1. Pelaez vs Auditor General same is evidenced by the presence chairmen in its 17 barangays, description in EO 258.
irmen in its 17 barangays, description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted
Facts: The President of the Philippines, purporting to act pursuant to
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive
Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities enumerated in the margin. Petitioner Emmanuel
Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
instituted the present special civil action, for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain him,
as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of said executive
orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon
the ground that said Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by
Republic Act No. 2370 effective January 1, 1960 and constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power. The third paragraph of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads: “Barrios shall not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except
under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.”
Issues: Whether or not Section 68 of Revised Administrative Code
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
Discussions: Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law
ordains:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws
be faithfully executed.
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the
President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be
vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such
officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the
latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority
than that of checking whether said local governments or the officers
thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments.
Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so
long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority.
2. CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Re: Municipal Corporations
FACTS: Among the EOs annuled in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor
General was EO No. 107 creating the Municipality of Andong.
Petitioner herein contends that Andong is still in existence and the
public officials, high school, etc.
ISSUES: (1) WON a municipality, such as Andong, whose creation
by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain
recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute.
(2) WON Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto municipal
corporation.
HELD: (1) No. The Municipality of Andong never existed as EO N0.
107 establishing Andong was declared void ab initio (from inception)
by the court in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General. Further, the
Pelaez case was never reversed by the court but was rather
affirmed in many cases. Finally, No subsequent legislation has been
passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these
facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not
exist as a duly constituted municipality.
(2) No. We have since held that where a municipality created as
such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are
accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In
Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court
considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a
municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was
created by executive order of the President before the ruling in
Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the
validity of the creation of the municipality had never been
challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo
warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order
creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was
later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a
municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in
the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of
Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there
might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be
deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of
1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal
districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive
orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials
holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall
henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."
3. MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ, ET AL .VS. HON. VICENTE T.
BAZ, JR., ET AL.
Facts: The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of
then Pres. Quirino pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Admin.
Code.Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on the technical
jurisdiction based on an agreement with Sinacaban which was
approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental which fixed
the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial
Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held
that the earlier resolution approving the agreement between the
municipalities was void since the Board had no power to alter the
boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez argued that
the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in
Pelaez v Auditor General), then Sinacaban, which was created thru
and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert a territorial
claim.
Issue: Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES
Held: Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly
recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can
no longer be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v
Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation
of a municipal corporation: 1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity
of the corporation has not been challenged; 2. The fact that no quo
warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating the
municipality; and 3. The fact that the municipality was later classified
as a 5th class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit
court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution
apportioning the seats in the House. In this case, the following
factors are present:
1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was
decided in 1965 and yet the validity of EO 258 creating it had
never been questioned. 2. It was only 40 years later that its
existence was questioned. 3. Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of
COurt provides that a quo warranto suit against a corporation
for forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years
from the time the act complaned of was done or committed. 4.
The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacaban’s corporate
existence by entering into an agreement with it regarding the
boundary. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
etc. 5. Sinacaban is constituted as part of a municipal circuit for
purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country.
Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that
“municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances
or executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this
Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.”
Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning
legislative districts throughout the country, which considered
Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. II.
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 Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987
Constitution took effect. It is not subject to the plebiscite
requirement. It applies only to new municipalities created for the
first time under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite
was originally contained in Art. XI, Section 3 of the previous
Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal corporations
created before, such as Sinacaban.
4. League of Cities v. Comelec
Action: These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City
of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the
constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent
municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood
Laws.
Facts:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills
converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not
act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act
No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009
amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into
a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the
amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely
to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the
12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to
exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24
municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate
approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to
the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator
Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100
million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the
cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7
June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on
various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s
signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to
determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.\
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the
Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the
Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to
the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application,
because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills
became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all
the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no
resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain
municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and
was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved
bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed
in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
5. ALVAREZ V. GUINGONA – G.R. NO. 118303 – 252 SCRA 695
Facts:
On April 18, 1993, HB No. 8817, entitled “An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an In-dependent Component City to be
known as the City of Santiago,” was filed in the House of Repre-
sentatives. Meanwhile, a counterpart of HB No. 8817, Senate Bill
No. 1243, was filed in the Senate.On March 22, 1994, the House of
Representatives, upon being apprised of the action of the Sen-ate,
approved the amendments proposed by the Senate.
Issue: Does the passing of SB No. 1243, the Senate’s own version
of HB No. 8817, into Republic Act No. 7720 be said to have
originated in the House of Representatives as required?
Held:Yes. Although a bill of local application should originate
exclusively in the House of Representa-tives, the claim of petitioners
that Republic Act No. 7720 did not originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives because a bill of the same import, SB No. 1243,
was passed in the Senate, is untenable because it cannot be denied
that HB No. 8817 was filed in the House of Representativesfirst
before SB No. 1243 was filed in the Senate.The filing in the Senate
of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill
of local application should originate inthe House of Representatives,
for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.
6. Mariano v COMELEC
G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995, 242 SCRA 211
FACTS: This is a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief filed
by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita
Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and
Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of
Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro
Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail sections 2, 51, and 52 of
Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
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ISSUE: Whether or not there is an actual case or controversy to
challenge the constitutionality of one of the questioned sections of
R.A. No. 7854.
HELD:The requirements before a litigant can challenge the
constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality
must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question
must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the
decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The
petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,
i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he
would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections.
Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen
to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of
Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper partiesto raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for
declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.
7. Cawaling vs. COMELEC
Facts: Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No.8806 which created the City of
Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant
thereto.On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada
signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an"Act Creating The City Of
Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In
TheProvince Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds
Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in theMunicipalities of
Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification
proclaimed the creationof the City of Sorsogon as having been
ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in
theplebiscite.Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the
petitioner filed the present petition forcertiorari seeking the
annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds:A. The
December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required
120-day period from theapproval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section
54 thereof; andB. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe
the legal requirement of twenty (20) day
extensiveinformation campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and
Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite.Petitioner instituted
another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806
unconstitutional,contending, in essence, that:1. The creation of
Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a)
of the LocalGovernment Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution) which requires thatonly "a municipality
or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city";
and2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a)
creation of the City of Sorsogon and the(b) abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one
subject-one bill"rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution.Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the
Code, a component city may be createdonly by converting "a
municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two
municipalities, aswhat R.A. No. 8806 has done.
Issue: (1) WON a component city may be created by merging two
municipalities.(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging
the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon inorder to create the City
of Sorsogon(3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill"
rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI ofthe Constitution(4)
WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional
Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the
Code is erroneous. The phrase"A municipality or a cluster of
barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion
butsimply one of the modes by which a city may be created.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitutionallows the merger of local
government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay
inaccordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation
of an entirely new local governmentunit through a division or a
merger of existing local government units is recognized
under theConstitution, provided that such merger or division shall
comply with the requirements prescribed bythe Code.
(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No.
8806, a matter which we are notcompetent to rule. In Angara
v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the judiciary
doesnot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of
legislation." In the exercise of judicialpower, we are allowed
only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legallydemandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an
act of the political departments simply becausewe feel it is unwise or
impractical.”3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of
the law, that is, the creation of theCity of Sorsogon. The
abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of
Baconand Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate
and distinct from the creation of SorsogonCity. Such
abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable
consequence of the merger.The rule is sufficiently complied with if
the title is comprehensive enough as to include the generalobject
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed ofthe nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation.(4) No. Every statute has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption isrooted
in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three
coordinate departments ofthe Government a becoming courtesy for
each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being thejoint act of
the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to
ensure that it is in accordwith the fundamental law. This Court,
however, may declare a law, or portions
thereof,unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, notmerely a doubtful or
argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity
must be beyondreasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We
hold that petitioner has failed to present clear andconvincing proof to
defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.
8. MARC DOUGLAS IV C. CAGAS v. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS represented by its CHAIRMAN ATTY. SIXTO
BRILLANTES JR. and the PROVINCIAL ELECTION
OFFICER OF DAVAO DEL SUR, represented by ATTY. MA.
FEBES BARLAAN. (G.R. No. 209185; October 25, 2013).
FACTS: Cagas, while he was representative of the first legislative
district of Davao del Sur, filed with Hon. Franklin Bautista, then
representative of the second legislative district of the same province,
House Bill No. 4451 (H.B. No. 4451), a bill creating the province of
Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as Republic
Act No. 10360 (R.A. No. 10360), the Charter of the Province of
Davao Occidental.
Section 46 of R.A. No. 10360 provides for the date of the holding of
a plebiscite.
Sec. 46. Plebiscite. The Province of Davao Occidental shall be
created, as provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the
majority of the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a
plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the
effectivity of this Charter.
As early as 27 November 2012, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
10360, the COMELEC suspended the conduct of all plebiscites as a
matter of policy and in view of the preparations for the 13 May 2013
National and Local Elections. During a meeting held on 31 July
2013, the COMELEC decided to hold the plebiscite for the creation
of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the 28 October 2013
Barangay Elections to save on expenses.
Cagas filed a petition for prohibition, contending that the COMELEC
is without authority to amend or modify section 46 of RA 10360 by
mere resolution because it is only Congress who can do so thus,
COMELEC's act of suspending the plebiscite is unconstitutional.
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ISSUE: Was COMELEC's act unconstitutional?
HELD: The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
The COMELEC has exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the
purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections. The text and
intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of
holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."
The right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling mishaps in
holding elections or plebiscites.
The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and
effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled with the
subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 May
2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered impossible the
holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao
Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as scheduled in R.A. No.
10360. We also take judicial notice of the COMELEC's burden in the
accreditation and registration of candidates for the Party-List
Elections. The logistic and financial impossibility of holding a
plebiscite so close to the National and Local Elections is unforeseen
and unexpected, a cause analogous to force majeure and
administrative mishaps covered in Section 5 of B.P. Blg. 881. The
COMELEC is justified, and did not act with grave abuse of
discretion, in postponing the holding of the plebiscite for the creation
of the province of Davao Occidental to 28 October 2013 to
synchronize it with the Barangay Elections.
To comply with the 60-day period to conduct the plebiscite then, as
insisted, petitioner would have the COMELEC hold off all of its tasks
for the National and Local Elections. If COMELEC abandoned any of
its tasks or did not strictly follow the timetable for the
accomplishment of these tasks then it could have put in serious
jeopardy the conduct of the May 2013 National and Local Elections.
The COMELEC had to focus all its attention and concentrate all its
manpower and other resources on its preparation for the May 2013
National and Local Elections, and to ensure that it would not be
derailed, it had to defer the conduct of all plebiscites including that of
R.A. No. 10360. DENIED.
9. CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and THE MUNICIPALITY OF
CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents
G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CITY OF PASIG, respondent first.
G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999 The decision on whose territorial jurisdiction the areas fall has
material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays. A
Facts: On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of requisite for the creation of a barangay is properly identified
Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its mother territorial jurisdiction for these define the limits of the exercise of the
Barangays and converted into a separate one, the City Council of governmental powers of the LGU. Beyond these limits, its acts are
Pasig passed and approved an ordinance, creating Barangay ultra vires (beyond the legal capacity). Moreover, considering the
Karangalan scheduling the plebiscite on the creation of said expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent
barangay on June 22, 1996. Upon learning of the ordinance, the to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same until the resolution of
Municipality of Cainta filed a petition on June 19, 1996 to the the boundary dispute.
Commission on Elections to suspend or cancel the scheduled In the case of Barangay Napico, the Court does not agree that the
plebiscite. According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed petition of the Municipality of Cainta has been rendered moot and
barangay involve areas included in the pending case before the RTC academic because the plebiscite was already held. The issues
Antipolo Rizal, Br. 74 for settlement of boundary dispute, hence the raised are still pending and must first be resolved. Therefore, the
plebiscite should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in
shall have been finally decided by the court.. Meanwhile, on abeyance; and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 ratifying the
September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued another creation of Barangay Napico should be annulled and set aside, and
ordinance, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. Plebiscite for this any plebiscite thereto is hold in abeyance pending final resolution of
purpose was set for March 15, 1997. Again the Municipality of the boundary dispute.
Cainta filed another petition on March 12, 1997 to suspend or cancel
the plebiscite on the same ground as for the proposed creation of
Barangay Karangalan.
The COMELEC ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay
Karangalan to be held in abeyance until the boundary dispute is
settled because it presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided. The City of Pasig filed the petition (G.R. No. 125646) to the
Supreme Court, arguing that there is no prejudicial question since
the same contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not
come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case.
In the case of Barangay Napico, the COMELEC dismissed the
petition for being moot because the plebiscite was already held and
the creation ratified and approved by the residents. Hence, the
Municipality of Cainta filed a petition (G.R. No. 128663) to the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of
Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or
cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two
local governments.
Ruling: The Court ruled that the pending civil case on boundary
dispute presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided
before the creation of the proposed barangays. While the City of
Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same
contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into play
where both cases are civil, as in the instant case, still in the interest
of good order, the Court can suspend action on one case pending
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