9/22/2020 3:26 PM

Marilyn Burgess - District Clerk Harris County

Envelope No. 46467197
By: Charlie Keys
Filed: 9/22/2020 3:26 PM

CAUSE NO. 2020-47658

MEMORIAL PARK MEDICAL § IN THE DISTRICT COURT

CENTER, INC.; and §
WILLIAM W. RUTH, §
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Plaintiffs, §

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v. §
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§ HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS

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STEWART TITLE GUARANTY §
COMPANY; THE BROWN COUNTY §

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ABSTRACT COMPANY, INC.; §

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BERT V. MASSEY II; and §
E. RAY WEST III, §

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Defendants. § 270TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

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DEFENDANT STEWART TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY’S
MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE
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Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 86, and before any other answer or pleading is
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filed, Defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Company (“STGC”) presents this Motion to Transfer
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Venue and would respectfully show the Court as follows:

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I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

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The current live pleading—the First Amended Petition—of Plaintiffs Memorial Park
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Medical Center, Inc. and William W. Ruth contains a lengthy recitation of a convoluted local
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dispute, but a cursory review of that pleading shows that the dispute has no connection to Harris
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County. In fact, the First Amended Petition establishes that all of the relevant operative conduct
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about which Plaintiffs complain occurred in Brown County.

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As more fully explained below, The First Amended Petition describes a series of events

involving Plaintiffs (who reside or are located in Brown County and Gillespie County, Texas)

and the other defendants in this case (all of whom reside or are located in Brownwood, Brown

County, Texas). See First Am. Pet. ¶¶ 2-3 & 5-7. The events originally stem from a transaction in
which Plaintiffs refinanced property located at 2400 Crockett Drive in Brownwood, Brown

County, Texas. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiffs complain that, in connection with that refinancing, Defendant

Brown County Abstract Company, Inc. (“Brown County Abstract”) and Defendants Bert V.

Massey II and E. Ray West III (“Massey and West”) failed to obtain the release of a lien in the

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amount of $19,275.13 on Plaintiffs’ Brown County property. The lien was obtained by non-party

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John Green (and his attorney, non-party Robert Reich). The alleged failure to obtain the release

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of the lien has led to a protracted series of events in Brown County that form the basis of this

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suit. See id. ¶¶ 13, 15-23; see also infra (discussing same).

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STGC is only mentioned because it allegedly underwrote a title insurance policy issued

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in connection with the refinancing. But as Brown County Abstract notes in its Motion to Transfer
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Venue, Brown County Abstract “did not issue any owner policy to Plaintiffs on the
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transaction involved here.” See Brown County Abstract’s Motion to Transfer Venue, p. 2 (filed
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September 11, 2020) (emphasis in original).

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Indeed, the Petition refers to an STGC title insurance policy with a policy number of “M-
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5967-000000431.” See First Am. Pet. ¶ 16. STGC specifically denies that either Plaintiff was an
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insured under or party to any policy of title insurance. This is because STGC policies that begin
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with an “M” are “mortgagee” policies (i.e., lender policies). Such policies provide indemnity
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coverage to lenders in loan and refinance transactions if there is a covered defect in the validity
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or priority of the lien a lender is insured to have on specified property. Plaintiffs claim they were
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the borrowers in the refinancing transaction. They were not an insured under any title insurance
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policy underwritten by STGC.

Additionally, as discussed below, STGC specifically denies the suggestion that STGC

took or failed to take other wrongful action(s) in connection with this case. Those suggestions are

not properly pleaded venue allegations; they are instead impermissibly vague and conclusory and
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do not suffice to properly plead that venue is proper in Harris County. STGC has its headquarters

in Harris County, but that fact alone is insufficient to establish that venue is proper given the

venue allegations in the First Amended Petition. There is no other well-pleaded allegation of an

act or omission that occurred in Harris County.

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Thus, as explained below, venue is not proper in Harris County under the general venue

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rule of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 15.002(a) that Plaintiffs invoke, see First Am.

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Pet. ¶ 10, because neither all nor a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the

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claims asserted in this suit occurred in Harris County. Nor does this case fall under any

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permissive venue or mandatory venue exception properly raised by Plaintiffs’ pleading.

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However, venue is proper in Brown County, Texas, because all or a substantial part of the events
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or omissions giving rise to the claims asserted in this suit occurred in Brown County. This Court
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should hence transfer this case to Brown County.

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Separately, this Court may transfer this case to Brown County for the convenience of the
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parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
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§ 15.002(b). For the reasons set out below, the relevant factors compel the conclusion that this
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case does not belong here, but should be transferred to Brown County.
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II. TRANSFER BECAUSE VENUE IS IMPROPER IN THIS COURT

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A. The Facts in Plaintiffs’ Pleading Fail to a Plead a Connection to Harris County.

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As noted above, this case originally arises from a transaction in which Plaintiffs
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refinanced property in Brownwood, Brown County, Texas, but Defendants Brown County
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Abstract, Massey, and West supposedly failed to obtain the release of a lien on Plaintiffs’

property that non-party John Green (and his attorney, non-party Robert Reich) had obtained. The

First Amended Petition then describes a drawn-out series of events that give rise to the claims

Plaintiffs assert in this case.

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 Specifically, Plaintiffs maintain that the failure to obtain the lien release led to further

legal proceedings in Brown County between Green (and Reich) on the one hand and Plaintiffs on

the other hand. Those further proceedings in turn led to (a) Plaintiff Ruth being “committed to

confinement for thirty (30) days” in Brown County for his “failure to pay attorney’s fees and

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provide post judgment discovery responses to Reich,” see First Am. Pet. ¶ 36, and (b) the

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publication in an online publication called “the Brown County Watchdawg” (published by non-

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party Joe Cooksey) of an account of (i) the dispute between Green and Plaintiffs and (ii) Ruth’s

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arrest by law enforcement authorities. That publication supposedly “conveyed to thousands of

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residents of Brown County” an account of disputes involving Plaintiffs, allegedly damaging

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Ruth’s reputation. Id. ¶¶ 40-42.
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Apart from the evident connection of this case to Brown County, STGC specifically
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denies the allegations of venue facts in the First Amended Petition. In particular, STGC denies
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(a) that either Plaintiff made a claim on the lender policy that was allegedly issued and (b) that
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either Plaintiff asked that STGC address the existence of or obtain the release of the alleged lien
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in favor of Green on Plaintiffs’ property. Similarly, STGC denies that it took, failed to take, or
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had knowledge of any of the actions or failures to act about which Plaintiffs otherwise complain,
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including allegedly failing to assist Plaintiffs and/or assisting Green in connection with litigation
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between Plaintiffs and Green in Travis County, or assisting Green in subsequent judicial
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proceedings in Brown County. See generally id. ¶¶ 24-56.

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B. The Court Should Transfer This Case Because Venue is Improper in Here.
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Under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 15.063, a court “shall transfer an action

to another county of proper venue” if the county “in which the action is pending is not a proper

county as provided by” Chapter 15 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. Here, venue is not

proper under the general venue rule of Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 15.002(a) upon
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which Plaintiffs rely, because neither all nor a substantial part of the events or omissions giving

rise to the claims asserted in this suit occurred in Harris County. Nor does this case fall under

any permissive venue or mandatory venue exception properly raised by Plaintiffs’ pleading.

As set out above, none of the operative facts about which Plaintiffs complain occurred in

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Harris County. The conduct about which Plaintiffs complain occurred in Brown County. The

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only reference to Harris County is the fact that STGC has its corporate headquarters there, but

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there is no well pleaded allegation that any act or omission occurred there. Plaintiffs plead that

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venue is proper in Harris County under § 15.002 because “all or a substantial part of the events

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giving rise to this lawsuit occurred in, should have been defended against, and/or stemmed from

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Harris County.” See First Am. Pet. ¶ 10. However, under the facts of this case, this conclusory
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allegation is insufficient to establish that venue is proper in this Court. Under Texas Rule of Civil
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Procedure 87.3, where—as here—venue facts are specifically denied, “the party pleading the
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venue fact must make prima facie proof of that venue fact.” Plaintiffs cannot satisfy their burden.
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Plaintiffs’ venue allegation also refers to Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code
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§ 15.032, which concerns venue for suits against certain insurers. See id. However, that venue
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statute by its express terms only refers to “fire, marine, [and] inland insurance companies,” as
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well as “life, health, and accident” insurance. Title insurance is a separate form of insurance that
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is not covered by § 15.032. See Tex. Ins. Code tit. 11 (statutory title addressing title insurance).
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As has been explained, venue is proper in Brown County, because a substantial part of
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the events or omissions giving rise to the claims asserted in this suit occurred in that county.
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This Court should transfer this case to Brown County.

III. TRANSFER FOR CONVENIENCE UNDER § 15.002(b).

Alternatively and additionally, this Court should transfer this case to Brown County

under Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code § 15.002(b) for the convenience of the parties and

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witnesses and in the interest of justice. The balance of interests strongly favors this case

proceeding in Brown County instead of Harris County.

Under § 15.002(b), a court may transfer an action to a county of proper venue “for the

convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice” where: (1) maintenance of

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the action in the county of suit would work an injustice to the movant; (2) the balance of interests

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of all the parties predominates in favor of the action being brought in the other county; and

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(3) the transfer of the action would not work an injustice to any other party.

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Here, the convenience of the parties and witnesses and the interest of justice favor

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transfer.

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First, the parties are centered in Brown County. The First Amended Petition shows that
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Plaintiff Memorial Park Medical Center, Inc. has its principal office in Brown County, see First
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Am. Pet. ¶ 2; Plaintiff Ruth has substantial dealings in Brown County, see, e.g., id. ¶ 38 (noting
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Ruth’s presence in Brown County); and Defendants Brown County Abstract, Massey, and West
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are all residents of Brown County as well. See id. ¶¶ 5-7.

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Moreover, witnesses to the events described in Plaintiffs’ pleading—including witnesses

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for Brown County Abstract, witnesses relating to Plaintiffs’ allegations concerning his
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detainment for contempt of court, and witnesses relating to the publication in Brown County of
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accounts of Plaintiffs’ disputes with others and alleged harm to Plaintiff Ruth’s reputation in
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Brown County—all point to Brown County being a more convenient venue for the witnesses.
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All of the operative facts—including facts relating to Green’s underlying judgment

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against Plaintiffs—occurred in Brown County. No events related to this suit occurred in Harris

County.

In this situation, maintenance of this suit here would impose a hardship on the parties

and, perhaps more significantly, the witnesses who the pleadings show will be relevant to his
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suit. Because discoverable documents and witnesses are located in Brown County, where all of

the operative facts occurred, this Court should transfer this case to where it could have—and

should have—been brought. Moreover, transfer of this case to Brown County would not work a

hardship on Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs have been parties to other cases in Brown County. See First Am.

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Pet. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs’ tactic of seeking a different forum because they have apparently not found

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success in prior matters that have been heard in Brown County is no justification for imposing a

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burden and hardship on the other parties in this case.

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Accordingly, in addition to transferring venue to Brown County because Harris County is

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not a proper venue, transfer is appropriate under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code

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§ 15.002(b), because Brown County is a more convenient venue for than Harris County.
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IV. CONCLUSION
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For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Stewart Title Guaranty Company prays that the
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Court grant its motion and transfer this case to Brown County, Texas, and grant STGC such
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other and further relief, at law or in equity, to which it may show itself justly entitled.
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Respectfully submitted,
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/s/ John A. Koepke

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John A. Koepke
Texas State Bar No. 11653200
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Scott M. McElhaney
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Texas State Bar No. 00784555

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JACKSON WALKER L.L.P.

2323 Ross Ave., Ste. 600
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Dallas, Texas 75201

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(214) 953-6000
(214) 953-5822 (facsimile)
jkoepke@jw.com
smcelhaney@jw.com

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 Jennifer A. Bryant
Texas State Bar No. 03276600
1401 McKinney Street, Suite 1900
Houston, Texas 77010
(713) 752-4211
(713) 308-4105 (facsimile)
jbryant@jw.com

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ATTORNEYS FOR STEWART TITLE
GUARANTY COMPANY

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has been e-served

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on counsel of record in accordance with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure on the 22nd day of
September, 2020, including:

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Thane Tyler Sponsel III Gina Viccinelli

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Allen Landon Cameron Salehi
Sponsel Miller Greenberg PLLC Bu
Hermes Law
50 Briar Hollow Lane, Suite 370 West 2001 N. Lamar St., Suite 450
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Houston, Texas 77027 Dallas, Texas 75202
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sponsel@smglawgroup.com gina@hermes-law.com
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allen.landon@smglawgroup.com cameron@hermes-law.com
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Paul J. McConnell, III Cory S. Reed

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R. Travis Piper Thompson Coe Cousins & Irons, LLP

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De Lange, Hudspeth, One Riverway, Suite 1400

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McConnell & Tibbets, LLP Houston, Texas 77056

1177 West Loop South, Suite 1700 creed@thompsoncoe.com
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Houston, Texas 77027

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pmcconnell@dhmtlaw.com
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tpiper@dhmtlaw.com
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/s/ John A. Koepke

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John A. Koepke
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