Chavez vs Public Estates Authority and

AMARI Corporation
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SPONSORED ADS
09 July 2002
Land Titles and Deeds – Lands of the Public Domain
 
The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation
projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed
or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the
Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to
AMARI.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended
JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of
Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the
public domain
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila
Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with
developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D.
1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA
entered into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by
PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was
followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of
Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI
entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when
Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously
known as the “mother of all scams”).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary
injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from
implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI
entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the
(Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture
agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease
these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of
the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared
no longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration
only after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can
alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside
the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of
still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still,
the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view
of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain
CASE NO. 11LIMITATIONS ON OWNERSHIP
 As Imposed by the LawOn Easements
CARIDAD O. DE GALLEGO
vs.
LAND AUTHORITY G.R. No. L-26848 (First Division) August 17, 1981FACTS
The petitioner herein, a registered owner of a parcel of land situated in the province of Rizal, seeks
thecancellation of certain conditions involving the conveyance of said land in question which was
said to have been acquired by the Government for residential purposes with the principal objective
of distributing the sameto the landless and thereby allow more people to have their own homes.
Petitioner insists that the primary intention of the restriction against transfers or conveyances of the
property except to the landless and except by hereditary succession in order to insure that more people shall
own residential homes, has been lost by thetransformation of the property from residential to commercial
since the landless who may want to establishtheir residential homes can no longer afford to pay the
commercial price of this commercial property and thussaid restriction should be eliminated to allow the
aforementioned property to contribute to the economicdevelopment of the country.Petitioner, wife of
former Ambassador Manuel Gallego, was not a landless individual, nor was shelandless at the time when the
said property was acquired by her, the fact being that the restriction refers only to voluntary
conveyances and did not comprehend sales by public auction, as in the particular case, where
thepetitioner came to own the property as the highest bidder in a foreclosure sale by reason of a mortgage thereon.
ISSUE
 Whether said conditions have lost any sound basis in that while the subject parcel of land was
originally aresidential lot, the classification of the property had been changed to that of commercial.
HELDNO.
The conditions are found or provided in Section 17 and 18 of Land Registration Order No. R-3under
the subject "Rules and Regulations Governing the Acquisition and Disposition of Landed Estate,"approved
November 15, 1951 by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Said conditions,
having been imposed pursuant to an Administrative Order which has the force and effect of the law,
are therefore binding upon any person who acquires title to the same, it appearing that said
Conditions are annotated asencumbrances on the back of the Certificate of Title of the land.
Moreover, said Conditions are not contrary tolaw, morals, customs, or public policy. In fact, these
Conditions had been imposed in order to implement moreeffectively the main purpose of the
constitutional provision which is to break up landed estates into reasonably small portions and to
discourage the concentration of excessive landed wealth in an entity or a few individuals,(Republic
vs. Baylosis, 96 Phil. 461) Incidentally, the New Constitution of 1973 provided a modification of
theoriginal provision in the 1935 Constitution, thus: "The National Assembly may authorize, upon
payment of justcompensation, the expropriation of private lands to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to
deserving citizens.
Therefore, it was only proper for the Court to hold the subject Conditions to remain as they were
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-61647 October 12, 1984
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF LANDS), petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BENJAMIN TANCINCO, AZUCENA TANCINCO
REYES, MARINA TANCINCO IMPERIAL and MARIO C. TANCINCO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Martin B. Laurea for respondents.
 
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
This is a petition for certiorari to set aside the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
(now Intermediate Appellate Court) affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VIII, which found that Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-
131892 are accretion to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 and
ordered their registration in the names of the private respondents.
Respondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be "Maria")
Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel of land covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-89709 situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan,
Bulacan bordering on the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers.
On June 24, 1973, the private respondents filed an application for the registration of three
lots adjacent to their fishpond property and particularly described as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Lot 1-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (lot 1 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio
of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the
NE., along line 1-2, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892; on the SE., along lines 2-3-
4, by Meycauayan River; on the S.W., along fines 4-5-6-7-8-9, by Bocaue
River; on the NE., along line 9-10, by property of Joaquina Santiago; on the
E., NE., and NW., along lines 10-11-12-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco
(Lot 2, Psu-111877). ... containing an area of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND
NINE HUNDRED THIRTY SEVEN (33,937) SQUARE METERS. ...
Lot 2-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
A parcel of land (Lot 2 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio
of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the
E., along line 1-2, by property of Rafael Singson; on the S., along line 2-3, by
Meycauayan River; on the SW., along line 3-4, by Lot 3 of plan Psu-131892;
and on the N., along line 4-1, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-
111877). ... containing an area of FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
FIFTY THREE (5,453) SQUARE METERS. ...
Lot 3-Psu-131892
(Maria C. Tancinco)
 A parcel of land (Lot 3 as shown on plan Psu-131892), situated in the Barrio
of Ubihan, Municipality of Meycauayan, Province of Bulacan. Bounded on the
NE., along line 1-2, by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 1, Psu-111877); and
along line 2-3, by Lot 2 of plan Psu-131892; on the S., along line 3-4, by
Meycauayan River, on the SW., along line 4-5, by Lot 1 of plan Psu-131892;
and along line 5-6 by property of Mariano Tancinco (Lot 2, Psu-111877), and
on the NW., along line 6-1, by property of Joaquina Santiago. ... containing
an area of ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE (1,985)
SQUARE METERS. ...
On April 5, 1974, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Amando C. Vicente, in representation of the
Bureau of Lands filed a written opposition to the application for registration.
On March 6, 1975, the private respondents filed a partial withdrawal of the application for
registration with respect to Lot 3 of Plan Psu-131892 in line with the recommendation of
the Commissioner appointed by the Court.
On March 7, 1975, Lot 3 was ordered withdrawn from the application and trial proceeded
only with respect to Lots 1 and 2 covered by Plan Psu-131892.
On June 26, 1976, the lower court rendered a decision granting the application on the
finding that the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE, it appearing that Lots 1 & 2 of plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) are
accretions to the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 89709 of
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, they belong to the owner of said property.
The Court, therefore, orders the registration of lots 1 & 2 situated in the barrio
of Ubihan, municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, and more
particularly described in plan Psu-131892 (Exh. H) and their accompanying
technical descriptions (Exhs. E, E-1) in favor of Benjamin Tancinco, married
to Alma Fernandez and residing at 3662 Heatherdown, Toledo, Ohio 43614
U.S.A.; Azucena Tancinco Reyes, married to Alex Reyes, Jr., residing at 4th
St., New Manila, Quezon City; Marina Tancinco Imperial, married to Juan
Imperial, residing at Pasay Road, Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Rizal; and
Mario C. Tancinco, married to Leticia Regidor, residing at 1616 Cypress St.,
Dasmariñas Village, Makati, Rizal, all of legal age, all Filipino citizens.
On July 30, 1976, the petitioner Republic appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On August, 19, 1982, the respondent Court rendered a decision affirming in toto the
decision of the lower court. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: têñ.£îhqwâ£
DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na iniakyat ay sinasangayunan at pinagtitibay sa
kanyang kabuuan nang walang bayad.
The rule that the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are binding
upon this Court admits of certain exceptions. Thus in Carolina Industries Inc. v. CMS Stock
Brokerage, Inc. (97 SCRA 734) we held that this Court retains the power to review and
rectify the findings of fact of said courts when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd, and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion,
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee.
There are facts and circumstances in the record which render untenable the findings of the
trial court and the Court of Appeals that the lands in question are accretions to the private
respondents' fishponds.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the New
Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents simply
transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River, and thus, if
there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of the
gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
On the other hand, the private respondents rely on the testimony of Mrs. Virginia Acuña to
the effect that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
xxx xxx xxx
... when witness first saw the land, namely, Lots 1 & 2, they were already dry
almost at the level of the Pilapil of the property of Dr. Tancinco, and that from
the boundaries of the lots, for about two (2) arms length the land was still dry
up to the edge of the river; that sometime in 1951, a new Pilapil was
established on the boundaries of Lots 1 & 2 and soil from the old Pilapil was
transferred to the new Pilapil and this was done sometime in 1951; that the
new lots were then converted into fishpond, and water in this fishpond was
two (2) meters deep on the side of the Pilapil facing the fishpond ... .
The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of
accretion without human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred after the
accretion was complete.
We agree with the petitioner.
Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion
which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters.
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites before an accretion
covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made through the effects of the current
of the water; and (3) that the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of
rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is
indispensable. This excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by
human intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case,
there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was made
gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We
agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is preposterous to believe that
almost four (4) hectares of land came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan
and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private respondents who happens to be their
overseer and whose husband was first cousin of their father noticed the four hectare
accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in 1939. The respondents claim that at this
point in time, accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness was incompetent to
testify to a gradual and imperceptible increase to their land in the years before 1939.
However, the witness testified that in that year, she observed an increase in the area of the
original fishpond which is now the land in question. If she was telling the truth, the
accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were
artificial and man-made and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and
Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect
of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the river and
encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry land cast
imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining it. It is under
two meters of water. The private respondents' own evidence shows that the water in the
fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond and only one
meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion
deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers because of
the location of his land. If estates bordering on rivers are exposed to floods and other evils
produced by the destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful provisions, said
estates are subject to incumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is proper that the
risk or danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be compensated by the right
of accretion. (Cortes v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Hence, the riparian owner does not
acquire the additions to his land caused by special works expressly intended or designed
to bring about accretion. When the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the
river bed, the dikes were meant for reclamation purposes and not to protect their property
from the destructive force of the waters of the river.
We agree with the submission of the Solicitor General that the testimony of the private
respondents' lone witness to the effect that as early as 1939 there already existed such
alleged alluvial deposits, deserves no merit. It should be noted that the lots in question
were not included in the survey of their adjacent property conducted on May 10, 1940 and
in the Cadastral Survey of the entire Municipality of Meycauayan conducted between the
years 1958 to 1960. The alleged accretion was declared for taxation purposes only in 1972
or 33 years after it had supposedly permanently formed. The only valid conclusion
therefore is that the said areas could not have been there in 1939. They existed only after
the private respondents transferred their dikes towards the bed of the Meycauayan river in
1951. What private respondents claim as accretion is really an encroachment of a portion
of the Meycauayan river by reclamation.
The lower court cannot validly order the registration of Lots 1 & 2 in the names of the
private respondents. These lots were portions of the bed of the Meycauayan river and are
therefore classified as property of the public domain under Article 420 paragraph 1 and
Article 502, paragraph 1 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. They are not open to
registration under the Land Registration Act. The adjudication of the lands in question as
private property in the names of the private respondents is null and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The private respondents are ordered to move back the dikes
of their fishponds to their original location and return the disputed property to the river to
which it belongs.