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B307452

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA


SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, DIVISION FIVE

VALERIE HANEY,
Plaintiff and Petitioner,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
Respondent,

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL AND


RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY CENTER,
Defendants and Real Parties in Interest

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT CASE NO. 19STCV21210

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


HONORABLE RICHARD J. BURDGE, DEPARTMENT 37

RESPONSE TO AMICUS BRIEF OF NATIONAL CENTER


ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION

SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER &


*WILLIAM H. FORMAN (BAR NO. 150477) MITCHELL LLP
DAVID C. SCHEPER (BAR NO. 120174) ROBERT E. MANGELS (BAR NO. 48291)
MARGARET E. DAYTON (BAR NO. 274353) *MATTHEW D. HINKS (BAR NO. 200750)
800 WEST SIXTH STREET, 18TH FLOOR 1900 AVENUE OF THE STARS, 7TH FLOOR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90017-2701 LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90067-4308
(213) 613-4655 • FAX: (213) 613-4656 (310) 203-8080 • FAX: (310) 203-0567
wforman@scheperkim.com mhinks@jmbm.com

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND REAL ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT AND REAL
PARTY IN INTEREST CHURCH OF PARTY IN INTEREST RELIGIOUS
SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY CENTER
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................5
II. RESPONSE TO AMICUS BRIEF OF NATIONAL
CENTER ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION .............................9
A. Amicus Curiae Are Limited to the Issues and
Evidence Presented by the Parties to the
Appellate Proceedings ..................................................9
B. Petitioner Seeks No Relief in This Lawsuit on
Account of Alleged Abuse Purportedly Suffered
as a Minor ................................................................... 10
C. The Arguments of the Amicus Brief Are Based
on Materials Not Part of the Record in These
Proceedings; NCOSE Undertakes No Effort to
Have Them Added to the Record .............................. 12

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


D. NCOSE’S Misguided and Bigoted Contentions
About Who May Serve as an Arbitrator Should
Be Rejected ................................................................. 17
III. CONCLUSION ..................................................................... 19

2
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Cases

California Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. State Water Res.


Control Bd.,
4 Cal. 5th 1032 (2018) ..................................................................9

Conference of Evangelical Methodist Church v.


Evangelical Methodist Church,
807 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (N.D. Ga. 2011) ..................................... 18

Easterly v. Heritage Christian Sch.,


2009 WL 2750099 (S.D. Ind. 2009) .......................................... 18

Eggert v. Pac. States Sav. & Loan Co.,


57 Cal. App. 2d 239 (1943) ..........................................................9

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


In re Zeth S.,
31 Cal. 4th 396 (2003) ............................................................... 14

Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church,


356 Ill. App. 3d 504, 825 N.E.2d 1206 (Ill. Ct.
App., 2005)................................................................................. 18

Lopez v. Bartlett Care Cntr., LLC,


39 Cal. App. 5th 311 (2019) ...................................................... 16

Medical Bd. of Calif. v. Superior Court,


227 Cal. App. 3d 1458 (1991) ................................................... 13

Mercury Cas. Co. v. Hertz Corp.,


59 Cal. App. 4th 414 (1997) ...................................................... 10

Parsons v. Superior Court,


149 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1 (2007) ............................................. 13

Philippine Export & Foreign Loan Guar. Corp. v.


Chuidian,
218 Cal. App. 3d 1058 (1990) ................................................... 14

3
Pinnacle Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Market
Dev. (US), LLC,
55 Cal.4th 223 (2012) ................................................................ 13

Professional Engineers in California Government v.


Kempton,
40 Cal. 4th 1016 (2007) ......................................................... 9, 13

Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern


California,
55 Cal. 4th 747 (2012) ............................................................... 15

Sheard v. Superior Court,


40 Cal. App. 3d 207 (1974) ....................................................... 11

Thomson v. Anderson,
113 Cal. App. 4th 258 (2003) .................................................... 11

Tupman v. Haberkern,

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


208 Cal. 256 (1929) ................................................................... 14

Statutes

California Evidence Code


§ 452 ........................................................................................... 15
§ 452(h) ...................................................................................... 15
§ 453(b) ...................................................................................... 15

Rules of Court

California Rule of Court


§ 8.252(c) .................................................................................... 14
§ 8.252(c)(2) ............................................................................... 14
§ 8.252(c)(3) ............................................................................... 14

4
Real Parties in Interest Church of Scientology International
(“CSI”) and Religious Technology Center (“RTC” and collectively
with CSI, the “Real Parties”) hereby respond to the amicus brief
filed by National Center on Sexual Exploitation (“NCOSE”).

I.
INTRODUCTION

NCOSE, formerly known as Morality in Media, is an


American conservative non-profit known for its anti-pornography
advocacy and such other issues as “child sexual abuse,” “child-on-
child harmful sexual behavior,” “compulsive sexual behaviors,”

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


“illicit massage businesses,” “prostitution,” “stripping,” and “the
intersection of these issues with technology.” (Amicus Brief (“Am.
Br.”), p. 2).1
This case has nothing to do with NCOSE’s purported
interests. These writ proceedings were filed by Valerie Haney, a
former member of Scientology’s Sea Organization, a religious order
composed of the most dedicated Scientologists committed to the
lifelong volunteer service of their religion.2 Petitioner joined the

1NCOSE website at: https://endsexualexploitation.org/; see also


NCOSE’s Wikipedia entry at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
National_Center_on_Sexual_Exploitation
2Volume 1. Exhibits to Petition for Writ of Mandate, page 16 (“1
EP 16”), at ¶ 44.

5
staff of RTC at the age of 23, and the staff of CSI at the age of 26.3
Petitioner left CSI in 2017 at the age 38.4 She then filed a lawsuit
in the Superior Court in 2019, alleging claims arising out of her
tenure with Real Parties as a volunteer staff member, including
alleged wage and hour violations, stalking, libel and slander,
kidnapping and false imprisonment.
The operative pleading is Petitioner’s First Amended
Complaint (“FAC”).5 Petitioner does not allege in the FAC to be a
victim of sexual abuse. The FAC includes no causes of action for
any form of sexual exploitation at all, let alone abuse as a child.
Indeed, there is no evidence in the record, and not even an
allegation in Petitioner’s complaint, that she had any contact at all

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


with RTC or CSI as a minor. Nor is there any allegation in the FAC
or evidence in the record related to NCOSE’s other purported
interests. Put simply, this is neither a child abuse nor a sexual
abuse case.
In December 2019, Real Parties filed motions to compel
arbitration, seeking to enforce the multiple agreements Petitioner
signed after the age of 30 agreeing to arbitrate any claims she may

3 1 EP 150; Volume 8, Defendants’ Exhibits in Support of


Preliminary Opposition, p. 1743 (“8 DEO 1743) (McShane
Declaration, ¶ 10).
4 1 EP 19-21 at ¶¶ 60-67.
5 1 EP 6-39.

6
have with CSI and/or RTC.6 The Superior Court judge granted the
motions following a hearing on January 30, 2020.7
Petitioner filed this Petition for Writ of Mandate on
September 10, 2020, over 7 months after the Superior Court
granted the motions to compel arbitration and long after her
deadline to petition this Court had run. In her Petition, Petitioner
makes two arguments: (1) that by compelling Petitioner to
arbitrate with her former Church, the Superior Court allegedly
violated the First Amendment, and (2) that the numerous
arbitration agreements Petitioner signed are unconscionable and
therefore unenforceable. (Petition, pp. 28-32 (First Amendment
Arguments), 33-39 (unconscionability arguments)). In support of

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


her unconscionability argument, Petitioner does not contend that
she lacked free will or capacity. Rather, Petitioner argues that her
arbitration agreements are procedurally unconscionable because
they are allegedly adhesion contracts, and that she was “surprised”
because she was not given a copy of the agreements or the rules of
arbitration. (Petition, pp. 33-36.) She also argues that the
requirement that the arbitrations be conducted before Scientology
ministers or Scientologists in good standing, and the supposed
non-mutuality of the agreements, rendered them substantively
unconscionable. (Petition, pp. 36-39.)
NCOSE’s amicus brief offers three arguments: two of which
concern matters that are not at issue in these proceedings at all

6 1 EP 40-67, 213-234; see also 3 EP 680-681 (Order compelling


arbitration: Petitioner “admits her agreements were all signed
after she was 30”).
7 3 EP 669-684.

7
and the last of which merely repeats the argument of Petitioner
with an added dose of anti-Scientology religious bigotry
(Scientologists should be disqualified to serve as arbitrators). In
the arguments it did make, NCOSE fails to address the evidence
of the trial court proceedings in the record and, instead, offers
opinions based upon unverified allegations of Petitioner’s
complaint. Even then, the amicus brief materially misrepresents
the allegations, falsely ascribing conduct alleged in the FAC to
Real Parties when the FAC says no such thing. Rather than
address the actual evidence in the record, the amicus brief relies
upon materials and studies that are not part of the record and have
not even been submitted for consideration with the amicus brief,

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


and offers opinions based on those materials that have nothing to
do with the Court’s consideration of the Petition. The “evidence”
cited by NCOSE was not before the Superior Court when it
rendered the challenged decision and is not before this Court now.
NCOSE has made no effort to seek its addition to the record.
In short, NCOSE’s amicus brief is not based in reality. It is
nothing but a slanderous, anti-Scientology screed offering opinions
of an organization that have nothing to do with the case under
consideration, based upon materials not before this Court and
unproven allegations in an unverified complaint that it does not
even correctly represent. The Court should reject the brief and not
consider it.

8
II.
RESPONSE TO AMICUS BRIEF OF NATIONAL CENTER
ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION

A. Amicus Curiae Are Limited to the Issues and


Evidence Presented by the Parties to the Appellate
Proceedings

“[A]n amicus curiae accepts the case as he finds it and may


not launch out upon a juridical expedition of its own …”.
Professional Engineers in California Government v. Kempton, 40
Cal. 4th 1016, 1047, fn. 12 (2007) (internal quotation and

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


alteration omitted). That rule applies to both fact and law. See id.
(amicus prohibited from going beyond “the actual appellate
record”). Thus, “California courts will not consider issues raised for
the first time by an amicus curiae.” California Bldg. Indus. Ass'n
v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 4 Cal. 5th 1032, 1049, fn 12 (2018).
Indeed “the rule is universally recognized that an appellate court
will consider only those questions properly raised by the appealing
parties.” Eggert v. Pac. States Sav. & Loan Co., 57 Cal. App. 2d
239, 251 (1943). “Amicus curiae must accept the issues made and
propositions urged by the appealing parties, and any additional
questions presented in a brief filed by an amicus curiae will not be
considered” Id.
Despite these “universally recognized” rules, NCOSE’s
amicus brief exceeds the limitations. NCOSE offers three
arguments, two of which were never made in the Superior Court

9
or in the Petition, and are not even with the scope of Petitioner’s
lawsuit in the Superior Court. The final argument made by
NCOSE merely repeats the argument made by the Petitioner. In
so doing, the amicus does not act as a “friend of the court” at all,
but rather an advocate for Petitioner extending the limits of her
brief without any justification. The Court should reject the brief.

B. Petitioner Seeks No Relief in This Lawsuit on Account


of Alleged Abuse Purportedly Suffered as a Minor

NCOSE first argues in its amicus brief that, “[t]he abuse


Plaintiff endured throughout her childhood, including extreme

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


threats of rape and sexual assault, is severely harmful and should
be eligible for redress in the courts.” [Am. Br., p. 3.] No such issue
is presented by these writ proceedings or even in the Superior
Court. Put simply, Petitioner does not seek relief in this lawsuit on
account of any alleged abuse she suffered as minor.
To the extent NCOSE means by this argument that
Petitioner claims of abuse suffered as an adult are not within the
scope of her arbitration agreements, Petitioner made that
argument in the Superior Court (2 EP 503-504), but does not raise
it in this Court and thereby concedes the issue. See Mercury Cas.
Co. v. Hertz Corp., 59 Cal. App. 4th 414, 425 (1997) (rule against
amicus addressing new issues “particularly appropriate” where
the party who stands to benefit from the argument has disavowed
it).

10
Even if the argument is properly raised here, it finds
absolutely no support in the record. Petitioner seeks no relief
anywhere on account of alleged childhood abuse. Her First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”) includes no causes of action arising
from any aspect of her childhood. (1 EP 6-39.) Indeed, despite
repeated incorrect characterizations, it is undisputed below that
Petitioner did not serve with the staff of Real Parties when she was
a minor, and served with RTC and CSI from the age of 23 to 38. (1
EP 150 ¶ 36; 8 DEO 1743 ¶ 10.) The amicus brief cites to no
evidence in the record supporting its false contentions that
Petitioner suffered abuse as a minor at the hand of Real Parties.
Moreover, NCOSE relies in its amicus brief exclusively on

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


the unverified allegations of the FAC even though an unverified
complaint has “no evidentiary value,” Thomson v. Anderson, 113
Cal. App. 4th 258, 271 (2003), and “could not serve as an affidavit,”
Sheard v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 207, 212 (1974). Even
then, NCOSE misrepresents the allegations. For example, NCOSE
makes the astonishing and slanderous contention that Real
Parties threatened Petitioner with rape when she was a minor,
when even the unverified FAC makes no such allegations against
Real Parties. [Am. Br., p. 3 (citing 1 EP 17, FAC ¶¶ 47-48).] The
remaining forms of alleged “abuse” according to NCOSE entail
Petitioner being raised a Scientologist, educated a Scientologist
and serving in Scientology’s Sea Org, as if being raised in the
traditions of her and her parents’ religion is a form of abuse—a
contention that is supported by nothing other than the opinion of
the brief’s author. NCOSE also makes the false contentions that

11
Petitioner lived as a minor on “compounds owned, operated and
controlled by” Real Parties, that her education was conducted
“under [Real Parties’] control”, and that “the only authority
[Petitioner] knew growing up was that of Defendants.” [Am. Br.,
pp. 3-4.] Not only is there no evidence in the record supporting
these bald contentions, the FAC does not even allege what NCOSE
represents it to allege.

C. The Arguments of the Amicus Brief Are Based on Materials


Not Part of the Record in These Proceedings; NCOSE
Undertakes No Effort to Have Them Added to the Record

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


Second, NCOSE argues that, “[s]urvivors of trafficking are
commonly subjected to coercive tactics designed to compromise
their ability to exercise free and independent judgment.” [Am. Br.,
p. 4.] Once again, Petitioner raises no such issue here. Petitioner
makes certain arguments in the Petition as to why she contends
her arbitration agreements are unconscionable (all of which were
rightly rejected by the Superior Court judge based on substantial
evidence in the record), but nowhere in the Petition does Petitioner
argue that she lacked “free and independent judgment” when she
executed the agreements. (Petition, pp. 33-39).
Moreover, NCOSE once again relies for its argument on
nothing other than the unverified allegations of the FAC. For
example, NCOSE purports to compare the allegations of the FAC
against the elements of the so-called “Biderman Framework”—a
range of coercive tactics employed by human traffickers. [Am. Br.,

12
pp. 4-6.] NCOSE fails to explain how and why it characterizes the
various allegations in the manner it has. But more importantly,
what Petitioner has alleged is irrelevant—the issue is what
Petitioner has proven through competent evidence. Pinnacle
Museum Tower Ass’n v. Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), LLC, 55
Cal.4th 223, 236 (2012) (party seeking to invalidate arbitration
agreement has the burden of proving any defense, including
unconscionability, with competent evidence). Whether unproven
allegations are or are not similar to elements of the “Biderman
Framework” has absolutely no bearing upon the issues pending in
this Court.
Further, neither the “Biderman Framework,” the purported

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


Los Angeles County Department of Health “study” of victims of
human trafficking (Am. Br., pp. 4, 6), the 2015 FBI Bulletin, nor
the “Human Trafficking BITE Model” (Am. Br., p. 7), were
submitted to the Superior Court or are part of the record in these
writ proceedings. Professional Engineers, 40 Cal. 4th at 1047, fn.
12 (improper for amicus to go beyond “the actual appellate
record”).
Thus, neither the factual assertions in the NCOSE brief, nor
the underlying materials on which those assertions are based, are
supported by or part of the evidence that was before the Superior
Court. That is improper. Medical Bd. of Calif. v. Superior Court,
227 Cal. App. 3d 1458, 1462 (1991) (the Court’s “concern is whether
the respondent court acted properly on the record before it”). This
Court should not consider extraneous materials here. See Parsons
v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 4th Supp. 1, 6-7 (2007) (declining

13
to consider evidence and argument presented for the first time in
writ proceedings).
Indeed, what NCOSE is plainly trying to do is to submit new
evidence on appeal. But this is rarely permitted even for a party.
The Court’s own website states that, “[a]n appeal is NOT … a
chance to present new evidence or new witnesses.”8 If a party seeks
to introduce new evidence on appeal, it can only do so through a
motion under California Rule of Court 8.252(c), which would
require the Court to issue an order complying with Rule
8.252(c)(2). For documentary evidence to be admitted it must
comply with Rule 8.252(c)(3). NCOSE has not even attempted to
comply with these rules. Taking new evidence on appeal is rarely

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


justified. In re Zeth S., 31 Cal. 4th 396, 405 (2003) (“the authority
should be exercised sparingly”). New evidence on appeal is never
permitted to overturn factual determinations made by a trial court
that are supported by substantial evidence, which is what NCOSE
is asking the Court to do here. Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256,
269 (1929) (appellate courts may not take new evidence to resolve
conflicts in the evidence or to substitute their own factual
determinations for those of the trial court); Philippine Export &
Foreign Loan Guar. Corp. v. Chuidian, 218 Cal. App. 3d 1058,
1090 (1990) (“The power to take evidence in the Court of Appeal is
never used where there is conflicting evidence in the record and
substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings”).9

8 https://www.courts.ca.gov/12429.htm (emphasis in original).


9 See Preliminary Opposition to Petition for Writ of Mandate, pp.
57-72, discussing the substantial evidence before the Superior

14
Nor has NCOSE established that it can meet the rigorous
standards for seeking judicial notice of the purported factual
materials it cites or seeking its introduction as expert opinion.
California Evidence Code § 452, which governs permissive judicial
notice, states that a court may take judicial notice of “[f]acts and
propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are
capable of immediate and accurate resort to sources of reasonably
indisputable accuracy.” Evid. Code, § 452(h). There is little
question that the “facts” NCOSE cites in its brief cannot meet this
exacting standard.10 Similarly, although the author of the brief
gives no foundation even suggesting that he has the expertise to
do so, the brief purports to opine on matters within the province of

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


an expert. As the California Supreme Court has put it, “[a] trial
court has the duty to act as a ‘gatekeeper’ to exclude speculative
expert testimony.” Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of
Southern California, 55 Cal. 4th 747, 753 (2012). NCOSE should
not be permitted to “back door” material that the Court would not
judicially notice, and has not been scrutinized and admitted by a
trial court judge, in the form of an amicus brief.
NCOSE cites only a single piece of evidence submitted by
Petitioner in opposition to the motion to compel arbitration in the
Superior Court—a snippet from Petitioner’s declaration—to argue
that Petitioner’s process of leaving staff was “dominated by

Court supporting its factual findings concerning Petitioner’s


unconscionability arguments.
10Moreover, a party seeking judicial notice must furnish the court
“with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of
the matter.” Evid. Code § 453(b). NCOSE has not done so.

15
Defendants’ coercive behavior.” (Am. Br., p. 8.) In doing so, NCOSE
ignores the evidence submitted by Defendants—particularly, the
declaration of counsel for CSI who conducted Petitioner’s exit
interview and was a witness to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of Petitioner’s Departure Agreement and attached a
transcript of the interview. (1 EP 80-85, 87-116.) Among other
things, that evidence directly refuted Petitioner’s contentions that
she was “made to sign” the Departure Agreement, that there was
“a man armed with a gun” in the room, that she “did not know the
contents of any of the documents.” (Am. Br., pp. 8-9; see, e.g., 1 EP
82-83, 90, 105 (“I did read it. … I do understand it”)). NCOSE
acknowledges that the Superior Court judge found Petitioner’s

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


testimony to be not credible, but asks this Court to reach a
different conclusion. NCOSE misses the point. The issue in this
Court is whether the Superior Court’s factual findings are
supported by substantial evidence, not whether there is some
evidence supporting Petitioner’s contentions. Lopez v. Bartlett
Care Cntr., LLC, 39 Cal. App. 5th 311, 317-18 (2019) (“If the court’s
order is based on a decision of fact, then we adopt a substantial
evidence standard”; “[a] factual finding cannot be overturned on
appeal simply because the record contains ‘credible evidence’ to the
contrary. Our task begins and ends with a determination of
whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s factual
finding[s]”). Based on the evidence submitted by Real Parties,
which NCOSE fails to address, clearly they are.

16
D. NCOSE’S Misguided and Bigoted Contentions About Who
May Serve as an Arbitrator Should Be Rejected

Finally, NCOSE argues that the arbitration agreement is


“manifestly unfair” because, it contends, the agreement delegates
Petitioner’s claims of abuse to a panel of Scientologists.
That argument suffers from the same defects as the others.
Particularly, where NCOSE bothers to cite to the record, it relies
exclusively upon unverified allegations, rather than evidence. And
even where NCOSE cites to the FAC, it cites to allegations not
made against Real Parties. The core premise of NCOSE’s
argument here is that, allegedly, “Defendants abused Plaintiff as

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


a child” and that “Plaintiff was in Defendants’ care as a minor”
(Am. Br. p. 9), when there is not even an allegation to that effect
in the FAC.
Moreover, NCOSE fails to even consider, address, discuss or
even mention the agreements Petitioner signed and the nature of
the arbitration called for by the arbitration agreements. NCOSE
argues that this “appeal will determine whether the very
institution that abused the Plaintiff will sit in judgment of her
claims.” (Am. Br., p. 10.) There is no truth to that at all. The
arbitration agreements do not call for Real Parties to preside over
the arbitration; rather, the requirement is that the arbitrators be
Scientology “ministers” or “Scientologists in good standing.” (1 EP
154, 177, 189, 201.) The agreements also call for Petitioner herself
to participate in the selection of the arbitrators. Upon the
submission of a dispute to arbitration, Petitioner designates one

17
arbitrator, the responding Scientology party designates a second
arbitrator, and the two designated arbitrators designate a third. (1
EP 154.)
Stripped of its rhetoric and false contentions, NCOSE’s
argument here boils down to a contention that Scientologists
should not be permitted to preside as arbitrators despite
Petitioner’s repeated agreements to resolve any dispute she may
have with Real Parties through Scientology Ethics and Justice
procedures. (1 EP 151-154.) Not surprisingly, the courts have
rejected such religious bigotry as a basis to void religious
arbitration agreements. See Conference of Evangelical Methodist
Church v. Evangelical Methodist Church, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1291,

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


1294-95, 1301 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (enforcing arbitration provision that
called for panel of church arbitrators: ‘“The Supreme Court has
repeatedly counseled that [under] the FAA ... courts should not
presume, absent concrete proof to the contrary, that arbitration
systems will be unfair or biased”); Easterly v. Heritage Christian
Sch., 2009 WL 2750099, at *3 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (rejecting claims
that arbitrators would be inherently biased because of their
religious beliefs and affiliations); Jenkins v. Trinity Evangelical
Lutheran Church, 356 Ill. App. 3d 504, 512, 825 N.E.2d 1206, 1214
(Ill. Ct. App., 2005) (rejecting partiality argument based on the fact
that “the dispute resolution procedure calls for arbitrators who are
either members or employees of the [defendant] Synod,” because
“Plaintiff has not pointed to any specific prejudice he would suffer
under the bylaws, but only a generalized fear of partiality. This
anxiety is insufficient to overturn the LCMS arbitration process.”).

18
III.
CONCLUSION

NCOSE’s amicus brief attempts to address matters that are


not at issue in this Court based upon unproven and
misrepresented allegations, while it ignores the actual evidence in
the record. Because amicus curiae are required to accept a case as
it finds it and may not go beyond the appellate record or raise
issues not presented by Petitioner, and because NCOSE does
exactly that, the Court should reject its amicus brief and not
consider it further.

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.

19
DATED: September 21, SCHEPER KIM & HARRIS LLP
2020 WILLIAM H. FORMAN
DAVID C. SCHEPER
MARGARET E. DAYTON

By:
______________________________________
WILIAM H. FORMAN
Attorneys for Defendant and Real Party
in Interest CHURCH OF
SCIENTOLOGY INTERNATIONAL

JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER &


MITCHELL LLP
ROBERT E. MANGELS
MATTHEW D. HINKS

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


By:
MATTHEW D. HINKS
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest
RELIGIOUS TECHNOLOGY
CENTER

20
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE PURSUANT TO
CALIFORNIA RULES OF COURT RULE 8.204(c)(1)
Pursuant to California Rules of Court Rule 8.204(c)(1) I
certify that according to Microsoft word the attached brief is
proportionally spaced, has a typeface of 13 points and contains
3,503 words.

DATED: September 21, 2020 JEFFER MANGELS BUTLER &


MITCHELL LLP
ROBERT E. MANGELS
MATTHEW D. HINKS

By:
MATTHEW D. HINKS
Attorneys for Real Party in

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


Interest RELIGIOUS
TECHNOLOGY CENTER

21
PROOF OF SERVICE

(C.C.P. §1013(a), 2015.5)

I, the undersigned, hereby declare under penalty of perjury as follows: I

am a citizen of the United States, and over the age of eighteen years, and not

a party to the within action; my business address is 1900 Avenue of the

Stars, 7th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90067. On this date, I served the interested

parties in this action the within documents: RESPONSE TO AMICUS

BRIEF OF NATIONAL CENTER ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION; via the

court’s online True Filing system as follows:

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


Los Angeles County Superior Court (via USPS)
Central District, Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Dept. 37
111 North Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Valerie T. McGinty (Valerie@plaintiffsappeals.com


Law Office of Valerie T. McGinty
524 Fordham Road
San Mateo, CA 94402

Robert W. Thompson (bobby@tlopc.com)


Thompson Law Offices
700 Airport Boulevard, Suite 160
Burlingame, CA 94010

Peter A. Gentala (pgentala@ncoselaw.org)


440 First Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20001

68342270v1
Marci A. Hamilton (hamilton.marci@gmail.com)
University of Pennsylvania
Fox-Fels Building
3814 Walnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104

William H. Forman (Wforman@scheperkim.com)


David Scheper (dscheper@scheperkim.com)
Scheper Kim & Harris LLP
800 West Sixth Street, 18th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90017-2701

Jeffrey K. Riffer (jriffer@elkinskalt.com)


Elkins Kalt Weintraub Reuben Gartside LLP
10345 West Olympic Boulevard
Los Angeles, CA 90064

Document received by the CA 2nd District Court of Appeal.


Executed at Los Angeles, California on September 21, 2020.

Sheila Jimenez

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68342270v1

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