1. PEOPLE V.

ZAFRA

READ NO. 1
2. DABALOS V. JUDGE PARAS-QUIAMBAO

Dabalos being then the boyfriend of the complainant, Held:

did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
use personal violence on the complainant, by pulling
her hair, punching complainant's back, shoulder and left
eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the
complainant's intrinsic worth and dignity as a human
being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act
9262.
After further examination of evidence, the RTC found
probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest against
petitioner. Dabalos filed a petition claiming that he was
no longer in a dating relationship with private
respondent; hence, RA 9262 was inapplicable.
In her affidavit, private respondent admitted that her
relationship with petitioner had ended prior to the
subject incident. She narrated that on July 13, 2009, she
sought payment of the money she had lent to petitioner
but the latter could not pay. She then inquired from
petitioner if he was responsible for spreading rumors
about her which he admitted. Thereupon, private
respondent slapped petitioner causing the latter to
inflict on her the physical injuries alleged in the
Information.
Yes.
Remarkably, while it is required that the offender has or
had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman, for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not
indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence
of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such
limitation be inferred. It is immaterial whether the
relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient
evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when
the physical harm was committed.
Since based from the Information, having sufficiently
alleged the necessary elements of the crime, such as: a
dating relationship between the petitioner and the
private respondent; the act of violence committed by
the petitioner; and the resulting physical harm to
private respondent, the offense is covered by RA 9262
which falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC in
accordance with Sec. 7 of the said law which reads:

Petitioner insisted that the act which resulted in

physical injuries to private respondent is not covered by
RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their
dating relationship. Instead, he claims that the offense
committed was only slight physical injuries under the
Revised Penal Code which falls under the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Trial Court.

The RTC denied petitioner's motion. It did not consider

material the fact that the parties' dating relationship
had ceased prior to the incident, ratiocinating that since
the parties had admitted a prior dating relationship, the
infliction of slight physical injuries constituted an act of
violence against women and their children as defined in
Sec. 3(a) of RA 9262.

Issues
Whether or not there is a violation of RA 9262.

3. MAGNO V. CA
Magno vs. CA
Paras, J.:
Facts:
Oriel Magno is on the process of putting up a car repair
shop sometime in April 1983 but he lacks fund in
acquiring complete set of equipments for him to make
his shop operational. Thus, she approached Corazon
Teng, Vice President of Mancor Industries, for his
needed equipment for car repair of which Mancor was a
distributor.Having been approached by petitioner on
his predicament, who fully bared that he had no
sufficient funds to buy the equipment needed, Teng
referred Magno to LS Finance and Management
Corporation advising its Vice-President, Joey Gomez,
that Mancor was willing and able to supply the pieces of
equipment needed if LS Finance could accommodate
petitioner and provide him credit facilities.
The arrangement went on requiring Magno to pay 30%
of the total amount of the equipment as a warranty
deposit. Since Magno don’t have that money he
requested Joey Gomez to look for third party who could
lend him that amount. And apparently Corazon Teng
was the one who provided that amount without the
knowledge of Magno. As a payment to the equipment,
Magno issued six checks wherein only two of them were
cleared and the rest have no sufficient fund. Likewise,
because of unsuccessful venture, Magno also failed to
pay LS Finance who then pulled out the garage
equipments. Magno was charged four counts of
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (The Bouncing Checks Law)
where he found guilty and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, the present petition for review
Issue:
Whether Magno should be punished for the issuance of
the checks in questions.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Magno is not criminally
liable for the issued checks. To charge the petitioner for
the refund of a "warranty deposit" which he did not
withdraw as it was not his own account, it having
remained with LS Finance, is to even make him pay an
unjust "debt", to say the least, since petitioner did not
receive the amount in question. All the while, said
amount was in the safekeeping of the financing
company, which is managed, supervised and operated
by the corporation officials and employees of LS
Finance.
It is intriguing to realize that Mrs. Teng did not
want the petitioner to know that it was she who
"accommodated" petitioner's request for Joey Gomez,
to source out the needed funds for the "warranty
deposit". Thus it unfolds the kind of transaction that is
shrouded with mystery, gimmickry and doubtful legality.
It is in simple language, a scheme whereby Mrs. Teng as
the supplier of the equipment in the name of her
corporation, Mancor, would be able to "sell or lease" its
goods as in this case, and at the same time, privately
financing those who desperately need petty
accommodations as this one. This modus operandi has
in so many instances victimized unsuspecting
businessmen, who likewise need protection from the
law, by availing of the deceptively called "warranty
deposit" not realizing that they also fall prey to leasing
equipment under the guise of a lease-purchase
agreement when it is a scheme designed to skim off
business clients.

4. IENT VS. PREBON
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE:
Intimately related to the in dubio pro reo principle is the
rule oflenity. The rule applies when the court is faced
with two possibleinterpretations of a penal statute, one
that is prejudicial to the accusedand another that is
favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption ofan
interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.The
rule oflenity prescribes the result when a criminal
statute is ambiguous: Themore lenient interpretation
must prevail.
FACTS:
Section 144. As for petitioners Ient and
Schulze,Tullett asserted that they conspired
with Villalon and Chuidian in thelatter's acts of
disloyalty against the company.Villalon and
Chuidian filed their respective Counter-
Affivadits.Villalon claimed that the DOJ had
previously proclaimed that Section31 is not a
penal provision of law but only the basis of a
cause ofaction for civil liability. Thus, he
concluded that there was no probablecause
that he violated the Corporation Code nor was
the charge ofconspiracy properly
substantiated.Chuidian argued that Section 144
as a penal provision should bestrictly construed
against the State and liberally in favor of
theaccused and Tullett has failed to
substantiate its charge of bad faith onher part.

 Petitioner Ient is a British national and the Chief

Financial Officer of Tradition Asia Pacific Pte.
Ltd. (Tradition Asia) in Singapore. Petitioner
Schulze is a Filipino/German who does
Application Suppor tfor Tradition Financial
Services Ltd. in London (Tradition
London).Tradition Group and Tullett are
competitors in the inter-dealerbroking business.
 Sometime in August 2008, in line with Tradition
Group's motive of expansion and diversification
in Asia, petitioners Ient and Schulzewere tasked
with the establishment of a Philippine
subsidiary of Tradition Asia to be known as
Tradition Financial Services Philippines, Inc.
(Tradition Philippines). Tradition Philippines was
registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on September 19,2008
 On October 15, 2008, Tullett, through one of its
directors, Gordon Buchan, filed a Complaint-
Affidavit... against the officers/employees of the
Tradition Group for violation of the Corporation
Code.
 Mercedes Chuidian and Meredes Chuidian, who
were formerly members OF Tullett's Board of
Directors, were charged with using theirformer
positions in Tullett to sabotage said company by
orchestratingthe mass resignation of its entire
brokering staff in order for them to join
Tradition Philippines.According to Tullett,
respondents Villalon and Chuidian
violatedSections 31 and 34 of the Corporation
Code which made themcriminally liable under
5. SCALZO V. MINUCHER
Facts
Violation of the “Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,” was
filed against Minucher following a “buy-bust operation”
conducted by Philippine police narcotic agents
accompanied by Scalzo in the house of Minucher, an
Iranian national, where heroin was said to have been
seized. Minucher was later acquitted by the court.
Minucher later on filed for damages due to trumped-up
charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo.
Scalzo on his counterclaims that he had acted in the
discharge of his official duties as being merely an agent
of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United
States Department of Justice.
Scalzo subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of
the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he
was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He attached to his
motion Diplomatic Note of the United States Embassy
addressed to DOJ of the Philippines and a Certification
of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the
note is a true and faithful copy of its original. Trial court
denied the motion to dismiss.
ISSUE
Whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to
diplomatic immunity.
RULLING
YES.
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be
cloaked with immunity from suit as long as it can be
established that he is acting within the directives of the
sending state.
The consent or imprimatur of the Philippine
government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the
undisputed facts in the case.
The official exchanges of communication between
agencies of the government of the two countries
Certifications from officials of both the Philippine
Department of Foreign Affairs and the United States
Embassy
Participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics
Command in the “buy-bust operation” conducted at the
residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo
These may be inadequate to support the “diplomatic
status” of the latter but they give enough indication that
the Philippine government has given its imprimatur, if
not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory
of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency.
The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct
surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after
having ascertained the target, to inform local law
enforcers who would then be expected to make the
arrest.
In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher, later
acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the
criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the
scope of his official function or duties.
6. LIANG V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Petitioner: Jeffrey Liang
Respondent: People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian
Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for
allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB
worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
Metropolitan TC of Mandaluyong City with two counts
of oral defamation. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of
a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s
bail, the MeTC released him to the custody of the
Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge
received an “office of protocol” from the DFA stating
that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal
process under section 45 of the Agreement between
the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB in the country. Based on the
said protocol communication that petitioner is immune
from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the
prosecution dismissed the criminal cases. The latter
filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed
by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with the RTC of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the
warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for
reconsideration was denied, the petitioner elevated the
case to the SC via a petition for review arguing that he is
covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal
case.
HELD:
(1) NO. The petitioner’s case is not covered by the
immunity. Courts cannot blindly adhere to the
communication from the DFA that the petitioner is
covered by any immunity. It has no binding effect in
courts. The court needs to protect the right to due
process not only of the accused but also of the
prosecution. Secondly, the immunity under Section 45
of the Agreement is not absolute, but subject to the
exception that the acts must be done in “official
capacity”. Hence, slandering a person could not possibly
be covered by the immunity agreement because our
laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as
defamation, in the name of official duty.
(2) NO. Preliminary Investigation is not a matter of
right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as this case.
Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation
may be invoked only when specifically granted by law.
The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required in cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC.
Hence, SC denied the petition.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner’s case is covered
with immunity from legal process with regard to Section
45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the
Philippine Gov’t.
(2) Whether or not the conduct of preliminary
investigation was imperative.
7. GONZALES V. ABAYA
FACTS:
Some armed members of the AFP had abandoned their
designated places of assignment with an aim to
destabilize the government. Thereafter, they entered
the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments in Makati City, led by Navy
Lt. Triplanes, disarmed the security guards, and planted
explosive devices around the building.
DOJ filed with RTC of Makati City an Information
for coup d’etat against those
soldiers while respondent General Abaya issued a Letter
Order creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to
determine the propriety of filing with the military
tribunal charges for violations of the Articles of War      EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION: Where the President of
The Pre-Trial Investigation Panel recommended that,
following the "doctrine of absorption," those charged
with coup d’etat  before the RTC should not be charged
before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles
of War.
RTC then issued an Order stating that "all charges
before the court martial against the accused…are
hereby declared not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime
of coup d’etat."
In the meantime, the AFP approved the
recommendation that those involved be prosecuted
before a general court martial for violation of Article 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the
Articles of War. The AFP Judge Advocate General then
directed petitioners to submit their answer to the
charge but instead they filed with this Court the
instant Petition for Prohibition praying that respondents
be ordered to desist from charging them with violation
of Article 96 of the Articles of War maintaining that
since the RTC has made a determination in its Order
that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles
of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the
crime of coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot
compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not those charged with coup d’etat before
RTC shall be charged before military tribunal for
violation of Articles of War. (YES)
HELD:
1) As to the jurisdiction of the court
GENERAL RULE: Members of the AFP and other
persons subject to military law who commit crimes or
offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code
(like  coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or local
ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. 
EXCEPTION: Where the civil court, before arraignment,
has determined the offense to be service-connected,
then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court
martial. 
the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before
arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried
by the proper civil court.
It bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners
concerns the alleged violation of their solemn oath as
officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-
constituted authorities. Such violation allegedly caused
dishonor and disrespect to the military profession. In
short, the charge has a bearing of
their professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected"
nature of the offense is the penalty prescribed for the
same (under Art. 96 of Articles of War) – dismissal from
the service –imposable only by the military court.
The RTC, in making the declaration that Art 96 of
Articles of War as “not sevice-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furthenance of the crime of coup
d’etat”, practically amended the law which expressly
vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-
connected crimes or offenses." It is only the Constitution
or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court,
tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or
nature of an action which can do so. Evidently, such
declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction
and is, therefore, void. 
2) As to the Doctrine of Absorption of Crimes

Moreover, the doctrine of ‘absorption of

crimes’ is peculiar to criminal law and generally applies
to crimes punished by the same statute, unlike here
where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the
doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction
over both offences. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055
deprives civil courts of jurisdiction over service-
connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles
of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not
applicable to this case.
8. PEOPLE V. PAREL

STUDY 8
9. PEOPLE V. MORAN
Facts: On December 20, 1920 an action was filed against
defendants Juan Moran, Fructuoso Cansino, and Hilario
Oda, election inspectors of the first precinct of the
municipality of Binalonan, Pangasinan, for having
falsified election returns. The defendants and were later
found guilty by Judge of First Instance Nepomuceno and
again on appeal by the Supreme Court for a crime
punishable under Chapter 18 of the Administrative
Code or the “Election Law”.
On March 9, 1922, Act No. 3030 amending certain
provision of the Election Law and providing for a
prescriptive period for acts done in violation of said
code was enacted by the Legislation. Section 71 of Act
No. 3030 says: "Offenses resulting from violations of
this Act shall prescribed one year after their
commission,"
On May 2, 1922, the defendants filed a motion for
reconsideration in the Supreme Court alleging that the
crime complained of had prescribed under the new
provisions of section 71 of Act No. 3030. Defendants
pray that they be absolved from the complaint and from
the related penalties thereof.
Issue:
Whether or not the prescriptive provision of Act No.
3030 be given retrospective effect for offenses
committed done before its effectivity, in accordance
with Art. 22 of the Penal Code?
Held:
Art. 22 of the Penal Code states “Penal laws shall have a
retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person
guilty of a felony..” In the case at bar, defendants were
charged with violating the Election Law on December
20, 1920. On March 9, 1922, Legislation passed an Act
amending the Election Law and providing for a one-year
prescriptive period for offenses resulting from violations
of the said act. The SC maintained that said article 22 of
the Penal Code refers NOT only to penalties but also to
appeals and proceedings, because the prescription of
the crime is intimately connected with that of the
penalty. It also held that the prescriptive provision of
Act No. 3030 must have retroactive effect, the same
being favorable to the accused. It stated “the sovereign,
in enacting a subsequent penal law more favorable to
the accused, has recognized that the greater severity of
the former law is unjust. The sovereign would be
inconsistent if it would still enforce its right under
conditions of the former law, which has already been
regarded by conscientious public opinion as juridically
burdensome.” The SC ruled in favor of the defendant
and dismissed the case for having already prescribed.
10. DEL SOCORRO V. VAN WILESEM
FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their
marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter,
Norma and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival
of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never
gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried again
a Filipina and resides again the Philippines particulary in
Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma filed a
complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for
the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner. The trial court dismissed the complaint since
the facts charged in the information do not constitute
an offense with respect to the accused, he being an
alien
other fact, they must be alleged and proved. Moreover,
foreign law should not be applied when its application
would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or
contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying the
foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither
enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor
penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation
is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it
would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A
9262) because the foreigner is living here in the
Philippines and committed the offense here.

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support

his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified
failure to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen

of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC
that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to
Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so. This does not, however, mean that
Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son
altogether. In international law, the party who wants to
have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case,
Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter
of provision of and capacity to support. While Ernst
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his
position that he is not obliged to support his son, he
never proved the same. It is incumbent upon Ernst to
plead and prove that the national law of the
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child. Foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any