CFM56-5B - HP DUCT CRACK

ATA: 36-11 FIN: Ref: 36.11.49.009

A/C Type: A319 A/C Serie: Potential Operational First Issue 01-NOV-
A320 Impact: Reliability Date: 2000
A321 Maintenance
cost
Line
Maintenance
Part 642-5508- Key Last 10-JUL-
Number: 503 Information: Publication 2014
Date:
Supplier: Solution
Benefit:
Linked Linked SB 36-1041
Articles: Documentation: SB 71-1032
VSB
RA32036-
10
Linked Status: Closed
FAIR-ISP:

Engineering Support
 Fault Code/ECAM Warning: First Issue Date: 01-NOV-2000
Model: CFM56-5A1 Last Publication Date: 10-JUL-2014
CFM56-5A3
CFM56-5A4
CFM56-5A5
CFM56-5B1
CFM56-5B2
CFM56-5B3
CFM56-5B4
CFM56-5B5
CFM56-5B6
CFM56-5B7
CFM56-5B8
CFM56-5B9
Manufacturer: CFMI
Status: Closed

Issue Description

A few cases of cracked High Pressure bleed duct PN 642-5508-503 have been reported to Airbus by
the operators on CFM56-5B engines. All the cracks were located on the HP duct first elbow, near the
end connected to the engine flange. The duct crack was noticed mainly during scheduled checks (as
per Airbus Inspection SB A320-36-1041), or due to nacelle advisory temperature warning or
subsequent engine thrust reverser damage.

Consequence

This issue has cost implications due to the operational impact and due to spare and repair cost of
subsequent damaged parts.
In addition, the worst event consequence was a perforation of the structural component (IFS Inner
Fixed Structure) / PDA.

Investigation Status

The laboratory analysis made on failed units revealed a fatigue failure mode. In order to determine the
root cause of these failures, two flight/ground test campaigns have been performed. The goal of these
tests was to use the physical data in order to build a 3D finite element model (FEM) for the area
concerned by the failure.
This model has then been refined to incorporate effects of different thermal expansions between the
engine case and the duct. It has shown a high stress level at the elbow location due to the thermal
expansion differences.
Further to these results, refined FEM was run with the HP duct forward link removed. It revealed a
significant reduction of the stress level on the HP duct first elbow.

Mitigation / Interim Plan

Following early 2000 events:

- MPD tasks have been created for a Detailed visual inspection of the HP bleed duct first elbow every
1800FC through VSB RA32036-10.
Following 2010 events:
- MPD tasks interval have been reduced from 1800FC to 750FC through new VSB RA32036-13.

Maintenance Information

As per last issue of UTAS VSB RA32036-13, detailed visual inspection of the HP bleed duct first elbow
is required:
 Every 1800FC for CFM56-5B/P (SAC) engines with all duct P/N.
 Every 1800FC for CFM56-5B/2P (DAC) and CFM56-5B/3 (Tech Insertion) engines with P/N
642-5508-505.
 Every 750FC for CFM56-5B/2P (DAC) and CFM56-5B/3 (Tech Insertion) engines with P/N
642-5508-503.

Repercussion on A/C Dispatch

Risk of AOG situation.

Solution

VSB RA32036-12 associated to the Airbus SB 71-1057 has been released in order to introduce a new
improved HP duct.
 Survey for the Engineering Support section

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