G.R. No.

L-24687             September 21, 1968

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, FONG

CHOY, also known as CARLOS YEE, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

ISSUE
The question presented in this appeal from a grant of citizenship is whether an applicant, who
previously pleaded guilty to an indictment for the violation of the Price Tag Law, had nonetheless
successfully hurdled the barrier rightfully interposed to weed out undesirables and to bestow
citizenship only on the deserving

FACTS

During the hearing, the petitioner admitted that he was fined P25.00 for violation of the Price Tag
Law. He explained that at that time all the articles he was selling were properly tagged as to its
prices, but it so happened that the tag of a certain article fell and when the inspector came the tag
was not on the article. In order to avoid any more discussion, he paid the fine. ... ." 2

The above admission notwithstanding, there being an opposition to the petition filed by the Republic
as to his failure to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner as shown by such
violation of the Price Tag Law, the lower court, on March 24, 1965, rendered a decision to the effect
that there was no impediment to applicant Fong Choy's naturalization. It was held that he was
possessed of all the qualifications required by law and none of the disqualifications specified therein,
thus entitling him to the grant of Filipino citizenship. The Republic appealed.1awphîl.nèt

We sustain the appeal and reverse the lower court. Its rather generous frame of mind in considering
this application for citizenship, manifested in the decision appealed from, finds no support in the law.
The decision was rendered on March 24, 1965. Approximately five months previously, on October
30, 1964, in Tio Tek Chai v. Republic,  3 this Court held that violation of the Price Tag Law "certainly
renders [petitioner's] conduct anything but proper and irreproachable."

RULING
What this Court has ruled is binding on inferior tribunals. The lower court, instead of exhibiting
deference and respect for a decision of this Court, would in effect overrule the same. It did not have
such a power. What this Court had decreed must be obeyed. The lower court's duty was plain. It
failed to do it. Its decision is tainted with the corrosion of substantial legal error. It cannot stand.

In the Tio Tek Chai decision, the opinion being penned by Justice Makalintal, reference was made to
the testimonial evidence of applicant to the effect that he had the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for naturalization. The opinion continues: "One of the facts disclosed by such
evidence, and now relied upon by appellant as the only ground for urging the denial of the petition, is
that sometime in 1956, petitioner was charged with violation of the Price Tag Law (Republic Act No.
71) and upon his plea of guilty was sentenced to pay a fine of P10.00. Petitioner tried to minimize
the significance of that conviction as follows: that he was the owner of a bakery, from which he was
deriving his income; that one day in 1956 his storekeeper cleaned the showcase in his establishment
where different kinds of bread and biscuit were displayed; that the storekeeper failed to replace the
price tag pertaining to one of them and a policeman noticed the omission; and that although
petitioner was not in the bakery at the time he nevertheless owned the violation, preferring the fine to
the trouble of defending himself in a litigation."

Even if there were no binding Tio Tek Chai ruling therefore, the lower court ought to have been less
generous in its indiscriminate acceptance of explanations of such character. It ought to have shown
greater awareness of the trend of decisions of this Tribunal, which is rightfully insistent on the
rigorous observance of each and every requisite indispensable for the acquisition of citizenship.
Such should be the case if the boon of nationality which is the basis of political rights is to be
accorded only to those who, by their exemplary behavior and conduct, have earned the title-deed to
membership in our political community.

The applicant in this case failed to live up to such a rigorous standard. Hence, his petition ought to
have been denied.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court naturalizing petitioner Fong Choy, also known as
Carlos Yee, is reversed. Costs against petitioner.

People vs. Jabinal

55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974

Antonio J.

Facts:

The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the
accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition.  The validity of the
conviction was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was
in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite
license a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and
was likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess
fire arm in the performance of his official duties as peace officer.  Relying on the Supreme Court’s
decision in People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.

Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided
otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently
abandoned in people vs. mapa.

Issue:

Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or
should his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in
Mapa?

Ruling:

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

Reason:
The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at
the time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial
court.  It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the
Supreme Court is overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof.

G.R. No. 163586               January 27, 2009

SHARON CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. MERLIN DELORIA, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Guimaras; the
COA-Region VI, represented by its Director; and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

FACTS

On May 31, 2000, petitioner was charged by the Ombudsman before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 65, Guimaras, with Malversation of Public Funds, under an Information which reads, as
follows:

That on or about the 17th day of August 1998, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of
Buenavista, Province of Guimaras, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the this Honorable Court,
abovenamed accused, a public officer, being the Revenue Officer I of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Buenavista, Guimaras and as such, was in the custody and possession of public funds in
the amount of P556,681.53, Philippine Currency, representing the value of her collections and other
accountabilities, for which she is accountable by reason of the duties of her office, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, taking advantage of her public position, with
deliberate intent, and with intent to gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own personal use and benefit said
amount of P556,681.53, and despite notice and demands made upon her account for said public
funds, she has failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

Petitioner pleaded NOT GUILTY when arraigned on February 16, 2001.

On August 31, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack
of authority of the Ombudsman to conduct the preliminary investigation and file the Information.
Petitioner argued that the Information failed to allege her salary grade -- a material fact upon which
depends the jurisdiction of the RTC. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan,4 petitioner further argued that as
she was a public employee with salary grade 27, the case filed against her was cognizable by the
RTC and may be investigated and prosecuted only by the public prosecutor, and not by the
Ombudsman whose prosecutorial power was limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

The RTC denied the Motion to Quash in an Order6 dated September 7, 2001. It held that the
jurisdiction of the RTC over the case did not depend on the salary grade of petitioner, but on the
penalty imposable upon the latter for the offense charged.
ISSUES

1. Whether or not the Ombudsman, as of May 31, 2000, when the Information for Malvesation of
Public Funds was instituted against the Petitioner, had the authority to file the same in light of this
Supreme Court’s ruling in the First "Uy vs. Sandiganbayan" case, which declared that the
prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman is limited to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

2. Whether or not the clarificatory Resolution issued by the Supreme Court dated February 22, 2001
in the Uy vs. Sandiganbayan case can be made applicable to the Petitioner-Accused, without
violating the constitutional provision on ex-post facto laws and denial of the accused to due process

RULING

The petition lacks merit.

- The petition calls to mind Office of the Ombudsman v. Enoc,14 wherein accused Ruben Enoc,
et al. invoked the August 9, 1999 Decision of the Court in Uy15 in a motion to dismiss the 11
counts of malversation that were filed against them by the Ombudsman before the RTC. The
RTC granted the motion but upon petition filed by the Ombudsman, the Court reversed the
RTC and held:

In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same resolution promulgated on March 20,
2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of the
Ombudsman extended only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has powers to
prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those cognizable
by the regular courts

The law does not make a distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those
cognizable by regular courts. It has been held that the clause "any illegal act or omission of any
public official" is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.

- A judicial interpretation of a statute, such as the Ombudsman Act, constitutes part of that law
as of the date of its original passage. Such interpretation does not create a new law but
construes a pre-existing one; it merely casts light upon the contemporaneous legislative
intent of that law.18 Hence, the March 20, 2001 Resolution of the Court in Uy interpreting the
Ombudsman Act is deemed part of the law as of the date of its effectivity on December 7,
1989.
- Where a judicial interpretation declares a law unconstitutional or abandons a doctrinal
interpretation of such law, the Court, recognizing that acts may have been performed under
the impression of the constitutionality of the law or the validity of its interpretation, has
consistently held that such operative fact cannot be undone by the mere subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the law or its interpretation; thus, the declaration can only have a
prospective application.19 But where no law is invalidated nor doctrine abandoned, a judicial
interpretation of the law should be deemed incorporated at the moment of its legislation
G.R. No. 187451 : August 29, 2012

JESUS VIRTUCIO, represented by ABDON VIRTUCIO, Petitioner, v. JOSE

ALEGARBES, Respondent.

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Respondent Jose Alegarbes (Alegarbes) filed a homestead application for a 24-

hectare tract of unsurveyed land. His application was approved on January 23,
1952. In 1955, however, the land was subdivided into three (3) lots -- Lot Nos.
138, 139 and 140, Pls-19 - as a consequence of a public land subdivision. Lot
139 was allocated to Ulpiano Custodio (Custodio) while Lot 140 was allocated to
petitioner Jesus Virtucio (Virtucio).

Alegarbes opposed the homestead applications filed by Custodio and Virtucio,

claiming that his approved application covered the whole area, including Lot Nos.
139 and 140. On October 30, 1961, the Director of Lands rendered a decision
denying Alegarbes' protest and amending the latter's application to exclude Lots
139 and 140. Only Lot 138 was given due course.

Alegarbes appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, who

dismissed the appeal. On appeal to the Office of the President, the latter affirmed
the dismissal order. Thus, an order of execution was issued by the Lands
Management Bureau of the DENR. It ordered Alegarbes and all those acting in
his behalf to vacate the subject lot, but he refused.

On September 26, 1997, Virtucio then filed a complaint for recovery of

possession and ownership before the RTC. The RTC ruled infavor of Virtucio.
The CA reversed the RTC and ruled that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner of
Lot 140 by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

Aggrieved, Virtucio filed this petition. He argues that the period of acquisitive
prescription was interrupted on October 30, 1961 when Alegarbes filed a protest
before the Director of Lands. Virtucio further claims that since 1954, several
extrajudicial demands were also made upon Alegarbes demanding that he
vacate said lot. Those demands constitute the "extrajudicial demand"
contemplated in Article 1155, thus, tolling the period of acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alegarbes acquired ownership over the subject

property by acquisitive prescription?
HELD: The petition must fail.

CIVIL LAW: acquisitive prescription; kinds of prescription

Article 1106 of the New Civil Code, in relation to its Article 712, provides that
prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership through the lapse of time in the
manner and under the conditions laid down by law. Under the same law, it states
that acquisitive prescription may either be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just
title for a period of ten years, while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires
uninterrupted adverse possession of thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.

There are two kinds of prescription provided in the Civil Code. One is acquisitive,
that is, the acquisition of a right by the lapse of time as expounded in par. 1,
Article 1106. Other names for acquisitive prescription are adverse possession
and usucapcion. The other kind is extinctive prescription whereby rights and
actions are lost by the lapse of time as defined in Article 1106 and par. 2, Article
1139. Another name for extinctive prescription is litigation of action. These two
kinds of prescription should not be interchanged. Article 1155 of the New Civil
Code refers to the interruption of prescription of actions. Interruption of
acquisitive prescription, on the other hand, is found in Articles 1120-1125 of the
same Code.

Thus, Virtucios reliance on Article 1155 for purposes of tolling the period of
acquisitive prescription is misplaced. The only kinds of interruption that effectively
toll the period of acquisitive prescription are natural and civil interruption. Civil
interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor.
When no action is filed, then there is no occasion to issue a judicial summons
against the respondents. The period of acquisitive prescription continues to run.

In this case, Virtucio claims that the protest filed by Alegarbes against his
homestead application interrupted the thirty (30)-year period of acquisitive
prescription. The law, as well as jurisprudence, however, dictates that only a
judicial summons can effectively toll the said period. Only in cases filed before
the courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession.
Records show that it was only in 1997 when Virtucio filed a case before the RTC.
The CA was, therefore, correct in ruling that Alegarbes became ipso jure owner
of Lot 140 entitling him to retain possession of it because he was in open,
continuous and exclusive possession for over thirty (30) years of alienable public
land.

DENIED.