REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL

JOSEPHUS Q. RAMAS and ELIZABETH DIMAANO

FACTS

Immediately upon her assumption of office following the EDSA Revolution, then
President Corazon Aquino issued EO 1 creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Governance (PCGG) primarily to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates.

Through its then chairman Jovito Salonga, the PCGG created an AFP Graft Board
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.

The Board investigated Major General Josephus Ramas and came out with their
findings that Ramas was the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City and Cebu City.
Which according to them is not proportionate to the Salary of the private respondent
Ramas.

Military communication equipment was seized within premised of Elizabeth Dimaano,

the alleged mistress of private respondent Ramas but items not included in the search
warrant were also seized such as cash, jewelry and land title.

The AFP Board recommended that Ramas be prosecuted before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and RA 1379 (Act for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property). The Solicitor General, in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint against Ramas and Dimaano before the
Sandiganbayan.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case stating that:

PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate the private respondents because the violation
charged is in connection with RA 1379 and 3019 and in not within the authority of the
PCGG specifically granted in EO 1, and also for the failure to prove that the private
respondents are “subordinates” of former president within the contemplation of the
subject law,

and that the search and seizure conducted was illegal, therefore the evidence cannot be
admitted in court.

The petitioner sought relief to the Supreme Court arguing that the search conducted is
valid as it was performed during a revolutionary government (five days after the
successful EDSA revolution) bound by no constitutional limitation, therefore, the right
against illegal search and seizure granted by the Bill of Rights was rendered
inoperative. During “interregnum” Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of
Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.

ISSUE

Whether or not the properties were illegally searched and seized and are inadmissible
as evidence.

RULING

Yes.

The Court hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during the interregnum. However, the protection accorded to individuals under the
Covenant (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and the Declaration
(Universal Declaration of Human Rights) remained in effect during the interregnum.

The only legal limitations existing during that time are treaty obligations that the
revolutionary government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed
under international law.

The Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost
the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution. Although the
signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being
only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the
rights of individuals under the Declaration.

Treaty Provisions:

Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights45 recognized in
the present Covenant."

Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that
"No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence."
Article 17(2) that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property." Although the
signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document, being
only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.46 Thus, the
revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the
rights47 of individuals under the Declaration.
 SIMON vs. CHR

FACTS

Private respondents are composed of vendors on the doing business along the
vicinity of North EDSA. Petitioner had issued a demolition notice to the city
government of QC. Private respondents sought the assistance of CHR to help them
legally on the matter. CHR acted accordingly to the vendors asseverations. CHR done
an investigation of the case and imposed penalties on each of the petitioners. Petitioner,
filed a motion to dismiss with the CHR but was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE

WON public respondent has jurisdiction to:

a) Conduct investigation over the case;
b) Impose fines to the petitioners; and
c) To disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the victims.

HELD

a) No. The Court is not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the
stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving
civil and political rights" intended by the constitution.

According to the intent of the Constitutional Committee that drafted the powers given
to CHR, it is not to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is
that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law
to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the commission does not
have.
b) No. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance
before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an
adjudicative power that it does not possess.

The CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only
to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to
carry out its investigatorial powers.

c) No. The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way
of financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in
the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioners to
question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate
administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
 BORIS MEJOFF vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. L-4254 September 26, 1951

FACTS

Boris Mejoff is an alien of Russian descent who was brought to this country
from Shanghai as a secret operative by the Japanese forces during the latter's regime in
these Islands. He was arrested as a Japanese spy.

He was ordered to be deported on the first available transportation to Russia, but was
confined while awaiting a vessel to transport him because the Commissioner of
Immigration believes it is for the best interests of the country to keep him under
detention while arrangements for his departure are being made.
Contending that the Government has the right to hold undesirable aliens for a
“reasonable time” depending on the circumstances.

But, the Court warned that "under established precedents, too long a detention may
justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus."

More than 2 years have passed, but the petitioner was still in detention.

ISSUE

Whether or not the detention of the petitioner is legal/permissible.

HELD

No. The petitioner's unduly prolonged detention is unwarranted by law and the
Constitution, if the only purpose of the detention be to eliminate a danger that is by no
means actual, present, or uncontrollable.

It is very arbitrary to jail a person because of anticipated but yet uncommitted crimes.
Fear that the petitioner may later engage in subversive activities cannot warrant the
continued detention of the petitioner. In fact, there were no charges pending against the
petitioner.

The right to be enlarged before formal charges are instituted is absolute.

In Art. II, Sec. 3 of the Constitution of the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the
United Nations of which the Philippines is a member, the right to life and liberty and all
other fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed.
Note: On the petitioner’s entry to the Philippines

The petitioner's entry into the Philippines was not unlawful; he was brought by the
armed and belligerent forces of a de facto government whose decrees were law during
the occupation.
 GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUÑOZ, Respondents.

FACTS

Respondent, Juan Antonio Munoz was charged with three counts of offenses of
"accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense
of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. He was issued a
warrant of arrest on the following dates, on August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999
respectively.

On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received the request from the Hongkong
Department of Justice the arrest of the private respondent while the DOJ forwarded the
case to the NBI which in turn filed in the RTC of Manila and on the same day, the
respondent was arrested and detained.

The respondent filed a petition in the court of appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with application for preliminary mandatory injunction
and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest. On
December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision
became final and executory on April 10, 2001.

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil
liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby
undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings
and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court,
will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash
bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

 3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its
own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition
proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case

or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if
they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of
accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition
that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of
the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein
accordingly.

ISSUE

Whether or not the extraditee is entitled to post bail.

RULING

According to Section 3, Article III of the constitution, the right to bail should not
be impaired, While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an
extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion
for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to

show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of
"clear and convincing evidence."

WHEREFORE, the petition was dismissed. This case is REMANDED to the trial court
to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail
bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings
with dispatch.
 Fujii vs State of California

Facts

In 1948, Sei Fujii, plaintiff, a Japanese citizen, bought land in California. The California
Alien Land Law prohibited Japanese citizens from owning property in the United
States. Sei Fujii brought suit against the State of California, defendant, claiming, among
other things, that the United Nations Charter invalidated the law. Specifically, Sei Fujii
relied on the preamble and Article I of the United Nations Charter, which described the
general purposes of the charter and the general guidelines by which the signatory
countries agreed to abide, including upholding human rights and fundamental liberties
in a nondiscriminatory manner.

Articles 55 and 56 of the charter of the United Nations promote universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion. By the Article 56 it is declared that, all members
pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the
Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.

Thus Articles 55 and 56 obligate the United States to take a separate action to promote
human rights for all without distinction as to race.

The Trial court upheld the California Alien Land Law. The plaintiff appealed and the
Appellate court decided in favor of the plaintiff. It held that the Alien Land Law was
invalid because it conflicted with the Charter’s human rights provisions. Such
California’s Alien Land Law was invalid because the Constitution’s supremacy Clause
provides that if there is conflict between a ratified treaty and state law the Supremacy
clause directs the judges in every state to apply the treaty.

Issue

Whether Alien Land Law conflicted with the exalted principles on human rights
provisions expressed in the United Nations Charter’s.

Held

No. The UN Charter was not self-executing because its relevant principles concerning
human rights lacked the mandatory quality and certainty required to create justiciable
rights for private persons upon its ratification.
In determining whether a treaty is self-executing courts look to the intent of the
signatory parties as manifested by the language of the instrument, and, if the
instrument is uncertain, recourse may be had to the circumstances surrounding its
execution.

Article 55 declares that the United Nations "shall promote ... universal respect for, and
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion," and in article 56, the member nations "pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for
the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." Although the member nations
have obligated themselves to cooperate with the international organization in
promoting respect for, and observance of, human rights, it is plain that it was
contemplated that future legislative action by the several nations would be required to
accomplish the declared objectives, and there is nothing to indicate that these
provisions were intended to become rules of law for the courts of this country upon the
ratification of the charter.

The language used in articles 55 and 56 is not the type customarily employed in treaties
which have been held to be self-executing and to create rights and duties in individuals.

It is significant to note that when the framers of the charter intended to make certain
provisions effective without the aid of implementing legislation they employed
language which is clear and definite and manifests that intention.

The provisions in the charter pledging cooperation in promoting observance of

fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which would
indicate an intent to create justiciable rights in private persons immediately upon
ratification.

The humane and enlightened objectives of the United Nations Charter are, of course,
entitled to respectful consideration by the courts and legislatures of every member
nation, since that document expresses the universal desire of thinking men for peace
and for equality of rights and opportunities. The charter represents a moral
commitment of foremost importance, and we must not permit the spirit of our pledge to
be compromised or disparaged in either our domestic or foreign affairs. [6] We are
satisfied, however, that the charters provisions relied on by plaintiff were not intended
to supersede existing domestic legislation, and that they operate to invalidate the Alien
Land Law.