Knutsen - Left-Right Self-Placement A Comparative Study PDF

The Partisan and the Value-Based Component of Left-Right Self-Placement: A Comparative
Study
Author(s): Oddbjorn Knutsen
Source: International Political Science Review / Revue internationale de science politique, Vol.
18, No. 2 (Apr., 1997), pp. 191-225
Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601386
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InternationalPolitical ScienceReview (1997), Vol. 18, No. 2, 191-225
The Partisan and the Value-based

Component of Left-Right Self-placement:
A Comparative Study
ODDBJ0RN KNUTSEN
ABSTRACT.This article takes Ronald Inglehart's and Hans-Dieter

Klingemann's (1976) study regarding party and ideological components of
left-right identification as a point of departure for a comparative analysis
of the relationship between party choice, value orientations and left-right
self-placement. The empirical analysis is based on eight and thirteen
countries from 1981 and 1990, respectively. Party choice is still the
dominant predictor of left-right self-placement although its dominance is
not as large as was shown in Inglehart and Klingemann's analysis.
However, if value orientations are considered prior to party choice in a
causal sense, value orientations have a larger impact than party choice in
most countries. Fragmentation of the party system and the division
between advanced and less advanced societies are used to explain the
cross-national variations. When the explained variance in the left-right
scale is decomposed into unique components explained by party choice and
value orientations and a compounded component, a strong compounded
component is characteristic in advanced societies, while a strong partisan
component is found in less advanced societies and in less fragmented party
systems.
Value Orientations, Party Choice and Left-Right Identity

Introduction
In a seminal article, Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) advanced the view that the
left-right dimension has a partisanship component as well as an ideological compo-
nent made up of value orientations and current political issues. They argued that
0192-5121(1997/02) 18:2, 191-35 ? 1997InternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation

SAGEPublications(London,ThousandOaks,cA and New Delhi)
192 ThePartisanand the Value-based A Comparative
Component: Study
party identification as the more concrete and close-to-home cue would normally be
used for an evaluation of politics, and hence this component would outweigh the
ideological one of left-right self-placement. It is the political parties' stand on issues
that first and foremost defines their programmatic image and consequently the
mass public's perception of the parties along the left-right continuum; neverthe-
less, individuals may recognize and use ideological labels in connection with politi-
cal parties without knowing or considering the implications of such concepts for
their own issue positions. If a respondent feels close to a given party and knows
that people say it is located on, for example, the extreme or moderate left, he or
she might decide to place himself or herself accordingly.Partisan loyalties may then
lead members of the public to adopt ideological labels for themselves that are
unrelated to their issue position. This means that the left-right terminology has a
major component based on party loyalty, which is more or less unrelated to issue
or value positions (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976: 244-245).
Inglehart and Klingemann's principal finding was that among European mass
publics, an individual's sense of belonging to the left or right reflected party affil-
iations more than issue preference or value orientations. Thus, the partisan compo-
nent emerged as stronger than the ideological component (Inglehart and
Klingemann, 1976: 260). Since the former component was shown to be almost
equally strong across all strata of political cognition, they concluded that the parti-
san component also reflected conventionally cultural given labels, in addition to the
parties' position on current issues (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976: 269).
Inglehart and Klingemann's comparative research has been followed up only to
a very small degree. There are at least three arguments in favour of carrying out
new research regarding the partisan and value-based components of left-right self-
placement: (1) Their data were from 1973, and longitudinal data which include
more recent points in time may reveal changes in the absolute and relative level of
these components. (2) Inglehart and Klingemann use only one set of value orien-
tations to determine the value-based component, tapping "socioeconomicand polit-
ical equality"versus "emphasis on preserving the hierarchical order" (Inglehart and
Klingemann, 1976: 258). Furthermore, their empirical measure was based on a
single indicator. A more complex model of the value-based component composed of
several value orientations, each measured by multiple indicators, may prove to be
more relevant for tapping the total impact of this component. (3) They used only
bivariate analysis to examine the impact of the two components. Multivariate analy-
sis might provide an important insight into the relationship and relative importance
of the two components.
This article follows up Inglehart and Klingemann's research by examining the
impact of the two components (partisan and ideological) in a comparative and in
part a longitudinal perspective, by enlarging the value orientations used to measure
the ideological or value-based component, and by using multivariate analysis. It will
examine the impact of the two components in the following way: First, various
aspects of the value-based and the partisan components are discussed theoretically,
as well as how these components are operationalized. Some macrostructural
variables are introduced to explain the cross-national differences found in.the value-
based and the partisan components. This empirical analysis is organized in three
parts: first, the strength of the two components of the left-right scale is examined
at the bivariate level, then the two components are examined in multivariate analy-
sis based on two different causal models; finally, the article examines the relation-
ship between the separate value orientations, party choice and the left-right scale.
ODDBJ0RNKNUTSEN 193
Unfortunately, questions that will produce indicators for the relevant value orien-
tations are rarely asked in the various comparative surveys, and the three sets of
value orientations that will comprise our value-based component have very seldom
been uncovered in the same surveys, which would be necessary to carry out multi-
variate analysis, so the analysis will be based on two data sets. One is the
Eurobarometer from 1981 (Eurobarometer No. 16, hereafter EB 16), and the other
is the second wave of the European Values Survey from 1990 (hereafter EVSII).
These data sets are the only comparative data sets that contain valid indicators for
all value orientations included in this model of the value-based component. The
indicators for the value orientations are, however, not the same in these two data
sets. Consequently, it is difficult to make inferences regarding development over
time. The reason for using two different data sets is to test the consistency of the
empirical findings with somewhat different operationalizations of the value orien-
tations and with a time-span of nine years. The analysis will use data from EB 16
for eight countries: Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy and
the Netherlands. The EVS data sets contain data for the same eight countries in
addition to data from Iceland, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Portugal. These countries
will also be included in the analysis based on these data.'
The Value Model

Inglehart and Klingemann (1976: 259) used a very simple measure to tap the mass
public's ideological orientations, based on four of the 12 items in the well-known
battery for materialist/post-materialist values. These values were, however, identi-
fied as values which focused on "support for socioeconomic and political equality"
versus values emphasizing the preservation of "the hierarchical order," and these
value opposites were labelled "an indicator of a key ideological theme involved in
the left-right dimension." Indeed, they tap physical security values related to law
and order and stronger measures against crime versus participatory values.2 These
values are then among the central materialist/post-materialist values. Inglehart and
Klingemann (1976: 257-258) assumed that the relevance of economic equality had
become less salient for left-right self-placement, but they did not test this assump-
tion.
Their empirical findings indicated that the left-right dimension did have a signif-
icant ideological component in each of the West European countries, but the corre-
lations with partisanship were at least twice as large as the correlations with the
ideological indicator, and in some instances the ratio was considerably higher. The
authors admitted that the ideological index they had used was a rough measure,
and that more broad-based measures, including nation-specific indices, would
produce higher correlations, but hinted that "it seems extremely doubtful that the
strength of this relationship would compare with that of party preference in the
European countries" (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976: 260).
This article takes a broader approach to the value orientations that may be
relevant for left-right identity. This approach is outlined in another work (Knutsen,
1995a), and I focus only upon certain central aspects of it here. My approach takes
a developmental perspective as a point of departure for deriving political values
which may be important determinants of left-right self-placement. In their seminal
article on the development of party systems in Western Europe, Seymour Martin
Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967) argued that the central political conflict lines in
the 1960s were the consequence of both national and the industrial revolutions.
Component: Study
These conflict lines have traditionally been considered to be structural cleavages

based on characteristics such as social class and religion. There are, however,
central sets of political value orientations which can be associated with both
national and the industrial revolutions. The dynamics of these sets of orientations
are poorly understood.
Religious/secularvalues are a decisive conflict line emerging from the national
revolution that might have been an important determinant of left-right identifica-
tion, and may even continue to influence left-right identification strongly today.
The Industrial Revolution gave rise to left-rightmaterialism,a central political value
orientation which has become of great importance in industrial society. Leftist
versus rightist materialist political value orientations incorporate value conflicts
related to control and power in the sphere of production, and to degrees of redis-
tribution in the sphere of distribution. These opposing value orientations include
worker control and state regulation of the economy versus emphasis on private
enterprise and the market economy, emphasis on economic and social equality
versus the need for differentiated rewards for stimulating efforts, etc. The political
values of left-right materialism are economicin nature, and refer in particular to the
conflict related to the role of government in creating greater economicequality in
society (Lafferty and Knutsen, 1984; Knutsen, 1995c).
The third set of value orientations which will be incorporatedinto our value-based
value orientation.According to the "new politics"
model is the materialist/post-materialist
theory, value change along the materialist/post-materialist dimension has produced
a new and increasingly important value conflict, one which will have an impact on
such dependent variables as party preference, political action, political attitudes and
left-right identification. The theories regarding the increasing relevance of materi-
alist/post-materialist value orientations have primarily been formulated by Ronald
Inglehart, who has also formulated a hypothesis of the increased relevance of materi-
alist/post-materialist value orientations for left-right identification. According to
Inglehart's theory, instead of being aligned with the traditional industrial left-right
groups and political issues and values, "left" and "right" will increasingly denote the
new polarization axis. Thus, "right" will become associated with materialist values,
while "left" will become associated with post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1990: 289).
In keeping with my theoretical perspective, I have included threesets of value orien-
tations in my study. These are religious/secular, left/right materialist and material-
ist/post-materialist, representing the central "pre-industrial," "industrial" and
"post-industrial" value orientations which may be important for left-right identifi-
cation. The indicators used to tap these three sets of value orientations are not
consistent in the two data sets. The various data and measures are discussed below;
Appendix 1 outlines the questions, formulas and construction of indices.
For tapping religious values church attendance is used in EB 16, since no direct
measure of religiosity is available in that survey. Recent research carried out by
Wolfgang Jagodzinski and Karel Dobbelaere (1995: 87-90) has shown very strong
correlations between church attendance and more direct measures of religiosity. On
the basis of European Value Surveys (I and II) they find that the correlations vary
between .41 and .73 in different countries. This is a magnitude very rare in survey
research and because of these strong correlations it is justifiable to use frequency
of church attendance as a measure of religious versus secular values. In EVS II I use
a ten-point scale on the importance of God in the respondent's life. This is a more
direct measure of religiosity, and one which taps religious values best Jagodzinski
and Dobbelaere, 1995: 87).
ODDBJ0RN KNUTSEN 195
There are very few comparative data sets that contain indicators for left-right
materialist orientation. The fact that only two data sets have been used for this
study is mainly due to a lack of indicators for this value orientation in other data
sets. We do not have identical indicators over time. Such indicators are found in
data sets from only two points in time: three EB surveys from around 1980 (includ-
ing EB 16) and EVSII. The validity and constraints of these indicators are discussed
in a comparative setting in Knutsen (1995c). Strictly speaking, the impact of
left-right materialist orientation on the self-placement scale cannot be analysed
over time, but the impact of these value orientations can be analysed in a compar-
ative setting and compared with the other orientations at the same points in time.
For tapping materialist/post-materialist values the 12-item battery developed by
Ronald Inglehart is used in EVS II; for EB 16 an index based on four other items
which tap New Politics or materialist/post-materialist value orientations is relied
on.
A detailed analysis of value orientations and left-right identification has been
presented elsewhere (Knutsen, 1995a). That article could use a broader data base
because it analysed the correlation between each value orientation and party choice
over time separately. It was thus not necessary to have indicators for all the value
orientations present in the same surveys.
As a measure of left-right identification the ten-point left-right self-placement
scale is used (see Appendix 1). This has proved to be a valid and reliable measure
of left-right identification, and is identical to that used by Inglehart and
Klingemann in their article based on the 1973 European Community Study
(Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976: 247-248).
The Partisan Component

There are several interesting substantive features about the relationship between
party choice and left-right self-placement and more technical aspects related to
how to measure that relationship. Here I briefly focus on how to measure the
strength of the partisan component, and how to deal with respondents who lack a
party choice when measuring the partisan component.
The strength of the partisan component can be measured in different ways
(Knutsen, 1996). To focus on the relative impact of the partisan and the value-
based component, I use standardized coefficients, more precisely eta-coefficients.
The eta-coefficient from variance analysis is a standardized coefficient which varies
from 0.00 to 1.00. It corresponds exactly to the r-coefficient when the categories on
the party choice variable are given the mean score on the self-placement scale, as
Inglehart and Klingemann do in their article (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976:
256).
A strong partisan component in left-right identity is indeed based on the assump-
tion that most people have a party they feel close to, identify with or at least vote
for. If only a small portion of the electorate have a party choice, it means that a
large segment of the population does not have a party choice to guide their place-
ment on the left-right scale. Inglehart and Klingemann (1976) eliminated all
respondents in the samples who did not indicate a party choice, thereby excluding
a group who have a left-right identification, but who do not vote for any specific
party. I have chosen to include this category. Excluding this group might inflate the
partisan component, since the calculation would then be based exclusively on the
portion of the mass public that has a specific party preference to steer its left-right
Component: Study
identity. This could also mean that respondents having a value orientation and a
left-right identity, but no party choice, would have to be excluded from the multi-
variate analysis.
Explainingthe Cross-National
Variation.
Indicatorsof PartySystemand theDivision
betweenLessAdvancedandAdvancedIndustrialSocieties
The cross-national variation in the impact of the value-based and the partisan
components will be explained by means of characteristics of the party systems and
the division between advanced and less advanced industrial societies.
The measure for the number of parties is the effectivenumberof parties,calculated
on the basis of the support for the various parties in the two surveys. The number
of effective parties is a good measure of the degree of fragmentation in the party
system. These figures are shown in Appendix 2; the number of effective parties varies
from 2.5 in Germany and Ireland to 5.0 in Belgium in the 1981 data set, and from
2.8-2.9 in Britain, Germany and Ireland to 5.3 in Denmark in the 1990 data set.
The three macro-structuralvariables tap central aspects of the division between
advanced/less advanced industrial societies, or typical industrial and post-industrial
societies. These three measures are GDP per capita, employment in services as a
percentage of civilian employment and "current disbursement of government per
capita."
GDPper capitareflects the wealth aspect of the transformationfrom a less
advancedto an advancedstage.
in servicesindicates thesize of theservicesector,and the size of the service
Employment
sector is considereda central aspect of the transitionfrom an industrialto a
post-industrialsociety(Bell, 1973:chap.2).
Disbursement is a technicalconceptthat coversall types of public
of government
expenditureor costsof runningvariouspublicpolicyprogrammes.Disbursement
of governmentis usedas a measureof the size of the publicsectoror the welfare
state, broadlyspeaking.It has been chosenbecauseit includesservicesas well
as income maintenance,while other relevantmeasures3tap only one of these
main typesof welfarepolicies.
The values of the three measures are displayed in Appendix 2, which also
presents the correlations between these macrostructural variables, and the corre-
lations between these variables and the number of effective parties. There is a clear
tendency for these macrostructural variables to be correlated, but the correlations
between them are not perfect: .56-.71, with one exception. The number of effec-
tive parties and the macro-structuralvariables are also highly positively correlated
(.55-.78, with one exception). The more advanced societies have the largest
numbers of effective parties.
These macrostructural variables and the number of effective parties will be used
as explanatory variables for the cross-national findings. A statistical method will
be employed, more specifically correlation analysis with the country as a unit in
the analysis. These variables are correlated with various figures from the compar-
ative individual-level analysis of the partisan and the value-based component. The
correlation analysis is based on few cases (8 and 13 in 1981 and 1990, respectively).
I present information as to whether the correlations are statistically significant,
but I consider coefficients of at least .30-.40 to be important even if they are not
statistically significant, since the statistically significant test in the traditional
ODDBJ0RNKNUTSEN 197
sense is not entirely appropriate. For all correlations, I have examined the scatter-
plots and dropped outliers. The outliers are reported in the tables. For the sake
of comparison, two correlation coefficients for EVS II are presented, one based on
the same eight countries as in EB 16, and one based on all 13 countries.
Bivariate Analysis: The Partisan and the Value-based Components

Compared
Hypotheses
Inglehart and Klingemann (1976: 261) argued that an ideological understanding of
the left-right dimension demands relatively great cognitive effort, in contrast to
the partisan component which reflects conventional political labels. The ideological
component would therefore be particularly strong among the more highly educated
and among those with a high level of political cognition. This was strongly
confirmed by their empirical analysis based on individual data (Inglehart and
Klingemann, 1976: 262-264).
The comparative strength of the ideological component will be related to socio-
economic development along the advanced/less-advanced society division. According
to Inglehart and Klingemann's reasoning the strength of the ideological component
of left-right identity can be connected to the process of cognitive mobilization, a
term that refers to the processes by which electors come to "possess the level of
political skills and resources necessary to become self-sufficient in politics" (Dalton
1988: 18). Low levels of education and the type of political information common to
industrial society mean that the average elector relies on social and party cues-
"external mobilization"-to enable him to deal with the complexities of politics; in
typical industrial societies the mass publics rely on party identification for their
left-right identification and on affiliation with a particular social group for their
party choice. With the rise in education, especially at the university level, citizens
become more politically sophisticated; with increased access to political informa-
tion, publics become better informed. At the macrostructural level these processes
mean that the mass publics in advanced societies will rely more on value orienta-
tions when choosing a political party and left-right identification, than publics in
the less-advanced societies. Cognitive mobilization is thus a function of advanced
industrial or post-industrial society (Inglehart, 1990: 336-347), and it may be
hypothesized that the value-based component will be stronger in advanced indus-
trial societies than in less-advanced societies.
As to the partisan component, it is natural to expect that the nature of the party
system will be important. A multiparty system implies that each party has a
perceived location on the left-right continuum, and given that the conventional
labelling of parties is quite constant in a given political culture, party voters can be
expected to place themselves very close to each other. In a multi-party system party
choice will more consistently direct people to have a specific left-right location than
in a two-party system. Thus, the partisan cue will be strongest in party systems with
a high number of effective parties.
Empirical Analysis
Inglehart and Klingemann (1976: 260) found that the partisan component was
stronger than the value-based or ideological component in all eleven countries they
Component: Study
examined. Based on bivariate correlation analysis, they found that the partisan
component was at least twice as large as the correlations with the value indicator.
Table 1 shows the impact of party choice (a) and value orientations (b) on the self-
placement scale in a comparative setting in the two data sets. This has been done by
examining the explained variance from two types of analysis: regression analysis
where the three sets of value orientations are regressed on the self-placement scale,
TABLE1. ExplainedVariancein theLeft-RightSelf-placement

Scale byPartyChoiceand Value
Orientations.
1981 1990 Average
(a) Party choice:

France 49.2 (1) 43.8 (1) 46.5
Netherlands 45.2 (3) 42.8 (2) 44.0
Denmark 43.4 (4) 41.6 (3) 42.5
Italy 47.5 (2) 31.8 (4) 39.7
Germany 26.8 (6) 30.6 (5) 28.7
Britain 19.3 (7) 27.3 (6) 23.3
Belgium 20.9 (5) 17.8 (7) 19.4
Ireland 8.3 (8) 8.7 (8) 8.5
Iceland 48.4
Spain 46.4
Sweden 44.6
Norway 35.7
Portugal 30.3
Average:
8 countries 32.6 30.6
13 countries 34.6
(b) Value orientations:

Netherlands 28.1 (1) 33.3 (1) 30.8
Denmark 27.5 (2) 30.0 (2) 28.8
France 24.6 (3) 23.4 (3) 24.0
Germany 19.5 (5) 21.6 (4) 20.6
Italy 22.0 (4) 19.2 (5) 20.6
Belgium 16.8 (6) 13.2 (7) 15.0
Britain 11.5 (7) 18.3 (6) 14.9
Ireland 3.7 (8) 14.3 (8) 9.0
Sweden 27.5
Norway 23.1
Iceland 23.1
Spain 22.9
Portugal 9.0
Average:
8 countries 19.2 21.7
13 countries 21.5
Note. The figures in parentheses are the rankings of the eight countries according to the strength of the partisan
and value-based components. The ordering of the eight countries in the table is done according to the average
strength of the partisan and the value-based component, respectively.
ODDBJ0RNKNUTSEN 199
and a one-way analysis of variance/MCA-analysis with party choice as an independent

variable and the self-placement scale as the dependent variable. The impact of each
component is calculated without controlling for the other. In this table and all other
tables below, the partisan component is estimated by taking those without a party
choice into account. In the Appendix table the average placement of party voters for
each party in all countries is displayed for 13 countries based on EVSII. That table
also displays the eta-coefficients where respondents without a party choice have been
both included and excluded.
First, I comment on the impact of each component in a comparative setting, and
then go on to comment on the relative impact of the two components.
With regard to the partisan component, the ranking of the eight countries in EVS
II is very similar to the ranking based on the 1981 data set. The partisan compo-
nent is largest in France, the Netherlands, Denmark and Italy, considerably weaker
in Germany, Britain and Belgium, and decisively smallest in Ireland. The only
significant changes in the strength of the partisan component from 1981 to 1990
are the large decline in the partisan component in Italy, and a considerably smaller
increase in Britain. The explained variance of the partisan component in four of
the five additional countries is substantial. In fact, three of these countries are
ranked in the three first positions if we rank all 13 countries in 1990 (Iceland, Spain
and Sweden). See Table 2 for a complete ranking of all 13 countries.
Table l(b) indicates that there is also substantial variation in the value-based
component. Of the eight countries from which there are two data sets, the impact
of values on the self-placement scale is largest in the Netherlands and Denmark,
and lowest in Belgium, Britain and Ireland, placing France, Germany and Italy in
a middle position. Of the five additional countries, four can placed in the middle
group and Portugal can definitely be grouped in the category where the impact of
the value-based component is low.
Table 2 calculates the size of each component by simply dividing the value-
based component by the partisan component. It is evident that the partisan
component is considerably larger than the value-based component. In the 1981
data set the partisan component is largest in all eight countries and the same
applies to twelve of the thirteen countries in 1990. Only in Ireland is the value-
based component larger, and this deviant case has to do with the fact that the
partisan component is very low. This indicates that Ireland is an outlier in a
comparative analysis of the relative importance of the two components. The range
of these proportions is indeed quite small for the other countries: In 1981 the
value-based component makes up from 0.45 to 0.80 of the partisan component. In
1990 the variation is smaller if the Irish case is omitted (0.53-0.78), but the lower
end of that range increases to 0.30 when the five additional countries are
included. If the deviant Irish case is excluded and only the countries from which
there are two data sets are compared, the value-based component's relative
importance is highest in Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands in
both surveys, followed by Britain, and lowest in Italy and France. The proportion
as regards ranking of the strength of each of the two components is high in very
dissimilar countries. Some countries rank high not because the value-based
component is particularly strong comparatively speaking, but because the parti-
san component is weak (Belgium and Germany in both surveys, and Ireland in
EVS II); other countries rank low because the partisan component is very strong
(Italy and France in particular, but also Iceland and Spain among the countries
with data from only 1990).
Component: Study
TABLE 2. ExplainedVariancein theLeft-RightSelf-placement

Scale byPartyChoiceand Value
Orientations
Compared.
Party choice Value Proportion value orientation/

orientations party choice
(a) 1981:
Belgium 20.9 (6) 16.8 (6) 0.80
Germany 26.8 (5) 19.5 (5) 0.73
Denmark 43.4 (4) 27.5 (2) 0.63
Netherlands 45.2 (3) 28.1 (1) 0.62
Britain 19.3 (7) 11.5 (7) 0.60
France 49.2 (1) 24.6 (3) 0.50
Italy 47.5 (2) 22.0 (4) 0.46
Ireland 8.3 (8) 3.7 (8) 0.45
Average 32.6 19.2 0.59
(b) 1990:
Ireland 8.7 (13) 14.3 (11) 1.64
Netherlands 42.8 (5) 33.3 (1) 0.78
Belgium 17.8 (12) 13.2 (12) 0.74
Denmark 41.6 (6) 30.0 (2) 0.72
Germany 30.6 (9) 21.6 (8) 0.71
Britain 27.3 (11) 18.3 (10) 0.67
Italy 31.8 (8) 19.2 (9) 0.60
France 43.8 (4) 23.4 (4) 0.53
Norway 35.7 (7) 23.1 (5) 0.65
Sweden 44.6 (3) 27.5 (3) 0.62
Spain 46.4 (2) 22.9 (7) 0.49
Iceland 48.4 (1) 23.1 (5) 0.48
Portugal 30.3 (10) 9.0 (13) 0.30
Average:
8 countries 30.6 21.7 0.71
13 countries 34.6 21.5 0.62
Note.Figuresin parenthesesare the rankingsof countrieson the basisof the explainedvarianceof

each component.
Countriesare rankedon the basisof the proportionof explainedvarianceof the valueorientations
dividedby the explainedvarianceof partychoice.
Generally, then, the partisan component is larger than the impact of the three
sets of value orientations; Inglehart and Klingemann's basic insight holds true.
However, the difference between the impact of the two components is not that
large: from the bottom of the two tables in which average figures are calculated, it
can be seen that in percentage terms of the explained variance of the partisan
component, the average explained variances for value orientations are 59% in 1981,
71% for eight countries and 62% for thirteen countries in 1990.
Compared to the findings by Inglehart and Klingemann, the impact of the value-
based component is higher in the two data sets examined here. All of the eight
countries from which there are data in 1981 and 1990 were among the 11 countries
of their study; their results from these eight countries are compared below with the
corresponding results from 1981 and 1990.
The r correlation between party choice and left-right identity in Inglehart and
Klingemann's data varied from .54 to .78 in seven of the eight countries, and was
considerably lower in Ireland (.19), while the corresponding correlation for the
value-based component (based on their single item indicator) varied from .20 to .35
for six countries and was considerably lower in Belgium and Ireland (0.10-0.12)
(Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976: 256, 259; Tables 13.4 and 13.5). Based on these
figures the value-based component was 0.30-0.50 of the partisan component in six
of eight countries, somewhat larger in Ireland (0.63) and lower in Belgium (0.19).
The average proportion is 0.39. These proportions are based on correlation coeffi-
cients, not explained variance as in Tables 1 and 2 for the 1981 and 1990 data, and
consequently cannot be compared. To obtain an equivalent measure to those in
Table 2, the correlation coefficients must be squared, which increases the impact
of the partisan component relatively more than the value-based component. The
proportion of the value-based component varies now between 0.10 to 0.25 for six of
the countries, with Belgium (0.03) and Ireland (0.40) as somewhat deviant cases.
The average proportion is 0.16, much lower than the results presented in Table 2.
How do these findings fit the hypotheses formulated above? Table 3 shows the
results for the correlation analysis based on the figures in Table 1 and 2, as well
as the number of effective parties and the macro-structural variables that measure
the less-advanced/advanced society continuum.
The correlations between these variables and the size of the partisan and value-
based components show strong positive correlations, but these are somewhat incon-
clusive with regard to the given hypotheses. The size of the partisan and the
value-based components are quite strongly positively related to the number of
TABLE3. Correlations
(r) betweenthePartisanand the Value-based
Component
of Left-Right
Dimension,and the Numberof EffectivePartiesand Macro-structural
Variables.
Number of GDP per Size of Disbursement

effective capita service of government
parties sector
Size of partisancomponent:
1981 .84a*** .74d** .13 .22
1990 (8) .51 .70** .36 .40
1990 (13) .41 .41 .13 .03
Size of value-basedcomponent:
1981 .64* .66* .37 .43
1990 (8) .48 .53 .34 .47
1990 (13) .60** .66*** .54** .44
Value-based/partisan components:
1981 .64b* .66* .53 .31
1990 (8) .07c .06c .41c .37c
1990 (13) .43c .61c** .79c*** .62c**
Significant at: ***1% level; **5% level; *10% level.

aOutlier: Belgium; bOutlier: Germany; cOutlier: Ireland; dOutlier: Italy.
Note. The size of the partisan and the value-based component is the explained variance reported in
Table 1 and 2. The "value-based component/partisan component" is the ratio reported in Table 2.
Component: Study
parties and the GDP per capita, and there are no clear differences between the
strength of these correlations that would indicate that the number of parties is
more highly correlated with the partisan component and the GDP per capita with
the value-based component. The same can be said about the correlations with the
ratio of the value-based component/partisan component. When outliers are removed
(that is, with one exception, the Irish case), the value-based component is relatively
stronger than the partisan component in advanced societies, but also in countries
with a high number of effective parties, and these correlations are very similar.4Of
the three macro-structuralvariables, GDP per capita is most strongly correlated with
the three measures apart from the ratio of the value-based component/partisan
component in the 1990 data set.
A strong party component and a strong value-based component are then both
associated with advanced industrial societies and a high number of parties, but
when the relative strength of these components is examined, a relatively strong
value-based component is found in the advanced societies and in party systems with
a high number of effective parties.
Multivariate Analysis: The Unique and Compounded Components of

Value Orientations and Party Choice
CompetingCausal Models
Inglehart and Klingemann's analyses were based on bivariate analysis; they did not
control for the partisan component when they examined the impact of the value-
based component, or vice versa. However, they expected the partisan component to
have a significant effect on left-right identity when value orientations were
controlled for, when they argued that individuals may recognize and use ideologi-
cal labels in connection with political parties without knowing or considering the
implications of such concepts for their own issue positions. Partisan loyalties may
lead members of the public to adopt ideological labels for themselves that are, in
fact, unrelated to their issue position (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976: 244). The
opposite possibility, that value orientations should have significant impact when
partisanship is controlled for, was not explicitly discussed.
However, in an analysis based on Eurobarometer data from the eight countries
for which there are data from both 1981 and 1990, John Huber (1989: 611-617)
examined the impact of political issues and partisanship in a multivariate analysis.
Huber's measure of the ideological component included 12 items, tapping both
economic left-right issues and new politics non-economic issues. After controlling
for party choice, Huber's conclusion was that the "data show that issues are a signif-
icant component of left-right self-placement in all countries" (Huber 1989: 614),
and that "the partisanship component does not generally dominate the issues
component of left-right scale" (Huber 1989: 617). Since Huber used unstandard-
ized coefficients, not standardized coefficients that indicate the relative importance
of different variables, it was, however, difficult to draw conclusions about the
relative strength of the two components.
In examining the dynamics of the two determinants of left-right identity-parti-
san and value orientations-it is not satisfactory to rely on bivariate analysis as
Inglehart and Klingemann did. Value orientations and party choice are quite strongly
correlated with each other, and a substantial part of the bivariate correlations and
explained variance in the left-right scale accounted for by each component could be
Model1. Ambiguous
relationship
Valueorientations
__ __ _ Left-right
self-placement
I
Partychoice
priorto partychoice
Model2. Valueorientations
Value orientations -----
Value#orientations- "-- ;-' self-placement

Left-right
Partychoice
FIGURE1. TwoAlternativeCausalModelsfor theRelationshipbetweenParty Choice,Value
Orientationsand Left-Right Self-placement.
compounded with the other component. To be able to probe further into the relation-
ship it is necessary to determine the causal relationship between the value-based
component and the partisan component. Which of them is a prior variable in a causal
sense? From the perspective of political conflict lines it can be argued that value orien-
tations determine party choice (Inglehart 1977: chaps. 7-9; 1984; 1990: 258-264;
Knutsen 1995b; 1995d). This is the underlying causal model for using value orienta-
tions as a species of conflict lines that have an impact upon party choice, and is based
on the assumption that value orientations are established before party identification
and choice in individual belief systems. It might, however, also be argued that the
causal relationship is uncertain or ambiguous. Both value orientations and party
choice are basic political beliefs that are founded quite early in people's lives.5 The
two models are shown in Figure 1.
MCA Analysis
Before the relative importance of the two independent variables is analysed accord-
ing to the two models, a brief overview is presented of the full analysis upon which
the test of the models is based. Table 4 presents the results from two related types
of analyses. These are regression analysis, where the three sets of value orienta-
tions are regressed on the self-placement scale, and MCAanalysis, which includes
these three sets of orientations as well as party choice. The three sets of value orien-
tations are included as covariates in the latter analysis, which means that they are
treated as interval level variables, that is, in the same way as independent variables
in regression analysis. Party choice is treated as a nominal-level variable (called a
factor variable in analysis of variance). The first step (beta 1) gives the results from
the regression analysis of the three sets of value orientations, while the second step
(beta 2) gives the results from the MCAanalysis where party choice is included in
Component: Study
4. Left-RightSelf-placement,
TABLE and thePartisanComponent.
ValueOrientations
r/eta beta 1 beta 2 r/eta beta 1 beta 2
Belgium EB 16 (N = 725) EVSII (N = 1980)

Religious values .35 .33 .22 .27 .27 .20
LRM .15 .13 .09 .22 .21 .13
MPM .19 .17 .14 .16 .11 .08
Party choice .46 .36 .42 .34
R2 .168 .278 .132 .239
Britain EB 16 (N = 945) EVSII (N = 1344)
LRM .22 .21 .11 .36 .29 .13
MPM .26 .25 .17 .31 .22 .15
Party choice .44 .38 .52 .42
R2 .115 .246 .183 .324
Denmark EB 16 (N = 699) EVSII (N = 934)
Religious values (.03) (.00) (.03) 16 .10 (.05)
LRM .42 .31 .10 .48 .38 .17
MPM .44 .34 .17 .40 .26 .15
Party choice .66 .53 .65 .49
R2 .275 .476 .300 .464
France EB 16 (N = 885) EVSII (N = 792)
LRM .40 .34 .11 .37 .32 .15
MPM .32 .23 .11 .27 .19 .11
Party choice .70 .61 .66 .56
R2 .246 .516 .234 .495
Germany EB 16 (N = 835) EVSII (N = 1846)
LRM .13 .10 (.04) .30 .21 .14
MPM .33 .28 .18 .37 .32 .19
Party choice .52 .41 .55 .43
R2 .195 .335 .216 .370
Ireland EB 16 (N = 822) EVSII (N = 898)
LRM (.04) (.06) (.05) .19 .17 .14
MPM .10 .12 .10 .18 .13 .10
Party choice .29 .26 .30 .21
R2 .037 .103 .143 .184
Italy EB 16 (N = 893) EVSII (N = 1514)
Religious values .20 .17 (.05) .29 .27 .16
LRM .23 .20 .09 .29 .27 .17
MPM .39 .36 .18 .25 .15 .12
Party choice .69 .60 .56 .47
R2 .220 .508 .192 .386
Netherlands EB 16 (N = 950) EVS II (N = 930)
LRM .29 .20 .06 .35 .26 .12
MPM .39 .28 .12 .41 .30 .15
ODDBJ0RNKNUTSEN 205
TABLE4. (Continued)
r/eta beta 1 beta 2 r/eta beta 1 beta 2
Party choice .67 .55 .65 .48

R2 .281 .481 .333 .492
Only EVSII
Iceland (N = 648) Norway (N = 1141)
Religious values .10 .07 (.05) .12 .10 .09
LRM .46 .43 .21 .43 .39 .20
MPM .24 .11 (.02) .29 .19 .14
Party choice .70 .60 .60 .48
R2 .231 .524 R2 .231 .422
Sweden (N = 935) Portugal (N = 1076)
LRM .49 .46 .24 .18 .19 .08
MPM .24 .15 .10 .13 .07 (.04)
Party choice .67 .54 .55 .51
R2 .275 .507 R2 .090 .324
Spain (N = 1998)
Religious values .34 .27 .14
LRM .36 .30 .14
MPM .25 .12 .07
Party choice .68 .58
R2 .229 .511
Abbreviations: LRM= left-right materialist value orientations; MPM = materialist/post-materialist

value orientations.
Note. The figures under r/eta are r for value orientations and eta for party choice. Figures in
parentheses are not significant at the 1%level.
addition to the three sets of value orientations. The R2 for the first step in the
analyses is identical to the explained variance for value orientations in Tables 1 and
2, and if the eta-coefficients for party choice in Table 4 are squared they are identi-
cal to the explained variance of the partisan component in Tables 1 and 2.
Table 4 provides three types of information regarding the three sets of value
orientations: (1) the bivariate correlations between each value orientation and party
choice on the one hand and the self-placement scale on the other, (2) the effects
of each value orientation controlled for the other value orientations (the first step
of the analysis [beta 1]), and (3) the impact of each value orientation and party
choice when all the other independent variables in the model are controlled for in
the second step (beta 2).
The table provides information about which of the value orientations are the most
important for determining left-right self-placement in each country. The relative
importance of each set of value orientations changes little from the bivariate analy-
sis (r) to the analysis when the other value orientations are controlled for in the first
step (beta 1). There is no significant tendency for any of the value orientations to
become relatively less salient than any of the others, when the reduction of the coeffi-
cients from the bivariate cases (r) to the controlled effects (betas) is systematically
206 The Partisan and the Value-basedComponent:A ComparativeStudy
compared (Knutsen 1995a). Although there are some variations for the two surveys,
the following main patterns emerge:
- In several countries left-right materialist values are the most important.
This applies to Britain, France and the four Nordic countries (Denmark,
Iceland, Norway and Sweden).
-In two countries, Belgium and Ireland, religious/secular values are clearly
the most important, and in Spain and Portugal religious/secular and
left-right materialist values are of close to equal importance.
-Germany is the only country in which materialist/post-materialist values are
most important (in the 1990 data set, and of equal importance with
religious/secular values in 1981), while in the Netherlands materialist/post-
materialist and religious/secular values are of about equal importance.
-The results for Italy are difficult to fit into any pattern because there is much
more change in the relative impact of value orientation in Italy than in any
of the other countries.
Changes from step 1 to step 2 in the relative importance of the value orienta-
tions are analysed more specifically in the next section.
Analysis of Variance
The problem with using the coefficients on the importance of the independent
variables from Table 4 to test the relative importance of party choice and value
orientations on left-right identity is that they do not provide any overall measure
of the impact of the three sets of value orientations, only coefficients for each
of the three value orientations. In order to examine the importance of the two
types of variables, analysis of variance is used, which decomposes the total
explained variance in the left-right scale into three components, one unique for
value orientations and party choice, respectively, and one a compound of the two
types of variables, representing the variance they explain jointly in the left-right
Uniquevalue Compounded Unique Value Partisan

component component partisan component component
component
A. Decompositionbased on the unique B. Decompositionbased on the assumptionthat
components(classicalexperimentaldesign) value orientationsare priorto partychoice
decomposition)
(hierarchical
FIGURE2. Decompositionof VarianceAccording to Models 1 and 2 in Figure 1.

scale because party choice and value orientations are correlated with each other.
The decomposition according to the two models is illustrated in Figures 2(a) and
2(b).
In Figure 2(a) the unique explained variance alone is ascribed to each of the two
types of variables and the compounded variance is ascribed to none of the variables.
In Figure 2(b), all variance explained by value orientations in the left-right scale
is ascribed to value orientations, while the variance ascribed to party choice
comprises only the variance that party choice explains in addition to value orien-
tations. These two principles for decomposition of variance are called classical
experimental design and hierarchical decomposition, respectively, and correspond
to the causal models in Figure 1. Classical experimental design corresponds to the
first model, where the causal relationship between the two variables is considered
ambiguous, while hierarchical decomposition corresponds to the second model,
where value orientations are considered prior to party choice.
Hypotheses
Analysis of variance decomposes the explained variance in the left-right scale into
three components, one of which is a compound of the two types of variables. From
the two causal models the relative impact of the two components, value orientations
and partisanship, can be examined; our hypotheses and empirical analysis apply to
both these aspects.
As to the relative importance of the three components, the compounded effect
of values and party choice is expected to be relatively largest in the most advanced
societies. According to the New Politics theory there is a change in conflict lines
from "class-based to value based" conflicts, and value orientations are expected to
be more important predictors for party choice in advanced industrial societies. This
hypothesis is supported empirically: In a comparative study of 13 countries value
orientations had the strongest effect on party choice in the more advanced societies
(Knutsen 1995b: 47-48, 61). Cognitive mobilization in advanced societies has
induced people to vote for parties according to their values, and both particular
value orientations and support for particular parties induce people to place
themselves in a specific position on the left-right dimension. As has been seen
above, there is a tendency for both value orientations and party choice to be more
highly correlated with left-right self-placement in the more advanced societies. As
a result, the compounded component, not the unique value-based component,
should be most significant in the most advanced societies, where it is not expected
that either of the unique components will be large. For the unique partisan compo-
nent exactly the opposite is expected: Individuals who recognise and place
themselves on the left-right scale on the basis of support for a given party without
knowing the implication of left and right for their issue position, would be most
likely to be found among the mass publics of less-advanced societies. The opposite,
placing oneself on the left-right scale on the basis of value orientation without
knowing the implication for preference for given parties, will not be characteristic
for advanced societies, but I have no hypothesis indicating that such a pattern would
be found in the less-advanced countries.
As to the party systems, I have no clear expectations regarding the unique and
compounded effects. It is expected that the partisan components-unique and
compounded-will be largest in party systems with a high number of effective
parties in keeping with the same line of reasoning outlined above for the bivariate
Component: Study
5. TheExplainedVarianceR2 of the Value-based

TABLE and thePartisanComponents into
Decomposed
Uniqueand CommonComponents in parentheses).
(percentages
Components Relative importance

of components
Values Partisan Shared Total Prop. values/ Prop. values/

Unique (%)Unique (%) (%) partisan I partisan II
1981:
France .024 .270 .222 .516 0.09 0.91
(5) (52) (43)
Italy .033 .288 .187 .508 0.11 0.76
(6) (57) (37)
Netherlands .029 .200 .252 .481 0.15 1.41
(6) (42) (52)
Denmark .042 .201 .233 .476 0.21 1.37
(9) (42) (49)
Germany .067 .140 .128 .335 0.48 1.39
(20) (42) (38)
Belgium .069 .110 .099 .278 0.63 1.53
(25) (40) (36)
Britain .053 .131 .062 .246 0.40 0.88
(22) (53) (25)
Ireland .020 .066 .017 .103 0.30 0.56
(19) (64) (17)
Average .042 .176 .150 .355 0.24 1.09
(11) (48) (41)
1990:
Iceland .040 .293 .191 .524 0.14 0.79
(8) (56) (36)
Spain .043 .282 .186 .511 0.15 0.81
(8) (55) (36)
Sweden .061 .232 .214 .507 0.26 1.19
(12) (46) (42)
France .057 .261 .177 .495 0.22 0.90
(12) (53) (36)
Netherlands .064 .159 .269 .492 0.40 2.09
(13) (32) (55)
Denmark .048 .164 .252 .464 0.29 1.83
(10) (35) (54)
Norway .065 .191 .166 .422 0.34 1.21
(15) (45) (39)
Italy .068 .194 .124 .386 0.35 0.99
(18) (50) (32)
Germany .064 (.154 .152 .370 0.42 1.40
(17) (42) (41)
Britain .051 .141 .132 .324 0.36 1.30
(16) (44) (41)
Portugal .021 .234 .069 .324 0.09 0.38
(6) (72) (21)
ODDBJ0RNKNUTSEN 209
analysis. Since it was found that the value-based component is also largest in
systems with a high number of effective parties, and a high number of effective
parties is characteristic of advanced societies, it might be speculated as to whether
the compounded effect, not the unique partisan component, would be strongest in
party systems with a high number of effective parties.
As to the relative importance of the partisan and the value-based components
according to the two causal models, our hypothesis follows from the arguments
formulated in relation to the hypotheses for the bivariate analyses and the
arguments above: I have no hypothesis indicating that the unique value-based
component will be more important in advanced societies than the unique partisan
component, but I believe that the value-based component in model 2, where the
impact of values includes the compounded variance, will be comparatively largest
in advanced societies. As to the number of effective parties, the relative impact of
the partisan component would be expected to be largest in party systems with a
high number of effective parties.
Empirical Analysis
Table 5 decomposes the total explanatory power (R2) of values and party choice in
the left-right scale into three components: the unique components for which values
and party choice account, and the compounded component, which represents the
portion of the explained variance shared by both values and partisanship.6 The
percentage of each component of the total explained variance is reported, and also
the total explained variance of value orientations and party choice combined. The
explanatory power is generally substantial, but there are also large cross-national
variations. For several countries the explained variance is about 50 percent, while
the explained variance is lowest in Ireland in both surveys, with Britain, Portugal
and Belgium following. Explanations of the comparative findings on the explana-
tory power of the entire model follow.
TABLE5. (Continued)
Components Relative importance

of components
Values Partisan Shared Total Prop.values/ Prop.values/
Unique (%)Unique (%) partisanI partisanII
Belgium .061 .107 .071 .239 0.57 1.23

(26) (45) (30)
Ireland .097 .041 .046 .184 2.37 3.49
(53) (22) (25)
Average8 c. .064 .153 .153 .369 0.42 1.42
(17) (41) (41)
Average 13 c. .057 .189 .158 .403 0.30 1.14
(14) (47) (39)
Note. The countries are ranked according to the explanatory power of values and party choice
altogether reported in Table 4.
Prop. values/partisan I is estimated by dividing values unique by partisan unique, while prop.
values/partisan II is calculated by dividing values unique, plus the shared component by the partisan
component.
Component: Study
Here we focus first on the relative importance of the three components. Table 5
shows that the unique partisan component and the compounded component are
dominant. From the average percentages for all countries it can be seen that each
of these components makes up to 40-50 percent of the explained variance, while
the unique value-based component accounts for 10-20 percent. The two former
components are both larger than the unique value-based component in all countries
except Ireland. As to the comparative differences, we rely here on average figures
for the two surveys for the eight countries: The unique value-based component's
share of the explained variance is lowest in Portugal, Spain, Iceland and France
(6-9%) and highest in Belgium, Germany, Britain and Ireland: 19-26% in the three
former countries and 36 percent in Ireland. Indeed, there are small variations apart
from the latter countries (5-15%). The unique partisan component is largest in
Portugal (about 70%), followed by Iceland, Spain, Italy and France (53-56%) and
lowest in Denmark and the Netherlands (37-39%), while the compounded compo-
nent is largest in Denmark and the Netherlands (about 50%), followed by Sweden,
Germany and France (40-42%) and smallest in Ireland and Portugal (21%).
Table 6 shows the correlations between the proportions of these three compo-
nents and the number of effective parties and the macro-structural variables.7 It
demonstrates that the unique partisan component is largest in less-advanced
societies as well as in party systems with a small number of parties. As to the unique
value-based component, there is no clear tendency for this component to correlate
consistently with any of the variables: Some of the correlations are positive, some
are negative, and most are quite unimpressive. On the other hand, there is a very
TABLE 6. Correlations
(r)betweenthePortionsof theExplainedVariancethatareDecomposedas Unique
and Compounded and theNumberof EffectivePartiesandMacro-structural
Components, Variables.
Number of GDP per Size of Disbursement

Strength of: effective parties capita service sector of government
Unique partisan
component
1981 -.46 -.85*** -.65* -.52
1990 (8) -.21 a -.24a -.41a -.42a
1990 (13) -.49a* -.29 -.78a*** -.61a**
Unique value-based
component
1981 -.82b** -.09 .04 -.21
1990 (8) -.15a -.40a .00a -.05a
1990 (13) .18a .28a .49a* .40a
Compounded
component
1981 .64* .71** .47 .55
1990 (8) .38 .59* .52 .43
1990 (13) .50* .63** .65*** .47*
Significant at: ***1%level; **5% level; *10% level.

aOutlier: Ireland; bOutlier:Belgium
Note. The three components correspond to the three first columns in Table 5.
consistent tendency for the compounded component to be largest in the more

advanced societies. The compounded varianceexplainedby valuesand partisanshipis thus
largest in advancedsocieties
and in partysystemswith manyeffective parties,whilea largevalue
for the uniquepartisan component is characteristic
of less advanced
societiesand partysystems
withfewereffective parties.These findings are basically in accordance with our hypothe-
ses. However, as expected on the basis of the previous findings, it is the compounded
component, not the unique partisan component, that is strongest in party systems
with a high number of effective parties.
Two causal models are formulated above: In one the causal relationship between
values and party choice is ambiguous, and in the other values are prior variables to
party choice. The relative importance of the two components according to the first
model can be estimated by calculating the explained variance of the unique value-
based component as a ratio of the explained variance of the partisan component,
while the same ratio according to the second model can be estimated by adding
together the unique value-based component and the compounded component and
dividing the sum by the partisan component.8 These two calculations have been
carried out in the two last columns in Table 5, respectively.
From the proportionsin the first of these columns, which show the relative impact
of the unique components, it can be seen that the partisan component is strongly
dominant in all countries apart from Ireland in the 1990 survey.Apart from Ireland in
1990 and Belgium in both surveys,the impact of the value-basedcomponent is less than
half of the impact of the partisan component. The dominance of the partisan compo-
nent is even more pronounced than in Table 2, which compares the two components
from bivariate analysis.This can also be seen from the average proportionsin the table.
The results according to the other model are very different, as can be seen from
the last column in Table 5. The average explained variance of the value-based
component is largerthan the explained variance of the partisan component. In the
1981 data set the average relative strength of the two components is nearly equal,
as shown by the average proportion of the value-based component in relation to the
partisan component, 1.09. In 1990 the average proportion is, however, considerably
higher (1.42), particularly for the eight countries for which there are data from
1981. In the 1981 surveys the impact of value orientations is largerthan the impact
of party choice in four of the eight countries; the same applies to eight of thirteen
countries in the 1990 survey and to six of the eight countries from which we have
time series data. In 1981 the value model is largest in Belgium, the Netherlands,
Denmark and Germany; in 1990 this model is largest in these countries in addition
to Britain, Norway, Sweden and the deviant Irish case. We may then conclude that
if valueorientationsare considered as priorvariablesto partychoice,theyhave a largercausal
influenceon left-rightidentitythanpartychoicein manycountries,andthat this holdstruewhen
the averageeffectsforall countriesare calculated.
Table 7 shows the correlations between these two proportions and the number
of effective parties and the macro-structural variables that indicate the division
between advanced/less advanced societies.
For the relative impact of the unique components (according to model 1 in
Figures 1 and 2), the correlations are not consistent. There is a clear tendency for
two of the macro-structural variables to be highly positively correlated with the
impact of values divided by the impact of partisanship only for 13 countries in 1990.
This negative finding corresponds to the hypothesis above. On the other hand, the
relative impact of value orientations according to model 2, is high and consistently
correlated with both the number of effective parties and the macro-structural
Component: Study
TABLE7. Correlations(r) betweentheRelativeImportance

of the Value-based
and thePartisan
accordingto the two CausalModelsand the TotalExplainedVariance,and theNumberof
Components
EffectivePartiesandMacro-structural
Variables.
Number of GDPper Size of Disbursement

Strength of: effective parties capita service sector of government
Ratio of unique components:

1981 -.77b** .14 .17 -.06
1990 (8) -.11a -.28a .18a .13a
1990 (13) .24a .36a .62a** .52a*
Ratio of values total/unique partisan component:

1981 .44 (.83)c** .79** .63 .57*
1990 (8) .24a .22a .42a .44a
1990 (13) .43a .51a* .70a*** .59a**
Total explained variance:

1981 .61* .47 (.81)d** .16 .22
1990 (8) .51 .66* .30 .39
1990 (13) .46* .47* .19 .08
Significant at: ***1%level; **5%level; *10% level.

aOutlier: Ireland; bOutlier:Belgium; cOutlier: Germany; dOutlier: Italy. In two cases it is doubtful if a
country is an outlier. For these cases two correlation coefficients are reported. The figures in
parentheses refer to analyses where the outlier is excluded.
Note. The two first measures of the relative impact of the two components are the portions from the
last two columns in Table 5. Total explained variance is the explained variance of value orientations
and party choice altogether, reported in Table 5.
variables. In the advancedsocieties it is thus characteristicthat the value-basedcomponentis

large comparedwith the uniquepartisan componentif value orientationsare consideredas prior
to party choice in a causal sense.
The general hypothesis formulated for the number of effective parties is not
supported. For the unique components, there is no consistent pattern, and for the
second model, value orientations are quite consistently more important than the parti-
san component in systems with many effective parties. This finding is easy to explain
on the basis of the findings from Table 6: the unique partisan component is strongest
in the less-advanced societies, while the compounded component, which according to
model 2 is ascribed to value orientations, is strongest in the more advanced societies.
Finally, Table 7 shows the correlation between the explained variance of the
model as a whole and the effective number of parties and macro-structural
variables. The explained variance is highly correlative with both number of effec-
tive parties and GDP per capita, while it is significantly lower for the two other
macro-structural variables.
The Direct and Indirect Effects of Particular Value Orientations
Hypotheses
The analysis of variance has revealed that a large part of the impact of the value
model is shared with party choice. This section examines the differences in this
ODDBJ0RNKNUTSEN 213
respect between the three sets of value orientations. Is a larger portion of the
impact of some of the value orientations on left-right self-placement shared with
party choice, or-according to model 2-is a larger portion of some of the value
orientations indirect via party choice compared to the other value orientations? This
research problem is analysed below on the basis of model 2, where value orienta-
tions have both a direct effect and an indirect effect via party choice.
There are two contradictory hypotheses in this respect: from one viewpoint a
larger share of the impact of religious/secular and left-right materialist values
would be expected to be compounded with party choice than would be expected for
materialist/post-materialist values. The former two value orientations have been
institutionalized in the party system in the sense that specific parties have
expressed political issues and values along these conflict lines for decades, while
materialist/post-materialist values are not institutionalised in the political system
to the same degree. On the other hand, the compounded component has previously
been associated with cognitive mobilization and sophisticated voters. Cognitive
mobilization is also associated with post-materialist values (Inglehart, 1990:
341-342), and it would therefore be expected that the compounded component, that
is, the indirect effects via party choice, would be particularly relevant for material-
ist/post-materialist values. According to this line of reasoning, the highest share of
materialist/post-materialist values would be expected to be compounded with party
choice.
Empirical Analysis
This research question could be examined solely through analysis of variance;
another possibility, however, is to use the beta weights from the MCA-analyses,
comparing the beta weights from the first and second step in Table 4 to examine
direct and indirect effects. The direct effect is the effect that remains when party
choice is controlled for, and the difference between the coefficients in these steps
indicates the proportion that is the indirect effect via party choice. I have chosen
to rely on this latter method and note that analysis of direct and indirect effects
provides different figures from decomposition of variance.
An examination of general tendencies across countries yields a general impres-
sion of these effects. In order to examine how much of the effects of the three value
orientations are transmitted via party choice, averages for each value orientation
are calculated from the first and second steps in Table 4.
Table 8 shows that materialist/post-materialist value orientations on average
have the largest effect on the self-placement scale in 1981, while left-right materi-
alist values have the largest effect in EVSII. This difference might be caused by the
different operationalizations of the value orientations in the two surveys.
The data sets are quite consistent with regard to the relative size of the direct
and indirect effects of the three value orientations. Both the 1981 and 1990 data
sets show a larger share of left-right materialist values being transmitted via party
choice compared to the other value orientations. In the Eurobarometer data set, 58
percent of the effect of left-right materialist values are on average transmitted via
party choice, while the percentages for the two other value orientations are 42-43
percent. In EVSII the share of indirect effects is somewhat lower, but on average a
larger portion of the effects of left-right materialist orientation are transmitted via
party choice in these data sets as well. In EVS II a somewhat larger portion of the
effects of materialist/post-materialist value orientations are transmitted via party
Component: Study
TABLE
8. EffectsTransmittedvia PartyChoiceandDirectEffectof eachof the ThreeSets of Value
EffectsCalculatedon theBasesof Resultsfrom 8 and 13 Countries
Orientation.(Average
- percentages
in parentheses).
Rel./sec. (%) LRM(%) MPM(%) Sum (%)
1981:
Total effects .181 .194 .254 .629
Direct .103 (57) .081 (42) .146 (58) .330 (52)
via party choice .078 (43) .113 (58) .108 (42) .299 (48)
1990 (8 countries):
Total effects .222 .264 .210 .696
Direct .150 (68) .144 (55) .131 (63) .425 (61)
via party choice .072 (32) .120 (45) .079 (37) .271 (39)
1990 (13 countries):

Total effects .195 .298 .178 .671
Direct .128 (66) .155 (52) .109 (61) .392 (58)
via party choice .067 (34) .143 (48) .069 (39) .279 (42)
Abbreviations:Rel./sec= religious/secular
valueorientations;LRM= left-rightmaterialistvalue
orientations;MPM= materialist/post-materialist
valueorientations.
choice compared to religious/secular values, while there is no difference in this

respect in EB 16. Thus, none of the hypotheses was confirmed. In the case of the
two highly institutionalized value orientations, a large portion of their impact on
left-right identity is transmitted via party choice, and the same is the case for
materialist/post-materialist value orientations. On average, the value orientation
that has the most predominant part of its effect transmitted via party choice
appears to be the left-right materialist orientation.
In order to understand this phenomenon, the cross-national variations must be
examined in more detail. Table 9 shows the percentages of the effect of each value
orientation that is indirect via party choice according to model 2 for each value
orientation.
Some main patterns can be briefly indicated here. The comparative patterns are
very similar for the two surveys, but when there are differences I refer to EVSII,
which includes all 13 countries. The tendency that left-right materialist orientation
is the value orientation that has the largest portion of its effect transmitted via
party choice applies to most of the countries, including the four Nordic countries,
France, Britain, Belgium and Portugal. In all these countries, apart from Belgium,
about 50 percent of the effect is transmitted via party choice. In four additional
countries another value orientation has nearly an equal portion of its effect trans-
mitted via party choice, namely the Netherlands (materialist/post-materialist value
orientations), Ireland, Italy and Spain (religious/secular values). In Germany
religious/secular and materialist/post-materialist value orientations have the
highest portion of their effect transmitted via party choice.
A consequence of the finding that the largest portion of left-right materialist
orientation is transmitted via party choice is that, in Table 4, the direct effects of
left-right materialist values are relatively smaller in step 2, when party choice is
controlled for, than in step 1. The same phenomenon can be observed for many
ODDBJ0RNKNUTSEN 215
TABLE9. Portionof theEffectof Given ValueOrientationsthat is Transmitted

via Party Choice.
Rel./ LRM MPM Rel./ LRM MPM

sec. sec.
Belgium Italy
1981 33 31 18 1981 71 55 50
1990 26 38 (27) 1990 41 37 20
Britain Netherlands
1981 (00) 48 32 1981 58 70 57
1990 (18) 55 32 1990 41 54 50
Denmark Iceland
1981 - 68 50 1990 (29) 51 (82)
1990 50 55 42 Norway
France 1990 (10) 49 26
1981 73 68 52 Spain
1990 35 53 42 1990 48 53 42
Germany Sweden
1981 32 (60) 38 1990 (50) 48 33
1990 47 33 41 Portugal
Ireland 1990 41 58 43
1981 33 (17) (17)
1990 10 18 23
Abbreviations:Rel./sec. = religious/secularvalue orientations;LRM= left-right materialistvalue

orientations;MPM= materialist/post-materialist value orientations.
Note. The figures in parentheses are based on a beta weight in the first step in Table 4 that is .12 or
smaller. Such small coefficients mean that the given value orientation has a small impact on
left-right self-placement, and the percentages calculated on the basis of these figures have not been
taken into consideration in the comments in the text.
countries where left-right materialist values originally were dominant in Table 4,

step 1.
Looking at the direct and indirect effects for each value orientation in a compar-
ative perspective, the following patterns emerge: For religious values the largest
portion of the effect is transmitted via party choice in several of the Catholic and
religiously mixed countries: Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Germany and Italy
(40-50%); for materialist/post-materialist value orientations the largest portion of
the impact on left-right identification is transmitted via party choice in the
Netherlands, Denmark, France and Germany, and also in Spain and Portugal (also
40-50%). For the two latter countries, the impact of materialist/post-materialist
value orientations on party left-right identity is, however, considerably smaller than
in the former countries. For left-right materialist values, about half of the effects
are transmitted via party choice in Spain and the Netherlands in addition to those
countries mentioned above, where left-right materialist values had a larger portion
transmitted via party choice than any of the other value orientations.
According to EVS II, left-right materialist value orientations have the largest
effect on left-right identification in many countries before party choice is controlled
for. Previous research has shown that left-right materialist values are on average
the strongest predictor of party choice compared to the other value orientations in
many West European countries (Knutsen, 1995b: 43-45). The finding that a larger
portion of left-right materialist orientations are compounded with party choice is
Component: Study
explained by these values' being more important predictors for party choice than
the two other orientations; at the same time they are an important predictor for
left-right identification.
Conclusions
This article has compared the impact of value orientations and party choice on
left-right self-placement. The findings can be summed up as follows:
Left-right identification appears to have an impressive absorptive capacity. In
most countries three sets of value orientations as well as party choice have a signif-
icant, and in some cases large, impact on left-right identity.
Party choice is still the dominant predictor of left-right self-placement, although
its dominance is not as large as was shown in Inglehart and Klingemann's analysis
based on a simple model of the value-based component. However, if value orienta-
tions are considered prior to party choice in a causal sense, this picture changes
dramatically.Value orientations now have a larger impact than party choice in most
countries.
The comparative analysis shows that both the party system and the distinction
between advanced/less advanced societies are important for explaining the cross-
national variations, but the way in which these macro-level variables influence the
strength of the partisan and the value-based component, respectively, is not uncom-
plicated.
In advanced societies and in fragmented party systems there exist both a strong
party component and a strong value-based component, however, when the relative
strength of these components is examined, a strong value-based component is found
both in the advanced societies and in party systems with a high number of effec-
tive parties. When the explained variance is decomposed into unique components
explained by party choice and value orientations, respectively, and into a third,
compounded component, a strong compounded component is characteristic in
advanced societies, while a strong partisan component is found in less-advanced
societies and in less fragmented party systems. A large, unique, value-based compo-
nent-independent of party choice-is uncharacteristic of advanced societies.
The analysis of the role of the different value orientations has shown that a large
part of all value orientations is compounded with party choice or indirect effects
via party choice if value orientations are considered as prior variables. However, the
basic value orientations arising for a typical industrial society-left-right material-
ism-is most important in this respect. The industrial conflict lines-represented
by well-known political party families and left-right materialist values-still have
a strong and shared impact on left-right identification.
Appendix 1
Variablesand Index Constructions
The Ten-pointLeft-RightSelf-placement Scale
The question is formulatedas follows:"Inpolitical matters, people talk about 'the Left'
and 'the Right.' How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?"
The respondentwas handeda cardwith the word "Left"at the one side and the word
"Right"at the opposite side, and a scale dividedinto ten boxes in between. These were
numberedfrom 1 (near the word "Left"at the left side) to 10 (near the word "Right"
ODDBJ0RNKNUTSEN 217
on the right side). Since the scale contains an even number of boxes, none of them
constitutes a halfwayhouse between Left and Right. In the empirical analysis, the scale
has been recoded so that placement on the left obtained the highest score (1=10, 2=9
and so on).
Religious/SecularValueOrientations
In EB 16 the question about church attendance was as follows. "Do you go to religious
services?-l =Several times a week; 2=Once a week; 3=A few times a year; 4=Never."
The various categories were given the same codes as in the question, that is, 1, Several
times a week, and so on.
In EVSII the question about importance of God was asked as follows:"Howimportant
is God in your life? Please use this card to indicate (SHOWCARD). 10 means very impor-
tant and 1 means not important at all." The values were recoded so that 10=1, 9=2
and so on.
Left-RightMaterialistOrientations
EB 16
1. Public ownershipof private industry should be expanded.
2. Greater effort should be made to reduce inequality of income.
3. Government should play a greater role in the management of the economy.
Respondents were shown a card offering the following categories for response to each
item: 1=agree strongly, 2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=disagree strongly.
The indices were constructed as follows: The "agree/disagree"items were coded so
that the leftist alternatives were given the highest scores. The scores were assigned to
each response alternative in the following way: 5=Strongly agree, 4=Agree, 3=Don't
know/no answer, 2=Disagree, =Strongly disagree. The scores were then added.
EVS II
The index is based on five items, of which three were forced-choiceitems:
1. Incomes should be made more There should be greater incentives
equal. for individual efforts.
2. Private ownershipof business and Government ownershipof business
industry should be in increased, and industry should be increased.
3. Individualsshould take more The state should take more
responsibilityfor providingfor responsibilityto ensure that everyone
themselves, is providedfor.
For these items the respondents were asked to place themselves on a ten-point scale
(1-10).
4. There is a lot of discussion about how business and industry should be managed.
Which of these four statements comes closest to your opinion? (1) The owners
should run their business or appoint the managers; (2) The owners and the
employees should participate in the selection of managers; (3) The State should
be the owner and appoint the managers; (4) The employees should own the
business and should elect the managers.
5. Which of the two statements comes closest to your own opinion? (a) I find that
both freedom and equality are important.But if I were to choose one or the other,
I would consider personal freedom more important; that is, everyone can live in
freedom and develop without hindrance. (b) Certainly both freedom and equality
are important. But if I were to choose one or the other, I would consider equal-
ity more important; that is, that nobody is underprivilegedand that social class
differences are not so strong.
Component: Study
Response alternatives were: (1) agree with statement a; (2) agree with statement b;
(3) neither.
The index was constructed as follows: For item 4 the original response alternatives were
given the following scores: 1= 1, 2=5.5, 3, 4= 10. Categories 3 and 4 were given the same
score because they both demonstrate leftist positions which are different but can not be
ranked in relation to each other. For item 5 the original response alternatives were
recoded in a similar way: Alternative "a" was assigned the score 1, and "b" the score
10, while the "neither" alternative was assigned the score 5.5.
Of the three variables which are ten-point scales, item 1 was recoded so that leftist
responses were assigned the highest scores (1=10, 2=9 and so on). The five recoded
variables with values from 1 to 10 were then added.
Materialist/post-materialistvalue orientations
EB 16 AGREE
1. Western Europe should make a stronger effort to provide
adequate military defence Mater.
2. More severe penalties should be introduced for acts of terrorism Mater.
3. Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment
against pollution Post-mater.
4. Nuclear energy should be developed to meet future energy needs Mater.
The index was constructed in a similar way as the left-right materialist index in EB 16.
Post-materialist priorities were given the highest scores.
EVS II
The materialist/post-materialist items were presented as three batteries where respon-
dents were to rank the first and second most important political value. "There is a lot
of discussion about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On
this card are listed some of the goals which different people would prefer. (SHOWCARD).
Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider most important? What
is your second choice?"
First set:
Maintaining law and order in the country (M);
Giving the people more to say in important governmental decisions (PM);
Fighting rising prices (M);
Protecting freedom of speech (PM).
Secondset:
Maintaining a high rate of economic growth (M);
Making sure that this country has a strong defence (M);
Seeing that people have more say in how things are decided at work and in their
community (PM);
Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful (PM).
Thirdset:
Maintaining a stable economy (M);
Progressing towards a less impersonal, more humane society (PM);
Fighting against crime (M);
Progressing towards a society where ideas are more important than money (PM).
Index constructions
Each political value was first constructed as a variable by assigning scores on the basis
of its ranking. This was done as follows: most important (2), next most important (1),
value not chosen (0). The scores for the materialist alternatives (M) were then reversed
so that value 2=0, 1=1, 0=2 and similar. The materialist/post-materialist index was
constructed by adding the scores of all 12 value variables. Scores were then collapsed in
the same way to obtain final indices with 10 values, from 1 (materialist) to 10 (post-
materialist).
Appendix 2
The Valuesforthe VariousCountrieson the Numberof EffectivePartiesand the
ThreeMacro-structural
Variables
Numberof EffectiveParties
1981 1990
Germany 2.5 Britain 2.8 Portugal 2.7

Ireland 2.5 Germany 2.9 Iceland 3.3
Britain 3.6 Ireland 2.9 Spain 4.2
France 4.2 France 4.0 Norway 4.9
Italy 4.4 Belgium 4.4 Sweden 5.0
Netherlands 4.6 Netherlands 4.5
Denmark 4.7 Italy 4.9
Belgium 5.0 Denmark 5.3
The number of effective parties is calculated on the basis of the party support in the surveys.
For Belgium the number of parties as well as all other data is based on collapsing the
separate Flemish and Francophone parties (Liberal, Christian Social, Socialist and Green
parties). For France, the three components of the UDFalliance are considered as one party.
Variables
The ThreeMacro-structural
1981
GDP per capita Employment Disbursement Average

in services of government ranking
Denmark 11350 (1) 63.3 (3) 55.1 (2) 2.0

Netherlands 9861 (4) 64.8 (1) 55.8 (1) 2.0
Belgium 9651 (5) 63.6 (2) 52.7 (3) 3.3
France 10552 (3) 56.2 (5) 45.8 (6) 4.3
Germany 11076 (2) 51.0 (6) 44.3 (8) 5.7
Britain 8886 (6) 61.3 (4) 44.6 (7) 5.7
Ireland 4855 (8) 50.6 (7) 48.3a (4) 6.3
Italy 6123 (7) 49.1 (8) 46.1 (5) 6.7
aData from 1980.

Source:OECD1983: Table lB (GDPper capita), Table 2.12 (employmentin services) and Table 6.4
(disbursementof government).
Component: Study
1990
GDPper capita Employment Disbursement Average

in services of government ranking
Sweden 26.652 (1) 67.5 (6) 59.1 (1) 2.7

Denmark 25.150 (2) 66.9 (5) 56.5 (2) 3.0
Norway 24.953 (3) 68.8 (4) 50.9 (4) 3.7
Belgium 19.303 (7) 69.0 (2) 53.1 (3) 4.0
Netherlands 18.676 (9) 69.1 (1) 51.7 (5) 5.0
France 21.105 (6) 64.0 (7) 46.2 (7) 6.7
Germany 23.536 (4) 56.8 (10) 42.6 (8) 7.3
Britain 16.985 (10) 68.9 (3) 38.1 (10) 7.7
Italy 18.921 (8) 58.6 (9) 48.1 (6) 7.7
Iceland 22.907 (5) 59.8 (8) 31.5 (13) 8.7
Ireland 12.131 (12) 56.2 (11) 41.5a (9) 10.7
Spain 12.609 (11) 54.8 (12) 35.5b (12) 11.7
Portugal 6.085 (13) 47.4 (13) 37.6a (11) 12.3
aData from 1989; bdata from 1988.

Source:OECD(1993): Table lB (GDPper capita), Table 2.12 (employment in services) and Table 6.4
(disbursement of government).
The countries have been ranked according to their values on each of the three variables in
parentheses behind the various figures. In both tables the countries are ranked on the basis
of the average ranking for the three variables. This ranking indicates roughly the position
of each country on the advanced/less advanced continuum, and is displayed to the right in
the table.
The number of effective parties and the macro-structuralvariables are highly positively
correlated. The more advanced societies have the largest numbers of effective parties, and
the various macrostructural variables are also highly correlated. This can be seen from the
following table.
Correlationsbetweenthe Numberof EffectiveParties and the Macro-structural

Variables
A. Numberof EffectivePartiesand theMacro-structural
Variables
Effective parties
1981 (N=8) 1990 (N= 13)
GDP per capita .32 (.70)a .57**

Employment in services .66* .55**
Disbursement of government .62* .78***
aThecorrelationcoefficientin parenthesisis basedon sevencountries,

omittingGermanywhichis an outlier.Germanyhadin the EB16 the
lowest numberof effectiveparties (togetherwith Ireland),and the
secondhighestGDPper capita.
B. Correlationsbetween the Three Macro-structural Variables
1981 1990
Employment Disbursement Employment Disbursement

in services of government in services of government
GDP per GDP per

capita .56 .25 capita .68*** .56*
Employment Employment
in services -.71* in services .64*
Significantat: ***1%level; **5%level; *10%level.
APPENDIXTABLE.Self-placement on the Left-Right Scale and Party Choice, EVSII

Denmark Iceland
Social. People's P. 3.8 (134) People's Alliance 3.0 (43)
Greens 4.3 (15) Women's Alliance 3.9 (43)
Social Democrats 5.0 (258) Social Democrats 4.8 (57)
Radicals Liberals 5.5 (31) Progress Party 4.9 (82)
Christ. People's P. 6.3 (16) Independence Party 7.7 (226)
Center Democrats 6.6 (46) Other parties 5.0 (8)
Progress P. 7.1 (51) No party choice 4.9 (162)
Agrarian Liberals 7.3 (107) TOTAL 5.7 (621)
Conservatives 7.4 (123) Eta (1) .71
Other parties 4.6 (16) Eta (2) .74
No party choice 7.8 (137)
TOTAL 5.7 (934) Belgium
Eta (1) .65 Socialist parties 4.4 (374)
Eta (2) .68 Ecologists 4.9 (250)
FDF/RW 5.6 (21)
Sweden Volksunie 6.1 (69)
Left Party 3.2 (52) Christian Social P. 6.5 (478)
Social Democrats 4.1 (214) Liberal P. 6.7 (262)
Green Party 5.3 (68) Flemish Block 6.7 (25)
Center P. 5.9 (67) Other parties 5.3 (20)
Christian Dem. 5.9 (25) No party choice 5.9 (481)
Liberals 6.1 (146) TOTAL 5.7 (1980)
Moderates 7.9 (198) Eta (1) .42
No party choice 5.3 (106) Eta (2) .47
TOTAL 5.7 (876)
Eta (1) .70 Ireland
Eta (2) .72 Workers' Party 4.7 (30)
Labour P. 5.0 (64)
Germany Green P. 5.4 (31)
Greens 3.8 (110)
Progress democrats 6.0 (30)
SPD 4.3 (646) Fianna Fail 6.4 (405)
FPD 5.5 (138) Fine Gael 6.5 (185)
Republikaner P. 6.2 (39) Other parties 5.1 (30)
CDU/CSU 6.4 (649) No party choice 5.8 (123)
Other parties 5.9 (15)
TOTAL 6.1 (898)
Eta (1) .30
TOTAL 5.3 (1846) Eta (2) .31
Eta (1) .55
Eta (2) .58
Component: Study
Norway Portugal
Socialist Left 3.9 (127) CDU 2.6 (56)
Labour Party 4.6 (320) PS 5.0 (270)
Liberal P. 5.0 (35) PSD 7.3 (308)
Center P. 5.9 (59) CDS 7.6 (38)
Christ. People's P. 6.3 (71) Other parties 5.6 (17)
Progress P. 7.3 (116) No party choice 5.5 (387)
Conservatives 7.4 (194) TOTAL 6.0 (1076)
Other parties 4.3 (11) Eta (1) .55
No party choice 5.8 (208) Eta (2) .62
TOTAL 5.7 (1141)
Eta (1) .60 Italy
Eta (2) .65 PCI 2.5 (204)
Prolet. Democrats 2.6 (13)
Britain Radical P. 3.3 (13)
Labour Party 4.4 (514) PSI 4.1 (139)
Nationalist P. 4.7 (64) Verdi 4.3 (140)
Social Dem. 4.9 (11) PSDI 5.1 (15)
Greens 5.0 (51) PRI 5.2 (35)
Liberal P./Alliance 5.4 (64) Regional lists 5.5 (63)
Conservatives 6.7 (428) DC 5.8 (380)
Other parties 5.7 (3) PLI 6.9 (16)
No party choice 5.2 (209) MSI 8.5 (29)
TOTAL 5.4 (1344) Other parties 5.4 (26)
Eta (1) .52 No party choice 4.8 (441)
Eta (2) .54 TOTAL 4.8 (1514)
Eta (1) .56
Netherlands Eta (2) .64
Green Left 2.8 (68)
PVDA 4.1 (194) Spain
D'66 4.9 (160) HB/EE 2.4 (39)
CDA 6.6 (273) IU 2.6 (164)
vvD 6.7 (92) Greens 3.6 (51)
Calv. Fund. 8.4 (34) PSOE 3.6 (494)
Other parties 6.4 (12) Various nationalist P. 4.3 (61)
No party choice 5.2 (95) PNV/PAR/EA 4.9 (27)
TOTAL 5.5 (930) CIU 5.2 (76)
Eta (1) .67 CDS 5.5 (100)
Eta (2) .70 PP 7.1 (419)
France No party choice 4.6 (562)
PCF 3.3 (31) TOTAL 4.7 (1998)
PS 3.6 (243) Eta (1) .68
Ecologists 4.5 (82) Eta (2) .76
UDF 6.4 (115)
RPR 7.1 (57)
National Front 7.8 (27)
TOTAL 4.8 (792)
Eta (1) .66
Eta (2) .72
ODDBJ0RNKNITSEN 223
Eta (1) and eta (2) are the correlation coefficients with those without a party choice included and
excluded, respectively.
Countries are presented alphabetically within three groups of countries, the Nordic countries, Central
European countries and Southern European countries.
Key to abbreviationsfor
variousparties
Belgium Italy
Volksunie = Flemish Nationalists DC = Christian Democratic Party
FDF/RW = Democratic Front of French Speakers MSI= Italian Social Movement
(FDF) and Walloon Gathering. PCI= Communist Party
PSI= Socialist Party
Germany PSDI = Social Democratic Party
CDU/CSU = Christian Democratic PR = Republican Party
Union/Christian Social Union PLI = Liberal Party
FDP = Free Democratic Party Verdi = Greens
SPD = Social Democratic Party
Spain
France CDS = Democratic Center Union
PCF= Communist Party CIU= Convergencia i Unio (Catalonian
PS = Socialist Party Nationalists)
UDF = Union pour la Democratie FranSaise IU = Izquierda Unida (Left coalition)
RPR = Rassemblement pour la Republique PSOE = Socialist Party
(Gaullist Party) PNV/PAR/EA= Moderate Basque Nationalists
HB/EE = Radical Basque Nationalists
Netherlands
D'66 = Democrats '66 Portugal
PVDA= Labour Party PS = Socialist Party
CDA = Christian Democratic Appeal PSD = Social Democratic Party
vD = People's Party for Freedom and CDS = Centre Social Democratic Party
Democracy (Liberal Party) CDU= United Democratic Coalition
Calv. Fund. = Fundamentalist Calvinist parties, (Communists and Greens)
collapsed results for three parties under this
name. The parties are Reformed Political
League (GPV),Political-Reformed Party (SGP)
and Reformed Political Federation (RPF)
lotes
1. Eurobarometer No. 16 and European Values Survey have been made available by the
Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) in anonymous form. The data archive is
not responsible for the analyses or the interpretations of the data that have been carried
out in this article.
2. The values were the following: (i) seeing that people have more say about how things are
done at their jobs and in their communities; (ii) giving people more say in important
governmental decisions; (iii) maintaining order in the nation; (iv) the fight against crime.
3. For example, "Government employment as a percentage of total employment" and
"Government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP" basically tap the
size of the public services, while "Social security transfers as a percentage of GDP" tap
the size of income maintenance schemes in a comparative setting. These variables are
also present in our source for macro-structural variables, but I found no theoretical
reasons for including these different aspect of welfare efforts, which indicate different
types of welfare states, in the analysis.
4. This conclusion does not apply to the eight-country analysis in 1990 for number of effec-
tive parties and GDPper capita, where there is no correlation when outliers are excluded.
5. The alternative model, that party choice is prior in a causal sense, will not be dealt with
here.
6. The three components have been calculated on the basis of R2 for value orientations and
party choice from Table 1 and 2, and from R2 from the whole model reported in Table
Component: Study
4. The unique explained variance for party choice is calculated by subtracting the R2 for
value orientations from R2 from the whole model, and similarly, the unique explained
variance for value orientations by subtracting R2 for party choice from R2 from the whole
model. The common variance is then calculated by subtracting the sum of the two unique
components from R2 for the whole model.
7. By using percentages or proportions of the explained variance for the whole model in
this analysis, we control for the fact that the explained variance in the left-right scale
for the whole model differs from country to country.
8. The nominator in the latter case is R2 for the value component from Tables 1 and 2.
References
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Huber, J.D. (1989). "Values and Partisanship in Left-Right Orientations: Measuring
Ideology."European Journalof PoliticalResearch,17: 599-621.
Inglehart, R. (1977). The Silent Revolution-ChangingValuesand Political StylesamongWestern
Publics.Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R. (1984). "The Changing Structure of Political Cleavages in Western Societies."
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Beck, eds), chap. 2. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.
Inglehart, R. (1990). CulturalShift in AdvancedIndustrialSociety. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Inglehart, R. and H.-D. Klingemann (1976). "PartyIdentification, Ideological Preference and
the Left-Right Dimension among Western Mass Publics." In PartyIdentification andBeyond.
Representationsof Voting and Party Competition(I. Budge, I. Crewe and D. Farlie, eds), chap.
13. London: Wiley.
Jagodzinski, W. and K. Dobbelaere (1995). "Secularization and Church Religiosity." In The
Impactof Values,vol. 4 in "Beliefs in Government" (J. van Deth and El. Scarbrough, eds),
chap. 4. European Science Foundation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Knutsen, O. (1995a). "Value Orientations, Political Conflicts and Left-Right Identification:
A Comparative Study."European Journalof Political Science,28: 63-93.
Knutsen, 0. (1995b). "The Impact of Old Politics and New Politics Value Orientations on
Party Choice-A Comparative Study."Journalof PublicPolicy, 15: 1-63.
Knutsen, 0. (1995c). "Left-Right Materialist Value Orientations." In The Impactof Values,
vol. 4 in "Beliefs in Government" (J. van Deth and E. Scarbrough,eds), chap. 6. European
Science Foundation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Knutsen, O. (1995d). "PartyChoice." In TheImpactof Values,vol. 4 in "Beliefs in Government"
(J. van Deth and E. Scarbrough, eds), chap. 17. European Science Foundation. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Knutsen, 0. (1996). "The Partisan Component Component of the Left-Right Self-Placement
Scale-A Comparative Longitudinal Study."Paper presented at the ECPRJointSessions of
Workshops, Oslo, 29 March to 3 April.
Lafferty, W. and O. Knutsen (1984). "Leftist and Rightist Ideology in a Social Democratic
State: An Analysis of Norway in the Midst of the Conservative Resurgence."BritishJournal
of PoliticalScience,14: 345-367.
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Alignments: An Introduction." In Party Systemsand VoterAlignments(S.M. Lipset and S.
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ODDBJ0RNKNUTSEN 225
BiographicalNote
ODDBJ0RN KNUTSENis Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo. His
main research interests are in values and value change, cleavages and political parties
and West European politics. He has published articles in Acta Sociologica,BritishJournal
of Political Science,Comparative
Politics, ComparativePolitical Studies,EuropeanJournal of
PoliticalResearch,ScandinavianPolitical Studies and WestEuropeanPolitics. He has been
involved in the European Science Foundation's program on "Beliefs in Government."
ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, University of Oslo, PO Box 1097, Blindern
N-0317 Oslo 3, Norway. Tel:47-22-854279/47-22-855181. Fax:47-22-854411 [email:
oddbjorn.knutsen@stv.uio.no].

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The Partisan and the Value-Based Component of Left-Right Self-Placement: A Comparative

The Partisan and the Value-based

ABSTRACT.This article takes Ronald Inglehart's and Hans-Dieter

Value Orientations, Party Choice and Left-Right Identity

0192-5121(1997/02) 18:2, 191-35 ? 1997InternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation

The Value Model

These conflict lines have traditionally been considered to be structural cleavages

The Partisan Component

Bivariate Analysis: The Partisan and the Value-based Components

TABLE1. ExplainedVariancein theLeft-RightSelf-placement

1981 1990 Average

(a) Party choice:

(b) Value orientations:

and a one-way analysis of variance/MCA-analysis with party choice as an independent

TABLE 2. ExplainedVariancein theLeft-RightSelf-placement

Party choice Value Proportion value orientation/

Note.Figuresin parenthesesare the rankingsof countrieson the basisof the explainedvarianceof

Number of GDP per Size of Disbursement

Significant at: ***1% level; **5% level; *10% level.

Multivariate Analysis: The Unique and Compounded Components of

Value orientations -----

Value#orientations- "-- ;-' self-placement

r/eta beta 1 beta 2 r/eta beta 1 beta 2

Belgium EB 16 (N = 725) EVSII (N = 1980)

r/eta beta 1 beta 2 r/eta beta 1 beta 2

Party choice .67 .55 .65 .48

Abbreviations: LRM= left-right materialist value orientations; MPM = materialist/post-materialist

Uniquevalue Compounded Unique Value Partisan

FIGURE2. Decompositionof VarianceAccording to Models 1 and 2 in Figure 1.

5. TheExplainedVarianceR2 of the Value-based

Components Relative importance

Values Partisan Shared Total Prop. values/ Prop. values/

Components Relative importance

Belgium .061 .107 .071 .239 0.57 1.23

Number of GDP per Size of Disbursement

Significant at: ***1%level; **5% level; *10% level.

consistent tendency for the compounded component to be largest in the more

TABLE7. Correlations(r) betweentheRelativeImportance

Number of GDPper Size of Disbursement

Ratio of unique components:

Ratio of values total/unique partisan component:

Total explained variance:

Significant at: ***1%level; **5%level; *10% level.

variables. In the advancedsocieties it is thus characteristicthat the value-basedcomponentis

The Direct and Indirect Effects of Particular Value Orientations

Rel./sec. (%) LRM(%) MPM(%) Sum (%)

1990 (13 countries):

choice compared to religious/secular values, while there is no difference in this

TABLE9. Portionof theEffectof Given ValueOrientationsthat is Transmitted

Rel./ LRM MPM Rel./ LRM MPM

Abbreviations:Rel./sec. = religious/secularvalue orientations;LRM= left-right materialistvalue

countries where left-right materialist values originally were dominant in Table 4,

Germany 2.5 Britain 2.8 Portugal 2.7

GDP per capita Employment Disbursement Average

Denmark 11350 (1) 63.3 (3) 55.1 (2) 2.0

aData from 1980.

GDPper capita Employment Disbursement Average

Sweden 26.652 (1) 67.5 (6) 59.1 (1) 2.7

aData from 1989; bdata from 1988.

Correlationsbetweenthe Numberof EffectiveParties and the Macro-structural

1981 (N=8) 1990 (N= 13)

GDP per capita .32 (.70)a .57**

aThecorrelationcoefficientin parenthesisis basedon sevencountries,

Significant at: 1% level; 5% level; 10% level.

Significant at: 1%level; 5% level; 10% level.

Significant at: 1%level; 5%level; 10% level.

Significantat: 1%level; 5%level; 10%level.