CRIMPRO Dec 2 PDF

AUSTRIA | DE VERA | LITERAL | QUINTANA | SOLANO
CASE #1: BACHE & CO. INC. V. RUIZ
FACTS:
On 24 February 1970, Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to
Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and
Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in
relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and
authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which
was attached to the letter.
In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera’s letter-request; an application
for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed
before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not
yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge. At that time the
Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take
the depositions of De Leon and Logronio.
After the session had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken.
The stenographer, upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, the
Judge asked Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and
without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury.
The Judge signed de Leon’s application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. Search Warrant 2-
M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served
the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Rizal.
The corporation’s lawyers protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of
testimony was attached to the warrant. The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which
yielded 6 boxes of documents.
On 3 March 1970, the corporation and Seggerman filed a petition with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Rizal praying that the search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory writs of injunction be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that Vera,
Logronio, de Leon, et. al., be ordered to pay the corporation and Seggerman, jointly and severally,
damages and attorney’s fees.
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

the court issued an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or
on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on the corporation in the total
sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the corporation has the right to contest the legality of the seizure of documents from its office. -
Page 1 of 60
RULING:
The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and
that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties. In Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno, et al. (GR L-19550, 19 June 1967; 20 SCRA 383) the Supreme
Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to object against unreasonable searches and
seizures; holding that the corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of the corporate officers, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of
them in said corporations, whatever, the offices they hold therein may be; and that the corporate officers
therefore may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said
papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may
not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.
The distinction between the Stonehill case and the present case is that: in the former case, only the officers
of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and effects were searched and seized
were the petitioners; while in the latter, the corporation to whom the seized documents belong, and whose
rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner.
On that score, the corporation herein stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.
Moreover, herein, the search warrant was void inasmuch as First, there was no personal examination
conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio).
The Judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for
determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The
participation of the Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was
thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the
commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be
consider a personal examination.
Second, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued
for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first is the violation of Section 46(a), Section 72
and Section 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The second is the violation of
Section 53 (withholding of income taxes at source).
The third is the violation of Section 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the
violation of Section 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output
actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the 6 provisions are embraced
in 2 different titles: Sections 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Sections 208 and
209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized. Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70 tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for
the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of the corporation,
which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative. Thus, Search Warrant 2-M-70 is null and
void.
Page 2 of 60
CASE #2: CASTRO V. PABALAN
FACTS:
Upon application before the respondent court, a search warrant was issued against the petitioners. The
said warrant merely mentioned illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse and the
premises of the petitioners. No specific offense had been alleged. The particular description of the things
to be seized was not averred, and neither was the premises to be searched.
Judge Pabalan ordered the issuance of a search warrant despite failure of the application of Lumang or
the warrant itself to specify the offense, to examine the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of
the Judge, and to describe with particularity the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Judge
never refuted the assertions when required to answer. Application alleged that applicants wee informed
and claimed that they verified the report that Maria Castro and Co Ling are in possession of narcotics and
other contraband in Barrio Padasil, Bangar, La Union without specifying the particular place in the Barrio.
No complete description of the goods and inquiry was brief. Upon actual search, it turned out that it was
in Barrio Ma. Cristina and not in Padasil.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was tainted by illegality because it does
not comply with the constitutional requirements. - NO
RULING:
The basic procedural requisite that a search warrant “shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense,” was not complied where in an application for a search warrant
reference was made to “an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband.” The latter is a generic term
covering all goods exported from or imported into the country contrary to applicable statutes.
Necessarily then more than one offense could arise from the activity designated as illegal traffic of
narcotics and contraband.
The Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular description of
"the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." As was admitted by the judge in the
challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the residence of petitioners, which was set forth
in the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina. He would gloss
over such inaccuracy by saying that they were, anyway, adjoining barrios. As to the premises to be
searched, it may be admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its
invalidation. That requisite was not complied with in this case. That would explain why the searching
party felt it had a free hand and did take possession of various kinds of goods, including personal
effects, which respondent Judge himself would have them return. What was aptly characterized as a
"major objective" of this constitutional provision, the elimination of general warrants, was thus frustrated.
It need not be stressed anew that this Court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this
constitutional provision is of a mandatory character and therefore must be strictly complied with.
Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search warrant
"shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Here reference was
made to "an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic term covering all goods
exported from or imported into the country contrary to applicable statutes.
Page 3 of 60
CASE #3: BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF
FACTS:
Respondent judge issued two search warrants under which the business addressed of the “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles, and other articles used in the printing, publication, and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books, and other written literature alleged to
be in the possession and control of petitioner, publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper were seized.
The issuance was upon application of an intelligence officer and the joint affidavit of two members of the
team which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search
warrant.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not there was sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may
validly issue. - NO
Whether or not the warrant of arrest is valid to justify the seizure of the items. - NO
RULING:
Mere generalization will not suffice. The broad statement in Col. Abadilla’s application is a mere conclusion
of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify
a finding of the existence of probable cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a
search warrant and it was a grave error for the respondent judge to have done so. Equally insufficient as
basis for the determination of probable cause is the statement contained in the joint affidavit of Alejandro
M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango. The Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the
complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.
The law provides that “...no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.” Probable cause
for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
In the case, the reason for the seizure must be well stated, as well as the specifications and the
particularities of the alleged subversive material that the petitioner has published or is intending to publish.
The warrant is constitutionally objectionable because they are in the nature of general warrants.
The search warrants were declared null and void.
Page 4 of 60
CASE #4: STONEHILL V. DIOKNO
FACTS:
Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against petitioners personally, and/or
corporations for which they are officers directing peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties “books of
accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents showing all business transactions including disbursement
receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarette wrappers)” as the subject
of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code, and
Revised Penal Code.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into (2) major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Petitioners averred that the warrant is null and void for being violative of the constitution and the Rules of
court by:
(1) not describing with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) money not mentioned in the warrants were seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence for deportation cases filed against the petitioner;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents paper and cash money were not delivered to the issuing courts for disposal in
accordance with law.
The prosecution counters that the search warrants are valid and issued in accordance with law; The
defects of said warrants were cured by petitioners consent; and in any event, the effects are admissible
regardless of the irregularity.
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: The Court granted the petition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
However, by a resolution, the writ was partially lifted dissolving insofar as paper and things seized from
the offices of the corporations.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the search warrants issued is valid. - NO
RULING:
The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in
said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. In the case at
bar, none of these are met.
The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.”
In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with
respect to the offense committed were abstract.
As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence
of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
Page 5 of 60
provision of our criminal laws.
As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by
herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as
alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws
or codes.
The warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of
petitioners regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
Thus, openly contravening the explicit command of the Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be
particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general
warrants.
However, SC emphasized that petitioners cannot assail the validity of the search warrant issued against
their corporation because petitioners are not the proper party.
The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties.
Page 6 of 60
CASE #5: BACHE & CO. INC. V. RUIZ
FACTS: SAME FACTS WITH CASE #1
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not respondent judge personally examined the complainant and his witness. - NO
2. Whether or not the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense - YES
3. Whether or not the search warrant particularly describes the things to be seized. - NO
RULING:
1. The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec.
1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be
conducted by the judge himself and not by others. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant
and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable
cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules
of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause." The
determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial
appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant and his witness While it is true that the complainant’s application for search warrant and the
witness’ printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge, the latter did
not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining
whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to
have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge
were not even taken. The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of
her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to
the complainant and his witness. This cannot be consider a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of
Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal examination by the judge. It was
precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention to make it a duty
of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that the question of how
much time would be consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the Convention, as can
be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic notes to
respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule;
for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on
account of its training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound
inference on the all-important question of whether or not there was probable cause.
2. The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The
first is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are
interrelated. The second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is
the violation of Sec. 208 (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of
Sec. 209 (failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed
or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their classification the six above-mentioned provisions are
embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73 are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs.
208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and Occupation).
Page 7 of 60
3. The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-
M-70. The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3,
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. The said warrant tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of
general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records
of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.
The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and
only those, particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’
may not be made, — that abuses may not be committed.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil.
384); or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer
may be guided in making the search and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court).
The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be
seized have any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some
evidence, other than those articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and
seizure should come in handy merely to strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description
contained in the herein disputed warrant should have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons,
and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities,
contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank deposits and
withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.
Page 8 of 60
CASE #6: PEOPLE V. HON. MARCOS
FACTS:
On June 15, 1969, NBI Supervising Agent Jose Vicente filed an application for the issuance of a search
warrant with the City Court of Baguio City which provides, among others, the following:
That he has been reliably informed and verily believes that the owner and/or manager of the Suntory
Grocery, of 36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City has in his possession and control stocks of San Miguel
Gin, product of the La Tondeña, Inc., Manila, which is adulterated, bearing fake auxiliary stamps,
and using crown caps not produced by the company, which is in violation of the provisions of Articles
188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
... and therefore has reason enough to believe that a search warrant should be issued to enable the
undersigned to take possession and control and bring it to this Court said stock, as evidence in the
above case under investigation.
City Judge Patricio Perez of Baguio City, acting on the aforesaid application issued on June 15, 1967,
Search Warrant No. 459.
Armed with said search warrant, the NBI agents, on June 19, 1967, searched the premises of the Suntory
Grocery located at 36 Rajah Soliman St., Baguio City, owned and managed by private respondent Yu Cua
Sio. During the search conducted in the presence of private respondent and his wife, the NBI agents
seized the following articles which were properly inventoried and receipted:
(1) One (1) bundle consisting of rubber siphon, trainer and funnel;
(2) One (1) galvanized tank, 15" in diameter, 2 feet in height;
(3) One (1) mounted crown cap sealer with accessories;
(4) Six (6) cases of San Miguel Gin, round bottles, fined with suspected adulterated Gin and bearing
BIR stamps dated 6 April 1967;
(5) Two(2)cases of San Miguel Gin empty bottles;
(6) One (1) case containing ten (10) San Miguel Gin (adulterated) and 14 empty bottles, without
stamps;
(7) One (1) bundle consisting of two (2) bottles believed to be containing genuine San Miguel Gin
which was marked as standard; and
(8) One (1) paper bag containing 122 auxiliary stamps dated 6 April 1967, without perforation and
bearing successive serial numbers starting from 43,000,000.
Private respondent Yu Cua Sio filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 459 with the City Court of
Baguio. In an Order dated February 3, 1969, the inferior court ordered the NBI agents who seized and
confiscated the various articles from the store of Yu Cua Sio to return the same immediately to him.
Petitioner claims that the lower court erred (1) when it held that the questioned search warrant violates
the provisions of Section 3, Rule 126 of the New Rules of Court; (2) in holding that the search warrant in
question was issued to fish for evidence; and (3) in declaring Search Warrant No. 459 as contrary to law
and in ordering the return of the articles seized by virtue of said search warrant to respondent Yu Cua Sio.

On appeal, the Court of First Instance of Baguio City, reversed the decision of the City Court and sustained
the validity of the questioned search warrant. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent Yu Cua Sio, respondent Judge, on October 13, 1969, reconsidered his decision and declared
the issuance of Search Warrant No. 459 as contrary to law and, forthwith, ordered the NBI agents to
deliver and return the articles seized by virtue of the search warrant to private respondent Yu Cua Sio.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Search Warrant No. 459 is valid. - NO
Page 9 of 60
RULING:
It is in the application filed by the NBI agents which states that the owner and/or manager of the Suntory
Grocery has in his possession and control stocks of San Miguel Gin which are adulterated and therefore,
violative of the provisions of Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code. These articles of the Revised
Penal Code are entitled: "Substituting and Altering Trademarks, Tradenames, or Service marks" and
"Unfair Competition and Fraudulent Registration of Trademark and Tradename," respectively. As aptly
stated by the Solicitor General, "the specific acts defining said offenses and mentioned in said articles are
closely allied to each other that in a sense, the punishable acts defined in one of them can be considered
as including, or necessarily included in the other."
There is no merit in the pronouncement by respondent Judge that the search warrant was issued to fish
for evidence just because the application for search warrant states that its purpose is "to take possession
and control of the articles to be used as evidence in the above case under investigation."
The search warrant issued mentions that respondent has in his possession and control stocks of La
Tondeña product which are adulterated, with fake auxiliary stamps, and are using crown caps which are
not produced by the company. The articles seized in the premises of respondent Yu Cua Sio show that
he was in possession of these articles mentioned in the application for search warrant and in the search
warrant itself. Possession of said fake stamps is illegal and the same should not be returned to respondent
Yu Cua Sio.
The order of respondent Judge, dated October 13, 1969, is SET ASIDE, and private respondent Yu Cua
Sio is hereby ordered to return the articles seized if they had been delivered to him by the NBI agents.
Page 10 of 60
CASE #7: MATA V. BAYONA
FACTS:
Respondent Judge issued a search warrant against petitioner after an information was filed accusing the
latter under P.D. 810, as amended by P.D. 1306 alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged
bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from
the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned. Petitioner
claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case
could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so
that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied,
"it is with the court." The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the search warrant is valid. - NO
RULING:
The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Section 4 of Rule 126 provides that the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine under
oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in
writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus insufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine
the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will
be found later that his declarations are false. The failure of the respondent judge to conform with the
essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record thus rendered the
search warrant invalid.
The writ of certiorari is granted and the order of March 1, 1979 denying the motion to annul the search
warrant as well as the order of March 21, 1979 denying the motion for reconsideration are hereby
reversed, the search warrant, being declared herein as illegal.
Page 11 of 60
CASE #8:THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. PEDRO DE LA PEÑA, OSMUNDO RAMOS and
HON. RAMON SAN JOSE
FACTS: Pedro de la Peña and Osmundo Ramos, are accused in 20 criminal cases of illegal procurement
of search warrants, in violation of Article 129 of the Revised Penal Code.
On or about April 30, 1951, Pedro de la Peña, then the Chief of the Special Investigating Team and
Osmundo Ramos being then an agent, of the Military Intelligence Service G-2, Armed Forces of the
Philippines conspired to obtain a search warrant by applying for the same and filing a deposition of witness
in support of the application for search warrant before the Court the Court of First Instance. Due to the
said application and deposition the said accused succeeded in procuring from the said court a search
warrant against Ty Kong Tek of 142 V. Mapa St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, where a search was actually made
or caused to be made by the said accused who both fully knowing that the allegations in the application
and deposition were false.
At the joint hearing of said twenty (20) cases, before Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
presided over by respondent Judge Ramon San Jose, Ty kong Tek testified that Peña and his
companions, including two Chinese named Koa San and Tan Tek; who were provided with a search
warrant, searched the house, stating that they were looking for firearms and U.S. dollars, none of which
were found in the premise; that they found, however, two (2) books of account of Ty Kong Tek.
During trial, All records of general objection to all questions relative to events which occurred subsequently
to the issuance of the search warrant were stricken from the record on motion of the respondent, including
the testimony of the alleged extortion of Koa San who approached the witness’ nephew, who was
previously arrested by De la Peña would be released if he (Ty Kong Tek) gave him (Koa San) and De la
Peña the sum of P20,000. Although the prosecution explained that it was trying to prove the unlawful
motive with which the search warrant had allegedly been obtained, respondent Judge holds that "anything
that happened after thae issuance of the search warrant will be immaterial. Respondent Judge suspended
the hearing, in order that the prosecution could bring the matter to this Court, for the determination of the
propriety of introducing evidence of acts performed by the accused after the issuance of the search
warrant in question.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court should allow petitioner to prove the motive of the accused in obtaining the
search warrant in question through acts subsequent to the issuance thereof?
RULING:
It is clear to the Court’s mind that said attempt to extort money, even if effected after the issuance of the
search warrant, but prior to the release of the complainant, is relevant to the question whether or not
said was illegally procured, to establish that the accused was prompted by the desire to get money from
the said complainant.
Inasmuch as the prosecution was entitled to introduce the evidence in question and respondent
Judge was, consequently, "under obligation by reason of his office" to admit said evidence, "and in
refusing to do so . . . he failed to perform his judicial duty. The court also directs that portions of the
testimony of Ty Kong Tek which were stricken from the record, should b, reversed and set aside.
Page 12 of 60
CASE #9: PAGKALINAWAN vs. HON. AMADOR E. GOMEZ and NORBERTO L. DAYRIT
FACTS: Respondent Norberto L. Dayrit filed a complaint for Replevin in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu presided by respondent Judge Gomez, against petitioner, Nicanor Pagkalinawan, Supervising Agent
of the National Bureau of Investigation and two members of the Manila Police Department for the recovery
of possession of the aforementioned car alleging that it is wrongfully detained by the herein petitioner.
The respondent Judge acting on said complaint issued an order directing the Sheriff of Cebu City or any
proper officer of the court, to take the aforementioned car into his custody. The petitioner after said writ of
replevin was served on him manifested that he could not possibly comply with said order to deliver the
aforementioned car to the sheriff because he was holding the same in 'custodia legis' for the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch II, the court that issued the search warrant under which the said car was seized
and held in custody.
The respondent Judge issued an order directing the petitioner to immediately comply with the order
of the court and to turn over to the sheriff the car in question upon receipt of a copy of this order. Petitioner
filed an urgent motion for reconsideration of the order and setting aside the writ of replevin, but respondent
Judge after hearing on said motion denied the same in its order. It was then alleged by petitioner that the
aforesaid orders issued by the respondent Judge compelling him to deliver such car to the Sheriff so that
it could be turned over to the other respondent, after it was explained that it was being held in custodia
legis for the Manila Court of First Instance, having been properly seized in pursuance of a search warrant
issued by it, were made without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; that said
orders moreover would likewise "nullify the purpose and defeat the force and validity of the search warrant
issued by the Court of First Instance, a competent court of equal category”
The prayer also contained one for preliminary mandatory injunction to be issued directing the respondent
Judge to order the return of said car to petitioner, desisting and refraining until further orders of this Court
from acting on the matter.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not respondent Judge acted in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
granting the replevin action?
RULING:
YES. It is settled that the jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of First Instance
belongs solely to the very same branch which rendered the judgment." As aptly stated, any other branch
"even it be in the same judicial district" that would attempt to do so "either excess its jurisdiction", or
"acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The moment a court of first instance has been informed through the filing of an appropriate pleading that
a search warrant has been issued by another court of first instance, it cannot, even if the literal language
of the Rules of Court yield a contrary impression which in this case demonstrated the good faith of
respondent Judge for acting as he did, require a sheriff or any proper officer of the Court to take the
property subject of the replevin action if it came into the custody of another public officer by virtue of a
search warrant. A contrary ruling would be subversive of a doctrine steadfastly adhered to, the main
purpose of which is to assure stability and consistency in judicial actuations and to avoid confusion that
may otherwise ensue if courts of coordinate jurisdiction are permitted to interfere with each other's lawful
orders. It should also be noted that The remedy for questioning the validity of a search warrant may be
sought in the Court of First Instance that issued it, not in the sala of another Judge, and as admitted in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Laurel, not through replevin
Page 13 of 60
CASE #10: Rizal Alih et al vs Castro
FACTS: On November 1984, more than two hundred Philippine marines and elements of the home
defense forces raided the compound occupied by the petitioners at Gov. Alvarez street, Zamboanga City,
in search of loose firearms, ammunition and other explosives. The military operation was commonly known
and dreaded as a "zona," which was not unlike the feared practice of the kempeitai during the Japanese
Occupation of rounding up the people in a locality, arresting the persons fingered by a hooded informer,
and executing them outright. The people inside the compound resisted the invasion and crossfire between
the Philippine marines and the petitioner occurred, resulting in number of casualties.
Petitioners surrendered the following morning, and sixteen male occupants were arrested, later to be
finger-printed, paraffin-tested and photographed over their objection. The military also inventoried and
confiscated nine M16 rifles, one M14 rifle, nine rifle grenades, and several rounds of ammunition found in
the premises.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction and restraining order.
Their purpose was to recover the articles seized from them, to prevent these from being used as evidence
against them, and to challenge their finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing being violative of
their right against self-incrimination. Petitioner argued that the arms and ammunition were taken without
a search warrant as required by law under Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution and it be declared inadmissible
in relation to Sec 4 (2) of the 1973 Constitution. Respondent justified their act on the ground that they
were acting under superior orders and that the measures were necessary due to the aggravation of peace
and order problem in their place.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the confiscated items shall be considered admissible?
RULING:
NO. "Superior orders" cannot, of course, countermand the Constitution. The fact that the petitioners were
suspected of the Climaco killing did not excuse the constitutional short-cuts the respondents took. The
record does not disclose that the petitioners were wanted criminals or fugitives from justice.
At the time of the "zona," they were merely suspected of the mayor's slaying and had not in fact even
been investigated for it. As mere suspects, they were presumed innocent and not guilty as summarily
pronounced by the military. Indeed, even if were assumed for the sake of argument that they were guilty,
they would not have been any less entitled to the protection of the Constitution, which covers both the
innocent and the guilty. This is not to say, of course, that the Constitution coddles criminals. What it does
simply signify is that, lacking the shield of innocence, the guilty need the armor of the Constitution, to
protect them, not from a deserved sentence, but from arbitrary punishment. Conceding that the search
was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it was
incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law-enforcement authorities have to do is force their way
into any house and then pick up anything they see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting
arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy.
It follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms
and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings
against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree." As Judge Learned Hand
observed, "Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that cannot profit
by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed." Pending determination of the legality of such articles,
however, they shall remain in custodia legis, subject to such appropriate disposition as the corresponding
courts may decide.
Page 14 of 60
CASE #11: Yu vs Honrado
FACTS: On June 27, 1978, Detective Carlos C. Nuestro of the police department of Makati, Metro Manila
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch XXV an application for a search warrant.
Nuestro alleged that he "has been informed and verily believes that Alfonso Yu" was in possession of
"about 55 metric tons of unstripped assorted cast iron engine blocks embezzled" and that he "has verified
the report and found (it) to be a fact which was affirmed under his testimony before respondent Judge
Honrado. He further alleged that the said goods were purchased by Carlito Refuerzo on June 10, 1978
from Marcelo Steel Corporation; that Refuerzo paid for the goods with a check in the sum of P61,808.25,
which check was dishonored for insufficient funds; that Refuerzo sold the engine blocks on June 12, 1978
to the Soledad Junk Shop and that Refuerzo was later apprehended and detained in the municipal jail of
Makati.
After the taking of Nuestro’s testimony, respondent Judge issued a search warrant, commanding any
peace officer to search the premises of the Soledad Junk Shop, to seize therefrom "55 metric tons of
unstripped assorted cast iron engine blocks" and bring them to the court. Nuestro and four policemen
implemented the search warrant on the following day, June 28. They seized from the Soledad Junk Shop
42.8 metric tons of engine blocks, which were loaded in six trucks and brought for safekeeping to the
premises of Marcelo Steel Corporation, Punta, Sta. Ana, Manila with the understanding that they were in
custodia legis. The motion to set aside the search warrant by the Petitioner was then denied by
Respondent Judge. Parallel to the search warrant proceeding was the complaint for estafa filed by Marcelo
Steel Corporation against Refuerzo, Soledad Yu and other confederates.
Parallel to the search warrant proceeding was the complaint for estafa filed by Marcelo Steel Corporation
against Refuerzo, Soledad Yu and other confederates. The Fiscal found that Yu was not a co-conspirator
and that she was an innocent purchaser for value. The Fiscal also found that Refuerzo and other
confederates defrauded Marcelo Steel Corporation as the value of scrap materials were not paid and that
the Soledad Junk Shop paid for the scrap materials. Thus, Refuerzo and others were charged for estafa.
ISSUE/S: Is the search warrant void because it was issued without probable cause as it was based on
Nuestro's hearsay testimony?
RULING:
NO. The search warrant was lawfully issued. Respondent Judge complied with the requirements for its
issuance as prescribed in section 3, Article IV of the Constitution and in sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.
While Nuestro’s knowledge of the alleged estafa was initially hearsay, yet his comprehensive investigation
of the case enabled him to have direct knowledge of the sale made by Pablo Tiangco of Marcelo Steel
Corporation to Refuerzo and the sale made by Refuerzo and his confederates to the Yu spouses.
Nuestro’s testimony was a sufficient justification for an examining magistrate to conclude that the scrap
engine blocks were the subject of estafa. That conclusion was confirmed by the filing of the information
for estafa. But from the fact that the search warrant was validly issued, it does not follow that Marcelo
Steel Corporation is entitled to retain the same. There is as yet no decree of restitution in the criminal case
entitling Marcelo Steel Corporation to recover the scrap iron from the third person who bought it in good
faith and for value.
Page 15 of 60
Marcelo Steel Corporation is ordered to return and deliver to the Yu spouses within ten days from notice
of the entry of judgment in this case the 42.8 tons of scrap engine blocks in question.
CASE #12: Alvarez v CFI
FACTS:The Chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented
to Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the
petitioner kept in his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers
used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in
violation of the law. In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his
answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the
truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him
from a reliable person. Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which
is the subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner’s house at any time of the day
or night, the seizure of the books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof
to him to be disposed of in accordance with the law.
Several agents of the Anti-Usury Board entered the petitioner’s store and residence at seven o’clock on
the night and seized and took possession of the certain articles and documents.
Alvarez filed a petition praying that the search warrant be declared illegal and that all the articles in
question be returned to him. He claimed that the search warrant was illegal for the following reasons: (a)
it was based solely upon the affidavit of the petitioner who had no personal knowledge of the facts of
probable cause; (b) it was not supported by other affidavits aside from that made by the applicant; (c) it
authorized its execution at night; (d) lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be
seized; and (e) it was issued for the sole purpose of seizing evidence which would later be used in the
criminal proceedings that might be instituted against him for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
The Anti-Usury Board insinuates in its answer that the petitioner cannot now question the validity of the
search warrant or the proceedings had subsequent to the issuance thereof, because he has waived his
constitutional rights in proposing a compromise whereby he agreed to pay a fine of P200 for the purpose
of evading the criminal proceeding or proceedings.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Search Warrant was valid?
RULING:
NO. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands,
signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property and bring it before the court. Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater
importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that
involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others.
The provisions of the constitution require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance
of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of
the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of
the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant
Page 16 of 60
issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged
thereon and affiant is held liable for damages caused.
It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and
fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that
the search warrant in question and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are
illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected. It should be
noted that it is not mandatory to present affidavits of witnesses to corroborate the applicant or complainant
in cases where the latter has personal knowledge of the facts. However, when the applicant's or
complainant's knowledge of the facts is merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require affidavits of
other witnesses so that he may determine whether probable cause exists.
With regard to the time of Seizure which was at 7PM, the search may be made at night when it is positively
asserted in the affidavits that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched. In this
case, it does not appear positively in the affidavit that the articles were in the possession of the petitioner
and in the place indicated; hence, the search and seizure could not be made at night.
Another ground alleged by the petitioner in support of his contention that the warrant was issued
illegally is the lack of an adequate description of the books and documents to be seized. A detailed
description of the person and place to be searched and the articles to be seized is necessary, but where,
by the nature of the articles to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required that a
technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. The only description of the
articles given in the affidavit presented to the judge was as follows: "that there are being kept in said
premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his
activities as money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking into
consideration the nature of the article so described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed
description could have been given, particularly because it is difficult to give a particular description of the
contents thereof. The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the
officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify the
articles, which he did.
The last ground alleged by the petitioner, in support of his claim that the search warrant was
obtained illegally, is that the articles were seized in order that the Anti-Usury Board might provide itself
with evidence to be used by it in the criminal case or cases which might be filed against him for violation
of the Anti-Usury Law. The hearing of the incidents of the case raised before the court, it clearly appeared
that the books and documents had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an
investigation and later use all or some of the articles in question as evidence against the petitioner in the
criminal cases that may be filed against him. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search
warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose
possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is
equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify
against himself. Therefore, it appearing that at least nineteen of the documents in question were seized
for the purpose of using them as evidence against the petitioner in the criminal proceeding or proceedings
for violation against him, the court hold that the search warrant issued is illegal and that the documents
should be returned to him.
Page 17 of 60
CASE #13:People v Kagui Malasuqui
FACTS: Tan Why, a Chinese merchant, a resident of Cotabato, a victim of robbery was found lying on the
ground, with several wounds in the head, on a path leading to the barrio of Carcar, Cotabato. Shortly
before the victim’s death he was able to mention the appellant’s first name, “Kagui”, when he was asked
about assailant. The accused was arrested shortly after eight o'clock in the morning of the same day, and
after he had been brought forthwith to Lieutenant Jacaria, who had already been informed that he had just
redeemed two pairs of bracelets from some pawnshops of Cotabato and that he carried money, said
lieutenant asked him for the bracelets and he then voluntarily and without protest produced. Alamada
testified that the deceased, shortly before he died, named Kagui as his aggressor, and the appellant was
known by this name in Cotabato. He also testified that on the morning in question, he saw the appellant,
with a club in his hand, pass by the house where he and the deceased lived.
The appellant testified at the trial that Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut had forcibly and
through intimidation taken from him the bracelets the pocketbook and all the money which he and that,
but for the printing thereon, the identification card found in the pocketbook then was blank and there was
no memorandum of the kind, in Tan Why's handwriting, inside the pocketbook, thereby, insinuating that it
was Lieutenant Jacaria who typed or caused to be typewritten on the card Tan Why's name and personal
data and who placed the memorandum in the pocketbook.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the search and seizure conducted on the accused was legal?
RULING:
YES. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made of his person or premises, he
is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like
every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. On the other hand, the
appellant was then charged with the crime, imputed to him by Tan Why before the latter's death, of having
assaulted the deceased; that he was then also known to be carrying much money; and that a few moments
before he was brought to Lieutenant Jacaria, and shortly after the assault on Tan Why, he was able to
redeem two pairs of bracelets from two persons to whom he had pledged them several months before.
These are circumstances which undoubtedly warranted his arrest without a previous judicial warrant, only
upon a verbal order from said officer to Sergeant Urangut, or of the latter's own will, inasmuch as he had
direct knowledge of the aggression committed on the person of Tan Why, his violent death, the revelation
made by Tan Why before his death naming the appellant as the author of the aggression, and the other
circumstances already stated. This is so because under the law, members of the Insular Police or
Constabulary as well as those of the municipal police and of chartered cities like Manila and Baguio, and
even of townships may make arrests without judicial warrant, not only when a crime is committed or about
to be committed in their presence, but also when there is reason to believe or sufficient ground to suspect
that one has been committed and that it was committed by the person arrested by them.
The Record also shows that before proceeding with the trial in the lower court, the appellant asked
for the return of said effects to him on the ground that they were unlawfully taken away from him. Leaving
aside the foregoing considerations, his testimony cannot prevail against nor is it sufficient to counteract
that of the government witnesses, Lieutenant Jacaria and Sergeant Urangut, who testified that when
Lieutenant Jacaria asked him what other things he carried, after having voluntarily placed the two pairs of
bracelets. It is certainly repugnant to maintain the opposite view because it would amount to authorizing
the return to the accused of the means of conviction seized from him, notwithstanding their being eloquent
proofs of his crime, for him to conceal, destroy or otherwise dispose of, in order to assure his impunity.
The facts which we consider as having been fully established in view of the foregoing considerations,
constitute the crime of robbery with homicide defined in article 294, subsection 1, of Revised Penal Code.
Page 18 of 60
CASE #14: PAPA v MAGO
FACTS:
•original action for prohibition and certiorari, with preliminary injunction filed by Ricardo Papa, Chief of
Police of Manila against Remedios Mago and Hon. Hilarion Jarencio, Presiding Judge of Branch 23 of
the Court of First Instance of Manila which authorized the release under bond of certain goods which
were seized and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff and Customs Code,
but which were claimed by respondent Remedios Mago (,enjoining the above-named police and
customs authorities, or their agents, from opening the bales and examining the goods, and a writ of
mandamus for the return of the goods and the trucks, as well as a judgment for actual, moral and
exemplary damages in their favor)
• certain shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released the
following day from the customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks, and upon orders of
petitioner Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police of Manila and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau of Customs,
conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone
• goods were seized by members of the Manila Police Department without search warrant issued by a
competent court; that anila Chief of Police Ricardo Papa denied the request of counsel for Remedios
Mago that the bales be not opened and the goods contained therein be not examined; that then
Customs Commissioner Jacinto Gavino had illegally assigned appraisers to examine the goods because
the goods were no longer under the control and supervision of the Commissioner of Customs
• were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs Code because Remedios
Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that they were imported illegally
• on November 24, 1966, their "Answer with Opposition to the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction", denying the alleged illegality of the seizure and detention of the goods and the trucks and of
their other actuations, and alleging special and affirmative defenses, to wit: that the Court of First
Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to try the case; that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court of Tax Appeals; the failure of Remedios Mago to exhaust the administrative remedies provided
for in the Tariff and Customs Code, that the Bureau of Customs had not lost jurisdiction over the goods
because the full duties and charges thereon had not been paid; that the members of the Manila Police
Department had the power to make the seizure; that the seizure was not unreasonable; and the persons
deputized under Section 2203 (c) of the Tariff and Customs Code could effect search, seizures and
arrests in inland places in connection with the enforcement of the said Code
• Remedios Mago, on December 23, 1966, filed an ex parte motion to release the goods, alleging that
since the inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation, the same
should be released as per agreement of the patties upon her posting of the appropriate bond that may
be determined by the court. Herein petitioners filed their opposition to the motion, alleging that the court
had no jurisdiction to order the release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction
over the case
ISSUE/S:
The principal issue in the instant case is whether or not, the respondent Judge had acted with
jurisdiction in issuing the order of March 7, 1967 releasing the goods in question.
RULING:
• The goods in question(watch bands, metal watch or watch bands) were imported from Hongkong, as
shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". 2 As long as the
importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
customs
• acting under directions and orders of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by
the Commissioner of Customs, 9 the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and custody of the
goods.
Page 19 of 60
• Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon the Collector of Customs the duty to hold
possession of all imported articles upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or
secured to be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question, therefore, were
under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs at the time the petition for mandamus,
• The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore, could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if
the warrant of seizure and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
• The record shows, however, that the goods in question were actually seized on October 6, 1964, i.e.,
before Francindy Commercial sued in court. The purpose of the seizure by the Customs bureau was to
verify whether or not Custom duties and taxes were paid for their importation. Hence, on December 23,
1964, Customs released 22 bales thereof, for the same were found to have been released regularly from
the Cebu Port (Petition Annex "L"). As to goods imported illegally or released irregularly from Customs
custody, these are subject to seizure under Section 2530 m. of the Tariff and Customs Code (RA 1957).
• The Bureau of Customs has jurisdiction and power, among others to collect revenues from imported
articles, fines and penalties and suppress smuggling and other frauds on customs; and to enforce tariff
and customs laws (Sec. 602, Republic Act 1957).
• The goods in question are imported articles entered at the Port of Cebu. Should they be found to have
been released irregularly from Customs custody in Cebu City, they are subject to seizure and forfeiture,
the proceedings for which comes within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs pursuant to Republic
Act 1937.
• is the settled rule, therefore, that the Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported
goods, for the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods are actually in
its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or detention had previously been issued by the
Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the
Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966, and so from that date
the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the
tariff and customs laws, to the exclusion of the regular courts
• the contention that the goods could not be seized without a search warrant is untenable. The Chief of
the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized in writing by the Commissioner
of Customs, could, for the purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches,
seizures, and arrests, 11 and it was his duty to make seizure, among others, of any cargo, articles or
other movable property when the same may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under
customs and tariff laws. 12 He could lawfully open and examine any box, trunk, envelope or other
container wherever found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable
articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or conveying such article as aforesaid.
• The Tariff and Customs Code authorizes him to demand assistance of any police officer to effect said
search and seizure, and the latter has the legal duty to render said assistance
• Petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any
search warrant issued by a competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said
warrant in the instant case. The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of
the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or
building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and
any trunk, package, or envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and examine any
vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced
into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases. 16
But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house may be entered and
searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace. . . ." 17 It is our considered view,
therefor, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority
under the customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of
customs laws.
• In the instant case, we note that petitioner Martin Alagao and his companion policemen did not have to
make any search before they seized the two trucks and their cargo. In their original petition, and
Page 20 of 60
amended petition, in the court below Remedios Mago and Valentin Lanopa did not even allege that
there was a search. 18 All that they complained of was. That while the trucks were on their way, they
were intercepted without any search warrant near the Agrifina Circle and taken to the Manila Police
Department, where they were detained.
But even if there was a search, there is still authority to the effect that no search warrant would be
needed under the circumstances obtaining in the instant case
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
(a) Granting the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for by petitioners;
(b) Declaring null and void, for having been issued without jurisdiction, the order of respondent
Judge Hilarion U. Jarencio, dated March 7, 1967, in Civil Code No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance
of Manila;
(c) Declaring permanent the preliminary injunction issued by this Court on March 31, 1967
restraining respondent Judge from executing, enforcing and/or implementing his order of March 7, 1967
in Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and from proceeding in any manner in
said case;
(d) Ordering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 67496 of the Court of First Instance of Manila;
and1äwphï1.ñët
(e) Ordering the private respondent, Remedios Mago, to pay the costs.
CASE #15: PACIS v PAMARAN
FACTS:
· For the petitioner Pedro Pacis, then Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, it was vital
that this prohibition proceeding against the then Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, Manuel R.
Pamaran, should be instituted. For unless restrained, the prosecutor was bent on continuing with
the investigation of a charge of usurpation of judicial
functions1 allegedly committed by him, when in the course of his official functions and pursuant thereto,
he issued a warrant of seizure and detention for an automobile owned by respondent Ricardo
Santos, who, according to the records in his office, had not paid the customs duty collectible
thereon. To counter such a move, and invoking what he alleged was a violation of the constitutional
provision that only a judge, under the 1935 Constitution could issue a search warrant,2 respondent
Santos filed the aforesaid complaint for usurpation
· Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile, model 1957. It was brought
into this country without the payment of customs duty and taxes, its owner Donald James Hatch
being tax-exempt.
· that the Land Transportation Commission reported that such automobile was a "hot car." By virtue
thereof, petitioner, through his subordinates, looked into the records of his office. Thus he did
ascertain that although the amount of P311.00 was already paid for customs duty, the amount
collectible on said car should be P2,500.00, more or less. Based on such discrepancy, on July 22,
1964, he instituted seizure proceedings and issued a warrant of seizure and detention. On the
strength thereof, the automobile was taken while it was parked on Economia Street, Manila, by
Department of National Defense agents who were authorized to do so by virtue of the said warrant
· Respondent Santos, through counsel, wrote to the petitioner asking that such warrant of seizure
and detention issued against his car be withdrawn or dissolved and the car released on his
contention that the issuance of the warrant was unauthorized. He likewise threatened to proceed
against the petitioner for violation of Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code and for damages.
· Petitioner, as Acting Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, had the requisite authority for the
Page 21 of 60
issuance of the contested warrant of seizure and detention for the automobile owned by respondent
Ricardo Santos. From the foregoing, there was no such infringement. What was done by petitioner
was strictly in accordance with settled principles of law. No doubt need be entertained then as to
the validity of the issuance of the warrant of seizure and detention. His liability for any alleged
usurpation of judicial function is non-existent. Such imputation was definitely unfounded. Even if
however the matter were less clear, the claim that the search and seizure clause was in effect
nullified is hardly impressed with merit. Considering that what is involved is an alleged evasion of
the payment of customs duties, what was said by Circuit Judge Hutcheson in the Ginsburg decision
12
possesses relevance.
· The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case.
ISSUE/S:
WON there was unreasonable seizure of the automobile of private respondent due to
unauthorized issuance of a seizure and detention warrant by petitioner.
RULING:
No, the issuance of the seizure and detention warrant was proper and so the actual seizure of the
automobile is warranted. The law being that authority to issue warrant was extended to officers
authorized by law and such power is no longer solely confined to a judge, petitioner can validly issue
such warrant. The only question that will remain is whether the said officer, the petitioner in this case,
was able to comply with the requisites in order to validly issue said warrant. The requisite only being that
“one's possessions be subject to seizure”. Since it was established that the proper custom duty and
taxes was not yet paid (/fully paid), the subject, the automobile, became a proper subject for seizure.
The issuance of the warrant and the actual seizure was therefore proper.
The Constitution (during the time of the case, the 1972 Constitution) afford protection to its citizens for
unreasonable seizures which must not be eroded or emasculated. It is only then upon the compliance of
proper requisites mandated by law should one's possessions be subject to seizure.
Page 22 of 60
CASE #18: People v Bagista
FACTS: · Elsie Bagista was charged by RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, finding her guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425.
· Narcotics Command (NARCOM) received information from one of its regular informants that
a certain woman, 23 years of age, with naturally curly hair, and with a height of 5’2" or 5’3",
would be transporting marijuana from up north. 1 Acting upon this piece of information, Sgt.
Oscar Parajas testified that he, Sgt. Godofredo Fider and a civilian NARCOM agent
proceeded to Km. 16, Acop, Tublay, Benguet. Upon arriving at said location at around 11:00
o’clock that same morning, they established a checkpoint and flagged down all vehicles, both
private and public, coming from the north to check if any of these vehicles were carrying
marijuana leaves on board.
After about 4 1/2 hours, the NARCOM agents stopped a Dangwa Tranco bus with Plate No. AVD
938 and body number 428
· While at the back, Sgt. Parajas noticed a woman with curly hair seated at the right side (as
one is facing the driver) of the last seat of the bus, with a travelling bag with black and orange
stripes 4 on her lap. Sgt. Parajas inspected the bag and discovered three (3) bundles of
marijuana leaves covered by assorted clothing. The bag and the contents thereof were
confiscated and the woman arrested. Tested and found positive for marijuana
. Accused-appellant claimed that the bag containing the marijuana was taken from the luggage carrier
above the passenger seats. When nobody admitted owning the bag, the NARCOM agent approached
her, took the shoulder bag on her lap, and asked her to come with them for investigation as she fits the
description of the would-be transporter of the marijuana given by the NARCOM informer. She denied
having anything to do with the marijuana found on the bus.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: ·

RTC: convicted Bagista: ". . . The testimony of Sgt. Oscar Parajas was direct and straightforward as he
gave all the requisite details of the entrapment operation they conducted based on an information
provided by a coordinating individual
CA: Accused-appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the marijuana leaves found in the
bag taken from her was inadmissible in evidence as it was the product of a warrantless search, which
motion was denied by the trial court for lack of merit on November 22, 1988 (DENIED)
ISSUE/S:
RULING:
· The general rule regarding searches and seizures can be stated in this manner: no person shall be
subjected to a search of his person, personal effects or belongings, or his residence except by virtue
of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. 14 The basis for the rule can be found in
Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which states
· . Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of
a moving vehicle, 15 and the seizure of evidence in plain view
· When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable
cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a
crime, in the vehicle to be searched. 18
Page 23 of 60
The NARCOM officers in the case at bar had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming
from the north at Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from
their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant
would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise have probable cause to search accused-
appellant’s belongings since she fits the description given by the NARCOM informant.
Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM agents, any evidence obtained during the
course of said search is admissible against Accused-Appellant.
· As to the alleged discrepancies in the prosecution’s case, such as the color of the stripes of the
bag which contained the marijuana and whether the items seized from accused-appellant were
marijuana leaves or marijuana fruit tops, these are minor in character and do not detract from the
prosecution’s case since it was shown by the Receipt of Property Seized, 24 which was signed by
accused-appellant, that these were the very items taken from her at the time of her arrest.
Page 24 of 60
CASE #19: MANIPON V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Manipon is a deputy sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Baguio. He was assigned to
execute a decision of the Labor Arbiter (LA) ordering Dominguez to pay Tabek and other creditors
P2,720 with interest. Manipon sent a notice to Commercial Bank and Trust (Comtrust) garnishing the
bank accounts of Dominguez but did not inform the LA of such fact. He also did not immediately satisfy
the judgment.
Manipon met with Dominguez and told the latter that he “can remedy the withdrawal so they will have
something for the New Year.” Dominguez interpreted this to mean that Manipon would withdraw the
garnished amount for a consideration. He agreed. Dominguez then told Officers of the National
Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) of such facts. They hatched a plan to entrap Manipon by
paying him with marked money.
The next day, Manipon sent a letter to the bank lifting the garnishment. Dominguez then withdrew
P2,500 from the bank, took P300, added it to the P700 marked bills, and gave the total P1,000 to
Manipon. As Manipon left, NISA operatives arrested him and seized the P1,000. He was charged with
direct bribery. Originally, Manipon was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 46 for having
demanded and received P l,000.00 from Dominguez, a private individual, for a favor extended by him to
the latter, i.e., by not enforcing the garnishment order issued to Comtrust which was his official duty.
However, in an amended information dated February 16, 1981, the charge was changed to direct bribery
under the Revised Penal Code.
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: Manipon was released on bail. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty.
ISSUE/S: WON the P1,000 is illegally seized.
RULING:
The rule that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule. An
exception to this rule is a search incidental to a lawful arrest, including valid warrantless arrests. The
evident purpose of this exception is both to protect the arresting officer against physical harm from the
person being arrested who might be armed with a concealed weapon and also to prevent the person
arrested from destroying evidence within his reach.
In the case at bar, NISA Commander Colonel Sanchez held a briefing among his men concerning the
planned entrapment. After the briefing, they all headed for the Comtrust bank. NISA Agent Caesar Murla
stationed himself near the door of the bank so that he could observe what transpired inside the bank. He
testified that he saw Dominguez give the marked money to Manipon which the latter accepted and
counted. Upon seeing Manipon take the money from Dominguez, Agent Murla gave a signal to some of
the agents positioned nearby by placing his right hand on his head to indicate that the money had
changed hands. Immediately thereafter, Dominguez left the bank. Manipon placed the money in his left
breast pocket and followed suit. As Manipon walked past Murla on his way out, the latter gave another
signal by putting his hand on his left breast to indicate that Manipon had placed the money in his left
breast pocket. Upon noticing the second signal, the NISA agents approached Manipon. After identifying
themselves as peace officers, they retrieved the P1,000 from Manipon.
The search and seizure of the P1,000 from Manipon would therefore fall within the said exception.
Page 25 of 60
CASE #18: PEOPLE v MUSA
FACTS:
· Mari Musa seeks to appeal the ruling of RTC Zamboanga City, finding him guilty of selling
marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
(PROSECUTION VERSION: Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team

based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct surveillance and test buy on
a certain Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information received from civilian informer was that
this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place The next day, December 14, 1989, about
1:30 P.M., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which
purpose he was given P20.00Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The
two NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team
and returned to the house. At the time Sgt. Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons
inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to
know to be Mari Musa's wife All submitted specimens she examined gave positive results for the
presence of marijuana.
DEFENSE VERSION: About 1:30 that afternoon, while he was being manicured at one hand, his wife
was inside the one room of their house, putting their child to sleep. . The NARCOM agents did not ask
permission to enter the house but simply announced that they were NARCOM agents. The NARCOM
agents searched Mari Musa's house and Mari Musa asked them if they had a search warrant. The
NARCOM agents were just silent. The NARCOM agents found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari
Musa said, he did not know Mari Musa was brought in a pick-up, his wife joining him to the NARCOM
Office at Calarian The document stated that the marijuana belonged to Mari Musa and Mari Musa was
asked to sign it. But Mari Musa refused to sign because the marijuana did not belong to him. Mari Musa
said he was not told that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel, although he himself told the
NARCOM agents he wanted to be assisted by counsel Mari Musa said four bullets were then placed
between the fingers of his right hand and his fingers were pressed which felt very painful. The NARCOM
agents boxed him and Mari Musa lost consciousness. Mari Musa denied the NARCOM agents' charge
that he had sold two wrappers of marijuana to them; that he had received from them a P20.00 bill which
he had given to his wife.

RTC Ruling: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling marijuana and pursuant to Sec. 4, Art II of Rep.
Act No. 6425
CA: The Court, after a careful reading of the record, finds the testimony of Sgt. Ani regarding the buy-
bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution and subsequent conviction of the
appellant, to be direct, lucid and forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any of the material
points, it deserves credence
ISSUE/S:
Was Mari Musa’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures violated? - NO
RULING:
In the case at bar, however, T/Sgt. Belarga did not positively claim that he saw the appellant hand over
Page 26 of 60
marijuana to Sgt. Ani. What he said was that there was an exchange of certain articles between the two.
The appellant next assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing marijuana
which the NARCOM agents found in the appellant's kitchen. It appears that after Sgt. Ani gave the pre-
arranged signal to the other NARCOM agents, the latter moved in and arrested the appellant inside the
house. They searched him to retrieve the marked money but didn't find it. Upon being questioned, the
appellant said that he gave the marked money to his wife.31 Thereafter, T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego
went to the kitchen and noticed what T/Sgt. Belarga described as a "cellophane colored white and stripe
hanging at the corner of the kitchen."32 They asked the appellant about its contents but failing to get a
response, they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves. At the trial, the appellant questioned the
admissibility of the plastic bag and the marijuana it contains but the trial court issued an Order ruling that
these are admissible in evidence.33
While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and seizure may be effected,
exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v. Dizon,36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most
important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an
incident to a lawful arrest."37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search and seizure
incident to a lawful arrest, thus:
Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant.
Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may
seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without
arrest and search warrants.39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his
house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house and, in the kitchen, found and seized a
plastic bag hanging in a corner.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may extend beyond the
person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control.40
Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.41
It has also been suggested that even if an object is observed in "plain view," the "plain view" doctrine will
not justify the seizure of the object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the
"plain view" of the object.47 Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to
retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole house
and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their "plain view"
when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOMagents had to move from one
portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag. Unlike Ker vs. California, where the
police officer had reason to walk to the doorway of the adjacent kitchen and from which position he saw
the marijuana, the NARCOM agents in this case went from room to room with the obvious intention of
Page 27 of 60
fishing for more evidence.
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had
no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the appellant
refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana
We, therefore, hold that under the circumstances of the case, the "plain view" doctrine does not apply
and the marijuana contained in the plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence
pursuant to Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution.
The exclusion of this particular evidence does not, however, diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of
the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in
violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
Page 28 of 60
CASE #21: NOLASCO v PAÑO
FACTS: Petitioners were accused of rebellion along against the government. On August 6th, at around
9:00 A.M., Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon.
Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-
B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of one of the accused.
A search warrant was then issued on the same date; however, Iit does not appear from the records that
an application in writing was submitted by Lt. Col. Saldajeno to Judge Paño. A search was then made at
12 noon. The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all, and they also arrested Tolentino who was the
person in-charge of the residence at that time. On August 10th, the three petitioners were charged for
"Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion. One of the petitioners raised
the issue of the inadmissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant but respondent
held that that the seized documents "shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case against
respondent."
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: On December 12th, petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the
SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned
to them. It was claimed that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos
denied the Motion on January 7, 1985 on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be
litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the (1) Search
Warrant issued by respondent RTC Judge Paño; (2) his Order admitting the Amended Return and
granting the Motion to Retain Seized Items; and (3) Order of respondent MTC Judge Santos denying
petitioners' Motion to Suppress.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not Search Warrant is void. - YES
2. Whether or not the seized items should be returned to its owners. - NO.
RULING:
1. Yes. Because the issued search warrant is a general search warrant which is violative of Section 3,
Article IV of the Constitution which guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose. It is evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties
vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything
conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It
does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise
available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
rebellion.
There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus
giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also
were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and
infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the
recent rulings of this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for
being too general.
As to the lack of probable cause, it was not sufficiently established by the respondent judge. The
"probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and
Page 29 of 60
circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. In this case,
the examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said
witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause
upon which a warrant may issue.
2. No. According to the rules of the court, some searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section
12, Rule 126, Rules of Court, explicitly provides: Section 12. Search without warrant of person
arrested.—A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. The provision is declaratory in the sense
that it is confined to the search, without a search warrant, of a person who had been arrested. It is also a
general rule that, as an incident of an arrest, the place or premises where the arrest was made can also
be search without a search warrant. Verily, what must be considered is the balancing of the individual's
right to privacy and the public's interest in the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. In
this case, the 3 accused were charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order. Hence, a
search warrant is not needed; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order.
Page 30 of 60
CASE #22: People v Burgos
FACTS: Cesar Masamlok voluntarily surrendered to the authorities at the headquarters of the Philippine
Constabulary (PC). He claimed that that Ruben Burgos and his companions forcibly recruited him to be
part of the NPA. Burgos allegedly threatened him and his family with a firearm.
The following day, a team, headed by PC officer Bioco, found Burgos plowing his field. They questioned
him regarding the firearm he allegedly used to threaten Masamlok. Burgos denied possession of the
firearm. However, Burgos’ wife pointed to where the gun was hidden, where the gun was indeed found.
Accused then admitted possession of the gun but claimed that it was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez.
He also pointed to the
location of subversive documents hidden in a stock pile of cogon.
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: Ruben Burgos was convicted by the RTC of Illegal Possession of
Firearms in
Furtherance of Subversion. The RTC reasoned that Burgos’ arrest without warrant was justified since
the authorities received an urgent report of his involvement in subversive activities from a reliable
source. The trial court also justified the search as valid since it was incidental to a lawful arrest. Burgos
appealed his conviction on the ground that his warrantless arrest and the search of his house were
illegal.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether Burgos’ warrantless arrest and the search of his house were illegal – NO.
2. Whether he was guilty beyond reasonable doubt – NO
RULING:
Burgos’ warrantless arrest was illegal since his case does not fall under any of the exceptions. Since his
warrantless arrest is illegal, the warrantless search conducted on his incidental to such arrest is also
illegal. There being no admissible evidence, the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable
doubt.
Under Article IV, Section 3 of the 1973 Constitution “...no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court provides the exceptions when an arrest may be made
without warrant:
1. when in his presence, person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
2. when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
3. When person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment.
These exceptions, however, are extremely construed. Thus, the trial court erred inapplying the
exception.
For there to be a valid warrantless arrest, an offense must be committed in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer. In this case, there was no such personal knowledge since the arresting
officers’ knowledge stemmed solely from Masamlok’s report and firearm’s location was given by Burgos’
wife. Nor was Burgos in
actual possession of any firearm or subversive document when he was arrested, nor was he committing
Page 31 of 60
any act which could be described as subversive since he was merely plowing his field.
The People’s claim that arrest is lawful using the reasonableness test is erroneous. The reasonableness
test applies only as to the perpetrator’s identity, not the crime. A crime must be in fact be committed first.
It is not enough to reasonably suspect that a crime may have been committed.
In this case, when Burgos was arrested the authorities merely suspected that the accused committed a
crime solely on Masamlok’s testimony. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet
ascertained. Subsequent recovery of the gun based on the wife’s testimony doesn’t make the arrest
lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, the search done incidental to
such arrest is also unlawful.
Hence, the evidence gathered was inadmissible in evidence. Having no additional evidence to prove his
guilty, Burgos should be acquitted.
Page 32 of 60
CASE #23: Roan v Gonzales
FACTS: A search warrant was issued by respondent judge Romulo T. Gonzales on May 10, 1984. The
application for the said search warrant was personally filed by PC Capt. Mauro Quillosa. Together with
Quillosa were two witnesses, Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who presented to respondent judge
their respective affidavits taken by police investigator Pat. Josue V. Lining. The application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to, as such respondent Judge proceeded to examine Quillosa on the contents of
the application to ascertain if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, Quillosa subscribed and
swore the said application before respondent judge.
Roan’s house was searched two days after the issuance of the search warrant. The said search was
conducted by military authorities. Despite none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered, the
officers who performed the search found one Colt Magnum revolver and 18 live bullets which they
confiscated. The said items served as bases for the charge of illegal possession of firearms against the
petitioner.
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: This case did not follow the procedural rules of having a search warrant
invalidated but the court explained it in this light:
It is true that the petitioner should have, before coming to this Court, ftted a motion for the quashal of the
search warrant by the respondent judge in accordance with the normal procedure. But as we said and
did in Burgos, “this procedural flaw notwithstanding, we take cognizance of this petition in view of the
seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised.
ISSUE/S: Whether or not the search warrant be annulled on the ground that it violates the privacy of one
person’s house. - YES.
RULING:
YES. To be valid, a search warrant must be supported by probable cause to be determined by the judge
or some authorized officer after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. There
must be a specific description of the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to prevent
arbitrary and indiscriminate use of the warrant. Probable cause, as described by Judge Escolin in
Burgos v. Chief of Staff, refers to “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense arein the place sought to be searched.” The probable cause must refer to
only one specific offense.
Capt. Quillosa was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of mere hearsay and not
of information personally known to him as required by settled jurisprudence. It is axiomatic that the
magistrate must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary or pro-forma, if the claimed probable
cause is to be established. The examining magistrate must not simply rehash the contents of the
affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent and justification of the application.
Prohibited articles may be seized but only as long as the search is valid. In this case, it was not because
there was no valid search warrant and absent of such warrant, the right thereto was not validly waived
by the petitioner. In short, the military officers who entered the petitioner’s premises had no right to be
there and therefore had no right to seize the pistol and bullets.
Page 33 of 60
CASE #24: VLASONS ENTERPRISES v CA
FACTS:
Florencio Sosuan, as buyer, filed a civil action for the recovery of possession of two (2) pieces of a
salvaged bronze propeller of a sunken vessel against the seller, Lo Bu, and also against the persons
from whom Lo Bu had purchased the propeller, Alfonso Calixto and Ernesto Valenzuela—and
alternatively against Vlasons Enterprises Corporation.
Judge Alfredo Cruz, Jr., issued an Order dated March 22, 1982 granting the motion of Sosuan “. . . t o
Repossess Propeller Pieces” pendente lite upon his posting of a bond in the sum of P82,940.00
representing the uncontroverted value thereof 3—this, after Sosuan had rested his case and before the
defendants could begin presenting theirs.
On June 21, 1979, those propeller pieces had been seized by METROCOM agents from Florencio
Sosuan on the strength of a search warrant issued by another branch of the same Manila Court of First
Instance, presided over by Judge Maximo Maceren.
4 The search warrant was issued at the instance of Vlasons Enterprises Corporation (hereafter simply
referred to as Vlasons), which claimed to be the owner of the propeller. Vlasons alleged that the
propeller was an accessory of an oil tanker (the “MT Feoso Sun) which it had purchased on December
21, 1978 and which had sunk at a point off Limay, Bataan: that the propeller, had been traced to a junk
shop of a man named Garcia in Cavite Street, Tondo, Manila, and when discovered, appeared to have
been broken into two (2) pieces; and that the propeller pieces had been subsequently sold for
P71,000.00 to Kim Hoc Hing Foundry at Jaboneros Street, Binondo, Manila, owned by Florencio
Sosuan.
METROCOM filed with the Office of the Manila City Fiscal a complaint accusing Alfonso Calixto and
Ernesto Valenzuela of theft of said propeller, and also charging Florencio Sosuan with violation of the
Anti-Fencing Law 7 for having allegedly purchased the propeller pieces from Lo Bu, a scrap dealer, with
knowledge that they were stolen goods. Both cases were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
In the meantime, in the civil action to recover possession the propeller pieces filed by Sosuan, pending
before Judge Cruz’ Branch, the order mentioned in the opening paragraph of this opinion—authorizing
Sosuan to take possession of the propellers pending action—was promulgated on March 22, 1982. The
Order stressed the fact that no criminal action has been filed in Court in connection with the seizure of
the propellers in- question.

This Order was also challenged by Vlasons in the Court of Appeals on certiorari. That Court however
refused to nullify the order.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the CA erred in ruling that Judge Cruz had the power to authorize the release of the
propeller pieces because these articles were in custodia legis of another Branch of the Court,
presided over by Judge Maceren. - YES
2. WON the CA, in sustaining respondent’s position, allowed Judge Cruz to interfere with the
jurisdiction and prerogative of a co- equal court. - YES
RULING:
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The proceeding for the seizure of property in virtue of a search warrant does not end with the actual
taking of the property by the proper officers and its delivery, usually constructive, to the court. The order
for the issuance of the warrant is not a final one and cannot constitute res judicata. Such an order does
not ascertain and adjudicate the permanent status or character of the seized property. By its very
nature, it is provisional, interlocutory. It is merely the first step in the process to determine the character
and title of the property. That determination is done in the criminal action involving the crime or crimes in
connection with which the search warrant was issued.
The outcome of the criminal action will dictate the disposition of the seized property. If found to be
contraband, i.e., articles the possession of which, without more, constitutes a crime and the
repossession of which would subject defendant to criminal penalties and frustrate the express policy
against the possession of such objects, they will not be returned, but shall be confiscated in favor of the
State or destroyed, as the case may be.
If not contraband, the property shall be returned without undue delay to the person who appears from
the evidence to be the owner or rightful possessor, whether or not the property was subject of theft,
robbery or other crime. Should there be conflicting claims of ownership over the property seized under a
warrant—and subsequently shown by the evidence not to be contraband, or otherwise illicit or subject to
forfeiture—the appropriate remedy, it has been held, is the institution of a civil suit by any of the parties
concerned or by the Government itself, assuming the role of stakeholder, although there is authority to
the effect that a magistrate issuing a search warrant on the ground that property has been stolen has
jurisdiction to dispose of the property seized thereunder, even if there be no criminal prosecution for the
larceny, where the applicable statute does not require a prosecution as a condition precedent to such
disposition, but that this jurisdiction is an exceptional one.
In the case at bar, no criminal prosecution was ever instituted in the Maceren Branch of the Manila Court
of First Instance with respect to the propeller pieces, subsequent to the issuance by said Branch of a
search warrant and the resultant seizure of those articles. Nor could any criminal prosecution ever be
expected at any time thereafter since both the fiscal and the Minister of Justice had opined that no crime
had been proven to have attended the acquisition by the suspects of the propeller pieces, an opinion
which this Court had refused to nullify.
The record shows that that civil action was indeed commenced by Florencio Sosuan; but as fate would
have it, it was raffled to another branch of the same Manila Court of First Instance, the Cruz Branch, not
the Maceren Branch. The first question that arises in view of this development is whether or not the Cruz
Branch had jurisdiction over this particular action for the recovery of title to the personal property in
question valued at more than twenty thousand pesos; and the answer cannot but be in the affirmative, in
the light of the clear provisions of the law. The Maceren Branch, on the other hand, could not take
cognizance of the issue of title for the simple reason that the action regarding that issue had not been
raffled to it.
The fact of the matter is that absent any contemporaneous or subsequent criminal action involving the
crime or crimes for which the search warrant had been issued, and specially in the light of the dismissal
of the criminal complaints in connection therewith, said search warrant and the proceedings thereon
were rendered inconsequential as far as the resolution of the civil action involving the conflicting claims
of title to the property was concerned. The question of title would have to be adjudged principally on the
basis of the pleadings filed and the evidence adduced in that civil action. These premises considered, it
is therefore immaterial which court takes cognizance of that civil suit, whether it be the court issuing the
search warrant or any other. After all, the former performs in this situation the function of no more than a
custodian of the property. No peculiar or additional competence to adjudicate the question of title was
acquired by it by reason of its having issued a search warrant. No possible inconsistency or
contradiction in disposition of the property could in the circumstances possibly arise between it and the
court where the civil action is pending, since only the latter could and would render a judgment on the
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question of title. There is therefore no reason to declare the court which issued the search warrant to be
the only branch which should exercise jurisdiction over the suit to resolve conflicting claims of ownership
over the seized articles. Nor may any valid reason be cited why, under the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in this case, the seizing court may not release the seized articles to the person pronounced by
the final judgment in the civil action to be entitled thereto, or even to transfer the custody of the goods to
the branch where the action is pending, upon due application, at any time prior to the final judgment.
It is therefore this Court’s holding that where personalty has been seized under a search warrant, and it
appears reasonably definite that the seizure will not be followed by the filing of any criminal action for the
prosecution of the offenses in connection with which the warrant was issued, the public prosecutors
having pronounced the absence of basis therefor, and there are, moreover, conflicting claims asserted
over the seized property, the appropriate remedy is the institution of an ordinary civil action by any
interested party, or of a special civil action of interpleader by the Government itself, that action being
cognizable not exclusively by the court issuing the search warrant but by any other competent court to
which it may be assigned by raffle.
2. The absence of criminal prosecution in the court issuing the search warrant makes necessary the
filing of civil suit to resolve issue of ownership. It does not of itself furnish basis or warrant the transfer of
possession from one party to the other in the civil action.—The attempt at justification must fail. The
petitioner’s thesis is untenable. The absence of any criminal prosecution in the Maceren Branch in
relation to the propeller has no relevance whatever to the question of whether or not in the civil suit
before the Cruz Branch the plaintiff, who claims to be the owner of the propeller, is entitled to its
possession pending action as against defendant Vlasons, who also claims to be the owner thereof. Non
sequitur. The absence of such a criminal prosecution and consequently of any occasion for the Maceren
Court to decide the question of title to the propeller, merely makes necessary the civil suit to precisely
resolve that issue. It does not of itself furnish basis for or warrant the transfer of possession from one
party to the other in the civil action.
The theory that the act of one branch of a court of first instance (regional trial court) may be deemed to
be the act of another branch of the same court is, upon its face, absurd. It flies in the teeth of the all too
familiar actuality that each branch is a distinct and separate court, exercising jurisdiction over the cases
assigned to it to the exclusion of all other branches.
Also patently erroneous is the holding of the Court of Appeals that “(t)he articles seized were under the
custody of Camp Crame, at Quezon City, and not in the custody of the Court of First Instance of Manila
presided over by Judge Maceren.” The METROCOM officers obtained custody of the pro-peller in virtue
of the search warrant issued by the Maceren Court and were holding possession thereof by that Court’s
authority. The officers at Camp Crame were not exercising control over the propeller on their own
authority, but by virtue of the power of the Court. Their custody of the propeller was obviously and
undeniably the custody of the Court. Finally, the lack of any provision in Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
ordaining “that the things seized could be released only by the court issuing the search warrant,” also
adverted to by the Court of Appeals, certainly does not negate the indisputable fact that said court does
acquire custody and control of the property described in the warrant after its seizure, to the exclusion of
any other court; and that that custody and control cannot be interfered with by any other coordinate court
or branch of the same court.
CASE #25: Elizalde Malaloan, Et Al. Vs. Court Of Appeals, Et Al.
FACTS:
On March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector)
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search
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warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon
City. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90.
On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant,
proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for
Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's 'Inventory of
Property Seized,' firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized
and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched
were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of
the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicted for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case
No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by
respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.
On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a 'Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For
the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence' before the Quezon City court; and a 'Supplemental
Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of evidence Illegally
Obtained'.
On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating
subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of
which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within
the contemplation of paragraphs 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be serve not only
within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court
(National Capital Judicial Region)
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: Court of Appeals rendered judgment, 3 in effect affirming that of the trial
court, by denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it had
issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now
impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us.
ISSUE/S:
WHETHER OR NOT a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection
with an offense allegedly committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and to issue a warrant to conduct a
search on a place likewise outside its territorial jurisdiction. - YES.
RULING:
The Court held that petitioners failed to convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1)
the court which has the competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the
permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement of such search warrant vis-a-vis the court’s territorial
jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution of one
does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid compounding the seeming
confusion, these questions shall be discussed seriatim.
1. Re: jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the search warrant issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and
ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City.
SC: It is erroneous to equate the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution
and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court.—The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously
equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and prosecution of
a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the
power to issue which is inherent in all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is
reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the requisites, procedure and
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purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a
criminal action.
A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.—For, indeed, a
warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process. A search warrant is
defined in our jurisdiction as an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines
signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and
bring it before the court. A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of
discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a
public necessity.
A search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the
main case.—It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the
Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if one has already been instituted, or in
anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial
clairvoyance to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed
where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a
territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This
is aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the rules for
delitos continuados or in those instances where different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction
over the same criminal offense.
2. Re: Petitioner’s invocation of Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No.
19 on August 4, 1987 by the SC arguing that only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has
jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant an application for and issue a warrant to search
that place.
SC: Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a
procedural law and much less by an administrative order or circular.—Jurisdiction is conferred by
substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by an
administrative order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their
judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17 thereof provides that “(e)very Regional Trial
Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall be his permanent station,” and he “may be assigned by
the Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within the same region as public interest may
require, and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station x x x”which,
otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.
It does not mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched
cannot issue a search warrant therefor where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and
justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place.—This should not, however,
mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue
a search warrant therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by
compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place. Conversely, neither should a search
warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an
executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied
enforcement or nullified just because it was implemented outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction
is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction, there
were limitations of the time wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is
provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within ten days from the delivery of the
warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge, said warrant does
not become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the
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other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has been expressly set in our Rules at ten days but there is
no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is implemented on
and within the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial
jurisdiction of the issuing court.
CASE #26: PEOPLE v RODRIGUEZA
FACTS:
The information, dated July 10, 1987, charges Don Rodrigueza and his co-accused, Samuel Segovia
and Antonio Lonceras, with allegedly having in their custody and possession 100 grams of marijuana
leaves and for selling, in a buy-bust operation, said 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves for a
consideration of P200.00.
2 During the arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge against them. At the trial, the
prosecution and the defense presented several witnesses after which the court a quo rendered
judgment acquitting Samuel Segovia and Antonio Lonceras but convicting and penalizing herein
appellant.
NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 1, 1987,
after gaining information that there was an ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Daraga,
Albay. The participating agents were given money (P200 in different denominations) treated with
ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a certain Don. Thereafter, Don,
herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in a plastic” later identified as marijuana
was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to headquarters and made a report, based on
which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid was conducted in the house of the father
(Jovencio Rodrigueza) of the accused. During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate
dried marijuana leaves and a plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search
warrant. The accused was found positive of ultraviolet powder.
The next day, July 2, 1987, Jovencio Rodrigueza was released from detention but appellant was
detained. An affidavit, allegedly taken from and executed by him, was sworn to by him before the
assistant city prosecutor.
Appellant had no counsel when his sworn statement was taken during that custodial investigation.
On the other hand, appellant testified that on said date he was in the house of his aunt in San Roque,
Legaspi City. He stayed there overnight and did not leave the place until the next day when his brother
arrived and told him that their father was taken by some military men the preceding night. He went to
Camp Bagong Ibalon and arrived there at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning of July 2, 1987. When he
arrived, he was asked if he knew anything about the marijuana incident, to which question he answered
in the negative. Like Segovia, he was made to hold a P10.00 bill and was brought to the crime
laboratory for examination.
From that time on, he was not allowed to go home and was detained inside the camp. He was also
tortured in order to make him admit his complicity in the alleged sale of marijuana.

The Regional Trial Court of Legaspi City, Branch 10, found accused- appellant Don Rodrigueza guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended) and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P20,000.00 and costs
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NOTE: the Solicitor General, deviating from his conventional stance in the prosecution of criminal cases,
recommends the acquittal of appellant for the reasons stated in his Manifestation for Acquittal (In Lieu of
Appellee's Brief) filed with the Court. We have reviewed and analyzed the testimonial and documentary
evidence in this case and we find said recommendation to be well taken.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or Not the trial court erred in (1) admitting in evidence the sworn statement of appellant which
was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights; (2) convicting appellant of the crime charged; (3)
convicting appellant of the crime charged despite the fact that the evidence for the prosecution is weak
and not convincing; and (4) finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of selling or at least acting
as broker in the sale of the 100 grams of marijuana. - APPELLANT is ACQUITTED.
RULING:
The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the qualification that
the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling marijuana to a person posing
as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual exchange. A search to be valid must
generally be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority; Instances
where the court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without a
search warrant.—As provided in the present Constitution, a search, to be valid, must generally be
authorized by a search warrant duly issued by the proper government authority. True, in some
instances, this Court has allowed government authorities to conduct searches and seizures even without
a search warrant. Thus, when the owner of the premises waives his right against such incursion; when
the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it is made on vessels and aircraft for violation of customs
laws; when it is made on automobiles for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view; or in cases of inspection of buildings
and other premises for the enforcement of fire, sanitary and building regulations, a search may be validly
made even without a search warrant.
Said raid also violated accused’ right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the situation did not
fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a search warrant, i.e. when
the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited articles in plain view.
In the case at bar, however, the raid conducted by the NARCOM agents in the house of Jovencio
Rodrigueza was not authorized by any search warrant. It does not appear, either, that the situation falls
under any of the aforementioned cases. Hence, appellant's right against unreasonable search and
seizure was clearly violated. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the
urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that
the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to
conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant
during that time.
The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the urgency and necessity of the
situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the place had already been
put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been their intention to conduct the raid, then they
should, because they easily could, have first secured a search warrant during that time.
The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the identification of the confiscated marijuana
leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia presented as evidence against appellant: CIC Taduran,
who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried marijuana leaves
wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been advanced therefor, what
were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as evidence against the appellant
were the following items: One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following: Exh. "A"—
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Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a white
colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops having a total
weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting
tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.
Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up raid in
the house of Rodrigueza’s father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity of the
marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this Court had the
occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained therein constitute the
corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved with certainty and
conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution. Conviction is reversed
and set aside and accused is acquitted.
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CASE #27: PADILLA vs CA
FACTS:
High-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla:
“(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
“(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazine
with ammunitions;
“(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; and
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver.”
Appellant voluntarily surrendered item no. 3. and a black bag containing two additional long magazines
and one short magazine.
PNP Chief Espino, Record Branch of the Firearms and Explosives Office issued a Certification which
stated that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle SN-RP 131280, a
.357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla. A second Certification stated that the three firearms were not
also registered in the name of Robinhood C. Padilla.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not his arrest was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the
course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule. - NO
RULING:
There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his
apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or
private person. Both elements concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner’s vehicle figured
in a hit and run – an offense committed in the “presence” of Manarang, a private person, who then sought
to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that “presence” does not only require that the arresting
person sees the offense, but also when he “hears the disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once
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to the scene.” As testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the
sideswiped victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring
Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having sent a radio report to
the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen
SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of
petitioner.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to
seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting
petitioner’s arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most
prudent action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as
policemen are unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a suspect (like
herein petitioner) who , in all probability, could have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained
civilian may not be able to contain without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. It is
precisely through this cooperation, that the offense herein involved fortunately did not become an
additional entry to the long list of unreported and unsolved crimes.
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein, cannot defeat the arrest which
has been set in motion in a public place for want of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent
need to render aid or take action. The exigent circumstances of – hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving
vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime – all created a situation in which speed is essential and
delay improvident. The Court acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more
than mere “reasonable and articulable” suspicion that the occupant of the vehicle has been engaged in
criminal activity. Moreover, when caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm
(Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper as he was
again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions) and this time
in the presence of a peace officer.
Besides, the policemen’s warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under paragraph (b)
as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of
time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves
at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang’s report, the policemen saw for themselves the fast
approaching Pajero of petitioner, its dangling plate number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the
dented hood and railings thereof. These formed part of the arresting police officer’s personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that petitioner’s Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run incident.
Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable
hearsay information.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending
an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. Petitioner’s belated challenge thereto
aside from his failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his
evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by applying for bail,
petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects.
We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a search warrant, the
admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid, are
as follows:
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1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence,
2. Seizure of evidence in “plain view”, the elements of which are:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally
present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where
they are;
© the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) “plain view” justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a
highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a
criminal activity.
4. Consented warrantless search, and
5. customs search.
In conformity with respondent court’s observation, it indeed appears that the authorities stumbled upon
petitioner’s firearms and ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly
understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of the Smith & Wesson
revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within “plain view” of the policemen who
inadvertently discovered the revolver and magazine tucked in petitioner’s waist and back pocket
respectively, when he raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to
the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the policemen as they took
a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying horizontally near the driver’s seat. Thus it has been
held that:
“(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, the . . . police officers
should happen to discover a criminal offense being committed by any person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of the
corpus delicti.”
“Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are subject to seizure
even without a warrant.”
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines, petitioner
voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of
his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his failure to quash the information
estopped him from assailing any purported defect.
Page 44 of 60
CASE #28: Malacat vs. CA
FACTS:
On 27 August 1990, at about 6:30 p.m., allegedly in response to bomb threats reported seven days
earlier, Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National
Police, Police Station No. 3, Quiapo, Manila, was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of
them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard, Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza
Miranda.
They chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four
men, posted at opposite sides of the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These
men were acting suspiciously with “their eyes moving very fast.” Yu and his companions positioned
themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for about 30 minutes. The police officers then
approached one group of men, who then fled in different directions. As the policemen chase them, Yu
caught up with and apprehended Sammy Malacat y Mandar (who Yu recognized, inasmuch as allegedly
the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw Malacat and 2 others attempt
to detonate a grenade). Upon searching Malacat, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside the
latter’s “front waist line.” Yu’s companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan
from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Malacat and Casan were then brought to Police
Station 3 where Yu placed an “X” mark at the bottom of the grenade and thereafter gave it to his
commander. Yu did not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from Malacat.
On 30 August 1990, Malacat was charged with violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree 1866.
At arraignment on 9 October 1990, petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Malacat denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several
other police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again
searched, but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of Malacat
was akin to a “stop and frisk,” where a “warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest” and “whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the
police officer seeks to obtain more information”; and that the seizure of the grenade from Malacat was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The trial court thus found Malacat guilty of the crime of illegal possession of
explosives under Section 3 of PD 1866, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of not less than 17
years, 4 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, and not more than 30 years of
Reclusion Perpetua, as maximum.
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court
ISSUE/S:
Whether the search made on Malacat is valid, pursuant to the exception of “stop and frisk. - NO
RULING:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is needed in order to validly
effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures
refers to those effected without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards valid
warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. A warrantless arrest
under the circumstances contemplated under Section 5(a) has been denominated as one “in flagrante
delicto,” while that under Section 5(b) has been described as a “hot pursuit” arrest. Turning to valid
warrantless searches, they are limited to the following: (1) customs searches; (2) search of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain view; (4) consent searches; (5) a search incidental to a lawful
Page 45 of 60
arrest; and (6) a “stop and frisk.”
The concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest must not be confused.
These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they
may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the
precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search. Here, there could have been no valid in
flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on
the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of Malacat, indicating that a
crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Plainly, the search conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest. On the
other hand, while probable cause is not required to conduct a “stop and frisk,” but genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the
person detained has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a
police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person
for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly
and fatally be used against the police officer.
Hence, the following are the reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:  
First - grave doubts as to Yu's claim that Malacat was a member of the group which attempted to bomb
Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor
corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.
Second - there was nothing in Malacat's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even
mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast". This was an observation which is
doubtful since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near Malacat and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
presumably dusk.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that Malaca was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the
front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any
telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made. Here,
there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of
the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the
part of Malacat, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to
be committed. Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search
conducted on Malacat could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
Challenged decision of the Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15988 is
SET ASIDE for lack of jurisdiction on the part of said Court and, on ground of reasonable doubt, the
decision of 10 February 1994 of Branch 5 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is REVERSED and
petitioner SAMMY MALACAT y MANDAR is hereby ACQUITTED and ORDERED immediately released
from detention, unless his further detention is justified for any other lawful cause.
CASE #29: People vs Malmstedt
Page 46 of 60
FACTS: Accused was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet for violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.
Accused was a Swedish national who was staying in Sagada and planned to stay in the country for 3
days. Desiring to go to Baguio City, he alighted a bus to going there. Captain Alen Velasco, the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, set up a temporary checkpoint near Mt Province. Such order was
prompted by repeated reports that prohibited drugs were being transported there. Moreover, information
was received that same morning that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited
drugs.
In the afternoon of the same day, the bus rode by accused was stopped at the checkpoint. Officers
boarded the bus and conducted the inspection. The officers noticed a bulge on accused’s waist and
asked to present identification papers. Upon failure to comply, accused was asked to reveal what he
was carrying and the showed the contents of his bag. There, suspicious objects wrapped in tape were
found which was later revealed to be hashish. A derivative of marijuana. His other belongings were also
inspected in which it was found that a teddy bear contained the same materials inside.
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: An information was filed against accused and during arraignment he
pleaded not guilty and raised the issue of “illegal-search.” He claimed that the NARCOM officers planted
the hashish into his belongings and denying ownership over the belongings. The RTC did not give
credence to his defense for failing to raise it at the earliest possible opportunity. Thus, the RTC
pronounced him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
Seeking the reversal of said decision, accused now argues that the search was illegal due to the
absence of a search warrant therefore the objects taken were not admissible as evidence.
ISSUE/S:
RULING: There may be a valid warrantless search incidental to a warrantless arrest. Rule 112 of the
ROC provides the instances where valid arrests can be made. Accused was searched and arrested
while transporting prohibited drugs. A crime was being committed and was caught in flagrante delicto.
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was
made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a
crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The required probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved
according to the facts of each case.
Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid,
because of the existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag
owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously, and attempted to flee.
It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It
was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the inspection, that
accused was required to present his passport. The failure of the accused to present his identification
papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was
Page 47 of 60
trying to hide his identity.
The SC AFFIRMS the decision of the RTC.
CASE #30: People vs Aminnudin
FACTS: Acting on a tip received from a regular informer, the PC officers proceeded to arrest and then
search the accused Aminnudin as he was descending down the gangplank of the ship (M/V Wilcon 9) he
rode to arrive at Iloilo City. After inspecting his bag, suspicious objects were found and then turned over
to the forensic examiner of the NBI which held them to be marijuana leaves. An information was filed
based on the findings.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed marijuana and averred that all he had in his bag was his clothing.
He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and was immediately handcuffed. His bag confiscated and
without a warrant. And was manhandled to force him to admit that he was carrying marijuana and
sustained injuries as a result. He also claims that he went to Iloilo to sell watches.
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: The RTC was unconvinced at his defense, noting that he came to Iloilo to
sell watches but carried only two which were not even present during the inspection nor were they
damaged as a result of the manhandling. Thus, the RTC held him guilty of illegally transporting
marijuana.
ISSUE/S:
RULING: There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that
he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this
point.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only
justification was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to
them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or a search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under the Rules of Court.
It was also testified that the arresting officers had 2 days prior to the arrival of the accused to secure a
search warrant from a judge. While it is understood that there may be a warrantless search of aircrafts
and vessels due to their quickness to move out of one jurisdiction, still the situation does not require any
expediency.
In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly
Page 48 of 60
became suspect and so subject to apprehension.
Thus, the decision of the RTC REVERSED and the accused, ACQUITTED.
Page 49 of 60
CASE #31: Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp & Petron Corp vs Romar’s International Gases
Corporation
FACTS: Petitioners received information that respondent was selling and distributing liquefied petroleum
gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the cylinders manufactured by and bearing the duly sealed trademark of
Petron. Petron through investigators, went to the premises of respondent and had empty cylinders
refilled in their refilling station. The refilled cylinders were thereafter brought to the Marketing
Coordinator of Petron Gasul and found that respondent was not authorized to sell, and/or otherwise deal
with Petron LPG products which constitutes a violation of RA 8293 which is otherwise known as
Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines and RA 623 aka An Act To Regulate the Use of Duly
Stamped or Marked Bottles, Boxes, Casks, Kegs, Barrels and Other Similar Containers.
Petitioners then requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate said activities of
respondent for the purpose of apprehending and prosecuting establishments. The NBI proceeded with
their investigation and reportedly found commercial quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders
stockpiled at respondent's warehouse.
Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed RTC-Naga City, two separate Applications for Search
Warrant. The RTC-Naga City issued an Order granting said Applications and Search Warrants were
issued. On the same day, the NBI served the warrants at the respondent's premises in an orderly and
peaceful manner, and articles or items described in the warrants were seized.
Respondent thereafter filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant where the only grounds cited were:
(a) there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy
to the date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned by
respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and
Marsflame
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: However, Respondent’s new counsel filed an Appearance with a motion
for reconsideration where it was raised for the first time the impropriety of filing the search warrant at
the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the RTC-Iriga City. Respondent pointed out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state
any compelling reason to justify the filing of the same in a court which does not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the crime, as required by Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Petitioner opposed the motion arguing that it would be a violation of the Omnibus Motion Rule. RTC-
Naga granted Respondent’s motion for reconsideration thereby quashing the search warrants.
CA affirmed the RTC Order quashing the search warrants. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
denied.
ISSUE/S:
RULING: Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
Page 50 of 60
(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime
was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial
region where the warrant shall be enforced.
The above provision is clear, the application for search warrant in this case should have stated
compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City,
considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime
was committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced.
The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that
all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be deemed
waived; and, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion
are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) the existence of another action pending
between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
The CA erroneously reasoned out that the application for a search warrant is a criminal action which
demands that venue shall be jurisdictional. However, it is ruled by the SC in the case of Malaloan vs CA
that the application for a search warrant is a Special Criminal Process which is inherent in all courts.
The CA gravely erred in equating the proceedings for applications for search warrants with criminal
actions themselves. As elucidated by the Court, proceedings for said applications are not criminal in
nature and, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Evidently, the issue of
whether the application should have been filed in RTC-Iriga City or RTC-Naga, is not one
involving jurisdiction because, as stated in the afore-quoted case, the power to issue a special
criminal process is inherent in all courts.
Inferring from the foregoing, the Court deems it improper for the RTC-Naga to have even taken into
consideration an issue which respondent failed to raise in its motion to quash, as it did not involve a
question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is quite clear that the RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to
issue criminal processes such as a search warrant.
Petition is GRANTED. The decision of the CA REVERSED, and the order of the RTC denying the
motion to quash REINSTATED.
Page 51 of 60
CASE #32: Ogayon vs People of the Philippines
FACTS: Two criminal information were filed against the accused for the illegal possession and use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).
According to the prosecution’s side, Police Chief Inspector Elmer Ferrera together with other police
officers proceeded to Ogayon’s house to enforce search warrant which was for the seizure of shabu and
drug paraphernalia allegedly kept by Ogayon.
Upon introducing themselves as police officers and searching the premise, some members of the police
went to a comfort room located some meters away from the house of the accused. There, shabu and
other drug paraphernalia were found. A receipt was made of the property seized and the arrest of the
accused was made.
As for the defense side, the accused testified that he did not have any knowledge of the prohibited drugs
and claimed that he saw the seized objects for the first time upon inventory. He also claimed that the
police team did not present to him any search warrant and it was only during the trial that he first saw a
copy of the warrant.
TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: RTC: Relying on the presumption of regularity, the RTC rejected Ogayon’s
frame up defense and rendered judgement convicting Ogayon of the two criminal charges against him.
The accused appealed to the CA, this time questioning the validity of the search warrant. He claimed
that the search warrant was defective for lack of transcript showing that the judge conducted an
examination of the applicant for search and his witnesses.
Findings of the CA:
Although the CA found no evidence in the records showing compliance with this requirement, it
nevertheless upheld the search warrant's validity due to Ogayon's failure to make a timely objection
against the warrant during the trial. That Ogayon objected to the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits,
which included the search warrant, was not sufficient for the CA. The CA noted that the objections were
not based on constitutional grounds, and for this reason, concluded that Ogayon is deemed to have
waived the right to question the legality of the search warrant.
Based on the search warrant's validity, the CA affirmed Ogayon's conviction for possession of drugs and
drug paraphernalia. Although the comfort room was located outside Ogayon's house, the CA declared
that he exercised exclusive control over it and should rightly be held responsible for the prohibited drugs
and paraphernalia found there.
As with the RTC, the CA relied on the presumption of regularity of the police team's operation and found
Ogayon's claim of frame-up to be unsupported. The CA thus ruled that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Ogayon was liable for the crimes charged.
ISSUE/S:
RULING: Under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant is central to the right, and its existence largely depends on the finding of the judge
conducting the examination. To substantiate a finding of probable cause, the Rules of Court specifically
require that:
Page 52 of 60
Rule 126, Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. - The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
We find that the failure to attach to the records the depositions of the complainant and his witnesses
and/or the transcript of the judge's examination, though contrary to the Rules, does not by itself nullify
the warrant. The requirement to attach is merely a procedural rule and not a component of the right.
Rules of procedure or statutory requirements, however salutary they may be, cannot provide new
constitutional requirements.
Instead, what the Constitution requires is for the judge to conduct an "examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," after which he determines the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant. The intent was to ensure that a warrant is
issued not merely on the basis of the affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, but only after
examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses. As the same examination requirement
was adopted in the present Constitution, The SC declared that affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses are insufficient to establish the factual basis for probable cause. Personal examination by the
judge of the applicant and his witnesses is indispensable, and the examination should be probing and
exhaustive, not merely routinary or a rehash of the affidavits.
Ideally, compliance with the examination requirement is shown by the depositions and the transcript. In
their absence, however, a warrant may still be upheld if there is evidence in the records that the
requisite examination was made and probable cause was based thereon.
In the present case, apart from the statement in the search warrant itself, we find nothing in the records
of this case indicating that the issuing judge personally and thoroughly examined the applicant and his
witnesses. The absence of depositions and transcripts of the examination was already admitted; the
application for the search warrant and the affidavits, although acknowledged by Ogayon himself could
not be found in the records. The police who conducted the search testified that he was one of those who
conducted the surveillance prior to the application but he was not the one who applied for the warrant; in
fact, he testified that he did not know who applied for it.
The records, therefore, bear no evidence from which we can infer that the requisite examination was
made, and from which the factual basis for probable cause to issue the search warrant was derived. A
search warrant must conform strictly to the constitutional requirements for its issuance; otherwise, it is
void. Based on the lack of substantial evidence that the search warrant was issued after the
requisite examination of the complainant and his witnesses was made, the Court declares the
search warrant a nullity.
The nullity of the search warrant prevents the Court from considering Ogayon's belated objections
thereto. In the light of the nullity of the Search Warrant, the search conducted on its authority is
likewise null and void. Under the Constitution, any evidence obtained in violation of a person's right
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Page 53 of 60
CASE #33: Bulauitan v. People
FACTS:
On Oct. 3, 2003, the PNP of Solana, Cagayan constituted a team to implement a search warrant issued
by Executive Judge Pauig to search petitioner Bulauitan’s residence. The search team were
accompanied by Kgd. Soliva and Polonia as search witnesses. Upon arrival at petitioner’s residence, the
search team was met by Bulauitan’s two children and housekeeper who informed them that the
petitioner was not home. The search team informed them of the reason for their presence, prompting the
latter to allow the team to enter the house and conduct a search. SP02 Baccay searched the petitioner’s
room and found 3 sachets of shabu, and showed said evidence to the children and housekeeper. When
Bulauitan arrived, the search team effected his arrest.
The RTC found that Bulauitan was guilty beyond reasonable doubt. The court explained that the
petitioner constructively possessed the sachets of shabu as they were found in his house where he
exercises dominion and control. The further explained that policemen must be accorder presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Bulauitan's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs should be upheld.
RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of petitioner. Bulauitan’s conviction must be set aside.
Section 8, Rule 126 provides that the search should be witnessed by "two witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality" only in the absence of either the lawful
occupant of the premises or any member of his family.
The members of the raiding team admitted that the search of the upper floor, which resulted in the
recovery of the shabu, did not take place in the presence of either the lawful occupant of the premises,
i.e. appellant (who was out), or his son Jack Go (who was handcuffed to a chair on the ground floor).
Such a procedure, whereby the witnesses are prevented from observing and monitoring the search,
violates both the spirit and letter of the law.
That the two barangay kagawads were present to witness the search is of no moment. The Rules of
Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose presence the search
must be conducted.
The violation of the procedure tainted the search with the vice of unreasonableness, thus compelled the
Court to apply the exclusionary rule and declare the seized articles inadmissible in evidence.
The testimonies given in the case ultimately prove that:
Page 54 of 60
(a) Bulauitan was not in his residence when the search was conducted;
(b) his daughter, Maria, was not able to witness SPO2 Baccay's search of Bulauitan's room as PO3
Tagal kept her in the living room and even instructed her to leave the house to contact her parents; and
(c) Kgd. Soliva and Kgd. Polonia neither witnessed the search as they remained outside Bulauitan's
residence.
As a consequence, the three (3) plastic sachets containing shabu recovered therefrom are inadmissible
in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is the very
corpus delicti of the crime charged, Bulauitan shall necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from all
criminal liability.
Page 55 of 60
CASE #34: People v. Castillo
FACTS:
On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued Search
Warrant No. 45 causing a search to be conducted by PDEA and PNP which yielded one sachet
containing residue of shabu inside the house of private respondent Rabino located in Aparri, Cagayan.
An Information was filed against private respondent Rabino for violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165.
Private respondent Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally
Acquired Evidence on the ground that the court issuing the search warrant must have territorial
jurisdiction over the place to be searched, thus the MTC of Gattaran had no compelling reason to issue
the same.
The RTC ruled in favor of private respondent stating that MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the application for and to issue Search Warrant No. 45 and therefore all proceedings had in
virtue thereof are null and void.
The case was raised directly to the SC by petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
Whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a search warrant involving an offense in which
it has no jurisdiction.
RULING:
This Court answers in the affirmative.
Under Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Constitution, the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1)
probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the
judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and
(5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
A motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as
(1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant;
and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
The respondent RTC judge, quashed the search warrant and dismissed the case based merely on the
fact that the warrant was issued by the MTC of Gattaran for a suspected violation of R.A. 9165 or The
Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the latter court. By that alone, the
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the
accepted grounds. A search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the
Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.
Sec. 2(b), Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly complied with. The application for a search warrant
Page 56 of 60
was filed within the same judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling
reasons, the MTC of Gattaran has the authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize the
dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same
judicial region.
Nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant must also
have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section
2, Rule 126 and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense
committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court
in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant
to its original jurisdiction. When no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search
warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense provided all requirements for its issuance are
present.
Page 57 of 60
CASE #35: People v. Pastrana
FACTS:
On 26 March 2001, NBI Special Investigator Gaerlan (SI Gaerlan) filed an application for a search
warrant before the RTC of Makati City to conduct a search of the office of respondents Amador Pastrana
and Rufina Abad in the same city. SI Gaerlan received confidential information that respondents were
engaged in a scheme to defraud foreign investors. Their employees would convince potential clients
abroad to invest in a foreign-based company by purchasing shares of stocks. Although the clients make
payment, no shares were actually purchased. SI Gaerlan averred that the scheme constituted estafa
under Article 315 of the RPC and also a violation of R.A. No. 8799 or the Securities Regulation Code
(SRC).
On 27 March 2001, NBI agents and representatives from the SEC searched the respondents' office. The
search was witnessed by Isagani Paulino and Gerardo Derma, Chief Security Officer and Building
Administrator. The NBI and the SEC were able to seize the following:
1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents:
a. Telephone bills of the company calls to clients;

b. List of brokers and 201 files;
c. Sales agreements;
d. Official receipts;
e. Credit advice;
f. Fax messages;
g. Clients message slips;
h. Company brochures;
i. Letterheads; and
j. Envelopes.
2. Forty (40) magazine stands of brokers' records;

3. Offshore incorporation papers;
4. Lease contracts; and
5. Vouchers/ledgers.
Respondent Abad moved to quash search warrant because it was issued in connection with two (2)
offenses, one for violation of the SRC and the other for estafa under the RPC, which contravened the
rules of criminal procedure that search warrants are to be issued only upon a finding of probable cause
in connection with one specific offense. Further, such warrant failed to specify the objects to be seized.
The RTC ruled that the search warrant was null and void because it violated the requirement that a
search warrant must be issued in connection with one specific offense only. It further opined that the
search warrant, its application, as well as the inventory submitted were all wanting in particularization.
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC for violating Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court because
the application failed to specify what provision of the SRC was violated or even what type of estafa was
committed by respondents. Further, the application for search warrant never alleged that respondents or
their corporations were not SEC-registered brokers or dealers, an element for violating Section 28.1 of
Page 58 of 60
the SRC.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the search warrant violated Rule 4 of Rule 126 for being issued in connection with
more than one specific offense.
2. Whether or not the search warrant specified the objects to be seized.
RULING:
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution guarantees every individual the right to personal liberty and
security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Additionally, Rule 126, Sections 4 and 5 provide for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant.
In the case of Stonehill, the Court stressed two points to be considered in the issuance of a search
warrant: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined personally by the
judge; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. Moreover, on account
of the seriousness of the irregularities committed regarding the search warrant in the case, the Court
amended the former Rules by providing that "a search warrant shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense."
1. The search warrant must be issued for one specific offense.
Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for having been issued for more than one specific offense.
One of the requirements of a search warrant is that it must be issued based on probable cause be in
connection with one specific offense to prevent the issuance of a scatter-shot warrant.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out one of the most fundamental
rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace officers.
This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted-to outlaw
the so-called general warrants.
a. First, violation of the SRC is not an offense in itself for there are several punishable acts under the
said law. Even the charge of "estafa under Article 315 of the RPC is vague for there are three ways of
committing the said crime.
b. The allegations in the application for search warrant do not indicate that respondents acted as brokers
or dealers without prior registration from the SEC – an essential element to be held liable for violation of
Section 28.1 of the SRC.
c. The two offenses are entirely different from each other and neither one necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the other.
2. Reasonable particularity of the description of the things to be seized.
Search Warrant No. 01-118 is null and void for lack of particularity in the description of the things sought
for seizure.
Page 59 of 60
The terms used in the warrant were too all-embracing, thus, subjecting all documents pertaining to the
transactions of respondents, whether legal or illegal, to search and seizure and the implementing
officers effectively had unlimited discretion as to what property should be seized.
In order to be valid, a search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the things
to be seized. The requirement of reasonable particularity of description of the things to be seized is
meant to enable the law enforcers serving the warrant to: (1) readily identify the properties to be seized
and prevent them from seizing the wrong items; and (2) leave said peace officers with no discretion
regarding the articles to be seized and thus prevent unreasonable searches and seizures.
In Bache and Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Judge Ruiz, one of the tests to determine the particularity in the
description of objects to be seized under a search warrant is when the things described are limited to
those which bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued.
In addition, under the Sec. 3 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the following personal property may be
the subject of a search warrant: (i) the subject of the offense; (ii) fruits of the offense; or (iii) those used
or intended to be used as a means of committing an offense.
Page 60 of 60

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AUSTRIA | DE VERA | LITERAL | QUINTANA | SOLANO

CASE #1: BACHE & CO. INC. V. RUIZ

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #2: CASTRO V. PABALAN

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #3: BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

The search warrants were declared null and void.

CASE #4: STONEHILL V. DIOKNO

CASE #5: BACHE & CO. INC. V. RUIZ

FACTS: SAME FACTS WITH CASE #1

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #6: PEOPLE V. HON. MARCOS

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #7: MATA V. BAYONA

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

ISSUE/S: Whether or not the confiscated items shall be considered admissible?

CASE #11: Yu vs Honrado

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #12: Alvarez v CFI

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #13:People v Kagui Malasuqui

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #14: PAPA v MAGO

CASE #15: PACIS v PAMARAN

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #18: People v Bagista

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING: ·

CASE #19: MANIPON V SANDIGANBAYAN

ISSUE/S: WON the P1,000 is illegally seized.

(PROSECUTION VERSION: Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #21: NOLASCO v PAÑO

CASE #23: Roan v Gonzales

CASE #24: VLASONS ENTERPRISES v CA

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #25: Elizalde Malaloan, Et Al. Vs. Court Of Appeals, Et Al.

CASE #26: PEOPLE v RODRIGUEZA

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

CASE #27: PADILLA vs CA

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:

CASE #28: Malacat vs. CA

Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court

CASE #29: People vs Malmstedt

The SC AFFIRMS the decision of the RTC.

CASE #30: People vs Aminnudin

CASE #32: Ogayon vs People of the Philippines

Findings of the CA:

CASE #33: Bulauitan v. People

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.

The testimonies given in the case ultimately prove that:

CASE #34: People v. Castillo

TRIAL COURT/CA RULING:

The case was raised directly to the SC by petition for certiorari.

This Court answers in the affirmative.

CASE #35: People v. Pastrana

1. Eighty-nine (89) boxes containing the following documents:

a. Telephone bills of the company calls to clients;