BUENAOBRA VS.
LIM KING GUAN
ART. 223 JURISDICTION OF THE LABOR ARBITERS AND THE COMMISSION
DOCTRINE:
It is true that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law
is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of
making the judgment final and executory. However, technicality should not be allowed to
stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the
parties.
FACTS:
Petitioners were employees of UNIX, a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing
bags, wallets and the like. Sometime in 1991 and 1992, petitioners filed several cases against
UNIX and its incorporators and officers for unfair labor practice, illegal lockout/dismissal,
underpayment of wages, holiday pay, proportionate 13th month pay, unpaid wages, interest,
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
LA RULING:
In favor of the petitioners ordering respondent Unix as follows: 1. P5,821,838.40 as
backwages;
2. P1,484,912.00 as separation pay;
3. P527,748.00 as wage differentials;
4. P33,830.00 as regular holiday pay differentials; and
5. P365,551.95 as proportionate 13th month pay for 1990.
All other claims were dismissed for lack of merit. However, petitioners complained that the
decision could not be executed because UNIX allegedly diverted, invested and transferred all
its money, assets and properties to FUJI whose stockholders and officers were also those of
UNIX.
Thus, petitioners filed another complaint against respondents UNIX, its corporate officers and
stockholders of record, and FUJI. Petitioners mainly prayed that respondents UNIX and FUJI
be held jointly and severally held liable for the payment of the monetary awards. LA Pati
rendered a decision on the second complaint piercing the veil of corporate fiction of the two
respondent sister corporations which were considered as mere associations of persons jointly
and severally pay the subject amount of P8,233,880.30 out of the properties and unpaid
subscription on subscribed Capital Stock of the Board of Directors, Corporate Officers,
Incorporators and Stockholders of said respondent corporations, plus the amount of
P3,000,000.00 and P1,000,000.00 in the form of moral and exemplary damages, respectively,
as well as 10% attorney’s fees from any recoverable amounts. FUJI, its officers and
stockholders filed a memorandum on appeal and a motion to dispense with the posting of a
cash or surety appeal bond on the ground that they were not the employers of petitioners.
NLRC RULING: Motion to exempt from filing appeal bond was DENIED for lack of merit.
Respondents were directed to post cash or surety bond. Petitioners moved for reconsideration
of the said order, arguing that the timely posting of an appeal bond is mandatory for the
perfection of an appeal and should be complied with. NLRC rendered an order dismissing the
MR.
Petitioners filed a petition in the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the
NLRC, Third Division when it allowed private respondents to post the mandated cash or
surety bond four months after the filing of their memorandum on appeal.
CA RULING: CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Is the posting of bond a four months after the filing of the memorandum of appeal
violative of the Labor
Code?
RULING:
NO. The provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code requiring the posting of bond on appeals
involving monetary
awards must be given liberal interpretation in line with the desired objective of resolving
controversies on the 3 merits. If only to achieve substantial justice, strict observance of the
reglementary periods may be relaxed if warranted. The NLRC, Third Division could not be
said to have abused its discretion in requiring the posting of bond after it denied private
respondents’ motion to be exempted therefrom.
It is true that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law
is not only mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of
making the judgment final and executory. However, technicality should not be allowed to
stand in the way of equitably and completely resolving 4 the rights and obligations of the
parties. We have allowed appeals from the decisions of the labor arbiter to the NLRC, even if
filed beyond the reglementary period, in the interest of justice.
It is only fair and just that respondent FUJI be afforded the opportunity to be heard on appeal
before the NLRC, specially in the light of labor arbiter Pati’s later decision holding FUJI
jointly and severally liable with UNIX in the payment of the monetary awards adjudged by
labor arbiter de Vera against UNIX.
YUPANGCO COTTON MILLS VS. CA
DOCTRINE:
A third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to enforce a decision against a
judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to protect its interests. The third
party may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively, and one will not preclude the
third party from availing himself of the other alternative remedies in the event he failed in the
remedy first availed of.
FACTS:
From the records before us and by petitioner’s own allegations and admission, it has taken the
following actions in connection with its claim that a sheriff of the National Labor Relations
Commission “erroneously and unlawfully levied” upon certain properties which it claims as its
own.
1.It filed a notice of third-party claim with the Labor Arbiter on May 4, 1995.
2.It filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) on July 4, 1995,
which was dismissed on August 30, 1995, by the Labor Arbiter.
3.It filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 49, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-75628 on October 6, 1995. The Regional Trial
Court dismissed the case on October 11, 1995 for lack of merit.
4.It appealed to the NLRC the order of the Labor Arbiter dated August 13, 1995 which
dismissed the appeal for lack of merit on December 8, 1995.
 5.It filed an original petition for mandatory injunction with the NLRC on November 16, 1995.
This was docketed as Case No. NLRC-NCR-IC. 0000602-95. This case is still pending with
that Commission.
6.It filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court in Manila which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 95-76395. The dismissal of this case by public respondent triggered the filing of the
instant petition.
In all of the foregoing actions, petitioner raised a common issue, which is that it is the owner
of the properties located in the compound and buildings of Artex Development Corporation,
which were erroneously levied upon by the sheriff of the NLRC as a consequence of the
decision rendered by the said Commission in a labor case docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No.
00-05-02960-90.”
CA RULING: Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition on the ground
of forum shopping and that petitioner’s remedy was to seek relief from this Court.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.
Petitioner argued that the filing of a complaint for accion reinvindicatoria with the Regional
Trial Court was proper because it is a remedy specifically granted to an owner (whose
properties were subjected to a writ of execution to enforce a decision rendered in a labor
dispute in which it was not a party) by Section 17 (now 16), Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court
and by several doctrines. Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
ISSUES:
a) Was there forum shopping in this case?
b) May a third party be precluded the from availing himself of the other alternative remedies
in the event he
failed in the remedy first availed of?
RULING:
1) FORUM SHOPPING. There is no forum-shopping where two different orders were
questioned, two distinct causes of action and issues were raised, and two objectives were
sought.
In the case at bar, there was no identity of parties, rights and causes of action and reliefs
sought. The case before the NLRC where Labor Arbiter Reyes issued a writ of execution on
the property of petitioner was a labor dispute between Artex and Samar-Anglo. Petitioner was
not a party to the case. The only issue petitioner raised before the NLRC was whether or not
the writ of execution issued by the labor arbiter could be satisfied against the property of
petitioner, not a party to the labor case.
On the other hand, the accion reinvindicatoria filed by petitioner in the trial court was to
recover the property illegally levied upon and sold at auction. Hence, the causes of action in
these cases were different.
2) THIRD PARTY CLAIM. A third party whose property has been levied upon by a sheriff to
enforce a decision against a judgment debtor is afforded with several alternative remedies to
protect its interests. The third party may avail himself of alternative remedies cumulatively,
and one will not preclude the third party from availing himself of the other alternative
remedies in the event he failed in the remedy first availed of. Thus, a third party may avail
himself of the following alternative remedies:
a) File a third party claim with the sheriff of the Labor Arbiter, and
b) If the third party claim is denied, the third party may appeal the denial to the NLRC.
The remedies above mentioned are cumulative and may be resorted to by a third-party
claimant independent of or separately from and without need of availing of the others. If a
third-party claimant opted to file a proper action to vindicate his claim of ownership, he must
institute an action, distinct and separate from that in which the judgment is being enforced,
with the court of competent jurisdiction even before or without need of filing a claim in the
court which issued the writ, the latter not being a condition sine qua non for the former. In
such proper action, the validity and sufficiency of the title of the third-party claimant will be
resolved and a writ of preliminary injunction against the sheriff may be issued.
GUICO VS. QUISUMBING
FACTS:
The case started when the Office of the Regional Director, Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE), Region I, San Fernando, La Union, received a letter-complaint
datedApril25, 1995, requesting for an investigation of petitioner's establishment, Copylandia
Services &Trading, for violation of labor standards laws. Pursuant to the visitorial and
enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representative under Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, inspections were conducted
at Copylandia's outlets on April 27 and May 2, 1995. The inspections yielded the following
violations involving twenty-one (21) employees who are copier operators: (1) underpayment
of wages; (2) underpayment of 13th month pay; and (3) no service incentive leave with pay.
 
ISSUE:
WON the Regional Director has jurisdiction over the labor standards case.
 
HELD:
Regional Director has jurisdiction over the case citing Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code,
asamended.
 
We sustain the jurisdiction of the respondent Secretary. As the respondent correctly pointed
out, this Court's ruling in Servando that the visitorial power of the Secretary of Labor to order
and enforce compliance with labor standard laws cannot be exercised where the individual
claimexceeds P5,000.00, can no longer be applied in view of the enactment of R.A. No.
7730amendingArticle 128 (b) of the Labor Code, viz: Art. 128 (b)  Notwithstanding the
provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the
relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his
duly authorizedrepresentatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect
to thelabor standards provisions of the Code and other labor legislation based on the findings
of thelabor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the
course of inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of
execution to the appropriate authority for the enforcement of their orders, except in cases
where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and enforcement officer
and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of
inspection. An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment under this article may be appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a
monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash
or surety bond issued by are putable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed
from. (Emphasis supplied.)The records of the House of Representatives show that
CongressmenAlberto S. Veloso and Eriberto V. Loreto sponsored the law. In his sponsorship
speech, Congressman Veloso categorically declared that "this bill seeks to do away with the
jurisdictional limitations imposed through said ruling (referring to Servando) and to finally
settle any lingering doubts on the visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of Labor
andEmployment."Petitioner's reliance on Servando is thus untenable.
DEL MONTE VS. SALDIVAR
SUMMARY: The Labor Arbiter refused to exercise jurisdiction over Del Monte's cross-claim
(for restitution by ALU should the company be held financially liable for dismissals). The CA
agreed with the LA. The SC held that the law precludes the LA from enforcing money claims
arising from the implementation of the CBA. Moreover, there is a provision in the CBA that
states that Voluntary Arbitrators have exclusive jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Associated Labor Union (ALU) is the exclusive bargaining agent of plantation workers of
petitioner Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (Del Monte) in Bukidnon. Respondent Nena Timbal
was a rank-and-file employee of Del Monte and also a member of ALU. Del Monte and ALU
entered into a CBA
o Section 5 of the CBA stipulated that "ALU assumes full responsibility of
any such termination of any member of the bargaining unit who loses his
membership in ALU and agrees to hold Del Monte free from any liability
by judgment of a competent authority for claims arising out of dismissals
made upon demand of ALU, and latter shall reimburse the former of such
sums as it shall have paid therefore.1
 Timbal, along with four other employees (collectively, co-
employees), were charged by ALU for disloyalty to the union
(for encouraging defections to a rival union, NFL). They
allegedly attended seminars.
 Disloyalty Board >>> Affidavit of Artajo (turns out there is bad
blood between Artajo and Timbal) >>> Disloyalty Board
nonetheless recommended the expulsion of Timbal from
membership in ALU, and likewise her dismissal from Del
Monte in accordance with the Union Security Clause in the
existing CBA >>> ALU Regional VP adopted recommendations
>>> ALU President affirmed the expulsion
 Del Monte terminated Timbal and her co-employees, noting that
the termination was "upon demand of ALU
Timbal and her co-employees filed separate complaints against Del Monte and/or its Personnel
Manager Warfredo C. Balandra and ALU with the Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice and
damages.
o The Labor Arbiter affirmed that all five were illegally dismissed and
ordered Del Monte to reinstate complainants, to their former positions and
to pay their full backwages and other allowances >>> NLRC: all validly
dismissed >>> CA: all, except Timbal, validly dismissed
Before the Labor Arbiter, Del Monte presented its cross-claim against ALU for reimbursement
should it be made liable for illegal dismissal or unfair labor practice pursuant to the union
security clause. LA ruled that it cannot validly entertain the cross-claims of respondent DMPI
and Tabusuares against the respondent ALU-TUCP because of the absence of employer-
1
employee relationship between the two.
ISSUE:
WoN the Labor Arbiter could properly pass judgment on the cross-claim
HELD: NO.
The law precludes the Labor Arbiter from enforcing money claims arising from the
implementation of the CBA. Del Monte and ALU expressly recognized the jurisdiction of
Voluntary Arbitrators in the CBA.
 Article 217 of the Labor Code sets forth the original jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters. In contrast, Article 261 of the Labor Code indubitably vests on the
Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary Arbitrators the "original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement." Among
those areas of conflict traditionally within the jurisdiction of Voluntary Arbitrators
are contract-interpretation and contract-implementation, the questions precisely
involved in Del Monte’s claim.
In reconciling the grants of jurisdiction vested under Articles 261 and 217 of the Labor Code,
the Court has pronounced that "the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
under Article 217(c) for money claims is limited only to those arising from statutes or
contracts other than a Collective Bargaining Agreement. The Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel
of Voluntary Arbitrators will have original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims
'arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
and, those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies',
under Article 261.
VELOSO VS. CHINA AIRLINES
FACTS:
Jose Pagsibigan purchased a plane ticket for a Manila-Taipei-Hongkong-Manila flight from
the Transaire Travel Agency.The said agency contacted Philippine Airlines (PAL) which at
that time was a sales and ticketing agent of China Airlines (CAL).PAL, through its ticketing
agent Roberto Espiritu, issued to Pagsibigan the plane ticket which showed that the latter had
been booked at the June 10, 1968 5:20 PM flight of China Airlines, departing from Manila for
Taipei.When Pagisibigan showed up at the airport an hour before the supposed scheduled time
of departure, he was informed that the CAL plane he was supposed to take for Taipei had left
at 10:20 AM that day.The PAL employees then made appropriate arrangements so that he
could take the PAL’s flight toTaipei the following day. Pagsibigan took the re-scheduled
flight.A few months after, he filed a complaint for moral damagesand attorney’s fees against
PAL. He alleged that Espiritu had been grossly negligent in his duties.In its defense, PAL
alleged that: (1) the departure time indicated on Pagsibigan’s plane ticket was furnished and
confirmed by CAL; and (2) CAL did not inform the issuing PAL branch of the revised
timetable of CAL flights. Hence, PAL asserted a cross-claim against CAL.CAL, for its part,
averred that: (1) all airlines, including PAL, were informed of the revised schedule of flights;
(2) notices of these revised schedule were furnished to all sales agent; and (3) the issuing PAL
branch had in fact been issuing and selling tickets based on the revised time schedule. Thus,
CAL also asserted a cross claim against PAL.
The trial court found PAL and Roberto Espiritu jointly and severally liable by way of
exemplary damages. It did not award moral damages. CAL was exonerated.CA ruled out the
claim for moral and exemplary damages, and instead awarded nominal damages.

ISSUE:
Who should be held liable?

HELD:
The SC noted that Pagsibigan has opted to seek redress by pursuing two remedies at the same
time, that is, to enforce the civil liability of CAL for breach of contract and, likewise, to
recover from PAL and Espiritu for tort or culpa aquiliana.A perusal of the complaint
of Pagisbigan will disclose that the allegations therein make out a case for a quasi-delict. Had
Pagisibigan intended to maintain an action based on breach of contract, he could  have sued
CAL alone considering that PAL is not a real party to the contractIt is thus evident that when
Pagsibigan sensed that he cannot hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict, he made a  detour on
appeal, by claiming that his action against CAL is based on breach of contract of carriage.SC
did not allow Pagsibigan to change his theory at this stage because it would be unfair for CAL
as it would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory.But
there is no basis to hold CAL liable on a quasi-delict, hence its exoneration from any liability
for fault or negligence.

With respect to PAL and Espiritu, PAL’s main defense is that is only an agent. As a  general
proposition, an agent who duly acts as such is not personally liable to third persons. However,
there are admitted exceptions, as in this case where the agent is being sued for damages arising
from a tort committed by his employee. In an action premised on the employee’s negligence,
whereby Pagsibigan seeks recovery for the damages from both PAL and Espiritu without
qualification, what is sought to be imposed is the direct and primary liability of PAL as an
employer. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the employer. This presumption,
however, may be rebutted by clear showing on the part of the employer that it has exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
employee. PAL failed to overcome such presumption. As found by CA, PAL was duly
informed of CAL’s revised schedule, and in fact, PAL had been issuing and selling ticket
based on said revised time schedule. For his negligence, Espiritu is primarily liable
to Pagisbigan under Article 2176 of the CC. For the failure of PAL to rebut the legal
presumption of negligence, it is also primarily liable under Article 2180 of CC. Under Article
2180, all that is required is that the employee, by his negligence, committed a quasi-delict
which caused damage to another, and this suffices to hold the employer primarily and
solidarily liable for the tortious act of the employee. PAL, however, can demand from Espiritu
reimbursement of the amount which it will have to pay the offended party’s claim.

DBP VS. NLRC