Vitangcol v People G.R. No.

207406, January 13, 2016

Submitted by: ERIC V. RAMOS, LLB-1

Doctrine:
Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of
their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they
are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.

Facts:
On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice). Born into their union were three (3)
children. After some time, Alice eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a
certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with
the National Statistics Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against
Norberto.

Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence a
Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no
record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina. He argues that with
no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails
to establish the legality of his first marriage. In addition, Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of
the first marriage is not an element of the crime of bigamy.

Issue: Whether the Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the
marriage license issued to petitioner Norberto A. Vitangcol and his first wife Gina proves the nullity of
petitioner’s first marriage and exculpates him from the bigamy charge.

Ruling: No. Petition for Certiorari is DENIED.

The Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar that it has no record of the marriage license is
suspect. Assuming that it is true, it does not categorically prove that there was no marriage license.
Furthermore, marriages are not dissolved through mere certifications by the civil registrar. For more
than seven (7) years before his second marriage, petitioner did nothing to have his alleged spurious
first marriage declared a nullity. Even when this case was pending, he did not present any decision
from any trial court nullifying his first marriage.

Ratio:
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still
legally married to Gina when he married Alice. Thus, the trial court correctly convicted him of the
crime charged which was bigamy.
DADIS v SPS DE GUZMAN
Delfin Domingo Dadis Vs. Sps. Magtanggol De Guzman and Nora Q. De Guzman, and the Register of Deeds of
Talavera, Nueva Ecija (G.R. No. 206008) June 7, 2017 

Submitted by: ERIC V. RAMOS, LLB-1

FACTS: 
On September 8, 2003, petitioner Delfin Domingo Dadis filed a Complaint against respondents Spouses Magtanggol De Guzman Nora Q.
De Guzman for reconveyance and damages. Delfin alleged that: he and his deceased wife, Corazon Pajarillaga Dadis, were the registered
owners of a 33,494-square meter parcel of land located at Guimba, Nueva Ecija, on December 11, 1996, their daughter, Marissa P. Dadis
(Marissa), entered into a contract of real estate mortgage (REM) over the subject property in favor of Magtanggol to secure a loan obligation
of 1,210,000.00 that was payable on or before February 1997, the Spouses De Guzman made it appear that Marissa was authorized by the
Spouses Dadis by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated December 10, 1996; the SPA was a forged document because it was
never issued by him or Corazon as the signatures contained therein are not theirs, especially so since he was in the United States of
America (USA) at the time. 

On November 1999, Corazon died, Magtanggol informed petitioner of the transaction, but he could not remedy the situation as he had to go
back to the USA in December 1999. April 2002, he returned to the Philippines and executed a SPA in favor of a friend, Eduardo Gunsay, to
look into the matter and make the necessary actions; in 2003, he was able to procure copies of the documents pertaining to the mortgage,
including the cancellation of their title and the issuance of a new one, TCT No. N-26572, in favor of the Spouses De Guzman; after his
verification, he immediately caused the filing of an Affidavit of Adverse Claim, which was annotated at the back of TCT No. N-26572; neither
he nor his family benefited from the loan secured by the mortgage; no demand letter, as well as notices of the foreclosure proceedings and
the consolidation of title, were sent to him; and, in view of these, he is entitled to receive from the Spouses De Guzman the amounts of
₱200,000.00 as moral damages, ₱500,000.00 as exemplary damages, ₱20,000.00 plus ₱l,000.00, per hearing as attorney's fees, interests,
and other costs of suit. The Spouses De Guzman countered that Delfin has no cause of action against them, stating that: they have no
knowledge as regards the supposed falsity of the SPA presented by Marissa and Corazon at the time the latter pleaded to accommodate
them into entering a mortgage contract; they have no knowledge that Delfin was not in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the
SPA, which, as a duly-notarized document, was presumed to have been done regularly. 

RTC favored to the petitioner and the mortgage is void and ordering the plaintiff to pay to the defendant-spouses Magtanggol de Guzman
and Nora Q. de Guzman the sum of ₱210,000.00 with interest at 6% per annum from finality of judgment until full payment. The CA
reversed and set aside the R TC Decision and dismissed Delfin's complaint for lack of merit. 

ISSUE: 
Whether or not Magtanggol acted in good faith, when he entered into the loan transaction secured by a mortgage. 

RULING: 
The doctrine of mortgagee in good faith presupposes that the mortgagor, who is not the rightful owner of the property, has already
succeeded in obtaining a Torrens title over the property in his or her name and that, after obtaining the said title, he or she succeeds in
mortgaging the property to another who relies on what appears on the said title, In this case, Marissa is undoubtedly not the registered
owner of the subject lot; and the certificate of title was in the name of her parents at the time of the mortgage transaction. She merely acted
as the attorney-in-fact of Corazon and Delfin by virtue of the falsified SPA. The protection accorded by law to mortgagees in good faith
cannot be extended to mortgagees of properties that are not yet registered with the RD or registered but not under the mortgagor's name. 

When the mortgagee does not directly deal with the registered owner of the real property, like an attorney-in-fact of the owner, it is
incumbent upon the mortgagee to exercise greater care and a higher degree of prudence in dealing with such mortgagor. ART. 124. The
administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision. In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in
the administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. 

These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the written consent of
the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall
be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract
upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors. 

 The particular provision in the New Civil Code giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to
the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance of the conjugal partnership property by the husband [or wife] without the
consent of the wife [or husband] is null and void. Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of property, if the husband [or wife], without
knowledge and consent of the wife [or husband], sells conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but without
the approval of the wife [or husband], thereby resulting in a disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife [or husband]
who is given five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband [or wife] to institute the case. As the forged
SP A and REM are void ab initio, the foreclosure proceedings conducted on the strength thereof suffer from the same infirmity. Being not a
mortgagee in good faith and an innocent purchaser for value at the auction sale, Magtanggol is not entitled to the protection of any right with
respect to the subject property. Since it was not shown that the property has been transferred to a third person who is an innocent
purchaser for value (because no intervention or third-party claim was interposed during the pendency of this case), it is but proper that the
ownership over the contested lot should be retained by Delfin, 

WHEREFORE, Decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Regional Trial Court are REINSTATED AND UPHELD.
JOYCELYN GUALBERTO V. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V (G.R. NO. 154994); CRISANTO
RAFELITO G. GUALBERTO V. COURT OF APPEALS, et. al. (G.R. No. 156254, June 28, 2005)

Submitted by: ERIC V. RAMOS, LLB-1

Facts:
Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto filed before the RTC of Paranaque City a petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto with an ancillary prayer for the custody pendente lite of their 4-
year old son, Rafaello. Crisanto alleged that Joycelyn took away their child from their conjugal home and
his school when she decided to abandon Crisanto. Despite efforts of Crisanto, he failed to see his child.
During the hearing on the custody pendente lite, the private investigator hired by Crisanto to conduct
surveillance on Joycelyn testified that Joycelyn was having lesbian relations with a certain Noreen in
Cebu City. This was corroborated by the house helper of the spouses who stated that Joycelyn often
leaves the house and on one occasion, she saw Joycelyn slap the child. The trial court awarded the
custody of the minor pendente lite to Crisanto. After hearing, the trial court awarded the custody
Crisanto, but it was reversed later, awarding the custody to Joycelyn. The CA reversed the Order of the
trial court and awarded custody to the father pendente lite, hence, the mother brought the matter to the
Supreme Court.

Issue:
The mother brought the matter to the Supreme Court raising the issue whether lesbianism may warrant
the separation of a child below the age of seven (7) from the mother?

Held:
As a rule, the mother's immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to deprive her of custody. It
is not enough however, that the woman is a lesbian. He must also demonstrate that she carried on her
purported relations relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under
circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. Such a fact has not been shown
here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother's alleged sexual proclivitior that his
proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result. Sexual preference or moral laxity
alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that the mother is a prostitute
or has been unfaithful to her husband would render her unfit to have custody of her minor child. To
deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly-establish that her moral lapses have an adverse
effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental
care. Article 213 of the Family Code provided: “Art 213. In case of separation of parents’ parental
authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all
relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit. ”No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,” This Court has held that when the parents separated,
legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes its
bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED.  The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the May 17, 2002 Regional Trial Court Order REINSTATED.  The
Petition in GR No. 156254 is DISMISSED.