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G.R. No.

163267 Case Digest


G.R. No. 163267, May 5, 2010
Teofilo Evangelista, petitioner
vs People of the Philippines, respondent
Ponente: Del Castillo

Facts:
There was an information saying that on January 30, 1996 at NAIA the accused
feloniously have in possession of the firearms without the corresponding permit or
license from competent authority.

RTC's ruling: Evangelista guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions.

Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which the RTC granted. RTC then found the
petitioner liable still for the offense charged but modified the penalty of imprisonment.

CA's ruling: CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its decision. It ruled that the
stipulations during the trial are binding on petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether CA gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from the charge of the
illegal possession of firearms.

Held:
Appeal is devoid of merit.

Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the
crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was
committed in the Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs
Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already
in possession of the subject firearms in the Philippines.

In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the
present charge happened in Dubai. It may be well to recall that while in Dubai,
petitioner, even in a situation between life and death, firmly denied possession and
ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal case having
been filed against petitioner in Dubai in connection with the discovered firearms. Since
there is no pending criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason that there was
no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must
prove his allegation applies.

Petition denied.
06 Constantino v. Heirs of Constantino
G.R. No. 181508 October 2, 2013

Topic: Settlement of Decedents’ Estates

Doctrine: Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions.
Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions explicitly
provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the
contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action, thereby,
defining and limiting the issues to be tried.

Facts:
- There is a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate which
needed to be subdivided among heirs.

- Pedro Sr, ancestor of petitioners and respondents owned several parcels of land.
- Pedro Sr. upon his death, was survived by his 6 children one of which is Pedro
Constantino Jr (grandfather of respondents).
- Respondents Asuncion and Josefina (great grandchildren of Pedro Sr.) filed a
complaint against petitioners Oscar, Maxima and Casmira (grandchildren of Pedro Sr.)
for nullification of document ‘Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman’
- Respondents alleged that the petitioners asserted their claim over the whole
parcel of land while respondents were occupying a portion of it. Respondents learned
that in Tax Declaration was in the name of petitioners Oscar and Maxima and that it was
unlawfully issued
- Respondents alleged that the petitioners misrepresented themselves as the sole
and only heirs of Pedro Sr.
- Petitioners avvered that Pedro Sr. left several parcels of land and that the
‘Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman’ was a product of mutual and voluntary agreement
among the descendants of Pedro Sr.
- Petitioners allege respondents have no cause of action because respondets
lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr has been transferred as evidenced by the Deed
of Extrajudicial settlement with waiver.
- A pre-trial conference was conducted wherein the parties entered into
stipulations and admissions as well as identification of the issues to be litigated.
- RTC: As a result of “Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver” executed by the heirs
of Pedro Constantino Jr. and the subsequent execution of another deed denominated
as “Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman” executed by the heirs of Santiago and Bruno
Constantino (sons of Pedro Sr.) to the exclusion of the other heirs, both plaintiffs and
defendants acted equally at fault. They are in pari declito.
- CA: In favor or the respondent heirs of Pedro Jr., declaring that the “Extrajudicial
Settlement with Waiver” covering the lot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of
the estate of Pedro Sr. It is erroneous for the trial court to declare the parties in pari
delicto.
- (Plaintiff -heirs Pedro Constantino Jr, Asuncion, Josefine are not parties to the
extrajudicial settlement with waiver but are considered ‘privies’ to the deed so are bound
by the extrajudicial settlement)

Issue: WON the CA erred in disregarding the stipulations and admissions during the
pre-trial conference on which the application of the doctrine of pari delicto was based

Held: YES.

Substantive part
- Both RTC and CA erroneously applied the doctrine of in pari delicto. It applies to
contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to contracts rendered
void for being simulated,28 or those in which the parties do not really intend to be bound
thereby.

- In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments unto the
signatories of the portions of the estate of an ancestor common to them and another set
of signatories likewise assigning unto themselves portions of the same estate.

Procedural part:
- The CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the respondents
during the pre-trial conference where they stipulated that the land belongs to Pedro Sr.
This is what it says:
- ‘That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro
Constantino, Sr. was transferred to Maria Constantino under Tax Declaration No. 9535;’

- The respondent’s admissions is an admission against the respondent’s interest


of the fact of ownership by Pedro Sr. which was transferred to respondent’s mother, the
daughter of Pedro Sr. Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the
admissions.

- Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial admissions


explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, which mandates
that the contents of the pre-trial order shall control the subsequent course of the action,
thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. Once the stipulations are reduced
into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the
parties who made them.

- They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at
a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it
must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.
- As contemplated in Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule
regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the
dispensation of proof admits two exceptions:
(1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake;
(2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.
- The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made
such an admission. However, respondents failed to refute the earlier
admissions/stipulation before and during the trial.
- While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq. m lot, respondent Asuncion,
when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of land
was acquired by Pedro Jr.
- The respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on which they based their
right over the property subject matter thereof. Therefore, both acted in violation of laws.
Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the circumvention of the laws as
contemplated by the parties in the case, we must declare both contracts void. Indeed,
any circumvention of the law cannot be countenanced.

-
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329 is hereby REVERSED. The Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman and Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver are hereby declared void without
prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro Constantino Sr. with the full participation
of all the latter’s heirs.
[G.R. No. 139282. September 4, 2000]

DIEGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN

Romeo Diego Y De Joya, herein petitioner, was convicted as principal in the


crime of Malversation of Public Property by the Sandiganbayan.

―Accused Romeo Diego started his career in the Philippine National Police as an
Auto Mechanic way back in 1950. Through the years, he rose to the rank of
Police Superintendent (equivalent rank of Lt. Colonel). At the time of the loss of
the ―shabu‖, the accused was the Evidence Custodian of the National Capital
Region, Criminal Investigation Service Command at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
On November 27, 1992, he received for safekeeping forty (40) self-sealed
transparent plastic bags of methamphetamine hydrochloride or ―shabu‖ with an
estimated street value of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00). As custodian of the
said ―shabu‖, he received a total of three (3) subpoenas from Branch 111,
Regional Trial Court, Pasay City, to bring the said ―shabu‖ as evidence in
Criminal Case No. 92-2097, entitled People vs. Ong Foo de la Cruz. The first two
subpoenas were for the hearings held on January 27, 1993 and January 29,
1993 during which police escorts accompanied the accused to help secure the
subject evidence. On these two occasions, he was accompanied by three police
officers, namely: Crime Investigator II Zosimo Escobar, SPO3 Oscar Bacani and
SPO3 Isalvanor Casissid. Thus, the ―shabu‖ was twice brought to the court but
was not presented in evidence since the hearings were postponed. In both
instances, the accused also asked Presiding Judge Sayo whether he could turn
over the evidence to the custody of the court. The latter, however, refused to
accept the ―shabu‖ for the reason that the court did not have a vault to secure the
same. In going to the Regional Trial Court at Pasay City, the accused and his
companions would leave Camp Crame at about 7:30 a.m. and they would take
EDSA to F.B. Harrison, which would lead them to the courthouse.

By virtue of the third subpoena, the accused again left his office to go to the RTC
at Pasay City with the five-and-a-half kilos (5.5 kgs.) of ―shabu‖ on February 9,
1993, again leaving at around 7:30 a.m. As usual, he took EDSA to F.B. Harrison
towards the Pasay City courthouse. Unlike the two previous trips to the said
courthouse, however, the accused travelled alone on that fateful day of February
9, 1993. In addition, unlike the two other previous trips, which were uneventful,
accused was waylaid by holduppers along F.B. Harrison, about fifty (50) meters
from the courthouse. The holduppers blocked the path of accused’s Beetle and
two holduppers alighted from their vehicle, a dark blue box type Lancer with plate
number PGM or PGN 44? One of the holduppers, armed with a .45 caliber pistol,
approached from the passenger side of the accused’s vehicle and told the
MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M. Evidence 36
accused, ―Huwag kang papalag. Madidisgrasya ka lang.‖ The holdupper then
asked for accused’s ignition keys and eyeglasses, opened the passenger door of
the vehicle, grabbed the bag containing the ―shabu‖ placed at the vehicle’s front
passenger floor. The holduppers immediately left the scene of the crime and
accused reported the incident to Judge Sayo of Branch 111 of the Regional Trial
Court and to his office at the CIS, to Major Gil Meneses, in particular. The
accused then testified in court before Judge Sayo regarding the loss of the
―shabu‖ and immediately reported the robbery to the Pasay City where he gave
his statement (Exhibit ―1‖) regarding the incident on F.B. Harrison St. (sic)‖[2]

WHETHER OR NOT, ASSUMING THAT THE BURDEN OF EVIDENCE WAS


PROPERLY SHIFTED TO PETITIONER, THE EXPLANATION HE RELIED
UPON FOR THE LOSS OF THE SUBJECT ―SHABU‖ IS SUFFICIENT TO
EXONERATE HIM FROM LIABILITY FOR THE OFFENSE CHARGED;

The petition has no merit.

.
All of the four elements of malversation are present in the case at bar, and these
elements are:

1. That the offender is a public officer;

2. That he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties
of his office;

3. That the funds or property are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and

4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or through


abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. (Emphasis
ours)[12]

Petitioner is a public officer who had custody of the shabu by reason of his official
duties as Evidence Custodian of the National Capital Regional Office of the
Philippine National Police - Criminal Investigation Service Command (NCRO,
PNP-CISC). The shabu was public property for which petitioner was accountable.
While the evidence on record fail to show that petitioner misappropriated said
public property for his personal aggrandizement, the evidence points to the
conclusion that the loss of the shabu to armed men was through petitioner’s
negligence.

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence.[13] The


Sandiganbayan in this case ruled that the loss of the shabu was due to
MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M. Evidence 37
petitioner’s gross negligence, a factual finding that is as a rule conclusive upon
this Court.[14] In cases involving public officials, there is gross negligence when
a breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.[15] What makes petitioner’s gross
negligence more pronounced is the fact that he was fully aware of the need to
transport the shabu with police escorts but despite the knowledge of the peril
involved in the transportation of illegal drugs, petitioner took it upon himself to
deliver the subject shabu without police escort, despite the fact that the shabu
involved is valued at five million pesos (P5,000,000.00), weighing 5.5 kilograms
and packed in 40 sealed transparent plastic bags. The sheer nature, value, and
amount of the contraband should have alerted petitioner, an experienced
evidence custodian, to the risk that organized criminals might attempt to forcibly
take away the shabu. Petitioner’s diligence unmistakably fell short of that
required by the circumstances.

We cite with approval the following findings of the Sandiganbayan:

―Indeed, the accused had miserably failed to exercise the necessary precautions
to secure the safekeeping of the ―shabu‖ under his care. There is no doubt that
the accused was aware of the dangers posed in transporting such a large
amount of ―shabu‖ subject of the instant case. As a matter of fact, he deemed it
indispensable to secure, as he did, the assistance of three police officers in the
previous instances as escorts in transporting the ―shabu‖ to and from the
courthouse in Pasay City. His knowledge of such dangers was further revealed in
his very own testimony before the court, thus:

In the case at bench, the accused could have pursued other options to ensure
the security of the ―shabu‖. The accused would have waited until alternative
escorts arrived at the office. A simple telephone call to the office of Judge Sayo
informing the latter that the accused would be late would have sufficed. Under
the circumstances, the judge would have understood the accused’s predicament
and could have called the case at a later hour. Another option is not to have gone
to the court if no escorts could be procured. Again, a telephone call to the office
of the judge would again have probably sufficed to allay his fears of being cited
for contempt. Simply put, the accused failed to take all possible actions to ensure
the security of the ―shabu‖; he left too many stones unturned, so to speak.

Furthermore, the court notes that the accused carried only a gun of a mere
caliber .22. Indeed, if he were to truly secure his valuable cargo, as was his
bounden duty, he should have carried a more powerful firearm and maybe more
than one such firearm, the need therefor having become more compelling
considering that he was to travel alone. It is a matter of common experience that
holduppers normally carry high powered firearms.‖[16]

In a last ditch effort to skirt the issue of gross negligence imputed against
petitioner, petitioner claims that the robbery was a fortuitous event. This
argument must likewise fail since the loss of the shabu to armed men is by no
MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M. Evidence 38
means a fortuitous event. A fortuitous event is defined as an occurrence which
could not be foreseen or which though foreseen, is inevitable.[17] Again, the very
nature of the object under the custody of petitioner and its street value posed
risks. One of these risks is that the shabu could be taken forcibly by armed men,
a risk that petitioner was in fact preparing against. The possibility of losing the
shabu to armed men was evidently a foreseeable event.

By all accounts, petitioner had previously undertaken certain measures to


safeguard the transportation of the shabu. In fact, during his first trip to the court
he was accompanied by police escorts; he suggested that the shabu be
deposited with the court, which the court denied due to the absence of a vault;
petitioner tried to look for a police escort on the day he was rescheduled to
deliver the shabu in court, but allegedly to no avail; and he decided to transport
the shabu alone and incognito. Petitioner’s actions underscore the fact that he
was fully aware of the inherent danger in transporting the shabu, a fact that
defeats his claim that the loss of the shabu to armed robbers was a fortuitous
event.

Concededly, the presence of police escorts would not have necessarily deterred
the robbers from taking the shabu, but in such a case, petitioner would have
shown due diligence that would controvert his own liability. True, petitioner is not
expected to match a holdupper gun for gun. However, what is simply expected of
him is to exhibit a standard of diligence commensurate with the circumstances of
time, person and place.

The scale of the damage sustained by the government because of the loss of the
shabu cannot be overemphasized. The estimated street value of the shabu is five
million pesos (P5,000,000.00) and the circulation of this illegal substance in the
market is a major setback in the effort of government to curb drug addiction. We
are thus in complete agreement with the Sandiganbayan that the unnecessary
risks taken by petitioner in transporting the subject shabu, leading to the eventual
loss of this prohibited substance, cannot be countenanced.

Lastly, petitioner contends that the illegal nature of the shabu prevents the courts
from basing the penalty on its value. We hold that the Sandiganbayan did not
commit a grievous error when it imposed the penalty based on the value of the
shabu. In malversation, the penalty for the offense is dependent on the value of
the public funds, money or property malversed.[18] Generally, when the value is
disputed, the court is proscribed from taking judicial notice of the value and must
receive evidence of the disputed facts with notice to the parties.[19] However, in
the case at bar, the value of the shabu is not in dispute. Petitioner subscribed to
the stipulation of facts that the street value of the shabu is five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00). As stated earlier, statements embodied in the stipulation of
facts are judicial admissions and are thereby binding on the declarant. There is
no indication that the admission as to the value of the shabu was made through
palpable mistake and petitioner does not deny having made such an admission.
MIFAÑA, DIVINE GRACE M. Evidence 39
Thus, the stipulated value of the shabu is not an improper basis for the imposition
of the penalty.[20]

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the appealed decision of the Sandiganbayan


convicting the accused Romeo Diego Y de Joya of Malversation of Public
Property and imposing upon him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum in view of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender; to pay a
fine of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00); and to suffer the penalty of perpetual
special disqualification from holding any public office.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 201427. March 18, 2015.] TEOFILO B. ADOLFO, petitioner, vs. FE T.
ADOLFO,respondent.FACTS
:Civil Case No. MAN-
4821 Petitioner Teofilo B. Adolfo filed with the RTC Mandaue a Petition for judicial
separation of property against his estranged wife. Parties were married on November
26, 1966, the union bore one child; that during the marriage, they acquired through
conjugal funds real properties that later on the parties separated due to irreconcilable
differences. Since reunion was no longer feasible, petitioner suggested a separation of
the conjugal property, but respondent adamantly refused; that respondent denied
petitioner's co-ownership of the subject property, claiming the same as her paraphernal
property; that several earnest efforts to amicably settle the matter between them proved
unavailing; and that a judicial separation of property is proper under the circumstances
and pursuant to Article 135 (6) of the Family Code. Petitioner thus prayed that judgment
be rendered decreeing a separation of the conjugal property. Respondent contended
that she is the sole owner of the property which is her paraphernal property inherited
from her mother. That petitioner is lazy, gambler drunkard, wife abuser and neglectful
father. Respondent bought on installment a tricycle for the petitioner's use in business,
but he kept the proceeds thereof to himself and used the same in his gambling and
drinking sprees; that respondent alone took the initiative to support the family and found
ways to take care of the daily needs of her child. One day, petitioner destroyed the roof
of the house that was then being built; that petitioner subsequently abandoned her and
their child in 1968, and transferred to Davao City where he took a mistress and begot
four children by her; that in 1986, petitioner returned to Cebu City seeking reconciliation
with respondent; that respondent took petitioner back, but in 1987 they once more
separated; that thereafter, respondent never again saw or heard from petitioner. Civil
Case No. MAN-2683, Respondent sold the property to her brother, her brother
mortgaged it to DBP, foreclosed and DBP sold it to the Garcias and the Garcias sold it
to respondent with new TCT. Respondent executed a deed of sale in favor of the
Gingoyons but refused to partition even Gingoyons paid the taxes and selling expenses.
That when the sale to the Gingoyons was made, the subject property constituted
conjugal property of her marriage with petitioner; when the Garcias executed the deed
of sale, the subject property became a conjugal asset; since petitioner did not sign the
deed of sale in favor of the Gingoyons as he was in Davao at the time and knew nothing
about the sale, the sale was null and void. RTC nullified the DOS.

Meanwhile during the pre-trial of Civil Case No. MAN-4821, respondent failed to file her
answer. Then RTC found that it’s a conjugal property and dismissed the case.
Respondent appealed to CA. Decision was reversed and set aside. Petitioner moved to
reconsider but in a March 2, 2012 Resolution, he was rebuffed. Hence, the present
Petition was filed on April 30, 2012

Issue
: whether the subject property is conjugal, or a paraphernal asset of the respondent

Ruling
: Paraphernal.Proceeding from the foregoing consideration, the finding that Lot No.1087
-A-2-E is a conjugalproperty does not have any basis, hence, does not have any merit
at all. On the contrary, plaintiffs-appellants 30 sufficiently proved that the aforesaid lot
was defendant-appellee's 31paraphernal property as the latter even admitted that she
inherited the same from her mother although she claimed it as a conjugal property
based on the TCT's attached to her answer. Another strong indication that Lot No.
1087-A-2-E is solely owned by defendant-appellee is the fact that in another case (Civil
Case No. MAN-2008) involving the same property and the same parties but for a
different issue (road right of way), defendant
-appellee alone signed the compromise agreement ceding a portion of the subject lot as
a right of way perpetually open and unobstructed for the benefit of plaintiffs
-appellants, defendant-appellee, their respective heirs, assigns and transferees and
guests. The same compromise agreement which became the decision of the
case attained finality without defendant-appellee questioning the absence of her
husband's signature.

On June 23, 2007, the above CA decision became final and executory. The principle of
estoppel bars Petitioner from denying the resultant pronouncement by the appellate
court, which became final and executory, that the subject property is respondent's
Paraphernal property. As an unfortunate consequence, the case was not appreciated
and resolved completely. Thus, with the development in Civil Case No. MAN-2683
brought upon by the final and executory decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 78971, petitioner's
case is left with no leg to stand on. There being no conjugal property to be divided
between the parties, Civil Case No. MAN-4821 must be dismissed. WHEREFORE, the
Petition is DENIED
When best evidence rule applies.

But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise
only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule
applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be
introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the
writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In
such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the
original (Heirs of Margarita Prodon v. Heirs of Maximo Alvarez, et al., G.R. No. 170604,
September 2, 2013, 704 SCRA 465, Bersamin, J)

The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence
sought to be introduced concerns external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the
writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case,
secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original. (Prodon vs. Heirs of
Alvarez, G.R. No. 170604, September 2, 2013)

The Heirs of Maximo Alvarez and Valentina Clave filed a complaint for quieting of title
and damages against Margarita Prodon. They alleged that Prodon maliciously made an
entry in the TCT of the property of the respondents, the entry states that the property
had been sold to them with a right of re purchase. The deed of sale with the right of
repurchase had been lost. The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a
written document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on
the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud
on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule does not apply, and the
defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the srcinal document.
HEIRS OFHEIRS OFMARGARITA PRODON v. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S.
ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE. G.R. No.MARGARITA P
SPOUSES RAMON and FELICISIMA DIOSO vs. SPOUSES TOMAS and LEONORA
CARDEÑOG.R. No. 150155 September 1, 2004FACTS:
Petitioners filed a complaint for specific performance and/or easement of right of way
with damages and prayed that the respondents be directed to comply with or perform
their obligation under the Pinanumpaang Salaysay and grant the petitioners a right of
way, and to pay them damages. The respondents specifically denied the genuineness
and due execution of the Pinanumpaang Salaysay, alleging that it was falsified. The trial
court held that the petitioners’ evidence did not support their claim and noted that the
petitioners presented only a photocopy or machine copy of the purported document,
and, during the trial, failed to lay the foundation or prepare the basis for the admission of
secondary evidence to prove the contents thereof.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners were able to establish the existence of the
PinanumpaangSalaysay by secondary evidence

RULING:
Yes. Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, indeed, provides that when the subject
ofinquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
originaldocument itself. This rule, however, admits of exceptions, as Section 5 thereof
further states that
“When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, the offer or, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates
thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the
original or its non-production in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith
on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent
loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary evidence. 23 In MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation, 24 it was held that where the missing document is the
foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only
collaterally involved.

A perusal of the above document would readily show that it does not specify a determinate subject
matter. Nowhere does it provide a description of the property subject of the sale, including its metes
and bounds, as well as its total area. The Court notes that while Julio, Jr. testified that the land
subject of the sale consisted of 352 square meters, Exhibit "4," however, states that it’s more than
400 square meters. Moreover, Exhibit "4" does not categorically declare the price certain in money.
Neither does it state the mode of payment of the purchase price and the period for its payment.

In Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court ruled that the manner of payment of the
purchase price was an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale could exist.
Albeit the Civil Code does not explicitly provide that the minds of the contracting parties must also
meet on the terms or manner of payment of the price, the same is needed, otherwise, there is no
sale.38 An agreement anent the manner of payment goes into the price so much so that a
disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. 39 Further, in
Velasco v. Court of Appeals,40 where the parties already agreed on the object of sale and on the
purchase price, but not on how and when the downpayment and the installment payments were to
be paid, this Court ruled:

Such being the situation, it cannot, therefore, be said that a definite and firm sales agreement
between the parties had been perfected over the lot in question. Indeed, this Court has already ruled
before that a definite agreement on the manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential
element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale. The fact, therefore, that the
petitioners delivered to the respondent the sum of ₱10,000.00 as part of the down-payment that they
had to pay cannot be considered as sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale
agreement between the parties herein under Art. 1482 of the new Civil Code, as the petitioners
themselves admit that some essential matter - the terms of payment - still had to be mutually
covenanted.41

The CA held that partial performance of the contract of sale- giving of a downpayment coupled with
the delivery of the res - took the oral contract out of the scope of the Statute of Frauds. This
conclusion arose from its erroneous finding that there was a perfected contract of sale. The above
disquisition, however, shows that there was none. There is, therefore, no basis for the application of
the Statute of Frauds. The application of the Statute of Frauds presupposes the existence of a
perfected contract.42 As to the delivery of the res, it does not appear to be a voluntary one pursuant
to the purported sale. If Julio, Jr. happened to be there, it was because his ancestors tenanted the
land. It must be noted that when Julio, Jr. built his house, Rogelio protested.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 25, 2010 Decision and the March
23, 2010 Resolution of the Court Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 85258, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The March 2, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in
Civil Case No. 280-M-2002, is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
CAPITAL SHOES FACTORY, LTD. vs. TRAVELER KIDS, INC.
G.R. No. 200065. September 24, 2014

Doctrine: Duplicate originals are admissible as evidence in accordance with


Section 4 (b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In this case the witness convincingly
explained that petitioner usually prepares two (2) copies of invoices for a
particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and retaining the other copy.
The Court saw no reason why Section 4 (b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court should
not apply in admitting the petitioner’s copy of the invoice as evidence.

Facts: Capital Shoes Factory Ltd., (CSFL) and Traveller Kids, Inc. (TKI), entered into
an agreement, wherein they agreed that TKI would import the shoes and sandals made
by CSFL from its China factory. After TKI placed numerous purchase orders, CSFL
began manufacturing the goods pursuant to the special designs and specifications of
TKI. CSFL then shipped the goods to TKI. It was their arrangement that TKI would pay
thirty (30%) percent of the purchase price of the goods by way of letters of credit, and
the balance of seventy (70%) percent by way of telegraphic transfer, thirty (30) days
from the date of delivery of the goods.

For the first three years, TKI was able to pay its purchase orders and the shipments
made by CSFL. In 2004, however, TKI started to default in its payments. Both verbal
and written demand letters were made by CSFL to TKI for the payment of its unpaid
accounts, but to no avail. To protect its interest, CSFL filed a complaint for collection of
sum of money and damages against TKI before the RTC.

After the presentation of its last witness, CSFL filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits seeking
the admission of the sales invoices and order slips. TKI objected to the admission of the
documents offered, contending that several of the sales invoices and order slips should
not be admitted because they were merely photocopies. TKI also objected to the
admission of documents by which CSFL sought to prove its claim for attorney's fees.
Nonetheless the RTC issued an Order admitting all the exhibits offered by CSFL. TKI
filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the RTC. It ruled that the sales
invoices and order slips could be admitted because the duplicate originals of the
invoices were already sufficiently established by the testimony of CSFL's officer and
principal witness, Susan Chiu.

Instead of presenting evidence, TKI opted to file a petition for certiorari with prayer for
TRO before the CA. Thereafter the CA rendered a decision partially granting TKI's
petition and denying the admission of sales invoices and order slips presented as
evidence by CSFL. Applying Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the CA
explained that while it was true that the original copies of the sales invoices were the
best evidence to prove TKI's obligation, CSFL merely presented photocopies of the
questioned exhibits. It stated that Chiu's testimony merely established the existence or
due execution of the original invoices. CSFL, however, did not present the original
invoices, only the photocopies, contrary to Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
CSFL filed an MR with the CA but was denied thus the present case before the SC.
CSFL now argues that the excluded documents are admissible in evidence because it
was duly established during the trial that the said documents were duplicate originals,
and not mere photocopies, considering that they were prepared at the same time as the
originals. On the other hand, TKI counters that CSFL's claim that the photocopied
documents were duplicate originals was just a unilateral and self-serving statement
without any supportive evidence.

Issue: WON sales invoices and order slips, offered as evidence by CSFL, are duplicate
originals and thus admissible as evidence?

Held: Yes.

Records reveal that Chiu, CSFL's principal witness, was able to satisfactorily explain
that the documents in question were duplicate originals of invoices and order slips, and
not mere photocopies. The transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) clearly show that
Chiu convincingly explained that CSFL usually prepared two (2) copies of invoices for a
particular transaction, giving one copy to a client and retaining the other copy. The
Court combed through her testimony and found nothing that would indicate that the
documents offered were mere photocopies. She remained firm and consistent with her
statement that the subject invoices were duplicate originals as they were prepared at
the same time. The Court saw no reason why Section 4 (b), Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court should not apply. At any rate, those exhibits can be admitted as part of the
testimony of Chiu.

The Court went over the RTC records and the TSNs and found that, contrary to the
assertion of TKI, the duplicate originals were produced in court and compared with their
photocopies during the hearing before the trial court. The transcripts bare all of these
but were missed by the CA, which believed the assertion of TKI that what were
produced in court and offered in evidence were mere photocopies. The TSNs further
reveal that after the comparison, the photocopies were the ones retained in the records.

Records of the case are ordered remanded to the trial court for appropriate
proceedings.
MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION VS. SSANGYONG CORPORATIONG.R.
No. 170633October 17, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo,
Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel
products.

One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading


company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati
City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and
facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices
containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto,
its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to
Ssangyong, again by fax. Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of
contract against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its
complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached their contract when they
refused to open the letter of credit in the amount ofUS$170,000.00 for the remaining
100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1and ST2-
POSTS0401-2. After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence
alleging that respondent failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices
on which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the pro
forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their
supposed contract of sale are inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit
of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best evidence the original fax
transmittal. On the other hand, Respondent claims that the photocopies of these fax
transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible
under the Rules on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the non-
production of the original fax transmittals.

ISSUE:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic
evidence and admissible as such

RULING:
NO.

R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards
an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on
admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in
the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent
of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output
readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be
admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the
functional equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, the
writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document.”

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