Nations, Parties, and Participation: A Critique of Political Sociology

Author(s): Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland

Source: Theory and Society, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Autumn, 1974), pp. 307-328
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/656736
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 307

NATIONS, PARTIES, AND PARTICIPATION: A CRITIQUE OF

POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY

ROBERT R. ALFORD AND ROGER FRIEDLAND

Studies of the political behavior of the citizens of various countries, the

course and outcomes of elections, and the organizationand functioning of
parties dominatedthe time and intellectualenergiesof political sociologistsin
the 1960s. Much of this work was associated with Stein Rokkan, scholars
connected with him, or those whose work was facilitatedby him.1 This paper
makes use of a collection of essays and articles, Citizens, Elections, Parties
(written over a period of nearly fifteen years of Rokkan's influence on
scholarship)in order to raise some issues concerning dominant intellectual
perspectivesin the field and the implicationsfor researchpriorities.2

Two of the majorthemes in this comprehensivevolume will be considered:

the model of "nation-bulding"presentedin Chapters2 and 3, and a proposed
agenda for research on a problem which has barely begun to be studied:
"institutionaland structuralcomparisonsof the different ways in which the
pressures of the mass electorate, the parties and the elective bodies are
dovetailed into a broadersystem of decision-makingamonginterest organiza-
tions and privateand public corporateunits" (p.30).

We shall argue that Rokkan'sevolutionaryapproachto political development

and the resulting methodological strategies make it difficult to develop a
theory and method appropriateto that researchagenda.Threemajorassump-
tions are especially troubling:(1) that the presentterritorialform of Western
nations is not theoretically problematic,although secessions and wars which
change boundariesare recognizedempirically,(2) that a static party structure

1. For Rokkan's own account of this history, see his Introduction to Erik Allardt and
Stein Rokkan, editors, Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology (New York: The Free
Press, 1970).
2. Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties (New York: David McKay Company, Inc.,
1970),

The University of Wisconsin

308

stably representingincorporatedinterest groups is an appropriatedependent

variable, and (3) that contemporarypolitics can be regardedas free of con-
tent. The result of these assumptionsis to disassociatemassmobilizationand
the social structuringof party affiliation from elite decision makingand the
formation of institutions and making of policy at the center. Given this
approach,it is difficult to analyze the emergenceof new political structures
and sources of nonelectoralpolitical power which counter the potential im-
pact of mass political participation. An adequate theory will require
reintegratedstudy of the state and the economy and of elites and masses.

NATION-BUILDING

Rokkan criticizes most existing studies of nation-buildingfor severalbiases

and imbalances: (1) an excessive concern with the larger nations, (2) a
tendency to considerdata for nations as wholes, and (3) a preoccupationwith
time-seriesdata from censuseswhich emphasizeeconomic growth. He believes
that this focus has reduced the number of cases of nations which could be
used to test important hypotheses, has ignored the internal diversity of
national units, and has neglectedavailabledata bearingon "social, education-
al and culturalmobilization"(p.49).

For his own model, Rokkan uses three sets of distinctions, one drawn from
BarringtonMoore,Jr., another from GabrielAlmond, Lucian Pye, and their
associates, and the third from his own work with S.M. Lipset.3 Explicating
Moore'sthesis, Rokkan distinguishesfour sets of actors: the "centraldynasty
and its bureaucracy,the tradingand manufacturingbourgeoisiein the cities,
the lords of the land, and the peasantry." The four possible "alliance
options" duringthe course of industrializationand the creation of a nation-
state have resulted in a variety of consequences for the structure of the
polity, rangingfrom a weak, elite-dominatedbureaucracyruledby alternating
parties (Great Britain), and a "weak, dispersedbureaucracy;rule through
pluralistbargainingbetween courts and establishedinterests"(United States),
to a "stronglycentralizedegalitarian-competitive bureaucracy;[with] oscilla-
tion between plebiscitarian rule and fragmented multiparty bargaining"
(France) (p.55). In the first two cases, the urban bourgeoisie formed a
coalition with the landedinterests;in the third,both were also alliedwith the
bureaucracy.The fourth case, Germany,was one of a coalition of the landed

3. See BarringtonMoore,Jr., The Social Originsof Dictatorshipand Democracy:Lord

and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Gabriel
A. Almond and James S. Coleman, editors, The Politics of Developing Areas (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1960); Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, editors, Political
Culture and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965).
 309

interests with the bureaucracy, and resulted in a strong elite-dominated

bureaucracy with autocratic rule leading to a mass dictatorship. Moore's
fundamentalassumptionwas that the patternsexhibited by the majornations
- France, Britain, Germany, United States, Japan, Russia, China, India -
account for much of the variation in the world system and that small, less
powerful nations are too highly dependent on their political-culturalregions
to be comparableacross regions.Rokkan,however, chooses a largersampleof
western European parliamentarydemocracies,justified by the logic of a
"most similar systems" design which eases the difficulty of comparisons,
minimizes the number of analyticallynecessaryvariables,and permitsa large
number of casesin the samplerelativeto the majornations studied by Moore.

Almond, Pye, and their associatesdevelopedan ideal type of nation-building,

focusingaroundsix "crisesof development:"penetration,integration,partici-
pation, identity, legitimacy, and distribution. These are "challenges,issues,
policy options, to be faced in the course of any process of nation-building"
(p.61). The ideal typical pattern would be an orderly sequence of solutions
which results in the achievement of a common sense of identity among all
members of a nation-state, agreement about the legitimate nature of
authority, effective formal institutions of government, confidence and
rapportbetween rulersand subjects,effective participationof specific interest
groups, effective interactingrelationshipsbetween different units of govern-
ment, and a reasonabledistributionof goods, servicesand valuesthroughout
the society (paraphrasedfrom pp.62-64). The last is the "final crisis."

After listing these crises, Rokkan moves to the problem of seeing them in
operation, and suggests a number of ingenious and researchableindices of
each (pp.66-67). Time-seriesdata on the share of GNP spent by different
levels of government, for example, are proposed as an indicator of the
"penetration"crisis,and votes for "anti-system"partiesin regularelections as
bearingon the "legitimacy"crisis.

Using these concepts, Rokkan develops (in Chapter 3) a typology of the

political histories of the fifteen Europeannations which currentlyhave com-
petitive party systems and universal adult suffrage (except for women in
Switzerland). Frankly labeling it a conceptual excercise, Rokkan claims
rightly that it is "the first attempt to develop a general typology of such
variations from a unified set of postulates and hypotheses" (p.116). It is
unique in that Rokkan refused to sacrifice empirical and historical com-
plexity to the temptation of a single abstractvariableand empiricalindicator
as the basis for classifying and ordering these nations. Most comparative
310

cross-nationalstudies have selected "degree of modernization,""degree of

centralization,""degree of political competitiveness,"GNP, "class voting,"
etc., as devices for reducingmultidimensionalreality to a set of measurable
variables.

Also unique is the introduction of historical factors which he calls "alliance

options" as integralpartsof the analytic typology, ratherthan as residualand
exogenousvariables.These historicaldimensionsareindeed simplificationsof
complexity, and Rokkan recognizes that his dichotomous-choicemodel of
nation-buildingis a "brutal"reduction of the "options of the central elite"
(p.127) at variouscrucial choice-pointsin Europeanhistory.

(1)During the Reformation in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,the

distinctivecleavagewas between the national center and the periphery,and
the crucialissues were between a national and a supranationalreligion,and a
nationallanguageas opposed to Latin (see p.131). (2) Duringthe period of
the "Democratic Revolution" after 1789, the distinctive cleavagewas be-
tween the state and the church, and the crucial issue was secular versus
religiouscontrol of mass education. (3) During the period of the "Industrial
Revolution"in thenineteenth century, the distinctive cleavagewas between
thelanded classesand the urban-industrialbourgeoisie,and the crucialissues
werethe tariff levels for agriculturalproducts and the extent of control or
freedomof industrial enterprise.(4) After the RussianRevolution, the dis-
tinctivecleavagewas between owners and workers,and the crucialissue the
integrationof the working class into thenational polity as opposed to its
commitmentto the international revolutionary movement. Rokkan then
chartsfor contemporary European states the consequences of the various
outcomesof the alliance options between seven basic actors -a centralcore
of"nation-builders"controlling the state bureaucracy,the national church,
thesupranationalchurch, dissentingreligiousactivists,urbancommercialand
industrial
entrepreneurs,a resistance movement in the territorialperiphery,
andestablishedlandownerscontrollingprimaryproduction.

Depending on the various coalitions between these actors at early stages in

nationaldevelopment,the party system took various forms representingdif-
ferentsets of actors. If the conflicts could not be resolved,the polity broke
upthroughsecessionand/or war.

Rokkan separatedthe three "early"cleavages(center-periphery,state-church,

from the later one (owner-worker)because the later cleavage
land-industry)
"tendedto bring the party systems closer to each other in their basic struc-
whereasthe firstthree "generatednational developmentsin divergent
ture,"
 311

directions" (p.113, italics in original). Since working-classmovements and

parties emerged at a certain point in every country, it was not necessary to
explain why such movements and parties emerged in some countries at a
particulartime and not in others; rather,what had to be explained was the
"strengthand solidarity of any such movement, its capacity to mobilize the
underprivilegedclasses for action and its ability to maintainunity in the face
of the many forces making for division and fragmentation"(p.130, italics in
original).

Unfortunately,the three-step model (representingthe first three cleavages)

"does not produce clear-cutpredictions of these developments"(p.131) in
the fourth stage. But Rokkan does suggest some factors that were possibly
associatedwith whether theemergingworking-classmovementwas "domesti-
cated"(in Denmark,Sweden, Britain,the Netherlands,Switzerland,Austria,
Luxembourg,and Ireland)or became deeply split between Socialist and Com-
munistwings (in Norway, Finland, Iceland, France, Italy, and Spain). The
unity of the working-classmovement was historically associated with the
successfulsolution of the identity crisis, the fourth crisis distinguishedby
Pye.Further,
Inthe Protestantand the [religiously]Mixed countries the
differentiating
criterionappearsto be the recency of thenation-buildingprocess: the less
settledthe issues of national identity and the deeperthe ongoing conflicts
overculturalstandardization,the greaterthe chancesof radicalizationand
fragmentationwithin the working class. In the Catholiccountriesa similar
processseems to have been at work but in different terms:the deeperand
morepersistent the Church-Stateconflicts, the greaterthe fragmentation
ofthe workingclass;the closer the historicalties between the ecclesiastical
hierarchyand the secular "nation-builders,"the less the chances of left-
wingsplit-offs. (p.137)

Rokkandoes not claim to have "explained" these patterns,only summarized

themparsimoniouslyby means of severaldichotomous descriptivevariables
summarizing the "criticaloptions for each territorial
system," and the "level
ofsolidaritiesand conflicts," which seem to be associatedwith the
emergence
ofthe "system of electoral alternativespresented by organized parties" in
eachnation (p.138).

Insum, this model defines relevant variations between existing European

statesconcerningthe historicalchangesin the distributionsof votes for differ-
entparties by territorial,ethnic, linguistic, religious, social
class, and rural-
urbandivisions of the electorate (summarizedon For this analytic
p.139).
purposethe model seems both sufficiently refined and generalto collect and
312

analyze data. A further question, however, is whether these concepts and

types are appropriate solutions for key methodological and theoretical
dilemmas.4

DILEMMASOF THEORYAND RESEARCH

One acute general dilemma confronting political sociologists is that the

requirementsfor systematic empirical, multivariateresearchon nations and
party systems and the requirementsfor developingan adequatetheory of the
complex historical developmentof Westernsocieties may differ and, indeed,
may be contradictory.Rokkan does not define his problem in that way, but
his book is particularlyinstructive if it is viewed as an explicit attempt to
close the gap between data and theory by trying to avoid assumingeither
separate units of analysis exhibiting limitlessly comparable and variable
properties(e.g., "centralization,""competitiveness")or unique and complex
historicalsequencesof events and actions.

Rokkan'ssolution to this dilemmais to use a Parsonianevolutionarysystem.5

He postulates the gradualemergence of separate entities - nation-states-
going through stages of development and finally reachingan end-point of
political modernity. At this end-point, social groups - labor, farm,business,
linguistic, religious - constitute a politically organized set of stable social
divisions which find expressionand representationthrough political parties.
These parties in turn have been institutionalizedas one stable political com-
ponent of the nation. Once established,these partiescontest elections within
nations by engaging in battles to increase their political support at the
margins, but the boundaries of the struggle are now set, given a cultural
consensus on the "rules of the game." This solution to the dilemmaraises a
number of related issues: (1) teleological assumptions,(2) externaland terri-
torial dimensions,and (3) politics without content.

TELEOLOGICAL
ASSUMPTIONS.

Rokkan'soverridingheuristicassumptionis that the processof differentiation

of parties and of formation of national units with a givencomposition, terri-

4. See Stein Rokkan,"Dimensionsof State Formationand Nation-Building:A Possible

Paradigmfor Research on VariationsWithin Europe," in CharlesTilly, editor, The
Formationof NationalStates in WesternEurope(Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,
1972), for a more recentand still more complex set of dimensions.
5. Ibid., Chapter3: here Rokkanderiveskey concepts from Talcott Parsonsand Neil J.
Smelser,Economyand Society, (London: Routledge, 1956); and in his chapterin Tilly,
op. cit., he relies upon Talcott Parsons,Societies: Comparativeand EvolutionaryPer-
spectives(EnglewoodCliffs,New Jersey:Prentice-Hall,1967).
 313

tory, and social base is at an end. (On page 131 he says the "processgets
under way... and it ends." The statement about "integration into the
national community"suggeststhe same inference.)Obviously,Rokkanknows
that the history of these nations has not ended and that changes will still
occur. The point is that the analytic frameworkdoes not include a recog-
nition of this fact. Instead, it is assumed that the four historic bases of
societal conflict have placed their mark on the party systems and are no
longer dynamic and active forces. Once a social group has become success-
fully embedded in a party which "represents"it, its force for change is
channeled through the stable processes of parliamentarylegislation and the
constant push of parties for influence over decisions and policies. Represen-
tation and integration of social groups - whether class, religious, or
territorial/culturalin character - via parties, satisfy their basic legitimate
demands, and a viable national community will find it possible to com-
promise among them through the normal processes of parliamentaryand
electoralpolitics.

We are given a brief glimpse of the kinds of politicized social cleavagespro-

ducing soluble crises in Rokkan's projections for working-classpolitics in
Europe. He argues that through political development, class conflict is
"solved through rational bargainingand the establishment of universalistic
rules of allocation" (p.98). The alternativeto consensual routinization of
class conflict is the developmentof ideological oppositionsbetween political-
ly organized classes. Rokkan arguesthat such a prospect would not be con-
ducive to furtherpolitical development,only disruption.In regardto the high
level of political repressionin Germany, Austria, France, Italy, and Spain,
Rokkanarguesthat
The working-classorganizationsconsequentlytended to isolate themselves
from the national culture and to develop soziale Ghettoparteien,strongly
ideological movements seeking to isolate their members and their
supportersfrom influences from the encompassingsocial environments...
The greater the number of citizens caught in such direct "friend-foe"
oppositions to each other the greaterthe dangerof total disruptionof the
body politic. (p. 110)
Restructuringthe political economy throughideological class conflict is not a
developmentalpossibility, only "disruption."

Rokkan's approachis far more historical than most theoretical frameworks

for the analysis of political behavior, because he defines the sequences of
development of a nation as marked by critical options and problematic
outcomes. But cleavagesand actors emerge on the historical stage only to
disappearonce they are incorporatedin a presumablystable party system.
314

Although the consequencesof their past actions continue to define the struc-
ture of electoralalternatives,that structureitself has become frozen.

Rokkan's dependent variable is therefore essentially static - the number,

composition, and structure of political parties and of nations. Barrington
Moore, Jr., dealing with the same historical period, presentsquite a different
picture (of war, fascism, communism,totalitarianism)than Rokkan,because
of his focus upon the historical conditions causing stability or instability in
democraticsuffragesystems in a global context ratherthan the variationsin
party structure of a number of separateand presumablystable competitive
democracies. The choice between these two dependent variablesnot only
enables us to study more units of analysis in a multivariate strategy, as
Rokkanurges,but it also follows from differentunderlyingtheories.

Moore, by maintaininga focus upon the developmentof the most dominant

democraticand nondemocraticnational structuresas the empiricaland theo-
retical referent, assumesthat developmentalsequences of small nations can-
not be analyzedindependentlyof these dominantworld patterns.Rokkan,by
allowingeach nation and its sequenceof decisionsand cleavagesto become an
entity for analysis,is tempted to forget that these are not closed systems. He
does not "forget" in a substantivesense, of course;there are many references
to the internationalconsequencesof the Frenchand RussianRevolutions,but
such "factors"are not part of the analyticframework.They constitute events
which have consequencesfor the structureof the systems he is studying,but
their causesare exogenous to his theory.

This conceptual and methodologicaldilemmais relatedto anotherone - the

characterof the historical actors who are dubbed the "nation-builders."As
alreadyindicated, these are the elites who initiated the centralizingprocessin
the early stages of national development and who control the national
bureaucracy.Yet, by definition, they have no other social, territorial,or
economic base, since they are distinguishedboth from the subjectterritories
(the periphery) and from possible social groups or classes like the land-
owners, the urban commercialand industrialbourgeoisie,or the nationaland
supranationalchurchesand dissenters.Whothese nation-builderschose to ally
themselveswith was a criticalhistoricalchoice determiningthe future form of
the party systems of these countries. But do they reallyhave an independent
existence apart from the social groups located in variousgeographicregions
within the potential nation? Should not the degreeof independentcontrol of
the state apparatusby a political elite be regardedratheras a variablein its
own right - ranging from nearly complete dominance of the state by one
group or class exercising political control over a population within a given
 315

territory - to nearly complete independence of the state bureaucracyand

governing elite from any social base? In contrast to Rokkan, Moore makes
the strengthand autonomy of the state contingent upon the political alliances
made by different social groups, including the political elites located in that
state.

To distinguishthe "nation-builders"as separateactors on the historicalstage

from the very beginning of the nation (and even before), is a conceptual
device consistent with the selection of the contemporaryform of the nation
as the entity to be used in projectingbackwards.If the presentnations are in
their final form, and if in some sense the historicalprocesswas "aiming"for
this form, than possibly one needs to postulate a set of actors whose
historicalrole was to build those nations.

In the developmentof his theory, Rokkan exhibits an essentiallyambivalent

analytic position towards the state. In his early analysis, he stresses the
independent nature of the "center" and the "nation-builders."Autonomous
political elites have independent interests and a variety of "allianceoptions."
The closer the analysis comes to the present, however, the more the state is
conceptualizedas an instrument for representationthroughwhich politicized
social groups achieve unspecified outputs, programs,and legislation. Thus
there is a curious tension between the developed state and the teleological
agent upon which that developmentis theoreticallycontingent.The state has
been transformed,but the analytic categoriesdo not referto that change.

Nonelectoral political elites located in the state apparatus(the "center")may

continue to have autonomous interests and sources of influence in their
expertise and organizational longevity. These interests might range from
organizationalrationalization to vested interests in the survivalof certain
programs or agencies.6 If so, the contemporary state is not only the
responsiveinstrumentof diverse social groups,but has interestsand power of
its own which may limit its substantive responses to certain social groups.
This important possibility has not been analytically incorporated in the
developmentalmodel.

Few if any of the empiricalindicators suggested in the book bear directly

upon the consequencesof elite decisions or "allianceoptions" for the forma-

6. This is consistent with the finding that the earlier a welfare program was started, the
greater the present expenditure. Henry Aaron, "Social Security: International Com-
parisons," in Otto Eckstein, editor, Studies in the Economics of Income Maintenance
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1967); and Frederick Pryor, Public Expendi-
tures in Communist and Capitalist Nations (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968).
316

tion of actual institutions and policies at the center. Just how these
con-
sequences can be assessedis a matter of considerablemethodologicalsignifi-
cance. It is easiest to collect discrete indicators such as personnel, debt,
expenditures, income, strikes, voting, readership, organizations,and social
services;while, inferences about causal relationshipsare extremely difficult
from such cross-sectionalor even time-seriesdata. Whatare the grounds
upon
which one could select between a Moore, an Almond-Pye, or a Rokkan
hypothesis using such data? How would one assess the conditions under
which the coalition between the urbanbourgeoisieand the landed interests
led to a centralized as opposed to a decentralizedbureaucraticstate? How
wouldone know why a crisis of nationalidentity was handledin a particular
way from such data? How would one know why given alternativeways of
handling classstrugglesbetween owners and workers resulted in extending
socialservices? Because Rokkan immediately leaps from formulatingalter-
native and plausible theoretical perspectives to listing detailed empirical
indicators of a multiplicity of variables characterizingvarious states of
nationalsystems over a period of time, he fails to solve some of the most
importantmethodological issues which confront those who wish to test
empiricallythe various models of political and economic development and
transformationby means of broadly defined and diverse historical and in-
stitutionaldata.

EXTERNAL
AND TERRITORIALDIMENSIONS.

Thereasons for wars, secessions, peaceful mergers,and empires are almost

totallyunexplained byRokkan'smodel. Territorialmovementsillustratethe
difficulty.Rokkandoes not ignorethe territorialand secessionmovements;in
factthey are a central concern, but in a descriptiveratherthan explanatory
context.These movements and their consequences for the composition of
anygiven nation are taken as given,and theproblemis seen as assessingtheir
consequences for the internal structureof a party system, once the territorial
boundaries of the nation had been "settled" - as of 1970.

Severalexamples may beuseful. It is assumed that there were good and

sufficient
reasonswhy Irelandleft Britain,and Belgiumthe Netherlands,and
whyFlandersremainedin Belgium,the Pyreneesin Spain,and South Tyrol in
Italy.Rokkan notes that Sweden is "one of the oldest and ethnically most
homogeneous"of the nations and has been little "afflicted by ethnic-
territorial
cleavages."This is so because "the Danish territories to the South
andthe Norwegian ones to the West were incorporatedwell before mass
literacyand therefore proved much less resistant to the national
standardization
process" (p.123). The basis for selection of units and their
 317

characteristicattributesis taken to be the contemporarystate of affairs,with

conflicts over the internal political structure of the nation as having been
"solved" by secession. Finally: "The Netherlandssolved its major ethnic-
territorial problem through the secessions of Belgium and Luxembourgin
1831-39" (p.123). In effect, the victories of one or another "actor"- either
through secession in the case of a territorialperipheryor throughsubordina-
tion of a territory and/or class within an existing national framework - are
excluded from the theoretical framework. What was formerly a territory
within another nation is now a separatenation in its own right, possessingall
the rightsand privilegesof a unit of analysisin Rokkan'scomparativeanalytic
framework. Yet, the former unit of analysis (the Netherlands, or Britain)
retains its analytic integrity, even though in a fundamental sense it is no
longer the same unit, precisely because some of its key identifying charac-
teristics have changed.This mode of analysisruns the dangerof reifyingthe
nation-state,which is assumed to carry on throughnumeroushistoricalvicis-
situdes essentiallyunchanged.7

Rokkan's empirical referent for the national system is the contemporary

territorialspace in which is found a politically bounded, culturallyintegrated,
economically differentiated and legitimate polity. The continual process of
fragmentationand consolidation of politically bounded territoryboth within
and without the westem European region can be empiricallydescribedbut
not explained. Frequent wars have recurrently redefined the territorial
boundariesof Europeannation-states.Some of these redefinitionshave taken
place through ideological and military confrontationsbeyond the European
region (WorldWarsI and II) by which some of the territoriesceased to be
part of the contemporarysampleof democraticnation-states(the splittingoff
of the East Germanterritory, the Nazi period in Germany,fascist Italy, the
nonparliamentarydevelopmentof Spain). Some territorieswere neverpermit-
ted to qualify by similarextra-territorialprocesses(the Hungarianinvasionof
1956, the Czech invasion of 1968). Many of the present democraticnations
have also incorporated(politically and economically) territoriesoutside the
Europeanarea through nominal or actual colonization in the Third World.
Because Rokkan focuses only on the functional relationswithin the current
political-territorialboundaries in western Europe, he is deflected from any
concern with the functional relationships between areas both within and

7. ReinhardBendix has also noted the dangersof reification when using the natural
systemsapproachto comparativehistory. "Such analysisruns the dangerof reification,
which occurswhenevera society is identifiedas a unit that maintainsor changesitself, in
order to 'survive'as such." ReinhardBendix, "Concepts in ComparativeHistorical
Analysis,"in Stein Rokkan,editor, ComparativeResearchAcross Culturesand Nations
(The Hague:Mouton,1968), pp. 67-81; the quotationis from p.69.
318

withoutthe European region whose boundaries may not have been con-
of
tiguouswith the contemporary nation-states. Yetcolonization, wars
nationalliberation, Europeanwars of expansion, and secession movements
probablycanbest beexplained bythese wider functionalrelationships.

Further,the adoption of Parsons'AGILscheme has misleadingconsequences

foran explanation of the current territorialform of the nation-state.This
schemadifferentiates two axes of cleavage formation: an interest-ideology
former is
(A-I)dimension and a periphery-center(L-G) dimension. The
definedas a cross-localfunctional axis, the latter as a territorialaxis which
function-
opposes"periphery"and "center."Disassociatingthe territorialand
aldimensions vitiates an explanation of parties of territorialopposition and
secessionmovements.

Rokkanobservesthat where functionalcleavagesare territoriallydispersedor

cross-local,they "tend to undermine the inherited solidarity of the
establishedterritorialcommunities" (p.98). It is only a small step to argue
conversely that territorial oppositions develop only when functional
cleavagesare territoriallydistinct. If this is so, territory should beregarded
onlyas a location for functional relationships,rather than an independent
explanatoryfactor.

Rokkan
Bydisassociatingterritorialand functional dimensionsconceptually,
isled to arguethat cross-localfunctional relationshipsare agentsof territorial
andcultural unification and standardization,and thus militate againstterri-
toriallybased oppositions. The explanation of the necessary conditionsfor
theemergenceof partiesof territorialopposition thus centerson the function-
alisolation of the "periphery:"
heavyconcentrationof the counter-culturewithin one clear-cutterritory;
few ties of communication,alliance,and bargainingexperiencetoward the
nationalcentre and more toward external centres of culturalor economic
influence; minimal economic dependence on the political metropolis.
(p.121)
The condition for national integrationis the developmentof functional rela-
tionships with the "center." Agents of economic development - "the
networksof tradersand merchants,of bankersand financiers,of artisansand
industrialentrepreneurs"-supposedly facilitate nationalintegration.

Yet Rokkan's own examples indicate that the functional relationshipsof a

institutions
particularcontent with territorially distinct social groups and
often actually exacerbate territorialresistance and identity.8 For example,
 319

Rokkan argues that the development of the rural-urbanopposition in the

Nordic countries and its political expressionin agrarianpartieswas a result of
the economic and cultural opposition to an urbanbourgeoisie,the domina-
tion of the administrativecenter by this bourgeoisieto exact a high level of
taxation from the peasantry relative to its own fiscal liability, and its
blockage of agriculturalmarket controls favorable to the peasantry.It was
not the economic developmentthat led to a decline in territorialopposition,
These economic cleavages became more and more pronounced as the
primary-producingcommunities entered into the national money and
marketeconomy. (p.109)
Another example is the case of Belgium.Rokkanwrites,
The continuing processes of economic, social and cultural mobilization
brought the country to a polarizationbetween French-speaking,secular
and industrialWalloniaand Nederlands-speaking, Catholicand agricultural
Flanders.(p.121) . .. The Flemishopposition expresseda class cleavageas
muchas a territorial-cultural
cleavage.(p. 125)
If a territoryis only the location for functional relationships,changesin the
political boundarieswithin the largerterritory may or may not changethese
functional relationships.Then it becomes problematicwhether or not func-
tional cleavagesare "solved" by secession. Functional relationshipsbetween
politically bounded territorieshave often provided the stimulus for wars by
which the nationalterritorieshave once againbeen politically redefined.Rok-
kan treats wars only as seemingly unfortunate interruptionsof the stable
process of nation-buildingwhich have resultedin the present configurationof
Europeanstates.

To summarize,because Rokkan has disassociatedterritory and function ana-

lytically, he thus cannot analyze the actual processes by which functional
relationships take territorial forms or those by which territoriallydistinct
functional relationshipsfind expressionin political boundariesor party struc-
ture. This complex theoretical and empiricaltask remainson the frontier of
political ecology.

8. See Michael Hechter, "The Persistence of Regionalism in the British Isles,

1885-1966," AmericanJournalof Sociology 79:2 (September,1973), pp. 319-342, for
empiricalsupport for the proposition that industrializationis an insufficientcause of
political integrationinto the nation-state.Hechter does not find that industrialization
leads to a decline in peripheralsectionalism defined as a political, regionalcultural
identity in Scotlandor Wales.Hechterthereforerejects the diffusionistmodel of politi-
cal integration, suggestingthe possibility of a reactive, internal colonialismmodel of
peripheralsectionalism.
320

POLITICSWITHOUTCONTENT

Very little of the content of politics appearsin the key categoriesof analysis.
The various thresholds of legitimation, incorporation, representation, and
power refer to degreesof participation,of access, and of influence, but they
say nothing about the nature of the issues over which groupsand elites have
been struggling (p.79). In specifying the empirical implications of his
categoriesand classifications,Rokkan does not mention the actual legislation
advocatedby parties or passed by parliament,the court decisions made, the
administrative agenciesestablished,or the consequencesof statutes, decisions,
and administrativeactions for the society or any social groups within it. He
also does not deal with possible ways of conceptualizingthat content and
subsequentlyworkingwith it.

Nor does the content of politics frequently appearin Rokkan's substantive

discussion.While he uses such terms as "class polarization"(p.233), "direct
interestconflict" (p.234), and "movementof working-classprotest"(p.235),
andan "explosive mobilization of protest" (p.237), what the movementsor
protestswere about is not clear. While it seems to be "natural"for newly
organizedworkers to protest againsttheir working conditions and wages, he
doesnot attempt to classify the variationsin theconcrete livingand working
conditionsfaced by the workers,their demands,the programsof the Socialist
andLabour parties, the degree to which other parties responded to those
conditionsand demandsby establishingwelfare legislation, the legitimacyof
unionorganization, the contents of the legislation actually passed, or its
consequences in maintainingor raisingliving standards.

This content-freediscussionof politics is consistentwith theassumptionthat

themain political consequence of concern is political participationper se -
theattaining of legal rights to participate, and the process through which
votingturnout increased as parties organized.But what goals this mobiliza-
tionhad, for what purposepeople participated,and for what programsparties
organizedare neglected. This is consistent with the premisethat elites will
respondif parties are organizedand people vote, and that the content of
politicsis much less important than the procedures and the process of
electingrepresentativesto office. Once in office, what they actually do is
relativelyunimportant,because the nation has been built, has successfully
integratedall groups, and is functioning in a way which is assumed to be
permanent.

Again,Rokkan might say that this subject is beyond his scope because his
problemis to explain the emergence of the present structure of political
 321

parties,and that the content of politics is more diverseand inherentlymore

difficult to comparethan the number, structure,and social base of the party
systems. But this choice seriously constricts the development of theories
about the dynamics (the "feedback") or contradictions in the political
economy in actual operation. An adequate theoretical frameworkfor future
work in political sociology should suggest empiricaldata which bear on the
content and consequencesof the decisionstaken by political elites.

Omittingmention of these elite decisions implies that the major sources of

their decisions are responsesto the demandsof social groupsand the require-
ments of maintainingpolitical stability. In his discussion of the early actions
of "nation-builders,"Rokkan considerstheir "allianceoptions." Surely these
optionsof the national political elites as well as of the mobilizedsocial groups
continue to exist even though their nations are already built. The analytic
strategyof assumingthat the presentstructureof partiesand polity is frozen,
that past cleavagesare stably representedin the party system, and that no
existingor new cleavagesportend any transformationof the structureof the
polity, providesan incomplete theoretical frameworkto deal with social and
politicalchange.

Rokkan'sconception of "political crisis" also follows from his content-free

approachto political relationsamong social groups and his disassociationof
politicaland economic development. Accordingto Rokkan, crisisis a shift in
therelationshipbetween "environmentalpressures,""governmentaloutput,"
and"politicization,"such that a new level of output must be institutionalized
to prevent the overthrow of the elite structure or change the political
boundaries(p. 64). But until we understandhow "outputs" are politically
andeconomically constrainedand what are the relationshipsbetween "poli-
ticization"and "output,"it is difficult to develop a theory of crisisdevelop-
mentand resolution. This will ultimately requirea focus on the conditions
underwhich demandswith a particularcontent are producedand the feasibil-
ityof a substantiveresponse.

Thestatic quality of the dependent variableand a conception of politics

withoutcontent perhapsaccount for the aura of optimism which surrounds
the models of various crises and key decisions in the process of nation-
building.Agreements, sentiments, effectiveness, confidence, and rapportare
emphasizedas if the normal process is that of stable, gradual,and healthy
growthof national integrationand identity. The
"nation-building"processis
conceptuallyisolated from other processes occurring in the culture or the
economy.Complex historical sequences are transformedinto "dimensions"
whichcan presumablybe separatedout and measuredin isolation from each
322

other. This is a theoretical decision masked by the empirical task of

specifying measuresor indicators. Such data as how much of the GNP the
governmentspends, which region of a country taxes most heavily and how
the money is spent, income differentialsby varioussocial categories,and tax
burdens upon different groups are important for theoretical purposes.The
methodological requirementthat variablesbe measuredseparately,however,
does not imply that their indicators necessarily measure isolated factors
which have an independentcausalimpact.

THE DIALECTICOF MASS PARTICIPATIONAND ELECTORALIM-

POTENCE

We suggest that the dilemmasoutlined in the previoussection will be resolved

differently if the neglected research area Rokkan himself has defined is
brought to life. The content of politics, the interactionsof elite decisionsand
the needs and demands of social groups, and the continuously problematic
characterof apparently "frozen" alternativesare confronted directly when
one attempts to study the consequences or "outputs" of politics, not as a
static dependentvariable,but as part of a continuingset of processes.

Rokkan makes use of an unpublishedpaperwritten in 1960 by Peter Rossi as

a source of hypotheses concerning this major problem area. Rossi's
hypotheses, which much influenced "communitypower studies,"have major
implicationsfor large-scalecomparativeinternationalstudies as well. To sum-
marizeRossi'shypothesesin Rokkan'swords:

The three basic strategiesused by economic elites in counteringthe effects

of this growth of electoral power will be these: 1) the promotion of
non-partisanelectoral systems and of technically neutral administrative
agencies; 2) the intensified proliferation of privately controlled com-
munity institutions and voluntary civic associationsservingas instruments
of influence and pressurein conflicts over local policies;and 3) the devel-
opment of state-wide or nation-wide interest organizationsto influence
polities beyond the control of the local political elite. (p.41)

Rokkangoes on to broadenthe applicabilityof these generalizations:

The extension of the suffrageincreasedthe chances for a status polariza-
tion of national politics, but this very polarizationbrought about a proli-
feration of sectional and functional organizationswhich in turn tended to
soften the overallstrainsin the system and reducethe level of polarization.
Whatwe tend to find is a cumulation of forces makingfor a narrowingof
the alternativesfor national politics, a fragmentationof the networks of
 323

policy-influencingorganizations,and a consequent decline in the impor-

tance of the decisions of the electorate-at-large.This may tend to lower
the level of general political participationand to alienate from politics
sizable sections of the once enfranchised citizenry, leaving the basic
decisions to a bargainingprocess between interest organizations,parties
and agenciesand departmentsof the nationalbureaucracy.(p. 43)9

Rokkan supplementsthese dialectical observationsin another paper on Nor-

way in which he arguesthat the nonsocialistNorwegianbloc compensatesfor
its electoral weakness through corporatebargainingand its control over the
allocationof criticaleconomic resources.The Labourgovernmenthas become
a mediatorin this nonelectoral,nonparliamentarybargainingprocess.Rokkan
notes, "Votes count in the choice of governingpersonnel,but other resources
decide the actual policies pursuedby the authorities."'?

Again, because his developmental schema severs political from economic

change and the content of demands from the substance of state outputs,
Rokkan cannot theoretically incorporate the empirically observed pheno-
menon: the developmentof nonelectoralmeansof influencingpolicy and the
conditions under which the responsivenessof the state to electoralmajorities
is attenuated. Rokkan's own observations must leave us in a less-than-
optimistic quandaryconcerningthe real meaningof political development.

This perspectiveon the "strategiesused by economic elites in counteringthe

effects of this growth of electoral power" has been forsaken in the 1960s in
favor of much research on national as well as local community power and
decision making. If the diversion of power from the mass electorate to a
fragmentednetwork of interest organizationsand bureaucraticagenciesis an
inevitable part of the modernization process, if it is part of the "end of
ideology" in Westernpolitics, if it is a healthy component of a functioning
pluralistpolity, then it is not necessaryto look for the "functions"of such a
political system for the continuing domination of the allocationof valuesby
dominant elites and ruling classes. One must simply accept the structureof
the society as given and assessthe channelsof influence and accesswhich less
privilegedgroups can maintain open to them. The latter emphasishas in fact
been the concern of much of the work on political participationand local
communitydecision-makingin the last decade or so.

9. See also Stein Rokkan,"NumericalDemocracyand CorporatePluralism,"in Robert

A. Dahl, editor, PoliticalOppositionsin WesternDemocracies(New Haven:Yale Univer-
sity Press,1966), pp. 70-116, for anotherformulationof this point.
10. Ibid.,p. 106.
324

Events of the late 1960s in both the United States and Europehave challen-
ged an easy acceptance of this perspective.It seems likely that the kind of
political system which Rokkan has described is neither a success nor the
inevitable end-point of a healthy process of political development.Despite
the increasingcentralizationof power at the nationallevel, the "narrowingof
the alternativesfor national policies" has meant avoidingeven the definition,
let alone the solution, of such crucialproblemsas the prioritiesfor allocation
of the national product and of the developmentof nonexploitativerelations
with other nations.

From a short-termpoint of view, the "softening"of the strainsin the system

by the reduction of polarization might be regardedas positive, as a way of
avoiding conflicts which might result in "system overload." Such has indeed
been the underlying and implicit assumption of much research both on
bureaucratic decision-making and on the nature of partisanship. Cross-
pressures on individualswere assumed to minimize extremism and lead to
system-consequencesof political moderation.In fact, the system-consequences
of institutional and organizationalfragmentationmay have been mainly to
free political elites to act with fewer constraints, and as a result, to place
them more underthe influence of the most stronglyorganizedgroups.

The dominant assumptionhas been that the addition to governmentof new

powers, new functions, and new agencieswould serve to increasethe power
of government vis-a-vis private economic interest groups. This twentieth-
century liberal view of the expansion of governmenthas welcomed almost
every addition of domestic governmentalfunctions and power and almost
every increaseof domestic governmentalbudgetsas providingnecessarysocial
services to the poor, amenities to the entire society, regulation of private
economic interests, or control over important society-wide functions. While
perhaps true for some programs and activities, the major consequences
(according to Rossi-Rokkan) of (1) expansion of the mass electorate, (2)
increasing centralizationand expansion of fiscal and executive authority in
government, and (3) "fragmentationof the networks of policy-influencing
organizations"may instead have been to reduce the "importance of the
decisions of the electorate-at-large"(p.43). A principal consequence of the
democratizationof the electoral process may have been the developmentof
mechanismsby political and economic elites to neutralize or cancel out the
potential consequencesof that democratization.

Although depriving the mass electorate of channels for the expression of

preferencesabout clearly defined national policy alternativesis undoubtedly
 325

not an accident of history, the causes are not clear. The ineluctable conse-
quence of the differentiationof the mass electorate, technologicalimperatives
of large-scale organization, a series of strategic choices by political and
economic elites, or the unanticipatedconsequence of the "logic"of develop-
ment of the political economy of advancedcapitalistsocieties are alternative
explanations which raise fundamental questions outside the scope of this
essay but crucialfor comparativeresearchin political sociology. 1

Neglect of the important Rossi-Rokkanhypothesis may have occurredpartly

because of the conceptual and empirical severing of the processes of mass
mobilization and elite formation from each other. Because the formation of
nations and their capacity to solve their crucial problems of production,
distribution, political integration, and control was assumednot to be prob-
lematic in these most "modernized"nations of the world, it was possible to
divide studies of elites from those of the mass electorate. It was assumedthat
if the electorate participated,elites would respond appropriatelyin a way
which would both preservetheir capacityto ruleand still satisfy the minimum
demandsof the electorate. Conversely,if elites were continuouslyvulnerable
to losing power, they would continue to respond to mass demands.That is,
the actions of elites were assumed to be sufficiently visible to the mass
electorate so that gross failures or incapacitieswould bring down the worst
offenders.

Given these assumptionsabout the healthy functioning of the total political

system, "elite" researchcould then focus upon decision-makingprocesses in
bureaucratic agencies, in legislatures, and in courts, while neglecting the
actual impact of these processes upon the mass electorate, as well as the
question of whether or not elite decisions were a substantial and tangible
response to the demandsof variouspublics. "Mass"researchcould then focus
upon the factors affecting participationof varioussegmentsof the electorate
in parties and voting, without worryingabout whetherthis participationhad
any impact upon elite behavior.

Thus, by dividing the political system into two parts - the elites and their
institutions on the one hand, and the mass electorate on the other - scholars
were then able to neglect makinghypotheses about the relationshipsbetween
these parts. The path taken by researchershas simply accepted the historical-
ly developed and institutionalizeddivisionbetween massesand elites without
transcendingit by means of a more inclusivetheoreticalframework.
11. See Robert R. Alford, PoliticalSociology (EnglewoodCliffs, New Jersey:Prentice-
Hall, forthcoming),for an extended analysis of these 'pluralist,''elite,' and 'class'ex-
planationsfor the structureand functioningof the state in contemporarysocieties.
326

AN ALTERNATIVEPERSPECTIVE

We argue that the structure of the state should be seen as the result of
strugglesamong politically organized social groups. This structure, in turn,
differentially affects the power, political consciousness, and strategies of
social groups. These in turn "cause" the differential responsivenessof the
state to the interests of these groups. A multi-level,reproductiveconception
of political developmentis thereforerequired.

The creationof a network of fragmented,decentralizedagencieschargedwith

dealingwith the social consequences of economic relationshipsis a major
mechanismto depoliticize and maintain the "nonpolitical,"private status of
those relationships,and thereby insulate them from electoral challenge. In
general,dominant interest groups will locate state functions critical to their
interestsin political structureswhere they are least likely to be visible and
undergopartisan political challenge. The emergence of new and powerful
politicalstructures(regulatoryagencies, special districts, metropolitanfrag-
mentation,reform city government, regional government,fragmentedand
decentralizedsocial service agencies, professional boards) function to de-
politicize areas of state allocation and intervention upon which dominant
interestsare dependent.12

Tosummarizethe major substantivehypothesis: elite response to mass en-

franchisementhas been simultaneously to centralize executive and fiscal
authorityand to fragment and decentralize administrativeand operating
authorityinto bureaucracieswhich are inherently incapableof formulating,
letalone carry out, possible solutions to the "problems"they are charged
with.This process has blurredthe understandingof political processesfor the
masselectorate; it is now almost literally impossible to understand how
decisionsare made and how they could be made in more rational ways. For
manyvoters, the net result has been cynicism about politicians and with-
drawalfrom participation;for many leaders, cynicism about ignorantvoters
andcareerism; and for social and political movements seeking changes,
frustration
and subsequentdecline.

Muchof contemporarypolitical sociology analyzesthe relationshipsbetween

theeconomy and the state only insofaras they aremediatedthroughpolitical
partieswith particularsocial compositions. This disassociationof economic
frompolitical change is consistent with the absence of any systematic con-
siderationof the content of political demands and the substance of state

12.For a case study which illustratesthese processesin one policy area, see RobertR.
ThePoliticsof Health
Alford, Care(Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,1974).
 327

outputs. Because of the tenuous analytic link between state and economy,
this perspective seriously limits analysis of the emergence of unsatisfied
interests, crisis-producingpolitical demands,differential state responsiveness
to different social groups, and the development and use of nonelectoral
political resourcesby which social groupscan influence policy.

A more comprehensive theory of the state in the context of capitalist

economic development is required which locates political and economic
limitations in the ability of state outputs to reproducestable political rela-
tions among social groups by electorally routinizingthese political relations
through the party structure.It cannot be assumedthat the political relations
among social groups will permit a range of state intervention sufficient to
respond substantively to persistent, salient political demands from dis-
advantagedgroups. Poverty, uneven metropolitan and regional development,
the quality, accessibility and cost of necessary services and commodities,
pollution, and unplannedaccelerationin the consumption of limited natural
resourcesare just a few of the problemslikely to persist unless the state can
be used to transformwhat are now nonpolitical as well as depoliticizedrela-
tions among social groups. Until the limits on the substantiveability of the
state to respond to critical problems are analyzed, their consequences for
future change in the political structureand for electorallycontainingpolitical
relationsamongsocial groupscannot be assessed.

The accretion of state powers and programsmay be insufficient to reproduce

an electoral party structure because nonpolitical relations among social
groups limit the level or structure of expenditures or the quality of state
interventionin the economy. The accumulatedweight of programsand legis-
lation is a responsenot only to politically mobilized social groups,but also to
economic and political crises which are only minimally, if at all, mediated
through partisan politics. Such recently recurrentphenomena as inflation,
recession, the Americancapital and technical invasion of Europe,the energy
crisis, the internationalmonetary crisis, pollution, the Indochina war, and
balance of payments problems may seriously constrain the capacity of the
state to respond substantivelyto the demands of particularsocial groups.
Economic relations may be so structuredthat state intervention,in order to
deal with the politically problematic social costs of these relations, must
reinforce dominant economic groups. The necessity for the state to maintain
"business confidence" in response to recession is indicative of the non-
decisional, systemic power of dominant economic groups. "Nonpolitical"
relationsamongsocial groupsare thus importantsources of political power.It
is in the interest of dominant groups to depoliticize these relationships,to
maintain at least a schizophrenic, ritual distinction between the public and
328

private sectors. It is ironic that today the private sector is publicly main-
tained, while the public sector increasinglyconducts its businessin private.

Developingcontradictions in the economy limit the levels of discretionary

resourcesand maneuverabilityavailable to the state in the allocation of re-
sources among different categories of expenditure. Yet to the extent that
political relations among social groups are contingent upon the continued
deliveryof "political commodities," the development of the economy can
destabilize the party structure and the ability of the political system to
routinizesocial conflicts through peaceful bargainingfor political commodi-
ties.

The movement of the economy may affect political relations among social
groupsin other ways. Most basically, the continuing process may generate
new forms of social organizationor new social groups
(e.g., multi-national
corporations,technocrats) or transform existing social groups (e.g., petit-
bourgeois, small-holding farmers, organized labor in the multi-national
sector),so that their interests and demandscan no longer be accommodated
in the existing party structure. Various ethnic groups in America, women,
homosexuals,foreign immigrantlabor in Europe, the multi-nationalcorpora-
tion, the technocracy, universitystudents, etc., have all emerged as political
actorssince the nation-state "arrived."Also, the inverventionof the state
itself creates new social groups who make politically problematic claims:
welfarerecipients, occupants of public housing, the vast cadre of service
professionals,bureaucraticworkers,soldiers, and students. Whetherexistent
oremerging groups are, or can be, politically incorporatedin the existing
partystructure,whether they use corporatistsocial movementsor other non-
electoralmeans to influence policy or remain quiescent, unsatisfied, and in-
effectual, are questions nearly unanswerable if parties and nations are
regarded as havingreachedthe end-pointof change.

Theboundarybetween the public and the privatesectors, between the polit-

icaland the nonpolitical, is the changingobject of historicalcontention. The
interpenetration between the two must be a pressingsubjectfor criticalanaly-
sis,lest we run the risk of reinforcingthe reificationsof the dominantpoliti-
calcultureand the intereststhey serve.

TheoryandSociety, 1 (1974) 307-328

?ElsevierScientificPublishingCompany,Amsterdam- printed in The Netherlands