. Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – After a charge in writing
has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such
period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any
of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

In several cases, SC have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be
an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law
under Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the
acts are punished because they are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and
obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In determining liability for criminal contempt,
well-settled is the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.
In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim that he never
intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of
the secretary of Atty. Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that
gave rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary
evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5
of respondent’s complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.
Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was the
result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect
contempt.
In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an
attorney or that he intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect
contempt considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.
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JUDICIAL ETHICS

PRELIMINARIES

TERMS
De Facto Judge – An officer who is not fully vested with all the powers and duties conceded to
judges but, one who exercises the office of judge under some color of right. He has the reputation
of the officer he assumes to be, yet he has some defect in his right to exercise judicial functions at
the particular time. (Luna v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-13744, Nov. 29, 1918)

De Jure Judge – One who exercises the office of a judge as a matter of right, fully vested with all
the powers and functions conceded to him under the law. (Luna v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. L-13744,
Nov. 29, 1918)

Independent judiciary – one free from inappropriate outside influence

Inhibition – An act when a judge personally prevents himself from taking cognizance of the case.
This is made through a written petition to inhibit which shall state the grounds for the same. The
explanation of the judge whether or not to take cognizance of the case must also be in writing

Judicial Ethics – It is the branch of moral science which treats of the right and proper conduct to
be observed by all judges in trying and deciding controversies brought before them for
adjudication which conduct must be demonstrative of impartiality, integrity, competence,
independence and freedom from improprieties. This freedom from improprieties must be observed
in both the public and private life of a judge – being the visible representation of the law.

Qualifications of Justices in the Supreme Court of Court of Appeals


One must be:
1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. At least 40 years of age;
3. A person who has been, for 15 years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of
law; and
4. A person of proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. (Sec. 7(2), Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)

Qualifications of Judges in the RTC


One must be:
1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. At least 35 years of age; and
3. For at least 10 years engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or held a public office in the
Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.

Qualifications of Judges in the MTC


One must be:
1. A natural-born citizen of the Philippines;
2. At least 30 years of age; and
3. For at least 5 years, engaged in the practice of law in the Philippines or held a public office in the
Philippines requiring admission to the practice of law as an indispensable requisite.
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THE NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUC


NDUCT FOR THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIARY

CANO
ANON 1
INDE
NDEPENDE
NDENCE

Judicial independence is a pre-requisite to the Rule of Law and a fundamental guarantee of a


fair trial. A judge shall, therefore, uphold and exemplify judicial independence in both its
individual and institutional aspects.

SECTION 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment
of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free of any extraneous
influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any
reason.

PEOPLE V. VENERACION
249 SCRA 244 (1995)

In one criminal case for the crime of rape and homicide, the judge found defendants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt. Under the law, particularly RA 7659, the punishment for the crime of
rape with homicide is death. However, in the subject case, the judge imposed upon the accused
the punishment of reclusion perpetua. A court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the
morality or propriety of the sentence, where the law itself provides for the sentence of death as
a penalty in specific and well-defined instances.

SECTION 2. In performing judicial duties, judges shall be independent from judicial colleagues in
respect of decisions
decisions which the judge is obliged to make independently.

TAHIL V. EISMA
64 SCRA 378 (1975)

The discretion of the Court to grant bail must be based on the Court’s determination as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. This discretion may be exercised only after the
evidence has been submitted at the summary hearing conducted pursuant to Sec. 7 of Rule 114
of the Rules. Respondent’s admission that he granted bail to an accused upon the request of a
Congressman, despite his belief that the evidence of guilt against said is strong, is indeed
reprehensible.

SECTION 3. Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court or administrative agency.

SABITSANA, JR. V. VILLAMOR


RTJ NO. 90- 474, October 4, 1991

FACTS: Judge Villamor is the executive judge of RTC. Acting on such capacity, he designated
Judge Pitao as the acting MCTC judge of a municipality. Judge Villamor, by sending a note to
Judge Pitao, assured the wife of a certain accused in a criminal case, which had long been
pending before the MCTC that Judge Pitao should acquit the accused. However, Judge Pitao
decided otherwise. This prompted Judge Villamor to direct Judge Pitao to forward the record of
the case to his sala. Judge Villamor then acquitted the accused.
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ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Villamor commit an act of misconduct?

HELD: Yes. A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. A judge shall not influence in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute
pending before another court. This is so because such interference does not only subvert the
independence of judiciary but also undermines the people’s faith in its integrity and
impartiality. In the instant case, Judge Villamor’s act of sending a note to Judge Pitao for the
latter to decide a case in favor of the accused constitutes undue interference

SECTION 4. Judges shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct
or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression
impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge.

Judges’ Family includes:


1. Judge’s spouse
2. Son
3. Daughter
4. Son-in-law
5. Daughter-in-law
6. Other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or
7. Person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household
(NCJC of the Philippine Judiciary-Annotated, February 2007)

PADILLA V. ZANTUA
237 SCRA 670 (1994)

Constant company with a lawyer tends to breed intimacy and camaraderie to the point that
favors in the future may be asked from respondent judge which he may find hard to resist. The
actuation of respondent Judge of eating and drinking in public places with a lawyer who has
pending cases in his sala may well arouse suspicion in the public mind, thus tending to erode
the trust of the litigants in the impartiality of the judge.

SECTION 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the
executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a
reasonable observer.

ALFONSO V. ALONZO-
ALONZO-LEGASTO
A.M. No. MTJ 94-995, September 5, 2002

An executive judge has no authority to cause the transfer of court employees as the jurisdiction
to do so is lodge solely upon the SC through the Office of the Court Administrator. This is so
because of the need to maintain judicial independence. Moreover, a judge shall be free from
inappropriate connections with and influence from the executive and legislative branch. Here,
the judge did not act independently of the LGU when she asked the Mayor of QC to re- employ
the displaced employees instead of informing the SC through the OCA of the need to streamline
her court of its personal needs.
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SECTION 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation to the
particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.

SECTION 7. Judges shall encourage and uphold safeguards for the discharge of judicial duties in order
to maintain and enhance the institutional and operational independence of the Judiciary.

SECTION 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce
public confidence in the Judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.

Good Judges, Defined


In the case of Borromeo v. Mariano, G.R. No. 16808, January 3, 1921, good judges are those
who:
1. Have the mastery of the principles of law,
2. Discharge their duties in accordance with law,
3. Are permitted to perform the duties of the office undeterred by outside influence, and
4. Are independent and self-respecting human units in a judicial system equal and coordinate with
the other two departments of the government

CANO
CANON 2
INTEG
TEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office, but also to the
personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived
to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

ATTY.
ATTY. ARTURO ROMERO V. JUDGE GABRIEL VALLE JR.
147 SCRA 197, January 9, 1987

FACTS: Atty. Romero charged Judge Valle with grave misconduct and oppression. The case
arose from a dispute between Romero and Valle as to the proper marking of Iglesia Filipina’s
inventory book in one civil case where Judge Valle is the presiding judge of the RTC where the
case was lodged. Atty. Romero insisted that it should be marked as Exh F while judge claimed
that it should be Exh G since there was already an Exh F marked during the previous trial
when counsel was absent. Counsel, however, continued insisting in a loud voice, which
irritated the judge. Valle admonished counsel not to bring his passion to the court and to
respect the court. He allegedly uttered embarrassing remarks against Atty. Romero and even
challenged the latter for a fight. Valle then banged his gavel, left the rostrum, and went to his
chamber. Outside, he allegedly held a gun with his right hand in an angry and menacing
manner.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Valle has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct.

HELD: Yes. Judge Valle, in losing his temper, failed to preserve order in his court. Judges have
contempt powers to endeavor counsel to appreciate his duties to the court. He should have
cited counsel in contempt instead of walking out of the courtroom. His act of carrying his
licensed gun, though permitted, was not an innocent gesture but with intent to intimidate
counsel. He violated the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which requires that “a judge’s official
conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should
be beyond reproach.”
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SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of
the Judiciary. Justice must not merely be done, but must also be seen to be done.

IN MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM AGAINST


AGAINST ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, February 8, 2011

A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted from a charge of
plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review article, novel thoughts published
in a legal periodical or language from a party’s brief are used without giving attribution. Thus
judges are free to use whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before
them, without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended to decide
cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and, more importantly, the
purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a result, judges adjudicating cases are not
subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.

SECTION 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court
personnel for unprofessional conduct of
of which the judge may have become aware.

CANO
CANON 3
IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the
decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

SECTION 1. Judges
Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

DIMO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC. V. DIMACULANGAN


G.R. No. 130991, March 11, 2004

For a judge to be inhibited, allegations of partiality and pre-judgment must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Here, mere allegation that the judge arbitrarily issued the TRO
without presenting evidence showing bias on his part is not sufficient. While Judge Santiago
acted in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued the TRO for such should only be enforceable
within his territorial jurisdiction, such error may not necessarily warrant inhibition at most it is
correctible by certiorari

SECTION 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and
enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants
litigants in the impartiality of the
judge and of the Judiciary.

TALENS-
TALENS-DABON V. ARCEO
259 SCRA 354 (1996)

The integrity of the Judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but
also upon the perception and confidence of the community that the people who run the system
have done justice. Hence, in order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary,
particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and
procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity,
probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then
can the people be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and
equity, thus creating confidence in the judicial system.
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SECTION 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions
deciding
on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

Rule of Necessity, Defined


In the case of Parayno v. Meneses, G.R. No. 112684, Apr. 26, 1994, it is stated that a judge is
not disqualified to sit in a case where there is no other judge available to hear and decide the case.
Furthermore, when all judges will be disqualified as a result, it will not be permitted to destroy the
only tribunal with the power in the premises. The doctrine operates on the principle that a basic judge
is better than no judge at all. It is the duty of the disqualified judge to hear and decide the case
regardless of objections or disagreements.

SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them,
make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or
impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise
that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

SECTION 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings


proceedings in which they
are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that
they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to
instances where:
(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed
evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;
(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;
(c) The judge or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the
matter in controversy;
(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter
in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or
the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(e) The judge s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree
or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or
(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee,
creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the
proceedings.

SECTION 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding,
parties
disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parti es and
lawyers, independently of the judge s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for inhibition
is immaterial or un-
un-substantial; the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement,
signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated
incorporated in the record of the proceedings.

Grounds for Disqualification and Inhibition of Judges under the Rules of Court
1. Mandatory of Compulsory Disqualification
Grounds: Specific and Exclusive
Role of the Judicial Officer: no discretion to sit or try the case

2. Voluntary Inhibition
Grounds: no specific grounds but there is a broad basis for such
Role of the Judicial Officer: the matter is left to the sound discretion of the judge
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QUERY OF EXECUTIVE JUDGE ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF


MAIOLOS, BULACAN, ON TIHE CONFLICTING VIEWS OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT —
JUDGES MASADAO and ELIZAGA RE:
RE: CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4954-
4954-M

FACTS: Judge Roy A. Masadao, Jr., rendered a decision in a criminal case finding the accused
guilty of the crime of estafa. Counsel for the accused, Atty. Efren C. Moncupa, filed a motion
for reconsideration. Retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes entered his appearance for the accused,
wherefore, Judge Masadao issued an order inhibiting himself from further sitting in the case on
the ground that retired Justice J. B. L. Reyes had been among those who had recommended him
to the Bench. The case was raffled to the sala of Judge Luciano G. Elizaga. Judge Elizaga
returned the records of the case with an accompanying letter stating a refusal to act on the
aforesaid motion for reconsideration and assailing the re-raffling of the case as impractical and
uncalled for.

ISSUE: Who shall resolve a motion for reconsideration filed against the decision of Judge Roy
A. Masadao, Jr., after he had voluntarily inhibited himself from further sitting in Criminal Case
No. 4954-M of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 9, Malolos entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Jaime Tadeo"?

HELD: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court embodies the rule on disqualification
and inhibition of judges.
No judge or judicial off icer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir. legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to
either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without written
consent of an the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

On the other hand, where no grounds for disqualification as above enumerated exist, as in the
case at bar, the rule on inhibition provides:
A judge may, in the exercise of his discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney
of record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. The court held that the
fact "that one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground for
the disqualification of said judge. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to
whom the case would be transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for under a different
rule, a judge would be barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his former classmates (and
he could have many) appeared." Likewise, the rule applies when the lawyer of the defendant
was a former associate of the judge, when he was practising law.

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a
presiding judge appears before him as counsel for one of the parties to a case. "Utang na
loob", per se, should not be a hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor should recognition
of such value in Philippine society prevent the performance of one's duties as judge. However,
where, as in this case, the judge admits that he may be suspected of surrendering to the
persuasions of utang na loob or he may even succumb to it considering that he "and the
members of his family, no less, shall ever remain obliged in eternal gratitude to Justice Reyes",
the negative answer to the question of judge Elizaga yields to exceptions in extraordinary cases.
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CANO
ANON 4
PROPRIETY
ETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities
of a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Prohibitions:
• Actual impropriety
• Appearance of impropriety

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that
might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In
particular, judges
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office.

SECTION 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession
who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations
situations which might reasonably give rise to the
suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.

SECTION 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their
family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner
manner with the case.

SECTION 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to
receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.

SECTION 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled tto o freedom of expression, belief, association
and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as
to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the Judiciary.

RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE ACUÑA


A.M. No. RTJ-04-1891, July 28, 2005

FACTS: Judge Acuña was charged with improper conduct for allegedly making humiliating
statements such as “putris,” and “putang-ina”. In his answer, Judge Acuña claimed that those
words are only his favorite expressions and they are not directed to any particular person. He
further maintained that his behavior is justified by the fact that he is still mourning the sudden
demise of his eldest son.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Acuna is guilty of improper conduct.

HELD: Yes. Judges are demanded to be always temperate, patient and courteous both in the
conduct and language. Indeed, judges should so behave at all times because having accepted the
esteemed position of a judge he ought to have known that more is expected of him than
ordinary citizen. Here, the judge’s use of humiliating and insensitive expressions like “putris”
and ”putang- ina” is improper as such intemperate language detracts from how he should
conduct himself. Moreover, it does not matter whether such expressions were directed to a
particular person or not, as they give the impression of a person’s ill manners.
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SECTION 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary and financial interests and
shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of their family.

SECTION 8. Judges shall not use or or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit
others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influe
influence
nce them in
the performance of judicial duties.

SECTION 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or
disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.

UMALE V. VILLALUZ
G.R. No. L-33508 May 25, 1973

FACTS:
FACTS: Petitioner Leon Umale impugns the validity of the order of respondent Judge Onofre A.
Villaluz disqualifying or inhibiting himself from trying the robbery charge against sixteen (16)
accused. Petitioner Leon Umale is the complainant in the said robbery case. However, without
any party moving for his disqualification or inhibition, respondent Judge Onofre Villaluz
voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the case on the ground that before the criminal case
was filed in his court, he already had personal knowledge of the same; and directed the
immediate forwarding of the records of the case to the Executive Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal, for proper disposition.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge Onofre A. Villaluz can voluntarily inhibit himself without
any motion therefor by the parties on the ground of his personal knowledge of the case even
before the same was filed.

HELD: Yes. A judge may voluntarily inhibit himself by reason of his being related to a counsel
within the fourth civil degree (no expressly included as a ground in par. 1 of Rule 137); because
Rule 126 (the old rule) "does not include nor preclude cases and circumstances for voluntary
inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned."
Herein respondent Judge has personal knowledge of the case. Such personal knowledge
on his part might generate in his mind some bias or prejudice against the complaining witness
or any of the accused or in a manner unconsciously color his judgment one way or the other
without the parties having the opportunity to cross-examine him as a witness.
A salutary norm is that he reflects on the probability that a losing party might nurture
at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of
justice against him. It is possible that the respondent Judge might be influenced by his personal
knowledge of the case when he tries and decides the same on the merits, which would certainly
constitute a denial of due process to the party adversely affected by his judgment or decision. It
is best that, after some reflection, the respondent Judge on his own initiative disqualified
himself from hearing the robbery case filed by herein petitioner and thereby rendered himself
available as witness to any of the parties and therefore maybe subject to cross-examination.

SECTION 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may:
(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;
(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law,
the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;
(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office
or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.
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SECTION 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.

SECTION 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations
representing the interests of judges.
judges.

SECTION 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for nor accept, any gift, bequest,
loan, or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of judicial duties.
duties.

ATTY. DAVID G. OMPOC vs. JUDGE NORITO E. TORRES

FACTS: A civil case for ejectment was filed and it was assigned to Judge Norito Torres. While
the case was being tried, at one time he invited Atty. Ompoc to see him at his residence and he
instructed the former to bring his client along with him. At the meeting, Judge Torres gave
them a guide what evidence and argument they have to present. Also in that meeting, Judge
Torres requested the client, who is engage in the business of Car Decor to install a brand new
air conditioner on his Toyota Hi-Ace and said air conditioner was installed without Judge
Torres paying for it. As the ejectment case progressed, Judge Torres had been pestering Atty.
Ompoc’s client with request for loans which Judge Torres never acknowledged by means of a
receipt and he was given by Atty. Ompoc’s client sums of money in various amounts and on
different dates. These loans have never been paid up to now and are certainly will not be paid,
to the end of time because Judge Norito Torres is smart enough not to sign anything.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Torres committed gross misconduct.

HELD: Yes. Receiving money from a party litigant is the kind of gross and flaunting misconduct
on the part of the judge, who is charged with the responsibility of administering the law and
rendering justice. Members of the judiciary should display not only the highest integrity but
must, at all times, conduct themselves in such manner as to be beyond reproach and suspicion.

SECTION 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence,
direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything
done, to be done or omitted
omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.

SECTION 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a
token gift, award, or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made, provided tthat
hat such
gift, award or benefit might not be reasonably perceived as intended to influence the judge in the
performance of official duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.

CANO
CANON 5
EQUAL
UALITY

Ensuring equality of treatment to all before the courts is essential to the due performance of the
judicial office.

SECTION 1. Judges shall be aware of and understand diversity in society and differences arising from
various sources, including, but not limited to, race, color, sex, religion,
religion, national origin, caste,
disability, age, marital status, sexual orientation, social and economic status, and other like causes.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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SECTION 2. Judges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias
or prejudice towards
towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.

SECTION 3. Judges shall carry out judicial duties with appropriate consideration for all persons, such
as the parties, witnesses, lawyers, court staff and judicial colleagues, without differentiation on any
irrelevant ground, immaterial to the proper performance of such duties.

SECTION 4. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to his or her influence,
direction or control to differentiate between persons concerned, in a matter
matter before the judge, on any
irrelevant ground.

SECTION 5. Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to refrain from manifesting,
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant grounds, except such as are legally
relevant
relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the subject of legitimate advocacy.

CANO
ANON 6
COMPETEN
ETENCE AND DILIGENCE

Competence and diligence are pre-requisites to the due performance of judicial office.

SECTION 1. The judicial duties of a judge take precedence


precedence over all other activities.

SECTION 2. Judges shall devote their professional activity to judicial duties, which include not only
the performance of judicial functions and responsibilities in court and the making of decisions, but
also other tasks
tasks relevant to the judicial office or the court's operations.

SECTION 3. Judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge, skills and
personal qualities necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties, taking advantage
advantage for this
purpose the training and other facilities which should be made available, under judicial control, to
judges.

ABAD V. BLEZA, 1986

As a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are
erroneous. Even on the assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of the
evidence, he cannot be held administratively or civilly liable for his judicial action. A judicial
officer cannot be called to account in a civil action for acts done by him in the exercise of his
judicial function, however erroneous. Not every error or mistake of a judge in the performance
of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge administratively accountable for every
erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position unbearable.
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DAGUDAG V JUDGE PADERANGA

FACTS: Illegal forest products possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc were seized by the
DENR. The items were found to be lacking the required legal documents and were
consequently abandoned by the unknown owner. Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of
replevin for the release of said confiscated products. Respondent Judge issued the writ despite
the fact that an administrative case was already pending before the DENR.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct
unbecoming a judge.

HELD: Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons.
First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take
cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies. In the instant case, Edma did not
resort to, or avail of, any administrative remedy. Second, under the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of
special competence. Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be
the subject of replevin. Judge Paderanga’s acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of
issuing the writ of replevin constitute gross ignorance of the law.
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that
competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6
states that judges shall take reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge
necessary for the proper performance of judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast
with legal developments and show acquaintance with laws. The rule that courts cannot
prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies is basic.

SECTION 4. Judges shall keep themselves informed about relevant developments of international
international law,
including international conventions and other instruments establishing human rights norms.

SECTION 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. JUDGE DOYON


A.M. No. RTJ-08-2108 November 25, 2008

FACTS: After the conducted judicial audit, respondent Judge Orlando P. Doyon was found to
have neglected his duties. The audit team reported that there were six civil cases and
nine criminal cases where no action was made for a considerable length of time and other cases
which were already beyond the period to resolve and beyond the reglementary period to
decide. At the time the findings were made, respondent judge has already retired which he also
used as a defense in order to exculpate himself.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Doyon is guilty of neglect and undue delay of rendering justice.

HELD: The Court held that the Constitution requires trial judges to dispose of all cases
or matters within three months. The New Code of Judicial Conduct also provides in Canon 6,
Section 5 thereof that judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved
decisions, efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness. The reason for this rule is
that justice delayed is justice denied. Undue delay in the disposition of cases results in a denial
of justice which, in turn, brings the courts into disrepute and ultimately erodes the faith and
confidence of the public in the judiciary. Thus, the failure of judges to render judgments within
the required period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction.
FSUU College of Law// Legal and Judicial Ethics Notes
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SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before the court and be
patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the
judge deals in an official capacity.
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.

SECTION 7. Judges shall not engage in conduct incompatible with the diligent discharge of judicial
duties.

//FSUU College of Law Consejo de Legis S.Y. 2012-2013/

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