DIGESTS:

1. People v. Galleno 291 Scra 761

Facts:
    The victim Evelyn ObligarGarganera a 5-year old together with her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, live
under the care and custody of their uncle, EmetarioObligar, and aunt, PenicolaObligar.The accused-appellant,
is 19-year old JoeralGalleno.  On August 16, 1994, Emetario and Penicola left their residence to work at
sugarcane plantation and  the only persons left in the house were Evelyn and Eleazar.
    At around 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Galleno passed by the  Obligars' residence and found the two children
left to themselves. The prosecution and the defense presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said
residence. However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a laceration in her vagina which result in
profuse, life-threatening bleeding due to her tender age.
    For the prosecution, the victim herself testified that Galleno took advantage of the situation by sexually
molesting her. After lowering her shorts, he made Evelyn  sit on his lap, facing him. The penetration caused the
child's vagina to bleed, making her cry in pain. Emeterio and Penicola also testified that when they came home
from work, they arrived to find Evelyn crying. Emetario noticed that there was blood in Evelyn's dress and she
was pressing a rug against her genital organ. Dr. Alfonso D. Orosco, the Rural Health Physician reported, upon
examining Evelyn, that he found (1) clotted blood, and (2) a  vaginal laceration.
    On August 18, 1994, Emeterio brought Evelyn to the Roxas Memorial General Hospital were she was
examined by resident physician Dr. Ma. Lourdes Lañada.  Dr. Lañada, testified that she found that "there was
a 3 cm. lacerated wound at the left anterior one-third of the vagina" and "the pressence of about 10-15cc of
blood" at the vaginal vault.  Dr. Lañada recommended that evelyn be admitted for confinement in the hospital
because the wound in her vagina, which was bleeding, had to be repaired.  The following day, Evelyn was
examined at  Roxas Memorial General Hospital again where she was attended to by Dr. Machael Toledo, the
resident physician on duty, who found blood clots and minimal bleeding in the genital area. Dr. Toledo " …
pack(ed) the area to prevent further bleeding and (he) … admitted the patient for possible repair of the
laceration and blood transfusion because she  has anaemia 2ndary to bleeding."
    The trial deemed the following circumstances significant in finding accused-appellant culpable for the crime
of Statutory Rape.
    Hence, the instant appeal and review.

Issue:
The Trial Court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the medical doctors.

Ruling:
    As a general rule, witnesses must state facts and not draw conclusions or give opinions. It is the court's duty
to draw conclusions from the evidence and form opinions upon the facts proved.  However, conclusions and
opinions of witnesses are received in many cases, and are not confined to expert testimony, based on the
principle that either because of the special skill or expert knowledge of the witness, or because of the nature of
the subject matter under observation, of for other reasons, the testimony will aid the court in reaching a
judgment.
    In the case at bar, the trial court arrived at its conclusions not only with the aid of the expert testimony of
doctors who gave their opinions as to the possible cause of the victim's laceration, but also the testimony the
victim herself.  In other words, the trial court did not rely solely on the testimony of the expert witnesses.  Such
expert testimony merely aided the trial court in the exercise of its judgment on the facts.  Hence, the fact that
the experts enumerated various possible causes of the victim's laceration does not mean the trial court's
interference is wrong.
    As regards the inconsistencies in Evelyn's declaration, particularly as to what really caused the laceration,
we are convinced that the child, due to her tender age, was just confused.
    As regards accused-appellant's argument that the victim's testimony is just a concocted story of what really
happened, we apply the rule that the revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full
credence (People vs. Cagto, 253 SCRA 455 [1996]). We likewise consider the fact that her uncle and aunt,
virtually her foster parents, themselves support her story of rape. It is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring
as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma (People vs.
Dones,supra.)

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant justified by the evidence on record, the assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

2. People vs. Salafranca, 666 SCRA 501, 511, Feb 22, 2012

Facts:
Johnny Bolanon  (Bolanon) was stabbed by Rodrigo Salafranca (Salafranca) on the night of July 31, 1993,
after the said incident, the assailant ran away. Bolanon still being able to walk, went to his uncle, Rodolfo B.
Estaño to seek help. After having known of the incident, Estaño then brought Bolanon to PGH. On their way to
the hospital on board a taxi, Bolanon confided to Estaño about the incident and told him that it was Salafranca
who stabbed him and a certain Augusto Mendoza witnessed the said incident.  At around 2:30am, despite
receiving medical attention, Bolanon succumbed to death.

ISSUE:
Whether the utterance of Bolanonis qualified as a dying declaration or part of the res gestae?

RULING:
Such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae, the Court has
recognized that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and right after the incident bore all the
earmarks either of a dying declaration or part of the res gestae.
Generally, dying declaration is inadmissible as evidence being hearsay, however, it may be admitted when the
following requisites concur:
 (a) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;
 (b) that at the time the declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of an impending death;
 (c) that the declarant is competent as a witness;  and 
 (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is
a victim.

All the requisites were met. Bolanon communicated his statements, identifying Salafranca as the person who
had stabbed him; that at the time of his declaration, he was conscious of his impending death. Bolanon died in
the emergency room a few minutes after admission, which occurred under three hours after the incident.
 Furthermore, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence when the following
requisites concur: 
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
 (b) the statements are made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

          The requisites for admissibility as part of the res gestae concur herein. That when he gave the identity of
the assailant, Bolanon was referring to a startling occurrence, and had no time to contrive his identification. His
utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to such startling occurrence. The statement was
relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.
Hence, such circumstances are qualified as both a dying declaration and a part of res gestae for having borne
the requisites of the both principles.

3. SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP vs ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, GR. No. 177809, 16 Oct
2009.

FACTS:
Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino
Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Parañaque City. On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses
Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by
Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court may take judicial notice of practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran
area.

RULING:

NO. On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to ₱2,570,000.00, we hold
that the practice of payment of goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or
discretionary on the courts. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The
power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain;
and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in
determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. To say that a court
will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be
dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the
matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere
personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his
individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial
cognizance is taken only of those matters which are "commonly" known. Things of "common knowledge," of
which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and
are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which
may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the
common knowledge of every person. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material
requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and
authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and
facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in
that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate
and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable. Things of
"common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men
generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted
by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are
universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded
as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and
wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge.
But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge. From the foregoing provisions of law and
our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of does not
meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay
goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling
in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of "common knowledge" or notoriously known. We note that the
RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim
that the amount of ₱2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie
attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other
stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we
emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule
129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain
matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.

4. BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX
APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
( ANG DAMING BPI V CA SIR WALANG SCRA NO UNG BINIGAY SO DI KO ALAM ALIN SA MGA
CASES ITO)

5. BPI vs Reyes, 544 SCRA 206

FACTS:

On December 7, 1990, respondent Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter, went to BPI Zapote
Branch to open an ATM account.
Respondent informed one of petitioners employees, Mr. Capati, that they wanted to open an ATM
account for the amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting
savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will be
given by her in cash.

Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from
her existing savings account with said bank and the respondent believing in good faith that Capati
prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.

Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the respondent was
seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.

Respondent explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and then changed
and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the
change, afterwhich the amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of
P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter
Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the name of resondentJesusa Reyes with the new
account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the teller's booth.

After a while, he returned and handed to the respondent her duplicate copy of her deposit to account
no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as
the date.

Later on, respondent would become aware that her ATM account only contained the amount of
P100,000.00 with interest. Hence, she filed an action before the RTC.

Petitioner claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the transactions which happened on
December 7, 1990 as contained in the bank’s teller tape.

On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision upholding the versions of respondents.

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision with modification

ISSUE:

Whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit
of P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.

HELD:

It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by
the degree of evidence required by law. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must
establish his case by preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of greater weight or is
more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means
that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other side, and that the probability of
truth is on one side than on the other.

For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the
judge who had heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the
decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would
not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility of witnesses on the basis of their
demeanor.

Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and
examined the pieces of evidence on record.

After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we find
that respondents failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa
made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.

6. Sison vs. People, 250 SCRA 58, 75

FACTS:
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified
as Marcos loyalists charging them with the murder of Salcedo. The cases were consolidated. All of the
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented
twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, and the police
officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the
prosecution likewise presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident
and various photographs taken during the mauling.

The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by
the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was denied
by the authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them gathered at the Rizal Monument of the
Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega, both
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest,
recited prayers and delivered speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy
Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. No permit
could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist
leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear
gas and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and
threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa Street and the situation later
stabilized.

At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the
Luneta. There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos,
jogging around the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer
angrily ordered them. Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting. The loyalists replied. A
few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody then shouted "Kailangang
gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists
attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt. He then saw a
man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons. The man in the yellow t-shirt was
Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked
and mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and
pummelled him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo
Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he
could extricate Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with
stones in their fists. Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's
attackers. They backed off for a while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But
accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head.
Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was
already fallen. Salcedo tried to stand but accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and
ear. Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape. Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the
latter lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked
him as he once more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head,
and when he tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him. Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach
the victim but did not notice what he did.

Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. He sat
on some cement steps and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal
Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process.
Salcedo pleaded for his life.

The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo
collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer,
brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to the
Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.

Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions, abrasions,

lacerated wounds and skull fractures.

The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign.
The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the following day,
capturing national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital
Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident.

For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and
offered their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the
photographs presented by the prosecution because he was in his house in Quezon City. Gerry Neri
claimed that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the incident. Romeo Sison, a commercial
photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at
that time. He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do
things forcefully. Richard de los Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but
denies hitting Salcedo. He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why his face
appeared in some of the photographs. Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a
Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that
fateful day. According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely
viewed the incident. His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting
Salcedo. Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The
maulers however ignored him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the photographs taken by the victim are admissible as evidence for lack of proper
identification by the person or persons who took the same.

RULING:

YES. The photographs taken by the victim are admissible as evidence.

Photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta — starting from a grassy
portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, — as he was being
chased by his assailants and as he sat pleading with his assailants. Photographs of Salcedo and the
mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the Philippine Star, Mr. and Ms.
Magazine, Philippine Daily Inquirer, and the Malaya.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were
produced. The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of
the original, and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the
crime. The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken.
The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved
prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after
which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be
identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and
accuracy.

This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants,
through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification.
However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused
Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used such Exhibits to prove that his clients were not in any of the
pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. The photographs were
adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at
this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective
counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the
photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. No objection was made by
counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a
continuing objection to their admissibility.

The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the
person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these
photographs by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an
admission of the exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of
the mauling incident was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan
identified themselves therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat.

An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the
appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various
belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. Appellant Romeo Sison appears only
once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the victim. Appellant Joselito
Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs
does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo
but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they
were unequivocally identified by Sumilang and Banculo Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome
their eyeball identification.
7. People vs. Larranaga, 463 SCRA 652

FACTS:
On the rainy night of July 16, 1997, Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong, sisters, failed to come home on the
expected time. Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff in Tan-awan,
Carcar Cebu. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled down.
Her face and neck were covered with masking tape, and attached to her left wrist was a handcuff. The
woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and
admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified appellants
Francisco Juan Larrañaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Caño, Ariel Balansag, James
Anthony Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia provided the following before
the trial court:

that he met Rowen and Josman at Ayala Mall at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, who told him to
ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larrañaga, James Anthony and James Andrew, who
were in a red car. Josman stopped in front of the waiting shed where Marijoy and Jacqueline were
standing, and were then forced to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them
jointly,
that after stopping by a safehouse at Guadalupe, Cebu City, the group thereafter headed to the South
Bus Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They
traveled towards Tan-awan, leaving the red car at the South Bus Terminal,
that after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they started
to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jacqueline,
thatJosman instructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine, and
that they made fun of Jacqueline, who was made to run while being followed by the group while
boarding the van; and was beaten until she passed out.

In his defense, Larrañaga, through his witnesses, claimed the following:

that on July 16, 1997, he was at Quezon City taking his mid-term examinations at the Center for
Culinary Arts,that he also attended his teacher’s lecture in Applied Mathematics,
that in the evening of that day until 3:00 in the morning of July 17, 1997, he was with his friends at the R
& R Bar and Restaurant, Quezon City,
that representatives of four airline companies plying the route of Manila-Cebu-Manila presented proofs
showing that Larrañaga does not appear in their records from July 15 to July 17, 1997, and
that his neighbors at Loyola Heights Condominium, Quezon City, including the security guard saw him
in his condo unit in the evening of July 16, 1997.
The brothers James Anthony and James Andrew claimed that they were at their home in Cebu City,
celebrating their father’s 50th birthday, which ended at 11:30 in the evening.

Alberto and Ariel claimed that they had the van’s aircon repaired in the evening of July 16, 1997,
accompanied by the former’s wife and the owners of the van. The repair shop was only able to finish
the work at 10:00 the following morning.

Josman claimed that he was at his house together with his friends about 8:00 in the evening of July 16,
1997, ate dinner and drank, and thereafter went to BAI Disco, transferred to DTM Bar, and went home
at 3:00 the following morning.

Rusia was discharged as an accused and became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was
never found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusionesperpetua. The
appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that there was
consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were
committed.

ISSUES:
1) Whether there was conspiracy.
2) Whether the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether the trial court erred in imposing the correct penalty.

HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated,
or may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and
community of interest. The appellants’ actions showed that they had the same objective to kidnap and
detain the Chiong sisters. The Court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the appellants indeed
conspired in the commission of the crimes charged.
 2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the
resulting crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when
the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will change from
complex crime to special complex crime. In the present case, the victims were raped and subjected to
dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court held that all the appellants were guilty of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the
victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of Jacqueline.

3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable penalty
to the offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old
when the crimes were committed. As penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious
illegal detention with homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be imposed should be reclusion
perpetua. On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion
perpetua to death. One degree lower from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be reclusion
temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With regard to the rest
of the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above should be imposed. Therefore, trial court
erred in merely imposing “two (2) reclusionesperpetua”.

8. People vs. Ganduma, 160 SCRA 799

FACTS:

Should an accused who admittedly shot the victim but is shown to have inflicted only a slight wound be held accountable for the death of the victim
due to a fatal wound caused by his co-accused? This is the focal issue addressed to this Court in this case.

In an Information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, 6th Judicial District on May 14, 1973,
Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute, herein petitioner, Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza, also a petitioner, Eden Ng y
Dumantay and Joselito "Boy" Santiago were charged with murder for the death of one Manuel Esteban, Jr.
due to multiple gun shot wounds on March 23, 1972.

After arraignment, with all the accused entering a plea of not guilty, and the trial on the merits. Finding
accused Eliseo Araneta, Jr. y Macute and Benjamin Bautista y Mendoza guilty beyond reasonable doubt .

On February 20, 1976, the appellate court rendered its decision affirming the decision of the trial court with
modification as to the civil liability of petitioners .

ISSUe;

Whether the findings of respondent court is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures,   that the judgment 20

is based on a misapprehension of facts,   and that there was grave abuse of discretion   to justify a review of the
21 22

findings of facts of respondent court.

RULING:

an examination of the records reveals that there are other circumstances upon which the respondent court based its
conclusion that petitioner Bautista fired his gun, thus —

a) The ballistics results show that the gun of appellant Bautista was newly oiled. Specifically the
finding was that it has "traces of thick oil." Appellant Bautista failed to refute the prosecution
evidence that his gun at the time of his examination in the morning of March 23, 1972, was newly
oiled. Neither did he explain the presence of thick oil in his gun. His obvious purpose of oiling his gun
is to remove traces of gun powder.

b) The ballistics test itself shows that one chamber in the gun of Bautista was found to have smoke
rings. Smoke rings, according to the testimony of the ballistics expert, appears in the chamber of a
revolver whose bullet was fired. Only one chamber had smoke rings. The other five chambers do not
have any. This shows that appellant Bautista fired only one shot which is in accordance with the
testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The lame explanation of Bautista that the said smoke
ring is attributable to the fact that in the month of February he participated in quelling student
demonstrations, fails to explain why, despite the fact that his gun is newly oiled, said smoke ring was
still present at that time. The obvious conclusion is that because he was racing against time,
Bautista forgot, in his desire to exculpate himself, to clean the inner chamber of his service revolver. 24
These circumstances are nevertheless of no moment because of the positive identification of petitioner Bautista as
the person who shot the victim by the prosecution witness Eduardo Saguil. Petitioner, however, discounts the
testimony of Saguil for the reason that he gave two (2) conflicting statements — one before the Manila Metropolitan
Police (MMP) given on March 23, 1972 wherein he failed to identify the person who fired the fatal shot and the other
before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on March 24, 1972 wherein he identified petitioner as the
assailant.

This apparent inconsistency in the statements of Saguil was satisfactorily explained at the trial during his direct and
cross examinations. He testified that he had no choice but to sign the sworn statements given before the MMP
because he was intimidated by the investigating officers who did not want him to implicate petitioner Bautista as the
person who shot the victim since petitioner was their comrade. In fact, when he insisted that it was Bautista who
shot the victim, the investigating officer Rolando Atanacio stopped the taking down of the statement and instead
indicated therein that Saguil refused to continue with the same. It is for this reason that Saguil together with another
prosecution witness Jaime Roque decided to proceed to the NBI to give another sworn statement this time
disclosing the whole truth.

We sustain the trial court's conclusion on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses Saguil and Roque,   as it is in a
26

better position to decide the question, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
behavior and manner of testifying.  The impressions of the court a quo on this matter is binding upon Us unless
27

there appears a grave abuse of discretion or an obvious misapprehension of facts.   The trial court noted that "no
28

evil or bad motive was shown to have existed before the incident which would prompt Roque and Saguil to testify in
the manner they did if such were not the fact.   The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the
29

principal witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain no improper motive existed and their testimony is
worthy of full faith and credit.   Hence, the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses that he was at the crime
30

scene at the inception of the incident and pointing to him as the person who confronted and last shot the victim
together with all the attendant circumstances cannot be overcome by the mere denials of petitioner Bautista.  31

As We uphold the factual findings of the respondent court, We therefore rule that petitioner should be held liable for
the death of the victim by inflicting the fatal wound upon him.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 20, 1976 affirming with modification the
decision of the trial court 

9. People vs. Malimit, 264 SCRA 167

FACTS:

Appellant Jose Encarnacion Malimit, charged with and convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, was meted by the trial court the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Onofre Malaki the sum of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the cost.

On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was attending to his store. Malaki's
houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen located at the
back of the store.

Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Rondon was to purchase chemical
for his rice farm. Rondon came from his house, approximately 150 meters distant from Malaki's store.

Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his
employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he
saw appellant coming out of the store with a bolo, while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on
the floor "struggling for his life" (hovering between life and death).

Rondon, who was outside and barely 5 meters away from the store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit (or
"Manolo") rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo. Aided by the
illumination coming from a pressure lamp ("petromax") inside the store, Rondon clearly recognized Malimit.

Batin immediately went out of the store to seek help. Outside the store, he met Rondon. After a brief
conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law Eutiquio Beloy and
informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, went back to the store. Inside,
they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor. Beloy readily noticed that the
store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket.

ISSUE: Whether or not the admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet together with its contents, viz., (1)
Malaki's residence certificate; (2) his identification card; and (3) bunch of keys, violates his right against self-
incrimination.

RULING:
NO. The admission as evidence of Malaki's wallet together with its contents, viz., (1) Malaki's residence
certificate; (2) his identification card; and (3) bunch of keys, does not violate his right against self-incrimination.
The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case.

This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. It does not apply to the instant
case where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.
Wigmore, discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence, thus, said:

If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal utterances,
but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut
himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in
evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and compelling the surrender
of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is
the kernel of the privilege, . . . but testimonial compulsion.

The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by
law or rules, is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. Concededly,
appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the investigating
policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these rights in
accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not affect the
admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of establishing
other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet
taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys found
inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki.
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not
detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing
appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.

Appellant's insistence that he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance while gathering shells along the
seashore, and that he feared being implicated in the crime for which reason he hid the wallet underneath a
stone, hardly inspires belief. The Court is at a loss, just as the trial court was, as to why appellant should fear
being implicated in the crime if indeed he merely found Malaki's wallet by chance. No inference can be drawn
from appellant's purported apprehension other than the logical conclusion that appellant had knowledge of the
crime. Besides, proof that appellant is in possession of a stolen property gives rise to a valid presumption that
he stole the same.

In fine, as the killing of Malaki took place on the occasion of robbery, appellant was correctly convicted of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code.

10. People vs. Enojas, G.R. No. 204894 March 10, 2014

FACTS:

PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall when they
spotted a suspiciously parked taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas and asked for his documents.
Having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they invited him in their mobile
car to the police station for further questioning. Enojas complied leaving his taxi behind. Upon reaching 7-11 on
Zapote-Alabang Road, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there. As he
approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and a shootout ensued. PO2
Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at PO2
Pangilinan causing his death. PO2 Gregorio was also engaged in a shootout with two more armed robbers
who managed to escape. He then went back to the patrol car and noticed that Enojas fled. Suspecting that
Enojas was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched his abandoned taxi and found a mobile phone
apparently left behind by Enojas. The police officers monitored the incoming messages and posed as Enojas.
The accused appellants were later on arrested in an entrapment operation and were convicted of murder by
RTC Las Pinas.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the evidence of the text messages were inadmissible, not having been properly identified.
2. Whether or not circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to attain a conviction.

RULING:
1. As to the admissibility of the text messages, the RTC admitted them in conformity with the Court’s earlier
Resolution applying the Rules on Electronic Evidence to criminal actions. Text messages are to be proved by
the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge of them. Here, PO3 Cambi,
posing as the accused Enojas, exchanged text messages with the other accused in order to identify and entrap
them. As the recipient of those messages sent from and to the mobile phone in his possession, PO3 Cambi
had personal knowledge of such messages and was competent to testify on them.

2. This may be true but the prosecution could prove their liability by circumstantial evidence that meets the
evidentiary standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. It has been held that circumstantial evidence is
sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

Here the totality of the circumstantial evidence the prosecution presented sufficiently provides basis for the
conviction of all the accused.

11. People vs. Dahil, G.R. 212196, 12 Jan 2015

FACTS:

On October 1, 2002, Dahil and Castro were charged in three (3) separate Informations before the RTC with
violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the sale of 26.8098 grams of marijuana.

Evidence of the prosecution tended to show that, for a couple of weeks, the agents of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region 3, conducted surveillance and casing operations relative to the
information they received that a certain alias "Buddy" and alias "Mel" were trafficking dried marijuana in TB
Pavilion, Marisol Subdivision, Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City. On September 29, 2002, the Chief of
PDEA formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team was composed of four (4) police officers,
namely, Sergeant Juanito dela Cruz (Sergeant dela Cruz), as team leader; and PO2 Corpuz, SPO1 Licu and
PO2 Javiar, as members. PO2 Corpuz was designated as the poseurbuyer while SPO1 Licu was assigned as
his back-up.

In his defense, Dahil claimed that on September 29, 2002, a tricycle driver came looking for him after he had
arrived home. He saw the tricycle driver with another man already waiting for him. He was then asked by the
unknown man whether he knew a certain Buddy in their place. He answered that there were many persons
named Buddy. Suddenly, persons alighted from the vehicles parked in front of his house and dragged him into
one of the vehicles. He was brought to Clark Air Base and was charged with illegal selling and possession of
marijuana.

For his part, Castro testified thaton September 29, 2002, he was on 4th Street of Marisol, Barangay Ninoy
Aquino, Angeles City, watching a game of chess when he was approached by some men who asked if he
knew a certain Boy residing at Hardian Extension. He then replied that he did not know the said person and
then the men ordered him to board a vehicle and brought him to Clark Air Base where he was charged with
illegal possession of marijuana.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the law enforcement officers substantially complied with the chain of custody
procedure required by R.A. No. 9165.

RULING:

The strict procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with.

A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven to
be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in
secrecy, a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the
framers of the law. It is susceptible topolice abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for
extortion.

The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in every
prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the
dangerous drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the items offered in court were
the same substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known under
R.A. No. 9165 as the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
In People v. Catalan, the Court said: To discharge its duty of establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the Prosecution must prove the corpus delicti. That proof is vital
to a judgment of conviction. On the other hand, the Prosecution does not comply with the
indispensable requirement of proving the violation of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 when the
dangerous drugs are missing but also when there are substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the
seized dangerous drugs that raise doubts about the authenticity of the evidence presented in court.

As a means of ensuring the establishment of the chain of custody, Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165
specifies that:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photographthe same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof.

Specifically, Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9165 enumerates the procedures to be observed by the apprehending officers to confirm the chain of
custody, to wit:

x x x(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrantis served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; x x x

The strict procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with. Although the
prosecution offered in evidence the Inventory of the Property Seized signed by the arresting officers
and Kagawad Pamintuan, the procedures provided in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not
observed. The said provision requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to
immediately (1) conduct a physically inventory; and (2) photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official who shall be required tosign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

First, the inventory of the property was not immediately conducted after seizure and confiscation as it
was only done at the police station. Notably, Article II, Section 21(a) of the IRR allows the inventory to
be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending team whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures. In this case, however, the prosecution did not even claim
that the PDEA Office Region 3 was the nearest office from TB Pavilion where the drugs were seized.
The prosecution also failed to give sufficient justification for the delayed conduct of the inventory.

PO2 Corpuz gave the flimsy excuse that they failed to immediately conduct an inventory because
they did not bring with them the material or equipment for the preparation of the documents. Such
explanation is unacceptable considering that they conducted a surveillance on the target for a couple
of weeks. They should have been prepared with their equipment even before the buy-bust operation
took place.

Second, there is doubt as to the identity of the person who prepared the Inventory of Property Seized.
According to the CA decision, it was Sergeant dela Cruz who prepared the said document. PO2 Cruz
on the other hand, testified that it was their investigator who prepared the document while SPO1
Licu’s testimony was that a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin was their investigator.
Third, there were conflicting claims on whether the seized items were photographed in the presence
of the accused or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ,
and any elected public official.

In other words, when questioned on the conduct of the inventory, PO2 Corpuz testified that no
pictures of the seized items were taken while SPO1 Licu said that pictures of the accused were taken.
From the vague statements of the police officers, the Court doubts that photographs of the alleged
drugs were indeed taken. The records are bereft of any document showing the photos of the seized
items. The Court notes that SPO1 Licu could have misunderstood the question because he answered
that "pictures were taken on the accused" when the question referred to photographs of the drugs
and not of the accused.

The prosecution failed to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved.

To ensure that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved, the proper
chain of custody of the seized items must be shown.

It must be noted that marking is not found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different from the inventory-taking
and photography under Section 21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165,
however, this Court had consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized
drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.

In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had placed their initials on the
seized items. They, however, gave little information on how they actually did the marking. It is clear,
nonetheless, that the marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure, and the markings
were only placed at the police station based on the testimony of PO2 Corpuz.

Hence, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office Region 3, the seized items were not marked.
It could not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked drugs were handled. The Court must
conduct guesswork on how the seized drugs were transported and who took custody of them while in
transit. Evidently, the alteration of the seized items was a possibility absent their immediate marking
thereof.

The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin. Surprisingly, there was no testimony
from the witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly
improbable for an investigator in a drug-related case to effectively perform his work without having
custody of the seized items. Again, the case of the prosecution is forcing this Court to resort to
guesswork as to whether PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu gave the seized drugs to SPO4 Jamisolamin
as the investigating officer or they had custody of the marijuana all night while SPO4 Jamisolamin
was conducting his investigation on the same items.

In People v. Remigio, the Court noted the failure of the police officers to establish the chain of
custody as the apprehending officer did not transfer the seized items to the investigating officer. The
apprehending officer kept the alleged shabu from the time of confiscation until the time he transferred
them to the forensic chemist. The deviation from the links in the chain of custody led to the acquittal
of the accused in the said case.

In view of all the foregoing, the Court can only conclude that, indeed, there was no compliance with
the procedural requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 because of the inadequate physical
inventory and the lack of photography of the marijuana allegedly confiscated from Dahil and Castro.
No explanation was offered for the non-observance of the rule. The prosecution cannot apply the
saving mechanism of Section 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 because it miserably failed to prove that
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. The four links required to
establish the proper chain of custody were breached with irregularity and lapses.