EN BANC red all throughout, with hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale
[ GR NO. 170236, Aug 31, 2006 ] navicular fossa and a very red perineum."[4] All these, according to Dr.
PEOPLE v. ROBERTO QUIACHON Y BAYONA +
DECISION
532 Phil. 414
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified
rape committed as follows:
On or about May 12, 2001, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the accused, by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with one Rowena Quiachon y Reyes, his daughter, 8 years
old, a deaf-mute minor, against her will and consent.
Contrary to law.[1]
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 120929-H. At his
arraignment, appellant, duly assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Rowel Quiachon,
11-year old son of appellant; Rowena Quiachon, the victim and
appellant's daughter; Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani; and SPO2
Noel Y. Venus.
Rowel testified that he is appellant's son. He averred, however, that he
no longer wanted to use his father's surname describing him as
"masama" for raping his (Rowel's) sister Rowena. Rowel recounted
that he used to sleep in the same bedroom occupied by his father,
sister and youngest sibling. Rowel slept beside his youngest sibling
while their father, appellant, and Rowena slept together in one bed.
On the night of May 12, 2001, Rowel saw his father on top of his sister
Rowena and they were covered by a blanket or "kumot." His father's
buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena
crying. He could not do anything, however, because he was afraid of
their father. Rowel remained in the room but the following morning, he,
forthwith, told his mother's sister Carmelita Mateo, whom he
called Ate Lita, about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and
Rowel went to the police to report what had transpired. During the
police investigation, Rowel executed a sworn statement in Tagalog and
signed it using the surname Mateo.[2]
Rowena, through sign language, testified that her father had sexual
intercourse with her and even touched her breasts against her will. She
was only eight years old at the time. She cried when she was asked if
she was hurt by what appellant did to her. She consistently declared
that she does not love her father and wants him to be punished for
what he did to her.[3]
Dr. Miriam Sta. Romana Guialani of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) General Hospital Health Services testified that she received a
letter request from the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct an
examination on Rowena. While she was about to proceed with the
forensic interview, she noticed that Rowena was deaf and mute, hence,
could not verbally communicate her ordeal. Dr. Guialani proceeded to
conduct a physical examination and, based thereon, she submitted her
medico-legal report.
Dr. Guialani, as indicated in her report, found that Rowena had a
"contusion hematoma" on her left cheek, which was compatible with
her claim that she was slapped by her father. Rowena also had an
"ecchymosis" or "kissmark" at the antero-lateral border of her left
breast as well as ano-genital injuries suggestive of chronic penetrating
trauma.
Dr. Guialani explained that although the external genitalia did not show
any sign of sexual abuse, when it was opened up, the following were
discovered: "markedly hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area with
fossa navicularis and markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly
hyperemic urethra layer up to the peri-hymenal margin up to the
posterior hymenal notch with attenuation." Further, the labia was "very
Guialani, were compatible with the recent chronic penetrating trauma
and recent injury which could have happened a day before the
examination. She pointed out that the hymenal attenuation sustained
by Rowena was almost in the 6 o'clock notch.[5]
For its part, the defense presented the lone testimony of appellant
Roberto Quiachon.
He testified that, on May 13, 2001, he was invited to the barangay hall
by their barangay chairman. He did not know then the reason for the
invitation. At the barangay hall, he was surprised to see the two sisters
of his deceased live-in partner and his two children. He was shocked to
learn that his daughter Rowena had accused him of raping her.
Thereafter, he was taken to the Karangalan Police Station. He suffered
hypertension and was brought to the hospital. When he recovered, he
was taken to the Pasig City Police Station and, thereafter, to jail.
Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor speech
handicap. He denied raping Rowena and alleged that Virginia
Moraleda and Carmelita Mateo, both sisters of his deceased common-
law wife, held a grudge against him because he abandoned his family
and was not able to support them. His common-law wife died of cancer
and her relatives were allegedly all interested in his house and other
properties. The said house was being leased and they were the ones
getting the rental income. Further, the nephew of his deceased partner
was sending financial support of US$100 a month for his child.
According to appellant, even before the death of his common-law wife,
his son Rowel was already hostile to him because he was closer to his
daughters. He disclaimed any knowledge of any reason why his
children, Rowel and Rowena, accused him of a very serious offense. [6]
After consideration of the respective evidence of the prosecution and
defense, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, rendered
its Decision[7] dated September 9, 2003, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized
under Articles 266-A and B[8] of the Revised Penal Code. The decretal
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum
penalty of DEATH, including its accessory penalties, and to indemnify
the offended party in the amount of P75,000.00 as compensatory
damages, PI00,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[9]
The case was automatically elevated to this Court by reason of the
death penalty imposed on appellant. However, pursuant to our ruling
in People v. Mateo,[10] the case was transferred and referred to the
Court of Appeals (CA).
Upon review, the CA rendered its Decision[11] dated August 25, 2005,
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court. In affirming
appellant's conviction, the CA held that there was no justification to
make a finding contrary to that of the trial court with respect to the
credibility of the witnesses. The CA particularly pointed out that the trial
court, after having "meticulously observed" the prosecution witness
Rowel and complainant Rowena, had declared that "their narration
palpably bears the earmarks of truth and is in accord with the material
points involved. When the testimony of a rape victim is simple and
straightforward, unshaken by rigid cross-examination, and unflawed by
an inconsistency or contradiction as in the present case, the same
must be given full faith and credit."[12]
Moreover, the CA ruled that the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena
recounting the bestial act perpetrated by appellant on the latter were
corroborated by physical evidence as presented by Dr. Guialani in her
medico-legal report.
On the other hand, the CA noted that appellant could only proffer a
bare denial. On this matter, it applied the salutary rule that denial is not
looked upon with favor by the court as it is capable of easy fabrication.
Consequently, the CA held that appellant's bare denial could not
overcome the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
including Rowena, the victim herself.
The CA believed that Rowena could not possibly invent a charge so
grave as rape against her father because "it is very unlikely for any
young woman in her right mind to fabricate a story of defloration
against her own father, undergo a medical examination of her private
parts, and subject herself to the trauma and scandal of public trial, put
to shame not only herself but her whole family as well unless she was
motivated by a strong desire to seek justice for the wrong committed
against her."[13]
Likewise, it is well settled that when it comes to the issue of credibility
of witnesses, the trial court is in a better position than the appellate
court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence having the full
opportunity to observe directly the witnesses' deportment and manner
of testifying.[18]
In this case, as correctly found by the CA, there is nothing on the
record that would impel this Court to deviate from the well-entrenched
rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings
of the trial court unless these were reached arbitrarily or when the trial
court misunderstood or misapplied some facts of substance and value
which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. [19]

In sum, the CA found that the trial court correctly found appellant guilty In convicting the appellant, the trial court gave full faith and credence to
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and in imposing the testimonies of Rowel and Rowena. The trial court observed that
the supreme penalty of death upon him. In the Pre-Trial Order dated Rowel and Rowena "never wavered in their assertion that accused
September 10, 2001, the prosecution and the defense agreed on the sexually abused Rowena. Their narration palpably bears the earmarks
following stipulation of facts: of truth and is in accord with the material points involved." [20] Further,
the trial court accorded great evidentiary weight to Rowena's testimony.
It justifiably did so as it characterized her testimony to be "simple,
1. The minority of the victim who is eight (8) years old; straightforward, unshaken by a rigid cross-examination, and unflawed
2. That the accused is the father of the victim; and by inconsistency or contradiction."[21]
3. The victim is a deaf-mute.[14]
Significantly, Rowel and Rowena's respective testimonies were
corroborated by Dr. Guialani's medico-legal report:[22]
According to the CA, the qualifying circumstances of the victim's
minority and her relationship to the offender were alleged in the
Contusion hematoma about 3x4 cm
Information and were duly proved during trial. These circumstances,
noted at the left mandibular area of
i.e., minority of the victim and her relationship to appellant, are special
PERTINENT PHYSICAL the left cheek compatible with the
qualifying circumstances in the crime of rape that warrant the
FINDINGS/PHYSICAL disclosed slapping of the cheek by
imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
INJURIES her father; 2x2 cm ecchymosis
(kissmark) noted at the antero-lateral
The CA, however, modified the trial court's decision with respect to the
border of the left breast
damages awarded to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. The decretal
portion of the CA decision reads: ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
Tanner 2
Pubic hair - none
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated September 9, 2003 of the Labia majora - no evident sign of
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159, in Criminal Case No. EXTERNAL GENITALIA
injury at the time of examination
120929-H finding the accused-appellant Roberto Quiachon y Bayona Labia minora - no evident sign of
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape and imposing upon injury at the time of examination
him the DEATH penalty is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that URETHA
the accused-appellant is also ordered to pay the victim, Rowena Markedly hyperemic urethra meatus
AND
Quiachon, the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity; P75,000 as moral and periurethral area
ERIURETHRAL AREA
damages; and P25,000 as exemplary damages. PERIHYMENAL
AREA Markedly hyperemic perihymenal
In accordance with A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC which took effect on October AND area, and pale fossa navicularis
15, 2004, amending Section 13, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of FOSSA NA VICULARIS
Criminal Procedure, let the entire records of this case be elevated to Tanner 2
the Supreme Court for review. Annular hymen; hymenal notch
HYMEN noted at 5 o 'clock with attenuation of
Costs de oficio. the hymenal rim from 5 o 'clock to 7
o 'clock; very hyperemic hymen
SO ORDERED.[15] PERINEUM Hyperemic perineum
In this Court's Resolution dated December 13, 2005, the parties were Whitish, foul-smelling discharge,
required to submit their respective supplemental briefs. The Office of DISCHARGE
minimal in amount noted
the Solicitor General manifested that it would no longer be filing a IE AND SPECULUM EXAM Not indicated
supplemental brief. Similarly, appellant, through the Public Attorney's No evident sign of injury at the time
Office, manifested that he would no longer file a supplemental brief. ANAL EXAMINATION
of examination;
REMARKS
After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court affirms the FORENSIC EVIDENCE
conviction of appellant. None
COLLECTED
LABORATORY Requested a) Urinalysis
In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by three EXAMINATION b) Gram Stain of Vaginal smear
(3) well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation for rape can be made IMPRESSIONS
with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more No verbal disclosure of sexual abuse (pt is a deaf-mute)
difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2)
considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are usually For referral to NCMH for evaluation of developmental stage and
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should competence to appear in court.
be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed Presence of contusion hematoma on the Left Cheek (slapmark) and
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. ecchymosis on the antero-lateral border of the left breast show clear
[16]
 Accordingly, the primordial consideration in a determination evidence of Physical Abuse.
concerning the crime of rape is the credibility of complainant's
testimony.[17]
Ano-genital findings suggestive of chronic penetrating trauma.
Dr. Guialani explained during her testimony that the foregoing findings
were consistent with Rowena's claim of sexual abuse. Specifically, her
internal genitalia showed signs of sexual abuse such as: "markedly
hyperemic urethra and peri-hymenal area with fossa navicularis,
markedly hyperemic perineum, markedly hyperemic urethra layer up to
the peri-hymenal margin up to the posterior hymenal notch with
attenuation." Further, Rowena's labia was "very red all throughout, with
hymenal notch with attenuation, a pale navicular fossa and a very red
perineum."[23] All these, according to Dr. Guialani, were compatible with
the recent chronic penetrating trauma and recent injury which could
have happened a day before the examination. She pointed out that the
hymenal attenuation sustained by Rowena was almost in the 6 o'clock
notch.[24] Dr. Guialani, likewise, confirmed that Rowena was deaf and
mute.
Viewed against the damning evidence of the prosecution, appellant's
simple denial of the charge against him must necessarily fail. The
defense of denial is inherently weak. A mere denial, just like alibi,
constitutes a self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.[25]
All told, the trial court and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of
raping his daughter Rowena pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised
Penal Code. The special qualifying circumstances of the victim's
minority and her relationship to appellant, which were properly alleged
in the Information and their existence duly admitted by the defense on
stipulation of facts during pre-trial,[26] warrant the imposition of the
supreme penalty of death on appellant.
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9346[27] on June 24, 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in
accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use
of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not
make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal
Code.
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case
pursuant to the principle in criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda
adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are
given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive
effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws, a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. [28]
However, appellant is not eligible for parole because Section 3 of R.A.
No. 9346 provides that "persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua by reason of the law, shall not be eligible for
parole."
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following
prevailing jurisprudence,[29] correctly awarded the following amounts:
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified
by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty;
P75,000.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have
suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral
damages even without proof thereof, and; P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages in light of the presence of the qualifying circumstances of
minority and relationship.
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant
because of the prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of
P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in People
v. Victor,[30] the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of
the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission
of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows
"not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law
and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the
displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity."
Notwithstanding the abolition of the death penalty under R.A. No. 9364,
the Court has resolved, as it hereby resolves, to maintain the award of
P75,000.00 for rape committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty would have been
imposed prior to R.A. No. 9346.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated August 25,
2005 of the Court of Appeals finding appellant Roberto Quiachon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty of death meted on
the appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act
No. 9346.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga,
Chico-Nazario, Garcia, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Corona. J., on leave.
[1]
 Information dated May 21, 2001, records, p. 1.
[2]
 TSN, September 10, 2001, pp. 10-31.
[3]
 TSN, September 17, 2001, pp. 3-5.
[4]
 TSN, November 12, 2001, pp. 4-14.
[5]
 Id.
[6]
 TSN, May 20, 2003, pp. 2-10.
[7]
 Penned by Judge Rodolfo R. Bonifacio; rollo, pp. 12-25.
[8]
 The said provision was introduced by Republic Act No. 8353 entitled
The Anti-Rape Law of 1997 which classified rape as a crime against
persons. It effectively repealed Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 266-B pertinently reads:
Art. 266-B. Penalties. -
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim.
xxxx
[9]
 Rollo, p. 25.
[10]
 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[11]
 Penned by Associate Justice Amelita Q. Tolentino, with Associate
Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo,
pp. 118-134.
[12]
 Rollo, p. 127.
[13]
 Id. at 131, citing People v. Obquia, 430 Phil. 65 (2002).
[14]
 Id. at 132.
[15]
 Id. at 133.

 People v. Del Mundo, Sr., G.R. No. 132065, April 3, 2001, 356
[16]

SCRA 45, 50.

[17]
 People v. Turco, Jr., 392 Phil. 498, 507 (2000).
[18]
 People v. Adajio, 397 Phil. 354, 359-360 (2000).
[19]
 People v. Baygar, 376 Phil. 466, 473 (1999).
[20]
 Rollo,p. 127.
[21]
 RTC Decision, p. 10; records, p. 130.
[22]
 Exhibit "D," id. at 76.
[23]
 TSN, November 12, 2001, pp. 4-14.
[24]
 Supra notes 4 and 5.

 People v. Geraban, G.R. No. 137048, May 24, 2001, 358 SCRA
[25]

213, 223-224.
[26]
 Rollo, p. 14.
[27]
 Entitled An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the
Philippines. Section 1 thereof reads:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby

prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. 8177, otherwise known as
the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law,
and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they
impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended
accordingly.

 People v. Zervoulakos, G.R. No. 103975, February 23, 1995, 241

[28]

SCRA 625, citing U.S. v. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5(1917).

 See, for example, People v. Barcena, G.R. No. 168737, February

[29]

26, 2006, p. 15.

[30]
 G.R. No. 127903, July 9, 1998, 292 SCRA 186, 201.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-31683. January 31, 1983.]
ERNESTO M. DE GUZMAN, Petitioner, v. HON. ABELARDO SUBIDO,
as Civil Service Commissioner, HON. NORBERTO AMORANTO, as
Mayor of Quezon City, ET AL., Respondents.
Juan T . David and Eulogio V . Reyes for Petitioner.
Jose Torcuator for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM; BASIC POLICY
FOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT. — The former Civil Service Act
No. 2260. as amended. stated in its Section 23 that opportunity for
government employment shall be open to all qualified citizens and
positive efforts shall be exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the
service. The same policy is reiterated in the Civil Service Decree,
Presidential Decree No. 807, at Section 19, which superseded
Republic Act No. 2260. The requirements for applicants to a
policeman’s position may be quite stringent but the basic policy of
attracting the best qualified is not served by automatically excluding
any person who violated a jaywalking ordinance or a municipal
ordinance prohibiting a cochero from occupying a seat in the calesa
intented for passengers.
2. ID.; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS; DISTINCTION BETWEEN
ACTS OF VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES. — The
Supreme Court takes cognizance of the distinction in the law of
municipal corporations which distinguishes between acts not
essentially criminal relating to municipal regulations for the promotion
of peace, good order, health, safety, and comfort of residents and acts
intrinsically punishable as public offenses.
3. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL REGULATION; PENALTY IMPOSED FOR
BREACH THEREOF; NATURE. — A penalty imposed for the breach of
a municipal regulation is not necessarily an exercise of the sovereign
authority to define crimes and provide for their punishment, delegated
to a local government. In many cases, the penalty is merely intended
not to render the ordinance inoperative or useless.
4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; POLICE ACT OF 1966;
INTERPRETATION AS TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT; MEANING OF
"CRIMINAL RECORD" AND "CRIME." — The phrase "criminal record"
governing qualifications for appointments could not have been intended
by the legislature to automatically cover every violation of a municipal
or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a nominal fine to enforce it. A
violation of a municipal ordinance to qualify as a "drime" must involve
at least a certain degree of evil doing, immoral conduct, corruption,
malice, or want of principles reasonably related to the requirements of
the public office.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; AUTOMATIC AND PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION
FOR VIOLATION OF MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES WITH NOMINAL
FINE; UNREASONABLE. — Automatic and perpetual disqualification
of a person who in one unguarded moment threw a cigarette butt on
the street, spat in public, deposited house garbage in a market
receptacle for garbage, exceeded the speed limit for vehicles, blew his
car horn near a school or hospital, or, as in this case, jaywalked, and
who has paid the fine imposed by ordinance as commensurate
deterrence for the act, would be unreasonable, if not oppressive.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM; PERIOD FOR
ACTION ON APPOINTMENT PAPERS UNDER THE CIVIL SERVICE
ACT; EFFECT OF INACTION; CASE AT BAR. — Under Rule VI of
Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the respondent Commissioner
had 180 days from receipt of the appointment papers to act on them.
Inaction means the appointment is approved as properly made. The
papers were returned by the Commissioner more than a year after he
received them. The appointment, not having any defect of record
except the matter in issue in this case, must be deemed complete and
properly made after the 180 days period.
7. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL AND INVALID REMOVAL; RIGHTS OF THE
APPOINTEE. — Where the termination of the petitioner’s services was
an illegal and invalid removal, the petitioner should be reinstated,
assuming he meets the physical and other requirements of the
Integrated National Police under the new legislation and procedures
governing police forces. In addition to being paid any salaries for
services actually rendered but not paid, the petitioner, following the
formula in cases of illegal dismissals is entitled to five years backpay.
(Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175, 187).
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
All persons appointed to positions covered by the civil service law are
required by regulation to accomplish an information sheet on the
prescribed form. The information sheet provides in summary outline the
personal date, eligibilities, education, experiences, and other
qualifications of the appointee. Included in the information sheet is a
query on any criminal records of the applicant, which in later versions
of the prescribed form asks if he has ever been arrested, indicted, or
convicted of any crime or accused in any administrative
proceeding.chanrobles law library : red
The issue in this petition for review is whether or not a person
otherwise qualified but who admits having violated a city ordinance on
jaywalking and another ordinance requiring a cochero to occupy only
the seat intended for a cochero in a calesa is disqualified for
appointment to the Quezon City Police Force.
Petitioner Ernesto M. de Guzman was appointed patrolman in the
Quezon City Police Department by Mayor Norberto S. Amoranto on
August 16, 1965. He was a civil service eligible having taken and
passed the civil service patrolman’s examination given on November
24, 1962. He had also passed the usual character investigation
conducted before appointment. As a newly appointed patrolman, the
petitioner went through and successfully completed the police training
course.
On March 21, 1966, the petitioner’s appointment was forwarded to the
Commissioner of Civil Service. On August 18, 1966, or a year after the
appointment and with no action on the appointment papers being taken
by the respondent commissioner, the respondents city treasurer and
city auditor stopped the payment of the petitioner’s salaries.
On May 12, 1967, the respondent commissioner returned the
petitioner’s appointment papers, without action thereon, to the
respondent mayor on the ground that Mr. de Guzman was disqualified
for appointment under Republic Act No. 4864, the Police Act of 1966,
which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘SEC. 9. General Qualifications of Appointment. — No person shall be
appointed to a local police agency unless he possesses the following
qualifications:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x       x       x
"(5) He must have no criminal record.’ (SEC. 9(5), Police Act of 1966)" 
The above finding was based solely on the petitioner’s own answer to
question No. 15 in the information sheet:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"15. Have you been accused, indicted, or tried for the violation of any
law, ordinance, or regulation, before any court or tribunal?
The answer given by the petitioner was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Yes. Jaywalking — paid fine P5.50; Municipal O.d. (Mla.) Sect 1187
(cochero) paid fine of P5.00."cralaw virtua1aw library
On September 7, 1967, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library
On May 29, 1969, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition. According to the court, the requirement of "no criminal record"
means without any criminal record and makes no distinction whether
an act violates a state law or only a municipal or city ordinance.
The issue posed in this petition is presented by Mr. de Guzman,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Whether or not violations and/or convictions of municipal ordinances,
one, for ‘Jaywalking’ and the other, Manila Municipal Ordinance No.
1187, prohibiting the cochero from ‘occupying any part of the vehicle
except the seat reserved for him’, constitute ‘CRIMINAL RECORD’ to
disqualify the petitioner under the Police Act of 1966 (Rep. Act No.
4864) from appointment to the Quezon City Police Force."cralaw
virtua1aw library
We are constrained to grant the petition.
The former Civil Service Act, Republic Act No. 2260, as amended,
stated in its Section 23 that opportunity for government employment
shall be open to all qualified citizens and positive efforts shall be
exerted to attract the best qualified to enter the service. The same
policy is reiterated in the Civil Service Decree, Presidential Decree No.
807, at Section 19, which superseded Republic Act No. 2260.
The requirements for applicants to a policeman’s position may be quite
stringent but the basic policy of attracting the best qualified is not
served by automatically excluding any person who in an absent minded
mood or while hurrying to an urgent appointment may unwittingly have
crossed a street or stepped down from the curb in violation of a
Jaywalking ordinance. The same thing is true of a person who may
have worked his way through college as a cochero and, who, pitying
his horse struggling up an incline or a bridge, leaves his seat to stand
aft and forward to balance the calesa load or who, alone on his way
home, sits in the seat intended for passengers only to be fined for
violating an obscure municipal ordinance.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual
law library
The petitioner cites decisions of American courts in support of his
arguments:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘By weight of authority, the violation of a municipal ordinance, enacted
by a city under legislative authority, as in the case of ordinances
prohibiting and punishing gaming and the keeping of gaming houses,
etc., is not a crime, in the proper sense of the term, for such ordinances
are not public laws, and the punishment for their violation is imposed
by the state.’ (Withers v. State, 36 Ala. 252; City of Greeb v. Hamman,
12 Cole., 94, 20 Pac. 1; Williams v. Augusta, 4 Ga. 509) as cited on p.
7, Francisco’s Revised Penal Code, Book One, 3rd Edition."cralaw
virtua1aw library
x       x       x
"‘The common-law definition of a ‘crime’ as given by Blackstone, is ‘an
act committed or omitted in violation of a public law,’. . . giving the
accused the right to be heard in all ‘criminal prosecutions’ relates
exclusively to prosecution for violation of public laws of the state, and a
city ordinance is not a public law of the state, but a local law of the
particular corporation, made for its internal practice and good
government. (Castillo [should be Costelo] v. Feagin, 50 South 134,
135, 162 Ala. 191)" 
There are other federal decisions which state that prosecutions to
enforce penalties for violations of municipal ordinances are not criminal
prosecutions and the offenses against these ordinances are not
criminal cases. (City of Mobile v. McCown, Oil Co., 148 So. 402, 405;
City of Mankato v. Arnold, 30 N.W. 305, 306; Village of Litchville v.
Hanson, 124 N.W. 1119, 1120).cralawnad
We do not go so far as to sustain the arguments that only violations of
statutes enacted by the national legislature can give rise to "crimes" or
"a criminal record" as these terms are used in our law on local
governments or the law of public officers. However, we take
cognizance of the distinction in the law of municipal corporations which
distinguishes between acts not essentially criminal relating to municipal
regulations for the promotion of peace, good order, health, safety, and
comfort of residents and acts intrinsically punishable as public
offenses. (See cases cited in Dillon, A Treatise On The Law of
Municipal Corporations, Vol. II, 5th Edition, Sections 745, 746, and
749.) A penalty imposed for the breach of a municipal regulation is not
necessarily an exercise of the sovereign authority, to define crimes and
provide for their punishment, delegated to a local government. In many
cases, the penalty is merely intended not to render the ordinance
inoperative or useless.
The phrase "criminal record" governing qualifications for appointments
could not have been intended by the legislature to automatically cover
every violation of a municipal or city ordinance carrying a sanction of a
nominal fine to enforce it. A violation of a municipal ordinance to qualify
as a "crime" must involve at least a certain degree of evil doing,
immoral conduct, corruption, malice, or want of principles reasonably
related to the requirements of the public office.
Automatic and perpetual disqualification of a person who in one
unguarded moment threw a cigarette butt on the street, spat in public,
deposited house garbage in a market receptacle for garbage,
exceeded the speed limit for vehicles, blew his car horn near a school
or hospital, or, as in this case, jaywalked, and who has paid the fine
imposed by ordinance as commensurate deterrence for the act, would
be unreasonable, if not oppressive.
Respondent Subido should have gone deeper into the nature of the
petitioner’s acts instead of taking every "Yes" answer in Question 15 of
the information sheet as an automatic disqualification. Under Rule VI of
the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, the respondent commissioner
had 180 days from receipt of the appointment papers to act on them.
Inaction means the appointment is approved as properly made. The
papers were returned more than a year by the commissioner after he
received them. The appointment, not having any defect of record
except the matter in issue in this case, must be deemed complete and
properly made after the 180 days period. The termination of the
petitioner’s services was, therefore, an illegal and invalid removal. The
petitioner should be reinstated, assuming he meets the physical and
other requirements of the Integrated National Police under the new
legislation and procedures governing police forces. In addition to being
paid any salaries for services actually rendered but not paid, the
petitioner, following the formula in cases of illegal dismissals is entitled
to five years backpay (Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175,
187).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is set aside. The
Integrated National Police and the respondent officials are directed to
reinstate the petitioner to the Quezon City Police Force provided he
meets the age, physical, and other qualifications and eligibilities for
patrolman under present legislation and rules. The city government of
Quezon City and the incumbent Mayor, Treasurer, and Auditor of the
city are ordered to pay the petitioner any unpaid salaries and
allowances for services actual]y rendered and five years backpay from
the date his services were actually terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ.,
concur.
 This case deals with a theft committed on board a transport while
  navigating the high seas. Act No. 136 of the organic law, as well as
Act No. 186 passed by the Civil Commission, and which repealed the
former law, Act No. 76, do not expressly confer jurisdiction or authority
upon this court to take cognizance of all crimes committed on board
vessels on the high seas. While the provisions of the law are clear and
EN BANC precise with respect to civil admiralty or maritime cases, this is not true
with respect to criminal cases. If any doubt could arise concerning the
[G.R. No. 496. December 31, 1902. ] true meaning of the law applicable to the case, Act. No. 400 effectively
dissipates such doubts. 
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellant, v. WILLIAM FOWLER
ET AL., Defendants-Appellees.  This law, which is an addition to Act No. 136, by which the courts of
justice of the Philippine Islands were organized, in article 1 adds to
Assistant Attorney-General Constantino, for Appellant.  article 56, consisting of seven paragraphs, another paragraph
numbered 8, which reads as follows: "Of all crimes and offenses
William Lane O’Neill, for Appellees.  committed on the high seas or beyond the jurisdiction of any country,
or within any of the navigable waters of the Philippine Archipelago, on
SYLLABUS bard a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands in accordance with the laws thereof." The purpose of
1. CRIMINAL LAW; JURISDICTION; CRIMES ON HIGH SEAS. — this law was to define the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance in
Courts of First Instance of the Philippines have no jurisdiction to take criminal cases for crimes committed on board vessels registered or
cognizance of crimes committed on the high seas on board of a licensed in the Philippine Islands. The transport Lawton not being a
transport or other vessel not registered or licensed in the Philippines. vessel of this class, our courts are without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a crime committed on board the same. 

Upon these grounds we consider that the order appealed should be

DECISION
affirmed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered. 

Arellano, C.J., Cooper, Smith, Willard, Mapa and Ladd, JJ., concur.

TORRES, J.  :

The two defendants have been accused of the theft of sixteen bottles
of champagne of the value of $20, on the 12th August, 1901, while on
board the transport Lawton, then navigating the high seas, which said
bottles of champagne formed part of the cargo of the said vessel and
were the property of Julian Lindsay, and which were taken lucri causa,
and with the intent to appropriate the same, without violence or
intimidation, and without the consent of the owner, against the statute
in the case made and provided. 

The accused having been brought before the court, the prosecuting
attorney being present on behalf of the Government, counsel for the
defendants presented a demurrer, alleging that the Court of First
Instance was without jurisdiction to try the crime charged, inasmuch as
it appeared from the information that the crime was committed on the
high seas, and not in the city of Manila, or within the territory
comprising the Bay of Manila, or upon the seas within the 3-mile limit
to which the jurisdiction of the court extends, and asked, upon these
grounds, that the case be dismissed. 

This contention was opposed by the prosecuting attorney, who alleged

that the court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases in which the
penalty exceeds six month’s imprisonment, or a fine of over $100; that,
in accordance with the orders of the Military Governor and the Civil
Commission admiralty jurisdiction over all crimes committed on board
vessels flying the flag of the United States has been vested in the
Courts of First Instance of the city of Manila. Among other laws and
orders he cited the order of August 14, 1898, and Acts Nos. 76 and
186 of the United States Civil Commission. He argued that the
President of the United States had unquestionable authority to
authorize the commanding general and the Civil Commission to
establish a judicial system with authority to take cognizance of
maritime and admiralty causes, citing a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in support of this doctrine, which was applicable to
this Archipelago, which is now analogous to the status of some of the
States of the Union during the Mexican was and the war of secession. 

The judge, however, by an order of the 14th of September, 1901, held

that the court was without jurisdiction to try the accused for the theft
alleged to have been committed on the high seas, sustained the
demurrer, and ordered the discharge of the defendants, with the costs
to the Government. Against this order the prosecuting attorney
appealed, and the case was brought before this court. 
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5272             March 19, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,  the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left
vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.  returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is
limited to the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very
nature of these facts and from the circumstances surrounding the
incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to
these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the defense.
We think, however, that, giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as
to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as
to which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of
the material facts disclose by the record may be taken to be
substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers'
quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley, Rizal Province, and at the same
place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy
or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates
some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 19087, was
occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one slept in the house
except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the
rear of the building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch
running along the side of the building, by which communication was
had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a
heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the
room was not furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and occupants,
as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch on the
inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat
insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In
the room there was but one small window, which, like the door, opened
on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other
openings of any kind in the room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant,
who had received for the night, was suddenly awakened by some
trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called
out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by
the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines
along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the
defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to
his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that
moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair
which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion
the defendant thought that the blow had been inflicted by the person
who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a burglar,
though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was
merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door
against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept
under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it
afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out
upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a desperately wounded
condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him
in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his
employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his
room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the
date of the incident just described, one of which took place in a house
in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as defendant
alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife
under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear
to have on friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had
an understanding that when either returned at night, he should knock at
the house early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends,
Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed at
officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
stopped at their room at No. 28, Pascual going on to his room at No.
27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and Mariano
heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual
sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon
one of them ran back to No. 28 and called Liuetenants Jacobs and
Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his
roommate, but said that he did it under the impression that Pascual
was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping room,
despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of
Pascuals suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief
was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to frightened
him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say
who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being
attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was
conveyed to the military hospital, where he died from the effects of the
wound on the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and
found guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating
circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one day presidio
mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his
roommate, Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow
without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right
of self-defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt
from criminal liability:
xxx             xxx             xxx
4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided
there are the following attendant circumstances:
(1) Illegal aggression.
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
or repel it.
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that
defendant would be entitle to complete exception from criminal liability
for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced
open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or
"ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and
repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his
threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will
not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room,
with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his
warnings defendant would have been wholly justified in using any
available weapon to defend himself from such an assault, and in
striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his
whereabouts and deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a
"ladron." That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the
property under his charge was in real danger at the time when he
struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on
the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling
and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of the
knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his
charge.
The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction
one can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as
to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal
liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would
constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had
known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the
act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we
hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability,
provided always that the alleged ignorance or mistake or fact was not
due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or
mistake of fact is sufficient to negative a particular intent which under
the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged (e.g., in
larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels
the presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those
cases where the circumstances demand a conviction under the penal
provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the
provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a
crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful act
committed by him, even though it be different from that which he
intended to commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited;
McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex.
Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32
N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7
Met., 500.)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and
the only question worthy of consideration is whether malice or criminal
intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide
and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has
been said that since the definitions there given of these as well as most
other crimes and offense therein defined, do not specifically and
expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must
be committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor
may be held criminally liable, the commission of the acts set out in the
various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described therein,
unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other
of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of
exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of
legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and
offenses as set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions
expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an essential
ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1
of the code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form,
is an essential requisite of all crimes and offense therein defined, in the
absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are
those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently
committed, and acts done by one voluntarily committing a crime or
misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that which he
intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these
exceptions are more apparent than real, for "There is little distinction,
except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and indifference
whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within
limits supplies the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's
New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little
difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition
to do harm that one of them may very well be looked upon as the
measure of the other. Since, therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in
the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it,
and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm
which is done by the crime, the consequence is that the guilt of the
crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according as the
crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p.
11); or, as it has been otherwise stated, the thing done, having
proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same whether the
corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions
punished by law.
Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to
be voluntarily unless the contrary shall appear.
An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor
shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act
committed be different from that which he had intended to
commit.
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the
word "voluntary" as used in this article, say that a voluntary act is
a free, intelligent, and intentional  act, and roundly asserts that without
intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no
crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and includes the words
"con malicia," which were expressly set out in the definition of the word
"crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870,
because, as Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was
redundant, being implied and included in the word "voluntary."
(Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime
can only be said to exempt from criminal responsibility when the act
which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful one, and
in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and
recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of the code
that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p.
16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which
declared that where there is no intention there is no crime . . .
in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall
within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2,
the Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of
Spain, as, for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it
made use of the following language:
It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime,
involve all the malice which is supposed from the operation of
the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
object of the crime.
And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that
"considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of
his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the
parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the
necessary element or criminal intention, which characterizes every
action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made
use of the following language:
 . . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is,
intent or malice or their absence in the commission of an act
defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and
decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to
be an essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors
therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the
provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act
that, if done with malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall
be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor  in its
maximum degree, to prision correccional  in its minimum
degrees if it shall constitute a less grave crime.
He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime
through simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the
penalty of arresto mayor  in its medium and maximum
degrees.
In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed
according to their discretion, without being subject to the
rules prescribed in article 81.
The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the
penalty prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those
contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the
courts shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which
they may consider proper.
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to
the words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions
is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence
of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not
impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would
seem to approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English
and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It has been
said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than
intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to
extent a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of
legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse.
In one case it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in
contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in another, "without
reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once
said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but
with a bad purpose; in other words, corruptly." In English and the
American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously,"
and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely
technical than "willful" or willfully," but "the difference between them is
not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to require
general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying
rather the intent from our legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)
But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a
condition in the definition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily,"
willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of the
various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think
that reasoning from general principles it will always be found that with
the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil
intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position
with numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present
this doctrine:
In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from
civil than in the rule as to the intent. In controversies between
private parties the quo animo  with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only
from a criminal mind. So that —
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind.
In other words, punishment is the sentence of wickedness,
without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any
people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty
unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal
system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of
an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not
exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally
with the modern, is distinct on this subject. It consequently
has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi
mens sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless
his intention were so;" Actus me incito factus non est meus
actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and
others of the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal
jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
Moral science and moral sentiment  teach the same thing.
"By reference to the intention, we inculpate or exculpate
others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or
misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what
it may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of
intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent."
The calm judgment of mankind keeps this doctrine among its
jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the
place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast
down. But with the return of reason comes the public voice
that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —
In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature
given by God to man, no one deems another to deserve
punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer
a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far
from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him to the
seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads
the want of bad intent in justification of what has the
appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the
plea, if its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now
these facts are only the voice of nature uttering one of her
immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior
to all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the
law itself proceeds, that no man is to be punished as a
criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent
departure from this doctrine of abstract justice result from the adoption
of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non excusat  ("Ignorance of the
law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered
in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity,
the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a
limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their
commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without
discussing these exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say
that the courts have always held that unless the intention of the
lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute
will not be so construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76
and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental
principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because "the
evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it is simply
to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal
Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing
necessity therefore, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise
that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice. On the
contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat  ("Ignorance or
mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient
excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime,
any such mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have
proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor
from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on
his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused
must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him."
(Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs.  Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65;
P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs.  P., 32 N. Y., 509;
Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41;
P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is
to say, the question as to whether he honestly, in good faith, and
without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be determined by
the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the
mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding
circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in
forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one
has reasonable cause to believe  the existence of facts which
will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with
the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless
of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life
of an innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other
words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the
not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason
and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse,
whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in
acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or
carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and defends
himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the
facts to be the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the extreme
measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large
array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the
application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised
as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friends in a
spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life,
but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a
real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life
and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No
one will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to
be he would be innocent of the commission of any crime and wholly
exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state of the
facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty
of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances,
proof of his innocent mistake of the facts overcomes the presumption
of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide
or assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption
established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law" was
committed "voluntarily."
Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that
the person slain had a felonious design against him, and
under that supposition killed him, although it should
afterwards appear that there was no such design, it will not
be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable
homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the
probable grounds of such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in
Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's report of the
case, p.7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as
follows:
A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing
rapidly toward him, with an outstretched arms and a pistol in
his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same
attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the
head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of
the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded
with powder only, and that the real design of B was only
to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more
criminal that he would have been if there had been a bullet in
the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require that a
man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop
and ascertain how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which
would entirely take away the essential right of self-defense.
And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause,
and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable
grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to
flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of
Spain, cited by Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because
the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.
QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting
at his hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without
other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man with
his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly
entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck
him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder,
because of which he turned, seized the person and took from
his the stick with which he had undoubtedly been struck, and
gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to the floor,
and afterwards striking him another blow on the head,
leaving the unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It
turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to
whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his
identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of
cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused,
who confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant
relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his
sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence.
Shall he be considered free from criminal responsibility, as
having acted in self-defense, with all the circumstances
related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia  of Valladolid found that he
was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient provocation, and
that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment
of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87
of the Penal Code condemned him to twenty months of
imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon
appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme
court, under the following sentence: "Considering, from the
facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the
accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his house
beside his wife who was nursing her child, was attacked,
struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with
which they might have executed their criminal intent,
because of the there was no other than fire light in the room,
and considering that in such a situation and when the acts
executed demonstrated that they might endanger his
existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should
have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick
with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of
self-defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally
necessary, particularly because the instrument with which he
killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was
capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house
and the consteration which naturally resulted from such
strong aggression, it was not given him to known or
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor
the arms which they might bear, not that which they might
accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find
from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity
 for the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph which he believe threatened his person and his property and the
4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of property under his charge.
supreme court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p.
266.) . The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court
should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with
QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the costs of
which was situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving both instance de oficio. So ordered.
at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man,
at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur. 
over you money!" because of which, and almost at the same Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing
immediately the voice of one of his friends (who had before
simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they have killed me,"
and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon
the ground, he cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, Separate Opinions
or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the victim of a
joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend TORRES, J.,  dissenting:
was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be declared
exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court,
homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the believes that, according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide
circumstances defined in paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568 of the
The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully
find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the (voluntariomente) killed, and while the act was done without malice or
requisites of said article, but not that of the reasonableness criminal intent it was, however, executed with real negligence, for the
of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore, acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison the defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused
mayor, etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his that the person who assaulted him was a malefactor; the defendant
appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person
acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the
means employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. undersigned the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one
(Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the accessory
136.) penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to
the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby
QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote reversing the judgment appealed from.
spot, is awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against
his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and
inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all
of his money, otherwise his house would be burned" —
SO ORDERED.
because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the
mill four individuals, one of whom addressed him with
blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the men, who, on the Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez, and
next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this Relova, JJ., concur.
man be declared exempt from criminal responsibility as
having acted in just self-defense with all of the requisites of
law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The
criminal branch of the Audiencia  of Zaragoza finds that there
existed in favor of the accused a majority of the requisites to
exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of
reasonable necessity for the means, employed, and
condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional  for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the
supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the
accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at
night in a remote spot by threatening robbery and
incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person,
property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p.
128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar

convinces us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged
in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who forced open
the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was
in imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of the property
committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they
must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted
in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was
doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that
had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have been
wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he
can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or
even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the
means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24978             March 27, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,  the forces of far and the sense of duty were at odds, the accused was
vs.
FERNANDO DE FERNANDO, defendant-appellant.
W. A. Armstrong for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This appeal has been taken by the defendant Fernando de Fernando
from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga, in
which he was held guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of twenty years cadena temporal, to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased Buenventura Paulino in the sum of P1,000 and to pay
the costs, by virtue of a complaint filed by the fiscal charging with the
said crime.
As a basis for his appeal the accused assigns the following errors as
committed by the trial court: (1) in holding that the acts committed by
the accused constituted the crime for murder; (2) in not holding that the
accused was exempt from criminal liability and in not acquitting him.
At the trial the following facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt:
Before the day of the crime several Moro prisoners had escaped from
the Penal Colony of San Ramon, Zamboanga. The residents of the
barrio of Municahan of the municipality of Zamboanga were alarmed by
the presence of three suspicious looking persons who were prowling
around the place. The accused Fernando de Fernando who, at that
time, was a municipal policeman, when passing in front of the house of
one Remigio Delgado, was called by the latter's daughter Paciencia
Delgado, who stated that her father wished to see him. When the
policeman came up the house Remigio Delgado informed him that
three unknown and suspicious looking persons, dressed in blue,
prowling around his house. The accused remained in the said house
talking with Paciencia Delgado, both being seated on a bench near the
window. While they were thus talking, at about 7 o'clock at night, there
appeared in the dark, at about 4 meters from the stairs, a person
dressed in dark clothes, calling "Nong Miong." At the time the accused
nor Paciencia Delgado knew who was thus calling. The accused
inquired what he wanted but instead of answering he continued
advancing with bolo in hand. Upon seeing this Fernando de Fernando
took out his revolver and fired a shot in the air. As he saw that the
unknown continued to ascend the staircase he fired at him. The
unknown disappeared and ran to the house of a neighbor Leon Torres,
where, after placing upon a table the bolos that he carried, he fell on
the floor and expired. Remigio Delgado, who was in the kitchen and
had recognized the voice of the unknown, on hearing the shots ran into
the parlor, took hold of the arm of the defendant and asked him why he
had fired at Buenventura Paulino. Fernando de Fernando only said "Let
me go, that is a cross eyed person" and immediately repaired to the
house of the teniente  of the barrio, Santiago Torres, from where he
telephoned to the chief of police advising him of what had happened.
When the body was examined it was found that a bullet had penetrated
the base of the neck at the right, imbedding itself in the left side under
the skin.
bolo in his hand, not heeding his question as to who he was. In the
midst of these circumstances and believing undoubtedly that he was a
wrongdoer he tried to perform his duty and first fired into the air and
then at the alleged intruder. But it happened that what to him appeared
to be wrongdoer was the nephew of the owner of the house who was
carrying three bolos tied together. At that psychological moment when
not able to take full account of the true situation and the bundle of
bolos seemed to him to be only one bolo in the hands of a suspicious
character who intended to enter the house. There is, however, a
circumstance that should have made him suspect that the man was not
only a friend but also a relative of the owner of the house from the fact
he called "Nong Miong," which indicated that the owner of the house
might be an older relative of the one calling, or an intimate friend; and
in not asking Paciencia Delgado who was it was that was calling her
father with such familiarity, he did not use the ordinary precaution that
he should have used before taking such fatal action.
Taking into consideration the estate of mind of the accused at the time,
and the meaning that he gave to the attitude of the unknown person, in
shooting the latter he felt that he was performing his duty by defending
the owners of the house against an unexpected attack, and such act
cannot constitute the crime of murder, but only that of simple homicide.
He cannot be held guilty, however, as principal with malicious intent,
because he though at the time that he was justified in acting as he did,
and he is guilty only because he failed to exercise the ordinary
diligence which, under the circumstances, he should have by
investigating whether or not the unknown man was really what he
though him to be. In firing the shot, without first exercising reasonable
diligence, he acted with reckless negligence.
The crime committed by the caused, therefore, is homicide through
reckless negligence defined and punished in article 568, in relation with
article 404, of the Penal Code, the penalty prescribed by law arresto
mayor  in its maximum degree to prision correcional  in its minimum
degree.
In view of the foregoing and reversing the appealed judgment, the
accused is held guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless
negligence, and he is sentenced to suffer one year  prision correcional,
to pay the amount of P500 to the heirs of the deceased as an
indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the
costs and with credit of one-half of the preventive imprisonment already
suffered. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Street, Malcom, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.

The status of the accused on the night in question was that of an agent
of the law, to whom notice had been given of the presence of
suspicious looking persons who might be the Moro prisoners who had
escaped from the Penal Colony of San Ramon. The appearance of a
man, unknown to him, dressed in clothes similar in color to the
prisoner's uniform who was calling the owner of the house, and the
silence of Paciencia Delgado, who did not at the time recognize the
man, undoubtedly caused the accused to suspect that the unknown
man was one of the three persons that the owner of the house said
were prowling around the place. The suspicion become a reality in his
mind when he saw that the man continued ascending the stairs with a
 Not only is this testimony directly contrary to the witnesses for the
prosecution but is greatly weakened by appellant’s own statement
EN BANC given to the chief of police the day after the crime. The story as told by
[G.R. No. 42117. March 29, 1935.] appellant was not believed by the trial court, and on the whole does not
ring with sincerity and truth. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
GREGORIO REYES, Defendant-Appellant.  Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of homicide as the
Jose G. Pardo for Appellant.  wound actually inflicted was a superficial wound of no intrinsic
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio for Appellee.  magnitude. As above stated, deceased ran screaming to the nearby
house where she dropped dead. The sanitary inspector who examined
SYLLABUS the body the next day, found no other wound and certified that
1. CRIMINAL LAW; HOMICIDE; LIABILITY FOR CONSEQUENCES deceased had died from shock as a result of the wound and so testified
OF A CRIMINAL ACT. — Appellant contends that he cannot be at the trial. 
convicted of homicide as the wound actually inflicted was a superficial
wound of no intrinsic magnitude. The death having occurred in an The death having occurred in an outlying barrio, there was no proper
outlying barrio, there was no proper autopsy. So far as is known, autopsy. So far as is known, deceased was in normal health, but
deceased was in normal health, but appellant contends that it is appellant contends that it is incumbent upon the State to prove that the
incumbent upon the State to prove that the deceased did not die of deceased did not die of poisoning or some other cause. 
poisoning or some other cause. In this jurisdiction it is well settled that
a person is responsible for the consequences of his criminal act and In this jurisdiction it is well settled that such is not the law. A person is
even if the deceased had been shown to be suffering from a diseased responsible for the consequences of his criminal act and even if the
heart (which was not shown), appellant’s assault being the proximate deceased had been shown to be suffering from a diseased heart
cause of the death, he would be responsible.  (which was not shown), appellant’s assault being the proximate cause
of the death, he would be responsible. (U. S. v. Luciano, 2 Phil., 96; U.
2. ID.; ID.; INTENT TO COMMIT THE CRIME PROVED. — We have S. v. Lugo and Lugo, 8 Phil., 80; U. S. v. Brobst, 14 Phil., 310; U. S. v.
repeatedly held that when a person stabs another with a lethal weapon Rodriguez, 23 Phil., 22.) 
such as a fan knife upon a part of the body, for example, the head,
chest, or stomach, death could reasonably be anticipated, and the The trial court appreciated the mitigating circumstances that the
accused must be presumed to have intended the natural offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
consequences of his wrongful act. The means employed contradict the committed and that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the
claim that appellant had lack of intention to commit the crime of offended party immediately preceded the act. 
homicide. 
We have repeatedly held that when a person stabs another with a
3. ID.; ID.; PROVOCATION MUST COME FROM THE OFFENDED lethal weapon such as a fan knife upon a part of the body, for example,
PARTY. — The trial court considered provocation as a mitigating the head, or stomach, death could reasonably be anticipated, and the
circumstance based on the testimony of appellant that he had been accused, must be presumed to have intended the natural
attacked, overlooking the fact that the law requires that the provocation consequences of his wrongful act. The means employed contradict the
come from the offended party. Certainly the deceased did not attack claim that appellant had lack of intention to commit the crime of
appellant, and her refusal to renew her illicit relationship with him can homicide. 
hardly be construed as legal provocation.
The trial court considered provocation as a mitigating circumstance
DECISION based on the testimony of appellant that he had been attacked,
overlooking the fact that the law requires that the provocation come
HULL, J.: from the offended party. Certainly the deceased did not attack
appellant, and her refusal to renew her illicit relationship with him can
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines hardly be construed as legal provocation. 
Sur of the crime of homicide committed on the person of Fausta Tavera
on the evening of April 30, 1934.  On a careful review of the evidence we are convinced that appellant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without
Previous to the crime, the deceased for a couple of weeks had been either aggravating or mitigating circumstances and therefore sentence
living with appellant, but her parents had persuaded her to come home him under Act No. 4103 to from eight years of prision mayor to fourteen
and were demanding that appellant pay a dowry of P30 before the date years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal and to
of the celebration of the marriage could be fixed.  indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the sum of P1,000. As thus
modified the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against
That evening there had been a barrio procession, and after the appellant. So ordered. 
procession, they were gathered in one of the houses, where an
impromptu dance took place. The deceased and appellant were talking Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, Goddard and
in the yard of the house where the dance was taking place, and she Diaz, JJ., concur. 
informed him that she could not return to him and that she was going
with her parents to Catanduanes. Appellant dragged the deceased Separate Opinions
towards the street and stabbed her in the chest with a fanknife. ABAD SANTOS, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Deceased ran to the house of the barrio lieutenant, a short distance
away, falling dead at the foot of the staircase, although the wound was Upon the evidence of record I am of the opinion that the appellant
only a slight one, it not having penetrated the thoracic cavity, having hit should be acquitted. 
a bone. 
I am inclined to believe the testimony of the appellant to the effect that
Immediately Andres Tapil, Tomas and Rufino, relatives of the he was attacked by the three men who were with the deceased at the
deceased, attempted to seize the appellant, but with the aid of his time, and that as a result of the fight that ensued, the deceased was
knife, he escaped and ran from the scene of the affray.  accidentally wounded. Moreover, the physician who examined the
deceased testified that the wound he found on her body was merely a
Appellant as witness in his own behalf claimed that he was attacked by "scratch." The nature of the wound was such that, under ordinary
the three relatives of the deceased, and if deceased was wounded by circumstances, would not have resulted in death. I do not believe that
him, it was in the midst of that affray and purely accidental on his part.  the appellant had intended to commit homicide.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5889 July 12, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LOOK CHAW
( alias  LUK CHIU), Defendant-Appellant.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
ARELLANO, C.J.  :chanrobles virtual law library
This case is a separate part of Case No. 5887 and bears No. 5889 on
the general docket of this court, and No. 377 on the docket of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The complaint in this case states:
That, on or about the 18th of August, 1909, within the boundaries of the
municipality of Cebu of this province and judicial district, the said Look
Chaw ( alias  Luk Chiu) did, without having obtained authorization from
the Collector of Internal Revenue and without being authorized in any
manner and traffic in the same.
C.J. Milliron, an internal-revenue agent, testified that Vicente Base took
to the governor of Cebu a can of opium containing 200 grammes of the
said drug, in order to show him that the accused had sold opium to
Base, and the governor called the witness in order that he might take
part in this case. After the accused was arrested, he confessed before
the witness and the provincial fiscal that he had sold to Vicente Base
thirty cans of opium on the 15th of August, 1909, but that he had
received the price thereof, and that the money which was found in a
box of his on board the British steamship Erroll, P1,500 in amount, was
obtained in Manila and was seized by the captain of the vessel.
According to the accused, he had purchased in Hongkong 137 cans of
opium for the purpose of introducing it as contraband into Mexico, the
destination of the vessel, but that as the latter changed its route
touching first at Manila, the opium arrived at
Cebu.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Vicente Base testified that he had negotiated with the accused with
respect to the sale of the three sacks of opium which were seized while
in the latter's possession an were the subject matter of the previous
cause; that these three sacks were not taken ashore, because the
accused would not permit this to be done without previous delivery of
the whole price of P1,000, of which witness had only paid P533; that he
therefore only took one can from one of the said
sacks.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of First Instance of Cebu sentenced the accused to one
year's imprisonment and the payment of a fine of P2,000, with
additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, not to exceed
one-third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs of the
trial. It was ordered in the judgment that the exhibits connected with the
case should be confiscated, and that, in case of an appeal, and even
after the sentence had been served, the defendant should not be
released from custody, but delivered to the customs authorities for the
purpose of the enforcement of the existing immigration
laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant appealed and has alleged before this court that he can
not punished in accordance with section 15 of Act No. 1761, under
which the complaint was drawn.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
This said section 15 reads thus:
( a) No person shall import, cook, or prepare opium, or engage in the
business of purchasing or selling opium or of dealing or trafficking
therein, unless he shall first have secured from the Collector of Internal
Revenue a license to transact such business and shall have paid the
license tax prescribed by this Act. . . .
To make an isolated sale, says the appellant, is not to engage in the
business of selling. To negotiate the sale of opium does not mean
clandestinely to sell opium once.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In our opinion, the act defined in section 15 is distinct from that
penalized in section 5; the act referred to in the latter is any act of sale,
while that concerned in the former relates to the business of selling, in
an habitual, professional manner, as one of an undertaking or
occupation, without license.
SEC. 5. ( a) It shall be unlawful to sell, transfer, give, or deliver opium
to any person except to a duly licensed and practicing physician,
pharmacist, or second-class pharmacist, or a duly licensed dispensator
of opium, or duly registered confirmed user of opium in a licensed
opium dispensary for consumption therein only, and in accordance with
the provisions of this Act: . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
( b) Any person violating the provisions of the preceding subsection
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos, or by
imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year, or both such fine
and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court: . . .
The crime concerned in this case, according to this section 5, is
compromised within the language of the complaint which charges the
act of selling opium without the authorization of the Collector of Internal
Revenue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The other ground of the appeal is that the confession of the accused
were taken into account for the purpose of his conviction. The trial
court pronounced its sentence after considering that "sufficient proof
has been furnished by the evidence,' and the evidence did not consist
solely in the confession that the accused, on the day and at the place
mentioned in the complaint, contracted with Vicente Base for the sale
of the opium, the subject matter of the present prosecution; and as this
finding does not appear to be erroneous nor contrary to the
conclusions reached from the evidence, it is accepted by this court in
order that thereby the judgment appealed from may be dully affirmed,
as we do affirm the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
This disposes of the appeal; but, in the opinion of this court, the
defense of double jeopardy alleged by the accused in first instance,
with exception to the order disallowing it, can not but be taken into
consideration, although in this instance, on appeal, that defense was
not reproduced with the allegation that its disallowance was an error
committed by the lower court in its judgment. This point appears to
involve a question of jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Before separating the two causes, as related at the beginning of this
decision, there was but one single complaint and there would have
been only one trial for the possession of opium and for the sale of
opium. But the defendant's counsel set up a demurrer, arguing that the
complaint was defective inasmuch as it charged two distinct crimes, for
according to the defense, it was alleged to be one crime to possess
opium and another different crime to sell opium; and the court deferred
to this pretension and ordered the filing of two complaints, one for the
possession of opium and another for the sale of opium; that for the
possession of opium was the one first tried by the lower
court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In answering the second complaint for the sale of opium, the defendant
alleged that he had already been in jeopardy.
The defendant was convicted yesterday," said his attorney, "for the
violation of law committed, of possessing opium, and has already been
sentenced by this court to five year's imprisonment and in addition to
pay a fine of ten thousand pesos. According to the principles of penal
law, when a crime has been committed which is necessary in order to
commit another, the delinquent, of course, can not be punished for the
two crimes, but must suffer for the crime for which the greater penalty
was provided.
The court rejected this allegation: first, because the prosecution of two
crimes instead of one was brought about by the defense itself; and
second, because, in the opinion of the trial judge, if the defendant had
first been convicted for selling opium, he certainly would have been in
jeopardy in the cause prosecuted for possessing opium, for the reason
that really one can not sell opium without possessing it, while, if the
terms are inverted, the same result does not follow, because one may
posses opium without selling it, and consequently in the present cause
the allegation of double jeopardy is an
admissible.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
prohibitum; because it not only aims at a more or less strict application
of a penal precept which, undoubtedly, in the practice of this court,
usually tends toward the lesser severity and, occasionally, the greatest
benignity when the second class, or conventional crimes, are
concerned, but also because that doctrine is the logical result of the
process of the intelligence in the derivation of consequences from the
principles constitute of the nature of
things.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Thus it is that we find the institution of this cause, and its separation
from the previous one, to be founded on law and juridical principles,
and the judgment appealed from, to be in accordance with right and
equity, except with regard to the amount of the penalty, which we
reduce, in harmony with the provisions of section 5 aforementioned, to
six months' imprisonment and a fine of P1,000 Philippine
currency.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Therefore, with the understanding that the imprisonment and the fine
imposed shall be, respectively, six months and P1,000 Philippine
Currency, we affirm, as to all the rest, the judgment appealed from,
with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

True it is, we assert, that it is one crime to possess opium, punished by Torres, Mapa, and Johnson, JJ.,  concur.
section 31 of the Act, and another, to sell opium, penalized by section 5 Carson, J.,  concurs in the result.
of the same Act before cited.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

And it is also true that when one single act constitutes two or more
crimes, or when one of them is a necessary means for the commission
of the other, only the penalty corresponding to the more serious crime
shall be imposed, in its maximum degree, and thus, he who smokes
opium in a pipe, by one single act lays himself liable to three penalties
of the law, one of them, merely for the fact of possessing opium,
another, for the mere possession of a pipe in which opium is smoked,
and the other, for the act of smoking opium; but the penalties
corresponding to these three crimes ought not to be imposed upon the
defendant in this case, and only the penalty for the most serious of
these crimes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

But the illegal possession of 137 cans of opium and the illegal sale of
30 cans of opium, which are two acts confessed by the accused, are
not one act which constitutes two crimes, nor a crime which is a
necessary means for the commission of another. They are two isolated
acts, punishable, each of them, in themselves. Only in the event where
all the amount of the opium possessed and seized be in its totality the
same as that which was possessed with the sole purpose of being
delivered as the matter or subject of a sale previously agree upon,
could it be said, in the opinion of this court, that the possession of the
opium was a necessary means to effect the delivery by reason of the
sale, and that the sale agreed upon was the sole reason for the
possession of the opium seized. The possession of the quantity
contained in the pipe can not be considered as a different crime from
that of smoking opium in a pipe, nor the possession of the pipe, as a
crime different from that of smoking opium in a pipe. But if the person
surprised in smoking opium in a pipe was also surprised in the
possession of the thirty cans sold by the accused, it could not properly
be inferred that the possession of these thirty cans, which in itself is a
crime, was a necessary means for the commission of the other crime of
smoking opium in a pipe, and that the person in whose possession the
thirty cans were seized, possessed the same solely and exclusively for
the purpose of smoking opium in a pipe. It might very well have been
that he had acquired the drug for the purpose of inhaling, injecting,
chewing, swallowing, or other uses, and that only by chance did it
occur to him to try to smoke it in a pipe, on the very occasion when he
was surprised, this being the evident fact of the commission of the
crime which can not, in its essence, include the existence of thirty cans,
not then contained in the pipe, each can certainly being susceptible of
other various uses, every one of which might by its nature constitute a
different crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

We consider this doctrine equally applicable to crimes which are evils

by their very nature, as well as to those which are merely malum quia
  Code, which states that "penal laws shall have a retroactive effect
insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony," finds meaning in
this case. Appellant is entitled to benefit from the reduction of the
penalty introduced by R.A. No. 7659.
FIRST DIVISION
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROPER PENALTY IN CASE AT BAR,
[G.R. No. 94953. September 5, 1994.]
DETERMINED. — In order to determine the penalty to be imposed
on appellant, we first divide the amount of 750 grams into three to
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARMANDO
correspond to the three applicable penalties, namely, prision
DE LARA Y GALARDO, Accused-Appellant.
correccional, prison mayor and reclusion temporal. If the marijuana
involved is from 500 to 749 grams, the penalty to be imposed is
reclusion temporal. If the marijuana involved is from 250 to 499
SYLLABUS grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision mayor and if the weight
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT of the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to be
WARRANT; LAWFUL IN CASE AT BAR. — Appellant was caught imposed is prision correccional. Since there is no evidence as to the
red-handed in delivering two tin foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., weight of the two foils and one plastic bag of flowering tops of
the poseur-buyer. Applying the aforementioned provision of law, marijuana seized from appellant, we resolve the doubt in favor of
appellant’s arrest was lawfully effected without need of a warrant of appellant and conclude that the quantity involved was: (i) below 750
arrest. "Having caught the appellant in flagrante as a result of the grams; and (ii) not less than 250 but not more than 499 grams.
buy-bust operation, the policemen were not only authorized but were Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on appellant is
also under obligation to apprehend the drug pusher even without a prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
warrant of arrest" The policemen’s entry into the house of appellant appellant, who was convicted under a special law (People v.
without a search warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught Macantando, 109 SCRA 35 [1981]), and as such law was interpreted
committing an offense in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot- in People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, the minimum
pursuit was valid. penalty that can be imposed on appellant should be within the range
of prision correccional.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID AS INCIDENTAL TO DECISION
ARREST. — We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of QUIASON, J.:
prohibited drugs found inside appellant’s house. The seizure of the This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the result of appellant’s Branch 28, Manila in Criminal Case No. 94953, finding appellant
arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous search may be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4 of Republic Act
conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the immediate No. 6425, as amended by B.P. Blg. 179.
vicinity where the arrest was made.
The Information charged appellant as follows:chanrob1es virtual
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; CUSTODIAL 1aw library
INVESTIGATION ABSENT COUNSEL, EVIDENCE ACQUIRED
THEREIN NOT ADMISSIBLE; BUT CONVICTION NOT AFFECTED
I
IN VIEW OF OTHER EVIDENCE. — We find to be meritorious
appellant’s claim that he was not assisted by counsel during the
"That on or about January 9, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
custodial investigation, specifically when he was forced to sign the
the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, give
photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill (Exh. "E"), Receipt of
away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there
Property Seized (Exh. "F"), and the Booking and Information Sheet
willfully and unlawfully sell or offer for sale two (2) foils of flowering
(Exh. "H"). The said documents are inadmissible in evidence for the
tops of marijuana and one (1) plastic bag of flowering tops of
reason that there was no showing that appellant was then assisted
marijuana, which are prohibited drugs" (Rollo, p. 6).
by counsel nor his waiver thereto put into writing (Constitution, Art.
III, Sec. 3 [2]). Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would
Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte,
not affect the conviction of appellant in view of the abundance of
pleaded not guilty to the information (Records p. 5).
other evidence establishing his guilt.
II
4. CRIMINAL LAW; DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT; SALE OF
On December 15, 1986, Capt. Restituto Cablayan of the National
PROHIBITED OF DRUGS; PENALTY DEPENDING ON THE
Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS) of the Western Police District
QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA INVOLVED (MORE OR LESS THAN
(WPD), instructed Sgt. Enrique David to conduct a surveillance
750 GRAMS), CLASSIFIED. — Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659,
operation in the vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets at Sta. Ana,
the penalty to be imposed for selling, administering, delivering or
Manila, after receiving reports of rampant drug-pushing in that area
distributing less than 750 grams of marijuana, shall range from
(TSN, December 14, 1987, p. 21).chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the
quantity." Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for selling,
In compliance thereof, a team led by Sgt. Enrique David, conducted
dispensing, delivering, transporting or distributing marijuana in
a surveillance operation on December 15 and 17, and confirmed the
excess of 750 grams or more shall be" reclusion perpetua to death
reported drug-pushing activities in that area by the group of
and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos to Ten
appellant and a certain Ricky alias "Pilay" (TSN, December 2, 1987,
Million Pesos." We noticed that the penalty of reclusion
pp. 5-6). No arrest was made because the team was instructed by
perpetua was imposed by R.A. No. 7659 as the maximum penalty
their superior to conduct a surveillance operation only (TSN, January
when the quantity of the marijuana involved in the offense is less
11, 1988, p. 28).
than 750 grams and at the same time as the minimum penalty when
the quantity of marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. It is the
On January 8, 1987, Malaya (Exh. "F") and People’s Tonight (Exh.
duty of the Court to harmonize conflicting provisions to give effect to
"K"), reported that there were rampant, drug-pushing activities in the
the whole law (Rufino Lopez and Sons v. Court of Appeals, 100 Phil.
vicinity of Garrido and Zamora Streets in Sta. Ana, Manila,
850 [1957]). Furthermore, one of this Court’s primordial
prompting Gen. Alfredo Lim, then WPD Superintendent, to
responsibilities is to give a statute its sensible construction. This is to
reprimand the NCIS office (TSN, December 2, 1987, p. 2).
effectuate the intention of the legislature so as to avoid an absurd
conclusion with regard to its meaning (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456
On January 9, because of the reprimand given by Gen. Lim, Capt.
[1912]). Therefore, when the quantity involved is less than 750
Cablayan instructed Sgt. David to plan a buy-bust operation and to
grams, Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 should be read correctly to
form a six-man team with Pfc. Martin Orolfo, Jr. as the poseur-buyer
provide a penalty ranging from prision correccional to reclusion
(TSN, December 2, 1987, p. 6, January 11, 1988, p. 6).
temporal only. The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal
 At around 4:45 P.M. of the same day, the team, together with their
confidential informant, went to Garrido Street. Upon arriving thereat,
they strategically positioned themselves. Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. and the
confidential informant proceeded to the house of appellant located at
No. 2267 Garrido Street, where they saw him standing outside. The
confidential informant introduced Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. to appellant as an
interested buyer of marijuana. Appellant asked Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. "Ilan
ang bibilhin ninyo?" (How much will you buy?). Pfc. Orolfo, Jr.
replied: "Two foils" handing at the same time the marked twenty-
peso bill (Exh. "E") to appellant. The latter, after placing the money
in the right pocket of his pants, went inside his house (TSN, January
11, 1988, pp. 7-9). Minutes later, appellant came back and handed
two foils (Exhs. "D-1-a" and "D-1-b") wrapped in onion paper (TSN,
January 11, 1988, p. 8). It was after he handed the two foils to Pfc.
Orolfo, Jr., that he sensed the presence of the police operatives. He
then tried to retrieve the two foils but Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. prevented him
from doing so. During the scuffle, one foil was torn. Appellant
showed the arresting officers a blue plastic bag with while lining
containing prohibited drugs. A receipt of the articles seized (Exh.
"F") was made by Pfc. Orolfo, Jr. (TSN, January 11, 1988, pp. 12-
15).chanrobles law library : red
Thereafter, the team, together with appellant, proceeded to the WPD
headquarters for investigation. Thereat, Sgt. David ordered Pfc.
Orolfo, Jr. to commence the investigation of appellant (TSN, January
11, 1988, pp. 19-21).
During the investigation, appellant was apprised of his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel. When
appellant was asked to give a written statement, he refused to do so
pending arrival of his lawyer (TSN, January 11, 1988, p. 23).
The prohibited drugs seized from appellant were brought to the NBI
for chemical analysis. A report and certification of Ms. Aida Pascual,
Forensic Chemist of the NBI (Exhs. "C" and "D"), show the drugs to
be positive for marijuana.
Appellant denied having sold marijuana to anyone and claimed that
the arresting officers merely planted the marijuana on his person. He
testified that on January 9, 1987, he arrived home from work as a
security guard of the Vergara Brothers Agency at around 3:00 P.M.
After changing his clothes, he went out to fetch his son, who was left
in the care of a neighbor. Upon returning to his house with his son,
he was arrested by the police. The police proceeded to search his
house, without any search warrant shown to him. After the search,
he and his wife were brought to the WPD headquarters. He claimed
that inspite of his protestation that he would like to wait for his lawyer
before giving any statement, the police continued their interrogation.
Appellant denied that the twenty-peso bill was given to him by the
poseur-buyer. He claimed that he was merely forced to sign his
name on the photocopy of the twenty-peso bill (Exh. "F") and that
the first time he saw the blue plastic bag containing prohibited drugs
was when he was at the police station (TSN, June 14, 1988, pp. 1-
11).cralawnad
To corroborate his story, appellant presented his younger brother,
Gerry de Lara.
On October 2, 1989, the trial court rendered its decision, disposing
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R.A.
6425 as amended as charged in the Information; and this Court
hereby sentences the accused to suffer a penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00" (Rollo, p. 24).
Hence, this appeal.  A: Sgt. David confronted him regarding this case and he voluntarily
III
In his appeal, appellant questions the legality of his arrest and the
seizure of prohibited drugs found inside his house. Furthermore, he
claims that he was not assisted by counsel during his custodial
interrogation (Rollo, pp. 55-57).
As to the legality of appellant’s arrest, we find that the police
operatives acted within the bounds of law.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
dealing with warrantless arrests provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it;
x       x       x
In the case at bench, appellant was caught red-handed in delivering
two tin foils of marijuana to Pat. Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer.
Applying the aforementioned provision of law, appellant’s arrest was
lawfully effected without need of a warrant of arrest. "Having caught
the appellant in flagrante as a result of the buy-bust operation, the
policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation
to apprehend the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest"
(People v. Kalubiran, 196 SCRA 644 [1991]; People v. De Los
Santos, 200 SCRA 431 [1991]).cralawnad
Appellant, however, asseverates that his arrest was precipitated only
by newspaper publications about the rampant sale of drugs along
Garrido and Zamora Streets, Sta. Ana, Manila (Rollo, p. 53). If
appellant implies that the police merely stage-managed his arrest in
order to show that they were not remiss in their duties, then
appellant is wrong. A surveillance on the illegal activities of the
appellant was already conducted by the police as early as
December 15 and 17, 1986. The newspaper reports concerning the
illegal drug activities came out only on January 8 and 14, 1987, long
after the police knew of the said illegal activities. Appellant’s
eventual arrest on January 9, 1987 was the result of the surveillance
conducted and the buy-bust operation.
The evidence shows that appellant ran inside his house upon
sensing the presence of the police operatives. The testimony of Pat.
Orolfo, Jr., the poseur-buyer, is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"FISCAL:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: After placing the P20 bill in his right pocket, what did he do?
A: He went to his house and minutes later, he came back, sir.
Q: When he came back what happened?
A: He handed to me two tin foils containing suspected marijuana
leaves wrapped in onion paper.
Q: And what happened next when he returned with those items?
A: After he handed to me two foils, he sensed the presence of the
operatives and he tried to retrieve the two foils, sir, and I prevented
him and during the scuffle one piece of foil was broken, he tried to
run inside the house, so I subdued him immediately and
apprehended him while he was inside the house.
Q: After he was subdued by your group, what happened?
admitted that he was still keeping prohibited drugs inside his house?
Q: What did the group do after he voluntarily admitted that he was
keeping prohibited drugs inside his house?
A: He pointed inside his house (sic) one plastic bag colored blue
with white lining containing prohibited drug" (TSN, January 11, 1988,
pp. 12-14)
The policemen’s entry into the house of appellant without a search
warrant was in hot-pursuit of a person caught committing an offense
in flagrante. The arrest that followed the hot-pursuit was valid (1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Section 5 [a]).
prision correccional to reclusion temporal only.
The provision of Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which states
that "penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the person guilty of a felony," finds meaning in this case. Appellant is
entitled to benefit from the reduction of the penalty introduced by
R.A. No. 7659.

We also find as valid the seizure of the plastic bag of prohibited
drugs found inside appellant’s house.
The seizure of the plastic bag containing prohibited drugs was the
result of appellant’s arrest inside his house. A contemporaneous
search may be conducted upon the person of the arrestee and the
immediate vicinity where the arrest was made (People v. Castiller,
188 SCRA 376 [1990]).
We find to be meritorious appellant’s claim that he was not assisted
by counsel during the custodial investigation, specifically when he
was forced to sign the photocopy of the marked twenty-peso bill
(Exh. "E"), Receipt of Property Seized (Exh. "F"), and the Booking
and Information Sheet (Exh. "H").
The said documents are inadmissible in evidence for the reason that
there was no showing that appellant was then assisted by counsel
nor his waiver thereto put into writing (Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 3
[2]).chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Be that as it may, the rejection of said evidence would not affect the
conviction of appellant in view of the abundance of other evidence
establishing his guilt. The ruling in People v. Mauyao, 207 SCRA
732 (1992), is apropos:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
In order to determine the penalty to be imposed on appellant, we
first divide the amount of 750 grams into three to correspond to the
three applicable penalties, namely, prision correccional, prison
mayor and reclusion temporal.
If the marijuana involved is from 500 to 749 grams, the penalty to be
imposed is reclusion temporal. If the marijuana involved is from 250
to 499 grams, the penalty to be imposed is prision mayor and if the
weight of the marijuana involved is below 250 grams, the penalty to
be imposed is prision correccional.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Since there is no evidence as to the weight of the two foils and one
plastic bag of flowering tops of marijuana seized from appellant, we
resolve the doubt in favor of appellant and conclude that the quantity
involved was: (i) below 750 grams; and (ii) not less than 250 but not
more than 499 grams.
Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on appellant is
prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law to
appellant, who was convicted under a special law (People v.
Macantando, 109 SCRA 35 [1981]), and as such law was interpreted
in People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, the minimum
penalty that can be imposed on appellant should be within the range
of prision correccional.

"It bears emphasis, however, that the accused appellant’s
conformity to the questioned documents has not been a factor at all
in his conviction. For even if these documents were disregarded, still
the accused-appellant’s guilt has been adequately established by
other evidence of record. The trial court’s verdict was based on the
evidence of the prosecution not on his signatures on the questioned
documents. Accused-appellant’s denial simply can not prevail over
the detailed and unshaken testimonies of the apprehending officers
who caught him red-handed selling marijuana and who have not
shown to have any ulterior motive to testify falsely against Accused-
Appellant."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the
modification that appellant shall suffer an indeterminate penalty of
FOUR (4) years and TWO (2) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to EIGHT (8) years and ONE (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.

IV
The trial court sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00 pursuant to Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by B.P.
Blg. 179. However, said law was further amended by R.A. No. 7659.

Under Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty to be imposed for

selling, administering, delivering or distributing less than 750 grams
of marijuana, shall range from" prision correccional to reclusion
perpetua depending upon the quantity."cralaw virtua1aw library

Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for selling,

dispensing, delivering, transporting or distributing marijuana in
excess of 750 grams or more shall be" reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos to Ten
Million Pesos." cralawnad

We noticed that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed by

R.A. No. 7659 as the maximum penalty when the quantity of the
marijuana involved in the offense is less than 750 grams and at the
same time as the minimum penalty when the quantity of marijuana
involved is 750 grams or more. It is the duty of the Court to
harmonize conflicting provisions to give effect to the whole law
(Rufino Lopez and Sons v. Court of Appeals, 100 Phil. 850 [1957]).
Furthermore, one of this Court’s primordial responsibilities is to give
a statute its sensible construction. This is to effectuate the intention
of the legislature so as to avoid an absurd conclusion with regard to
its meaning (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456 [1912]). Therefore, when
the quantity involved is less than 750 grams, Section 17 of R.A. No.
7659 should be read correctly to provide a penalty ranging from

 
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 75256. January 26, 1989.]
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, Petitioner, v.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, Respondent.
Teresita Dy-Liaco and Roberto Madrid for Petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES;
INTENT DEFINED. — The word "intent" has been
defined as:" (a) design; a determination to do a certain
things; an aim the purpose of the mind, including such
knowledge as is essential to such intent; . . .; the
design resolve, or determination with which a person
acts." (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.) It is this intent which
comprises the third element of dolo as a means of
committing a felony, freedom and intelligence being the
other two.
2. ID.; ID.; DISCERNMENT, CONCEPT. — We have
defined the term "discernment," as used in Article 12(3)
of the RPC, in the old case of People v. Doquena, 68
Phil. 580(1939), in this wise: "The discernment that
constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal
liability of a minor under fifteen years of age but over
nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his
mental capacity to understand the difference between
right and wrong . . ." (Emphasis ours) p. 583
3. ID.; ID.; DISCERNMENT AND INTENT,
DISTINGUISHED. — It is clear that the terms "intent"
and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While
both are products of the mental processes within a
person, the former refers to the desired of one’s act
while the latter relate to the moral significance that
person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may
not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the
consequences of his negligent act which may cause
injury to the same person in negligently handling an air
rifle. It is not correct, therefore, to argue, as petitioner
does, that since a minor above nine years of age but
below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended
such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the
same time recognize the undesirable result of his
negligence.
4. ID.; ID.; BASIC REASON BEHIND ITS
EXACTMENT. — In further outlining the distinction
between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is
worthy to note the basic reason behind the enactment
of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12
of the RPC; the complete absence of intelligence,
freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused.
5. ID.; ID.; INTELLIGENCE, PRESENCE OR
ABSENCE, VITAL TO APPRECIATION OF CRIMINAL
LIABILITY. — "The second element of dolus is
intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine
the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an
illicit act, no crime can exist, and because . . . the infant
(has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from
criminal liability." (Emphasis ours) "Intelligence" as an
element of dolo actually embraces the concept of
discernment as used in Article 12 of the RPC and as
defined in the case of People v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580
(1939). It could not therefore be argued that
discernment is equivalent or connotes "intent" for they
refer to two different concepts. Intelligence, which
includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a
means of committing an offense.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RETAINED AS ONE OF THE
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS IN CULPA. — In evaluating
felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3)
elements are indispensable, namely, intelligence,
freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is
wanting in such felonies. However, intelligence remains
as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a
minor above nine but below fifteen years of age be
possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent
act which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be
criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or
wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a
minor over nine years of age but below fifteen may be
held liable for a said Article would reveal such fact as it
starts off with the phrase "Any person . . ." without any
distinction or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit
nec nos distinguere debemos.
7. ID.; SECTION 2(3) OF P.D. 1508, CONSTRUED. —
The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is
determined by the penalty imposable under the law for
the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed
(People v. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People v. Purisima, 69
SCRA 314; Dioquino v. Cruz and People v. Savellano,
116 SCRA 415). The same principle applies in
constructing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which the law
defining the offense attaches to the latter should be
considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect
criminal liability must now considered.
8. ID.; P.D. 1508, NOT JURISDICTIONAL. — The
petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D.
1508 has not been complied with, the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception
has been corrected long before. As intimated in the
case of Royales v. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and
categorically stated in Ebol v. Amin, 135 SCRA 438,
P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
DECISION
PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action
for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio
Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, Branch I,
Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law which
We are tasked to resolve, We impleaded the People of
the Philippines as party respondents herein a
resolution dated 17 September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was
playing with his bestfriend Teodoro Almine, Jr. and
three other children in their backyard in the morning of
29 October 1984. They were target-shooting a bottle
cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20)
meters away with an air rifle borrowed from a neighbor.
In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet
on his left collar bone which caused his unfortunate
death.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, the
examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age
and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to
be an accident. The victim’s parents appealed to the
Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a
case against petitioner for Homicide through reckless
Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985
was consequently filed, which narrated in part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years
but below 15 years of age and acting with discernment,
did then and there, without taking the necessary
precautions to prevent and/or avoid accident or injuries
to persons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate
and cause to be fired, in a reckless and imprudent
manner, an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling,
oxygen and bolt operated thereby hitting as a result of
said carelessness and imprudence one TEODORICO
PABLO ALMINE at the left side of the body with its
pallet, causing injuries which directly caused his
untimely death; . . ." (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the
said information on the following grounds:chanrobles
virtual l
I
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT
CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
II
THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS
WHICH IF TRUE WOULD CONSTITUTE A LEGAL
EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.
III
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGES
AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9,
Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was
denied with respect to the first and third grounds relied
upon. However, the resolution of the second ground
was deferred until evidence shall have been
represented during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was
filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
I injury to the same person in negligently handling an air
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD
BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE
THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
II
WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT
DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON.
(Petitioner, p. 3, Rollo)
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the
surfacing of a corollary controversy with respect to the
first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term
"discernment", as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the
position of the petitioner that "discernment" connotes
"intent" (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of
People v. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that
case We held that the allegation of "with intent to
kill . . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment
should be alleged when the accused is a minor
between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his
syllogism in saying that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"If discernment is the equivalent of ‘with intent’, then
the allegation in the information that the accused acted
with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and
feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a reckless
and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber’ is an
inherent contradiction tantamount to failure of the
information to allege a cause of action or constitute a
legal excuse or exception." (Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner’s argument is correct, then no minor
between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of a
quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that
discernment and intent are two different concepts. We
agree with the Solicitor General’s view; the two terms
should not be confused.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The word "intent" has been defined
as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an
aim the purpose of the mind, including such knowledge
as is essential to such intent; . . .; the design resolve,
or determination with which a person acts." (46 CJS
Intentp. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of
dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom and
intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We
have defined the term "discernment," as used in Article
12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People v.
Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this
wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The discernment that constitutes an exception to the
exemption from criminal liability of a minor under fifteen
years of age but over nine, who commits an act
prohibited by law, is his mental capacity to understand
the difference between right and wrong . . ." (italics
Ours) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent"
and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts. While
both are products of the mental processes within a
person, the former refers to the desired of one’s act
while the latter relate to the moral significance that
person ascribes to the said act. Hence a person may
not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the
consequences of his negligent act which may cause
rifle. It is not connect, therefore, to argue, as petitioner
does, that since a minor above nine years of age but
below fifteen acted with discernment, then he intended
such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his
friend, thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the
same time recognize the undesirable result of his
negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words
"intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note the basic
reason behind the enactment of the exempting
circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the RPC; the
complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or
intent, or on the absence of negligence on the part of
the accused. 1 In expounding on intelligence as the
second element of dolus, Albert 2 has
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The second element of dolus is intelligence; without
this power, necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no
crime can exist, and because . . . the infant 3 (has) no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal
liability." (Emphasis ours)
It is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of
age and below are not capable of performing a criminal
act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of age
but below fifteen are not absolutely exempt. However,
they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but
which presumption may be rebutted if it could be
proven that they were "capable of appreciating the
 nature and criminality of the act, that is, that (they)
acted with discernment." 4 The preceding discussion
shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually
embraces the concept of discernment as used in
Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited
case of People v. Doquena, supra. It could not
therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or
connotes "intent" for they refer to two different
concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a
distinct element of dolo as a means of committing an
offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa,
three (3) elements are indispensable, namely,
intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence.
Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies. However,
intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it
is necessary that a minor above nine but below fifteen
years of age be possessed with intelligence in
committing a negligent act which results in a quasi-
offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern
the rightness or wrongness of the effects of his
negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age
but below fifteen may be held liable for a said Article
would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase
"Any person . . ." without any distinction or exception
made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere
debemos.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the
words "intent" and "discernment" used under the law,
he cites the case of People v. Nieto, supra. However,
petitioner failed to present the qualifying sentence
preceding the ruling he now invokes, which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That requirement should be deemed amply met with
the allegation in the formation that she . . .’with the
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and
feloniously push one Lolita Padilla . . ." into a deep
place of the Penaranda River and as a consequence
thereof Lolita Padilla got drowned and died right then
and there.’ This allegation clearly conveys the idea that
she knew what would be the consequence of her
unlawful act of publishing her victim into deep water
and that she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis ours)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to
equate the words "intent" and discernment." What We
meant was that the combines effect of the words used
in the information is to express a knowledge, on the
part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or
rightness of her act. Hence, petitioner may not validly
contend that since the information now in question
alleged "discernment," it in effect alleged "intent." The
former may never embrace the idea of the latter; the
former expresses the thought of passivity while the
latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is
contended by the petitioner that the case against him
should have first been brought before the Lupong
Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1508,
Section 2 (3). He submits that considering his
entitlement to a two-degree privileged mitigating
circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to
his case because the penalty imposable is reduced to
not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto
mayor maximum to prision correctional medium as
prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC. This is not
correct. The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case
is determined by the penalty imposable under the law
for the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed
(People v. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People v. Purisima, 69
SCRA 314; Dioquino v. Cruz and People v. Savellano,
116 SCRA 415). The same principle applies in
constructing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x       x       x
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30
days, or a fine exceeding P200.00; . . ." (Emphasis
supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the
committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The law says ‘punishable,’ not ‘punished.’ One should
therefore consider the penalty provided for by law or
ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually
imposed in particular cases after considering the
attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability." 5 
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as
above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing
Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law
defining the offense attaches to the later should be
considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect
criminal liability must now considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since
P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous
perception has been corrected long before. As
intimated in the case of Royales v. IAC, 127 SCRA
470, and categorically stated in Ebol Vs. Amin, 135
SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this
petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the
Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September
1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla, Sarmiento and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book I, 12th Ed.,
1981, p. 213.
2. Albert, the Revised Penal Code, Manila: University
Publishing Co., Inc., 1946, p. 22.
3. Ibid., referring to article 12, Number 2. See footnote,
p. 22
4. Ibid., p. 82
5. Pe, Cecilio and Tadiar, Alfredo, "Katarungang
Pambarangay: Dynamics of Compulsory Conciliation."
Manila: UST Press, 1979 p. 65-66.
 
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 34665. August 28, 1931.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
DONATO BINDOY, Defendant-Appellant.  seen the accused stab Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not
Florentino Saguin for Appellant.  Omamdam by accident. The window testified that she knew of her
Attorney-General Jaranilla for Appellee.
DECISION
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Misamis to the penalty of twelve years and one day of
reclusión temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs
of the deceas pd in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The
crime charged against the accused is homicide, according to the
following information:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod,
municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused
Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked and with
his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a
serious wound in the chest which caused his instant death, in violation
of article 404 of the Penal Code."cralaw virtua1aw library
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his
counsel in this instance contends that the court erred in finding him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of
homicide.  Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his wound when he
The record shows that in the afternoon on May 6, 1930, a disturbance
arose in a tuba wineshop in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality
of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of the
tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas’ wife; and as she refused to
drink having already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did
not accept. There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and
Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take
away from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance
which attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who, with his
family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was
happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the
course this struggle, Bindoy succeeded in disengaging himself from
Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter’s hand towards the left
behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo
reached Emigdio Omamdam’s chest, who was then behind Bindoy. 
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy
and Pacas. Neither is there any indication that the accused was aware
of Emigdio Omamdam’s presence in the place, for, according to the
testimony of the witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants
when he left his house to satisfy his curiosity. There was no
disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam, on the
contrary, it appears they were nephew and uncle, respectively, and
were on good terms with each other. Bindoy did not try to wound
Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only
defending his possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to
wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.  Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Romualdez Villa-Real and
EN BANC
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the
description given by the sanitary inspector who attended him as he lay
dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy’s bolo. 
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced
Emigdio Omamdam’s death, but the defendant alleges that it was
caused accidentally and without malicious intent. 
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having
incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that he wounded
husband’s wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement to her
before his death. 
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that
the accused stabbed Omamdam in the chest with his bolo on that
occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas,
who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in
the chest; but, as we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he
did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in his
struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his
opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would
have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a felony
or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal
Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case. 
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the
defendant to the effect that Pacas and Bindoy were actually struggling
for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the
former had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the
very moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore
hit in the chest, without Donato’s seeing him, because Emigdio had
passed behind him. The same witness adds that he went to see
replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please
look after my wife when I die: See that she doesn’t starve," adding
further: "This wound was an accident. Donato did not aim at me, nor I
at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was not
contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal. 
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which,
had it existed, would have greatly facilitated the solution of this case.
And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United States v.
Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial
fiscals, directed to the importance of definitely ascertaining and
proving, when possible, the motives which actuated the commission of
a crime under investigation. 
"In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing
the proof of the commission of the crime by the accused is the
introduction of evidence disclosing the motives which tempted the mind
of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act."cralaw virtua1aw library
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that
the appellant is entitled to acquittal according to article 8, No. 8, Penal
Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the
accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So
ordered. 
Imperial, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-42288 February 16, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. CORNELIO BAYONA, Defendant-Appellant.
Gervasio Diaz for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
 VICKERS, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Braulio Bejasa in the Court
of First Instance of Capiz, finding the defendant guilty of a violation of
section 416 of the Election Law and sentencing him to suffer
imprisonment for thirty days and to pay a fine of P50, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The facts as found by the trial judge are as follows:
A eso de las once de la ma�ana del dia 5 de junio de 1934, mientras
se celebrahan las elecciones generales en el precinto electoral numero
4, situado en el Barrio de Aranguel del Municipio de Pilar, Provincia de
Capiz, el aqui acusado fue sorprendido por Jose E. Desiderio, que era
entonces el representante del Departamento del Interior para
inspecionar las elecciones generales en la Provincia de Capiz, y por el
comandante de la Constabularia F.B. Agdamag que iba en aquella
ocasion con el citado Jose E. Desiderio, portando en su cinto el
revolver Colt de calibre 32, No. 195382, Exhibit A, dentro del cerco que
rodeaba el edificio destinado para el citado colegio electoral numero 4
y a una distancia de 22 metros del referido colegio electoral.
Inmediatament Jose E. Desiderio se incauto del revolver en
cuestion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
La defensa, por medio del testimonio de Jose D. Benliro y de Dioscoro
Buenvenida, trato de establecer que el aqui acusado paro en la calle
que daba frente al colegio electoral numero 4 a invitacion de dicho
Jose D. Benliro y con el objeto de suplicarle al mencionado acusado
para llevar a su casa a los electores del citado Jose D. Benliro que ya
habian terminado de votar, y que cuando llegaron Jose E. Desidierio y
el comadante F.B. Agdamag, el aqui acusado estaba en la calle.
Desde el colegio electoral hasta el sitio en que, segun dichos testigos,
estaba el acusado cuando se le quito el revolver Exhibit a, hay una
distancia de 27 metros.
Appellant's attorney makes the following assignments of error:
1. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar que el apelante fue sorprendido
con su revolver dentro del cerco de la casa escuela del Barrio de
Aranguel, Municipio de Pilar, que fue habilitado como colegio
electoral.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
2. El Juzgado a quo erro al declarar al apelante culpable de la
infraccion de la Ley Electoral querrellada y, por consiguiente, al
condenarle a prision y multa.
As to the question of fact raised by the first assignment of error, it is
sufficient to say that the record shows that both Jose E. Desiderio, a
representative of the Department of the Interior, and Major Agdamag of
the Philippine Constabulary, who had been designated to supervise the
elections in the Province of Capiz, testified positively that the defendant
was within the fence surrounding the polling place when Desiderio took
possession of the revolver the defendant was carrying. This also
disposes of that part of the argument under the second assignment of
error based on the theory that the defendant was in a public road,
where he had a right to be, when he was arrested. The latter part of the
argument under the second assignment of error is that if it be
conceded that the defendant went inside of the fence, he is
nevertheless not guilty of a violation of the Election Law, because he
was called by a friend and merely approached him to find out what he
wanted and had no interest in the election; that there were many
people in the public road in front of the polling place, and the defendant
could not leave his revolver in his automobile, which he himself was
driving, without running the risk of losing it and thereby incurring in a
violation of the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
As to the contention that the defendant could not leave his revolver in
his automobile without the risk of losing it because he was alone, it is
sufficient to say that under the circumstances it was not necessary for
the defendant to leave his automobile merely because somebody
standing near the polling place had called him, nor does the record
show that it was necessary for the defendant to carry arms on that
occasion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Solicitor-General argues that since the Government does not
especially construct buildings for electoral precincts but merely utilizes
whatever building there may be available, and all election precincts are
within fifty meters from some road, a literal application of the law would
be absurd, because members of the police force or Constabulary in
pursuit of a criminal would be included in that prohibition and could not
use the road in question if they were carrying firearms; that people
living in the vicinity of electoral precincts would be prohibited from
cleaning or handling their firearms within their own residences on
registration and election days;chanrobles virtual law library
That the object of the Legislature was merely to prohibit the display of
firearms with intention to influence in any way the free and voluntary
exercise of suffrage;chanrobles virtual law library
That if the real object of the Legislature was to insure the free exercise
of suffrage, the prohibition in question should only be applied when the
facts reveal that the carrying of the firearms was intended for the
purpose of using them directly or indirectly to influence the free choice
of the electors (citing the decision of this court in the case of People vs.
Urdeleon [G.R. No. 31536, promulgated November 20, 1929, not
reported], where a policeman, who had been sent to a polling place to
preserve order on the request of the chairman of the board of election
inspectors, was acquitted); that in the case at bar there is no evidence
that the defendant went to the election precinct either to vote or to work
for the candidacy of anyone, but on the other hand the evidence shows
that the defendant had no intention to go to the electoral precinct; that
he was merely passing along the road in front of the building where the
election was being held when a friend of his called him; that while in
the strict, narrow interpretation of the law the defendant is guilty, it
would be inhuman and unreasonable to convict
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We cannot accept the reasons advanced by the Solicitor-General for
the acquittal of the defendant. The law which the defendant violated is
a statutory provision, and the intent with which he violated it is
immaterial. It may be conceded that the defendant did not intend to
intimidate any elector or to violate the law in any other way, but when
he got out of his automobile and carried his revolver inside of the fence
surrounding the polling place, he committed the act complained of, and
he committed it willfully. The act prohibited by the Election Law was
complete. The intention to intimidate the voters or to interfere otherwise
with the election is not made an essential element of the offense.
Unless such an offender actually makes use of his revolver, it would be
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to prove that he intended to
intimidate the voters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The rule is that in acts mala in se  there must be a criminal intent, but in
those mala prohibita  it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally
done. "Care must be exercised in distinguishing the difference between
the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. ..."
(U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128.)
While it is true that, as a rule and on principles of abstract justice, men
are not and should not be held criminally responsible for acts
committed by them without guilty knowledge and criminal or at least
evil intent (Bishop's New Crim. Law, vol. I, sec. 286), the courts have
always recognized the power of the legislature, on grounds of public
policy and compelled by necessity, "the great master of things", to
forbid in a limited class of cases the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer.
(U.S. vs. Go Chico, 14 Phil., 128; U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.) In
such cases no judicial authority has the power to require, in the
enforcement of the law, such knowledge or motive to be shown.
(U.S. vs. Siy Cong Bieng and Co Kong, 30 Phil., 577.)
The cases suggested by the Solicitor-General do not seem to us to
present any difficulty in the enforcement of the law. If a man with a
revolver merely passes along a public road on election day, within fifty
meters of a polling place, he does not violate the provision of law in
question, because he had no intent to perpetrate the act prohibited,
and the same thing would be true of a peace officer in pursuing a
criminal; nor would the prohibition extend to persons living within fifty
meters of a polling place, who merely clean or handle their firearms
within their own residences on election day, as they would not be
carrying firearms within the contemplation of the law; and as to the
decision in the case of People vs. Urdeleon, supra, we have recently
held in the case of People vs. Ayre, and Degracia (p. 169, ante), that a
policeman who goes to a polling place on the request of the board of
election inspectors for the purpose of maintaining order is authorized
by law to carry his arms.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

If we were to adopt the specious reasoning that the appellant should be

acquitted because it was not proved that he tried to influence or
intended to influence the mind of any voter, anybody could sell
intoxicating liquor or hold a cockfight or a horse race on election day
with impunity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As to the severity of the minimum penalty provided by law for a

violation of the provision in question, that is a matter for the Chief
Executive or the Legislature.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
the costs against the appellant.

Avance�a, C.J., Street, Abad Santos, and Hull, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000.]

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank

(ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words
against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two counts
of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and
53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the
MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge,
the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer of ADB.
The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered
by immunity from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement
between the ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the
Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country.
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune
from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed
the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration
which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it
earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review
arguing that he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that
no preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were
filed in court.chanrobles.com.ph:red

The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is covered by
immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In
receiving ex-parte the DFA’s advice and in motu proprio dismissing the
two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter’s right to
due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a right
of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed inquiry
in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged
utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time. 1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the
mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the
dropping of the charges. 2 

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which

provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy
the following privileges and immunities:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them
in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the
immunity."cralaw virtua1aw library

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the

exception that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-32485. October 22, 1970.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF
THE PETITIONER’S RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A.
No. 6132.
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS;
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION LAW, CONSTITUTIONAL,
REASONS. — The questioned provision, Section 8(a) of the
Constitutional Convention Law, is a valid limitation on the due process,
freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly
and equal protection clauses of the bill of rights of the Constitution for
the same is designed to prevent the clear and present danger of the
twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution of electoral process and
denial of the equal protection of the laws. Moreover, under the
balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing of the electoral process, the
guarantee of equal chances for all candidates and the independence of
the delegates who must be "beholden to no one but to God, country
and conscience," are interests that should be accorded primacy.
2. ID.; ID.; ID;. SEC. 8(a) OF REPUBLIC ACT 6132 NOT EX POST
FACTO LAW. — Section 8(a) of Republic Act 6132 is not an ex post
facto law for the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws
which arc given retroactive effect. While it is true that Sec. 18 penalties
a violation of any provision of R.A. 6132 including Sec. 8(a) thereof, the
penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the law
and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that
remotely insinuates that Sec. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision
thereof, shall apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the
contrary, Sec. 23 directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its
approval on August 24, 1970.
TEEHANKEE, J, dissenting.
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PAR. I OF SEC. 8(a)
OF REPUBLIC ACT 6132, UNCONSTITUTIONAL. — The challenged
provision, together with the Act’s other restrictions and strictures
enumerated therein, oppressively and unreasonable straitjacket the
candidates as well as the electorate and gravely violate the
constitutional guaranties of freedom of expression, freedom of the
press and freedom of association, and deny due process and the equal
protection of the laws. The statute stifles and curtails the right to free
political discussion.
2. ID.; ID.; STATUTES; WHEN PURPOSES THEREOF ARE
DECLARED MALA PROHIBITA.. — Laws that would regulate the
purposes for which associations and societies may be formed or would
declare their purposes mala prohibita must pass the usual
constitutional test of reasonableness, and furthermore must not abridge
freedom of speech and press.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc.,
claiming to be a duly recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit
corporation created under the laws of the land, and praying for a
determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a
declaration of petitioner’s rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7
of its petition, petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to
propagate its ideology and program of government, which materials
include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11 of said petition, petitioner
intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the
Constitutional Convention who will propagate its ideology.
Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns, because it
quoted, only the first paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it
violates the due process clause, right of association, and freedom of
expression and that it is an ex post facto law.
The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that
the questioned provision is a valid limitation on the due process,
freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of assembly
and equal protection clauses; for the same is designed to prevent the
clear and present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the
prostitution of electoral process and denial of the equal protection of
the laws. Moreover, under the balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing
of the electoral process, the guarantee of equal change for all
candidates, and the independence of the delegates who must be
"beholden to no one but to God, country and conscience," are interests
that should be accorded primacy. 1 
The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the
pronouncements in the cases of Imbong and Gonzales. 2 
The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex
post facto law is likewise untenable.
An ex post facto law is one which:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and
which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act;
(2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed;
(3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when committed;
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
commission of the offense;
(5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect
imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something which when
done was lawful; and
(6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 3 
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto
laws, the constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are
given retroactive effect. 4 
While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of
R.A. No. 6132 including Sec. 8 (a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only
for acts committed after the approval of the law and not those
perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely
insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall
apply to acts carried out prior to its approval. On the contrary, Sec. 23
directs that the entire law shall be effective upon its approval. It was
approved on August 24, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and
paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional.
Without costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Actg. C.J., Dizon, Makalintal and Castro, JJ., concur.

Zaldivar, J., reserves his vote.
Fernando, J., concurs and dissents in accordance with his separate
opinion in Imbong v. Comelec, L-32432 and Gonzales v. Comelec, L-
32443.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., reiterates his views in Gonzales and Imbong insofar as
they are relevant to the issues in this case, dissents, even as agrees
that Republic Act 6132 is not ex post facto.
Villamor, J., concurs in the sense that the law is declared not ex post
facto law and dissents as to the rest.
Concepcion, C.J., is on official leave.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Court’s decision reaffirms its split-vote ruling last September 11,
1970 in Imbong v. Ferrer and Gonzales v. Comelec 1 upholding the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 8(a) of Republic Act
6132. Inasmuch as I was unable to participate in the said cases, 2 I
have expressed my contrary view in my separate dissenting opinion in
Badoy, Jr. v. Ferrer 3 that the challenged provision, together with the
Act’s other restrictions and strictures enumerated therein, "oppressively
and unreasonably strait-jacket the candidates as well as the electorate
and gravely violate the constitutional guaranties of freedom of
expression, freedom of the press and freedom of association, and deny
due process and the equal protection of the laws."cralaw virtua1aw
library
I therefore dissent from the Court’s decision at bar for the same reason
and considerations stated in my separate dissenting opinion in the
case of Badoy.
I only wish to add a few words on the statements in the main opinion in
Imbong-Gonzales that" (W)hile it may be true that a party’s support of a
candidate is not wrong per se, it is equally true that Congress in the
exercise of the broad law-making authority can declare certain acts as
mala prohibita when justified by the exigencies of the times. One such
act is the party or organization support prescribed in Sec. 8 (a), which
ban is a valid limitation on the freedom of association as well as
expression, for the reasons aforestated. Senator Tolentino emphasized
that ‘equality of chances may be better attained by banning all
organization support.’" 
I trust that said statements were not intended, and should not be
construed, as endorsing the contention of Senator Tolentino, the Act’s
sponsor, that" (T)he protection of the Constitution cannot be invoked
for the right of association when the purpose is a malum prohibitum
because such purpose would be ‘contrary to law’" and" (O)nce the ban
(on party and organization support) is approved into law, the freedom
of association cannot be invoked against it" — since the Constitution
decrees only that" (T)he right to form associations or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged." 4  of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar. 6
Such a concept of malum prohibitum vis-a-vis the Constitutional
guarantee of freedom of association which has its root in the Malolos
Constitution would render sterile and meaningless the Constitutional
safeguard, should Congress be conceded, in the exercise of its broad
law-making authority, the power to strike down at any time associations
and societies by the simple expedient of declaring their purposes or
certain activities, not wrong per se, as "contrary to law" or mala
prohibita. I believe that such a concept begs the question. Obviously,
the word "law" in the qualifying clause "for purposes not contrary to
law" does not mean that an enactment of the legislature forecloses the
question with finality and sounds the death-knell. Laws that would
regulate the purposes for which associations and societies may be
formed or would declare their purposes mala prohibita must pass the
usual constitutional test of reasonableness and furthermore, must not
abridge freedom of speech and press. 5 
Endnotes:
1. Imbong v. Comelec, L-32432 and Gonzales v. Comelec, L-32443,
September 11, 1970.
2. Ibid.
3. Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, Mekin v. Wolfe, 2 Phil. 74.
4. Fernandez v. Oasan, L-9141, Sept. 25, 1956, 99 Phil. 934, 937.
1. Nos. L-32432 and L-32443, jointly decided.
2. The writer hereof was then on official leave.
3. Nos. L-32456 and L-32551, October 17, 1970.
4. Sponsorship speech of Senator Arturo Tolentino of July 20, 1970,
notes in parentheses furnished; emphasis copied; cit, Art, III, Sec. 1(6),
Philippine Constitution.
5. See 2 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, 209.
necessary to determine if petitioner’s case falls within the ambit of
Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the
chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the
opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of
a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. 3 The
imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions.
It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his
personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by
his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction. 4 It appears that even the government’s chief
legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken
by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an
action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by
the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.
5 As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of
official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter
Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked
only when specifically granted by law. 7 The rule on criminal procedure
is clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling
within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. 8 Besides, the absence of
preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction nor
does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective. 9 
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 13005. October 10, 1917. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AH SING, Defendant-
Appellant. 
Antonio Sanz for Appellant.  article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for Appellee.  soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with
SYLLABUS
1. OPIUM LAW; ILLEGAL IMPORTATION, WHEN EXISTS. — Section
4, Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law) construed as follows: Any person
unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine
Islands when the prohibited drug is found under this person’s control
on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within
the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person
is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances
exist or the defense proves otherwise. United States v. Look Chaw
([1910]), 18 Phil., 573), and United States v. Jose ([1916]), 34 Phil.,
840), distinguished. 
2. ID.; ID. — Defendant purchased opium in Saigon, brought it on
board a foreign vessel, and had it under his control when that vessel
arrived after direct voyage in the port of Cebu. Held: To constitute
illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine
Islands.
DECISION
MALCOLM, J.  :
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No.
2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years imprisonment,
to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.  it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium be
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of
China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The
Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on
April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The
defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on
board the steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession
during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the
port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search
found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes
below the boiler of the steamer’s engine. The defendant confessed that
he was the owner of this opium, and that he had purchased it in
Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the
opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited
drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to
show that the intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium
into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.  before entry of the Custom House. (U.S. v. Lyman [U.S. ], 26 Fed.
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands
been proven?
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court,
but with the intimation that there exists inconsistency between the
doctrines laid down in the two cases. However, neither decision is
directly a precedent on the facts before us. 
In the case of United States v. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the
opinion handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found — 
"That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in
these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports,
does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of
this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the
present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the
place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in the
said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an
agreement under an international treaty."cralaw virtua1aw library
A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the
facts in the present instance is readily observable. In the Look Chaw
case, the charge was the illegal possession and sale of opium — in the
present case the charge is illegal importation of opium; in the Look
Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit — in the present case the
foreign vessel was not in transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was
landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil — in the present case the
opium was not landed by the defendant. In the case of United States v.
Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which
resolution turned, was that in a prosecution based on the illegal
importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the Government must
prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the
vessel from which the drug is discharged came into Philippine waters
from a foreign country with the drug on board. In the Jose case, the
defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the opium
was imported from a foreign country; in the present case there is no
question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu. However, in
the opinion in the Jose case, we find the following which may be obiter
dicta, but which at least is interesting as showing the view of the writer
of the opinion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying
discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the
opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat
destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a
port of the Philippine Islands with intent to discharge its cargo."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Resolving whatever doubt may exist as to the authority of the views
just quoted, we return to an examination of the applicable provisions of
the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any
person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug into the
Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The
Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of
going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence of
importation. (The Mary [U.S. ], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the
importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but
merely the bringing them into port; and the importation is complete
Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots v. U.S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As applied to the
Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or
brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the
prohibited drug is found under this person’s control on a vessel which
has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional
limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal
importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the
defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be
absurd to think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and
forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of so doing. It
would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so
large an amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation
being possible, the logical deduction is that the defendant intended this
opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find
that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into
the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let
it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in
transit, a situation not present. 

The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court being
within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be
affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered. 

Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Carson, Araullo and Street, JJ., concur.


EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-6486. March 2, 1911.]
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL B.
CATOLICO, Defendant-Appellant.  said actions be attached (so called in the record) and delivered to him
B. Pobre for Appellant.  petition of the plaintiff, ordered said sums attached and delivered same
Acting Attorney-General Harvey for Appellee.  for each attachment, conditioned that he would respond for the
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; PRESUMPTION OF
CRIMINAL INTENT. — In order to constitute a crime the act must,
except with respect to crimes made such by statute, be accompanied
by criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty to
consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime i not committed if the
mind of the person performing the accomplained of is innocent.  Upon these facts the Acting Attorney-General recommends the
2. ID., ID.; ACT COMPLAINED OF MUST BE UNLAWFUL. — The
presumption of criminal intent does not arise from the proof of the
commission of an act unless the act itself be unlawful. And where the
facts proven for the purpose of raising the presumption of criminal
intent are accompanied by other facts which show that the act
complained of was not unlawful, the presumption does not arise.  done in good faith under the belief that he was acting judicially and
3. ID.; ACT NO. 1740; MALVERSATION; "PRIMA FACIE" CASE;
PRESUMPTION. — While Act No. 1740 provides that: "In all
prosecutions for violations of the preceding section (sec. 1), the
absence of any of the public funds or property of which any person
described in said section has charge, and any failure or inability of such
person to produce all the funds and property properly in his charge on
demand of any officer authorized to examine or inspect such person,
office, treasury, or depositary shall be deemed to be prima facie
evidence that such missing funds or property have been put to
personal use or used for personal ends by such person within the
meaning of the preceding section," yet such a presumption is a
rebuttable one and constitutes only a prima facie case against the
accused person, and when the prosecution in presenting its case
against the accused, introduces evidence showing that the money or
property had not been put to personal use by the defendant, the
presumption of guilt does not arise.
DECISION
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Cagayan, Hon. Charles A. Low presiding, convicting the
defendant of the crime of malversation of public funds and sentencing
him to two months’ imprisonment, to perpetual disqualification to hold
public office or public employment of any kind, and to the payment of
the costs.  exceeded his authority as such court and passed beyond the limits of
It appears from the proofs of the prosecution that the accused as
justice of the peace of Baggao, Province of Cagayan, on the 2d day of
October, 1909, had before him sixteen separate civil cases
commenced by Juan Canillas against sixteen distinct individuals, each
one for damages resulting from a breach of contract; that said cases
were all decided by the appellant in favor of the plaintiff; that each one
of the defendant in said cases appealed from the decision of the justice
of the peace and deposited P16 as required by law, at the same time
giving a bond of P50, each one of which was approved by the court;
that on the 12th day of said month the plaintiff in said cases presented
a writing to the appellant as said justice of the peace, alleging that the
sureties on the said bonds were insolvent and later demonstrated this
to the satisfaction of the appellant; that thereupon the latter ordered the
cancellation of the said bonds and, in the same order, required each of
the appellants to file another bond within fifteen days, that, inasmuch
as none of the appellants in said causes presented new bonds within
the time fixed, the plaintiff in said causes applied to the appellant, as
said court, for an order declaring final the judgment entered in each of
the said sixteen cases and commanding the execution of the same, at
the same time asking that the sums deposited by the defendants in
in satisfaction of said judgments; that the accused acceded to the
to the plaintiff, at the same time requiring of the plaintiff a bond of P50
damages which should result from such attachment. 
After this attachment (so called) the attorney for the defendants in the
said sixteen cases presented a complaint against the appellant to the
Court of First Instance, by virtue of which said court ordered that the
plaintiff, Juan Canillas, deliver to the clerk of the Court of First Instance
the sums deposited by the defendants in said actions. Canillas obeyed
the order of the court and made the delivery as required. 
acquittal of the accused. We are in entire accord with that
recommendation. The case made against the appellant lacks many of
the essential elements required by law to be present in the crime of
malversation of public funds. The accused did not convert the money to
his own use or to the use of any other person; neither did he
feloniously permit anybody else to convert it. Everything he did was
correctly. The fact that he ordered the sums, deposited in his hands by
the defendants appellants in the sixteen actions referred to, attached
for the benefit of the plaintiff in those actions, after the appeals had
been dismissed and the judgments in his court had become final, and
that he delivered the said sums to the plaintiff in satisfaction of the
judgment which he held in those cases, can not be considered an
appropriation or a taking of said sums within the meaning of Act No.
1740. He believed that, as presiding officer of the court of justice of the
peace, he had a perfect right under the law to cancel the bonds when it
was clearly shown to him that the sureties thereon were insolvent, to
require the filing of new undertakings, giving the parties ample time
within which to do so, to dismiss the appeals in case said undertakings
were not filed, and to declare the judgment final. He believed that after
said appeals had been dismissed and said judgment had become final,
the sums deposited were subject to be applied in payment of the
judgments in the actions in which said sums had been deposited and
that he was acting judicially and legally in making such applications. 
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such
by statute, be accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence
or indifference to duty or to consequences, as, in law, is equivalent to
criminal intent. The maxim is, actus non facit reum, nisi mens rea — a
crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of be innocent. 
In the case at bar the appellant was engaged in exercising the
functions of a court of justice of the peace. He had jurisdictions of the
actions before him. He had a right and it was his duty to require the
payment by each appellant of P16, as well as the giving of a proper
undertaking with solvent sureties. While, in dismissing the appeals and
delivering the P256 to the plaintiff in the said cases, he may have
his jurisdiction and power, a question we do not now discuss or decide,
it was, so far as appears from the record, at most a pure mistake of
judgment, an error of the mind operating upon a state of facts. Giving
the act complained of the signification most detrimental to the
appellant, it, nevertheless, was simply the result of the erroneous
exercise of the judicial function, and not an intention to deprive any
person of his property feloniously. His act had back of it the purpose to
do justice to litigants and not to embezzle property. He acted that
honest debts might be paid to those to whom they were legally and
justly due, and not to enrich himself or another by criminal
misappropriation. It was an error committed by a court, not an act done
by a criminal-minded man. It was a mistake, not a crime. 

It is true that a presumption of criminal intention may arise from proof of

the commission of a criminal act; and the general rule is that, if it is
proved that the accused committed the criminal act charged, it will be
presumed that the act was done with criminal intention, and that it is for
the accused to rebut this presumption. But it must be borne in mind
that the act from which such presumption springs must be a criminal
act. In the case before us the act was not criminal. It may have been an
error; it may have been wrong and illegal in the sense that it would
have been declared erroneous and set aside on appeal or other
proceeding in the superior court. It may well be that his conduct was
arbitrary to a high degree, to such a degree in fact as properly to
subject him to reprimand or even suspension or removal from office.
But, from the facts of record, it was not criminal. As a necessary result
no presumption of criminal intention arises from the act. 

Neither can the presumption of a criminal intention arise from the act
complained of, even though it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that
of malversation of public funds as defined and penalized in Act No.
1740. It is true that that Act provides that "In all prosecutions for
violations of the preceding section, the absence of any of the public
funds or property of which any person described in said section has
charge, and any failure or inability of such person to produce all the
funds and property properly in his charge on the demand of any officer
authorized to examine or inspect such person, office, treasury, or
depositary shall be deemed to be prima facie evidence that such
missing funds or property have been put to personal uses or used for
personal ends by such person within the meaning of the preceding
section." Nevertheless, that presumption is a rebuttable one and
constitutes only a prima facie case against the person accused. If he
present evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or
property to personal uses, then that presumption is at an end and the
prima facie case destroyed. In the case at bar it was necessary for the
accused to offer any such evidence, for the reason that the people’s
own pleading alleged, and its own proofs presented, along with the
criminal charge, facts which showed, of themselves, that said money
had not been put to personal uses or used for personal ends. In other
words, the prosecution demonstrated, both by the allegations in its
information filed against the accused and by its proofs on the trial, that
the absence of the funds in question was not due to the personal use
thereof by the accused, thus affirmatively and completely negativing
the presumption which, under the act quoted, arises from the absence
of the funds. The presumption was never born. It never existed. The
facts which were presented for the purpose of creating such
presumption were accompanied by other facts which absolutely
prevented its creation. 

On the other hand, if it be admitted that the crime, if any, is that of

estafa, as defined in paragraph 5 of article 535 of the Penal Code, then
the presumption just referred to does not arise. Mere absence of the
funds is not sufficient proof of conversion. Neither is the mere failure of
the accused to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make
even a prima facie case. (U. S. v. Morales, 15 Phil. Rep., 236; U. S. v.
Dominguez, 2 Phil. Rep., 580.) Conversion must be affirmatively
proved, either by direct evidence or by the production of facts from
which conversion necessarily follows. (U. S. v. Morales, supra.) 

The judgment of conviction is reversed and the defendant ordered

discharged from custody forthwith. 

Arellano, C.J., Mapa and Trent, JJ., concur. 

Separate Opinions

CARSON, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I am strongly inclined to doubt the bona fides of the defendant in the

transactions herein set out, but in the absence of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt upon this point I concur in the judgment of acquittal
of the crime charged in the information.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3008 March 19, 1951
FEDERICO SORIANO, Petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Felix V. Macalalag for petitioner.
First Assistance Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Acting
Solicitor Antonio Consing for respondent.
JUGO, J.:
Federico Soriano was charged on August 22, 1945, with the crime of
theft of one electric motor marked "Cyclix," with Western Electric
Company cable, and one lantern slide projector, with their
corresponding accessories, for the operation of motion pictures, valued
at P6,000, belonging to the eagle Cinema Co., Inc., represented by its
President Manager, Teodoro S.
Benedicto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After trial he was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and
sentenced to suffer and indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months
of arresto mayor  to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, with the accessory penalties of the law,
and to pay the costs. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
modified the above judgment and sentenced him to three (3) months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and
twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional, as maximum, with the
accessory penalties of the law, and to pay the costs, ordering the
lantern slide projector (Exhibit C) and the "Cyclix" motor generator
(Exhibit D) be returned to the owner, the Eagle Cinema Co.,
Inc.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant filed a petition for certiorari in this Court against the
Court of Appeals. Only questions of law are raised which may be
reduced to the issue whether or not the acts of the accused, as found
by the Court of Appeals, Constitute
theft.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals, in a carefully prepared opinion, held as follows:
Taking into account the respective contentions of the parties and the
evidence produced in support thereof, We are of the opinion despite
Emilia Saenz' letter (Exhibit E) where she writes to Benedicto that
Federico Soriano was only in charge of collecting the rents and of
transmitting them to her, that appellant was their representative and
duly appointed substitute administrator in her stead. It seems also clear
that, because of the disturbance caused by the war, the Eagle Cinema
Co., Inc., was indebted to the Saenz for rents due on account of the
lease; and that appellant in the exercise of the powers conferred upon
him (Exhibit 16) could have sued said debtor to foreclose the mortgage
executed by the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., in favor of his principals, if he
could not have come to a better understanding with Teodoro S.
Benedicto. It is no longer disputed that the properties of the Eagle
Cinema Co., Inc., in the building were losts, and that the lantern slide
projector (Exhibit C) and the "Cyclix" motor generator (Exhibit D) have
been found in the house and in the possession of the appellant after
having repeatedly denied any knowledge of the equipment and
accessories of the Cine and disclined any responsibility for their loss.
Considering these facts that have been fully established in the case,
and particularly the manner and circumstances under which said
projector and generator were taken from the building of the Eagle-
Theater, can appellant be held liable for the crime of theft of such
properties?chanrobles virtual law library
Counsel for appellant contends that the latter is entitled to an acquittal,
because in the case at barchanrobles virtual law library
1. All the elements of theft are not present;chanrobles virtual law library
2. There was no criminal intent (on the part of the
appellant);chanrobles virtual law library
3. The action of the appellant is susceptible of two interpretations, both
consistent with his innocence or guilt. Therefore, he should be
acquitted; andchanrobles virtual law library
4. The guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The crime of theft of which appellant stands charged and convicted, is
covered by the 1st paragraph of Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
which read as follows:
ART. 308 Who are liable for theft. - Theft is committed by any person
who, with intent of gain but without violence against or intimidation of
persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter's consent.
and we agree with counsel for appellant that in order to justify a
conviction for theft the following elements must concur,
namely:chanrobles virtual law library
(a) that a chattel or personal property must have been taken or
abstracted; (b) that there be intent of gian when the taking away of the
article took place; (c) that the property stolen be owned by another; and
(d) that in the taking, neither violence of intimidation against persons or
force upon things be employed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
With regard to the "taking," appellant contends that he did not execute
this element of theft because being an attornye-in-fact of the heirs of
Saenz, he acted for his principals, and for all intents and purposes of
the power conferred upon him, he was the principal himself and,
naturlly, he could not steal something belonging to him under the
principle that "Rei nostrae furtum facera non pos sumus". The power of
attorney (Exhibit 16) clearly empowered the appellant "to ask, demand,
sue for, recover, collect and receipt for any and all sums of money . . .
and other things of value of whatever nature or kind," and gave him
"full power to do anything requisite and necessary to be done in the
premises as fully as I (Emilia Saenz) could if persnally preent, hereby
ratifying and confirming all that my said attorney adn substitute attorney
shall lawfully do or cause to be done by virtue hereof." But appellant
fails to take two important factors into condieration, to writ: firstly, that
when he took, as he finally admitted to have taken, the lantern slike
projector and the "Cyclix" motor generator from the Eagle-Theater, he
did not really act in behal and representation of this principals, for
otherwise he would not have repeatedly denied having taken said
properties and insiunated that they had been taken by the Japanese;
and secondly, that even his principals could not have taken and
appropriated said properties for themselves without previous and
proper action in court, because no mortgage creditor can foreclose the
property mortgage to him witout judicial proceedings. Thus, the
doctrones laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. Reyes, (Phil., 441); People vs. Soriano, (50 Phil.,
203) Manila Mercantile Co. vs. Flores (50 Phil., 759) and Levy
Hermanos, Inc., vs. Ramirez  (60 Phil., 978), on which appellant builds
up his contention, are of no bearing onte case at
bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Discussing further this element of "taking," it can be added that the
projector (Exhibit C) and the generator (Exhibit D) were in the premises
of the Eagle Theather, and that sometime in September, 1944, when
the Japanese Ishii ceased to operate the Cine, appellant received the
keys of the building where said equipment was stored. So, the question
that remains to be determined in connection with this point is whether
appellant, having received those  properties, could, for the purposes of
the crime of theft, take things already in his possession. If is to be
remembered that the apparatus, accessories and equipment of the
Cine belonged to the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., though they were
mortgaged to appellant's principals; that the mortgage was never
foreclosed, and that neither Teodoro S. Benedicto, as President,
General Manager and majority stockholder of said corporation, nor any
other duly authorized person in this stead, had ever entrusted said
poroperties to him for the execution of the mortgage, or for any other
purpose. And even conceding for the sake of argument that with the
return of the keys and the delivery of the building to appellant, he would
have received the physical possession of the machinery therein
located, yet, the acquisition of such possesion did not carry with it the
power to exercise any act of dominion over said chattels. Among the
leading cases that can be cited to illustrate this phase of the problem,
we quote the following from Question No. XXXI of Viada (vol. 3, page
433, 4th ed.):
"Is the shepherd, who takes away and converts to his own use several
head of cattle under his care, guilty of the crime of estafa within case
No. 5 of articl 548, or of theft, defined and punished in article 533, No.
2, of the Spanish Penal Code" - The Supreme Court has decided that it
was this latter and more serious crime that was committed:
"Considering that the crime of theft is committed when one, with intent
of gain, and without using violence or intimidation against persons, or
force upon things, takes away personal property of another without the
owner's consent; and in the present case Manuel Diaz Castilla
undoubtedly commited the crime defined, for, with intent of gian, he
took away two bucks and a female goat, against the will of his mater,
the owner of said animals, which were under his care as shepherd;
Considering that, in holding that the crime committed was that of theft
and not of estafa, as claimed by the appellant, ignorant of the true
elements which constitute the latter crime, the lower court did not
commit any error of law, nor violate any legal provision, as contended
by defendant's counsel in support of this appeal." (Decision rendered
on June 23, 1886, published in the Gazette of September 16, p. 189.)
And this is so, because as stated in the case of United
States vs. Nieves de Vera, (43 Phil. 1000):
When the delivery of a chattel or cattle has not the effect of transferring
the juridicial possession thereof, or title thereto, it is presumed that the
possession of, and title to, the thing so delivered remains in the owner;
and the act of disposing thereof with intent of gain and without the
consent of the owner constitutes the crime of theft.
As to the element of "intent of gain," We further declare that whenever
a cattle or other personal property vlaue is abstracted witout the
consent of the owner, an dthe evidence on record does not show any
other reason for the abstraction, it is to be presumed and logically
inferred that such act was motivated by an intent of gain. (Decision, pp.
7-12.)
The petitioner shields himself behind the power-of-attorney, Exhibit 16,
granted to him by Emilia Saenz, the owner of the building which was
rented by the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., the essential part of which reads
as follows:
To ask, take, sue for, recover, collect and receive any and all sums of
money, debts, dues, accounts, interests, demands, and other things of
value of whatsover nature or kind  as may be or hereafter be due,
owing, payable or belonging to the community entrusted to me (Emilia
Saenz) in the City of Iloilo an dto have, use, and take any and all lawful
ways and means for the recovery thereof by suit, attachement or
otherwise, and to compromise, settle and agree for the same;
(Decision, pp. 5-6.)
It is clear tha tsaid power of attorney did not authorize the petitioner to
take away the projector and the generator, hiding them in his house
and denying to the owner and the police authorities that he had them in
his possessions, which was an illegal act, not covered by his power-of-
attorney. He was authrorized only to adk, take, sue for, recover, collect,
etc., sums of money, debts, dues, accounts and other things which
were or might thereafter be due, etc., to his principal Emilia Saenz.
This authority referred mainly to the collection of the rents of the
building rented by the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc. The projector and the
generator were not due or owing to Emilia Saenz. It is not to be
supposed that Saenz herself would have denied the possession of
those articles. It is was the purpose of the petitioner only to protect
those instruments from looting, there is o reason why he should have
concealed them from the owner and denied having
them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Even thogh the equipment, including those articles, were mortgaged to
Sanez to guaantee the payment of the rents due on the building, yet
there had been no faoreclosure and neither she nor the petitioner had
the authority to take away and conceal those articles from teh owner or
the police authorities. The Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., had the right to
possess said articles.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
With regard to the element of taking or asportation, there is not doubt
that it existed, notwithstanding that the peititioner had been entreusted
with the keys of the building werhe they were kept. This point has been
settled by Viada, numerious decisions of the Supreme court of Spain
and of the Philippines, some of which authorities are cited
above.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
As to the element of intent, it is clear that whent the petitioner caried
away and concealed from teh owner and the police authorities the
above-mentioned articles, he acted with intent of gian. Intent is a
mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a
person, which in the present case unmistakably point to that
intent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing, the petition for the writ of certiorari is denied,
with costs against the petitioner. so
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor and
Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions chanrobles virtual law library
PARAS, J.,  dissenting:chanrobles virtual law library
I dissent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner cannot rightly be convicted of the crime of theft, because he
had not acted with intent of gain. The Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., was
indebted to the Saenz heirs (represented by Emilia Saenz) for rents of
a building leased by the company. The apparatus, accessories and
equipment of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc, contained in the leased
building, were mortgaged to Saenz to secure the payment of siad
rents. The petitioner was the representative and duly appointed
substitute administrator of the premises, in place of Emilia Saenz.
Indeed, the petitioner could have sued the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., and
foreclosed its mortgage.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The fact that the lantern slide projector and the "Cyclix" morot
generator forming part of the equipment of the Eagle Co., Inc., were
taken by the petitioner (after the Japanese Ishii, who had ceased to
operate the business, delivered to the petitioner the keys of the building
where said equipment was stored) and removed to and kept in
petitioner's house, is consistent with the theory that the petitioner, to
protect the interest of his principals, in good faith believed that he had
the right to do so under his powers and by virtue of the mortgage
covering said equipment, espcially because the petitioner was
empowered not only to recover, collect or receive money, debts or
dues, but also to take or recover "other things of value of whatsover
nature or kind" that may be due from the lessee. That the petitioner
was wrong in his belief, or had been so over-zealous in the matter as to
have even denied that the articles in question were in this possession,
made him at most civilly liable but does not go to show that he acted
with intent of personal porofit. The intent of gain cannot be inferred
from the bare acts of the petitioner, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of the case that supply plausible reasons for said acts.
Had he sold or tried to dispose of the articles, intent of gain would have
been established.

 
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-30801. March 27, 1974.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DOMINGO
URAL, Accused-Appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonlo
A. Torres and Solicitor Vicente P. Evangelista for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.:
This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of
Judge Vicente G. Ericta of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in
the sum of twelve thousand pesos and to pay the costs (Criminal Case
No. 3280).
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido
Alberto, a twenty-six year old former detention prisoner in Buug,
Zamboanga del Sur. He had been accused of murder and then set at
liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting bail. He went to Barrio Camongo,
Dumalinao where his father resided. On July 31, 1966, he intended to
go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug but night overtook
him in the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug municipal building
where there would be more security.
Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o’clock, he
witnessed an extraordinary occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with
whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was boxing the
detention prisoner, Felix Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows,
Napola collapsed on the floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped on his
prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a
bottle. He poured its contents on Napola’s recumbent body. Then, he
ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in agony. He
shouted for help. Nobody came to succor him.
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left
the municipal building. Before his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You
better keep quiet of what I have done" (sic) Alberio did not sleep
anymore that night. From the municipal building, he went to the
crossing, where the cargo trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a truck
hauling iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the
thirty-year old victim, whom she treated twice, sustained second-
degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-half of
the body including the back (Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and
epidermis were burned. If the burns were not properly treated, death
would unsue from toxemia and tetanus infection. "Without any medical
intervention", the burns would "cause death", she said. She explained
that, because there was water in the burnt area, secondary infection
would set in, or there would be complications.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a
certificate of death indicating "burn" as the cause of death (Exh. B).
The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the
prosecution (represented by Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor,
Delfin Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the prosecution’s failure to
present as witnesses Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the
detention prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. They had
executed a joint affidavit which was one of the bases of the information
for murder. 1 
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim’s widow, who was present in
court, was a vital witness who should have been presented as a
witness to prove the victim’s dying declaration or his statements which
were part of the res gestae. 2 
In this appeal appellant’s three assignment of error may be condensed
into the issue of credibility or the sufficiency of the prosecution’s
evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
His story is that at around nine o’clock in the evening of July 31, 1966
he was in the municipal jail on guard duty. He heard a scream for help
from Napola. He entered the cell and found Napola’s shirt in flames.
With the assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed
Napola’s shirt. Ural did not summon a doctor because, according to
Napola, the burns were not serious. Besides, he (Ural) was alone in
the municipal building.
Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc’s common-law wife, whom the trial court
branded "as a complete liar", testified that she heard Napola’s scream
for help. She saw that Napola’s shirt was burning but she did not know
how it happened to be burned. She said that Ural and Siton removed
the shirt of Napola and put out the fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard
by Ural at eight-thirty in the evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that
Alberio was in the municipal building at eight o’clock. 
The trial court held that Ural’s denials cannot prevail over the positive
testimony of Alberio. It observed that Ural’s alleged act of removing
Napola’s burning shirt was at most an indication that he was "belatedly
alarmed by the consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that
he was not the incendiary.
Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in
assailing the credibility of Alberio, pointed out that he was not listed as
a prosecution witness and that he was convicted of murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible
witness. It should be noted that the accused was a policeman.
Ordinarily, a crime should be investigated by the police. In this case,
there was no police investigation. The crime was investigated by a
special counsel of the fiscal’s office. That might explain why it was not
immediately discovered that Alberio was an eyewitness of the atrocity
perpetrated by Ural.
The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc’s common-law wife, and
Policeman Matugas are compatible with the prosecution’s theory that
Ural burned Napola’s shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue is: who should
be given credence, Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court
which had the advantage of seeing their demeanor and behavior on
the witness stand, chose to believe Alberio. This Court, after a
searching scrutiny of the whole record, does not find any justification
for disbelieving Alberio.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which
provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended." The presumption is "that a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c],
Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que
es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause
of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). "Conforme a dicha
doctrina no alteran la relacion de causalidad las condiciones
preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicas del lesionado, la
predisposicion del ofendido, la constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni
las condiciones concomitantes (la falta de medicos para asistir al
herido); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el ttanos, la pulmon!a,
o la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello
Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th Ed., 1968, p. 335-336).

The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the
accused was the cause of the cause of death, no more is required" (40
C.J.S. 854). So, where during a quarrel, the accused struck the victim
with a lighted lamp, which broke and fell to the floor, causing the oil to
ignite and set fire to the rug, and, in the course of the scuffle, which
ensued on the floor, the victim’s clothes caught fire, resulting in burns
from which he died, there was a sufficient causal relation between the
death and the acts of the accused to warrant a conviction of homicide
(Williams v. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40 C.J.S. 854, note 90).
There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon
another person, which result in the death of the latter, is guilty of the
crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not receive
proper medical attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility"
(U.S. v. Escalona, 12 Phil. 54). In the Escalona case, the victim was
wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused death had it been
properly treated. The victim died sixty days after the infliction of the
wound. It was held that lack of medical care could not be attributed to
the wounded man the person who inflicted the wound was responsible
for the result thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire
(incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248, Revised Penal Code; People v. Masin, 64
Phil. 757; U.S. v. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440). 3  by us and on same date our companions inside the said jail were
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his
public position (Par. 1, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code). He could not
have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard duty.
Because of his position, he had access to the cell where Napola was
confined The prisoner was under his custody. "The policeman, who
taking advantage of his public position maltreats a private citizen,
merits no judicial leniency. The methods sanctioned by medieval
practice are surely not appropriate for an enlightened democratic
civilization. While the law protects the police officer in the proper
discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively
protect the individual from the abuse of the police." (U. S. v. Pabalan,
37 Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that
the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal code). It is manifest from
the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His
design was only to maltreat him may be because in his drunken
condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the detention
cell. When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act,
he allowed Napola to secure medical treatment at the municipal
dispensary.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic
aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial
court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the
medium period of the penalty for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised
Penal Code).
Finding no error in the trial court’s judgment, the same is affirmed with
costs against the Appellant.
So ordered.
Zaldivar and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., concurs with the qualification set forth in the observation
of Justice Barredo.
Antonio, J., did not take part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Except for the unnecessary reference to the supposed statement of
the deceased to his wife and the joint affidavit of Ogoc and De la
Serna, all of which were not properly presented in evidence, hence it is
preferable not to mention them in order to avoid any suspicion that our
judgment has been influenced by factors other than evidence duly
presented in court, I concur.
Endnotes:
1.’Republic of the Philippines . . . .)
Province of Zamboanga del Sur . . . .)
Municipality of Pagadian
JOINT-AFFIDAVIT
WE, ERNESTO OGOC, married, and JUANITO DE LA CERNA,
single, both of legal age, farmers, residents of Lakewood, Lapuyan,
Zamboanga del Sur and at Buug, Zamboanga del Sur, respectively,
after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose
and say:
That both of us were confined inside the municipal jail of Buug,
Zamboanga del Sur on July 31, 1966 for offenses allegedly committed
Anisio Siton and Felix Napola, the latter being confined for being
drunk;
That at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less on July 31,
1966, our policeman guard by the name of Domingo Ural entered the
jail and called for Felix Napola. He called for him and told him that
Felix Napola is aggressive. When Felix Napola went near Domingo
Ural, the latter boxed him at his lower chin and he fell to the cement
floor of the jail. He kicked him also at the same spot after Felix Napola
fell to the floor. Because Felix Napola cannot stand anymore, Domingo
Ural got a bottle and poured the contents of said bottle to the dress of
Felix Napola. Domingo Ural lighted a match and burned the spot
where the substance in the bottle was poured in the dress of Felix
Napola. The dress of Felix Napola got burned and Felix Napola got
burned. He was forced to stand up and asked mercy from Domingo
Ural. Instead Domingo Ural locked the jail and went out and Domingo
Ural threatened us not to talk about the burning of Felix Napola to
anybody or else he will burn us also.
When Felix Napola was already suffering much from the burns he
sustained, Ural became frightened and he and Inesio Siton helped put
out the fire.
Affiants further sayeth none.
(SGD.) Ernesto Ogoc (SGD.) Juanito de la Cerna
ERNESTO OGOC JUANITO DE LA CERNA
(Affiant) (Affiant)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 19th day of
September, 1966 hereat Pagadian, Zamboanga del Sur.
(SGD.) Basilio T. Roque
BASILIO T. ROQUE
Special Counsel"
2. Mrs. Napola (Mapola) testified at the preliminary investigation
conducted by Basilio T. Roque, a special counsel, that she learned
from a neighbor that her husband suffered burns in the municipal jail in
the evening of July 31, 1966. Her husband told her that Policeman
Ural had burned him. Ural allowed her to bring Napola to the
dispensary where he was treated. Because of the injuries on his
mouth and his swollen gums, he could not eat and move his head. He
was confined in jail due to drunkenness. He was burned from the waist
up to the neck and on the back and right arm. She reported the case
to the mayor. That functionary said that he would not take any hand in
the case. Mrs. Napola was cross-examined by Ural’s counsel.

At the same preliminary investigation the witnesses, Ernesto Ogoc and

Juanito de la Serna, testified and were cross-examined by Ural’s
counsel. The accused presented evidence at the preliminary
investigation.

3. "Un sujeto, despues de cohabitar con una prostituta, encendio un

mixto que aplic" a uno de los latones de petroleo que habia proximos
la cama en que yacieron, inflam ndose el contenido de aqul y cayendo
el liquido sobre la prostituta, que falleci" a consequencia de las
quemaduras.

El Tribunal Supremo declara:

Que segun el articulo 418 del Codigo penal, es reo de asesinato el

que por medio de incendio mata persona que no le est ligada por
alguno de los vinculos familiares señalados en el art. 417,
entendindose empleado el incendio en este concepto juridico cuando
se mata" intenta matar por medio de fuego aplicado directa"
immediamente sobre la persona objeto de la accion criminal, siempre
que lo sea con riesgo de propagacion cosas distintas, en cualquiera
de las condiciones previstas en el capitulo 7., titulo 13 del libro 2. del
Codigo penal; cuyo medio de ejecucion de aquel delito, principal en la
intencion del culpable estima la ley con el grave car cter que atribuye
tambin a la inundacion y al empleo del veneno, no solo por los
peligros que implica, sino igualmente por la notoria malicia, semejante
la alevosia, que revela la accion que para su xito no se detiene ante el
respeto de otros derechos que pone en inminente riesgo" quebranta y
lesiona impulso de decidida resolucion.

Que todas estas consideraciones aparecen manifiestas en el acto

ejecutado por el procesado, puesto que voluntariamente emple" el
petroleo inflamado para lesionar la interfecta, poniendo el fuego, que
por su natural poder se propag" al local en que se cometi" el delito, al
servicio de su proposito punible; constituyendo por esto el incendio,
elemento integrante del delito de asesinato, . . . ." (Sentencia de 29 de
Noviembre de 1887, II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, 175).
 
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142396. February 11, 2003.]
KHOSROW MINUCHER, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and ARTHUR SCALZO, Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher and
one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of
Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation"
conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of
Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited
drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were
accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due
time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08
January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision
acquitting the two accused.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on
account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug
trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it
had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national.
He came to the Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines
in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was
appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan
and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by
Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations
and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian
National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.
"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter
was brought to his house and introduced to him by a certain Jose
Iñigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo, on
the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto
Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head
of the anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.
"During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the
introduction of Jose Iñigo, the defendant expressed his interest in
buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from
plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside from that of
Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his
business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of over
$3,000.00 per month. During their introduction in that meeting, the
defendant gave the plaintiff his calling card, which showed that he is
working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of
the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the
United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the
back of the card appears a telephone number in defendant’s own
handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire
to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman named
Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff
for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however, was more
concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant
promised to see plaintiff again.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the
latter for dinner at Mario’s Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200
grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandise but for the reason
that the defendant was not yet there, he requested the restaurant
people to . . . place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however,
came and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he was paid. Then
their conversation was again focused on politics and business.
"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter’s
residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to
buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some
haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that defendant
did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come
back the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with
his $24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn,
gave him the pair of carpets.
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came
back again to plaintiff’s house and directly proceeded to the latter’s
bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were
playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained
$2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter’s fee in
obtaining a visa for plaintiff’s wife. The defendant told him that he
would be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come
out of the house for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin
waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as
he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he
saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an
American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He
was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6
Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes
in the street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He
was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was
inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out
from defendant’s attaché case, he took something and placed it on the
table in front of the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff’s wife who was at
that time at the boutique near his house and likewise arrested
Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the bedroom and both
were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he was being
handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom
was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use the telephone.
In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but
the defendant told him to ‘shut up.’ He was nevertheless told that he
would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him
to come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept
the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another
$8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet
worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also
discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian
carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought P30,000.00
together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he was
handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was,
therefore, nothing left in his house.
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker . . . had been well publicized
throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia,
America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the
papers as an international drug trafficker. . . .
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on
television, not only in the Philippines, but also in America and in
Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw him on
TV with said news.
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to
Camp Crame handcuffed together, where they were detained for three
days without food and water." 1 
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special
appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an
answer pending a supposed advice from the United States
Department of State and Department of Justice on the defenses to be
raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo
filed another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground
that he, not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being
one in personam, was beyond the processes of the court. The motion
was denied by the court, in its order of 13 December 1988, holding
that the filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an
answer to the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to
service of summons which could likewise be construed a waiver of the
requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration
of the court order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to
file an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of
summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that
in cases involving the United States government, as well as its
agencies and officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly
unavoidable due to the need (1) for both the Department of State and
the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be raised and
(2) to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to
first review the case. The court a quo denied the motion for
reconsideration in its order of 15 October 1989.
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there
docketed CA-G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated
06 October 1989, the appellate court denied the petition and affirmed
the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the incident in a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this
Court. The petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with
SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed
to show that the appellate court was in error in its questioned
judgment.
Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was
issued (a) declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive
pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for the reception of
evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the
order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the
motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo
denied the material allegations of the complaint and raised the
affirmative defenses (a) of Minucher’s failure to state a cause of action
in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his
official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo
interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys’
fees and expenses of litigation.
Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of
the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United
States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the Department of
Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June
1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a
true and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the
trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction
with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W.
Scalzo, Jr., v. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, Et Al.," asking that the complaint
in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The case was
referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No.
22505, per this Court’s resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October
1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining the
diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the
complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this
Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher v.
the Honorable Court of Appeals, Et. Al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242),
appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a decision, dated
24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario
Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and
remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was
ordered on the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting
the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his person
without even considering the issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic
Note No. 414 and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient
allegations to the effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his
personal capacity and outside the scope of his official duties and,
absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s diplomatic
immunity could not be taken up.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17
November 1995, the trial court reached a decision; it
adjudged:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully
established his claim by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in
the manner following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"‘Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory
damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million;
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney’s fees in the
sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.
‘The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note
of the lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid
docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this
action as a pauper litigant." ‘ 2 
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the
evidence presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to
immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held
accountable for the acts complained of committed outside his official
duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently
clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby
immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving State"
pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention.
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review
raises a two-fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of
conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision rendered by this
Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of Appeals
from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2)
whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res
judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the
court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of
the parties, subject matter and causes of action. 3 Even while one of
the issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 — "whether or not public
respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent
Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" — is also a pivotal
question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765,
however, has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court
there has made this observation —
"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in
his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he
would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his
investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and duties
as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to
present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the
alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the
belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable,
intelligent and fair resolution of the diplomatic immunity." 4 —
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity
from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States
Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on
suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of
prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained
the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to)
make the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a
number of documents —
1. Exh.’2’ — Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;
2. Exh.’1’ — Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated
11 June 1990;
3. Exh.’5’ — Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;
4. Exh.’6’ — Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
5. Exh.’7’ — Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.
6. Exh.’3’ — 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal
Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990
forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC
Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);
7. Exh.’4’ — Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st
Indorsement (Exh.’3’); and
8. Exh.’8’ — Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the
Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel
Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court. 5  service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the
The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United
States Embassy accordingly advised the Executive Department of the
Philippine Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic
staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the
Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988;
(2) that the United States Government was firm from the very
beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect
to the case pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy
repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate
action to inform the trial court of Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity. The
other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the
Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department,
recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally
advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and his
entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the
Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself
authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented
Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports of investigation on the
surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the
Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the Philippines at
all times relevant to the complaint, and the special power of attorney
executed by him in favor of his previous counsel 6 to show (a) that the
United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged
Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States
diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October
1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986,
with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement officials and in
the exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he
investigated Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and
(c) that the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized
that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985
up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché of the
United States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status
by the Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo
described the functions of the overseas office of the United States
Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative
expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on
narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host
country, 2) to establish and maintain liaison with the host country and
counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct
complex criminal investigations involving international criminal
conspiracies which affect the interests of the United
States.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of
centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18
April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city
states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of the Mediterranean
before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states
of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the
diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held sacrosanct. 7
By the end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises on
diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was
firmly established as a rule of customary international law. 8
Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states was
undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent
embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the
official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a
state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the
receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission.
Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the
diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the
interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the
receiving state. 9 
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to
include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,
10 (b) envoys, 11 ministers or internuncios accredited to the head of
states; and (c) charges d’ affairs 12 accredited to the ministers of
foreign affairs. 13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are
the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and
diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, technical
and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. Even
while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for
immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does so,
nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively
applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention,
are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal
suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of
missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly withholding
the same privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that even
consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of
commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and
notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas,
authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not
ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges
accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged
with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed,
the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat
entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs
duties of diplomatic nature.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an
Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was
accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attaché belongs
to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in
charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There
could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or
departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or
department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or
departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air,
commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the
like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are
administratively under him, but their main function is to observe,
analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective
fields in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or
departments in the home government. 14 These officials are not
generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they
normally designated as having diplomatic rank.
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented
Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam,
respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November
1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court’s initial
reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public
respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No.
88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply
because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is clothed with
diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over
his person.
"x       x       x
"And now, to the core issue — the alleged diplomatic immunity of the
private Respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of
authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such
claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1) year,
eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel
filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking
for a first extension of time to file the Answer because the
Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America
were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses,
before he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in
Manila, and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is
authentic, the complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot be
peremptorily dismissed.
"x       x       x
"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts
imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports this
self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. . . . . The
public respondent then should have sustained the trial court’s denial of
the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper and
appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the
self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even suspect
and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue haste with
which respondent Court yielded to the private respondent’s claim is
arbitrary."cralaw virtua1aw library
A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08
November 1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of
Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant
Secretary, certifying that "the records of the Department (would) show
that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the
Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as
an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was,
therefore, accredited diplomatic status by the Government of the
Philippines." No certified true copy of such "records," the supposed
bases for the belated issuance, was presented in
evidence.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a
prerogative of the executive branch of the government. In World
Health Organization v. Aquino, 15 the Court has recognized that, in
such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst
apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity,
designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should
behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of
Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no
less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be
recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of
the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is,
rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 16 The
government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be
acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic
agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic
status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title
and "performs duties of diplomatic nature." 17 Supplementary criteria
for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or,
from States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note
formally representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic
duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one
years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially
full-time basis. 18 Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the
most accurate and descriptive job title to that which currently applies to
the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign
each individual to the appropriate functional category. 19  "x       x       x
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain
contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to
conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on
the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur
Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he
committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy
could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity
from Suit.
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state
is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely
identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit
20 and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not
just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also
distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. 21 If the acts
giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its
foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the
immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a
representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state
itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual
but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim — par in
parem, non habet imperium — that all states are sovereign equals and
cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. 22 The implication, in
broad terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such
as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages
decreed against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the
state itself, although it has not been formally impleaded. 23 
In United States of America v. Guinto, 24 involving officers of the
United States Air Force and special officers of the Air Force Office of
Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has
ruled —
"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them
in the discharge of their duties. . . . . It cannot for a moment be
imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity
when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It
follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States,
they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal,
which has not given its consent to be sued. . . . As they have acted on
behalf of the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is
that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were]
responsible for their acts."25cralaw:red
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf v.
Court of Appeals 26 elaborates:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in
his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights
of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of
the Bureau of Telecommunications, Et Al., v. Aligaen, Et. Al. (33
SCRA 368): ‘Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said
that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the
director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act
for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of
the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within
the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice.
"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice
and in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction."
27 
A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with
immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is
acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the
host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between
the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and
personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory,
under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is
wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of
the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its
agents and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected
drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the
Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts
heretofore elsewhere mentioned. The official exchanges of
communication between agencies of the government of the two
countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department
of Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the
participation of members of the Philippine Narcotics Command in the
"buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of Minucher at the
behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status"
of the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine
government has given its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities
within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug
Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to
conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having
ascertained the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be
expected to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on
Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case
against Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the
scope of his official function or duties.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo,
an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by
the Philippine government to conduct activities in the country to help
contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the defense of
state immunity from suit.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, pp. 39–42.
2. Rollo, p. 51.
3. Linzag v. CA, 291 SCRA 304.
4. Minucher v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 242.
5. For documentary Exhibits Nos. 1–8, see Rollo, pp. 143–155.
6. For Documentary Exhibits Nos. 9–13, See Rollo, pp. 156–168.
7. Eileen Denza, "Diplomatic Law, A Commentary on the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations," 2nd Edition, Claredon Press,
Oxford, 1998, at 210.
8. Ibid.
9. Article 3 of the Vienna Convention enumerates the functions of the
diplomatic mission as
(a) representing the sending State in the receiving State;
(b) protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State
and of its nationals, within the limits permitted by international law;
(c) negotiating with the Government of the receiving State;
(d) ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in
the receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the
sending State;
(e) promoting friendly relations between the sending State and the
receiving State, and developing their economic, cultural and scientific
relations.
10. Ambassadors are diplomatic agents of the first class, who deal, as
a rule with the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Secretary of State, as
the case may be. (Melquiades J. Gamboa, "Elements of Diplomatic
and Consular Practice, A Glossary," Central Lawbook Publishing, Co.,
1966, p. 19.)
11. Envoys are diplomatic agents of the second class. This is the title
of the head of legation as distinguished from an embassy, the head of
which is called Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Like
the Ambassador, the envoy is also accredited to the Head of State.
(Gamboa, p. 190.)
12. Charges d’ Affairs are either en titre or ad interim. Charges d’
affairs en titre are appointed on a permanent basis and belong to the
fourth class of diplomatic envoys, the other three being ambassadors,
ministers plenipotentiary and envoys extraordinary, and ministers
resident. He is the head of the legation in his own right and is not
accredited to the head of State but to the foreign office. According to
Radloric, charges d’ affairs are sometimes used to described a person
who has been placed in custody of the archives and other property of
a mission in a country with which formal diplomatic relations are not
maintained. Charges d’ affairs ad interim, in contrast are usually those
second in command of the diplomatic mission — minister, counselor or
first secretary, who are only temporarily in charge of the mission
during the absence of the head of the mission. He is not accredited
either to the Head of State or the Foreign Office. (Gamboa, Ibid., pp.
51–52.)
13. The classification of diplomatic representatives was considered
significant before because direct communication with the head of state
depended on the rank of the diplomat and, moreover, only powerful
states were regarded as entitled to send envoys of the highest rank. At
present however, diplomatic matters are usually discussed not with the
head of state but with the foreign secretary regardless of the
diplomat’s rank. Moreover, it has become the practice now for even
the smallest and the weakest states to send diplomatic representatives
of the highest rank, even to the major powers. (Cruz, International
Law, 1985 Edition, p. 145.)
14. Gamboa, supra, pp. 32–33.
15. 48 SCRA 242.
16. J.L. Brierly, "The Law of Nations," Oxford University Press, 6th
Edition, 1963, p. 244.
17. Denza, supra, at 16.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid., at 55.
20. Charles G. Fenwick, "International Law," Appleton-Century-Crofts,
Inc., New York, 1948, pp. 307–308.
21. The international law on sovereign immunity of states from suit in
the courts of another state has evolved from national court decisions
with good deal of variance in perspectives. Even though national
cases have been the major source of pronouncements on sovereign
immunity, it should be noted that these constitute evidence of
customary international law now widely recognized. In the latter half of
the 20th century, a great deal of consensus on what is covered by
sovereign immunity appears to be emerging, i.e., that state immunity
covers only acts which deal with the government functions of a state,
and excludes, any of its commercial activities, or activities not related
to "sovereign acts." The consensus involves a more defined
differentiation between public acts (juri imperii) and private acts (jure
gestionis). (Gary L. Maris, "International Law, An Introduction,"
University Press of America, 1984, p. 119; D.W. Grieg, "International
Law," London Butterworths, 1970, p. 221.)
The United States for example, does not claim immunity for its publicly
owned or operated merchant vessels. The Italian courts have rejected
claims of immunity from the US Shipping Board, although a state
body, as it could not be identified with the American government on
the ground that undertaking maritime navigation and business as a
commercial enterprise do not constitute a sovereign act. (D.W. Grieg,
"International Law," London Butterworths, 1970, p. 221.)

22. See Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812), cited

in Charles G. Fenwick, "International Law," New York, 3rd Edition
(1948), p. 307.

23. United States of America, Et. Al. v. Guinto, etc., Et Al., G.R. No.
76607, 26 February 1990.

24. 182 SCRA 644.

25. At pp. 653–659.

26. 191 SCRA 713.

27. At pp. 727–728.


EN BANC
G.R. No. 100776 October 28, 1993
ALBINO S. CO, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.chanrobles virtual law library
The Solicitor General for the people.
NARVASA, C.J.:
In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel
- and in payment of his share of the expenses of the salvage
operations therein stipulated - petitioner Albino Co delivered to the
salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the
Associated Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of
P361,528.00. 1 The check was deposited on January 3, 1984. It was
dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank
being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT." chanrobles virtual law library
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was
filed by the salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City. The case eventuated in Co's conviction of the
crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of
imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company
in the sum of P361,528.00.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals. There he sought exoneration
upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court
to have relied, as basis for its verdict of conviction, on the ruling
rendered on September 21, 1987 by this Court in Que v. People, 154
SCRA 160 (1987) 3 - i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22.
This was because at the time of the issuance of the check
on September 1, 1983, some four (4) years prior to the promulgation of
the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987, the delivery of
a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as guarantee for an obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement made in a
Circular of the Ministry of Justice. That Circular (No. 4),
dated December 15, 1981, pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation
of B.P. Blg. 22.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or
secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the
drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg.
22 (Res. No. 438, s. 1981, Virginia Montano vs. Josefino Galvez, June
19, 1981; Res. No. 707, s. 1989; Alice Quizon vs. Lydia Calingo,
October 23, 1981, Res. No. 769, s. 1981, Alfredo Guido vs. Miguel A.
Mateo, et. al., November 17, 1981; Res. No. 589, s. 1981, Zenaida
Lazaro vs. Maria Aquino, August 7, 1981).
This administrative circular was subsequently reversed by another
issued on August 8, 1984 (Ministry Circular No. 12) - almost one (1)
year after Albino Co had delivered the "bouncing" check to the
complainant on September 1, 1983. Said Circular No. 12, after
observing inter alia that Circular No. 4 of December 15, 1981 appeared
to have been based on "a misapplication of the deliberation in the
Batasang Pambansa, . . . (or) the explanatory note on the original bill,
i.e. that the intention was not to penalize the issuance of a check to
secure or guarantee the payment of an obligation," as follows:  4
Henceforth, conforming with the rule that an administrative agency
having interpreting authority may reverse its administration
interpretation of a statute, but that its review interpretation applies only
prospectively (Waterbury Savings Bank vs. Danaher, 128 Conn., 476;
20 a2d 455 (1941), in all cases involving violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 where the check in question is issued after this date, the claim
that the check is issued as a guarantee or part of an arrangement to
secure an obligation collection will no longer be considered a valid
defense.
Co's theory was rejected by the Court of Appeals which affirmed his
conviction. Citing Senarillos v.Hermosisima, 101 Phil. 561, the
Appellate Court opined that the Que  doctrine did not amount to the
passage of new law but was merely a construction or interpretation of a
pre-existing one, i.e., BP 22, enacted on April 3,
1979.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
From this adverse judgment of the Court of Appeals, Albino Co
appealed to this Court on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. By Resolution dated September 9, 1991, the Court dismissed
his appeal. Co moved for reconsideration under date of October 2,
1991. The Court required comment thereon by the Office of the
Solicitor General. The latter complied and, in its comment dated
December 13, 1991, extensively argued against the merits of Albino
Co's theory on appeal, which was substantially that proffered by him in
the Court of Appeals. To this comment, Albino Co filed a reply dated
February 14, 1992. After deliberating on the parties' arguments and
contentions, the Court resolved, in the interests of justice, to reinstate
Albino Co's appeal and adjudicate the same on its merits.
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," according to
Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a
declaration that is echoed by Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code:
"Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal . . . 5chanrobles
virtual law library
The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has
been applied in many cases. These include: Buyco v. PNB, 961 2
SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which
divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay
certificates in payment of loans, does not apply to an offer of payment
made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5
SCRA 522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, s amended by RA
3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts jurisdiction over
guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the
absence of a saving clause; Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the
effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending
Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People
v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding that a person cannot be convicted
of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central, when the alleged violation
occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official
Gazette; Baltazar v.C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying retroactive
application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from
the bondage of the soil, and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of
tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the promulgation of
rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v.Court of
Appeals, 128 SCRA 519, adjudging that RA 6389 whichremoved
"personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant cannot
be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for
retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129 SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the
old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded retroactive
effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389
should have only prospective application; (see also  Bonifacio v. Dizon,
177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA
419).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to
administrative rulings and circulars, to wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a
circular or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be
given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer: Sanchez
v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of
the Commission on Elections, which directed the holding of recall
proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197
SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29,
s. 1989 cannot be given retrospective effect so as to entitle to
permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment
had expired before the Circular was
issued.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions
which, "although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of
what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason whyunder Article 8 of
the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . . .'"chanrobles
virtual law library
So did this Court hold, for example, in Peo. v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607,
611:
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the
Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter
was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959)
and People v. Lucero(1958). 6 Our decision in People
v. Mapa, 7reversing the aforesaid doctrine, came only in 1967. The sole
question in this appeal is: should appellant be acquitted on the basis of
Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand
in view of the complete reverse of the Macarandang and Lucero
doctrine in Mapa? . . .chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are
nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason
why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system . . ."The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a
way, a part of the law as of the date that law was originally passed,
since this Court's construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends
to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a
restatement of the legal maxim "legis interpretation legis vim obtinet" -
the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has
the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of
the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of
the firearm in question and where he was arraigned by the trial court. It
is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is
adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should
not apply to parties who had relied on, the old doctrine and acted on
the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and
application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishment
of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
So, too, did the Court rule in Spouses Gauvain and Bernardita
Benzonan v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 97973)
and Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et
al  (G.R. No 97998), Jan. 27, 1992, 205 SCRA 515, 527-528:  8
We sustain the petitioners' position, It is undisputed that the subject lot
was mortgaged to DBP on February 24, 1970. It was acquired by DBP
as the highest bidder at a foreclosure sale on June 18, 1977, and then
sold to the petitioners on September 29,
1979.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At that time, the prevailing jurisprudence interpreting section 119 of
R.A. 141 as amended was that enunciated in Monge and Tupas cited
above. The petitioners Benzonan and respondent Pe and the DBP are
bound by these decisions for pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code
"judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines." But while our
decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to
Article 4 of the Civil Code which provides that "laws shall have no
retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in
the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks
forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to
perceive. The retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that
have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and
hence, is unconstitutional (Francisco vs. Certeza, 3 SCRA 565
[1061]).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The same consideration underlies our rulings giving only prospective
effect to decisions enunciating new doctrines. Thus, we emphasized
in People v. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]" . . . when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine
should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties who
had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
A compelling rationalization of the prospectivity principle of judicial
decisions is well set forth in the oft-cited case of Chicot County
Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]. The
Chicot doctrine advocates the imperative necessity to take account of
the actual existence of a statute prior to its nullification, as an operative
fact negating acceptance of "a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Thus, in this Court's decision in Tañada v. Tuvera, 9 promulgated on
April 24, 1985 - which declared "that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published,shall have no force and
effect," and as regards which declaration some members of the Court
appeared "quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect . . .
(the) decision might have on acts done in reliance on the validity of
these presidential decrees . . ." - the Court said:
. . . . The answer is all too familiar. In similar situation is in the past this
Court, had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot
County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank  (308 U.S. 371, 374) to
wit:chanrobles virtual law library
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it
was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and
hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby
County, 118 US 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.
S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects - with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to
have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have
finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those
who have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is
manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Much earlier, in De Agbayani v. PNB, 38 SCRA 429 - concerning the
effects of the invalidation of "Republic Act No. 342, the moratorium
legislation, which continued Executive Order No. 32, issued by the then
President Osmeña, suspending the enforcement of payment of all
debts and other monetary obligations payable by war sufferers," and
which had been "explicitly held in Rutter v. Esteban (93 Phil. 68
[1953] 10 . . . (to be) in 1953 'unreasonable and oppressive, and should
not be prolonged a minute longer . . ." - the Court made substantially
the same observations, to wit: 11
. . . . The decision now on appeal reflects the orthodox view that an
unconstitutional act, for that matter an executive order or a municipal
ordinance likewise suffering from that infirmity, cannot be the source of
any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under
it. Its repugnancy to the fundamental law once judicially declared
results in its being to all intents and purposes amere scrap of
paper. . . . It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution
being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act
contrary to its terms cannot
survive.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity.
lt may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt
that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be compiled with.
This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares
its invalidity,, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have
acted under it and may have changed theirpositions, what could be
more fitting than that in a subsequent litigation regard be had to what
has been done while such legislative or executive act was in operation
and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted as a
doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its existence is a fact must be
reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness that precisely
because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say
on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a, period
of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial
review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive
the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such
adjudication.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the language of an American Supreme Court decision: 'The actual
existence of a statute, prior to such a determination [of
unconstitutionality], is an operative fact and may have consequences
which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a
new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects, - with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct,
private and official (Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter States
Bank, 308 US 371, 374 [1940]). This language has been quoted with
approval in a resolution in Araneta v. Hill (93 Phil. 1002 [1953]) and the
decision in Manila Motor Co. Inc. v. Flores (99 Phil. 738 [1956]). An
even more recent instance is the opinion of Justice Zaldivar speaking
for the Court in Fernandez v. Cuerva and Co. (L-21114, Nov. 28, 1967,
21 SCRA 1095).
Again, treating of the effect that should be given to its decision
in Olaguer v. Military Commission No 34, 12 - declaring invalid criminal
proceedings conducted during the martial law regime against civilians,
which had resulted in the conviction and incarceration of numerous
persons - this Court, in Tan vs.Barrios, 190 SCRA 686, at p. 700, ruled
as follows:
In the interest of justice and consistently, we hold that Olaguer should,
in principle, be applied prospectively only to future cases and cases still
ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence,
there should be no retroactive nullification of final judgments, whether
of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians
before the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences
should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases where
the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial
of constitutional rights of the accused, should the nullity of the sentence
be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If
a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should be released since
judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before the military
tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period of martial rule
(1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by
President Marcos in the exercise of his legislative powers is an
operative fact that may not just be ignored. The belated declaration in
1987 of the unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did
not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long before
our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us
from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic. Thus did this Court rule in
Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question
arose as to whether the nullity of creation of a municipality by executive
order wiped out all the acts of the local government
abolished. 13chanrobles virtual law library
It would seem then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of
the proposition that the Court's decision of September 21, 1987 in Que
v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) 14 that a check issued merely to
guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by
B.P. Blg. 22 - should not be given retrospective effect to the prejudice
of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official
opinion of the Minister of Justice that such a check did not fall within
the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
Inveighing against this proposition, the Solicitor General
invokes U.S. v. Go Chico, 14 Phil. 128, applying the familiar doctrine
that in crimes mala prohibita, the intent or motive of the offender is
inconsequential, the only relevant inquiry being, "has the law been
violated?" The facts in Go Chico are substantially different from those
in the case at bar. In the former, there was no official issuance by the
Secretary of Justice or other government officer construing the special
law violated; 15 and it was there observed, among others, that "the
defense . . . (of) an honest misconstruction of the law under legal
advice" 16 could not be appreciated as a valid defense. In the present
case on the other hand, the defense is that reliance was placed, not on
the opinion of a private lawyer but upon an official pronouncement of
no less than the attorney of the Government, the Secretary of Justice,
whose opinions, though not law, are entitled to great weight and on
which reliance may be placed by private individuals is reflective of the
correct interpretation of a constitutional or statutory provision; this,
particularly in the case of penal statutes, by the very nature and scope
of the authority that resides in as regards prosecutions for their
violation. 17 Senarillos vs. Hermosisima, supra, relied upon by the
respondent Court of Appeals, is crucially different in that in said case,
as in U.S. v. Go Chico, supra, no administrative interpretation
antedated the contrary construction placed by the Court on the law
invoked.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to
familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason
why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of
prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and
discussed, negating criminal
liability.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of
the Regional Trial Court are reversed and set aside, and the criminal
prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with
costs de oficio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Regalado, Nocon and Puno, JJ., concur.
# 
Endnotes:
1 As found by the Court of Appeals, the agreement was between Co,
representing Mayflower Shipping Corporation, and Geronimo B. Bella,
representing Tans-Pacific Towage, Inc. The expenses for refloating
were apportioned chiefly between FGU Insurance and Development
Bank of the Philippines, which respectively contributed P2,329,022.00 the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion
and P1,579,000.00. SEE Rollo, pp. 9, 20-21.chanrobles virtual law against the United States, . . .chanrobles virtual law library
library
16 14 Phil. 128, 133-134.chanrobles virtual law library
2 Otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law".chanrobles virtual
law library 17 Estrella vs. Orendain, 37 SCRA 640; Noblejas vs. Salas, 67 SCRA
47.
3 The ruling is contained in an extended resolution on a motion for
reconsideration, promulgated by the Special Former Second Division of
the Court on September 21, 1987, written for the division by Paras,  J.,
with whom concurred Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin and
Cortes, JJ. In that resolution, the Court gave its  "stamp of approval" on
the decision of the Court of Appeals holding inter alia that "It is now
settled that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 applies even in cases where
dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a
guarantee."

4 Emphasis supplied.chanrobles virtual law library

5 Exceptions to the rule of prospectivity are collated, e.g., in the

textbook of retired Justice Edgardo A. Paras (Civil Code of the
Philippines Annotated, 1984 ed., Vol. 1, pp. 22-23) viz  : 1) laws
remedial in nature; 2) penal law favorable to accused, if ; after not
habitual delinquent; 3) laws of emergency nature under police power :
e.g., tenancy relations (Vda. de Ongsiako v. Gamboa, 47 O.G. 4259,
Valencia et al. v. Surtida et al., May 31, 1961); 4) curative laws; 5)
substantive right declared for first time unless vested rights impaired
(Unson v. del Rosario, Jan. 29, 1953; Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997; Peo
v. Alejaga, 49 OG 2833).chanrobles virtual law library

6 106 Phil. 713 and 103 Phil. 500, respectively, both involving
prosecutions for illegal possession of firearms, and both holding that
appointment by the Provincial Governor or Provincial Commander of a
person as a "secret agent" or "confidential agent" "sufficiently placed
him under the category of a 'peace officer' . . . who under section 879
of the Revised Administrative Code is exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearm.chanrobles virtual
law library

7 SEE Ilagan v. People, Jan. 29, 1974, 55 SCRA 361.chanrobles

virtual law library

8 The title of the cited Monge case is Monge, et al. v. Angeles, et al.,
and is reported in 101 Phil., 563 [1957], while that of the cited Tupas
case is Tupas v. Damasco, et al., reported in 132 SCRA 593
[1984].chanrobles virtual law library

9 136 SCRA 27, 40-41.chanrobles virtual law library

10 And several other rulings set forth in a corresponding footnote in the

text of the decision.chanrobles virtual law library

11 SEE also Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144

(1987) (Citing Municipality of Malabang v. Benito, 27 SCRA 533 where
the question arose as to whether the judicial nullification of an
executive order creating a municipality wiped out all the acts of the
local government abolished); Tan v. Barrios, 190 SCRA 686 (1990);
Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378 (1991); Union of Filipino
Employees v. Vivar, Jr., 205 SCRA 200 (1992); Peralta v. Civil Service
Commission, 212 SCRA 425.chanrobles virtual law library

12 150 SCRA 144 (1987).chanrobles virtual law library

13 SEE also  Cruz v. Enrile, 160 SCRA 700 [1988] and Res. of
February 26, 1991; and Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 378
[1991].chanrobles virtual law library

14 SEE  footnote 3, supra.chanrobles virtual law library

15 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission punishing any person

who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view . . .
any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. H. N. BULL, Defendant-
Appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.  and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation
of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275,
and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where
under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the complaint
does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2)
that under the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear
and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in violation
of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void
as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is
insufficient to support the
conviction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The information alleges:
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908,
the said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel
known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there
engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other
animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that
the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid,
on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the port and city
of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six
hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so
as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in
this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then and
there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable
means for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did
then and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means of
rings passed through their noses, and allow and permit others to be
transported loose in the hold and on the deck of said vessel without
being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason
of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some
of said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were
tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly
wounded, bruised, and killed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the
Philippine Commission.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901,
provides that -
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within
the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying
such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the
suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period
occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port
of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with
adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four
hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their
final debarkation.
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended
by adding to section 1 thereof the following:
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within
the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such
animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading
they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is
hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by
swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to
the thorns.
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that -
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who
knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section
one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less
that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United
States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be
instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court organized
in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not
state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were
disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel
registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine
Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on
Courts of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province
or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing
inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the
organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely
extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses
committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country,
or within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or
water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands,
in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep.,
614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance
in any province into which such ship or water upon which the offense or
crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this
offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry,
there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court,
because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with
well recognized and established public law. But the Standard  was a
Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or
licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then
the question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this
character, committed on board a foreign ship by the master thereof,
when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense continued
during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United
States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an
offenses or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial
waters of any other country, but when she came within 3 miles of a line
drawn from the headlines which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay,
she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became
applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le
Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her
crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign
subject through the proper political agency. This offense was
committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines
these waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before
she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the violation of the
statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is
concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed
while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it
originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one,
and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the voyage
across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done
within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the
offender.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of
the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question
whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the
ship. Every. Every state has complete control and jurisdiction over its
territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels
may not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is
now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are
considered as open to the public ship of all friendly powers. The
exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such
waters was not established until within comparatively recent times. In
1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee,
rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the
commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the
jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys.
Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by Lord Stowell in an
opinion given by him to the British Government as late as 1820. In the
leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs.  McFadden (7 Cranch
(U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license
under which such vessels enter a friendly port may reasonably be
construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of the
sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality."
The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which
announced that "the priviledge of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of
war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an absolute right,
but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and
mutual deference between nations."  member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55;
Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)chanrobles
virtual law library
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come
and go freely. Local official exercise but little control over their actions,
and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their own
officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance.
This limitation upon the general principle of territorial sovereignty is
based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds its justification
in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally
careful to respect local laws and regulation which are essential to the
health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience
does not require the extension of the same degree of exemption to
merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as to extent of
the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to the French
theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship
which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to
the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to which the
vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive jurisdiction
over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign
ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le
Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp.
338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome
2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by Great
Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties.
(Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters
Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a
theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is
doubtless the leading English authority, says that -
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of
merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign
state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which
the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a
merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of
the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of
acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a
portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore,
Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review,
Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, said
that -
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be
obviously in convinient and dangerous to society and would subject the
laws to continual infraction and the government to degradation if such
individual merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and
were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the
merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the
purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the
ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in
peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs.  Diekelman, 92
U. S., 520-525.)chanrobles virtual law library
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed
by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between
Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, which
concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each
country "The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as
may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to
the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the
interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or
of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country."
(Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to
controversies between the members of the ship's company, and
particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec.
206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and
tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not
amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one
the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty
withdrawn from the cognizance of the local
authorities.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and
Carolina  engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of
Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace,
but the United States district attorney was instructed by the
Government to take the necessary steps to have the proceedings
dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the
view to "guard against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish,
Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May
16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel"
was of such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of
Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston
was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and
battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of
Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which
deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness,
14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through diplomatic
channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts,
Secretary of State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and
Norwegian minister, as follows:
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful
consideration in connection with the views and suggestion of your note
and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between
the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations contained
in the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is
contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers,
not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing out of
the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense for
which the party may be held amenable under the local criminal
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of
such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls
is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges or abitrators in
such differences as may arise between captains and crews of the
vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the
captain or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country .
When, however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate, either by
the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel, involving the
disturbance of the order  or tranquillity of the country, it is competent for
such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the
local laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it
becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty
voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the
local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in the
United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there had been such
disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the complaint is
supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party
accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be
defined against the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore,
Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction
over offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member
of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order
or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of
the language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws
disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which
the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between
the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of the
criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that
neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the
commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general
principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived
of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does
not allege that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an
allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court
sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue would be
to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the
Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in
order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable
construction of the language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the
court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are
then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of
their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
This might be different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted
a constitutional element in the offense, but it does
not.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to
allege that the defendant knowingly  and willfully  failed to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid
cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that
the act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was
committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R.
Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when
used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be
done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will
consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of
Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the
complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the
appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was
fully answered by the respondent's counsel - that the words 'willfully'
and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act
implies that it was done by design - done for a certain purpose; and I
think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To
the same effect is Johnson vs. The People  (94 Ill., 505), which seems
to be on all fours with the present
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly
done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his
experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in
the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the
animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was done
knowingly and intentionally.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58,
paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or omission
complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and
concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the
words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person
of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to
pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies
with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep.,
556.)chanrobles virtual law library
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a
vessel the duty to "provide suitable means for securing such animals
while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to
the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is
that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle
"without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said
animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of
the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals were
cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the
decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and
killed."chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the
information does not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient" and
"adequate" means. The words used are " medios suficientes" and
" medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint was
prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by the
words " adecuado," " suficiente," and " conveniente," according to the
context and circumstances, we determine this point against the
appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not
made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure
to provide "suitable means for the protection of the
animals." chanrobles virtual law library
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55
and the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally
erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The
statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation
of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands,
and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been
enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would
doubtless have been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the
Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R.
A., N. S., 1071.) chanrobles virtual law library
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United
States is controlled by constitutional principles different from those
which apply to States of the Union. The importance of the question
thus presented requires a statement of the principles which govern
those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of the
legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of
the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of
opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are
established.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to
make war and treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations
to acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired
belongs to the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the
power of Congress to provide for its government being questioned, the
framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress
should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting territory and other property belonging to the
United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the
territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into
the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon
Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create
a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required
for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been
the usual procedure. Congress has provided such governments for
territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired territory
not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a
government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive,
legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain
general conditions in accordance with which the local government
should act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the
government of the territory which had not been formally incorporated
into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local
legislature was determined by its conformity with the requirements of
such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.) To
the legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated
that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed
necessary for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the
right to annul the action of the local legislature and itself legislate
directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during the
entire period of the history of the United States. The right of Congress
to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously
questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.
S., 370, 385.) chanrobles virtual law library
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate
within such territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating
the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an
impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own
force. (Downes vs.  Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with
reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by
those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its
power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it
is plenary. (De Lima vs.  Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs.  Bidwell, 182
U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U.
S., 138; Rassmussen vs.  U. S., 197 U. S., 516.) chanrobles virtual law
library
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole
history of the United States, and legislation founded on the theory was
enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular possessions.
Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The
Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally
inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the
organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as
elsewhere within the United States." When Congress organized a civil
government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of
the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec.
1, Act of 1902.) chanrobles virtual law library
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by
the United States as a result of the war with Spain, the executive and
legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with
the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the
United States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was
directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a
peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government
of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to
preserve peace and protect person and property within the occupied
territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on August
26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty
of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of December,
1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish fleet
and the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of
the Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty
therein, and that by the treaty of peace the future control, disposition,
and government of the Islands had been ceded to the United States.
During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty of
peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted
(Santiago vs.  Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed
under the military authority of the President as commander in chief.
Long before Congress took any action, the President organized a civil
government which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely
military government which it gradually superseded, in the war power.
The military power of the President embraced legislative, executive
personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to
select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901 -
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation
includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently
happens that in a single order of a military commander can be found
the exercise of all three of these different powers - the exercise of the
legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial
power by determination of right; and the executive power by the
enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights determined.
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government
as rapidly as conditions would permit. After full investigation, the
organization of civil government was initiated by the appointment of a
commission to which civil authority was to be gradually transferred. On
September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of
the President. "that part of the military power of the President in the
Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred
from the military government to the Commission, to be exercised under
such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary of
War, until such time as complete civil government should be
established, or congress otherwise provided. The legislative power
thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the
making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of
revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and
expenditure of public funds of the Islands; the establishment of an
educational system to secure an efficient civil service; the organization
and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of
municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil
nature which the military governor is now competent to provide by rules
or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to
the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain
declared general principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions
for the protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in
mind that the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction
or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness,
peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the
measures adopted should be made to conforms to their customs, their
habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with
the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective
government." The specific restrictions upon legislative power were
found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to
be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance
of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted;
that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the
right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist
except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post
facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."chanrobles virtual
law library
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being
raised, the Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed
March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers
necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise
provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall
be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States
shall direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for
maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free
enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4,
1901, the authority, which had been exercised previously by the
military governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus
created by virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the
Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1,
1902, Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a
law which, in connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900,
constitutes the organic law of the Philippine
Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of
government which the President had erected. Congress adopted the
system which was in operation, and approved the action of the
President in organizing the government. Substantially all the limitations
which had been imposed on the legislative power by the President's
instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the
Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution, but all its provisions for
the protection of the rights and privileges of individuals which were
appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in
creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in
creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-
General, and through the Commission establishing certain executive
departments, was expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the
action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after the
ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and approved by
Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902;
U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.)
Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be
governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the enacting
clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States"
instead of "By the authority of the President." In the course of time the
legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the Islands not
inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a
legislature consisting of two houses - the Philippine Commission and
the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus
assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired
territory not incorporated into the United
States.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory,
although its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It
stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and
Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and
maintenance  is derived from the Constitution of the United States,
which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not
directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United
States, acting through the President and Congress, both deriving
power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its
powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines
looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the
Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived
from the formally and legally expressed will of the President and
Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies
upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress,
and when it exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the
Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in
the United States.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a
complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and
judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to
such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most
governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine.
For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises
executive powers, and the President to some extent controls legislation
through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to
exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the
head of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is a
member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto
power. The President and Congress framed the government on the
model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best
adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection
of individual rights and priviliges.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to
adopt the general constitutional doctrined which are inherent in the
system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the
limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the national
Constitution, and the States under the national and state constitutions.
The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted.
The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written
constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative enactments, as
well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these
functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State
judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory
could there be that government of laws and not of men which is
essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly
government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the
Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts must consider the
question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the
Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State
legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as
are expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United
States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been
granted to the central government. The former operates under grants,
the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress
depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains a
grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State
legislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or
impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of the
Philippines Government which has not been expressly disapproved by
Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by
congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision
of the organic laws.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in
general terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not
alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the
legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that specific
authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to
certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated
upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply
as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and
ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local
legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U.
S., April 16, 1908.)chanrobles virtual law library
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of
legislation by the Government of the Philippine tends strongly to
confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of
the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of
enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new
government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To
relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to
details, it was thought better to grant general legislative power to the
new government, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions,
and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with
disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws passed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress,
which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same."
(Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not
suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by
Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make
them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of
the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How.
(U. S.), 1.)chanrobles virtual law library
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain
whether the Legislature has been expressly or implication forbidden to
enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States
operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the
Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign
commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern
the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign
commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly
through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this
respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the
duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines,
and it has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to
provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable
waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce
may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left
to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved power of
Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval.
The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and
Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the
regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted
before Congress took over the control of the Islands, and this act was
amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March 2,
1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government
instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called
legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign
nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How.
(U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act
has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other
action by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its
approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission had, and the
Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the
regulation of commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the
Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is
valid.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has
testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated
positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he is
acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and
cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year. The
defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according
to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks
and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of
the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either by
the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for
instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or
any other protection for them individually can safely and suitably
carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such
a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if
he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the
wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in the manner
found in this case.
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two
hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is
affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ.,  concur.

3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the

meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the
ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the
evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and
disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came
from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means
for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of
section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The
trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by
the evidence:

That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian

steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six months or
thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was engaged in
the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese
ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master

and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said
ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was anchored, under the
directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the
city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court;
and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three
others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said
cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the
defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without suitable
precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid
danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle
were so transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought
into the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any provisions
being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold
thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for
such transportation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle

abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of
Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle, providing partitions
between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear thereof,
and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are
transported, of that in case of storms, which are common in this
community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping
and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the
production of panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle
were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. FAUSTA
GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR.,
CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO
LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., Accused-
Appellant.chanrobles virtual law library
SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision 1dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of
the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia
Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio
Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded
arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet arrained, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of
P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of P14,000.00 and to pay
the costs." 2 The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a
resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara,
Iloilo.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio
Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During
the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be
rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants,
except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose
instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the
then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division. 3chanrobles
virtual law library
On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 4 on
the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision
in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to
indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00.
In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further,
on the basis of our ruling in People vs. Ramos, 5 the appellate court
certified this case to us for review. 6chanrobles virtual law library
The antecedent facts are as follows:chanrobles virtual law library
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome
Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was
awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their
landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the
authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the
killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately
ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police authorities at
the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew
brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to
the municipal building. 7Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the
couple informed the police on duty of the incident. That same night,
Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the
Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay
Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was made to
stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the
latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly
occurred. 8There they saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad
only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom. 9 The
group stayed for about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno
inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and
the immediate surroundings. 10The next day, February 22, 1981, at
around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied
by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct
further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was
brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police
substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion
arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company
stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the
incident, were already there conducting their own investigation.
Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the
scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought to
the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for
autopsy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about
11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was made
with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built
and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower
3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the right
axillary pit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right,
posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length
with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right,
with 1 cm. wound exit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior
aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in
width.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border
of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right
nipple.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the
thoracic cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the level of
the 5th rib left.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the
right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of
the 8th intercostal space.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit
directed toward the left thoracic
cavity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward
the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla
left.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the
anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed
downward.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length,
medial aspect, palm right.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with
portion of large intestine and mysentery coming
out.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the
shoulder, right, directed downward to the aspex of the light thoracic
cavity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the
medial portion of the medial border of the right
scapula.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the
posterior aspect of the right
elbow.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the
posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm,
right.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of
the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the
heart.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the
lungs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the
lungs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large
intestine, thru and thru.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs
(sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED,
STABBED (sic), INCISED AND PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
JESUS D. ROJAS, M.D.
Rural Health Physician
Ajuy, Iloilo 11
The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16)
wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the internal
organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased." 12chanrobles
virtual law library
On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales
appeared before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and
voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and
protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters
in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained having
been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force. 13chanrobles virtual law
library
Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the
Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for
murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of
Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The
information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and
AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as
follows:chanrobles virtual law library
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of
Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the above-named accused with four other companions whose
identities are still unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-
pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping
each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate
intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their
superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused were provided
at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada multiple
wounds on different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report
attached to the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused
the immediate death of said Lloyd D.
Peñacerrada.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
CONTRARY TO LAW.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 14chanrobles virtual law library
When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both
entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria 15who
claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, presented
himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981,
and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the
case was therefore conducted by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the
basis of which an Amended Information, 16 dated March 3, 1982,
naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein
appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio
Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained,
Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the
crime.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural
Health physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of the
victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla;
Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy
Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of
the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and
Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of
the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22,
1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy. 17 His findings
revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds,
and one (1) lacerated wound. In his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while
admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all
the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim,
nevertheless opined that due to the number and different
characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two
instruments were used is high. 18 The police authorities and the P.C.
operatives for their part testified on the aspect of the investigation they
respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada
testified mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of
her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the
events surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as
on other matters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged
eyewitness account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave
his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982, 19 at 5:00 o'clock in
the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay
Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by
one Mr. Piccio, and walked home; 20he took a short-cut route. 21 While
passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00
o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for help. 22Curiosity prompted him
to approach the place where the shouts were emanating. When he was
some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees. 23 From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused
ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim
Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he
clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight. 24 Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were
through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his body
and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was
situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the "linasan". 25 Huntoria
then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related
what he saw to his mother and to his wife 26 before he went to
sleep. 27Huntoria explained that he did not immediately report to the
police authorities what he witnessed for fear of his life. 28 In October
1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he
allegedly witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his
father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him
likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's widow,
Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his
place at Sitio Nabitasan, in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to
Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to her what he
saw on February 21, 1981. 29chanrobles virtual law library
Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of
her honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused
denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant,
Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep 30 in his house
which was located some one kilometer away from the scene of the
crime 31 when the incident happened. He asserted that he only came to
know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales
went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform
him. 32chanrobles virtual law library
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the
testimony of Huntoria.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone
appellant, contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the
basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness,
and in not appreciating his defense of
alibi.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In
upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein
accused-appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July
27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the
assailant at a distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering
that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If Huntoria could
not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased, it was
only because the assailant were moving around the
victim.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that
Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. ( Id.,
pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450
(1980): "The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a
criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the
initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer information
about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or
dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially
declared not to affect credibility.'"chanrobles virtual law library
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had
known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in
good terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33,
July 18, 1984) He said that he could not think of any reason why
Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is
beyond question. 33chanrobles virtual law library
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of
alibi. 34 The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by
the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate
court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-
appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248 is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. As there was no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should be reclusion
perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the
Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the award of
P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the
rulings of the Supreme Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA
518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado,
128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27,
1987). 35chanrobles virtual law library
The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by
the Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion
perpetua.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we
find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime
charged.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities
leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force
in his sworn statements 36 even gave the date of the commission of the
crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch 37 he made of the
scene is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various
blood stains and their locations relative to the scene of the crime, there
was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather
unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two
versions proferred on where the killing was carried out, the extent of
blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue as to
which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it,
the killing transpired inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses,
there would have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom
or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance would
provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape
asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the prosecution's version
that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth,
then blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other
place.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the
other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused
Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to
state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that
Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge
by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise admitted that Augusto
never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing
of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C.
investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an
investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal complaint 38 four
other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales, to have conspired in killing Lloyd
Peñacerrada.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that
the sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused by
two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the
possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus,
insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned,
Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for the
killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive
testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that could be
fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy report. We shall
discuss more the significance of these wounds
later.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant
by the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the basis of the
testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a
meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is
compelling.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused,
including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd
Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21,
1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed
behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from
where the crime was being committed. According to him, he
recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was
then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the stabbing and
hacking took about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria
admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did
the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by
each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):chanrobles
virtual law library
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?chanrobles
virtual law library
A Yes, Sir.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and
the stabbing, at that distance by the herein accused as identified by
you?chanrobles virtual law library
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly
shining.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this
Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant
movement, I could not determine who did the
hacking.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
ATTY. GATON:chanrobles virtual law library
The interpretation is not clear.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
COURT: chanrobles virtual law library
They were doing it rapidly.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual
law library
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid . I
only saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot
determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the
hacking and the stabbing blow.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
ATTY. GATON:chanrobles virtual law library
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked
Lloyd Peñacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the
hacking.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did
the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid
movements.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the
weapons used because according to you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir. 39
(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and
specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing of
Lloyd Peñacerrada.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial
court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal
liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under
Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is
nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by
inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by
indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was
the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support the
ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
chanrobles virtual law library
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is
incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability  - Criminal liability shall be incurred:chanrobles
virtual law library
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he
intended.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its
accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through
the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition  - Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies
(delitos).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by
means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent ; and
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence,
negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act
or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the
Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission
incurred by means of deceit or
fault.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both
found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was
performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any
bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the external
world." 40 In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act"
committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the
body of the victim that produced his
death.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that

he did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this
principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the
appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know
what specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of
specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article
3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the
fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of
sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there are six accused
charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused
could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as
well be the appellant, granted ex gratia argumenti that he took part in
the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he
not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and
practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument
to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable, that only four,
or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal
wounds to the exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching
the logic further, it is possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds,
including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by
Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But
more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence that the appellant
caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond
reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be
sustained.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by

the fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or eight long
months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While
ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police
authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect
his credibility, 41 here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out
engenders doubt on his veracity. 42 If the silence of coming out an
alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility
doubtful, 43 the more it should be for one who was mute for eight
months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he allegedly
witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that
he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There
is no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by anybody.
And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the
accused, 44 why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that
except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales who were
already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still
free and around; they were not yet named in the original
information, 45 thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still
be clear and present when he
testified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed

by the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased.
In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was
because the victim was also his landlord.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw
the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told Mrs.
Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?chanrobles virtual
law library

A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was
haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim was also my
landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.  46

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis ours.)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-27031. May 31, 1974.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LORETO
RENEGADO y SEÑORA, Accused-Appellant.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General
Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Alicia V. Sempio-Diy for Plaintiff-
Appellee.
Roberto C. Alip (Counsel de Oficio) for Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
On September 4, 1966, Mamerto de Lira, a teacher of the Tiburcio
Tancinco Memorial Vocational School," died at the Calbayog City
General Hospital from a stab wound inflicted upon him a few days
before, more particularly, on August 29, within the premises of the
school by Loreto Renegado, an employee of the same institution. As a
result, the City Fiscal of Calbayog City filed with the local Court of First
Instance an Information against Loreto Renegado for "Murder with
assault upon a person in authority," which, as amended,
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 29th day of August, 1966, at about 9.30 A.M., in
Calbayog City, Philippines, and within the premises of the Tiburcio
Tancinco Vocational School and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court; the above-named accused armed with a
sharppointed double bladed weapon, with decided intent to kill, with
assault upon a person in authority; the deceased being at the time a
public school teacher of the Tiburcio Vocational School and therefore a
person in authority; and at the time was in the lawful performance of his
duties as such or on the occasion of such performance and, with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with his weapon
Mamerto de Lira, who, as a result thereof, sustained stab wound on his
abdomen which caused his death." (p. 11, original record)
The Hon. Jesus N. Borromeo who conducted the trial of the case found
the accused guilty as charged and pursuant to Articles 148 and 248 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 48 thereof, sentenced him
to "suffer the supreme penalty of death; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Mamerto de Lira in the amount of P6,000.00; and to pay the
costs." (p. 94, ibid) The case is now before Us on automatic review.
We find the following facts duly established by the evidence of the
prosecution:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Tiburcio Tancinco Memorial Vocational School is run by the-
national government in the City of Calbayog, and for the school year
1966-67 its principal was Mr. Bartolome B. Calbes, and in his absence,
Mr. Felix U. Tingzon was authorized to act as officer-in-charge (Exhibit
E). The deceased Mamerto de Lira was a classroom teacher of
mathematics in said school with dally classes from Monday to Friday,
starting at 7:10 o’clock in the morning till about 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon with vacan, periods in-between (Exhibit D) while accused-
appellant, Loreto Renegado, was a clerk in the same institution whose
duties included the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. To type correspondence, memorandum circulars of the Heard of the
school.
2. To help type test questions of teachers for every periodical test.
3. To help type reports of the schools.
4. To help type handout of the teachers.
5. To file and account records of the school.
6. To mail some reports, prepared form like Form 137 and mail it, etc."
(Exhibit F)
A periodical test was scheduled on September 2, 1966, and the
teachers were instructed to submit their questions for approval and
cutting of the stencil for mimeographing purposes by August 25 and 26.
1 
At about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of Friday, August 26, 1966,
appellant Renegado was in the school canteen and other persons
present at the time were teachers Natividad Boco, Mrs. Alviola, and
Mrs. Benita Tan, and some students. On that occasion Lira entered the
canteen and seeing Renegado he requested the latter to type the
stencil of his test questions for the examination set for September 2.
Renegado answered that he had much work in the principal’s office
and that typing test questions was not among his duties. Lira reminded
Renegado of the instructions of the principal that he could be asked by
the teachers to type their test questions especially if the teacher
concerned had no knowledge of typing, and Lira finished his remark
stating: "you can finish your work if you only will sit down and work." At
this remark, Renegado became angry and as he stepped out of the
canteen he boxed with his fist a cabinet which belonged to Mrs. Alviola.
Seeing the hostile attitude of Renegado, Lira followed the latter outside
of the canteen and asked Renegado if he was challenging him.
Renegado did not answer but quickly left the place. 2 
On his way out of the school premises, later that afternoon, Renegado
passed by the guardhouse where he met security guard, Primitivo
Velasco, and Renegado told the latter: "Friend, I will be sad if I could
not kill somebody," and having learned about the altercation between
Renegado and Lira, Velasco placed his arm around the shoulder of
Renegado and pacified him with these words: "Loreto, do not do that
because that is a little trouble, you might be able to kill someone and
you will be separated from your family." 3 Also on that afternoon before
leaving the school, Renegado met Basilio Ramirez, another employee,
to whom he recounted his altercation with Lira and ended up saying: "I
am going to kill him." Basilio Ramirez, however, advised Renegado:
"Padi, do not take that to the extent because to kill a person is not
good, think of your family, you have many children." 4 
In the evening of that Friday, August 26, there was a dance at the
school premises and on that occasion Renegado was seen cycling
around the school several times, 5 and Renegado inquired from
security guard, Nicomedes Leonor, if Lira was at the dance. Leonor
informed Renegado that the teacher was not around and at the same
time advised Renegado thus: "Choy, do not attend to that small trouble
and we have families. Have patience because we have families." 6
Another teacher, Arturo Querubin, likewise saw Renegado that evening
acting in a suspicious manner and sensing the state of mind of
Renegado because of the incident which happened earlier in the
afternoon, Querubin approached Renegado, advised him to "calm his
temper," and told him "remember, you have plenty of children, please
be calm." 7 
Came Monday morning, August 29, and at around 9:00 o’clock, Erlinda
Rojo, a bookkeeper in the school, met accused Renegado in the office
of the principal. Renegado inquired from Erlinda about his salary loan,
and during their conversation, the school janitor called the attention of
the two to some boys quarelling near the school’s shop building and
Renegado remarked: "stab him" ; to those words Erlinda replied: "That
is the case with you. Your intention is to stab. If that is your attitude,
there will be nobody left on earth, they will all die," to which Renegado
countered: "So that the bad persons will be taken away and
eliminated," and after that exchange of remarks Renegado left the
room. 8 
That same morning, past 9:00 o’clock, which was his vacant period,
Lira went to the school canteen, seated himself at the counter, and
ordered a bottle of "pepsi cola" from the girls who were then serving,
namely, Venecia Icayan and Lolita Francisco. At about 9:30 while Lira
was drinking his "pepsi cola", Renegado entered the canteen and
seeing Lira with his back towards him, he immediately and without
warning stabbed Lira with a knife hitting the latter on the right lumbar
region. The wounded Lira turned around holding his abdomen and
raised a chair to ward off his assailant who was poised to stab him for
the second time. Renegado tried to reach Lira but he was blocked by
Mrs. Tan who shouted "Stop it, Loreto, don’t anymore." Because of the
intervention of Mrs. Tan and the screaming of the girls inside the
canteen, Renegado desisted from continuing with his attack and left
the canteen. 9 During that incident, Felix Tingzon was also in the
canteen having a snack with a guest and although he did not actually
see the very act of stabbing, he saw however that when Renegado
entered the canteen Lira was beside the counter and had his back
towards appellant Renegado. 9  filed against Lira but her husband said: "never mind" ; in the evening of
Lira was brought to the Calbayog City General Hospital and was
attended by Dr. Erlinda Ortiz who performed an operation on him. Dr.
Ortiz found that the weapon of the assailant entered through the right
lumbar region of the victim and penetrated the right lower lobe of the
liver. Notwithstanding the medical attention given to Lira, the latter died
on September 4,1966, from "hepatic insufficiency" caused by the stab
wound which perforated the right lower lobe of the liver resulting in
internal hemorrhage. 10  me, he purposely did it to me, that is why I was hurt." ; after that, her
Appellant Renegado asks Us not to believe the above-given narration
of the witnesses for the prosecution and submits instead his own
version of the incident as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
At about 4:30 o’clock in the afternoon of Friday, August 26, he was in
the school canteen for a snack and on that occasion Lira arrived and
approached him with a bunch of papers and told him to type the stencil
of his test questions; he answered that he could not do the work
because he was busy in the principal’s-office; Lira got mad and
pointing his finger at him said: "The question with you is that the work
that you can do in a day you finish it in to many days, because you
stroll only in the office and keep on sleeping" ; scared by the
aggressive mood of Lira, he went out of the canteen, but Lira followed
him and, overtaking him near the door, boxed him on his stomach; he
told Lira that he was not fighting back, however, Lira angrily shook his
fingers at him and said: "don’t show yourself to me, I will kill you with
maltreatment" ; he proceeded to the office of the principal and informed
the latter about the incident but the principal advised him not to mind
Mr. Lira and to go ahead with his work; later, in the afternoon, he went
home; the following morning Saturday, he was in his house repairing
the "pantao" or wash stand and on that occasion spouses Lourdes and
Feling Renegado came to the house and they talked about the incident
between him and Lira; Lourdes Renegado suggested the filing of a
complaint against Lira but he replied he was not taking the matter
seriously and, at any rate, he was resigning from his job; on Monday,
August 29, at about 7:30 o’clock in the morning he went to his work in
the school as usual; upon reaching the school, he proceeded to the
room of Miss-Rojo to get some papers on which he was working, and
then he returned to his room; at about 9:30, he went to the canteen for
a snack and on the way, he was "singing, whistling, and tossing a coin
in his hand" ; before reaching the canteen, he saw Lira and Manuel
Cordove conversing and when the two parted, Lira went to his room;
upon reaching the canteen, he went to the counter (see Exhibits 3 and
3-A), and while he was there standing, Lira arrived, stood beside him,
elbowed him, and said in a loud voice: "Ano ka?" ; he turned around to
face Lira and the latter banged on the counter the folders he (Lira) was
carrying; Lira then placed his right hand inside his pocket, pulled with
the other hand a chair and pushed it at him; he became confused and
remembered that on Friday afternoon Lira threatened to kill him if he
(Lira) would meet him again; after a while he saw Mrs. Tan standing
before him and heard her say: "Loreto, don’t do that" ; upon hearing
those words, "he regained his senses" and only then did he realize that
he had wounded Lira; he became panicky, left the canteen, proceeded
home, and informed his wife that he had wounded a person; he then
called for a tricycle, looked for a policeman, and surrendered to the
latter. 11  "regained his senses" when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan telling him:
To corroborate his testimony that in the morning of the stabbing
incident he was ahead of Lira in the school canteen, appellant called to
the witness stand Manuel Cordove who declared that on Monday
morning after he and Lira had conversed and parted, Lira proceeded to
his (Lira’s) office while he went to his own room and on the way he
passed by Renegado who was then standing by the door of the
canteen and greeted him; after a short while he heard shouts from the
canteen and he learned that Renegado had stabbed Lira 12 Another
witness, Lourdes Renegado, testified on the conversation between her
and her brother-in-law, the herein appellant, on Saturday morning, and
she tried to impress the court that appellant Renegado had dismissed
from his mind his altercation with Lira and as a matter of fact on the
following day, Sunday, she met Renegado who had just come from
church and was on his way to attend a cockfight. 13 Appellant’s wife,
Elena de Guia, also took the witness stand and declared inter alia that
when her husband returned home on Friday afternoon and narrated to
her the occurrence at the canteen she suggested that a complaint be
that same day, Friday, her husband invited her to go with him to the
school dance, however, she excused herself because of the children;
on Monday morning, August 29, her husband reported for work at the
school as usual and before leaving the house he told her that he was
returning about 9:00 o’clock for his "merienda" ; her husband returned
later in the morning only to tell her that he had stabbed someone; upon
hearing the news she cried out: "Oh my God what have you done to
us?", and he replied: "I would not have done that had he not bullied
husband left the house to surrender to the police. 14 
On the basis of the testimony of appellant, his counsel-de-oficio, Atty.
Roberto C. Alip, in his well-written brief pleads for an acquittal with the
argument that accused should be exempt from criminal liability
"because at the precise time that the prosecution claims de Lira was
stabbed, Accused lost his senses and he simply did not know what he
was doing." 15 To bolster his argument on the mental condition of
appellant, defense counsel directs Our attention to that portion of the
evidence showing that sometime in June of 1950 Renegado was
"clubbed" on the forehead by Antonio Redema and was treated by Dr.
J.P. Rosales for head injuries (Exh. 4-A), and as a result of that
incident Redema was charged with and convicted of "frustrated
murder" in the Court of First Instance of Samar on July 21, 1950; 16
that the head injury of appellant produced "ill-effects" because since
that particular occurrence appellant would have fits of violent temper
such as maltreating his wife and children for no reason at all, and for
which he would ask forgiveness from his wife because "he lost his
head." 17 
For purposes of disposing of appellant’s defense it becomes necessary
to restate certain basic principles in criminal law, viz: that a person is
criminally liable for a felony committed by him; 18 that a felonious or
criminal act (delito doloso) is presumed to have been done with
deliberate intent, that is with freedom, intelligence, and malice 19
because the moral and legal presumption is that freedom and
intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person in the absence
of evidence to the contrary; 20 that one of the causes which will
overthrow this presumption of voluntariness and intelligence is insanity
in which event the actor is exempt from criminal liability-as provided for
in Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing act, that is, the accused is
deprived of reason, he acts without the least discernment because
there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a
total deprivation of freedom of the will; mere abnormality of the mental
faculties will not exclude imputability. 21 The onus probandi rests upon
him who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance and he must
prove it by clear and positive evidence. 22 
Applying the foregoing basic principles to the herein appellant, his
defense perforce must fail.
By his testimony appellant wants to convey that for one brief moment
he was unaware or unconscious of what he was doing, that he
"Loreto, don’t do that," and only then did he realize that he had
wounded Lira. That, to Us, is incredible. For it is most unusual for
appellant’s mind which was in a perfect normal state on Monday
morning, August 29, to suddenly turn blank at that particular moment
when he stabbed Lira. Appellant himself testified that he was acting
very sanely that Monday morning, as shown by the fact that he went to
the canteen in a jovial mood "singing, whistling, and tossing a coin in
his hand" ; he saw the persons inside the canteen namely Venecia
Icayan, Lolita Francisco, Benita Tan, Felipe Tingzon and a guest of the
latter (all of whom, except the last one, testified for the prosecution); he
noticed the arrival of Lira who banged his folders on the table, elbowed
him, and said in a loud voice: "ano ka" ; he saw Lira put his right hand
inside his pocket and with the other hand push a chair towards him; he
became "confused" because he remembered that Lira threatened to kill
him if he would see him again; at this point he "lost his senses" and
regained it when he heard the voice of Mrs. Tan saying: "Loreto, don’t
do that", and he then found out that he had wounded Lira. If appellant
was able to recall all those incidents, We cannot understand why his
memory stood still at that very crucial moment when he stabbed Lira to
return at the snap of a finger as it were, after he accomplished the act
of stabbing his victim. His is not a diseased mind, for there is no
evidence whatsoever, expert or otherwise, to show that he is suffering
from insanity or from any other mental sickness which impaired his
memory or his will. The evidence shows and the trial court did find that
appellant is a perfectly normal being, and that being the case, the
presumption is that his normal state of mind on that Monday morning
continued and remained throughout the entire incident.
The testimony of appellant’s wife, Elena, that her husband at times
manifests unusual behaviour, exempli gratia: lashing at his children if
the latter refuses to play with him, tearing off the mosquito net if not
properly tied, "executing a judo" on her person, boxing her, and so on
and so forth, is not the evidence needed to prove a state of insanity. At
most such testimony shows that appellant Renegado is a man of
violent temper who can be easily provoked to violence for no valid
reason at all. Thus in People v. Cruz, this Court held that breaking
glasses and smashing dishes are simply demonstrations of an
explosive temper and do not constitute clear and satisfactory proof of
insanity; they are indications of the passionate nature of the accused,
his tendency to violent fits when angry, and inasmuch as the accused
was not deprived of the consciousness of his acts but was simply
obfuscated by the refusal of his wife to live with him, his conviction for
parricide was proper. 23  sustained for the following reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Very relevant to the case now before Us in U.S. v. Ramon Hontiveros
Carmona, 18 Phil. 62, where the appellant was accused of serious.
physical injuries committed on his wife, mother-in-law, and sisters-in-
law. The accused Hontiveros pleaded insanity as a defense, and
claimed that immediately before the incident he had intermittent fever
at intervals of a few hours during which he lost consciousness and after
he regained consciousness he found himself outside of the house and
heard voices commanding him to surrender his weapon, and he came
to know that he had wounded his wife, his mother-in-law and sisters-in-
law. The Court sustained the conviction of the accused holding.
"In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his reason or
became demented a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of
the crime, it is presumed that he was in a normal condition of mind. It is
improper to conclude that he acted unconsciously in order to relieve
him from responsibility on the ground of exceptional mental condition,
unless his insanity and absence of will are proven .. Acts penalized by
law are always considered to be voluntary, unless the contrary be
shown, and by this rule of law Ramon Hontiveros, by inflicting upon the
offended parties the respective wounds, is considered to have been in
a normal, healthy, mental condition, and no weight can he given to the
defendant’s allegation of insanity and lack of reason, which would
constitute an exceptional condition; nor, for lack of evidence, can his
state of mind be deemed to have been abnormal." (p. 65, emphasis
Ours)
The next point raised by the defense is that the testimonial evidence of
the prosecution comes from "biased, partial, and highly questionable
sources," and is not to be believed. 23  Monday morning within which to ponder over his plan and listen to the
Appellant claims that it is highly improbable for a person who intends to
kill someone to reveal his plan to others such as what the prosecution
witnesses Velasco and Ramirez testified that Renegado told them on
Friday afternoon that he was going to kill Lira. It may be true that
ordinarily one would keep to one’s self such a hideous plot, but the
workings of the human mind are at times mysteriously
incomprehensible, and to a man like the herein appellant who is
pictured by his own evidence to be one of violent disposition, it was
natural for him to blurt out his outraged feelings and his evil design to
his two co-employees in the school because the incident with Lira was
still fresh in his mind at the time.
Appellant also contends that the prosecution witnesses are biased and
partial. We find that contention unjustified. The mere fact that the
witnesses of the People were employees, students, and teachers in the
school is no reason to consider their declarations biased in the
absence of satisfactory proof that any of them had personal motives of
his own either to favor the deceased or prejudice the herein appellant.
In assessing the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the trial judge
found no sufficient evidence proving hostility towards the herein
appellant or any notable relationship of friendship with the deceased,
and We see no valid reason for discrediting His Honor’s findings in this
regard. Time and again this Tribunal has stated that the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses are not to be disturbed for the
trial judge is in a better position to appreciate the same, having seen
and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behaviour and
manner of testifying during the trial, unless there is a showing that the
trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or
circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the
result of the case; in the case at bar, there is no such showing. 24 The
rule is so, because as rightly said, the opportunity to observe the
demeanor and appearance of witnesses in many instances is the very
touchstone of credibility.25cralaw:red
As a last issue, appellant claims that the court a quo erred in holding
the appellant guilty of "murder with assault upon a person in authority."
26 
The zeal of appellant’s counsel-de-oficio in pursuing all possible lines
of defense so as to secure the acquittal of his client or at least to
minimize his liability is truly laudable. However, predicated on the
credible and impartial testimonies of the prosecution witnesses the
judgment of the trial court finding the accused guilty as charged is to be
First, the killing of Mamerto de Lira is qualified by evident
premeditation. The circumstance of evident premeditation is present
because on that very Friday afternoon immediately after the incident at
the canteen appellant Renegado, giving vent to his anger, told his co-
employee, Ramirez, and the security guard, Velasco, that he was going
to kill Lira. That state of mind of appellant was evident once more when
he went to the school dance that same Friday evening and was seen
cycling around the school premises several times, and he asked
another security guard, Nicomedes Leonor, if Lira was at the dance.
On the following day, Saturday, appellant met Mrs. Benita Tan to whom
he confided that had he seen Lira the night before he would surely
have killed him. And on Monday morning, knowing the time of Lira for a
snack (tsn, Nov. 17, 1966, p. 307), appellant armed himself with a knife
or some bladed weapon which by his own admission on cross-
examination was his and which he used for "cutting bond paper" (tsn.
ibid, p. 299), proceeded to the canteen at around 9:30 o’clock, and
seeing the teacher Lira with his back towards him, without much ado,
stabbed Lira from behind hitting the victim on the right lumbar region.
Appellant’s attempt to show that he does not remember how the
weapon reached the canteen is of course futile, preposterous as it is.
(tsn. ibid, pp. 299-300) There is no doubt that the act of appellant in
bringing with him his knife to the canteen on Monday morning was the
culmination of his plan to avenge himself on Lira for the remark made
by the latter on Friday afternoon. Evident premeditation exists when
sufficient time had elapsed for the actor to reflect and allow his
conscience to overcome his resolution to kill but he persisted in his
plan and carried it into effect. 27 Here, appellant Renegado had more
or less sixty-four hours from the Friday incident up to 9:30 o’clock of
advice of his co-employees and of his own conscience, and such
length of time was more than sufficient for him to reflect on his intended
revenge.
Second, treachery attended the killing of Lira because the latter, who Makalintal, C.J. Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar,
was unarmed, was stabbed from behind, was totally unaware of the Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.
coming attack, and was not in a position to defend himself against it.
There is treachery where the victim who was not armed was never in a Barredo, J., took no part.
position to defend himself or offer resistance, nor to present risk or
danger to the accused when assaulted. 28  Endnotes:
Third, the killing of Lira is complexed with assault upon a person in
authority. A teacher either of a public or of a duly recognized private
school is a person in authority under Art. 152 of the Revised Penal
Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 578. 29  1. Exhibits G & G-1; T.s.n. Tingzon, October 8,1966, pp. 168-172.

The defense claims, however, that while it is true that Mamerto de Lira 2. T.s.n. Boco, Sept. 28, 1966, pp. 3-8; T.s.n. Tan, Sept. 30, 1966, pp.
was at the time of his death a teacher of the Tiburcio Memorial 99-101.
Vocational School run by the national government, he was not stabbed
while in the performance of his duties nor on the occasion of such 3. T.s.n. Velasco, Sept. 29, 1966, pp. 34-35.
performance. According to the defense counsel, the motive of the
assault is important to determine whether or not the assault falls under 4. T.s.n. Ramirez, ibid, p. 58.
Art. 148 of the Revised Penal Code; 30 in the instant case it is clear
that the underlying motive for the assault was not that Renegado was 5. T.s.n. Boco, ibid, p. 8.
asked to type the test questions of the teacher Lira but that the latter
made insulting and slanderous remarks to the herein appellant. This 6. T.s.n. Leonor, ibid, pp. 69-71.
contention of the defense is incorrect. The assault or attack on Lira was
committed on the occasion of the performance of the duties of the latter 7. T.s.n. Querubin, ibid, p. 75.
as a teacher because: as narrated in the early part of this Decision,
Lira was scheduled to give a periodical test on September 2, 1966, and 8. T.s.n. Rojo, ibid, pp. 82-85.
was required to submit his. test questions for approval and
mimeographing by August 25 and 26; Lira asked appellant Renegado 9. T.s.n: Tan, Sept. 30,1966. pp. 102-107: T.s.n. Francisco, Oct. 1.
to prepare the stencil of his questions inasmuch as he was not versed 1966, pp. 137-143; T.s.n. Icayan, ibid, pp. 151-153.
with typing; appellant was duty bound to type said stencil under the
memorandum-circular enumerating his duties as a clerk of the school; 9a T.s.n. Tingzon, Oct. 8,1966, p. 175.
appellant refused the request of Lira under pretext that he had much
work in the principal’s office and furthermore that typing test questions 10. Exhibit C: T.s.n. Dr. Ortiz October 7, 1966, pp. 156-159.
for teachers was not among his duties; Lira reminded Renegado that
the principal gave necessary instructions for that purpose, and ended 11. T.s.n. Renegado, pp. 265-275.
up with the remark: "you can finish your work if you only will sit down
and work" ; Lira’s remark was neither insulting nor slanderous but more 12. T.s.n. Cordove, October 14, 1966, pp. 212-215.
of a reminder to Renegado that if he would sit down and work he could
finish all the work that had to be done; as a teacher of the school, Lira 13. T.s.n. Lourdes Renegado, ibid, pp. 224-227.
had the authority to call the attention of an employee of the institution
to comply with his duties and to be conscientious and efficient in his 14. T.s.n. Elena Renegado, October 28, 1966, pp. 244-246.
work; it was Renegado’s violent character, as shown by his own
evidence, which led him to react angrily to the remark of Lira and 15. Appellant’s brief, p. 21, p. 98 rollo.
conceive of a plan to attack the latter. Under these enumerated facts,
We conclude that the impelling motive for the attack on Mamerto de 16. T.s.n. Renegado, Nov. 16, 1986, p. 276; see Exh. 4;
Lira was the performance by the latter of his duties as a teacher.
17. T.s.n. EIena Renegado, supra, p. 228-229.
In Justo v. Court of Appeals, wherein the offended party was a district
supervisor of the Bureau of Public Schools, the Court held that the 18. Art. 4, Revised Penal Code.
phraseology "on occasion of such performance" used in Art. 148 of the
Revised Penal Code signifies "because" or "by reason" of the past 19. Art 3, ibid; Guevara’s Commentaries Revised Penal Code 52.
performance of official duty, even if at the very time of the assault no
official duty was being discharged, inasmuch as the evident purpose of 20. People v. Formigones, 27 Phil. 52.
the law is to allow public officials and their agents to discharge their
official duties without being haunted by the fear of being assaulted or 21. People v. Formigones, 37 Phil. 658, 661, citing from Judge
injured by reason thereof. 31  Guillermo B. Guevaras’ Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code 4th
Edition, pp. 42-43, Decision of Supreme Court of Sapin, November 21,
Inasmuch as the crime committed is murder with assault upon a person 1891, 47 Jur. Crim. 413 & Decision of Supreme Court of Spain, April
in authority and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is 20, 1911, 86 Jur. Crim 94, 97; see also People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,
offset by the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the penalty of 292.
DEATH imposed by the trial court is pursuant to Article 48 in relation to
Articles 148 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The court a quo, 22. People v. Bascos, 44 Phi. 204; People v. Formigones, supra;
however, in its decision recommends to the President of the Republic People v. Cruz, supra; People v. Balondo, L-27401, October 31, 1969,
the commutation of the death penalty to reclusion perpetua, and the 30 SCRA 155.
Solicitor General ** concurs with such recommendation. On the part of
the Court, for lack of ten votes for purposes of imposing the death 23. supra, p. 293.
sentence, the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, is to be
imposed. 23a. pp. 10-15, appellant’s brief, pp. 87-92, rollo.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the conviction of appellant
Loreto Renegado for murder with assault on a person in authority and
We sentence him to suffer reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Mamerto de Lira in the sum of twelve thousand
(P12,000.00) pesos 32 and to pay the costs. Decision modified.
24. see People v. Lumayag, L-19142, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 502,
506; People v. Sampang, Et Al., L-15843, March 31, 1966, 16 SCRA
531; People v. Orzame, Et Al., L-17773, May 19, 1966, 17 SCRA 161;
People v. Ablaza, L-27352, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 173; People v.
Espejo, Et Al., L-27708, December 19, 1970, 36 SCRA 400.
25. Connor v. Connor, 77 A. 2d 697, cited in Francisco’s Volume VII,
Part II, on Evidence, Revised Rules of Court, p. 546, 1973 Ed.

26. appellant’s brief, pp. 15-21, pp. 92-98 rollo.

27. People v. Ompad, Et Al., L-23513, January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA

750; Guevara’s Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, Fifth Ed.,
pp. 56-57;

28. People v. Vicente, Et Al., L-26241, May 21, 1969, 28 SCRA 247;

29. "Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority -

Who shall be deemed as such. —

x       x       x

"In applying the provisions of Articles one hundred forty-eight are one
hundred fifty-one of this Code, teachers, professors and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities, shall be deemed persons in
authority." (As amended by Com. Act 578, which took effect June 8,
1940)

30. "Art. 148. Direct assaults. — Any person or persons who, without a
public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of
any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and
sedition, or shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist
any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the
performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance,
shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the
assault is committed with a weapon or when the offender is a public
officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in
authority. If none of these circumstances be present, the penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500
pesos shall be imposed."cralaw virtua1aw library

31. 99 Phil. 453.

** Mr. Justice Antonio P. Barredo was then the Solicitor General.

32. People v. Pantoja, L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468.

At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our
socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood,
if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land
to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their
landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the
latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a purported
eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to
the conviction of the entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife,
Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, would, in a
perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate
himself with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is
especially so because the need to get into the good graces of his
landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he
ceased to be employed as early as May 1981. 47Volunteering his
services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria
proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he
volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken
under the protective wings of the victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who
gave him employment and provided lodging for his family. 48Given all
the foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as
an unreliable witness, to say the
least.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged

participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada
doubtful - it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino
family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated
by their adult children from any possible physical and emotional harm.
It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much younger
and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the
participation of their 65-year old 49father, the appellant, in the killing of
their lone adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary.
And considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer
from the scene of the crime, 50 we seriously doubt that the appellant
went there just for the purpose of aiding his three robust male sons
(Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and
sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if
the latter were a perceived
enemy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense, 51 under appropriate

circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of the
appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory.
Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if
taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to
acquit the accused. 52chanrobles virtual law library

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED

and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de
oficio.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.


EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25459 August 10, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs. RAMON MABUG-AT, Defendant-Appellant.
Vicente Sotto for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros imposed upon Ramon
Mabug-at the penalty of twelve years and one day cadena temporal,
with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the offended party in the
sum of P700 and to pay the costs, for the crime of frustrated
murder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The appellant appealed from this judgment, making two assignments of
error as committed by the trial court, to wit:
1. In holding that the crime committed is frustrated murder,
and chanrobles virtual law library
2. In not giving any credit to the evidence presented by the defense,
finding the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that the accused and Juana
Buralo was sweethearts. Juana had been jealous of the accused on
account of the latter having frequently visited the house of one
Carmen. Their relations were such that the accused invited Juana to
take a walk on the afternoon of August 9, 1925. Juana refused him,
later sending him a note of excuse. On the third day, or the night of
August 11th, the accused went to the threshold of Cirilo Banyan's
house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in some devotion.
There the accused, revolver in hand, requested Francisco Abellon to
ask Juana to come downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the
accused said: "If you do not want to go upstairs, I will get Juana and if
anyone tries to defend her I will kill him." chanrobles virtual law library
The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came
downstairs, when they went in the direction of their house. The
accused, who was seen by the two girls, followed them without saying
a word. It is only a short distance from the house where the devotion
took place to that of the offended party, the houses being adjacent. As
the two girls were going upstairs, the accused, while standing at the
foot of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver which wounded
Perfecta Buralo, the bullet passing through a part of her neck, having
entered the posterior region thereof and coming out through the left
eye, which was completely destroyed. Due to proper medical attention,
Perfecta Buralo did not die and is on e of the witnesses who testified at
the trial of this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not
responsible for the crime, contends that the crime proven is not
frustrated murder but the discharge of a firearm, with injuries, it not
having been proven that it was the accused's intention to
kill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his
disappointment at her not accepting his invitation to take a walk, the
fact that the accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana Buralo at
the house where the devotion was being held, later following her to her
house, and especially having aimed at her person--the head--are facts
which, in our opinion, permit of no other conclusion than that, in firing
the shot, it was the accused's intention to
kill.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. Montenegro
(15 Phil., 1), it was held:
We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a
firearm at another is not in itself  sufficient to sustain a finding of the
intention to kill, and there are many cases in the books wherein the
attendant circumstances conclusively establish that on discharging a
firearm at another the actor was not in fact animated by the intent to
kill. But, in seeking to ascertain the intention with which a specific act is
committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the
act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they are
developed by the evidence; and where, as in the case at bar, a
revolver is twice discharged point-blank at the body of another, and the
shots directed at the most vital parts of the body, it needs but little
additional evidence to establish the intent to kill beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for
another, does not alter his criminal liability. (Art. 1, par. 3, Penal
Code.) chanrobles virtual law library
The circumstances qualifying the murder alleged in the complaint are
evidence premeditation and treachery. Even when there is sufficient
proof of premeditation (which we do not believe has been sufficiently
established), yet, it cannot be considered as a qualifying circumstance
in the present case, because the person whom the accused intended
to kill was not Perfecta Buralo, who was hit by the bullet, but her aunt
Juana Buralo. Had evident premeditation been proven, and there being
no other qualifying circumstance of frustrated murder present in this
case, the acts should be held to be frustrated homicide and punished
with the maximum degree of the penalty prescribed by law. (Question
2, p. 28, 1890 ed., Viada's Penal Code.) But, the fact is that treachery
was proven and must be taken into consideration in this case, because
the accused fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means which tended to
insure the execution of the crime without running any risk himself from
anyone who might attempt to defend the said offended party. The
treachery which, according to the evidence, would have attended the
crime had the bullet hit Juana Buralo was present in this case because
the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going upstairs with
their backs towards the accused when he fired his revolver. The
Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision of May 7, 1885 (Viada, do., pp.
29, 30), in holding a crime to be murder and not homicide, stated the
following:
Considering that, according to the concept of treachery as it is
explained in article 10 of the Civil code dealing with said circumstance,
it is evident that in firing the gun which Alejandro Sola was carrying
which caused the death of Nazario I�igo, he employed means which
tended to insure the commission of the crime without any risk to
himself arising from any defense that might be made by the offended
party, for neither the wounded party Bartolome Lobejano, at whom the
shot was aimed in order to kill him so that he might not testify as to the
assault committed upon him shortly before, as held by the trial court,
was not in a position to defend himself in any way, nor could Nazario
I�igo become aware of any attack so unjustified, rapid and
unforeseen; considering, further, that the purely accidental
circumstance that as a result of the shot a person other than the one
intended was killed, does not modify, in the instant case, the elements
constituting the crime of murder qualified by the treachery with which
Alejandro Sola acted, whether with respect to the wounded Bartolome
Lobejano or to the deceased Nazario I�igo, for which reason the rules
of article 65 are not applicable herein, the culprit not having, in fact,
committed a crime different from that which he intended, taking into
consideration the substantial and intrinsical meaning thereof, etc.
Although the case just cited refers to the crime of consummated
murder, the doctrine sustained therein is applicable to the case at bar
so far as the concurrence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is
concerned.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused having

intended to kill and performed all the acts of execution, which would
have produced the crime of murder but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal
Code.) chanrobles virtual law library

We find no merit in the first assignment of

error.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In regard to the second, it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the

facts enumerated above constitute the crime of frustrated
murder.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

With the exception of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, we find

no other aggravating
circumstance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment appealed from being in accordance with the law and the
facts proven, the same is hereby affirmed in all its parts costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

Avance�a, C.J., Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real JJ.,

concur.
 murder. 

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left Matuta, a Dutch possession,
for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one
EN BANC individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women,
[G.R. No. L-17958. February 27, 1922. ] and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of
navigation, at about 7 o’clock in the evening, the second boat arrived
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-appellee, v. between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies.
LOL-LO and SARAW, Defendants-Appellants.  There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four
Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the
Thos. D. Aitken for Appellants.  Dutch boat, took for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for Appellee.  men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible
to described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the exception
SYLLABUS of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were
1. PIRACY; ARTICLES 153, 154 PENAL CODE; WHETHER I made in it, with the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter
FORCE. — The provisions of the Penal Code relating to piracy are not of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were
inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in the United States.  succored. Taking the two women with them, and repeatedly violating
them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of
2. ID; ID. — Those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the the Moro marauders were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women,
crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, are  and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape. 

still in force in the Philippines.  Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-
3. ID; ID.; ID. — Article 153 of the Penal Code now reads as follows:
"The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States
and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation
at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging
from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. If the crime be committed
against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio
mayor."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID; DEFINED. — Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility.  them in the amount of 942 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the
5. ID; JURISDICTION . — Piracy is a crime not against any particular
State but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent
 
tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which
he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crime has
no territorial limits. 
6. ID; ID. — It does not matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though
neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. v. Furlong [1820], 5
Wheat., 184.) 
7. ID; INSTANT CASE. — One Moro who participated in the crime of
piracy was sentenced to death and another to life imprisonment.  Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes
8. PUBLIC LAW; CRIMINAL LAW; EFFECT OF TRANSFER OF
TERRITORY. — The political law of the former sovereignty is
necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent
with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the
characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force.  does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-
9. ID.; ID; ID. — Laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to
secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a
municipal character, continue until by direct action of the new
government they are altered or repealed.  decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal
10. ID.; ID.; ID. — Wherever "Spain" is mentioned in the Penal Code, it
should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever
"Spaniards" are mentioned the word should be substituted by the
expression, "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine
Islands."
DECISION
MALCOLM, J.  :
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when the picturesque
buccaneers Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew
Roberts gripped the imagination, when grotesque brutes like
Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and
romance. Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth
century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry
or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near
Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy.
A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based
on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands,
and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the laws in
force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the
trial judge, a trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the
two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life
imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with Kinawalang
and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the
thirty-nine sacks of coprax which had been robbed, or to indemnify
costs. 
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the
attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain
questions can be quickly disposed of. 
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of
piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility. 
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the
lower court and as is gain done in this court, that the Court of First
humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but
against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of
any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be
carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor
mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are
not neutral to crimes." (U. S. v. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.) 
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for
Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Articles 153 to
156 of the Penal Code read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the
subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished
with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. 
"If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another
nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty or
presidio mayor. 
"ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first
paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of
cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes referred
to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal
to cadena perpetua:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed
on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S Const.
"1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the
the same.  necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high
seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations,
"2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death:
fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the
of article four hundred and sixteen.  members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on
its universal conception under the law of nations. 
"3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity
specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of the book.  It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the
Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the
"4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means corresponding provisions in force in the United States. 
of saving themselves. 
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the
"5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.  United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like
the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever
"ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title as well as all "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United
others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be
including any part of the national territory.  substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and
citizens of the Philippine Islands." Somewhat similar reasoning led this
"ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, court in the case of United States v. Smith ([1919]); 39 Phil., 533) to
every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has give to the word "authority" as found in the penal Code a limited
the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such."cralaw virtua1aw meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military,
library and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of the
Philippine Islands. 
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United
States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code
to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former would read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States or the "The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States
characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation
a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer, not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty
designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua. 
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the
new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Island, "If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another
etc., R. Co. v. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)  nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the
penalty of presidio mayor."cralaw virtua1aw library
These principles of the public law were given specific application to
the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May We hold those provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of
19,1889, to General Wesley Merritt, the Commanding General of the piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he Philippines. 
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal
"Thought the powers of the military occupant are absolute and Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the
supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing either
inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by
affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons
punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only
they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial
practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity,
force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of
as they before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal
possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion." (Official Gazette, Code, sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three
Preliminary Number, Jan. 71. 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt’s aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of
Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)  the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not
necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code strength, and that means were employed which added ignominy to the
dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in
Article 156 of the Penal Code of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and importance
of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which
provisions of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to cannot be offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of
Filipinos.  instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes
our duty to impose capital punishment. 
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the
same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety
The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and
statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. appellant Lol-lo (the accused who raped one of the women) but is not
This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its unanimous with regard to the defendant and appellant Saraw, since
inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the one member of the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his
Novisima Recopilacion.  nonconformity. In accordance with the provisions of Act No. 2726, it
results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the
defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of
piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time
and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-
sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang
and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and
severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and
shall pay a one-half part of the cost of both instances. So ordered. 
Araullo, C.J., Johnson, Avancena, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and
Romualdez, JJ., concur.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-18924. October 19, 1922. ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), Defendant-Appellee.  Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for Appellant.  In the case of The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon and Others (7
Edgardo Gutierrez Repide for Appellee.  said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
SYLLABUS
1. JURISDICTION; FOREIGN MERCHANT VESSELS; CRIMES
COMMITTED ABOARD. — There are two fundamental rules on this
particular matter in connection with International law; to wit, the French
rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant
vessel should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within
whose territorial jurisdiction they were committed unless their
commission affects the peace and security of the territory; and the
English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed in the United
States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such
circumstances are in general triable in the courts of the country within
whose territory they were committed. Of these two rules, it is the last
one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories and
jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on the matter are authority
in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.  applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed. ], p. 255, note 105;
2. ID., ID., CRIME OF SMOKING OPIUM. — The mere possession of
opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court in United
States v. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), not triable by our courts, because
it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants
of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of
this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our
territory, does not bring about in the said territory those effects that our
statute contemplates avoiding. hence such a mere possession is not
considered a disturbance of the public order. 
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious
effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature had in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute,
and is, therefore, triable in our courts.
DECISION
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer
presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium
aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said
vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the
shores of the city.  does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court,
which so held and dismissed the case.  which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessel upon
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such
ruling is erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous according
to said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense. 
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have
jurisdiction over a crime, like the one herein involved, committed
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdictional waters. 
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection
with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which
crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel should not be
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial
jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the
peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the
territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general
triable in the courts of the country within whose territory they were
committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this
jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence
prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the
 
Cranch [U. S. ]. 116), Chief Justice Marshall
". . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would
be obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject
the law to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if
such individual or merchants did not owe temporary and local
allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the
country. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
In United States v. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court
held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense
or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of
any other country, but when she came within tree miles of a line drawn
from the headlands which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, she
was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became
Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The
ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial
sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that
sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in
Mali and Wildenhus v. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U. S., 1),
wherein it was said that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorders
which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be
dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but
those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need
be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local
jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine to which of the
two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the
local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with
the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to
prevent it."cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence in United States v. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the
Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any local port,
the Islands, such vessel being considered as an extension of its own
nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of
Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land
is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law
in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than
that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the
absence of an agreement under an international treaty."cralaw
virtua1aw library

As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or

otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find
nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation
the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides,
in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy
says the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"There shall be between the territories of the United States of America,

and all the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal
liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries, respectively,
shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships and
cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid,
to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same,
and to remain and reside in any parts of the said territories,
respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses for the
purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders
of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection
and security for their commerce, but subject always to the laws and
statutes of the two countries, respectively." (Art. 1, Commerce and
Navigation Convention.) 

We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign

vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by our courts,
because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the
inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by
the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being
used in our territory, does not bring about in the said territory those
effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere
possession is not considered a disturbance of the public order. 

But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious
effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our
Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly
observes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign

vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local
authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply subversive
of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to
conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow
or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on board."cralaw virtua1aw
library

The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded
to the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law,
without special finding as to costs. So ordered. 

Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avanceña, Villamor, Ostrand, and

Johns, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 120921. January 29, 1998.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FELIPE
BALLESTEROS, CESAR GALO and ALVIN BULUSAN, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, to wit:chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the three accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, and applying Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code hereby
sentences them to reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
provided by law, and further sentencing them to pay jointly and
solidarily —
1. The heirs of Jerry Agliam compensatory damages in the amount of
FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), moral damages in the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00), and actual
damages in the amount of THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND SEVEN
HUNDRED FIFTY-FIVE PESOS (P35,755.00), with interest;
2. The heirs of the late Eduardo Tolentino, Sr., compensatory damages
in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), moral
damages in the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P20,000.00), and actual damages in the total amount of SIXTY-ONE
THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS (P61,785.00),
with interest;
3. Carmelo Agliam, actual damages in the amount of TWO
THOUSAND AND THREE PESOS AND FORTY CENTAVOS
(P2,003.40), and moral damages in the amount of TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00), with interest;
4. Vidal Agliam Jr., Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino, moral
damages in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00)
each, with interest.
5. The costs.
The accused shall be credited in the service of their sentence the full
time during which they had undergone preventive imprisonment, if they
agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, they shall be credited in
the service thereof with only four-fifths of the time during which they
had undergone preventive imprisonment." 1  that he saw only Galo on the evening of the dance but did not talk to
In the warm summer evening of May 28, 1991, Carmelo Agliam, his
half-brother Eduardo Tolentino, Ronnel Tolentino, Vidal Agliam, his
brother Jerry Agliam, Robert Cacal, Raymundo Bangi and Marcial
Barid converged at a carinderia owned by Ronnel Tolentino at
Ganayao, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte. They proceeded to the barangay hall
at Carusipan to attend a dance. The group did not tarry for long at the
dance because they sensed some hostility from Cesar Galo and his
companions who were giving them dagger looks. In order to avoid
trouble, especially during the festivity, they decided to head for home
instead of reacting to the perceived provocation of Galo and his
companions.
The group had barely left when, within fifty meters from the dance hall,
their owner jeep was fired upon from the rear. Vidal Agliam was able to
jump out from the eastern side of the "topdown" jeep and landed just
beside it. He scurried to the side of the road and hid in the ricefield. His
younger brother Jerry also managed to jump out, but was shot in the
stomach and died. 2 Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel
Tolentino sustained injuries in the right foot, back of the right thigh, and
legs and thighs, respectively. 3 The stunned Eduardo Tolentino was
not even able to move from his seat and was hit with a bullet which
punctured his right kidney. 4 He did not survive. The precipitate attack
upon the jeep left two people dead and four others injured.
Based upon the affidavits of Carmelo and Vidal Agliam, warrants for
the arrest of Ballesteros, Galo and Bulusan were issued. Charged with
the crime of double murder with multiple frustrated murder, an
information was filed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about (sic) May 28, 1991, in the Municipality of Pasuquin,
Ilocos Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, nighttime purposely sought, with
evident premeditation and treachery, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there, with intent to kill, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot Eduardo Tolentino Sr., Jerry
Agliam, Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel
Tolentino, with the use of firearms which caused the death of Eduardo
Tolentino Sr. and Jerry Agliam and thereby inflicting gunshot wounds to
Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel Tolentino
having performed all the acts which would have produced the crime of
Murder, but which did not by reason of causes independent of the will
of the defendant, namely the able and timely medical assistance given
to said Vidal Agliam, Carmelo Agliam, Robert Cacal and Ronnel
Tolentino which prevented their death."cralaw virtua1aw library
All pleaded not guilty. Paraffin tests conducted on Galo and Ballesteros
produced positive results. Bulusan was not tested for nitrates.
In his testimony, Galo claimed that he did not even talk to Bulusan or
any of his companions at the basketball court, as alleged by the
complainants. Having been found with gunpowder residue in his hands,
Galo attempted to exculpate himself from the results by confessing that
he had been a cigarette smoker for the past ten years and had, in fact,
just consumed eight cigarette sticks prior to the test. He further
asserted that paraffin tests are not infallible, and that his hand may
have been contaminated by a nitrogenous compound, the source of
which is urine. Lastly, he said that he was not even present at the
crime scene when the firing incident took place; hence, he could not
have been one of those who strafed the jeep. 5 
For his part, Ballesteros interposed the defense of alibi, narrating to the
court that, on May 28, 1991, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he
went to a nearby store to purchase some cigarettes. He returned home
within thirty minutes and cleaned his garlic bulbs before retiring at 9:00
o’clock. The next morning, he busied himself with some chores, which
included fertilizing his pepper plants with sulfate. He handled the
fertilizers without gloves. To counter the finding of traces of nitrates on
his left hand, Ballesteros maintained that he uses his left hand in
lighting cigarettes, as it was very painful for him to use his right hand.
He likewise informed the trial court that he had no motive to kill the
victims. 6 
Bulusan echoed the defense of alibi of Galo and Ballesteros, stating
him. He denied joining the two later that night because after the dance,
he went straight to the house of Michael Viloria, where he spent the
night until he went to work at 7:00 o’clock in the morning of the
following day. 7 
The trial court found the three accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of murder, qualified by treachery, as charged, defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
The accused now come to the High Court on appeal, praying that the
decision of the trial court be reversed and that a new one be entered
acquitting them of the charges.
The principal question to be resolved has to do with the merits of the
decision of the lower court. Was it correct in finding accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt? We answer in the affirmative.
Accused-appellants insist that the trial court erred in finding that
Carmelo and Vidal Agliam recognized them as the assailants. This
claim is unmeritorious. In their testimonies, Carmelo and Vidal Agliam
both described the area to be well illumined by the moon. The shooting
took place on a small road in the mountainous terrains of Ilocos Norte,
where the air is free from darkening elements and turbidity. It being a
summer evening, there could not have been any fog to becloud the
atmosphere and hamper the vision of the victims, which would have
prevented them from clearly seeing their assailants. They pinpointed
the location of the malefactors to be approximately three meters from
where they stood. 8 Considering the luminescence of the moon and the
proximity between them, the victims could distinctly identify their
assailants. It must be noted that Carmelo was acquainted with Galo
and his brother, a butcher, since he used to deal with them in his
business of buying and selling cattle. 9 Bulusan was a classmate of
Vidal at Cadaratan School. Generally, people in rural communities
know each other both by face and name. 10 Bulusan and Agliam were,
not only townmates, but former classmates as well. The constant
interaction between them through the years would necessarily lead to
familiarity with each other such that, at the very least, one would have
been able to recognize the other easily.
That accused-appellants had no motive in perpetrating the offense is
irrelevant. A distinction is herein timely made between motive and
intent. Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a
definite result. Intent, on the other hand, is the purpose to use a
particular means to effect such result. 11 Motive alone is not proof of
crime. 12 In order to tip the scales in its favor, intent and not motive
must be established by the prosecution. Motive is hardly ever an
essential element of a crime. A man driven by extreme moral
perversion may be led to commit a crime, without a real motive but just
for the sake of committing it. 13 Along the same line, a man who
commits a crime with an apparent motive may produce different
results, for which he is punished. As held in a line of cases, the rule is
well-settled that the prosecution need not prove motive on the part of
the accused when the latter has been positively identified as the author
of the crime. 14 Lack or absence of motive for committing the crime
does not preclude conviction thereof where there were reliable
witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the accused as the
perpetrator of the felony. 15  result of the impulsiveness of the offenders. Manifestations of their evil
Accused-appellants’ attempt to offer wild excuses regarding the source
of the gunpowder traces found on their hands is futile. Experts confirm
the possibility that cigarettes, fertilizers and urine may leave traces of
nitrates, but these are minimal and, unlike those found in gunpowder,
may be washed off with tap water.
The hackneyed defense of alibi interposed by accused-appellants must
likewise fail. As consistently enunciated by this Court, the established
doctrine is that, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
prove, not only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity. 16 This
accused-appellants failed to satisfactorily prove. On the night of May
28, 1991, Galo and Bulusan attended the dance at the barangay hall.
After the dance, they went their separate ways but remained within the
barangay. Galo lingered in the premises. Bulusan slept over at the
house of Michael Viloria, which was within walking distance from the
dance hall.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear and
satisfactory evidence, the reason being that it is easily manufactured
and usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence. 17 This
is especially true in case of positive identification of the culprit by
reliable witnesses, 18 which renders their alibis worthless. 19 Positive
identification prevails over denials and alibis. 20  Consistent with the policy of this Court, the amount of fifty thousand
Accused-appellants are under the common misconception that proof
beyond reasonable doubt requires total freedom from any quantum of
doubt. This is not so. Under Section 2, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court,
"(p)roof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of
proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind."cralaw virtua1aw library
Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by law to convict a person
of a criminal charge. The doubt to the benefit of which an accused is
entitled in a criminal trial is a reasonable doubt, not a whimsical or
fanciful doubt based on imagined but wholly improbable possibilities
and unsupported by evidence. 21 Reasonable doubt is that
engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and inability, after
such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty of guilt.
22 A precise example would be the uncorroborated alibi of accused in
the case at bar where accused-appellants individually interposed the
wavering defense of alibi. Galo failed to elucidate on his whereabouts
after the dance, whereas Bulusan claimed to have slept in the house of
one Michael Viloria. Ballesteros attested that he was not at the dance
hall at all. None of them, however, attempted to corroborate their alibi
through the testimony of witnesses. In fact, they never attempted to
present as witnesses those who could have testified to having seen
them elsewhere on the night in question. Had they done so, the
presentation of corroborative testimony would have reinforced their
defense of alibi. As held in People v. Ligotan, 23 an alibi must be
supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, and
where such defense is not corroborated, it is fatal to the accused.
The Court correctly ruled in finding that the offense was qualified by
treachery. Under Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code,"
(t)here is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make." The requisites of treachery are twofold: (1)
(t)hat at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular
means, method or form of attack employed by him. 24 As regards the
second requisite, the accused must make some preparation to kill his
victim in such a manner as to insure the execution of the crime or to
make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or
retaliate. 25 There must be evidence that such form of attack was
purposely adopted by the accused. 26 Here, it is obvious that the
accused-appellants had sufficient opportunity to reflect on their heinous
plan. The facts show that the attack was well-planned and not merely a
designs were already apparent as early as the time of the dance. They
were well-armed and approached the homebound victims, totally
unaware of their presence, from behind. There was no opportunity for
the latter to defend themselves, the attack being so sudden that
Eduardo Tolentino was shot right where he sat.
The trial court was also correct in the award of damages to the heirs of
the victims. Damages may be defined as the pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury sustained, or as otherwise
expressed, the pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the
breach of some duty or the violation of some right. 27 Actual or
compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in
recompense for, loss or injury sustained, 28 whereas moral damages
may be invoked when the complainant has experienced mental
anguish, serious anxiety, physical suffering, moral shock and so forth,
and had furthermore shown that these were the proximate result of the
offender’s wrongful act or omission. 29 In granting actual or
compensatory damages, the party making a claim for such must
present the best evidence available, viz., receipts, vouchers, and the
like, 30 as corroborated by his testimony. 31 Here, the claim for actual
damages by the heirs of the victims is not controverted, the same
having been fully substantiated by receipts accumulated by them and
presented to the court. 32 Therefore, the award of actual damages is
proper. However, the order granting compensatory damages to the
heirs of Jerry Agliam and Eduardo Tolentino Sr. must be amended.
pesos (P50,000.00) is given to the heirs of the victims by way of
indemnity, and not as compensatory damages. 33 As regards moral
damages, the amount of psychological pain, damage and injury caused
to the heirs of the victims, although inestimable, 34 may be determined
by the trial court in its discretion. Hence, we see no reason to disturb its
findings as to this matter.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

 
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 47722. July 27, 1943.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANTONIO
Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, Defendants-Appellants.  uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest. (5 C. J., p.
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.  a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a menace
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.  justification for killing him when, in effecting his arrest, he offers no
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for  asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon
appellee. 
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER. — Appellants Corporal Galanta and
Chief of Police Oanis were under instructions to arrest one, Balagtas,
a notorious criminal and an escaped convict, and, if overpowered, to
get him dead or alive. Proceeding to the suspected house, appellants
went into a room and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and
.45 caliber revolvers, without first making any reasonable inquiry as to
his identity. The victim turned out to be an innocent man, Tecson, and
not the wanted criminal. Held: That under the circumstances, the
crime committed by appellants is murder though specially mitigated by
circumstances presently to be mentioned.  man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule;
2. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR DISTINGUISHED FROM UNITED STATES
v. AH CHONG (15 Phil., 488). — In support of the theory of non-
liability by reason of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case
of United States v. Ah Chong (15 Phil., 488). The maxim is ignorantia
facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed
without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein
after having gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open
the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but received no answer.
Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and
called out again, "if you enter the room I will kill you." But at that
precise moment, he was struck by a chair which had been placed
against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he
seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who
turned out to be his room-mate. A common illustration of innocent
mistake of fact is the case of a man who was masked as a footpad at
night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and
with leveled pistol demanded his money or life. He was killed by his
friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol
leveled at his head was loaded and that his life and property were in
imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. In these instances,
there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or
carelessness because the accused, having no time or opportunity to
make a further inquiry, and being pressed by circumstances to act
immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then
appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant
case, appellants, unlike the accused in the instances cited, found no
circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate
action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had
ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable
effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed,
according to one eyewitness. This, indeed, is the only legitimate
course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really
Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill Balagtas, at sight, but to
arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or
aggression is offered by him.  requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a
3. ID.; ID.; FORCE WHICH A PEACE OFFICER MAY USE IN
MAKING ARREST. — Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is
justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and
detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm
(People v. Delima, 46 Phil., 738), yet he is never justified in using
unnecessary force or in treating him wanton violence, or in resorting to
dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C. J.
S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court
thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making
an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater
restraint than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2).
And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he
753; U. S. v. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Balagtas was
to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no
resistance, or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is
different facts, in United States v. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242). 
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ARREST OF A NOTORIOUS CRIMINAL. — It is
suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without
regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety already
forfeited. This Court may approve of this standard of official conduct
where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places
his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise, this court cannot
see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make
the life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law.
Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and
vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human
life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost
an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to
warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent
otherwise this Court would offer a premium to crime in the shelter of
official actuation. 
5. ID.; ID.; KILLING AT BAR IS INTENTIONAL AND NOT MERELY
ACCIDENTAL. — The crime committed by appellants is not merely
criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In
criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed
without malice. (People v. Sara, 55 Phil., 939.) In the words of Viada,
"para que se califique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no
haya mediado en el malicia ni intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo
esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha producido,
por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de
tanta gravedad como el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo
Penal Comentado, 5.a ed., pag. 7.) And, as once held by this court, a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with
the idea of reckless imprudence (People v. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232;
People v. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully
done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be
considered as reckless imprudence (People v. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to
support a plea of mitigated liability. 
6. ID.; ID.; TREACHERY; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE DEFINED
IN ARTICLE 11, NO. 5, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE. — As the
deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with
the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is, however, a
mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete
justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised
Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person incurs no
criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order that the
circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the offender
acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right;
and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instant case, only the first
duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed
be the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty.
 Their duty was to arrest Balagtas, or to get him dead or alive if
resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they
have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person
whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him
and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According
to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or
two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be
imposed.
DECISION
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused
Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan
and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively were, after
due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless
imprudence and were sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of
from one year and six months to two years and two months of prision
correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately
from this judgment.  up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta testified that
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938, Captain Godofredo Monsod,
Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor:
"Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with
bailarina named Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain
Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be
given four men. Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates
Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez, upon order of
their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where
they were shown a copy of the abovequoted telegram and a
newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They were
instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the
instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction was given
to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one
Irene, a bailarina, he answered that he knew one of loose morals of
the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector, the chief of
police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary
soldiers in ascertaining Balagtas’ whereabouts, and failing to see
anyone of them he voluntered to go with the party. The Provincial
Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and
Galanta, and private Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading
to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When this group
arrived at Irene’s house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who
was then stripping banana stalks, and asked her where Irene’s room
was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further inquiry also said that
Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately
returned to her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene
and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the
room of Irene, and on seeing a man sleeping with his back towards
the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him
with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots,
Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door
where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him.
Shocked by the entire scene, Irene fainted; it turned out later that the
person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson,
Irene’s paramour. The Provincial Inspector, informed of the killing,
repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the
deceased, Galanta, referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We
two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the provincial hospital
and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds
inflicted by a .32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson’s
body which caused his death.  The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by
the evidence, particularly by the testimony of Irene Requinea.
Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy.
According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis
arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida where Irene’s room was.
Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping
in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus indicated and upon
opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas,
stand up." Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as
the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis fired at him. Wounded,
Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted:
"That is Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson. 
On the other hand, Oanis testified that, after he had opened the
curtain covering the door and after having said, "if you are Balagtas
stand up," Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas,
while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had
exhausted his bullets; that it was only thereafter that he, Oanis,
entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was
then apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he
fired at him. 
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are
certainly incredible not only because they are vitiated by a natural urge
to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they are
materially contradictory. Oanis averred that he fired at Tecson when
the latter was apparently watching somebody in an attitude of picking
Oanis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed
immediately after he was awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that
he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter was
rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the
latter was still lying on bed. It is apparent from these contradictions
that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the crime
charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual
incriminating averments dovetail with, and corroborate substantially,
the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according
to Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to
death by appellants. And this, to a certain extent, is confirmed by both
appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According to
Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit
up just after he was awakened by a noise. And Oanis assured that
when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus
corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to
observe her demeanor on the stand, we believe and so hold that no
error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting the
exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful
examination of Irene’s testimony will show not only that her version of
the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia of veracity.
In her cross- examination, even misleading questions had been put
which were unsuccessful, the witness having stuck to the truth in
every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do not
feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the
trial court. 
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping
in his room with his back towards the door, Oanis and Galanta, on
sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be
Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable
inquiry as to his identity. And the question is whether or not they may,
upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to
Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake
of fact in the honest performance of their official duties, both of them
believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared
them guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. We
are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the case,
the crime committed by appellants is murder though specially
mitigated by circumstances to be mentioned below. 
In support of the theory of non-liability by reason of honest mistake of
fact, appellants rely on the case of U. S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488.
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong
case, defendant therein after having gone to bed was awakened by
someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there,"
but received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he
leaped from his bed and called out again, "if you enter the room I will
kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which
had been placed against the door and believing that he was then
being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally
wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common
illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was
masked as a footpad at night and in a lonely road held up a friend in a
spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demanded his money or life.
He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack
was real, that the pistol leveled at his head was loaded and that his life
and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor.
In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed
without any fault or carelessness because the accused, having no
time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the
facts as they then appeared to him, and such facts justified his act of
killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the
instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would
press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then
asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a
bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made,
as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed,
is the only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if
the victim was really Balagtas, as they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.  have exceeded in the fulfillment of such duty by killing the person
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such
force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender,
overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People v. Delima, 46
Phil., 738), yet he is never justified in using unnecessary force or in
treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C. J. S., par. 13, p.
612). The doctrine is restated in the new Rules of Court thus: "No
unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest,
and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint
than is necessary for his detention." (Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a
peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest. (5 C. J., p. 753; U.
S. v. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas
was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a
menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone
constitute no justification for killing him when, in effecting his arrest, he
offers no resistance, or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when
he is asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon
different facts, in U. S. v. Donoso (3 Phil., 234, 242). 
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by
storm" without regard to his right to life which he has by such notoriety
already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct
where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places
his captors in danger of imminent attack. Otherwise we cannot see
how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the
life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law.
Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for redoubled official alertness and
vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human
life. Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost
an innocent life and there exist no circumstances whatsoever to
warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent
man, condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule;
otherwise we would offer a premium to crime in the shelter of official
actuation.  stalks in the yard, and inquired for the room of Irene. After Mallari had
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence,
the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply
the incident of another act performed without malice. (People v. Sara,
55 Phil., 939). In the words of Viada, "para que se califique un hecho
de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni
intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse
el hecho del delito que ha producido, por mas que no haya sido la
intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como el que
se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag.
7). And, as once held by this Court, a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence (People v. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People v. Bindor, 56
Phil., 16), and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in
the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People v. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of
mitigated liability. 
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is
murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. There is,
however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the
incomplete justifying circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the
Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision, a person
incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office. There are two requisites in order
that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one: (a) that the
offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of
a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. In the instant case, only the first
requisite is present — appellants have acted in the performance of a
duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by them committed
is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty.
Their duty was to arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if
resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But through
impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they
whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance from him
and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According
to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or
two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such case, be
imposed. 
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are
hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of from five (5) years of prision correccional to fifteen (15)
years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of the law, and to
pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an
indemnity of P2,000, with costs. 
Yulo, C.J., Bocobo, Generoso and Lopez Vito, A., concur. 
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Anselmo Balagtas, a life termer and notorious criminal, managed to
escape and flee from Manila to the provinces. Receiving information to
the effect that he was staying with one Irene in Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, the office of the Constabulary in Manila ordered the Provincial
Inspector in Cabanatuan by telegram dispatched on December 24,
1938, to get Balagtas "dead or alive." Among those assigned to the
task of carrying out the said order, were Antonio Z. Oanis, chief of
police of Cabanatuan, and Alberto Galanta, a Constabulary corporal,
to whom the telegram received by the Provincial Inspector and a
newspaper picture of Balagtas were shown. Oanis, Galanta and a
Constabulary private, after being told by the Provincial Inspector to
gather information about Balagtas, "to arrest him and, if overpowered,
to follow the instructions contained in the telegram," proceeded to the
place where the house of Irene was located. Upon arriving thereat,
Oanis approached Brigida Mallari, who was then gathering banana
pointed out the room, she was asked by Oanis to tell where Irene’s
paramour, Balagtas, was, whereupon Mallari answered that he was
sleeping with Irene. Upon reaching the room indicated, Oanis and
Galanta, after the former had shouted "Stand up, if you are Balagtas,"
started shooting the man who was found by them lying down beside a
woman. The man was thereby killed, but Balagtas was still alive, for it
turned out that the person shot by Oanis and Galanta was one
Serapio Tecson. 
Consequently, Oanis and Galanta were charged with having
committed murder. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
however, convicted them only of homicide through reckless
imprudence and sentenced them each to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of from 1 year and 6 months to 2 years and 2 months of
prision correccional, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of
Serapio Tecson in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. Oanis
and Galanta have appealed.  appellants, Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta, acquitted, with
In accomplishing the acts with which the appellants were charged,
they undoubtedly followed the order issued by the Constabulary
authorities in Manila requiring the Provincial Inspector in Cabanatuan
to get Balagtas dead or alive, in the honest belief that Serapio Tecson
was Anselmo Balagtas. As the latter became a fugitive criminal, with
revolvers in his possession and a record that made him extremely
dangerous and a public terror, the Constabulary authorities were
justified in ordering his arrest, whether dead or alive. In view of said
order and the danger faced by the appellants in carrying it out, they
cannot be said to have acted feloniously in shooting the person
honestly believed by them to be the wanted man. Conscious of the
fact that Balagtas would rather kill than be captured, the appellants did
not want to take chances and should not be penalized for such
prudence. On the contrary, they should be commended for their
bravery and courage bordering on recklessness because, without
knowing or ascertaining whether the wanted man was in fact asleep in
his room, they proceeded thereto without hesitation and thereby
exposed their lives to danger.  what they had done. That was when all parties concerned honestly
The Solicitor-General, however, contends that the appellants were
authorized to use their revolvers only after being overpowered by
Balagtas. In the first place, the alleged instruction by the Provincial
Inspector to that effect, was in violation of the express order given by
the Constabulary authorities in Manila and which was shown to the
appellants. In the second place, it would indeed be suicidal for the
appellants or, for that matter, any agent of the authority to have waited
until they have been overpowered before trying to put out such a
character as Balagtas. In the third place, it is immaterial whether or not
the instruction given by the Provincial Inspector was legitimate and
proper, because the facts exist that the appellants acted in conformity
with the express order of superior Constabulary authorities, the legality
or propriety of which is not herein questioned.  according to their belief, was Balagtas. It was unfortunate, however,
The theory of the prosecution has acquired some plausibility, though
quite psychological or sentimental, in view only of the fact that it was
not Balagtas who was actually killed, but an "innocent man . . . while
he was deeply asleep." Anybody’s heart will be profoundly grieved by
the tragedy, but in time will be consoled by the realization that the life
of Serapio Tecson was not vainly sacrificed, for the incident will
always serve as a loud warning to any one desiring to follow in the
footsteps of Anselmo Balagtas that in due time the duly constituted
authorities will, upon proper order, enforce the summary forfeiture of
his life.  circumstances of this case which favored the accused-appellants,
In my opinion, therefore, the appellants are not criminally liable if the
person killed by them was in fact Anselmo Balagtas for the reason that
they did so in the fulfillment of their duty and in obedience to an order
issued by a superior for some lawful purpose (Revised Penal Code,
art. 11, pars. 5 and 6). They also cannot be held criminally liable even
if the person killed by them was not Anselmo Balagtas, but Serapio
Tecson, because they did so under an honest mistake of fact not due
to negligence or bad faith. (U. S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488).  Penal Code provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
It is true that, under article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended; but said
article is clearly inapplicable since the killing of the person who was
believed to be Balagtas was, as already stated, not wrongful or
felonious.  mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such
The case of U. S. v. Mendieta (34 Phil., 242), cited by the Solicitor-
General, is not in point, inasmuch as the defendant therein, who
intended to injure Hilario Lauigan with whom he had a quarrel, but
killed another by mistake, would not be exempted from criminal liability
if he actually injured or killed Hilario Lauigan, there being a malicious
design on his part. The other case invoked by the prosecution is U. S.
v. Donoso (3 Phil., 234). This is also not in point, as it appears that the
defendants therein killed one Pedro Almasan after he had already
surrendered and allowed himself to be bound and that the said
defendants did not have lawful instructions from superior authorities to
capture Almasan dead or alive. 
The appealed judgment should therefore be reversed and the
costs de oficio. 
HONTIVEROS, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
According to the opinion of the majority, it is proper to follow the rule
that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm without regard to his
life which he has, by his conduct, already forfeited," whenever said
criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors
in danger of imminent attack. Precisely, the situation which confronted
the accused-appellants Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto Galanta in the
afternoon of December 24, 1938, was very similar to this. It must be
remembered that both officers received instructions to get Balagtas
"dead or alive", and according to the attitude of not only the said
appellants but also of Capt. Monsod, constabulary provincial inspector
of Nueva Ecija, it may be assumed that said instructions gave more
emphasis to the first part; namely, to take him dead. It appears in the
record that after the shooting, and having been informed of the case,
Capt. Monsod stated that Oanis and Galanta might be decorated for
believed that the dead person was Balagtas himself, a dangerous
criminal who had escaped from his guards and was supposedly armed
with a .45 caliber pistol. Brigida Mallari, the person whom the
appellants met upon arriving at the house of Irene Requinea,
supposed mistress of Balagtas, informed them that said Balagtas was
upstairs. Appellants found there asleep a man closely resembling the
wanted criminal. Oanis said: "If you are Balagtas stand up." But the
supposed criminal showed his intention to attack the appellants, a
conduct easily explained by the fact that he should have felt offended
by the intrusion of persons in the room where he was peacefully lying
down with his mistress. In such predicament, it was nothing but human
on the part of the appellants to employ force and to make use of their
weapons in order to repel the imminent attack by a person who,
that an innocent man was actually killed. But taking into consideration
the facts of the case, it is, according to my humble opinion, proper to
apply herein the doctrine laid down in the case of U. S. v. Ah Chong
(15 Phil., 488). In the instant case we have, as in the case supra, an
innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness
on the part of the accused, who, having no time to make a further
inquiry, had no alternative but to take the facts as they appeared to
them and act immediately. 
The decision of the majority, in recognition of the special
arrives at the conclusion that an incomplete justifying circumstance
may be invoked, and therefore, according to Article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code, the imposable penalty should be one which is lower by
one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. This incomplete
justifying circumstance is that defined in Article 11, No. 5, of the
Revised Penal Code, in favor of "a person who acts in the fulfillment of
a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office." I believe that the
application of this circumstance is not proper. Article 69 of the Revised
"ART. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not
wholly excusable. — A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that
prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable
by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the
same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases
conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the
period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and
nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking."cralaw
virtua1aw library
This provision has been copied almost verbatim from Article 84 of the
old Penal Code of the Philippines, and which was also taken from
Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870. 
Judge Guillermo Guevara, one of the members of the Committee
created by Administrative Order No. 94 of the Department of Justice
for the drafting of the Revised Penal Code, in commenting on Article
69, said that the justifying circumstances and circumstances
exempting from liability which are the subject matter of this article are
the following: self-defense, defense of relatives, defense of strangers,
state of necessity and injury caused by mere accident. Accordingly,
justifying circumstance No. 5 of Article 11 dealing with the fulfillment of
a duty or the lawful exercise of a right, calling or office, cannot be
placed within its scope.  out of order and therefore there was no reason why Galanta should
The eminent treatiser of criminal law Mr. Groizard, in his commentary
of Article 87 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870 which is the source of
Article 69 of our Code, says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Ni tratandose de la imbecilidad, ni de la locura, ni de la menor edad,
ni del que obra violentado por una fuerza irresistible o impulsado por
miedo insuperable de un mal igual o mayor, o en cumplimiento de un
deber, o en el ejercicio legitimo de un derecho, oficio o cargo, o en
virtud de obediencia debida, ni del que incurre en alguna omision
hallandose impedido por causa legitima o insuperable, puede tener
aplicacion al articulo que comentamos. Y la razon es obvia. En
ninguna de estas exenciones hay pluralidad de requisitos. La
irresponsabilidad depende de una sola condicion. Hay o no
perturbacion de la razon; el autor del hecho es o no menor de nueve
años; existe o no violencia material o moral irresistible, etc., etc.; tal es
lo que respectivamente hay que examinar y resolver para declarar la
culpabilidad o inculpabilidad. Es, por lo tanto, imposible que
acontezca lo que el texto que va al frente de estas lineas requiere,
para que se imponga al autor del hecho la penalidad excepcional que
establece; esto es, que falten algunos requisitos de los que la ley
exige para eximir de responsabilidad, y que concurran el mayor
número de ellos, toda vez que, en los casos referidos, la ley no exige
multiples condiciones."cralaw virtua1aw library
and missed. This testimony is corroborated by that of a ballistic expert
who testified that bullets exhibits F and O, — the first being extracted
from the head of the deceased, causing wound No. 3 of autopsy report
Exhibit C and the second found at the place of the shooting, — had
not been fired from revolver Exhibit L nor from any other revolver of
the constabulary station in Cabanatuan. It was impossible for the
accused Galanta to have substituted his revolver because when
Exhibit L was taken from him nobody in the barracks doubted that the
deceased was none other than Balagtas. Moreover, Exhibit L was not
carry along another gun, according to the natural course of things. On
the other hand, aside from wound No. 3 as above stated, no other
wound may be said to have been caused by a .45 caliber revolver
bullet. Doctor Castro’s record gives the conclusion that wound No. 2
must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet, but inasmuch as the
diameter of the wound’s entrance was only 8 mm., the caliber should
be .32 and not .45, because according to the medico-legal expert who
testified in this case, a bullet of a .45 caliber will produce a wound
entrance with either 11 mm. or 12 mm. diameter. All other wounds
found by the surgeon who performed the autopsy appeared to have
been caused by bullets of a lesser caliber. In consequence, it can be
stated that no bullet fired by Galanta did ever hit or kill Serapio Tecson
and therefore there is no reason why he should be declared criminally
responsible for said death.

It must be taken into account the fact according to Article 69 a penalty

lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of
some of the conditions required by the law to justify the same or
exempt from criminal liability. The word "conditions" should not be
confused with the word "requisites." In dealing with justifying
circumstance No. 5, Judge Guevara states: "There are two requisites
in order that this circumstance may be taken into account: (a) That the
offender acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right; and (b) That the injury or offense committed be the
necessary consequence of the performance of a duty or the lawful
exercise of a right or office." It is evident that these two requisites
concur in the present case if we consider the intimate connection
between the order given to the appellant by Capt. Monsod, the
showing to them of the telegram from Manila to get Balagtas who was
with a bailarina named Irene, the conduct of said appellants in
questioning Brigida Mallari and giving a warning to the supposed
criminal when both found him with Irene, and the statement made by
Capt. Monsod after the shooting. 

If appellant Oanis is entitled to a reversal of the decision of the court

below, there are more reasons in favor of the acquittal of appellant
Galanta. According to the evidence no bullet from the gun fired by this
accused ever hit Serapio Tecson. Galanta was armed in the afternoon
of December 24, 1938, with a .45 caliber revolver (Exhibit L). He so
testified and was corroborated by the unchallenged testimony of his
superior officer Sgt. Valeriano Serafica. According to this witness,
since Galanta was made a corporal of the Constabulary he was given,
as part of his equipment, revolver Exhibit L with a serial No. 37121.
This gun had been constantly used by Galanta, and, according to Sgt.
Pedro Marasigan, who accompanied said accused when he took it
from his trunk in the barracks on the night of December 24, 1938,
upon order of Captain Monsod, it was the same revolver which was
given to the witness with five .45 caliber bullets and one empty shell.
Fourteen unused bullets were also taken from Galanta by Sergeant
Serafica, thus completing his regular equipment of twenty bullets
which he had on the morning of December 24, 1938, when Sergeant
Serafica made the usual inspection of the firearms in the possession
of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the constabulary
post at Cabanatuan. Galanta stated that he had fired only one shot

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 116736. July 24, 1997.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BENJAMIN
ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE, MANUEL GARCIA y RIVERA and JOHN
DOE, Accused, BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. y CONJE and MANUEL
GARCIA y RIVERA, Accused-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Evaristo P. Veligaria for Accused-Appellants.
SYNOPSIS
Appellants Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were charged with
the killing of Andre Mar Masangkay, attended with treachery, evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength. They were found guilty
and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua. The trial court explained
its basis for appellants’ conviction as follows: "The Court is convinced
that the concerted acts of accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel
Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega in lifting, carrying and dumping the
victim Andre Mar Masangkay who was still alive and breathing inside
the deep well filled with water, head first and threw big stone/rocks
inside the well to cover the victim is a clear indication of the community
of design to finish/kill victim Andre Mar Masangkay. Wounded and
unarmed victim Andre Mar Masangkay was in no position to flee
and/or defend himself against the three malefactors. Conspiracy and
the taking advantage of superior strength were in attendance. The
crime committed by the accused is murder."cralaw virtua1aw library
  May as accused who originally intended to conceal and bury what he
thought was the lifeless body of the victim be held liable as a principal,
where it is proven that the said victim was actually alive but
subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment and burial?
Article 4, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability
shall be incurred by "any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." In
assisting appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of Masangkay to the
well, appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The offense was that
of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery, i.e. that of
being an accessory in the crime of homicide. Although appellant
Garcia may have been unaware that the victim was still alive when he
assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the well, he is still liable for
the direct and natural consequence of his felonious act, even if the
resulting offense is worse than that intended.
True, appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the
victim. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer
showed that the victim at that time was still alive, and that he died
subsequently of drowning. That drowning was the immediate cause of
death was medically demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the
victim’s airway, lungs and stomach.
The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony that appellant Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies
praeter intentionem covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal
Code. Under this paragraph, a person may be convicted of homicide
although he had no original intent to kill.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH; NOTHING IN THE TESTIMONY AND
CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASE AT BAR CAN BE INTERPRETED
AS ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH. — Although treachery,
evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were alleged in
the information, the trial court found the presence only of abuse of
superior strength. We disagree with the trial court’s finding. Abuse of
superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused
to take advantage of such superiority. It must be shown that the
accused purposely used excessive force that was manifestly out of
proportion to the means available to the victim’s defense. In this light,
it is necessary to evaluate not only the physical condition and weapon
of the protagonists but also the various incidents of the event. In his
testimony, Witness Dominador Quitlong mentioned nothing about
Appellant Ortega’s availment of force excessively out of proportion to
the means of defense available to the victim to defend himself. It
should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, whereas
Appellant Ortega, Jr. was only five feet and five inches tall. There was
no testimony as to how the attack was initiated. The accused and the
victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in the
foregoing testimony and circumstances can be interpreted as abuse
superior strength. Hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide, not
murder.
2. ID.; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; THE LIABILITY OF APPELLANT
MANUEL GARCIA; HE IS LIABLE FOR THE DIRECT AND NATURAL
CONSEQUENCE OF HIS FELONIOUS ACT, EVEN IF THE
RESULTING OFFENSE IS WORSE THAN THAT INTENDED. —
Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability
shall be incurred by "any person committing a felony (delito) although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended." The
essential requisites for the application of this provision are that (a) the
intended act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and
(c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the
actor’s wrongful acts. In assisting Appellant Ortega. Jr. carry the body
of Masangkay to the well, Appellant Garcia was committing a felony.
The offense was that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its
discovery, i.e. that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide.
Although Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim
was still alive when he assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the
well, he is still liable for the direct and natural consequence of his
felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than that intended.
True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the
victim. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer
showed that the victim at that time was still alive, and that he died
subsequently of drowning. That drowning was the immediate cause of
death was medically demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the
victim’s airway, lungs and stomach. The drowning was direct, natural
and logical consequence of the felony that Appellant Garcia had
intended to commit; it exemplifies praeter intentionem covered by
Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code. Under this paragraph, a
person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original
intent to kill.
3. ID.; ED.; TWO LEGAL OBSTACLES BAR APPELLANT GARCIA’S
CONVICTION AS PRINCIPAL, EVEN AS AN ACCESSORY, IN THE
CRIME OF HOMICIDE; REASON. — The Information accused
Appellant Garcia (and Appellant Ortega) of "attack[ing], assault[ing],
and stab[bing] repeatedly with a pointed weapon on the different parts
of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y ABLOLA." The
prosecution’s evidence itself shows that Garcia had nothing to do with
the stabbing which was solely perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His
responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the crime
and the resulting drowning of Victim Masangkay. The hornbook
doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted of
an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than
that charged in the complaint or information would be a violation of this
constitutional right. By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be
convicted of homicide through drowning in an information that charges
murder by means of stabbing. Second. Although the prosecution was
able to prove that Appellant Garcia assisted in "concealing . . . the
body of the crime, . . . in order to prevent its discovery," he can neither
be convicted as an accessory after the fact defined under Article 19,
par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The records show that Appellant
Garcia is a brother-in-law of Appellant Ortega, the latter’s sister,
Maritess, being his wife. Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia
 from criminal liability as provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal
Code.
4. ID.; HOMICIDE; PENALTY AND DAMAGES. — The award of
actual damages should be reduced to P31,790.00 from P35,000.00.
The former amount was proven both by documentary evidence and by
the testimony of Melba Lozano, a sister of the victim. Of the expenses
alleged to have been incurred, the Court can give credence only to
those that are supported by receipts and appear to have been
genuinely incurred in connection with the death of the victim. However,
in line with current jurisprudence. Appellant Ortega shall also
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P50,000.00.
Indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death and
appellant’s responsibility therefor. The penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, which
is imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, as in the case of Appellant Ortega. Because
he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is, prision mayor.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A person who commits a felony is liable for the direct, natural and
logical consequences of his wrongful act even where the resulting
crime is more serious than that intended. Hence, an accused who
originally intended to conceal and to bury what he thought was the
lifeless body of the victim can be held liable as a principal, not simply
as an accessory, where it is proven that the said victim was actually
alive but subsequently died as a direct result of such concealment and
burial. Nonetheless, in the present case, Appellant Garcia cannot be
held liable as a principal because the prosecution failed to allege such
death through drowning in the Information. Neither may said appellant
be held liable as an accessory due to his relationship with the principal
killer, Appellant Ortega, who is his brother-in-law.
Statement of the Case
This case springs from the joint appeal interposed by Appellants
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia from the Decision, 1 dated
February 9, 1994 written by Judge Adriano R. Osorio, 2 finding them
guilty of murder.
Appellants were charged by State Prosecutor Bernardo S. Razon in an
Information 3 dated October 19, 1992, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about October 17, 1992 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another, without any justifiable cause, with treachery and evident
premeditation and with abuse of superior strenght (sic) and with
deliberate intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab repeatedly with a pointed weapon
on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR MASANGKAY y
ABLOLA, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries
which directly caused his death."cralaw virtua1aw library
During arraignment, Appellants Ortega and Garcia, assisted by
counsel de officio, 4 pleaded not guilty to the charge. 5 Accused "John
Doe" was then at large. 6 After trial in due course, the court a quo
promulgated the questioned Decision. The dispositive portion reads: 7  see what happened to Andre Mar Masangkay. That he only heard
"WHEREFORE, finding accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. y Conje and
Manuel Garcia y Rivera [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, the Court hereby sentenced (sic) them to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs of suit.
Accused are hereby ordered to pay the offended party the sum of
P35,000.00 for funeral expenses of deceased Andre Mar Masangkay
and death indemnity of P50,000.00."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Notice of Appeal, dated March 9, 1994, was thus filed by Atty.
Evaristo P. Velicaria 8 who took over from the Public Attorney’s Office
as counsel for the accused.
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
The trial court summarized the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses as follows: 9 
"Diosdado Quitlong substantially testified that on October 15, 1992 at
about 5:30 in the afternoon, he, the victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel
Caranto, Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres were having a drinking
spree in the compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. at
Daangbakal, Dalandanan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. That while they
were drinking, Accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who
were [already] drunk arrived and joined them. That victim Andre Mar
Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the back portion
of the house. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and
later they [referring to the participants in the drinking session] heard
the victim Andre Mar shouted, ‘Don’t, help me!’ (Huwag, tulungan
ninyo ako!) That he and Ariel Caranto ran towards the back portion of
the house and [they] saw accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr., on top of
Andre Mar Masangkay who was lying down in a canal with his face up
and stabbing the latter with a long bladed weapon. That Ariel Caranto
ran and fetched Benjamin Ortega, Sr., the father of accused Benjamin,
Jr. That he [Quitlong] went to Romeo Ortega in the place where they
were having the drinking session [for the latter] to pacify his brother
Benjamin, Jr. That Romeo Ortega went to the place of the stabbing
and together with Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia lifted Andre
Mar Masangkay from the canal and brought Andre Mar to the well and
dropped the latter inside the well. That Romeo Ortega, Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia then dropped stones measuring 11 to
12 inches high, 2 feet in length and 11 to 12 inches in weight to the
body of Andre Mar Masangkay inside the well. That Romeo Ortega
warned him [Quitlong] not to tell anybody of what he saw. That he
answered in the affirmative and he was allowed to go home. That his
house is about 200 meters from Romeo Ortega’s house. That upon
reaching home, his conscience bothered him and he told his mother
what he witnessed. That he went to the residence of Col. Leonardo
Orig and reported the matter. That Col. Orig accompanied him to the
Valenzuela Police Station and some police officers went with them to
the crime scene. That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel
Garcia were apprehended and were brought to the police station.
On cross-examination, he said that he did not talk to the lawyer before
he was presented as witness in this case. That he narrated the
incident to his mother on the night he witnessed the killing on October
15, 1992. That on October 15, 1992 at 5:30 in the afternoon when he
arrived, victim Andre Mar Masangkay, Romeo Ortega, Serafin and one
Boyet were already having [a] drinking spree and he joined them. That
accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia were not yet in the
place. That the stabbing happened between 12:00 midnight and 12:30
a.m. That they drank gin with finger foods such as pork and shell fish.
That he met the victim Andre Mar Masangkay only on that occasion.
That accused Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia joined them at
about 11:00 p.m. That there was no altercation between Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia in one hand and Andre Mar
Masangkay, during the drinking session. That at about 12:30 a.m.
Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went to the
back portion of the house. That he cannot see Andre Mar Masangkay
from the place they were having the drinking session. That he did not
Masangkay asking for help. That accused Manuel Garcia was still in
the drinking session when he heard Masangkay was asking for help.
That Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia are his friends and
neighbors. That when he heard Andre Mar Masangkay was asking for
help, he and Ariel Caranto ran to the back portion of the house and
saw Benjamin Ortega, Jr. on top of Andre Mar Masangkay and
stabbing the latter. That Andre Mar Masangkay was lying down with
his back in the canal and Benjamin Ortega, Jr. on top stabbing the
former. That he did not see any injuries on Benjamin Ortega, Jr. That
he called Romeo Ortega to pacify his brother Benjamin, Jr. That he did
not do anything to separate Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Masangkay.
That he knows that Andre Mar Masangkay was courting Raquel
Ortega. That Raquel Ortega asked permission from Andre Mar
Masangkay when she left between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. That there was
no trouble that occurred during the drinking session.
PNP Superintendent Leonardo Orig substantially testified that
Diosdado Quitlong is his neighbor for about 9 years. That on October
16, 1992 at 5:00 in the morning, he was summoned by Diosdado
Quitlong and reported to him the stabbing incident that occurred at
Daangbakal near the subdivision he is living. That he relayed the
information to the Valenzuela Police Station and a police team under
police officer Param accompanied them to the place. That he asked
the police officers to verify if there is a body of person inside the well.
That the well was covered with stones and he asked the police officers
to seek the help of theneighbors (sic) to remove the stones inside the
well. That after the stones were removed, the body of the victim was
found inside the well. That the lifeless body was pulled out from the
well. That the body has several stab wounds. That he came to know
the victim as Andre Mar Masangkay. That two men were arrested by
the police officers.
On cross-examination, he said that he saw the body when taken out of
the well with several stab wounds. That Diosdado Quitlong told him
that he was drinking with the victim and the assailants at the time of
the incident. That Benjamin Ortega, Jr. stabbed the victim while the
latter was answering the call of nature.
NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ludivico J. Lagat substantially testified
that he conducted [an] autopsy on the cadaver of Andre Mar
Masangkay on October 16, 1992 at the Valenzuela Memorial Homes
located at Macarthur Highway. That he prepared the autopsy report
and the sketch of human head and body indicating the location of the
stab wounds. That the cause of death is multiple stab wounds,
contributory, [a]sphyxia by submersion in water. That there were 13
stab wounds, 8 of which were on the frontal part of the body, 2 at the
back and there were contused abrasions around the neck and on the
left arm. There was stab wound at the left side of the neck. That the
contused abrasion could be produced by cord or wire or rope. That
there is (an) incised wound on the left forearm. That the stab wounds
which were backward downward of the body involved the lungs. That
the victim was in front of the assailant. That the stab wound on the
upper left shoulder was caused when the assailant was in front of the
victim. That the assailant was in front of the victim when the stab
wound near the upper left armpit was inflicted as well as the stab
wound on the left chest wall. That the stab wound on the back left side
of the body and the stab wound on the back right portion of the body
may be produced when the assailant was at the back of the victim.
That the assailant was in front of the victim when the stab wound[s] on
the left elbow and left arm were inflicted. That the large airway is filled
with muddy particles indicating that the victim was alive when the
victim inhaled the muddy particles. The heart is filled with multiple
hemorrhage, loss of blood or decreased of blood. The lungs is filled
with water or muddy particles. The brain is pale due to loss of blood.
The stomach is one half filled with muddy particles which could [have
been] taken in when submerged in water.
On cross-examination, he said that he found 13 stab wounds on the
body of the victim. That he cannot tell if the assailant or the victim
were standing. That it is possible that the stab wounds was (sic)
inflicted when both [referring to participants] were standing or the
victim was lying down and the assailant was on top. That he cannot
tell the number of the assailants."cralaw virtua1aw library
Evidence for the Appellants
Appellant Manuel Garcia testified that in the early morning of October
15, 1992, he and his wife, Maritess Garcia, brought their feverish
daughter, Marjorie, to the Polo Emergency Hospital. He left the
hospital at seven o’clock in the morning, went home, changed his
clothes and went to work. 10 After office hours, he and Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. passed by the canteen at their place of work. After drinking
beer, they left at eight o’ clock in the evening and headed home. En
route, they chanced on Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre
Mar Masangkay, who invited them to join their own drinking spree.
Thereupon, Appellant Garcia’s wife came and asked him to go home
because their daughter was still sick. To alleviate his daughter’s
illness, he fetched his mother-in-law who performed a ritual called
"tawas." After the ritual, he remained at home and attended to his sick
daughter. He then fell asleep but was awakened by police officers at
six o’clock in the morning of the following day.
Maritess Garcia substantially corroborated the testimony of her
husband. She however added two other participants in the drinking
session aside from Diosdado Quitlong alias Mac-mac and Andre Mar
Masangkay, namely, a Mang Serafin and Boyet Santos. 11 
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. likewise substantially corroborated the testimony
of Appellant Manuel Garcia. 12 According to him, between eleven and
twelve o’clock in the evening, Masangkay left the drinking session.
Thirty (30) minutes after Masangkay left, he also left the drinking place
to urinate. 13 He went behind the house where he saw Masangkay
peeping through the room of his sister Raquel. He ignored Masangkay
and continued urinating. 14 After he was through, Masangkay
approached him and asked where his sister was. He answered that he
did not know. Without warning, Masangkay allegedly boxed him in the
mouth, an attack that induced bleeding and caused him to fall on his
back. When he was about to stand up, Masangkay drew a knife and
stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm, thereby immobilizing him.
Masangkay then gripped his neck with his left arm and threatened to
kill him. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong came and,
to avoid being stabbed, grabbed Masangkay’s right hand which was
holding the knife. Quitlong was able to wrest the knife from Masangkay
and, with it, he stabbed Masangkay ten (10) times successively, in the
left chest and in the middle of the stomach. When the stabbing started,
Ortega moved to the left side of Masangkay to avoid being hit. 15
Quitlong chased Masangkay who ran towards the direction of the well.
Thereafter, Ortega went home and treated his injured left armpit and
lips. Then, he slept.
When he woke up at six o’clock the following morning, he saw police
officers in front of his house. Taking him with them, the lawmen
proceeded to the well. From the railroad tracks where he was asked to
sit, he saw the police officers lift the body of a dead person from the
well. He came to know the identity of the dead person only after the
body was taken to the police headquarters. 16 
The Trial Court’s Discussion
The trial court explained its basis for appellants’ conviction as follows:
17 
"The Court is convinced that the concerted acts of accused Benjamin
Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, Jr. and one Romeo Ortega in lifting,
carrying and dumping the victim Andre Mar Masangkay who was still
alive and breathing inside the deep well filled with water, head first and
threw big stones/rocks inside the well to cover the victim is a clear
indication of the community of design to finish/kill victim Andre Mar
Masangkay. Wounded and unarmed victim Andre Mar Masangkay
was in no position to flee and/or defend himself against the three
malefactors. Conspiracy and the taking advantage of superior strength
were in attendance. The crime committed by the accused is Murder.
Concert of action at the moment of consummating the crime and the
form and manner in which assistance is rendered to the person
inflicting the fatal wound may determine complicity where it would not
otherwise be evidence (People v. Yu, 80 SCRA 382 (1977)).
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Accused
(m)ust reimburse the heirs of victim Andre Mar Masangkay the amount
of P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of the deceased."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The Issues
In their ten-page brief, appellants fault the trial court with the following:
18 
"I. The trial court erred in holding that there is conspiracy on the basis
of the prosecution’s evidence that at the time both accused and one
Romeo Ortega lifted the body of Andrew Masangkay from where he
succumbed due to stab wounds and brought and drop said body of
Andrew Masangkay to the well to commit murder;
II. The trial court erred in finding and holding that Andrew Masangkay
was still alive at the time his body was dropped in the well;
III. The trial court erred in convicting Manuel Garcia and in not
acquitting the latter of the crime charged; and
IV. The trial court erred in not finding that if at all Benjamin Ortega Jr.
is guilty only of homicide alone."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the basis of the records and the arguments raised by the
appellants and the People, we believe that the question to be resolved
could be simplified thus: What are the criminal liabilities, if any, of
Appellants Ortega and Garcia?
The Court’s Ruling
We find the appeal partly meritorious. Appellant Ortega is guilty only of
homicide. Appellant Garcia deserves acquittal.
First Issue: Liability of Appellant Ortega
The witnesses for the prosecution and defense presented conflicting
narrations. The prosecution witnesses described the commission of
the crime and positively identified appellants as the perpetrators. The
witnesses for the defense, on the other hand, attempted to prove
denial and alibi. As to which of the two contending versions speaks the
truth primarily rests on a critical evaluation of the credibility of the
witnesses and their stories. In this regard, the trial court held: 19  house of Benjamin Ortega Sr. and the house of his son Benjamin
"The Court has listened intently to the narration of the accused and
their witnesses and the- prosecution witnesses and has keenly
observed their behavior and demeanor on the witness stand and is
convinced that the story of the prosecution is the more believable
version. Prosecution eyewitness Diosdado Quitlong appeared and
sounded credible and his credibility is reinforced by the fact that he
has no reason to testify falsely against the accused. It was Diosdado
Quitlong who reported the stabbing incident to the police authorities. If
Quitlong stabbed and killed the victim Masangkay, he will keep away
from the police authorities and will go in hiding. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses’
demeanor and deportment on the stand as they rendered their
testimonies, its evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to
the highest respect. Therefore, unless the trial judge plainly
overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case, his assessment of credibility must
be respected. 20  A Yes, sir.
In the instant case, we have meticulously scoured the records and
found no reason to reverse the trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies 21 insofar as
Appellant Ortega is concerned. The narration of Eyewitness Diosdado
Quitlong appears to be spontaneous and consistent. It is
straightforward, detailed, vivid and logical. Thus it clearly deserves full
credence.
On the other hand, in asserting alibi and denial, the defense bordered
the unbelievable. Appellant Ortega claimed that after he was able to
free himself from ‘Masangkay’s grip, he went home, treated his injuries
and slept. 22 This is not the ordinary reaction of a person assaulted. If
Ortega’s version of the assault was true, he should have immediately
reported the matter to the police authorities, if only out of gratitude to
Quitlong who came to his rescue. Likewise, it is difficult to believe that
a man would just sleep after someone was stabbed in his own
backyard. Further, we deem it incredible that Diosdado Quitlong would
stab Masangkay ten (10) times successively, completely ignoring
Benjamin Ortega Jr. who was grappling with Masangkay. Also
inconsistent with human experience is his narration that Masangkay
persisted in choking him instead of defending himself from the alleged
successive stabbing of Quitlong. 23 The natural tendency of a person
under attack is to defend himself and not to persist in choking a
defenseless third person. 
Murder or Homicide?
Although treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength were alleged in the information, the trial court found the
presence only of abuse of superior strength.
We disagree with the trial court’s finding. Abuse of superior strength
requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take advantage
of such superiority. It must be shown that the accused purposely used
excessive force that was manifestly out of proportion to the means
available to the victim’s defense. 24 In this light, it is necessary to
evaluate not only the physical condition and weapon of the
protagonists but also the various incidents of the event.25cralaw:red
In his testimony, Witness Dominador Quitlong mentioned nothing
about Appellant Ortega’s availment of force excessively out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the victim to defend
himself. Quitlong described the assault made by Appellant Ortega as
follows: 26 
"ATTY. ALTUNA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q Will you please tell me the place and date wherein you have a
drinking spree with Andrew Masangkay and where you witnessed a
stabbing incident?
A It was on October 15, 1992, sir, at about 5:30 in the afternoon we
were drinking in the house of Mr. Benjamin Ortega, Sr., because the
Ortega, Jr. are near each other.
x       x       x
Q Mr. Witness, who were the companions of said persons, Benjamin
Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, you (sic) in drinking in said place?
A The other companions in the drinking session were Ariel Caranto y
Ducay, Roberto San Andres and Romeo Ortega.
Q What about this victim, Andrew Masangkay, where was he at that
time?
A Also the victim, Andrew Masangkay, he was also there.
Q You said that the two accused, Manuel Garcia and Benjamin
Ortega, Jr. arrived drunk and joined the group?
Q What happened next?
A While we were there together and we were drinking . . . (interrupted
by Atty. Altuna)
Q Who is that ‘we’?
A Referring to Benjamin Ortega, Jr., Manuel Garcia, Ariel Caranto,
Romeo Ortega, Roberto San Andres, myself and Andrew Masangkay.
Andrew Masangkay answer to a call of nature and went to the back
portion of the house, and Benjamin Ortega; Jr. followed him where he
was.
Q What happened next?
A And afterwards we heard a shout and the shout said ‘Huwag,
tulungan n’yo ako’.
Q From whom did you hear this utterance?

A The shout came from Andrew Masangkay.
Q After Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed Andrew Masangkay to answer a
call of nature and after you heard ‘huwag, tulungan n’yo ako’ coming
from the mouth of the late Andrew Masangkay, what happened next?
A Ariel Caranto and I ran towards the back portion of the house.
Q And what did you see?
A And I saw that Benjamin Ortega, Jr. was on top of Andrew
Masangkay and he was stabbing Andrew Masangkay.
Q Will you please demonstrate to the Honorable Court how the
stabbing was done telling us the particular position of the late Andrew
Masangkay and how Benjamin Ortega, Jr. proceeded with the
stabbing against the late victim, Andrew Masangkay?
INTERPRETER:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(At this juncture, the witness demonstrating.)
Andrew Masangkay was lying down on a canal with his face up, then
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. was ‘nakakabayo’ and with his right hand with
closed fist holding the weapon, he was thrusting this weapon on the
body of the victim, he was making downward and upward motion
thrust.
ATTY. ALTUNA: (To the witness)
Q How many times did Benjamin Ortega, Jr. stabbed Andrew
Masangkay?
A I cannot count the number of times."cralaw virtua1aw library
It should be noted that Victim Masangkay was a six-footer, whereas
Appellant Ortega, Jr. was only five feet and five inches tall. 27 There
was no testimony as to how the attack was initiated. The accused and
the victim were already grappling when Quitlong arrived. Nothing in
the foregoing testimony and circumstances can be interpreted as
abuse of superior strength. Hence, Ortega is liable only for homicide,
not murder.
Second Issue: Liability of Appellant Manuel Garcia
Appellants argue that the finding of conspiracy by the trial court "is
based on mere assumption and conjecture . . .." 28 Allegedly, the
medico-legal finding that the large airway was "filled with muddy
particles indicating that the victim was alive when the victim inhaled
the muddy particles" did not necessarily mean that such muddy
particles entered the body of the victim while he was still alive. The
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Quitlong stated, "Nilubayan lang nang
saksak nang mapatay na si Andrew ni Benjamin Ortega, Jr." Thus, the
prosecution evidence shows Masangkay was already "dead" when he
was lifted and dumped into the well. Hence, Garcia could be held
liable only as an accessory. 29 
We do not agree with the above contention. Article 4, par. 1, of the
Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by
"any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended." The essential
requisites for the application of this provision are that (a) the intended
act is felonious; (b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and (c) the
unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s
wrongful acts. In assisting Appellant Ortega, Jr. carry the body of
Masangkay to the well, Appellant Garcia was committing a felony. The
offense was that of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its
discovery, i.e., that of being an accessory in the crime of homicide. 30
Although Appellant Garcia may have been unaware that the victim
was still alive when he assisted Ortega in throwing the body into the
well, he is still liable for the direct and natural consequence of his
felonious act, even if the resulting offense is worse than that
intended.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
True, Appellant Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the
victim. But the autopsy conducted by the NBI medico-legal officer
showed that the victim at that time was still alive, and that he died
subsequently of drowning. 31 That drowning was the immediate cause
of death was medically demonstrated by the muddy particles found in
the victim’s airway, lungs and stomach. 32 This is evident from the
expert testimony given by the medico-legal officer, quoted below: 33 
ATTY. ALTUNA:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Will you please explain this in simple language the last portion of
Exhibit N, beginning with ‘tracheo-bronchial tree’, that is sentence
immediately after paragraph 10, 2.5 cms. Will you please explain this?
A The trancheo-bronchial tree is filled with muddy particles.
Q I ask you a question on this. Could the victim have possibly get this
particular material?
A No, sir.
Q What do you mean by no?
A A person should be alive so that the muddy particles, could be
inhaled.
Q So, in short, you are telling or saying to us that if there is no inhaling
or the taking or receiving of muddy particles at that time, the person is
still alive?
A Yes, sir.
Q Second point?
A The heart is pale with some multiple petechial hemorrhages at the
anterior surface.
Q And this may [be] due to stab wounds or asphyxia?
A These are the effects or due to asphyxia or decreased amount of
blood going to the heart.
Q This asphyxia are you referring to is the drowning?
A Yes, sir.
Q Next point is the lungs?
A The lungs is also filled with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
Q What could have caused this injury of the lungs?
A This is due to asphyxia or the loss of blood.
Q Are you saying that the lungs have been filled with water or muddy
particles?
A Yes, sir.
Q And, precisely, you are now testifying that due to stab wounds or
asphyxia, the lungs have been damaged per your Report?
A Yes, sir.
Q Continuing this brain and other visceral organs, pale. What is this?
A The paleness of the brain and other visceral organs is due to loss of
blood.
Q And, of course, loss of blood could be attributed to the stab wound
which is number 13?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the last one, under the particular point ‘hemothorax’?

A It indicates at the right side. There are around 1,400 cc of blood that
accumulate at the thoraxic cavity and this was admixed with granular
materials.
Q And what cause the admixing with granular materials on said
particular portion of the body?
A Could be muddy particles.
Q Due to the taking of maddy (sic) materials as affected by asphyxia?
Am I correct?
A It’s due to stab wounds those muddy particles which set-in thru the
stab wounds.
Q So, because of the opening of the stab wounds, the muddy particles
now came in, in that particular portion of the body and caused
admixing of granular materials?
A Yes, sir.
Q Continuing with your report, particularly, the last two portions, will
you Please explain the same?
A The hemoperitoneum there are 900 cc of blood that accumulated
inside the abdomen.
Q And what could have cause the same?
A [T]he stab wound of the abdomen.
Q The last one, stomach 1/2 filled with muddy particles. Please explain
the same?
A The victim could have taken these when he was submerged in
water.
Q What is the take in?
A Muddy particles.
Q And he was still alive at that time?
A Yes, sir." (Emphasis supplied)
A Filipino authority on forensic medicine opines that any of the
following medical findings may show that drowning is the cause of
death: 34 
"1. The presence of materials or foreign bodies in the hands of the
victim. The clenching of the hands is a manifestation of cadaveric
spasm in the effort of the victim to save himself from drowning.
2. Increase in volume (emphysema aquosum) and edema of the lungs
(edema aquosum).
3. Presence of water and fluid in the stomach contents corresponding
to the medium where the body was recovered.
4. Presence of froth, foam or foreign bodies in the air passage found in
the medium where the victim was found.
5. Presence of water in the middle ear."cralaw virtua1aw library
The third and fourth findings were present in the case of Victim
Masangkay. It was proven that his air passage, or specifically his
tracheo-bronchial tree, was filled with muddy particles which were
residues at the bottom of the well.
Even his stomach was half-filled with such muddy particles. The
unrebutted testimony of the medico-legal officer that all these muddy
particles were ingested when the victim was still alive proved that the
victim died of drowning inside the well.
The drowning was the direct, natural and logical consequence of the
felony that Appellant Garcia had intended to commit; it exemplifies
praeter intentionem covered by Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal
Code. Under this paragraph, a person may be convicted of homicide
although he had no original intent to kill. 35 
In spite of the evidence showing that Appellant Garcia could be held
liable as principal in the crime of homicide, there are, however, two
legal obstacles barring his conviction, even as an accessory — as
prayed for by appellants’ counsel himself.
First. The Information accused Appellant Garcia (and Appellant
Ortega) of "attack[ing], assault[ing], and stab[bing] repeatedly with a
pointed weapon on the different parts of the body one ANDRE MAR
MASANGKAY y ABLOLA." The prosecution’s evidence itself shows
that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing which was solely
perpetrated by Appellant Ortega. His responsibility relates only to the
attempted concealment of the crime and the resulting drowning of
Victim Masangkay. The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an
accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged
in the complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To
convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or
information would be a violation of this constitutional right. 36 Section
14, par. 2, of the 1987 Constitution explicitly guarantees the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure, to appear is unjustifiable." ( Emphasis
supplied)
In People v. Pailano, 37 this Court ruled that there can be no
conviction for rape on a woman "deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious" where the information charged the accused of sexual
assault "by using force or intimidation," thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The criminal complaint in this case alleged the commission of the
crime through the first method although the prosecution sought to
establish at the trial that the complainant was a mental retardate. Its
purpose in doing so is not clear. But whatever it was, it has not
succeeded.
If the prosecution was seeking to convict the accused-appellant on the
ground that he violated Anita while she was deprived of reason or
unconscious, such conviction could not have been possible under the
criminal complaint as worded. This described the offense as having
been committed by ‘Antonio Pailano, being then provided with a
scythe, by means of violence and intimidation, (who) did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant, Anita Ibanez, 15 years of age, against her will.’ No
mention was made of the second circumstance.
Conviction of the accused-appellant on the finding that he had raped
Anita while she was unconscious or otherwise deprived of reason —
and not through force and intimidation, which was the method alleged
— would have violated his right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.[Article IV, Sec. 19, Constitution of 1973;
now Article III, Sec. 14(2)] This right is safeguarded by the Constitution
to every accused so he can prepare an adequate defense against the
charge against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is
concentrating his defense against the ground alleged would, plainly be
unfair and underhanded. This right was, of course, available to the
herein Accused-Appellant.
In People v. Ramirez, [fn: 69 SCRA 144] we held that a person
charged with rape could not be found guilty of qualified seduction,
which had not been alleged in the criminal complaint against him. In
the case of People v. Montes, [fn: 122 SCRA 409] the Court did not
permit the conviction for homicide of a person held responsible for the
suicide of the woman he was supposed to have raped, as the crime he
was accused of — and acquitted — was not homicide but rape. More
to the point is Tubb v. People of the Philippines, [fn: 101 Phil. 114]
where the accused was charged with the misappropriation of funds
held by him in trust with the obligation to return the same under Article
315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, but was convicted of
swindling by means of false pretenses, under paragraph 2(b) of the
said Article, which was not alleged in the information. The Court said
such conviction would violate the Bill of Rights."cralaw virtua1aw
library
By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of
homicide through drowning in an information that charges murder by
means of stabbing.
Second. Although the prosecution was able to prove that Appellant
Garcia assisted in concealing . . . the body of the crime, . . . in order to
prevent its discovery," he can neither be convicted as an accessory
after the fact defined under Article 19, par. 2, of the Revised Penal
Code. The records show that Appellant Garcia is a brother-in-law of
Appellant Ortega, 38 the latter’s sister, Maritess, being his wife. 39
Such relationship exempts Appellant Garcia from criminal liability as
provided by Article 20 of the Revised Penal
Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. — The
penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those
who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants,
legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees with the single exception of
accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next
preceding article."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the hand, "the next preceding article"
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners.
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or
instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal
of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive,
or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Appellant Garcia, being a covered relative by affinity of the principal
accused, Benjamin Ortega, Jr., is legally entitled to the aforequoted
exempting provision of the Revised Penal Code. This Court is thus
mandated by law to acquit him.
Penalty and Damages
The award of actual damages should be reduced to P31,790.00 from
P35,000.00. The former amount was proven both by documentary
evidence and by the testimony of Melba Lozano, a sister of the victim.
38 Of the expenses alleged to have been incurred, the Court can give
credence only to those that are supported by receipts and appear to
have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death of the
victim. 39 However, in line with current jurisprudence, 40 Appellant
Ortega shall also indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P50,000.00. Indemnity requires no proof other than the fact of death
and appellant’s responsibility therefor. 43  People v. Jaca, 229 SCRA 332, January 18, 1994; People v. Tismo,
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, which is imposable in its medium period, absent
any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as in the case of Appellant
Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be one degree lower, that is,
prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the joint appeal is PARTLY
GRANTED. Appellant Benjamin Ortega, Jr. is found GUILTY of
homicide and sentenced to ten (10) years of prision mayor medium, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. Appellant Ortega, Jr. is also
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity and
P31,790.00 as actual damages. Appellant Manuel Garcia is
ACQUITTED. His immediate release from confinement is ORDERED
unless he is detained for some other valid cause.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Original Records, pp. 183-198; rollo, pp. 29-44.
2. Footnote text is not found in the original copy.
3. Original Records, p. 1; rollo, p. 8.
4. Atty. Ricardo Perez of the Public Attorney’s Office.
5. Original Records, p. 25.
6. After promulgation of judgment, John Doe was identified as Romeo
Ortega and the latest trial court’s Order in this case was for the state
prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation to determine his
liability. (Original Records, pp. 207-210).
7. Original Records, p. 198; rollo, p. 44; Decision, p. 16.
8. Original Records, p. 205.
9. Ibid., pp. 185-187.
10. Footnote text is not found in the original copy.
11. Ibid., pp. 11-20.
12. TSN, August 16, 1993, pp. 7-19.
13. Ibid., pp. 21-22.
14. Ibid., pp. 23-25.
15. Ibid, pp. 26-35.
16. TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 3-22.
17. Original Records, pp. 197-198; rollo, pp. 43-44; Decision, pp. 15-
16.
18. Rollo, p. 63; original text in upper case.
19. Original Records, pp. 196-197; rollo, pp. 42-43; Decision, pp. 14-
15.
20. People v. De Guzman, 188 SCRA 405, 410-411, August 7, 1990.
21. People v. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663, 671, July 11, 1996 citing the
cases of People v. Vallena, 244, SCRA 685, 691, June 1, 1995;
204 SCRA 535, 552, December 4, 1991; and People v. Uycoque, 246
SCRA 769, 779, July 31, 1995.
22. TSN, September 22, 1993, pp. 6-14.
23. Ibid., pp. 4-6.
24. People v. Casingal, 243 SCRA 37, 46, March 29, 1995.
25. People v. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87, 97-98, May 11, 1995 citing the
case of People v. Martinez, 96 SCRA 714, March 31, 1980 and People
v. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 285, December 17, 1976.
26. TSN, February 12, 1993, pp. 11-15.
Diocese of Lucena for funeral and electricity charges (350.00); (2)
receipt for transportation expense for the transfer of remains of Andre
Mar Masangkay (3,500.00); (3) receipt of Funeral Helen for home and
coach services (5,000.00); (4) receipt of the Diocese of San Pedro
Bautista Parish for mortuary rental (350.00); (5) receipt of the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish for use of mortuary (2,590.00); and (6) receipt
of La Funeraria Paz for their services (20,000.00).
39. People v. Cayabyab, G.R. No. 123073, June 19, 1997 citing the
cases of People v. Rosario, 246 SCRA 658, 671, July 18, 1995 and
People v. Degoma, 209 SCRA 266, 274, May 22, 1992.

27. TSN, October 27, 1993, p. 12. 40. People v. Quinao, Et Al., G.R. No. 108454, March 13, 1997;
People v. Azugue, G.R. No. 110098, February 26, 1997; People v.
28. Rollo, p. 64. Ombrog, G.R. No. 104666, February 12, 1997.

29. Ibid., pp. 65-66. 41. Footnote reference and footnote text are not found in the original
copy.
30. Paragraph no. 2 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code provides
for accessories’ manners of participation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw 42. Footnote reference and footnote text are not found in the original
library copy.

ARTICLE 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having 43. People v. Cayabyab, supra.
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequently to its commission in any of the following
manners:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the

effects of the crime.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or

instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery.

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal

of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public
functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason
parricide, murder or attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.

Under this Article, it is required that: (1) the accessory should have
knowledge of the crime, (2) he did not take part in its commission as
principal or accomplice, and (3) subsequent to its commission, he took
part in any of the three ways enumerated above.

31. The exact words used by the medico-legal officer were: "The
multiple stab wounds sustained by the victim and asphyxia by
submersion in water." (TSN, April 16, 1993, p. 8).

32. TSN, April 16, 1993, pp. 20-24.

33. TSN, April 16, 1993, pp. 20-24.

34. Pedro Solis, Legal Medicine, 1987, p. 448.

35. Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1987 edition, Volume 1, p. 70

citing Pico v. U .S ., 57 L. Ed. 812, 40 Phil. 117, 15 Phil. 549.

36. People v. Guevarra, 179 SCRA 740, 751, December 4, 1989 citing
the cases of Matilde, Jr., v. Jabson, 68 SCRA 456, 461, December 29,
1975 and U.S. v. Ocampo, 23 Phil. 396.

37. 169 SCRA 649, 653-654, January 31, 1989.

38. TSN, June 14, 1993, p. 39; August 16, 1993, p. 9.

(Footnote reference and footnote text copied from the Supreme Court
Advance Sheets)

39. TSN, October 13, 1993, p. 16.

(Footnote reference and footnote text copied from the Supreme Court
Advance Sheets)

38. The following receipts were offered as evidence: (1) receipt of the