Joya vs.

Presidential Commission on Good Government

G.R. No. 96541. August 24, 1993.

FACTS:

Dean Jose Joya and 34 other petitioners filed Special Civil Action for Prohibition and
Mandamus with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order seek to enjoin the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) from proceeding with the auction sale
scheduled on 11 January 1991 by Christie’s of New York of the Old Masters Paintings and 18th and
19th century silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and placed
in the custody of the Central Bank.

The said items to be auction include eighty-two (82) Old Masters Paintings and antique
silverware seized from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the
ill-gotten wealth of the late President Marcos, his relatives and cronies. These items however are
certified by then Director of National Museum Gabriel S. Casal that they are not within the
classification of protected cultural properties and did not specifically qualify as part of the Filipino
cultural heritage.

After the oral arguments of the parties on 9 January 1991, the Supreme Court issued
immediately our resolution denying the application for preliminary injunction to restrain the
scheduled sale of the artworks on the ground that petitioners had not presented a clear legal right to
a restraining order and that proper parties had not been impleaded. On 11 January 1991, the sale at
public auction proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the
Bureau of Treasury.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing (one of the requisites of Judicial Review) to
file the instant petition.
2. Whether or not the paintings and silverware are properties of public dominion which can be
disposed of through the joint concurrence of the President and Congress.
3. Whether or not the Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are embraced in the phrase
“cultural treasure of the nation” which is under the protection of the state pursuant to the
1987 Constitution and/or “cultural properties” contemplated under R.A. 4846, otherwise
known as “The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act.
HELD:

The Petitioners DOESN’T HAVE LEGAL STANDING and the paintings and silverware are NOT
properties of public dominion.

The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a
party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. “Legal standing” means
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term “interest” is material
interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must
be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
unrelated party.

The Petioners DOES NOT have the Proprietary rights over the items sold in auction. The
pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries
from foreign countries on their silver wedding anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the
Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware
were taken from Malacañang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central
Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should
not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on to the
government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and
just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the government, any constitutional
or statutory defect in their acquisition and their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the
proper parties, the true owners thereof, whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary
rights which are protected by statutes and the Constitution. Having failed to show that they are
the legal owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners
do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.

The Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware are NOT embraced in the phrase “cultural
treasure of the nation” which is under the protection of the state pursuant to the 1987
Constitution and/or “cultural properties” contemplated under R.A. 4846, otherwise known as
“The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act.

The items sold in the aucition are not embraced in the pharse “Cultural Treasure of the
Nation” as certified be the Director of the Museum. Under the law, it is the Director of the Museum
who is authorized to undertake the inventory, registration, designation or classification, with the aid
of competent experts, of important cultural properties and national cultural treasures. Findings of
administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence and are controlling on the reviewing authorities
because of their acknowledged expertise in the fields of specialization to which they are assigned.
 Commission on Human Rights Employees’ Association
(CHREA) vs. Commission on Human Rights
G.R. No. 155336. July 21, 2006

FACTS:

Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1998. It
provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On
the strength of these special provisions, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) promulgated
Resolution No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among selected positions
in the Commission.
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055 providing for the upgrading or
raising of salary grades of various positions in the Commission. The CHR also issue Resolution No.
A98-062, that will “collapsed” the vacant positions in the body of CHR to provide additional source
of funding for said staffing modification. The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) with a request for its approval, but the
then DBM secretary denied the request.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed personnel modification scheme, the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) - National Capital Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended
to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) - Central Office that the subject appointments be rejected
owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employees Association
(CHREA) in representation of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central
Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a Resolution and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be censured. CHREA filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA, which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on
the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s fiscal autonomy.
A petition for review was consequently filed by the petitioner challenging the Decision dated
29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the Resolutions dated
16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Petitioner has locus standi to sue the petitioner.
2. Whether or not Can the CHR validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and
collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the
Department of Budget and Management?
HELD:

The Petitioner HAS Locus Standi to sue the Respondent.

The petitioner’s personality to bring this suit, we held in a multitude of cases that a proper
party is one who has sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act
complained of. Here, petitioner, which consists of rank and file employees of respondent CHR,
protests that the upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select few in the upper level
positions in the Commission resulting to the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This
sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR’s upgrading scheme, if found to be valid, potentially
entails eating up the Commission’s savings or that portion of its budgetary pie otherwise allocated
for Personnel Services, from which the benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file,
are derived.

Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was recognized by the CSC when it took
cognizance of the CHREA’s request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-National Capital Region
Office. CHREA’s personality to bring the suit was a non-issue in the CA when it passed upon the merits
of this case. Thus, neither should our hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled
jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the complaint nor in the court below cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice,
and due process.

The CHR CANNOT validly implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of
plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior approval of the Department of Budget
and Management.
The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants fiscal autonomy only to the
Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. As compared to the
previously quoted Article VIII, Section 3, Article IX, Part A, Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the
1987 Constitution on the Judiciary, the constitutional commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman,
respectively, Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights (CHR) evidently does
not contain the first sentence on the express grant of fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only
the second sentence on the automatic and regular release of its approved annual
appropriations.

Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal autonomy, this Court shares the stance of the DBM
that the grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must, all the same, follow to
the Salary Standardization Law. In RA 6758, An Act Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government and For Other Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law,
provides that it is the DBM that shall establish and administer a unified Compensation and Position
Classification System. The disputation of the CA that the CHR is exempt from the long arm of the
Salary Standardization Law is flawed considering that the coverage thereof encompasses the entire
gamut of government offices, sans qualification.

This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in character as erroneously held by the
Court of Appeals. The word to administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to direct
or superintend the execution, application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct public affairs, as
to administer the government of the state.

The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation is encrypted not only in law,
but in jurisprudence as well. The Supreme Court ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that this Department has the sole power and
discretion to administer the compensation and position classification system of the National
Government.

Note:
Article VI, Section 29 of the 1987 Constitution - No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except
in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Article VIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution - The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
Article IX, Part A, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution - The Commission (Constitutional
Commissions) shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Article XI, Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution - The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
Article XIII, Section 17 (4) of the 1987 Constitution - The approved annual appropriations of the
Commission (Commission on Human Rights) shall be automatically and regularly released.
 Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 155001. May 5, 2003.
FACTS:

Sometime in 1993, six business leaders consisting of John Gokongwei, Andrew Gotianun, Henry
Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco, explored the possibility of investing in the new NAIA
airport terminal III, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corporation (AEDC). They submitted
proposals to the government for the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT
III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited, and among the proposals,
Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to
Paircargo, but still the project was awarded to Paircargo. Later, Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo)
incorporated into Philippines Internation Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO).

On July 12, 1997, the Government and PIATCO signed the “Concession Agreement for the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer” (BOT) Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger Terminal III” (1997 Concession
Agreement). The Government granted PIATCO the franchise to operate and maintain the said terminal
during the concession period and to collect the fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates
or schedules stipulated in the 1997 Concession Agreement. The Agreement provided that the concession
period shall be for twenty-five (25) years commencing from the in-service date, and may be renewed at
the option of the Government for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25) years. At the end of the
concession period, PIATCO shall transfer the development facility to MIAA. In November 1998
amendments were made in the matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to the
concessionaire, development of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the termination of contract.

The 1997 Concession Agreement and the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement (ARCA)
also grant PIATCO the exclusive right to operate a commercial international passenger terminal within
the Island of Luzon, except those international airports already existing at the time of the execution of the
agreement. The contracts further provide that upon the commencement of operations at the NAIA IPT III,
the Government shall cause the closure of Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminals I and
II as international passenger terminals.

Meanwhile, the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) which is charged with the
maintenance and operation of the NAIA Terminals I and II, had existing concession contracts with various
service providers to offer international airline airport services, such as in-flight catering, passenger
handling, ramp and ground support, aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo handling and
warehousing, and other services, to several international airlines at the NAIA. These existing concession
contracts under the 1997 Concession Agreement and the ARCA uniformly provide that such services or
operations will not be carried over to the NAIA IPT III and PIATCO is under no obligation to permit such
carry over except through a separate agreement duly entered into with PIATCO.

On September 17, 2002, the workers of the international airline service providers, claiming
that they would lose their job upon the implementation of the questioned agreements, filed a petition
for prohibition. Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a petition assailing the legality of the various
agreements.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have Locus Standi to file the case.
2. Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its amendments for being
contrary to the constitution.

HELD:

Petition granted and declare the subject contracts NULL and VOID

The question on legal standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.” Accordingly, it has been held that the interest of a person assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. That he sustained or is in imminent danger
of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby
in some indefinite way. It must appear that the person complaining has been or is about to be denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
In the abovementioned cases, petitioners have a direct and substantial interest to protect by
reason of the implementation of the PIATCO Contracts. They stand to lose their source of
livelihood, a property right which is zealously protected by the Constitution. Moreover,
subsisting concession agreements between MIAA and petitioners intervenors and service contracts
between international airlines and petitioners-intervenors stand to be nullified or terminated by the
operation of the NAIA IPT III under the PIATCO Contracts. The financial prejudice brought about by
the PIATCO Contracts on petitioners and petitioners-intervenors in these cases are legitimate
interests sufficient to confer on them the requisite standing to file the instant petitions.
And even if petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention were not sufficiently clothed with legal
standing, I have at the outset already established that, given its impact on the public and on national
interest, this controversy is laden with transcendental importance and constitutional
significance. In Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. the supreme court states “in cases of transcendental
importance, the Court may relax the standing requirements and allow a suit to prosper even when
there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review.”

The substantial amendments made on the 1997 Concession Agreement renders the same
NULL AND VOID for being contrary to public policy. These amendments convert the 1997
Concession Agreement to an entirely different agreement from the contract bidded out or the draft
Concession Agreement. The material amendments on (1) the types of fees or charges that are subject
to MIAA regulation or control and the extent thereof and (2) the assumption by the Government,
under certain conditions, of the liabilities of PIATCO directly translates concrete financial advantages
to PIATCO that were previously not available during the bidding process. These amendments cannot
be taken as merely supplements to or implementing provisions of those already existing in the draft
Concession Agreement. The amendments discussed above present new terms and conditions which
provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have altered the technical and financial parameters
of other bidders had they known that such terms were available.