Russell Marcus Formal Logic

Introduction to Formal Logic
Introduction to Formal Logic
RUSSELL MARCUS
Hamilton College
The question of logic is: Does the conclusion

certainly follow if the premises be true?
AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN
Formal Logic: Or, The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable (1847)
New York Oxford

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Marcus, Russell, 1966– author.

Title: Introduction to formal logic / Russell Marcus.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, 2018. | Includes
bibliographical references.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017051737 (print) | LCCN 2017053175 (ebook) | ISBN
9780190861797 (Ebook) | ISBN 9780190861780 (pbk.)
Subjects: LCSH: Logic—Textbooks.
Classification: LCC BC108 (ebook) | LCC BC108 .M35 2017 (print) | DDC
160—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017051737
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed by LSC Communications, United States of America
Contents
Preface vii
Chapter 1: Introducing Logic 1

1.1: Defining ‘Logic’ 1
1.2: Logic and Languages 3
1.3: A Short History of Logic 5
1.4: Separating Premises from Conclusions 9
1.5: Validity and Soundness 16
Key Terms 21
Chapter 2: Propositional Logic: Syntax and Semantics 22
2.1: Logical Operators and Translation 22

2.2: Syntax of PL: Wffs and Main Operators 43
2.3: Semantics of PL: Truth Functions 48
2.4: Truth Tables 59
2.5: Classifying Propositions 68
2.6: Valid and Invalid Arguments 77
2.7: Indirect Truth Tables 83
2.8: Notes on Translation with PL 105
Key Terms 112
Chapter 3: Inference in Propositional Logic 113

3.1: Rules of Inference 1 113
3.2: Rules of Inference 2 124
3.3: Rules of Equivalence 1 135
3.4: Rules of Equivalence 2 146 v
v i C O N T E N T S
3.5: Practice with Derivations 156

3.6: The Biconditional 164
3.7: Conditional Proof 174
3.8: Logical Truths 184
3.9: Indirect Proof 191
3.10: Chapter Review 203
Key Terms 211
Chapter 4: Monadic Predicate Logic 212

4.1: Introducing Predicate Logic 212
4.2: Translation Using M 219
4.3: Syntax for M 233
4.4: Derivations in M 238
4.5: Quantifier Exchange 254
4.6: Conditional and Indirect Proof in M 263
4.7: Semantics for M 273
4.8: Invalidity in M 280
4.9: Notes on Translation with M 299
Key Terms 309
Chapter 5: Full First-Order Logic 310

5.1: Translation Using Relational Predicates 310
5.2: Syntax, Semantics, and Invalidity in F 328
5.3: Derivations in F 337
5.4: The Identity Predicate: Translation 351
5.5: The Identity Predicate: Derivations 370
5.6: Translation with Functions 380
5.7: Derivations with Functions 390
Key Terms 400
Appendix A: Fallacies and Argumentation 401

Appendix B: The Logical Equivalence of the Rules of Equivalence 413
Summary of Rules and Terms 419
Solutions to Selected Exercises 421
Glossary/Index 475
Preface
Introduction to Formal Logic (IFL) and Introduction to Formal Logic with Philosophi-
cal Applications (IFLPA) are a pair of new logic textbooks, designed for students of
formal logic and their instructors, to be rigorous, yet friendly and accessible. Unlike
many other logic books, IFL and IFLPA both focus on deductive logic. They cover
syntax, semantics, and natural deduction for propositional and predicate logics. They
emphasize translation and derivations, with an eye to semantics throughout. Both
books contains over 2000 exercises, enough for in-class work and homework, with
plenty left over for extra practice, and more available on the Oxford website.
WHY THIS LOGIC BOOK?

I initially conceived my project as a two-part logic book. The first part would be a
thorough, standard introduction to formal logic: syntax, semantics, and proof theory
for propositional and predicate logics. The second part would add interesting exten-
sions of the basic formal material and engaging reflections on why philosophers are
interested in logic, with essay prompts and suggestions for further readings. These
two parts reflect how I teach logic, asking students both to work through the formal
material and to write a little about how logic is useful outside of logic.
As the book that I initially envisioned went through the review process at Oxford,
it became clear that some instructors were mainly interested in the first part, and did
not see a use for the second. The book you are holding, Introduction to Formal Logic,
is one result: a nuts-and-bolts introductory formal deductive logic textbook. There
is a brief introductory chapter. Chapter 2 covers propositional semantics, leading to
the standard truth-table definition of validity. Chapter 3 covers natural deductions
in propositional logic. Chapter 4 covers monadic predicate logic. Chapter 5 covers
full first-order logic. This material is straight logic, and I have kept the text simple and
focused, without distracting discussions of the philosophy of logic. (The other book,
IFLPA, contains the same formal material, but adds enrichment sections that encour-
age reflecting on the technical work and integrating writing into logic classes. See
below for more details on the differences between the two books.)
vii
v i i i P reface
Teachers of logic are often faced with a bimodal distribution of student abili-
ties: some students get the material quickly, and some students take more time—
sometimes significantly more time—to master it. Thus one central challenge to logic
teachers is to figure out how to support the former group of students while keeping
the latter group engaged. I have addressed this challenge, in part, by providing lots
of exercises with varying, progressive levels of difficulty and including some exercise
sections that can be used by the strongest students and skipped by others without
undermining their later work.
Since logic is most often taught in philosophy departments, special attention is
given to how logic is useful for philosophers. Many examples use philosophical con-
cepts, translating philosophical arguments to one of the formal languages, for ex-
ample, and deriving their conclusions using the inferential tools of the text. Some of
these arguments are artificial, as one might expect in an introductory logic text; I do
not endorse their content. I hope mainly to have the arguments be ones that someone
might use. There are plenty of exercises with more ordinary content, too, which may
be friendlier to the beginning student, or one with no background in philosophy.
SPECIAL FEATURES
Each section of IFL contains a Summary and a section of important points to
Keep in Mind.
Key terms are boldfaced in the text and defined in the margins, and are listed
at the end of each chapter. In addition, all terms are defined in a glossary at
the end of the book.
There are over 2000 exercises in the book.
Exercises are presented progressively, from easier to more challenging.
Translate-and-derive exercises are available in every section on deriva-
tions, helping to maintain students’ translation skills.
Translation exercises are supplemented with examples for translation
from formal languages into English.
Regimentations and translations contain both ordinary and philosophi-
cal themes.
Solutions to exercises, about 20% of total, are included at the back of the
book. Solutions to translate-and-derive exercises appear in two parts:
first, just the translation, and then the derivation. Solutions to all exer-
cises are available for instructors.
IFL contains several topics and exercise types not appearing in many standard
logic textbooks:
Seven rules for biconditionals, parallel to the standard rules for conditionals;
Exercises asking students to interpret and model short theories
Two sections on functions at the end of chapter 5
P R E F A C E i x
Exercises asking students to determine whether an argument is valid or

invalid, or whether a proposition is a logical truth or not, and then to
construct either a derivation or a counterexample
These sections are perfect for stronger students, while easily skipped by
others.
Emphasis is placed on semantics through the text, with truth tables for prop-
ositional logic and interpretations and models for first-order logic.
Two supplementary sections on subtleties of translation, 2.8 and 4.9, pro-
vide students with discussions of the complications of translation while not
interfering with the progress of the formal work.
An appendix on fallacies and argumentation supports instructors’ connec-
tions between formal logic and real-world reasoning.
INTRODUCTION TO FORMAL LOGIC OR INTRODUCTION TO

FORMAL LOGIC WITH PHILOSOPHICAL APPLICATIONS? T WO
BOOKS—YOUR CHOICE.
In addition to this formal logic book, I have written a longer version: Introduction to
Formal Logic with Philosophical Applications (IFLPA) with two chapters not included
in IFL. These additional chapters contain thirteen enrichment essays with writing
prompts for students, and reading suggestions. The topics of these sections include
conditionals, modal logic, three-valued logics, deduction and induction, logic and sci-
ence, logic and philosophy of religion, logic and the philosophy of mind, truth, names
and definite descriptions, and others. These sections are independent of the formal
logic in chapters 1–5, and of each other.
All enrichment essays in IFLPA encourage students to reflect on the philosophi-
cal applications of their work in formal logic. I use the material in class as biweekly
pauses in formal instruction, which I call Philosophy Fridays. I ask students to write
an essay each term in addition to their homework and exams. My approach has helped
to engage students and their individual interests, and to manage more effectively the
natural diversity of skills in a typical logic class. With more enrichment material avail-
able than I ordinarily use in a semester, I vary my choices in each class, sometimes
responding to student interest.
I have included in IFL three sections of IFLPA, tucked away at the ends of chapters:
2.8 and 4.9 on some interesting subtleties of translation, and an appendix on falla-
cies and argumentation. This enrichment material need not get in a logic instructor’s
way. But if your students begin to reflect on what they are doing and ask questions
about why our logic is as it is, or why philosophers are interested in it, you might find
IFLPA to be of some use. The formal material is the same in IFL and IFLPA: the same
examples, the same exercises, and the same numberings. So instructors and students
may work together with either version and move freely between the two books.
x P reface
USING INTRODUCTION TO FORMAL LOGIC

IFL proceeds sequentially through standard formal logic. Mostly, instructors will
move through as much material as they desire, from the start. There are three possible
exceptions.
First, the initial three sections of chapter 1 are mainly background and not really
necessary to cover. There are no exercises in these sections.
Second, one of my goals for IFL was a better discussion of semantics, especially for
predicate logic, a topic many logic books elide or exclude. Instructors who wish to
skip this material (especially sections 4.7 and 5.2) will need to support students for
the further work on distinguishing valid from invalid arguments in sections 4.8 and
5.3, or just skip the relevant exercises in those sections.
Third, section 3.6 contains seven natural deduction rules governing inferences with
biconditionals that do not appear in standard logic texts. This section can be skipped,
though instructors might want to be careful in assigning subsequent exercises which
use biconditionals. All later inferences will be derivable, but some exercises will be
more difficult than they would be with the extra rules from 3.6.
STUDENT AND INSTRUCTOR RESOURCES

A rich set of supplemental resources is available to support teaching and learning
in this course. These supplements include Instructor Resources on the Oxford
University Press Ancillary Resource Center (ARC); intuitive, auto-graded as-
sessments and other student resources on Dashboard by Oxford University Press; a
free Companion Website for students; and downloadable Learning Management
System Cartridges. For access to these resources, please visit www.oup.com/us/
marcus.
The ARC houses a wealth of Instructor Resources:
• A customizable, auto-graded Computerized Test Bank
• An Instructor’s Manual, which includes the following:
■■ A Microsoft Word document containing the questions from the Comput-
erized Test Bank
■■ A traditional “Pencil-and-Paper” version of the Test Bank, containing the
same questions as the Computerized Test Bank, but converted for use
in hard-copy exams and homework assignments, including open-ended
questions that allow students to develop extended analysis, such as com-
pleting truth tables and doing proofs
■■ Complete answers to every set of exercises in the book—over 2,000
exercises
■■ Bulleted Chapter Summaries, which allow the instructor to scan the
important aspects of each chapter quickly and to anticipate section
discussions
P R E F A C E x i
■■ PowerPoint Lecture Outlines to assist the instructor in leading class-

room discussion
■■ Sample syllabi
• Downloadable Course Cartridges which allow instructors to import the com-
puterized test bank and student resources from the Companion Website into
their school’s Learning Management System
Dashboard at www.oup.com/us/dashboard delivers a wealth of Student Re-
sources and auto-graded activities in a simple, intuitive, and mobile device–friendly
format. Dashboard contains:
• A fully-integrated eBook version of the text
• Level-One and Level-Two Quizzes, autograded and linked to the Learning Ob-
jectives for easy instructor analysis of each student’s topic-specific strengths
and weaknesses.
• A Proof-Checking Module for solving symbolic proofs that allows students to
enter proof solutions, check the their validity, and receive feedback, both by
line and as a whole, as well as Truth Table Creation Modules, all feeding auto-
matically into a Gradebook that offers instructors the chance to view students’
individual attempts
• Quiz Creation Capability for instructors who wish to create original quizzes in
multiple-choice, true/false, multiple-select, long-answer, short-answer, order-
ing, or matching question formats, including customizable answer feedback
and hints
• A built-in, color-coded Gradebook that allows instructors to monitor student
progress from virtually any device
• Chapter Learning Objectives adapted from the book’s chapter headings
• Interactive Flashcards of Key Terms and their definitions from the book
• Tools for student communication, reference, and planning, such as messaging
and spaces for course outlines and syllabi
Access to Dashboard can be packaged with Introduction to Formal Logic at a dis-
count, stocked separately by your college bookstore, or purchased directly at www
.oup.com/us/dashboard.
The free Companion Website found at www.oup.com/us/marcus contains supple-
mental Student Resources:
• Student Self-Quizzes
• Interactive Flashcards of Key Terms and their definitions from the book
• Bulleted Chapter Summaries
To find out more information or to order Dashboard access or a Course Cartridge
for your Learning Management System, please contact your Oxford University Press
representative at 1 800-280-0280.
x i i P reface
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The first draft of this book was written in the summer of 2011. I worked that sum-
mer alongside my student, Jess Gutfleish, with support of a Class of 1966 Faculty
Development Award from the Dean of Faculty’s Office at Hamilton College, in the
archaeology teaching lab at Hamilton. I wrote the text, and she worked assiduously
and indefatigably writing exercises; I had difficulty keeping up with her. I am ineffably
grateful to Jess for all of her hard work and the mountain of insidiously difficult (as
well as more ordinary) logic problems she devised. Jess worked on more problems in
spring 2014. Spencer Livingstone worked with me and Jess in spring 2014. Deanna
Cho helped enormously with the section summaries and glossary in the summer of
2014, supported by the philosophy department at Hamilton College. Spencer Living-
stone and Phil Parkes worked during summer 2015, helping me with some research
and writing still further exercises. Sophie Gaulkin made many editing suggestions
during summer 2015. Reinaldo Camacho assisted me with new exercises in fall 2016.
Jess, Spencer, and Rey have all been indescribably supportive and useful as teaching
assistants and error-seeking weapons. Students in my logic classes at Hamilton, too
numerous to mention, found many typos. Andrew Winters, using a draft of the text at
Slippery Rock University in 2016, sent the errors he and his students discovered, and
made many helpful suggestions.
At the behest of Oxford, the following people made helpful comments on drafts of
the book, and I am grateful for their work:
Joshua Alexander, Siena College
Brian Barnett, St. John Fisher College
Larry Behrendt, Mercer County Community College
Thomas A. Blackson, Arizona State University
Dan Boisvert, University of North Carolina, Charlotte
Jeff Buechner, Rutgers University, Newark
Eric Chelstrom, Minnesota State University
Chris Dodsworth, Spring Hill College
Michael Futch, University of Tulsa
Nathaniel Goldberg, Washington and Lee University
Nancy Slonneger Hancock, Northern Kentucky University
Brian Harding, Texas Woman’s University
Reina Hayaki, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
Marc A. Hight, Hampden Sydney College
Jeremy Hovda, KU Leuven
Gyula Klima, Fordham University
Karen Lewis, Barnard College
Leemon McHenry, California State University, Northridge
John Piers Rawling, Florida State University
Reginald Raymer, University of North Carolina, Charlotte
Ian Schnee, Western Kentucky University
P R E F A C E x i i i
Aeon Skoble, Bridgewater State University

Michael Stoeltzner, University of South Carolina
Harold Thorsrud, Agnes Scott College
Mark Tschaepe, Prairie View A&M University
Andrew Winters, Slippery Rock University of Pennsylvania
I am also grateful to Robert Miller, Executive Editor at Oxford, and Alyssa Palazzo,
Associate Editor, for supporting both IFL and IFLPA.
Thank you to Margaret Gentry and the Dean of Faculty’s Office at Hamilton. I am
grateful to Nathan Goodale and Tom Jones for letting us have their lab in which to
work, summer 2011. I also owe thanks to the many students who have helped me
construct an innovative Logic course, and for the constant, unwavering support of me
and my course by the Hamilton College philosophy department. Thanks to Marianne
Janack for example 4.2.27.
More remotely, I am deeply grateful to authors of the logic books I’ve studied and
with which I’ve taught, especially: Irving Copi’s Symbolic Logic; Geoffrey Hunter’s
Metalogic; Elliott Mendelson’s Introduction to Mathematical Logic; Patrick Hurley’s A
Concise Introduction to Logic; John Nolt’s Logics; and Graham Priest’s An Introduction
to Non-Classical Logic. Elliott Mendelson and Melvin Fitting were especially influ-
ential logic teachers of mine; they made logic elegant and beautiful. I studied Copi’s
logic with Richard Schuldenfrei, whose encouragement I appreciate. And I am grate-
ful to Dorothea Frede, into whose Ancient Philosophy class I brought my excitement
about logic, for her patience as I discovered (by regimenting his arguments through
the term) that, no, Plato wasn’t making simple logical errors.
Most importantly, I am grateful to my wife, Emily, and my children, Marina and
Izzy, who suffered through many summers less fun than they could have been, for
them, so that I could have the logic book I wanted.
Chapter 1
Introducing Logic
1.1: DEFINING ‘LOGIC’

An Introduction to Formal Logic is a textbook in formal deductive logic. If you work
through the material in the book, you can gain a good sense of what philosophers and
logicians call deductive arguments.
Let’s start by trying to characterize to what the terms ‘logic’ and ‘argument’ refer.
Consider the following claims that someone might use to define those terms.
1.1.1 Logic is the study of argument.
Arguments are what people who study logic study.
Two aspects of the pair of sentences in 1.1.1 are worth noticing. First, they provide
a circular definition that makes the characterizations nearly useless. If you do not
understand the terms ‘logic’ and ‘argument’, then the sentences in 1.1.1 are not going
to help you, except for showing that the two terms are related.
Second, the circularity of this pair of definitions is a formal result that can be seen
in other pairs of purported definitions, like the pairs of sentences in 1.1.2 and 1.1.3.
1.1.2 Sheep are the things that shepherds tend.
Shepherds are things that tend sheep.
1.1.3 Glubs are extreme cases of wizzles.
Wizzles are ordinary forms of glubs.
In 1.1.2, you might not notice the problem of the formal property of circularity
because you already know the meanings of the terms involved. In 1.1.3, the prob-
lem should be obvious. Without knowing what glubs and wizzles are, 1.1.3 is use-
less, and its uselessness is a product of its poor form. This textbook is about such
formal results.
1
2 C h apter 1 Intro d u c i ng L og i c
Returning to the definitions of ‘logic’ and ‘argument’, notice that in contrast to

1.1.1, 1.1.4 is not formally circular.
1.1.4 Logic is the study of argument.
An argument is a set of statements, called premises, together with
a claim, called the conclusion, which the premises are intended to
support or establish.
1.1.4 explains the meaning of one term, ‘ logic’, by using other ones, like ‘statement’
and ‘establish’. If such a definition is to be informative, these other terms should be
more familiar. If not, we can continue the process, as at 1.1.5.
1.1.5 To establish a claim is to justify or provide evidence for it.
A statement is a declarative sentence that has a truth value.
Truth values include truth and falsity. Some interesting logics have
other truth values: three (e.g., truth, falsity, and indeterminacy) or
infinitely many. In this book we will focus on just truth and falsity.
Pairing 1.1.4 and 1.1.5, we see a characterization of logic as the rules of what follows
from what, of which consequences derive from which assumptions.
We make inferences all the time: if I buy this book, I won’t have enough money for
the cup of coffee I wanted; if I make a turn here, I’ll end up in Waterville; she must be
angry with me because she hasn’t returned my email. When we think about the con-
sequences of our actions or the reasons some event has occurred, we are using logic.
Good logic is thus a precondition for all good reasoning.
Some inferences are better than others. I am well justified in inferring that it is after
dawn from the light peeking through my window shades. I am not well justified in
believing that it is nine in the morning from the fact that it was six in the morning an
hour ago; that’s an error. This book is devoted to some general principles of evaluating
certain kinds of arguments, called deductive arguments.
Deductive arguments are contrasted with inductive arguments, though the dif-
ference between them is difficult to specify both precisely and briefly. Roughly, in a
deductive argument, the conclusion follows without fail, necessarily, from the prem-
ises. The conclusions of inductive arguments are supported by their premises, more or
less depending on the argument, but not guaranteed. Inductive arguments are often
(though not always) generalizations from particular experiences and can be under-
mined by further evidence.
Logic and mathematics are largely characterized by their uses of deduction, though
statistical inferences are not purely deductive. Sciences involve both deduction and
induction, broadly speaking, though there are other methods of inference, like infer-
ence to the best explanation. The best way to understand the difference between de-
duction and induction is to work through the material in this book and contrast that
kind of reasoning with others.
1 . 2 : L og i c an d L ang u ages 3
When evaluating an argument, we can perform two distinct steps. First, we can see
whether the conclusion follows from the assumptions. An argument whose conclu-
sion follows from its premises is called valid. Chapter 2 is dedicated to constructing
a precise notion of deductive validity, of what follows, for propositional logic. Indeed,
the notion of validity is the central topic of the book.
A second step in evaluating an argument is to see whether the premises are true.
In a valid deductive argument, if the premises are true, then the conclusion must be
true. This result is what makes deductive logic interesting and is, in a sense, the most
important sentence of this entire book: in a valid deductive argument, if the premises
are true, then the conclusion must be.
An Introduction to Formal Logic is dedicated to the first step in the process of eval-
uating arguments. The second step is not purely logical, and it is largely scientific.
Roughly speaking, we examine our logic to see if our reasoning is acceptable and we
examine the world to see if our premises are true. Although we prefer our arguments
both to be valid and to have true premises, this book is dedicated mainly to the form
of the argument, not to its content.
1.2: LOGIC AND LANGUAGES

There are (at least) three kinds of languages in this book. First, most of the book is
written in a natural language, English. Other natural languages include Spanish and
Swahili. Second, there are the formal languages that we will discuss in careful detail.
As these formal languages are our main objects of study, we can call them the object
languages.
Between formal and natural languages is a third kind of language made of elements
of the other two and used to study a formal language. This metalanguage is mostly
English. You might not even think of it as a language separate from English, and for
the most part you need not think about the metalanguage too carefully. But it in-
cludes some technical terms that do not occur in ordinary English. For example, the
rules of inference we will examine in chapter 3 are written using Greek letters. They
are parts of the metalanguage we use to tell us how to work in the object language.
We can add these same meta-linguistic rules to any natural language to form a meta-
language made mostly out of Spanish or Swahili. Our metalanguage thus differs from
any particular natural language. I will not specify the metalanguage as precisely as
the object languages.
It is customary to give names to object languages. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on one
object language that I will call PL, for propositional logic. Chapters 4 and 5 discuss
three further formal languages:
M Monadic (first-order) predicate logic

F Full (first-order) predicate logic
FF Full (first-order) predicate logic with functors
For each formal language we study, we will specify a syntax and a semantics. The
syntax gives the vocabulary of the language, series of symbols like letters and terms
like ∨, ⊃, and ∃, along with rules for forming formulas. The semantics allows us to
interpret the language, to understand it as meaningful, rather than just an empty set
of squiggles. There are different possible interpretations of the symbols just as there
are different meanings to most words or different languages using the same letters.
We specify an interpretation of an object language by thinking of ourselves as step-
ping outside of those languages into metalanguages. We might say, for example, that
we will use the letter ‘P’ in the object language to stand for the statement expressed
in English by ‘Prunes are dried plums’. We will also study derivations (or proofs) in
each language.
There are advantages to both natural languages and formal languages. Natural lan-
guages are excellent for ordinary communication. Formal languages are excellent for
precision, especially for clarifying ambiguities. Much of the formal material in this
book is based on Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1879); Begriffsschrift means ‘concept writing’.
In his preface, Frege compared natural languages and formal languages to an eye and
a microscope, respectively:
I believe I can make the relationship of my Begriffsschrift to ordinary lan-
guage clearest if I compare it to that of the microscope to the eye. The latter,
due to the range of its applicability, due to the flexibility with which it is
able to adapt to the most diverse circumstances, has a great superiority over
the microscope. Considered as an optical instrument, it admittedly reveals
many imperfections, which usually remain unnoticed only because of its in-
timate connection with mental life. But as soon as scientific purposes place
great demands on sharpness of resolution, the eye turns out to be inadequate.
The microscope, on the other hand, is perfectly suited for such purposes.
Many students, when they begin to study logic, find it to be an amusing toy. There
are careful rules for working in the object language. Once you learn those rules, it
can be fun to play with them. When I started studying logic, in college, I couldn’t
believe that one could earn credit for filling out truth tables, translating English into
formal languages, and constructing derivations. It was like getting credit for eating
candy. I love puzzles and games; logic seemed to be too much fun to be serious or
important.
But to many students, especially many philosophy students, logic seems too ab-
stract and mathematical to be fun. We study philosophy because we want to think
about metaphysics or morality or truth or beauty. Logic prides itself on its lack of
content. Moreover, there are rules in logic that can be violated. You can get problems
wrong. The solutions to problems are not always obvious.
1 . 3 : A S h ort H i stor y of L og i c 5
My advice to students who have difficulty with the computational or mathematical

portions of the text is to practice, frequently. Do a lot of exercises, and do not let the
work pile up. It is far better to work just a little each day than to try to pick up logic
skills in long cramming sessions.
The key ideas of the formal logic in this book were developed in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. But logic is a much older discipline. Before starting our
formal work, let’s look briefly at the history of logic and how the contemporary notion
of logical consequence was developed.
1.3: A SHORT HISTORY OF LOGIC

Aristotle, who lived in the fourth century b.c.e., famously described some fundamen-
tal logical rules, called categorical syllogisms. The categorical syllogisms described
relations among four kinds of statements, known since the early Middle Ages as A, E,
I, and O, and which we see in 1.3.1.
1.3.1 A All Fs are Gs.
E No Fs are Gs.
I Some Fs are Gs.
O Some Fs are not Gs.
In categorical logic, the fundamental elements are portions of assertions. The Fs
and Gs of Aristotelian syllogisms stand for general terms, like ‘people’ or ‘Martians’
or ‘red’ or ‘mortal’. We will look at the modern version of term ‘logic’, called predicate
or quantificational logic, in chapters 4 and 5.
In the third century b.c.e., the stoic philosopher Chrysippus developed a proposi-
tional logic, in which the fundamental elements are complete assertions rather than
terms. Some complete assertions are simple; others are complex. Complex assertions
are composed of simple assertions combined according to logical rules. In chapters 2
and 3, we will look at the rules of propositional logic.
Through the Middle Ages, although there were some major advances in logic, the
structure of the discipline was generally stable. After the scientific revolution, philos-
ophers started paying more attention to human psychological capacities. This focus,
which we can see in Descartes, Locke, and Hume, culminated in the late eighteenth-
century work of Kant, and the early nineteenth-century work of Hegel. Kant’s logic
was essentially a description of how human beings create their experiences by impos-
ing, a priori, conceptual categories on an unstructured manifold given in sensation.
The term ‘a priori’ indicates that Kant believed that some of our intellectual activity
occurs prior to, or independent of, experience. Although he distinguished these a
priori capacities from purely subjective psychological processes, logic, for Kant, still
concerned human reasoning rather than objective rules of consequence. Moreover,
according to Kant, logic, as a discipline, was complete:
We shall be rendering a service to reason should we succeed in discovering

the path upon which it can securely travel, even if, as a result of so doing,
much that is comprised in our original aims, adopted without reflection, may
have to be abandoned as fruitless. That logic has already, from the earliest
times, proceeded upon this sure path is evidenced by the fact that since
Aristotle it has not required to retrace a single step, unless, indeed, we care
to count as improvements the removal of certain needless subtleties or the
clearer exposition of its recognised teaching, features which concern the
elegance rather than the certainty of the science. It is remarkable also that
to the present day this logic has not been able to advance a single step, and
is thus to all appearance a closed and completed body of doctrine. (Critique
of Pure Reason B17)
In the nineteenth century, several developments led mathematicians to worry
about logical entailments and to call Kant’s claims about logic, its completeness and
its psychological status, into question. Because these mathematical worries led di-
rectly to the logic in this book, I will take a short detour to discuss two of them: the
problem of infinity and non-Euclidean geometries.
For nearly two hundred years, mathematicians had worked with the calculus of
Newton and Leibniz. The calculus allowed mathematicians to find the area under
a curve by dividing the area into infinitely many infinitely small areas. Working
with infinity, both small and large, seemed problematic, even if the resulting calcu-
lations were successful. An infinitely small region seemed indistinguishable from
an empty region, one with zero size. The sum of the sizes of any number of empty
regions should be zero. To make matters worse, Cantor, in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury, discovered a proof that there are different sizes of infinity—indeed, there are
infinitely many different sizes of infinity. Infinite size had long been identified with
God, one of the divine properties in contrast to our human finitude. Cantor’s proof
struck many mathematicians as absurd, even heretical, but they could not find a
flaw in his logic.
Developments in geometry raised similar worries about mathematical inferences.
Consider the first four axioms, or postulates, of Euclidean geometry, at 1.3.2.
1.3.2 The First Four Axioms of Euclidean Geometry
1. Between any two points, one can draw a straight line.
2. Any straight line segment can be extended indefinitely, to form a
straight line.
3. Given any straight line segment, a circle can be drawn having the
segment as radius and one endpoint as center.
4. All right angles are congruent.
Euclid relied on a commonsense interpretation of the terms in these axioms,
especially terms for concepts like ‘straight’ and ‘right angle’. Given those ordinary
1 . 3 : A S h ort H i stor y of L og i c 7
concepts, it seemed obvious that the parallel postulate, Euclid’s fifth postulate,
would also hold.
1.3.3 Euclid’s Fifth Axiom, the Parallel Postulate: If a straight line falling
on two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side less
than two right angles, the two straight lines, if produced indefinitely,
meet on that side on which are the angles less than the two right
angles.
The parallel postulate is equivalent to Playfair’s postulate (after John Playfair, the
Scottish mathematician who proposed his version in 1795), 1.3.4, which may be easier
to visualize.
1.3.4 Given a line, and a point not on that line, there exists a single line
that passes through the point and is parallel to the given line.
In the two millennia between Euclid and the early nineteenth century, geometers
tried in vain to prove 1.3.3 or 1.3.4. They did so mainly by trying to find that some
contradiction would arise from the denials of one or the other. They supposed that there
was more than one parallel line through the given point. They supposed that
there were no parallel lines through the given point. Both suppositions led to odd
kinds of spaces. But neither supposition led to an outright contradiction.
By the early nineteenth century, some mathematicians realized that instead of lead-
ing to contradiction, the denials of 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 lead to more abstract conceptions
of geometry, and exciting new fields of study. Riemann and others explored the prop-
erties of elliptical geometries, those that arise when adding the claim that there are
no parallel lines through the given point mentioned in Playfair’s postulate to the first
four axioms. Lobachevsky, Gauss, and others explored the properties of hyperbolic
geometries, which arise when adding the claim that there are infinitely many parallel
lines through the given point in 1.3.4 to the first four axioms. In both elliptical and
hyperbolic geometries, the notions of straightness and right-angularity, among oth-
ers, have to be adjusted. Our original Euclidean conceptions had been smuggled in
to the study of geometry for millennia, preventing mathematicians from discovering
important geometric theories.
These geometric theories eventually found important applications in physical sci-
ence. The parallel postulate is also equivalent to the claim that the sum of the angles
of a triangle is 180°. Consider an interstellar triangle, formed by the light rays of three
stars, whose vertices are the centers of those stars. The sum of the angles of our inter-
stellar triangle will be less than 180° due to the curvatures of space-time correspond-
ing to the gravitational pull of the stars and other large objects. Space-time is not
Euclidean, but hyperbolic.
As in the case of Cantor’s work with infinity, mathematicians considering the
counterintuitive results of non-Euclidean geometries worried that the laws of logical
consequence were being flouted. Mathematicians and philosophers began to think

more carefully about the notion of logical consequence.
In the late nineteenth century, Gottlob Frege argued that hidden premises, like the
assumption that there is only one size of infinity, or that all space must conform to the
parallel postulate, had undermined mathematical progress. Frege wanted to ensure
that all branches of mathematics, indeed all of human reasoning, were not liable to sim-
ilar problems. He thus formalized the study of logical consequence, turning logic into
a mathematical subject. In 1879, Frege published Begriffsschrift, or Concept-Writing, a
logical calculus that subsumed both Aristotle’s term logic and the stoics’ propositional
logic. Frege’s logic extended and refined the rules of logic, generalizing results.
The preface to Frege’s Begriffsschrift makes his motivation clear:
So that nothing intuitive could intrude [into our concept of logical con-
sequence] unnoticed, everything had to depend on the chain of inference
being free of gaps. In striving to fulfill this requirement in the strictest way,
I found an obstacle in the inadequacy of language: however cumbersome
the expressions that arose, the more complicated the relations became, the
less the precision was attained that my purpose demanded. . . . The present
Begriffsschrift . . . is intended to serve primarily to test in the most reliable
way the validity of a chain of inference and to reveal every presupposition
that tends to slip in unnoticed, so that its origin can be investigated.
In this book, by separating the syntax of logic, its formation and derivation rules,
from its semantics, its interpretations and our ascriptions of truth and falsity, we are
attempting to fulfill Frege’s dream of a secure theory of logical consequence.
Frege’s work, while not immediately recognized as revolutionary, spurred fifty
years of intense research in the logical foundations of mathematics and reasoning
generally. Perhaps the culmination of this flurry of research came in the early 1930s,
with Alfred Tarski’s work on truth and Kurt Gödel’s incompleteness theorems.
Frege’s logic, in a neater and more perspicuous form, is mainly the focus of this text-
book. Frege, like Whitehead and Russell in their Principia Mathematica, used an axi-
omatic, or what is now known as a Hilbert-style, inferential system, after the eminent
mathematician and logician David Hilbert. Their work was in the service of a view,
called logicism, that arithmetic is really just logic in complex disguise. This book uses
a now more common style called natural deduction, developed independently in the
1930s by the Polish logician Stanislaw Jaśkowski and the German logician Gerhard
Gentzen.
The brief history I just sketched is of course, in its brevity, highly misleading. Many
others contributed to the history of logic, especially in the late Middle Ages. Frege
was not the only logician to develop modern logic. Charles Sanders Peirce, for ex-
ample, independently developed much of what made Frege’s logic innovative, his
work extending and generalizing Aristotle’s categorical logic to include relations.
1 . 4 : S eparat i ng P re m i ses fro m C oncl u s i ons 9
Augustus De Morgan, even earlier than Peirce and Frege, had worked on relational
logic. But Frege’s larger logicist project, coming mainly as a response to Kant’s phi-
losophy and that of the early nineteenth-century idealists, is especially interesting
to contemporary philosophers. Indeed, Frege produced seminal work not only in
logic and philosophy of mathematics, but in philosophy of language, epistemology,
and metaphysics.
But enough about this engaging history. Let’s get started with the formal work.
1.4: SEPARATING PREMISES FROM CONCLUSIONS

Given that the central goal of this book is a better understanding of logical conse-
quence, of what follows from what, our first formal task is to look at the ways in which
deductive inferences are structured. Compare a disorganized heap of stones with the
same pile of stones arranged into the form of a house. The stones are the same. The
difference between the two collections is the organizational structure of the latter
collection. We want to examine the organizational structure of our inferences.
The basic medium for inference is called an argument. An argument is a set of state- Argumentsare collections
ments, or propositions, one of which is called the conclusion, and the others of which of propositions, called
premises, together
are called premises. The premises are used to support or establish the conclusion. Our with a claim, called the
first task, then, is to analyze arguments, separating premises from conclusions. conclusion, that the
When we analyze an argument, we represent it in a way that reveals its structure. I premises are intended to
will call this process and its results regimentation. The term regimentation can indi- support.
cate either of two different processes. First, we can regiment by putting an argument
A propositionis a
into numbered premise-conclusion form, a process we will explore in this section. statement, often
Second, we can regiment by translating an argument into one of the formal languages expressed by a sentence.
in this book, a process we will explore in chapters 2–5.
Let’s consider the argument 1.4.1 in order to regiment it into numbered premise- A regimentationof an
argument helps reveal its
conclusion form. logical structure, either
1.4.1 We may conclude that texting while driving is wrong. This may be by putting the argument
inferred from the fact that texting is distracting. And driving while into numbered premise-
distracted is wrong. conclusion form, or by
translating the argument
The conclusion of this argument is that texting while driving is wrong. The prem- into a formal language.
ises are that texting is distracting and that driving while distracted is wrong. Notice
that the premises, together, are reasons that entail or support the conclusion.
In addition to the words used to make the assertions in 1.4.1, there are premise
and conclusion indicators. ‘We may conclude that’ is used to indicate a conclusion.
‘This may be inferred from the fact that’ is used to indicate a premise. ‘And’ is also
used to indicate a premise. When we regiment an argument, we eliminate those
indicators.
1 0 C h apter 1 Intro d u c i ng L og i c
Here are some premise and conclusion indicators:
Premise Indicators Conclusion Indicators
since therefore
because we may conclude that
for we may infer that
in that entails that
may be inferred from hence
given that thus
seeing that consequently
for the reason that it follows that
inasmuch as implies that
owing to as a result
Although these lists are handy, they should not be taken as exhaustive or categorical.
Natural languages like English are inexact and non-formulaic. Not all sentences in an
argument will contain indicators. ‘And’ often indicates the presence of an additional
premise, but it can also be used to indicate the extension of a conclusion. Often you will
have to judge from the content of an argument which propositions are premises and
which are conclusions. The best way to identify premises and conclusions is to deter-
mine what the main point of an argument is, and then to see what supports that point.
Once we have determined what the conclusion of an argument is, and which prop-
ositions are the premises, we can regiment the argument into numbered premise-
conclusion form, identifying each of the premises (P1, P2, etc.) and indicating the
conclusion with a ‘C’. Thus we can regiment 1.4.1 as the perspicuous 1.4.2, eliminat-
ing premise and conclusion indicators, and placing the conclusion at the end.
1.4.2 P1. Texting is distracting.
P2. Driving while distracted is wrong.
C. Texting while driving is wrong.
When regimenting an argument, the order of premises is unimportant. 1.4.3 would
be just as good a regimentation as 1.4.2.
1.4.3 P1. Driving while distracted is wrong.
P2. Texting is distracting.
Similarly, the number of premises is not very important. You can combine or sepa-
rate premises, though it is often useful to keep the premises as simple as possible. 1.4.4
is logically acceptable but not as perspicuous as 1.4.2 or 1.4.3.
1.4.4 P1. Driving while distracted is wrong, and texting is distracting.
The most important task when first analyzing an argument is to determine its con-
clusion. The most serious mistake you can make in this exercise is to confuse prem-
ises and conclusions. Argument 1.4.5 is derived from Leibniz’s work.
1 . 4 : S eparat i ng P re m i ses fro m C oncl u s i ons 1 1
1.4.5 God is the creator of the world. If this world is not the best of all
possible worlds, then either God is not powerful enough to bring
about a better world or God did not wish this world to be the best.
So, this world is the best of all possible worlds, because God is both
omnipotent and all-good.
1.4.6 is a poor and misleading regimentation of 1.4.5, merely listing the assertions
in the order in which they appear in 1.4.5.
1.4.6 P1. God is the creator of the world.
P2. If this world is not the best of all possible worlds, then either
God is not powerful enough to bring about a better world or
God did not wish this world to be the best.
P3. This world is the best of all possible worlds.
C. God is both omnipotent and all-good.
The main problem with 1.4.6 is that it switches a premise and the conclusion. The
central claim of 1.4.5 is that this is the best of all possible worlds. The “so” at the begin-
ning of the last sentence is a hint to the conclusion. Thinking about the content of the
argument should produce the same analysis. A proper regimentation would switch
P3 and C, as in 1.4.7.
1.4.7 P1. God is the creator of the world.
P2. If this world is not the best of all possible worlds, then either
God is not powerful enough to bring about a better world or
God did not wish this world to be the best.
P3. God is both omnipotent and all-good.
C. This world is the best of all possible worlds.
Sometimes it is not easy to determine how to separate premises from conclusions.
Often, such discrimination requires broad context. For example, some single sen-
tences contain both a premise and a conclusion. Such compound sentences must be
divided. 1.4.8 is derived from Locke’s work.
1.4.8 Words must refer either to my ideas or to something outside my mind.
Since my ideas precede my communication, words must refer to my
ideas before they could refer to anything else.
A good regimentation of 1.4.8 divides the last sentence, as in 1.4.9.
1.4.9 P1. Words must refer either to my ideas or to something outside
my mind.
P2. My ideas precede my communication.
C. Words must refer to my ideas before they could refer to any-
thing else.
Some arguments contain irrelevant, extraneous information. When constructing
an argument, it is better to avoid extraneous claims, lest you distract or mislead a
reader. But when regimenting someone else’s argument, it is usually good practice to
include all claims, even extraneous ones. Then, when you are evaluating an argument,
you can distinguish the important premises from the extraneous ones.
Lastly, some arguments contain implicit claims not stated in the premises. These
arguments are called enthymemes. 1.4.10 is enthymemic.
1.4.10 P1. Capital punishment is killing a human being.
C. Capital punishment is wrong.
Again, when regimenting an argument, we ordinarily show just what is explicitly
present in the original. When evaluating an argument, we can mention suppressed
premises. For instance, we can convert 1.4.10 into a more complete argument by in-
serting a second premise.
1.4.11 P1. Capital punishment is killing a human being.
P2. Killing a human being is wrong.
C. Capital punishment is wrong.
Notice that P2 here is contentious. Is it always wrong to kill a human being? What if
you are defending yourself from a raging murderer? Or what if you are fighting a just
war? Some people believe that euthanasia is acceptable for people suffering from ter-
minal illnesses and in great pain. The contentiousness of P2 might explain why some-
one defending 1.4.10 might suppress it. Still, filling out an enthymeme is a job for later,
once you have become confident regimenting arguments as they appear. Nothing in
our logic will determine an answer to the interesting questions around claims like P2,
but logic will help us understand the structures of arguments that contain or suppress
such premises.
KEEP IN MIND
The first step in analyzing arguments is to identify a conclusion and separate it from the
premises.
There are often indicators for premises and conclusions.
EXERCISES 1.4
Regiment each of the following arguments into premise-
conclusion form. The inspiration for each argument is noted;
not all arguments are direct quotations.
1. Statements are meaningful if they are verifiable. There are mountains on the
other side of the moon. No rocket has confirmed this, but we could verify it to
be true. Therefore, the original statement is significant. (A. J. Ayer, Language,
Truth, and Logic)
2. The workingman does not have time for true integrity on a daily basis. He can-
not afford to sustain the manliest relations to men, for his work would be mini-
mized in the market. (Henry David Thoreau, Walden)
3. The passage from one stage to another may lead to long-continued different
physical conditions in different regions. These changes can be attributed to
natural selection. Hence, the dominant species are the most diffused in their
own country and make up the majority of the individuals, and often the most
well marked varieties. (Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species)
4. We must be realists about mathematics. Mathematics succeeds as the language
of science. And there must be a reason for the success of mathematics as the lan-
guage of science. But no positions other than realism in mathematics provide a
reason. (Hilary Putnam)
5. Local timelines are temporally ordered. The faster you go, the quicker you get
to your destination. As you go faster, time itself becomes compressed. But it is
not possible to go so fast that you get there before you started. (Albert Einstein,
Relativity)
6. The sphere is the most perfect shape, needing no joint and being a complete
whole. A sphere is best suited to enclose and contain things. The sun, moon,
planets, and stars are seen to be of this shape. Thus, the universe is spherical.
(Nicolaus Copernicus, The Revolution of the Celestial Orbs)
7. The happiest men are those whom the world calls fools. Fools are entirely de-
void of the fear of death. They have no accusing consciences to make them fear
it. Moreover, they feel no shame, no solicitude, no envy, and no love. And they
are free from any imputation of the guilt of sin. (Desiderius Erasmus, In Praise
of Folly)
8. It is impossible for someone to scatter his fears about the most important mat-
ters if he knows nothing about the universe, but gives credit to myths. Without
the study of nature, there is no enjoyment of pure pleasure. (Epicurus of Samos,
Sovran Maxims)
9. If understanding is common to all mankind, then reason must also be com-
mon. Additionally, the reason which governs conduct by commands and prohi-
bitions is common to us. Therefore, mankind is under one common law and so
are fellow citizens. (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations)
10. Rulers define ‘justice’ as simply making a profit from the people. Unjust men
come off best in business. But just men refuse to bend the rules. So, just men get
less and are despised by their own friends. (Plato, Republic)
11. We must take non-vacuous mathematical sentences to be false. This is because
we ought to take mathematical sentences at face value. If we take some sentences
to be non-vacuously true, then we have to explain our access to mathematical
objects. The only good account of access is the indispensability argument. But
the indispensability argument fails. (Hartry Field)
12. Labor was the first price, in that it yielded money that was paid for all things.
But it is difficult to ascertain the proportion between two quantities of labor.
Every commodity is compared with other exchanged commodities rather than
labor. Therefore, most people better understand the quantity of a particular
commodity than the quantity of labor. (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations)
13. Authority comes from only agreed conventions between men. Strength alone
is not enough to make a man into a master. Moreover, no man has natural au-
thority over his fellows and force creates no right. (Jean Jacques Rousseau, The
Social Contract)
14. Just as many plants only bear fruit when they do not grow too tall, so in the
practical arts, the theoretical leaves and flowers must not be constructed to
sprout too high, but kept near to experience, which is their proper soil. (Carl
von Clausewitz, On War)
15. The greatest danger to liberty is the omnipotence of the majority. A democratic
power is never likely to perish for lack of strength or resources, but it may fall
because of the misdirection of this strength and the abuse of resources. There-
fore, if liberty is lost, it will be due to an oppression of minorities, which may
drive them to an appeal to arms. (Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America)
16. There is no distinction between analytic and synthetic claims. If there is an
analytic/synthetic distinction, there must be a good explanation of synonymy.
The only ways to explain synonymy are by interchangeability salva veritate or
definition. However, interchangeability cannot explain synonymy. And defini-
tion presupposes synonymy. (W. V. Quine)
17. The object of religion is the same as that of philosophy; it is the internal verity
itself in its objective existence. Philosophy is not the wisdom of the world, but
the knowledge of things that are not of this world. It is not the knowledge of ex-
ternal mass, empirical life and existence, but of the eternal, of the nature of God,
and all which flows from his nature. This nature ought to manifest and develop
itself. Consequently, philosophy in unfolding religion merely unfolds itself and
in unfolding itself it unfolds religion. (Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phi-
losophy of Religion)
18. Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought
to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to
be that at which all things aim. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics)
19. By ‘matter’ we are to understand an inert, senseless substance, in which ex-
tension, figure, and motion do actually subsist. But it is evident from what we
have already shown that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing
in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that
consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving
substance. Hence it is plain that the very notion of what is called matter, or
corporeal substance, involves a contradiction in it. (George Berkeley, A Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge)
20. Reading challenges a person more than any other task of the day. It requires the
type of training that athletes undergo, and with the same life-long dedication.
Books must be read as deliberately and reservedly as they were written. Thus, to
read well, as in, to read books in a true spirit, is a noble exercise. (Henry David
Thoreau, Walden)
21. The only course open to one who wished to deduce all our knowledge from first
principles would be to begin with a priori truths. An a priori truth is a tautology.
From a set of tautologies alone, only further tautologies can be further deduced.
However, it would be absurd to put forward a system of tautologies as consti-
tuting the whole truth about the universe. Therefore, we cannot deduce all our
knowledge from first principles. (A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic)
22. Men, in the state of nature, must have reached some point when the obstacles
maintaining their state exceed the ability of the individual. Then the human
race must either perish or change. Men cannot create new forces, only unite
and direct existing ones. Therefore, they can preserve themselves only by com-
bining forces great enough to overcome resistance. (Jean Jacques Rousseau,
On the Social Contract)
23. Physics can be defined as the study of the laws that regulate the general prop-
erties of bodies regarded en masse. In observing physics, all senses are used.
Mathematical analysis and experiments help with observation. Thus in the
phenomena of physics man begins to modify natural phenomena. (Auguste
Comte, The Course in Positive Philosophy)
24. There are not two indiscernible individuals in our world. If there were two in-
discernible individuals in our world then there must be another possible world
in which those individuals are switched. God could have had no reason for choos-
ing one of these worlds over the other. But God must have a reason for acting
as she does. (Leibniz)
25. In aristocratic countries, great families have enormous privileges, which their
pride rests on. They consider these privileges as a natural right ingrained in
their being, and thus their feeling of superiority is a peaceful one. They have
no reason to boast of the prerogatives that everyone grants to them without
question. So, when public affairs are directed by an aristocracy, the national
pride takes a reserved, haughty, and independent form. (Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America)
26. It must be some one impression that gives rise to every real idea. But self or
person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and
ideas are supposed to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea
of self, that impression must continue invariably the same through the whole
course of our lives, since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there
is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, pas-
sions and sensations succeed each other and never all exist at the same time. It
cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions or from any other that the
idea of self is derived, and, consequently, there is no idea of the self. (David
Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature)
27. Every violent movement of the will, every emotion, directly agitates the body.
This agitation interferes with the body’s vital functions. So, we can legitimately
say that the body is the objectivity of the will. (Arthur Schopenhauer, The
World as Will and Idea)
28. The work of the defensive forces of the ego prevents repressed desires from en-
tering the conscious during waking life, and even during sleep. The dreamer
knows just as little about the meaning of his dreams as the hysteric knows
about the significance of his symptoms. The technique of psychoanalysis is the
act of discovering through analysis the relation between manifest and latent
dream content. Therefore, the only way to treat these patients is through the
technique of psychoanalysis. (Sigmund Freud, The Origin and Development of
Psychoanalysis)
29. Either mathematical theorems refer to ideal objects or they refer to objects that
we sense. If they refer to ideal objects, the radical empiricist cannot defend our
knowledge of them, since we never sense such objects. If they refer to objects
that we sense, they are false. So, for the radical empiricist, mathematical theo-
rems are either unknowable or false. In either case, the radical empiricist can-
not justify any proof of a mathematical theorem. (John Stuart Mill)
30. My mind is distinct from my body. I have a clear and distinct understanding
of my mind, independent of my body. I have a clear and distinct understand-
ing of my body, independent of my mind. Whatever I can clearly and distinctly
conceive of as separate can be separated by God and so are really distinct.
(René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy)
1.5: VALIDITY AND SOUNDNESS

Consider the following three arguments.
1.5.1 P1. All philosophers are thinkers.
P2. Socrates is a philosopher.
C. Socrates is a thinker.
1.5.2 P1. All persons are fish.
P2. Alexander Hamilton is a person.
C. Alexander Hamilton is a fish.
1 . 5 : Val i d i t y an d S o u n d ness 1 7
1.5.3 P1. All mathematicians make calculations.

P2. Padmé Amidala makes calculations.
C. Padmé Amidala is a mathematician.
1.5.1 is a good argument for two reasons. First, the conclusion follows from the
premises. Second, the premises are true. 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 are both bad arguments, but
for different reasons. In 1.5.2, the conclusion follows from the premises, but the first
premise is false. In 1.5.3, the premises are true, we can suppose, but the conclusion
does not follow from the premises. We call arguments like 1.5.3 invalid. 1.5.2 is valid,
but unsound.
The validity of an argument depends on its form. The conclusion of a valid argu- An argument is valid
ment follows logically from the premises. In this book, we will develop precise defini- when the conclusion is a
logical consequence of
tions of validity, and thus logical consequence, for formal languages. We will see that the premises.
certain forms of argument are valid and certain forms are invalid. We will explore
rigorous methods for distinguishing between valid and invalid arguments.
In contrast, the soundness of an argument, as I will use the term, depends both
on its formal structure and on the truth of its premises. A sound argument is a valid A valid argument is sound
argument with true premises. Only valid arguments can be sound. A sound argument if, and only if, all of its
premises are true. A valid
has both a valid structure and true premises.
argument is unsound
Valid arguments are important because in deductive logic, if the form of an argu- when at least one of its
ment is valid and the premises are all true, then the conclusion must be true. The pre- premises is false.
vious sentence is the most important sentence of this book. The power of deductive
logic is simply that if the premises of an argument in a valid form are true, then, on
pain of contradiction, the conclusion of the argument must be true. In invalid argu-
ments, the premises can be true at the same time that the conclusion is false. The
central theme of this book, then, is to identify the valid forms of argument.
The validity of an argument is independent of the truth of the premises of an ar-
gument. As we saw, 1.5.1 is both valid and sound, while 1.5.2 is valid but unsound.
An argument, for example 1.5.3 or 1.5.4, can also have all true premises while being
invalid.
1.5.4 P1. 2 + 2 = 4.
P2. The sky is blue.
C. Kant wrote Critique of Pure Reason.
Although the soundness of an argument depends on the truth of the premises, va-
lidity is more closely related to possibility. An argument is sound only if the premises
are actually true. An argument is valid if it is impossible to make the conclusion false
while the premises are true by substituting alternative sentences of the same logical
form. This last claim will become a little clearer once we have looked more carefully
at the nature of logical form.
The arguments 1.5.5–1.5.7 share a logical form.
1.5.5 Either the stock market will rise or unemployment will go up.
The market will not rise.
So, unemployment will increase.
1.5.6 You will get either rice or beans.

You do not get the rice.
So, you will have the beans.
1.5.7 The square root of two is either rational or irrational.
It is not rational.
So, it’s irrational.
We can represent this common logical form by replacing the specific propositions
in the argument with variables, using the same variable each time a particular propo-
sition is repeated.
1.5.8 Either P or Q.
Not P.
So, Q.
Just as an architect, when building a building, focuses on the essential structures,
so a logician looks mainly at the form of an argument, ignoring the content of the
sentences. ‘P’ and ‘Q ’, above, are variables, standing for statements and allowing us to
see the logical form of the argument more clearly.
We call the form displayed at 1.5.8 disjunctive syllogism. In chapter 3 we will
identify some basic valid forms, and use them to determine whether any argument
is valid. To start the process of identifying valid forms, in this section we rely on
our intuitive judgments about whether or not some sample inferences are valid. The
main purpose of chapter 2 is to develop a rigorous method to determine whether any
form is valid.
In our study of propositional logic, we will use capital English letters to stand for
simple, positive propositions. Simple propositions are often of subject-predicate form,
but not necessarily. They are the shortest examples of statements; they cannot be de-
composed further in propositional logic. In predicate logic, chapters 4 and 5, we work
beneath the surface of propositions.
KEEP IN MIND
In deductive logic, if the form of an argument is valid, and the premises are all true, then
the conclusion must be true.
An argument is valid if the conclusion follows logically from the premises.
The validity of an argument depends on its form and is independent of the truth of its
premises.
A valid argument is sound if all of its premises are true.
Only valid arguments can be sound.
EXERCISES 1.5
Determine whether each of the following arguments is
intuitively valid or invalid. For valid arguments, determine
whether they are sound (if you can).
1. Archaeologists are anthropologists. Anthropologists are social scientists. It fol-

lows that archaeologists are social scientists.
2. All trees are tall. All tall things are hard to climb. So, all trees are hard to climb.
3. Frankfort is the capital of Kentucky. Trenton is the capital of New Jersey. Phoenix
is the capital of Arizona. It follows that Raleigh is the capital of North Carolina.
4. All princesses are women. Kate Middleton is a princess. Therefore, Kate Middle-
ton is a woman.
5. All horses are mammals. All horses have four legs. So, all mammals have four
legs.
6. All unicorns are pink. All unicorns have horns. So, if something is pink and has
a horn, it is a unicorn.
7. Either some cats are black or all cats are fluffy. All cats are black. So, some cats
are fluffy.
8. Some cats are black. Some cats are fluffy. So, some cats are black and fluffy.
9. Some cats are fluffy. All cats have whiskers. So, all fluffy cats have whiskers.
10. All doctors went to medical school. All medical students took chemistry. So, all
doctors have taken chemistry.
11. All circles are shapes. All shapes have distinct sides. Therefore, a circle has dis-
tinct sides.
12. All musicians play piano. Some musicians sing opera. So, some musicians play
piano and sing opera.
13. Some percussionists play piano. All pianists are musicians. Therefore, all per-
cussionists are musicians.
14. Plants need sunlight to grow. Plants need water to grow. So, plants need two
things to grow.
15. Thunder occurs only when it is raining. It never rains in February. Hence, there
is never any thunder in February.
16. All windows are made of glass. Glass is transparent. So, all windows must be
transparent.
17. Either it is raining or it is sunny, but not both. It is not raining. So, it is sunny.
18. Either I stop smoking or I risk getting ill. If I stop smoking, then I will have
withdrawal symptoms. If I get ill, then I risk death. So, either I have withdrawal
symptoms or I risk death.
19. Some fish live in the Atlantic Ocean. The Atlantic Ocean is a body of water. So,
some fish live in water.
20. All rats have tails. Some rats are white. So, all rats are white and have tails.
21. All rats have tails. Some rats are white. Therefore, some white things have tails.
22. All squares are rectangles. All rectangles are parallelograms. All parallelograms
are quadrilaterals. Therefore, all squares are quadrilaterals.
23. All professional singers are classically trained. Some classically trained singers
are Italian. So, some professional singers are Italian.
24. Kangaroos live in Australia. Sydney is in Australia. Hence, kangaroos live in
Sydney.
25. All logicians are philosophers. All philosophers study Kant. It follows that all
logicians study Kant.
26. If mathematical objects exist, then either we have mathematical intuition or we
can’t know about them. We don’t have mathematical intuition. So, mathemati-
cal objects don’t exist.
27. Either only the present is real or time is four-dimensional. Time is four-dimen-
sional. So, only the present is real.
28. Logic is a priori if, and only if, mathematics is. Mathematics is a priori if, and
only if, metaphysics is. So, logic is a priori if, and only if, metaphysics is.
29. Nietzsche believes in eternal recurrence, but Spinoza does not. If Heidegger
believes in the reality of time, then Spinoza believes in eternal recurrence. So,
Heidegger does not believe in the reality of time.
30. Objective morality is either consequentialist or deontological. If objective mo-
rality is deontological then Aristotle is a relativist. So, Aristotle is not a relativist.
31. All logical empiricists are verificationists. Some verificationists are holists. So,
some holists are logical empiricists.
32. Either Plato taught Aristotle or Aristotle taught Plato. But Aristotle taught
Alexander, and Alexander was not taught by Plato. So, Plato taught Aristotle.
33. Descartes corresponded with Elisabeth of Bohemia and Queen Christina of
Sweden. So, Queen Christina and Elisabeth corresponded with each other.
34. If Hegel was influenced by Kant, then Marx was influenced by Hegel. Marx was
influenced by Hegel if, and only if, Nietzsche was influenced by Marx. So, if
Hegel was influenced by Kant, then Nietzsche was influenced by Marx.
35. There is a difference between correlation and causation only if we have knowl-
edge of the laws of nature. But the laws of nature are obscured to us. So, correla-
tion is causation.
36. All ravens are black. But black is a color. And nothing has color. So, there are
no ravens.
37. All humans have some virtues. Not all humans have all virtues. So, some hu-
mans lack some virtues, but no humans lack all virtues.
38. If infinity is actual, then Achilles cannot catch the tortoise. If infinity is poten-
tial, then Achilles can catch the tortoise. Infinity is either actual or potential. So,
Achilles can catch the tortoise.
39. If I am my body, then the self is constantly changing and does not persist
through time. If the self does not persist through time, then the person who
borrows money is not the one who returns it. So, if the person who borrows
money is the person who returns it, then I am not my body.
40. If knowledge is justified true belief, then Gettier cases are not counterexamples.
But Gettier cases are counterexamples, and there are others, too. So, knowl-
edge is justified true belief with a causal connection between the knower and
the object of knowledge.
KEY TERMS
argument, 1.4 proposition, 1.4 unsound argument, 1.5

conclusion, 1.4 regimentation, 1.4 valid argument, 1.5
premise, 1.4 sound argument, 1.5
Chapter 2
Propositional Logic
Syntax and Semantics
2.1: LOGICAL OPERATORS AND TRANSLATION

The subjects of chapters 2 and 3 are the syntax and semantics of a formal language of
propositional logic, which I will call PL. Propositional logic is the logic of proposi-
tions and their inferential relations.
It is not easy to define ‘proposition’, but propositions are often taken to be what-
ever it is that we call true or false. We might say that a proposition is a statement,
often expressed by a sentence. Some people take propositions to be just sentences.
Others take them to be sets or types of sentences. Still others take them to be the
meanings of sentences, though the nature of the meaning of a sentence is another
controversial question. These controversies need not get in the way of our work
with PL.
In the first two sections of this chapter, to construct the language of PL, we will
specify its syntax. In section 2.3, to interpret the language, we will specify its seman-
tics. By the end of this chapter, in sections 2.6 and 2.7, we will have worked through a
formal definition of validity, a way to determine, for any inference in PL, whether or
not it is valid. In chapter 3, we will look more deeply at inferences using PL.
Natural languages like English, as well as many formal languages, have a finite,
if very large, stock of simple sentences. From these we can construct indefinitely
many, perhaps infinitely many, grammatically correct complex sentences. To pro-
Logical operatorsare duce complex sentences from simple ones, we use what the logician calls operators
tools for combining or connectives.
propositions or terms.
In natural language, we usually find it convenient to write or speak in short sen-
tences. In logic, we assume an unrestricted ability to construct sentences of any
length. Even in natural languages, though, we assume something like an ability to
compose longer sentences indefinitely. This passage is from a much longer story com-
posed of a single sentence:
Now they’re going to see who I am, he said to himself in his strong new man’s
voice, many years after he had seen the huge ocean liner without lights
and without any sound which passed by the village one night like a great
22
2 . 1 : L og i cal O perators an d T ranslat i on 2 3
uninhabited palace, longer than the whole village and much taller than the
steeple of the church, and it sailed by in the darkness toward the colonial
city on the other side of the bay that had been fortified against buccaneers,
with its old slave port and the rotating light, whose gloomy beams transfig-
ured the village into a lunar encampment of glowing houses and streets of
volcanic deserts every fifteen seconds . . . (Gabriel García Márquez, “The Last
Voyage of the Ghost Ship,” emphases added)
Grammarians often bristle at long, run-on sentences like this one. But from a logi-
cal point of view, we can build sentences of indefinite length by repeated applications
of operators like the ‘and’ in Márquez’s story. Such operators, including ‘or’ and ‘not’,
are often all called conjunctions in grammar, though in logic we reserve the term
‘conjunction’ for just the operator for which we use ‘and’.
The system of propositional logic that we will study uses five operators, which we
identify by their syntactic properties, or shapes:
Tilde ∼
Dot ∙
Vel ∨
Horseshoe ⊃
Triple bar ≡
These operators are used to represent logical operations on sentences. We will
consider five basic logical operations, though systems of logic can be built from
merely one or two operations. We could also introduce other, less intuitive logical
operations.
These five operators are standard for propositional logic:
Negation ∼
Conjunction ∙
Disjunction ∨
Material implication ⊃
The biconditional ≡
We read or write sentences of English from left to right, and we might think of them
as being composed in that way. But the logical structure of a complex sentence is
grounded in its simple parts and the operators used, like bricks and mortar. We think
of complex sentences, as we will see in the next section, as being composed or built up
from smaller parts using the operators.
Along with the assumption of our ability to construct sentences of indefinite length,
we presume a principle, called compositionality, that the meaning of the longer sen- Compositionality: the
tences is determined by the meanings of the shorter sentences, along with the mean- meaning of a complex
sentence is determined
ings of the conjunctions or other logical operators. The compositionality of our logic
by the meanings of its
allows us to understand the properties of even very long sentences as long as we un- component parts.
derstand the nature of the logical operators. This section is a detailed explication of
each of our five operators.
2 4 C h apter 2 P ropos i t i onal L og i c
Negation
Negation, ∼, is the logical Negation is a unary operator, applying to one propositional variable. The other four
operator used for ‘it is not operators are all binary. Some English indicators of negation include the following:
the case that’ and related
terms. not
it is not the case that
A unary operatorapplies it is not true that
to a single proposition. it is false that
Binary operators
relate or connect two 2.1.2–2.1.4 each express a negation of 2.1.1.
propositions.
2.1.1 John will take the train.
2.1.2 John won’t take the train.
2.1.3 It’s not the case that John will take the train.
2.1.4 John takes the train . . . not!
We can represent 2.1.1 as ‘P’ and each of 2.1.2–2.1.4 as the negation ‘∼P’. 2.1.5–2.1.7
are all negations, too.
2.1.5 ∼R
2.1.6 ∼(P ∙ Q)
2.1.7 ∼{[(A ∨ B) ⊃ C] ∙ ∼D}
2.1.5 is built out of a simple sentence ‘R’ and a negation in front of it. 2.1.6 is built
out of two simple sentences, conjoined and then negated. 2.1.7 is the negation of a
conjunction of a conditional and another negation, though now we’re getting a little
bit ahead of ourselves.
Negation is a fairly simple logical operator to translate, though some subtleties are
worth considering. Ordinarily, when we translate natural language into logical lan-
guage, we want to reveal as much logical structure as we can so that we can see the
logical relations among sentences. We use single capital letters to represent simple,
positive sentences, so that we can show the logical operation of negation on those
simple sentences. For example, we symbolize ‘Pedro has no beard’ as ‘∼P’, where ‘P’
stands for ‘Pedro has a beard’.
For some sentences, it is not clear whether to use a negation when symbolizing.
2.1.9 has a negative feel to it.
2.1.8 Kant affirms that arithmetic is synthetic a priori.
2.1.9 Kant denies that arithmetic is synthetic a priori.
It would be misleading to represent 2.1.9 as the negation of 2.1.8, though. Deny-
ing is not the negation of affirming. There are two ways to fail to affirm P. First, one
can deny P. Second, one can remain silent. Denying is an activity that is related to
affirming, but it is not, strictly, the negation of affirming. For similar reasons, reject-
ing, disputing, and dissenting are not negations of accepting or affirming. We want
our simple sentences to be positive, if possible, but not at the expense of the meaning
of the original. Sometimes a negative verb can represent a positive act, or anyway not
the logical negation of any simple act.
Conjunction
These are some English indicators of a logical conjunction: Conjunction, ∙, is the
logical operator used for
and still ‘and’ and related terms.
but moreover The formulas joined by
also although a conjunction are called
however nevertheless conjuncts.
yet both
2.1.10–2.1.13 are English sentences that we can represent as conjunctions.
2.1.10 Angelina walks the dog, and Brad cleans the floors. A∙B
2.1.11 Although Beyonce walks the dog, Jay cleans the floors. B∙J
2.1.12 Key and Peele are comedians. K∙P
2.1.13 Carolina is nice, but Emilia is really nice. C∙E
Although the logical operator in each of 2.1.10–2.1.13 is a conjunction, the tone
of the conjunction varies. Logicians often distinguish between the logical and prag-
matic properties of language. ‘And’ and ‘but’ are both used to express conjunctions
even though they have different practical uses.
We use conjunctions to combine complete sentences. In English, 2.1.12 is short for
a more complete sentence like 2.1.14.
2.1.14 Key is a comedian and Peele is a comedian.
Sometimes, sentences using ‘and’ are not naturally rendered as conjunctions.
2.1.15 Key and Peele are brothers.
2.1.15 is most naturally interpreted as expressing a relation between two people,
and not a conjunction of two sentences. Of course, 2.1.15 could also be used to ex-
press the claim that both Key and Peele are monks, in which case it would best be
represented in logic as a conjunction. In propositional logic, we regiment the most
natural sense of 2.1.15 merely as a simple letter: ‘P’, say. We will see how to represent
the sibling relation more finely in chapter 5. The difference between the two inter-
pretations cannot be found in the sentence itself. It has to be seen from the use of the
sentence in context. Many sentences are ambiguous when seen out of context.
In symbols, 2.1.16–2.1.18 are all conjunctions.
2.1.16 P ∙ ∼Q
2.1.17 (A ⊃ B) ∙ (B ⊃ A)
2.1.18 (P ∨ ∼Q) ∙ ∼[P ≡ (Q ∙ R)]
Disjunction
Disjunction is sometimes called alternation. Some English indicators of disjunction Disjunction, ∨, is the
include the following: logical operator used for
‘or’ and related terms.
or The formulas joined by
either a disjunction are called
unless disjuncts.
Unlessis represented as a Most disjunctions use an ‘or’, though ‘unless’ is also frequently used for disjunction.
disjunction in PL . 2.1.19–2.1.21 are English sentences that we can represent as disjunctions.
2.1.19 Either Paco makes the website or Matt does. P∨M
2.1.20 Jared or Rene will go to the party. J∨R
2.1.21 Tomas doesn’t feed the kids unless Aisha asks him to. ∼T ∨ A
In symbols, 2.1.22–2.1.24 are all disjunctions.
2.1.22 ∼P ∨ Q
2.1.23 (A ⊃ B) ∨ (B ⊃ A)
2.1.24 (P ∨ ∼Q) ∨ ∼[P ≡ (Q ∙ R)]
Standard combinations of negations with disjunctions and conjunctions are useful
Not bothP and Q is to learn. The negation of a conjunction is simply ‘not both’, as in 2.1.25.
represented in PL as
∼(P ∙ Q ). 2.1.25 It is not the case that both Adam goes to the movies and Bianca
works on her paper.
2.1.25 is the denial that both claims hold, leaving open the possibility that one (but
not the other) holds. Such a claim is best translated as 2.1.26, which (as we will see in
section 3.3) is logically equivalent to the form at 2.1.27.
2.1.26 ∼(A ∙ B) Not both A and B
2.1.27 ∼A ∨ ∼B Not both A and B
NeitherP nor Q is In parallel, the negation of a disjunction is just the common structure of ‘neither’,
represented in PL as short for ‘not either’. 2.1.28 is both a denial that Caleb takes ethics and a denial that
∼(P ∨ Q ).
Danica does.
2.1.28 Neither Caleb nor Danica takes ethics.
2.1.28 is most directly translated as 2.1.29, the negation of a disjunction. 2.1.30,
the conjunction of two negations, is logically equivalent to both, and also acceptable.
2.1.29 ∼(C ∨ D) Neither C nor D
2.1.30 ∼C ∙ ∼D Neither C nor D
‘Neither’ and ‘not-both’ sentences are not logically equivalent to each other, so it is
important not to confuse the two.
Material Implication (the Conditional)

Material implication, ⊃, The operator that we call material implication (or the material conditional) is most
is the logical operator closely associated with ‘if . . . then . . .’ of natural language. We will use it to translate
used for conditionals,
‘if . . . then . . . statements’,
sentences with that structure, and related ones, though it is not a perfect representa-
and related terms. tion of the natural language conditional. Briefly, some aspects of the natural-language
conditional are simply not represented by the logic in this book.
Here are some English indicators of material implication:
if entails
only if means
only when provided that
is a necessary condition for given that

is a sufficient condition for on the condition that
implies in case
The order of the parts of a material implication is important in ways unlike the order
In a conditional, the
of disjunctions and conjunctions. ‘A ∙ B’ and ‘B ∙ A’ are logically equivalent; so are formula that precedes
‘A ∨ B’ and ‘B ∨ A’. But ‘A ⊃ B’ and ‘B ⊃ A’ must be carefully distinguished. We even the ⊃ is called the
have different names for the different sides of the ⊃: the antecedent precedes the antecedent; the formula
horseshoe and is the ‘if ’ clause; the consequent follows the horseshoe and is the ‘then’ that follows the ⊃ is
called the consequent .
clause. In ‘A ⊃ B’, ‘A’ is the antecedent and ‘B’ is the consequent. In ‘B ⊃ A’, ‘B’ is the
antecedent and ‘A’ is the consequent.
2.1.31–2.1.39 are some examples of natural-language conditionals and their usual
translations into PL, using ‘A’ to stand for ‘Marina dances’ and ‘B’ to stand for ‘Izzy
plays tennis’. Make sure to recognize the placement of antecedents and conditionals.
2.1.31 If Marina dances, then Izzy If A then B A⊃B
plays tennis.
2.1.32 Marina dances if Izzy plays If B then A B⊃A
tennis.
2.1.33 Marina dancing entails (implies, A entails (implies, means) B A ⊃ B
means) that Izzy plays tennis.
2.1.34 Marina dances given (provided, A given (provided, on the B⊃A
on the condition) that Izzy condition) that B
plays tennis.
2.1.35 Marina dances only if (only A only if (only when) B A⊃B
when) Izzy plays tennis.
2.1.36 Marina dancing is a necessary A is necessary for B B⊃A
condition for Izzy playing tennis.
2.1.37 Marina dancing is a sufficient A is sufficient for B A⊃B
condition for Izzy playing tennis.
2.1.38 A necessary condition of Marina B is necessary for A A⊃B
dancing is Izzy playing tennis.
2.1.39 A sufficient condition for Marina B is sufficient for A B⊃A
dancing is Izzy playing tennis.
Note that in both 2.1.31 and 2.1.32, whatever follows the ‘if ’ is the antecedent.
Conditions that entail, imply, or mean, as in 2.1.33, and conditions that are given or
provided, as in 2.1.34, are also antecedents.
In contrast, whatever follows an ‘only if ’ or an ‘only when’, as in 2.1.35, is a con-
sequent. If I write an essay only when the deadline is looming, then if I’m writing
an essay, the deadline is looming. But even if the deadline is looming, I might not
be writing!
Note in 2.1.36–2.1.39 that necessary conditions are consequents, whereas suf-
ficient conditions are antecedents. The case of sufficient conditions is fairly easy to
understand. If some condition in the antecedent is met, then the consequent follows;
the condition is sufficient to entail the consequent.
Necessary conditions are trickier. If A is necessary for B, then if B is true, we can
infer that A must also be true. For example, oxygen is necessary for burning. So, if
something is burning, there must be oxygen present; the necessary condition is in the
consequent. Given that the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition for something
burning, we cannot infer from the presence of oxygen to something burning. Oxygen
is not sufficient to cause a fire; it’s just one of various necessary conditions.
To remember that sufficient conditions are antecedents and necessary conditions
are consequents, we can use the mnemonic ‘SUN’. Rotating the ‘U’ to a ‘⊃’ we get
‘S ⊃ N’.
In symbols, 2.1.40–2.1.42 are all conditionals.
2.1.40 ∼P ⊃ Q
2.1.41 (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (B ⊃ A)
2.1.42 (P ∨ ∼Q) ⊃ ∼[P ≡ (Q ∙ R)]
While we’re defining terms, we can define three conditionals using traditional
names that you might run into. The names of the conditionals 2.1.44–2.1.46 are all
relative to the original conditional at 2.1.43.
2.1.43 The conditional A⊃B
2.1.44 Its converse B⊃A
2.1.45 Its inverse ∼A ⊃ ∼B
2.1.46 Its contrapositive ∼B ⊃ ∼A
A statement and its contrapositive, 2.1.43 and 2.1.46, are logically equivalent. The
inverse and the converse of a conditional, 2.1.44 and 2.1.45, are logically equivalent
to each other. But a conditional is not equivalent to either its inverse or its converse.
These names are holdovers from the traditional, Aristotelian logic, and ‘inverse’ es-
pecially is not much used in modern logic. I will explain what ‘logical equivalence’
means in more detail in section 2.5.
The Biconditional
The biconditional, ≡, is Our final propositional operator, the biconditional, is really the conjunction of a con-
the logical operator used ditional with its converse. We see biconditionals in definitions, which give both nec-
for ‘if and only if ’ and
related terms.
essary and sufficient conditions. Some English indicators of a biconditional include
the following:
if and only if
when and only when
just in case
is a necessary and sufficient condition for
The biconditional ‘A ≡ B’ is short for ‘(A ⊃ B) ∙ (B ⊃ A)’, to which we will return,
once we are familiar with truth conditions. ‘If and only if ’ statements often indi-
cate definitions. For example, something is water if, and only if, it is H 2O. Thus, if
something is water, then it is H2O. And, if something is H 2O, then it is water. ‘If and
only if ’ is sometimes abbreviated ‘iff ’.
2.1.47 and 2.1.48 are English examples of biconditionals.
2.1.47 You’ll be successful just in case you work hard and are lucky.
S ≡ (W ∙ L)
2.1.48 Something is a bachelor if, and only if, it is unwed and a man.
B ≡ (∼W ∙ M)
In symbols, 2.1.49–2.1.51 are all biconditionals.
2.1.49 ∼P ≡ Q
2.1.50 (A ⊃ B) ≡ (B ⊃ A)
2.1.51 (P ∨ ∼Q) ≡ ∼[P ≡ (Q ∙ R)]
Translation and Ambiguity

When translating between English and propositional logic, make sure to resolve or
avoid ambiguities. 2.1.52 can be translated as either 2.1.53 or 2.1.54, as it stands.
2.1.52 You may have salad or potatoes and carrots.
2.1.53 (S ∨ P) ∙ C
2.1.54 S ∨ (P ∙ C)
There is an important difference between the two translations. In the first case, you
are having carrots and either salad or potatoes. In the second case, you are either hav-
ing one thing (salad) or two things (potatoes and carrots). To avoid ambiguities, look
for commas and semicolons.
2.1.55 You may have salad or potatoes, and carrots.
2.1.56 You may have salad, or potatoes and carrots.
With commas, 2.1.55 is clearly best translated as 2.1.53, while 2.1.56 is clearly best
translated as 2.1.54.
Still, not all sentences of English, or any natural language, are unambiguous. In the
real world, when we want to disambiguate, we might ask the speaker what she or he
means, or try to determine the meaning of an ambiguous sentence from context. In
this book, I follow a convention of using commas or semicolons to assist in clarity.
Arguments and Numbered Premise-Conclusion Form

The theme of this chapter is validity for arguments of PL. To that end, we will con-
sider not just individual propositions, but complete arguments, premises, and conclu-
sions. Thus, in the exercises, you will be asked to regiment arguments like 2.1.57 into
numbered premise-conclusion form in PL.
2.1.57 Morality is backward-looking. For, if morality is possible, then it is
either forward-looking or backward-looking. But we can be moral.
And morality is not forward-looking.
Remember that we can regiment in two ways, by putting an argument into num-
bered premise-conclusion form, or by translating the argument into a formal lan-
guage. Here we will do both.
For the first step, remember that in chapter 1, we indicated premises with ‘P’ and a
number, and conclusions with a ‘C’. Here, we will adjust that form slightly, omitting
the ‘P’s and ‘C’s, and using a ‘/’ to indicate the separation between the premises and
the conclusion. Thus, we can write the argument 2.1.57 as 2.1.58.
2.1.58 1. I f morality is possible, then it is either forward-looking or
backward-looking.
2. We can be moral.
3. Morality is not forward-looking.
/ Morality is backward-looking.
There are alternatives to the ‘/’ to indicate conclusions. We could just use ‘so’, or
some other simple English conclusion indicator. Some people use ‘∴’ to indicate a
conclusion. Sometimes logicians draw a horizontal line between the premises and
conclusions, as at 2.1.59.
2.1.59 1. I f morality is possible, then it is either forward-looking or
backward-looking.
2. We can be moral.
3. Morality is not forward-looking.
Morality is backward-looking.
Neither 2.1.58 nor 2.1.59 is regimented into PL, which is our goal here. To regi-
ment it, we need to choose propositional letters for the simple English sentences. I’ll
use ‘P’ for ‘morality is possible’ and ‘we can be moral’, since I take those to be the
same proposition expressed slightly differently. ‘F’ can stand for ‘morality is forward-
looking’ and ‘B’ for ‘morality is backward-looking.’ The result is 2.1.60.
2.1.60 1. P ⊃ (F ∨ B)
2. P
3. ∼F /B
Notice that I put the conclusion on the same line as the last premise, rather than on
a different line. This form will be useful later on, and it makes the argument just a bit
more compact.
Summary
Now that you have seen each of the five operators and their English-language approxi-
mations, you can start to translate both simple and complex English sentences into
our artificial language, PL. Given a translation key, you can also interpret sentences
of PL into English sentences.
Translation is an art. In this section, I presented some guidelines for translating
English terms, like ‘and’ and ‘if . . . then . . .’, into our precise formal language. These
guidelines are not hard and fast rules. Natural language is flexible and inexact, which
is part of why formal languages are useful. The indicators of conditionals are particu-
larly liable to misconstrual. You must be careful to distinguish antecedents and con-
sequents. Be especially wary of confusing ‘only if ’ with ‘if ’, and with ‘if and only if.’
Certain uses of the indicators are not even properly translated as logical operators.
‘Means’ is a conditional in “this means war” and “Beth’s deciding to join us means that
Kevin will be uncomfortable.” But ‘means’ is not a conditional in “Josie means to go
to the party tonight” and “ ‘querer’ means ‘to love’ in Spanish.” Sometimes the indica-
tors can be quite misleading; we will even see, in section 4.2, instances of ‘and’ that
are best translated using disjunction! But the indicators provided are generally good
hints about where to start with a translation, and the guidelines in this section should
be violated only for good reasons. As you develop greater facility with the logical lan-
guages in the book, you will come to a better feel of how best to translate. And there
are many acceptable alternatives to any translation, as we will see better after more
discussion of logical equivalence.
KEEP IN MIND
Our language PL uses five operators, which we identify by their syntactic properties.
The five propositional logical operations are negation, conjunction, disjunction, material
implication, and the biconditional.
The operators always apply to complete propositions, whether simple or complex.
The rules for translating conditionals are particularly tricky and require carefully distin-
guishing between antecedents and consequents.
EXERCISES 2.1a
Identify the antecedents and consequents of each of the
following sentences.
1. If Abhishek studies religion, then Bima majors in sociology.

2. Cora working for her state senator entails that Danilo takes a job at the law
office.
3. Edwidge’s thinking about graduate school implies that she takes the GREs.
4. Fernanda will apply to medical school provided that organic chemistry goes
well.
5. Gita plays lacrosse if her financial aid comes through.
6. Henry’s joining the history club is a necessary condition for Isabel to join.
7. Janelle becoming president of the robotics club is sufficient for Kyrone becom-
ing treasurer.
8. Lisette joins the activities board on the condition that the board revises its
funding rules.
9. Mercedes manages mock trial only if Nana is too busy to do it.
10. Orlando organizes peer tutoring when Percy rounds up volunteers.
11. Aristotle distinguishes actual from potential infinity if Parmenides argues for
the One.
12. If Bergson denies time, then so does McTaggart.
13. Camus encouraging authenticity means that Sartre does too.
14. Davidson defending anomalous monism is sufficient for Spinoza’s being cor-
rect about parallelism.
15. Emerson bails out Thoreau on the condition that Thoreau pays his taxes.
16. Fanon writing Black Skin, White Masks is a necessary condition for Freire writ-
ing Pedagogy of the Oppressed.
17. Grice analyzes pragmatics on the condition that Austin follows Wittgenstein.
18. Foot discussing trolley cases and philosophers reflecting on her work entail
that there will be more thought experiments.
19. The Churchlands denying mental states is sufficient for Dennett denying qualia
and Chalmers emphasizing the hard problem of consciousness.
20. When Singer is a utilitarian, no one else is.
EXERCISES 2.1b
Translate each sentence into propositional logic using the
propositional variables given after the sentence.
1. Andre likes basketball. (A)

2. Andre doesn’t like soccer. (A)
3. Pilar and Zach are logicians. (P, Z)
4. Sabrina wants either a puppy or a kitten. (P, K)
5. Kangaroos are marsupials, and they live in Australia. (M, A)
6. José cooks only when his mother comes over for dinner. (C, M)
7. Martina doesn’t like shopping unless Jenna comes with her. (S, J)
8. The world will end just in case alien kittens invade. (E, A)
9. It is safe to swim when, and only when, the water is calm or a lifeguard is on
duty. (S, C, L)
10. Logic is challenging and fun given that you pay attention in class. (C, F, P)
11. Cars are eco-friendly if they are hybrids or run on low-emission fuel. (E, H, L)
12. Cara will go horseback riding only if it doesn’t rain, and she has a helmet.
(C, R, H)
13. The restaurant served chicken, and either peas or carrots. (C, P, T)
14. Making butter is a necessary condition for the farmer to go to the market and
make a profit. (B, M, P)
15. Patrons may have corn and potatoes if, and only if, they do not order carrots.
(C, P, T)
16. If the restaurant runs out of cheesecake, then you can have a meal of chicken
and pie and ice cream. (C, K, P, I)
17. A farmer keeps goats in a pen and sheep in a pen only if the dogs and cat are kept
inside. (G, S, D, C)
18. Either the farmer shears the sheep and milks the cows, or he slops the pigs and
walks the dogs. (S, C, P, D)
19. If the farmer shears the sheep, then he makes wool, and if he milks the cows,
then he makes butter. (S, W, C, B)
20. If the farmer goes to the market, then she makes a profit, and her wife is happy.
(M, P, W)
21. Plato believed in the theory of forms, and Aristotle held that there are four
kinds of causes, but Parmenides thought that only the one exists. (P, A, R)
22. If Thales reduced everything to water, then Democritus was an atomist if and
only if Heraclitus claimed that the world is constantly in flux. (T, D, H)
23. If Plato believed in the theory of forms or Democritus was an atomist, then
Aristotle held that there are four kinds of causes or Parmenides thought that
only the one exists. (P, D, A, R)
24. Democritus was not an atomist if and only if Plato didn’t believe in the theory
of forms, and Thales didn’t reduce everything to water. (D, P, T)
25. Either Heraclitus claimed that the world is constantly in flux or Thales reduced
everything to water, and either Aristotle held that there are four kinds of causes
or Parmenides thought that only the one exists. (H, T, A, R)
26. Smart believes that minds are brains, and Skinner thinks that inner states are
otiose, unless Descartes argues that the mind and body are distinct. (M, K, D)
27. Either Putnam claims that minds are probabilistic automata, or the Church-
lands deny that there are any minds and Turing believes that machines can
think. (P, C, T)
28. Searle rejects the possibility of artificial intelligence if, and only if, Smart
believes that minds are brains and Turing believes that machines can think.
(E, M, T)
29. Either Putnam doesn’t claim that minds are probabilistic automata and the
Churchlands don’t deny that there are any minds, if Skinner thinks that inner
states are otiose, or Searle rejects the possibility of artificial intelligence and
Descartes doesn’t argue that the mind and body are distinct. (S, P, C, R, D)
30. Either Turing believes that machines can think or Smart doesn’t believe that
minds are brains, and the Churchlands deny that there are any minds. (T, S, C)
EXERCISES 2.1c
Translate each argument into propositional logic using the
letters provided.
D: Descartes defended libertarian free will.

E: Elisabeth complained that free will makes virtue independent of luck.
S: Spinoza defended determinism.
H: Hume developed compatibilism.
1. Descartes defended libertarian free will and Elisabeth complained that free
will makes virtue independent of luck. If Elisabeth complained that free will
makes virtue independent of luck, then Spinoza defended determinism. Hume
developed compatibilism. So, Spinoza defended determinism and Hume de-
veloped compatibilism.
2. Descartes defended libertarian free will if, and only if, Elisabeth complained
that free will makes virtue independent of luck. Descartes does not defend
libertarian free will. If Spinoza defended determinism, then Elisabeth com-
plained that free will makes virtue independent of luck. Therefore, Spinoza
does not defend determinism or Hume developed compatibilism.
3. If Descartes defended libertarian free will, then Elisabeth complained that free
will makes virtue independent of luck. If Elisabeth complained that free will
makes virtue independent of luck, then Hume developed compatibilism. Des-
cartes defending libertarian free will is sufficient for either Hume not develop-
ing compatibilism or Spinoza defending determinism. So, Descartes does not
defend libertarian free will or Spinoza defended determinism.
4. Descartes defended libertarian free will just in case Spinoza defended deter-
minism. If Spinoza defended determinism, then either Hume developed com-
patibilism or Elisabeth complained that free will makes virtue independent of
luck. Descartes defended libertarian free will. Hume does not develop com-
patibilism. Therefore, Descartes defended libertarian free will and Elisabeth
complained that free will makes virtue independent of luck; also Spinoza
defended determinism.
5. Descartes defended libertarian free will. Hume developed compatibilism if
either Descartes defended libertarian free will or Spinoza defended determin-
ism. Elisabeth complained that free will makes virtue independent of luck if
Hume developed compatibilism. Elisabeth complaining that free will makes
virtue independent of luck and Descartes defending libertarian free will are
sufficient conditions for Spinoza not defending determinism. So, Spinoza does
not defend determinism.
A: Annas wrote on Aristotle and friendship.

J: Sorabji works on Aristotle’s commentators.
B: Broadie looks at Aristotle’s ethics in contemporary work.
M: Sim compares Aristotle and Confucius.
6. It is not the case that if Broadie looks at Aristotle’s ethics in contemporary work,
then Sorabji works on Aristotle’s commentators. Sorabji works on Aristotle’s
commentators if Sim compares Aristotle and Confucius. Sim compares Aris-
totle and Confucius unless Annas wrote on Aristotle and friendship. Hence,
Annas wrote on Aristotle and friendship.
7. It is not the case that both Broadie looks at Aristotle’s ethics in contemporary
work and Sim compares Aristotle and Confucius. Broadie does not look at Ar-
istotle’s ethics in contemporary work only if Annas did not write on Aristotle
and friendship. If Sorabji works on Aristotle’s commentators, then both Sim
compares Aristotle and Confucius and Annas wrote on Aristotle and friend-
ship. So, Sorabji does not work on Aristotle’s commentators.
8. Sorabji working on Aristotle’s commentators is a sufficient condition for Sim
comparing Aristotle and Confucius. Sorabji working on Aristotle’s commenta-
tors is a necessary condition for Sim comparing Aristotle and Confucius. An-
nas wrote on Aristotle and friendship. If Broadie looks at Aristotle’s ethics in
contemporary work and Annas wrote on Aristotle and friendship, then Sorabji
does not work on Aristotle’s commentators. Therefore, Sim comparing Aris-
totle and Confucius entails that Broadie does not look at Aristotle’s ethics in
contemporary work.
9. If Sorabji does not work on Aristotle’s commentators, then Broadie does not
look at Aristotle’s ethics in contemporary work. Annas wrote on Aristotle and
friendship and Sim compares Aristotle and Confucius, if Sorabji works on

Aristotle’s commentators. Broadie looks at Aristotle’s ethics in contemporary
work. Annas writing on Aristotle and friendship and Sim comparing Aris
totle and Confucius are necessary and sufficient for both Sorabji working on
Aristotle’s commentators and Annas writing on Aristotle and friendship. So,
Sorabji works on Aristotle’s commentators and Annas writes on Aristotle and
friendship.
10. If Annas does not write on Aristotle and friendship, then Sorabji works on Ar-
istotle’s commentators, and Sim compares Aristotle and Confucius if Broadie
does not look at Aristotle’s ethics in contemporary work. It is not the case that
Annas wrote on Aristotle and friendship and Broadie looks at Aristotle’s ethics
in contemporary work. Sorabji does not work on Aristotle’s commentators. Sim
compares Aristotle and Confucius just in case either Annas wrote on Aristotle
and friendship or Sorabji works on Aristotle’s commentators. If Sorabji works
on Aristotle’s commentators, then Broadie looks at Aristotle’s ethics in con-
temporary work, if, and only if, Sim compares Aristotle and Confucius. Hence,
Broadie not looking at Aristotle’s ethics in contemporary work is necessary and
sufficient for Sim comparing Aristotle and Confucius.
F: Foot developed the trolley problem.

T: Thomson introduced the fat man scenario.
K: Kamm presents the looping trolley case.
11. Foot developed the trolley problem. Thomson introduced the fat man scenario.
Kamm presents the looping trolley case, if Foot developed the trolley problem
and Thomson introduced the fat man scenario. Therefore, Kamm presents the
looping trolley case; however, Thomson introduced the fat man scenario.
12. Foot developing the trolley problem is sufficient for Thomson introducing the
fat man scenario. Kamm presents the looping trolley case if Thomson intro-
duced the fat man scenario. Foot developed the trolley problem. So, Kamm
presents the looping trolley case.
13. Either Foot developed the trolley problem or Thomson introduced the fat man
scenario. Thomson introduces the fat man scenario unless Kamm does not
present the looping trolley case. Foot developing the trolley problem is neces-
sary and sufficient for Kamm presenting the looping trolley case. Either Kamm
presents the looping trolley case or Foot developed the trolley problem, given
that Thomson introduced the fat man scenario. So, Thomson introduced the
fat man scenario.
14. Foot developed the trolley problem unless Thomson does not introduce the fat
man scenario. Kamm presents the looping trolley case, if, and only if, Foot de-
veloping the trolley problem is a necessary condition for Thomson introducing
the fat man scenario. If either Foot developed the trolley problem or Thomson
introduced the fat man scenario, then Kamm does not present the looping trol-
ley case. Hence, Foot did not develop the trolley problem.
15. Either Foot developed the trolley problem or Kamm presents the looping trol-
ley case. Foot developed the trolley problem unless Thomson introduced the
fat man scenario. It is not the case that Foot developed the trolley problem,
and Thomson introduced the fat man scenario. If Thomson introduced the fat
man scenario, then Kamm presents the looping trolley case. Both Foot did not
develop the trolley problem and Thomson introduced the fat man scenario if
Kamm presents the looping trolley case. So, Foot did not develop the trolley
problem and Thomson introduced the fat man scenario.
F: Field is a fictionalist.
B: Bueno is a nominalist.
W: Wright is a neo-logicist.
L: Leng is an instrumentalist.
M: Maddy is a naturalist.
16. If Field is a fictionalist, then Leng is an instrumentalist and Wright is a neo-
logicist. Maddy is a naturalist and Field is a fictionalist. If Wright is a neo-logicist,
then Bueno is a nominalist. So, Bueno is a nominalist.
17. Maddy is a naturalist only if Wright is a neo-logicist. Wright is a neo-logicist
only if Field is a fictionalist and Bueno is a nominalist. Leng is an instrumen-
talist, but Maddy is a naturalist. Hence, Field is a fictionalist and Bueno is a
nominalist.
18. Maddy is a naturalist, if, and only if, Bueno is not a nominalist. Maddy is a
naturalist unless Leng is an instrumentalist. Leng being an instrumentalist is
a sufficient condition for Field being a fictionalist. Wright is a neo-logicist, yet
Bueno is a nominalist. Therefore, Field is a fictionalist.
19. Bueno is a nominalist unless both Wright is a neo-logicist and Maddy is a natu-
ralist. Leng being an instrumentalist is a necessary condition for Bueno not
being a nominalist entailing that Wright is a neo-logicist. Leng being an instru-
mentalist entails that Field is a fictionalist. Bueno is not a nominalist; however,
Maddy is a naturalist. Thus, Field is a fictionalist.
20. Leng is an instrumentalist given that Field is not a fictionalist. If Bueno is a
nominalist, then Leng is not an instrumentalist. Either Field is not a fictionalist
and Bueno is a nominalist, or Maddy is a naturalist. Maddy is a naturalist just
in case Wright is a neo-logicist. Wright is a neo-logicist only if Bueno is not a
nominalist. So, Bueno is not a nominalist.
R: Rawls is a deontologist.
V: Hursthouse is a virtue ethicist.
A: Anscombe defends the doctrine of double effect.
U: Hardin is a utilitarian.
21. If Hardin is a utilitarian, then Rawls is a deontologist. Rawls is a deontologist
only if Hursthouse is not a virtue ethicist. Hardin is a utilitarian. Consequently,
Anscombe defends the doctrine of double effect if Hursthouse is a virtue
ethicist.
22. Hardin is a utilitarian and Rawls is not a deontologist only if both Hursthouse
is a virtue ethicist and Anscombe defends the doctrine of double effect. Hurst-
house is not a virtue ethicist unless Anscombe does not defend the doctrine of
double effect. Hardin is a utilitarian. Hence, Rawls is a deontologist.
23. Hursthouse being a virtue ethicist is a necessary condition for Hardin not be-
ing a utilitarian. Hardin being a utilitarian is a sufficient condition for Rawls
not being a deontologist. Rawls is a deontologist. Anscombe defends the doc-
trine of double effect if Hardin is not a utilitarian. So, Anscombe defends the
doctrine of double effect and Hursthouse is a virtue ethicist.
24. If Anscombe defends the doctrine of double effect, then Hardin is a utilitarian.
Either Hursthouse is a virtue ethicist or Rawls is a deontologist. Hursthouse is
not a virtue ethicist. Rawls is not a deontologist if Hardin is a utilitarian. Con-
sequently, Anscombe does not defend the doctrine of double effect.
25. Hardin is not a utilitarian if, and only if, Rawls is not a deontologist. Rawls is
a deontologist. Anscombe defends the doctrine of double effect if Hardin is
a utilitarian. Hursthouse is a virtue ethicist. If Hursthouse is a virtue ethicist
and Anscombe defends the doctrine of double effect, then it is not the case that
either Hardin is not a utilitarian or Anscombe defends the doctrine of double
effect. So, Hardin is a utilitarian and Anscombe does not defend the doctrine
of double effect.
F: Freire is a liberation theologist.

G: Gutiérrez is influenced by Lascasianism.
V: Vaz integrates logic and pragmatism.
26. Gutiérrez is influenced by Lascasianism if, and only if, Vaz integrates logic and
pragmatism. Vaz does not integrate logic and pragmatism. Freire is a liberation
theologist only if Gutiérrez is influenced by Lascasianism. Thus, Freire is not a
liberation theologist.
27. Freire is a liberation theologist only if Vaz integrates logic and pragmatism.
Gutiérrez is influenced by Lascasianism if Vaz integrates logic and pragmatism.
Gutiérrez is not influenced by Lascasianism. So, Freire is not a liberation

theologist.
28. Freire being a liberation theologist is a sufficient condition for Gutiérrez not
being influenced by Lascasianism, and Vaz integrating logic and pragmatism
entails that Freire is a liberation theologist. Either Freire is a liberation theolo-
gist or Vaz integrates logic and pragmatism. If Gutiérrez is not influenced by
Lascasianism unless Freire is a liberation theologist, then Freire is a liberation
theologist. Vaz integrates logic and pragmatism. Therefore, Freire is a libera-
tion theologist and Vaz integrates logic and pragmatism.
29. Freire being a liberation theologist is a necessary and sufficient condition for
both it not being the case that Gutiérrez is influenced by Lascasianism and Vaz
integrating logic and pragmatism. Gutiérrez is not influenced by Lascasianism.
Vaz integrates logic and pragmatism. If Freire is a liberation theologist, then
Vaz does not integrate logic and pragmatism just in case Gutiérrez is influenced
by Lascasianism. So, it is not the case that Vaz integrates logic and pragmatism
if, and only if, Gutiérrez is influenced by Lascasianism.
30. Freire is a liberation theologist or Gutiérrez is influenced by Lascasianism.
Gutiérrez is influenced by Lascasianism unless Vaz integrates logic and prag-
matism. Gutiérrez is influenced by Lascasianism given that Freire is a libera-
tion theologist. Vaz integrates logic and pragmatism if Freire is a liberation
theologist. Vaz does not integrate logic and pragmatism. So, Gutiérrez is influ-
enced by Lascasianism.
C: Chisholm is a foundationalist.
L: Lehrer is a coherentist.
G: Goldman is a reliabilist.
U: Unger is a skeptic.
Z: Zagzebski is a virtue epistemologist.
31. Zagzebski is a virtue epistemologist if, and only if, either Goldman is a reliabi-
list or Chisholm is a foundationalist. Zagzebski is a virtue epistemologist, but
Unger is a skeptic. Lehrer is a coherentist and Chisholm is not a foundationalist.
Thus, Goldman is a reliabilist.
32. If Unger is a skeptic, then Lehrer is a coherentist and Zagzebski is a virtue epis-
temologist. Chisholm being a foundationalist is sufficient for both Goldman
being a reliabilist and Lehrer not being a coherentist. Chisholm is a foundation-
alist; still, Goldman is a reliabilist. So, Unger is not a skeptic.
33. Chisholm is a foundationalist, or Unger is a skeptic only if Lehrer is a coherent-
ist. Zagzebski is a virtue epistemologist given that Goldman is a reliabilist. If
Goldman is a reliabilist, then Chisholm is not a foundationalist. Goldman is a

reliabilist, yet Unger is a skeptic. So, Lehrer is a coherentist.
34. Chisholm is a foundationalist just in case both Goldman is a reliabilist and Un-
ger is a skeptic. Either it is not the case that Goldman is a reliabilist or Unger is
not a skeptic. If Chisholm is not a foundationalist, then Lehrer is a coherentist.
Lehrer is a coherentist only if Zagzebski is a virtue epistemologist. Therefore,
Zagzebski is a virtue epistemologist.
35. It is not the case that if Zagzebski is a virtue epistemologist, then Chisholm is a
foundationalist. Chisholm being a foundationalist is a necessary condition for
Unger being a skeptic. Lehrer is a coherentist or Unger is a skeptic. Lehrer is a
coherentist if, and only if, Goldman is a reliabilist. If Goldman is a reliabilist,
then Unger is not a skeptic. Hence, Goldman is a reliabilist.
S: Searle is a descriptivist.
K: Kripke is a direct reference theorist.
N: Neale is a metalinguistic descriptivist.
36. Searle is a descriptivist or Neale is a metalinguistic descriptivist. If Neale is a
metalinguistic descriptivist, then Kripke is a direct reference theorist. Searle is
a descriptivist if Kripke is a direct reference theorist. So, Searle is a descriptivist.
37. Either Searle is a descriptivist or Kripke is a direct reference theorist. Kripke is
not a direct reference theorist. Searle is a descriptivist only if Neale is a meta-
linguistic descriptivist. Therefore, Neale is a metalinguistic descriptivist and
Searle is a descriptivist.
38. Searle is a descriptivist given that Neale is a metalinguistic descriptivist. It is
not the case that Neale is a metalinguistic descriptivist unless Kripke is a direct
reference theorist. Either Searle is a descriptivist or Kripke is not a direct refer-
ence theorist. If it is not the case that both Searle is a descriptivist and Kripke
is a direct reference theorist, then Neale is a metalinguistic descriptivist. Thus,
it is not the case that Searle is a descriptivist and Neale is not a metalinguistic
descriptivist.
39. Searle being a descriptivist is sufficient for Kripke being a direct reference
theorist. Kripke being a direct reference theorist is necessary and sufficient for
Neale not being a metalinguistic descriptivist. If it is not the case that Kripke is
a direct reference theorist, then Searle is a descriptivist and Neale is a metalin-
guistic descriptivist. Searle is a descriptivist. So, it is not the case that Neale is a
metalinguistic descriptivist.
40. Either Kripke is a direct reference theorist or Neale is a metalinguistic descrip-
tivist, just in case Searle is not a descriptivist. Neale is not a metalinguistic de-
scriptivist unless Kripke is a direct reference theorist. Kripke is not a direct
reference theorist; still, Searle is a descriptivist. Searle being a descriptivist is a

sufficient condition for it not being the case that either Kripke is a direct refer-
ence theorist or Neale is a metalinguistic descriptivist. Hence, both it is not the
case that Kripke is a direct reference theorist and Neale is not a metalinguistic
descriptivist.
K: Kant defended cosmopolitan right.

H: Hegel criticized Kant’s views.
D: Du Bois integrated pan-Africanism.
A: Appiah emphasizes universality plus difference.
41. Kant defended cosmopolitan right and Appiah emphasizes universality plus
difference, only when Du Bois integrated pan-Africanism. Either Kant de-
fended cosmopolitan right or Hegel criticized Kant’s views. Hegel did not
criticize Kant’s views. So, Appiah emphasizes universality plus difference only
when Du Bois integrated pan-Africanism.
42. Hegel criticized Kant’s views if, and only if, both Appiah emphasizes univer-
sality plus difference and Du Bois integrated pan-Africanism. Hegel criticized
Kant’s views; however, Kant defended cosmopolitan right. If either Du Bois
integrated pan-Africanism or Appiah emphasizes universality plus difference,
then Kant defended cosmopolitan right and Appiah emphasizes universality
plus difference. Therefore, Kant defended cosmopolitan right and Appiah em-
phasizes universality plus difference.
43. If both Kant defended cosmopolitan right and Du Bois integrated pan-
Africanism, then Hegel criticized Kant’s views. Either Appiah emphasizing
universality plus difference or Du Bois not integrating pan-Africanism are
necessary conditions for Hegel criticizing Kant’s views. Kant defended cos-
mopolitan right, but Hegel criticized Kant’s views. Appiah does not emphasize
universality plus difference. Consequently, it is not the case that both Kant de-
fended cosmopolitan right and Du Bois integrated pan-Africanism.
44. Kant defended cosmopolitan right. Hegel criticized Kant’s views. Kant defend-
ing cosmopolitan right and Hegel criticizing Kant’s views are necessary and
sufficient for either Du Bois integrating pan-Africanism or Appiah empha-
sizing universality plus difference. Du Bois did not integrate pan-Africanism.
Thus, Appiah emphasizes universality plus difference.
45. Hegel did not criticize Kant’s views. If Kant defended cosmopolitan right, then
Hegel criticized Kant’s views. Either Kant defended cosmopolitan right or
Du Bois integrated pan-Africanism. Du Bois integrated pan-Africanism just
in case Appiah emphasizes universality plus difference. So, Appiah emphasizes
universality plus difference and Hegel didn’t criticize Kant’s views.
EXERCISES 2.1d
Interpret the following sentences of propositional logic using
the given translation key. Strive for elegance in your English
sentences.
A: Willa teaches English.

B: Willa teaches history.
C: Willa teaches in a middle school.
D: Willa has a master’s degree.
E: Javier teaches English.
F: Ahmed teaches English.
1. C ⊃ (B ∨ A)
2. A ∙ ∼B
3. A ⊃ (E ∙ F)
4. ∼D ⊃ ∼(A ∨ B)
5. ∼(E ∨ F) ⊃ B
G: Suneel majors in philosophy.

H: Suneel majors in physics.
I: Suneel majors in psychology.
J: Suneel is a college student.
K: Marjorie is a philosophy professor.
L: Marjorie teaches logic.
6. (K ∙ L) ⊃ G
7. J ⊃ (G ∙ I)
8. ∼(G ∙ I) ∨ ∼H
9. ∼(K ∙ L) ⊃ (I ∨ H)
10. G ≡ ( J ∙ K)
M: Carolina plants vegetables.

N: Carolina plants flowers.
O: Carolina has a garden.
P: Carolina’s plants grow.
Q: Carolina sprays her plants with pesticides.
R: Deer eat the plants.
11. O ⊃ (M ∙ N)
12. (O ∙ P) ⊃ R
2 . 2 : S y nta x of P L : W ffs an d Ma i n O perators 4 3
13. [(N ∙ P) ∙ Q ] ⊃ ∼R
14. [(M ∨ N) ∙ P] ⊃ (Q ∨ R)
15. ∼P ≡ ∼Q
2.2: SYNTA X OF PL: WFFS AND MAIN OPERATORS

To this point, we have been rather casual about the language of propositional logic. I will
now be more rigorous in setting up the syntax of our first formal language, PL, one of The syntaxof a logical
many different possible languages for propositional logic. To specify a formal language, language is the definition
of its vocabulary
we start with a list of the vocabulary of the language, its symbols. For our purposes in
and rules for making
this chapter and the next, the following thirty-seven different symbols will suffice. formulas.
Capital English letters, used as propositional variables A . . . Z
Five operators ∼, ∙, ∨, ⊃, ≡
Punctuation (, ), [, ], {, }
Notice that PL contains only twenty-six propositional variables. More flexible sys-
tems of propositional logic can accommodate infinitely many propositional variables.
One way to include more propositional variables is by including the prime symbol
among our vocabulary and allowing iterated repetitions of it.
P, P′, P″, P‴, P⁗, P⁗′ . . .
Since we won’t need so many variables, we will just use English letters with no
primes. We saw the five operators in the previous section. The punctuation comes in
pairs and helps us to avoid ambiguity.
Once we have specified the vocabulary of a formal language, we can combine our
symbols into formulas. Some ways of combining the symbols are acceptable, while
others are not. Consider the two combinations of English words 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.
2.2.1 Sky blue is the.
2.2.2 The sky is blue.
2.2.2 is a well-formed English expression, a grammatical sentence, and 2.2.1 is not,
even for Yoda. Analogously, in our language of propositional logic, only some strings
of symbols are well formed. We call strings of logical symbols that are constructed
properly well-formed formulas, or wffs, or just formulas (since any string must be A wff is a well-formed
well formed to be a formula). ‘Wff’ is pronounced like ‘woof ’, as if you are barking. formula of a formal
language.
2.2.3 and 2.2.4 are wffs, while 2.2.5 and 2.2.6 are not wffs.
2.2.3 P ∙ Q
2.2.4 (∼P ∨ Q) ⊃ ∼R
2.2.5 ∙P Q
2.2.6 Pq ∨ R∼
In English, there are indefinitely many grammatical sentences, composed of a large,
though finite, stock of words and grammatical conjunctions. In propositional logic,
there are infinitely many wffs, constructed by applying a simple set of rules, called
Formation rulessay formation rules.
how to combine the
vocabulary of a language
Formation Rules for Wffs of PL
into well-formed PL1. A single capital English letter is a wff.
formulas. PL2. If α is a wff, so is ∼α.
PL3. If α and β are wffs, then so are:
(α ∙ β)
(α ∨ β)
(α ⊃ β)
(α ≡ β)
PL4. These are the only ways to make wffs.
An atomic formulais The simplest wffs, which we call atomic, are formed by a single use of PL1. Com-
formed by a single use of plex wffs are composed of atomic wffs, using any of the other rules. The Greek letters
PL1. All other wffs are α and β in the formation rules are metalinguistic variables; they can be replaced by
complex formulas. any wffs of the object language to form more complex wffs.
We add the punctuation in PL3 to group any pair of wffs combined using a binary
operator. By convention, we drop the outermost punctuation of a wff. That punctua-
tion must be replaced when a shorter formula is included in a more complex formula.
As wffs get longer, it can become difficult to distinguish nested punctuation. For read-
ability, I use square brackets, [ and ], when I need a second set of parentheses, and
braces, { and }, when I need a third. The three kinds of punctuation are interchangeable.
2.2.7 provides an example of how one might construct a complex wff using the for-
mation rules, starting with simple letters.
2.2.7 W By PL 1
X By PL 1
∼W By PL2
∼W ∙ X By PL3, and the convention for dropping brackets
(∼W ∙ X) ≡ X By PL3, putting the brackets back
∼[(∼W ∙ X) ≡ X] By PL2
The order of construction of a wff is especially important because it helps us de-
The last operator added termine the main operator. The main operator of a wff is important because we
to a wff according to the characterize wffs by their main operators: negations, conjunctions, disjunctions, con-
formation rules is called ditionals, or biconditionals. In the next few sections, we will learn how to character-
the main operator. ize wffs further.
We can determine the main operator of any wff of PL by analyzing the formation of
that wff, as I do at 2.2.8.
2.2.8 (∼M ⊃ P) ∙ (∼N ⊃ Q)
‘M’, ‘P’, ‘N’, and ‘Q’ are all wffs, by PL1.
‘∼M’ and ‘∼N’ are wffs by PL2.
‘(∼M ⊃ P)’ and ‘(∼N ⊃ Q)’ are then wffs by PL3.
Finally, the whole formula is a wff by PL3 and the convention for dropping
brackets.
2 . 2 : S y nta x of P L : W ffs an d Ma i n O perators 4 5
As I mentioned in the previous section, I use commas and semicolons in English

to disambiguate ambiguous sentences; these will often appear at the main operators.
Also, given our convention for dropping brackets, main operators are usually not en-
closed in brackets.
Summary
In this section, we examined the syntax of the language PL, its vocabulary and rules
for constructing well-formed formulas. We saw that the main operator of a complex
formula is the final operator added when the formula is built according to the forma-
tion rules. We identify formulas with their main operators, and, as we leave syntax to
study the semantics of PL in the next three sections, we will classify formulas accord-
ing to the truth conditions at their main operators.
KEEP IN MIND
We can use the formation rules to distinguish wffs from non-well-formed strings.
We can also use the formation rules to identify the main operator of any wff.
EXERCISES 2.2
Are the following formulas wffs? If so, which operator is the
main operator? (For the purposes of this exercise, consider
formulas without their outermost punctuation as well formed,
according to the convention mentioned in this section.)
1. C ⊃ D ∙ E 11. [(Q ⊃ R) ∨(S ∨ ∼T)] ≡ (T ∙ Q ∨ R)

2. (T ∙ V)∼W 12. (W ∨ X ∙ ∼Y) ⊃ [Z ≡ (Y ∨ W)]
3. ( J ∨ ∼J) ⊃ K 13. (D ∨ E) ⊃ ∼(E ∙ F)
4. ∼[(A ∨ B) ⊃ C] 14. [G ⊃ (H ∙ I)] ∨ ∼[I ≡ (H ∨ G)]
5. ∼(A ∙ B) ⊃ C ∨ D 15. (P ∙ Q ∨ R) ⊃ ∼S
6. ∼D ⊃ E ≡ C 16. ∼(K ⊃ N) ⊃ (L ∙ M)
7. ∼[A ∙ B ⊃ D ∨ E] 17. ∼K [M ≡ (N ∙ O)]
8. ∼Z ⊃ X ∙ Y 18. (D ∨ E) ≡ ∼[(F ⊃ G) ∙ H)]
9. (A ∨ B) ∙ C 19. [D ⊃ (E ∙ F)] ∨ (F ≡ D)
10. M ≡ [(L ∙ N) ⊃ ∼O ∨ P] 20. (S ∨ L) ⊃ C ⊃ (Q ∙ R)
21. (X ∙ Y∼Z) ⊃ [(F ∨ ∼G) ≡ ∼H]

22. ∼[ J ⊃ (K ∨ ∼L)] ≡ [(L ∙ M) ≡ ∼K]
23. ∼{[N ≡ (∼O ⊃ P)] ∨ [∼P ∙ (Q ∨ ∼O)]}
24. ∼{(P ∙ Q ) ⊃ [(P ∙ R) ∨(R ⊃ Q )]}
25. [(T ∨ U) ∙ (U ∨ V)] ⊃ [(V ∙ W) ∨ (T ∙ W)]
2.3: SEMANTICS OF PL: TRUTH FUNCTIONS

When constructing a formal system of logic, we start with a language like PL. In sec-
tion 2.2, I provided formation rules, or a syntax, for that language. Once we have
specified the language, there are two ways that we can use it. First, we can interpret
The semanticsof a formal the language, providing a semantics for it, which tells us how to understand the sym-
language are the rules for bols and formulas.
interpreting the symbols
and formulas of the
Second, we can use the language in a deductive system by introducing inference
language. rules. Both the semantics and the inference rules will help us characterize logical con-
sequence: what follows from what.
We will study inference rules in chapter 3. In this section, we will look at the inter-
pretations, or semantics, of our language. In the remainder of chapter 2, we will use
our semantics to characterize different kinds of propositions and provide a formal
test for the validity of an argument.
Informally, we can interpret our propositional variables as particular English prop-
ositions. For example, we might take ‘P’ to stand for ‘It is raining in Clinton, NY’ and
‘Q’ to stand for ‘It is snowing in Clinton, NY’. Then ‘P ∙ Q’ would stand for ‘It is both
raining and snowing in Clinton, NY’.
More formally, and more generally, in PL and all standard propositional logics, we
In our bivalent logic, interpret propositional variables by assigning truth values to them. The truth value
every statement is either of a wff is a characteristic of the proposition, whether true, false, or something else.
true or false, and not
In nearly all of this book, we use a bivalent logic, on which every statement is either
both. True and false are
called truth values. true or false, but not both. Other systems of logic use three or more truth values, with
a third truth value of unknown, or undetermined, or indeterminate.
We have carefully defined our language PL, and it does not contain tools for do-
ing the interpretation. To interpret our formal language, we use a metalanguage. Our
metalanguage will be English, supplemented with some specific symbols used with
specific intents. For example, we will use “1” to represent truth and “0” to represent
falsity. We specify rules of our metalanguage less formally than we do the rules of our
object language.
2 . 3 : S e m ant i cs of P L : T r u t h F u nct i ons 4 7
We will start our study of the semantics of propositional logic by looking at how
we calculate the truth value of a complex proposition on the basis of the truth values
of its component sentences. We can calculate the truth value of any complex proposi-
tion using the truth values of its component propositions and the basic truth tables
for each propositional operator, which we will see shortly. The fact that the truth
values of complex propositions are completely determined by the truth values of the
component propositions is called truth-functional compositionality, a basic presup-
position of our logic. Consider a complex proposition like 2.3.1 and its translation
into PL 2.3.2.
2.3.1 If either the Beatles made The White Album or Jay-Z didn’t make
The Black Album, then Danger Mouse did not make The Grey Album
or Jay-Z did make The Black Album.
2.3.2 (W ∨ ∼J) ⊃ (∼G ∙ J)
We can easily determine the truth values of the component, atomic propositions,
W, J, and G. In this case, all of the atomic propositions are true: the Beatles made The
White Album, Jay-Z made The Black Album, and Danger Mouse made The Grey Album.
But what is the truth value of the whole complex proposition 2.3.1? The truth value of a
To determine the truth value of a complex proposition, we combine the truth complex proposition is
the truth value of its main
values of the component propositions using rules for each operator. These rules are
operator.
summarized in basic truth tables, one for each propositional operator. The basic
truth table for each logical operator defines the operator by showing the truth value The basic truth table
of the operation, given any possible distribution of truth values of the component for each logical operator
propositions. shows the truth value of
a complex proposition,
Once we combine these truth tables, our semantics, with our translations of natural given the truth values
languages into PL, can cause certain problems to arise. Not all of our natural-lan- of its component
guage sentences conform precisely to the semantics given by the truth tables. Diffi- propositions.
culties arise for the conditional, in particular. In this section, we’ll look at the details
of the truth tables for each operator before returning to 2.3.1 to see how to use the
basic truth tables.
Negation
Negation is the simplest truth function. When a statement is true, its negation is false;
when a statement is false, its negation is true.
2.3.3 Two plus two is four.
2.3.4 Two plus two is not four.
2.3.5 Two plus two is five.
2.3.6 Two plus two is not five.
2.3.3 is true, and its negation, 2.3.4, is false. 2.3.5 is false, and its negation, 2.3.6,
is true.
We generalize these results using the basic truth table for negation. In the first row
of the truth table, we have an operator, the tilde, and a Greek metalinguistic letter,
α. The column under the ‘α’ represents all possible assignments of truth values to a
single proposition. We could use ‘T’ for ‘true’ and ‘F’ for ‘false’ in the truth table. I use
‘1’ for true and ‘0’ for false in this book, largely because ‘1’s and ‘0’s are very easy to tell
apart. The column under the ‘∼’ represents the values of the negation of the proposi-
tion in each row.
∼ α
0 1 Basic Truth Table for Negation
1 0
The truth table for a complex proposition containing one variable has two lines,
since there are only two possible assignments of truth values. This truth table says
that if the value of a propositional variable is true, the value of its negation is false, and
if the value of a propositional variable is false, the value of its negation is true.
Conjunction
Conjunctions are true only when both conjuncts are true; otherwise they are false.
2.3.7 Esmeralda likes logic and metaphysics.
2.3.7 is true if ‘Esmeralda likes logic’ is true and ‘Esmeralda likes metaphysics’ is
true. It is false otherwise. Note that we need four lines to explore all the possibilities
of combinations of truth values of two propositions: when both are true, when one is
true and the other is false (and vice versa), and when both are false.
α ∙ β
1 1 1
1 0 0 Basic Truth Table for Conjunction
0 0 1
0 0 0
Our basic truth tables all have either two lines or four lines, since all of our opera-
tors use either one or two variables. Truth tables for more-complex sentences can be
indefinitely long.
Disjunction
Disjunctions are false only when both disjuncts are false.
2.3.8 Kareem will get an A in either history or physics.
We’ll take 2.3.8 as expressing our optimism that Kareem will do very well in at least
one of the named courses. If he gets an A in neither course, then our optimism will
have proven to be unfounded; our statement will have been false. But as long as he
gets an A in either history or physics, the statement will have been shown to be true.
And if he gets an A in both of those classes, our optimism will have been shown to be
more than called for.
This interpretation of the ‘∨’ is slightly contentious, and is called inclusive disjunc-
tion. On inclusive disjunction, 2.3.8 is false only when both component statements
are false.
α ∨ β
1 1 1
1 1 0 Basic Truth Table for Disjunction
0 1 1
0 0 0
There is an alternative use of ‘or’ on which a disjunction is also false when both com-
ponent propositions are true, which we can call exclusive disjunction. 2.3.9 is most
naturally interpreted as using an exclusive disjunction.
2.3.9 You may have either soup or salad.
Uses of 2.3.9 are usually made to express that one may have either soup or salad, but
not both. Thus it seems that some uses of ‘or’ are inclusive and some uses of ‘or’ are
exclusive.
One way to manage the problem of the different senses of ‘or’ would be to have two
different logical operators, one for inclusive ‘or’ and one for exclusive ‘or.’ This would
give us more operators than we need, since we can define either one in terms of the
other, along with other logical operators. So, it is mainly arbitrary whether we take
inclusive or exclusive disjunction as the semantics of ‘∨’. We just need to be clear
about what we mean when we are regimenting sentences into our formal logic. We
will thus (traditionally, but also sort of arbitrarily) use inclusive disjunction, the ∨, to
translate ‘or’.
Material Implication
To interpret English-language conditionals, we use what is called the material inter-
pretation on which a conditional is false only when the antecedent is true and the
consequent is false.
α ⊃ β
1 1 1
1 0 0 Basic Truth Table for Material Implication
0 1 1
0 1 0
To understand the material interpretation, consider when 2.3.10 will be falsified.

2.3.10 If you paint my house, then I will give you five thousand dollars.
It is true in the first row, when both the antecedent and consequent are true: you
paint my house and I give you five thousand dollars. It is false in the second row, when
the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. You’ve painted my house, but I
don’t pay you.
The third and fourth rows of the truth table for the conditional, when the anteced-
ent is false, are controversial. Notice that in those two cases, when you don’t paint my
house, 2.3.10 is unfalsified whether or not I give you five thousand dollars. The only
case in which 2.3.10 is clearly false is when you paint my house and I fail to give you
the money; that’s the second row of the truth table for ‘⊃’. Since we have only two
truth values, and we don’t want to call the statement false if you haven’t painted my
house, we seem forced to call the sentence true in the last two rows.
The conditional is the trickiest operator, in large part because many of our uses of
‘if . . . then . . .’ are not truth-functional. In other words, the truth value of many com-
plex sentences that use conditionals are not exclusively dependent on the truth values
of their components.
Imagine that I have a sugar cube, a hunk of steel, and a pot of boiling water.
2.3.11 If this sugar cube is dropped into a pot of boiling water, then it will
dissolve.
2.3.12 If this hunk of steel is dropped into a pot of boiling water, then it
will dissolve.
We naturally believe that 2.3.11 is true and 2.3.12 is false. But there is no logical
difference between the sentences. They are both conditionals. The difference in our
estimation of the two sentences depends on the laws of physics; sugar dissolves in
boiling water while steel does not. That is not a logical difference, though, and the two
sentences have the same truth conditions as far as ⊃ is concerned.
Some uses of conditionals in English are truth-functional, and we are going to
use ‘⊃’ to regiment conditionals into PL despite worries about sentences like 2.3.11
and 2.3.12.
The Biconditional
A biconditional is true if the component statements share the same truth value. It is
false if the components have different values.
α ≡ β
1 1 1
1 0 0 Basic Truth Table for the Biconditional
0 0 1
0 1 0
2.3.13 Supplies rise if, and only if, demand falls.

If supplies rise and demand falls, 2.3.13 is true. If supplies don’t rise and demand
doesn’t fall, then 2.3.13 is true as well. But if one happens without the other, then
2.3.13 is false.
The biconditional is thus really a shorthand for two material conditionals: if α then
β and if β then α. The result is that ≡ works like an equals sign for propositions: it will
be true if, and only if, the truth values of the components are the same.
Truth Values of Complex Propositions

The basic truth tables can be used to evaluate the truth value of any proposition of any
complexity, given truth values for all the simple component propositions. Remember,
the truth value of a complex proposition is the truth value of its main operator.
Method for Determining the Truth Value of a Proposition

1. Assign truth values to each atomic formula.
2. Evaluate any negations of those formulas.
3. Evaluate any binary operators for which both values are known.
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3, working inside out, until you reach the main operator.
Let’s see how to use this method with the example 2.3.14.
2.3.14 (A ∨ X) ∙ ∼B
Let’s arbitrarily assume that A and B are true and X is false. If we were starting with
an English sentence, we might be able to determine appropriate truth values of the
component sentences.
First, assign the assumed values to the atomic formulas A, B, and X.
(A ∨ X) ∙ ∼ B
1 0 1
Next, evaluate the negation of B.
(A ∨ X) ∙ ∼ B
1 0 0 1
Since we know the values of the disjuncts, we can next evaluate the disjunction.
(A ∨ X) ∙ ∼ B
1 1 0 0 1
Finally, we can evaluate the main operator, the conjunction.
(A ∨ X) ∙ ∼ B
1 1 0 0 0 1
2.3.14 is thus false for the values we arbitrarily assumed.

Let’s return to 2.3.1. We already regimented it as 2.3.2. Now we can assign the val-
ues we know to W, J, and G.
(W ∨ ∼ J) ⊃ (∼ G ∙ J)
1 1 1 1
Then we can use our method for determining the truth value of a complex proposi-
tion, first evaluating the negations.
(W ∨ ∼ J) ⊃ (∼ G ∙ J)
1 0 1 0 1 1
Now we can evaluate the disjunction on the left and the conjunction on the right.
(W ∨ ∼ J) ⊃ (∼ G ∙ J)
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Finally, we can find the truth value of the main operator, the horseshoe.
(W ∨ ∼ J) ⊃ (∼ G ∙ J)
1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
2.3.1 and 2.3.2 are thus false.

2.3.15 and 2.3.16 are a bit more complex.
2.3.15 A ⊃ (∼X ∙ ∼Y) where A is true and X and Y are false.
Start by assigning truth values to the atomic propositions.
A ⊃ (∼ X ∙ ∼ Y)
1 0 0
Next, evaluate the negations of X and Y.
A ⊃ (∼ X ∙ ∼ Y)
1 1 0 1 0
Then the conjunction.
A ⊃ (∼ X ∙ ∼ Y)
1 1 0 1 1 0
Finally, the conditional, the main operator.
A ⊃ (∼ X ∙ ∼ Y)
1 1 1 0 1 1 0
2.3.15 is thus true for our assumed values.

2.3.16 [(A ∙ B) ⊃ Y] ⊃ [A ⊃ (C ⊃ Z)] where A, B, and C are true; Y
and Z are false.
First the atomic propositions.
[(A ∙ B) ⊃ Y] ⊃ [A ⊃ (C ⊃ Z)]
1 1 0 1 1 0
Next, the formulas in parentheses.
[(A ∙ B) ⊃ Y] ⊃ [A ⊃ (C ⊃ Z)]
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
Now we can evaluate both the antecedent and the consequent of the main operator.
[(A ∙ B) ⊃ Y] ⊃ [A ⊃ (C ⊃ Z)]
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
Finally, the main operator.
[(A ∙ B) ⊃ Y] ⊃ [A ⊃ (C ⊃ Z)]
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
2.3.16 is true for the given assignments of truth values.
Complex Propositions with Unknown Truth Values

We have seen how to calculate the truth value of a complex proposition when the
truth values of the components are known. But sometimes you don’t know truth val-
ues of one or more component variable. It may still be possible to determine the truth
value of the complex proposition. If the truth values of the whole proposition are the
same whatever values we assign to the unknown propositions, then the statement
has that truth value. If the values come out different in different cases, then the truth
value of the complex statement is really unknown.
Let’s look at a few of these cases, and suppose that A, B, C are true; X, Y, Z are false;
and P and Q are unknown for the remainder of the section. We’ll start with 2.3.17.
2.3.17 P ∙ A
If P were true, then the truth value of 2.3.17 would be true.
P ∙ A
1 1 1
If P were false, then 2.3.17 would be false.
P ∙ A
0 0 1
Since the truth value of 2.3.17 depends on the truth value of P, it too is unknown.
In contrast, 2.3.18 has a determinable truth value even though one of the atomic
propositions in it is unknown.
2.3.18 P ∨ A
If P is true, then 2.3.18 is true.
P ∨ A
1 1 1
If P is false, then 2.3.18 is true too!
P ∨ A
0 1 1
The truth value of 2.3.18 is true in both cases. In our bivalent logic, these are the
only cases we have to consider. Thus, the value of that statement is true, even though
we didn’t know the truth value of one of its component propositions.
We have seen that the truth value of a complex proposition containing a component
proposition with an unknown truth value may be unknown and it may be true. Some-
times the truth value of such a complex proposition will come out false, as in 2.3.19.
2.3.19 Q ∙ Y
If Q is true, then 2.3.19 is false.
Q ∙ Y
1 0 0
If Q is false, then 2.3.19 is also false.
Q ∙ Y
0 0 0
Since the truth value of the complex proposition is false in both cases, the value of
2.3.19 is false.
Lastly, we can have more than one unknown in a statement. If there are two un-
knowns, we must consider four cases: when both propositions are true; when one is
true and the other is false; the reverse case, when the first is false and the second is
true; and when both are false, as in 2.3.20.
2.3.20 (A ⊃ P) ∨ (Q ⊃ A) where A is true.
(A ⊃ P) ∨ (Q ⊃ A)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 P and Q are true
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 P is true and Q is false
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 P is false and Q is true
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 P and Q are false
Since all possible substitutions of truth values for ‘P’ and ‘Q’ in 2.3.20 yield a true
statement, the statement itself is true.
Summary
In this section I introduced all of the basic truth tables, one for each of the five propo-
sitional operators. The basic truth tables are mostly intuitive, and so not very difficult
to reconstruct if you forget one or other of the lines. Remember, especially, that our
disjunction is inclusive, and the material conditional is false only in the second row,
when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false.
The basic truth tables are useful in evaluating the truth value of a complex proposi-
tion on the basis of the truth values of the component, atomic propositions. We can
even sometimes evaluate propositions for which we do not know all of the truth val-
ues of the atomic propositions.
KEEP IN MIND
The five basic truth tables give the semantics of PL.

We interpret propositional variables by assigning truth values to them.
The truth value of a complex proposition is the truth value of its main operator.
The negation of a statement is the opposite truth value of the statement.
The conjunction of two statements is true only when both conjuncts are true.
The disjunction of two statements is false only when both disjuncts are false.
The material conditional is false only when the antecedent is true and the consequent is
false.
The biconditional is true if the component statements share the same truth value.
The basic truth tables can be used to evaluate the truth value of any proposition built using
the same formation rules.
EXERCISES 2.3a
Assume A, B, C are true and X, Y, Z are false. Evaluate the
truth values of each complex expression.
1. X ∨ Z 11. X ∙ [A ⊃ (Y ∨ Z)]
2. A ∙ ∼C 12. (B ∨ X) ⊃ ∼(Y ≡ C)
3. ∼C ⊃ Z 13. (∼B ⊃ Z) ∙ (A ≡ X)
4. (A ∙ Y) ∨ B 14. ∼(A ≡ C) ⊃ (X ∙ Y)
5. (Z ≡ ∼B) ⊃ X 15. ∼(A ∨ Z) ≡ (X ∙ Y)
6. (A ⊃ B) ∨ ∼X 16. (C ⊃ Y) ∨ [(A ∙ B) ⊃ ∼X]
7. (Z ∙ ∼X) ⊃ (B ∨ Y) 17. [(C ∙ Y) ∨ Z] ≡[∼B ∨ (X ⊃ Y)]
8. (B ≡ C) ⊃ ( A ⊃ X) 18. [(X ∙ A) ⊃ B] ≡[C ∨ ∼(Z ⊃ Y)]
9. (A ∙ Z) ∨ ∼(X ∙ C) 19. [(A ∙ B) ≡ X] ⊃ [(∼Z ∙ C) ∨ Y]
10. (Z ∙ A) ∨ (∼C ∙ Y) 20. [X ⊃ (A ∨ B)] ≡ [(X ∙ Y) ∨ (Z ∙ C)]
EXERCISES 2.3b
Assume A, B, C are true; X, Y, Z are false; and P and Q are
unknown. Evaluate the truth value of each complex
expression.
1. Q ∙ ∼Q 11. ∼[(P ∙ Z) ⊃ Y] ≡ (Z ∨ X)
2. Q ⊃ B 12. [Q ∙ (B ≡ C)] ∙ ∼Y
3. P ∙ ∼C 13. [(A ∨ X) ⊃ (Y ∙ B)] ≡ ∼Q
4. P ≡ ∼P 14. ∼(A ∨ P) ≡ [(B ∙ X) ⊃ Y]
5. P ∨ (X ∙ Y) 15. ∼P ⊃ [∼(A ∙ B) ∨ (Z ∙ Y)]
6. ∼(Z ∙ A) ⊃ P 16. [∼Z ∙ (P ⊃ A)] ∨ [X ≡ ∼(B ⊃ Y)]
7. Q ∨ ∼(Z ∙ A) 17. ∼(X ∨ C) ∙[(P ⊃ B) ⊃ (Y ∙ Z)]
8. (P ⊃ A) ∙ (Z ∨ B) 18. [∼P ⊃ (A ∨ X)] ⊃ [(B ∨ P) ≡ (Y ⊃ Z)]
9. (P ≡ B) ∨ (Y ⊃ C) 19. [(P ∙ A) ∨ ∼B] ≡{∼A ⊃ [(C ∨ X) ∙ Z]}
10. [(Z ⊃ C) ∙ P] ≡ (A ∨ X) 20. [(Q ∨ ∼C) ⊃ Q ] ≡ ∼[Q ≡ (A ∙ ∼Q )]
EXERCISES 2.3c
As in Exercises 2.3b, assume A, B, C are true; X, Y, Z are
false; and P and Q are unknown. Evaluate the truth value of
each complex expression.
1. Q ⊃ (A ∨ P)
2. (P ⊃ C) ≡ [(B ∨ Q ) ⊃ X]
3. (A ∙ Q ) ∙ (X ∙ P)
4. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ (X ∨ A)
5. (Q ⊃ P) ∙(Z ∨ ∼Y)
6. (P ∙ Z) ⊃ (Q ∨ A)
7. (P ∨ Q ) ∨ (∼A ≡ Y)
8. (P ∙ Z) ⊃ ∼(Q ≡ C)
9. ∼(Y ∨ Q ) ∨ [(P ⊃ B) ≡ A]
10. (X ∙ P) ≡ [(Q ∨ B) ⊃ (Z ≡ A)]
11. ∼{[P ⊃ (Q ⊃ C)] ∙ Z}
2 . 4 : T r u t h T ables 5 9
12. (Q ∙ P) ∨ (∼Q ∨ ∼P)

13. [(Q ⊃ (P ⊃ Z)] ∨ ∼(∼X ∨ C)
14. {Z ⊃ [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ A)]} ⊃ (X ∙ Q )
15. [(Q ⊃ B) ∙ (X ∨ ∼Z)] ≡ [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ ∼Y)]
16. ∼{[(P ⊃ A) ∙ X] ≡ [(Q ∨ ∼Q ) ⊃ ∼B]}
17. ∼{[Q ⊃ (B ≡ (A ∨ P)]} ∙ {[∼C ⊃ (Z ≡ Y) ∨ (X ∙ P)]}
18. [Q ∨ (X ⊃ P)] ≡ [A ∙ ∼(Z ⊃ Q )]
19. [Z ∨ (X ∙ Q )] ≡ ∼[(Y ⊃ P) ⊃ Z]
20. [A ⊃ (Z ∙ ∼P)] ∨ [(Q ≡ X) ⊃ C]
2.4: TRUTH TABLES

As we saw in the previous section, when we are given a complex proposition and we
know the truth values of the component propositions, we can calculate the truth
value of the longer statement. When we are given a complex proposition and some of
the truth values of the component propositions are unknown, sometimes we can still
determine the truth value of the complex proposition. But sometimes the best we can
do is to describe how the truth value of the whole complex proposition varies with the
truth value of its parts. To do so, we construct truth tables for complex propositions A truth tableshows the
using the basic truth tables as guides. We can construct truth tables for any proposi- truth value for a complex
proposition given
tion, with any number of component propositions of unknown truth values. Such
any truth values of its
truth tables summarize the distributions of all possible truth values of the complex component propositions.
propositions.
I start this section by describing the method of constructing truth tables for com-
plex propositions. To use this method comfortably, you should have memorized the
basic truth tables and mastered their applications. Then, in the next section, we’ll use
the method to identify some interesting properties of propositions and to describe
some relations among propositions. In the following section, we will use truth tables
to distinguish valid from invalid arguments, the central task of this book.
We construct truth tables for wffs of PL in three steps.
Method for Constructing Truth Tables

Step 1. Determine how many rows are needed.
Step 2. Assign truth values to the component variables.
Step 3. Working from the inside out according to the order of construction, evaluate
each operator, placing each column directly beneath that operator until you
reach the main operator and complete the table.
For step 1, the number of rows of a truth table is a function of the number of vari-
ables in the wff. With one propositional variable, we need only two rows, as in the
basic truth table for negation: one for when the variable is true and one for when it
is false. With two propositional variables, we need four rows, as in the basic truth
tables for all the binary operators. Each additional variable doubles the number of
rows needed: the number of rows needed for the simpler table when the new variable
is true and the same number again when the new variable is false.
Determining the Size of a Truth Table
1 variable: 2 rows
2 variables: 4 rows
3 variables: 8 rows
4 variables: 16 rows
n variables: 2 n rows
For step 2, it is conventional and useful to start truth tables in a systematic way,
assigning a set of truth values that depends on the size of the truth table to the first
variable in the proposition, a different set to the next variable, and so on. These con-
ventions are constrained by two requirements:
• The truth table must contain every different combination of truth values of the
component propositions.
• The assignments of truth values to any particular propositional variable must
be consistent within the truth table: if the third row under the variable ‘P’ has
a 1 in one column, the third row under the variable ‘P’ must have a 1 in every
column.
Our conventional method for constructing truth tables, which I’ll describe in the
remainder of this section, can be adapted to construct a truth table for any wff of PL.
First, I’ll introduce columns on the left of the table, one for each variable in the wff.
Then, I’ll use a conventional method for assigning truth values to each variable. The
method is the same for each wff with the same number of variables and expands in a
natural way for longer formulas. There are other ways of presenting the same infor-
mation, the truth conditions for any proposition, but I’ll use this one method consis-
tently throughout the book.
For wffs with only one variable, we only need to consider what happens when that
variable is true and when it is false: two rows. We’ll consider what happens when
the variable is true in the first row and what happens when it is false in the second row.
Here is a two-row truth table, for ‘P ⊃ P’:
P P ⊃ P
1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0
2 . 4 : T r u t h T ables 6 1
Notice that the left side of the truth table contains a column for the only variable,
‘P’. The values in that column are exactly the same under every instance of ‘P’ in the
table. The column under the ⊃, the main operator, contains the values of the whole
wff, which we calculate using the values of ‘P’ and the basic truth table for the material
conditional.
Also notice that, to make things a little easier to read, I highlight the values of the
main operator. Some students like to use highlighters for the values of the main op-
erator, or even different colored highlighters for different columns as one constructs
the table.
Below example 2.4.1 is the beginning of a four-row truth table.
2.4.1 (P ∨ ∼Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ P)
P Q (P ∨ ∼ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ P)
1 1
1 0
0 1
0 0
Since the wff at 2.4.1 has two variables, the left side of the truth table has two col-
umns. The assignments of truth values to the variables ‘P’ and ‘Q’ use the conven-
tional method I mentioned; it would be good to memorize this pair of columns. All
four-row truth tables ordinarily begin with this set of assignments, though it does not
matter which variable gets which column at first.
To continue to complete the truth table for 2.4.1, we copy the values from the left
side of the truth table to columns under each propositional variable on the right side,
making sure to assign the same values to any particular variable each time it occurs.
P Q (P ∨ ∼ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ P)
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
To complete the truth table, we have to fill in the column under the main operator,
the conjunction. We work toward it in the order described in the formation rules of
section 2.2, first evaluating the negations of any formulas whose columns are already
complete, then evaluating binary operators whose two sides are complete.
Let’s continue our example 2.4.1. First complete the column under the tilde.
P Q (P ∨ ∼ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ P)
1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Then we can complete the columns under the disjunction and the conditional.
P Q (P ∨ ∼ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ P)
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
Finally, we can complete the truth table by completing the column under the main
operator, the conjunction, using the columns for the disjunction and the conditional.
2 . 4 : T r u t h T ables 6 3
P Q (P ∨ ∼ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ P)
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
Thus, 2.4.1 is false when P is false and Q is true, and true otherwise.
Ordinarily, we write out the truth table only once, as in the last table in this dem-
onstration. Some people choose not to use the left side of the truth table, just assign-
ing values to variables directly. This has the short-term advantage of making your
truth tables shorter, but the long-term disadvantage of making them more difficult
to read.
Here is the start to an eight-line truth table, for 2.4.2.
2.4.2 [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
P Q R [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
1 1 1
1 1 0
1 0 1
1 0 0
0 1 1
0 1 0
0 0 1
0 0 0
To proceed, first copy the values of the component propositions, P, Q , and R into
the right side of the table.
P Q R [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Now work inside out, determining the truth values of the operators inside
parentheses.
P Q R [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
2 . 4 : T r u t h T ables 6 5
Next, we evaluate the conjunction, inside the square brackets.
P Q R [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
Finally, we reach the main operator.
P Q R [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
You may notice that 2.4.2 has an interesting property: it is true in every row. Not
every proposition is true in all cases! We will return to this property, and others, in
the next section.
Summary
The goal of this section is to show you how to construct truth tables for any proposi-
tion, of any length, at least in principle. It will be helpful to memorize the method
for assigning truth values to variables for propositions with one, two, and three, and
even four variables. But there is, of course, a general method that you could learn for
propositions of any number of variables.
Constructing Truth Tables for Propositions with Any Number of Variables

Consider the atomic propositional variables, in any order.
The first variable is assigned 1 in the top half of the table and 0 in the bottom
half.
The second variable is assigned 1 in the top quarter, 0 in the second quarter,
1 in the third quarter, and 0 in the bottom quarter.
The third variable is assigned 1 in the top eighth, 0 in the second eighth, 1 in
the third either, 0 in the fourth eighth . . .
. . .
The final variable is assigned alternating instances of 1 and 0.
Thus, in a 128-row truth table (7 variables), the first variable would get 64 1s and
64 0s, the second variable would get 32 1s, 32 0s, 32 1s, and 32 0s, the third variable
would alternate 1s and 0s in groups of 16, the fourth variable would alternate 1s and
0s in groups of 8s . . . , and the seventh variable would alternate single instances of 1s
and 0s. It does not matter which variables we take as first, second, third, and so on; I
usually choose the order from the appearances of the variables in the formula, from
left to right. Remember that every instance of the same variable letter gets the same
assignment of truth values.
While we can, in theory, construct truth tables for propositions of any number of
variables or any complexity (measured by the number of operators), we ordinarily
restrict our studies to propositions with fewer than five variables. The exercises at the
end of this section contain propositions with at most four variables, requiring truth
tables of no more than sixteen rows. We will want to work with propositions with
more variables and greater complexity later, but by then we will have other methods
to do so.
2 . 4 : T r u t h T ables 6 7
KEEP IN MIND
Truth tables summarize the distributions of truth values of simple and complex propositions.
We construct truth tables for wffs of PL in three steps:
1. Determine how many rows we need.
2. Assign truth values to the component variables.
3. Work inside out until we reach the main operator.
The number of rows of a truth table is a function of the number of variables in the wff.
Assignments of truth values to a propositional variable must be consistent within the truth
table.
If completed correctly, the truth table will contain every different combination of truth values
of the component propositions.
EXERCISES 2.4
Construct truth tables for each of the following propositions.
1. A ⊃ ∼A 16. ∼(W ⊃ X) ∙(X ≡ W)

2. B ⊃ (∼B ⊃ B) 17. (U ∙ ∼V) ⊃ (V ∨ U)
3. (C ∙ ∼C) ⊃ C 18. ∼[(W ∨ X) ∙ ∼X] ⊃ W
4. (D ∨ ∼D) ≡ D 19. [(∼Y ∙ Z) ⊃ Y] ∨ (Y ≡ Z)
5. E ≡ ∼E 20. (A ≡ ∼B) ⊃ [(B ∨ ∼B) ∙ A]
6. ∼[(I ∙ ∼I) ⊃ ∼I]
21. A ∙ (B ∨ ∼C)
7. ∼E ⊃ F 22. (D ∙ E) ⊃ ∼F
8. G ≡ ∼H 23. ∼G ≡ (H ∨ I)
9. (K ≡ L) ⊃ L 24. (M ⊃ N) ⊃ ∼(N ∨ O)
10. ∼(M ∨ N) ≡ N 25. (P ⊃ Q ) ∨ [R ≡ (∼Q ∙ P)]
11. (M ∙ N) ∨ ∼M 26. (S ∨ ∼T) ⊃ [(T ∙ ∼U) ≡ S]
12. (K ∙ L) ⊃ ∼K 27. [L ⊃ (M ∨ N)] ≡ L
13. (O ∨ ∼P) ⊃ (P ∙ ∼O) 28. [∼O ∙ (P ⊃ O)] ∨ Q
14. ∼[(Q ∨ R) ≡ ∼R] 29. (∼R ∨ S) ∙(∼T ⊃ R)
15. (S ∙ ∼T) ∨ (T ⊃ S)
30. [U ⊃ (V ⊃ W)] ∙ (V ∨ W) 35. ∼(A ⊃ B) ∙ (C ∨ D)

31. [∼X ≡ (Y ∙ Z)] ⊃ (X ∨ Z) 36. (A ∙ C) ⊃ [(B ∨ C) ≡ D]
37. ∼(G ∙ F) ≡ [E ⊃ (H ∨ F)]
32. (A ⊃ B) ∨ (C ≡ D) 38. [(I ∨ J) ∙ (K ⊃ L)] ∨ ( J ∙ K)
33. [I ⊃ (J ∙ K)] ∨ (L ≡ I) 39. (∼M ⊃ N) ∨ [(N ≡ O) ∙ P]
34. (∼W ≡ X) ∨ (Z ⊃ ∼Y) 40. [(∼M ∙ N) ∨ (O ⊃ P)] ≡ M
2.5: CLASSIFYING PROPOSITIONS

The technical work of constructing truth tables for propositions of any length allows
us to classify individual propositions and their relations in a variety of interesting
ways. As in section 2.3, where the truth value of a complex proposition is its truth
value at its main operator, the truth conditions for a proposition are the truth condi-
tions at its main operator.
A tautologyis a 2.5.1, which you should recognize from the last section, is what we call tautolo-
proposition that is true gous; it is true in every row of its truth table.
in every row of its truth
table. 2.5.1 [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
P Q R [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Logical truthsare
propositions which
are true on any Tautologies are important because they are the logical truths of PL, propositions
interpretation. that are true on any interpretation, for any values of its component premises.
2 . 5 : C lass i f y i ng P ropos i t i ons 6 9
While there are infinitely many tautologies of PL, most wffs are not tautologies.
2.5.2 is true in some cases, false in others; its truth value is contingent on the truth
values of its component propositions.
2.5.2 P ∨ ∼Q
P Q P ∨ ∼ Q
1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0
Contingencies are true in at least one row of their truth table and false in at least A contingency is a
one row. In ordinary language, we say that an event is contingent if it is possible that proposition that is true
in some rows of its truth
it happens and possible that it doesn’t happen; logical contingency is similarly neither table and false in others.
certainly true nor certainly false.
Some propositions are false in every row. We call such statements contradictions. A proposition which
2.5.3 and 2.5.4 are contradictions. is false in every row
of its truth table is a
2.5.3 P ∙ ∼P contradiction .
P P ∙ ∼ P
1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0
2.5.4 (∼P ⊃ Q) ≡ ∼(Q ∨ P)
P Q (∼ P ⊃ Q) ≡ ∼ (Q ∨ P)
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
In addition to helping us characterize individual propositions, truth tables give us

tools to characterize relations among two or more propositions. Propositions can
have the same values or opposite values. Consider the tautology 2.5.5.
2.5.5 (A ∨ B) ≡ (∼B ⊃ A)
A B (A ∨ B) ≡ (∼ B ⊃ A)
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
Now consider the two sides of the biconditional in 2.5.5, as separate propositions,
2.5.6 and 2.5.7, and let’s look at the truth table for just the main operators of each.
2.5.6 A ∨ B 2.5.7 ∼B ⊃ A
A ∨ B ∼ B ⊃ A
1 1
1 1
1 1
0 0
Notice that 2.5.6 and 2.5.7 have the same truth values in each row; that’s what
Two or more propositions makes the biconditional between them a tautology. This property of propositions,
are logically equivalent having identical truth conditions, is called logical equivalence.
when they have the same The concept of logical equivalence has many uses. It is important in part because
truth values in every row
it shows a limit to the expressibility of truth-functional languages like PL: there are
of their truth tables.
many equivalent ways of saying the same thing, of expressing the same truth con-
ditions. For example, notice that the truth conditions of any statement made using
the biconditional are identical to those made with a conjunction of two conditionals.
That is, a statement of the form ‘α ≡ β’ is logically equivalent to a statement that uses
only other operators, a statement of the form ‘(α ⊃ β) ∙ (β ⊃ α)’.
α β α ≡ β (α ⊃ β) ∙ (β ⊃ α)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
We can thus see the biconditional as a superfluous element of our logical language.
Other operators can be shown to be superfluous in similar ways. When constructing
languages for propositional logic, we have choices of which operators to use and how
many operators to use. The study of the relations among the different operators, and
which operators are adequate for propositional logic, is a topic in metalogic. Meta
logic is the study of logical systems.
When evaluating the relations among two or more propositions, make sure to as-
sign the same truth conditions to the same variables throughout the exercise. To com-
pare the two propositions, the column under the A in 2.5.8 should be the same as the
column under the A in 2.5.9, and similarly for the B, even though the B comes first,
reading left to right, in the latter proposition.
2.5.8 A ∨ ∼B
A B A ∨ ∼ B
1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 1 0
2.5.9 B ∙ ∼A
A B B ∙ ∼ A
1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
2.5.8 and 2.5.9 have opposite truth values in each row; we call this pair of proposi-
Two propositions with
opposite truth values in
tions a contradiction.
all rows of the truth table Notice that just as a biconditional connecting logically equivalent statements
are contradictory. is a tautology, a biconditional connecting two contradictory statements will be a
contradiction.
Also notice that contradiction is a relation between exactly two propositions, where
logical equivalence can hold for indefinitely many propositions.
Most pairs of statements, like 2.5.10 and 2.5.11, are neither logically equivalent nor
contradictory.
2.5.10 E ⊃ D 2.5.11 ∼E ∙ D
E D E ⊃ D E D ∼ E ∙ D
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
We can see that 2.5.10 and 2.5.11 are not contradictory in rows 2 and 4; they have
Two or more propositions the same truth values in those two rows. We can see that they are not logically equiva-
that are true in at least
one common row of
lent in rows 1 and 4, where they have opposite truth values. Still, there are ways to
their truth tables are characterize their relation.
consistent. 2.5.10 and 2.5.11 are called consistent propositions, since while they are not equiv-
alent, they still may be true together. There is at least one row of the truth tables in
which both propositions are true. In consistent propositions, there are values of the
component variables that will make both propositions true in the same conditions.
2.5.10 and 2.5.11 are both true in row 3. Thus, someone who uttered both proposi-
tions would be speaking truthfully if E is false and D is true. This assignment of truth
values to component propositions is called a valuation. When you determine that A valuation i s an
two or more propositions are consistent, you can thus describe a consistent valuation assignment of truth
values to simple
by stating the values of the component variables in the row in which both full proposi-
component propositions.
tions are true.
If two statements are neither logically equivalent nor contradictory, they may thus
be consistent or inconsistent. Inconsistency is just the negation of consistency; like
contradictoriness, inconsistency holds only among pairs of propositions.
2.5.12 and 2.5.13 are an inconsistent pair.
2.5.12 E ∙ F 2.5.13 ∼(E ⊃ F)
E F E ∙ F E F ∼ (E ⊃ F)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Notice that the conjunction of two inconsistent statements is a self-contradiction.

The difference between two sentences that are inconsistent and two sentences that
are contradictory is subtle. In both cases, the pair of sentences cannot be true to-
gether. The difference is whether the pair can be false in the same conditions. Contra-
dictory pairs always have opposite truth values. Inconsistent pairs may have truth In an inconsistent pairof
conditions in which they are both false. When we are making assertions, and aiming propositions, there is no
row of the truth table in
at the truth, it is generally just as bad to make inconsistent assertions as it is to make which both statements
contradictory assertions. are true; there is no
consistent valuation.
Summary
In this section, we used the technique of completing truth tables for complex proposi-
tions that I described in section 2.4 to characterize both individual propositions and
complex propositions. I identified three characteristics of individual propositions;
they may be tautologies, contingencies, or contradictions. I identified four charac-
teristics of comparisons between propositions: they may be logically equivalent or
contradictory, or they may be consistent or inconsistent.
74 C h apter 2 P ropos i t i onal L og i c
In this section, we compared only pairs of propositions. Only pairs of proposi-

tions may be contradictory. But consistency, inconsistency, and logical equivalence
are properties that can hold among sets of propositions of any size: two, three, or
more propositions may be consistent or not, or logically equivalent. In section 2.7, we
will explore a shortcut method for testing consistency and work with larger sets of
propositions.
KEEP IN MIND
Remember to assign truth values consistently through the truth tables.

In a single truth table, give each propositional variable the same distribution of truth
values each time that letter appears in the formula.
When comparing two propositions, assign the same truth values to each instance of
each propositional variable throughout the two truth tables.
Most pairs of statements are neither logically equivalent nor contradictory.
Contradictory statements always have opposite truth values, whereas inconsistent pairs
may have truth conditions in which they are both false.
When comparing two propositions, first look for the stronger conditions: logical equiva-
lence and contradiction. Then, if these fail, look for the weaker conditions: consistency
and inconsistency.
EXERCISES 2.5a
Construct truth tables for each of the following propositions
and then classify each proposition as tautologous,
contingent, or contradictory.
1. A ∨ ∼A 9. (E ⊃ F) ≡ ∼(F ∨ ∼E)
2. B ≡ ∼B 10. (G ∙ ∼H) ∨ (H ⊃ ∼G)
3. ∼C ⊃ ∼C 11. ∼(I ∙ J) ≡ (∼I ∨ ∼J)
4. ∼(A ∨ ∼A) 12. (K ⊃ L) ≡ (K ∙ ∼L)
5. ∼(B ∙ ∼B) 13. (∼M ∙ N) ∙ (N ⊃ M)
6. ∼C ≡ (C ∨ ∼C) 14. (A ⊃ B) ≡ (∼A ∨ B)
15. (∼E ⊃ F) ∨ (∼E ∙ ∼F)
7. B ≡ (A ∙ ∼B) 16. (M ⊃ ∼N) ∙ (M ∙ N)
8. (C ∨ D) ∙ ∼(D ⊃ C) 17. (Q ⊃ R) ≡ (∼R ∙ Q )
18. (S ⊃ ∼T) ∨ (T ≡ S)
19. (U ∙ ∼V) ⊃ (V ≡ ∼U)
20. (∼P ≡ Q ) ∙ ∼[Q ⊃ (P ∨ Q )]
21. (T ⊃ U) ∨ (U ⊃ T)
22. (D ⊃ F) ∨ (E ⊃ D)
23. (O ≡ P) ≡ [(∼O ∨ P) ⊃ (P ∙ ∼O)]
24. ∼[W ⊃ (X ∨ ∼W)]
25. (∼Y ⊃ ∼Z) ∙ (Z ∨ Y)
26. ∼C ≡ (A ∨ ∼B)
27. (G ∙ H) ⊃ (G ∨ I)
28. (J ∙ ∼K) ∙ ∼(L ∨ J)
29. (N ∨ O) ⊃ (M ∙ O)
30. ∼(P ∙ Q ) ∨ (Q ⊃ R)
31. ∼{A ⊃ [(B ∙ C) ≡ ∼A]}
32. [(G ∙ H) ⊃ (I ∨ ∼H)] ≡ ∼(G ∙ H)
33. [(J ∙ K) ⊃ L] ≡ [L ∨ (∼J ∨ ∼K)]
34. [M ⊃ (∼N ∙ ∼O)] ∙ [(M ∙ N) ∨ (M ∙ O)]
35. [∼A ∨ (∼B ∙ ∼C)] ≡ [(A ∙ B) ∨ (A ∙ C)]
36. [D ∨ (E ∙ F)] ≡ [(D ∨ E) ∙ (D ∨ F)]
37. (G ∨ H) ∨ (I ∨ J)
38. (T ∙ U) ⊃ ∼(V ⊃ W)
39. [K ∙ (L ⊃ M)] ∨ (N ≡ K)
40. [P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)] ⊃ [∼S ≡ (P ∨ R)]
41. [(W ∙ X) ⊃ (Y ∨ Z)] ∨ [(∼Z ∙ X) ∙ (W ∙ ∼Y)]
42. [(A ∨ B) ⊃ (∼D ∙ C)] ≡ {∼[(A ∨ B) ∙ D] ∙ [(A ∨ B) ⊃ C]}
43. [(E ∙ F) ∨ (∼E ∨ ∼F)] ⊃ [(∼G ∙ H) ∙ (∼G ⊃ ∼H)]
44. [(J ⊃ ∼I) ∙ (∼K ⊃ ∼L)] ∙[(L ∙ ∼K) ∨ (I ∙ J)]
45. [M ≡ (∼N ∙ O)] ⊃ [(P ∙ N) ⊃ M]
EXERCISES 2.5b
Construct truth tables for each of the following pairs of
propositions. Then, for each pair of propositions, determine
whether the statements are logically equivalent or
contradictory. If neither, determine whether they are
consistent or inconsistent.
1. ∼E ⊃ ∼F and E ∨ F
2. G ⊃ H and ∼H ∙ G
3. K ≡ L and ∼(L ⊃ K)
4. ∼(M ∨ N) and ∼M ∙ ∼N
5. ∼O ⊃ P and O ∨ P
6. ∼Q ≡ R and Q ∙ R
7. (S ∨ T) ∙ ∼S and T ⊃ S
8. ∼Y ⊃ Z and ∼Z ⊃ Y
9. ∼(A ∙ B) and ∼A ⊃ B
10. C ⊃ (D ∙ C) and ∼D ∙ C
11. (E ∨ F) ∙ E and
∼(E ∨ F)
12. (G ∙ H) ∨ ∼G and
∼H ⊃ (G ≡ H)
13. I ∨ (J ∙ ∼J) and ( J ≡ ∼I) ∙ J
14. (∼M ∙ ∼N) ≡ N and (N ∨ M) ∙ ∼M
15. (O ∨ P) ⊃ O and
∼O ≡ (P ∙ O)
16. (Q ∨ R) ∙ S and (Q ⊃ S) ∙ R
17. T ∨ (U ∙ W) and (T ∨ U) ∙ (T ∨ W)
18. (X ∙ Y) ∨ Z and (∼X ∨ ∼Y) ∙ ∼Z
19. (A ∙ B) ⊃ C and A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)
20. ∼(G ∨ H) ∙ I and (I ⊃ G) ∙ H
21. ( J ≡ K) ∙ L and [(∼L ∨ ∼K) ∙(L ∨ K)] ∨ ∼L
22. (M ⊃ N) ∨ (N ∙ ∼O) and (M ∙ ∼N) ∙ (∼N ∨ O)
23. (X ∙ Y) ⊃ Z and (X ∙ Y) ∙ ∼Z
24. (A ⊃ B) ∙ C and (∼B ⊃ ∼A) ∙ C
2 . 6 : Val i d an d In v al i d A rg u m ents 7 7
25. (∼D ⊃ ∼E) ∨ (F ≡ E) and (∼D ∙ E) ∙[(∼F ∨ ∼E) ∙ (F ∨ E)]

26. (∼K ⊃ L) ∙ ∼M and M ≡ (L ∨ K)
27. (∼M ≡ N) ∙ (O ≡ P) and ∼{(∼M ≡ N) ⊃ [(O ∙ P) ∨ (∼P ∙ O)]}

28. ∼[(W ∙ X) ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)] and [(Y ⊃ W ) ⊃ (Y ∙ ∼X)] ∙ [(Z ∨ W) ⊃ (∼Z ∙ ∼X)]
29. (A ∨ B) ⊃ (C ∙ D) and [∼C ⊃ (∼A ∙ ∼B)] ∙ [(A ∨ B) ⊃ D]
30. ( J ⊃ K) ⊃ (L ∨ I) and (∼L ∙ ∼I) ∙ (K ∨ ∼J)
2.6: VALID AND INVALID ARGUMENTS

The central task of this book is to characterize logical consequence, to distinguish
valid from invalid inferences. We have thus far used truth tables to characterize indi-
vidual propositions and relations among propositions. We will now use truth tables
to define validity in PL.
2.6.1 is a valid argument.
2.6.1 1. If God exists then every effect has a cause.
2. God exists.
So, every effect has a cause.
2.6.1 is valid because there is no way for the premises to be true while the conclu-
sion is false. Whether the premises are true, whether 2.6.1 is a sound argument, is a
separate question, which we set aside here. 2.6.1 has the form 2.6.2.
2.6.2 α⊃β
α / β
2.6.2 is a valid argument form known as modus ponens. We will see a lot of valid
argument forms in this book; there are infinitely many. We will give names to eleven
valid forms of argument for PL in chapter 3, as well as fourteen rules of equivalence
and three different proof techniques.
We write the valid forms which we name in the metalanguage, using Greek letters
to indicate that any consistent substitution of wffs of PL for the metalinguistic vari-
ables (replacing each α with the same wff and each β with the same wff) yields a valid
inference. We write the premises on sequential lines, and the conclusion on the same
line as the final premise, following a single slash.
In contrast to 2.6.1, 2.6.3 is not valid, since the premises could be true while the
conclusion is false; the conclusion fails to follow from the premises.
2.6.3 1. If God exists then every effect has a cause.
2. Every effect has a cause.
So, God exists.
To show that 2.6.3 is invalid, we could assign truth values to the component propo-
sitions which yield true premises and a false conclusion. If ‘God exists’ were false and
‘every effect has a cause’ were true, then the conclusion would be false, but each of the
premises would be true. (The first premise is vacuously true according to the basic
truth table for the material conditional.) This assignment of truth values, or valuation,
A counterexample t o an is called a counterexample to argument 2.6.3.
argument is a valuation The argument in example 2.6.3 has the form at 2.6.4.
that makes the premises
true and the conclusion 2.6.4 α⊃β
false. β / α
In deductive logic, an invalid argument is called a fallacy. In informal or inductive
contexts, the term ‘fallacy’ has a broader meaning. Arguments of the form 2.6.4 are
fallacies that are so well known that they have a name: affirming the consequent. It
is logically possible for its premises to be true while its conclusion is false. A counter-
example is generated when the wff that replaces α is false and the wff that replaces
β is true. This fallacy is a formal result having nothing to do with the content of the
propositions used in the argument.
We need a rigorous method for distinguishing valid argument forms like 2.6.2 from
invalid ones like 2.6.4. The truth table method for determining if an argument is valid
is both rigorous and simple.
Method of Truth Tables to Test for Validity

Step 1. Set up one set of truth tables for the whole argument by determining how
many rows are needed: how many variables appear in the premises or conclu-
sion? Assign truth values to the component variables on the left side of the
truth table.
Step 2. Line up premises and conclusion horizontally, separating premises with a
single slash and separating the premises from the conclusion with a double
slash.
Step 3. Construct truth tables for each premise and the conclusion, using the as-
signments to component variables from the left side of the truth table consis-
tently throughout the whole set of truth tables.
Step 4. Look for a counterexample: a row in which the premises are all true and the
conclusion is false.
• If there are one or more counterexamples, the argument is invalid. Spec-
ify at least one counterexample.
• If there is no counterexample, the argument is valid.
A valid argument h as no
row of its truth table in Recall that in a valid argument, if the premises are true then the conclusion must
which the premises are be true. An invalid argument is one in which it is possible for true premises to yield a
true and the conclusion
is false. An invalid
false conclusion. In such cases, the conclusion contradicts the premises. By focusing
argument has at least one on valid arguments, we can make sure that if all our premises are true, our conclu-
counterexample. sions will be true as well. False premises are irrelevant to counterexamples.
Let’s examine the argument 2.6.5 to determine whether it is valid.

2.6.5 P ⊃ Q
P /Q
First, we construct our truth table for the argument, assigning values to the two
propositional variables on the left and then carrying them over to the appropriate
columns on the right. Then, we evaluate all the main operators of the premises and
the conclusions, which in this case involves only evaluating the conditional in the first
premise; the values of the second premise and the conclusion are just the values of P
and Q , respectively.
P Q P ⊃ Q / P // Q
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Now that our truth table is complete, we can search for a counterexample. Notice
that in no row are the premises true and the conclusion false. There is thus no coun-
terexample. 2.6.5 is a valid argument.
In contrast, both 2.6.6 and 2.6.7 are invalid arguments. To show that they are in-
valid, we specify a counterexample. Some arguments will have more than one coun-
terexample; demonstrating that one counterexample is sufficient to show that an
argument is invalid.
2.6.6 P ⊃ Q
Q /P
P Q P ⊃ Q / Q // P
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Argument 2.6.6 has a counterexample in the third row, when P is false and Q is true.
2.6.7 (P ∙ Q) ⊃ R
∼P ∨ R
Q ∨ R / R ∙ Q
P Q R (P ∙ Q) ⊃ R / ∼ P ∨ R /
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Q ∨ R // R ∙ Q
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
Argument 2.6.7 has a counterexample in row 3, where P and R are true and Q is
false. There is another counterexample in row 6, where Q is true but P and R are false,
and another in line 7, where P and Q are false and R is true. Again, one needs only a
single counterexample to demonstrate that an argument is invalid.
Summary
The method of determining the validity of an argument of PL in this section is the
most important item in this chapter. It is a foundation of all of the work on deriva-
tions in chapter 3 and in principle could be used to test the validity of any argument
of propositional logic. As we will see in the next section, and in the next chapter, this
method can get unwieldy and there are alternative methods for determining the va-
lidity and the invalidity of longer, more complicated arguments. All of those methods,
though, rely on this method for their justifications.
KEEP IN MIND
To test an argument for validity, look for a counterexample, a valuation on which the prem-
ises are true and the conclusion is false.
To look for a counterexample, construct one truth table for the entire argument, including
all of the premises and the conclusion.
Line up premises and conclusion horizontally, separating premises with a single slash and
separating the premises from the conclusion with a double slash.
Use consistent assignments to component variables throughout the whole truth table.
If there is a counterexample, the argument is invalid.
An invalid argument is one in which it is possible for true premises to yield a false
conclusion.
EXERCISES 2.6
Construct truth tables to determine whether each argument
is valid. If an argument is invalid, specify a counterexample.
1. A ⊃ ∼A 3. A ⊃ ∼A
∼A /A ∼ ∼A / ∼A
2. ∼ ∼B ∨ (∼B ⊃ B) / B

4. B ∙ C 19. D ∨ E
C / ∼B ∼D ∙ ∼F / ∼(E ∙ F)
5. C ∨ D 20. G ≡ H
∼D / ∼C H ∙ ∼I / ∼(I ∙ G)
6. E ∨ F 21. J ⊃ ∼K
∼(E ∙ ∼F) / E ≡ F K ⊃ L / ∼(L ∙ J)
7. G ≡ H 22. I ⊃ ( J ∙ K)
∼H / ∼G I ∙ ∼K / J ∙ ∼K
8. (K ∙ L) ∨ (K ∙ ∼L) 23. O ⊃ P
∼K /L ∼P ∨ Q
9. M ≡ ∼N ∼Q / ∼O
M∨N 24. (∼A ∨ B) ⊃ C
M / ∼N ⊃ N A ∙ B /C
10. ∼P ⊃ Q 25. L ≡ (M ∨ N)
Q ⊃ P / ∼P L ∙ ∼N
11. A ⊃ B M ⊃ ∼L / ∼L
∼B ∙ ∼A 26. ∼R ∨ S
B / B ∨ ∼A ∼(∼T ∙ S)
12. G ⊃ (H ∙ ∼G) ∼T ∙ ∼R
H∨G R ∨ S /T∙S
∼H / ∼G 27. (U ∙ V) ∨ W
13. J ⊃ K (∼W ⊃ U) ⊃ V
K ∼V ∨ W
∼J ∨ K / ∼J ∼W ∨ U / U
14. P ⊃ Q 28. (X ∙ Y) ≡ Z
∼Q ∨ P ∼Z ∙ X
∼Q /P ∼X ⊃ Y /Y
15. R ≡ S 29. D ∨ ∼E
∼R ∨ S ∼E ∙ F
∼S ⊃ ∼R /R ∼D ⊃ F /D
16. R ⊃ S 30. (G ∙ H) ⊃ ∼I
S ∨ T /R⊃T I∨G
H ⊃ ∼G
17. X ∙ ∼Y H ≡ I / ∼H ∨ G
Y ∨ Z / ∼Z
31. T ⊃ (U ∙ V)
18. ∼(A ∙ B) T∙U
B ⊃ C /A ∼V
U ⊃ ∼T / T
2 . 7 : In d i rect T r u t h T ables 8 3
32. M ∙ ∼N 38. ∼A ⊃ (B ∨ C)
O⊃P ∼C ∙ (∼B ∨ A)
P ∨ N / ∼M C ∨ ∼A
33. Q ⊃ R A ≡ (B ⊃ ∼C)
S∨T B / ∼A
T /R 39. (D ∙ G) ⊃ (E ∙ F)
34. ∼W ⊃ (X ∨ Y) D∨E
Y∙Z (G ∨ F) ≡ ∼E
∼(Z ⊃ X) /W≡Y G ⊃ E / ∼G
35. ∼A ∙ (B ∨ C) 40. ∼(H ⊃ K)
C⊃A K ⊃ (I ∙ J)
B ⊃ D / A ⊃ ∼D I≡H
H ⊃ ( J ∨ K)
36. E ∙ F ∼J ∙ (H ∨ ∼K) / K
G ⊃ (H ∨ ∼E)
∼F ∨ G /H
37. (W ⊃ X) ≡ Z
∼Z ∙ Y
(Y ∙ W) ⊃ X
X∙Z
(W ∙ Y) ⊃ (∼Z ∙ X) / Z ∨ W
2.7: INDIRECT TRUTH TABLES

We can use the truth table method of the previous section, a mechanical procedure
for determining counterexamples, to determine the validity of any argument. But the
method becomes unwieldy as the number of variables in an argument grows. With
merely five variables, for example, a truth table is 32 lines. The truth table for an argu-
ment that contains ten propositional variables would require 1024 lines.
Fortunately, there is a shortcut method for constructing counterexamples, the sub-
ject of this section. This method will also help us demonstrate whether a set of propo-
sitions is consistent or inconsistent.
To show that an argument is valid, one must show that there is no row of the truth
table with true premises and a false conclusion; we seem to have to examine every
row. But we need only one row in order to demonstrate that an argument is invalid: a
counterexample. Thus, to determine whether an argument is valid or invalid, we can
try to construct a counterexample. If we find a counterexample, then we know the
argument is invalid. If there are no counterexamples, then the argument is valid.
2.7.1 is an invalid argument, as we can show with the indirect, or shortcut, method.
2.7.1 G ≡ H
G / ∼H
To show that 2.7.1 is invalid, first write it out, as you would a normal truth table for
an argument. Just as I did for the truth tables, I’ll list all the component propositions
on the left side of the table; that way, when we’re done, the valuation that generates a
counterexample will be obvious.
G H G ≡ H / G // ∼ H
Next, we can assign the value true to H, in order to make the conclusion false. I’ll
use the left side of the truth table to keep track of the valuation.
G H G ≡ H / G // ∼ H
1 0 1
Carry this value over to any other H in the argument.
G H G ≡ H / G // ∼ H
1 1 0 1
Assign a value to G that makes the premises true.
G H G ≡ H / G // ∼ H
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
2.7.1 is thus invalid since there is a counterexample when G is true and H is true.
Note that an argument is either valid or invalid. If there is at least one counterexample,
the argument is invalid. It is not merely invalid on that assignment of truth values; it
is always invalid.
Method of Indirect Truth Tables for Validity

Line up your component variables, premises, and conclusions horizontally, as in
the full truth table method, but do not create any further rows for the table.
Try to assign values to component variables that make the conclusion false and all
premises true.
If such a valuation is possible, then the argument is invalid; specify the counter
example.
If no such valuation is possible, then the argument is valid.
If there is a counterexample, this indirect method will be able to find it. But we have
to make sure to try all possible valuations before we pronounce the argument valid.
2.7.2 is a valid argument. We will not be able to construct a counterexample. Let’s
see how that goes.
2.7.2 C ⊃ (D ⊃ E)
D ⊃ (E ⊃ F) / C ⊃ (D ⊃ F)
The only way to make the conclusion false is to assign true to C and to D, and
false to F.
C D E F C ⊃ (D ⊃ E) /
1 1 0
D ⊃ (E ⊃ F) // C ⊃ (D ⊃ F)
1 0 1 0 0
Carry these values over to the premises.
C D E F C ⊃ (D ⊃ E) /
1 1 0 1 1
D ⊃ (E ⊃ F) // C ⊃ (D ⊃ F)
1 0 1 0 1 0 0
To make the first premise true, E must also be true.
C D E F C ⊃ (D ⊃ E) /
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
D ⊃ (E ⊃ F) // C ⊃ (D ⊃ F)
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
But now the second premise is false. If we tried to make the second premise true
by making E false, the first premise would come out false. There was no other way to
make the conclusion false. So, there is no counterexample. 2.7.2 is thus valid.
In some arguments, there is more than one way to make a conclusion false or to
make premises true. You may have to try more than one. Once you arrive at a counter-
example, you may stop. But if you fail to find a counterexample, you must keep going
until you have tried all possible assignments.
The argument at 2.7.3 has multiple counterexamples.
2.7.3 I ⊃ K
K ⊃ J /I∙J
There are three ways to make the conclusion of 2.7.3 false. We can try them in any
order, but we have to remember that if our first attempts to construct true premises
fail, we must try the others. I’ll write them all, which gives us (potentially) a three-
row truth table to complete; it’s still fewer than the eight rows we would need in a full
truth table.
I K J I ⊃ K / K ⊃ J // I ∙ J
1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
In the first row, there is no way to assign a truth value to K that makes the prem-
ises true.
I K J I ⊃ K / K ⊃ J // I ∙ J
1 0 1 ? ? 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
We must move on to the second option.
I K J I ⊃ K / K ⊃ J // I ∙ J
1 0 1 ? ? 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0
In the second row, we can assign either value to K and find a counterexample. So,
2.7.3 is shown invalid by the counterexample when I is false, J is true, and K is true;
it is also shown invalid by the counterexample when I is false, J is true, and K is false.
Since we found counterexamples in the second option, there is no need to continue
with the third option.
2.7.4 requires more work.
2.7.4 T ⊃ (U ∨ X)
U ⊃ (Y ∨ Z)
Z ⊃ A
∼(A ∨ Y) / ∼T
Let’s start with the conclusion, making T true in order to make its negation false,
carrying that assignment into the first premise.
T U X Y Z A T ⊃ (U ∨ X) /
1 1
U ⊃ (Y ∨ Z) / Z ⊃ A / ∼ (A ∨ Y) // ∼ T
0 1
From the first premise, ‘U ∨ X’ must be true, but there are three ways to assign
values to make it so. Similarly, there are multiple ways to assign values for the second
and third premises. But there is only one assignment that makes the fourth premise
true, making A and Y false.
T U X Y Z A T ⊃ (U ∨ X) /
1 0 0 1
U ⊃ (Y ∨ Z) / Z ⊃ A / ∼ (A ∨ Y) // ∼ T
1 0 0 0 0 1
Let’s carry these assignments to the Y in the second premise and the A in the third.
T U X Y Z A T ⊃ (U ∨ X) /
1 0 0 1
U ⊃ (Y ∨ Z) / Z ⊃ A / ∼ (A ∨ Y) // ∼ T
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Inspecting the third premise, we can see that Z must also be false; we can carry this
value to the second premise.
T U X Y Z A T ⊃ (U ∨ X) /
1 0 0 0 1
U ⊃ (Y ∨ Z) / Z ⊃ A / ∼ (A ∨ Y) // ∼ T
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Since “Y ∨ Z” has now been made false, U must be made false in order to keep the
second premise true.
T U X Y Z A T ⊃ (U ∨ X) /
1 0 0 0 0 1
U ⊃ (Y ∨ Z) / Z ⊃ A / ∼ (A ∨ Y) // ∼ T
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Carry the value of U to the first premise; we are now forced to make X true in order
to make the first premise true.
T U X Y Z A T ⊃ (U ∨ X) /
1 0 0 0 0 1 0
U ⊃ (Y ∨ Z) / Z ⊃ A / ∼ (A ∨ Y) // ∼ T
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
The counterexample is thus constructed. The argument is shown invalid when T

and X are true and U, Y, Z, and A are all false.
T U X Y Z A T ⊃ (U ∨ X) /
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
U ⊃ (Y ∨ Z) / Z ⊃ A / ∼ (A ∨ Y) // ∼ T
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
Consistency and the Indirect Method

The most important use of the indirect truth table method is in determining whether
an argument is valid. An argument is valid if there is no valuation, or assignment of
truth values to the component propositional variables, such that the premises come
out true and the conclusion comes out false. That condition for validity is the same as
testing whether the negation of the conclusion is consistent with the premises: a set of
propositions is consistent when there is a set of truth values that we can assign to the
component variables such that all the propositions come out true.
So, we can use the same method for determining whether a set of propositions is
consistent as we used for determining whether an argument is valid. If we can find a
valuation that makes all of the propositions in a set true, then we have shown them to
A consistent valuation be consistent; this assignment is called a consistent valuation. If no consistent valu-
is an assignment of ation is possible, then the set is inconsistent.
truth values to atomic
To determine if a set of propositions is consistent, line them up, just as we lined
propositions that makes
a set of propositions all up the premises and conclusion in evaluating arguments. We use only single slashes
true. between the propositions; since a set of sentences has no conclusion, there is no dif-
ferentiation between premises and conclusion and we are just trying to make all prop-
ositions come out true.
Let’s examine the set of propositions 2.7.5 to see if they are consistent.
2.7.5 A ⊃ (B ∨ C)
∼B ∨ ∼C
(A ∙ B) ⊃ C
A ∙ D
Let’s start with the last proposition, since there is only one way to make it true. Re-
member, we are working now with bare sets of propositions, not premises and conclu-
sions, trying to make all propositions true.
A B C D A ⊃ (B ∨ C) / ∼ B ∨ ∼ C /
1 1
(A ∙ B) ⊃ C / A ∙ D
1 1 1
I’ll carry the value of A through the rest of the set (there are no other Ds), but there
are no other obvious, forced moves.
A B C D A ⊃ (B ∨ C) / ∼ B ∨ ∼ C /
1 1 1
(A ∙ B) ⊃ C / A ∙ D
1 1 1 1
The consequent in the first proposition must be true, but there are three ways to
make it true (making B true, C true, or both). There are three ways to make any con-
ditional, like that in the second proposition, true. And the antecedent of the third
proposition may be either true or false, so we are not forced to assign a value to its
consequent.
We must arbitrarily choose a next place to work. I’ll choose to start with B, expand-
ing the table to include a true value and a false value for B. If one does not work out, I
will have to return to the other one.
A B C D A ⊃ (B ∨ C) / ∼ B ∨ ∼ C /
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
(A ∙ B) ⊃ C / A ∙ D
1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1
I’ll try the first line first. Assigning 1 to B makes the first proposition true, without
constraining an assignment to C; so far so good. In the second proposition, if B is true,
then C must be false. But in the third proposition, if B is true, then the antecedent is
true and so C must be true.
A B C D A ⊃ (B ∨ C) / ∼ B ∨ ∼ C /
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
(A ∙ B) ⊃ C / A ∙ D
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1
There is thus no consistent valuation with B true. Let’s move to the second line,
where B is false; I’ll cross off the values in the first row to remind us that we’re finished
with it. With B false, in the first proposition, C must be true.
A B C D A ⊃ (B ∨ C) / ∼ B ∨ ∼ C /
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
(A ∙ B) ⊃ C / A ∙ D
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1
But making B false makes the second proposition true without considering the
value for C. And the third proposition is the same; once we make B false, the anteced-
ent is false and so the proposition is true.
A B C D A ⊃ (B ∨ C) / ∼ B ∨ ∼ C /
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
(A ∙ B) ⊃ C / A ∙ D
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1
We have thus found a consistent valuation. The set of propositions is shown consis-
tent when A, C, and D are true and B is false.
Method of Indirect Truth Tables for Consistency

Line up your component variables on the left and all propositions on the right,
separated by single slashes.
Assign values to propositional variables to make each statement true.
If you can make each statement true, then the set is consistent. Provide a consistent
valuation.
If it is not possible to make each statement true, then the set is inconsistent.
Let’s look at another example.

2.7.6 A ≡ B
(B ∨ ∼A) ⊃ C
(A ∨ ∼B) ⊃ D
D ⊃ E
∼F ∨ ∼D
First, we’ll line up the propositions, separating each by a single slash. Again, I’ll use
two rows.
A B C D E F A ≡ B / (B ∨ ∼ A) ⊃ C /
(A ∨ ∼ B) ⊃ D / D ⊃ E / ∼ F ∨ ∼ D
There is no obvious place to start. There are three ways to make the conditionals in
the second, third, and fourth propositions true and three ways to make the disjunc-
tion in the final proposition true. We might as well start with the first proposition,
since there are only two ways to make it true: either both A and B are true or both A
and B are false. Other options are available, and may even be better in the long run.
In this example, I’ll work on both rows at the same time, carrying values for A and
B throughout.
A B C D E F A ≡ B / (B ∨ ∼ A) ⊃ C /
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0
(A ∨ ∼ B) ⊃ D / D ⊃ E / ∼ F ∨ ∼ D
1 1
0 0
We can make some progress on the second and third propositions.
A B C D E F A ≡ B / (B ∨ ∼ A) ⊃ C /
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
(A ∨ ∼ B) ⊃ D / D ⊃ E / ∼ F ∨ ∼ D
1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0
Looking at the second proposition, above, we see that C must be true in both rows,
since the antecedent of the main operator is true in both rows. Similar reasoning
holds for D. I’ll fill in the results for the second and third propositions and carry the
values for D to the fourth and fifth.
A B C D E F A ≡ B / (B ∨ ∼ A) ⊃ C /
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
(A ∨ ∼ B) ⊃ D / D ⊃ E / ∼ F ∨ ∼ D
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Now we can see from the fourth proposition that E must be true in both rows, too.
We can also evaluate the negation in the fifth proposition.
A B C D E F A ≡ B / (B ∨ ∼ A) ⊃ C /
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
(A ∨ ∼ B) ⊃ D / D ⊃ E / ∼ F ∨ ∼ D
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Since we want the last proposition to be true, since we are working toward a con-
sistent valuation, the negation of F must be true. But for the negation of F to be true,
F must be false.
A B C D E F A ≡ B / (B ∨ ∼ A) ⊃ C /
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
(A ∨ ∼ B) ⊃ D / D ⊃ E / ∼ F ∨ ∼ D
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
We have thus found two consistent valuations for 2.7.6: when A, B, C, D, and E are
all true and F is false; and when A, B, and F are false and C, D, and E are true.
Remember, just as an argument is invalid if there is at least one counterexample, a
set of propositions is consistent if there is at least one consistent valuation; we do not
need the second one. If there is no consistent valuation, the set is inconsistent.
Let’s look at one more example.
2.7.7 P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)
Q ⊃ (S ⊃ T)
R ⊃ (T ⊃ ∼S)
P ∙ S
We have a clear place to begin: the fourth proposition. P and S must both be true.
I’ll fill in those values through all four propositions.
P Q R S T P ⊃ (Q ∙ R) / Q ⊃ (S ⊃ T) /
1 1 1 1
R ⊃ (T ⊃ ∼ S) / P ∙ S
1 1 1 1
Looking at the first proposition next, we can see that the values of Q and R are also
determined. I’ll fill those in throughout, finishing the first proposition, and evaluate
the negation of S in the third proposition.
P Q R S T P ⊃ (Q ∙ R) / Q ⊃ (S ⊃ T) /
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
R ⊃ (T ⊃ ∼ S) / P ∙ S
1 0 1 1 1 1
Now we can turn our attention to the final component variable T. If we make T true,
then the second proposition comes out true but the third proposition turns out false.
If we make T false, then the third proposition comes out true but the second propo-
sition comes out false. There are no other possibilities: our hand was forced at each
prior step. There is no way to make all the propositions in the set true. 2.7.7 is thus an
inconsistent set of propositions.
Summary
The method of indirect truth tables is powerful when applied both to determining the
validity of an argument and to determining the consistency of a set of propositions.
(It can also be fun to use!) At root, it is the same method. But be careful to distinguish
the two cases. When we want to know if a set of propositions is consistent, we try to
make all the propositions true. When we want to know if an argument is valid, we
look for a counterexample, a valuation on which the premises all come out true but
the conclusion comes out false. And remember, some arguments are valid and some
arguments are invalid, and some sets of propositions are consistent and some sets of
propositions are inconsistent. So, even though you must try all possible valuations,
you might not be able to find a counterexample or consistent valuation.
We will use an extended version of this indirect truth table method for determining
counterexamples to arguments again in chapters 4 and 5, in first-order logic. For now,
there are two salient applications of the method. When determining if an argument
is valid, the method, if used properly, will generate a counterexample if there is one.
For sets of sentences, the method will yield a consistent valuation if there is one. Make
sure to work until you have exhausted all possible assignments of truth values to the
simple, component propositions.
KEEP IN MIND
To determine whether an argument is valid or invalid, try to construct a counterexample.

Making the premises true and the conclusion false shows that an argument is invalid.
To determine whether a set of propositions is consistent, try to construct a consistent
valuation.
Making all propositions true shows that the set is consistent.
EXERCISES 2.7a
Determine whether each of the following arguments is valid.
If invalid, specify a counterexample.
1. L ≡ (M ∙ N)
L∙O
(M ∙ O) ⊃ P /P
2. A ⊃ (B ∨ C)
C ∙ (∼D ⊃ A)
E ∙ B /E∙A
3. F ≡ (G ∨ H)
I ⊃ (J ⊃ F)
(I ∙ G) ∨ H /J⊃G
4. (Z ∙ V) ⊃ (U ∨ W)
X ∨ (∼Y ≡ W)
Z ∙ Y / ∼U
5. A ∙ B
B⊃C
∼B ∨ (D ⊃ ∼C) / ∼D
6. ∼Y ≡ (∼X ∙ Z)
Z ⊃ Y /Z⊃X
7. J ∨ M
L∙M
K ⊃ L / ∼K ⊃ J
8. N ⊃ O
O∙P
P ≡ Q / ∼(Q ∨ N)
9. T ≡ S
S∙U
R ⊃ U /R∨T
10. Z ∨ (X ∙ Y)
W≡V
Z ∙ V / W ⊃ (X ∨ Y)
11. S ⊃ (V ∙ T)
U∨R
∼S ≡ (R ∨ T) /T⊃U
12. E ⊃ (F ∨ H)
(G ∙ H) ⊃ E
∼F ∙ ∼H
E ⊃ ∼G / E ⊃ ∼H
13. W ⊃ (X ∙ Y)
∼(Z ⊃ X)
X ∨ (W ∙ ∼Z) / Y ∙ ∼Z
14. A ∨ (D ∙ C)
A ⊃ (B ∨ C)
D ∙ (∼B ∙ ∼C) / D ∙ C
15. ∼N
[(O ∨ P) ∨ Q ] ⊃ (N ∙ R)
P ⊃ ∼Q
(O ∙ R) ⊃ N /P
16. D ∨ ∼E
(F ∙ G) ∙ ∼H
D ⊃ (H ∨ I)
∼I / F ∙ ∼E
17. J ⊃ (K ∙ ∼L)
∼L ≡ (N ⊃ M)
J ∨ ∼N
K ∙ M / ∼N
18. ∼(P ⊃ Q )
R ≡ (S ∨ ∼T)
P⊃R
Q ∨ T /S∨O
1 0 0 C h apter 2 P ropos i t i onal L og i c
19. B ∙ (D ∨ C)
D ⊃ (A ∨ E)
∼E ∨ (B ∙ C) / (A ⊃ E) ∨ C
20. (F ∨ G) ≡ (H ∙ J)
(I ⊃ H) ∙ (J ∨ G)
∼G /I⊃F
21. K ⊃ (M ⊃ P)
P ∙ ∼(N ∨ L)
O ⊃ (K ≡ N) /M
22. Q ⊃ (T ∙ S)
R ≡ (U ∨ T)
∼[S ⊃ (T ⊃ Q )] / ∼U ∙ S
23. Y ⊃ (Z ≡ X)
Y ∙ ∼W
W ⊃ (Y ∨ Z) / ∼(X ⊃ ∼W)
24. L ⊃ (M ≡ ∼N)
(M ∙ O) ∨ (∼P ∙ O)
O∨L
∼M /N
25. S ∙ (T ∨ W)
U ⊃ (W ∙ V)
S ≡ ∼W
T ⊃ V / ∼(S ∨ U)
26. ∼(X ∨ Y)
∼(Z ⊃ W)
U∙Z
X ⊃ V /Y≡U
27. R ⊃ [U ∨ (S ∨ Q )]
R ∙ ∼S
∼U ≡ T /T⊃Q
28. N ∙ (Q ⊃ P)
M ∨ ∼L
L⊃Q
P ∨ M /L≡M
29. U ∙ ∼R
(T ∨ ∼S) ≡ U
R∨S
T ⊃ (∼R ∨ V) / ∼V
2 . 7 : In d i rect T r u t h T ables 1 0 1
30. E ∙ F
E⊃G
∼G ∙ ∼H /F≡H
31. N ∨ O
N ⊃ (Q ⊃ O)
(P ∨ Q ) ∨ R
R ⊃ ∼R / ∼O ⊃ P
32. A ⊃ B
B∨C
D ≡ C / D ≡ ∼B
33. ∼(I ≡ J)
K ⊃ ( J ∨ L)
(I ∙ L) ⊃ K
(L ∨ J) ∨ (K ⊃ I) / ∼( J ⊃ L)
34. Q ⊃ T
(T ∙ S) ∨ R
R≡Q
∼(S ∙ R) / ∼Q ≡ S
35. Q ⊃ (R ∙ ∼S)
(T ∨ U) ∙ (V ⊃ W)
(R ⊃ S) ∙ ∼U /Q∙T
36. F ⊃ (G ∙ H)
∼I ⊃ (G ⊃ ∼H)
I ⊃ ( J ∙ K) / F ⊃ ( J ∙ K)
37. V ⊃ (Z ∙ W)
X ∨ ∼Y
Z⊃Y
V ≡ Y / ∼W
38. B ∙ (C ⊃ E)
B ⊃ (A ∙ F)
D ⊃ (∼B ∨ C)
E ⊃ D / A ≡ [F ∙ (E ⊃ C)]
39. E ≡ [(F ∙ G) ⊃ H]
∼H ∙ ∼F
E∨G
G ⊃ (F ∙ E) / H ∙ ∼E
40. ∼(E ∙ F)
F ⊃ (G ∨ H)
(H ∙ E) ≡ F
G ∨ ∼F / ∼(E ∨ G)
41. I ∨ ( J ∙ K)
(∼I ⊃ J) ⊃ L
L ≡ (∼J ∨ ∼I) / (I ∨ K) ∙ (I ⊃ ∼J)
42. ∼(∼C ∙ B)
A∨D
D ≡ (∼B ∙ ∼A)
C ⊃ ∼A /∼(B ∨ D)
43. ∼[I ⊃ ( J ∙ K)]
J ∨ ∼L
M ⊃ (K ∙ I)
L ≡ M /J≡K
44. (M ⊃ N) ∙ (O ⊃ P)
N∨O
(M ∨ P) ≡ (∼N ⊃ ∼O)
(O ⊃ N) ⊃ (∼M ∙ ∼P) / ∼(M ∨ P)
45. (A ∙ ∼D) ∨ (∼B ∙ C)
∼C ⊃ ∼B
(A ∨ E) ⊃ D
A ≡ B / ∼(A ∙ ∼E) ∙ B
EXERCISES 2.7b
Determine, for each given set of propositions, whether it is
consistent. If it is, provide a consistent valuation.
1. A ∨ B 4. B ∙ (C ⊃ A)
B ∙ ∼C D ∨ (E ∙ F)
∼C ⊃ D F ⊃ (C ∨ D)
D≡A E ∙ ∼A
2. D ⊃ F
5. ∼A ∙ ∼E
F ≡ (A ∙ E)
(A ∨ B) ⊃ (D ∙ F)
D ∙ (B ∨ C)
C ⊃ ( E ⊃ D)
∼A
∼A ∙ (C ∨ B)
E∨C
3. D 6. ∼[A ⊃ (F ∙ B)]
A⊃C B ∙ (E ∙ ∼D)
(B ∙ ∼C) ∙ ∼A E≡F
D ⊃ (A ∙ B) D ⊃ (C ∙ A)
2 . 7 : In d i rect T r u t h T ables 1 0 3
7. G ⊃ (H ∙ I) 16. (O ∨ ∼P) ⊃ ∼Q
∼J ⊃ (K ∨ L) R ∙ (∼S ∨ T)
L ∨ (G ⊃ J) O ∙ ∼(R ⊃ Q )
(I ≡ K) ∨ H P⊃S
8. (A ∙ C) ⊃ (D ∙ B) 17. O ≡ Q
∼(A ⊃ D) ∙ ∼(C ⊃ B) P ∙ (Q ∨ O)
B ≡ ∼(D ∨ C) R ⊃ ∼(P ∙ S)
(A ∙ B) ⊃ ∼C (S ∨ O) ∙ ∼Q
9. (W ∙ X) ⊃ Z 18. T ∙ V
(Y ∙ W) ≡ (X ∙ Z) U ⊃ (W ∙ X)
W ∨ (Y ⊃ Z) Y ∙ (T ⊃ ∼V)
(X ∙ Y) ⊃ (Z ∨ W) (Z ∙ U) ≡ (W ∙ Y)
X ⊃ (V ∨ W)
10. (E ∙ F) ⊃ (G ∨ H)
(E ∙ ∼H) ∙ (I ∨ J) 19. Q ⊃ (R ∨ S)
(I ⊃ ∼H) ∙ (F ∙ ∼G) T ≡ (U ∙ Q )
( J ∙ I) ≡ ∼F (∼S ∙ Q ) ∙ (R ∨ T)
U ∨ (S ∙ T)
11. ∼F ∙ ∼G
H ⊃ (I ∙ F) 20. ∼(J ⊃ I)
J ∙ (F ∨ G) I ∙ (K ∨ L)
∼H ∨ (I ∙ J) (L ∙ J) ≡ K
H ≡ ∼F (K ∙ I) ⊃ ∼( J ∨ L)
12. (F ∙ G) ≡ I 21. ∼F
(H ∨ J) ⊃ F (E ∙ G) ⊃ F
K ≡ (G ∙ J) (E ∙ H) ∙ G
H ⊃ (K ≡ I) F≡H
13. C ≡ (D ∨ B) 22. ∼(M ⊃ K)
D ∙ (C ⊃ A) ( J ∙ L) ⊃ K
∼A ∙ (E ∨ F) ( J ∨ M) ∙ (M ⊃ J)
F ⊃ (B ∙ A) K∨L
14. D ⊃ (∼A ∙ ∼F) 23. ∼( J ⊃ N)
E ∨ (∼B ∨ C) N ⊃ (M ∙ ∼L)
E⊃C K ≡ ∼I
A ∙ (∼B ≡ D) J ∙ (K ∨ M)
I∙L
15. B ∨ (F ∙ D)
E≡B 24. K ⊃ (L ∙ M)
∼E ∙ ∼F N ∙ ∼M
D ⊃ (A ⊃ C) (K ∙ ∼L) ∨ (K ∙ ∼M)
(C ∙ E) ∨ A (N ⊃ K) ∨ (N ⊃ L)
25. (∼L ∙ M) ⊃ O 33. ∼[A ⊃ (B ∙ C)]

∼(N ∙ P) C ⊃ (D ≡ E)
L ≡ (P ∨ O) (B ∙ E) ∨ (A ∙ C)
(M ∙ P) ∨ (N ∙ O) (D ∨ B) ⊃ ∼A
26. K 34. ∼[(T ∙ Z) ⊃ (W ≡ V)]

L ⊃ (M ∙ N) U ⊃ (X ∙ Y)
(N ∙ K) ≡ ∼L (X ∨ T) ⊃ [Y ⊃ (W ∙ U)]
(M ⊃ L) ∨ ∼K ∼(V ∙ Z)
27. S ⊃ [O ∙ (∼P ∙ R)] 35. ∼[(C ⊃ D) ∨ (A ∙ B)]

S ∨ (T ∙ ∼O) B ⊃ (A ∙ C)
R ⊃ (P ≡ T) ∼D ≡ (B ∙ C)
∼S ∨ R (A ∙ D) ⊃ ∼B
28. P ⊃ [Q ⊃ (R ⊃ O)] 36. M ≡ (N ⊃ P)

∼S ∙ T (O ∨ Q ) ∙ (M ⊃ P)
R ≡ (T ∙ P) ∼[(N ∨ O) ∙ Q ]
∼(O ∨ S) (P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ ∼M
29. ∼(T ∙ S) ∙ (∼O ⊃ R) 37. R ⊃ ∼(S ∙ T)

S ∙ (O ∨ ∼P) (U ∨ R) ⊃ (T ∙ V)
R ⊃ (Q ∙ P) V ≡ (S ⊃ R)
T ∨ ∼O (U ∨ T) ⊃ ∼(S ∙ R)
30. ∼[ J ⊃ (K ⊃ L)] 38. (P ∨ Q ) ∙ (R ⊃ ∼S)

(M ≡ N) ⊃ J (Q ⊃ R) ∙ (P ⊃ S)
(L ∨ N) ∙ K S ≡ (∼Q ∨ S)
∼(M ∙ K) (R ∙ P) ⊃ Q
31. ∼O 39. ∼[E ∨ (F ≡ H)]

(P ∙ Q ) ⊃ (R ∨ S) ∼[(G ∙ F) ∨ (H ∙ I)]
S≡O I ⊃ (G ∙ E)
(P ⊃ R) ⊃ Q ∼(I ∙ F) ⊃ H
32. (∼J ∨ ∼K) ∙ L 40. L ∨ (K ∙ J)

∼I ∨ (M ∨ N) J ⊃ (M ∙ N)
L ⊃ (I ∙ J) M ⊃ (I ∨ J)
( J ∙ M) ⊃ ∼N ∼[(N ⊃ K) ∙ L]
2 . 8 : N otes on T ranslat i on w i t h P L 1 0 5
2.8: NOTES ON TRANSLATION WITH PL

In section 2.1, I presented some useful general guidelines for regimenting English
sentences into PL. But since that discussion came before our exploration of the basic
truth tables, some of the guidelines appeared dogmatic. Here, I discuss a few of the
subtleties that underlie the guidelines of the early section on translation: the exten-
sionality of PL, the importance of logical equivalence in translation, and the differ-
ence between inclusive and exclusive disjunction.
Logical Equivalence and Translation

In general, our logic is more fine-grained than natural language. We can use it to make
careful distinctions, ones that are trickier to make in English. As Frege observed, us-
ing formal logic is like looking at ordinary language through a microscope. It allows
us to be precise. Still, every logical language has its limits. One limit of our logic is its
extensionality.
Extensionality is to be contrasted with intensionality (not intentionality). Roughly,
intensions are meanings. Two phrases are intensionally equivalent when they have
the same meaning. Two phrases are extensionally equivalent when they have the
same truth value (for sentence-sized phrases) or are true of the same things (for
smaller linguistic units). Consider, for example, the difference between the subsen-
tential phrases 2.8.1 and 2.8.2.
2.8.1 Creature with a heart
2.8.2 Creature with kidneys
As a matter of biology, creatures have hearts if, and only if, they have kidneys. So,
2.8.1 and 2.8.2 pick out the same creatures; they have the same referents. But the
two phrases have different meanings. They are extensionally equivalent, but inten-
sionally different.
To see the difference between intension and extension at the level of sentences, re-
member that we provide the semantics for PL by giving truth conditions, using truth
tables. As long as the truth conditions for two sentences are the same, we call the
propositions logically equivalent. Our truth-functional logic does not distinguish be-
tween two logically equivalent propositions. Thus, our logic is extensional.
Because our logic is extensional, sentences with different intensions, like 2.8.3 and
2.8.4, may be translated identically.
2.8.3 Quine is an extensionalist and Frege is not.
2.8.4 It is not the case that either Quine is not an extensionalist or
Frege is.
To see that 2.8.3 and 2.8.4 are extensionally equivalent though intensionally dis-
tinct, let’s regiment them and look at their truth tables.
2.8.3r Q ∙ ∼F
2.8.4r ∼(∼Q ∨ F)
Q ∙ ∼ F ∼ (∼ Q ∨ F)
1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
Since the two propositions have the same values for the main operator in their truth
tables, despite whatever differences they might have in meaning, 2.8.3 and 2.8.4 are
logically equivalent. As far as our truth-functional logic is concerned, we can use
these two propositions interchangeably. They have the same entailments. They are
consistent or inconsistent with the same propositions.
The notion of an intension, or a meaning, like the concept of a proposition, is con-
troversial. To help clarify or illustrate the concept of an intension, some philosophers
and logicians have explored, fruitfully, possible worlds and their corresponding
modal logics, advanced topics not covered in this book.
In contrast, the concept of logical equivalence is the central concept in the charac-
terization of logic as extensional. We can use it, for example, to help us understand
the biconditional.
The Material Conditional and the Biconditional

We use biconditionals to represent ‘if and only if ’ statements. By comparing the bi-
conditional to the conjunction of two conditionals, as at 2.8.5, we can understand the
relation between the biconditional and the material conditional.
2.8.5 α ≡ β (α ⊃ β) ∙ (β ⊃ α)
α ≡ β (α ⊃ β) ∙ (β ⊃ α)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Notice that claims of each form are logically equivalent. And the expression on the
right is just the conjunction of ‘α if β’, on the right of the conjunction, and ‘α only if β’,
on the left: α if, and only if, β.
Inclusive and Exclusive Disjunction

In section 2.3, we adopted the inclusive disjunction as the semantics for ∨, despite
some concerns that ‘or’ has both an inclusive and an exclusive sense. Decisions are
often framed with an exclusive ‘or’: Will you take the Thursday lab or the Tuesday lab?
Will you have the soup or the salad? Let’s use ⊕ as the symbol for exclusive disjunc-
tion (though we will use it only in this section). 2.8.6 thus shows the truth tables for
inclusive and exclusive ‘or’.
2.8.6 Inclusive ‘or’ Exclusive ‘or’
α ∨ β α ⊕ β
1 1 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
Using the concept of logical equivalence, we can show that ⊕ is definable in terms
of ∨, and thus that we do not need a special symbol for exclusive disjunction. We just
need to provide a formula that yields the same truth table as ⊕, but which does not
use that term. Such a truth table is at 2.8.7.
2.8.7 (α ∨ β) ∙ ∼(α ∙ β)
(α ∨ β) ∙ ∼ (α ∙ β)
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Thus we can see that if we want to regiment a sentence of English as an exclusive ‘or’,
we can just use the conjunction of ‘α ∨ β’ with ‘∼(α ∙ β)’, which, if you think about
it, should strike you as sensible: you’ll take either the Thursday lab or the Tuesday lab,
but not both.
A good grasp of logical equivalence allows us also to clear up a related question
about translation, about the use of disjunction for ‘unless’.
‘Unless’ and Exclusive Disjunction

We ordinarily translate ‘unless’ using a ∨. Let’s see why.
Consider the sentence 2.8.8 and think about what we want as the truth values of
‘unless’ in that sentence.
2.8.8 The car will not run unless there is gas in its tank.
We’ll start by translating the ‘unless’ as a ∨, and constructing a standard truth table
for the proposition, at 2.8.9
2.8.9
∼ R ∨ G
0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0
1 0 1 1
1 0 1 0
Now, let’sr uns.

The car think aboutThewhat we not
car will want
runasunless
the truth
it has values
gas. for the
The proposition
car has gas. ex-
pressed by1 6.1.8. 1
1 0
0 1
0 0
In the first row, the car runs and has gas, so the complex proposition 2.8.8 should be
true. In the second row, the car runs but does not have gas. In this case, perhaps the
car runs on an alternative fuel source, or magic. The proposition 2.8.8 should thus be
false in the second row.
In the third row, the car does not run but has gas. Perhaps the car is missing its en-
gine. This case does not falsify the complex proposition, which does not say what else
the car needs to run. 2.8.8 gives a necessary condition for a car to run (having gas),
but not sufficient conditions. Thus 2.8.8 should be considered true in the third row.
In the fourth row, the car does not run and does not have gas. The proposition thus
should be true in the fourth row.
Considering our desired truth values for the sentence, we get a truth table for ‘un-
less’, at 2.8.10
2.8.10
The car r uns. The car will not run unless it has gas. The car has gas.
1 1 1
1 0 0
0 1 1
0 1 0
Notice that the truth table for ‘unless’, at 2.8.10, is precisely the same as the truth
table for the ∨, at 2.8.9. Since the two truth tables are the same, we can use the ∨ to
stand for ‘unless’; it gives us precisely what we want.
Unfortunately, this felicitous result does not hold for all uses of ‘unless’. Let’s ana-
lyze 2.8.11 the same way we analyzed 2.8.8.
2.8.11 Liesse attends school full time unless she gets a job.
Liesse at tends Liesse at tends school full time unless she

school. gets a job. Liesse gets a job.
1 1
1 0
0 1
0 0
This time, we will work from the bottom up. In the fourth row, Liesse does not get
a job but doesn’t go to school. The complex proposition is false, since it says that she
will attend school unless she gets a job. In the third row, she gets a job and doesn’t go
to school, and so the proposition should be true. In the second row, she attends school
but doesn’t get a job, and so the proposition should be true.
In the first row, Liesse gets a job but attends school anyway. What are your intu-
itions about the truth value of 2.8.11 in this case?
In my experience, most people who have not studied formal logic take 2.8.11 to be
false in the first row. It’s clear that if the proposition is true and Liesse does not get a
job, then she will attend school. Many people also believe that if the complex propo-
sition is true and Liesse does get a job, then she will not attend school. Here, ‘unless’
is taken in what is sometimes called a stronger sense. In this case, the truth table for
2.8.11 should be 2.8.12.
2.8.12
Liesse at tends Liesse will at tend school full time unless

school. she gets a job. Liesse gets a job.
1 0 1
1 1 0
0 1 1
0 0 0
The truth table for ‘unless’ as used in 2.8.11 seems to have the same truth conditions
as ⊕, exclusive disjunction, not for ∨. Unless thus appears to be ambiguous in the
same way as ‘or’: there is an inclusive and exclusive ‘unless’.
To regiment 2.8.11, then, it would be natural to use the form of 2.8.7, the exclusive
disjunction, yielding 2.8.13.
2.8.13
(S ∨ J) ∙ ∼ (S ∙ J)
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
There are even simpler ways of representing exclusive disjunctions. Notice that
we understand 2.8.11 really as a biconditional: Liesse attends school if she does not
get a job, and if she attends school she does not get a job. Thus we can use either ‘∼S ≡
J’ or ‘∼(S ≡ J)’, as we see at 2.8.14, since they are logically equivalent to 2.8.13 (and
shorter too!).
2.8.14
∼ S ≡ J ∼ (S ≡ J)
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
In other words, if you have a sentence that you wish to regiment as an exclusive dis-
junction, you can use a proposition of any of the forms: ∼α ≡ β, ∼(α ≡ β); or (α ∨ β)
∙ ∼(α ∙ β); or any alternative form that is logically equivalent to it.
When faced with an unless, then, we ordinarily just take it to be a ∨. But if we are
concerned about getting the truth conditions precisely correct, then we have to de-
cide whether the sentence functions more like 2.8.8, and so deserves the inclusive
disjunction, or more like 2.8.11, in which case we should write it with one of the ac-
ceptable forms for exclusive disjunction. Nothing in our logic can tell you which truth
conditions you want in a translation. That is a matter of interpretation.
Summary
The extensionality of our logic means that our main concern in translation is getting
the truth conditions of our propositions right. There are always different, but logically
equivalent, ways of regimenting a sentence of English into PL. The concept of logical
equivalence is thus central to our work in translation.
Generally, we seek the simplest translations. But the concept of simplicity is not
clear and categorical. Using ⊕ for exclusive disjunction, for example, makes our lan-
guage more complicated. But ‘P ⊕ Q’ is a shorter, and thus simpler, way of expressing
‘∼(P ≡ Q )’ or ‘(P ∨ Q ) ∙ ∼(P ∙ Q )’. This tension in the notion of simplicity becomes
more apparent as we think more about how many logical operators we really need to
express the concepts and entailments of propositional logic.
For Further Research and Writing

1. What is the difference between an intension and an extension? How does this
difference underlie our work in logic?
2. Is the natural language ‘or’ inclusive or exclusive? Provide examples.
3. Are there alternatives to ∨ for translating ‘unless’ into PL? Provide examples,
distinguishing between those that are logically equivalent to a straight ∨ and
those that are not.
Suggested Readings
Fitting, Melvin. “Intensional Logic.” In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato
.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/logic-intensional/. Accessed January 25, 2016.
Traces the history of intensional logics and presents some details of various approaches.
Hurford, James. “Exclusive or Inclusive Disjunction.” Foundations of Language 11 (1974):
409–411. Hurford argues that some uses of ‘or’ are exclusive.
Orlandini, Anna. “Logical, Semantic and Cultural Paradoxes.” Argumentation 17 (2003):
65–86. Orlandini connects the exclusive disjunction to some paradoxes.
Sainsbury, Mark. Logical Forms: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, 2nd ed. Oxford, UK:
Blackwell, 2001. Chapter 2 has a lovely and engaging discussion of many aspects of trans-
lation with propositional logic.
KEY TERMS
antecedent, 2.1 contingency, 2.5 not both, 2.1

atomic formula, 2.2 contradiction, 2.5 operators, 2.1
basic truth table, 2.3 contradictory, 2.5 semantics, 2.3
biconditional, 2.1 counterexample, 2.6 syntax, 2.2
binary operator, 2.1 disjunction, 2.1 tautology, 2.5
bivalent logic, 2.3 formation rules, 2.2 truth table, 2.4
complex formula, 2.2 inconsistent pair, 2.5 truth value, 2.3
compositionality, 2.1 logical truths, 2.5 unary operator, 2.1
conditional, 2.1 logically equivalent, 2.5 unless, 2.1
conjunction, 2.1 main operator, 2.2 valid argument, 2.6
consequent, 2.1 material implication, 2.1 valuation, 2.5
consistent, 2.5 negation, 2.1 wff, 2.2
consistent valuation, 2.7 neither, 2.1
Chapter 3
Inference in Propositional Logic
3.1: RULES OF INFERENCE 1

We have used truth tables, including the indirect method, to separate valid from in-
valid arguments. Our work was guided by a semantic definition of validity: an argu-
ment is valid if there are no assignments of truth values to the propositional variables
on which the premises are true and the conclusion is false. The truth table method gets
increasingly and prohibitively arduous as the complexity of an argument grows. The
indirect method, while pleasant and effective, requires ingenuity and can be nearly
as laborious as the complete truth table method. More importantly, while semantic
tests of validity are effective in propositional logic, they become less useful than other
methods in more sophisticated logical systems.
This chapter explores one salient and enjoyable alternative method for determining
valid inferences: the method of natural deduction. A natural deduction is sometimes
called a derivation or a proof, though the use of the word ‘proof ’ for the derivations
in this book is somewhat loose. Roughly, a derivation, or proof, is a sequence of for- A derivation, or proof, is
mulas, every member of which is an assumed premise or follows from earlier wffs in a sequence of formulas,
every member of which
the sequence according to specified rules; we will adjust this definition in section 3.9.
is an assumed premise
The specified rules comprise a system of inference. Systems of inference are con- or follows from earlier
structed first by specifying a language and then by adding rules governing deriva- formulas in the sequence.
tions: how to get new wffs from the old ones. In addition, in some formal systems,
some basic axioms are given. In formal systems of propositional logic, these axioms A system of inference
is a set of rules for
are ordinarily tautologies. Since tautologies are true in all cases, they can be added to derivations.
any derivation. We will not use any axioms.
Just as we named our languages, we can also name our systems of inferences. Any
logical language may be used with various different systems of inference. But since we
are mainly using only a single system of inference for each language, I won’t bother
to confuse us with more names than we need. We’ll just continue to call our language
PL and leave our one system of inference using PL unnamed.
For natural deductions, our formal system will use the language of propositional
logic, eleven rules of inference, fourteen rules of equivalence, and three proof
11 3
1 1 4 C h apter 3 Inference i n P ropos i t i onal L og i c
In a complete system of methods. The rules are chosen so that our system is complete: every valid argument
inference, every valid and logical truth will be provable using our rules.
argument and every
logical truth is provable.
For PL, the logical truths are just the tautologies; we will expand our definition
of logical truth for the logics in chapters 4 and 5. Our rules are chosen arbitrarily, in
the sense that there are many different complete systems of rules—indeed, infinitely
many. One can devise deductive systems with very few rules; the resulting proofs be-
come very long. One can devise systems so that proofs become very short; in such sys-
tems the required number of rules can be unfeasibly large. I chose a moderate number
of rules (twenty-five) so that there are not too many to memorize and the proofs are
not too long.
I also chose the rules and proof methods in our system of inference to mirror, at
least loosely, natural patterns of inference. You are likely to find some of the rules to
be easy and obvious, though the full collection of rules will include some inferences
you may find awkward at first.
The rules we choose are defined purely syntactically, in terms of their form, but
Rules of inferenceare they are justified semantically. A rule of inference must preserve truth: given true
valid argument forms premises, the rules must never yield a false conclusion. A rule preserves truth if every
that are used to justify
steps in an inference.
argument of its form is valid. We can show that each of the rules of inference preserves
truth using the indirect truth table method. We show that each rule of equivalence
preserves truth using truth tables as well.
This criterion for our rules, that they should preserve the truth of the premises, un-
In a sound system of derlies our goal of soundness for a system of inference. I do not prove the metalogical
inference, every provable results of soundness or completeness for the systems in this book; the proofs require
argument is semantically
more mathematics than we will use.
valid; every provable
proposition is logically Derivations begin with any number of premises and proceed by steps to a conclu-
true. sion. A derivation is valid if every step is either a premise or derived from premises
or previous steps using our rules. I introduce four rules of inference in this section
and four more in the next section. I introduce ten rules of equivalence in the third
and fourth sections of this chapter. In section 6, I introduce the seven remain-
ing rules (three inference rules and four equivalence rules), all of which govern the
biconditional.
Modus Ponens (MP)

Let’s start to examine our first rules. Observe first that each of 3.1.1–3.1.3 are valid
inferences; you can use truth tables to check them.
3.1.1 A ⊃ B
A /B
3.1.2 (E ∙ I) ⊃ D
(E ∙ I) /D
3.1.3 ∼G ⊃ (F ∙ H)
∼G /F∙H
3 . 1 : R u les of Inference 1 1 1 5
Notice that despite their differing complexity, 3.1.1–3.1.3 share a form. The first
premise of each argument is a conditional. The second premise is the antecedent of
that conditional. The conclusion is the consequent of the conditional.
We can write this form at 3.1.4, using metalinguistic (Greek) variables.
3.1.4 α⊃β
α /β Modus Ponens
This form of argument is called modus ponens, abbreviated MP. We can apply Modus ponens (MP) is a
3.1.4 in our object language, PL, by constructing substitution instances of it, par- rule of inference of PL.
ticular applications of the rule which match, syntactically, its form. In particular,
the main operators of each formula in the substitution instance will be the same as the
main operators in the rule. So, a substitution instance of MP will contain one wff
whose main operator is a conditional and another that is precisely the antecedent of
that conditional. The last wff of a substitution instance of MP will contain exactly the
consequent of the conditional statement as a new wff in a derivation.
Notice that any substitution instance of MP yields a valid argument. Logicians A substitution instance
ordinarily prove the validity of rules by mathematical induction. Here, an informal of a rule is a set of wffs of
PL that match the form of
argument should suffice: the only way to construct a counterexample would be on a
the rule.
line on which the main operator of the conclusion were false and the main operator
of the second premise were true. Any such valuation would make the first premise
false and so make the inference valid. (Remember, a counterexample requires true
premises and a false conclusion.)
Given that every substitution instance of MP will be valid, we can substitute simple
or complex formulas for α and β in 3.1.4 and be sure that the resulting deduction is
valid. 3.1.5 is another example of MP, with even greater complexity.
3.1.5 [(H ∨ G) ⊃ I] ⊃ (K ∙ ∼L)
[(H ∨ G) ⊃ I] / (K ∙ ∼L)
Modus Tollens (MT)

We can justify adopting other rules of inference just as we justified modus ponens.
Consider modus tollens, at 3.1.6. Modus tollens (MT) is a
rule of inference of PL.
3.1.6 α⊃β
∼β / ∼α Modus Tollens
Like modus ponens, our first premise is a conditional. But in modus tollens, we
infer the denial of the antecedent of the conditional from the denial of its consequent.
Let’s assume that if you receive your paycheck by Friday, then you will go out to din-
ner on Saturday. Then, if you don’t go out to dinner on Saturday, if the conditional
holds, we can infer that you didn’t get your paycheck by Friday.
For obvious reasons, we are mainly interested in valid rules of inference, like modus
ponens and modus tollens. But it is sometimes useful to contrast the valid forms with
invalid ones, like 3.1.7 and 3.1.8. Again, we can check them, using truth tables, or
indirect truth tables.
3.1.7 α ⊃ β Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent

β / α
3.1.8 α ⊃ β Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent
∼α / ∼β
To show that 3.1.7 is invalid, we can assign false to α and true to β. The premises
turn out true and the conclusion turns out false. The same set of assignments provides
a metalinguistic counterexample for 3.1.8. Any substitution instance of these forms
will thus be invalid and we can construct an object-language counterexample in the
same way.
Let’s look at a couple of concrete instances to get an intuitive sense of the difference
between valid and invalid arguments. Let ‘P’ stand for ‘I study philosophy’ and ‘Q’
stand for ‘I write essays’. We can write the conditional ‘P ⊃ Q’ as 3.1.9.
3.1.9 If I study philosophy, then I write essays.
From 3.1.9 and the claim that I study philosophy, modus ponens licenses the infer-
ence that I write essays. From 3.1.9 and the claim that I do not write essays, modus
tollens licenses the inference that I do not study philosophy. But I would commit the
fallacy of affirming the consequent if I concluded, from 3.1.9 and the claim that I write
essays, that I study philosophy. People write papers without studying philosophy.
Similarly, from 3.1.9 and the claim that I do not study philosophy, it does not follow
that I do not write papers; such an inference would be an instance of the fallacy of
denying the antecedent.
Disjunctive Syllogism (DS)

Disjunctive syllogism Similar arguments thus show that the forms 3.1.10, disjunctive syllogism, and
(DS) is a rule of inference 3.1.11, hypothetical syllogism, are also all valid.
of PL.
3.1.10 α∨β
∼α / β Disjunctive Syllogism
We can check that each form is valid by using truth tables on the metalinguistic
forms. For 3.1.10, if we make the conclusion false and the second premise true, then
α and β are false and the first premise is false. If we try to make the first premise true,
then either the second premise comes out false or the conclusion comes out true.
Disjunctive syllogism captures the form of inference we make when, for example,
we are faced with the choice between soup or salad: if we don’t have the soup, then
we’re having the salad. Or, if you get to a fork in the road and you have only two
options, if you don’t take the left fork, you’re going to take the right. We might be
considering two hypotheses. When we discover evidence against one of them, we
conclude the other.
Often, when we are faced with options, we have more than two from which to
choose. But if you have only two options and you don’t take one, you can infer the
other by what is sometimes called a process of elimination.
Hypothetical Syllogism (HS)

3.1.11 α⊃β
β ⊃ γ / α ⊃ γ Hypothetical Syllogism
In 3.1.11, hypothetical syllogism, if we try to make the conclusion false, we have Hypothetical syllogism
to make α true and γ false. Then, to make the first premise true, we have to make β (HS) is a rule of inference
of PL.
true; that makes the second premise false. If we try to make the second premise true
by making β false, then we make the first premise false. In either case, we cannot con-
struct a counterexample. Thus, any substitution instance of HS will be valid.
Hypothetical syllogism captures the reasoning we perform when we are faced with
a chain of inferences. If going to college entails taking loans, and taking loans entails
having to work to pay them off, then going to college entails having to work to pay off
one’s loans.
Using the Rules in Derivations

We now have four rules of inference: MP, MT, DS, and HS. Let’s see how to combine
uses of them to derive the conclusion of the argument 3.1.12, showing that it is a valid
argument.
3.1.12 1. (X ⊃ Y) ⊃ T
2. S ∨ ∼T
3. U ⊃ ∼S
4. U / ∼(X ⊃ Y)
We could show that the argument is valid using truth tables, including the indirect
truth table method. Instead, in this chapter, we will show that arguments are valid by
constructing derivations of their conclusions, starting with assumed premises. We
will string together inferences, using our rules one at a time, until we reach our de-
sired conclusion. The rules are purely syntactic; we won’t use truth values in our deri-
vations. But the rules are chosen to preserve validity, so any conclusion we reach will
never be false if the premises are true. In other words, every inference will be valid.
3.1.13 is an example of the natural deductions we will use throughout the rest of
the book.
3.1.13 1. (X ⊃ Y) ⊃ T
2. S ∨ ∼T
3. U ⊃ ∼S
4. U / ∼(X ⊃ Y)
5. ∼S 3, 4, MP (taking ‘U’ for α and ‘∼S’ for β)
6. ∼T 2, 5, DS (taking ‘S’ for α and ‘∼T’ for β)
7. ∼(X ⊃ Y) 1, 6, MT (taking ‘X ⊃ Y’ for α and ‘T’ for β)
QED
Let’s notice some properties of the derivation 3.1.13. First, we number all of the
premises as well as every wff that follows. While a derivation is really just the sequence
of wffs, we will write our deductions in the metalanguage, including line numbers
and justifications in a second column. The line numbers allow us to keep track of our
A justification i n a justifications. All steps except the premises require justification. The justification of
derivation includes the any step includes the line numbers and rule of inference used to generate the new wff.
rule used and the earlier
For example, “3, 4, MP” on line 5 indicates that ‘∼S’ is derived directly from the wffs
line numbers to which
the rule is applied. at lines 3 and 4 by a use of the rule of modus ponens. The explanations such as “taking
‘U’ for α and ‘∼S’ for β” are not required elements of the derivation, but they can be
useful, especially when you are first learning to use natural deductions.
The conclusion of the argument is initially written after a single slash following the
last premise. The conclusion, like the justifications of every following step, is not tech-
nically part of the deduction. Importantly, you may not use it as part of your proof. It
merely indicates what the last numbered line of your derivation should be.
QEDis placed at the end of Lastly, QED at the end of the derivation stands for ‘Quod erat demonstrandum’,
a derivation, to show that which is Latin for ‘that which was required to be shown’. ‘QED’ is a logician’s
it is finished.
punctuation mark: “I’m done!” It is not essential to a proof, but looks neat and signals
your intention to end the derivation.
Rules of inference are to be used only on whole lines, not on portions of lines. In
other words, the main operators of the propositions to which you are applying the rule
must match the operators given in the rule. The inference at 3.1.14 violates this condi-
tion and so is illegitimate, even though valid.
3.1.14 1. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)
2. Q
3. P ⊃ R 1, 2, MP Not Acceptable!
We’ll have other ways to make such valid inferences once our proof system is
complete.
3.1.15 is an example of a longer derivation using our first four rules of inference.
3.1.15 1. ∼A ⊃ [A ∨ (B ⊃ C)]
2. (B ∨ D) ⊃ ∼A
3. B ∨ D
4. C ⊃ A /D
5. ∼A 2, 3, MP
6. A ∨ (B ⊃ C) 1, 5, MP
7. B ⊃ C 6, 5, DS
8. B ⊃ A 7, 4, HS
9. ∼B 8, 5, MT
10. D 3, 9, DS
QED
Summary
In this section, we saw the first four of our rules of inference and how they can com-
bine to form derivations of the conclusions of arguments. Constructing derivations
can be intimidating at first. If you can, start with simple sentences or negations of
simple negations. Plan ahead. Working backward from the conclusion on the side can
be helpful. For example, in 3.1.15, we could start the derivation by observing that we
could get the conclusion, ‘D’, by DS from line 3 if we had ‘∼B’. Then, both ‘∼B’ and ‘D’
are goals as we work forward through the proof.
Don’t worry about introducing extraneous lines into your proof as long as they are
the results of valid inferences. Especially as we introduce further rules, we are going
to be able to infer statements that are not needed for the most concise derivation. But
as long as every step is valid, the entire inference will be valid. It is not the case that
every wff must be used after it is introduced into the deduction.
Lastly, notice that some wffs may be used more than once in a derivation. In 3.1.15,
the ‘∼A’ at line 5 was used first with premise 1 in a MP to yield the wff at line 6. Then,
it is used immediately a second time, with the wff at line 6, to yield ‘B ⊃ C’ on line 7.
Some students will have encountered proofs like these, perhaps in slightly less rigor-
ous form, in a geometry class, or in other mathematics courses. For other students, nat-
ural deductions of this sort are new. Be patient, and practice. And practice some more.
KEEP IN MIND
Our formal system for propositional logic will use eleven rules of inference, fourteen rules
of equivalence, and three proof methods.
We have seen four rules of inference: modus ponens (MP); modus tollens (MT);
disjunctive syllogism (DS); hypothetical syllogism (HS).
Every valid argument will be provable using our rules once our rule set is complete.
Rules of inference preserve truth; given true premises, the rules never yield a false
conclusion.
Derivations begin with any number of premises and proceed by steps to a conclusion.
A derivation is valid if every step is either a premise or derived from premises or previous
steps using our rules.
In derivations:
Number all premises and every wff that follows.
The conclusion of the argument is written after a single slash following the last premise.
Justify all steps except the premises.
A justification includes line numbers and the rule of inference used to generate the
new wff.
Use rules of inference only on whole lines, not on portions of lines.
QED may be added to the end of a derivation to mark its conclusion.
Rules Introduced
Modus Ponens (MP)
α⊃β
α / β
Modus Tollens (MT)

α⊃β
∼β / ∼α
Disjunctive Syllogism (DS)

α∨β
∼α / β
Hypothetical Syllogism (HS)

α⊃β
β ⊃ γ / α ⊃ γ
EXERCISES 3.1a
Derive the conclusions of each of the following arguments
using natural deduction.
1. 1. V ⊃ (W ⊃ X) 8. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ∨ R
2. V 2. ∼(P ∙ Q )
3. ∼X / ∼W 3. R ⊃ ∼S / ∼S
2. 1. X ⊃ Y 9. 1. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)
2. ∼Y 2. (Q ⊃ R) ⊃ S
3. X ∨ Z /Z 3. (P ⊃ S) ⊃ (T ⊃ P) / T ⊃ P
3. 1. E ⊃ F
2. ∼F 10. 1. P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)
3. ∼E ⊃ (G ∙ H) / G ∙ H 2. ∼(Q ∙ R)
3. P ∨ (S ≡ T) /S≡T
4. 1. I ⊃ J
2. J ⊃ K 11. 1. (P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
3. ∼K / ∼I 2. P ⊃ S
3. S ⊃ Q /P⊃R
5. 1. (I ∙ L) ⊃ (K ∨ J)
2. I ∙ L 12. 1. G ⊃ E
3. ∼K /J 2. F ⊃ ∼E
6. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ⊃ R 3. H ∨ F
2. R ⊃ S 4. ∼H / ∼G
3. P ∨ Q /S
13. 1. A ⊃ D
7. 1. P ⊃ R 2. D ⊃ (B ⊃ C)
2. Q ⊃ P 3. B
3. (Q ⊃ R) ⊃ S /S 4. A /C
14. 1. L ∨ N 24. 1. J ⊃ L
2. ∼L 2. L ⊃ (I ∙ M)
3. N ⊃ (M ∨ O) 3. (I ∙ M) ⊃ K
4. (M ∨ O) ⊃ (P ≡ Q ) / P ≡ Q 4. ∼K / ∼J
15. 1. R ⊃ S 25. 1. Q ⊃ (∼R ⊃ S)
2. S ⊃ (T ∨ U) 2. T ∨ Q
3. R 3. ∼T
4. ∼T /U 4. R ⊃ T /S
16. 1. U ⊃ V 26. 1. ∼Q ⊃ (N ∙ O)
2. ∼V 2. (N ∙ O) ⊃ (P ⊃ Q )
3. U ∨ W 3. M ∨ ∼Q
4. W ⊃ X /X 4. ∼M / ∼P
17. 1. X ⊃ Z 27. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ∨ (S ∨ ∼T)
2. Z ⊃ Y 2. R ⊃ ∼(P ∨ Q )
3. ∼Y 3. (S ∨ ∼T) ⊃ ∼S
4. ∼X ⊃ A /A 4. R / ∼T
18. 1. P ⊃ (Q ∙ ∼R) 28. 1. (P ∙ ∼R) ⊃ (Q ∨ S)
2. S ⊃ ∼(Q ∙ ∼R) 2. Q ⊃ (S ≡ T)
3. T ∨ S 3. ∼(S ≡ T) ⊃ (P ∙ ∼R)
4. ∼T / ∼P 4. ∼(S ≡ T) / S
19. 1. ∼ ∼R ⊃ (∼P ⊃ Q ) 29. 1. A ⊃ (B ∙ C)

2. ∼R ⊃ P 2. G ∨ ∼H
3. ∼P /Q 3. E ⊃ F
4. H ∨ E
20. 1. (P ≡ R) ∨ (Q ⊃ ∼R) 5. (B ∙ C) ⊃ ∼G
2. (P ≡ R) ⊃ S 6. D ∨ A
3. Q 7. ∼D /F
4. ∼S / ∼R
30. 1. C ⊃ (D ≡ ∼E)
21. 1. P ∨ (Q ⊃ R) 2. (D ≡ ∼E) ⊃ (B ∨ A)
2. ∼Q ⊃ (S ∙ ∼T) 3. C ⊃ ∼B
3. ∼P 4. C /A
4. ∼R / S ∙ ∼T
31. 1. V ⊃ (W ∨ U)
22. 1. P ∨ [Q ∨ (∼R ∨ S)] 2. X ∨ V
2. T ⊃ ∼P 3. X ⊃ Y
3. T ⊃ ∼Q 4. ∼Y
4. T 5. ∼Y ⊃ ∼W / U
5. ∼ ∼R /S 32. 1. X ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)
23. 1. E ⊃ H 2. W ∨ X
2. G ∨ ∼F 3. W ⊃ Y
3. ∼G 4. ∼Y
4. H ⊃ F / ∼E 5. ∼W ⊃ Y / Z
33. 1. (H ∙ ∼G) ⊃ F 37. 1. (P ∙ ∼Q ) ⊃ (R ⊃ S)

2. F ⊃ (G ∨ J) 2. (P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ (R ≡ S)
3. I ∨ (H ∙ ∼G) 3. (R ≡ S) ⊃ (P ∨ ∼Q )
4. I ⊃ G 4. ∼(R ⊃ S) / P ∨ ∼Q
5. ∼G /J 38. 1. (A ∙ ∼B) ⊃ (C ⊃ D)
34. 1. A ⊃ B 2. (A ∙ ∼B) ∨ (D ⊃ ∼C)
2. B ⊃ (C ⊃ D) 3. ∼(C ⊃ D)
3. E ∨ C 4. ∼C ⊃ A / D ⊃ A
4. E ⊃ F 39. 1. (P ∨ R) ⊃ (∼P ⊃ R)
5. ∼F 2. (Q ∨ S) ⊃ (P ∨ R)
6. C ⊃ A /D 3. T ∨ (Q ∨ S)
35. 1. (P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ (R ∨ S) 4. ∼R
2. ∼R ⊃ (∼R ⊃ Q ) 5. ∼T / ∼ ∼P
3. P ⊃ ∼R 40. 1. P ⊃ [∼(Q ⊃ R) ⊃ (Q ∨ ∼R)]
4. P /S 2. (Q ⊃ R) ∨ P
36. 1. (P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ [R ⊃ (S ∨ T)] 3. (Q ⊃ R) ⊃ T
2. P ⊃ (R ≡ ∼S) 4. ∼T
3. (R ≡ ∼S) ⊃ Q 5. ∼Q / ∼R
4. R
5. ∼S /T
EXERCISES 3.1b
Translate each of the following paragraphs into arguments
written in PL. Then, derive the conclusions of the arguments
using the first four rules of our system of natural deduction.
1. If Allison doesn’t go grocery shopping, Billy will go. Allison goes grocery
shopping only if Carla gets home from school early. Carla doesn’t get home
early. Therefore, Billy goes grocery shopping.
2. Don Juan plays golf only if Edie makes a reservation. If Edie makes a reservation,
then Frederique writes it on the calendar. Don Juan played golf. So, Frederique
wrote it down on the calendar.
3. If Gertrude mops the kitchen, then Hillary washes the dishes. Either Inez or
Gertrude mops the kitchen. Inez doesn’t mop the kitchen. So, Hillary washes
the dishes.
4. Katerina driving to practice is a necessary condition for Jelissa’s playing soccer.

Katerina drives only if Liza puts gas in her car. Liza doesn’t put gas in the car.
So, Jelissa doesn’t play soccer.
5. Nico skateboards if Mandy gives him lessons. If Nico skateboards, then either
Olivia or Patricia will watch. Mandy gives skateboarding lessons. Olivia doesn’t
watch. So, Patricia watches.
6. Jose will play either trombone or ukulele. If he plays trombone, then he’ll also
play violin. If he plays ukulele, then he’ll also play a woodwind instrument. He
doesn’t play violin. So, he plays a woodwind instrument.
7. If the corn doesn’t grow, dandelions will grow. If dandelions grow, then the
apple tree will bloom. If the corn grows, then the badgers will eat the crops. The
badgers don’t eat the crops. So, the apple tree blooms.
8. If the zoo has hippos, then it has yaks. If the zoo has yaks, then it has zebras.
The zoo has either water buffalo or hippos. The zoo having water buffalo is a
sufficient condition for their having turtles. But they don’t have turtles. So, the
zoo has zebras.
9. If we are just, then we have settled the nature of justice. Either we are just or
deliberation is useful. We haven’t settled the nature of justice. So, deliberation
is useful.
10. If there are social points of view acceptable to all, then we can construct
principles of justice. If we can construct principles of justice, then we are
free equals. But we are not free equals. So, there are no social points of view
acceptable to all.
11. If there are genocides, then we must develop schemes of humanitarian
intervention. If we must develop schemes of humanitarian intervention, then
being able to develop just war theory is a necessary condition for international
cooperation being possible. There are genocides. International cooperation is
possible. So, just war theory can be developed.
12. If all things are full of gods, then water is holy. If water is holy, then all things
are made of water or all things are caused by water. If all things are made of or
caused by water, then the world itself is divine. But the world is not divine. So,
it is not the case that all things are full of gods.
13. Either our wills are free or responsibility is either meaningless or
incomprehensible. If responsibility is either meaningless or incomprehensible,
then I need not fret about my decisions. If responsibility is meaningless, then I
do have to fret about my decisions. Our wills are not free. So, responsibility is
incomprehensible.
14. If mathematics can be known a priori, then so can logic. If logic is knowable a
priori, then human reason is not purely scientific. If the a priori knowability of
mathematics entails that human reason is not purely scientific, then if logic can
be known a priori, then there are eternal truths. So, if mathematics is knowable
a priori, then there are eternal truths.
15. Either monadism is true just in case atomism is, or space is infinitely divisible
if and only if the world is a plenum. If monadism entails atomism, then space
is not infinitely divisible. Either space is infinitely divisible or it’s not the
case that monadism is true just in case atomism is. If monadism is true, then
there are elementary particles. But if there are elementary particles, then
atomism is true. So, space is infinitely divisible if, and only if, the world is a
plenum.
16. You’re befuddled. Either you are a necessitarian or you are not a proper
apriorist. Either you are a contingentist or you are not a proper empiricist. If
you’re a contingentist, then you don’t believe that logic is a priori. But it’s not
the case that you do not believe that logic is a priori. You’re not a necessitarian.
And if you aren’t a proper apriorist, then if you aren’t a proper empiricist, then
you are befuddled.
3.2: RULES OF INFERENCE 2

In this section, I introduce and discuss four more valid rules of inference. While there
are no new ideas about derivations in this section, each rule has its own characteristics
that must be learned. As we add rules to our system, the proofs become more
interesting and amusing, but also they can be more difficult.
Conjunction (Conj) and Addition (Add)

Conjunction (Conj) is a The rule of inference at 3.2.1, conjunction, should be highly intuitive.
rule of inference of PL.
3.2.1 α
β / α ∙ β Conjunction
Conjunction merely allows us to put two prior premises together on one line. It
hardly seems like an inference worth making: if we have peas and we have carrots,
then we have peas and carrots. But Conj will be useful in a variety of ways.
Addition (Add) is a rule of In contrast, the rule of addition, at 3.2.2, uses a disjunction and requires only one
inference of PL. premise.
3.2.2 α / α ∨ β Addition
If some proposition is already established—say, that Nietzsche is a nihilist—then

we can infer that either Nietzsche is a nihilist or Berkeley is an idealist. We can also
infer that either Nietzsche is a nihilist or Berkeley is a materialist. Since the first
disjunct in the conclusion of an inference licensed by addition is already taken as true,
it doesn’t matter whether the second disjunct is true or false; a disjunction is true as
long as one of the disjuncts is.
Addition can thus license our adding a false proposition into a proof, as a
subformula. This may seem odd. But as long as our argument is not inconsistent,
the addition of such formulas has no ill effect on the system or its soundness. We’ll
see what happens with inconsistent arguments in section 3.5. For now, make sure
to distinguish conjunction from addition; these two rules are easy for beginners to
confuse. We can add anything to an already established wff; conjunction works only
with two formulas that have already appeared.
The inference at 3.2.3 uses Add properly.
3.2.3 1. ∼M ∨ N
2. ∼∼M /N∨O
3. N 1, 2, DS
4. N ∨ O 3, Add
QED
Notice that ‘O’ never appears in the derivation until it is added in the last step. This
oddity of Add is perfectly legitimate and useful. If a proposition is true, then its dis-
junction with any other proposition, no matter its truth value, will also be true.
3.2.4 is just a slightly longer derivation illustrating uses of addition and conjunction.
3.2.4 1. (∼A ∨ B) ⊃ (G ⊃ D)
2. (G ∨ E) ⊃ (∼A ⊃ F)
3. A ∨ G
4. ∼A /F∙D
5. G 3, 4, DS
6. G ∨ E 5, Add
7. ∼A ⊃ F 2, 6, MP
8. F 7, 4, MP
9. ∼A ∨ B 4, Add
10. G ⊃ D 1, 9, MP
11. D 10, 5, MP
12. F ∙ D 8, 11, Conj
QED
Simplification (Simp)
Simplification, the rule of inference shown at 3.2.5, is like the reverse of conjunction, Simplification (Simp) i s a
allowing you to infer the first conjunct of a conjunction. rule of inference of PL.
3.2.5 α ∙ β / α Simplification
If you have peas and carrots, then you have peas. Notice that Simp does not license
the derivation of ‘you have carrots’ from ‘you have peas and you have carrots’; a rule
of equivalence in the next section will allow us to infer the second conjunct. For now,
our list of rules is incomplete. We must leave the second conjunct alone.
3.2.6 is a sample derivation using conjunction and simplification.
3.2.6 1. A ⊃ B
2. F ⊃ D
3. A ∙ E
4. ∼D / B ∙ ∼F
5. A 3, Simp
6. B 1, 5, MP
7. ∼F 2, 4, MT
8. B ∙ ∼F 6, 7, Conj
QED
Be careful to avoid the invalid inferences 3.2.7 and 3.2.8.
3.2.7 α / α ∙ β Invalid!
3.2.8 α ∨ β / α Invalid!
From a single proposition, 3.2.7, we cannot conclude the conjunction of two propo-
sitions unless the second appears earlier in our derivation. And from a disjunction,
3.2.8, we cannot conclude either disjunct unless the negation of the other appears
earlier in our derivation.
Constructive Dilemma (CD)

Constructive dilemma The last of our four new rules of inference in this section, constructive dilemma,
(CD) is a rule of inference shown at 3.2.9, is different from our other rules in having three premises. (Add and
of PL.
Simp have one premise; the other rules all have two premises.)
3.2.9 α⊃β
γ⊃δ
α ∨ γ / β ∨ δ Constructive Dilemma
Note the similarity of CD to modus ponens. In MP, we infer a consequent from
a conditional and (separately) its antecedent. In CD, we conclude the disjunction
of two consequents from two conditionals and (separately) the disjunction of their
antecedents.
3.2.10 is a simple derivation using CD. Note that one of the disjuncts used in the
inference, at line 3, is itself a conjunction; the antecedent of the wff at line 2 is the
same conjunction.
3.2.10 1. N ⊃ (O ∙ P)
2. (Q ∙ R) ⊃ O
3. N ∨ (Q ∙ R) / (O ∙ P) ∨ O
4. (O ∙ P) ∨ O 1, 2, 3, CD
QED
The derivation at 3.2.11 uses all of the rules of inference of this section.
3.2.11 1. P ∨ Q
2. Q ⊃ S
3. R ⊃ T
4. ∼P ∙ U / Q ∙ (S ∨ T)
5. ∼P 4, Simp
6. Q 1, 5, DS
7. Q ∨ R 6, Add
8. S ∨ T 2, 3, 7, CD
9. Q ∙ (S ∨ T) 6, 8, Conj
QED
Summary
The four new rules of inference in this section differ only in their details from the four
rules of section 3.1. Any substitution instance of a rule yields a valid inference. You
can check the validity of each form using the truth table method, or indirect truth
table method, applied to the metalinguistic forms.
Remember, we choose these rules on two bases: the completeness of the resulting
logical system and the way in which they represent or reflect ordinary inferences.
As our derivations become more complex, it will become increasingly important
for you not only to be able to use the rules we have, but also to see substitution in-
stances of the rules quickly and naturally. Constructing derivations requires not just
understanding the rules, but knowing how to use them. It’s like riding a bicycle or
cooking: you can’t just know how to do it in theory; you have actually to do it in order
to get good at it. At the risk of redundancy: practice, practice, practice.
KEEP IN MIND
We have seen four more rules of inference: conjunction (Conj); addition (Add); simplifica-
tion (Simp); constructive dilemma (CD).
We now have eight rules.
Be especially careful not to confuse conjunction and addition.
Rules Introduced
Conjunction (Conj)
α
β / α ∙ β
Addition (Add)
α / α ∨ β
Simplification (Simp)
α ∙ β / α
Constructive Dilemma (CD)

α⊃β
γ⊃δ
α ∨ γ / β ∨ δ
EXERCISES 3.2a
For each of the following arguments, determine which, if
any, of the eight rules of inference is being followed. Though
there are many valid inferences other than our eight rules,
in these exercises, if the inference is not in the form of one
of the eight rules, it is invalid.
The invalid inferences in these exercises are common
errors that logic students make when learning the rules of
inference, so it might be worth your time to study and
understand the errors in order to avoid them yourself.
1. A ⊃ (B ∙ C)
∼(B ∙ C) / ∼A
2. (D ∨ E) ⊃ F
F ⊃ (G ≡ H)
(D ∨ E) ∨ F / F ∨ (G ≡ H)
3. I ⊃ ∼J
K ⊃ I / K ⊃ ∼J
4. L
∼M ∙ N / ∼(M ∙ N) ∙ L
5. O / O ∙ ∼O
6. P / P ∨ [Q ≡ (R ∙ ∼P)]
7. S ∨ ∼T
∼ ∼T / ∼S
8. ∼U ≡ V
(∼U ≡ V) ⊃ W /W
9. X ⊃ ∼Y
∼Y ⊃ Z / (X ⊃ ∼Y) ∙ (∼Y ⊃ Z)
10. (A ∨ ∼B) ∨ ∼∼C / A ∨ ∼B
11. ∼[D ⊃ (E ∨ F)]

[D ⊃ (E ∨ F)] ∨ [G ⊃ (E ∙ ∼F)] / G ⊃ (E ∙ ∼F)
12. [(G ∨ H) ∙ I] ∙ (∼I ≡ K) / (G ∨ H) ∙ I
13. P /P∨P
14. P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)
Q ∙ R /P
15. P ⊃ (Q ∨ R)
∼P / ∼(Q ∨ R)
16. ∼(P ∨ ∼Q ) ⊃ R
∼(P ∨ ∼Q ) /R
17. (P ∙ ∼Q ) ⊃ R
P ∙ ∼Q /R
18. P ⊃ Q
R ⊃ ∼S
P ∨ R / Q ∙ ∼S
19. P ⊃ ∼Q
Q ⊃ ∼S / P ⊃ ∼S
20. P ∙ Q / (P ∙ Q ) ∨ ∼(P ∙ Q )
EXERCISES 3.2b
using the eight rules of inference.
1. 1. P ∙ Q
2. R /P∙R
2. 1. P ⊃ ∼Q
2. ∼Q ⊃ R / (P ⊃ R) ∨ (S ⊃ T)
3. 1. (A ⊃ C) ⊃ D
2. ∼B ⊃ C
3. A ⊃ ∼B / D
4. 1. (E ∨ F) ⊃ ∼G
2. H ⊃ G
3. E / ∼H
5. 1. I ∨ J
2. ∼I ∙ K /J∨L
6. 1. W ⊃ X
2. ∼X ∙ Y / (∼W ∨ Z) ∙ ∼X
7. 1. T ∨ S
2. ∼T
3. U /U∙S
8. 1. ∼P ⊃ ∼Q
2. ∼R ⊃ ∼S
3. T ∨ (∼P ∨ ∼R)
4. ∼T / ∼Q ∨ ∼S
9. 1. N ∨ ∼ ∼P
2. ∼N ∙ Q
3. ∼P ∨ Q / ∼∼P ∙ Q
10. 1. (P ≡ Q ) ⊃ R
2. Q ∨ ∼R
3. ∼Q
4. ∼P ⊃ (P ≡ Q ) / ∼∼P
11. 1. P ⊃ Q
2. ∼R ⊃ S
3. P ∨ ∼R
4. ∼Q /S
12. 1. P ⊃ Q
2. ∼Q ∙ R / ∼P ∨ R
13. 1. ∼P ∨ Q
2. ∼P ⊃ R
3. ∼R /Q∨S
14. 1. P ∙ ∼Q
2. ∼Q ∙ R
3. (P ∙ ∼Q ) ⊃ S /S∙P
15. 1. ∼P ⊃ Q
2. ∼Q ⊃ R
3. (∼P ∨ ∼Q ) ∙ S / Q ∨ R
16. 1. (P ∙ ∼Q ) ∙ R
2. P ⊃ S
3. R ⊃ T /S∨T
17. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ⊃ R
2. (P ∨ S) ⊃ T
3. P ∙ V /R∙T
18. 1. ∼P ⊃ Q
2. ∼R ⊃ S
3. Q ⊃ ∼R
4. ∼P / ∼R ∨ S
19. 1. (E ∨ I) ⊃ H
2. H ⊃ (F ∙ G)
3. E / (F ∙ G) ∙ E
20. 1. M ⊃ N
2. O ⊃ P
3. M ∙ Q /N∨P
21. 1. ∼A ⊃ B
2. C ⊃ D
3. A ⊃ D
4. ∼D /B∨D
22. 1. M ⊃ N
2. N ⊃ O
3. M ∙ P /O∨P
23. 1. B ⊃ A
2. ∼A ∙ D
3. ∼B ⊃ C / C ∨ A
24. 1. D ∨ E
2. D ⊃ F
3. ∼F ∙ G / (E ∨ H) ∙ ∼F
25. 1. O ⊃ Q
2. Q ⊃ P
3. P ⊃ (R ∙ S)
4. O /R∙S
26. 1. (R ∨ T) ⊃ S
2. S ⊃ U
3. R /U∨T
27. 1. P ∙ Q
2. ∼P ∙ R /S
28. 1. [(∼Q ∙ ∼P) ⊃ R] ∙ (S ∨ ∼T)
2. P ⊃ Q
3. ∼Q /R∨T
29. 1. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)
2. P ⊃ (R ⊃ ∼S)
3. Q ∨ R
4. P ∙ T / R ∨ ∼S
30. 1. (∼P ∨ Q ) ⊃ (S ⊃ T)

2. P ⊃ T
3. ∼T / ∼S
31. 1. (P ≡ Q ) ⊃ (R ∨ T)
2. (P ≡ R) ∨ (P ≡ Q )
3. ∼(P ≡ R)
4. ∼R /T
32. 1. ∼P ∨ (R ∙ S)
2. ∼Q ∙ (R ∨ S)
3. ∼P ⊃ Q / R
33. 1. P ⊃ (Q ∨ ∼R)
2. Q ⊃ (S ∨ ∼T)
3. P ∨ Q
4. ∼(Q ∨ ∼R)
5. ∼S / ∼T
34. 1. W ⊃ Z
2. Z ⊃ (X ∨ Y)
3. W ∙ Y
4. X ⊃ U
5. Y ⊃ V /U∨V
35. 1. R ⊃ S
2. S ⊃ (T ⊃ U)
3. R
4. U ⊃ R /T⊃R
36. 1. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)
2. S ⊃ (P ⊃ T)
3. P ∨ S
4. ∼(Q ⊃ R)
5. ∼T /S
37. 1. ∼P ⊃ (Q ∨ S)
2. ∼R ⊃ ∼Q
3. P ⊃ R
4. ∼R /S
38. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ∨ (R ∨ S)
2. (P ∨ Q ) ⊃ T
3. R ⊃ T
4. ∼T /S
39. 1. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ ∼U)
2. R ⊃ (Q ⊃ S)
3. (P ∨ R) ∙ T
4. ∼(Q ⊃ ∼U)
5. Q / S ∨ ∼U
40. 1. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)
2. S ⊃ (T ⊃ U)
3. W ⊃ X
4. ∼(Q ⊃ R)
5. P ∨ S
6. T ∨ W / U ∨ X
EXERCISES 3.2c
using the eight rules of inference.
1. If Alessandro sings in the musical, then Beatriz will buy a ticket. Beatriz doesn’t
buy a ticket and Carlo goes to watch the musical. So, Alessandro doesn’t sing in
the musical and Beatriz doesn’t buy a ticket.
2. If Don is an EMT, then everyone is saved. All girls are saved provided that
Frank is an EMT. Helga’s being a doctor implies that Don is an EMT. Helga is
a doctor; moreover, all girls are saved. So, either everyone is saved or all girls
are saved.
3. If the classroom is quiet, then it is not rowdy. If the classroom isn’t rowdy, then
it’s silent. The classroom is quiet and not tumultuous. So, the classroom is quiet
and silent.
4. Having a thunderstorm is a sufficient condition for needing an umbrella. Either
it is very cloudy or you don’t need an umbrella. It’s not very cloudy. So, either
there aren’t thunderstorms or it’s windy.
5. Either elephants or flamingos eat nuts. If elephants eat nuts, then gorillas eat
fruit. Gorillas don’t eat fruit, but hippos eat berries. So, either flamingos eat
nuts or hippos eat berries.
6. Elia playing basketball is a necessary condition of her taking art. She’ll walk the
dog on the condition that she takes ceramics. She doesn’t play basketball. She
takes ceramics. So, she doesn’t take art, but she does walk the dog.
7. Jaime either flies a kite or lies in the sun and listens to music. He doesn’t fly a
kite, but he juggles. If he lies in the sun, then he juggles. So, he either juggles or
listens to music.
8. If Xavier takes Spanish, then Yolanda tutors him. Zeke pays Yolanda if she tu-
tors Xavier. Either Waldo or Xavier takes Spanish. Waldo doesn’t take Spanish;
also Yolanda doesn’t tutor Xavier. So, Zeke pays Yolanda, but Waldo doesn’t
take Spanish.
9. If God is either benevolent or omnipotent, then we have both freedom and
knowledge. Either God is morally neutral or benevolent. But God is not mor-
ally neutral. So, we are free.
10. If I do not have sense experience of apples, then I do not know about apples. If I
have an idea of an apple, then the apple is real. If you tell me about apples, then
either I do not have sense experience of apples or I have an idea of an apple. You
tell me about apples. It is not the case that I do not know about apples. So, an
apple is real.
11. If we eat meat, then the environment is degraded. If we are vegetarians, then
fewer livestock are raised. If humanity persists, then either we eat meat or are
vegetarians. Humanity persists. So, either the environment is degraded or
fewer livestock are raised.
12. Either art is dead or a new form will appear. If art is dead, then it is not the
case that some sculpture by Botero is valuable. But the claim that it’s not the case
that some sculpture by Botero is valuable is false. So, a new form will appear
and art is not dead.
13. If Mill is right, then consequences have moral weight; also, I like Mill’s work. If
Kant is right, then pleasure is not important; I’m not a fan of Kant’s work. Either
Mill is right or Kant is. So, either consequences have moral weight or pleasure
is not important.
14. If values are transcendent, then truth does not matter. Either values are tran-
scendent or the world has no meaning. But it is not the case that truth does not
matter. So, either the world has no meaning or truth is pleonastic.
15. If names are either purely referential or contain descriptive content, then both
Mill and Frege are worth reading. Names are purely referential and do not contain
descriptive content. So, Mill is worth reading and names are purely referential.
16. If there is a self, then I could be eternal. If I could be eternal, then I am not my
body. If I could be eternal, then I am not my soul. Either there is a self or I could
be eternal. So, either I am not my body or I am not a soul.
3 . 3 : R u les of E q u i v alence 1 1 3 5
3.3: RULES OF EQUIVALENCE 1

Rules of inference allow you to derive new conclusions based on previously accepted
premises or derivations. They are justified by appeal to the truth table definitions of
validity: using a rule of inference can never lead you from true premises to a false
conclusion. They must be used on whole lines only, when the main operators of the
lines of the derivation you wish to use match the operators that appear in the rules.
Further, uses of the rules go only in one direction, from premises to conclusion.
Rules of equivalence are pairs of logically equivalent forms of propositions; you A rule of equivalence
may substitute a proposition of the form of one of the pair for a proposition of the is a pair of logically
equivalent proposition
other form of the pair. You may use rules of equivalence on parts of a proposition, too.
forms.
The rules may be used in either direction; propositions of the form of either of any of
the pairs may be substituted for propositions of the other.
Since the rules of equivalence are based on truth table equivalences, we can check
the legitimacy of the substitutions by looking at truth tables to see that the expres-
sions are in fact logically equivalent. The appendix to this book has truth tables show-
ing the non-obvious rules of equivalence.
There are five rules of equivalence in this section, though some of the rules have
multiple forms. Five more are discussed in the next section, and four more are cov-
ered in section 3.6. As with the rules of inference, I present the rules of equivalence
in a metalanguage, using Greek letters to emphasize that any consistent substitution
of wffs for the metalinguistic variables is acceptable. I introduce a new metalinguistic
→ ’, to mean ‘is logically equivalent to’. This symbol does not belong to PL
symbol, ‘ ← → is a metalogical sym-
←
and is used only in formulating the rules, not in expressions of the object language. bol used for ‘is logically
equivalent to’.
De Morgan’s Laws (DM)

De Morgan’s laws summarize the equivalences of propositions using ‘neither’ and De Morgan’s laws (DM)
‘not both’. a re rules of equivalence
of PL.
∼(α ∙ β) → ∼α ∨ ∼β
← De Morgan’s Laws
∼(α ∨ β) → ∼α ∙ ∼β
←
Notice that there are two versions of De Morgan’s law: one for the negation of a
conjunction, and the other for the negation of a disjunction. We often think of the
negation of the conjunction, the first form above, as a statement of the form ‘not both’.
The negation of a disjunction is a ‘neither’ sentence.
Since you can substitute any formula of the form of either side for a formula of the
other, as with all rules of equivalence, you can go forward (left-to-right) or backward
(right-to-left). A forward DM distributes the tilde to the components of the conjunc-
tion or disjunction, changing the operator inside the parentheses. A backward DM
factors out the tilde. Both the forward and backward uses require the same justifica-
tion. 3.3.1 contains a forward use of DM, while 3.3.2 contains a backward use.
3.3.1 1. (A ∨ B) ⊃ E
2. ∼E
3. A ∨ D /D
4. ∼(A ∨ B) 1, 2, MT
5. ∼A ∙ ∼B 4, DM
6. ∼A 5, Simp
7. D 3, 6, DS
QED
3.3.2 1. G ⊃ ∼(H ∙ F)
2. ∼(∼H ∨ ∼F) / ∼G
3. ∼∼(H ∙ F) 2, DM
4. ∼G 1, 3, MT
QED
Association (Assoc)
Association (Assoc) a re Association allows you to regroup series of conjunctions or disjunctions.
rules of equivalence of PL. → (α ∨ β) ∨ γ Association
α ∨ (β ∨ γ) ←
→ (α ∙ β) ∙ γ
α ∙ (β ∙ γ) ←
As with DM, Assoc has a version for conjunction and a version for disjunction. Un-
like DM, Assoc requires no switching of operators. It merely allows you to regroup
the component propositions; the two operators must be the same. Assoc is often used
to organize a series of conjunctions before simplifying one of the conjuncts, or with
DS, as in 3.3.3.
3.3.3 1. (L ∨ M) ∨ N
2. ∼L
3. (M ∨ N) ⊃ O /O
4. L ∨ (M ∨ N) 1, Assoc
5. M ∨ N 4, 2, DS
6. O 3, 5, MP
QED
Distribution (Dist)
Distribution (Dist) a re The rules of distribution allow you to distribute a conjunction over a disjunction or
rules of equivalence of PL. to distribute a disjunction over a conjunction.
→ (α ∙ β) ∨ (α ∙ γ) Distribution
α ∙ (β ∨ γ) ←
→ (α ∨ β) ∙ (α ∨ γ)
α ∨ (β ∙ γ) ←
The main operator is always switched (between conjunction and disjunction) after
a use of Dist. So, using Dist on a sentence whose main operator is a disjunction yields
a conjunction from which you can simplify.
Notice that while the grouping of terms changes, the order of the first two opera-
tors remains after using Dist, with an extra operator of the first type added at the end
(going left to right) or taken away (going right to left). So, ∙∨ becomes ∙∨∙ and ∨∙
becomes ∨∙∨ (and vice versa).
Be careful to distinguish Dist from Assoc. Assoc is used when you have two of the
same operators. Dist is used when you have a combination of conjunction and dis-
junction. 3.3.4 contains a forward use of Dist, while 3.3.5 contains a backward use.
3.3.4 1. H ∙ (I ∨ J)
2. ∼(H ∙ I) /H∙J
3. (H ∙ I) ∨ (H ∙ J) 1, Dist
4. H ∙ J 3, 2, DS
QED
3.3.5 1. (P ∨ Q) ∙ (P ∨ R)
2. ∼P /Q∙R
3. P ∨ (Q ∙ R) 1, Dist
4. Q ∙ R 3, 2, DS
QED
Commutativity (Com)
Commutativity often combines with rules of inference to facilitate some obvious in- Commutativity (Com)
ferences that we could not yet make. a re rules of equivalence
of PL.
α ∨ β → β ∨ α Commutativity
←
α ∙ β → β∙α
←
In effect, Com doubles the rules DS, Simp, and Add. From a disjunction, we can
now infer the first disjunct from the negation of the second, as at 3.3.6. From a con-
junction, we can now infer the second conjunct using Simp, as at 3.3.7. And we can
add a proposition in front of a given wff, as at 3.3.8.
3.3.6 1. P ∨ Q
2. ∼Q
3. Q ∨ P 1, Com
4. P 3, 4, DS
3.3.7 1. P ∙ Q
2. Q ∙ P 1, Com
3. Q 2, Simp
3.3.8 1. P
2. P ∨ Q 1, Add
3. Q ∨ P 2, Com
Each of the three derivations 3.3.6–3.3.8 can be inserted into any derivation. 3.3.9
demonstrates the use of commutativity with simplification and disjunctive syllogism.
3.3.9 1. A ∙ B
2. B ⊃ (D ∨ E)
3. ∼E /D
4. B ∙ A 1, Com
5. B 4, Simp
6. D ∨ E 2, 5, MP
7. E ∨ D 6, Com
8. D 7, 3, DS
QED
Double Negation (DN)

Double negation (DN) is a Double negation allows you to add two consecutive negations to formula or to re-
rule of equivalence of PL. move two consecutive negations.
→ ∼∼α
α ← Double Negation
Be sure to use DN with two consecutive tildes. Do not remove two tildes separated
by a parenthesis or other punctuation. And never insert one negation in front of punc-
tuation and one after. You may add two consecutive tildes either inside or outside of a
bracket. Just do not divide them around punctuation.
Double negation is often used right-to-left as a way of clearing extraneous tildes.
But be careful not to add or subtract single tildes. They must be added or removed in
consecutive pairs.
There are three ways to use DN to add two tildes to a statement with a binary op-
erator. 3.3.10 can be transformed, in a single use of DN, into 3.3.11, 3.3.12, or 3.3.13.
Two uses of DN yields 3.3.14.
3.3.10 P ∨ Q
3.3.11 ∼∼P ∨ Q by double-negating the ‘P’
3.3.12 P ∨ ∼∼Q by double-negating the ‘Q’
3.3.13 ∼∼(P ∨ Q) by double-negating the whole disjunction
3.3.14 ∼∼(∼∼P ∨ Q) by double-negating both the ‘P’ and the disjunction
DN, like Com, allows us to expand our uses of other rules, as we can see in 3.3.15.
3.3.15 1. ∼F ⊃ ∼G
2. G
3. F ⊃ H /H
4. ∼∼G 2, DN
5. ∼∼F 1, 4, MT
6. F 5, DN
7. H 3, 6, MP
QED
Rules of Equivalence and Rules of Inference

Be careful to distinguish the rules of equivalence, which we saw in this section, from
the rules of inference, which we saw in the previous two sections. One difference is
that each rule of equivalence can be used in two different directions. Another differ-
ence is that the rules of equivalence are justified by showing that expressions of each
form are logically equivalent, which I have done for most of the rules of equivalence
in the appendix. A third difference is that rules of equivalence apply to any part of a
proof, not just to whole lines. Rules of inference must be used on whole lines, as we
saw in example 3.1.15. In contrast, we can use any rule of equivalence on only a part
of a line, as with DM in 3.3.16 and DN and DM in 3.3.17.
3.3.16 P ⊃ ∼(Q ∨ P)
P ⊃ (∼Q ∙ ∼P) DM
3.3.17 S ⊃ (∼P ∙ Q)
S ⊃ (∼P ∙ ∼∼Q) DN
S ⊃ ∼(P ∨ ∼Q) DM
Summary
Rules of equivalence are transformation rules that allow us to replace some formulas
and subformulas with logical equivalents. These transformations help expand the
applications of our rules of inference. They are also, in many cases, formal versions
of natural-language equivalencies. We’ve seen five rules of equivalence in this sec-
tion, though each rule has at least two different applications (in each direction), and
some of the rules, like De Morgan’s laws and distribution, are actually two pairs of
rules. We’ll see five more rules of equivalence in the next section, and four more in
section 3.6.
While the thirteen rules to this point are not very many to manage, they allow so
many more derivations than just the first few rules that the proofs can be subtle and
interesting. Even the strongest logic students should find some of the derivations in
this section challenging.
KEEP IN MIND
Rules of equivalence allow you to substitute one proposition or part of a proposition with a
logically equivalent expression.
We saw five rules of equivalence in this section: De Morgan’s laws (DM); association
(Assoc); distribution (Dist); commutativity (Com); double negation (DN).
Forward DM distributes a tilde to the components of a conjunction or disjunction.
Backward DM factors out the tilde.
All uses of DM switch a conjunction to a disjunction or a disjunction to a conjunction.
Assoc is used when you have two conjunctions or two disjunctions.

Dist is used when you have a combination of conjunction and disjunction.
Differences between rules of equivalence and rules of inference include the following:
Rules of inference are based on the truth table definition of validity; they are
unidirectional.
Rules of equivalence are based on truth table equivalences and may be used in either
direction.
Unlike rules of inference, rules of equivalence may be used on parts of lines or on whole
lines.
Rules Introduced
De Morgan’s Laws (DM)
∼(α ∙ β) → ∼α ∨ ∼β
←
∼(α ∨ β) → ∼α ∙ ∼β
←
Association (Assoc)
α ∨ (β ∨ γ) → (α ∨ β) ∨ γ
←
α ∙ (β ∙ γ) → (α ∙ β) ∙ γ
←
Distribution (Dist)
α ∙ (β ∨ γ) → (α ∙ β) ∨ (α ∙ γ)
←
α ∨ (β ∙ γ) → (α ∨ β) ∙ (α ∨ γ)
←
Commutativity (Com)
α ∨ β → β∨α
←
α ∙ β → β∙α
←
Double Negation (DN)
→ ∼∼α
α ←
EXERCISES 3.3a
using the rules of inference and the first five rules of
equivalence.
1. 1. A ⊃ B
2. C ∙ A /B
2. 1. ∼(P ∨ Q )
2. R ⊃ P / ∼R
3. 1. H ∨ J
2. I ∙ ∼H /J
4. 1. X ⊃ Y
2. Z ∙ ∼Y / ∼X ∙ Z
5. 1. R ∨ B
2. B ⊃ M
3. R ⊃ D
4. ∼M /D
6. 1. Q ⊃ R
2. ∼(S ∨ T)
3. T ∨ Q /R
7. 1. X ⊃ Y
2. (∼Y ∙ Z) ∙ T
3. X ∨ W /W
8. 1. ∼A ∨ B
2. ∼[(∼A ∨ C) ∨ D] / B
9. 1. A ∨ (B ∙ C)
2. (C ∨ A) ⊃ ∼∼B /B
10. 1. A ⊃ (C ∨ B)
2. ∼C ∙ A
3. B ⊃ D /D
11. 1. (A ⊃ B) ∨ T
2. ∼T
3. B ⊃ C /A⊃C
12. 1. ∼A ⊃ C
2. B ∙ ∼C
3. A ⊃ D /D∙B
13. 1. ∼D ∙ ∼E
2. (D ∨ F) ∨ E /F
14. 1. E ∙ D
2. D ⊃ ∼A
3. (B ∨ A) ∨ C /B∨C
15. 1. P ∨ (Q ∙ R)
2. P ⊃ S
3. R ⊃ T /S∨T
16. 1. C ⊃ (∼A ∨ ∼C)

2. C ∙ D
3. D ⊃ B / ∼(A ∙ C) ∙ B
17. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ⊃ R
2. R ⊃ S
3. ∼S / ∼(R ∨ P)
18. 1. R ∙ (S ∨ T)
2. ∼R ∨ ∼S /T
19. 1. (A ∙ B) ∨ (A ∙ C)
2. D ⊃ ∼A / ∼D
20. 1. ∼(E ∨ F) ⊃ D
2. ∼∼G ∙ ∼F
3. E ⊃ ∼G /D
21. 1. P ∙ (∼Q ∨ R)
2. ∼P ∨ Q /P∙R
22. 1. I ∙ {∼[ J ∙ (K ∨ L)] ∙ M}
2. (∼J ∨ ∼L) ⊃ N /N
23. 1. ∼[(G ∙ H) ∙I]
2. G ∙ I / ∼H
24. 1. (K ∙ L) ∙M
2. K ⊃ N
3. N ⊃ ∼(O ∨ P) / ∼P
25. 1. [T ∙ (U ∨ V)] ⊃ W
2. W ⊃ ∼X
3. Y ∙ X / ∼(T ∙ U) ∙ ∼(T ∙ V)
26. 1. O ⊃ P
2. (O ∙ ∼Q ) ∙ ∼R
3. P ⊃ [Q ∨ (R ∨ S)] / S
27. 1. U ⊃ V
2. V ⊃ ∼(W ∙ X)
3. U ∙ (W ∙ Y) / ∼X ∙ Y
28. 1. A ⊃ D
2. D ⊃ ∼(A ∙ B)
3. A ∙ (B ∨ C) /A∙C
29. 1. C ∨ (D ∙ B)
2. (C ∨ D) ⊃ ∼C /D∙B
30. 1. E ∨ (F ∨ G)
2. ∼(∼∼G ∨ ∼H)
3. [(E ∨ F) ∙ ∼G] ⊃ A /A
31. 1. ∼X ∙ (Y ∨ Z)
2. ∼Y ∨ ∼∼X
3. (∼X ∙ Z) ⊃ W /T∨W
32. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ∨ R
2. ∼P
3. Q ⊃ S
4. R ⊃ T
5. ∼S /T
33. 1. J ⊃ K
2. K ⊃ [L ∨ (M ∙ N)]
3. ∼N ∙ J /L
34. 1. [O ∨ (P ∙ Q )] ⊃ R
2. R ⊃ ∼S
3. P ∙ S / ∼Q
35. 1. A ⊃ B
2. ∼[(C ∙ D) ∨ (C ∙ B)]
3. C ∙ E / ∼A
36. 1. F ⊃ G
2. H ⊃ I
3. (J ∨ F) ∨ H
4. ∼J ∙ ∼G /I
37. 1. ∼(A ∨ B)
2. D ⊃ B
3. A ∨ (∼E ∨ D)
4. [∼(∼C ∨ E) ⊃ F] ∙ C / F
38. 1. A ∙ ∼C
2. ∼(C ∙ D) ⊃ E
3. ∼(F ∨ C) ⊃ ∼E /F∙E
39. 1. M ∨ (Q ⊃ ∼P)
2. (∼Q ∙ L) ⊃ (∼Q ⊃ ∼O)
3. (P ∨ M) ∙ (M ∨ L)
4. ∼M / ∼O
40. 1. (O ∙ P) ⊃ (Q ∙ R)
2. P ⊃ ∼Q
3. O ⊃ ∼R
4. P ∨ O / ∼P ∨ ∼O
EXERCISES 3.3b
using the eight rules of inference and the first five rules of
equivalence.
1. If Albert asks Bernice on a date, then she’ll say yes. Bernice doesn’t say yes to a
date and her cat died, but her dog is still alive. So, Albert didn’t ask Bernice on
a date.
2. Callie majors in English only if she reads Charles Dickens. Either Callie and
Elisa major in English or Callie and Franz major in English. So, Callie reads
Charles Dickens.
3. If there is a mouse in the house, then nuts were left out. The lights were turned
off unless no nuts were left out. Neither the lights were turned off nor were the
doors left open. So, there was no mouse in the house.
4. It is not the case that either there was a paper or both a quiz and recitation
in French class. If there is no quiz, then the students are happy. If there is no
recitation, the teacher is happy. So, either the students or the teacher is happy.
5. Roland will either go on the upside-down roller coaster, or the speedy vehicle or
the water slide. He doesn’t go on the upside-down roller coaster and he doesn’t
go on the speedy vehicle. If he goes on the tilt-a-whirl, then he won’t go on the
water slide. So, he doesn’t go on the tilt-a-whirl.
6. If Luz doesn’t travel to Greece, then she’ll go to Haiti. She’ll go to Israel given
that she travels to Haiti. She doesn’t go to either Greece or Jordan. So, she goes
to Israel and not Jordan.
7. It is not the case that either Ernesto and Francisco go to swim practice or Gillian
or Hayden go to swim practice. Either Isaac or Joan goes to swim practice. If
Isaac goes to swim practice, then Hayden will go to swim practice. So, Joan
goes to swim practice.
8. If it’s not the case that both Katrina and Laetitia go to math class, then Ms.
Macdonald will be angry. Ms. Macdonald is angry only when Nigel skips math
class. It is not the case that either Olivia and Polly both skip math class, or Nigel
does. Therefore, Laetitia goes to math class.
9. Time is not both dynamic and static. But time is both subjective and dynamic.
So, time is not static.
10. Anaximander, Thales, or Pythagoras believes that everything is made of water.
But neither Anaximander nor Pythagoras believes that everything is made of
water. So, either Thales or Protagoras believes that everything is made of water.
11. If meaning is atomic and compositional, then there are no incompatible
translation manuals. But there are incompatible translation manuals. And
meaning is compositional. So, meaning is not atomic.
12. Either Sartre believes in freedom just in case Camus does, or existentialism
is problematic. But existentialism is neither incoherent nor problematic. So,
Sartre believes in freedom if, and only if, Camus does.
13. Descartes and either Spinoza or Leibniz defend the ontological argument. But
if Descartes and Spinoza defend the ontological argument, then rationalism
is not theistic. If Descartes and Leibniz defend the ontological argument,
then rationalism is not libertarian. So, rationalism is not both theistic and
libertarian.
14. If truth is not subjective, then there are universally valid principles of justice. If
truth is not relative, then we can know the principles of justice. If truth is both
subjective and relative, then there are no moral facts. But there are moral facts.
So, either there are universally valid principles of justice or we can know the
principles of justice.
15. Either morality is individualistic or Nietzsche is not right about morality.
Either morality is individualistic or Thrasymachus is not right about
morality. Nietzsche and Thrasymachus are not both wrong. So, morality is
individualistic.
16. The self is either the soul or consciousness, or it’s irreducible or nonexistent.
If the self is either the soul or consciousness, then empirical science is
useless. If the self is irreducible, then it is really consciousness. Empirical
science is not useless. So, neither empirical science is useless nor is the soul
not nonexistent.
3.4: RULES OF EQUIVALENCE 2

This section introduces the next five rules of equivalence. Once we have these five rules,
we have nearly a complete set of rules for derivations in PL. The derivations in this
section are among the most difficult in the book. In the next section, I will demonstrate
a few short techniques that will be useful to learn. In the following section, we will
discuss seven further rules (three rules of inference and four rules of equivalence)
that govern the biconditional. Then, we will explore two additional proof methods,
techniques that make derivations less challenging and complete our system.
Contraposition (Cont)
Contraposition (Cont) is a Contraposition is based on the equivalence of a conditional and its contrapositive.
rule of equivalence of PL. → ∼β ⊃ ∼α Contraposition
α ⊃ β ←
In other words, the antecedent and consequent of a conditional statement may be
exchanged if they are both negated (or, right-to-left, un-negated). Cont is often used
with HS, as in 3.4.1.
3.4.1 1. A ⊃ B
2. D ⊃ ∼B / A ⊃ ∼D
3. ∼∼B ⊃ ∼D 2, Cont
4. B ⊃ ∼D 3, DN
5. A ⊃ ∼D 1, 4, HS
QED
Cont can be tricky when only one formula is negated, as we can see in 3.4.2 and
3.4.3, which perform the same transformation in different orders. You can either add
a negation to both the antecedent and consequent when you use Cont or you can take
a tilde off of each of them. But you cannot mix-and-match. Thus, you often need to
invoke DN together with Cont.
3.4.2 A ⊃ ∼B
∼∼B ⊃ ∼A by Cont (left-to-right)
B ⊃ ∼A by DN
3.4.3 A ⊃ ∼B
∼∼A ⊃ ∼B by DN
B ⊃ ∼A by Cont (right-to-left)
Material Implication (Impl)

Material implication The rule of material implication allows you to change a disjunction to a conditional,
(Impl) is a rule of or vice versa, showing the relation between implication and disjunction.
equivalence of PL.
→ ∼α ∨ β
α ⊃ β ← Material Implication
It is often easier to work with disjunctions. From a disjunction, you may be able to
use De Morgan’s laws to get a conjunction. You may be able to use distribution, which
does not apply to conditionals. In contrast, sometimes you just want to work with
conditionals, using hypothetical syllogism, modus ponens, or modus tollens. Proofs

are overdetermined by our system: there are multiple ways to do them once we have
all the rules. The rule of material implication gives us a lot of options.
The rule of material implication also illustrates the underlying logic of the material
conditional. It is just a way of saying that either the antecedent is false or the
consequent is true. Unlike many natural-language conditionals, it says nothing about
the connections between the antecedent and the consequent.
The derivation 3.4.4 illustrates the use of Impl with HS.
3.4.4 1. G ⊃ ∼E
2. E ∨ F /G⊃F
3. ∼∼E ∨ F 2, DN
4. ∼E ⊃ F 3, Impl
5. G ⊃ F 1, 4, HS
QED
Material Equivalence (Equiv)

The two versions of material equivalence are the first rules that govern inferences Material equivalence
with the biconditional. We will look at seven more in section 3.6. (Equiv) a re rules of
equivalence of PL.
α ≡ β → (α ⊃ β) ∙ (β ⊃ α)
← Material Equivalence
α ≡ β → (α ∙ β) ∨ (∼α ∙ ∼β)
←
The first option for unpacking a biconditional tends to be more useful since it yields
a conjunction, both sides of which you can simplify, as in 3.4.5.
3.4.5 1. A ≡ B
2. ∼A
3. B ⊃ C / ∼B ∙ (A ⊃ C)
4. (A ⊃ B) ∙ (B ⊃ A) 1, Equiv
5. (B ⊃ A) ∙ (A ⊃ B) 4, Com
6. B ⊃ A 5, Simp
7. ∼B 6, 2, MT
8. A ⊃ B 4, Simp
9. A ⊃ C 8, 3, HS
10. ∼B ∙ (A ⊃ C) 7, 9, Conj
The second version of material equivalence reflects the truth table definition of the
operator. Remember, a biconditional is true if either both components are true (first
disjunct of Equiv) or both disjuncts are false (second disjunct of Equiv). 3.4.6 demon-
strates an instance of the second use of the rule.
3.4.6 1. D ≡ E
2. ∼D / ∼D ∙ ∼E
3. (D ∙ E) ∨ (∼D ∙ ∼E) 1, Equiv
4. ∼D ∨ ∼E 2, Add
5. ∼(D ∙ E) 4, DM
6. ∼D ∙ ∼E 3, 5, DS
If you need to derive a biconditional, again the first version of the rule is often more
useful. First, derive the two component conditionals. Then, conjoin them and use the
rule. We will explore this method more carefully in sections 3.6, 3.7, and 3.9. For now,
take a moment to see how the rule is used at 3.4.7.
3.4.7 1. ∼[(K ⊃ ∼H) ∙ (∼H ⊃ K)]
2. (I ∙ J) ⊃ (K ≡ ∼H) / ∼(I ∙ J)
3. ∼(K ≡ ∼H) 1, Equiv
4. ∼(I ∙ J) 2, 3, MT
QED
Exportation (Exp)
Exportation (Exp) i s a Exportation allows you to group antecedents of nested conditionals either together
rule of equivalence of PL. as a conjunction (on the right) or separately (on the left).
→ (α ∙ β) ⊃ γ Exportation
α ⊃ (β ⊃ γ) ←
According to Exp, a typical nested conditional like 3.4.8 can be translated as either
3.4.9 or 3.4.10.
3.4.8 If I get my paycheck today, then if you come with me, we can go
to dinner.
3.4.9 P ⊃ (C ⊃ D)
3.4.10 (P ∙ C) ⊃ D
While 3.4.9 is the more natural reading of 3.4.8, the alternative 3.4.10 is also satis-
fying. A close English translation of 3.4.10, at 3.4.11, is intuitively equivalent to the
original.
3.4.11 If I get my paycheck today and you come with me, then we can go
to dinner.
Further, exportation, when combined with commutativity, allows us to switch an-
tecedents. So, 3.4.9 is also equivalent to 3.4.12. A natural translation of that proposi-
tion into English is at 3.4.13.
3.4.12 C ⊃ (P ⊃ D)
3.4.13 If you come with me, then if I get my paycheck, we can go to
dinner.
While 3.4.13 is not as intuitively satisfying as 3.4.11 as an equivalent of 3.4.8, they
are all logically equivalent. The difference in tone or presupposition may arise from
the awkwardness of representing natural-language conditionals, and their causal
properties, with the material conditional.
The rule of exportation sometimes allows you to get to MP or MT, as in 3.4.14.
3.4.14 1. L ⊃ (M ⊃ N)
2. ∼N / ∼L ∨ ∼M
3. (L ∙ M) ⊃ N 1, Exp
4. ∼(L ∙ M) 3, 2, MT
5. ∼L ∨ ∼M 4, DM
QED
When using exportation, be careful to distinguish propositions like 3.4.15 from
propositions like 3.4.16. These are not equivalent. Remember that exportation allows
us to group two antecedents, as in the former, not two consequents, as in the latter.
Only 3.4.15 may be used with exportation.
3.4.15 A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)
3.4.16 (A ⊃ B) ⊃ C
Tautology (Taut)
Tautology eliminates some redundancy. Tautology (Taut) a re rules
→ α ∙ α Tautology of equivalence of PL.
α ←
→ α∨α
α ←
The conjunction version of Taut is redundant on whole lines, right-to-left, since we
can use Simp instead. The disjunction version is redundant on whole lines left-to-
right, since we can use Add instead. But Taut can be used on parts of lines, and the
other directions can also be useful, especially for disjunction, as in 3.4.17.
3.4.17 1. O ⊃ ∼O / ∼O
2. ∼O ∨ ∼O 1, Impl
3. ∼O 2, Taut
QED
Summary
We have now seen eight rules of inference and ten rules of equivalence. It is a lot of
rules to learn and master. The best way to learn how to use the rules is just to practice
lots of derivations.
With our eighteen rules, our proof system is almost complete. We’ll need at least
one of the proof methods of sections 3.7 and 3.9 to finish. But we have plenty of in-
teresting rules to learn and use, and the derivations of this section and the next are
among the most difficult in the textbook. While it will take some work to learn the
new proof techniques, they will, in the end, make derivations much simpler.
Before we get to the new techniques, though, our next section, 3.5, features some
hints and tricks that may be adapted for use in lots of longer derivations and should
help make some of the more difficult derivations more manageable. In section 3.6, we
will see a set of rules governing inferences using the biconditional.
KEEP IN MIND
We saw five further rules of equivalence in this section: contraposition (Cont), material
implication (Impl), material equivalence (Equiv), exportation (Exp), and tautology
(Taut).
Cont displays the equivalence of a statement with its contrapositive.
The rule of material implication is another way of saying that either the antecedent is false
or the consequent is true.
Equiv provides two ways to unpack or introduce a biconditional.
Exp allows you to group the antecedents of some nested conditionals.
Taut eliminates redundancy with conjunctions or disjunctions.
We now have eighteen rules available for use in derivations.
Rules Introduced
Contraposition (Cont)
→ ∼β ⊃ ∼α
α ⊃ β ←
Material Implication (Impl)
→ ∼α ∨ β
α ⊃ β ←
Material Equivalence (Equiv)
α ≡ β → (α ⊃ β) ∙ (β ⊃ α)
←
α ≡ β → (α ∙ β) ∨ (∼α ∙ ∼β)
←
Exportation (Exp)
→ (α ∙ β) ⊃ γ
α ⊃ (β ⊃ γ) ←
Tautology (Taut)
α → α∙α
←
α → α∨α
←
EXERCISES 3.4a
For each of the following inferences, determine which single
rule of equivalence of sections 3.3 or 3.4 is used, if any. If
the second formula does not result from a single application
of a rule of equivalence to the first formula, write, ‘does not
follow’. (Some of those inferences are valid, even if not
immediately inferable in our system.)
The inferences that do not immediately follow in these
exercises are common errors that logic students make when
learning the rules of equivalence. It might be worth your

time to study and understand the errors, in order to avoid
them yourself.
1. (P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ ∼R 16. (∼P ∙ Q ) ∨ (∼P ∙ R)

/ P ⊃ (Q ⊃ ∼R) / ∼P ∙ (Q ∨ R)
2. ∼P ∨ [Q ∙ (R ≡ S)] 17. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ ∼R
/ (∼P ∙ Q ) ∨ [∼P ∙ (R ≡ S)] / ∼(P ∙ Q ) ∨ R
3. ∼[P ∨ (∼Q ∙ R)] 18. (P ⊃ ∼Q ) ⊃ (∼Q ⊃ P)
/ ∼P ∙ ∼(∼Q ∙ R) / P ≡ ∼Q
4. (P ∨ Q ) ≡ ∼R 19. (P ∨ ∼Q ) ⊃ ∼R
/ (Q ∨ P) ≡ ∼R / ∼ ∼R ⊃ ∼(P ∨ ∼Q )
5. P ∙ ∼(Q ∨ R) 20. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ ∼R)
/ ∼ ∼P ∙ ∼(Q ∨ R) / (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ ∼R
6. P ∨ [(S ∨ T) ∨ U] 21. P ∙ (∼Q ∙ R)
/ [P ∨ (S ∨ T)] ∨ U / (P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ (P ∙ ∼R)
7. R ≡ (S ∨ S) 22. ∼ ∼(P ∨ Q ) ∨ ∼R
/R≡S / ∼[∼(P ∨ Q ) ∙ R]
8. ∼P ≡ Q 23. P ∙ (Q ≡ ∼R)
/ (∼P ∙ Q ) ∨ (∼ ∼P ∙ ∼Q ) / ∼(Q ≡ ∼R) ∙ ∼P
9. P ⊃ ∼Q 24. P ∨ ∼Q
/ ∼Q ⊃ P / ∼(∼P ∨ ∼ ∼Q )
10. ∼(∼P ∨ Q ) 25. (P ∙ ∼Q ) ∙ (R ∙ ∼S)
/P∨Q / [(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∙ R] ∙ ∼S
11. [(P ∙ Q ) ∙ ∼R] ⊃ S 26. P ∨ ∼P
/ (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ (∼R ⊃ S) /P
12. (P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ (R ∙ S) 27. P ⊃ (Q ∨ ∼R)
/ [(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ R] ∙ [(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ S] / ∼P ∨ (Q ∨ ∼R)
13. ∼P ∙ ∼(Q ∙ R) 28. P ≡ [(Q ∨ S) ≡ R]
/ P ∨ (Q ∙ R) / P ≡ {[(Q ∨ S) ⊃ R] ∙ [R ⊃ (Q ∨ S)]}
14. P ∙ ∼Q 29. P ∨ ∼Q
/ ∼ ∼P ∙ ∼ ∼Q / Q ∨ ∼P
15. ∼P ∙ (Q ∨ ∼R) 30. ∼(P ≡ ∼Q ) ∨ ∼R
/ (∼P ∙ Q ) ∨ ∼R / ∼ ∼[(P ≡ ∼Q ) ∨ R]
EXERCISES 3.4b
using the rules of inference and equivalence.
1. 1. P ⊃ ∼Q
2. R ⊃ Q
3. (P ⊃ ∼R) ⊃ S /S
2. 1. P ∨ Q
2. ∼Q ∨ R /P∨R
3. 1. ∼(P ≡ ∼Q )
2. P /Q
4. 1. ∼I ∨ J
2. J ≡ K
3. (I ∙ L) ∨ (I ∙ M) / K
5. 1. G ∨ H
2. ∼I ∙ ( J ∙ ∼G) / H ∨ ∼I
6. 1. P ∨ (Q ∙ R)
2. S ⊃ ∼R /S⊃P
7. 1. ∼P ∨ (Q ∨ S)
2. ∼P ⊃ R / ∼R ⊃ (Q ∨ S)
8. 1. E ≡ F
2. ∼(G ∨ E) / ∼F
9. 1. A ∨ (B ∨ A)
2. ∼(B ∨ C)
3. A ⊃ D /D
10. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ R
2. (P ∙ S) ∨ (P ∙ T) / Q ⊃ R
11. 1. L ⊃ ∼(∼M ∨ K)
2. M ⊃ (∼K ⊃ N)
3. ∼N / ∼L
12. 1. D ≡ E
2. (E ∨ F) ⊃ G
3. ∼(G ∨ H) / ∼D
13. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ∨ (R ∙ S)
2. ∼S /P
14. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ R
2. ∼(R ∨ S) / P ⊃ ∼Q
15. 1. P ⊃ (∼Q ⊃ R)
2. ∼(R ∨ S) /P⊃Q
16. 1. ∼P ∨ Q
2. ∼R ⊃ ∼Q
3. S ∨ ∼R /P⊃S
17. 1. ∼(P ∨ Q ) ⊃ R
2. ∼P / ∼R ⊃ Q
18. 1. ∼(P ∙ Q ) ⊃ R
2. ∼S ∨ ∼R /S⊃P
19. 1. ∼Q ⊃ ∼P
2. ∼Q ∨ R
3. ∼(∼S ∙ R) / ∼S ⊃ ∼P
20. 1. P ≡ ∼Q
2. P ∨ R
3. Q /R
21. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ∨ ∼R
2. ∼R ⊃ S / ∼S ⊃ P
22. 1. ∼P ∨ Q
2. ∼Q ∨ (R ⊃ ∼S) / S ⊃ (∼P ∨ ∼R)
23. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ R
2. ∼S ∨ P / (S ∙ Q ) ⊃ R
24. 1. D ∨ (E ∨ F)
2. F ⊃ (G ∙ H)
3. ∼G /D∨E
25. 1. Q ⊃ R
2. R ⊃ (S ⊃ T) / ∼T ⊃ (S ⊃ ∼Q )
26. 1. (P ⊃ ∼Q ) ∨ R / (∼R ∙ P) ⊃ ∼Q
27. 1. (P ≡ Q ) ∨ P / P ∨ ∼Q
28. 1. ∼[(P ∨ Q ) ∙ R]
2. R ∨ S /Q⊃S
29. 1. (P ≡ Q ) ∨ ∼P /P⊃Q
30. 1. ∼P ∨ Q
2. R ⊃ ∼Q
3. R ∨ ∼S
4. ∼T ⊃ S /P⊃T
31. 1. (S ≡ T) ∙ ∼U
2. ∼S ∨ (∼T ∨ U) / ∼S
32. 1. [V ∨ (W ∨ X)] ⊃ Y
2. Y ⊃ Z / Z ∨ ∼V
33. 1. F ⊃ (G ⊃ H)
2. G ∙ ∼H
3. J ⊃ F / ∼J
34. 1. N ⊃ O
2. P ⊃ Q
3. ∼(Q ∨ O) /P≡N
35. 1. T ⊃ (U ⊃ V)
2. Q ⊃ (R ⊃ V)
3. (T ∙ U) ∨ (Q ∙ R) / V
36. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ (R ∙ S)
2. Q / ∼S ⊃ ∼P
37. 1. (P ∙ ∼Q ) ⊃ (R ∨ S)
2. P ∙ ∼S /Q∨R
38. 1. Q ⊃ ∼P
2. ∼Q ⊃ R
3. ∼R ∨ ∼S
4. S ∨ ∼P / ∼P
39. 1. P ≡ (Q ∙ R)
2. S ⊃ P
3. T ⊃ P
4. ∼S ⊃ T /Q
40. 1. ∼(P ≡ ∼Q )
2. P ⊃ R
3. Q ∨ R / R
EXERCISES 3.4c
1. There is a rainbow if, and only if, the sun is out. The sun is not out. So, there is
no rainbow.
2. If there are alpacas on the farm, then there are beagles. If there are beagles, then
there are cows. So, either there are cows or there are no alpacas.
3. If there is a line, Marla must wait in it. If New England High School shows up,
then there is a line if the organist attends. The organist attends and New Eng-
land High School shows up. Therefore, Marla must wait in line.
4. Cecilia goes roller skating if, and only if, Denise comes with her. Denise and
Elise go roller skating, and Felicia goes running. So, Cecilia goes roller skating.
5. Either Ana doesn’t like lemons or she likes mangoes. She likes lemons and nec-
tarines, and oranges. She either doesn’t like mangoes or she likes plums. So, she
likes plums.
6. Quincy takes the job just in case Miriam does not veto the move. Miriam
vetoes the move. So, either Quincy does not take the job or she gets another
offer.
7. I can be happy if, and only if, I have both friends and wealth. But I have no
friends. So, I cannot be happy.
8. Either we act freely or we lack reasons to act. Either we conceive of ourselves
as free or we do not act freely. So, either we conceive of ourselves as free or we
lack reasons to act.
9. Either art does not presuppose a distinctive sort of experience or there is no
unified essence for art. If art does not presuppose a distinctive sort of experience
then there is a unified essence for art. So, art presupposes a distinctive sort of
experience if, and only if, there is no unified essence for art.
10. Either there are moral facts or murder is not wrong. Either murder is wrong or
we cannot know ethical principles. If there are moral facts then we can know
ethical principles. So, there are moral facts if, and only if, we can know ethical
principles.
11. If metaphysics is a priori, then if it is synthetic, then Hume is wrong about
causation. If we cannot see gravity, then Hume is not wrong about causation.
Therefore, if metaphysics is synthetic and a priori, then we can see gravity.
12. We are conscious if, and only if, not all facts are physical. If we are not conscious
and we are zombies, then dualism is true. All facts are physical. So, if we are
zombies, then dualism is true.
13. If there is a self, then the concept of the self is irreducible. If I am my conscious
experience, then the concept of the self is not irreducible. If I do not have a soul,
then I am my conscious experience. If I do have a soul, then I am not my body.
So, if I am my body, then there is no self.
14. Consequences are morally important if, and only if, duties are not. Either con-
sequences are morally important or duties are not. So, consequences are mor-
ally important and duties are not.
15. If womanhood has an essence, then if there is a mystique of feminine fulfill-

ment, then there is a monolithic patriarchy. But there is no monolithic patriar-
chy. So, if there is a mystique of femininity, then womanhood has no essence.
16. Either you are moderate and restrained, or you are not happy. Either you are
not moderate but are restrained, or you are happy. Either it is not the case that
you are happy if and only if you are moderate, or you are restrained. So, you are
restrained.
3.5: PRACTICE WITH DERIVATIONS

Our proof system is now fairly robust. With eighteen of our twenty-five rules available,
some of the proofs you will be asked to derive now are long. Some are quite difficult.
In the next section, I add seven more rules, all governing biconditionals. Toward
the end of the chapter, I introduce two additional proof techniques which will make
derivations easier.
For now, the best way to improve your skill at constructing derivations is to practice.
A lot. It’s a skill, like playing an instrument or riding a horse. You can’t learn it merely
by reading about it, and you can’t get better without lots of practice.
Practice constructing derivations improves your skill largely because you learn
some simple tricks that recur in proofs. In this section, I show you some techniques,
some mini-proofs, that can be applied in various different derivations.
Making Conditionals
In 3.5.1, we infer from the negation of a wff that the wff (un-negated) entails anything.
You just add the desired consequent and use the rule of material implication.
3.5.1 1. ∼A /A⊃B
2. ∼A ∨ B 1, Add
3. A ⊃ B 2, Impl
QED
In 3.5.2, we see that any wff entails a formula that is already assumed or proven. As
in 3.5.1, you add a wff: this time, the negation of your desired antecedent. Again, a use
of Impl ends the derivation.
3.5.2 1. E /F⊃E
2. E ∨ ∼F 1, Add
3. ∼F ∨ E 2, Com
4. F ⊃ E 3, Impl
QED
3 . 5 : P ract i ce w i t h Der i v at i ons 1 5 7
Switching Antecedents of a Nested Conditional

3.5.3 demonstrates how to switch the antecedents of a conditional whose consequent
is another conditional, using exportation and commutativity.
3.5.3 1. G ⊃ (H ⊃ I) / H ⊃ (G ⊃ I)
2. (G ∙ H) ⊃ I 1, Exp
3. (H ∙ G) ⊃ I 2, Com
4. H ⊃ (G ⊃ I) 3, Exp
QED
Negated Conditionals
Having the negation of a conditional in a proof can often be useful. Remember, the
only way for a conditional to be false is for the antecedent to be true and the consequent
to be false. So, if you have assumed or derived the negation of a conditional, you can
also derive the antecedent conjoined with the negation of the consequent, as at 3.5.4.
Then you can simplify either conjunct.
3.5.4 1. ∼(P ⊃ Q) / P ∙ ∼Q
2. ∼(∼P ∨ Q) 1, Impl
3. ∼ ∼P ∙ ∼Q 2, DM
4. P ∙ ∼Q 3, DN
QED
Simplifying Antecedents and Consequents

Examples 3.5.5 and 3.5.6 show how to simplify a conditional. In 3.5.5, you might
be tempted to simplify either of the conjuncts in the conclusion of the premise. But
Simp is a rule of inference and may not be used on a part of a line. Instead, we can
use Impl to turn the main conditional into a disjunction, and distribute the first dis-
junct, creating a conjunction. Then, we can simplify either conjunct, using Com for
the second one, and turn the resulting, simpler disjunction back into a conditional
to finish.
3.5.5 1. O ⊃ (P ∙ Q) /O⊃P
2. ∼O ∨ (P ∙ Q) 1, Impl
3. (∼O ∨ P) ∙ (∼O ∨ Q) 2, Dist
4. ∼O ∨ P 3, Simp
5. O ⊃ P 4, Impl
QED
In 3.5.6, we use the same general technique, turning the conditional into a disjunc-
tion, distributing, and then simplifying either of the resulting conjuncts.
3.5.6 1. (R ∨ S) ⊃ T /R⊃T
2. ∼(R ∨ S) ∨ T 1, Impl
3. (∼R ∙ ∼S) ∨ T 2, DM
4. T ∨ (∼R ∙ ∼S) 3, Com
5. (T ∨ ∼R) ∙ (T ∨ ∼S) 4, Dist
6. T ∨ ∼R 5, Simp
7. ∼R ∨ T 6, Com
8. R ⊃ T 7, Impl
QED
Be careful to note the contrast between 3.5.5 and 3.5.6. We can reduce a condi-
tional with a conjunction in the consequent or a conditional with a disjunction in the
antecedent. We cannot reduce a conditional with a conjunction in the antecedent,
nor can we reduce a conditional with a disjunction in the consequent. If α entails β
and γ, then α entails β and α entails γ. If either α or β entails γ, then α entails γ and
β entails γ. But from α and β together entailing γ, one cannot conclude that either
α or β on its own entails γ. And from α entailing either β or γ, one does not know
whether β or γ is entailed.
Combining Conditionals
3.5.7 and 3.5.8 show techniques that are the reverse of those in 3.5.5 and 3.5.6, com-
bining two conditionals that share a consequent (in the former) and combining two
conditionals that share an antecedent (in the latter).
3.5.7 1. W ⊃ X
2. Y ⊃ X / (W ∨ Y) ⊃ X
3. (W ⊃ X) ∙ (Y ⊃ X) 1, 2, Conj
4. (∼W ∨ X) ∙ (Y ⊃ X) 3, Impl
5. (∼W ∨ X) ∙ (∼Y ∨ X) 4, Impl
6. (X ∨ ∼W) ∙ (∼Y ∨ X) 5, Com
7. (X ∨ ∼W) ∙ (X ∨ ∼Y) 6, Com
8. X ∨ (∼W ∙ ∼Y) 7, Dist
9. (∼W ∙ ∼Y) ∨ X 8, Com
10. ∼(W ∨ Y) ∨ X 9, DM
11. (W ∨ Y) ⊃ X 10, Impl
QED
3.5.8 1. A ⊃ B
2. A ⊃ C / A ⊃ (B ∙ C)
3. ∼A ∨ B 1, Impl
4. ∼A ∨ C 2, Impl
5. (∼A ∨ B) ∙ (∼A ∨ C) 3, 4, Conj
6. ∼A ∨ (B ∙ C) 5, Dist
7. A ⊃ (B ∙ C) 6, Impl
QED
A Statement Entailing Its Own Negation

If a statement entails its own negation, the statement is false, as 3.5.9 shows.
3.5.9 1. D ⊃ ∼D /D
2. ∼D ∨ ∼D 1, Impl
3. ∼D 2, Taut
QED
Explosion
Lastly, let’s take a look at an important and curious inference that logicians call
explosion. Explosion is a characteristic of inconsistent theories, given the rules of
inference of classical logic. An inconsistent theory is one in which both a statement
and its negation are derivable. In other words, inconsistent theories contain In derivations, a
contradictions. contradiction is any
In chapter 2, we saw that individual statements can be self-contradictory, if they statement of the form:
α ∙ ∼α.
are false in every row of the truth table. We also saw that pairs of statements can
be contradictory, if they differ in truth value in each row of the truth table, and
inconsistent, if they cannot be true together. For the purposes of our proof theory,
we will henceforth take a more narrow view of the term ‘contradiction’, as the con-
junction of any statement with its negation, any statement of the form α ∙ ∼α, for
any wff α.
Let’s look at explosion, starting with a contradiction, at 3.5.10. Explosionis a property
of classical systems
3.5.10 1. P ∙ ∼P of inference: from a
2. P 1, Simp contradiction, any
3. P ∨ Q 2, Add statement can be derived.
4. ∼P ∙ P 1, Com
5. ∼P 4, Simp
6. Q 3, 5, DS
QED
Notice that the only premise for the explosive inference is the contradiction at
line 1; Q never appears until it’s added at line 3. And then it is derived all by itself!
From a contradiction, anything, and everything, follows. That’s why logicians call
this property of logical systems explosion: every wff of the language can be derived
from any contradiction. Classical systems explode.
We will return to explosion and the importance of contradictions (and avoid-
ing them in classical systems such as ours) in section 3.9. For now, just notice that
if you ever find an argument in which a contradiction is provable, you can just in-
sert a few lines, as in 3.5.10, to demonstrate any conclusion. (I ordinarily try to keep
the premises of the arguments in the exercises consistent, but here I included a few
contradictions—see if you can find them!)
Summary
The proofs of section 3.4 were often difficult due both to the number of rules we have
to know and the complexities of the arguments whose conclusions we are now able to
derive. One way to improve your abilities to construct complicated derivations is to
know and recognize a variety of common techniques, such as the ones of this section.
They are worth a little time studying, so that you can use them in future derivations.
Moreover, some of the underlying concepts, such that if a statement is true then
anything entails it or that a contradiction entails all other formulas, are central to PL,
classical propositional logic. So, getting to know these techniques can help you better
understand the logic you are using.
KEEP IN MIND
If a statement is assumed or derived, its opposite entails any wff.

If a statement is assumed or derived, any wff entails it.
In a nested conditional with two antecedents, the order of the antecedents may be reversed.
The negation of a conditional is your friend.
Conditionals with conjunctions in their consequents can be simplified.
Conditionals with disjunctions in their antecedents can be simplified.
If a statement entails its own negation, the statement is false.
A contradiction entails anything.
EXERCISES 3.5a
1. 1. A ⊃ B
2. B ⊃ ∼B / ∼A
2. 1. ∼K ∨ L
2. L ⊃ ∼K / ∼K
3. 1. G ⊃ H
2. ∼(I ⊃ H) / ∼G
4. 1. (T ∙ U) ⊃ V
2. ∼(T ⊃ W) / U ⊃ V
5. 1. ∼(P ⊃ Q )
2. ∼(R ⊃ S) / ∼(Q ∨ S)
6. 1. P ⊃ Q
2. P /R⊃Q
7. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ⊃ R
2. R ⊃ ∼S / P ⊃ ∼S
8. 1. (A ⊃ B) ⊃ C
2. ∼A ∨ (B ∙ D) / C
9. 1. W ⊃ (X ∙ Y)
2. (W ∙ ∼X) ∨ Z / Z
10. 1. N ⊃ (O ∙ P)
2. ∼N ⊃ Q / ∼O ⊃ Q
11. 1. ∼P ⊃ R
2. ∼Q ⊃ R
3. ∼R / S ⊃ (P ∙ Q )
12. 1. P ≡ (Q ∙ R)
2. ∼Q / ∼P
13. 1. P ⊃ (∼Q ⊃ ∼R)
2. R /P⊃Q
14. 1. ∼[(P ∙ Q ) ∙ R]
2. R / P ⊃ ∼Q
15. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ (R ⊃ S)
2. Q ∙ R / ∼S ⊃ ∼P
16. 1. I ⊃ J
2. ∼J ∙ K
3. ∼J ⊃ L
4. ∼ ∼I /K∙L
17. 1. ∼(P ≡ ∼Q )
2. P ⊃ ∼Q / ∼Q ∙ ∼P
18. 1. P ⊃ R
2. Q ⊃ R
3. S ⊃ (P ∨ Q ) /S⊃R
19. 1. R ∨ Q
2. ∼R ∨ ∼S
3. ∼(∼S ∙ ∼T)
4. ∼(P ⊃ U)
5. ∼(P ∙ Q ) / T ∙ ∼U
20. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ (R ∨ S) / ∼R ⊃ [(Q ∙ P) ⊃ S]
21. 1. ∼(X ⊃ Y)
2. Y ∨ (Z ∙ A) /Z≡A
22. 1. (H ∙ I) ⊃ J
2. H ∙ (I ∨ K) / ∼J ⊃ K
23. 1. (X ⊃ Y) ⊃ Z
2. W ⊃ ∼Z / ∼(W ∙ Y)
24. 1. ∼V ⊃ W
2. X ⊃ Y
3. V ⊃ Z
4. ∼W ∙ X
5. ∼Z ∙ Y / Y ∙ ∼V
25. 1. P ⊃ Q
2. P ⊃ R
3. (Q ∙ R) ⊃ ∼S / ∼P ∨ ∼S
26. 1. P ⊃ (Q ∨ R)
2. R ⊃ (S ∙ T)
3. ∼Q /P⊃T
27. 1. ∼P ∨ Q
2. ∼R ∨ ∼Q
3. ∼R ⊃ (S ∙ T) /P⊃S
28. 1. A ⊃ B
2. B ⊃ D
3. D ⊃ A
4. A ⊃ ∼D / ∼A ∙ ∼D
29. 1. (I ∙ E) ⊃ ∼F
2. F ∨ (G ∙ H)
3. I ≡ E /I⊃G
30. 1. ( J ⊃ J) ⊃ (K ⊃ K)
2. (K ⊃ L) ⊃ ( J ⊃ J) /K⊃K
EXERCISES 3.5b
1. If David quits the team, then Sandra watches the games provided that Ross
joins the team. So, it is not the case that David quits the team, and Ross joins
the team, and Sandra doesn’t watch the games.
2. If you are from the planet Orc, then you have pin-sized nostrils. But, things
with pin-sized nostrils are not from Orc. Either you are from Orc or Quaznic,
or you rode a long way in your spaceship. So, you are from Quaznic unless you
rode a long way in your spaceship.
3. It is not the case that violets bloom only if they are watered. Either violets are
watered or they undergo special treatment. So, they undergo special treatment.
4. If Francesca playing the xylophone entails that she yawns in class, then Zara
gives a presentation in class. If Zara gives a presentation, then the woodwind
players listen. So, either the woodwind players listen or Francesca plays
xylophone.
5. Either experience eternally recurs unless there is no God, or suffering is the
meaning of existence. If I can go under, then experience does not eternally re-
cur. So, if I can go under and there is a God, then the suffering is the meaning
of existence.
6. If life is suffering, then if you do not have compassion, then only the truth can
save us. It is not the case that if life is suffering, then you have compassion. So,
only the truth can save us.
7. If we explain events by reference to better-known phenomena, then explana-
tions are not inferences. Explanations of events refer to better-known phenom-
ena. So, we explain events by reference to better-known phenomena if, and only
if, explanations are not inferences.
8. If God’s nonexistence entails her existence, then the existence of goodness en-
tails that there is no goodness. God exists. So, there is no goodness.
9. If removing one’s glasses entails that the quality of experience changes, then
the content of experience is subjective. But the content of experience is not sub-
jective. So, if the quality of experience changes, then qualia fade.
10. If truth arises from societies with constraints and not from solitary freedom,
then philosophy and politics are inextricably linked. Truth arising from socie
ties with constraints does not entail that philosophy and politics are inextrica-
bly linked. So, truth arises from solitary freedom.
11. If acting freely entails the existence of external causation, then we are aware
of our freedom. If we are aware of our freedom, then we are unaware of our
freedom. So, we act freely.
12. If slowness is not a property of a walker, then if it is a property of walking,
then events exist. Either slowness is a property of walking and of running,
or slowness is a property of walking and of thinking. So, if slowness is not a
property of a walker, then events exist.
13. If moral theory is useful, then it should not serve only oneself. If either moral
theory should not serve only oneself or self-interest is difficult to know, then
we ought to consider the good of others. If moral theory is not useful, then we
should not consider the good of others. So, a moral theory is useful if, and only
if, we should consider the good of others.
14. If the general will is common interest, then if foreign powers see the state as
an individual, then the general will involves total subjection and is sometimes
misunderstood. If the general will is sometimes misunderstood, then to govern
is to serve. Foreign powers see the state as an individual. So, if the general will
is common interest, then to govern is to serve.
15. If sense experience is reliable, then mass is a real property and color is not. If
Newtonian physics is true, then mass is a real property and teleology is not a
physical concept. If Newtonian physics is not true, then sense experience is reli-
able. If mass is a real property and color is not, then teleology is a physical con-
cept. So, color is a real property if, and only if, teleology is not a physical concept.
16. If there is a God, then there is goodness. But the existence of a God also entails
that we are free. Either the nonexistence of God entails the nonexistence of
goodness or we are not free. So, God exists if, and only if, there is goodness and
we are free.
3.6: THE BICONDITIONAL

Conditionals and biconditionals have different meanings and different truth condi-
tions. These differences can be subtle and difficult to discern in natural language. For
example, the inference 3.6.1 is not logically valid.
3.6.1 I’ll accompany you if you go to the movies.
You don’t go to the movies.
So, I don’t go with you.
Nevertheless, people sometimes make such fallacious inferences. One account of
the fact that people make inferences like 3.6.1 is that they confuse the conditional and
3 . 6 : T h e B i con d i t i onal 1 6 5
the biconditional. 3.6.2, which is identical to 3.6.1 except for the main operator of the
first premise, is logically valid.
3.6.2 I’ll go with you if, and only if, you go to the movies.
You don’t go to the movies.
So, I don’t go with you.
In 3.6.1, I commit to joining you if you go to the movies, but I say nothing about
what happens if you decide instead to go bowling. Perhaps I really like you and would
join you no matter what you do. (And perhaps I utter the first premise of 3.6.1 in order
not to appear overeager!) In contrast, in 3.6.2, I both commit to joining you if you go
to the movies and not going with you if you do anything else. I join you only if you
go to the movies, so if you go bowling, I’m out.
Compounding the confusion, perhaps, is the fact that in many mathematical or log-
ical contexts, people use conditionals where biconditionals are also (perhaps more)
appropriate. For example, a mathematician might utter 3.6.3.
3.6.3 If a tangent to a circle intersects a chord at a right angle, the
chord is a diameter.
While there’s nothing wrong with 3.6.3, the stronger 3.6.4 is also warranted.
3.6.4 A tangent to a circle intersects a chord at a right angle if, and only
if, the chord is a diameter.
Since conditionals and biconditionals have different truth conditions, it is impor-
tant to keep them distinct in your mind and regimentations. It will also be useful to
have some more rules governing inferences using the biconditional.
We have lots of rules governing the conditional. The only rule we have so far govern-
ing use of the biconditional is Equiv. So, the inference 3.6.5 is made in a single step.
3.6.5 1. P ⊃ Q Premise
2. P Premise
3. Q 1, 2, MP
QED
In contrast, the parallel inference 3.6.6 has five lines.
3.6.6 1. P ≡ Q Premise
2. P Premise
3. (P ⊃ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ P) 1, Equiv
4. P ⊃ Q 3, Simp
5. Q 4, 2, MP
QED
Since our reasoning with biconditionals often parallels (with important differ-
ences) our reasoning with conditionals, it is useful to shorten some derivations by
adopting some rules governing the biconditional that are parallel to those governing
the conditional. Here are three rules of inference and four rules of equivalence. The
validity of these rules of inference and the equivalence of the rules of equivalence
are easily demonstrated using truth tables; tables for BDM and BInver appear in the
appendix.
Biconditional Rules of Inference

Biconditional Modus Ponens (BMP)
α ≡β
α / β
Biconditional Modus Tollens (BMT)
α ≡β
∼α / ∼β
Biconditional Hypothetical Syllogism (BHS)
α ≡β
β ≡ γ / α ≡ γ
Biconditional Rules of Equivalence

Biconditional De Morgan’s Law (BDM)
→ ∼α ≡ β
∼(α ≡ β) ←
Biconditional Commutativity (BCom)
→ β ≡α
α ≡ β ←
Biconditional Inversion (BInver)
→ ∼α ≡ ∼β
α ≡ β ←
Biconditional Association (BAssoc)
Biconditional modus
→ (α ≡ β) ≡ γ
α ≡ (β ≡ γ) ←
ponens (BMP) is a rule of
inference of PL, parallel Most of the biconditional rules are fairly intuitive if you have mastered the material
to modus ponens, but in sections 3.1–3.5. Biconditional modus ponens shortens the inference at 3.6.6, as
used with a biconditional.
we see at 3.6.7.
Biconditional modus 3.6.7 1. P ≡ Q Premise
tollens (BMT)is a rule 2. P Premise
of inference of PL. 3. Q 1, 2, BMP
Unlike modus tollens,
use BMT when you
QED
have the negation of the Like modus tollens, the second, or minor, premise of biconditional modus tollens
term which precedes the
consists of the negation of one side of the first premise. But in BMT, we negate the left
biconditional.
side of the biconditional. We can use biconditional commutativity in combination
Biconditional with BMT if we have the negation of the right side of the first premise, as in 3.6.8.
commutativity (BCom)
3.6.8 1. P ≡ ∼Q
is a rule of equivalence
of PL which allows 2. ∼ ∼Q / ∼P
you to switch the order 3. ∼Q ≡ P 1, BCom
of formulas around a 4. ∼P 3, 2, BMT
biconditional. QED
Biconditional hypothetical syllogism facilitates natural chains of reasoning,

ones that we often see in mathematics. It can be used effectively in combination with
Biconditional
biconditional inversion, in which both sides of a biconditional are negated. hypothetical syllogism
3.6.9 1. P ≡ ∼Q (BHS) is a rule of
inference of PL, and
2. Q ≡ ∼R /P≡R
works just like ordinary
3. ∼Q ≡ ∼ ∼R 2, BInver hypothetical syllogism.
4. ∼Q ≡ R 3, DN
5. P ≡ R 1, 4, BHS Biconditional inversion
QED (BInver)is a rule of
equivalence of PL. To use
Biconditional De Morgan’s law allows you to take a negation inside brackets in BInver, negate both sides
which the main operator is a biconditional. But be careful with BDM. When you of the biconditional.
move the negation inside the parentheses, only one side of the resulting biconditional
Biconditional De
gets negated. Morgan’s lawis a rule of
3.6.10 1. P ≡ (Q ≡ ∼R) equivalence of PL. When
bringing a negation inside
2. ∼P /Q≡R
parentheses with BDM,
3. ∼(Q ≡ ∼R) 1, 2, BMT make sure to negate only
4. ∼Q ≡ ∼R 3, BDM the formula on the left
5. Q ≡ R 4, BInver side of the biconditional.
QED
Lastly, biconditional association helps with propositions containing multiple bi- Biconditional Association
conditionals, often in combination with other biconditional rules. (BAssoc)is a rule of
equivalence of PL which
3.6.11 1. P ≡ (Q ≡ R) allows you to regroup
2. ∼R ∙ ∼Q /P propositions with two
3. (P ≡ Q) ≡ R 1, BAssoc biconditionals.
4. R ≡ (P ≡ Q) 3, BCom
5. ∼R 2, Simp
6. ∼(P ≡ Q) 4, 5, BMT
7. ∼P ≡ Q 6, BDM
8. Q ≡ ∼P 7, BCom
9. ∼Q ∙ ∼R 2, Com
10. ∼Q 9, Simp
11. ∼ ∼P 8, 10, BMT
12. P 11, DN
QED
Summary
The biconditional rules of this section facilitate many inferences, though they do not
allow you to convert biconditionals into other operators as Equiv does. They supple-
ment, rather than supplant, the earlier rule.
KEEP IN MIND
We saw three new rules of inference in this section: biconditional modus ponens (BMP),
biconditional modus tollens (BMT), and biconditional hypothetical syllogism
(BHS).
We saw four new rules of equivalence in this section: biconditional De Morgan’s law
(BDM), biconditional commutativity (BCom), biconditional inversion (BInver), and
biconditional association (BAssoc).
BMT uses the negation of the left side of the biconditional.
BHS often must be set up properly with BCom.
BDM does not require changing an operator, only the punctuation.
To use BInver, either add one negation to each side of a biconditional or remove one from
each side.
It is important, especially in future sections, not to confuse the biconditional rules with the
parallel rules governing the conditional.
Rules Introduced
Rules of Inference:
Biconditional Modus Ponens (BMP)

α≡β
α / β
Biconditional Modus Tollens (BMT)

α≡β
∼α / ∼β
Biconditional Hypothetical Syllogism (BHS)

α≡β
β ≡ γ / α ≡ γ
Rules of Equivalence:
Biconditional De Morgan’s Law (BDM)

→ ∼α ≡ β
∼(α ≡ β) ←
Biconditional Commutativity (BCom)

→ β≡α
α ≡ β ←
Biconditional Inversion (BInver)

→ ∼α ≡ ∼β
α ≡ β ←
Biconditional Association (BAssoc)

→ (α ≡ β) ≡ γ
α ≡ (β ≡ γ) ←
EXERCISES 3.6a
using the eighteen standard rules and the new rules for the
biconditional. Compare your derivations to those done in
3.4b without these new rules.
1. (3.4b.3) 1. ∼(P ≡ ∼Q )

2. P /Q
2. (3.4b.4) 1. ∼I ∨ J
2. J ≡ K
3. (I ∙ L) ∨ (I ∙ M) / K
3. (3.4b.8) 1. E ≡ F
2. ∼(G ∨ E) / ∼F
4. (3.4b.12) 1. D ≡ E
2. (E ∨ F) ⊃ G
3. ∼(G ∨ H) / ∼D
5. (3.4b.20) 1. P ≡ ∼Q
2. P ∨ R
3. Q /R
6. (3.4b.27) 1. (P ≡ Q ) ∨ P / P ∨ ∼Q
7. (3.4b.29) 1. (P ≡ Q ) ∨ ∼P /P⊃Q
8. (3.4b.31) 1. (S ≡ T) ∙ ∼U
2. ∼S ∨ (∼T ∨ U) / ∼S
9. (3.4b.39) 1. P ≡ (Q ∙ R)
2. S ⊃ P
3. T ⊃ P
4. ∼S ⊃ T /Q
10. (3.4b.40) 1. ∼(P ≡ ∼Q )
2. P ⊃ R
3. Q ∨ R /R
EXERCISES 3.6b
using the rules of inference and equivalence, including the
biconditional rules.
1. 1. A ≡ B
2. ∼B / ∼A
2. 1. ∼(E ≡ F)
2. F / ∼E
3. 1. G ≡ H
2. ∼H ≡ ∼I /G≡I
4. 1. J ≡ K
2. K ≡ ∼L / L ≡ ∼J
5. 1. M ≡ (N ≡ O)
2. ∼O / ∼M ≡ N
6. 1. ∼(S ≡ T)
2. ∼(T ≡ U) / S ≡ U
7. 1. X ≡ (∼Y ∨ Z)
2. X ∙ ∼Z / ∼Y
8. 1. (A ≡ B) ≡ C
2. ∼B / ∼A ≡ C
9. 1. ∼[D ≡ (E ∙ F)]
2. ∼F /D
10. 1. (G ≡ H) ⊃ H
2. ∼H /G
11. 1. L ∙ M
2. M ≡ N /L≡N
12. 1. (P ≡ Q ) ∙ (P ∨ R)
2. ∼R /Q
13. 1. W ≡ (X ∨ Y)
2. Y ∨ Z
3. ∼W /Z
14. 1. (P ≡ Q ) ⊃ ∼(R ≡ ∼S)
2. ∼(R ≡ S) / ∼P ≡ Q
15. 1. ∼P ≡ (Q ∙ R)
2. ∼Q /P
16. 1. ∼(P ≡ Q )

2. ∼(Q ≡ R)
3. ∼(R ≡ ∼S) /S≡P
17. 1. P ⊃ (Q ≡ R)
2. ∼(P ⊃ ∼R) / Q
18. 1. P ≡ (Q ≡ R)
2. S ≡ (R ≡ T) / (P ≡ Q ) ≡ (S ≡ T)
19. 1. ∼[A ≡ (B ≡ C)]
2. C / A ≡ ∼B
20. 1. D ≡ (E ∙ F)
2. ∼F / ∼D
21. 1. J ≡ K
2. ∼(L ≡ K)
3. M ≡ J / ∼L ≡ M
22. 1. ∼[P ≡ (Q ≡ R)]
2. P ∙ ∼R /Q
23. 1. S ≡ T
2. ∼T ≡ U
3. W ≡ ∼U
4. W ≡ ∼S / ∼S
24. 1. X ⊃ (Y ≡ Z)
2. X ≡ ∼Z
3. ∼Z / ∼Y
25. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ≡ R
2. P ≡ S
3. R /S∙Q
26. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ⊃ (R ≡ S)
2. ∼R ∙ S / ∼P ∙ ∼Q
27. 1. (P ≡ Q ) ⊃ R
2. (Q ≡ S) ⊃ R
3. ∼R /P≡S
28. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ≡ R
2. (Q ⊃ R) ⊃ S / P ⊃ S
29. 1. P ⊃ (Q ≡ R)
2. ∼Q ≡ S
3. R ≡ S / ∼P
30. 1. P ≡ Q
2. ∼Q ≡ R
3. R ≡ P /S
31. 1. (A ∙ B) ≡ C
2. (D ∙ ∼A) ∨ (D ∙ ∼B)
3. (C ≡ D) ≡ E / ∼E
32. 1. (J ∙ K) ≡ L
2. J ≡ M
3. K ≡ N
4. M ≡ N
5. M ∨ N /L
33. 1. ∼X ∨ Y
2. X ∨ ∼Y
3. (Z ≡ A) ⊃ ∼(X ≡ Y) / ∼Z ≡ A
34. 1. ∼P ≡ Q
2. Q ≡ R
3. (R ∙ S) ≡ T
4. S ∙ ∼T /P
35. 1. P ≡ (Q ∙ ∼R)
2. ∼S ≡ P
3. S ∙ ∼R /Q≡R
36. 1. ∼P ≡ Q
2. ∼Q ≡ R
3. P ⊃ S
4. ∼R ⊃ S /S
37. 1. B ≡ (C ∙ D)
2. E ≡ C
3. ∼D ≡ ∼E /B≡E
38. 1. (F ∨ G) ⊃ H
2. (I ∨ J) ⊃ ∼H
3. ∼I ⊃ F / ∼(F ≡ I)
39. 1. P ∨ (Q ∙ R)
2. ∼(P ∙ Q ) / ∼(P ≡ Q )
40. 1. P ≡ (Q ∨ R)
2. R ≡ S
3. Q ⊃ R /P≡S
EXERCISES 3.6c
1. Edye is patient when, and only when, she is not sleepy. She is sleepy when, and
only when, her children are not happy. So, Edye’s children are happy when,
and only when, Edye is patient.
2. Gustavo plays tennis if, and only if, he runs. But Gustavo doesn’t run. So, if Gus-
tavo plays tennis, then Martians have landed on Earth.
3. Aardvarks eat ants just in case they don’t drink beer. Aardvarks drink beer just
in case they do not chase chickens. But aardvarks do chase chickens. So, they
eat ants.
4. Doug’s playing golf entails his eating a hearty dinner if, and only if, he either
plays with Bob or he doesn’t eat at home. But it’s not the case that if Doug eats
at home, then he plays with Bob. So, Doug plays golf but does not eat a hearty
dinner.
5. Emily studies in Rome if, and only if, it is not the case that she prefers classes
on campus and her funding does not fall through. Her preferring classes on
campus does not entail that her funding falls through. So, she does not study
in Rome.
6. I’ll work in the supermarket this summer just in case I need money for a new
guitar. It’s not the case that I need money for a new guitar if, and only if, my
band gets back together. My band gets back together if, and only if, the drum-
mer drops out and the guitarist transfers back home. Neither the guitarist
transfers back home nor the singer breaks up with her girlfriend. So, I will work
in the supermarket this summer.
7. Isla stays in to study if, and only if, Christine goes to the party just in case Mer-
cedes does not go to the movie. Either Mercedes goes to the movie or Kwadwo
doesn’t hang around reading Wittgenstein. Kwadwo hangs around reading
Wittgenstein if, and only if, Hunter is busy working on his paper. It’s not the
case that Hunter’s being busy with his paper entails that Christine goes to the
party. So, Isla stays in to study.
8. Genesis does research on Hobbes if, and only if, she gets a grant or finds other
money for her work. She does not do research on Hobbes if, and only if, she
takes a different job. So, if she gets a grant, then she will not take a different job.
1 74 C h apter 3 Inference i n P ropos i t i onal L og i c
9. We are not free if, and only if, our wills are determined or our bodies are con-
strained. But we are free. So, if our wills are determined, then Leibniz is a
libertarian.
10. We have moral responsibilities if, and only if, it is not the case that our wills are
free just in case there are souls. But we do not have moral responsibilities and
our wills are not free. So, there are no souls.
11. I am not mortal if, and only if, the self is a conceptual construct. I am mortal
just in case either my body dies or the self is something physical. So, the self
is a conceptual construction if, and only if, my body does not die and the self is
not physical.
12. God is perfect if, and only if, there is no evil, just in case human intelligence is
limited. If God is perfect, then there is no evil. If God is not perfect, then there
is evil. So, human intelligence is limited.
13. Zombies are possible if, and only if, we are conscious just in case mental states
are not physical. But mental states are physical and zombies are not possible.
So, we are conscious.
14. I am altruistic, just in case I am not just if, and only if, I use the ring of Gyges.
But I am just. So, I do not use the ring of Gyges if, and only if, I am altruistic.
15. Either arithmetic is synthetic or not a priori, if, and only if, it is not analytic.
Arithmetic is synthetic just in case seven and five are not contained in twelve.
Seven and five are contained in twelve if, and only if, arithmetic is not a priori.
So, arithmetic is not analytic.
16. If color is real if, and only if, mass is, then philosophy is not independent of
science. If philosophy is not independent of science, then there are synthetic
a priori claims. If there are synthetic a priori claims, then arithmetic is syn-
thetic. Either arithmetic is not synthetic or philosophy is independent of sci-
ence. Color is not real. So, mass is.
3.7: CONDITIONAL PROOF

There are three derivation There are four more sections in this chapter on natural deductions in PL. This section
methodsin this book. introduces a derivation method, called conditional proof, that allows us to simplify
We have been working many long, difficult proofs. It will also allow us to derive logical truths, or theorems of
with direct proof. In our system of logic, as we will see in the next section. In section 3.9, we will examine a
this section we explore
conditional proof. In
third derivation method, indirect proof. At the end of the chapter, we will review our
section 3.9, we will look twenty-five rules and three derivation methods: conditional proof, indirect proof, and
at indirect proof. direct proof, the last of which is the method we have been using in this chapter so far.
3 . 7 : C on d i t i onal P roof 1 7 5
Conditional proof is useful when you want to derive a conditional conclusion. We Conditional proof is a
assume the antecedent of the desired conditional, for the purposes of the derivation, derivation method useful
for deriving conditional
taking care to indicate the presence of that assumption later. conclusions.
Consider the argument at 3.7.1, which has a conditional conclusion.
3.7.1 1. A ∨ B
2. B ⊃ (E ∙ D) / ∼A ⊃ D
Think about what would happen if we had the antecedent of the conditional
conclusion, ‘∼A’, as another premise. First, we would be able to infer ‘B’ by DS with
line 1. Then, since we would have ‘B’, we could use MP to infer ‘E ∙ D’ from line 2.
Lastly, given ‘E ∙ D’ we could use Com and Simp to get ‘D’. So, ‘D’ would follow from
‘∼A’. The method of conditional proof formalizes this line of thought.
Method of Conditional Proof

1. Indent, assuming the antecedent of your desired conditional.
Justify the assumption by writing ‘ACP’, for ‘assumption for conditional
proof ’.
Use a vertical line to set off the assumption from the rest of your derivation.
2. Derive the consequent of desired conditional within an indented sequence.
Continue the vertical line.
Proceed as you would normally, using any propositions already established.
3. Discharge (un-indent).
Write the first line of your assumption, a ‘⊃’, and the last line of the indented
sequence.
Justify the un-indented line with CP, and indicate the indented line numbers.
The line of thought we took discussing 3.7.1 is thus formalized by using the in-
dented sequence you see at 3.7.2.
3.7.2 1. A ∨ B
2. B ⊃ (E ∙ D) / ∼A ⊃ D
3. ∼A ACP Suppose ∼A.
4. B 1, 3, DS
5. E ∙ D 2, 4, MP
6. D ∙ E 5, Com
7. D 6, Simp Then D would follow.
8. ∼A ⊃ D 3–7, CP So, if ∼A were true, then D
An indented sequence
would be.
is a series of lines in a
QED derivation that do not
The purpose of indenting and using a vertical line is to create an indented sequence follow from the premises
directly, but only with
that marks the scope of your assumption. Any statements you derive within the a further assumption,
scope of an assumption are not derived only from the premises, as in all the direct indicated on the first line
derivations we have done until now. They are derived from the premises with an of the sequence.
additional assumption like the one we made at line 3. Thus, after you discharge an
assumption, you may not use statements derived within the scope of that assumption
later in the proof. We could have discharged our assumption in 3.7.2 after any number
of steps in the indented sequence: ‘∼A ⊃ (D ∙ E)’; ‘∼A ⊃ (E ∙ D)’; ‘∼A ⊃ B’; and even
‘∼A ⊃ ∼A’ are all valid inferences given the premises. But none of the consequents
of those conditional statements are themselves validly inferred from the premises
without assuming ‘∼A’.
Conditional proof makes many of the derivations we have done earlier using the
direct method significantly easier. To see a striking difference between the direct and
conditional derivation methods, compare an argument proved directly, in 3.7.3, and
conditionally, in 3.7.4.
3.7.3 Direct Method
1. (P ⊃ Q) ∙ (R ⊃ S) / (P ∙ R) ⊃ (Q ∙ S)
2. P ⊃ Q 1, Simp
3. ∼P ∨ Q 2, Impl
4. (∼P ∨ Q) ∨ ∼R 3, Add
5. ∼P ∨ (Q ∨ ∼R) 4, Assoc
6. (R ⊃ S) ∙ (P ⊃ Q) 1, Com
7. (R ⊃ S) 6, Simp
8. ∼R ∨ S 7, Impl
9. (∼R ∨ S) ∨ ∼P 8, Add
10. ∼P ∨ (∼R ∨ S) 9, Com
11. [∼P ∨ (Q ∨ ∼R)] ∙ [∼P ∨ (∼R ∨ S)] 5, 10, Conj
12. ∼P ∨ [(Q ∨ ∼R) ∙ (∼R ∨ S)] 11, Dist
13. ∼P ∨ [(∼R ∨ Q) ∙ (∼R ∨ S)] 12, Com
14. ∼P ∨ [∼R ∨ (Q ∙ S)] 13, Dist
15. P ⊃ [∼R ∨ (Q ∙ S)] 14, Impl
16. P ⊃ [R ⊃ (Q ∙ S)] 15, Impl
17. (P ∙ R) ⊃ (Q ∙ S) 16, Exp
QED
3.7.4 Conditional Method
1. (P ⊃ Q) ∙ (R ⊃ S) / (P ∙ R) ⊃ (Q ∙ S)
2. P ∙ R ACP
3. P ⊃ Q 1, Simp
4. P 2, Simp
5. Q 3, 4, MP
6. (R ⊃ S) ∙ (P ⊃ Q) 1, Com
7. R ⊃ S 6, Simp
8. R ∙ P 2, Com
9. R 8, Simp
10. S 7,9, MP
11. Q ∙ S 5, 10, Conj
12. (P ∙ R) ⊃ (Q ∙ S) 2–11, CP
QED
Not only is the conditional method often much shorter, as in this case, it is also
conceptually much easier. In this case, to see that one has to add what one needs at
lines 4 or 9 in the direct version is not easy. The conditional proof proceeds in more
obvious ways.
You can use CP repeatedly within the same proof, whether nested or sequentially. A nested sequence is
3.7.5 demonstrates a nested use of CP. an assumption within
another assumption.
3.7.5 1. P ⊃ (Q ∨ R)
2. (S ∙ P) ⊃ ∼Q / (S ⊃ P) ⊃ (S ⊃ R)
3. S ⊃ P ACP Now we want S ⊃ R.
4. S ACP Now we want R.
5. P 3, 4, MP
6. Q ∨ R 1, 5, MP
7. S ∙ P 4, 5, Conj
8. ∼Q 2, 7, MP
9. R 6, 8, DS
10. S ⊃ R 4–9, CP
11. (S ⊃ P) ⊃ (S ⊃ R) 3–10, CP
QED
Within an indented sequence, you can use any formula in which that sequence is
embedded. So, in the sequence following line 4, you can use lines 1 and 2 as well as line
3. But once you discharge your assumption, as I do at line 10, any conclusions of that
indented sequence are also put off limits. At line 10, the only lines I can use are lines
1–3. If you need any of the propositions derived within an indented sequence after
you discharge the relevant assumption, you have to rederive them. Given this restric-
tion, it is often useful to do as much work as you can before making an assumption.
3.7.6 shows how we can use CP sequentially to prove biconditionals. In such cases,
you want ‘α ≡ β’ which is logically equivalent to ‘(α ⊃ β) ∙ (β ⊃ α)’. This method is
not always the best one, but it is usually a good first thought.
3.7.6 1. (B ∨ A) ⊃ D
2. A ⊃ ∼D
3. ∼A ⊃ B /B≡D
4. B ACP
5. B ∨ A 4, Add
6. D 1, 5, MP
7. B ⊃ D 4–6 CP
8. D ACP
9. ∼ ∼D 8, DN
10. ∼A 2, 9, MT
11. B 3, 10, MP
12. D ⊃ B 8–11 CP
13. (B ⊃ D) ∙ (D ⊃ B) 7, 12, Conj
14. B ≡ D 13, Equiv
QED
Notice that we start the second sequence at line 8 intending to derive ‘B’. We al-
ready have a ‘B’ in the proof at line 4. But that ‘B’ was a discharged assumption, and is
off limits after line 6.
Method for Proving a Biconditional Conclusion

Assume α, derive β, discharge.
Assume β, derive α, discharge.
Conjoin the two conditionals.
Use material equivalence to yield the biconditional.
You may also use CP in the middle of a proof to derive statements that are not your
main conclusion, as in 3.7.7.
3.7.7 1. P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)
2. (P ⊃ R) ⊃ (S ∙ T) /T
3. P ACP
4. Q ∙ R 1, 3, MP
5. R ∙ Q 4, Com
6. R 5, Simp
7. P ⊃ R 3–6, CP
8. S ∙ T 2, 7, MP
9. T ∙ S 8, Com
10. T 9, Simp
QED
Such uses are perhaps not common. But you can feel free to use a conditional proof
at any point in a derivation if you need a conditional claim.
Summary
We now have two derivation methods, a direct method and a conditional method. In
direct proofs we ordinarily construct our derivations by looking at the premises and
seeing what we can infer. Sometimes we work backward from our conclusions, figur-
ing out what we need, but that kind of work is done on the side, not within a proof.
When setting up conditional proofs, in contrast, we generally look toward our de-
sired conditionals, assuming the antecedent of some conditional we want, rather than
looking at what we have in the premises. We hope that our assumptions will work
with our premises, of course, and we proceed, after our assumptions, to use the ordi-
nary, direct methods. But in setting up our indented sequences, we focus on what we
want, thinking about how our assumption will be discharged.
As it was used in this section, the conditional derivation method is used within a
direct proof, as a subsequence of formulas. In the next section, we’ll do some proofs
completely by the conditional derivation method. In the following section, we’ll look
at a third and final derivation method, indirect proof.
KEEP IN MIND
When you want to derive a conditional conclusion, you can assume the antecedent of the
conditional, taking care to indicate the presence of that assumption later.
Conditional proofs are especially useful when the conclusion of the argument is a conditional
or a biconditional.For biconditionals, assume one side to derive the other side and dis-
charge; do a second CP for the reverse (if necessary); then conjoin the two conditionals.
Indent and use a vertical line to mark the scope of an assumption.
After you discharge an assumption, you may not use statements derived within the scope of
that assumption later in the proof.
It is often useful to do what you can with a proof before making an assumption so that the
propositions you derive are available after you discharge your assumption.
You can use conditional proof at any point during a proof and anytime you need a condi-
tional statement, not just when the conclusion of the argument is a conditional.
EXERCISES 3.7a
using the method of conditional proof where appropriate.
1. 1. (A ∨ C) ⊃ D
2. D ⊃ B /A⊃B
2. 1. X ⊃ Y
2. Y ⊃ Z / X ⊃ (Y ∙ Z)
3. 1. R ⊃ ∼O
2. ∼R ⊃ [S ∙ (P ∨ Q )] / O ⊃ (P ∨ Q )
4. 1. (E ∨ F) ∨ G
2. ∼F / ∼E ⊃ G
5. 1. L ⊃ M
2. L ⊃ N
3. (M ∙ N) ⊃ O /L⊃O
6. 1. Q ⊃ (∼R ∙ S) / R ⊃ ∼Q
7. 1. ∼M ⊃ N
2. L ⊃ ∼N / ∼L ∨ M
8. 1. I ⊃ H
2. ∼I ⊃ J
3. J ⊃ ∼H / J ≡ ∼H
9. 1. ∼M ∨ N
2. P / (M ∨ ∼P) ⊃ (O ∨ N)
10. 1. ∼(I ∨ ∼K)

2. L ⊃ J / (I ∨ L) ⊃ (K ∙ J)
11. 1. E ⊃ ∼(F ⊃ G)
2. F ⊃ (E ∙ H) /E≡F
12. 1. H ∨ (I ∨ J)
2. H ⊃ K
3. J ⊃ K / ∼I ⊃ K
13. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ⊃ R
2. S ⊃ ∼R
3. S ∨ P /Q⊃P
14. 1. A ⊃ (B ≡ C)
2. ∼C / B ⊃ ∼A
15. 1. D ≡ E
2. F ∨ D / ∼E ⊃ F
16. 1. W ⊃ T
2. X ⊃ (T ∨ W)
3. X ∨ S /T∨S
17. 1. P ∨ Q
2. ∼P ∨ ∼Q / ∼(P ≡ Q )
18. 1. R ⊃ (S ∨ W)
2. R ⊃ (T ∨ W)
3. ∼(W ∨ X) / R ⊃ (S ∙ T)
19. 1. P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)
2. (Q ∨ S) ⊃ ∼P / ∼P
20. 1. A ⊃ [(D ∨ B) ⊃ C] / A ⊃ (D ⊃ C)
21. 1. Z ⊃ ∼Y / (X ∙ Y) ⊃ (Z ⊃ W)
22. 1. ∼(U ∨ V)
2. W ⊃ X / (U ∨ W) ⊃ (V ⊃ X)
23. 1. E ⊃ (F ⊃ G)
2. ∼(I ∨ ∼E)
3. G ⊃ H /F⊃H
24. 1. (T ⊃ ∼Q ) ∙ ∼W
2. ∼Q ⊃ [(W ∨ S) ∙ (W ∨ T)]
3. ∼T ∨ (S ⊃ X) /T⊃X
25. 1. M ⊃ (∼K ∨ N)
2. N ⊃ L
3. M ∨ (K ∙ ∼L) / M ≡ (K ⊃ L)
26. 1. A ≡ (B ∙ ∼C)
2. C ⊃ (D ∙ E)
3. (D ∨ F) ⊃ G / (∼A ∙ B) ⊃ G
27. 1. (H ∨ J) ⊃ K
2. (I ∨ L) ⊃ M / (H ∨ I) ⊃ (K ∨ M)
28. 1. J ⊃ K
2. L ⊃ ∼K
3. ∼J ⊃ M
4. N ⊃ ∼O
5. ∼N ⊃ I
6. ∼O ⊃ L /M∨I
29. 1. D ⊃ (F ∨ G)
2. E ⊃ (F ∨ H)
3. I ⊃ ∼F
4. ∼H / (D ∨ E) ⊃ (I ⊃ G)
30. 1. (X ⊃ Y) ⊃ Z
2. (∼X ∨ Y) ≡ (A ∨ B)
3. ∼B ⊃ (D ⊃ A) / ∼Z ⊃ ∼D
31. 1. (K ∙ ∼L) ⊃ ∼M
2. M ∨ N
3. M ∨ O
4. ∼(N ∙ O) / ∼K ∨ L
32. 1. L ⊃ M
2. O ⊃ M
3. ∼N ⊃ (L ∨ O)
4. (M ∙ N) ⊃ K
5. ∼(J ⊃ K) / ∼M ≡ N
33. 1. I ⊃ (J ∨ K)
2. ∼J ∨ (∼I ∨ L)
3. L ⊃ ∼I /I⊃K
34. 1. (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (C ⊃ B)
2. A ⊃ ∼(B ⊃ D)
3. (A ⊃ ∼D) ⊃ C / B
35. 1. A ⊃ (∼B ∨ C)
2. ∼A ⊃ (B ∨ C)
3. C ⊃ ∼C / ∼(A ≡ B)
36. 1. (A ∙ B) ⊃ (C ∙ D)
2. (A ∙ C) ⊃ (E ∨ ∼D)
3. F ⊃ (E ⊃ G) / A ⊃ [B ⊃ (F ⊃ G)]
37. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ∨ (R ∙ S)
2. ∼P ∨ T
3. ∼Q ∨ W
4. T ⊃ (W ⊃ S) / ∼R ⊃ S
38. 1. X ⊃ [(T ∨ W) ⊃ S]
2. (W ⊃ S) ⊃ (Y ⊃ R)
3. ∼Z ⊃ ∼R / X ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)
39. 1. ∼R ⊃ S
2. S ⊃ (R ∨ ∼P)
3. ∼(R ∨ P) ⊃ (Q ⊃ ∼S) / (P ∨ Q ) ⊃ R
40. 1. J ≡ (L ∨ M)
2. (M ∨ J) ≡ N
3. (L ⊃ N) ⊃ (K ≡ ∼K) / L ≡ (N ∨ K)
EXERCISES 3.7b
written in PL. Then, derive the conclusions of the
arguments.
1. If Raul doesn’t play lacrosse, then he plays tennis. So, if Raul doesn’t play la-
crosse, then he plays either tennis or soccer.
2. It is not the case that either Polly or Ramon takes out the trash. So, if Owen
cleans his room, then Polly takes out the trash only if Quinn clears the table.
3. If Adams and Barnes are translators, then Cooper is a reviewer. Evans is an edi-
tor if either Cooper or Durning are reviewers. Hence, Adams being a translator
is a sufficient condition for Barnes being a translator only if Evans is an editor.
4. If it’s not the case that there are frogs in the pond, then George will go swim-
ming. So, if Eloise goes swimming and George does not, then either there are
frogs in the pond or hornets in the trees.
5. If Kip does well on his report card, then he will get ice cream. If Kip doesn’t do
well on his report card, then he’ll be jealous of his brother. So, Kip will either
get ice cream or be jealous.
6. If Lisa goes to Arizona, then she’ll go to Colorado. If she goes to Boulder, Colo-
rado, then she’ll go to Dragoon, Arizona. So, if she goes to Arizona and Boulder,
then she’ll go to Colorado and Dragoon.
7. If the train doesn’t come, then it is not the case that Shanti and Ricardo go to
New York. So, If Ricardo goes to New York, then Shanti goes to New York only
if the train comes.
8. If Justin goes to Ikea, then Luke doesn’t go. Either Luke goes to Ikea or Kate
sleeps on the floor. If either Kate or Madeline sleeps on the floor, then Justin
goes to Ikea. So, Justin goes to Ikea if, and only if, Kate sleeps on the floor.
9. If Aristotle’s Physics is right, then motion is goal-directed and everything has a
telos. But if everything is goal-directed, then other planets are unlike Earth. So,
if Aristotle’s Physics is right, then other planets are unlike Earth.
10. If nothing is worse for society than anarchy, then if people are mutually hostile,
then we need a central authority. But we do not need a central authority. So, if
nothing is worse for society than anarchy, then people are not mutually hostile.
11. If meanings are abstract objects or mental states, then if I believe that cats are
robots, then cats are robots. But cats are not robots. So, if meanings are mental
states, then I don’t believe that cats are robots.
12. If being a platonist entails rejecting empiricism, then Quine is not a platonist.
Being a platonist entails being an apriorist. Not rejecting empiricism entails not
being an apriorist. So, Quine is not a platonist.
13. If the common interest is imposed on individuals, then they are alienated or not
self-determining. But people are self-determining. So, if people are not alien-
ated, then the common interest is not imposed.
14. Either it is not the case that nothing is certain or we have unmediated access
to our mental states. If we have unmediated access to our mental states and
our basic beliefs are not secure, then either our mental states are potentially
misleading or we lack mental states. But if we lack mental states, then our basic
beliefs are secure. So, if nothing is certain and our basic beliefs are not secure,
then we have unmediated access to our mental states, but they are potentially
misleading.
15. Either some objects are beautiful or we impose cultural standards on artifacts.
It’s not the case that some particular proportions are best. So, if some objects be-
ing beautiful entails that some particular proportions are best, then if something
is aesthetically moving, then we impose cultural standards on artifacts.
16. If suicide is not legal, then we lack autonomy and the least powerful people do
not have self-determination. If education is universal and free, then the least
powerful people have self-determination. If only the privileged are educated,
then suicide is not legal. Either education is universal and free or only the
privileged are educated. So, suicide is legal if, and only if, the least powerful
people have self-determination.
3.8: LOGICAL TRUTHS

To this point, all of our derivations have started with some assumptions, or premises.
Even in direct proofs, our derivations have been, in a sense, conditional: on the
assumption of such and such premises, a conclusion follows. In this section, we
will use the method of conditional proof to prove theorems of logic, constructing
derivations with no premises at all. Such derivations may look strange at first, but
they can really be quite simple once you learn how to construct them.
A theory is a set of A theory is a set of sentences, called theorems. A formal theory is a set of sen-
sentences, called tences of a formal language. The provable statements of a logical system of inference
theorems . A formal
are theorems, just as provable geometric statements are theorems of, say, Euclidean
theory is a set of
sentences of a formal geometry.
language. As we saw in section 2.5, a logical theory is characterized by the set of its logical
truths. In PL, the logical truths are the same as the derivable theorems. Thus, PL
can be identified with either the logical truths, defined semantically, or its theorems,
the derivable propositions. Those propositions are true no matter what assumptions
we make about the world, or whatever we take to be the content of our propositional
variables. They thus can be proved without assuming any premises.
So, there are two ways to show that a wff is a logical truth of PL. Semantically, we
can show, using truth tables, whether any wff is a tautology or not. We just see whether
it is true in all rows of the truth table. In this section, we see how we can prove theo-
rems using any premises, and even without any premises. Since our theory is sound,
any statement that is provable without premises is a tautology.
One way to derive a theorem with no premises, which we are not using, is to adopt
a deductive system that takes certain wffs as axioms. Some theories, including most
nonlogical theories, are axiomatic. Axiomatic logical theories normally take a few
tautologies as axioms or axiom schemas. In such a system, any sentence of the form
of an axiom or schema can be inserted into a derivation with no further justification.
In our logical system so far, we have had no way to construct a derivation with
no premises. Now we can use conditional proof to derive logical truths without any
premises. We can just start our derivation with an assumption, as in 3.8.1, which
shows that ‘[(P ⊃ Q ) ∙ P] ⊃ Q’ is a logical truth.
3.8.1 1. (P ⊃ Q) ∙ P ACP
2. P ⊃ Q 1, Simp
3. P ∙ (P ⊃ Q) 1, Com
4. P 3, Simp
5. Q 2, 4, MP
6. [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ P] ⊃ Q 1–5, CP
In other words, from the assumption that P entails Q , and P, Q follows. Our con-
clusion is conditional, but holds without any further assumptions than the antecedent
of that conditional. Note that the last line of 3.8.1 is further un-indented than the first
line, since the first line is indented. Lines 1–5 are all based on at least one assumption.
But line 6 requires no assumption. It is a theorem of logic, a logical truth.
3 . 8 : L og i cal T r u t h s 1 8 5
Many proofs of logical truths involve nesting conditional proofs, as the derivation
3.8.2 does in showing that ‘(P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ [(Q ⊃ R) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)]’ is a logical truth.
3.8.2 1. P ⊃ Q ACP
2. Q ⊃ R ACP
3. P ⊃ R 1, 2, HS
4. (Q ⊃ R) ⊃ (P ⊃ R) 2–3, CP
5. (P ⊃ Q) ⊃ [(Q ⊃ R) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)] 1–4, CP
QED
Again, the conclusion is a conditional statement, but one that requires no premises
for its derivability. It is another logical truth. You can check that the theorems at 3.8.1
and 3.8.2 are logical truths by constructing truth tables for them, or for any of the
logical truths of this section. They will all be tautologies.
Derivations of logical truths can look awkward when you are first constructing and
considering them. Remember, the logical truth we prove in 3.8.2 is conditional, and
doubly so: if P entails Q , then if Q entails R, then P entails R. So, while we have
demonstrated a logical truth out of thin air, the nature of that logical truth should
make the process seem less magical.
When the logical truth has nested conditionals, as 3.8.2 does, setting up the as-
sumptions can require care. But such logical truths are often simple to derive once
they are set up properly. Be especially careful not to use the assigned proposition in
the proof. The conclusion is not part of the derivation until the very end.
3.8.3 shows that ‘[P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)]’ is a logical truth, using
three nested conditional sequences.
3.8.3 1. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) ACP (to prove (P ⊃ Q) ⊃
(P ⊃ R))
2. P ⊃ Q ACP (to prove (P ⊃ R))
3. P ACP (to prove R)
4. Q ⊃ R 1, 3, MP
5. Q 2, 3, MP
6. R 4, 5, MP
7. P ⊃ R 3–6 CP
8. (P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R) 2–7, CP
9. [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)] 1–8, CP
QED
A trivial, or degenerate, instance of CP can prove one of the simplest logical truths,
at 3.8.4.
3.8.4 1. P ACP
2. P ⊃ P CP, 1
QED
Notice that the CP at 3.8.4 has only one line. The second line discharges the as-
sumption; since the first and last line are the same, the antecedent and consequent of
the discharging formula are the same. It should be no surprise that a statement entails
itself. But a use of Impl and Com on that formula yields an instance of the standard
The law of the excluded form of the law of excluded middle, at 3.8.5, one of the characteristic logical truths.
middle is that any claim
of the form α ∨ ~α is a
3.8.5 P ∨ ∼P
tautology, a logical truth The metalinguistic version of the law of the excluded middle is called bivalence, as we
of PL.
saw in section 2.3. Bivalence, that every proposition is either true or false, and not both,
underlies the two-valued semantics of PL. (The middle that is excluded is any truth
value other than truth or falsity.) Bivalence has long been a controversial claim. Con-
sider the problem of future contingents; Aristotle’s example is, ‘there will be a sea battle
tomorrow’. Since we do not know today whether there will be a sea battle tomorrow, we
don’t know whether the statement is true or false and seem unable to assert either. We
surely could look back on the day after tomorrow to assign a truth value to the claim, but
as of today, it may not even have a truth value. Though even this simple logical truth is
controversial, our uses of CP do not raise these problems. The problem comes from the
semantics of PL, since every instance of the law of excluded middle is a tautology.
A Common Error to Avoid in Using CP to Derive Logical Truths

A common error made by students just learning to use CP is to include the desired
conclusion as a numbered line in the argument. This can be done in at least two ways,
both wrong. In the first way, one puts the assumed formula as the first assumption for
CP, as at 3.8.6 (reusing the example at 3.8.3 to show the error).
3.8.6 1. [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)] ACP (but not a good one!)
Although one can assume anything for CP, starting the CP in this way is unproduc-
tive for proving this logical truth. Remember, when you discharge an assumption for
CP, the first line becomes the antecedent of the discharging formula; imagine what
that formula would look like on the assumption at 3.8.6! Students sometimes follow
errant assumptions like the one at 3.8.6 with assuming, further, the antecedent of that
very formula, as at 3.8.7.
3.8.7 1. [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)] ACP (again not useful!)
2. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) ACP
Now, one could derive the consequent of the formula at line 1, using MP, as at 3.8.8,
but then look at the resulting discharged formula.
3.8.8 1. [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)] ACP (still not useful!)
2. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) ACP
3. (P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R) 1, 2, MP
4. [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)] 2–3, CP
5. {[P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)]} ⊃ {[P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)]}
1–4, CP
There is actually nothing wrong with the CP at 3.8.8, except that it doesn’t prove
what one sets out to prove. Indeed, it merely long-windedly proves a complex instance
of the law of the excluded middle, as at 3.8.4!
3 . 8 : L og i cal T r u t h s 1 8 7
The second version of the error, not properly setting up the CP, is to take the desired
formula as a premise, as at 3.8.9. Then a CP can just prove the same formula you’ve
already assumed.
3.8.9 1. [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃[(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)] Premise
2. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) ACP
3. (P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ (P ⊃ R) 1, 2, MP
4. [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(P ⊃ Q) ⊃ (P ⊃ R)] 2–3, MP
In 3.8.9, the conclusion certainly follows from the premise. Line 4 is just a restate-
ment of line 1. Any statement entails itself! But what we want, as at 3.8.3, is a deriva-
tion of the logical truth with no premises at all.
The assumptions of this subsection, from 3.8.6–3.8.9, are all errors to avoid in con-
structing conditional proofs to demonstrate logical truths. If you learn to set up your
CPs correctly, indenting and assuming only the antecedent of your desired condi-
tional, you can easily avoid these mistakes and the proofs tend to be quite simple.
Converting Ordinary Derivations into Logical Truths

Until now, our derivations have required assumptions as premises. Such assumptions
are often naturally interpreted as empirical claims, taken from observation, perhaps.
Most of the premises of most of the arguments we have seen so far have been contin-
gencies, though we can take any kind of premise, even a contradiction, as an assump-
tion. Whatever their status, premises of arguments are generally not justified by the
same methods that we use to justify our system of logic. Thus, our derivations before
this section may be seen as not purely logical. They are not, as they stand, proofs of log-
ical conclusions. They are merely derivations from assumed premises to conclusions.
But for every valid argument requiring premises, we can create a proof of a purely
logical truth. Neither of the premises of 3.8.10 are logical truths, for examples, being
mere atomic wffs, both contingencies.
3.8.10 1. ∼A ⊃ B
2. ∼A /B
But because the argument is an instance of a modus ponens, and thus valid, we can
turn it into the logical truth at 3.8.11 or the logical truth at 3.8.12.
3.8.11 [(∼A ⊃ B) ∙ ∼A] ⊃ B
3.8.12 (∼A ⊃ B) ⊃ (∼A ⊃ B)
There are two options for constructing logical truths from any set of premises and a
conclusion. On the first option, which I used at 3.8.11, conjoin all of the premises into
one statement. Then write a conditional that takes the conjunction of the premises as
the antecedent and the conclusion of the argument as the consequent.
On the second option, which I used at 3.8.12, form a series of nested conditionals,
using each premise as an antecedent and the conclusion as the final consequent. For
a short argument, like 3.8.10, you can see the equivalence of the two methods by one
use of exportation.
The derivation of 3.8.10 is straightforward. The derivation of 3.8.11, as a logical

truth with no premises, is just a bit more complicated, but it has the same technique at
its core, a simple MP. The derivation is at 3.8.13.
3.8.13 1. (∼A ⊃ B) ∙ ∼A ACP
2. ∼A ⊃ B 1, Simp
3. ∼A ∙ (∼A ⊃ B) 1, Com
4. ∼A 3, Simp
5. B 2, 4, MP
6. [(∼A ⊃ B) ∙ ∼A] ⊃ B 1–5, CP
QED
3.8.14 has more premises than 3.8.10, but can be converted to a logical truth in
either of the ways just described.
3.8.14 1. P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)
2. R ⊃ S
3. T ∨ ∼S
4. ∼T / ∼(P ∨ S)
The first method for turning it into a logical truth, resulting in 3.8.15, is perhaps a
little easier than the second, resulting in 3.8.16. It doesn’t matter how you group the
four premises. Either way works.
3.8.15 {{[P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)] ∙ (R ⊃ S)} ∙ [(T ∨ ∼S) ∙ ∼T]} ⊃ ∼(P ∨ S)
3.8.16 [P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)] ⊃ {(R ⊃ S) ⊃ {(T ∨ ∼S) ⊃ [∼T ⊃ ∼(P ∨ S)]}}
The arguments we have been deriving so far, which include premises, are useful
in applying logic to ordinary arguments. But the logical truths are the logician’s real
interest, as they are the theorems of propositional logic.
The transformations we have made at the object-language level can also be made
at the metalinguistic level. Our rules of inference are written in a metalanguage. Any
substitution instances of the premises in our rules of inference entail a substitution in-
stance of the conclusion. We can similarly convert all of our rules of inference. 3.8.17
shows how modus ponens can be written as a single sentence of the metalanguage.
3.8.18 shows the same for constructive dilemma.
3.8.17 α⊃β
α /β
can be converted to:
[(α ⊃ β) ∙ α] ⊃ β
3.8.18 α⊃β
γ⊃δ
α ∨ γ / β ∨ δ
can be converted to:
{[(α ⊃ β) ∙ (γ ⊃ δ)] ∙ (α ∨ γ)} ⊃ (β ∨ δ)
3 . 8 : L og i cal T r u t h s 1 8 9
Any consistent substitution instance of these new forms, ones in which each meta-
linguistic variable is replaced by the same wffs of the object language throughout, will
be a logical truth and provable in PL with no premises.
All ten rules of equivalence we have been using can easily be turned into templates
for constructing logical truths even more easily. We can just replace the metalinguis-
→ ’ with the object-language symbol ‘≡’, as I did for Impl and one version
tic symbol ‘ ←
of DM in 3.8.19.
3.8.19 (α ⊃ β) ≡ (∼α ∨ β)
∼(α ∨ β) ≡ (∼α ∙ ∼β)
Again, any substitution instance of these forms will be a logical truth.
These metalinguistic templates for logical truths are the kinds of rules one would
adopt in an axiomatic system of logic. The templates are called axiom schemas. Such
axiomatic theories can be constructed to derive the same logical theorems as our
PL, to have the same strength as our system of logic, often with many fewer rules of
inference or equivalence. Again, we are not using an axiomatic system, and we will
retain all twenty-five rules, as well as the direct, conditional, and indirect derivation
methods, the last of which is the subject of our next section.
Summary
The primary goal of this section was to show you how to construct proofs of logical
truths of PL, the theorems of propositional logic. Using conditional proof, we start by
indenting and assuming the antecedents of a conditional logical truth and then derive
the consequent. When we discharge our assumption, we have proven a formula of PL
without any premises.
The secondary goal of the section was to show the relation between our ordinary
proofs so far, which contain premises, and the proofs of logical truths. Since every
proof that assumes premises is convertible into a proof that does not, even the deriva-
tions that assume contingent premises can be seen as proofs of logical truths.
KEEP IN MIND
The logical truths of PL are tautologies.

Logical truths do not depend on any premises and can be proven with or without premises.
Conditional proofs may be used to derive logical truths.
We can construct logical truths from any set of premises and a conclusion in two ways:
1. Conjoin all premises and take the resulting conjunction as the antecedent of a
complex conditional with the conclusion as the consequent.
2. Form a series of nested conditionals, using each premise as an antecedent and
the conclusion as the final consequent.
EXERCISES 3.8a
Convert each of the following arguments to a logical truth,
using either of the methods described above.
1. 1. ∼A ⊃ B 7. 1. R ⊃ S
2. ∼B /A 2. S ⊃ T
3. ∼(T ∨ U) / ∼R
2. 1. ∼C ∨ D
2. C /D 8. 1. V ⊃ W
2. ∼W ∨ X
3. 1. E ∙ (F ∨ G)
3. V ∙ (Y ∙ Z) / X
2. ∼E /G
9. 1. A ∨ (B ∙ C)
4. 1. ∼(H ∨ I)
2. A ⊃ D
2. J ⊃ I / ∼J
3. ∼(D ∨ E) /C
5. 1. K ∙ (∼L ∨ M)
10. 1. F ⊃ G
2. L ⊃ ∼K / M
2. H ⊃ F
6. 1. N ⊃ (P ∙ Q ) 3. H ∙ I / ∼G ⊃ I
2. ∼(O ∨ P) / ∼N
EXERCISES 3.8b
Use conditional proof to derive each of the following logical
truths.
1. [A ∨ (B ∙ C)] ⊃ (A ∨ C)
2. [(A ⊃ B) ∙ C] ⊃ (∼B ⊃ ∼A)
3. (O ∨ P) ⊃ [∼(P ∨ Q ) ⊃ O]
4. [V ∙ (W ∨ X)] ⊃ (∼X ⊃ W)
5. [(P ∨ Q ) ∨ (R ∨ S)] ⊃ [(R ∨ Q ) ∨ (S ∨ P)]
6. [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(P ∙ ∼R) ⊃ ∼Q ]
7. [(P ∨ Q ) ∨ R] ⊃ [∼P ⊃ (∼Q ⊃ R)]
8. (P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ [(Q ⊃ S) ⊃ (∼S ⊃ ∼P)]
3 . 9 : In d i rect P roof 1 9 1
9. [(P ∨ Q ) ∙ (P ∨ R)] ⊃ [∼P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)]

10. ∼[P ≡ (Q ∙ R)] ⊃ (∼P ⊃ Q )
11. ∼(P ≡ Q ) ≡ [(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ (Q ∙ ∼P)]
12. [(D ⊃ ∼E) ∙ (F ⊃ E)] ⊃ [D ⊃ (∼F ∨ G)]
13. [(H ⊃ I) ⊃ ∼(I ∨ ∼J)] ⊃ (∼H ⊃ J)
14. [(W ⊃ X) ∙ (Y ∨ ∼X)] ⊃ [∼(Z ∨ Y) ⊃ ∼W]
15. (P ≡ ∼Q ) ⊃ ∼(P ∙ Q )
16. [P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R)] ⊃ [(Q ∙ ∼R) ⊃ ∼P]
17. [(P ≡ Q ) ∙ ∼Q ] ⊃ (P ⊃ R)
18. [(P ∨ Q ) ∙ ∼P] ⊃ [(Q ⊃ R) ⊃ R]
19. [P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)] ≡ [(∼P ∨ Q ) ∙ (∼P ∨ R)]
20. [(P ⊃ Q ) ∙ (P ⊃ R)] ⊃ {(S ⊃ P) ⊃ [S ⊃ (Q ∙ R)]}
21. [(R ∙ S) ⊃ U] ⊃ {∼U ⊃ [R ⊃ (S ⊃ T)]}
22. [(∼K ⊃ N) ∙ ∼(N ∨ L)] ⊃ [(K ⊃ L) ⊃ M]
23. [(D ∙ E) ⊃ (F ∨ G)] ≡ [(∼F ∙ ∼G) ⊃ (∼D ∨ ∼E)]
24. [(P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ (R ⊃ P)] ⊃ [∼P ⊃ (P ≡ R)]
25. [(P ⊃ Q ) ∙ (R ⊃ S)] ⊃ [(∼Q ∨ ∼S) ⊃ (∼P ∨ ∼R)]
3.9: INDIRECT PROOF

We have seen two derivation methods, now, the direct and conditional. For ordinary
derivations with assumptions, we can use either a direct or conditional proof. For
logical truths, which need no assumptions, we use conditional proof. Indirect proof, or reductio
ad absurdum , is a third
Our third and final method is called indirect proof. It is the formal version of method of derivation,
what is commonly called a reductio ad absurdum, or just reductio, proof. Reductio ad along with the direct and
absurdum is ‘reduction to the absurd’ in English. In reductio arguments, we assume conditional methods.
a premise, show that it leads to an unacceptable (or absurd) consequence, and then
conclude the opposite of our assumption. Indirect proof, like conditional proof, is
useful for proving logical truths.
We can see the justification for indirect proof by considering the arguments 3.9.1,
which we called explosion in section 3.5, and 3.9.2.
3.9.1 1. A ∙ ∼A /B
2. A 1, Simp
3. A ∨ B 2, Add
4. ∼A ∙ A 1, Com
5. ∼A 4, Simp
6. B 3, 5, DS
QED
3.9.2 1. B ⊃ (P ∙ ∼P) / ∼B
2. B ACP
3. P ∙ ∼P 1, 2, MP
4. P 3, Simp
5. P ∨ ∼B 4, Add
6. ∼P ∙ P 3, Com
7. ∼P 6, Simp
8. ∼B 5, 7, DS
9. B ⊃ ∼B 2–8, CP
10. ∼B ∨ ∼B 9, Impl
11. ∼B 10, Taut
QED
The moral of 3.9.1 is that anything follows from a contradiction in PL. The moral
of 3.9.2 is that if a statement entails a contradiction in PL, then its negation is
provable. Indirect proof is based on these two morals, and it captures a natural style
of inference: showing that some assumption leads to unacceptable consequences and
then rejecting the assumption.
To use an indirect proof, we assume the opposite of our desired conclusion and
derive a contradiction. When we get the contradiction, then we can infer the negation
of our assumption.
Method for Indirect Proof

1. Indent, assuming the opposite of what you want to conclude.
2. Derive a contradiction, using any wff.
3. Discharge the negation of your assumption.
The last line of an indented sequence for indirect proof is always a contradiction. As
in section 2.5, a contradiction, for the purposes of indirect proof, is any statement of
the form α ∙ ∼α. The wffs listed in 3.9.3 are all contradictions.
3.9.3 P ∙ ∼P
∼ ∼P ∙ ∼ ∼ ∼P
∼(P ∨ ∼Q) ∙ ∼ ∼(P ∨ ∼Q)

We can assume any wff we want, for both CP and IP, by indenting and noting the
assumption. But only certain assumptions will discharge in the desired way. For CP,
we assume the antecedent of a desired conditional because when we discharge, the
first line of the assumption becomes the antecedent of the resulting conditional. For
IP, we always discharge the first line of the proof with one more tilde. Thus, if we wish
to prove the negation of a formula, we can just assume the formula itself.
3.9.4 is a sample derivation using IP. At line 3, we are considering what would follow
if the opposite of the conclusion is true. At line 6, we have found a contradiction, and
so we discharge our assumption at line 7.
3.9.4 1. A ⊃ B
2. A ⊃ ∼B / ∼A
3. A AIP
4. B 1, 3, MP
5. ∼B 2, 3, MP
6. B ∙ ∼B 4, 5, Conj
7. ∼A 3–6, IP
QED
Since the discharge step of an indirect proof requires an extra∼, we often need to
use DN at the end of an indirect proof, as in 3.9.5.
3.9.5 1. F ⊃ ∼D
2. D
3. (D ∙ ∼E) ⊃ F /E
4. ∼E AIP
5. D ∙ ∼E 2, 4, Conj
6. F 3, 5, MP
7. ∼D 1, 6, MP
8. D ∙ ∼D 2, 7, Conj
9. ∼ ∼E 4–8, IP
10. E 9, DN
QED
In addition to deriving simple statements and negations, the method of indirect
proof is especially useful for proving disjunctions, as in 3.9.6. Assuming the negation
of a disjunction leads quickly, by DM, to two conjuncts that you can simplify.
3.9.6 1. ∼A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)
2. C ⊃ D
3. B /A∨D
4. ∼(A ∨ D) AIP
5. ∼A ∙ ∼D 4, DM
6. ∼A 5, Simp
7. B ⊃ C 1, 6, MP
8. ∼D ∙ ∼A 5, Com
9. ∼D 8, Simp
10. ∼C 2, 9, MT
11. C 7, 3, MP
12. C ∙ ∼C 11, 10, Conj
13. ∼ ∼(A ∨ D) 4–12, IP
14. A ∨ D 13, DN
QED
Indirect proof is compatible with conditional proof. Indeed, the structure of many
mathematical proofs involves making a conditional assumption, and then assuming
the opposite of a desired conclusion to get a contradiction. 3.9.7 is a formal example
of exactly this procedure, nesting an IP within a CP.
3.9.7 1. E ⊃ (A ∙ D)
2. B ⊃ E / (E ∨ B) ⊃ A
3. E ∨ B ACP
4. ∼A AIP
5. ∼A ∨ ∼D 4, Add
6. ∼(A ∙ D) 5, DM
7. ∼E 1, 6, MT
8. B 3, 7, DS
9. ∼B 2, 7, MT
10. B ∙ ∼B 8, 9, Conj
11. ∼ ∼A 4–10, IP
12. A 11, DN
13. (E ∨ B) ⊃ A 3–12, CP
QED
Essentially the same proof structure could have been used with a single assump-
tion of the negation of the whole desired conclusion, as a single IP without using CP.
I begin that alternative at 3.9.8.
3.9.8 1. E ⊃ (A ∙ D)
2. B ⊃ E / (E ∨ B) ⊃ A
3. ∼[(E ∨ B) ⊃ A] AIP
4. ∼[∼(E ∨ B) ∨ A] 3, Impl
5. ∼ ∼(E ∨ B) ∙ ∼A 4, DM
6. (E ∨ B) ∙ ∼A 5, DN
Now the proof can proceed as it did from line 5 in 3.9.7. Either method is acceptable,
though some find the nested structure of 3.9.7 both clearer and more conceptually
useful. You can even nest indirect proofs within one another, though such measures
are rarely warranted.
When first learning to use IP, it is typical to try to invoke it as if it were magic, turn-
ing statements into their negations. Be very careful with your negations and with the
structure of indirect proofs. DN always adds or subtracts pairs of consecutive tildes.
IP always places a single tilde in front of the formula you assumed in the first line of
your indented sequence after that sequence ends in a contradiction.
Like conditional proof, the method of indirect proof is easily adapted to proving
logical truths. To prove that ‘∼[(X ≡ Y) ∙ ∼(X ∨ ∼Y)]’ is a logical truth, as in 3.9.9, we
again start with an assumption, the opposite of the theorem we wish to prove.
3.9.9 1. (X ≡ Y) ∙ ∼(X ∨ ∼Y) AIP
2. X ≡ Y 1, Simp
3. (X ⊃ Y) ∙ (Y ⊃ X) 2, Equiv
4. ∼(X ∨ ∼Y) ∙ (X ≡ Y) 1, Com
` 5. ∼(X ∨ ∼Y) 4, Simp
6. ∼X ∙ ∼ ∼Y 5, DM
7. ∼X ∙ Y 6, DN
8. (Y ⊃ X) ∙ (X ⊃ Y) 3, Com
9. Y ⊃ X 8, Simp
10. ∼X 6, Simp
11. ∼Y 9, 10, MT
12. Y ∙ ∼X 7, Com
13. Y 12, Simp
14. Y ∙ ∼Y 13, 11, Conj
15. ∼[(X ≡ Y) ∙ ∼(X ∨ ∼Y)] 1–14, IP
QED
3.9.10 is another example of using IP to derive a logical truth, ‘(P ⊃ Q ) ∨ (∼Q ⊃ P)’.
Since our desired formula this time is a disjunction, an indirect proof quickly yields,
by a use of DM, two simpler formulas with which to work. Since the assumption is a
formula with a negation, though, we have to use DN at the end (line 17) to get our
desired formula.
3.9.10 1. ∼[(P ⊃ Q) ∨ (∼Q ⊃ P)] AIP

2. ∼(P ⊃ Q) ∙ ∼(∼Q ⊃ P) 1, DM
3. ∼(P ⊃ Q) 2, Simp
4. ∼(∼P ∨ Q) 3, Impl
5. ∼ ∼P ∙ ∼Q 4, DM
6. P ∙ ∼Q 5, DN
7. ∼(∼Q ⊃ P) ∙ ∼(P ⊃ Q) 2, Com
8. ∼(∼Q ⊃ P) 7, Simp
9. ∼(∼ ∼Q ∨ P) 8, Impl
10. ∼(Q ∨ P) 9, DN
11. ∼Q ∙ ∼P 10, DM
12. ∼P ∙ ∼Q 11, Com
13. ∼P 12, Simp
14. P 6, Simp
15. P ∙ ∼P 14, 13, Conj
16. ∼ ∼[(P ⊃ Q) ∨ (∼Q ⊃ P)] 1–15, IP
17. (P ⊃ Q) ∨ (∼Q ⊃ P) 16, DN
QED
We can nest proofs of logical truths inside a larger proof, as intermediate steps, as
in 3.9.11. Notice that the antecedents of the conditionals on lines 4 and 8 are logical
truths.
3.9.11 1. B ⊃ [(D ⊃ D) ⊃ E]
2. E ⊃ {[F ⊃ (G ⊃ F)] ⊃ (H ∙ ∼H)} / ∼B
3. B AIP
4. (D ⊃ D) ⊃ E 1, 3, MP
5. D ACP
6. D ⊃ D 5, CP
7. E 4, 6, MP
8. [F ⊃ (G ⊃ F)] ⊃ (H ∙ ∼H) 2, 7, MP
9. F ACP
10. F ∨ ∼G 9, Add
11. ∼G ∨ F 10, Com
12. G ⊃ F 11, Impl
13. F ⊃ (G ⊃ F) 9–12, CP
14. H ∙ ∼H 8, 13, MP
15. ∼B 3–14, IP
QED
As with CP (see example 3.8.4 and lines 5–6 in 3.9.11, above), there is a trivial form
of IP, at 3.9.12. The result is, perhaps unsurprisingly, the same.
3.9.12 1. P ∙ ∼P AIP
2. ∼(P ∙ ∼P) 1, IP
3. ∼P ∨ ∼ ∼P 2, DM
4. ∼ ∼P ∨ ∼P 3, Com
5. P ∨ ∼P 4, DN
Voila: the law of the excluded middle!
Three Derivation Methods

With the introduction of the methods of conditional and indirect proof, our proof
system for PL is now complete: any tautology or valid argument of PL is provable. In
chapters 4 and 5, we will explore a series of more refined logical languages. We will
introduce new rules governing these refinements. These languages will contain all the
vocabulary of PL, and the systems of inference will include all of the rules we have
studied in this chapter.
A small change to our definition of proof is worth noting here. In section 3.1, I
wrote that a derivation, or proof, is a sequence of wffs, every member of which is an
assumed premise or follows from earlier wffs in the sequence according to specified
rules. Given the uses of CP and IP, we should expand that characterization.
A derivation or proof is a sequence of wffs, every member of which is:
a premise; or
follows from earlier lines in the derivation using the rules; or
is an (indented) assumption for CP or IP; or
is in the scope of an assumption for CP or IP and follows from earlier lines
of the derivation (but not from earlier closed indented sequences).
Summary
We now have three derivation methods: direct, conditional, and indirect. Indirect
proof is both a useful, legitimate tool of inference in classical systems like ours and
the last hope of the desperate. If you are stuck in a proof and cannot see how to get
your conclusion, it is often very useful just to assume the opposite of what you want
and derive whatever you can, looking for a contradiction. The result might not be the
most efficient derivation, but as long as you do not misuse any rules, the derivation
will be legitimate.
We now have two different kinds of assumptions: assumptions for conditional
proof and assumptions for indirect proof. These assumptions are really no different.
Indeed, you might think of indirect proof as a conditional proof of a formula whose
consequent is a contradiction. Since the antecedent entails a contradiction, we know
that the first line of the indented sequence is false, and we can, given bivalence, con-
clude its opposite.
It is natural, especially at first, to wonder about which derivation method to use in
any particular derivation. Some guidelines are generally useful, though they should
not be taken as inviolable rules.
Which Derivation Method Should I Use?

If the main operator is a conditional or a biconditional, generally use conditional
proof.
If the main operator is a disjunction or a negation, generally use indirect proof.
If the main operator is a conjunction, look to the main operators of each conjunct
to determine the best derivation method.
KEEP IN MIND
For indirect proof, assume (in the first indented line) the opposite of your desired
conclusion.
The last line of an indented sequence for IP should always be a contradiction.
A contradiction is any statement of the form α ∙ ∼α.
For IP, always discharge the first line of the proof with one more tilde.
Logical truths may be proven using either CP or IP.
You may use indirect proof whenever you are stuck in a derivation.
EXERCISES 3.9a
Derive the conclusions of the following arguments using
conditional proof and/or indirect proof where appropriate.
1. 1. U ⊃ (V ∨ W)
2. ∼(W ∨ V) / ∼U
2. 1. Y ∨ ∼Z
2. ∼X ∨ Z /X⊃Y
3. 1. A ⊃ B
2. ∼(C ∨ ∼A) /B
4. 1. L ⊃ M
2. L ∨ O /M∨O
5. 1. A ∨ ∼B
2. (B ∨ C) ⊃ ∼A / ∼B
6. 1. F ⊃ (E ∨ D)
2. ∼E ∙ (∼D ∨ ∼F) / ∼F
7. 1. M ⊃ L
2. ∼(K ∙ N) ⊃ (M ∨ L) / K ∨ L
8. 1. H ⊃ G
2. H ∨ J
3. ∼(J ∨ ∼I) /G∙I
9. 1. X ⊃ Y
2. ∼(Z ⊃ W) / X ⊃ (Y ∙ Z)
10. 1. ∼(G ⊃ H) ⊃ ∼F
2. G ∙ (F ∨ H) /H
11. 1. B ≡ (A ∙ D)
2. ∼A ⊃ (∼B ⊃ C) /A∨C
12. 1. P ≡ (Q ∨ ∼R)
2. T ∙ ∼(Q ∙ P) / ∼(P ∙ R)
13. 1. (C ∨ ∼B) ⊃ (∼D ⊃ A)
2. (A ∨ B) ≡ D /D
14. 1. X ⊃ T
2. Y ⊃ T
3. T ⊃ Z / (X ∨ Y) ⊃ Z
15. 1. S ⊃ T
2. S ∨ (∼R ∙ U) /R⊃T
16. 1. A ≡ (B ∙ D)
2. C ⊃ (E ∨ F)
3. A ∨ ∼E
4. A ∨ ∼F /C⊃B
17. 1. M ⊃ (L ∙ ∼P)
2. K ⊃ ∼(O ∙ ∼P)
3. N ⊃ O / (K ∙ M) ⊃ ∼N
18. 1. A ⊃ B
2. ∼C ⊃ ∼(A ∨ ∼D)
3. ∼D ∨ (B ∙ C) / A ⊃ (B ∙ C)
19. 1. Z ⊃ Y
2. Z ∨ W
3. Y ⊃ ∼W
4. W ≡ ∼X /X≡Y
20. 1. W ≡ (X ∙ Z)
2. ∼(∼X ∙ ∼W) /Z⊃W
21. 1. ∼[J ∨ (F ∙ ∼H)]
2. ∼G ⊃ ∼H
3. G ∨ [∼F ⊃ (J ∙ K)] / E ∨ G
22. 1. (G ∙ ∼H) ⊃ F
2. G / (H ∨ F) ∙ G
23. 1. Y ≡ ∼(V ∙ X)
2. ∼W ⊃ ∼V
3. ∼(Y ⊃ ∼V) / ∼(W ⊃ X)
24. 1. ∼(I ⊃ J) ⊃ ∼F
2. (F ∨ H) ∙ (G ∨ I)
3. ∼H ⊃ ∼J /H∨G
25. 1. K ⊃ (L ∙ I)
2. ∼(J ⊃ M)
3. L ⊃ (∼K ∨ ∼I) / ∼[ J ⊃ (M ∨ K)]
26. 1. ∼(∼E ∙ ∼H) ∨ I
2. (E ∙ ∼I) ⊃ (H ∙ G) /H∨I
27. 1. (T ⊃ U) ∙ (S ⊃ V)
2. [V ⊃ (∼T ⊃ W)] ⊃ ∼U
3. S / ∼T ∙ V
28. 1. M ⊃ (O ⊃ L)
2. ∼[(∼O ∙ ∼K) ≡ (L ∨ M)] / L ∨ ∼O
29. 1. P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)
2. ∼Q ⊃ R
3. (∼R ≡ ∼Q ) ∨ P / ∼(Q ⊃ ∼R)
30. 1. A ≡ ∼(B ∨ C)
2. (D ∨ E) ⊃ ∼C
3. ∼(A ∙ D) /D⊃B
31. 1. U ⊃ (P ∙ ∼Q )
2. T ⊃ (S ∨ U)
3. ∼T ⊃ ∼R / (P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ (R ⊃ S)
32. 1. B ⊃ C
2. E ≡ ∼(B ∨ A)
3. D ⊃ ∼E / D ⊃ (A ∨ C)
33. 1. F ⊃ (K ≡ M)
2. ∼F ⊃ [L ⊃ (F ≡ H)]
3. ∼(M ∨ ∼L)
4. ∼H ⊃ ∼(∼K ∙ L) /F≡H
34. 1. ∼P ∨ R
2. ∼P ⊃ ∼(N ⊃ ∼Q )
3. ∼R ≡ (P ∨ O) /Q∙N
35. 1. ∼(R ∙ U) ⊃ T
2. [R ⊃ ∼(S ∙ ∼Q )] ⊃ ∼T / R ∙ (S ∨ U)
36. 1. ∼L ⊃ ∼K
2. N ∙ ∼(K ∙ L) / ∼[K ∨ ∼(J ⊃ N)]
37. 1. (L ⊃ ∼J) ∨ (K ∙ M)
2. (∼M ⊃ K) ⊃ ( J ∙ L) /K≡M
38. 1. (E ⊃ ∼A) ⊃ B
2. [(A ∙ D) ⊃ ∼C] ⊃ ∼B / A ∙ (C ∨ E)
39. 1. ∼E ⊃ ∼(A ⊃ C)
2. (∼D ∙ A) ⊃ (B ∙ ∼B)
3. ∼(∼A ∙ E) /D
40. 1. V ⊃ (T ∙ ∼W)
2. (T ⊃ W) ⊃ (∼X ∨ ∼Y)
3. ∼[∼(V ∨ Y) ∨ ∼(V ∨ X)] / ∼(T ⊃ W)
EXERCISES 3.9b
written in PL. Then, derive the conclusions of the
arguments.
1. If Lorena makes quiche, then she’ll make potatoes. She either doesn’t make po-
tatoes or doesn’t make quiche. So, she doesn’t make quiche.
2. Stephanie either plays miniature golf and not netball, or she goes to the ocean.
She doesn’t play miniature golf. So, she goes to the ocean.
3. If Grady eats quickly, then he’ll get hiccups. If he gets hiccups, then he’ll suck
on an ice cube and will not eat quickly. So, Grady doesn’t eat quickly.
4. If either Xander or Yael go to the water park, then Vivian will go. Winston go-
ing to the water park is sufficient for Vivian not to go. So, if Winston goes to the
water park, then Xander will not.
5. If Esme grows olives, then she grows mangoes. She grows either olives or nec-
tarines. So, she grows either mangoes or nectarines.
6. Having gorillas at the circus entails that there are elephants. There are either
gorillas or hippos. Having fancy ponies means that there are no hippos. Thus,
either there are elephants or there are no fancy ponies.
7. If the house is painted ivory and not green, then it will appear friendly. The
neighbors are either happy or jealous. If the neighbors are jealous, then the
house will be painted ivory. So, if it is not the case that either the house appears
friendly or it is painted green, then the neighbors will be happy.
8. If tanks tops are worn in school, then the rules are not enforced. It is not the
case that either short skirts or very high heels are in the dress code. Tank tops
are worn in school, and either uniforms are taken into consideration or the
rules are not enforced. So, it is not the case that either the rules are enforced or
short skirts are in the dress code.
9. If we are just, we help our friends. If we are unjust, we harm our enemies. So, we
either help our friends or harm our enemies.
10. If beauty does not increase with familiarity, then it either is intellectual per-
fection or a manifestation of secret natural laws. But beauty is not intellectual
perfection. If it’s a manifestation of secret natural laws, then it is intellection per-
fection. So, beauty increases with familiarity.
11. If I am my body, then I am constantly changing. If I am my conscious aware-
ness, then I am sometimes changing. If I am either constantly or sometimes
changing, then I do not have to repay my debts. But I do have to repay my debts.
So, I am not my body and I am not my conscious awareness.
12. If there are no atoms, then multiplicity is an illusion. If there are no atoms, we
can’t explain physical phenomena. Either we can explain physical phenomena
or there is a physical world. Either there is no physical world or multiplicity is
not an illusion. So, there are atoms.
13. If everything is either simple or real, then either causation is observable or time
is an illusion. But time is no illusion. So, if everything is simple, then causation
is observable.
14. Truth is not both correspondence of words to reality and consistency. If truth
is not consistency, then we do not know whether our sentences are true and we
are threatened with solipsism. If we have a good semantic theory, then we know
whether our sentences are true. So, if truth is correspondence of words to real-
ity, then we don’t have a good semantic theory.
15. If life is not all suffering, then we can be compassionate. If we can be compas-
sionate or have empathy, then we are emotionally vulnerable. It is not the case
that our sentience entails that we are emotionally vulnerable. So, life is all
suffering.
16. If morality is relative, then it is either subjective or culturally conditioned. If
morality is absolute, then either it is intuitive or not culturally conditioned.
If morality is not intuitive, then it is not subjective. So, if morality is relative and
not intuitive, then it is not absolute.
EXERCISES 3.9c
Use conditional or indirect proof to derive each of the
following logical truths.
1. ∼(∼P ∨ ∼Q ) ⊃ P
2. [∼P ∨ (Q ∙ R)] ⊃ (Q ∨ ∼P)
3 . 1 0 : C h apter R e v i ew 2 0 3
3. ∼(P ≡ ∼P)
4. (P ∨ Q ) ∨ (∼P ∙ ∼Q )
5. A ∨ (B ∨ ∼A)
6. C ∨ (C ⊃ D)
7. ∼(P ∙ Q ) ∨ P
8. ∼P ∨ (P ∨ Q )
9. ∼[(I ⊃ ∼I) ∙ (∼I ⊃ I)]
10. J ≡ [ J ∨ ( J ∙ K)]
11. (∼P ≡ Q ) ≡ [(∼P ∙ Q ) ∨ (P ∙ ∼Q )]
12. [(∼P ∨ Q ) ∙ (∼P ∨ R)] ∨ [P ∨ (∼Q ∙ ∼R)]
13. (P ∨ ∼Q ) ∨ (∼P ∨ R)
14. (E ⊃ F) ∨ (F ⊃ E)
15. (G ⊃ H) ∨ (∼G ⊃ H)
16. (L ≡ ∼M) ≡ ∼(L ≡ M)
17. (P ⊃ Q ) ≡ (Q ∨ ∼P)
18. (∼P ≡ Q ) ∨ (∼P ∨ Q )
19. [(P ∙ Q ) ∙ ∼R] ∨ [(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ (∼P ∨ R)]
20. [(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ (R ∙ ∼S)] ∨ [(Q ∙ S) ∨ (∼P ∨ ∼R)]
3.10: CHAPTER REVIEW

We have come to the end of our study of proof theory for propositional logic. We have
eleven rules of inference (sections 3.1, 3.2, and 3.6); fourteen rules of equivalence (sec-
tions 3.3, 3.4, and 3.6); and two alternatives to direct derivations (conditional proof
in section 3.7 and indirect proof in section 3.9). In chapters 4 and 5, all of these tools
continue to be used in constructing derivations in predicate logic. Practice with the
rules and methods of proof can make them both intuitive and useful beyond pure logic.
The main goal of the technical work of this book is a formal characterization of logi-
cal consequence: what follows from what. Our characterization in terms of our sys-
tem of inference, by the equivalences between valid arguments and logical truths we
saw in section 3.8, applies equally to logical truths and valid arguments. Our system
allows us multiple ways of deriving the conclusion of an argument or proving a logical
truth. By the soundness and completeness of our system, we can prove all and only
the logical truths and we can derive the conclusions of all and only valid arguments.
Proof Strategies
Sometimes, when faced with the challenge of deriving the conclusion of an argument
or proving a logical truth, we can quickly see our way through to the end. Other times,
we get stuck. At such times, it is useful to work off to the side of the proof, or on scratch
paper, trying different strategies. In particular, it can often be useful to work back-
ward from our desired conclusions. Here are some useful strategies worth keeping in
mind, for various kinds of conclusions. They can work for the main conclusions of an
argument, or to get propositions that you see you need along the way. It is not a com-
plete list, but it collects some of the most reliable strategies.
If your desired conclusion is a simple propositional letter or a negation of one, it is
useful to see where that letter exists in the premises. If it is in the consequent of a
conditional, try to derive the antecedent of that conditional, so you can use MP. If it is
in the antecedent of a conditional, try to derive the negation of the consequent, so you
can use MT. If it is part of a disjunction, try to get the negation of the other disjunct,
so you can use DS. You might also try an indirect proof, starting with the negation of
your desired conclusion. Sometimes, though much less frequently, you can use Taut
on statements of the form α ∨ α.
If your desired conclusion is a conjunction, it is typical to derive each conjunct sepa-
rately. Remember that conjunctions are the negations of disjunctions, by DM, so that
statements of the form ∼(α ∨ β) turn into statements of the form ∼α ∙ ∼β.
You can sometimes derive a disjunction merely by deriving one of the disjuncts and
using Add for the other. If that fails, CD can be useful. Since Impl allows us to turn
statements of the form α ∨ β into statements of the form ∼α ⊃ β, conditional proof
can be effective with disjunctions, too. And an indirect proof of a disjunction allows
you quickly to get two simpler statements. One use of DM on the negation of a state-
ment of the form α ∨ β yields ∼α ∙ ∼β; you can simplify either side.
Conditional proof is often effective in proving conditionals, especially for logical
truths. Don’t forget HS, especially when you are given a few conditionals in the prem-
ises. Cont can help you set up HS properly. DM can turn disjunctions into condition-
als on which you can use HS too.
Lastly, while there are many rules for deriving biconditionals in section 3.6, it re-
mains typical to derive each of the two component conditionals and then conjoin
them. CP can help with each side, though you should try first to see if you really need
CP; sometimes derivations are quicker without it.
Logical Truth or Not?

If we combine our deductive system for proving logical truths and valid arguments
with the semantic tools for constructing valuations and counterexamples in chap-
ter 2, we have the ability, given any statement or argument of the language PL, to
determine and demonstrate its validity. For example, we might be given a proposition
like 3.10.1, without being told whether it is a logical truth or not.
3.10.1 [P ⊃ (R ⊃ Q)] ⊃ (P ⊃ Q)
3 . 1 0 : C h apter R e v i ew 2 0 5
To determine whether it is a logical truth, we can just construct a truth table and see
whether it comes out false in any row, as we did in section 2.5. Perhaps more easily, we
can attempt to construct a derivation, as I begin to do at 3.10.2.
3.10.2 1. P ⊃ (R ⊃ Q) ACP (to prove P ⊃ Q)
2. P ACP (to prove Q)
3. R ⊃ Q 1, 2, MP
At this point, I don’t see any further helpful inferences and I begin to worry that I
might have a contingent (or even contradictory) proposition on my hands. I turn to
my semantic techniques: Can I construct a valuation that makes 3.10.1 false?
P Q R [P ⊃ (R ⊃ Q)] ⊃ (P ⊃ Q)
To make the proposition false, I have to make the antecedent true and the conse-
quent false. To make the consequent false, I must make P true and Q false. I can carry
these values through the formula.
P Q R [P ⊃ (R ⊃ Q)] ⊃ (P ⊃ Q)
1 0 1 0 1 0 0
If 3.10.1 were a logical truth, I would not be able to make the antecedent true. But if
I take R to be false, the antecedent comes out true and the whole formula comes out
false. We have a valuation that shows that 3.10.2 is not a logical truth.
Valid or Invalid?
We can use a similar combination of the methods of chapters 2 and 3 when given an
argument that we do not know is valid or invalid, like 3.10.3.
3.10.3 1. P ≡ Q
2. ∼P ∨ R
3. R ⊃ S / ∼Q ∙ S
We might try to derive the conclusion, as I do at 3.10.4.
3.10.4 1. P ≡ Q
2. ∼P ∨ R
3. R ⊃ S / ∼Q ∙ S
4. (P ⊃ Q) ∙ (Q ⊃ P) 1, Equiv
5. (Q ⊃ P) ∙ (P ⊃ Q) 4, Com
6. Q ⊃ P 5, Simp
7. ∼P ⊃ ∼Q 6, Cont
8. ∼Q ∨ S 7, 3, 2, CD
At this point, despite my ingenuity in using CD, I begin to suspect that the argu-
ment is invalid. I could try an indirect proof, but with the conjunction in the conclu-
sion, it doesn’t seem promising. If the argument is invalid, I should be able to construct
a counterexample. I turn to that task next.
There’s no obvious place to start, so I’ll start with the first premise, which is true
either when P and Q are both true or when they are both false.
P Q R S P ≡ Q / ∼ P ∨ R /
1 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 0
R ⊃ S // ∼ Q ∙ S
0 1 0
1 0
In the first row, our conclusion is already false, so we just need to make the second
and third premises true. If we take R to be false, we make the third premise true, but
the second premise is false. But if we take R to be true, we can make both premises true
by taking S to be true. We have a counterexample when all atomic formulas are true.
P Q R S P ≡ Q / ∼ P ∨ R /
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 0
R ⊃ S // ∼ Q ∙ S
1 1 1 0 1 0
1 0
3 . 1 0 : C h apter R e v i ew 2 0 7
Since the argument has a counterexample, it is invalid. Since all and only valid argu-
ments are provable in our system of deduction, the attempted derivation at 3.10.4 was
indeed quixotic.
To complete chapter 3, then, and our study of PL, use the tools from both chapters
2 and 3 on the exercises below, which give you arguments and propositions without
telling you whether they are valid or invalid, logical truths or not.
EXERCISES 3.10a
Determine whether each of the following arguments is valid
or invalid. If it is valid, provide a derivation of the
conclusion. If it is invalid, provide a counterexample.
1. 1. A ≡ C
2. C ⊃ (D ∨ B)
3. D /A⊃B
2. 1. E
2. (E ∨ G) ⊃ H
3. H ⊃ F
4. (F ∙ E) ⊃ ∼G / ∼G
3. 1. L ⊃ I
2. I ⊃ (K ⊃ J)
3. K ⊃ L /J⊃L
4. 1. M ⊃ N
2. N ≡ ∼O
3. ∼N ⊃ (M ∙ O) / ∼N
5. 1. (Q ∨ R) ≡ ∼P
2. Q ∨ S
3. P /S∙R
6. 1. X ⊃ W
2. W ⊃ X
3. Y
4. (Z ∙ Y) ⊃ ∼X / ∼X
7. 1. (A ∙ B) ⊃ (C ∙ D)
2. ∼C
3. B
4. A ∨ (∼D ∙ ∼B) / ∼D
8. 1. E ∨ F
2. ∼F ∨ G
3. E ≡ G
4. F ⊃ (G ∨ E) /F
9. 1. P ⊃ Q
2. R ∨ S
3. ∼R
4. Q ⊃ S / ∼P
10. 1. Z ≡ ∼X
2. ∼X ∨ Y
3. W ∙ ∼Y /Z∙W
11. 1. A ≡ B
2. ∼B
3. C
4. (D ∙ C) ⊃ ∼(A ∨ D) / ∼A ∙ ∼D
12. 1. F ≡ (H ∙ I)
2. ∼H ∨ ∼I
3. ∼F ⊃ G
4. G ⊃ E /E
13. 1. ∼P ⊃ R
2. Q ⊃ ∼R
3. (∼P ∙ Q ) ∨ S
4. S ≡ T
5. T ⊃ ∼Q /∼Q
14. 1. (W ∙ X) ⊃ Y
2. Y ⊃ (Z ∨ ∼X)
3. ∼Z / ∼(W ∙ X)
15. 1. ∼A ⊃ ∼B
2. A ⊃ (C ∙ D)
3. (C ∙ D) ≡ A /A
16. 1. ∼(E ∨ F)
2. H ≡ F
3. (H ∙ G) ∨ (H ∙ I) / ∼(G ⊃ E)
3 . 1 0 : C h apter R e v i ew 2 0 9
17. 1. J ≡ K
2. ∼J ∙ L
3. M ⊃ J
4. N ⊃ (K ∨ M) / L ∙ ∼N
18. 1. P ⊃ Q
2. P ∨ R
3. Q ⊃ ∼R
4. R ≡ ∼S /S≡Q
19. 1. ∼W ∨ X
2. Y ⊃ X
3. Y ⊃ ∼(Z ∙ X) / ∼Z ∨ ∼X
20. 1. (∼K ⊃ L) ∙ (∼M ⊃ N)

2. ∼(K ∙ M)
3. ∼L
4. N ≡ (K ∨ L) /M≡N
21. 1. P ≡ (∼Q ∙ R)
2. (R ⊃ Q ) ⊃ S
3. S ⊃ T
4. S ⊃ ∼T
5. P ⊃ (T ≡ ∼X) / ∼(X ≡ T)
22. 1. A ⊃ [∼B ∨ (C ∙ ∼D)]

2. B ⊃ D / B ⊃ ∼A
23. 1. (E ∙ F) ⊃ (G ∙ H)
2. ∼G ∨ ∼H
3. F
4. I ⊃ ( J ⊃ E) / ∼I ∨ ∼J
24. 1. K ⊃ (∼L ⊃ M)
2. N ∨ K
3. L ⊃ ∼N /M∨L
25. 1. ∼Z ⊃ Y
2. Z ⊃ ∼X
3. X ∨ ∼Z
4. Y ⊃ A
5. X ⊃ ∼A / ∼X
EXERCISES 3.10b
Determine whether each of the following propositions is a
logical truth. If it is a logical truth, provide a proof using
our system of natural deduction. If it is not a logical truth,
provide a valuation that makes the statement false.
1. (G ∨ G) ⊃ G
2. (T ∨ ∼T) ⊃ T
3. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ (P ∨ Q )
4. (R ∨ S) ⊃ (R ∙ S)
5. [(A ∨ ∼B) ∙ ∼A] ⊃ B
6. [(C ∨ ∼D) ∙ ∼C] ⊃ (∼D ∨ E)
7. [(A ⊃ B) ∙ (B ⊃ C)] ⊃ (∼C ⊃ ∼A)
8. [E ⊃ (F ⊃ G)] ⊃ [F ⊃ (E ⊃ G)]
9. [(H ∨ I) ⊃ K] ⊃ [(H ∙ I) ⊃ K]
10. [(J ∙ L) ⊃ M] ⊃ [( J ∨ L) ⊃ M]
11. ∼(R ⊃ S) ≡ (T ⊃ R)
12. ∼(P ⊃ Q ) ≡ (P ∨ ∼Q )
13. ∼(X ⊃ Y) ⊃ (Y ⊃ Z)
14. [(S ∨ T) ∙ ∼T] ⊃ (S ⊃ R)
15. [(P ∨ Q ) ∙ ∼P] ⊃ [(Q ⊃ R) ⊃ R]
16. [P ⊃ (Q ∨ S)] ⊃ (∼Q ⊃ ∼P)
17. [J ≡ (K ∙ L)] ⊃ [(J ⊃ K) ∙ (K ⊃ J)]
18. ∼(A ∨ ∼B) ⊃ [(A ⊃ C) ∙ (C ⊃ B)]
19. [G ≡ (H ∨ I)] ⊃ [(H ⊃ G) ∙ (I ⊃ G)]
20. [A ≡ (B ∙ C)] ⊃ [(A ≡ B) ∙ (A ≡ C)]
21. (E ∨ F) ⊃ {(E ⊃ H) ⊃ [(F ⊃ H) ⊃ H]}
22. [D ≡ (E ∨ F)] ⊃ [(D ⊃ E) ∙ (D ⊃ F)]
23. [(W ≡ X) ⊃ (Y ≡ Z)] ⊃ [(Y ≡ ∼Z) ⊃ (∼W ≡ X)]
24. [(P ∨ Q ) ⊃ (R ∙ S)] ⊃ [(P ⊃ R) ∙ (Q ⊃ S)]
25. [(W ∙ X) ⊃ (Y ∙ Z)] ⊃ [(W ⊃ X) ⊃ Y]
3 . 1 0 : C h apter R e v i ew 2 1 1
KEY TERMS
addition (Add), 3.2 justification, 3.1

association (Assoc), 3.3 law of the excluded middle, 3.8
commutativity (Com), 3.3 → ), 3.3
logically equivalent ( ←
complete system of inference, 3.1 material equivalence (Equiv), 3.4
conditional proof, 3.7 material implication (Impl), 3.4
conjunction (Conj), 3.2 modus ponens (MP), 3.1
constructive dilemma (CD), 3.2 modus tollens (MT), 3.1
contradiction, 3.5 nested sequence, 3.7
contraposition (Cont), 3.4 PL, 3.1
De Morgan’s laws (DM), 3.3 proof, 3.1, 3.9
derivation, 3.1, 3.7 QED, 3.1
direct proof, 3.7 reductio ad absurdum, 3.9
disjunctive syllogism (DS), 3.1 rule of equivalence, 3.3
distribution (Dist), 3.3 rule of inference, 3.1
double negation (DN), 3.3 simplification (Simp), 3.2
explosion, 3.5 sound system of inference, 3.1
exportation (Exp), 3.4 substitution instance, 3.1
formal theory, 3.8 system of inference, 3.1
hypothetical syllogism (HS), 3.1 tautology (Taut), 3.4
indented sequence, 3.7 theorem, 3.8
indirect proof, 3.9 theory, 3.8
Chapter 4
Monadic Predicate Logic
4.1: INTRODUCING PREDICATE LOGIC

We started our study of logic with a casual understanding of what follows from
what. Intuitively, a valid argument is one in which the truth of the premises ensures
the truth of the conclusion. Then, we explored a semantic definition of validity, in
chapter 2, and a proof system based on that semantic definition, in chapter 3. Our
formal notion of validity for propositional logic captures many intuitively valid in-
ferences. But it does not capture all of them. For example, argument 4.1.1 is an intui-
tively valid inference.
4.1.1 All philosophers are happy.
Emily is a philosopher.
So, Emily is happy.
But our tests for logical validity in propositional logic are of no help in showing the
validity of the argument.
4.1.2 P
Q /R
The conclusion does not follow from the premises using our system of inference for
PL. The truth tables show a counterexample, when P and Q are true and R is false.
The rules for validity for propositional logic are thus insufficient as a general charac-
terization of logical consequence. PL captures entailments among propositions. The
entailments in 4.1.1 are within, rather than among, the simple propositions. We need
a logic that explores logical relations inside propositions. Quantificational, or predi-
cate, logic does that.
In PL, we use the following vocabulary:
Capital English letters for simple statements
Five propositional operators
Punctuation (brackets)
212
4 . 1 : Intro d u c i ng P re d i cate L og i c 2 1 3
In predicate logic, we extend the vocabulary. We retain the same propositional op- A predicate logic
erators and punctuation. But the terms are more complex, revealing some subpropo- i ncludes singular
terms, predicates, and
sitional logical relations: quantifiers.
Complex statements made of singular terms and predicates
Quantifiers
Five propositional operators
Punctuation
Our study of predicate logic starts with a simple language, which I will call M, for M is monadic predicate
monadic predicate logic. logic.
Singular Terms and Predicates

In all predicate logic, we represent particular things using lower-case letters which
we call singular terms. In monadic predicate logic, M, we have two kinds of singular Singular terms a re lower-
terms: constants and variables. case letters which follow
predicates. They may be
a, b, c, . . . u stand for specific objects and are called constants. constants or variables .
v, w, x, y, z are used as variables.
We might use ‘a’ to stand for a person (perhaps Alycia or Andres); a city (Abidjan
or Athens); a work of art (Van Gogh’s Arles: View from the Wheat Fields or the movie
The Amazing Spider-Man); a mountain (Annapurna); or any other object to which we
give a name. The constant need not be the first letter of the object named; indeed, for
objects with names beginning with the letters v . . . z we cannot use the first letter. But
it is convenient to pick an obvious letter.
We represent properties of objects using any of the twenty-six capital letters of Eng-
lish. Used this way, we call them predicates. Predicates are placed in front of singular A predicate i s a capital
terms so that ‘Pa’ is used to say that object a has property P. A predicate of M followed letter that precedes a
singular term.
by a constant is called a closed sentence and expresses a proposition. 4.1.3 shows some
closed sentences.
4.1.3 Amaya is clever. Ca
Baruch plays chess. Pb
Carlos is tall. Tc
A predicate followed by a variable is called an open sentence. 4.1.4 shows some
open sentences. Notice that closed sentences express what we might call a complete
proposition, whereas open sentences do not. Indeed, they are not easily expressed in
English.
4.1.4 v is admirable Av
w is bold Bw
x is courteous Cx
2 1 4 C h apter 4 Mona d i c P re d i cate L og i c
We call M monadic The predicates used in 4.1.3 and 4.1.4, and generally in M, are called one-place
because the predicates predicates since they are followed by only one singular term. In section 5.1, we will
take exactly one singular
term.
extend our uses of predicates, using capital letters followed by any number of singular
terms to stand for relations among various objects.
Returning to 4.1.1, we can now regiment the second premise and the conclusion.
Emily is a philosopher. Pe
Emily is happy. He
To finish translating the argument in M, we must deal with the first premise, which
is not about a single thing and so cannot be translated using a constant. We can use a
variable, but variables are themselves insufficient to complete a proposition. ‘Px’ just
means that x is a philosopher and ‘Hx’ just means that x is happy. Those claims are,
by themselves, ambiguous among claims that a something is a philosopher, nothing
is a philosopher, or everything is a philosopher; and among claims that something is
happy, nothing is happy, or everything is happy. We need to disambiguate.
Frege thought of predicates as functions from singular terms to complete proposi-
tions. He put the singular terms after the predicates in imitation of the mathematical
practice of putting a function in front of its argument: f(3) or g(x). (See section 5.6 for
more on functions.) We follow Frege, writing ‘Pe’ for ‘Emily is a philosopher’ instead
of ‘eP’, or ‘Ep’, either of which might be a bit more natural.
Just as a function needs an argument, a proposition expressed by a predicate has
a hole in it, which must be filled with a singular term. When the singular term is a
constant, we have a complete proposition, as at 4.1.3. But when the singular term is
a variable, as at 4.1.4, we have to complete the proposition by indicating more about
the variable, disambiguating among something, nothing, and everything. We do that
with quantifiers.
Quantifiers
The subject of ‘All philosophers are happy’ is not a specific philosopher. No specific
object is mentioned. Similarly, in ‘Something is made in the USA’, there is no spe-
Quantifiers a re operators cific thing to which the sentence refers. For sentences like these, we use quantifiers
that work with variables to bind and modify our singular terms. There are two quantifiers: existential and
to stand for terms like
‘something’, ‘everything’,
universal, which always appear with a variable.
‘nothing’, and ‘anything’. (∃x), (∃y), (∃z), (∃w), (∃v)
They may be existential (∀x), (∀y), (∀z), (∀w), (∀v)
or universal .
Existential quantifiers are used to represent expressions like the following:
There exists a thing such that
For some thing
There is a thing
For at least one thing
Something
Universal quantifiers are used to represent expressions like the following:

For all x
Everything
Some terms, like ‘anything’, can indicate either an existential or a universal quanti- ‘Anything’ can indicate
fier, depending on the context. either an existential or a
universal quantifier.
4.1.5 If anything is missing, you’ll be sorry.
4.1.6 Anything goes.
In 4.1.5, we use an existential quantifier. ‘Anything’ in that case indicates ‘some-
thing’: if something is missing, then you’ll be sorry. In 4.1.6, we use a universal quan-
tifier, since that sentence expresses that everything is acceptable. To know whether to
use an existential or universal quantifier in cases where a quantifier is called for, you
will have to judge from the context of the use.
Similar remarks hold for the indefinite articles ‘a’ and ‘an’. 4.1.7 is universal, whereas
4.1.8 is existential.
4.1.7 A whale is a mammal.
4.1.8 Ahab sought a whale.
4.1.9–4.1.11 are examples of simple translations using quantifiers.
4.1.9 Something is made in the USA. (∃x)Ux
4.1.10 Everything is made in the USA. (∀x)Ux
4.1.11 Nothing is made in the USA. (∀x)∼Ux or ∼(∃x)Ux
Notice that the variables following the predicate match the quantifier variable. It
doesn’t matter which variables you use in a translation, but it does matter that they
match the appropriate quantifier. So, 4.1.9 could be written ‘(∃y)Uy’ or ‘(∃w)Uw’, but
it could not be written ‘(∃x)Uy’. In this chapter, we generally work with one variable
at a time. Some formulas will have more than one quantifier, but they will usually not
overlap with each other.
Notice also, in 4.1.11, that statements with quantifiers and negations can be trans-
lated in at least two different ways: everything lacks a property or it is not the case that
something has the property.
In the above examples, the quantifiers appear in the subject of the sentence. They
can appear elsewhere, too, as in 4.1.12 and 4.1.13.
4.1.12 Kwame did everything. (∀x)Kx
4.1.13 I wish that something would happen. (∃x)Wx
Quantifiers are operators, like the unary propositional operator negation or the
four binary propositional operators. The main operator of 4.1.9 is the existential
quantifier. The main operator of 4.1.10 is the universal quantifier. The main opera-
tor of the first version at 4.1.11 is the universal quantifier; the second version is a
negation.
Quantified Sentences with Two Predicates

Most English sentences are best translated using at least two predicates. We can
roughly divide most sentences into grammatical subjects and grammatical predicates.
The subject o f a sentence The grammatical subject (or just ‘subject’) is what the sentence is about. The gram-
is what is discussed. The matical predicate is what the sentence says about its grammatical subject. To avoid
attribute of a sentence
confusion between grammatical predicates and logical predicates, I’ll use the term
is what is said about
the subject. Both may ‘attribute’ for ‘grammatical predicate’. For example, in ‘Dinesh loves apples’, ‘Dinesh’
contain multiple logical is the subject and ‘loves apples’ is the attribute. In ‘Mind-body materialists are chau-
predicates. vinists’, the subject is ‘mind-body materialists’ and the attribute is ‘are chauvinists’.
When regimenting sentences such as the latter, it is typical to use one or more predi-
cates for the subject of the sentence and another one or more predicates for the attri-
bute of the sentence. Between the subject and attribute, there will be a propositional
operator. 4.1.14 has the basic form of a universally quantified proposition, and 4.1.15
has the basic form of an existentially quantified sentence.
4.1.14 All persons are mortal. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Mx)
4.1.15 Some actors are vain. (∃x)(Ax ∙ Vx)
Notice that the propositional operator in the universally quantified 4.1.14 is a
horseshoe: take anything you like; if it’s a person, then it is mortal. The existentially
quantified proposition, 4.1.15, uses a conjunction: there are some things that are both
actors and are vain. This is a useful lesson. Universally quantified propositions tend
to use conditionals between the subject and the attribute. Existentially quantified
propositions usually use conjunctions. These are not absolute rules, but are generally
useful guidelines.
Be careful not to confuse the two. A conjunction in the universally quantified ex-
pression 4.1.14 would assert that everything is a mortal person, not the meaning of
the original sentence. Using a conjunction entails that each conjunct is asserted of
everything; there are very few properties that hold of everything. A conditional in
the existential claims 4.1.15 would weaken the force of the claim: there are some
things such that if they are actors, then they are vain. My chair is such that if it is an
actor, then it is vain; since my chair is not an actor, the claim is vacuously true. But
the original English is best seen as asserting of one or more actors that they are in
fact vain.
As with simpler propositions, there are different ways of regimenting complex
quantified propositions with negations, some with the negations in front and some
with the negations embedded.
4.1.16 Some gods aren’t mortal. (∃x)(Gx ∙ ∼Mx)
or ∼(∀x)(Gx ⊃ Mx)
4.1.17 No frogs are people. (∀x)(Fx ⊃ ∼Px)
or ∼(∃x)(Fx ∙ Px)
The alternatives at 4.1.16 and 4.1.17 show that negations and quantifiers can com-
bine differently. In 4.1.16, the first option says that there is something that is a God
and is not mortal; the second option says that it is not the case that all gods are mortal,
which would be the case only if some god is not mortal. The two forms are logically
equivalent. In parallel, the first version at 4.1.17 says that everything that is a frog is
not a person, whereas the second says, equivalently, that it is not the case that there is
something that is a frog and a person. Notice that even with the negation, the univer-
sal statement is a conditional and the existential statement is a conjunction. Later, in
section 4.5, we will move between these equivalent translations.
Languages of Predicate Logic

We are starting our study of predicate logic by considering a simplified version of first-
order logical language: monadic predicate logic, or M. Predicate logic is monadic if
the predicates take only one singular term. When predicates take more than one sin-
gular term, we call them relational and we call the resulting language full first-order
predicate logic, or F. Chapter 4 focuses nearly exclusively on M. We use F (and some
further extensions of F) in chapter 5.
In constructing a formal language, we first specify the language, and then rules for
wffs. Each time we extend our predicate logic, we will generate a slightly new lan-
guage, with slightly new formation rules. From M, we proceed to F, and then to FF,
full first-order predicate logic with functors. For PL, in chapters 2 and 3, we studied
one language and one system of inference. But we can use the same language in dif-
ferent deductive systems and we can use the same deductive system with different
languages. In the chapters on predicate logic, I use M and F with the same deductive
system. Then, I add new inference rules covering a special identity predicate. It is typi-
cal to name both the deductive systems and the languages, but we need not do so and
I will name only the different languages.
Summary
The goal of this section is to start you translating between English and monadic predi-
cate logic. When faced with a sentence of English, you first have to ask whether it uses
constants (if it names particular objects) or quantifiers and variables (if it uses the
quantifier terms like ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘none’, ‘any’, or ‘only’). Some sentences will use both
constants and variables.
The main subformulas of universally quantified sentences (after their quantifiers)
are ordinarily conditionals, with subjects as their antecedents and attributes as their
consequents. The main subformulas of existentially quantified sentences are ordinar-
ily conjunctions; the order of the subject and attribute does not matter.
Remember that sentences containing ‘nothing’ and related quantifiers can be trans-
lated either using a universal quantifier, with a negation embedded inside the formula,
or using the negation of an existentially quantified sentence.
KEEP IN MIND
Predicate logic extends propositional logic with predicates, singular terms, and quantifiers.
Singular terms may be constants, standing for particular things, or variables, which must be
modified by quantifiers to form a closed sentence that expresses a complete proposition.
Quantifiers may be existential or universal.
Statements with quantifiers and negations can be translated in at least two different ways.
Start translating into M by asking whether the sentence is universal or existential.
Think of English sentences in terms of the ordinary rules of subject-predicate grammar.
The subject of the proposition is what we are talking about.
The attribute of the proposition is what we are saying about it.
The subject of a sentence is the antecedent in a universally quantified statement or the first
conjunct in an existentially quantified statement.
The attribute of a sentence is the consequent of the conditional in a universally quantified
statement or the second conjunct of an existentially quantified statement.
Quantifiers are logical operators and may be the main operators of a proposition.
EXERCISES 4.1a
Translate each sentence into predicate logic using constants
in each.
1. Andre is tall.
2. Belinda sings well.
3. Deanna drives to New York City.
4. The Getty Museum is located in Los Angeles.
5. Snowy is called Milou in Belgium.
6. Cortez and Guillermo go to the gym after school.
7. Either Hilda makes dinner or Ian does.
8. Jenna doesn’t run for class president.
9. Ken doesn’t walk to school when it rains.
10. Either Lauren or Megan buys lunch.
11. Nate and Orlando play in the college orchestra.
12. Paco will play football only if he’s not injured.
13. Ramona plays volleyball if, and only if, she sets up the net.
4 . 2 : T ranslat i on Us i ng M 2 1 9
14. If Salvador invests all his money in the stock market, then he takes a second job.
15. Hamilton College is closed if, and only if, President Wippman invokes the
closure policy.
EXERCISES 4.1b
Translate each sentence into predicate logic. Do not use
constants.
1. All computers are difficult to program. (Cx, Dx)

2. Some trees are green. (Tx, Gx)
3. Some flowers do not bloom. (Fx, Bx)
4. Every fruit has seeds. (Fx, Sx)
5. A few people walk fast. (Px, Wx)
6. Not all buses are yellow. (Bx, Yx)
7. A cloud is not fluffy. (Cx, Fx)
8. Every mistake is a lesson. (Mx, Lx)
9. Nothing worthwhile is easy. (Wx, Ex)
10. Most planes are safe. (Px, Sx)
11. Some mountains are not difficult to climb. (Mx, Dx)
12. Not all snakes are poisonous. (Sx, Px)
13. Some spiders are not harmful. (Sx, Hx)
14. No dog has antennae. (Dx, Ax)
15. No lions are not carnivorous. (Lx, Cx)
4.2: TRANSLATION USING M

In section 4.1, we saw how to use singular terms (constants and variables), predicates,
and quantifiers to translate some simple sentences into monadic predicate logic, M.
In this section, we see how to use M to regiment more complex English sentences.
Quantified Sentences with More than Two Predicates

Most quantified sentences in M have a subject and an attribute separated by either a
conjunction, if they are existential, or a conditional, if they are universal. But many
subjects and attributes will themselves be complex. 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 have more than
one predicate in the subject portion of the proposition.
4.2.1 Some wooden desks are uncomfortable.
(∃x)[(Wx ∙ Dx) ∙ ∼Cx]
4.2.2 All wooden desks are uncomfortable.
(∀x)[(Wx ∙ Dx) ⊃ ∼Cx]
4.2.3 and 4.2.4 have more than one predicate in the attribute part of the proposition.
4.2.3 Many applicants are untrained or inexperienced.
(∃x)[Ax ∙ (∼Tx ∨ ∼Ex)]
4.2.4 All applicants are untrained or inexperienced.
(∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∼Tx ∨ ∼Ex)]
As we saw in 4.1, when regimenting into predicate logic, start by asking whether
the sentence is universal or existential. Then, think of the sentence in terms of the
ordinary rules of subject-predicate grammar. What are we talking about? That’s the
subject of the proposition. What are we saying about it? That’s the predicate, or at-
tribute; I’ll use the latter term to avoid confusion with logical predicates. The subject
is the antecedent in a universally quantified statement or the first conjunct in an exis-
tentially quantified statement. The attribute goes as the consequent or as the second
conjunct. Subjects and attributes may be simple (as ‘philosophers’ and ‘are happy’ in
‘some philosophers are happy’) and be regimented as single predicates. But they may
both be complex (as ‘green lemons’ in ‘green lemons are unripe’ or ‘is a big, strong,
blue ox’ in ‘Babe is a big, strong, blue ox’) and regimented using multiple predicates.
Things and People

The parallel sentences 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 each contain a quantifier but have different
meanings.
4.2.5 Something is making noise in the basement.
4.2.6 Someone is making noise in the basement.
If 4.2.5 is true, anything could be making noise in the basement. But the scope of
the claim in 4.2.6 is narrower. Unlike uses of 4.2.5, using 4.2.6 rules out mice and
ghosts and wind through the broken window. We mark the difference by saying that
a ‘one’ is a person, and we add a predicate for personhood to regimentations of sen-
‘Someone’, ‘anyone’, tences using ‘someone’. Thus, 4.2.5 is represented in M by 4.2.7, taking ‘Mx’ for ‘x is
‘everyone’, and ‘no one’ all making noise’ and ‘Ix’ for ‘x is in the basement’.
indicate both a quantifier
and a predicate for ‘is a 4.2.7 (∃x)(Mx ∙ Ix)
person’.
But 4.2.6 is represented by the more complex 4.2.8, adding ‘Px’ for ‘x is a person’.
4.2.8 (∃x)[Px ∙ (Mx ∙ Ix)]

I grouped the latter two terms in 4.2.8, but really, we could group any pairs, since
the only operators (besides the existential quantifier) are the conjunctions.
The same kind of adjustment can be made for ‘everyone’ (instead of ‘everything’),
‘anyone’ (‘anything’) and ‘no one’ (‘nothing’).
4.2.9 Everyone who takes logic works on derivations.
(∀x)[(Px ∙ Tx) ⊃ Wx]
4.2.10 Anyone who runs for office is corrupt.
(∀x)[(Px ∙ Rx) ⊃ Cx]
4.2.11 No one who reads Berkeley converts to idealism.
(∀x)[(Px ∙ Bx) ⊃ ∼Ix] or ∼(∃x)[(Px ∙ Bx) ∙ Ix]
Only
Like ‘all’ and ‘some’, ‘only’ can modify an open sentence and so indicate the presence
of a quantifier. But such translations can be tricky. ‘Only’ usually indicates a universal ‘Only’ usually indicates
quantifier, as at 4.2.12. a universal quantifier.
Sentences using ‘only’
4.2.12 Only men have been presidents. must be carefully
distinguished from their
4.2.12 claims that if something has been a president, it has been a man; all presi-
related ‘all’ sentences.
dents have been men. Thus, it is equivalent to 4.2.13.
4.2.13 All presidents have been men.
In propositions with just two predicates, ‘only Ps are Qs’ is logically equivalent to
‘all Qs are Ps’. Thus, in simple cases, we can just invert the antecedent and consequent
of a parallel sentence that uses ‘all’. Start with a related ‘all’ sentence, like 4.2.14 or
4.2.16. Then take the converse to find the ‘only’ sentence.
4.2.14 All men have been presidents. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Px)
4.2.15 Only men have been presidents. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Mx)
4.2.16 All cats are animals. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Ax)
4.2.17 Only cats are animals. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Cx)
In more complex sentences, the rule of just switching antecedent and consequent
between an ‘all’ sentence and its correlated ‘only’ sentence must be adjusted. 4.2.18 is
standardly regimented as 4.2.19.
4.2.18 All intelligent students understand Kant.
4.2.19 (∀x)[(Ix ∙ Sx) ⊃ Ux]
If we regiment 4.2.20 merely by taking the converse of the conditional in 4.2.19, we
get 4.2.21.
4.2.20 Only intelligent students understand Kant.
4.2.21 (∀x)[Ux ⊃ (Ix ∙ Sx)]
4.2.21 says that anything that understands Kant must be an intelligent student. It
follows from that regimentation that I don’t understand Kant, since I am no longer
a student. I am not sure whether I understand Kant, but that I do not is not a logical
consequence of 4.2.20.
A preferred regimentation of 4.2.20 is 4.2.22, which says that any student who un-
derstands Kant is intelligent.
4.2.22 (∀x)[(Ux ∙ Sx) ⊃ Ix]
4.2.22 is a reasonable representation of 4.2.20. When regimenting, we need not
assume that everything that is said is reasonable; that’s surely a false assumption.
But it is customary and charitable to presume reasonableness unless we have good
reason not to.
Just above, I said that to regiment sentences into predicate logic, we think of them
as divided into a subject and an attribute. Universally quantified sentences ordinarily
have a horseshoe between the subject portion of the proposition and the attribute por-
tion. In existential sentences, we use a conjunction between the subject and attribute.
In sentences like 4.2.18, the subject portion of the sentence has both a subordi-
nate subject (‘x is a student’) and a subordinate attribute (‘x is intelligent’); there is a
single grammatical attribute (‘x understands Kant’). The relation between the only-
quantified sentence and its corresponding all-quantified sentence is that the sub-
ordinate attribute is switched with the main attribute, but the subordinate subject
remains where it is, in the antecedent.
Thus, an amended rule could be that if an only-quantified sentence uses only two
predicates, you can just switch the antecedent and consequent from the related ‘all’
sentence, the one that results from replacing ‘only’ with ‘all’; but if the grammatical
subject contains two predicates (a subordinate subject and an attribute), then you
should just switch the two subordinate attributes (‘x is intelligent’ and ‘x understands
Kant’), leaving the subordinate subject alone. Let’s summarize this new guideline for
‘only’ as 4.2.23.
4.2.23 ‘Only PQs are R’ is ordinarily the same as ‘All RQs are P’
4.2.23 is a good general rule, often applicable. But there are exceptions, and some
sentences may be ambiguous. It is not especially clear whether 4.2.24 is best regi-
mented as 4.2.25 or as 4.2.26.
4.2.24 Only famous men have been presidents.
4.2.25 (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Mx ∙ Fx)]
4.2.26 (∀x)[(Px ∙ Mx) ⊃ Fx]
4.2.25 and 4.2.26 are not logically equivalent. 4.2.25 says that if something is a
president, then it is a famous man. 4.2.26 says that if something is a male president,
then it is famous. If we take ‘president’ to refer to presidents of the United States, say,
the former regimentation seems better. But imagine a place in which there have been
both men and women presidents (like Switzerland). Of the women presidents, let’s
imagine, some have been famous, and some have been obscure. But, all of the men
who have been president have been famous. In such a case, we would favor the second
regimentation, using an inflection on ‘men’ when we utter the original 4.2.24 to say
that of the male presidents, all of them have been famous, but of the women, some
have been famous and some have not.
4.2.27 is a good exception to the rule at 4.2.23.
4.2.27 Only probability-challenged ticket holders win the lottery.
Since one must hold a ticket to win the lottery, ‘winners of the lottery who are ticket
holders’, at 4.2.28, which the rule at 4.2.23 would recommend, is redundant. The bet-
ter regimentation is 4.2.29.
4.2.28 (∀x)[(Wx ∙ Tx) ⊃ Px]
4.2.29 (∀x)[Wx ⊃ (Px ∙ Tx)]
When translating ‘only’ sentences, then, you have to decide from the context
whether to use the simple converse rule (as at 4.2.14–4.2.17) or the more complex
rule at 4.2.23.
Propositions with More than One Quantifier

The main operator of the quantified sentences we have seen so far has been the quan-
tifier, whether existential or universal. But some propositions in M will contain more
than one quantifier. The main operator of such sentences can be any of the proposi-
tional operators. Look for multiple quantifier indicators in the sentence, or a leading
term that indicates that the main operator is one of the propositional operators.
4.2.30 If anything is damaged, then everyone in the house complains.
(∃x)Dx ⊃ (∀x)[(Ix ∙ Px) ⊃ Cx]
4.2.31 The gears are all broken if, and only if, a cylinder is missing.
(∀x)(Gx ⊃ Bx) ≡ (∃x)(Cx ∙ Mx)
4.2.32
Some philosophers are realists, but some philosophers are fiction-
alists and some are modalists.
(∃x)(Px ∙ Rx) ∙ [(∃x)(Px ∙ Fx) ∙ (∃ x)(Px ∙ Mx)]
4.2.33
It’s not the case that either all conventionalists are logical empiricists
or some holists are conventionalists.
∼[(∀x)(Cx ⊃ Lx) ∨ (∃x)(Hx ∙ Cx)]
Adjectives
Adjectives are a main source of increasing complexity in our sentences and their
regimentations. For example, in 4.2.1 we represented ‘wooden desks’ as ‘(Wx ∙ Dx)’,
something that has the properties both of being wooden and of being a desk. 4.2.34
has a selection of similar examples.
4.2.34 green book Gx ∙ Bx
beautiful painting Bx ∙ Px
hungry puppy Hx ∙ Px
confused teenager Cx ∙ Tx
A green book is something that is both green and a book; a confused teenager is
something that is both confused and a teenager.
But not all adjectives are properly regimented using an additional predicate, as in
the items in the list at 4.2.35.
4.2.35 large baby
smart bee
old fruit fly
A large baby is not something that is large and a baby; it is something that is large
for a baby. Such adjectives are context sensitive and cannot be ascribed to something
in the way that ‘green’ or ‘hungry’ can. Nothing could be said to be large or smart or
old by itself; things have these properties only relative to other things of their types.
When faced with a sentence containing such context-sensitive adjectives, it is
best to use one predicate for the modified noun. In 4.2.36, I use ‘Sx’ for ‘x is a jumbo
shrimp’ and ‘Px’ for ‘x is on the plate’.
4.2.36 There are jumbo shrimp on the plate.
(∃x)(Sx ∙ Px)
In the exercises that follow, I provide predicates and specify what they are to rep-
resent, so you won’t find yourself challenged to make the distinction. But if you are
regimenting completely on your own, it is worth keeping this phenomenon in mind.
Summary
In section 4.1, we started translating between English and monadic predicate logic. In
this section, we explored the subtleties of M. As sentences become more complicated,
they have increasing numbers of predicates. A rough division of our natural-language
sentences into subjects and attributes can be useful. While the main subformulas
of universally quantified sentences are ordinarily conditionals, the antecedents and
consequents of those conditionals may be complex formulas, often conjunctions,
especially in the antecedents. The main subformulas of existentially quantified sen-
tences are ordinarily conjunctions; again, the first and second conjuncts may be com-
plex formulas themselves.
There are lots of translation exercises in this section and the following sections that
explore derivations in M. In section 5.1, we expand beyond monadic predicate logic
into full first-order predicate logic. Even if you have mastered translation in M, the
new translations there, and in section 5.4 where we look at identity theory, will be
challenging. Practice! The translations to English from logic in exercises 4.2b can also
be useful in learning how to translate from logic to English.
KEEP IN MIND
Simple quantified English sentences often have two predicates, separated by a conditional,
for universal sentences, or a conjunction, for existential sentences. More complex uni-
versal sentences may have complex antecedents (often conjunctions) or consequents.
More complex existential sentences may have multiple predicates either before or after
the main conjunction.
Be careful to distinguish sentences with ‘someone’, ‘everyone’, ‘anyone’, and ‘no one’ from
the simpler, more universal sentences that contain ‘something’, ‘everything’, ‘anything’,
and ‘nothing’.
To formalize sentences that use ‘only’ as a quantifier, there are two options:
For two-predicate sentences, and some more complex sentences, just use the converse
of the related ‘all’ sentence.
For more-complex sentences, ‘Only PQs are R’ is often best rendered as ‘All RQs are P’.
The meaning of the sentence, in context, will help you decide between the two
alternatives.
Sentences with multiple quantifiers often have propositional operators as their main
operator.
EXERCISES 4.2a
Translate each sentence into predicate logic using the given
translation keys.
For exercises 1–8, use:

Fx: x is a flower
Ox: x is orange
Px: x is pink
Sx: x is fragrant
1. Some pink flowers are fragrant.
2. Some pink flowers are not fragrant.
3. All orange flowers are fragrant.
4. No orange flowers are fragrant.

5. No flowers are both orange and pink.
6. Some flowers are both pink and fragrant.
7. Some flowers are neither orange nor pink.
8. All fragrant flowers are pink, if they are not orange.

Cx: x is hypercritical
Fx: x is friendly
Ix: x is intelligent
Px: x is a person
Sx: x succeeds
9. Some people are friendly.
10. Some people are intelligent, but not friendly.
11. Everyone friendly succeeds.
12. No one friendly is hypercritical.
13. All friendly and intelligent people succeed.
14. Someone intelligent succeeds if s/he is friendly.
15. Hypercritical people who are not friendly do not succeed.
16. If some friendly people are intelligent, then no hypercritical people succeed.

Cx: x is a cat
Dx: x is a dog
Ex: x has pointed ears
Lx: x likes humans
Wx: x has whiskers
17. Some cats have whiskers, but not pointed ears.
18. No cats are dogs.
19. Some cats and all dogs have pointed ears.
20. All cats like humans if, and only if, some dogs do not have whiskers.
21. All cats and dogs have whiskers.
22. Not all dogs and cats like humans.
23. It is not the case that both some dogs with pointed ears like humans and no cats
with whiskers like humans.
24. All cats have whiskers if, and only if, they have pointed ears.

t: Theodore Roosevelt
Ax: x is American
Cx: x went to an Ivy League college
Gx: x is a good communicator
Lx: x is a politician
Px: x is a president of the United States
25. Some American politicians are good communicators.
26. A few American politicians went to Ivy League colleges, and Theodore Roose
velt is one.
27. All presidents of the United States are American politicians.
28. Only American politicians are presidents of the United States.
29. Theodore Roosevelt is not a good communicator if, and only if, some presi-
dents of the United States who went to Ivy League colleges are not good
communicators.
30. Only good communicators are politicians.
31. Only American politicians who went to Ivy League colleges are good
communicators.
32. American politicians went to Ivy League colleges if, and only if, they are good
communicators.

t: two
Ex: x is even
Nx: x is a number
Ox: x is odd
Px: x is prime
33. Two is an even prime number.
34. Some prime numbers are even.
35. Not all prime numbers are odd.
36. If all prime numbers are odd, then two is not even.
37. No number is neither odd nor even.

38. If all prime numbers are odd, then no prime numbers are even.
39. Some odd numbers are not prime if, and only if, not all even numbers are not
prime.
40. It is not the case that only prime numbers are odd, but it is the case that no even
numbers are odd.
41. Either some prime numbers are not even or no even numbers are not prime.
42. Even prime numbers are not odd just in case not all prime numbers are odd.

Ax: x is an animal
Cx: x is a cow
Gx: x is a goat
Hx: x has horns
Mx: x (is a kind of animal that) produces milk
Wx: x is a whale
43. All animals with horns produce milk.
44. Not all animals that produce milk have horns.
45. Whales produce milk but don’t have horns.
46. All goats and some cows have horns.
47. Some goats and cows produce milk.
48. Some goats, some cows, and some whales produce milk.
49. No whales have horns if, and only if, it is not the case that all animals that pro-
duce milk have horns.
50. Goats and cows are animals that produce milk.

Cx: x is creative
Hx: x is hard-working
Ix: x is imaginative
Mx: x is a poem
Px: x is a poet
Rx: x rhymes
Sx: x is successful
51. Only short poems rhyme.
52. All successful poets are either creative or hard-working.

53. Some successful poets are creative but not imaginative.
54. Not all poets are creative and hard-working.
55. Some successful poems are creative but do not rhyme.
56. Some unsuccessful poems are imaginative.
57. Some hard-working poets are unsuccessful just in case not all imaginative po-
ems are creative.
58. If every creative, imaginative poem is successful just in case some hard-working
poets are unsuccessful, then no poem that doesn’t rhyme is successful.

Ax: x is absolutist
Ex: x is an ethicist
Ox: x is objective
Px: x is a person
Rx: x is a relativist
59. All absolutist ethicists are objective.
60. Only absolutist ethicists are objective.
61. Some people are neither absolutists nor relativists.
62. No one who is a relativist is an objective ethicist.
63. Ethicists are relativists only if they are not absolutists.
64. If an ethicist is not an absolutist, then s/he is a relativist.
65. No ethicist is an absolutist without being objective.
66. Non-relativist ethicists are objective if, and only if, they are absolutists.
67. If someone is an objective relativist, then everyone who is an ethicist is
absolutist.
68. Someone who is absolutist is not an objective ethicist.

Ex: x is an existentialist
Hx: x is a humanist
Nx: x is a nihilist
Px: x is a phenomenologist
69. Some existential phenomenologists are humanists.
70. Some existential humanists are not phenomenologists.

71. Not all phenomenologists are existential humanists.
72. No nihilists are humanists, if some phenomenologists are not existentialists.
73. Either some humanist phenomenologist is a nihilist or no nihilist is a humanist.
74. All humanist phenomenologists are either existentialists or nihilists.
75. Humanist existentialists are phenomenologists if they are not nihilists.
76. Some existentialist is not a humanist just in case it is false that no humanist is
a phenomenologist.

h: Hume
s: Spinoza
Bx: x is British
Ex: x is an empiricist
Rx: x is a rationalist
Sx: x is a skeptic
77. Hume is a British empiricist, but Spinoza is neither.
78. Some, but not all, British empiricists are skeptics.
79. It is not the case that skeptic empiricists are all British.
80. Hume is a skeptic empiricist just in case no rationalist is a skeptic.
81. If Spinoza is a British empiricist, then Hume is not a skeptic and all rationalists
are British.
82. There are no empiricist rationalists unless Hume is not a skeptic.
83. Any rationalist skeptic is either not a rationalist or not a skeptic.
84. All empiricists are skeptics if, and only if, either Spinoza is not a rationalist or
some British skeptics are rationalists.

Cx: x is a compatibilist
Dx: x is a determinist
Lx: x is a libertarian
Mx: x is a materialist
Ox: x is a monist
Px: x is a philosopher
85. No libertarian philosophers are determinists.
86. Monists are compatibilists if they are materialists.
87. Monists are compatibilists only if they are materialists.
88. If you’re a compatibilist, then you’re a determinist, but not a libertarian.
89. Either every material monist is a compatibilist or some material monists are
determinists.
90. Some materialists are compatibilists, if some philosophers are monists, but not
determinists.
91. No determinist who is not a materialist is a compatibilist.
92. If all materialist monists are compatibilists, if they are philosophers, then some
libertarian philosophers are actually determinists.

k: Kant
m: Mill
Cx: x is a consequentialist
Dx: x is a deontologist
Kx: x is a Kantian
Ux: x is a utilitarian
93. Kant is a deontologist and a Kantian, but Mill is neither.
94. Some philosophers are deontologists without being Kantian.
95. Not all consequentialists are utilitarian philosophers, but Mill is both.
96. Deontologists are Kantians, just in case only consequentialists are utilitarians.
97. If all utilitarians are consequentialists, then all Kantians are deontologists.
98. Kantians are not utilitarians only if they are deontologists and not consequen-
tialists.
99. No deontologist is a Kantian unless she is not a utilitarian.
100. Some philosophers are Kantian deontologists if, and only if, they are neither
consequentialists nor utilitarians.
EXERCISES 4.2b
Use the given interpretations to translate the following
arguments written in predicate logic into natural, English
sentences.
Ax: x is an athlete
Bx: x is brawny
Cx: x is a champion
m: Malik
g: Gita
n: Ned
1. 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx)
2. Am ∙ An / Bm ∙ Bn
2. 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx)
2. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Cx) / (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Cx)
3. 1. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Cx)
2. (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx) / (∃x)(Ax ∙ Cx)
4. 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx)
2. ∼Bm / (∃x)∼Ax
5. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (Bx ∨ Cx)]
2. Ag ∙ ∼Bg / Cg
6. 1. (∀x)[(Ax ∙ Bx) ⊃ Cx]
2. (∃x)(Bx ∙ ∼Cx) / (∃x)∼Ax
7. 1. (∃x)Ax ⊃ (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Bx)
2. (∃x)(Ax ∨ Bx)
3. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Ax) / (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Ax)
8. 1. (∀x)[Bx ∨ (Cx ∙ Ax)]
2. ~Bg / ~(∀x)(Cx ⊃~Ax)
9. 1. Cg ∙ (∃x)Bx
2. ∼Am ⊃ (∀x)∼Cx / ∼[(∃x)Ax ⊃ ∼(∃x)Bx]
10. 1. (∀x)[Bx ∙ (Ax ∨ Cx)]
2. Cn ⊃ (∀x)∼(Ax ∨ Bx)
3. ∼(∃ x)Cx / ∼Cn
4 . 3 : S y nta x for M 2 3 3
4.3: SYNTA X FOR M

This section presents the syntax of M more formally than the previous two sections
do, emphasizing the technical vocabulary and the concept of the scope of a quantifier,
essential for constructing derivations in M and understanding the formation rules.
We’ll start, as is customary, with the vocabulary of our language.
Vocabulary of M
Capital letters A . . . Z used as one-place predicates
Lower-case letters used as singular terms
a, b, c, . . . u are used as constants.
Five operators: ∼, ∙, ∨, ⊃, ≡
Quantifier symbols: ∃, ∀
Punctuation: (), [], {}
The next step is to specify formation rules for formulas (wffs) of M. In order to
explain the formation rules and use quantifiers properly, one has to be sensitive to
their scope. The quantifiers in 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 have different scope. The scope o f an operator
is its range of application.
4.3.1 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) Every P is Q.
4.3.2 (∀x)Px ⊃ Qx If everything is P, then x is Q.
We have already tacitly seen the notion of scope in using negations. The scope of a negation is
whatever directly follows
If what follows the tilde is a single propositional variable, then the scope of the the tilde.
negation is just that propositional variable.
If what follows the tilde is another tilde, then the scope of the first (outside)
negation is the scope of the second (inside) negation plus that inside tilde.
If what follows the tilde is a bracket, then the entire formula that occurs
between the opening and closing of that bracket is in the scope of the
negation.
4.3.3 ∼{(P ∙ Q) ⊃ [∼R ∨ ∼ ∼(S ≡ T)]}
There are four tildes in 4.3.3. The first one has the broadest scope. Since what follows
it is a bracket, the rest of the formula, everything enclosed in the squiggly brackets,
is in the scope of the leading negation. The second tilde in the formula, which occurs
just in front of the ‘R’, has narrow scope. It applies only to the ‘R’. The third tilde in the
formula has ‘∼ (S ≡ T)’ in its scope. The fourth tilde has ‘(S ≡ T)’ in its scope.
Similarly, the scope of a quantifier is whatever formula immediately follows the The scope of a quantifier
quantifier. is whatever formula
immediately follows the
If what follows the quantifier is a bracket, then any formulas that occur until quantifier.
that bracket is closed are in the scope of the quantifier.
If what follows the quantifier is a tilde, then the tilde and every formula in its
scope is in the scope of the quantifier.
If what follows the quantifier is another quantifier, then the inside quantifier
and every formula in the scope of the inside quantifier is in the scope of the
outside quantifier.
4.3.4 (∀w){Pw ⊃ (∃x)(∀y)[(Px ∙ Py) ⊃ (∃z)∼(Qz ∨ Rz)]}
The scope of a quantifier may be wider or narrower. We can increase the scope by
using punctuation. There are four quantifiers in the formula at 4.3.4. Their scopes are
as follows.
Quantifier Scope
(∀w) {Pw ⊃ (∃x)(∀y)[(Px ∙ Py) ⊃ (∃z)∼(Qz ∨ Rz)]}

(∃x) (∀y)[(Px ∙ Py) ⊃ (∃z)∼(Qz ∨ Rz)]
(∀y) [(Px ∙ Py) ⊃ (∃z)∼(Qz ∨ Rz)]
(∃z) ∼(Qz ∨ Rz)
Scope is important for quantifiers because it affects which variables are bound by
the quantifier. When we construct derivations in predicate logic, we will often remove
quantifiers from formulas. When we do so, the variables bound by those quantifiers
will become unbound. Similarly, we will add quantifiers to the fronts of formulas,
binding variables that are in their scopes. We will see some rules for removing and
replacing quantifiers, unbinding and binding variables, in the next section, with a
few further restrictions to follow. If we are not careful in using these rules, observant
about binding and unbinding variables, invalid inferences can result.
A bound variable is Quantifiers bind every instance of their variable in their scope. A bound variable is
attached, or related, to connected to the quantifier that binds it. In 4.3.1, the ‘x’ in ‘Qx’ is bound, as is the ‘x’ in
a quantifier. A variable
‘Px’. In 4.3.2, the ‘x’ in ‘Qx’ is not bound, though the ‘x’ in ‘Px’ is bound. An unbound
is bound by a quantifier
when it is in the scope of variable is called a free variable.
the quantifier and they Wffs that contain at least one unbound variable are open sentences, as we saw in
share a variable. A free section 4.1. Examples 4.3.5–4.3.8 are all open sentences.
variable is not bound by a
quantifier. 4.3.5 Ax
4.3.6 (∀x)Px ∨ Qx
4.3.7 (∃x)(Px ∨ Qy)
4.3.8 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) ⊃ Rz
4.3.6, 4.3.7, and 4.3.8 contain both bound and free variables. In 4.3.6, ‘Qx’ is not in
the scope of the quantifier, so is unbound. In 4.3.7, ‘Q y’ is in the scope of the quanti-
fier, but ‘y’ is not the quantifier variable, so is unbound. In 4.3.8, ‘Rz’ is neither in the
scope of the quantifier, nor does it contain the quantifier variable.
A closed sentence h as no
If a wff has no free variables, it is a closed sentence, and expresses a proposition.
free variables. An open
sentence has at least one 4.3.9 and 4.3.10 are closed sentences. Translations from English into M should ordi-
free variable. narily yield closed sentences.
4 . 3 : S y nta x for M 2 3 5
4.3.9 (∀y)[(Py ∙ Qy) ⊃ (Ra ∨ Sa)]

4.3.10 (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) ∨ (∀y)(Ay ⊃ By)
We are ready for the formation rules. They are fairly straightforward, and you have
probably already gleaned most of the important points from working with translation
in sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Formation Rules for Wffs of M

M1. A predicate (capital letter) followed by a singular term (lower-case letter) is
a wff.
M2. For any variable β, if α is a wff that does not contain either ‘(∃β)’ or ‘(∀β)’,
then ‘(∃β)α’ and ‘(∀β)α’ are wffs.
M3. If α is a wff, so is ∼α.
M4. If α and β are wffs, then so are:
(α ∙ β)
(α ∨ β)
(α ⊃ β)
(α ≡ β)
M5. These are the only ways to make wffs.
A few observations concerning the formation rules are in order. As we saw in sec-
tion 4.1, quantifiers are operators like the five propositional operators. As with PL,
the last operator added according to the formation rules is called the main operator.
By convention, we continue to drop the outermost brackets which are required by
rule M4. Again, those brackets are implicit and replaced if we augment the formula.
A wff constructed using only rule M1 is called an atomic formula; atomic formulas An atomic formula i n M
lack operators. 4.3.11–4.3.13 are atomic formulas. Notice that an atomic formula can is formed by a predicate
followed by a singular
be closed (as in 4.3.11 and 4.3.12) or open (as in 4.3.13). term.
4.3.11 Pa
4.3.12 Qt
4.3.13 Ax
A wff that is part of another wff is called a subformula. The proposition in the first A subformula is a formula
line of 4.3.14 has all of the formulas to its right as subformulas. that is part of another
formula.
4.3.14 (Pa ∙ Qb) ⊃ (∃x)Rx Subformulas: Pa
Qb
Rx
(∃x)Rx
Pa ∙ Qb
Lastly on the formation rules, rule M2 contains a clause used to prevent overlap-
ping quantifiers of the same type (i.e., using the same variable). This clause prevents
us from constructing propositions like the ill-formed 4.3.15.
4.3.15 (∃x)[Px ∙ (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx)]
The terms ‘Qx’ and ‘Rx’ contain variables that appear to be bound by both the lead-
ing existential quantifier and the universal quantifier inside the proposition. In the
first few sections of chapter 4, we won’t normally be tempted to construct such sen-
tences. But after we introduce relational predicates, we will have to be very careful to
avoid such overlapping.
How to Expand Our Vocabulary

We are using only a small, finite stock of singular terms and quantifiers. It is cus-
tomary to use a larger stock—in fact, an infinite stock. To generate an indefinite
number of singular terms and quantifiers, we could use the indexing functions of
subscripts and superscripts. We could introduce arabic numerals, say, into the lan-
guage. Then, we could index each constant and variable so that we have indefinitely
many of them.
a1, a2, a3 . . .
x1, x2, x3 . . .
Similarly, we can create an indefinite number of quantifiers by using the indexed
variables.
(∃x1), (∃x2), (∃x3) . . .
(∀x1), (∀x2), (∀x3) . . .
More austere languages avoid introducing numbers by using different numbers of
prime symbols to indicate different variables.
a′, a″, a‴, a⁗ . . .
x′, x″, x‴, x⁗ . . .
(∃x′), (∃x″), (∃x‴), (∃x⁗) . . .
(∀x′), (∀x″), (∀x‴), (∀x⁗) . . .
Both of these techniques quickly become unwieldy as it becomes difficult to discern
the different terms. Since we are going to need only a few variables and constants, we
can use a cleaner, if more limited, syntax, remembering that there is a technique to
extend our vocabulary if we were to need it.
Summary
As we explore the languages of predicate language, we will focus mainly on two cen-
tral tasks: translation and derivation. Each time we extend our language, I will show
the changes to the vocabulary and formation rules. It will be important, especially as
we learn the derivation rules for predicate logic, to understand scope and binding, the
central concepts in proofs for predicate logic. As with PL, it will also be important
to quickly determine the main operator of a wff. The few exercises in this section are
4 . 3 : S y nta x for M 2 3 7
aimed at helping you master these important concepts in order to make the deriva-
tions easier.
In 4.7 and 5.2, we will look at the semantics for our languages of predicate logic,
which are distinctly more complicated than the mere truth tables of PL. The semantics
will allow us also to demonstrate the invalidity of arguments in predicate logic.
KEEP IN MIND
Atomic wffs of M are predicates together with a singular term.

Atomic wffs may be modified by any of the logical operators.
They may be preceded by a quantifier.
They may be negated.
Pairs of atomic wffs may be joined by any of the binary operators.
The scope of a quantifier is whatever formula immediately follows the quantifier.
Quantifiers bind variables of their type within their scope.
A formula with a free variable is open.
Translations should ordinarily yield closed formulas and express propositions.
Quantifiers are the main operators of a proposition when they are the last elements added
to a wff according to the formation rules, at the front of the wff.
We can expand our vocabulary if we want more quantifiers or variables, but we won’t do so
in this book.
EXERCISES 4.3
For each of the following wffs of M, answer each of the
following questions:
A. For each quantifier in the sentence, which subformulas are in its scope?
(List them all.)
B. For each quantifier in the sentence, which variables are bound by the
quantifier?
C. Which variables in the sentence are free?
D. Is the sentence open or closed?
E. What is the main operator of the sentence?
1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
2. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ ∼Ra]
3. (∀x)(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ (∃x)[(Px ∨ Q y) ∨ Rx]

4. (∃x)Py
5. (∀x)Px ⊃ (Qx ∙ Ra)
6. ∼(∀x)[Px ∨ (∼Q y ∙ Rx)]
7. (∀y)(Pa ⊃ Qb)
8. (∃x)(Ry ∙ Qx) ∙ Pa
9. (∃x)(Rx ∙ ∼Qx) ≡ (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qa)
10. (Pa ∨ Qb) ⊃ Rc
11. (∀x)(Px ∨ Qx) ⊃ (∀y)(∼Q y ⊃ ∼Py)
12. (∃x){[(Px ∨ Rx) ∙ Q y] ⊃ (∀y)[(Rx ⊃ Q y) ∙ Pb]}
13. ∼(∀x)[(Px ≡ Rx) ⊃ Qa]
14. ∼(∃y)(Qx ∨ Px)
15. (∀x){(Px ∙ Q y) ⊃ (∃y)[(Ry ⊃ Sy) ∙ Tx]}
4.4: DERIVATIONS IN M
In this section, we start to construct derivations in M. All of the twenty-five rules we
used with PL continue to hold, governing the uses of the propositional operators.
There are four new rules governing removing and adding quantifiers, the subjects of
this section. In the next section, we will add a rule for exchanging the universal and
existential quantifiers. Then, in section 4.6, we will look at how the methods of condi-
tional and indirect proof must be modified for M.
The general structure of most of the derivations of this section is first to take off
quantifiers; second, to use the rules we already saw for PL; and last, to put quantifiers
on. So, we need four rules, two for taking off each of the quantifiers and two for put-
ting on each of the quantifiers.
Taking Off the Universal Quantifier

Recall the valid argument at 4.1.1, which we can now fully regiment.
4.1.1 All philosophers are happy. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Hx)
Emily is a philosopher. Pe
So, Emily is happy. He
In order to derive the conclusion, we need a rule that will allow us to remove the
quantifier and to show that the conclusion follows as a simple matter of modus ponens.
4 . 4 : Der i v at i ons i n M 2 3 9
Rule #1: Universal Instantiation (UI) Universal instantiation

(UI) is the rule of
(∀α)Fα inference in predicate
Fβ for any variable α, any formula F, and any logic that allows us
singular term β to take off a universal
quantifer.
To use UI, we remove the leading universal quantifier, as long as it is the main
operator. Then, we replace all occurrences of variables bound by that quantifier with
either a variable (v, w, x, y, z) or a constant (a, b, c, . . . u).
When instantiating, you must change all the bound variables in the same way. Thus,
4.4.1 can be instantiated as any formula in the list 4.4.2.
4.4.1 (∀x)[Sx ∨ (Pa ∙ Tx)]
4.4.2 Sa ∨ (Pa ∙ Ta)
Sb ∨ (Pa ∙ Tb)
Sx ∨ (Pa ∙ Tx)
Sy ∨ (Pa ∙ Ty)
But 4.4.1 cannot be instantiated as 4.4.3 or as 4.4.4.
4.4.3 Sa ∨ (Pa ∙ Tb)
4.4.4 Sx ∨ (Pa ∙ Ta)
Let’s see how we use UI in the derivation of our original argument, at 4.4.5.
4.4.5 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Hx)
2. Pe / He
3. Pe ⊃ He 1, UI
4. He 3, 2, MP
QED
Putting on the Universal Quantifier

All of the propositions in 4.4.6, both premises and the conclusion, contain quantifiers
as main operators. To derive the conclusion, we will remove the quantifiers from each
premise, make some inferences, and put on a quantifier at the end.
4.4.6 1. Everything happy is content.
2. No miser is content.
So, no miser is happy.
1. (∀x)(Hx ⊃ Cx)
2. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ ∼Cx) / (∀x)(Mx ⊃ ∼Hx)
We have UI to guide our removal of the quantifiers. We just need a rule allowing us
to put a universal quantifier on the front of a formula in a derivation.
We might be tempted to introduce a rule such as 4.4.7.
4.4.7 Bad Universal Generalization Rule
Fa
(∀x)F x
To see why 4.4.7 is a bad generalization rule, consider the instance of it at 4.4.8.
4.4.8 1. Pa
2. (∀x)Px
Inferring a universal
claim from an existential
Now, interpret ‘P’ as ‘is a professor’ and ‘a’ as ‘Asha’. 4.4.7 thus licenses the conclusion
one commits the fallacy that everything is a professor from just the premise that Asha is a professor. Such an
of hasty generalization. inference is called the fallacy of hasty generalization. Most of the restrictions on the
instantiation and generalization rules are constructed precisely to avoid confusing
our existential assertions with our universal ones, to prevent our making a strong
universal conclusion on the bases of weak existential assumptions.
To avoid hasty generalization, we never universally generalize (or quantify) over a
constant. In other words, we may not replace a constant with a variable bound by a
universal quantifier. This restriction keeps us from ever universally quantifying over
individual cases.
While we do not universally quantify over constants, we may do so over variables.
Indeed, the point of introducing variables, and distinguishing them from constants,
is to mark where universal generalization is permitted. Variables, except in circum-
stances we will introduce in section 4.6, retain universal character, even when they
are unbound. Generalizing over them (i.e., binding them with a universal quantifier)
does not commit a fallacy because the variable can stand for anything and everything.
Universal generalization Rule #2: Universal Generalization (UG)

(UG) is the rule of
inference in predicate Fβ
logic that allows us to (∀α)Fα for any variable β, any formula F not
put a universal quantifier containing α, and any variable α
onto a formula.
UG, like all of the instantiation and generalization rules, works only on whole lines:
we place the universal quantifier in front of a statement so that the scope of the quan-
tifier is the entire rest of the proposition. Further, we replace all occurrences of the
variable over which we are quantifying with the variable in the quantifier: we bind all
instances of the variable. You must replace all occurrences!
4.4.9 contains a proper use of UG.
4.4.9 1. (∀x)(Hx ⊃ Cx)
2. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ ∼Cx) / (∀x)(Mx ⊃ ∼Hx)
3. Hy ⊃ Cy 1, UI
4. My ⊃ ∼Cy 2, UI
5. ∼Cy ⊃ ∼Hy 3, Cont
6. My ⊃ ∼Hy 4, 5, HS
7. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ ∼Hx) 6, UG
QED
Notice that I changed all the ‘x’s to ‘y’s when instantiating at lines 3 and 4. I could
have kept the variables as ‘x’s or used any other variable.
Notice also that I replaced the ‘y’s with ‘x’s at the end. I could have kept the ‘y’s,
adding a universal quantifier using a ‘y’ at line 7, yielding ‘(∀y)(My ⊃ ∼Hy)’. Strictly
4 . 4 : Der i v at i ons i n M 2 4 1
speaking, this would not be a proof of the stated conclusion. But since the statements
are equivalent, such a derivation would suffice.
UI would have allowed us to instantiate either premise to constants. Indeed, the
derivation could have proceeded through line 6 with all of the ‘y’s changed to ‘a’s or
‘b’s. But line 7 would not have been permitted by UG had the ‘y’s been constants.
Putting on the Existential Quantifier

We now have rules for removing and putting on the universal quantifier. There are
parallel rules for the existential quantifier. We will use the rule for existentially gener-
alizing to facilitate the inference 4.4.10.
4.4.10 Oscar is a Costa Rican. Co
So, there are Costa Ricans. (∃x)Cx
Rule #3: Existential Generalization (EG) Existential generalization

(EG) is the rule of
Fβ inference in predicate
(∃α)Fα
for any singular term β, any formula F not logic that allows us to put
containing α, and for any variable α an existential quantifier
onto a formula.
To use EG, place an existential quantifier in front of any proposition and change all
occurrences of the singular term (constant or variable) over which you are quantifying
with the quantifier letter. Unlike UG, which results in a strong, universal claim, EG is
a weak inference and so can be made from any claim, whether concerning constants or
variables. Quantifying over a variable allows us to infer an existential claim from a uni-
versal one. In an empty universe, such an inference would be invalid. But we ordinarily
make the very weak assumption that the universe is not completely empty. Again, the
resulting formula will have the quantifier you just added as the main operator.
The derivation of the argument at 4.4.10 is trivial.
4.4.11 1. Co / (∃x)Cx
2. (∃x)Cx 1, EG
QED
Although it is rarely useful, you need not bind all instances of a singular term in the
scope of the quantifier when you use EG, as at 4.4.12.
4.4.12 1. Pa ∙ Qa
2. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qa) 1, EG
3. (∃y)(∃x)(Px ∙ Qy) 2, EG
The third line does not imply the existence of two different things, though it might
seem to. Instantiating the third line, we must use two different constants. But they
might, for all we know, refer to the same thing. The parallel inference for UG is not valid.
Taking off the Existential Quantifier

Our fourth rule for managing quantifiers allows us to remove an existential quanti-
fier. As with UG, we need a restriction.
4.4.13 All New Yorkers are Americans. 1. (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Ax)

Some New Yorkers are bald. 2. (∃x)(Nx ∙ Bx)
So, some Americans are bald. / (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx)
In order to derive 4.4.13, we have to take off the ‘∃x’ in the second premise. The
existential quantifier commits us to the existence of only one thing. So, when we take
it off, we have to put on a constant. Moreover, we cannot have said anything earlier in
the derivation about that constant; it has to be a new thing. If a constant appears in the
premises, in a prior derived line, or even in the stated conclusion of the argument, you
may not instantiate an existentially quantified statement to that constant.
Existential instantiation Rule #4: Existential Instantiation (EI)

(EI) is the rule of
inference in predicate (∃α)Fα
logic that allows us to Fβ for any variable α, any formula F, and any
remove an existential new constant β
quantifier from a formula.
As with all four of the quantifier management rules, EI must be used only on whole
lines. We remove the leading existential quantifier and replace all occurrences that
A new constant is one were bound by the quantifier with the same, new constant, one that does not appear
that does not appear in in either the premises or the desired conclusion.
either any earlier line
An existentially quantified sentence commits you only to the existence of some
of the argument or the
desired conclusion. thing that has the property ascribed to it in the formula, and not to any particular thing
that might have other properties inconsistent with those in the formula.
To see further why a new constant is required, consider what would happen without
that restriction, in the fallacious inference at 4.4.14.
4.4.14 1. (∃x)(Ax ∙ Cx)
2. (∃x)(Ax ∙ Dx)
3. Aa ∙ Ca 1, EI
4. Aa ∙ Da 2, EI: but wrong!
5. Ca ∙ Aa 3, Com
6. Ca 5, Simp
7. Da ∙ Aa 4, Com
8. Da 7, Simp
9. Ca ∙ Da 6, 8, Conj
10. (∃x)(Cx ∙ Dx) 9, EG
Uh-oh!
To see that 4.4.14 contains a fallacious inference, let’s interpret ‘Ax’
as ‘x is an animal’; ‘Cx’ as ‘x is a cat’ and ‘Dx’ as ‘x is a dog’. The first two
premises are perfectly reasonable: there are cats, and there are dogs.
The conclusion indicates the existence of a cat-dog. Whatever the
advances in biogenetic engineering may be, we cannot infer the exis-
tence of a cat-dog from the existence of cats and the existence of dogs.
4 . 4 : Der i v at i ons i n M 2 4 3
Since EI contains a restriction whereas UI does not, in the common case in which
you have to instantiate both universally quantified and existentially quantified
propositions, EI before you UI.
4.4.15 contains an acceptable use of EI.
4.4.15 1. (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Ax)
2. (∃x)(Nx ∙ Bx) / (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx)
3. Na ∙ Ba 2, EI
4. Na ⊃ Aa 1, UI
5. Na 3, Simp
6. Aa 4, 5, MP
7. Ba ∙ Na 3, Com
8. Ba 7, Simp
9. Aa ∙ Ba 6, 8, Conj
10. (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx) 9, EG
QED
Which Singular Term Should I Use?

When instantiating, you must decide whether to replace your bound variables with
either constants or variables. Here is a chart to help you understand how to choose.
I’m taking off an ∃ (Using EI) I’m taking off an ∀ (Using UI)
Use a constant. It depends . . .

Make sure that your constant does not Will you want to Do you want to connect the
appear earlier in the proof: UG the terms of terms of this wff with those of
in the premises, this wff later? an existentially quantified wff?
in the desired conclusion, Use a variable. Use a constant, and EI the
or in any earlier row. other formula first. (EI before
you UI.)
Remember: You can EI the same formula Remember: You can UI to any singular term at any
repeatedly as long as you use a new con- time. So if you UI to the wrong singular term, you can
stant each time. just UI the same formula again.
Instantiation and Generalization Rules and Whole Lines

Like the rules of inference in chapter 3, all four rules of instantiation and generaliza-
tion may be used only on whole lines. We can use them only when the main operator
of a formula is a quantifier. For example, in 4.4.16, line 2 cannot be instantiated; to use
MP, we have to get the antecedent of line 2 on a line by itself.
4.4.16 1. (∀x)(Dx ∙ Ex)

2. (∀x)Dx ⊃ Fa / (∃x)Fx
3. Dx ∙ Ex 1, UI
4. Dx 3, Simp
5. (∀x)Dx 4, UG
6. Fa 2, 5, MP
7. (∃x)Fx 6, EG
QED
Similarly, we cannot take off either quantifier in line 1 of 4.4.17.
4.4.17 1. (∀x)(Jx ∨ Kx) ⊃ (∃y)Ly
2. (∀x)(Jx ∨ Lx)
3. (∀x)(∼Lx ∨ Kx) / (∃x)Lx
4. Jx ∨ Lx 2, UI
5. ∼ ∼Jx ∨ Lx 4, DN
6. ∼Jx ⊃ Lx 5, Impl
7. ∼Lx ∨ Kx 3, UI
8. Lx ⊃ Kx 7, Impl
9. ∼Jx ⊃ Kx 6, 8, HS
10. ∼ ∼Jx ∨ Kx 9, Impl
11. Jx ∨ Kx 10, DN
12. (∀x)(Jx ∨ Kx) 11, UG
13. (∃y)Ly 1, 12, MP
14. La 13, EI
15. (∃x)Lx 14, EG
QED
Instantiating the Same Quantifier Twice

You may instantiate the same quantifier twice, including the existential quantifier. When
the quantifier is universal, as in 4.4.18, there are no restrictions on instantiating it.
4.4.18 1. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx)
2. (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Ox)
3. Ma ∙ Mb / Na ∙ Ob
4. Ma ⊃ Na 1, UI
5. Ma 3, Simp
6. Na 4, 5, MP
7. Mb ⊃ Nb 1, UI
8. Mb ∙ Ma 3, Com
9. Mb 8, Simp
10. Nb 7, 9, MP
11. Nb ⊃ Ob 2, UI
12. Ob 11, 10, MP
13. Na ∙ Ob 6, 12, Conj
QED
4 . 4 : Der i v at i ons i n M 2 4 5
When a quantifier is existential, the second instantiation must go to a new constant,

as in line 9 of 4.4.19.
4.4.19 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)
3. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Sx) / (∃x)Rx ∙ (∃x)Sx
4. Pa ∙ Qa 1, EI
5. Pa 4, Simp
6. Pa ⊃ Ra 2, UI
7. Ra 6, 5, MP
8. (∃x)Rx 7, EG
9. Pb ∙ Qb 1, EI
10. Qb ∙ Pb 9, Com
11. Qb 10, Simp
12. Qb ⊃ Sb 3, UI
13. Sb 12, 11, MP
14. (∃x)Sx 13, EG
15. (∃x)Rx ∙ (∃x)Sx 8, 14, Conj
QED
It may seem odd that we can instantiate an existential quantifier twice when the use
of an existential quantifier only commits you to a single thing having a given prop-
erty. That odd feeling should be removed by remembering that objects may have more
than one name.
We do not often instantiate an existential sentence more than once in M, but we do
use this ability in full predicate logic (5.3), especially using identity (5.5).
Summary
The four rules of inference in this section allow you to take off quantifiers and put
them back on. Once the quantifiers are off, proofs generally proceed according to the
rules of PL.
Great care must be paid in order not to misuse the instantiation and generalization
rules. Students first using these rules are sometimes not as sensitive as they should be
to the differences between constants and variables. A proof can look perfectly fine,
and use all of the PL rules well, and yet make serious errors of using constants when
one must use variables, or vice versa.
Be careful not to instantiate parts of lines. The exercises for this section mainly
illustrate the instantiation and generalization rules and so mainly contain premises
and conclusions that have quantifiers as the main operators. In the next section,
we will work with propositions whose main operators are not quantifiers, but the
propositional operators, and you will have to take care not to instantiate (or gener-
alize) errantly.
KEEP IN MIND
Pay close attention to the application conditions for each of the four rules, whether they
hold for just constants, just variables, or for any singular term.
EG and UI are anytime, anywhere rules; they have no restrictions.
EI and UG require care:
Never EI to a variable; always use a new constant.
We need new constants when using EI in order not to confuse our claims about par-
ticular objects.
A new constant is one that appears nowhere earlier in the derivation, not even in the
stated conclusion.
Never UG from (i.e., over) a constant.
The restrictions on EI and UG are grounded mainly in avoiding hasty generalization.
Constants may be replaced only by existentially quantified variables.
Unbound variables are available for universal generalization.
If you want to make inferences that connect existential and universal claims, EI before
you UI.
Rules Introduced
Universal Instantiation (UI)
(∀α)Fα
Fβ for any variable α, any formula F, and any
singular term β
Universal Generalization (UG)
Fβ
(∀α)Fα for any variable β, any formula F not
containing α, and any variable α
Never UG over a constant.
Existential Instantiation (EI)
(∃α)Fα
Fβ for any variable α, any formula F, and any
new constant β
Never EI to a variable.
Existential Generalization (EG)
Fβ
(∃α)Fα for any singular term β, any formula F not
containing α, and for any variable α
4 . 4 : Der i v at i ons i n M 2 4 7
EXERCISES 4.4a
Derive the conclusions of the following arguments.
1. 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx)
2. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ ∼Bx)
3. Aa / ∼Ca
2. 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx)
2. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ ∼Bx) / (∀x)(Cx ⊃ ∼Ax)
3. 1. (∃x)(Dx ∙ ∼Ex)
2. (∀x)(Ex ∨ Fx) / (∃x)Fx
4. 1. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Bx)
2. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Bx) / (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Cx)
5. 1. (∀x)Hx ∨ Ja
2. (∀x)[(∼ Jx ∙ Ix) ∨ (∼ Jx ∙ Kx)] / (∀x)Hx
6. 1. (∀x)(Jx ∙ Kx) / (∃x)Jx ∙ (∃x)Kx
7. 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
2. (∃x)(Rx ∙ Sx) / (∃x)Px ∙ (∃x)Rx
8. 1. (∀x)(Fx ∨ Hx) ⊃ (∃x)Ex
2. (∀x)[Fx ∨ (Gx ∙ Hx)] / (∃x)Ex
9. 1. (∀x)(Ix ⊃ Kx)
2. (∀x)(Jx ⊃ Lx)
3. (∃x)(Jx ∨ Ix) / (∃x)(Kx ∨ Lx)
10. 1. (∀x)[Gx ⊃ (Hx ∨ Ix)]
2. (∃x)(Gx ∙ ∼Ix) / (∃x)(Gx ∙ Hx)
11. 1. (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Ex)
2. (∀x)(Ex ⊃ ∼Gx)
3. (∃x)Gx / (∃x) ∼Dx
12. 1. (∀x)(Ox ⊃ Qx)
2. (∀x)(Ox ∨ Px)
3. (∃x)(Nx ∙ ∼Qx) / (∃x)(Nx ∙ Px)
13. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (Bx ∨ Cx)]
2. (∃x)∼(Bx ∨ ∼Ax) / (∃x)Cx
14. 1. (∃x)(Tx ∙ Ux) ⊃ (∀x)Vx

2. (∃x)[(Wx ∙ Tx) ∙ Ux] / (∀x)Vx
15. 1. (∃x)(Fx ∙ Hx) ≡ Gb
2. Gb / Fa
16. 1. (∀x)(Fx ≡ Gx) / (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx) ∙ (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Fx)
17. 1. (∀x)Ax ⊃ Ba
2. (∀x)∼(Ax ⊃ Cx) / (∃x)Bx
18. 1. (∃x)Lx ≡ Nb
2. (∃x)[(Lx ∙ Mx) ∙ Ox] / (∃x)Nx
19. 1. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx)
2. (∀x)(Ox ⊃ Px)
3. (∀x)[Mx ∨ (Ox ∙ Qx)] / (∀x)(Nx ∨ Px)
20. 1. (∀x)(Lx ≡ Nx)
2. (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Mx)
3. (∀x)∼(Mx ∨ Ox) / (∃x)∼Lx
21. 1. (∃x)(Dx ∙ Fx)
2. (∃x)(Gx ⊃ Ex)
3. (∀x)∼(Hx ∨ Ex) / (∃x)Fx ∙ (∃x)∼Gx
22. 1. (∃x)[(Sx ∨ Tx) ∙ Ux]
2. (∀x)(Ux ⊃ ∼Sx) / (∃x)∼Sx ∙ (∃y)(Uy ∙ Ty)
23. 1. (∃x)(∼Tx ∙ Ux) ≡ (∀x)Wx
2. (∀x)(Tx ⊃ Vx)
3. (∃x)(Ux ∙ ∼Vx) / (∀x)Wx
24. 1. (∀x)[Lx ⊃ (Bx ∨ Ux)]
2. (∃x)(∼Bx ∙ ∼Ux)
3. (∀x)(Lx ≡ Ax) / (∃x)(~Ax ∨ Sx)
25. 1. (∀x)(Bx ≡ Fx)
2. (∃x)∼(∼Gx ∨ Cx)
3. (∀x)(∼Bx ⊃ Cx) / (∃x)Fx
26. 1. ∼(∀x)Mx
2. (∃x)Sx ∨ (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Tx)
3. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Tx) ≡ (∀x)Mx / Sa
27. 1. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx)
2. (∃x)(∼Nx ∙ Ox)
3. (∃x)∼Mx ⊃ (∃x) ∼Ox / (∃x)Ox ∙ (∃x)∼Ox
4 . 4 : Der i v at i ons i n M 2 4 9
28. 1. (∀x)(Px ∨ Qx) ≡ Rc

2. (∀x) ∼(Sx ∨ ∼Qx) / (∃x)Rx
29. 1. (∃x)Qx ≡ (∃x)Sx
2. (∀x)(Rx ∨ Sx)
3. (∃x)∼(Rx ∨ Qx) / Qb
30. 1. (∃x)Ax ⊃ (∀x)Cx
2. (∀x)(∼Bx ⊃ Dx)
3. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Ax)
4. (∃x)∼(Dx ∨ ∼Cx) / (∀x)Cx
31. 1. (∃x)Kx ⊃ (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Mx)
2. (∀x)∼(Kx ⊃ ∼Lx)
3. (∀x)∼Mx / (∃x)∼Lx
32. 1. (∃x)[Ix ∨ (Hx ∨ Jx)]
2. (∀x) ∼(∼Ix ⊃ Jx)
3. (∀x) ∼(Hx ∙ Kx) / (∃x)∼Kx
33. 1. (∀x)(Ox ⊃ Mx) ⊃ (∃x)Nx
2. (∀x)Mx / (∃x)∼(∼Nx ∨ ∼Mx)
34. 1. (∀x)∼[∼(∼Px ∙ Mx) ⊃ (Px ∙ ∼Mx)] /(∀x)(Mx ≡ Px)
35. 1. (∀x)(Lx ⊃ ∼Nx) ∙ (∀x)(∼Mx ⊃ ∼Ox)
2. (∀x)∼(∼Nx ∙ ∼Ox) / (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Mx)
36. 1. (∀x)(Dx ∙ Ex)
2. (∃x)(∼Fx ∨ Gx) / (∃x)[(Dx ≡ Ex) ∙ (Fx ⊃ Gx)]
37. 1. (∀x)(Rx ≡ Tx)
2. (∃x)(Tx ∙ ∼Sx)
3. (∀x) [Sx ∨ (Rx ⊃ Ux)] / (∃x)Ux
38. 1. (∃x)( Jx ≡ Kx) ⊃(∀x)(Ix ∙ Lx)
2. (∀x)[(Ix ∙ Jx) ⊃ Kx]
3. (∃x)∼(Ix ⊃ Kx) / (∀y)Ly
39. 1. (∀x)(Kx ⊃ ~Lx)
2. (∃x)Jx ⊃ Ib
3. (∃x)[ Jx ∨ (Kx ∙ Lx)] / (∃x)(Hx ∨ Ix)
40. 1. (∀x)Tx ⊃ [(∀x)(Qx ∨ Sx) ⊃ (∀x)Rx]
2. (∀x)~(Tx ⊃ ~Sx) / (∃x)Rx
EXERCISES 4.4b
written in M, using the given translation key. Then, derive
the conclusions of the arguments using the four quantifier
rules, plus the rules of inference and equivalence for PL.
1. Some students are teenagers. Everything is either not a teenager or not a child.
So, some students are not children. (Cx: x is a child; Sx: x is a student; Tx: x is
a teenager)
2. If there are black holes, then there are star clusters. S5 0014+81 is a black hole.1
All star clusters are gravitationally bound. So, something is gravitationally
bound. (a: S5 0014+81; Bx: x is a black hole; Gx: x is gravitationally bound; Sx:
x is a star cluster)
3. Someone is either an elephant or a badger. No one is a badger. If there are el-
ephants, then there are tusks. So, there are tusks. (Bx: x is a badger; Ex: x is an
elephant; Px: x is a person; Tx: x is a tusk)
4. Some prime numbers are either Mersenne primes or semiprimes. Things are
prime if, and only if, they are not composite. Semiprimes are composite. So,
some prime numbers are Mersenne primes. (Cx: x is composite; Mx: x is a Mer-
senne prime; Px: x is a prime number; Sx: x is a semiprime)
5. Things are cats just in case they are feline. No feline is canine. There are cats. So,
something is not canine. (Cx: x is canine; Fx: x is feline; Mx: x is a cat)
6. All trains run on tracks. Trains that run on tracks lack steering wheels. No cars
lack steering wheels. Some trains are purple. So, some trains aren’t cars. (Lx: x
lacks a steering wheel; Px: x is purple; Rx: x runs on tracks; Tx: x is a train)
7. If Shangri-La and the Shire exist, then so does Sodor. Anything that’s Sodor
has tank engines. Nothing with tank engines has real people. But Utopia is
Shangri-La and i Drann is the Shire. So, Sodor exists and does not have real
people. (i: i Drann; u: Utopia; Lx: x is Shangri-La; Px: x has real people; Rx: x is
the Shire; Sx: x is Sodor; Tx: x has tank engines)
1
S5 0014+81 is actually the name of a “blazar, in fact an FSRQ quasar, the most energetic subclass
of objects known as active galactic nuclei, produced by the rapid accretion of matter by a central
supermassive black hole,” according to its Wikipedia entry, June 9, 2016. But let’s take it as the name
of the black hole itself here.
4 . 4 : Der i v at i ons i n M 2 5 1
8. Someone is a composer but does not get paid. Others are composers and work
in Hollywood. Anyone who works in Hollywood gets paid. So, some people get
paid and some don’t. (Cx: x is a composer; Gx: x gets paid; Px: x is a person; Wx:
x works in Hollywood)
9. All treatises are books. No journal article is a book. So, everything is either not
a treatise or not a journal article. (Bx: x is a book; Jx: x is a journal article; Tx: x
is a treatise)
10. All fallacies seem valid, if they resemble formal inferences. But nothing that
seems valid is valid. So, everything valid, if it resembles a formal inference, is
not a fallacy. (Fx: x is a fallacy; Rx: x resembles a formal inference; Sx: x seems
valid; Vx: x is valid)
11. Some intuitions are reliable. Nothing reliable is obviously false. If some intu-
ition is not obviously false, then there are useful epistemologies. So, there are
useful epistemologies. (Ix: x is an intuition; Ox: x is obviously false; Rx: x is
reliable; Ux: x is a useful epistemology)
12. There is a thing that is either a utilitarian or a Kantian. Any utilitarian is a con-
sequentialist. Any Kantian is a deontologist. If something is either a conse-
quentialist or a deontologist, then something is a moral theorist. So, something
is a moral theorist. (Cx: x is a consequentialist; Dx: x is a deontologist; Kx: x is
a Kantian; Mx is a moral theorist; Ux: x is a utilitarian)
13. All empiricists make sense experience primary. No rationalist does. And every-
thing is either an empiricist or a rationalist. So, everything is an empiricist just
in case it is not a rationalist. (Ex: x is an empiricist; Rx: x is a rationalist; Sx: x
makes sense experience primary)
14. Everything good is beautiful and hard work. If something is hard work or re-
warding, then it is worth pursuing. So, the good is worth pursuing. (Bx: x is
beautiful; Gx: x is good; Hx: x is hard work; Rx: x is rewarding; Wx: x is worth
pursuing)
15. Everything good is beautiful and hard work. If something is hard work, then
either you do it yourself or you ask someone else to do it for you. Nothing you
do yourself is beautiful. So, anything good you ask someone else to do for you.
(Ax: you ask someone else to do x for you; Bx: x is beautiful; Gx: x is good; Hx:
x is hard work; Yx: you do x yourself)
16. If some philosophers are existentialists, then some are nihilists. There are her-
meneuticist philosophers. All philosophers are hermeneuticists just in case
they are existentialists. All nihilist philosophers are empowering. So, some-
thing is empowering. (Ex: x is an existentialist; Hx: x is a hermeneuticist; Nx: x
is a nihilist; Px: x is a philosopher; Sx: x is empowering)
EXERCISES 4.4c
Find the errors in each of the following illicit inferences.
Some of the arguments are valid; some are not. All
derivations contain errors. (We’ll show the invalid ones to be
invalid in Exercises 4.8b.)
1. 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
2. (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx) / (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rx)
3. Px ∙ Rx 2, EI
4. Px ⊃ Qx 1, UI
5. Px 3, Simp
6. Qx 4, 5, MP
7. Rx ∙ Px 3, Com
8. Rx 7, Simp
9. Qx ∙ Rx 6, 8, Conj
10. (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rx) 9, EG
QED—Oops!
2. 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx)

2. Pa ∙ Qa / (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rx)
3. Pa ∙ Ra 1, EI
4. Qa ∙ Pa 2, Com
5. Qa 4, Simp
6. Ra ∙ Pa 3, Com
7. Ra 6, Simp
8. Qa ∙ Ra 5, 7, Conj
9. (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rx) 8, EG
QED—Oops!
3. 1. (∃x)Px ⊃ (∃x)Qx

2. Pa / (∃x)Qx
3. Pa ⊃ (∃x)Qx 1, EI
4. (∃x)Qx 3, 2, MP
QED—Oops!
4. 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) / (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)

2. Pa ⊃ Qa 1, UI
3. (∃x)(Px ⊃ Qx) 2, EG
QED—Oops!
4 . 4 : Der i v at i ons i n M 2 5 3
5. 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) / (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx)
3. Pa ∙ Qa 1, EI
4. Pa ⊃ Ra 2, UI
5. Pa 3, Simp
6. Ra 4, 5, MP
7. Ra ∨ ∼Qa 6, Add
8. ∼Qa ∨ Ra 7, Com
9. Qa ⊃ Ra 8, Impl
10. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) 9, UG
QED—Oops!
6. 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)

2. (∃x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) / (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)
3. Qx ⊃ Rx 2, EI
4. Px ⊃ Qx 1, UI
5. Px ⊃ Rx 4, 3, HS
6. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) 5, UG
QED—Oops!
7. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Qx ≡ Rx)]

2. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Qx) / (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx)
3. Pa ⊃ (Qa ≡ Ra) 1, UI
4. Pa ∙ ∼Qa 2, EI
5. Pa 4, Simp
6. Qa ≡ Ra 3, 5, MP
7. ∼Qa ∙ Pa 4, Com
8. ∼Qa 7, Simp
9. ∼Ra 6, 8, BMT
10. Pa ∙ ∼Ra 5, 9, Conj
11. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) 10, EG
QED—Oops!
8. 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) ⊃ [(∃ x)Px ⊃ (∃x)Qx]

2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
3. (∃x)Px / (∃x)Qx
4. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) ⊃ (∃ x)Qx 1, 3, MP
5. (∃x)Qx 4, 2, MP
QED—Oops!
9. 1. (∀x)Px ⊃ (∀x)Qx

2. (∃x)Px / (∃x)Qx
3. Pa 2, EI
4. Pa ⊃ Qa 1, UI
5. Qa 4, 3, MP
6. (∃x)Qx 5, EG
QED—Oops!
10. 1. (∃x)(∼Px ∨ Qx)

2. (∀x)(∼Px ⊃ Qx) / Qa
3. ∼Pa ∨ Qa 1, EI
4. Qa ∨ ∼Pa 3, Com
5. ∼ ∼ Qa ∨ ∼Pa 4, DN
6. ∼Qa ⊃ ∼Pa 5, Impl
7. ∼Pa ⊃ Qa 2, UI
8. ∼Qa ⊃ Qa 6, 7, HS
9. ∼ ∼Qa ∨ Qa 8, Impl
10. Qa ∨ Qa 9, DN
11. Qa 10, Taut
QED—Oops!
4.5: QUANTIFIER EXCHANGE

The rules for removing and replacing quantifiers that we saw in the last section allow
us to make many inferences in predicate logic. But some inferences need more ma-
chinery. Consider the argument at 4.5.1 and a natural expression of it in M.
4.5.1 All successful football players are hard-working. But, not all foot-
ball players are hard working. So, not everything is successful.
1. (∀x)[(Fx ∙ Sx) ⊃ Hx]
2. ∼(∀x)(Fx ⊃ Hx) / ∼(∀x)Sx
We must remove the quantifier in the second premise of 4.5.1 to derive the conclu-
sion. But the quantifier is not the main operator of that proposition, and so we cannot
instantiate the premise as it stands. Further, we will want to put a quantifier on some
proposition near the end of the derivation. But it’s unclear how we are going to sneak
the quantifier in between the tilde and the ‘Sx’ in the conclusion. We need some rules
for managing the interactions between quantifiers and negations.
We already saw, in section 4.1, that there were alternative ways of translating sen-
tences with quantifiers and negations. For example, 4.5.2 can be translated naturally
as either 4.5.3 or 4.5.4.
4 . 5 : Q u ant i f i er E x c h ange 2 5 5
4.5.2 No apples are blueberries.

4.5.3 ∼(∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx)
4.5.4 (∀x)(Ax ⊃ ∼Bx)
As we will see in this section, every proposition that has a negation in front of a
quantifier, like 4.5.3, is equivalent to another proposition in which the quantifier is
the main operator, like 4.5.4.
The two different quantifiers in predicate logic, the existential and the universal,
are inter-definable. Indeed, some systems of logic take only one quantifier as funda-
mental and introduce the other by definition. We can see the relationship between the
existential and universal quantifiers in natural language by considering the following
four pairs of equivalent claims.
4.5.5 Everything is made of atoms.
4.5.5′ It’s not the case that something is not made of atoms.
4.5.6 Something is made of atoms.
4.5.6′ It’s wrong to claim that nothing is made of atoms.
4.5.7 Nothing is made of atoms.
4.5.7′ It’s false that something is made of atoms.
4.5.8 At least one thing isn’t made of atoms.
4.5.8′ Not everything is made of atoms.
Take your time to recognize that each pair above contains two different ways of
saying the same thing. We can represent the equivalence of each pair in predicate
logic, as I do at 4.5.9.
4.5.9 (∀x)Ax is equivalent to ∼(∃x)∼Ax
(∃x)Ax is equivalent to ∼(∀x)∼Ax
(∀x)∼Ax is equivalent to ∼(∃x)Ax
(∃x)∼Ax is equivalent to ∼(∀x)Ax
I’ll generalize those equivalences with the rule of quantifier exchange (QE). QE Quantifier exchange (QE)
allows us to replace any expression of one of the above forms with its logical equiva- is a rule of equivalence in
predicate logic.
lent. Like rules of equivalence, QE is based on logical equivalence, rather than valid-
ity, and thus may be used on part of a line.
Quantifier Exchange (QE)

(∀α)Fα →
← ∼(∃α)∼Fα
(∃α)Fα →
← ∼(∀α)∼Fα
(∀α)∼Fα →
← ∼(∃α)Fα
(∃α)∼Fα →
← ∼(∀α)Fα
QE appears as four rules. But we can really think of them as one more general rule.
Consider the following three spaces:
1. The space directly before the quantifier
2. The quantifier itself
3. The space directly following the quantifier
QE says that to change a quantifier, you change each of the three spaces.
Add or remove a tilde directly before the quantifier.
Switch quantifiers: existential to universal or vice versa.
Add or remove a tilde directly after the quantifier.
For example, in 4.5.10, we have a negation in front of a universal quantifier, but no
negation directly after it.
4.5.10 ∼(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
Using quantifier exchange, we can transform 4.5.10 into 4.5.11, removing the lead-
ing quantifier (the main operator of 4.5.10), changing the universal quantifier to an
existential quantifier, and adding a negation immediately following the existential
quantifier.
4.5.11 (∃x)∼(Px ⊃ Qx)
We can also transform 4.5.12 into 4.5.13 by adding a negation in front, where there
is none, changing the existential quantifier to a universal quantifier, and adding a ne-
gation directly after the quantifier where again there is none.
4.5.12 (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
4.5.13 ∼(∀x)∼(Px ∙ Qx)
Wffs like 4.5.11 and 4.5.13 may seem unnatural; we would rarely translate a sen-
tence of English into forms like either of those. But a few uses of propositional rules
of equivalence within those formulas can transform them into wffs that would be
the obvious results of translations from natural language, as we will see in the next
subsection.
Some Transformations Permitted by QE

Understanding the relation between the existential and universal quantifiers facili-
tates some natural transformations, like between 4.5.14 and 4.5.15, as the following
derivation shows.
4.5.14 It’s not the case that every P is Q. ∼(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
4.5.15 Something is P and not Q. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Qx)
1. ∼(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) Premise
2. (∃x)∼(Px ⊃ Qx) 1, QE
3. (∃x)∼(∼Px ∨ Qx) 2, Impl
4. (∃x)(∼ ∼Px ∙ ∼Qx) 3, DM
5. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Qx) 4, DN
Similarly, 4.5.16, 4.5.17, and 4.5.18 are all equivalent, as the derivation given below
them shows.
4.5.16 It’s not the case that something is both P and Q. ∼(∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
4.5.17 Everything that’s P is not Q (or, no Ps are Qs). (∀x)(Px ⊃ ∼Qx)
4.5.18 Everything that’s Q is not P (or, no Qs are Ps). (∀x)(Qx ⊃ ∼Px)
1. ∼(∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) Premise

2. (∀x)∼(Px ∙ Qx) 1, QE
3. (∀x)(∼Px ∨ ∼Qx) 2, DM
4. (∀x)(Px ⊃ ∼Qx) 3, Impl
5. (∀x)(∼ ∼Qx ⊃ ∼Px) 4, Cont
6. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ ∼Px) 5, DN
Most of the proofs we have been doing require some instantiation and/or gener-
alization. Now that we have QE available, we can derive arguments that require no
removal or replacement of quantifiers, like 4.5.19.
4.5.19 1. (∃x)Lx ⊃ (∃y)My
2. (∀y)∼My / ∼La
3. ∼(∃y)My 2, QE
4. ∼(∃x)Lx 1, 3, MT
5. (∀x)∼Lx 4, QE
6. ∼La 5, UI
QED
Note that in 4.5.19 you cannot existentially instantiate line 4. You may use EI only
when it is the main operator on a line. On line 4, the main operator is the tilde. Thus,
you must use QE before instantiating. On line 4, the quantifier is existential. But on
line 5, it is universal; the rule for instantiating that claim is UI, not EI.
Let’s return to 4.5.1, the conclusion of which I’ll derive at 4.5.20. The argument
does not appear, at first glance, to have an existential premise. But since the main
operator at line 2 is a tilde in front of a quantifier, in order to instantiate, we first must
use QE on that formula. Using QE yields, after some quick transformations, the exis-
tential sentence at line 6. Then, we EI (line 7) before we UI (line 10).
4.5.20 1. (∀x)[(Fx ∙ Sx) ⊃ Hx]
2. ∼(∀x)(Fx ⊃ Hx) / ∼(∀x)Sx
3. (∃x)∼(Fx ⊃ Hx) 2, QE
4. (∃x)∼(∼Fx ∨ Hx) 3, Impl
5. (∃x)(∼ ∼Fx ∙ ∼Hx) 4, DM
6. (∃x)(Fx ∙ ∼Hx) 5, DN
7. Fa ∙ ∼Ha 6, EI
8. ∼Ha ∙ Fa 7, Com
9. ∼Ha 8, Simp
10. (Fa ∙ Sa) ⊃ Ha 1, UI
11. ∼(Fa ∙ Sa) 10, 9, MT
12. ∼Fa ∨ ∼Sa 11, DM
13. Fa 7, Simp
14. ∼ ∼Fa 13, DN
15. ∼Sa 12, 14, DS
16. (∃x)∼Sx 15, EG
17. ∼(∀x)Sx 16, QE
QED
Summary
The rules of quantifier exchange (QE) allow us to manage the interactions between
negations and quantifiers. They allow us to instantiate some wffs in which the main
operator is not the quantifier but the negation; just make sure to use QE to change
the wff so that the quantifier is the main operator before instantiating. QE also allows
us to use the rules governing the propositional operators to make inferences with
propositions whose main operators are neither negations nor quantifiers, especially
in propositions with multiple quantifiers.
KEEP IN MIND
Never instantiate a quantifier if it is not the main operator in a wff.

If the main operator is a negation followed by a quantifier, use QE before instantiating.
Whether to use UI or EI to instantiate depends on the quantifier once it is the main operator.
All four QE rules can be summarized in one procedure. Just change each of three spaces:
Add or remove a tilde directly before the quantifier.
Switch quantifiers: existential to universal or vice versa.
Add or remove a tilde directly after the quantifier.
Rules Introduced
Quantifier Exchange (QE)
(∀α)Fα →
← ∼(∃α)∼Fα
(∃α)Fα →
← ∼(∀α)∼Fα
(∀α)∼Fα →
← ∼(∃α)Fα
(∃α)∼Fα →
← ∼(∀α)Fα
EXERCISES 4.5a
Derive the conclusions of each of the following arguments.
Do not use CP or IP.
1. 1. (∀x)Ax ⊃ (∃x)Bx
2. (∀x)∼Bx / (∃x)∼Ax
2. 1. (∃x)[Qx ∙ (Rx ∙ ∼Sx)] / ∼(∀x)Sx
3. 1. (∀x)Xx ⊃ (∀x)Yx
2. (∃x)∼Yx / (∃x)∼Xx
4. 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
2. ∼(∃ x)(Px ∙ Rx) / (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx)
5. 1. (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Ex)
2. ∼(∀x)(Dx ⊃ Fx) / (∃x)(Ex ∙ ∼Fx)
6. 1. (∃x)[(Gx ∙ Hx) ∙ Ix]
2. ∼(∃x)(Ix ∙ Jx) / (∃x)(Hx ∙ ∼Jx)
7. 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
2. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ ∼Qx) / ∼(∃x)(Px ∙ Rx)
8. 1. (∃x)Sx ⊃ (∃x)Tx
2. (∀x)∼Tx / (∀x)∼Sx
9. 1. (∃x)(Xx ∙ Yx) ⊃ (∃x)(Xx ∙ Zx)
2. (∀x)(Xx ⊃ ∼Zx) / ∼(∃x)(Xx ∙ Yx)
10. 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx) ⊃ (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Cx)
2. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Cx) / (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Bx)
11. 1. (∃x)(Tx ∙ ∼Vx)
2. (∃x)(Tx ∙ Vx) / ∼(∀x)(Tx ⊃ Vx) ∙ ∼(∀x)(Tx ⊃ ∼Vx)
12. 1. (∃x)∼Fx ∨ (∀x)(Gx ∙ Hx)
2. (∀x)[(Fx ∙ Gx) ∨ (Fx ∙ Hx)] / (∃x)(Gx ∙ Hx)
13. 1. ∼(∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx)
2. (∀x)(∼Rx ⊃ Tx) / ∼(∀x)∼Tx
14. 1. (∀x)[Lx ∨ (Mx ∙ ∼Nx)]
2. ∼(∃x)Lx / ∼(∃x)(Lx ∨ Nx)
15. 1. (∀x)(Ax ∨ Bx)
2. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Dx)
3. ∼(∀x)(Bx ∙ ∼Cx) / (∃y)(Dy ∨ Cy)
16. 1. ∼(∃x)(Ox ≡ Px)
2. Pa / ∼(∀x)Ox
17. 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx)
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ ∼Rx) / (∀x)(Qx ⊃ ∼Px)
18. 1. ∼(∃x)(Lx ∙ ∼Mx)
2. ∼(∃x)(Mx ∙ Nx) / ∼(∃x)(Lx ∙ Nx)
19. 1. ∼(∃x)[(Px ∙ Qx) ∙ ∼Rx]
2. ∼(∃x)(Rx ∙ ∼Sx) / ∼(∃x)[(Px ∙ Qx) ∙ ∼Sx]
20. 1. (∀x)(Tx ≡ ∼Vx)

2. (∃x)Vx
3. ∼(∀x)Tx ⊃ (∃x)Wx / (∃x)Wx
21. 1. ∼(∃x)(Rx ∨ Sx) ∨ (∀x)(Tx ⊃ ∼Rx)
2. Ra / ∼(∀x)Tx
22. 1. (∀x)[(Tx ∙ Ux) ⊃ Vx]
2. ∼(∀x)∼Tx / ∼(∀x)(Ux ∙ ∼Vx)
23. 1. (∃x)[Px ∙ (Rx ∙ ∼Sx)]
2. (∀x)[Qx ⊃ (Rx ⊃ Sx)] / ∼(∀x)(∼Px ∨ Qx)
24. 1. ∼(∀x)[Kx ⊃ (Lx ⊃ Mx)]
2. (∀x)[(Nx ∙ Ox) ≡ Mx] / ∼(∀x)(Nx ∙ Ox)
25. 1. ∼(∃x)[Ex ∙ (Fx ∨ Gx)]
2. (∀x)[Hx ⊃ (Ex ∙ Gx)]
3. (∃x)[∼Hx ⊃ (Ix ∨ Jx)] / (∃x)(∼Ix ⊃ Jx)
26. 1. ∼(∀x)[(Jx ∙ Kx) ∙ Lx]
2. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Jx)
3. (∀x)(∼Nx ∙ Mx) / ∼(∀x)(Kx ∙ Lx)
27. 1. (∃x)(Nx ∨ ∼Ox)
2. ∼(∀x)(Px ∙ Qx) ∙ ∼(∃x)(Nx ∨ ∼Qx) / ∼[(∀x)Px ∨ (∀x)Ox]
28. 1. (∃x)[Ax ∙ (Bx ∨ Cx)] ⊃ (∀x)Dx
2. ∼(∀x)(Ax ⊃ Dx) / ∼(∀x)Cx
29. 1. ∼[(∃x)(Ax ∨ Bx) ∙ (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Dx)]
2. ∼(∀x)(∼Ax ∨ Ex) / (∃x)Cx
30. 1. (∃x)Px ≡ (∀x)(Qx ⊃ ∼Rx)
2. (∃x)[Qx ∙ (Rx ∨ Sx)]
3. ∼(∃x)Sx / (∀x)∼Px
31. 1. (∀x)[(Ax ∨ Bx) ⊃ ∼Cx]
2. (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Cx) / ∼(∃x)(Ax ∙ Dx)
32. 1. (∀x)(Kx ≡ ∼Lx)
2. ∼(∃x)(Lx ≡ ∼Mx) / ∼(∃x)(Mx ≡ Kx)
33. 1. (∃x)(Sx ∙ ∼Tx) ⊃ ∼(∀x)[Px ⊃ ∼(Qx ∨ Rx)]
2. (∀x)(Vx ⊃ Sx)
3. ∼(∀x)(Vx ⊃ Tx)
4. ∼(∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) / (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx)
34. 1. (∃x)[(Ax ∨ Cx) ⊃ Bx]
2. ∼(∃x)(Bx ∨ Ex)
3. (∃x)(Dx ⊃ Ex) ⊃ (∀x)(Ax ∨ Cx) / (∃y)Dy
35. 1. (∃x)(Mx ∙ ∼Nx) ⊃ (∀x)(Ox ∨ Px)

2. ∼(∀x)(∼Nx ⊃ Ox)
3. ∼(∃x)Px / ∼(∀y)My
36. 1. (∀x)(Ex ∙ Fx) ∨ ∼(∀x)[Gx ⊃ (Hx ⊃ Ix)]
2. ∼(∀x)(Jx ⊃ Ex) / ∼(∀y) Iy
37. 1.∼(∃x)( Jx ∙ ∼Kx)
2. ∼(∃x)[Kx ∙ (∼Jx ∨ ∼Lx)] / (∀x)(Jx ≡ Kx)
38. 1. (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Hx) ∨ ∼(∃x)(Gx ≡ Ix)
2. (∃x)[Fx ∙ (∼Hx ∙ Ix)] / ∼(∀x)Gx
39. 1. ∼(∃x)[Px ∙ (Qx ∙ Rx)]
2. ∼(∀x)[∼Rx ∨ (Sx ∙ Tx)]
3. (∀x)(Px ∙ Qx) ∨ (∀x)(Tx ⊃ Rx) / ∼(∃x)(Tx ∙ ∼Rx)
40. 1. (∀x)[Ex ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx)]
2. ∼(∃x)[Ex ∙ (Fx ∙ Gx)]
3. (∀x)(Hx ⊃ Ex) / (∀x){Hx ⊃ [(Fx ∨ Gx) ∙ ∼(Fx ∙ Gx)]}
EXERCISES 4.5b
Translate each of the following arguments into propositions
of M. Then, derive the conclusions of the arguments.
1. Everyone is weird. But not everyone is nice. So, some weird things aren’t nice.
(Nx: x is nice; Px: x is a person; Wx: x is weird)
2. If there are gods, then everything is determined. But something is not deter-
mined. So, everything is not a god. (Dx: x is determined; Gx: x is a god)
3. Nothing blue is edible. This Sour Patch Kid is blue food. So, not all food is ed-
ible. (s: this Sour Patch Kid; Bx: x is blue; Ex: x is edible; Fx: x is food)
4. Someone in the class doesn’t keep up with the reading. Anyone who doesn’t
keep up with the reading has trouble understanding the classwork. It is not the
case that someone who has trouble understanding the classwork doesn’t strug-
gle with the final. So, someone in the class struggles with the final. (Cx: x is in
the class; Fx: x struggles with the final; Kx: x keeps up with the reading; Px: x is
a person; Ux: x has trouble understanding the classwork)
5. All new phones have lots of memory and large screens. Not every new phone
lacks a screen protector. So, not everything with a large screen lacks a screen
protector. (Lx: x has a large screen; Mx: x has lots of memory; Px: x is a new
phone; Sx: x has a screen protector)
6. Any fruit on the table is either a strawberry or has a pit. Some fruits on the
tables are apples. It is not the case that some apples are strawberries. So, it is not
the case that no apples have a pit. (Ax: x is an apple; Fx: x is a fruit on the table;
Px: x has a pit; Sx: x is a strawberry)
7. Everything is an Earthling just in case it is not an alien. It is false that some
politicians are aliens from Mars. So, all politicians from Mars are Earthlings.
(Ax: x is an alien; Ex: x is an Earthling; Mx: x is from Mars; Px: x is a politician)
8. No rock stars have bad hair. It is not the case that some rock stars lack
amplifiers. Not every rock star has either devoted fans or a functioning website.
So, not everything with amplifiers but not bad hair has either devoted fans or a
functioning website. (Ax: x has amplifiers; Fx: x has devoted fans; Hx: x has bad
hair; Rx: x is a rock star; Wx: x has a functioning website)
9. Some philosophers are A-theorists. It is not the case that some A-theorist
doesn’t overvalue the present. So, some philosophers overvalue the present.
(Ax: x is an A-theorist; Ox: x overvalues the present; Px: x is a philosopher)
10. Every Hegelian idealist believes in the transcendent. Not everything believes
in the transcendent. So, not everything is a Hegelian idealist. (Hx: x is a Hege-
lian; Ix: x is an idealist; Tx: x believes in the transcendent)
11. All ethicists are utilitarians if, and only if, they are consequentialists. Not every
ethicist is a utilitarian. So, not everything is a consequentialist. (Cx: x is a con-
sequentialist; Ex: x is an ethicist; Ux: x is a utilitarian)
12. If all beliefs are grounded in sense experience, then some beliefs are abstract.
All beliefs are mental states. It is not the case that some mental states are not
grounded in sense experience. And it is not the case that something abstract is
not ineffable. So, some beliefs are ineffable. (Ax: x is abstract; Bx: x is a belief;
Ix: x is ineffable; Mx: x is a mental state; Sx: x is grounded in sense experience)
13. All existentialists are either nihilists or theists. All theists have faith. Not all
existentialists have faith. So, it is not the case that no existentialists are nihil-
ists. (Ex: x is an existentialist; Fx: x has faith; Nx: x is a nihilist; Tx: x is a theist)
14. Neither everything is material nor some people are zombies. It’s not the case
that something is both not a zombie and not material. So, not everything is a
person. (Mx: x is material; Px: x is person; Zx: x is a zombie)
15. All philosophers are determinists if, and only if, they are not libertarians. Not
all philosophers are either determinists or nihilists. It is not the case that some
libertarians are pessimists and not nihilists. So, not everything is either a de-
terminist or a pessimist. (Dx: x is a determinist; Lx: x is a libertarian; Nx: x is a
nihilist; Px: x is a philosopher; Sx: x is a pessimist)
4 . 6 : C on d i t i onal an d In d i rect P roof i n M 2 6 3
16. All empiricists either believe in abstract ideas or do not believe that we have
mathematical knowledge. It is not the case that some empiricists who believe
in abstract ideas are fictionalists. It is not the case that some empiricists who
do not believe that we have mathematical knowledge approve of the calculus.
So, it is not the case that some empiricists both are fictionalists and approve of
the calculus. (Ax: x believes in abstract ideas; Cx: x approves of the calculus;
Ex: x is an empiricist; Fx: x is a fictionalist; Mx: x believes that we have
mathematical knowledge)
4.6: CONDITIONAL AND INDIRECT PROOF IN M

The rules for instantiating and generalizing and the rules of quantifier equivalence
are the main rules for predicate logic, whether monadic, in this chapter, or full, in
chapter 5. I’ll add a few rules governing the identity predicate in section 5.5. There are
some important restrictions on the rules as we refine our techniques and extend our
language. But we’ve already seen most of the rules.
For PL we had, in addition to our rules of inference and equivalence, three dif-
ferent derivation methods: direct, conditional, and indirect. To this point, we have
used only direct proof with predicate logic. But the conditional and indirect deriva-
tion methods work just as well in M as they did in PL, with one small restriction. The
restriction arises from considering the unrestricted and fallacious derivation 4.6.1.
4.6.1 1. (∀x)Rx ⊃ (∀x)Bx Premise
2. Rx ACP
3. (∀x)Rx 2, UG: but wrong!
4. (∀x)Bx 1, 3, MP
5. Bx 4, UI
6. Rx ⊃ Bx 2–5, CP
7. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx) 6, UG
Uh-oh!
Allowing line 7 to follow from the premise at line 1 would be wrong. We can show
that the inference is invalid by interpreting the predicates. Let’s take ‘Rx’ to stand for
‘x is red’ and ‘Bx’ to stand for ‘x is blue’. 4.6.1 would allow the inference of ‘Everything
red is blue’ (the conclusion) from ‘If everything is red, then everything is blue’ (the
premise). But that premise can be true while the conclusion is false. Indeed, since it
is not the case that everything is red, the first premise is vacuously true; it is a condi-
tional with a false antecedent. But the conclusion is clearly false: it is not the case that
all red things are blue. So, the derivation should be invalid. We must restrict condi-
tional proof.
The problem with 4.6.1 can be seen at step 3. The assumption for conditional proof
at line 2 just means that a random thing has the property denoted by ‘R’, not that
everything has that property. While variables ordinarily retain their universal char-
acter in a proof, when they are used within an assumption (for CP or IP), they lose
that universal character. It is as if we are saying, “Imagine that some (particular)
thing has the property ascribed in the assumption.” If it follows that the object in
the assumption also has other properties, we may universally generalize after we’ve
discharged, as in line 7, for we have not made any specific claims about the thing
outside of the assumption.
Using conditional proof in this way should be familiar to mathematics students.
Often in mathematics we will show that some property holds of a particular example.
Then we claim, without loss of generality, that since our example was chosen arbitrarily,
whatever we derived using our assumption holds universally. Within the assumption,
we have a particular example and we treat it existentially. Once we are done with that
portion of the proof, we can treat our object universally.
Consider an indirect proof of some universally quantified formula, ‘(∀x)α’. To be-
gin the proof, we assume its opposite: ‘∼(∀x)α’. We can then change that assumption,
using QE, to ‘(∃x)∼α’. In other words, we start an indirect proof of a universal claim
with an existential assertion: let’s say that something is not α. Another way to do such
an indirect proof would be to assume ‘∼α’ immediately. We could do this by making
the free variables in α constants or variables. Either way, they have to act as constants
within the assumption, so we must not use UG within the assumption on those sin-
gular terms.
Whenever we use CP or IP, we start by indenting, drawing a vertical line, and
All lines of an indented
sequence are within the making an assumption. All lines of the proof until we discharge the assumption are
scope of an assumptionin also indented, indicating that they are within the scope of the assumption in the first
the first line. line of the indented sequence.
To summarize the restriction, we may not UG on a variable within the scope of
an assumption in which that variable is free. Once the assumption is discharged,
the restriction is dismissed and you may UG on the variable. This restriction holds
on both CP and IP, though it would be unusual to use IP with a free variable in the
first line.
Addendum to the rule of inference UG: Within the scope of an assumption
for conditional or indirect proof, never UG on a variable that is free in the
assumption.
Derivations in Predicate Logic with CP

There are two typical uses of CP in predicate logic. The first way, using CP when you
want to derive a wff whose main operator is a ⊃, is rather obvious and entails no com-
plications or restrictions. When you desire such a proposition, just assume the whole
antecedent to prove the whole consequent, as in 4.6.2.
4.6.2 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Qx ∙ Rx)]

2. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Sx) / (∃x)Px ⊃ (∃x)Sx
3. (∃x)Px ACP
4. Pa 3, EI
5. Pa ⊃ (Qa ∙ Ra) 1, UI
6. Qa ∙ Ra 5, 4, MP
7. Ra ∙ Qa 6, Com
8. Ra 7, Simp
9. Ra ⊃ Sa 2, UI
10. Sa 9, 8, MP
11. (∃x)Sx 10, EG
12. (∃x)Px ⊃ (∃x)Sx 3–11, CP
QED
The other typical use of CP within predicate logic involves assuming the anteced-
ent of the conditional we ordinarily find inside a universally quantified formula. Since
universally quantified propositions ordinarily have conditional subformulas, CP can
be useful. But in such cases, the typical assumption will have a free variable in the first
line of an indented sequence, so we must be aware of the restriction on UG within the
scope of an assumption, as in 4.6.3.
4.6.3 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (Bx ∨ Dx)]
2. (∀x)∼Bx / (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Dx)
3. Ay ACP
4. Ay ⊃ (By ∨ Dy) 1, UI
5. By ∨ Dy 4, 3, MP
6. ∼By 2, UI
7. Dy 5, 6, DS
8. Ay ⊃ Dy 3–7, CP
9. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Dx) 8, UG
QED
In 4.6.3, at line 3, we pick a random object that has property A. From lines 3 to 7, we
show that given any object, if it has A, then it has D; we make that claim at step 8. Then,
at line 9, since we are no longer within the scope of the assumption, we may use UG.
Thus, to prove statements of the form (∀x)(αx ⊃ βx), we use the method sketched
at 4.6.4.
4.6.4 Assume αx
Derive βx
Discharge (αx ⊃ βx)
UG to get your desired conclusion: (∀x)(αx ⊃ βx)
Derivations in Predicate Logic with IP

Indirect proof ordinarily works just as it did in propositional logic, as you can see
in 4.6.5.
4.6.5 1. (∀x)[(Ax ∨ Bx) ⊃ Ex]

2. (∀x)[(Ex ∨ Dx) ⊃ ∼Ax] / (∀x)∼Ax
3. ∼(∀x)∼Ax AIP
4. (∃x)Ax 3, QE
5. Aa 4, EI
6. ∼ ∼Aa 5, DN
7. (Ea ∨ Da) ⊃ ∼Aa 2, UI
8. ∼(Ea ∨ Da) 7, 6, MT
9. ∼Ea ∙ ∼Da 8, DM
10. ∼Ea 9, Simp
11. (Aa ∨ Ba) ⊃ Ea 1, UI
12. ∼(Aa ∨ Ba) 11, 10, MT
13. ∼Aa ∙ ∼Ba 12, DM
14. ∼Aa 13, Simp
15. Aa ∙ ∼Aa 5, 14, Conj
16. ∼ ∼(∀x)∼Ax 3–15, IP
17. (∀x)∼Ax 16, DN
QED
With CP, we sometimes assume only part of a line and then generalize outside the
assumption. With IP, we almost always assume the negation of the whole conclusion,
as in line 3 of 4.6.5.
Remember, after you make your assumption, you’re looking for any contradic-
tion. A contradiction may be an atomic formula and its negation, or it may be a more
complex formula and its negation. It can contain quantifiers, or not. But be sure to
maintain our definition of a contradiction as any statement of the form α ∙ ∼α. In
particular, do not make the mistake of thinking that statements of the form at 4.6.6
are contradictions; they are not.
4.6.6 (∃x)Px ∙ (∃x)∼Px
There is nothing contradictory about something having a property and something
not having that property. Some things are red and other things are not; some things
have wings and others do not. Statements like 4.6.7 are not, strictly speaking, contra-
dictions, though contradictions may easily be derived from them.
4.6.7 (∀x)Px ∙ (∀x)∼Px
4.6.8 is a list of typical contradictions in predicate logic.
4.6.8 (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) ∙ ∼(∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) ∙ ∼(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
(∃x)Px ∙ ∼(∃x)Px
(∀x)Px ∙ ∼(∀x)Px
Pa ∙ ∼Pa
Px ∙ ∼Px
Logical Truths of M
Just as CP and IP allowed us to use our proof theory to prove that some formulas of
PL were logical truths, these methods allow us to prove that some formulas of M, like
4.6.9, are logical truths.
4.6.9 (∀x)(Px ∨ ∼Px)
1. ∼(∀x)(Px ∨ ∼Px) AIP
2. (∃x)∼(Px ∨ ∼Px) 1, QE
3. ∼(Pa ∨ ∼Pa) 2, EI
4. ∼Pa ∙ ∼ ∼Pa 3, DM
5. ∼ ∼(∀x)(Px ∨ ∼Px) 1–4, IP
6. (∀x)(Px ∨ ∼Px) 5, DN
QED
4.6.10–4.6.13 are further logical truths of M. Note that each one has a similarity to
one of the four rules for removing or replacing quantifiers.
4.6.10 (∀y)[(∀x)Fx ⊃ Fy]
4.6.11 (∀y)[Fy ⊃ (∃x)Fx]
4.6.12 (∃y)[Fy ⊃ (∀x)Fx]
4.6.13 (∃y)[(∃x)Fx ⊃ Fy]
I’ll prove the first, at 4.6.14, leaving the others for Exercises 4.6c.
4.6.14 1. ∼(∀y)[(∀x)Fx ⊃ Fy] AIP
2. (∃y)∼[(∀x)Fx ⊃ Fy] 1, QE
3. (∃y)∼[∼(∀x)Fx ∨ Fy] 2, Impl
4. (∃y)[∼ ∼(∀x)Fx ∙ ∼Fy] 3, DM
5. (∃y)[(∀x)Fx ∙ ∼Fy] 4, DN
6. (∀x)Fx ∙ ∼Fa 5, EI
7. (∀x)Fx 6, Simp
8. Fa 7, UI
9. ∼Fa ∙ (∀x)Fx 6, Com
10. ∼Fa 9, Simp
11. Fa ∙ ∼Fa 8, 10, Conj
12. (∀y)[(∀x)Fx ⊃ Fy] 1–11, IP
QED
Summary
In PL, we first showed that statements were logical truths semantically by using the
truth tables to show that they were tautologies. We can show that statements are logi-
cal truths of M semantically, too, though the semantics for predicate logic are more
complicated; we’ll deal with them in the next two sections, after which we’ll be able
to show that arguments are invalid, too.
KEEP IN MIND
The conditional and indirect derivation methods are useful in predicate logic, though there
is an important restriction on UG within any indented sequence.
Within the scope of an assumption for conditional or indirect proof, never UG on a vari-
able that is free in the assumption.
You may UG on a variable that is free in an assumption after the assumption is discharged.
Conditional proof is especially useful for deriving universally quantified conclusions or for
deriving conditional conclusions.
Indirect proof is often used just as in PL, by assuming the opposite of your desired
conclusion.
Be sure to maintain our strict sense of ‘contradiction’ for the last line of an indirect proof.
Either CP or IP is useful in proving logical truths of M.
EXERCISES 4.6a
Derive the conclusions of the following arguments.
1. 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx)
2. (∀x)∼(Bx ∙ ∼Cx) / (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Cx)
2. 1. (∀x)(Dx ∨ Ex)
2. (∀x)(Fx ⊃ ∼Ex) / (∀x)(∼Dx ⊃ ∼Fx)
3. 1. (∀x)(Gx ≡ ∼Hx)
2. (∀x)(Ix ⊃ Hx) / (∃x)Ix ⊃ (∃x)∼Gx
4. 1. (∀x)[Mx ⊃ (Nx ∙ Ox)]
2. (∃x)∼Nx / (∃x)∼Mx
5. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Qx ∙ Rx)]
2. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Sx) / (∀x)(Px ⊃ Sx)
6. 1. (∀x)(Tx ≡ ∼Vx)
2. (∀x)[Vx ⊃ (Wx ∙ Xx)] / (∀x)(∼Tx ⊃ Xx)
7. 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Cx)
2. ∼(∃x)(Bx ∙ ∼Cx) / (∀x)[(Ax ∨ Bx) ⊃ Cx]
8. 1. (∃x)[(Dx ∙ Ex) ∙ ∼Fx]
2. (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Fx) / ∼(∀x)(Ex ⊃ Gx)
9. 1. (∀x)[Hx ≡ (Ix ∨ Jx)]
2. ∼(∃x) Jx / (∀x)(Hx ≡ Ix)
10. 1. (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Hx)

2. ∼(∃x)(Ix ∙ ∼Gx)
3. (∀x)(∼Hx ⊃ Ix) / (∀x)Hx
11. 1. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Ux)
2. ∼(∃x)(Ux ∙ Sx) / (∃x)Rx ⊃ (∃x)∼Sx
12. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (Dx ∨ Ex)]
2. (∀x)[(∼Dx ⊃ Ex) ⊃ (∼Cx ⊃ Bx)] / (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (Bx ∨ Cx)]
13. 1. (∀x)[∼Nx ∨ (Qx ∙ Rx)]
2. (∀x)(Px ≡ Qx) / (∃x)Nx ⊃ (∃x)Px
14. 1. (∀x)(Ox ⊃ Nx)
2. (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Px)
3. ∼(∃x)(Px ∨ Qx) / (∀x)∼Ox
15. 1. (∀x)[(Fx ∨ Gx) ⊃ Ix]
2. (∀x)[(Ix ∙ Ex) ⊃ Gx] / (∀x)[Ex ⊃ (Fx ⊃ Gx)]
16. 1. (∀x)[Sx ⊃ (∼Tx ∨ ∼Rx)]
2. (∀x)(Ux ⊃ Sx) / (∃x)(Rx ∙ Tx) ⊃ (∃x)(∼Sx ∙ ∼Ux)
17. 1. (∀x)(Ex ≡ Hx)
2. (∀x)(Hx ⊃ ∼Fx) / (∀x)Ex ⊃ ∼(∃x)Fx
18. 1. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Ax)
2. (∃x)∼Bx ⊃ (∀x)Cx / (∃x)(Ax ∨ Bx)
19. 1. (∀x)[ Jx ⊃ (∼Kx ⊃ ∼Lx)]
2. (∃x)(Jx ∙ ∼Kx) / ∼(∀x)Lx
20. 1. (∃x)Ax ⊃ ∼(∀x)Bx
2. (∃x)Cx ⊃ (∀x)Bx
3. (∀x)Ax ∨ (∀x)∼Cx / ∼(∃x)Cx
21. 1. (∀x)[(Px ∨ Qx) ≡ Rx]
2. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Sx)
3. ∼(∃x)(Sx ∙ ∼Px) / (∀x)(Px ≡ Rx)
22. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (Cx ∙ Dx)]
2. (∃x)(Bx ∙ ∼Cx) / ∼(∀x)(Ax ≡ Bx)
23. 1. (∀x)[ Jx ⊃ (Mx ∙ Lx)]
2. (∀x)[(∼Kx ∨ Nx) ∙ (∼Kx ∨ Lx)] / (∀x)[( Jx ∨ Kx) ⊃ Lx]
24. 1. (∀x)(Ix ⊃ Kx)
2. (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Jx)
3. ∼(∃x)(∼Kx ⊃ Jx) / ∼(∃x)[Ix ∨ (Lx ∙ Mx)]
25. 1. (∀x)[Fx ⊃ (Dx ∙ ∼Ex)]

2. (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Hx)
3. (∃x)Fx / ∼(∀x)(Dx ⊃ Ex) ∨ (∃x)[Fx ∙ (Gx ∙ Hx)]
26. 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx)
2. (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Cx)
3. (∃x)(Ax ∨ Dx) / (∃x)Bx ∨ (∃x)Cx
27. 1. (∃x)Xx ⊃ (∀x)(Yx ≡ Zx)
2. (∃x)Yx / (∀x)[Xx ⊃ (∃y)Zy]
28. 1. (∃x)(Sx ∨ Tx)
2. (∃x)(Ux ⊃ ∼Vx)
3. (∃x)Tx ⊃ (∀x)Ux / ∼(∀x)(∼Sx ∙ Vx)
29. 1. (∀x)[(Lx ∙ Ix) ⊃ ∼Kx]
2. (∀x)[Mx ∨ ( Jx ∙ Nx)]
3. (∀x)(Kx ⊃ ∼Mx)
4. (∃x)(Ix ∙ Kx) / ∼(∀x)(Jx ⊃ Lx)
30. 1. ∼(∃x)(Dx ∙ ∼Ex)
2. (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx)
3. ∼(∃x)(Gx ∙ Ex) / ∼(∃x)(Dx ∙ Fx)
31. 1. (∀x)[Dx ≡ (∼Ex ∙ ∼Fx)]
2. (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Ex)
3. (∀x)[∼(Gx ∨ Fx) ⊃ Hx] / (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Hx)
32. 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Qx) ⊃ (∀x)(∼Rx ⊃ Sx)
2. (∃x)(∼Qx ∙ ∼Rx) / ∼(∃x)Sx ⊃ ∼(∀x)Px
33. 1. (∃x)[Fx ∨ (Gx ∨ Hx)]
2. (∀x)[∼Jx ⊃ (∼Fx ∙ ∼Hx)]
3. (∀x)(∼Gx ⊃ ∼Jx) / (∃x)Gx
34. 1. (∃x)Ax ⊃ ∼(∀x)Cx
2. (∃x)Bx ⊃ ∼(∀x)Dx
3. (∃x)∼Cx ⊃ (∀x)(Ex ⊃ Fx)
4. (∃x)∼Dx ⊃ (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx) / (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx) ⊃ ∼(∃x)(Ex ∙ ∼Gx)
35. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Qx ⊃ ∼Rx)]
2. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Sx ⊃ ∼Rx)]
3. (∀x)(Qx ∨ Sx) / (∀x)(Px ⊃ ∼Rx)
36. 1. ∼(∃x)[Rx ≡ (Tx ∙ Ux)]
2. (∀x){(Tx ⊃ ∼Ux) ⊃ [Sx ≡ (Rx ∨ Wx)]} /(∀x)[Rx ⊃ (Sx ∨ Vx)]
37. 1. (∀x)(Ax ≡ Dx)

2. (∀x)[(∼Bx ⊃ Cx) ⊃ Dx]
3. (∀x)[(Ex ⊃ Bx) ∙ (Dx ⊃ Cx)] / (∀x)[Ax ≡ (Bx ∨ Cx)]
38. 1. (∃x)[Kx ∙ (Lx ∙ Mx)]
2. (∀x)[Ox ⊃ ∼(Lx ∙ Mx)]
3. (∃x)(Kx ∙ Nx)
4. (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Ox) / (∃x)(Kx ∙ Ox) ∙ ∼(∀x)(Kx ⊃ Ox)
39. 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) ≡ (∃x)(Rx ∙ Qx)
2. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) ≡ (∃x)(Rx ∙ ∼Qx)
3. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
4. (∃x)Px / ∼[(∀x)(Rx ⊃ Qx) ∨ ∼(∃x)(Rx ∨ Qx)]
40. 1. ∼(∃x)[(Kx ∙ Lx) ∙ (Mx ≡ Nx)]
2. (∀x){Kx ⊃ [Ox ∨ (Px ⊃ Qx)]}
3. (∀x)[(Lx ∙ Mx) ⊃ Px]
4. (∀x)[Nx ∨ (Kx ∙ ∼Qx)] / (∀x)[Lx ⊃ (Nx ∨ Ox)]
EXERCISES 4.6b
of M. Then, derive the conclusions of the arguments.
1. All gibbons are apes. It’s not the case that there are apes that are not primates.
So, if there are gibbons, there are primates. (Ax: x is an ape; Gx: x is a gibbon;
Px: x is a primate)
2. All living things are carbon-based. Things that aren’t living are eternal. So,
anything not eternal is carbon-based. (Cx: x is carbon-based; Ex: x is eternal;
Lx: x is living)
3. Anything corrupt is not happy if it’s real. There are real dinosaurs. So, if every-
thing is corrupt, then there are unhappy dinosaurs. (Cx: x is corrupt; Dx: x is a
dinosaur; Hx: x is happy; Rx: x is real)
4. All plays are either comedies or tragedies. Everything is not a tragedy if, and
only if, it ends well. So, if some play is not a comedy, then something doesn’t
end well. (Cx: x is a comedy; Ex: x ends well; Px: x is a play; Tx: x is a tragedy)
5. No violent thunderstorms are safe. There are safe thunderstorms. So, not every-
thing is violent. (Sx: x is safe; Tx: x is a thunderstorm; Vx: x is violent)
6. All restaurants have chefs. It’s not the case that there are lazy chefs. There are
restaurants. So, something isn’t lazy. (Cx: x is a chef; Lx: x is lazy; Rx: x is a
restaurant)
7. All deserts are arid and cool at night. Anything arid or semi-arid has lizards.
So, it is not the case that some deserts lack lizards. (Ax: x is arid; Cx: x is cool at
night; Dx: x is a desert; Lx: x has lizards; Sx: x is semi-arid)
8. Good parents are either not too busy or don’t fail to make time for their children.
So, if all good parents are too busy, then if something is a good parent, then not
everything fails to make time for its children. (Bx: x is too busy; Px: x is a good
parent; Tx: x fails to make time for its children)
9. Platonists believe that forms are causes. Aristotelians believe that forms are
material. So, if there are Platonists or Aristotelians, then something believes
either that forms are causes or that they are material. (Ax: x is an Aristotelian;
Cx: x believes that forms are causes; Mx: x believes that forms are material; Px:
x is a Platonist)
10. All art is either expressive or representational. All art is either expressive or
formal. Art exists. So, either something is expressive or something is both rep-
resentational and formal. (Ax: x is art; Ex: x is expressive; Fx: x is formal; Rx: x
is representational)
11. Everything is a human if, and only if, it is rational. Everything is an animal if,
and only if, it is either human or not rational. So, there are animals. (Ax: x is an
animal; Hx: x is human; Rx: x is rational)
12. Everything is either a substance or an accident. Something is not a substance,
but a shape. So, something is an accident and a shape. (Ax: x is an accident; Fx:
x is a shape; Sx: x is a substance)
13. All desire is self-destructive. It is not the case that something is both not desire
and not self-destructive. So, something is self-destructive. (Dx: x is a desire; Sx:
x is self-destructive)
14. It is not the case that some historians are not both broadly trained and learned.
Some philosophers are not broadly trained. So, it’s not the case that everything
is an historian if, and only if, it is a philosopher. (Hx: x is an historian; Lx: x is
learned; Px: x is a philosopher; Tx: x is broadly trained)
15. If no morality is objective, then all morality is relative. Some morality is not
relative. If something is objective, then something lacks perspective. So, not
everything has perspective. (Mx: x is morality; Ox: x is objective; Px: x has per-
spective; Rx: x is relative)
16. All idealists are either empirical or transcendental. Some idealist is not empiri-
cal. All transcendentalists are empirical if they haven’t read Kant. So, not ev-
erything hasn’t read Kant. (Ex: x is empirical; Ix: x is an idealist; Kx: x has read
Kant; Tx: x is transcendental)
4 . 7 : S e m ant i cs for M 2 7 3
EXERCISES 4.6c
Derive the following logical truths of M.
1. (∀y)[Fy ⊃ (∃x)Fx]
2. (∃y)[Fy ⊃ (∀x)Fx]
3. (∃y)[(∃x)Fx ⊃ Fy]
4. (∃x)Ax ∨ (∀x)∼Ax
5. (∀x)Bx ⊃ (∃x)Bx
6. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Dx) ⊃ [(∀x)Cx ⊃ (∀x)Dx]
7. [(∀x)(Gx ⊃ Hx) ∙ (∃x)Gx] ⊃ (∃x)Hx
8. (∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx) ∨ (∃x)(Ix ∙ ∼Jx)
9. Fa ∨ [(∀x)Fx ⊃ Ga]
10. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ [(∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) ⊃ (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx)]
11. (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx) ⊃ [(∃x)Ax ∙ (∃x)Bx]
12. [(∀x)Dx ∨ (∀x)Ex] ⊃ (∀x)(Dx ∨ Ex)
13. (∃x)Ix ∨ (∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx)
14. [(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) ∙ (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx)] ⊃ (∀x)(∼Rx ⊃ ∼Px)
15. [(∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx) ∙ ∼(∃x)(Ox ∙ Nx)] ⊃ ∼(∃x)(Mx ∙ Ox)
16. ∼(∃x)Kx ≡ [(∀x)(Kx ⊃ Lx) ∙ (∀x)(Kx ⊃ ∼Lx)]
17. [(∃x)Ax ⊃ Ba] ≡ (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Ba)
18. [∼(∃x)Cx ∙ ∼(∃x)Dx] ⊃ (∀x)(Cx ≡ Dx)
19. {[(∃x)Fx ∨ (∃x)Gx] ∙ (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Hx)} ⊃ [(∃x)Fx ∨ (∃x)Hx]
20. (∃x)(Ka ∙ Lx) ≡ [Ka ∙ (∃x)Lx]
4.7: SEMANTICS FOR M

We have been constructing and using formal theories of logic. Some theories have
just finitely many theorems. Many interesting formal theories are infinite. For the
theories we are using with the languages PL and M, the theorems are the logical
truths. Those theories are infinite since there are infinitely many logical truths.
To construct a formal theory, we first specify a language and its syntax: vocabulary
and rules for well-formed formulas. We have looked carefully at the syntax of both PL
2 74 C h apter 4 Mona d i c P re d i cate L og i c
(in section 2.2) and M (in section 4.3). Once we have specified the wffs of a language,
we can use that language in a theory. But until we specify a semantics or a proof theory,
a language can be used in a variety of theories. We could have, for instance, adopted
a three-valued semantics for PL, which would have generated different logical truths
and thus a different logical theory.
There are different ways to specify a theory. We can just list some theorems. List-
ing the theorems of infinite theories like those we use with PL or M would be an
arduous task.
More promisingly, we can describe some limited ways of generating theorems.
For example, we can adopt some axioms and rules of inference. In geometry, the
Euclidean axioms, along with a background logic, characterize what we call Euclid-
ean geometry. We can also axiomatize physical theories, like quantum mechanics,
and purely logical systems too.
The logical systems in this book do not include any axioms. Instead, to characterize
the theories we are using, we have two options. The first option involves what we call
Proof theory is the study proof theory, the subject of chapter 3. Proof theory studies the axioms, for theories
of axioms (if any) and that include axioms, and rules of a formal theory. Our proof theory included both
rules for a formal theory.
rules of inference and rules of equivalence.
To generate the theorems of the theory we used with the language PL, we just stated
our rules of inference, including the methods of conditional and indirect proof that
allow us to derive the logical truths. By adding the inference rules of the previous few
sections to those of chapter 3, we have been developing a proof theory for monadic
predicate logic.
The second option, which is independent of proof theory, is to provide a semantics
for our language, a pursuit more generally called model theory. Our semantics for
propositional logic consists of assigning truth values to the simple sentences and
using the basic truth tables to compute truth conditions for complex sentences. We
simply interpret formulas by assigning 1 or 0 to each atomic sentence. We compute
truth values of complex propositions by combining the truth values of the atomic
sentences according to the truth table definitions. Since we have only twenty-six
simple terms, there are only 226 = ∼6.7 million possible interpretations, a large, but
finite, number.
The semantics for PL was thus pretty easy, using the truth tables. For M, and the
other languages of predicate logic, the semantics is more complicated. We have to
deal with logical particles, singular terms, predicates, and quantifiers. That is the goal
of this section, and we’ll use the framework described here to show the invalidity of
arguments in M in the next section.
An interpretation of Interpretations, Satisfaction, and Models

a formal language
describes the meanings
The first step in formal semantics for predicate logic is to show how to provide an
or truth conditions of its interpretation of a language. Then, we can determine its logical truths. The logical
components. truths will be the wffs that come out as true under every interpretation. To define an
4 . 7 : S e m ant i cs for M 2 7 5
interpretation of a theory written in our language M, we specify, in a metalanguage,

how to handle constants, predicates, quantifiers, and the propositional operators.
To interpret predicates and quantifiers, we use some set theory in our metalanguage A set is an unordered
as a tool for talking about the terms and formulas of M. Set theory is an important collection of objects.
mathematical theory that can get sophisticated and technical. But our uses of sets
will be elementary. Indeed, for this section, you need to know only two facts about set
theory. First, a set is an imagined collection and the order of objects in that collection
is unimportant. Second, a subset of a set is a set all of whose members are in the larger A subset o f a set is a
set; a subset can be empty, and it can have all of the members of the original set. (A set collection, all of whose
that contains strictly fewer members is called a proper subset.) members are in the
larger set.
We ordinarily write the members of a set in curly braces. Some sets are small and
finite, like the set of current U.S. Supreme Court justices. Other sets are infinite, like
the set of natural numbers. Some sets are empty, like the set of trees growing on the
moon. We can describe sets in various ways, including listing all of their members or
describing a rule for generating members.
S1: {Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama}
S2: {Winners of the Academy Award for Best Actress}
S3: {1, 2, 3 . . . }
S4: {}
There are three members of S1; seventy-four members of S2 (as of 2017); and an
infinite number of members of S3. There are no members of S4.
There are eight different subsets of S1.
{Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama}
{Bill Clinton, George W. Bush}
{Bill Clinton, Barack Obama}
{George W. Bush, Barack Obama}
{Bill Clinton}
{George W. Bush}
{Barack Obama}
{}
Moving on to our main work, we interpret a first-order theory in four steps.
Step 1. Specify a set to serve as a domain of interpretation.
The domain of interpretation (sometimes called a domain of quantification) is A domain of
the universe of the theory, the objects to which we apply the theory. We can consider interpretation, or domain
of quantification , is a set
small finite domains, sets of even just one or two objects. Or we can consider larger
of objects to which we
domains, like the whole universe or all of the real numbers. In showing arguments to apply a theory.
be invalid, in the next section, we’ll use small finite domains. But often we implicitly
think of our domain of interpretation as much larger.
Step 2. Assign a member of the domain to each constant.
We introduced constants to be used as names of particular things. In giving an in-
terpretation of our language, we pick one thing out of the domain for each constant.
Different constants may correspond to the same object, just as an individual person
or thing can have multiple names.
For example, if we are using M and working with a small domain of interpretation
{1, 2, 3}, we can assign the number 1 to ‘a’, the number 2 to ‘b’, and the number 3 to all
of the remaining nineteen constants (‘c’, . . .‘u’).
Just as not every object in our world has a name, not every object in a domain of
interpretation needs to have a name in a theory. So we can pick a universe of many
objects and name only some of them. Also, since one object can have multiple names,
a theory with many different constants can be interpreted with a domain of fewer
objects. But we ordinarily use a different name for each object.
Step 3. Assign some set of objects in the domain to each predicate.
We interpret predicates as subsets of the domain of interpretation, the objects of
which that predicate holds. We can interpret predicates by providing a list of mem-
bers of the domain or by providing a rule. If we use a predicate ‘Dx’ to stand for ‘x is a
Democrat who has been elected president of the United States’, then the interpreta-
tion of that predicate will be the set of things in the domain of interpretation that were
elected president as Democrats. Using a domain of S1, the interpretation of ‘Dx’ will
be {Bill Clinton, Barack Obama}. Using a domain of S2 , it will be empty.
In the domain of natural numbers, S3, we might define a predicate of even numbers,
‘Ex’, as the set of all objects that are multiples of two: {2, 4, 6 . . . }.
Step 4. Use the customary truth tables to interpret the propositional operators.
We are familiar with step 4 of the semantics from our work with PL, and we natu-
rally assume the truth table definitions for all the propositional operators when inter-
preting theories written in M.
Let’s take, for an example, the interpretation of a small set of sentences that I’ll call
Theory TM1, with a small domain.
Theory TM1 1. Pa ∙ Pb
2. ∼Ib
3. (∃x)Px
4. (∀x)Px
5. (∀x)(Ix ⊃ Px)
6. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Ix)
An Interpretation of TM1
Domain: {Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune}
a: Venus
b: Mars
c: Neptune
4 . 7 : S e m ant i cs for M 2 7 7
Px: {Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune}

Ix: {Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars}
We can think of ‘Px’ as meaning that x is a planet in our solar system. We can think
of ‘Ix’ as meaning that x is an inner planet. But the interpretation, speaking strictly, is
made only extensionally, by the members of the sets listed.
Sentence 1 is true on our interpretation because the objects assigned to ‘a’ and ‘b’
are in the set assigned to ‘Px’. We say that the given objects satisfy that predicate. An object satisfies a
Sentence 2 is not true on our interpretation, since the object assigned to ‘b’ is in the predicate if it is in the
set that interprets that
set assigned to ‘Ix’ and sentence 2 denies that it is.
predicate.
Sentences 3–6 of TM1 require interpreting quantified sentences. Sentence 3 is true
because there is an object in the domain that is in the set which interprets ‘Px’. Sen-
tence 4 is true because all objects in the domain are in the set which interprets ‘Px’.
We can define satisfaction for quantified sentences too. An existentially quantified An existentially
sentence is satisfied if, and only if, it is satisfied by some object in the domain; a uni- quantified sentence
is satisfiedwhen it
versally quantified sentence is satisfied if, and only if, it is satisfied by all objects in
is satisfied by some
the domain. Sentence 5 is true since every object in the domain that satisfies ‘Ix’ also object in the domain. A
satisfies ‘Px’. But sentence 6 is false since there are some objects in the domain that universally quantified
satisfy ‘Px’, but do not satisfy ‘Ix’. Not all Ps are Is, on our interpretation. sentence is satisfied
Let’s interpret a new theory, TM 2 , using the same domain and assignments as when it is satisfied by all
objects in the domain.
above.
Theory TM2 1. Pa ∙ Pb
2. Ib ∙ ∼Ic
3. (∃x)(Px ∙ Ix) ∙ (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Ix)
4. (∀x)(Ix ⊃ Px)
Notice that all of the sentences of TM 2 are true on our interpretation. We thus call
our interpretation a model of TM 2 . To construct a model for a given set of sentences, A model o f a theory is an
we specify an interpretation, using the four steps above. The exercises at the end of interpretation on which
all of the sentences of the
this section contain some theories for which you are to construct models. You may
theory are true.
pick any domain of interpretation and any assignment of objects of that domain for
your constants and predicates.
Logical Truth: Semantic Arguments

The logical truths of PL are the tautologies. We can show that a formula of PL is a
logical truth either semantically, by the truth table method, or proof-theoretically, A wff of M is a logical
using either conditional or indirect proof. In section 4.6, we saw how to prove that truth when it is true for
every interpretation.
a wff of M is a logical truth with our proof theory, using conditional or indirect
proof. We can show that a wff is a logical truth semantically, too. To show that a
formula of M is a logical truth, semantically, we have to show that it is true for every
interpretation.
To show that a formula is true for every interpretation, we have to think about
various domains, with various assignments of objects to constants and sets of objects
to predicates. I will show semantically that 4.7.1 is a logical truth.
4.7.1 Pa ∨ [(∀x)Px ⊃ Qa]
Suppose that ‘Pa ∨ [(∀x)Px ⊃ Qa]’ is not a logical truth.
Then there is an interpretation on which it is false.
On that interpretation, the object assigned to ‘a’ will not be
in the set assigned to ‘Px’, and there is some counterex-
ample to ‘(∀x)Px ⊃ Qa’.
Any counterexample to a conditional statement has to have a
true antecedent.
So, every object in the domain of our interpretation will be
in the set assigned to ‘Px’.
That contradicts the claim that the object assigned to ‘a’ will
not be in the set assigned to ‘Px’.
So, our assumption must be false: no interpretation will
make that sentence false.
So, ‘Pa ∨ [(∀x)Px ⊃ Qa]’ is logically true.
QED
Semantic proofs of the logical truth of wffs of M are essentially metalogical,
and very different in feel from the semantic proofs for PL. The truth tables are
also metalogical, not part of the object language, but they are more mechanical.
Semantics proofs for logical truths of M are often structured as reductio arguments:
suppose that the given proposition is not a logical truth. Then there will be an
interpretation that makes it false. If the statement is a logical truth, a contradiction
should follow.
We’ll spend more time on proof theory for M and F than we will on the semantics
for logical truth. Still, there is a nice, simple, and agreeable method for showing that
an argument is invalid using the semantics for M, one that we will examine in our
next section.
Summary
We are near the end of our studies of M. We have translated between natural language
and predicate logic. We have a proof system to show that arguments are valid and
which can be used to show that formulas are logical truths. And we have a semantic
method for interpreting our theories of M, constructing models and showing that
formulas are logical truths.
When we introduced our system of inference for PL, we already had a way of
distinguishing the valid from the invalid arguments, using truth tables. In M, we need
a corresponding method for showing that an argument is invalid. In the next section,
4 . 7 : S e m ant i cs for M 2 7 9
we will explore a formal, semantic method for showing that an argument is invalid in
M. Then, we will proceed to a new language, of relational predicate logic.
KEEP IN MIND
We interpret a theory of M in four steps:

Step 4. Use the customary truth tables to interpret the propositional operators.
We can pick any domain to interpret a theory.
Not every member of a domain of interpretation must have a name (be assigned to a
constant).
We can interpret predicates using any subjects of objects of the domain.
We can show semantically that wffs of M are logical truths, by showing that they are true
on any interpretation.
EXERCISES 4.7a
Construct models for each of the following theories by
specifying a domain of interpretation (make one up) and
interpreting the constants and predicates. Translate each of
the sentences of the theory to English, given your
interpretation.
1. Pa ∙ ∼Pb 3. Eb ∙ Ec
Qa ∙ Qb Kd ∙ ∼Ka
(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) ∼Ea ∙ Pa
(∃x)(∼Px ∙ ∼Qx) (∀x)(Ex ⊃ ∼Kx)
(∃x)(Px ∙ Kx)
(Eb ∨ Ed) ⊃ ∼Ka
2. Mb ∙ ∼Md 4. Oa ∙ ∼Ob
∼La ∙ ∼Wa Ra ∙ ∼Ea
Wc ∙ Wd Rd ∙ Od ∙ ∼Ed
(∃x)(Mx ∙ Lx) (∃x)(Rx ∙ Ox)
(∃x)(Mx ∙ ∼Wx) ∼(∃x)(Ex ∙ Ox)
(∀x)(Lx ⊃ ∼Wx) (∃x)(Ex ∙ Rx) ⊃ ∼Oc
5. (Pa ∙ Pb) ∙ Pc
(Qa ∙ Qb) ∙ ∼Qc
(∀x)[(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ Rx]
(∃x)[(Px ∙ Qx) ∙ Sx]
(∀x)[(Px ∙ ∼Qx) ⊃ (∼Rx ∙ ∼Sx)]
EXERCISES 4.7b
Show, semantically, that the following propositions selected
from Exercises 4.6c are logical truths.
1. (∃x)Ax ∨ (∀x)∼Ax (4.6c.4)

2. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Dx) ⊃ [(∀x)Cx ⊃ (∀x)Dx] (4.6c.6)
3. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ [(∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) ⊃ (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx)] (4.6c.10)
4. [(∀x)Dx ∨ (∀x)Ex] ⊃ (∀x)(Dx ∨ Ex) (4.6c.12)
5. [(∃x)Ax ⊃ Ba] ≡ (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Ba) (4.6c.17)
4.8: INVALIDITY IN M
We studied proof-theoretic methods for showing that an argument in M is valid in
sections 4.4–4.6. In this section, I demonstrate a semantic method for showing that
an argument in M is invalid.
A valid argument is one that is valid under any interpretation, using any domain.
An invalid argument will have counterexamples, interpretations on which the
premises come out true and the conclusion comes out false. Understanding how we
interpret theories in the language of predicate language, the subject of section 4.7,
will help us here to formulate a method for showing that an argument in predicate
logic is invalid.
Recall how we proved that an argument in PL, such as 4.8.1, is invalid.
4.8.1 1. A ⊃ B
2. ∼(B ∙ A) /A ≡ B
4 . 8 : In v al i d i t y i n M 2 8 1
We lined up the propositional variables on the left side of the table, and the premises
and conclusion on the right. Then we assigned truth values to the component
sentences to form a counterexample, a valuation that makes the premises true and the
conclusion false.
4.8.2
A B A ⊃ B / ∼ (B ∙ A) // A ≡ B
0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
The table at 4.8.2 shows that the argument is invalid since there is a counterexample
when A is false and B is true. We will adapt this method for first-order logic.
Just as logical truths are true for all interpretations, if an argument is valid, then it is
valid no matter what we choose as our domain of interpretation. Even if our domain has
only one member, or two or three or a million, valid arguments have no counterexamples.
Inversely, if an argument is invalid, then there will be a counterexample in some finite
domain, though there may be no counterexample in any particular finite domain.
As in PL, we will show that arguments of M are invalid by constructing
counterexamples. Our approach is sometimes called the method of finite universes. The method of finite
Of course, the counterexamples for M will be more complex. Assigning truth values to universesis a semantic
method that can produce
closed atomic propositions is easy enough. It’s the quantifiers that create complexity. counterexamples to
So, to construct a counterexample, we transform propositions with quantifiers into arguments in predicate
unquantified equivalents in finite domains. Then we will have propositions whose logic.
operators are just the operators of PL and we’ll be able to use our old methods.
We’ll start with some examples in domains of one member and then move to more
complex examples that require larger domains.
Domains of One Member

Argument 4.8.3 is invalid.
4.8.3 (∀x)(Wx ⊃ Mx)
(∀x)(Px ⊃ Mx) / (∀x)(Wx ⊃ Px)
We can see intuitively that 4.8.3 is invalid by interpreting the predicates. For
example, we can take ‘Wx’ to stand for ‘x is a whale’, ‘Mx’ to stand for ‘x is a mammal’,
and ‘Px’ to stand for ‘x is a polar bear’. All whales are mammals, all polar bears are
mammals, but it’s not the case that all whales are polar bears. True premises; false
conclusion.
To show that 4.8.3 is invalid more formally, I will start by choosing a domain of one
object. We will call it ‘a’. Since there is only one object in the domain, the universally
quantified formulas are equivalent to statements about that one object.
4.8.4 (∀x)(Wx ⊃ Mx) is equivalent to Wa ⊃ Ma
(∀x)(Px ⊃ Mx) is equivalent to Pa ⊃ Ma
(∀x)(Wx ⊃ Px) is equivalent to Wa ⊃ Pa
We can thus eliminate the quantifiers and use the same method we used for
arguments in PL. We assign truth values to make the premises true and the conclusion
false, as in 4.8.5.
4.8.5
Wa Ma Pa Wa ⊃ Ma / Pa ⊃ Ma // Wa ⊃ Pa
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
The argument 4.8.3 is thus shown invalid because there is a counterexample in a

one-member domain, where Wa is true, Ma is true, and Pa is false. In other words,
there is a counterexample in a domain of one object, when that object is a whale, and
a mammal, but not a polar bear. Again, a specification of the assignments of truth
values to the atomic sentences of the theory, as in the previous sentence, is called a
counterexample.
The method of finite domains works with existential quantifiers as well, as in argu-
ment 4.8.6.
4.8.6 1. (∀x)[Ux ⊃ (Tx ⊃ Wx)]
2. (∀x)[Tx ⊃ (Ux ⊃ ∼Wx)]
3. (∃x)(Ux ∙ Wx) / (∃x)(Ux ∙ Tx)
Expanding an existentially quantified formula to a one-member domain, as in 4.8.7,
works exactly like it does for universally quantified formulas. In a world with just one
thing, ‘everything’ is the same as ‘something’.
4.8.7 (∀x)[Ux ⊃ (Tx ⊃ Wx)] is equivalent to Ua ⊃ (Ta ⊃ Wa)
(∀x)[Tx ⊃ (Ux ⊃ ∼Wx)] is equivalent to Ta ⊃ (Ua ⊃ ∼Wa)
(∃x)(Ux ∙ Wx) is equivalent to Ua ∙ Wa
(∃x)(Ux ∙ Tx) is equivalent to Ua ∙ Ta
The construction of a counterexample proceeds in the same way, too. The table at
4.8.8 shows that there is a counterexample in a one-member domain, where Ua is
true, Ta is false, and Wa is true.
4 . 8 : In v al i d i t y i n M 2 8 3
4.8.8
Ua Ta Wa Ua ⊃ (Ta ⊃ Wa) / Ta ⊃ (Ua ⊃ ∼
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
Wa) / Ua ∙ Wa // Ua ∙ Ta
1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Be careful not to confuse expansions into finite domains with instantiation in natu-
ral deductions. In each case, we remove quantifiers. But the restrictions on EI play no
role in expansions.
To show that an argument is invalid, we need only one counterexample. For many
simple arguments, we can construct a counterexample in a domain of one member.
But not all invalid arguments have counterexamples in a one-member domain. To
construct a counterexample, we often must use a larger domain.
Domains of Two Members

Argument 4.8.9 is invalid, but has no counterexample in a one-member domain.
4.8.9 (∀x)(Wx ⊃ Hx)
(∃x)(Ex ∙ Hx) / (∀x)(Wx ⊃ Ex)
To make the conclusion false, we have to make ‘Wa’ true and ‘Ea’ false. Then the
second premise is false no matter what value we assign to ‘Ha’.
Wa Ha Ea Wa ⊃ Ha / Ea ∙ Ha // Wa ⊃ Ea
0 1 0 0
Thus, to show that 4.8.9 is invalid, we have to consider a larger domain. If there are
two objects in a domain, a and b, then the expansions of quantified formulas become
more complex. Universally quantified formulas become conjunctions: a universally
quantified proposition states that every object in the domain has some property.
Existentially quantified formulas become disjunctions: at least one object in the
domain has the property ascribed by an existential formula.
4.8.10 shows the rules for expanding quantified formulas into two- and three-
member domains.
4.8.10 In a two-member domain:

(∀x)Fx becomes Fa ∙ F b
(∃x)Fx becomes Fa ∨ F b
In a three-member domain:
(∀x)Fx becomes Fa ∙ F b ∙ Fc
(∃x)Fx becomes Fa ∨ F b ∨ Fc
Returning to argument 4.8.9, let’s expand the argument into a domain of two mem-
bers, as in 4.8.11, to look for a counterexample.
4.8.11 (Wa ⊃ Ha) ∙ (Wb ⊃ Hb)
(Ea ∙ Ha) ∨ (Eb ∙ Hb) / (Wa ⊃ Ea) ∙ (Wb ⊃ Eb)
Let’s assign values to each of the terms to construct a counterexample.
Wa Wb Ha Hb Ea Eb (Wa ⊃ Ha) ∙ (Wb ⊃ Hb)
1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
/ (Ea ∙ Ha) ∨ (Eb ∙ Hb)
0 0 1 1 1 1 1
// (Wa ⊃ Ea) ∙ (Wb ⊃ Eb)
1 0 0 0 0 1 1
Note that in a two-membered domain, each quantified wff has two instances, one
for each object in the domain.
Constants
When expanding formulas into finite domains, constants remain themselves; there
is no need to expand a term with a constant when moving to a larger domain. If an
argument contains more than one constant, then it will require a domain larger than
one object.
Remember that expanding formulas into finite domains is not the same as
instantiating. In particular, the restriction on EI that we must instantiate to a new
constant does not apply. If an argument contains both an existential quantifier and
a constant, you may expand the quantifier into a single-member domain using the
constant already present in the argument. It need not be a new constant.
4.8.12 cannot be shown invalid in a one-member domain.
4 . 8 : In v al i d i t y i n M 2 8 5
4.8.12 (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx)

Ac /Bc
Ac Bc Ac ∙ Bc / Ac // Bc
0 0 0
We can generate a counterexample in a two-member domain, though, as at 4.8.13.

4.8.13
Ac Aa Bc Ba (Ac ∙ Bc) ∨ (Aa ∙ Ba) / Ac // Bc
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0
The counterexample is in a two-member domain, when Aa, Ac, and Ba are true and
Bc is false.
Some arguments require three-member, four-member, or larger domains to be
shown invalid. The pattern apparent at 4.8.10 can be extended for larger domains,
adding further conjunctions for universal quantifiers and further disjunctions for ex-
istential quantifiers.
Domains of Three or More Members

The argument at 4.8.14 is invalid, but it has no counterexamples in domains of fewer
than three members. (Check it!) Let’s see how to expand it to a domain of three objects.
4.8.14 Pa ∙ Qa
(∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Qx)
(∃x)(Qx ∙ Rx)
(∀x)(Px ⊃ ∼Rx) / (∃x)(Rx ∙ ∼Qx)
I’ll unpack each proposition on a separate line, starting with a row for the atomic
formulas.
Pa Qa Ra Pb Qb Rb Pc Qc Rc
Pa ∙ Qa
(Pa ∙ ∼ Qa) ∨ (Pb ∙ ∼ Qb) ∨ (Pc ∙ ∼ Qc)
(Qa ∙ Ra) ∨ (Qb ∙ Rb) ∨ (Qc ∙ Rc)
(Pa ⊃ ∼ Ra) ∙ (Pb ⊃ ∼ Rb) ∙ (Pc ⊃ ∼ Rc)
// (Ra ∙ ∼ Qa) ∨ (Rb ∙ ∼ Qb) ∨ (Rc ∙ ∼ Qc)
Note that the first premise does not get expanded to other objects; only quantified
sentences expand. No matter how large a domain you choose, a statement without
quantifiers remains the same.
Also notice that I do not group the three disjuncts in the second premise, the third
premise, or the conclusion, and that I do not group the three conjuncts in the fourth
premise. Technically, according to our formation rules, each pair of disjuncts or con-
juncts should be grouped. But since conjunction and disjunction are both associative
and commutative, the grouping really doesn’t matter. For a disjunction to be true,
only one of however many disjuncts appear must be true; it doesn’t matter which.
For a disjunction to be false, every one of the disjuncts must be false. For a conjunc-
tion to be true, every one of the conjuncts must be true. For a conjunction to be false,
just one of the conjuncts has to be false. The extra punctuation as you reach three- or
four-membered domains is less helpful than it is cluttering, so I relax the need for
groupings of pairs when unpacking quantifiers into larger domains. I’ll still use it
for derivations until section 5.5, when similar considerations lead me again to relax
punctuation in long conjunctions or disjunctions.
Returning to our work at hand, the counterexample is relatively easy to construct. I’ll
describe my process of constructing a counterexample and provide a completed table.
I started by assigning values for Pa and Qa in the first premise, both true. The con-
clusion has three disjuncts that each have to be false, and the truth of Qa means that
the first disjunct is false.
4 . 8 : In v al i d i t y i n M 2 8 7
The fourth premise includes three conjuncts, each of which must be true, and the
truth of Pa entails that Ra must be false in order for the first conjunct to be true.
The second and third premises are both series of disjuncts. The values so far as-
signed entail that the first disjunct in each expanded premise is false, but we have two
other disjuncts that we can make true for each, and only one of the disjuncts has to
be true.
I assigned true to Pb and false to Qb to take care of the second premise. The truth
of Pb, carried to the fourth premise, entails that Rb must be false. And the falsity of
Rb makes the second disjunct in the conclusion false, which was needed there given
the falsity of Qb.
Still, the third premise now had two false disjuncts, so I had to make Qc and Rc both
true. Then all that remained was making the last conjunct of the fourth premise true
and the last disjunct of the conclusion false. The truth of Qc already accomplished
the latter task, and making Pc false accomplishes the former. The counterexample is
constructed.
Pa Qa Ra Pb Qb Rb Pc Qc Rc
1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
Pa ∙ Qa
1 1 1
(Pa ∙ ∼ Qa) ∨ (Pb ∙ ∼ Qb) ∨ (Pc ∙ ∼ Qc)
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
(Qa ∙ Ra) ∨ (Qb ∙ Rb) ∨ (Qc ∙ Rc)
1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
(Pa ⊃ ∼ Ra) ∙ (Pb ⊃ ∼ Rb) ∙ (Pc ⊃ ∼ Rc)
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
// (Ra ∙ ∼ Qa) ∨ (Rb ∙ ∼ Qb) ∨ (Rc ∙ ∼ Qc)
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
There is no easy rule for determining how large a domain is required for a
counterexample for a given argument. The standard approach is just to start with
a one-membered domain and work upward as needed. But students often ask for
guidelines, and a rough one is that the size of the required domain increases with
the number of existential premises. Universal premises are easily satisfied trivially,
with false antecedents of their conditionals. But existentials often require conflicting
assignments of truth values and so can increase the size of the required domain.
It is useful and elegant to find a counterexample in the smallest domain possible.
But whatever the minimum size of the domain required to construct a counterex-
ample for a particular argument, there will be counterexamples in all larger domains.
So, if you mistakenly miss a counterexample in, say, a two-membered domain, there
will be one in a three-membered domain, and in larger ones.
Propositions Whose Main Operator Is Not a Quantifier

The main operator of the second premise of 4.8.15 is a ⊃, not a quantifier. On each
side of the conditional, there is a quantifier. There is no counterexample to the argu-
ment in a one-member domain, though the expansion is straightforward.
4.8.15 (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
(∀x)Px ⊃ (∃x)Rx
(∀x)(Rx ⊃ Qx) / (∀x)Qx
Pa Qa Ra Pa ∙ Qa / Pa ⊃ Ra / Ra ⊃ Qa // Qa
0 0 0 0
In a two-member domain, each quantifier in the second premise is unpacked in-

dependently, as in 4.8.16. Notice that the main operator of the premise remains the
conditional.
4.8.16 (∀x)Px ⊃ (∃x)Rx becomes (Pa ∙ Pb) ⊃ (Ra ∨ Rb)
We can clearly see here the difference between instantiation and expansion into a
finite domain. In a derivation, we could not instantiate the second premise, since the
main operator is not a quantifier. But interpreting the argument in a finite domain, we
can expand each quantifier.
We can construct a counterexample for the argument 4.8.15 in a two-member
domain.
4 . 8 : In v al i d i t y i n M 2 8 9
4.8.16
Pa Qa Ra Pb Qb Rb (Pa ∙ Qa) ∨ (Pb ∙ Qb)

1 or
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
0
/ (Pa ∙ Pb) ⊃ (Ra ∨ Rb)
1 1 0 1 1
/ (Ra ⊃ Qa) ∙ (Rb ⊃ Qb)
0 1 0 1 1 1 1
// Qa ∙ Qb
0 0 1
Logical Truths
The method of finite domains can easily be adapted to show that individual propo-
sitions are not logical truths. If a proposition is a logical truth, it will be true on
any valuation, in any domain. So, if we can find a valuation that makes it false in a
domain of any size, we have a counterexample to the claim that the proposition is
a logical truth.
4.8.17 is not a logical truth.
4.8.17 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) ∨ (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Px)
Let’s start by translating it into a domain of one object, at 4.8.18.
4.8.18 (Pa ⊃ Qa) ∨ (Qa ⊃ Pa)
In a one-object domain, no false valuation is possible. Making either disjunct false
makes the other disjunct true. We’ll have to expand it into a domain of two objects,
at 4.8.19.
4.8.19 [(Pa ⊃ Qa) ∙ (Pb ⊃ Qb)] ∨ [(Qa ⊃ Pa) ∙ (Qb ⊃ Pb)]
The expansion into a two-object domain, 4.8.20, is more promising for a false
valuation.
4.8.20
Pa Qa Pb Qb [(Pa ⊃ Qa) ∙ (Pb ⊃ Qb)]
1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
∨ [(Qa ⊃ Pa) ∙ (Qb ⊃ Pb)]
0 0 1 0 0
We can make each disjunct false, so that the whole proposition is false. Thus, we
have a valuation that shows that 4.8.17 is not a logical truth.
Overlapping Quantifiers
Sometimes, two quantifiers of M overlap. Unpacking propositions with overlapping
quantifiers requires some care. Consider a logical truth such as 4.8.21. (We saw the
derivation of this proposition at example 4.6.14.)
4.8.21 (∀y)[(∀x)Fx ⊃ Fy]
To expand 4.8.21 into a finite domain, we have to manage the overlapping quanti-
fiers. For a one-membered domain, the expansion is simple, as at 4.8.22.
4.8.22 Fa ⊃ Fa
For larger domains, just work in stages, starting with the outside quantifiers, as I do
at 4.8.23, in a two-object domain, and at 4.8.24, in a three-object domain.
4.8.23 [(∀x)Fx ⊃ Fa] ∙ [(∀x)Fx ⊃ Fb]
[(Fa ∙ Fb) ⊃ Fa] ∙ [(Fa ∙ Fb) ⊃ Fb]
4.8.24 [(∀x)Fx ⊃ Fa] ∙ [(∀x)Fx ⊃ Fb] ∙ [(∀x)Fx ⊃ Fc]
[(Fa ∙ Fb ∙ Fc) ⊃ Fa] ∙ [(Fa ∙ Fb ∙ Fc) ⊃ Fb] ∙ [(Fa ∙ Fb ∙ Fc) ⊃ Fc]
As you should be able to see, no matter how large a domain we consider, we will not
be able to construct a counterexample.
Now consider a related claim that is not a logical truth, 4.8.25.
4.8.25 (∀y)[(∃x)Fx ⊃ Fy]
To show that it is not a logical truth, we just need a valuation that makes the state-
ment false. There is no counterexample in a one-membered domain, which looks
exactly like 4.8.22. For a two-membered domain, once again start with the outside
quantifier, as at 4.8.26.
4 . 8 : In v al i d i t y i n M 2 9 1
4.8.26 [(∃x)Fx ⊃ Fa] ∙ [(∃x)Fx ⊃ Fb]

[(Fa ∨ Fb) ⊃ Fa] ∙ [(Fa ∨ Fb) ⊃ Fb]
Now we can assign truth values to show the proposition to be false.
Fa Fb [(Fa ∨ Fb) ⊃ Fa] ∙ [(Fa ∨ Fb) ⊃ Fb]
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
There is a false valuation of 4.8.25 in a domain of two objects, when Fa is false and
Fb is true.
Negations of Quantified Formulas

You may notice that none of the arguments we’ve examined in this section, and none
of those in the exercises below, contain negations of quantified formulas. You can
expand the negation of a quantified formula by merely leaving the negation alone,
expanding the quantified formula, and then negating the entire result. But it is sim-
pler just to use the rules of quantifier exchange to turn a negated formula into its un-
negated equivalent before expanding it. So, given an invalid argument like 4.8.27, we
can construct a countermodel for the equivalent argument at 4.8.28.
4.8.27 ∼(∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Qx)
∼(∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) / ∼(∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)
4.8.28 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
(∃x)(Qx ∙ ∼Rx) / (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx)
Given the ready availability of such equivalents, we won’t bother with the expan-
sions of quantified formulas with leading negations.
Summary
The method of constructing counterexamples to arguments by considering
interpretations in finite domains draws on both our semantics for PL, in the uses
of truth tables, and our semantics for M, in translating quantified sentences into
unquantified claims in finite domains. We now have a semantic method for proving
arguments of M invalid and a proof-theoretic method of proving arguments valid.
We can also adapt our method of expansion into finite domains to provide a
semantic method for showing that a statement is not a logical truth. We can prove
logical truths of M using the methods of conditional or indirect proof, or the semantic
method sketched at the end of section 4.7. We can now show that a wff is not a logical
truth by providing a valuation that makes it false in a finite domain.
KEEP IN MIND
To show that an argument of M is invalid, we translate quantified sentences into unquanti-

fied equivalents in finite domains and then construct a counterexample.
As for PL, a counterexample is a valuation that makes the premises true and the conclusion
false.
Existential statements are equivalent to series of disjunctions.
Universal statements are equivalent to series of conjunctions.
Series of disjunctions are true if at least one is true; they are false if every one is false.
Series of conjunctions are true if every one is true; they are false if at least one is false.
Only quantified formulas expand in finite domains; propositions with constants and no
variables do not expand.
In propositions with more than one quantifier, expand each quantifier independently.
When expanding overlapping quantifiers, work in stages, from the outside quantifier in.
There is no rule about the size of the domain needed to construct a counterexample,
though the size tends to increase with the number of existential premises.
If there is a counterexample in a domain of a certain size, there will be counterexamples in
domains of all larger sizes; still, you should seek the smallest domain possible.
To show that a wff is not a logical truth, construct a false valuation in a finite domain.
EXERCISES 4.8a
Show that each of the following arguments is invalid by
generating a counterexample.
1. 1. (∃x)(Ax ∨ Bx)
2. (∀x)Ax / (∀x)Bx
2. 1. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Dx)
2. Da / Ca
3. 1. (∀x)(Kx ≡ Lx)
2. (∃x)(Mx ∙ Lx) / (∃x)(Nx ∙ Kx)
4. 1. (∀x)[(Gx ∙ Hx) ∨ Ix]

2. (∼Hc ⊃ Jc) ⊃ ∼Ic / (∃x)(Gx ∙ ∼Jx)
4 . 8 : In v al i d i t y i n M 2 9 3
5. 1. (∀x)(Px ≡ Rx)
2. (∃x)(Qx ∙ ∼Sx) / (∀x)(Qx ⊃ ∼Rx)
6. 1. (∃x)(Ex ∙ Fx) ⊃ (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Hx)
2. ∼(∀x)(Fx ⊃ Ex) / (∀x)(∼Hx ⊃ ∼Gx)
7. 1. (∃x)(Ix ∙ Jx) ≡ (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Kx)
2. (∃x)( Jx ∙ ∼Kx) ≡ (∀x)(Lx ⊃ ∼Kx)
3. (∃x)(Ix ∙ ∼Kx) / (∃x)(Lx ∙ Kx)
8. 1. (∃x)[(Ax ∙ Bx) ∙ Cx]
2. (∃x)[(Ax ∙ Bx) ∙ ∼Cx]
3. (∃x)(Bx ∙ Dx)
4. ∼Da / (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Dx)
9. 1. (∃x)(Ex ∙ Fx)
2. Fb / Eb
10. 1. (∃x)Dx ⊃ (∃x)Gx
2. (∃x)(Dx ∙ Ex) / (∃x)(Ex ∙ Gx)
11. 1. (∃x)(Sx ∙ Tx)
2. (∃x)(Tx ∙ Vx) / (∃x)(Sx ∙ Vx)
12. 1. (∃x)(Xx ∙ Yx)
2. (∀x)(Yx ⊃ Zx)
3. (∃x)(Zx ∙ ∼Yx) / ∼(∀x)(Xx ⊃ Yx)
13. 1. Pa ∙ Qb
2. (∃x)(Rx ∙ Sx)
3. (∃x)(Rx ∙ ∼Sx)
4. (∀x)(Sx ⊃ Qx) / (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Px)
14. 1. (∃x)(Lx ∙ Nx)
2. (∃x)(Mx ∙ ∼Nx)
3. (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Ox) / (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Ox)
15. 1. (∃x)(Rx ∨ ∼Tx)
2. (∃x)(∼Rx ∙ Tx)
3. (∀x)(Sx ≡ Tx) / (∀x)(Sx ⊃ Rx)
16. 1. (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx)
2. (∃x)(Cx ∙ ∼Bx)
3. (∀x)[(Ax ∙ Cx) ⊃ Dx] / (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Dx)
17. 1. (∃x)(Ex ∙ Fx)
2. ∼(∀x)(Ex ⊃ Fx)
3. (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Ex) / (∀x)(∼Fx ⊃ ∼Ex)
18. 1. (∃x)( Jx ∨ Kx) ⊃ (∃x)(Lx ∙ ∼Jx)
2. (∃x)(Lx ∙ Jx) / (∃x)(Kx ∙ ∼Jx)
19. 1. (∀x)Ax ⊃ (∀x)Bx

2. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Bx)
3. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Bx) / (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Ax)
20. 1. (∃x)[Ox ∙ (Px ≡ Qx)]
2. (∃x)[∼Ox ∙ (Px ⊃ Qx)]
3. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Ox) / (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Qx)
21. 1. (∃x)Ex ⊃ (∃x)Fx
2. (∃x)(Ex ∙ ∼Fx)
3. (∀x)[(Gx ∨ Hx) ⊃ Fx] / (∀x)(Hx ⊃ Ex)
22. 1. (∀x)( Jx ≡ Ix) ∙ (∃x)Kx
2. (∃x)(Ix ∙ ∼Kx)
3. (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Kx)
4. ∼Ja ∙ Jb / (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Ix)
23. 1. (∃x)[∼Wx ∙ (Xx ∙ Yx)]
2. (∀x)(Xx ≡ Yx)
3. (∃x)(Yx ∙ Zx) / (∀x)(Wx ⊃ Zx)
24. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (Bx ∙ Cx)]
2. (∃x)[(Bx ∙ Cx) ∙ Ax] / (∀x)[Ax ≡ (Bx ∙ Cx)]
25. 1. (∃x)Dx ⊃ (∃x)Ex
2. (∃x)(Ex ∙ Fx) ⊃ (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Gx)
3. (∃x)(Dx ∙ Fx) / ∼(∃x)(Dx ∙ ∼Gx)
26. 1. (∃x)(∼Hx ∙ Ix)
2. (∃x)(Hx ∙ ∼Ix)
3. (∀x)( Jx ≡ Ix) / (∀x)(Hx ⊃ Jx)
27. 1. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx)
2. (∃x)(Mx ∙ Ox)
3. Oa / Oa ∙ Na
28. 1. (∃x)[Dx ∙ (Ex ∨ Fx)]
2. ∼(∃x)(Ex ∙ Fx)
3. (∃x)Ex
4. Fa / (∃x)(Dx ∙ Fx)
29. 1. (∃x)[(Ix ∙ Jx) ∙ ∼Kx]
2. (∃x)[(Ix ∙ Jx) ∙ Kx]
3. (∀x)(Kx ≡ Lx) / (∃x)(Lx ∙ ∼Ix)
30. 1. (∃x)(Ex ∙ Fx)
2. (∃x)(Ex ∙ ∼Fx)
3. (∀x)(Fx ≡ Gx) / (∀x)Ex
4 . 8 : In v al i d i t y i n M 2 9 5
31. 1. (∃x)(Kx ∙ Mx)

2. La ∙ Lb / (∃x)(Lx ≡ Mx)
32. 1. (Ha ∙ ∼Ia) ∙ Ja
2. (∃x)[Ix ∙ (Jx ≡ ∼Kx)]
3. (∃x)(∼Jx ∨ Kx) / (∃x)Kx
33. 1. (∃x)(Kx ∙ ∼Lx)
2. (∃x)(Kx ∙ Lx)
3. (∀x)[(Mx ∨ Nx) ⊃ Lx] / (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Kx)
34. 1. (∃x)(Lx ∙ Mx)
2. (∃x)(∼Lx ∙ Mx)
3. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx) / (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Nx)
35. 1. (∃x)(Fx ∙ Gx)
2. (∃x)(∼Fx ∙ Gx)
3. (∀x)[Gx ⊃ (Fx ≡ Hx)] / (∀x)(Fx ≡ Hx)
36. 1. (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx)
2. (∃x)[(Ax ∙ ∼Bx) ∙ Cx]
3. ∼(∃ x)(∼Ax ∙ ∼Dx)
4. (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Cx) / Ca ∨ Cb
37. 1. (La ∙ ∼Lb) ∙ (∼Mc ∙ Md)
2. (∃x)(Lx ∙ Nx)
3. (∃x)(Mx ∙ Ox)
4. (∀x)[(Lx ∨ Mx) ⊃ Ox] / (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Ox)
38. 1. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx)
2. ∼(∀x)(Ox ⊃ Nx)
3. (∀x)(Px ⊃ ∼Ox)
4. Ma ∙ Mb / (∀x)(Px ⊃ Nx)
39. 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
2. (∀x)(∼Px ≡ Rx)
3. (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rx)
4. (Pa ∙ Pb) ∙ (∼Pc ∙ ∼Pd) / ∼Qb
40. 1. (∃x)[(Ex ∙ Fx) ∙ Gx]
2. (∃x)[(Ex ∙ ∼Fx) ∙ Gx]
3. (∃x)(∼Ex ∙ Gx)
4. (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Hx)
5. (∀x)(∼Gx ⊃ ∼Ex) / Ha ∨ Fa
EXERCISES 4.8b
Show that each of the invalid arguments from Exercises 4.4c,
listed here, is invalid.
1. (4.4c: 2) 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx)

2. Pa ∙ Qa / (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rx)
2. (4.4c: 4) 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) / (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
3. (4.4c: 5) 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) / (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx)
4. (4.4c: 6) 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
2. (∃x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) / (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)
5. (4.4c: 9) 1. (∀x)Px ⊃ (∀x)Qx
2. (∃x)Px / (∃x)Qx
6. (4.4c: 10) 1. (∃x)(∼Px ∨ Qx)
2. (∀x)(∼Px ⊃ Qx) / Qa
EXERCISES 4.8c
For each argument, determine whether it is valid or invalid.
If it is valid, derive the conclusion using our rules of
inference and equivalence. If it is invalid, provide a
counterexample.
1. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (Bx ∙ Cx)]

2. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Ax) / (∀x)(Ax ≡ Cx)
2. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (Bx ∙ Cx)]
2. (∀x)[(Bx ∨ Cx) ⊃ Ax] / (∀x)(Ax ≡ Cx)
3. 1. (∀x)[(Dx ∨ Ex) ⊃ Fx]
2. ∼(∃x)(Fx ∙ Gx) / (∀x)(Ex ⊃ ∼Gx)
4. 1. (∀x)[(Dx ∙ Ex) ⊃ Fx]
2. ∼(∃x)(Fx ∙ Gx) / (∀x)(Ex ⊃ ∼Gx)
5. 1. (∀x)(Hx ⊃ Ix)
2. (∀x)( Jx ⊃ Ix)
3. ∼(∃x)(Hx ∙ Jx) / (∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx)
4 . 8 : In v al i d i t y i n M 2 9 7
6. 1. (∀x)[Xx ⊃ (Yx ≡ Zx)]

2. (∃x)(Xx ∙ ∼Yx)
3. (∀x)(Zx ∨ Wx) / (∃x)(Xx ∙ Wx)
7. 1. (∃x)(Xx ∙ Yx) ⊃ (∀x)[Xx ⊃ (Yx ∙ Zx)]
2. ∼(∃x)(∼Xx ∙ ∼Yx)
3. (∃x)(Yx ∙ Zx) / (∃x)(Xx ∙ Zx)
8. 1. (∀x)[Px ≡ (Qx ∨ Rx)]
2. (∀x)(Rx ≡ Sx)
3. (∃x)(Sx ∙ Tx) / (∃x)(Px ∙ Tx)
9. 1. (∀x)[Px ≡ (Qx ∨ Rx)]
2. (∀x)(Rx ≡ Sx)
3. (∃x)(Sx ∙ Tx) / ∼(∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Tx)
10. 1. (∀x)[Xx ⊃ (Yx ≡ Zx)]
2. (∃x)(Xx ∙ ∼Yx)
3. (∃x)(Zx ∙ Yx) / (∃x)(Xx ∙ Yx)
11. 1. (∀x)(Kx ⊃ Lx)
2. ∼(∃x)(∼Mx ∙ Lx)
3. (∀x)(∼Mx ∨ Nx)
4. ∼(∃x)∼(∼Nx ∨ ∼Kx) / ∼(∃x)Kx
12. 1. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Bx) ⊃ (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx) / (∃x)Ax ⊃ ∼(∀x)∼Bx
13. 1. (∀x)[(Cx ∨ Dx) ⊃ ∼Ex]
2. ∼(∃x)(∼Fx ∙ ∼Ex) / (∀x)(Fx ∨ ∼Dx)
14. 1. (∃x)(Gx ∙ ∼Hx)
2. (∃x)(Hx ∙ ∼Gx)
3. (∀x)[Ix ⊃ (Gx ∨ Hx)] / (∃x)[Ix ∙ (∼Gx ∨ ∼Hx)]
15. 1. (∃x)[( Jx ∙ Kx) ∙ ∼Lx]
2. (∀x)[Lx ⊃ ( Jx ∨ Kx)]
3. (∃x)(Mx ∙ Lx) / (∃x)(Mx ∙ ∼Lx)
16. 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) ≡ (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx)
2. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Qx)
3. (∀x)(∼Sx ⊃ Rx) / (∃x)(Qx ∙ Sx)
17. 1. (∀x)[Gx ⊃ (Hx ∨ Ix)]
2. (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Hx) ⊃ (∀x)(Jx ∙ ∼Hx)
3. ∼(∃x)Ix / (∃x)Jx
18. 1. (∀x)(Px ≡ ∼Qx)
2. (∀x)[(Rx ∨ Sx) ⊃ Qx]
3. (∀x)(Tx ⊃ Rx)
4. ∼(∃x)(∼Ux ∙ ∼Tx) / (∀x)(Px ⊃ Ux)
19. 1. (∀x)[Gx ⊃ (Hx ∙ ∼Ix)]

2. (∃x)(Gx ∙ Hx) ⊃ (∀x)(Jx ⊃ ∼Hx)
3. ∼(∃x)Ix / (∃x)Gx ⊃ (∀x)Jx
20. 1. (∃x)[Ax ∙ (Bx ∙ ∼Cx)]
2. (∃x)[∼Ax ∙ (Bx ∙ ∼Cx)]
3. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ ∼Dx) / (∀x)(∼ Cx ⊃ ∼Dx)
EXERCISES 4.8d
For each proposition, determine if it is a logical truth. If it
is a logical truth, provide a derivation. If it is not, provide a
valuation that shows it false in some finite domain.
1. (∀x)Ax ⊃ (∃x)Ax
2. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ ∼Bx)
3. (∃x)Cx ∨ (∃x)∼Cx
4. (∀x)Dx ∨ (∀x)∼Dx
5. (∀x)(Ex ⊃ Fx) ⊃ (∃x)(Ex ∙ Fx)
6. [(∀x)(Gx ⊃ Hx) ∙ (∃x)∼Hx] ⊃ (∃x)∼Gx
7. ∼(∃x)∼(Kx ∙ Lx) ⊃ (∀x)(Kx ∙ Lx)
8. (∃x)(Ix ∙ ∼Jx) ≡ ∼(∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx)
9. (∀x)[(Mx ∨ Nx) ⊃ Ox] ⊃ (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Ox)
10. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ Rx] ⊃ (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)
11. [(∃x)(Sx ∙ ∼Tx) ∙ (∃x)Tx] ⊃ (∃x)∼Sx
12. (∀x)[Xx ⊃ ∼(Yx ∨ Zx)] ⊃ ∼(∃x)(Xx ∙ Yx)
13. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ ∼(Bx ∙ Cx)] ⊃ (∃x)(∼Bx ∨ ∼Cx)
14. (∀x)(Dx ⊃ ∼Ex) ∨ (∃x)(Dx ∙ Ex)
15. (∀x)[(Fx ∨ Gx) ∨ Hx] ⊃ [(∃x)(∼Fx ∙ ∼Gx) ⊃ (∃x)Hx]
16. (∀x)[(Ix ∨ Jx) ∨ Kx] ⊃ (∀x)[∼(Ix ∙ Jx) ⊃ Kx]
17. (∃x)(Lx ∨ Mx) ≡ ∼(∀x)(Lx ∙ Mx)
18. (∃x)(Nx ∨ Ox) ∨ (∃x)(∼Nx ∨ ∼Ox)
19. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) ∨ (∃x)(∼Px ∙ ∼Qx)
20. [(∀x)(Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(Rx ∙ ∼Sx)] ∨ [(∃x)(∼Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(∼Rx ∙ ∼Sx)]
4 . 9 : N otes on T ranslat i on w i t h M 2 9 9
4.9: NOTES ON TRANSLATION WITH M

In sections 4.1 and 4.2, we looked at translation between monadic predicate logic
and English, focusing on the core aspects (how to use predicates, singular terms,
and quantifiers) and some general rules for working with sentences with multiple
predicates and multiple quantifiers. In this section, I discuss a few of the subtleties of
translation in M using the tools of our inferential system for M presented in sections
4.4–4.6 and our semantics for M in sections 4.7–4.8. First, let’s look at a controversy
about our use of conditionals as the main connectives in the subformulas of universally
quantified formulas.
Universally Quantified Formulas and Existential Import

In predicate logic, we ordinarily use conditionals with universally quantified
expressions, as at 4.9.1.
4.9.1 All hippogriffs are aggressive.
(∀x)(Hx ⊃ Ax)
In other words, we take 4.9.1 to say that if there are hippogriffs, then they are
aggressive. We sometimes call this the Boolean interpretation of universally
quantified formulas, after the nineteenth-century logician George Boole. But using
conditionals with universally quantified propositions in this Boolean way reinforces a
particular answer to a controversial question regarding the existential import of such
claims. To see the controversial question, consider 4.9.2.
4.9.2 All orangutans are mammals.
The controversy is whether to understand 4.9.2 as 4.9.3 or as 4.9.4.
4.9.3 If something is an orangutan, then it is a mammal.
4.9.4 There are orangutans, and they are all mammals.
4.9.3 is the Boolean interpretation. 4.9.4 may be called Aristotelian, since Aristotle
believed that universal claims about existing things have existential import. To see
the difference between the Boolean and the Aristotelian interpretations, notice that
4.9.3 may be taken as vacuously true but 4.9.4 could not. Orangutans are critically
endangered. Were they, sadly, to become extinct, 4.9.3 would remain true but 4.9.4
would be false. So, is it better to understand 4.9.2 as 4.9.3 or as 4.9.4?
The answer to this controversial question is settled in favor of the Boolean
interpretation in standard classical logic, like the logic of this book. But that is not to
say that the Boolean interpretation is the right one.
‘And’s and ‘Or’s and Universally Quantified Formulas

The English ‘and’ may be represented by a disjunction when it appears in the
antecedent of a universally quantified formula, as at 4.9.5. That sentence may be
regimented either as 4.9.6, in which the ‘and’ is a disjunction, or 4.9.7, in which it

is not.
4.9.5 All planets and asteroids are rocky.
4.9.6 (∀x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ⊃ Rx]
4.9.7 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) ∙ (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Rx)
To show that 4.9.6 and 4.9.7 are equivalent, we can do two derivations: 4.9.6 from
4.9.7 and 4.9.7 from 4.9.6. (The derivations are in an appendix to this section.) Since
4.9.6 and 4.9.7 are derivable from each other, either they are logically equivalent or
our logic is inconsistent (which it’s not).
The equivalence of these two ways of expressing common properties of different
groups is useful but does not extend to related pairs of claims that invoke existential
quantifiers instead of universal quantifiers. So 4.9.8 and 4.9.9 are not equivalent.
4.9.8 (∃x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ∙ Rx]
4.9.9 (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx) ∙ (∃x)(Ax ∙ Rx)
Let’s take ‘Px’ to stand for ‘x is a planet’, ‘Ax’ to stand for ‘x is an asteroid’, and ‘Rx’
to stand for ‘x is rocky’. Then 4.9.9 says that some planets are rocky and some asteroids
are rocky. This claim requires at least two objects, a rocky planet and a rocky asteroid,
while 4.9.8 requires only one object, either a rocky planet or a rocky asteroid. 4.9.8
follows easily from 4.9.9; again, I’ll put the derivation in the appendix. But 4.9.9 does
not entail 4.9.8. There is a counterexample in a domain of one object, where Pa and Ra
are true but Aa is false.
When negations enter the picture, whether we can use the two forms equivalently
depends on whether the sentence is existential or universal when the negation has
narrow scope. 4.9.10 may look like a universal claim, in which case one might think
that either 4.9.11 or 4.9.12 is an acceptable translation.
4.9.10 Not all planets and asteroids are rocky.
4.9.11 ∼(∀x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ⊃ Rx]
4.9.12 ∼(∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) ∙ ∼(∀x)(Ax ⊃ Rx)
But 4.9.10 is really an existential claim: some planets or asteroids are not rocky.
Using QE, we can show that 4.9.11 is equivalent to 4.9.13 and that 4.9.12 is equivalent
to 4.9.14.
4.9.13 (∃x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ∙ ∼Rx]
4.9.14 (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) ∙ (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Rx)
As in the relevantly similar cases of 4.9.8 and 4.9.9, 4.9.13 and 4.9.14 are not
equivalent. We can derive 4.9.13 from 4.9.14, just as we derived 4.9.8 from 4.9.9. But
4.9.14 does not follow from 4.9.13 since it requires two things where 4.9.13 does not.
I don’t believe that there is an unequivocal answer to the question of which pair
is the correct translation of 4.9.10. If the speaker of 4.9.10 intends a proposition that
would be refuted if it turned out that all planets were rocky but some asteroids weren’t
(or vice versa), then 4.9.12 and 4.9.14 are the correct pair. But if the speaker intended
a proposition that would be refuted only if all planets and all asteroids were rocky,
then 4.9.11 and 4.9.13 are the right ones. And if one wants a version of those with two
quantifiers, one can use 4.9.15.
4.9.15 (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) ∨ (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Rx)
Again, I leave the proofs of the equivalence of 4.9.15 and 4.9.13 to the appendix.
Quantifiers, Domains, and Charity

Some sentences of English are implicitly quantificational but without a clear statement
of whether they are to be existential or universal, like 4.9.16.
4.9.16 Goats and cows produce milk.
If we take 4.9.16 to be existential, we want 4.9.17 (or an equivalent) as its translation
in M. But if we take it to be universal, we want 4.9.18 (or an equivalent).
4.9.17 (∃x)(Gx ∙ Mx) ∙ (∃x)(Cx ∙ Mx)
4.9.18 (∀x)[(Gx ∨ Cx) ⊃ Mx]
There is no grammatical criterion for statements of this form, as we can see from
4.9.19–4.9.21, which share grammatical form.
4.9.19 Goats and cows have spots.
4.9.20 Goats and cows are in the barn.
4.9.21 Goats and cows are mammals.
4.9.19 and 4.9.20 are existential claims: some goats and cows have spots; some goats
and cows are over there in the barn. But the claim about being mammals is likely to
be intended as identifying a natural property of the two species that is more properly
understood as universal. And similarly for 4.9.16, which is, in some sense, very close
to 4.9.21.
But what about the male goats and cows? They don’t produce milk. If we translate
4.9.16 as 4.9.18, we’re taking what seems like a true sentence and regimenting it as a
false one. That violates one of the first rules of interpretation: the principle of charity.
The principle of charity has a variety of formulations. At root, it is advice to try to
understand the words of others as true unless you have good reason to think that they
are not. When you’re given a sentence in a logic book to translate, there is no obvious
speaker, no one to ask about the speaker’s intent in uttering a sentence. Still, we should
practice charity. We don’t want to turn what looks like a true sentence into a false one.
Maybe there’s a true sentence of M that we can use instead of 4.9.18. How about
4.9.22, which restricts the claim to female goats and cows?
4.9.22 (∀x){[(Gx ∨ Cx) ∙ Fx] ⊃ Mx}
4.9.22 is better at charity than 4.9.18, but it’s not better as a translation. The original
sentence said nothing about female goats and cows. We’ve imposed this extra
predicate on the translation. It looks as if we’re kind of stuck in a dilemma between a

strict translation of the words and a charitable interpretation of them.
So be it. That’s a problem with interpretation generally. Sometimes our best
translations of other people’s words aren’t literal (what we sometimes call
homophonic). Consider what it takes to translate a poem, like the Iliad. Translators do
not ordinarily match words in English with words in ancient Greek, one by one. Such
translations would be clunky and would impose idiomatic expressions of the original
onto a language with a different set of quirks. Instead, we aim to match other factors,
like rhyme or meter or feel, while preserving what we can of content. Also, sometimes
we speak in euphemism. Your friend might say, “I’m going to the barn dance tonight,”
when it’s common knowledge (among your friend group) that you use ‘going to the
barn dance’ to mean ‘going to the library to study logic’ because you don’t want other
people to know that you spend a lot of time at the library studying logic. A friend of
mine often feeds his children “chicken nuggets”; but they’re made of soy, not chicken.
So 4.9.22 might be preferable to 4.9.18 in real life. But it’s too much interpretation
for a logic class. If you gave your instructor 4.9.22 rather than 4.9.18 on an assignment,
s/he would likely be puzzled. Where did the ‘Fx’ come from?
And things get worse: 4.9.22 doesn’t even get things right. Baby female goats don’t
produce milk. Lactating cows stop producing milk if they aren’t milked, and there
are ailments that will prevent milk production. Like all mammals, goats and cows
must meet conditions other than being female in order to produce milk. If we’re
interpreting charitably, we seem to have to expand past 4.9.22 to include all of these
other conditions.
The situation is actually not quite so bad. Maybe we can appeal to some sorts of
dispositions. Let’s take ‘Dx’ to stand for the property of being disposed to produce
milk, a simple predicate standing for the complex of properties that are required of
a goat or a cow to produce milk: having given birth, having continued milking, and
not suffering from mastitis or lameness or other problems that Wikipedia tells us can
reduce or end milk production. Then 4.9.23 might seem better than 4.9.22.
4.9.23 (∀x){[(Gx ∨ Cx) ∙ Dx] ⊃ Mx}
I expect that you are not very surprised when I tell you that there are problems with
4.9.23 too. The speaker of the original sentence might use the given English words
to mean any of a variety of claims. But it would be pretty deviant to use it to mean
something like: If P then P. Or even: If you’re a goat or a cow, then if P then P. But
that’s pretty close to what 4.9.23 does: For all x, if x is a goat or a cow disposed to
make milk, then it makes milk. That’s nearly tautological. But the original sentence is
nothing like a tautology. So 4.9.23 is no good either.
We can help quite a bit by taking ‘Mx’ to stand for the property of being the kind
of thing of which the female produces milk after giving birth; again, that requires
a bit of complex charity, but that’s not the kind of thing we can ever really avoid.
Interpretive questions are just below the surface, and sometimes they poke out
without warning.
At this point, you might just want to give up completely on charity. What’s the
use of charity if it gives you such a headache? But charity is always a factor in our
translations. Even taking the less controversial sentences for translation in this book
as grammatical sentences of English requires charity. You might take them as Swahili
nonsense, for example, and refuse to translate nonsense!
Many uses of universal quantifiers for translation require some kind of charity. We
rarely say anything about everything. More often with the universal quantifier, we
make claims about all things within a particular domain, as at 4.9.24, where we are
talking about only humans, not all things.
4.9.24 All humans are mortal.
(∀x)(Hx ⊃ Mx)
Technically, in interpreting such a sentence, we start with the universal quantifier

indicating everything and then narrow our domain with the antecedent of the
conditional: we’re talking only about humans. Sometimes these restrictions of a
domain are more subtle, and not explicitly stated, as at 4.9.25, literally regimented
at 4.9.26.
4.9.25 Only executives have administrative assistants.
4.9.26 (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Ex)
4.9.25 seems false, unless we were to stipulate it as a definition of ‘executive’, and such
a definition is implausible. To read 4.9.25 charitably, we are likely to want to restrict
the domain to a particular institution in which only executives have administrative
assistants. For example, the speaker of 4.9.25 is likely to mean something like 4.9.27,
translated into M at 4.9.28.
4.9.27 At Metalogic Incorporated, only executives have administrative
assistants.
4.9.28 (∀x)[(Mx ∙ Ax) ⊃ Ex]
Still, there’s no indication of which institution we might be talking about in 4.9.25.

Translating 4.9.25 as 4.9.28 is ill advised.
Similarly, a charitable interpretation of 4.9.29 seems difficult to manage.
4.9.29 All presidents are American politicians.
Do we take this as a true sentence, and thus interpret ‘president’ as ‘president of the
United States’? Or do we take this as a false sentence in which the speaker forgot that
there are presidents of many different sorts.
In practice, it often doesn’t matter. We work mainly on the surface grammar. And
for the purposes of this book, 4.9.18 is probably the best choice for the original 4.9.16,
and 4.9.25 is probably best as 4.9.26.
Still, there are important cases in which the surface grammar of a sentence is really
not what we usually use it to mean, as in 4.9.30.
4.9.30 All that glitters is not gold.
The surface grammar yields 4.9.31, with ‘Gx’ standing for ‘x glitters’ and ‘Ax’
standing for ‘x is gold’: nothing gold glitters.
4.9.31 (∀x)(Gx ⊃ ∼Ax)
But ordinary uses of 4.9.30 are usually better rendered as either 4.9.32 or 4.9.33:
there are things that glitter that aren’t gold; you’d better not conclude from its
glittering that what you’ve got is valuable.
4.9.32 ∼(∀x)(Gx ⊃ Ax)
4.9.33 (∃x)(Gx ∙ ∼Ax)
So, while we ordinarily translate according to the surface grammar, in cases like
4.9.30, where the usage is so obviously not according to the surface grammar, we
have to invoke charitable interpretation. It would be nice if language were cleaner and
easier to translate. But if English were precise in all cases, we wouldn’t need formal
logic.
Summary
Pretty much all work in philosophy requires interpretation and critical assessment.
We first have to know what folks are saying before we can determine whether it is
valid or sound, true or false. One of the advantages of formal language is that it can be
more precise than natural language. Thus, regimenting sentences of English or other
languages into formal languages requires us to disambiguate and clarify. Written
sentences are often ambiguous or unclear. When we translate into logical languages,
we have to make decisions about their likely intended meanings. Such meanings will
not always be determinate. Our translations must be guided by general principles of
charity and by our practical goals. Do we need relational predicates, or will monadic
ones do for our purposes? Should we use functions or definite descriptions? Why are
we formalizing our claims? Answers to questions about why we are translating into
logical languages can help us frame our decisions about levels of precision and charity.
For Further Research and Writing

1. The examples in the translation exercises in chapters 3 and 4 are designed
largely to have clear answers, and so are often not as unclear or ambiguous as
language we ordinarily use. An excellent exercise is to try to translate philo-

sophical texts you are reading in other classes, especially once you have the
full expressive power of F, which we study in Chapter 5, at your disposal.
2. Discuss the purposes of translation into formal languages. What does such
regimentation achieve? Are there disadvantages as well as advantages? For
the more ambitious, you could look more closely into translation and charity,
especially in the work of Quine and Davidson.
3. What is quantification? How does it differ from predication? Compare
quantifiers and mathematical functions. See the suggested readings by both
Dummett and Frege, and the chapter in Kneale and Kneale.
Suggested Readings
Davidson, Donald. “Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge.” In Truth and Interpretation:
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, edited by Ernest LePore, 308–319.
Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1986. Davidson uses the principle of charity in responding to
problems of skepticism.
Dummett, Michael. “Quantifiers.” In A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic, edited
by R. I. Hughes, 136–161. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1993. A detailed examination of the
nature of quantification in Frege’s work.
Fisher, Jennifer. On the Philosophy of Logic. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2008. Chapters 1 and 5
contain some useful observations on the utility of quantificational logics.
Frege, Gottlob. Begriffsschrift. In From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic,
1879–1931, edited by Jean van Heijenoort, 1–82. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1967. The preface is an important and engaging statement of the purposes of formal
logic, and includes Frege’s eye and microscope analogies.
Kneale, W., and M. Kneale. The Development of Logic. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1962.
In this classic history of logic, chapter VIII on Frege’s logic contains a detailed and lucid
discussion of Frege’s work on quantification.
Quine, W. V. Methods of Logic, 4th ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.
Chapters 14–18 describe various alternatives to quantification, historical antecedents to
Fregean quantification, and their limits.
Quine, W. V. Word and Object. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960. Chapter 2, “Translation
and Meaning,” is an influential work on the challenges of translation, especially from an
unknown language, and contains some of Quine’s thoughts on charity.
Sainsbury, Mark. Logical Forms: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic, 2nd ed. Oxford,
UK: Blackwell, 2001. Chapter 4, “Quantification,” is a broad discussion of the uses of
quantificational logic, with close attention to questions about translation.
Strawson, P. F. “Logical Appraisal.” In A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic, edited
by R. I. Hughes, 6–27. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1993. This chapter contains insightful
observations about logic and our goals in using it.
Appendix to 4.9
DERIVING 4.9.7 FROM 4.9.6
1. (∀x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ⊃ Rx] Premise
2. ∼[(∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) ∙ (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Rx)] AIP
3. ∼(∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) ∨ ∼(∀x)(Ax ⊃ Rx) 2, DM
4. (∃x)∼(Px ⊃ Rx) ∨ (∃x)∼(Ax ⊃ Rx) 3, QE
5. (∃x)∼(∼Px ∨ Rx) ∨ (∃x)∼(∼Ax ∨ Rx) 4, Impl
6. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) ∨ (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Rx) 5, DM, DN
7. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) AIP
8. Pa ∙ ∼Ra 7, EI
9. (Pa ∨ Aa) ⊃ Ra 1, UI
10. Pa 8, Simp
11. Pa ∨ Aa 10, Add
12. Ra 9, 11, MP
13. ∼Ra 8, Com, Simp
14. Ra ∙ ∼Ra 12, 13, Conj
15. ∼(∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) 7–14, IP
16. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Rx) 6, 15, DS
17. Ab ∙ ∼Rb 16, EI
18. Ab 17, Simp
19. (Pb ∨ Ab) ⊃ Rb 1, UI
20. Pb ∨ Ab 18, Add, Com
21. Rb 19, 20, MP
22. ∼Rb 17, Com, Simp
23. Rb ∙ ∼Rb 21, 22, Conj
24. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) ∙ (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Rx) 2–23, IP, DN
QED

1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) ∙ (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Rx) Premise
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) 1, Simp
3. Px ⊃ Rx 2, UI
4. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Rx) 1, Com, Simp
5. Ax ⊃ Rx 4, UI
6. (Px ⊃ Rx) ∙ (Ax ⊃ Rx) 3, 5, Conj
7. (∼Px ∨ Rx) ∙ (∼Ax ∨ Rx) 6, Impl
8. (Rx ∨ ∼Px) ∙ (Rx ∨ ∼Ax) 7, Com
9. Rx ∨ (∼Px ∙ ∼Ax) 8, Dist
10. Rx ∨ ∼(Px ∨ Ax) 9, DM
11. ∼(Px ∨ Ax) ∨ Rx 10, Com
12. (Px ∨ Ax) ⊃ Rx 11, Impl
13. (∀x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ⊃ Rx] 12, UG
QED

1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx) ∙ (∃x)(Ax ∙ Rx) Premise
2. (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx) 1, Simp
3. Pa ∙ Ra 2, EI
4. Pa 3, Simp
5. Pa ∨ Aa 4, Add
6. Ra 3, Com, Simp
7. (Pa ∨ Aa) ∙ Ra 5, Conj
8. (∃x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ∙ Rx] 7, EG
QED

1. (∃x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ∙ ∼Rx] Premise
2. ∼[(∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) ∨ (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Rx)] AIP
3. ∼(∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) ∙ ∼(∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Rx) 2, DM
4. (∀x)∼(Px ∙ ∼Rx) ∙ (∀x)∼(Ax ∙ ∼Rx) 3, QE
5. (∀x)(∼Px ∨ Rx) ∙ (∀x)(∼Ax ∨ Rx) 4, DM, DN
6. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) ∙ (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Rx) 5, Impl
7. (Pa ∨ Aa) ∙ ∼Ra 1, EI
8. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) 6, Simp
9. Pa ⊃ Ra 8, UI
10. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Rx) 6, Com, Simp
11. Aa ⊃ Ra 10, UI
12. Pa ∨ Aa 7, Simp
13. Ra ∨ Ra 9, 11, 12, CD
14. Ra 13, Taut
16. Ra ∙ ∼Ra 14, 15, Conj
17. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) ∨ (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Rx) 2–16, IP, DN
QED

1. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) ∨ (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Rx) Premise
2. ∼(∃x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ∙ ∼Rx] AIP
3. (∀x)∼[(Px ∨ Ax) ∙ ∼Rx] 2, QE
4. (∀x)[∼(Px ∨ Ax) ∨ Rx] 3, DM, DN
5. (∀x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ⊃ Rx] 4, Impl
6. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) AIP
7. Pa ∙ ∼Ra 6, EI
8. (Pa ∨ Aa) ⊃ Ra 5, UI
9. Pa 7, Simp
10. Pa ∨ Aa 9, Add
11. Ra 8, 10, MP
13. Ra ∙ ∼Ra 11, 12, Conj
14. ∼(∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rx) 6–13, IP
15. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Rx) 1, 14, DS
16. Ab ∙ ∼Rb 15, EI
17. (Pb ∨ Ab) ⊃ Rb 5, EI
18. Ab 16, Simp
19. Pb ∨ Ab 18, Add, Com
20. Rb 17, 19, MP
21. ∼Rb 16, Com, Simp
22. Rb ∙ ∼Rb 20, 21, Conj
23. (∃x)[(Px ∨ Ax) ∙ ∼Rx] 2–22, IP, DN
QED
KEY TERMS
anyone, 4.2 only, 4.2

anything, 4.1 open sentence, 4.3
atomic formula, 4.3 predicate, 4.1
attribute, 4.1 predicate logic, 4.1
bound variable, 4.3 proof theory, 4.7
closed sentence, 4.3 quantifier, 4.1
constant, 4.1 quantifier exchange (QE), 4.5
domain of interpretation, 4.7 satisfaction, 4.7
domain of quantification, 4.7 scope, 4.3
everyone, 4.2 scope of an assumption, 4.6
existential generalization (EG), 4.4 scope of a negation, 4.3
existential instantiation (EI), 4.4 scope of a quantifier, 4.3
existential quantifier, 4.1 set, 4.7
free variable, 4.3 singular terms, 4.1
hasty generalization, 4.4 someone, 4.2
interpretation, 4.7 subformula, 4.3
logical truth for M, 4.7 subject, 4.1
M, 4.1 subset, 4.7
method of finite universes , 4.8 universal generalization (UG), 4.4
model, 4.7 universal instantiation (UI), 4.4
monadic predicate logic, 4.1 universal quantifier, 4.1
new constant, 4.4 variable, 4.1
no one, 4.2
Chapter 5
Full First-Order Logic
5.1: TRANSLATION USING RELATIONAL PREDICATES

Argument 4.1.1 showed that some intuitively valid inferences were not valid in PL;
we explored M in response. Argument 5.1.1 shows that some intuitively valid infer-
ences are not valid in M and that we should examine a further refinement of our logic.
5.1.1 Alyssa is taller than Bhavin.
Bhavin is taller than Carlos.
Given any three things, if one is taller than another, and the latter is
taller than the third, then the first is also taller than the third.
So, Alyssa is taller than Carlos.
In M, with only monadic predicates, we translate the two first sentences with differ-
ent predicates. The first sentence ascribes to Alyssa the property of being taller than
Bhavin. The second sentence ascribes to Bhavin the property of being taller than Car-
los. Being taller than Carlos is a different property from being taller than Bhavin. So, if
I use ‘Tx’ for ‘x is taller than Bhavin’, I need a different predicate, say, ‘Ux’ for ‘x is taller
than Carlos’.
5.1.2 Alyssa is taller than Bhavin. Ta
Relational predicates, Bhavin is taller than Carlos. Ub
or polyadic predicates,
are followed by more
But what we really want is a more general predicate, being taller than, that relates
than one singular term. two singular terms. Such a predicate is called dyadic. 5.1.3 contains examples of vari-
Dyadic predicates are ous dyadic predicates.
followed by two singular
terms. Triadic predicates
5.1.3 Txy: x is taller than y
are followed by three Kxy: x knows y
singular terms. Pxy: x precedes y
We can construct three-place predicates too, called triadic predicates, as at 5.1.4.
5.1.4 Gxyz: x gives y to z
Bxyz: x is between y and z
Kxyz: x kisses y at z
We can construct four-place and higher-place predicates, as well. All predicates that
take more than one singular term are called relational, or polyadic. With relational
310 predicates, we now have a choice of how to regiment sentences like 5.1.5.
5 . 1 : T ranslat i on Us i ng R elat i onal P re d i cates 3 1 1
5.1.5 Andrés loves Beatriz.

We could regiment 5.1.5 in monadic predicate logic as ‘La’. In that case, ‘L’ stands
for the property of loving Beatriz. But if we want to use ‘L’ to stand for the general,
relational property of loving, it will take two singular terms: one for the lover and one
for the beloved. We can introduce a two-place predicate, ‘Lxy’, which means that x
loves y. Then, we regiment 5.1.5 as 5.1.6.
5.1.6 Lab
A similar translation, using a three-place relation for giving, can help us avoid using
an overly simple monadic predicate for 5.1.7.
5.1.7 Camila gave David the earring.
Instead of using ‘Gx’ for ‘x gives David the earring,’ we can invoke ‘Gxyz’ for ‘x gives
y to z’. Then, 5.1.7 is regimented as 5.1.8, using constants ‘c’, ‘d’, and ‘e’ for Camila,
David, and the earring. (Using a constant to stand for the object picked out by a defi-
nite description—‘the earring’—is somewhat contentious; we’ll see a more standard
way to represent definite descriptions in section 5.4.)
5.1.8 Gced
By using relational predicates, we reveal more logical structure. The more logical
structure we reveal, the more we can facilitate inferences. We will rarely, in this text,
use relational predicates of more than three places. But more-complex relations can
be useful. For example, 5.1.9, couched in a serious scientific theory, might be regi-
mented using a five-place relation.
5.1.9 There is something blue over there now.
We need a predicate for blueness and one place for the object. To indicate the spatial
position of the object, we could use three places: one for each position on a three-
dimensional coordinate axis. And we can add one more place for a temporal location,
resulting in the formula at 5.1.10.
5.1.10 (∃v)Bvabct
In other words, there is a thing that is blue at spatial location a,b,c at time t. 5.1.10
thus uses constants for spatial locations (a, b, and c) and temporal location (t), but we
could of course quantify over them as well, as at 5.1.11.
5.1.11 (∃v)(∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(∃w)Bvxyzw
The utility of a language with more variables (and thus more quantifier variables),
which we discussed in section 4.3 (‘How to Expand Our Vocabulary’), should be
apparent.
The order of the singular terms that follow a predicate is important. The property
of loving is distinct from the property of being loved. And, as many of us sadly know,
the loving relation is not always symmetric: things we love don’t always love us back.
For these reasons, we have to be careful to be clear about the precise nature of our
relational predicates. I’ll be pedantically explicit as we proceed.
3 1 2 C h apter 5 F u ll F i rst - O r d er L og i c
By introducing relational predicates, we have extended our language. We are now

using a language I call F, for full first-order predicate logic, rather than M. The differ-
ences here between F and M are minor. The two languages use the same vocabulary
except for two small additions introduced in section 5.4 and used merely as short-
hands and nearly the same formation rules. But beyond this text, the differences be-
tween M and F are significant.
Quantifiers with Relational Predicates

We can now translate the first two premises of 5.1.1 and its conclusion, using ‘Txy’ for
‘x is taller than y’.
5.1.1 Alyssa is taller than Bhavin. Tab
Bhavin is taller than Carlos. Tbc
Alyssa is taller than Carlos. Tac
To regiment the third premise of 5.1.1, we need multiple, overlapping quantifiers.
Let’s see how to use quantifiers with relational predicates in steps. We’ll start with
sentences with just one quantifier. The sentences at 5.1.12 use ‘Bxy’ for ‘x is bigger
than y’. (Ignore for now the inconsistency of the last two sentences, which entail that
something [Joe] is bigger than itself. We’ll introduce a device to eliminate that incon-
sistency in section 5.4.)
5.1.12 Joe is bigger than something. (∃x)Bjx
Something is bigger than Joe. (∃x)Bxj
Joe is bigger than everything. (∀x)Bjx
Everything is bigger than Joe. (∀x)Bxj
Next, we can introduce overlapping quantifiers. 5.1.13 uses ‘Lxy’ for ‘x loves y’.
5.1.13 Everything loves something. (∀x)(∃y)Lxy
Note the different quantifier letters: overlapping quantifiers must use different vari-
ables in order not to violate the formation rules, which we’ll see in detail in the next
section. Also, the order of quantifiers matters. 5.1.14 differs from 5.1.13, but only in
the order of the quantifiers.
5.1.14 Something loves everything. (∃x)(∀y)Lxy
Switching the order of the quantifiers in front of a formula thus changes its mean-
ing. Note that the leading quantifier in each sentence of F corresponds to the first
word of the corresponding English sentence.
Changing the order of the singular terms changes the meaning as well, as we can
see at 5.1.15 and 5.1.16.
5.1.15 Everything is loved by something. (∀x)(∃y)Lyx
5.1.16 Something is loved by everything. (∃x)(∀y)Lyx
We now can regiment 5.1.1 completely. The remaining third premise is ‘given any
three things, if one is taller than another, and the latter is taller than the third, then the
first is also taller than the third’. We translate that claim, also known as the transitive
property of ‘taller than’ with three universal quantifiers, as in the third premise of the
argument 5.1.17.
5.1.17 1. Tab
2. Tbc
3. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Txy ∙ Tyz) ⊃ Txz] / Tac
We will return to deriving the conclusion of this argument in section 5.3. For the
remainder of this section, and in the next section as well, we will look at some more
complicated translations.
People and Things and Using Relational Predicates

Instead of Monadic Ones
In full first-order logic, we often use the terms ‘someone’ and ‘everyone’ in addition
to ‘something’ and ‘everything’. We represent this difference by invoking a predicate
‘Px’ for ‘x is a person’. Sometimes we’ll use ‘some people’ or ‘all people’ to mean the
same thing. The difference should be clear in 5.1.18–5.1.22, which also use ‘Txy’ for ‘x
teaches y’ and the constant ‘p’ for ‘Plato’.
5.1.18 Something teaches Plato. (∃x)Txp
5.1.19 Someone teaches Plato. (∃x)(Px ∙ Txp)
5.1.20 Plato teaches everyone. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Tpx)
5.1.21 Everyone teaches something. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)Txy]
5.1.22 Some people teach themselves. (∃x)(Px ∙ Txx)
We can also use relational predicates to reduce our dependence on monadic predi-
cates. For example, we can take ‘teacher’ to refer to someone who teaches something
and ‘student’ to refer to someone who is taught (by something). Then, we can use
‘Txy’, for ‘x teaches y’ to characterize both teachers and students, eliminating any
need for the monadic predicates ‘x is a teacher’ and ‘x is a student’.
5.1.23 There are teachers. (∃x)(∃y)Txy
5.1.24 There are students. (∃x)(∃y)Tyx
In 5.1.25, we say that anything that is such that there is something that it teaches
(i.e., any teacher) is interesting, if it is skilled.
5.1.25 Skilled teachers are interesting. (∀x)[(∃y)Txy ⊃ (Sx ⊃ Ix)]
5.1.26 expands this practice, using two different predicates for teachers: the skilled
ones and the unskilled ones.
5.1.26 Skilled teachers are better than unskilled teachers.
(∀x){[(∃y)Txy ∙ Sx] ⊃ {(∀z)[(∃y)Tzy ∙ ∼Sz] ⊃ Bxz}}
Notice that we can use ‘(∃y)’ in both the first antecedent and the second, since the
scope of the first quantifier has ended before we need the second one.
Wide and Narrow Scope

A quantifier’s scope
is wider t he more The scope of a quantifier may be wider (have more subformulas in its scope) or
subformulas it contains; narrower (having fewer). When you have multiple quantifiers in a proposition, they
it is narrower the fewer
subformulas it contains.
can take wide scope by standing in front of the proposition, as in 5.1.27. Or one can
take a narrower scope by being located inside the proposition, as in 5.1.28.
5.1.27 (∃x)(∃y)[(Px ∙ Py) ∙ Lxy]
5.1.28 (∃x)[Px ∙ (∃y)(Py ∙ Lxy)]
5.1.27 and 5.1.28 are equivalent. But sometimes changing the scope of a quantifier
changes the meaning of the sentence. 5.1.29 and 5.1.30, for example, are not logically
equivalent.
5.1.29 (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Qxy)]
5.1.30 (∃y)(∀x)[Px ⊃ (Py ∙ Qxy)]
5.1.29 could be used for ‘all people love someone’. Using the same interpretation
of the predicates, 5.1.30 would stand for ‘there is someone everyone loves’. 5.1.29 is
plausible. 5.1.30 is not.
In general, the scope of the quantifiers doesn’t much matter when the quantifiers
are all existential or all universal. Just as 5.1.27 and 5.1.28 are equivalent, 5.1.31, in
which we introduce all of the quantifiers we need at the beginning of our formula, is
equivalent to 5.1.32, in which we alter the formula by a simple use of exportation and
wait to introduce ‘(∀y)’.
5.1.31 (∀x)(∀y)[(Mx ∙ My) ⊃ Pxy]
5.1.32 (∀x)[Mx ⊃ (∀y)(My ⊃ Pxy)]
When some quantifiers are existential and some are universal, changes of scope can
alter meaning. When translating, it is best form to introduce quantifiers only when
needed, giving them as narrow a scope as possible. On occasion, we will put all quan-
tifiers in front of a formula, using wide scope. But moving quantifiers around is not
always simple, and we must be careful.
More Translations
For 5.1.33–5.1.38, I use Px: x is a person, and Kxy: x knows y.
5.1.33 Someone knows everything. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∀y)Kxy]
5.1.34 Someone knows everyone. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∀y)(Py ⊃ Kxy)]
5.1.35 Everyone knows someone. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Kxy)]
5.1.36 Everyone knows everyone. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∀y)(Py ⊃ Kxy)]
or (∀x)(∀y)[(Px ∙ Py) ⊃ Kxy)]
5.1.37 No one knows everything. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)∼Kxy]
or ∼(∃x)[Px ∙ (∀y)Kxy]
5.1.38 No one knows everyone. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ ∼Kxy)]
or ∼(∃x)[Px ∙ (∀y)(Py ⊃ Kxy)]
Notice the structural similarities among many of these propositions, especially

with the quantifiers having narrow scopes. The leading quantifier matches the first
word in the English sentence. The main operator of the subformula that follows
depends on the quantifier (conditionals for universals; conjunctions for existentials).
And similarly, when the second quantifier is introduced, the operator in the ensuing
subformula will match the leading quantifier.
5.1.39 Every child is stronger than some adult.
(Cx: x is a child; Ax: x is an adult; Sxy: x is stronger than y)
(∀x)[Cx ⊃ (∃y)(Ay ∙ Sxy)]
5.1.40 No cat is smarter than any horse.
(Cx: x is a cat; Hx: x is a horse; Sxy: x is smarter than y)
(∀x)[Cx ⊃ (∀y)(Hy ⊃ ∼Sxy)]
∼(∃x)[Cx ∙ (∃y)(Hy ∙ Sxy)]
(∀x)(∀y)[(Cx ∙ Hy) ⊃ ∼Sxy]
5.1.40 uses a ‘no’ as a quantifier, but the first and second version I provide maintains
the structure. The third one uses a wide scope, which is acceptable since there are two
universal quantifiers.
Sometimes it is useful, before translating, to try to put a proposition into a semi-
formal form. Take the adage ‘dead men tell no tales’, which has only a slightly more
complex structure. To translate the adage into F, we can first think about how we
would add the quantifiers: for all x, if x is a dead man, then for all y, if y is a tale, then
x does not tell y.
5.1.41 Dead men tell no tales.
(Dx: x is dead; Mx: x is a man; Tx: x is a tale; Txy: x tells y)
(∀x)[(Dx ∙ Mx) ⊃ (∀y)(Ty ⊃ ∼Txy)]
Also worth noting, at 5.1.41 is that the same predicate letter can be used twice, as I
did with ‘T’. You can distinguish a monadic predicate from a dyadic or triadic predi-
cate by looking at how they are used. In 5.1.41, you can see which is which by just
looking at the number of singular terms that follow the predicate letter.
The structure of our wffs really remains the same even with three-place predicates,
as at 5.1.42–5.1.44.
5.1.42 There is a city between New York and Washington.
(n: New York; w: Washington; Cx: x is a city; Bxyz: y is
between x and z)
(∃x)(Cx ∙ Bnxw)
5.1.43 Everyone gives some gift to someone.
(Gx: x is a gift; Px: x is a person; Gxyz: y gives x to z)
(∀x){Px ⊃ (∃y)[Gy ∙ (∃z)(Pz ∙ Gxyz)]}
5.1.44 Everyone gives something to someone.
(Px: x is a person; Gxyz: y gives x to z)
(∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(∃z)(Pz ∙ Gxyz)]
When punctuating, make sure never to leave variables unbound. It is often useful
to punctuate after the translation is done, rather than along the way, or at least to
check your punctuation once you have completed a translation. Leading quantifiers
generally have the whole statement in their scope. Other quantifiers tend to have
smaller scopes. In 5.1.26, we saw two quantifiers with very narrow scopes. The second
quantifier in 5.1.45, as in many of the earlier examples, has the remainder of the
formula in its scope since it has to bind a variable in the last term of the wff.
5.1.45 A dead lion is more dangerous than a live dog.
(Ax: x is alive; Dx: x is a dog; Lx: x is a lion;
Dxy: x is more dangerous than y)
(∀x){(Lx ∙ ∼Ax) ⊃ (∀y)[(Dy ∙ Ay) ⊃ Dxy]}
The Power of F
F allows us to translate some neat subtleties and facilitate the understanding of many
aspects of our language. Using F can be pretty amusing, too. For example, check out
the formalization of William Carlos Williams’s “The Red Wheelbarrow,” at 5.1.46,
using: Bx: x is a wheelbarrow; Bxy: x is beside y; Cx: x is a chicken; Dxy: x depends
on y; Gxy: x glazes y; Rx: x is red; Sx: x is rainwater; Wx: x is white.
5.1.46 so much depends
upon
a red wheel
barrow
glazed with rain
water
beside the white
chickens.
(∃x){(Bx ∙ Rx) ∙ (∃y)Dyx ∙ (∃z)(Sz ∙ Gzx) ∙ (∃w)(Cw ∙ Ww ∙ Bxw)}
An interesting exercise would be to discuss the virtues and weaknesses of this for-
malization. Another interesting exercise would be to translate other work.
There is a translation of Williams’s “This Is Just to Say” at the end of the exercises;
look it up and give it a try before peeking!
Summary
F is a powerful language, nearly the strongest of the formal languages we will study. It
allows us to represent, in logical language, a wide range of propositions and inferences
of English, without the ambiguity of natural languages. Exercises 5.1b, which I
adapted from the logic textbook I used as an undergraduate, asks you to translate into
English some well-known sentences that have been rendered in F; you’ll be able to see
how much subtlety and expression you can pack into wffs of F there especially. Once
again, the best way to get comfortable with the difficulties and subtleties of F is to
practice your translations as much as possible. Remember to check your punctuation.
In the next section, I’ll lay out the formal syntax and semantics of F. You might
find that looking at that material will help you with the translation exercises of this
section. Then we’ll look at derivations in section 5.3. There’s one more major topic,
identity theory, that we will study in sections 5.4 and 5.5. Identity theory actually
doesn’t change our language, but it introduces a special predicate and some rules
governing inferences with it.
KEEP IN MIND
Relational predicates can be followed by any number of singular terms, though most of our
work in this text will use one- to three-place predicates.
The order of the singular terms matters.
The order of quantifiers also matters.
Try to keep the scope of your quantifiers as narrow as possible.
When all quantifiers are existential or all are universal, putting them all in front, with wide
scope, is acceptable.
Be careful to distinguish “someone” from “something” and “everyone” from “everything.”
It is important to punctuate correctly, never leaving an unbound variable.
EXERCISES 5.1a
Translate each of the following into predicate logic using
relational predicates.

b: Ben
Gx: x is gray
Mx: x is a mouse
Rx: x is a rat
Lxy: x is larger than y
1. All rats are larger than Ben.
2. Ben is larger than all rats.
3. Some rats are larger than Ben.
4. No rats are larger than Ben.
5. All gray rats are larger than Ben.

6. All rats are larger than some mice.
7. No rats are larger than some mice.
8. Some gray rats are larger than all mice.
9. No gray mice are larger than some gray rats.
10. If some gray mouse is larger than all rats, then Ben is not larger than some gray
mouse.

Gx: x is a god
Px: x is a pen
Sx: x is a sword
Mxy: x is mightier than y
11. All pens are mightier than all swords.
12. All gods are mightier than all pens.
13. No pens are mightier than some gods.
14. All gods are mightier than all pens and all swords.
15. No sword is mightier than any pen.
16. No god is mightier than herself.
17. Any sword mightier than some god is mightier than all pens.
18. Some pens are mightier than some swords, but some swords are mightier than
some pens.
19. No swords are mightier than all gods, but some swords are mightier than
some gods.
20. If some pens are mightier than all swords, then some gods are not mightier
than some pens.

Dx: x is a dancer
Px: x is a person
Rx: x is a runner
Hxy: x is healthier than y
Sxy: x is stronger than y
21. All runners are healthier than some people.

22. Some dancers are healthier than some people.
23. All dancers are healthier than some people.
24. No dancer is healthier than some runner.
25. No runner is stronger than every person.
26. Some runners are healthier than no dancers.
27. Some people who are dancers are stronger than some people who are not
runners.
28. If someone is stronger than someone, then s/he is healthier than someone.
29. If some dancer is stronger than all people, then no person is healthier than some
dancer.
30. Either some runner is stronger than all dancers or some dancer is healthier than
all runners.

l: literature
m: mathematics
p: philosophy
Sx: x is a student
Mxy: x majors in y
Cxy: x is a course in y
Txy: x takes y
31. Every student majors in something.
32. All math majors take a philosophy class.
33. Some math majors do not take a literature class.
34. Some math majors take a literature class and a philosophy class.
35. No literature majors take a mathematics course.
36. All literature majors take a course in philosophy or a course in mathematics.
37. Some students major in philosophy and take courses in mathematics.
38. No student majors in philosophy and mathematics without taking a course in
literature.
39. Every student who majors in literature or philosophy takes a course in math-
ematics.
40. If some students take courses in philosophy and mathematics, then all litera-
ture majors take courses in philosophy or mathematics.

c: Chiara
m: Marina
o: Orsola
Px: x is a person
Ixyz: x introduces y to z
41. Orsola introduces Chiara to Marina.
42. Someone introduces Chiara to Marina.
43. Someone introduces Chiara to everyone.
44. No one introduces Chiara to Orsola.
45. Orsola introduces Chiara to everyone.
46. Orsola introduces someone to Marina.
47. Orsola introduces someone to everyone.
48. Marina does not introduce Chiara to Orsola.
49. No one introduces Marina to everyone.
50. No one introduces someone to everyone.

Bx: x is big
Hx: x is a home
Ox: x is an office
Px: x is a person
Dxyz: x drives from y to z
51. Some people drive from an office to a home.
52. Some people do not drive from an office to a home.
53. Some people drive from a home to an office.
54. No one drives from an office to a home.
55. Someone drives from a big home to all offices.
56. Someone drives from an office to all big homes.
57. A big person drives from a home to an office.

58. No one drives from a big home to an office that is not big.
59. Everyone who drives from a home to an office drives from the office back home.
60. If you don’t drive from some home to any office, then you don’t drive from some
office to a home.

a: Asimov
j: Jin
Bx: x is a book
Ix: x is intelligent
Px: x is a person
Sx: x is a scholar
Rxy: x reads y
Wxy: x writes y
61. Jin reads all books written by Asimov.
62. Jin is an intelligent person who reads some books by Asimov.
63. If Jin writes intelligent books, then he is a scholar.
64. Some people read all books written by Asimov.
65. Some people read all books written by someone.
66. Some scholars read all intelligent books written by Asimov.
67. No scholar reads any book written by Asimov unless s/he is intelligent.
68. If a scholar writes a book, then all intelligent people read it.
69. No intelligent person reads any book by any scholar.
70. All intelligent people read books written by some scholar.

Cx: x is a child
Ex: x is elderly
Hx: x is a home
Jx: x is a jewel
Px: x is a person
Tx: x is a thief
Txyz: x takes y from z
71. Some thieves take jewels from elderly people.

72. Some children take jewels from thieves.
73. Some thieves take children from homes.
74. Every thief takes something from some home.
75. No thief takes jewels from elderly people.
76. No elderly thief takes children from a home.
77. No children take jewels from anything.
78. Some thieves take jewels from both children and elderly people.
79. No children who are thieves take anything from elderly people.
80. If some thieves take some jewels from some homes, then some thieves take all
jewels from some homes.

b: Judith Butler
d: Simone de Beauvoir
m: Mary Wollstonecraft
Axy: x anticipates y
Rxy: x respects y
81. Mary Wollstonecraft anticipates both Simone de Beauvoir and Judith Butler.
82. Some philosophers respect Butler, but some do not.
83. Butler respects both Wollstonecraft and de Beauvoir but anticipates neither.
84. Any philosopher who anticipates Butler respects de Beauvoir.
85. No philosopher anticipates either de Beauvoir or Wollstonecraft.
86. All philosophers respect Wollstonecraft, but some philosophers also anticipate
Butler.
87. Any philosopher who anticipates de Beauvoir also respects her.
88. Any philosopher who does not respect Butler doesn’t respect Wollstonecraft.
89. A philosopher respects de Beauvoir if, and only if, she respects herself.
90. If some philosopher anticipates either Wollstonecraft or de Beauvoir, then no
philosopher does not respect both de Beauvoir and Butler.

a: Aristotle
c: that forms are causes
p: Plato
s: that forms are in a separate world
Px: x is a person
Bxy: x believes y
Dxy: x denies y
91. Plato believes that forms are causes, and in a separate world, but Aristotle be-
lieves neither.
92. Plato believes something that Aristotle denies.
93. Aristotle believes everything that Plato denies.
94. Not only does Aristotle not believe that forms are causes, but he denies that
they are.
95. Plato believes that forms are in a separate world just in case Aristotle denies it.
96. No one believes that forms are causes, even though Plato does not deny it.
97. Aristotle denies either that forms are causes or that they are separate, but not
both.
98. If someone believes that forms are in a separate world, then Plato does.
99. No one denies that forms are separate even though not everyone believes it.
100. If Plato believes nothing that Aristotle believes, then no one believes that forms
are causes.

c: Christina, Queen of Sweden
d: Descartes
e: Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia
Px: x is a person
Cxy: x corresponded with y
Ixy: x influenced y
101. Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia, and Christina, Queen of Sweden, corre-
sponded with Descartes.
102. Elisabeth did not correspond with Christina but did influence her.
103. Everyone who corresponded with Descartes influenced Descartes.

104. No one who corresponded with Descartes was not influenced by him.
105. No one who influenced Descartes corresponded with both Elisabeth and
Christina.
106. If Elisabeth corresponded with Descartes and influenced him, then so did
Christina.
107. Everyone who corresponded with Descartes was influenced by someone who
corresponded with Elisabeth.
108. Everyone who corresponded with Descartes corresponded with each other.
109. Elisabeth did not influence Descartes if, and only if, no one who corresponded
with him influenced him.
110. Someone who was influenced by Elisabeth corresponded with someone who
was influenced by Christina.

b: boastfulness
c: courage
m: mock modesty
t: truthfulness
Cx: x is a characteristic
Ex: x is an extreme
Vx: x is a virtue
Bxyz: y is between x and z
111. Truthfulness is a virtue between the characteristics of boastfulness and mock
modesty.
112. Boastfulness and mock modesty are not virtues, but extremes.
113. No extreme is a virtue, and no virtue is an extreme.
114. Mock modesty is an extreme characteristic, and not between anything.
115. No virtue is between boastfulness and itself.
116. Courage is a virtue, but it is not between boastfulness and mock modesty.
117. Some virtue is between boastfulness and some characteristic.
118. All virtues are between some extremes.
119. If truthfulness is between two extremes, then boastfulness is not a virtue.

120. If mock modesty is a virtue, then anything is between any two characteristics.

Bx: x is British
Cx: x is continental
Ex: x is an empiricist
Rx: x is a rationalist
Rxy: x is read more often than y
Wxy: x wrote more than y
121. Some empiricist wrote more than some rationalist.
122. Some empiricist wrote more than all rationalists.
123. All rationalists wrote more than some empiricists.
124. No rationalist wrote more than some empiricist.
125. Some British empiricists wrote more than all continental rationalists.
126. No continental rationalist wrote more than all British empiricists.
127. Some continental rationalists wrote more than, but are not read more often
than, some British empiricists.
128. All continental rationalists are read more than all British empiricists.
129. A British empiricist is read more than a continental rationalist.
130. If some British empiricist wrote more than all continental rationalists, then
some continental rationalist is read more than all British empiricists.

Ax: x is an act
Gx: x is good
Lx: x is laudable
Px: x is punished
Bxy: x produces better consequences than y
Hxy: x is more heinous than y
131. All good acts are laudable.
132. Some unpunished act is more heinous than any punished act.
133. For any act that is punished, there is some act more heinous.
134. Any act that produces better consequences than some act is laudable.
135. No laudable act is more heinous than all punished acts.
136. For any laudable act, some more heinous act produces better consequences.
137. Some laudable act does not produce better consequences than some act that is
not laudable.
138. Some good acts are punished even though they produce better consequences
than some acts that are not good.
139. No punished act is laudable if it doesn’t produce better consequences than
some good act.
140. If no good acts are punished, then no acts which are not good produce better
consequences than any laudable acts.

Bx: x is a barber
Fx: x has facial hair
Mx: x is a man
Tx: x is in town
Sxy: x shaves y
141. Some men shave themselves.
142. Some men do not shave themselves.
143. All barbers shave some men.
144. A town barber shaves himself.
145. A town barber shaves everyone in town.
146. Some men with facial hair get shaved by a town barber.
147. No men with facial hair get shaved by a town barber.
148. Some barbers are not men and shave some barbers in town.
149. Some men in town are not shaved by any barber.
150. A barber in town shaves all men in town who do not shave themselves.
EXERCISES 5.1b
Use the translation key to translate the formulas into
natural English sentences.1
Ax: x is silver 1. (∀x)[Dx ⊃ (∃y)(Yy ∙ Byx)]

Bxy: x belongs to y
Cx: x is a cloud
Cxy: x keeps company with y 2. (∀x)[(∃y)(Py ∙ Fxy) ⊃ (∀z)(Pz ⊃ Fxz)]
Dx: x is a dog
Ex: x is smoke
Fx: x is fire 3. (∀x)[(Rx ∙ Sx) ⊃ (∀y)(My ⊃ ∼Gxy)]
Fxy: x is fair for y
g: God
Gx: x is glass 4. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Wx) ⊃ (∀y)Uyx]
Gxy: x gathers y
Hx: x is home
Hxy: x helps y 5. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Hxx) ⊃ Hgx]
Ixy: x is in y
Jxy: x is judged by y
Kxy: x is a jack of y 6. (∀x)[Hx ⊃ (∀y)(Q y ⊃ ∼Lyx)]
Lx: x is a lining
Lxy: x is like y
7. (∀x){Cx ⊃ (∃y)[(Ay ∙ Ly) ∙ Byx]}
Mx: x is moss
Mxy: x is master of y
Px: x is a person
8. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∀y)(Cxy ⊃ Jxy)]
Qx: x is a place
Rx: x rolls
Sx: x is a stone 9. (∀x){Qx ⊃ [(∃y)(Ey ∙ Iyx) ⊃ (∃z)(Fz ∙ Izx)]}
Tx: x is a trade
Txy: x should throw y
Ux: x is a house 10. (∀x){[Px ∙ (∀y)(Ty ⊃ Kxy)] ⊃ (∀z)(Tz ⊃ ∼Mxz)}
Uxy: x comes to y
Vxy: x ventures y
Wx: x waits 11. (∀x){{Px ∙ (∃y)[(Gy ∙ Uy) ∙ Ixy]} ⊃ (∀z)(Sz ⊃ ∼Txz)}
Yx: x is a day
12. (∀x){[Px ∙ (∀y)∼Vxy] ⊃ (∀z)∼Gxz}
1
Adapted from I. Copi, Symbolic Logic, 5th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1979), 127–128.
EXERCISE 5.1c, A WRITING ASSIGNMENT

Consider the formalization in F of William Carlos Williams’s
“The Red Wheelbarrow,” example 5.1.46, and this version of
his “This Is Just to Say.”
I have eaten
the plums
that were in
the icebox
and which
you were probably
saving
for breakfast
Forgive me
they were delicious
so sweet
and so cold
(∃x){Px ∙ Dx ∙ Sx ∙ Cx ∙ (∃y)(Iy ∙ Ixy) ∙ ◊Sux ∙ Eix ∙ Fiu}
where: i: me; u: you; Cx: x is cold; Dx: x is delicious; Exy: x eats y; Fxy: x asks
forgiveness from y; Ix: x is an icebox; Ixy: x is in y; Sx: x is sweet; and ◊ is to
be taken (contentiously) as modal operator representing ‘probably’.
What are the virtues and weaknesses of the regimentations?
5.2: SYNTA X, SEMANTICS, AND INVALIDITY IN F

In our last section, we started translating arguments of F. In this section, I’ll lay out
the syntax and semantics of F more carefully.
Moving from M to F requires no change of vocabulary. The formation rules for F
are almost the same, too.
Formation Rules for Wffs of F

F1. A predicate followed by any number of singular terms is a wff.
F2. For any variable β, if α is a wff that does not contain either ‘(∃β)’ or ‘(∀β)’,
F3. If α is a wff, so is ∼α.
5 . 2 : S y nta x , S e m ant i cs , an d In v al i d i t y i n F 3 2 9
F4. If α and β are wffs, then so are:

(α ∙ β)
(α ∨ β)
(α ⊃ β)
(α ≡ β)
F5. These are the only ways to make wffs.
The only difference is to the first rule: predicates may be followed by any number of
singular terms (constants and variables, for now), yielding monadic, dyadic, triadic,
and other polyadic atomic formulas. The change in our formation rules thus multi- A n atomic formula of F
plies the number of predicate letters we have available: twenty-six monadic predicate is an n-placed predicate
followed by n singular
letters, twenty-six dyadic ones, and so on. Despite using the same predicate letter, terms.
‘P’, the predicates at 5.2.1 may be distinguished by counting the number of singular
terms that follow it.
5.2.1 Pa
Pab
Pabc
Pabcd
The semantics of M must also be adjusted to account for relational predicates. Re-
call that there were four steps for providing a standard formal semantics for M.
Step 1. Specify a set to serve as a domain of interpretation, or domain of quan-
tification.
Step 4. U se the customary truth tables for the interpretation of the propositional
operators.
The introduction of relational predicates requires adjustment to step 3. For an inter-
pretation of F, we can also assign sets of ordered n-tuples to each relational predicate.
Let’s take a moment to see the little bit more of set theory you need to understand
‘n-tuple’.
An n-tuple is a set with structure used to describe an n-place relation. ‘N-tuple’ is a An ‘n-tuple’ is a general
general term for pairs, triples, quadruples, and so on. Sets are unordered collections; term for pairs, triples,
quadruples, and so on.
n-tuples are sets in which order matters. The sets {1, 2} and {2, 1} are equivalent,
since all that matters for the constitution of a set is its members. In contrast, the
triple <1, 2, 5> is distinct from the triple <2, 1, 5>, which is distinct from the triple
<5, 2, 1>, even though they all have the same members.
For the semantics of F, a two-place predicate is assigned sets of ordered pairs, a three-
place predicate is assigned sets of three-place relations, and so on. Given a domain of
{1, 2, 3}, the relation ‘Gxy’, which could be understood as meaning ‘is greater than’,
would be standardly interpreted by the set of ordered pairs: {<2,1>, <3,1>, <3, 2>}.
For relational predicates, our definitions of satisfaction and truth must be adjusted
as well. Objects in the domain can satisfy predicates; that remains the case for one-
place predicates. Ordered n-tuples may satisfy relational predicates. A wff will be
satisfiable if there are objects in the domain of quantification that stand in the rela-
tions indicated in the wff. A wff will be true for an interpretation if all objects in the
domain of quantification stand in the relations indicated in the wff. The definition of
logical truth remains the same: a wff is logically true if, and only if, it is true for every
interpretation.
For an example, let’s extend the interpretation we considered when originally dis-
cussing semantics of M, in section 4.7, to the theory TF1.
Theory TF1: 1. Pa ∙ Pb
2. Ib ∙ ∼Ic
3. Nab
4. Nbc
5. (∃x)(Px ∙ Nxb)
6. (∃x)(Px ∙ Nbx)
7. (∀x)[Ix ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Nxy)]
An Interpretation of TF1
Domain: {Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune}
a: Venus
b: Mars
c: Neptune
Px: {Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, Uranus, Neptune}
Ix: {Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars}
Nxy: {<Mercury, Venus>, <Mercury, Earth>, <Mercury, Mars>,
<Mercury, Jupiter>, <Mercury, Saturn>, <Mercury, Uranus>,
<Mercury, Neptune>, <Venus, Earth>, <Venus, Mars>, <Ve-
nus, Jupiter>, <Venus, Saturn>, <Venus, Uranus>, <Venus,
Neptune>, <Earth, Mars>, <Earth, Jupiter>, <Earth, Saturn>,
<Earth, Uranus>, <Earth, Neptune>, <Mars, Jupiter>, <Mars,
Saturn>, <Mars, Uranus>, <Mars, Neptune>, <Jupiter, Saturn>,
<Jupiter, Uranus>, <Jupiter, Neptune>, <Saturn, Uranus>,
<Saturn, Neptune>, <Neptune, Uranus>}
Notice that our interpretation is a model of TF1; all of the statements of the theory
come out true.
Constructing an interpretation of a theory of F can be arduous, especially if the
theory contains lots of relational predicates. I wrote out all of the ordered pairs for
‘Nxy’. But, as you probably observed, I could have just said that I was taking that rela-
tion to be interpreted as ‘x is nearer to the sun than y’, in which case I would have at
least provided a rule that allows us to generate the list if we need it.
For a three-place predicate, we use ordered triples. We can interpret the predicate
‘Bxyz’ as at 5.2.2, with a small domain.
5.2.2 Domain: {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}

Bxyz: {<1, 2, 3>, <1, 2, 4>, <1, 3, 4>, <1, 2, 5>, <1, 3, 5>,
<1, 4, 5>, <2, 3, 4>, <2, 3, 5>, <2, 4, 5>, <3, 4, 5>}
Here, the predicate can be understood as betweenness; “Bxyz” says that y is be-
tween x and z. But the interpretation of the relation is given purely extensionally,
above, by the list of ordered triples.
Invalidity in F
The method of finite domains of section 4.8 can be used in F just as well as it can be
used in M, though the preponderance of overlapping quantifiers in many formulas of
F can make the process more arduous. Let’s work with the invalid argument 5.2.3.
5.2.3 (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Lxy)]
(∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) / (∃x)[Qx ∙ (∃y)Lyx]
The argument is easily expanded into a domain of one object, though there is no
counterexample there.
Pa Qa Laa Pa ⊃ (Pa ∙ Laa) / Pa ∙ Qa // Qa ∙ Laa
To construct a counterexample, we have to make Pa and Qa true in the second

premise. Then we have to make Laa false for the conclusion. But that makes the first
premise false. We’ll have to move to a domain of two objects.
In a two-membered domain, we unpack the second premise just as we did in M. The
first premise and conclusion will take a little more work. I’ll work in stages, as we did
with the overlapping quantifiers of section 4.8, starting with the outer quantifier and
moving to the inner quantifier, showing the process at 5.2.4.
5.2.4 (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Lxy)]
[Pa ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Lay)] ∙ [Pb ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Lby)]
{Pa ⊃ [(Pa ∙ Laa) ∨ (Pb ∙ Lab)]} ∙ {Pb ⊃ [(Pa ∙ Lba) ∨ (Pb ∙ Lbb)]}
In the first step I remove the outside quantifier and replace all the ‘x’s with ‘a’s, con-
joining that formula with the same formula that replaces all the ‘x’s with ‘b’s. Then I
take that long second formula and replace all the existentially quantified subformulas
with disjunctions of the subformula with the ‘y’s replaced by ‘a’s and the subformula
with the ‘y’s replaced by ‘b’s.
The process of expanding the conclusion, at 5.2.5, is parallel, and just a bit simpler.
5.2.5 (∃x)[Qx ∙ (∃y)Lyx]
[Qa ∙ (∃y)Lya] ∨ [Qb ∙ (∃y)Lyb]
[Qa ∙ (Laa ∨ Lba)] ∨ [Qb ∙ (Lab ∨ Lbb)]
We’re ready to construct the counterexample, lining up the premises and a conclu-
sion, after a list of all the atomic formulas. It has taken a little more work to get to the
unquantified expansion, but the work from here is no more difficult than it was in M.
Pa Qa Pb Qb Laa Lab Lba Lbb
{Pa ⊃ [(Pa ∙ Laa) ∨ (Pb ∙ Lab)]} ∙
{Pb ⊃ [(Pa ∙ Lba) ∨ (Pb ∙ Lbb)]}
/ (Pa ∙ Qa) ∨ (Pb ∙ Qb)
// [Qa ∙ (Laa ∨ Lba)] ∨ [Qb ∙ (Lab ∨ Lbb)]
I’ll start with the second premise. One of the disjuncts has to be true, so I’ll arbi-
trarily choose the first one, making Pa and Qa true. Carrying those values into the
conclusion, we see that Laa and Lba must be false. Then, on the left side of the first
premise, we can see that Pb and Lab each must be true.
1 1 1 0 1 0
{Pa ⊃ [(Pa ∙ Laa) ∨ (Pb ∙ Lab)]} ∙
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
{Pb ⊃ [(Pa ∙ Lba) ∨ (Pb ∙ Lbb)]}
1 1 0 1
/ (Pa ∙ Qa) ∨ (Pb ∙ Qb)
1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1
The second premise is done, but we still have to make the right conjunct of the first
premise true and the right disjunct of the conclusion false.
All we need to do to make the first premise true is make Lbb true. Then the disjunc-
tion is true, and so the conditional is also true, finishing our work with the premise.
Only the conclusion remains, and that’s easily completed by making Qb false.
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
{Pa ⊃ [(Pa ∙ Laa) ∨ (Pb ∙ Lab)]} ∙
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
{Pb ⊃ [(Pa ∙ Lba) ∨ (Pb ∙ Lbb)]}
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
/ (Pa ∙ Qa) ∨ (Pb ∙ Qb)
1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
The counterexample is complete.

When expanding formulas into finite domains, it is typical to find some redundancy,
which you can eliminate before constructing a valuation. For example, consider 5.2.6.
5.2.6 (∀x)(∀y)[(Px ∙ Py) ⊃ (Lax ∙ Lay)]
I’ll expand 5.2.6 into a domain of two members, a and b. First, I’ll remove the
outside quantifier, yielding 5.2.7.
5.2.7 (∀y)[(Pa ∙ Py) ⊃ (Laa ∙ Lay)] ∙ (∀y)[(Pb ∙ Py) ⊃ (Lab ∙ Lay)]
So far, so good; no redundancy. Now, let’s remove the remaining quantifier from
each conjunct, yielding 5.2.8.
5.2.8 [(Pa ∙ Pa) ⊃ (Laa ∙ Laa)] ∙ [(Pa ∙ Pb) ⊃ (Laa ∙ Lab)] ∙ [(Pb ∙ Pa) ⊃
(Lab ∙ Laa)] ∙ [(Pb ∙ Pb) ⊃ (Lab ∙ Lab)]
Notice the redundancies. There are two in both the first and last conjuncts, and
the second and third conjuncts are equivalent. It’s prudent to eliminate these before
proceeding, as I do at 5.2.9. Make sure you understand how to convert a statement
like 5.2.8 to one like 5.2.9 before taking on Exercises 5.2b.
5.2.9 (Pa ⊃ Laa) ∙ [(Pa ∙ Pb) ⊃ (Laa ∙ Lab)] ∙ (Pb ⊃ Lab)
Summary
The semantics for F are not much different from the semantics for M, except for the
interpretations of relational predicates by ordered n-tuples. The semantic definitions
of validity and logical truth remain unaltered.
We can also still use our method of finite domains, though its utility is limited. The
expansions of formulas with three or more quantifiers can get unpleasantly long, even
in a two-membered domain, let alone larger domains. But this method can generate
counterexamples reliably for many invalid arguments.
There are other methods for generating counterexamples for invalid arguments of F
and the further extensions of logic in this book. Most notably, truth trees, sometimes
called semantic tableaux, can be both amusing and effective. But we’ll stick with our
work on natural deduction, moving to proof theory for F in the next section.
KEEP IN MIND
In F, predicates may be followed by any number of singular terms.

The same predicate letter may be used as a monadic predicate, dyadic predicate, and any
other polyadic predicate in the same formula.
Relational predicates are interpreted using sets of ordered n-tuples.
A two-place predicate is interpreted by a set of ordered pairs.
A three-place predicate is interpreted by a set of ordered triples.
A four-place predicate is interpreted by a set of ordered quadruples.
And so on.
The method of finite domains can be effective in generating counterexamples in F.
To expand formulas with overlapping quantifiers into finite domains, work in stages, from
the outside quantifier inward.
EXERCISES 5.2a
Construct models for each of the given theories by
specifying a domain of interpretation and interpreting the
constants and predicates so that all sentences of the theory
come out true.
1. 1. Aa ∙ Ab
2. Rab ∙ Rba
3. (∃x)∼Rax ∙ (∃x)∼Rbx
4. (∃x)∼Rxa ∙ (∃x)∼Rxb
2. 1. (Pa ∙ Pb) ∙ Pc
2. Babc ∙ ∼Bcba
3. (∀x)(∃y)(∃z)(Byxz ∨ Bzxy)
3. 1. Pa ∙ ∼Sa
2. Pb ∙ ∼Tb
3. (∃x)(∃y)[(Px ∙ Py) ∙ (Rxy ∙ ∼Ryx)]
4. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Sx ∨ Tx)]
4. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[(Px ∙ Py) ⊃ (∃z)(Rxyz ∨ Ryxz)]

2. (∃x)Px ∙ ∼(∀x)Px
3. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){{[(Rxyz ∨ Rxzy) ∨ (Ryxz ∨ Ryzx)] ∨ (Rzxy ∨ Rzyx)} ⊃
[(Qx ∙ Q y) ∙ Qz]}
5. 1. (Pa ∙ Pb) ∙ Pc
2. Hc
3. Cab ∙ Cde
4. Cba
5. (∃x)(Px ∙ Cxe)
6. (∃x)(Px ∙ Cxm)
7. (∀x)[Hx ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Cyx)]
EXERCISES 5.2b
Show that each of the following arguments is invalid by
generating a counterexample.
1. 1. Aa ∙ Ab
2. Bab ∙ ∼Bba / (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bxa)
2. 1. (∃x)Cax
2. (∃x)Cbx / (∃x)(Cax ∙ Cbx)
3. 1. Da ∙ (∃x)Eax
2. Db ∙ (∃x)Ebx / (∀x)[Dx ∙ (∃y)Exy]
4. 1. (∀x)(Fax ⊃ Gx)
2. (∀x)[Gx ⊃ (∃y)Fyx]
3. Faa / (∀x)(∃y)Fyx
5. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[( Jx ∙ Jy) ⊃ (Kxa ∙ Kya)]
2. Jb / Kba
6. 1. (∀x)[Lx ⊃ (∃y)Mxy]
2. ∼Mab / ∼La
7. 1. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∃y)(Py ∙ Qxy)]
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx) / (∀x)[Rx ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Q yx)]
8. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[(Hx ∙ Hy) ⊃ Ixy]
2. Ha / (∀x)[Hx ⊃ (∀y)Ixy]
9. 1. Da ∙ Eab
2. (∃x)(∃y)(Eyx ∙ Fx) / (∃x)(Dx ∙ Fx)
5 . 3 : Der i v at i ons i n F 3 3 7
10. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∃y)Bxy]

2. (∀x)[(∃y)Byx ⊃ Cx]
3. (∃x)Ax / (∀x)Cx
11. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] ⊃ (∃x)[Px ∙ (∃y)(Sy ∙ Rxy)]
2. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∃y)(Q y ∙ ∼Rxy)] / (∃x)[Px ∙ (∃y)(Sy ∙ ∼Rxy)]
12. 1. (∃x)[Lx ∙ (∀y)(My ⊃ Nxy)]
2. (∃x)[Mx ∙ (∀y)(Ly ⊃ Oxy)] / (∃x)(∃y)(Nxy ∙ Oxy)
13. 1. (∃x)[Lx ∙ (∃y)(My ∙ Nxy)]
2. (∀x)[Lx ⊃ (∃y)(My ∙ Oxy)] / (∃x)(∃y)(Nxy ∙ Oyx)
14. 1. (∃x)(∃y)(Dxy ∙ ∼Dyx)
2. Dab / ∼Dba
15. 1. (∃x)[(∀y)(Dy ⊃ Fyx) ∙ (∀y)(Ey ⊃ Fyx)]
2. (∃x)(Dx ∨ Ex) / (∀x)Fxx
16. 1. (∃x)[(∀y)(Dy ⊃ Fyx) ∨ (∀y)(Ey ⊃ Fyx)]
2. (∀x)(Dx ∨ Ex) / (∃x)Fxx
17. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∀y)(Q yx ≡ Ryx)]
2. (∃x)(∀y)(Q yx ∙ ∼Ryx) / (∀x)∼Px
18. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)Q yx]
2. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∀y)Ryx] / (∃x)[Px ∙ (∃y)(Qxy ∙ Rxy)]
19. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Qx ∙ Rxy)]
2. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∀y)(Sy ⊃ Rxy)] / (∃x)(∃y)(Rxy ∙ Ryx)
20. 1. (∀x)[Gx ⊃ (∃y)(Gy ∙ Ixy)]
2. (∀x)[Hx ⊃ (∃y)(Hy ∙ Ixy)]
3. (∃x)(Gx ∙ Hx) / (∃x)(∃y)(Ixy ∙ Iyx)
5.3: DERIVATIONS IN F
In section 5.1, I motivated extending our language M to a language F by introducing
relational predicates to regiment argument 5.1.1.
5.1.1 Alyssa is taller than Bhavin.
Bhavin is taller than Carlos.
Given any three things, if one is taller than another, and the latter is
taller than the third, then the first is also taller than the third.
So, Alyssa is taller than Carlos.
1. Tab
2. Tbc
To derive the conclusion, we use the same rules of inference we used with M. When
instantiating, we remove quantifiers one at a time, taking care to make appropriate
instantiations to variables or constants. We will need to make only one small
adjustment to the rule UG, which I will note shortly. A derivation of our motivating
argument is below, at 5.3.1. Notice that the removal of quantifiers from the third
premise takes three steps.
5.3.1 1. Tab
2. Tbc
4. (∀y)(∀z)[(Tay ∙ Tyz) ⊃ Taz] 3, UI
5. (∀z)[(Tab ∙ Tbz) ⊃ Taz] 4, UI
6. (Tab ∙ Tbc) ⊃ Tac 5, UI
7. (Tab ∙ Tbc) 1, 2, Conj
8. Tac 6, 7, MP
QED
Sometimes, as in 5.3.1, we start our derivations by removing all quantifiers. Some

times we remove the quantifiers in the middle of the proof, rather than at the beginning,
as in 5.3.2.
5.3.2 1. (∃x)[Hx ∙ (∀y)(Hy ⊃ Lyx)] / (∃x)(Hx ∙ Lxx)
2. Ha ∙ (∀y)(Hy ⊃ Lya) 1, EI
3. Ha 2, Simp
4. (∀y)(Hy ⊃ Lya) ∙ Ha 2, Com
5. (∀y)(Hy ⊃ Lya) 4, Simp
6. Ha ⊃ Laa 5, UI
7. Laa 6, 3, MP
8. Ha ∙ Laa 3, 7, Conj
9. (∃x)(Hx ∙ Lxx) 8, EG
QED
The Restriction on UG
All of our rules for removing and replacing quantifiers work in F just as they did in M,
with only one exception. Consider the problematic 5.3.3, beginning with a proposition
that can be interpreted as ‘Everything loves something’.
5.3.3 1. (∀x)(∃y)Lxy
2. (∃y)Lxy 1, UI
3. Lxa 2, EI
4. (∀x)Lxa 3, UG: but wrong!
5. (∃y)(∀x)Lxy 4, EG
5 . 3 : Der i v at i ons i n F 3 3 9
Given our interpretation of line 1, line 5 reads, ‘There’s something that everything
loves’. It does not follow from the proposition that everything loves something that
there is one thing that everything loves. Imagine that we arranged all the things in
a circle and everyone loved just the thing to its left. Line 1 would be true, but line 5
would be false. We should not be able to derive step 5 from step 1.
We can locate the problem in step 4 of 5.3.3. In line 2 we universally instantiated
to some random object x. So, ‘x’ could have stood for any object. It retains its
universal character, even without a universal quantifier to bind it, and so we are free
to UG over x.
Then, in line 3, we existentially instantiated. In existentially instantiating, we gave
a name, ‘a’ to the thing that bore relation L to it, to the thing that x loves. Once we
gave a name to the thing that x loves, x lost its universal character. It could no longer
be anything that loves something. It now is the thing that loves a. Thus ‘x’ became as
particular an object as ‘a’ is. So, the generalization at line 4 must be blocked. In other
words, variables lose their universal character if they are free when EI is used.
We formulate the resultant restriction on UG as 5.3.4.
5.3.4 Never UG on a variable when there’s a constant present and the
variable was free when the constant was introduced.
A constant may be introduced as the result of EI or UI, and these are the cases you
will have to keep your eye on. Constants may also be introduced in the premises,
though there are ordinarily no free variables in premises, since premises should be
closed formulas. The restriction on UG debars line 4 of 5.3.3 because ‘x’ was free in
line 3 when ‘a’ was introduced.
5.3.5 contains an acceptable use of UG in F.
5.3.5 1. (∃x)(∀y)[(∃z)Ayz ⊃ Ayx]
2. (∀y)(∃z)Ayz / (∃x)(∀y)Ayx
3. (∀y)[(∃z)Ayz ⊃ Aya] 1, EI
4. (∃z)Ayz ⊃ Aya 3, UI
5. (∃z)Ayz 2, UI
6. Aya 4, 5, MP
7. (∀y)Aya 6, UG
8. (∃x)(∀y)Ayx 7, EG
QED
Note that at line 7, UG is acceptable because ‘y’ was not free when ‘a’ was introduced
in line 3. The restriction 5.3.4 applies only to UG. All other rules are just as they are
in monadic predicate logic.
Accidental Binding
When using UG or EG, watch for illicit accidental binding. 5.3.6 contains an instance
of accidental binding.
5.3.6 (Pa ∙ Qa) ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx)

(∃x)[(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx)] EG
The first proposition already contains two instances of the variable ‘x’. If you try
to quantify over the ‘a’ using EG with the variable ‘x’, you illicitly bind the latter two
singular terms with the same quantifier that binds the first two terms. 5.3.7 has an
acceptable inference.
5.3.7 (Pa ∙ Qa) ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx)
(∃y)[(Py ∙ Qy) ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx)]
In 5.3.7, the latter two singular terms, the ‘x’s, remain free. We can bind them with
either a universal quantifier or an existential quantifier, later, as in either of the propo-
sitions at 5.3.8.
5.3.8 (∀x)(∃y)[(Py ∙ Qy) ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx)]
(∃x)(∃y)[(Py ∙ Qy) ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx)]
More Derivations
Derivations in F often involve propositions with overlapping quantifiers. Neverthe-
less, we must adhere to the rules and restrictions we had in M, as well as the new
restriction on UG for F. UI and EG remain anytime-anywhere rules. The restrictions
on EI can be trickier to manage, since quantifiers may be buried inside formulas. Still,
remember always to EI to a new constant. Derivations with more than one existential
quantifier in the premises are likely to need multiple constants, as in 5.3.9, where at
line 4 I EI line 2 to ‘b’ because I had already EIed line 1 to ‘a’.
5.3.9 1. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∀y)(Py ⊃ Qxy)]
2. (∃x)(Px ∙ Sx) / (∃x)[Sx ∙ (∃y)Qyx]
3. Pa ∙ (∀y)(Py ⊃ Qay) 1, EI
4. Pb ∙ Sb 2, EI
5. (∀y)(Py ⊃ Qay) ∙ Pa 3, Com
6. (∀y)(Py ⊃ Qay) 5, Simp
7. Pb ⊃ Qab 6, UI
8. Pb 4, Simp
9. Qab 7, 8, MP
10. (∃y)Qyb 9, EG
11. Sb ∙ Pb 4, Com
12. Sb 11, Simp
13. Sb ∙ (∃y)Qyb 12, 10, Conj
14. (∃x)[Sx ∙ (∃y)Qyx] 13, EG
QED
It remains generally useful to EI before you UI. But sometimes an existential quan-
tifier is buried in a line and we cannot instantiate its subformula until we have the
quantifier as the main operator, as in 5.3.10, which uses conditional proof.
5 . 3 : Der i v at i ons i n F 3 4 1
5.3.10 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∀y)Bxy]

2. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∃y)Dyx] / (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∃y)(Bxy ∙ Dyx)]
3. Ax ACP
4. Ax ⊃ (∀y)Bxy 1, UI
5. Ax ⊃ (∃y)Dyx 2, UI
6. (∀y)Bxy 4, 3, MP
7. (∃y)Dyx 5, 3, MP
8. Dax 7, EI
9. Bxa 6, UI
10. Bxa ∙ Dax 9, 8, Conj
11. (∃y)(Bxy ∙ Dyx) 10, EG
12. Ax ⊃ (∃y)(Bxy ∙ Dyx) 3–11, CP
13. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∃y)(Bxy ∙ Dyx)] 12, UG
QED
We could not instantiate the existential quantifier in line 2 until we instantiated the
leading universal quantifier and used modus ponens to get the existential quantifier
as the main operator at line 7. I thus had to wait to UI the universal formula at line 6
until after line 8.
The methods for indirect proofs in M carry over neatly to F, as at 5.3.11, in which I
make a strategic assumption for IP.
5.3.11 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Ry ∙ Fxy)]
2. (∀x)[Qx ⊃ (∀y)(Ry ⊃ ∼Fxy)] / (∃x)(∼Px ∨ ∼Qx)
3. (∀x)(Px ∙ Qx) AIP
4. Px ∙ Qx 3, UI
5. Px 4, Simp
6. Px ⊃ (∃y)(Ry ∙ Fxy) 1, UI
7. (∃y)(Ry ∙ Fxy) 6, 5, MP
8. Qx ∙ Px 4, Com
9. Qx 8, Simp
10. Qx ⊃ (∀y)(Ry ⊃ ∼Fxy) 2, UI
11. (∀y)(Ry ⊃ ∼Fxy) 10, 9, MP
12. Ra ∙ Fxa 7, EI
13. Ra 12, Simp
14. Ra ⊃ ∼Fxa 11, UI
15. Fxa ∙ Ra 12, Com
16. Fxa 15, Simp
17. ∼Fxa 14, 13, MP
18. Fxa ∙ ∼Fxa 16, 17, Conj
19. ∼(∀x)(Px ∙ Qx) 3–18, IP
20. (∃x)∼(Px ∙ Qx) 19, QE
21. (∃x)(∼Px ∨ ∼Qx) 20, DM
QED
Note that the proof would work just as well, and be one line shorter, had I assumed
‘Px ∙ Qx’ at line 3.
5.3.12 is a more complex derivation using CP and illustrating the importance of

remaining vigilant about the differences between constants and variables in F.
5.3.12 1. (∀x)(Wx ⊃ Xx)
2. (∀x)[(Yx ∙ Xx) ⊃ Zx]
3. (∀x)(∃y)(Yy ∙ Ayx)
4. (∀x)(∀y)[(Ayx ∙ Zy) ⊃ Zx] / (∀x)[(∀y)(Ayx ⊃ Wy) ⊃ Zx]
5. (∀y)(Ayx ⊃ Wy) ACP
6. (∃y)(Yy ∙ Ayx) 3, UI
7. Ya ∙ Aax 6, EI
8. Aax ⊃ Wa 5, UI
9. Aax ∙ Ya 7, Com
10. Aax 9, Simp
11. Wa 8, 10, MP
12. Wa ⊃ Xa 1, UI
13. Xa 12, 11, MP
14. Ya 7, Simp
15. Ya ∙ Xa 14, 13, Conj
16. (Ya ∙ Xa) ⊃ Za 2, UI
17. Za 16, 15, MP
18. (∀y)[(Ayx ∙ Zy) ⊃ Zx] 4, UI
19. (Aax ∙ Za) ⊃ Zx 18, UI
20. Aax ∙ Za 10, 17, Conj
21. Zx 19, 20, MP
22. (∀y)(Ayx ⊃ Wy) ⊃ Zx 5–21, CP
23. (∀x)[(∀y)(Ayx ⊃ Wy) ⊃ Zx] 22, UG
QED
Notice that at line 17, you might be tempted to discharge your assumption and fin-
ish your CP. But you wouldn’t be able to UG over the ‘Za’. We have to UI at line 18,
retaining a variable for the predicate ‘Z’.
Logical Truths
We can use CP and IP to prove logical truths in F. 5.3.13 proves that ‘(∃x)(∀y)Pxy ⊃
(∀x)(∃y)Pyx’ is a logical truth by conditional proof.
5.3.13 1. (∃x)(∀y)Pxy ACP
2. (∀y)Pay 1, EI
3. Pax 2, UI
4. (∃y)Pyx 3, EG
5. (∀x)(∃y)Pyx 4, UG
6. (∃x)(∀y)Pxy ⊃ (∀x)(∃y)Pyx 1–5, CP
QED
Notice that the use of UG at line 5 is legitimate since the constant at line 3 was
bound at line 4; there’s no constant present on the line on which I used UG.
5 . 3 : Der i v at i ons i n F 3 4 3
We can prove that ‘(∃x)∼Pxx ∨ (∀x)(∃y)Pxy’ is a logical truth by indirect proof, as

I do at 5.3.14.
5.3.14 1. ∼[(∃x)∼Pxx ∨ (∀x)(∃y)Pxy] AIP
2. ∼(∃x)∼Pxx ∙ ∼(∀x)(∃y)Pxy 1, DM
3. ∼(∃x)∼Pxx 2, Simp
4. (∀x)Pxx 3, QE
5. ∼(∀x)(∃y)Pxy ∙ ∼(∃x)∼Pxx 2, Com
6. ∼(∀x)(∃y)Pxy 5, Simp
7. (∃x)∼(∃y)Pxy 6, QE
8. (∃x)(∀y)∼Pxy 7, QE
9. (∀y)∼Pay 8, EI
10. ∼Paa 9, UI
11. Paa 4, UI
12. Paa ∙ ∼Paa 11, 10, Conj
13. ∼ ∼[(∃x)∼Pxx ∨ (∀x)(∃y)Pxy] 1–12, IP
14. (∃x)∼Pxx ∨ (∀x)(∃y)Pxy 13, DN
QED
As with all other proofs in F, take your time with the quantifiers. Notice that the
exchange of the consecutive quantifiers from lines 6–8 takes two separate steps. Be
careful also to obey the restrictions on UG, and always EI to a new constant.
Summary
Derivations in F look different from those in M, and they are generally more
complex, but the rules are basically the same. The presence of multiple quantifiers
tends to lengthen any derivation, since instantiation, generalization, and
exchanging quantifiers has to be done one step at a time. Keep track of your
variables and constants, make sure to obey the restrictions on UG and EI, and be
patient. And, of course, practice. It is much better to do a little every day than to
try to do a lot at once.
KEEP IN MIND
All rules for M are the same for F, with one exception, a restriction on UG.
Never UG on a variable when there’s a constant present and the variable was free when the
constant was introduced.
Remove quantifiers from formulas one at a time, and only when they are the main
operators.
Logical truths of F can be derived using conditional or indirect proof, just as for M.
EXERCISES 5.3a
1. 1. Bab
2. (∀x)(Bax ⊃ Ax) / (∃x)Ax
2. 1. Da ∙ (∃x)Eax
2. Db ∙ (∀x)Ebx / (∃x)(Eax ∙ Ebx)
3. 1. Fab
2. (∀x)(Fax ⊃ Gx)
3. (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Fxa) / Fba
4. 1. ∼(∃x)(Hx ∙ Ixa)
2. (∃x)Ixa / (∃x)∼Hx
5. 1. (∀x)[Lx ⊃ (∃y)Mxy]
2. (∀y)∼May / ∼La
6. 1. Aa ∙ (Ba ∙ ∼Cab)
2. (∀y)Cay ∨ (∀z)Dbz / (∃y)(∀z)Dyz
7. 1. (∀x)[(∃y)Bxy ⊃ (Ax ∨ Cx)]
2. (∃z)(∼Az ∙ ∼Cz) / (∃z)(∀y)∼Bzy
8. 1. Db ∙ Eab
2. (∀x)[(∃y)Eyx ⊃ Fx] / (∃x)(Dx ∙ Fx)
9. 1. (∃x)[Nx ∙ (∃y)(Ny ∙ Qxy)]
2. (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Px) / (∃x)[Px ∙ (∃y)(Py ∙ Q yx)]
10. 1. (∃x)[Qx ∨ (∃y)(Ry ∙ Pxy)]
2. ∼(∃x)(Sx ∨ Qx) / (∃z)(∃y)(Ry ∙ Pzy)
11. 1. (∀x)[(∀y)Uxy ⊃ (Tx ∙ Vx)]
2. ∼(∃x)Tx / (∃z)∼Uza
12. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∃y)Bxy]
2. (∀x)[(∃y)Bxy ⊃ (Cx ∨ Dx)]
3. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ∼Cx) / (∃x)(Ax ∙ Dx)
13. 1. (∃x)[Mx ∙ (∃y)(Ny ∙ Lxy)]
2. (∀x)(∀y)[Lxy ⊃ (∃z)Oyz] / (∃x)(∃y)Oxy
14. 1. (∀x)[Ex ∙ (Fx ∨ Gx)]
2. (∃x){Hx ∙ (∀y)[(Fy ∨ Gy) ⊃ Ixy]} / (∃y)(∃x)Ixy
15. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∃y)(Cy ∙ Dxy)]
2. (∀x)(∀y)(Dxy ⊃ By) / (∀x)Ax ⊃ (∃y)(By ∙ Cy)
5 . 3 : Der i v at i ons i n F 3 4 5
16. 1. (∀x)(∀y){Fxy ⊃ [(Gx ∙ Hy) ∨ (∼Gx ∙ ∼Hy)]}

2. Fmb
3. ∼Hb / ∼Gm
17. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)Qxy]
2. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∀y)Rxy] / (∃x)[Px ∙ (∃y)(Qxy ∙ Rxy)]
18. 1. (∃x)[Lx ∙ (∀y)(My ⊃ Nxy)]
2. (∃x)[Mx ∙ (∀y)(Ly ⊃ Oxy)] / (∃x)(∃y)(Nxy ∙ Oyx)
19. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Bxy ∙ Byz) ⊃ Bxz]
2. (∀x)(∀y)(Bxy ⊃ Byc)
3. (∃x)Bax / Bac
20. 1. (∀x)[(Fx ∙ Hx) ⊃ (∀y)(Gy ∙ Ixy)]
2. (∃x)[ Jx ∙ (∀y)(Gy ⊃ ∼Ixy)] / ∼(∀z)(Fz ∙ Hz)
21. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∀y)(Dy ⊃ Byx)]
2. (∃x)[Dx ∙ (∀y)(Bxy ⊃ Cy)] / (∀x)Ax ⊃ (∃y)Cy
22. 1. (∃x)[(∀y)(Hy ⊃ Jyx) ∙ (∀y)(Iy ⊃ Jyx)]
2. (∀x)(Hx ∨ Ix) / (∃x)Jxx
23. 1. (∀x)[Lx ⊃ (∃y)(Ly ∙ Nxy)]
2. (∀x)[Mx ⊃ (∃y)(My ∙ Nxy) / (∃x)(Lx ∙ Mx) ⊃ (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(Nzx ∙ Nzy)
24. 1. (∃x){Px ∙ (∀y)[Oy ⊃ (∀z)(Rz ⊃ Qxyz)]}
2. (∀x)[Px ≡ (Ox ∙ Rx)] / (∃x)Qxxx
25. 1. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ ∼Ox) ⊃ (∃y)Ny
2. (∀y)[Ny ⊃ (∃z)(Pz ∙ Q yz)]
3. ∼(∃x)(Mx ∙ Ox) / (∃x)[Nx ∙ (∃y)Qxy]
26. 1. (∀x)(Kx ≡ Lx) ∙ (∀x)Jx
2. (∀x)[ Jx ⊃ (∃y)(∼Ky ∙ Mxy)] / (∀x)(∃y)(∼Ly ∙ Mxy)
27. 1. (∀x)[Rx ⊃ (∀y)(Ty ⊃ Uxy)]
2. (∀y)[(∀x)(Uxy ⊃ Sy)] / (∀x)[(Rx ∙ Tx) ⊃ (∃y)Sy]
28. 1. (∀x)[Kx ⊃ (∃y)( Jy ∙ Ixy)]
2. (∀x)(∀y)(Ixy ⊃ Lx) / (∀x)(∼Kx ∨ Lx)
29. 1. (∀x)(Fx ≡ Hx)
2. (∀x)(Hx ⊃ ∼Ix)
3. (∃x)[Fx ∙ (∃y)(Iy ∙ ∼Gxy)] / (∃x)[(Fx ∙ ∼Ix) ∙ (∃y)(Iy ∙ ∼Gxy)]
30. 1. (∀x){Ax ⊃ (∃y)[By ∙ (∀z)(∼Cz ∙ Dzxy)]}
2. ∼(∀x)(Ax ⊃ Cx) / (∃x)(∃y)Dxxy
31. 1. (∀x)[Tx ⊃ (∀y)(Vy ⊃ Uxy)]
2. ∼(∃x)(Tx ∙ Sx)
3. Ta ∙ Vb / (∃x)[∼Sx ∙ (∃y)Uxy]
32. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∀y)(Dyx ≡ ∼Byx)]

2. (∃x)(∀x)(Dyx ∙ Byx) / (∃x)∼Ax
33. 1. (∀x)[Fx ⊃ (∃y)(Gy ∙ Hxy)]
2. (∃x)[Fx ∙ (∀y)(Iy ⊃ Hyx)]
3. (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Ix) / (∃x)(∃y)(Hxy ∙ Hyx)
34. 1. (∀x)[(Ox ⊃ Nx) ⊃ (∀y)(Q y ∙ ∼Rxy)]
2. (∀y)(∀x)(Pxy ⊃ Rxy) / (∀x)[(Nx ∨ Ox) ⊃ (∀y) ∼(Q y ⊃ Pxy)]
35. 1. (∀x)[(Bx ⊃ Ax) ⊃ (∃y)(Cy ∙ Dxy)]
2. (∀x)[(∀y)∼Dxy ∨ Ex]
3. (∃x)Ex ⊃ ∼(∃x)Cx / (∀x)Bx
36. 1. (∀x){(Tx ⊃ ∼Sx) ⊃ (∃y)[Uy ∨ (∀z)(Vz ⊃ Wxyz)]}
2. ∼(∃x)(Tx ≡ Sx)
3. ∼(∃x)(Vx ⊃ Ux) / (∃x)(∃y)Wxyy
37. 1. (∀x)[Fx ⊃ (∃y)(Hy ∙ Gxy)]
2. (∀x)[Hx ⊃ (∃y)(Ey ∙ Gxy)]
3. (∀x)[Ex ⊃ (∀y)Fy] / (∀x)Fx ≡ (∃x)Ex
38. 1. (∃x)(∃y)[(Px ∙ Py) ∙ (∀z)(∃w)Fxywz]
2. (∀x)(∀y){(Px ∙ Py) ⊃ [(∃w)(∃z)Fxywz ⊃ Rxy]}
3. (∀x)(∀y)(Rxy ≡ Ryx)
4. (∀x)(∀y){[(Rxy ∙ Ryx) ∙ (Px ∙ Py)] ⊃ (Qx ∙ Q y)} / (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
39. 1. (∀x)[(Dx ∨ Gx) ⊃ (∃y)(Ey ∙ Fxy)]
2. (∀x)[Dx ⊃ (∀y)(Hy ⊃ Fyx)]
3. (∀x)[Gx ⊃ (∀y)(Ey ⊃ Fyx)]
4. (∀y)(∃z)(Hz ∙ ∼Fzy) / (∀x)[(Dx ∨ Gx) ⊃ (∃y)(Fyx ∙ Fxy)]
40. 1. (∀x){ Jx ⊃ (∀y)[My ⊃ (∀z)(Lz ⊃ Kxyz)]}
2. (∃x)(∃y)[Mx ∙ ( Jy ∙ Nxy)]
3. ∼(∀x)(Lx ⊃ Ox) / (∃x){Mx ∙ (∃y)[Nxy ∙ (∃z)(∼Oz ∙ Kyxz)]}
EXERCISES 5.3b
of F using the indicated formulas. Then, derive the
conclusions of the arguments.
1. Some ballet dancers are shorter than some gymnasts. No gymnasts are clumsy.
So, it is not the case that all things are clumsy. (Bx: x is a ballet dancer; Gx: x is
a gymanst; Cx: x is clumsy; Sxy: x is shorter than y)
5 . 3 : Der i v at i ons i n F 3 4 7
2. Anyone who teaches a math class is intelligent. Professor Rosen is a person who
teaches Calculus I. Calculus I is a math class. So, Professor Rosen is intelligent.
(c: Calculus I; r: Professor Rosen; Px: x is a person; Ix: x is intelligent; Mx: x is
a math class; Txy: x teaches y)
3. All cats love all dogs. It is not the case that everything loves Brendan; and all
things are cats. So, it is not the case that everything is a dog. (b: Brendan; Cx:
x is a cat; Dx: x is a dog; Lxy: x loves y)
4. Alice buys a baguette from some store. Baguettes are food. Alice is a resident
of Clinton. So, some residents of Clinton buy some food from some store. (a:
Alice; c: Clinton; Bx: x is a baguette; Fx: x is food; Sx: x is a store; Rxy: x is a
resident of y; Bxyz: x buys y from z)
5. All philosophers have some mentor to whom they respond. Either something
isn’t a philosopher or nothing is a mentor. So, not everything is a philosopher.
(Mx: x is a mentor; Px: x is a philosopher; Rxy: x responds to y)
6. Some students read books written by professors. All books written by profes-
sors are well-researched. So, some professor wrote a well-researched book. (Bx:
x is a book; Px: x is a professor; Sx: x is a student; Wx: x is well-researched; Rxy:
x reads y; Wxy: x wrote y)
7. Sunflowers and roses are plants. Some sunflowers grow taller than all roses.
Russell gave a rose to Emily. So, some plant is taller than some rose. (e: Emily;
r: Russell; Px: x is a plant; Rx: x is a rose; Sx: x is a sunflower; Gxy: x grows taller
than y; Gxyz: x gives y to z)
8. There is something trendier than everything that’s expensive or of good quality.
Anything that’s meaningful or serves a purpose is either expensive, or there’s
something more uninteresting than it. Not everything is expensive or not
meaningful, but everything is of good quality. So, there is something trendier,
and there is something more uninteresting, than something of good quality.
(Ex: x is expensive; Mx: x is meaningful; Px: x serves a purpose; Qx: x is of good
quality; Txy: x is trendier than y; Uxy: x is more uninteresting than y)
9. All philosophers are more skeptical than some physicists. All physicists are sci-
entists. So, all philosophers are more skeptical than some scientists. (Px: x is
a philosopher; Sx: x is a scientists; Yx: x is a physicist; Sxy: x is more skeptical
than y)
10. Some sets include sets. If something includes all sets, then it is not a set. So,
some set does not include some set. (Sx: x is a set; Ixy: x includes y)
11. All philosophers who influenced Mill influenced Quine. Bentham was a politi-
cal theorist and a philosopher who influenced Mill. Any philosopher who influ-
enced Quine was an empiricist. So, Bentham was an empiricist. (b: Bentham;
m: Mill; q: Quine; Ex: x is an empiricist; Px: x is a philosopher; Tx: x is a politi-
cal theorist; Ixy: x influenced y)
12. Any act with better consequences than some act is more morally required than
it. Pulling the lever in a trolley case is an act with better consequences than the
act of ignoring it. If pulling the lever is more morally required than ignoring it,
then the doctrine of acts and omissions is unsupportable. So, the doctrine of
acts and omissions is unsupportable. (a: the doctrine of acts and omissions; i:
ignoring the lever in a trolley case; p: pulling the lever in a trolley case; Ax: x
is an act; Sx: x is supportable; Cxy: x has better consequences than y; Mxy: x is
more morally required than y)
13. Any characteristic that is between extremes is a virtue. Cowardice and rash-
ness are vices. Every vice is an extreme. Courage is a characteristic between
cowardice and rashness. So, courage is a virtue. (c: courage; f: cowardice; r:
rashness; Cx: x is a characteristic; Ex: x is an extreme; Gx: x is a virtue; Vx: x is
a vice; Bxyz: y is between x and z)
14. All virtues are between some extremes. Any characteristic between any two
things is not an extreme. Any characteristic that is not extreme has some ben-
efit. Temperance is a characteristic that is a virtue. So, temperance has some
benefit. (t: temperance; Cx: x is a characteristic; Ex: x is an extreme; Vx: x is a
virtue; Bxy: x is a benefit of y; Bxyz: y is between x and z)
15. Philosophers who are read more widely than other philosophers have greater
influence than them. No philosopher has greater influence than the philoso-
pher Plato. So, no philosopher is read more widely than Plato. (p: Plato; Px: x
is a philosopher; Ixy: x has greater influence than y; Rxy: x is read more widely
than y)
16. Given any three works of philosophy, if the first has greater influence than the
second, and the second has greater influence than the third, then the first has
greater influence than the third. Gorgias, Republic, and Laws are all dialogues
written by Plato. Everything written by Plato is a work of philosophy. Gorgias
has more influence than Laws, but Republic has more influence than Gorgias. So,
Republic has greater influence than Laws. (g: Gorgias; l: Laws; p: Plato; r: Repub-
lic; Dx: x is a dialogue; Wx: x is a work of philosophy; Ixy: x has greater influence
than y; Wxy: x wrote y)
EXERCISES 5.3c
Derive the following logical truths of F.
1. (∀x)(∀y)Axy ⊃ (∃x)(∃y)Axy
2. (∃x)(∀y)Dyx ⊃ (∃x)Dxx
5 . 3 : Der i v at i ons i n F 3 4 9
3. (∀x)Fmxn ⊃ (∃x)(∃y)Fxoy
4. (∀x)(∃y)(Gxy ∨ ∼Gxx)
5. (∃x)Exx ⊃ (∃x)(∃y)Exy
6. (∃x)∼Bxa ∨ (∃x)Bbx
7. (∃x)(∀y)Cxy ⊃ (∀y)(∃x)Cxy
8. (∀x)(∃y)Hxy ⊃ (∃x)(∃y)Hxy
9. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] ⊃ {(∃x)Px ⊃ (∃x)(∃y)[(Px ∙ Q y) ∙ Rxy]}
10. (∃x)(∀y)( Jxy ∙ ∼Jyx) ∨ (∀x)(∃y)(Jxy ⊃ Jyx)
11. (∃x)(∀y)(Kxy ∨ Kyx) ⊃ (∃x)[(∃y)∼Kxy ⊃ (∃y)Kyx]
12. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)Qxy] ⊃ [(∀x)(∀y)∼Qxy ⊃ ∼(∃x)Px]
13. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] ⊃ (∃x)[Qx ∙ (∃y)(Py ∙ Ryx)]
14. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∀y)Qxy] ≡ (∀x)(∀y)(Py ⊃ Q yx)
15. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] ∨ (∃x)(∀y)[Px ∙ ∼(Q y ∙ Rxy)]
EXERCISES 5.3d
For each argument, determine whether it is valid or invalid.
If it is valid, derive the conclusion using our rules of
inference and equivalence. If it is invalid, provide a
counterexample.
1. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(Bxy ≡ Byx)
2. Bab ∙ Bbc / Bac
2. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(Pxy ≡ ∼Pyx)
2. ∼(∃x)Pxa / (∃x)Pax
3. 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qxi)
2. (∃x)(Qix ∙ Px)
3. Pa / Qia
4. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∃z)(Bxzy ≡ Byzx)
2. Babc / Bcba
5. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Qxy)]
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ ∼Rx) / (∀x)[Rx ⊃ (∀y)(Ry ⊃ ∼Qxy)]
6. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Rxy)]
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) / (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)]
7. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)Qxy]
2. (∃x)∼Qax / (∃x)∼Px
8. 1. (∀x)[Ux ⊃ (∃y)(Ty ∙ Vxy)]
2. (∃x)Vax ⊃ (∀x)Vax
3. Ua / (∃x)(∀y)Vxy
9. 1. (∃x)(∃y)[(Px ∙ Py) ∙ Rxy]
2. (∃x)(∃y)[(Px ∙ Py) ∙ Qxy] / (∃x)(∃y)(Qxy ∙ Rxy)
10. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(Pxy ⊃ Pyx)
2. (∃x)[Qx ∙ (∀y)Pxy] / (∃x)[Qx ∙ (∀y)Pyx]
11. 1. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ Rxx]
2. (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Rxx)
3. (∀x)[Qx ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Rxy)] / (∃x)(∃y)(Rxy ∙ ∼Rxx)
12. 1. (∀x)[(∃y)Pxy ⊃ (∃y)Qxy]
2. (∃x)(∀y)∼Qxy / (∃x)(∀y)∼Pxy
13. 1. (∀x)[(∃y)Pxy ⊃ (∃y)Qxy]
2. (∃x)(∃y)∼Qxy / (∃x)(∃y)∼Pxy
14. 1. (∃x)(∀y)[(Fx ∙ Dx) ∨ (Ey ⊃ Gxy)]
2. (∀x)[(∃y)Gxy ⊃ (∃z)Hxz]
3. ∼(∃x)Fx ∙ (∀z)Ez / (∃y)(∃z)Hyz
15. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(Pxy ⊃ Pyx)
2. Pab ∙ Pbc / Pac
16. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Pxy ∙ Pyz) ⊃ Pxz]
2. Pab ∙ ∼Pac / Pbc
17. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Pxy ∙ Pyz) ⊃ Pxz]
2. Pab ∙ Pba / (∃x)Pxx
18. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Pxy ∙ Pyz) ⊃ Pxz]
2. (∀x)Pxx
3. Pac ∙ ∼Pba / ∼Pcb
19. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(Bxzy ≡ ∼Byzx)
2. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){[(Px ∙ Py) ∙ Pz] ⊃ Bxyz}
3. Pa ∙ Pb
4. Babc / ∼Pc
20. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(Pxy ⊃ Pyx)
2. (∀x)[Qx ⊃ (∃y)(Sy ∙ Rxy)]
3. (∀x)(Sx ⊃ Qx)
4. Qa ∙ Pba / (∃x)(Qx ∙ Pxb) ∙ (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rax)
5 . 4 : T h e I d ent i t y P re d i cate : T ranslat i on 3 5 1
5.4: THE IDENTITY PREDICATE: TRANSLATION

We’ve come to the last major topic in the formal work of this book. In this section
and the next, we will explore an extension to the system of inference we have adopted
for our language F. This extension concerns a special two-place relation, identity. In
translation, identity allows us to use F to express a wide range of concepts including
some fundamental mathematical concepts. In the next section, we will add some
simple derivation rules governing the identity predicate.
There is some debate about whether identity is strictly a logical relation. I start by
explaining that debate, and then proceed, in the remainder of this section, to show
how to use identity in translation.
Introducing Identity Theory

Some claims, like 5.4.1, are paradigmatically logical.
5.4.1 If P, then P. P⊃P
Other claims, like 5.4.2, are paradigmatically nonlogical.
5.4.2 It snows in winter in Quebec.
Still other claims fall somewhere in between. 5.4.3 is generally not considered a
logical truth, even though it has something of the feel of a logical truth.
5.4.3 All bachelors are unmarried.
Philosophers generally characterize the truth of 5.4.3 as semantic, rather than
logical, though not in the sense of ‘semantic’ that we have been using in this book.
‘Semantics’ in logic refers to interpretations of logical vocabulary. Semantics more
broadly is the study of meanings. That bachelors are not married is not a logical en-
tailment. It follows from the meaning of the word ‘bachelor’ that ‘unmarried’ follows
from (most uses of ) it, not the logic of our language.
The line between logical and nonlogical claims is not always clear. Other predicates
have logical properties: ‘taller than’ is transitive and anti-reflexive, and ‘is married to’
is symmetric. But we don’t assume those logical properties as part of a logical system;
we just add them as axioms or premises when using the terms.
Still, entailments surrounding identity, like the inference at 5.4.4, are so thin and
uncontroversial that they are generally considered logical.
5.4.4 1. Superman can fly.
2. Superman is Clark Kent.
So, Clark Kent can fly.
If we write the second premise as ‘Isc’, as at 5.4.5, the conclusion of the argument
does not follow in our inferential system.
5.4.5 1. Fs
2. Isc / Fc
So, we introduce derivation rules that govern inferences like this one and give
identity its own symbol, ‘=’.
Syntax and Rules for Identity Statements

Identity sentences, like those at 5.4.6, look a little different from others with dyadic
relations.
5.4.6 Clark Kent is Superman. c=s
Mary Ann Evans is George Eliot. m=g
We need not extend our language F by introducing the identity predicate. We only
set aside a particular two-place predicate. But, for convenience, we add a new short-
hand (=) for it. We need no new formation rules, though we should clarify how the
shorthand works. Formulas like ‘a=b’ are really short for ‘Iab’, taking ‘Ixy’ as the
identity relation. Just as we do not put brackets around ‘Iab,’ we do not punctuate
‘a=b’. As far as the logical language is concerned, identities are just special kinds of
two-place relations.
Negations of identity claims, strictly speaking, are written just like the negations of
any other two-place relation, with a tilde in front, though there is another shorthand
(≠). Both ways of writing negations are displayed at 5.4.7.
5.4.7 ∼a=b
a≠b
Remember that negation applies to the identity predicate, and not to the objects
related by that predicate. We cannot negate names. The statements at 5.4.7 say that it
is not the case that the objects named by ‘a’ and ‘b’ are identical.
By adopting new derivation rules governing uses of the identity predicate, we intro-
duce a new deductive system using the same language F. There are three rules, based
on three principles surrounding identity: that every object is identical to itself; that
identity is symmetrical (if one thing is identical to another, then the second is also
identical to the first); and a claim, called Leibniz’s law, that identical objects share all
properties. Perhaps more clearly, this latter property of identity is just that any object
with two different names has all the same characteristics whether we call it by one
name or another. We’ll see the inference rules based on these three principles in the
next section. For the rest of this section, we focus on translation.
Translation
The identity predicate allows us to reveal inferential structure for a wide variety of
propositions, making it extraordinarily powerful. It allows us to express propositions
with ‘only’ and ‘except’; superlatives; and ‘at least’, ‘at most’, and ‘exactly’; and to man-
age a problem with names and definite descriptions.
To start, note that, as a convention for the rest of the chapter, I will drop the
requirement on wffs that series of conjunctions and series of disjunctions have
brackets for every two conjuncts or disjuncts. Propositions using identity can
become long and complex. To reduce the amount of punctuation in our formulas,
given that commutativity and association hold for both conjunction and disjunction,
we allow such series, even if they have many terms, to be collected with one set of
brackets.
Thus, 5.4.8 can be written as 5.4.9, and 5.4.10 can be written as 5.4.11.
5.4.8 (∃x)(∃y){(Ax ∙ Bxj) ∙ [(Ay ∙ Iyj) ∙ x≠y)]}
5.4.9 (∃x)(∃y)(Ax ∙ Bxj ∙ Ay ∙ Iyj ∙ x≠y)
5.4.10 (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(∀w){[(Px ∙ Py) ∙ (Pz ∙ Pw)] ⊃ {[(x=y ∨ x=z) ∨
(x=w ∨ y=z)] ∨ (y=w ∨ z=w)}}
5.4.11 (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(∀w)[(Px ∙ Py ∙ Pz ∙ Pw) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ x=w ∨ y=z
∨ y=w ∨ z=w)]
SIMPLE IDENTIT Y CLAIMS

As we have seen, simple identity claims are easily written, as in 5.4.6. Ordinarily, we
think of such claims as holding between two names of a single object.
EXCEPT AND ONLY

Statements using terms like ‘except’ and ‘only’ can be regimented usefully using iden-
tity. To say that Julio loves only Maria, we add to the claim that Julio loves Maria,
5.4.12, the claim that anyone Julio loves is Maria, as at 5.4.13.
5.4.12 Julio loves Maria. Ljm
5.4.13 Julio loves only Maria. Ljm ∙ (∀x)(Ljx ⊃ x=m)
To say that only Julio loves Maria, we add to 5.4.12 the claim that anyone who loves
Maria is Julio.
5.4.14 Only Julio loves Maria. Ljm ∙ (∀x)(Lxm ⊃ x=j)
Notice that each ‘only’ statement contains two parts. ‘Julio loves only Maria’
means both that Julio loves Maria and Maria is the only love of Julio. ‘Only Julio
loves Maria’ means again that Julio loves Maria, but this time also that he is the only
lover of Maria.
These two clauses are present in all ‘only’ sentences, as in the further examples
5.4.15 and 5.4.16. Note that the negation in 5.4.16 is present in both clauses, and that
we need two leading clauses for 5.4.17.
5.4.15 Nietzsche respects only Spinoza.
Rns ∙ (∀x)(Rnx ⊃ x=s)
5.4.16 Only Nietzsche doesn’t like Nietzsche.
∼Lnn ∙ (∀x)(∼Lxn ⊃ x=n)
5.4.17 Only Kant is read more widely than Descartes and Hume.
Mkd ∙ Mkh ∙ (∀x)[(Mxd ∨ Mxh) ⊃ x=k]
‘Only’ sentences can be even more complex, as at 5.4.18, in which both clauses con-
tain quantification.
5.4.18
Only Locke plays billiards with some rationalist who is read more
widely than Descartes.
(Rx: x is a rationalist; Mxy: x is read more widely than y;
Pxy: x plays billiards with y)
(∃x){(Rx ∙ Mxd ∙ Plx) ∙ (∀y)[(Ry ∙ Myd) ⊃ (∀z)(Pzy ⊃ z=l)]}
Sentences with ‘except’ also contain universal claims and a preceding clause. As
usual, universal claims have a conditional as the main propositional operator in their
scope. But identity shows up in the consequent of the conditional for ‘only’ claims,
while it shows up in the antecedent in ‘except’ claims, allowing us to omit the desired
exception, as in 5.4.19.
5.4.19 Everyone except Julio loves Maria.
∼Ljm ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠j) ⊃ Lxm]
Ordinarily, when we use ‘except’, not only do we exempt one individual from a uni-
versal claim, we also deny that whatever we are ascribing to everyone else holds of
the exemption. Julio doesn’t love Maria, and every other person does. As with ‘only’
sentences, these denials are extra clauses that I put at the beginning.
5.4.20 and 5.4.21 have slightly more complex preceding clauses; you can see the
role of negation in the latter.
5.4.20 Every philosopher except Berkeley respects Locke.
Pb ∙ ∼Rbl ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠b) ⊃ Rxl]
5.4.21 Nietzsche does not respect any philosopher except Spinoza.

Ps ∙ Rns ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠s) ⊃ ∼Rnx]
The exception clause added to the antecedent of the conditional following the uni-
versal quantifier can also be longer, as when we except more than one thing, as at
5.4.22.
5.4.22 Some philosopher respects all philosophers except Plato and Aristotle.
Pp ∙ Pa ∙ (∃x){Px ∙ ~Rxp ∙ ~Rxa ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ y≠p ∙ y≠a) ⊃ Rxy]}
Some uses of ‘but’ work just like ordinary uses of ‘except’, as at 5.4.23, which also
has a quantified preceding clause.
5.4.23
Every philosopher but Socrates wrote a book.
(Bx: x is a book; Px: x is a philosopher; Wxy: x wrote y)
Ps ∙ ∼(∃x)(Bx ∙ Wsx) ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠s) ⊃ (∃y)(By ∙ Wxy)]
Socrates is a philosopher, and there is no book that he wrote, but for all philosophers
except Socrates, there is a book that they wrote. Of course, 5.4.23 is false, though
that’s no barrier to writing it.
SUPERLATIVES
Relational predicates allow us to express comparisons: larger than, smaller than, older
than, funnier than, and so on. The identity predicate allows us to express superlatives.
We have a comparison at 5.4.24 where ‘Ix’ stands for ‘x is an impressionist’ and ‘Bxy’
stands for ‘x is a better impressionist than y’.
5.4.24 Degas is a better impressionist than Monet. Id ∙ Im ∙ Bdm
We don’t really need the ‘Ix’ clauses for 5.4.24, and we don’t need identity. But what
if you want to say that Degas is the best impressionist, or to say that you are the nicest
person? If you are nicer than anyone, then you are nicer than yourself, which is impos-
sible. We really need to say ‘nicer than anyone else’, ‘nicer than anyone except oneself ’.
We thus add a universal quantifier with an identity clause to except the single, reflex-
ive case: better (or more profound or nicer or whatever) than anyone else, as at 5.4.25.
5.4.25 Degas is the best impressionist. Id ∙ (∀x)[(Ix ∙ x≠d) ⊃ Bdx]
Notice that we do need the ‘Ix’ clauses here: Degas is an impressionist, and no mat-
ter what other impressionist you pick, he’s a better impressionist.
5.4.26 is another standard superlative sentence. 5.4.27 adds a negation, which leads
to two equivalent propositions (given QE).
5.4.26
Hume is the biggest philosopher.
(h: Hume; Px: x is a philosopher; Bxy: x is bigger than y)
Ph ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠h) ⊃ Bhx]
5.4.27
Hume is not the most difficult empiricist to read.
(h: Hume; Ex: x is an empiricist; Dxy: x is more difficult to
read than y)
Eh ∙ ∼(∀x)[(Ex ∙ x≠h) ⊃ Dhx]
Eh ∙ (∃x)[(Ex ∙ x≠h) ∙ ∼Dhx]
5.4.28 just complicates the sentence slightly, and 5.4.29 a bit more.
5.4.28
The Ethics is the most difficult book by Spinoza to read.
(e: The Ethics; Bx: x is a book; Wxy: x wrote y; Dxy:
x is more difficult to read than y)
Be ∙ Wse ∙ (∀x)[(Bx ∙ Wsx ∙ x≠e) ⊃ Dex]
5.4.29 Either The Critique of Pure Reason or The Ethics is the most difficult
book to read.
(c: The Critique of Pure Reason; e: The Ethics;
Bx: x is a book; Dxy: x is more difficult to read than y)
Bc ∙ Be ∙ (∀x)[(Bx ∙ x≠c ∙ x≠e) ⊃ (Dcx ∨ Dex)]
The last few uses of identity that I will discuss are especially philosophically inter-
esting. The next few (‘at least’, ‘at most’, and ‘exactly’) concern how much mathemat-
ics can be developed using just logic. The latter (‘definite descriptions’) concerns a
puzzle in the philosophy of language, often called the problem of empty reference.
AT LEAST AND AT MOST

Frege’s development of formal logic was intricately linked to his logicist project of
trying to show that mathematics is just logic in complex form. Frege’s logicism, as he
developed it, was a failure; he used an inconsistent logic. Subsequent logicist (or neo-
logicist) projects rely on substantial set-theoretic principles that many philosophers
believe are not strictly logical. Normally, we extend logical systems to mathematical
ones by including one more element to the language, ‘∈’, standing for set inclusion,
and axioms governing set theory. Mathematics is uncontroversially definable in
terms of logic plus set theory.
Part of the contemporary neo-logicist project is to see just how little set theory we
need to add to logic in order to develop mathematics. It is edifying to see, then, how
much mathematics can be generated by the logical machinery of just F, using the
identity predicate. For example, we can express many adjectival uses of numbers in
F. We have already seen how to say that there is at least one of something; that’s just
using the existential quantifier. To say that there is exactly one of something, we can
use ‘only’ as in 5.4.30.
5.4.30 There is only one aardvark. (∃x)[Ax ∙ (∀y)(Ay ⊃ x=y)]
So, we have already seen how to translate sentences including ‘exactly one’ clauses.
To regiment ‘exactly’ sentences for larger numbers, to say that there are exactly n of
some object, for any n we need just a little more machinery, combining at-least sen-
tences with at-most clauses.
Let’s start with the at-least sentences, 5.4.31–5.4.34. Notice that there is a natural
procedure for translating ‘at least’ for any number. You use as many quantifiers as the
number you are trying to represent. The identity predicate is used to make sure that
each of the quantifiers refers to a distinct individual.
5.4.31 There is at least one aardvark.
(∃x)Ax
5.4.32 There are at least two aardvarks.
(∃x)(∃y)(Ax ∙ Ay ∙ x≠y)
5.4.33 There are at least three aardvarks.
(∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(Ax ∙ Ay ∙ Az ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z)
5.4.34 There are at least four aardvarks.
(∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(∃w)(Ax ∙ Ay ∙ Az ∙ Aw ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ x≠w ∙
y≠z ∙ y≠w ∙ z≠w)
Note that with ‘at least one’, we don’t need an identity clause. With ‘at least two’, we
need one identity clause. ‘At least three’ takes three clauses, and ‘at least four’ takes
six. We won’t do ‘at least’ for numbers greater than four, but if you’re looking for a
formula, I’ll put it in the Keep in Minds at the end of the section.
The identity clauses at the end become increasingly long as the number we are ex-
pressing increases, but the algorithm is simple: just make sure to include one clause
for each pair of variables.
5.4.35–5.4.39 contain relational predicates as well as ‘at least’. The increasing

complexity just follows the pattern.
5.4.35
At least one materialist respects Berkeley.
(b: Berkeley; Mx: x is a materialist; Rxy: x respects y)
(∃x)(Mx ∙ Rxb)
5.4.36 At least two materialists respect Berkeley.
(∃x)(∃y)(Mx ∙ Rxb ∙ My ∙ Ryb ∙ x≠y)
5.4.37 There are at least three materialists who respect Berkeley.
(∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(Mx ∙ Rxb ∙ My ∙ Ryb ∙ Mz ∙ Rzb ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z)
5.4.38
At least two idealist philosophers respect each other.
(Ix: x is an idealist; Px: x is a philosopher; Rxy: x respects y)
(∃x)(∃y)(Ix ∙ Px ∙ Iy ∙ Py ∙ Rxy ∙ Ryx ∙ x≠y)
5.4.39 At least three idealist philosophers respect each other.
(∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(Ix ∙ Px ∙ Iy ∙ Py ∙ Iz ∙ Pz ∙ Rxy ∙ Ryx ∙ Rxz ∙ Rzx ∙
Ryz ∙ Rzy ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z)
The pairs of ‘respect’ clauses in 5.4.39 follow a pattern similar to that for the identity
clauses.
5.4.40 requires a fourth quantifier to take care of ‘some book written by Descartes’.
5.4.40
At least three coherentists respect some book written by Descartes.
(d: Descartes; Bx: x is a book; Cx: x is a coherentist;
Wxy: x wrote y; Rxy: x respects y)
(∃x)(∃y)(∃z){Cx ∙ Cy ∙ Cz ∙ (∃w)[(Bw ∙ Wdw) ∙ Rxw] ∙ (∃w)[(Bw ∙
Wdw) ∙ Ryw] ∙ (∃w)[(Bw ∙ Wdw) ∙ Rzw] ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z}
Notice that we can use the same quantifier, (∃w), repeatedly: there is some book
written by Descartes that x respects, and one that y respects, and one that z respects.
We need all three clauses in case x, y, and z respect different books. Let’s move on to
‘at most’ sentences.
At-most clauses use universal quantifiers. The core idea is that to say that one has
at most n of something, we say that if we think we have one more than n of it, there
must be some redundancy. Again, the complexity increases in a predictable way, as at
5.4.41–5.4.43.
5.4.41
There is at most one aardvark.
(Ax: x is an aardvark)
(∀x)(∀y)[(Ax ∙ Ay) ⊃ x=y]
5.4.42 There are at most two aardvarks.
(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Ax ∙ Ay ∙ Az) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
5.4.43 There are at most three aardvarks.
(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(∀w)[(Ax ∙ Ay ∙ Az ∙ Aw) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ x=w ∨ y=z
∨ y=w ∨ z=w)]
As with at-least sentences, we have identity clauses at the end. For at-most sen-
tences, though, the identity clauses are affirmative and we disjoin them. Again, make
sure to have one clause for each pair of variables. The complexity of relational predi-
cates and quantified subformulas, which we see in 5.4.44–5.4.49, does not change the
‘at most’ pattern.
5.4.44
Nietzsche respects at most one philosopher.
(n: Nietzsche; Px: x is a philosopher; Rxy: x respects y)
(∀x)(∀y)[(Px ∙ Rnx ∙ Py ∙ Rny) ⊃ x=y]
5.4.45 Nietzsche respects at most two philosophers.
(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Px ∙ Rnx ∙ Py ∙ Rny ∙ Pz ∙ Rnz) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
5.4.46 Nietzsche respects at most three philosophers.
(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(∀w)[(Px ∙ Rnx ∙ Py ∙ Rny ∙ Pz ∙ Rnz ∙ Pw ∙ Rnw) ⊃
(x=y ∨ x=z ∨ x=w ∨ y=z ∨ y=w ∨ z=w)]
5.4.47
Kant likes at most two empiricists better than Hume.
(h: Hume; k: Kant; Ex: x is an empiricist; Lxyz: x likes y better
than z)
(∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Ex ∙ Lkxh ∙ Ey ∙ Lkyh ∙ Ez ∙ Lkzh) ⊃
(x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
5.4.48
At most one idealist plays billiards with some rationalist.
(Ix: x is an idealist; Rx: x is a rationalist; Pxy: x plays
billiards with y)
(∀x)(∀y){Ix ∙ (∃z)(Rz ∙ Pxz) ∙ Iy ∙ (∃z)(Rz ∙ Pyz)] ⊃ x=y}
5.4.49
At most two rationalists wrote a book more widely read than every
book written by Hume.
(h: Hume; Bx: x is a book; Rx: x is a rationalist; Wxy: x wrote y;
Mxy x is read more widely than y)
(∀x)(∀y)(∀z){{Rx ∙ (∃w)[Bw ∙ Wxw ∙ (∀v)[(Bv ∙ Whv) ⊃ Mwv]] ∙
Ry ∙ (∃w)[Bw ∙ Wyw ∙ (∀v)[(Bv ∙ Whv) ⊃ Mwv]] ∙ Rz ∙ (∃w)[Bw ∙
Wzw ∙ (∀v)[(Bv ∙ Whv) ⊃ Mwv]]} ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)}
EX ACTLY
To express “exactly,” we combine the at-least and at-most clauses. 5.4.30 says that
there is exactly one aardvark. The first portion says that there is at least one. The sec-
ond portion, starting with the universal quantifier, expresses the redundancy that fol-
lows from supposing that there are two aardvarks. We still need n+1 quantifiers in an
‘exactly’ sentence. The first n quantifiers are existential. Then we add the one further
universal quantifier.
The identity clauses at the end of the at-most portion of the proposition hold be-
tween only the variable bound by the universal quantifier and the other variables, not
among the existentially bound variables: there are n things that have such and such a
property; if you think that you have another one, an n+1 thing, it must be identical to
one of the first n. As you can see at 5.4.50–5.4.52, the ‘at most’ clause always has just
one universal quantifier.
5.4.50 There are exactly two aardvarks.
(∃x)(∃y){Ax ∙ Ay ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[Az ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
5.4.51 There are exactly three aardvarks.
(∃x)(∃y)(∃z){Ax ∙ Ay ∙ Az ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z ∙
(∀w)[Aw ⊃ (w=x ∨ w=y ∨ w=z)]}
5.4.52 There are exactly four aardvarks.
(∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(∃w){Ax ∙ Ay ∙ Az ∙ Aw ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ x≠w ∙ y≠z ∙
y≠w ∙ z≠w ∙ (∀v)[Av ⊃ (v=x ∨ v=y ∨ v=z ∨ v=w)]}
These numerical sentences get very long very quickly. Indeed, our language of predi-
cate logic, F, cannot express ‘exactly five’ or more, since we have run out of quantifiers.
To abbreviate numerical sentences, logicians sometimes introduce special shorthand
quantifiers like the ones at 5.4.53.
5.4.53 (∃1x), (∃2x), (∃3x) . . .
The quantifiers at 5.4.53 might be taken to indicate that there are at least the num-
ber indicated. To indicate exactly a number, ‘!’ is sometimes used. For exactly one
thing, people sometimes write ‘(∃!x)’. For more things, we can insert the number and
the ‘!’, as at 5.4.54.
5.4.54 (∃1!x), (∃2!x), (∃3!x) . . .
These abbreviations are useful for translation. But once we want to make inferences
using the numbers, we have to unpack their longer forms. We will not extend our lan-
guage F to include more variables, or to include numerals or ‘!’, but it is easy enough
to do so.
5.4.55–5.4.58 contain further ‘exactly’ translations, with the same kinds of compli-
cations we saw above with ‘at least’ and ‘at most’ sentences.
5.4.55 There is exactly one even prime number.
(∃x){(Ex ∙ Px ∙ Nx) ∙ (∀y)[(Ey ∙ Py ∙ Ny) ⊃ y=x]}
5.4.56 There are exactly two chipmunks in the yard.
(∃x)(∃y){Cx ∙ Yx ∙ Cy ∙ Yy ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Cz ∙ Yz) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
5.4.57 There are exactly three aardvarks on the log.
(∃x)(∃y)(∃z){Ax ∙ Lx ∙ Ay ∙ Ly ∙ Az ∙ Lz ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z ∙
(∀w)[(Aw ∙ Lw) ⊃ (w=x ∨ w=y ∨ w=z]}
5.4.58 Exactly three idealists play billiards with some rationalist.
(∃x)(∃y)(∃z){[Ix ∙ (∃w)(Rw ∙ Pxw) ∙ Iy ∙ (∃w)(Rw ∙ Pyw) ∙ Iz ∙
(∃w)(Rw ∙ Pzw) ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z] ∙ (∀v){[Iv ∙ (∃w)(Rw ∙
Pvw)] ⊃ (v=x ∨ v=y ∨ v=z)}}
DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS
Our last use of the identity predicate is in a solution to a problem in the philosophy of
language. The problem can be seen in trying to interpret 5.4.59.
5.4.59 The king of America is bald.
We might regiment 5.4.59 as 5.4.60, taking ‘k’ for ‘the king of America’.
5.4.60 Bk
5.4.60 is false, since there is no king of America. Given our bivalent semantics, then,
5.4.61 should be true since it is the negation of a false statement.
5.4.61 ∼Bk
5.4.61 seems to be a perfectly reasonable regimentation of 5.4.62.
5.4.62 The king of America is not bald.
5.4.62 has the same grammatical form as 5.4.63.
5.4.63 This happy man is not bald.
We take 5.4.63 to be true because the happy man
has a lot of hair. So, 5.4.61 may reasonably be taken
to say that the king of America has hair. But that’s not
something we want to assert as true.
In fact, we want both 5.4.60 and 5.4.61 to be false.
The conjunction of their negations is the contradiction
5.4.64.
5.4.64 ∼Bk ∙ ∼ ∼Bk
And given what we saw about explosion in section 3.5, we certainly don’t want to
assert that! We had better regiment our sentences differently.
Bertrand Russell, facing just this problem, focused on the fact that ‘the king of
A definite description America’ is a definite description that refers to no real thing. Like a name, a definite
picks out an object by description is a way of referring to a specific object. A definite description picks out
using a descriptive phrase
an object by using a descriptive phrase that begins with ‘the’, as in ‘the person who . . .’,
beginning with ‘the’.
or ‘the thing that . . .’.
Both 5.4.59 and 5.4.62 use definite descriptions to refer to an object. They are
both false due to a false presupposition in the description that there exists a king of
America.
Russell’s solution to the problem is to rewrite sentences that use definite
descriptions. Definite descriptions, he says, are disguised complex propositions,
and the grammatical form of sentences that contain definite descriptions are more
complicated than they look. We have to unpack them to reveal their true logical
form. So, according to Russell, 5.4.59, properly understood, consists of three
simpler expressions.
5.4.59A There is a king of America. (∃x)Kx

5.4.59B There is only one king of America. (∀y)(Ky ⊃ y=x)
5.4.59C That thing is bald. Bx
Putting them together, so that every term is within the scope of the original ex
istential quantifier, we get 5.4.65, which Russell claims is the proper analysis of
5.4.59.
5.4.65 (∃x)[Kx ∙ (∀y)(Ky ⊃ y=x) ∙ Bx]
5.4.59 is false because clause A is false. 5.4.62 is also false, for the same reason,
which we can see in its proper regimentation, 5.4.66.
5.4.66 (∃x)[Kx ∙ (∀y)(Ky ⊃ y=x) ∙ ∼Bx]
The tilde in 5.4.66 affects only the third clause. The first clause is the same in 5.4.65
and 5.4.66, and still false. Further, when we conjoin 5.4.65 and 5.4.66, we do not get
a contradiction, as we did in 5.4.64.
5.4.67 (∃x)[Kx ∙ (∀y)(Ky ⊃ y=x) ∙ Bx] ∙ (∃x)[Kx ∙ (∀y)(Ky ⊃ y=x) ∙ ∼Bx]
5.4.67 is no more problematic than 5.4.68.

5.4.68 Some things are purple, and some things are not purple.
(∃x)Px ∙ (∃x)∼Px
There is much more to say about Russell’s theory of definite descriptions. In

particular, Russell’s distinction between grammatical form and logical form is both
enormously influential and deeply contentious. Here, though, let’s put away the
problem of empty reference for definite descriptions and see how Russell’s analysis
guides translation generally.
A definite description starts with ‘the’, rather than ‘a’ or ‘an’, indicating the definite-
ness of the description. Identity allows us to represent that definiteness. We regiment
sentences of the form of 5.4.69 as sentences like 5.4.70; I separated the three clauses
one more time.
5.4.69 The country called a subcontinent is India.
5.4.69A There is a country called a subcontinent.
5.4.69B There is only one such country.
5.4.69C That country is (identical with) India.
5.4.70 (∃x){(Cx ∙ Sx) ∙ (∀y)[(Cy ∙ Sy) ⊃ y=x] ∙ x=i}

Russell’s original example is at 5.4.71.
5.4.71 The author of Waverley was a genius.
(∃x){Wx ∙ (∀y)[Wy ⊃ y=x] ∙ Gx}
Summary
The identity symbol, =, is just an ordinary binary relation between two singular terms.
But the logic of that relation is both simple and powerful in translation, allowing us to
regiment sentences with ‘except’, ‘only’, superlatives, ‘at least’, ‘at most’, ‘exactly’, and
definite descriptions. Each kind of translation follows a standard pattern that can be
learned without too much effort, if you have mastered F.
In our next section, we will construct derivations using the rules governing
identity that I introduced in this section. Take your time to get comfortable with the
translations before moving on to derivations.
KEEP IN MIND
The identity predicate is a two-place relation of singular terms.

Instead of Ixy, we write ‘x=y’.
For negations of identity statements, ∼Ixy, we write ∼x=y or x≠y.
Do not punctuate identity sentences; reserve punctuation for wffs connected by dyadic
propositional operators and for quantifiers.
Identity is reflexive and symmetric.
The identity predicate is especially useful in translating sentences containing
‘only’ and ‘except’; superlatives; ‘at least’, ‘at most’, and ‘exactly’; and definite
descriptions.
Propositions including ‘except’ and ‘only’ have two clauses, one of which is universal.
Identity appears in the consequent of the conditional following the universal quantifier for
‘only’ claims and in the antecedent of that conditional in ‘except’ claims.
For superlatives, use a relational predicate with an identity clause to except the reflexive
case.
For ‘at least n’ statements, use n existential quantifiers.
‘At least’ statements greater than ‘one’ require negative identity clauses to ensure that each
quantifier refers to a distinct thing.
The formula for the number of negative identity clauses in an ‘at least’ statement is
n(n–1)/2.
For ‘at most n’ statements, use n+1 universal quantifiers.
The formula for the number of identity clauses in an ‘at most’ statement is n(n+1)/2.
‘Exactly’ sentences combine ‘at least’ sentences with ‘at most’ sentences.
For ‘exactly n’ objects, use n existential quantifiers and one universal quantifier.
Definite descriptions use ‘the’ and a descriptive phrase to pick out an object; identity is
used to represent the uniqueness of the object that fits the description.
EXERCISES 5.4
Translate into first-order logic, using the identity predicate
where applicable.

b: Bob
e: Emilia
Dx: x attends the conference dinner
Px: x presents original work
Sx: x is a speaker at the conference
1. There are at least two speakers at the conference.
2. Exactly two speakers at the conference present original work.
3. Only Bob and Emilia present original work.
4. All speakers at the conference except Bob attend the conference dinner.
5. Exactly one speaker at the conference presents original work and attends the
conference dinner.
6. The speaker at the conference presents original work.
7. All speakers at the conference that present original work attend the conference
dinner, except Emilia and Bob.
8. If at least three speakers at the conference present original work then some of
those presenting original work do not attend the conference dinner.

e: Zoe
l: Leah
r: Riverdale High
s: Sunnydale University
Hx: x is a high school
Sx: x is a student
Tx: x is in our town
Ux: x is a university
Axy: x attends y
Exy: x enrolls at y
9. At most two students who attend Riverdale High enroll at Sunnydale Uni-
versity.
10. At most three students who attend Riverdale High enroll at Sunnydale
University.
11. All students who attend Riverdale High enroll at Sunnydale, except Leah.
12. All students who enroll in some university attend some high school, except
Zoe and Leah.
13. Exactly three students who attend Riverdale High enroll at Sunnydale Uni-
versity.
14. Only Zoe attends high school without enrolling in some university.
15. The university in our town is Sunnydale.
16. If exactly one student attends Riverdale High and enrolls in Sunnydale Uni-
versity, then Zoe enrolls in a university in our town.

c: Carla
f: Fifi
r: Ravi
Dx: x is a dog
Bxy: x is better trained than y
Txy: x trains y
17. Only Carla trains dogs.
18. Carla only trains dogs.
19. If only Carla trains dogs, then Ravi does not train dogs.
20. Fifi is the best trained dog.
21. Fifi is the best dog that is trained by Carla.
22. Exactly two dogs trained by Carla are better trained than Fifi.
23. At least three dogs trained by Ravi are better trained than some dog trained
by Carla.
24. Every dog trained by Carla is better trained than every dog trained by Ravi,
except Fifi.

c: Canada
f: Fernanda
h: Honora
Hx: x is heavy
Px: x is a person
Wx: x is a worker
Cxy: x carries y
Ixy: x is in y
Lxy: x likes y
Sxy: x is stronger than y
25. At least two workers like Honora.
26. Exactly two workers like Honora.
27. At least three workers are stronger than Fernanda.
28. The strongest worker is Fernanda.
29. Fernanda is the strongest worker in Canada.
30. Only Fernanda carries heavy things.
31. Everyone except Honora likes Fernanda.
32. No one who likes Honora is stronger than Honora, except Fernanda.

g: Grant’s Tomb
j: Jalisa
n: New York City
o: One World Trade Center
Ax: x is an apartment
Bx: x is called the Big Apple
Cx: x is a city
Ex: x is a building
Sx: x is a student
Bxy: x is bigger than y
Fxy: x is from y
Ixy: x is in y
Hxy: x has y
33. The city called the Big Apple is New York.

34. Exactly one city is called the Big Apple.
35. At most two students are from New York.
36. At most one New Yorker has an apartment bigger than Grant’s Tomb.
37. At most two New Yorkers have apartments bigger than Grant’s Tomb.
38. One World Trade Center is bigger than Grant’s Tomb.
39. One World Trade Center is the biggest building in New York City.
40. No student has an apartment bigger than Grant’s Tomb except Jalisa.

c: Chemistry 200
j: Juan
n: Nicola
p: Physics 101
r: Rick
Bx: x is a biology major
Gx: x is a grade
Hxy: x is higher than y
Ixy: x is in y
Rxy: x received y
Txy: x takes y
41. There are at least two biology majors in Physics 101.
42. There are exactly three biology majors in Physics 101.
43. Only Nicola and Rick received a higher grade than Juan.
44. Either Nicola or Rick received the highest grade in Physics 101.
45. Every biology major except Nicola takes Physics 101.
46. The biology major who received the highest grade in Physics 101 takes Chem-
istry 200.
47. The biology major who received the highest grade in Chemistry 200 received
the highest grade in Physics 101.
48. Every biology major who takes Physics 101, except Rick, received a higher
grade in that class than any grade that some biology major received in Chem-
istry 200.

a: Andre
j: Juliana
l: Logic
t: Tarski
Px: x is a paper
Sx: x is a student
Bxy: x is busier than y
Ixy: x is in y
Rxy: x reads y
Wxy: x wrote y
49. Andre is the busiest student in Logic.
50. At least two students in Logic read a paper written by Tarski.
51. At least three students in Logic are busier than Andre.
52. Exactly three students in Logic are busier than Juliana.
53. Every student in Logic reads a paper written by Tarski except Andre.
54. No student in Logic reads all papers by Tarski, except Juliana.
55. At most two papers by Tarski are read by all students in Logic.
56. If only Andre reads all papers by Tarski, then no student in Logic is busier
than Andre.

g: Gödel
p: Principia Mathematica
s: Schmidt
Lx: x is a logician
Bxy: x is a better logician than y
Dxy: x discovered the incompleteness of y
57. At most one logician is better than Gödel.
58. No logician is better than Gödel, except Schmidt.
59. Schmidt is the best logician.
60. Exactly two logicians are better than Gödel.
61. At most two logicians discovered the incompleteness of Principia Mathe
matica—Gödel or Schmidt.
62. Only Schmidt discovered the incompleteness of Principia Mathematica.

63. The logician who discovered the incompleteness of Principia Mathematica
was either Gödel or Schmidt.
64. Schmidt discovered the incompleteness only of Principia Mathematica.

b: Berkeley
d: Descartes
k: Kant
Ax: x is an atomist
Ix: x is an idealist
Mx: x is a materialist
Tx: x is a transcendental idealist
Fxy: x is more famous than y
65. Exactly three materialists are idealists.
66. At most two atomists are not materialists.
67. The most famous idealist is Berkeley.
68. The transcendental idealist is Kant.
69. No materialist except Kant is an idealist.
70. No idealist except Berkeley is more famous than Kant.
71. Only Descartes, among materialists, is not an atomist.
72. At least two materialists are atomists, if, and only if, at least one idealist is a
transcendental idealist.

d: Descartes
h: Hume
s: Spinoza
Cx: x is a compatibilist
Dx: x is a determinist
Fx: x believes in free will
Lx: x is a libertarian
Rx: x believes in moral responsibility
73. At least one determinist believes both in free will and moral responsibility.
74. At least two determinists believe in moral responsibility, but not free will.
75. At most three compatibilists do not believe in moral responsibility.
76. All compatibilists who believe in moral responsibility are determinists, except
Hume.
77. No philosopher is a libertarian except Descartes.
78. The libertarian is Descartes; the determinist is Spinoza; the compatibilist is Hume.
79. The only determinist who does not believe in free will but does believe in moral
responsibility is Spinoza.
80. If exactly one compatibilist believes in free will, then only Hume believes in
moral responsibility.

a: Aristotle
b: Bentham
j: Jones
m: Mill
Cx: x is a consequentialist
Dx: x is a deontologist
Gx: x teaches in the graduate school
Kx: x is a Kantian
Ux: x is a utilitarian
81. At most two deontologists are Kantians.
82. At least two consequentialists who teach in the graduate school are utilitarians.
83. Exactly one philosopher is both a consequentialist and a deontologist.
84. No consequentialist is also a deontologist except Aristotle.
85. The deontologist who teaches in the graduate school is a Kantian.
86. There are at least three consequentialists who teach in the graduate school, but
the only utilitarians are Mill and Bentham.
87. Every philosopher who teaches in the graduate school is either a consequential-
ist or a deontologist, except Jones.
88. No philosophers who teach in the graduate school are Kantians if, and only if,
exactly one philosopher who teaches in the graduate school is a deontologist.
5.5: THE IDENTITY PREDICATE: DERIVATIONS

In this section, we will use three rules governing the identity predicate to construct
derivations using identity. The rules are generally simple to use, but the complexity of
the propositions that identity allows us to express make some proofs quite long. Some
can be intimidatingly complicated. But the core ideas are not particularly difficult, so
patience and persistence can pay off.
Rules Governing Identity

For any singular terms α and β:
IDr (reflexivity) α=α
IDs (symmetry) → β=α
α=β ←
IDi (indiscernibility of identicals) ℱα
α=β / ℱ β
Identity rules (IDi, IDr, IDr is an axiom schema that says that any singular term stands for an object that is
IDs) are three rules identical to itself. While we are not generally using an axiomatic system of inference,
governing the identity
we will follow tradition and allow any instance of the schema IDr into any proof, with
relation.
no line justification. IDr is not often useful in derivations, but it helps to characterize
the relation.
IDs is a rule of equivalence that says that identity is commutative: if one thing is
identical to another, then the second is also identical to the first. As we have noticed,
many relations, like loving or being taller than, are not symmetric. Identity, like the
relations of being married to or being collinear with, is symmetric. We can use IDs on
whole lines or on parts of lines, switching the order of the singular terms in the rela-
tion. IDs often assists us in managing the uses of identity statements with other rules.
IDi is a rule of inference, and the most useful of the ID rules. IDi says that if you
have α=β, then you may rewrite any formula containing α with another formula that
has β in the place of α throughout. With IDi, we always rewrite a whole line, switch-
ing one singular term for another.
To understand IDi, consider again Superman and Clark Kent. We know that the
two people are the same, so anything true of one is true of the other. Since Clark Kent
works at The Daily Planet, Superman works at The Daily Planet, too, even though his
coworkers do not generally know this. Since Superman can fly, Clark Kent can fly,
though characters in the Superman universe do not generally know this.
The property captured by IDi is called Leibniz’s law, or the indiscernibility of iden-
ticals. Be careful not to confuse this simple logical property, written as a single sche-
matic sentence at 5.5.1, with the related identity of indiscernibles, written at 5.5.2 and
defended by the philosopher G. W. Leibniz.
5.5.1 (∀x)(∀y)[x=y ⊃ (ℱx ≡ ℱ y)] indiscernibility of identicals
5.5.2 (∀x)(∀y)[(ℱx ≡ ℱ y) ⊃ x=y] identity of indiscernibles
The indiscernibility of identicals says that if two terms refer to the same object, then
whatever we predicate of the one term can be predicated of the other. The contentious
5 . 5 : T h e I d ent i t y P re d i cate : Der i v at i ons 3 7 1
identity of indiscernibles says that no two things share all properties. Whether two
things can share all of their properties is a vexing question that depends for its truth
on a theory of properties, a topic well beyond our range.
For examples of these rules in use, let’s start with 5.4.4, the inference with which I
motivated identity theory.
Superman can fly.
Superman is Clark Kent.
So, Clark Kent can fly.
To derive the conclusion, we need only a simple application of IDi, as at 5.5.3.
5.5.3 1. Fs
2. s=c / Fc
3. Fc 1, 2, IDi
QED
5.5.4 uses IDs and IDi.
5.5.4 1. a=b ⊃ j=k
2. b=a
3. Fj / Fk
4. a=b 2, IDs
5. j=k 1, 4, MP
6. Fk 3, 5, IDi
QED
To derive the negation of an identity statement, one ordinarily uses indirect proof
as in 5.5.5.
5.5.5 1. Rm
2. ∼Rj / m≠j
3. m=j AIP
4. Rj 1, 3, IDi
5. Rj ∙ ∼Rj 4, 2, Conj
6. m≠j 3–5, IP
QED
5.5.6 uses the reflexivity rule, at line 4, to produce a contradiction. Alternatively,
one could use it to set up a modus tollens with line 3.
5.5.6 1. (∀x)(∼Gx ⊃ x≠d) / Gd
2. ∼Gd AIP
3. ∼Gd ⊃ d≠d 1, UI
4. d=d IDr
5. d≠d 3, 2, MP
6. d=d ∙ d≠d 4, 5, Conj
7. ~ ~Gd 2-6, IP
8. Gd 7, DN
QED
We can generalize over variables in identity statements, as in the use of EG at line 9

in 5.5.7. Notice also the use of IDs at line 5, working like commutativity for singular
terms.
5.5.7 1. Rab
2. (∃x)∼Rxb / (∃x)∼x=a
3. ∼Rcb 2, EI
4. c=a AIP
5. a=c 4, IDs
6. Rcb 1, 5, IDi
7. Rcb ∙ ∼Rcb 6, 3, Conj
8. ∼c=a 4–7, IP
9. (∃x)∼x=a 8, EG
QED
The derivations 5.5.3–5.5.7 have been quick. But many simple arguments using
identity require long derivations. The argument 5.5.8 is valid.
5.5.8 The Joyce scholar at Hamilton College is erudite. Therefore, all
Joyce scholars at Hamilton College are erudite.
It may seem a little odd, since it derives a universal conclusion from an existential
premise. But the universality of the conclusion is supported by the uniqueness clause
in the definite description. Remember that a definite description is definite: there is
only one thing that fits the description. The premise thus entails that there is only one
Joyce scholar at Hamilton College. Anything we say of a Joyce scholar at Hamilton
holds of all Joyce scholars at Hamilton (viz., only the one).
Let’s translate 5.5.8 into F, at 5.5.9. As I noted in section 5.4, by convention we may
drop brackets from series of conjunctions or disjunctions.
5.5.9 (∃x){Jx ∙ Hx ∙ (∀y)[(Jy ∙ Hy) ⊃ x=y] ∙ Ex} / (∀x)[(Jx ∙ Hx) ⊃ Ex]
Given our convention about dropping brackets among series of conjunctions and se-
ries of disjunctions, we should add corresponding conventions governing inferences.
Conventions for Derivations with Dropped Brackets

If a wff is a series of conjunctions, you may use Simp to infer, immediately, any
of the conjuncts, including multiple conjuncts.
If a wff is a series of disjunctions and you have the negation of one of the dis-
juncts on a separate line, you may eliminate it, using DS, from the series.
You may use Conj to conjoin any number of propositions appearing on sepa-
rate lines into a single proposition in a single step.
If there is a negation in front of a bracket containing a series of conjunctions you
may use DM to negate each of the conjuncts and change all the ∙ s to ∨ s.
If there is a negation in front of a bracket containing a series of disjunctions you
may use DM to negate each of the disjuncts and change all the ∨ s to ∙ s.
You may use Dist to distribute a conjunction over any number of disjuncts
and to distribute a disjunction over any number of conjuncts.
You may use Com to re-order, in any way, any series of disjuncts or of conjuncts.
In the proof of the argument 5.5.9, which is at 5.5.10 and uses a standard CP, I avail
myself of the first of these conventions at lines 4 and 7.
5.5.10 1. (∃x){Jx ∙ Hx ∙ (∀y)[(Jy ∙ Hy) ⊃ x=y] ∙ Ex} / (∀x)[(Jx ∙ Hx) ⊃ Ex]
2. Jx ∙ Hx ACP
3. Ja ∙ Ha ∙ (∀y)[(Jy ∙ Hy) ⊃ a=y] ∙ Ea 1, EI
4. (∀y)[(Jy ∙ Hy) ⊃ a=y] 3, Simp
5. (Jx ∙ Hx) ⊃ a=x 4, UI
6. a=x 5, 2, MP
7. Ea 3, Simp
8. Ex 7, 6, IDi
9. (Jx ∙ Hx) ⊃ Ex 2–8, CP
10. (∀x)[(Jx ∙ Hx) ⊃ Ex] 9, UG
QED
5.5.11 contains another substantial proof using propositions with identity, this
time showing how ‘at least’ and ‘at most’ entail ‘exactly’ proof-theoretically.
5.5.11 There is at least one moon of Earth.
There is at most one moon of Earth. / So, there is exactly one
moon of Earth.
1. (∃x)Mx
2. (∀x)(∀y)[(Mx ∙ My) ⊃ x=y] / (∃x)[Mx ∙ (∀y)(My ⊃ x=y)]
3. Ma 1, EI
4. My ACP
5. (∀y)[(Ma ∙ My) ⊃ a=y] 2, UI
6. (Ma ∙ My) ⊃ a=y 5, UI
7. Ma ∙ My 3, 4, Conj
8. a=y 6, 7, MP
9. My ⊃ a=y 4–8, CP
10. (∀y)(My ⊃ a=y) 9, UG
11. Ma ∙ (∀y)(My ⊃ a=y) 3, 10, Conj
12. (∃x)[Mx ∙ (∀y)(My ⊃ x=y)] 11, EG
QED
5.5.12 has an even longer derivation, even with our new conventions (especially at
lines 27, 33, and 40). Removing and replacing multiple quantifiers, moving negations
across multiple quantifiers using QE, and just working with the complex statements
that identity helps us represent all lengthen the proofs.
When working with long proofs, be especially careful to keep track of your different
singular terms, which ones are constants and which are variables. Look ahead to see
whether you are going to need to UG, in which case you’ll need to work with variables.
And, as always, indirect proof is the refuge of the desperate.
3 74 C h apter 5 F u ll F i rst - O r d er L og i c
5.5.12 There are at least two cars in the driveway.

All the cars in the driveway belong to Jasmine.
Jasmine has at most two cars. / So, there are exactly two cars in the driveway.
1. (∃x)(∃y)(Cx ∙ Dx ∙ Cy ∙ Dy ∙ x≠y)
2. (∀x)[(Cx ∙ Dx) ⊃ Bxj]
3. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Cx ∙ Bxj ∙ Cy ∙ Byj ∙ Cz ∙ Bzj) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
/ (∃x)(∃y){Cx ∙ Dx ∙ Cy ∙ Dy ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Cz ∙ Dz) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
4. (∃y)(Ca ∙ Da ∙ Cy ∙ Dy ∙ a≠y) 1, EI
5. Ca ∙ Da ∙ Cb ∙ Db ∙ a≠b 4, EI
6. Ca ∙ Da 5, Simp
7. (Ca ∙ Da) ⊃ Baj 2, UI
8. Baj 7, 6, MP
9. Cb ∙ Db 5, Simp
10. (Cb ∙ Db) ⊃ Bbj 2, UI
11. Bbj 10, 9, MP
12. a≠b 5, Simp
13. ∼(∀z)[(Cz ∙ Dz) ⊃ (z=a ∨ z=b)] AIP
14. (∃z)∼[(Cz ∙ Dz) ⊃ (z=a ∨ z=b)] 13, QE
15. (∃z)∼[∼(Cz ∙ Dz) ∨ (z=a ∨ z=b)] 14, Impl
16. (∃z)[∼ ∼(Cz ∙ Dz) ∙ ∼(z=a ∨ z=b)] 15, DM
17. (∃z)[(Cz ∙ Dz) ∙ ∼(z=a ∨ z=b)] 16, DN
18. Cc ∙ Dc ∙ ∼(c=a ∨ c=b) 17, EI
19. Ca 6, Simp
20. Ca ∙ Baj 19, 8 Conj
21. Cb 9, Simp
22. Cb ∙ Bbj 21, 11, Conj
23. Cc ∙ Dc 18, Simp
24. (Cc ∙ Dc) ⊃ Bcj 2, UI
25. Bcj 24, 23, MP
26. Cc 23, Simp
27. Cc ∙ Bcj 26, 25, Conj
28. Ca ∙ Baj ∙ Cb ∙ Bbj ∙ Cc ∙ Bcj 20, 22, 27, Conj
29. (∀y)(∀z)[(Ca ∙ Baj ∙ Cy ∙ Byj ∙ Cz ∙ Bzj) ⊃ (a=y ∨ a=z ∨ y=z)] 3, UI
30. (∀z)[(Ca ∙ Baj ∙ Cb ∙ Bbj ∙ Cz ∙ Bzj) ⊃ (a=b ∨ a=z ∨ b=z)] 29, UI
31. (Ca ∙ Baj ∙ Cb ∙ Bbj ∙ Cc ∙ Bcj) ⊃ (a=b ∨ a=c ∨ b=c) 30, UI
32. a=b ∨ a=c ∨ b=c 31, 28, MP
33. a≠b 5, Simp
34. a=c ∨ b=c 32, 33, DS
35. ∼(c=a ∨ c=b) 18, Simp
36. ∼(c=a ∨ b=c) 35, IDs
37. ∼(a=c ∨ b=c) 36, IDs
38. (a=c ∨ b=c) ∙ ∼(a=c ∨ b=c) 34, 37, Conj
39. ∼ ∼(∀z) (Cz ∙ Dz) ⊃ (z=a ∨ z=b)] 13–38, IP

40. (∀z)[(Cz ∙ Dz) ⊃ (z=a ∨ z=b)] 39, DN
41. Ca ∙ Da ∙ Cb ∙ Db ∙ a≠b ∙ (∀z)[(Cz ∙ Dz) ⊃ (z=a ∨ z=b)] 6, 9, 12, 40, Conj
42. (∃y){Ca ∙ Da ∙ Cy ∙ Dy ∙ a≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Cz ∙ Dz) ⊃ (z=a ∨ z=y)]} 41, EG
43. (∃x)(∃y){Cx ∙ Dx ∙ Cy ∙ Dy ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Cz ∙ Dz) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]} 42, EG
QED
Summary
The rules governing the identity predicate are fairly simple and easy to learn. The
propositions that use identity, though, can be long and complex. Arguments that use
such propositions tend to be consequently long, and sometimes difficult, mainly just
because of the complexity of the propositions.
KEEP IN MIND
Singular terms of which identity holds may be exchanged in wffs; we call this property the
indiscernibility of identicals, or Leibniz’s law.
Do not confuse Leibniz’s law with its converse, the identity of indiscernibles.
IDi allows us to rewrite a whole line, switching one singular term for another.
IDs is a rule of equivalence, allowing us to commute the two singular terms flanking a ‘=’.
IDr allows us to insert an identity sentence, of a singular with itself, with no line justifica-
tion; it is rarely useful in derivations.
Our conventions for dropping brackets in series of conjunctions or disjunctions lead to
further conventions within derivations for some rules.
Rules Introduced
For any singular terms α and β:
IDr (reflexivity) α=α
IDs (symmetry) α=β → β=α
←
IDi (indiscernibility of identicals) ℱα
α=β / ℱβ
EXERCISES 5.5a
1. 1. (∀x)[(∃y)Pxy ⊃ (∃z)Pzx]
2. (∃x)(Pxb ∙ x=d) / (∃z)Pzd
2. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[Ax ⊃ (By ⊃ Cxy)]
2. Aa ∙ Ba
3. a=b / Cab
3. 1. (∃x)(Mx ∙ Px)
2. (∀x)[Mx ⊃ (∀y)(Ky ⊃ x=y)]
3. Kf / Mf ∙ Pf
4. 1. Pa ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠a) ⊃ Qax]
2. Pb ∙ a≠b / Qab
5. 1. Dkm ∙ (∀x)(Dkx ⊃ x=m)
2. Dab
3. Fb ∙ ∼Fm / a≠k
6. 1. (∀x)[ Jx ∨ (Kx ∙ Lx)]
2. ∼(Ja ∨ Kb) / a≠b
7. 1. (∀x)[(Mx ∨ Nx) ⊃ Ox]
2. ∼Oc
3. Md / c≠d
8. 1. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Sx)
2. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Tx)
3. (∀x)[Qx ∨ (Rx ∙ Ux)]
4. a=b / Sb ∨ Ta
9. 1. (∀x)[Ax ∨ (Bx ∙ Cx)]
2. ∼(∀x)Bx
3. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ x=c) / (∃x)x=c
10. 1. (∃x){Px ∙ Qx ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y) ⊃ Axy]}
2. (∀x)(∀y)(Axy ⊃ Byx) / (∃x){Px ∙ Qx ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y) ⊃ Byx]}
11. 1. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Qx ∙ x≠a) ⊃ (∃y)Rxy]
2. ∼(∃y)Rby
3. Sa ∙ ∼Sb / ∼(Pb ∙ Qb)
12. 1. Pa ∙ Qab ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ Qxb ∙ x≠a) ⊃ Rax]
2. Pc ∙ Qcb ∙ ∼Rac / c=a
13. 1. Dp ∙ (∃x)(Ex ∙ ∼Fxp)
2. (∀x)[Gx ⊃ (∀y)Fyx] / (∃x)(Dx ∙ ∼Gx)
14. 1. La ∙ Lb ∙ a≠b
2. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Lx ∙ Ly ∙ Lz) ⊃ (x=y ∨ y=z ∨ x=z)]
/ (∀x)[Lx ⊃ (x=a ∨ x=b)]
15. 1. (∃x){Px ∙ Qx ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y) ⊃ y=x]}
2. (∃x){Rx ∙ Qx ∙ (∀y)[(Ry ∙ Q y) ⊃ y=x]}
3. (∀x)(Px ≡ ∼Rx) / (∃x)(∃y)(Qx ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y)
16. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[(Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Q y) ⊃ x=y]
2. (∃x)(∃y)(Px ∙ Rx ∙ Py ∙ Ry ∙ x≠y) / (∃x)(Px ∙ ∼Qx)
17. 1. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∀y)(Py ⊃ y=x)]
2. (∀x){Px ⊃ (∃y)[Q y ∙ (∀z)(Qz ⊃ z=y) ∙ Rxy]}
/ (∃x)(∃y)[Px ∙ Q y ∙ Rxy ∙ (∀z)(Pz ⊃ z=x) ∙(∀z)(Qz ⊃ z=y)]
18. 1. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ x≠a]
2. (∃x){Px ∙ Rx ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ Ry) ⊃ y=x]}
3. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Qx) / ∼(Pa ∙ Ra)
19. 1. (∃x)[Px ∙ (∀y)(Py ⊃ y=x) ∙ Qx]
2. (∀x)[Qx ⊃ (∃y)Rxy]
3. (∃x)(Px ∙ Sx) / (∃x)[Qx ∙ Sx ∙ (∃y)Rxy]
20. 1. (∃x)(∃y)(Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y)
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)
3. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Qx ∙ Rx ∙ Q y ∙ Ry ∙ Qz ∙ Rz) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
/ (∃x)(∃y){Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Qy ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Pz ∙ Qz) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
21. 1. (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(Px ∙ Py ∙ Pz ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z ∙ Qxyz ∙ Qzyx)
2. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(Qxyz ≡ Q yxz)
3. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)(Qxyz ≡ Qxzy) / (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(Px ∙ Py ∙
Pz ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z ∙ Qxyz ∙ Qxzy ∙ Q yxz ∙ Q yzx ∙ Qzxy ∙ Qzyx)
22. 1. (∃x)(∃y)(Hx ∙ Ix ∙ Jx ∙ Hy ∙ Iy ∙ Jy ∙ x≠y)
2. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Hx ∙ Ix ∙ Jx ∙ Hy ∙ Iy ∙ Jy ∙ Hz ∙ Iz ∙ Jz) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
/ (∃x)(∃y){Hx ∙ Ix ∙ Jx ∙
Hy ∙ Iy ∙ Jy ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Hz ∙ Iz ∙ Jz) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
23. 1. Na ∙ Oa ∙ Nb ∙ Ob ∙ a≠b ∙ (∀x)[(Nx ∙ Ox) ⊃ (x=a ∨ x=b)]
2. Na ∙ ∼Pa ∙ (∀x)[(Nx ∙ x≠a) ⊃ Px]
/ (∃x){Nx ∙ Ox ∙ Px ∙ (∀y)[(Ny ∙ Oy ∙ Py) ⊃ y=x]}
24. 1. (∃x)(∃y)(Kx ∙ Lx ∙ Ky ∙ Ly ∙ x≠y)
2. Ka ∙ La ∙ Ma ∙ (∀y)[(Ky ∙ Ly ∙ My) ⊃ y=a] / (∃x)(Kx ∙ Lx ∙ ∼Mx)
25. 1. (∃x)(∃y)(Ax ∙ Cx ∙ Ay ∙ Cy ∙ x≠y)
2. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Cx ∙ Cy ∙ Cz) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
3. (∃x)(Bx ∙ ∼Ax) / ∼(∀x)(Bx ⊃ Cx)
26. 1. (∃x)(∃y)(Qx ∙ Rx ∙ Q y ∙ Ry ∙ x≠y)

2. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Rx ∙ Sx ∙ Ry ∙ Sy ∙ Rz ∙ Sz) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
3. (∀x)(∼Qx ∨ Sx) / (∃x)(∃y){Qx ∙ Rx ∙ Sx ∙ Q y ∙ Ry ∙ Sy ∙ x≠y ∙
(∀z)[(Rz ∙ Sz) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
27. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Px ∙ Qxa ∙ Rxb ∙ Py ∙ Q ya ∙ Ryb ∙ Pz ∙ Qza ∙ Rzb) ⊃
(x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
2. Pc ∙ Sc ∙ Qca ∙ Rcb
3. Pd ∙ ∼Sd ∙ Qda ∙ Rdb / (Pe ∙ Qea ∙ Reb) ⊃ (e=c ∨ e=d)
28. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ Pz ∙ Qz) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
2. (∃x)(∃y)(Rx ∙ Qx ∙ Ry ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y)
3. (∀x)(Px ≡ Rx)
/ (∃x)(∃y){Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Pz ∙ Qz) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
29. 1. (∃x)(∃y){Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Pz ∙ Qz) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
2. (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(Sx ∙ Sy ∙ Sz ∙ Qx ∙ Q y ∙ Qz ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z)
3. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)
4. ∼(∃x)(Rx ∙ Sx) / (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)(∃w)(∃v)(Qx ∙ Q y ∙ Qz ∙ Qw ∙
Qv ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ x≠w ∙ x≠v ∙ y≠z ∙ y≠w ∙ y≠v ∙ z≠w ∙ z≠v ∙ w≠v)
30. 1. Ma ∙ ∼Pa ∙ Mb ∙ ∼Pb ∙ (∀x)[(Mx ∙ x≠a ∙ x≠b) ⊃ Px]
2. Qb ∙ (∀x)[(Mx ∙ Qx) ⊃ x=b]
3. (∀x){Mx ⊃ [∼(Qx ∨ Px) ≡ Rx]}
4. a≠b / (∃x){Mx ∙ Rx ∙ (∀y)[(My ∙ Ry) ⊃ y=x]}
EXERCISES 5.5b
Translate each of the following arguments into F, using the
given terms and the identity predicate, where useful. Then,
derive the conclusion using our rules of inference.
1. Polly flies. Olivia doesn’t. So, Polly is not Olivia. (o: Olivia; p: Polly; Fx: x flies)
2. If George is Dr. Martin, then Dr. Martin is married to Mrs. Wilson. Dr. Martin
is George. Mrs. Wilson is Hilda. So, George is married to Hilda. (g: George; h:
Hilda; m: Dr. Martin; w: Mrs. Wilson; Mxy: x is married to y)
3. If something is a not superhero, then everything is not Wonder Woman. So,
Wonder Woman is a superhero. (w: Wonder woman; Sx: x is a superhero)
4. Katerina is the fastest runner on the team. Pedro is a runner on the team. Kat-
erina is not Pedro. So, Katerina is faster than Pedro. (k: Katerina; p: Pedro; Rx:
x is a runner; Tx: x is on the team; Fxy: x is faster than y)
5. The author of Republic was a Greek philosopher. John Locke was a philosopher,
but he was not Greek. Therefore, John Locke did not write Republic. (l: John
Locke; r: Republic; Gx: x is Greek; Px: x is a philosopher; Wxy: x wrote y)
6. The only person who went skiing was James. The only person who caught a cold
was Mr. Brown. Some person who went skiing also caught a cold. So, James is
Mr. Brown. (b: Mr. Brown; j: James; Cx: x caught a cold; Px: x is a person; Sx:
x went skiing)
7. Exactly one student in the class gives a presentation about Spinoza. At least two
students in the class give a presentation about Leibniz. No student in the class
gives a presentation about both Leibniz and Spinoza. So, there are at least three
students in the class. (l: Leibniz; s: Spinoza; Sx: x is a student in the class;
Gxy: x gives a presentation about y)
8. Every employee except Rupert got a promotion. The only employee to get a
promotion was Jane. So, there are exactly two employees. (j: Jane; r: Rupert;
Ex: x is an employee; Px: x gets a promotion)
9. No philosopher except Descartes is a dualist. Spinoza is a philosopher, distinct
from Descartes. Every philosopher is either a dualist or a monist. So, Spinoza
is a monist. (d: Descartes; s: Spinoza; Dx: x is a dualist; Mx: x is a monist; Px:
x is a philosopher)
10. Kierkegaard and Sartre are both existentialists, but Kierkegaard is a theist and
Sartre is not. If all existentialists are nihilists, then Kierkegaard and Sartre are
identical. So, some existentialists are not nihilists. (k: Kierkegaard; s: Sartre;
Ex: x is an existentialist; Nx: x is a nihilist; Tx: x is a theist)
11. No idealist is more renowned than Berkeley, except Kant. Russell, who is nei-
ther Berkeley nor Kant, is more renowned than Berkeley. So, Russell is not an
idealist. (b: Berkeley; k: Kant; r: Russell; Ix: x is an idealist; Rxy: x is more re-
nowned than y)
12. Every platonist except Plato believes in the existence of the material world. Ev-
ery platonist believes in an abstract realm. Gödel is a platonist who is not Plato.
So, something believes in both a material world and an abstract realm, and
something does not. (g: Gödel; p: Plato; Ax: x believes in an abstract realm;
Mx: x believes in the existence of a material world; Px: x is a platonist)
13. At least two philosophers are more prolific than the philosopher Hume. No
philosopher is more insightful than Hume. Nothing is more prolific than itself.
So, at least two philosophers are more prolific, without being more insightful,
than a third philosopher. (h: Hume; Px: x is a philosopher; Ixy: x is more in-
sightful than y; Pxy: x is more prolific than y)
14. At most one argument for consequentialism is not utilitarian. There are some
non-utilitarian arguments for consequentialism. Any argument for consequen-
tialism faces trolley-case objections. So, exactly one non-utilitarian argument
for consequentialism faces trolley-case objections. (Ax: x is an argument for

consequentialism; Fx: x faces trolley-case objections; Ux: x is utilitarian)
15. Exactly two students in the class are compatibilists. Exactly one student in the
class is a hard determinist. No compatibilist or hard determinist is a libertar-
ian. No compatibilist is a hard determinist, and vice versa. So, at least three
students in the class are not libertarians. (Cx: x is a compatibilist; D: x is a hard
determinist; Lx: x is a libertarian; Sx: x is a student in the class)
16. Any two distinct points determine exactly one line that contains both of
those points. A and B are distinct points. Line L contains points A and B.
Line M is distinct from Line L. So, Line M does not contain both points A and
B. (a: Point A; b: Point B; l: Line L; m: Line M; Lx: x is a line; Px: x is a point;
Cxy: x contains y)
EXERCISES 5.5c
Derive the following logical truths of identity theory.
1. (∀x)(∀y)(x=y ≡ y=x)
2. (Fa ∙ a=b) ⊃ Fb
3. (∃x)x=a ∨ (∀x)x≠a
4. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(x=y ∙ y=z) ⊃ x=z]
5. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(x=y ∙ x=z) ⊃ y=z]
6. (∀x)(∀y)[(Fx ∙ ∼Fy) ⊃ x≠y]
7. (∀x)(∀y)[x=y ⊃ (Fx ≡ Fy)]
8. (∀x)(∀y)[x=y ⊃ (∀z)(Pxz ≡ Pyz)]
9. (∀x)(∀y){(x=a ∙ y=a) ⊃ [Rab ≡ (Rxb ∙ Ryb)]}
10. (∀x)(Pax ⊃ x=b) ⊃ [(∃y)Pay ⊃ Pab]
5.6: TRANSLATION WITH FUNCTIONS

In the last two sections of this chapter, we will look at one final, formal topic: func-
tions. This extension beyond F is contentious. Some philosophers consider functions
to be mathematical, not purely logical. But their introduction gives us some efficient
translations and facilitates some natural inferences.
Consider, as a motivating example, the intuitively valid argument 5.6.1.
5 . 6 : T ranslat i on w i t h F u nct i ons 3 8 1
5.6.1 All applicants will get a job.

Jean is an applicant.
Jean is the first child of Dominique and Henri.
So, some first child will get a job.
The first two premises are easily regimented into F.
5.6.2 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Gx)
2. Aj
We have several options for the third premise. We could take ‘first child of Domi-
nique and Henri’ as a monadic predicate, as at 5.6.3.
5.6.3 3. Fj
Then we would need a different predicate for being the first child (of any parents)
for the conclusion. Being the first child of Dominique and Henri is a different mo-
nadic property than being some first child.
A second option is to regiment the third premise of 5.6.1 by using Russell’s theory
of definite descriptions. We can use ‘Fxyz’ for ‘x is a first child of y and z’ and add a
uniqueness clause.
5.6.4 3. (∃x)[Fxdh ∙ (∀y)(Fydh ⊃ y=x) ∙ x=j]
5.6.4 has the advantage of taking ‘first child of ’ to be a three-place relation. That op-
tion reveals more logical structure than 5.6.3, and so may be useful. Correspondingly,
we can regiment the conclusion of 5.6.1 as 5.6.5.
5.6.5 (∃x){(∃y)(∃z)[Fxyz ∙ (∀w)(Fwyz ⊃ w=x)] ∙ Gx}
The conclusion 5.6.5 follows from the premises at 5.6.2 and 5.6.4, as we can see
at 5.6.6.
5.6.6 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Gx)
2. Aj
3. (∃x)[Fxdh ∙ (∀y)(Fydh ⊃ y=x) ∙ x=j]
4. Fadh ∙ (∀y)(Fydh ⊃ y=a) ∙ a=j 3, EI
5. a=j 4, Simp
6. j=a 5, IDs
7. Aa 2, 6, IDi
8. Aa ⊃ Ga 1, UI
9. Ga 8, 7, MP
10. (∀y)(Fydh ⊃ y=a) 4, Simp
11. Fwdh ⊃ w=a 10, UI
12. (∀w)(Fwdh ⊃ w=a) 11, UG
13. Fadh 4, Simp
14. Fadh ∙ (∀w)(Fwdh ⊃ w=a) 13, 12, Conj
15. (∃z)[Fadz ∙ (∀w)(Fwdz ⊃ w=a)] 14, EG
16. (∃y)(∃z)[Fayz ∙ (∀w)(Fwyz ⊃ w=a)] 15, EG
17. (∃y)(∃z)[Fayz ∙ (∀w)(Fwyz ⊃ w=a)] ∙ Ga 16, 9, Conj
18. (∃x){(∃y)(∃z)[Fxyz ∙ (∀w)(Fwyz ⊃ w=x)] ∙ Gx} 17, EG
QED
While the derivation at 5.6.6 is successful, there is a more efficient, and more fe-
cund, option for regimenting ‘the first child of x and y’: we can take ‘the first child of x
and y’ to be a function. Using a function allows us to regiment both the third premise
and the conclusion more simply, and to construct tighter derivations. Let’s take a mo-
ment to explore functions before returning to 5.6.1.
When working with Consider terms like ‘the biological father of ’, ‘the successor of ’, ‘the sum of ’, and
functions, an argument ‘the academic adviser of ’. Each takes one or more arguments, from their domain,
is an element or ordered and produces a single output, the range. We can tell that there is a single output by the
n-tuple of elements of
use of the definite description. One-place functions take one argument, two-place
the domain paired with
exactly one element of functions take two arguments, and n-place functions take n arguments. With a small
the range. extension of F, adding functors like ‘f(x)’, we can express such functions neatly.
5.6.7 lists some functions and some possible logical representations.
5.6.7 f(x) the father of
g(x) the successor of
f(x, y) the sum of
f(a, b) the truth value of the conjunction of A and B
g(x1 . . . xn) the teacher of
The last function can take as arguments, say, all the students in a class.
An essential characteristic of functions is that they yield exactly one value no mat-
ter how many arguments they take. Thus, the expressions at 5.6.8 are not functions.
5.6.8 the biological parents of a
the classes that a and b share
the square root of x
These expressions are relations. Relations may be one-many, like ‘the square root
of n’, which pairs a single number, say 4, with both its positive and negative square
roots, +2 and −2. Relations may be many-many, like the classes that Johanna and
Alexis share when they are both taking Logic, Organic Chemistry, and The Study
of the Novel. Functions are special types of relations that always yield a single value.
‘The positive square root of x’ is a function, as is ‘the first class of the day for student x’.
Functions play an important role in mathematics and science, as well as logic. We
have seen that we can use the identity predicate to simulate adjectival uses of numbers:
three apples, seven seas. With functions, we can express even more mathematics. A
A functor is a symbol functor is a symbol used to represent a function, like any of the functions ubiquitous
used to represent a in mathematics and science. In mathematics, there are linear functions, exponential
function.
functions, periodic functions, quadratic functions, and trigonometric functions. In
science, force is a function of mass and acceleration; momentum is a function of mass
and velocity. The genetic code of a child is a function of the genetic codes of its biologi-
cal parents. Functions are also essential for metalogic. Recall that the semantics for
PL is presented in terms of truth functions. All the operators are truth functions, tak-
ing one argument (negation) or two arguments (the rest of the operators) and yield-
ing a specific truth value.
By adding functors to our language F, we adopt a new language, which I call FF, for
full first-order predicate logic with functors.
Vocabulary of FF
Capital letters A . . . Z, used as predicates
Lower-case letters
a, b, c, d, e, i, j, k . . . u are used as constants.
f, g, and h are used as functors.
Five propositional operators: ∼, ∙, ∨, ⊃, ≡
Quantifiers: ∃, ∀
Punctuation: (), [], {}
In order to specify the formation rules for FF, we invoke n-tuples of singular An n-tuple of singular
terms, ordered series of singular terms: constants, variables, or functor terms. As we terms is an ordered series
of singular terms.
saw in section 5.2, n-tuples are like sets in that they are collections of objects but
differ from sets in that the order of their objects (which we call arguments) matters.
Often, n-tuples are represented using angle brackets: <a, b>, <Clinton, New Hartford,
Utica>, or <Lady Gaga>. For FF, we will represent n-tuples of singular terms by listing
the singular terms separated by commas, as at 5.6.9.
5.6.9 a, b two arguments
a, a, f(a) three arguments
x, y, b, d, f(x), f(a, b, f(x)) six arguments
a one argument
Now that we have characterized n-tuples, we can use them to define functor A functor term is a
terms. Suppose α is an n-tuple of singular terms. Then a functor symbol, followed by functor followed by an
n-tuple of singular terms
an n-tuple of singular terms in brackets, is a functor term. The expressions at 5.6.10 in brackets.
are all functor terms (once we substitute the proper n-tuple for α).
5.6.10 f(α)
g(α)
h(α)
Note that an n-tuple of singular terms can include functor terms, as in the second
and third examples at 5.6.9. ‘Functor term’ is defined recursively, which allows for
composition of functions. For example, one can refer to the grandfather of x using just
the functions for father, for example f(x), and mother, for example g(x). 5.6.11 repre-
sents ‘paternal grandfather’ and 5.6.12 represents maternal grandfather’.
5.6.11 f(f(x))
5.6.12 f(g(x))
The use of punctuation (parentheses) in functor terms can multiply, but is sadly
needed.
For another example, if we take ‘h(x)’ to represent the square of x, then 5.6.13 rep-
resents the eighth power of x, in other words, ((x 2)2)2 .
5.6.13 h(h(h(x)))
I have introduced only three functor letters. As with variables and constants (see
4.3), there are several different tricks for constructing an indefinite number of terms
out of a finite vocabulary using indexing. But we won’t need more than the three let-
ters here, so we will make do with only these.
Even with just the three letters, we have an indefinite number of functors, since
each of 5.6.14 is technically a different functor and can represent a different function.
5.6.14 f(a)
f(a, b)
f(a, b, c)
f(a, b, c, d)
and so on
The scope and binding rules are the same for FF as they were for M and F. The for-
mation rules need only one small adjustment, at the first line.
Formation Rules for wffs of FF

FF1. An n-place predicate followed by n singular terms (constants, variables, or
functor terms) is a wff.
FF2. For any variable β, if α is a wff that does not contain either ‘(∃β)’ or ‘(∀β)’,
FF3. If α is a wff, so is ∼α.
FF4. If α and β are wffs, then so are:
(α ∙ β)
(α ∨ β)
(α ⊃ β)
(α ≡ β)
FF5. These are the only ways to make wffs.
The semantics for FF are basically the same as for F, too. For an interpretation of
FF, we insert an interpretation of function symbols at step 3.
Semantics for FF
Step 3. A
ssign a function with arguments and ranges in the domain to each func-
tion symbol.
Step 4. A ssign some set of objects in the domain to each one-place predicate; as-
sign sets of ordered n-tuples to each relational predicate.
Step 5. Use the customary truth tables for the interpretation of the propositional
operators.
The function assigned in step 3 will be a function in the metalanguage used to inter-
pret the function in the object language. I won’t pursue a discussion of metalinguis-
tic functions, except to say that they work just like ordinary mathematical functions.
Once you have the idea of how functions work in the object language, it will become
clear how they work in the metalanguage.
Let’s move on to the nuts and bolts of translation with functions.
Translations into FF and Simple Arithmetic Functions

At 5.6.15, there is a translation key and some English sentences with their regimenta-
tions in FF.
5.6.15 Lxy: x loves y
f(x): the father of x
g(x): the mother of x
o: Olaf
Olaf loves his mother. Log(o)
Olaf loves his grandmothers. Log(g(o)) ∙ Log(f(o))
Olaf’s father loves someone. (∃x)Lf(o)x
No one is his/her own mother. (∀x)∼x=g(x)
While 5.6.15 shows some ordinary uses of functions, their most natural appli-
cations come in regimenting sentences of mathematics. Many simple concepts in
arithmetic are functions: addition, multiplication, least common multiple. The
most fundamental function in mathematics is the successor function. All other
mathematical functions can be defined in terms of successor and other basic con-
cepts. In fact, all of arithmetic can be developed from five basic axioms, called the
Peano axioms. They are named for Giuseppe Peano, who published in 1889 a pre-
cise version of the axioms that Richard Dedekind had published a year earlier. Peano
credited Dedekind, and sometimes these axioms are called the Dedekind-Peano, or
even the Dedekind, axioms.
5.6.16 The Peano Axioms for Arithmetic
P1: Zero is a number.
P2: The successor of every number is a number.
P3: Zero is not the successor of any number.
P4: No distinct numbers have the same successor.
P5: I f some property may (or may not) hold for any number, and if zero has
the property, and if, for any number, its having the property entails that
its successor has the property, then all numbers have the property.
P5 is called the induction schema. It can be used to generate an indefinite number
of axioms, one for each mathematical property. Mathematical induction is essential
in metalogic, as well as in linear algebra and number theory.
We can write the Peano axioms in FF using the given key, as I do at 5.6.17.
5.6.17 Peano’s Axioms in FF
a: zero
Nx: x is a number
f(x): the successor of x
PA1. Na
PA2. (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Nf(x))
PA3. ∼(∃x)(Nx ∙ f(x)=a)
PA4. (∀x)(∀y)[(Nx ∙ Ny) ⊃ (f(x)=f(y) ⊃ x=y)]
PA5. {Pa ∙ (∀x)[(Nx ∙ Px) ⊃ Pf(x)]} ⊃ (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Px)
Notice that the predicate ‘P’ as used in PA5 can stand for any property, like the
property of being prime or the property of having a square. To write this axiom even
more generally, one needs a stronger language, such as second-order logic.
5.6.18–5.6.21 present translations of some arithmetic sentences using functions.
Note that in the following sentences, I take ‘number’ to mean ‘natural number’ (i.e.,
the counting numbers 1, 2, 3, . . .) and use the following translation key.
o: one
f(x): the successor of x
f(x, y): the product of x and y
Ex: x is even
Nx: x is a number
Ox: x is odd
Px: x is prime
5.6.18 One is the successor of some number.
(∃x)[Nx ∙ f(x)=o]
5.6.19 The product of the successor of one and any other number is even.
(∀x)Ef(f(o), x)
5.6.20
If the product of a pair of numbers is odd, then the product of the
successors of those numbers is even.
(∀x)(∀y){(Nx ∙ Ny) ⊃ [Of(x, y) ⊃ Ef(f(x), f(y))]}
5.6.21 There are no prime numbers such that their product is prime.
∼(∃x)(∃y)[Nx ∙ Px ∙ Ny ∙ Py ∙ Pf(x, y)]
Summary
Functors are not in the vocabulary of standard first-order logic. By adding functors
to our language, we switch from F to FF. The addition facilitates some natural infer-
ences. But some philosophers resist seeing functions as purely logical, and see them
as mathematical. Mathematicians treat functions as kinds of relations, and relations
as kinds of sets; we can define relations and functions in terms of sets. Set theory is
ordinarily taken to be mathematics, not logic. But we are here supposed to be working
with a purely logical, and not mathematical, language.
Concerns that functions are mathematical, and not logical, should be allayed some-
what by noting that the work we are doing with functions here can be done in F with
definite descriptions, though in more complicated fashion.
Our last technical subject, in the next section, is derivations with functions.
KEEP IN MIND
The work of functions can be done, less efficiently, with definite descriptions.
FF is the result of adding functors to the language of F.
We reserve ‘f ’, ‘g’, and ‘h’ as functor symbols; they don’t work as constants in FF.
EXERCISES 5.6
Use the given key to translate the following sentences into FF.

m: Mariel
f(x): the mother of x
g(x): the father of x
Px: x is a person
Sxy: x is a sister of y
Txy: x takes care of y
1. Mariel takes care of her mother.
2. Mariel’s paternal grandmother takes care of Mariel.
3. Mariel takes care of her grandmothers.
4. Mariel’s sister takes care of Mariel’s grandfathers.
5. Mariel’s only sister takes care of Mariel’s grandfathers.
6. No one is his/her own mother.
7. Not everyone is the father of someone.
8. Some maternal grandmothers are sisters to someone.

t: two
f(x): the square of x
g(x): the successor of x
f(x, y): the product of x and y
Ex: x is even
Nx: x is a number
Ox: x is odd
Px: x is prime
9. Two and its successor are prime numbers.
10. Not all odd numbers are prime.
11. The square of an odd number is odd.
12. The square of a number is not prime.
13. The product of even numbers is even.
14. The product of a number and its successor is not prime.
15. The product of an odd number and an even number is even.
16. The square of a number is the product of it with itself.

a: Ayo
c: Conor
j: Javier
k: Katja
m: Marquis
o: Olivia
s: Spencer
f(x): the thing one place in front of x in line
Gx: x is a graduate
Lx: x is in line
Px: x majored in philosophy
Sx: x majored in sociology
17. Every graduate except Olivia is in line.
18. The graduate two places in front of Ayo majored in philosophy, as did Ayo.
19. In line, Ayo is one place in front of Conor, who is one place in front of Marquis.
20. In line, Javier is one place behind Katja, who is one place behind Marquis.
21. Every philosophy major is one place in front of some sociology major.
22. Some philosophy majors are two spaces in front of some sociology majors.
23. Of all the graduates in line, none is one place in front of Olivia, and none is one
place behind Spencer.
24. At most three sociology majors are two spaces in front of some philosophy
major.

e: false
p: proposition P
q: proposition Q
t: true
f(x): the truth value of x
f(x, y): the truth value of the conjunction of x and y
g(x, y): the truth value of the disjunction of x and y
Px: x is a proposition
25. The truth value of P is true, not false.
26. The conjunction of propositions P and Q is false.
27. No proposition is neither true nor false.
28. The truth value of the disjunction of some proposition with P is true.
29. If the conjunction of propositions P and Q is false, then either P is false or Q is.
30. If the truth value of the conjunction of P with every proposition is false, then
P is false.
31. If the truth value of the disjunction of Q with every proposition is true, then Q
is true.
32. If the truth value of the conjunction of any two propositions is equal to the
truth value of the disjunction of those propositions, then either the original
propositions are both true or they are both false.

b: Betsy
h: Helena
o: Oscar
w: Will
f(x): the mother of x
f(x, y): the first child of x and y
Mxy: x is married to y
33. The first child of Betsy and Helena is a philosopher.

34. Betsy’s mother is the first child of Will and Helena.
35. No one is the first child of Oscar and Betsy.
36. The first child of Will and Oscar is married to the first child of Betsy and Helena.
37. Every philosopher’s mother is married to some first child.
38. If Betsy’s first child with someone is a philosopher, then Will is the first child of
Oscar and Helena.
39. Some philosopher is married to the first child of two philosophers.
40. Exactly two philosophers are married to first children.
5.7: DERIVATIONS WITH FUNCTIONS

Our final section concerns the derivations with functions that will simplify some of
the inferences using definite descriptions. There are no new rules for producing deri-
vations with functions, since they are just complex singular terms and act, in deriva-
tions, like other singular terms. We use instantiation and generalization rules as we
have until now, with a couple of restrictions, focusing mainly on when you can and
cannot introduce new functional structure into a formula.
Derivations and Functional Structure

Functional structure The functional structure of a singular term arises from the way in which functions
reflects the complexity of may be embedded in other functions. The functional structure increases with the
a functor term or of the number of embedded functions. A precise definition is possible, but not necessary
n-tuple of singular terms
in a functor term. here. A simple constant or variable has no functional structure. The singular terms in
5.7.1 have increasing functional structure.
5.7.1 f(a, b)
f(f(a), g(b))
f(f(g(a, b)), g(h(a, b, f(b))))
Using the instantiation and generalization rules with functions is straightforward,
with no new restrictions if you don’t change the functional structure of the propositions
with which you are working. You just have to be careful to manage constants and
variables as usual. We consider a function as if it were either a constant or a variable,
for the purposes of instantiating or generalizing, depending on the arguments of the
function. A complex singular term acts like a variable if there are any variables in any
5 . 7 : Der i v at i ons w i t h F u nct i ons 3 9 1
of its argument places, or those of any of its embedded functions. Otherwise, it acts
like a constant.
If the arguments of a function are all variables, then you are free to use UG over the
variables in that function. If the arguments of a function contain any constants, then
you may not use UG. You may use UG on either ‘x’ or ‘y’ in 5.7.2, assuming that the
proposition does not appear within an indented sequence in which the variables are
free in the first line.
5.7.2 Af(x, y) ⊃ Bx(fx)
You may not use UG on ‘x’ and ‘y’ in 5.7.3, depending on whether the variables were
free when ‘a’ was introduced.
5.7.3 Af(x, y, a)
For EI, we must continue always to instantiate to a new singular term. A functor is
not a new singular term if any of its arguments or any of the arguments of any of its
subfunctors have already appeared in the derivation or appear in the conclusion. The
functor itself need not be new. At 5.7.4, you may not instantiate line 2 to ‘a’ or to ‘b’;
use a new constant, as at line 3.
5.7.4 1. f(a)=b Premise
2. (∃x)Sf(x) Premise
3. Sf(c) 2, EI
Turning to complete proofs, the derivation at 5.7.5 uses a function merely as a sin-
gular term and does not alter the functional structure of any singular term.
5.7.5 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ Pf(x)]
2. (∃x)(Px ∙ Rxa) / (∃x)[Pf(x) ∙ Rxa]
3. Pb ∙ Rba 2, EI
4. Pb 3, Simp
5. Pb ⊃ Pf(b) 1, UI
6. Pf(b) 5, MP
7. Rba 3, Simp
8. Pf(b) ∙ Rba 6, 7, Conj
9. (∃x)[Pf(x) ∙ Rxa] 8, EG
QED
Sometimes, though, a derivation requires us to add or reduce functional structure,
as at 5.7.6.
5.7.6 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ Pf(x)]
2. (∃x)[Pf(x) ∙ Qf(f(x))] / (∃x)[Pf(f(x)) ∙ Qf(f(x))]
In order to derive the conclusion of 5.7.6, we have to UI line 1 to ‘f (a)’. That will in-
crease the functional structure of the terms in the premise. That’s acceptable, though,
since the premise is universal. If a claim holds of anything, it holds of all functions of
anything. So, the derivation at 5.7.7 is perfectly fine.
5.7.7 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ Pf(x)]

2. (∃x)[Pf(x) ∙ Qf(f(x))] / (∃x)[Pf(f(x)) ∙ Qf(f(x))]
3. Pf(a) ∙ Qf(f(a)) 2, EI
4. Pf(a) 3, Simp
5. Pf(a) ⊃ Pf(f(a)) 1, UI
6. Pf(f(a)) 5, 4, MP
7. Qf(f(a)) 3, Simp
8. Pf(f(a)) ∙ Qf(f(a)) 6, 7, Conj
9. (∃x)[Pf(f(x)) ∙ Qf(f(x))] 8, EG
QED
Given that you may increase functional structure when using UI, the inferences
at 5.7.8 from the universal statement at the top to any of its instances below it are all
acceptable.
5.7.8 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
Pa ⊃ Qa
Px ⊃ Qx
Pf(x) ⊃ Qf(x)
Pf(a) ⊃ Qf(a)
Pf(x, y) ⊃ Qf(x, y)
Pf(a, f(x), b) ⊃ Qf(a, f(x), b)
Pf(f(g(f(a)))) ⊃ Qf(f(g(f(a))))
Pf(f(g(f(x)))) ⊃ Qf(f(g(f(x))))
Similarly, you can increase functional structure when using UG. All of the infer-
ences at 5.7.9 are legitimate as long as the variables in the formula above the line still
have their universal character (i.e., the formula is not within an indented sequence in
which x is free in the first line).
5.7.9 Px ⊃ Qx
(∀x)[Pf(x) ⊃ Qf(x)]
(∀x)[Pf(x, g(y)) ⊃ Qf(x, g(y))]
(∀x)[Ph(f(g(x, x))) ⊃ Qh(f(g(x, x)))]
You may not decrease functional structure with the universal rules. For an example
of the problem with UG, consider the faulty derivation at 5.7.10 that decreases func-
tional structure when using UG at line 3.
5.7.10 1. (∀x)Gf(x) Premise
2. Gf(x) 1, UI
3. (∀x)Gx 2, UG But wrong!
Uh-oh!
The problem with 5.7.10 is clear if we interpret ‘Gx’ as ‘x is greater than 0’ and ‘f(x)’as
the successor function for natural numbers. If we restrict our domain to the natural
numbers including zero, then we have concluded that all natural numbers are greater
than zero from the premise that all successors are greater than zero. But zero is not
greater than zero!
Decreasing functional structure is also unacceptable for UI. Imagine an interpre-
tation of 5.7.11 that takes ‘Px’ as ‘x is even’ and ‘f(x)’ as ‘twice x’, and imagine again a
domain of natural numbers.
5.7.11 (∀x)[Pf(f(x)) ⊃ Pf(x)]
On our interpretation, 5.7.11 says that if four times a number is even, then twice
a number is even. That’s true. But if we decrease the functional structure when
instantiating, as at 5.7.12, we get a false claim.
5.7.12 Pf(a) ⊃ Pa
5.7.12 says that if twice ‘a’ is even, then ‘a’ is even. If we interpret ‘a’ as any odd num-
ber, say 3, 5.7.12 is false even though 5.7.11 is true.
So, when using universal instantiation and generalization rules, you can increase
functional structure. But never decrease functional structure with the universal rules.
Conversely, you may decrease functional structure with existential rules, both EI
and EG, but you may never increase functional structure with them.
Since existentially quantified sentences are so weak, merely claiming that some ob-
ject in the domain has a property, we can EG at any point over any singular terms.
‘(∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)’ can be inferred from any of the statements listed above the horizontal
line at 5.7.13, decreasing even very complex functional structure.
5.7.13 Pa ∙ Qa
Pf(a) ∙ Qf(a)
Pf(x) ∙ Qf(x)
Pf(a, b, c) ∙ Qf(a, b, c)
Pf(f(x), x, f(f(x))) ∙ Qf(f(x), x, f(f(x)))
Pf(f(g(f(a)))) ∙ Qf(f(g(f(a))))
Pf(f(g(f(x)))) ∙ Qf(f(g(f(x))))
(∃x)(Px ∙ Qx)
Moreover, with nested functions, you can EG in different ways. All of the proposi-
tions below the line at 5.7.14 can also be acceptably inferred from the proposition at
the top using EG.
5.7.14 Pf(f(g(f(a)))) ∙ Qf(f(g(f(a))))
(∃x)[Pf(f(g(f(a)))) ∙ Qf(f(g(f(a))))]
(∃x)[Pf(f(g(x))) ∙ Qf(f(g(x)))]
(∃x)[Pf(f(x)) ∙ Qf(f(x))]
(∃x)[Pf(x) ∙ Qf(x)]
Decreasing functional structure using EI is also acceptable. Either inference from
the quantified formula at 5.7.15 is acceptable.
5.7.15 (∃x)[Pf(x) ∙ Qf(f(x))]

Pf(a) ∙ Qf(f(a))
Pa ∙ Qf(a)
To see that you may not increase functional structure with existential rules, con-
sider the illegitimate inference at 5.7.16.
5.7.16 1. (∃x)Qx Premise
2. Qf(a) 1, EI: but wrong!
Just interpret ‘Qx’ as ‘x is the last sale of the day’, ‘f(x)’ as the previous sale (in any
given day) function, and ‘a’ as some sale. Then, 5.7.16 concludes that some sale that is
previous to another is also the last of the day.
So, you can’t decrease functional structure with EI. You can’t decrease functional
structure with EG, either: a person may have a property without her/his mother or
father or grandmother or firstborn child having it too!
In brief, you may increase functional structure when using universal rules, but you
may not decrease it. You may decrease functional structure when using existential
rules, but you may not increase it.
There is one last caveat about changing functional structure, which some proofs re-
quire. If you are changing the functional structure, make sure to change it uniformly.
If you are replacing ‘f(x, g(a))’ with ‘x’ in one place in a wff, you must replace it with
‘x’ everywhere it appears in the wff. And you may not change functional structure
for one singular term and not for another in the same instantiated or generalized for-
mula. So, neither of the inferences 5.7.17 nor 5.7.18 is valid.
5.7.17 (∃x)[Ox ∙ Ef(x)]
Oa ∙ Ea No good!
5.7.18 Ox ⊃ ∼Ex
(∀x)[Ox ⊃ ∼Ef(x)] No good!
In 5.7.17, we might be concluding that some number is both odd and even from the
premise that odd numbers have even doubles. And in 5.7.18, we might be concluding
that no odd numbers have even successors from the claim that no odd numbers are
even. Functional structure must be changed uniformly within a wff. So, in cases like
(∃x)[Pf(x) ∙ Qh(f(x), g(x))], where you could, in theory, reduce the functional struc-
ture when instantiating because the quantifier is existential, the presence of the ‘g(x)’
means that you cannot, say, replace all of the ‘f(x)’s with ‘x’s.
Derivations with Functors

Let’s return to argument 5.6.1. We saw at 5.6.6 that the conclusion follows if we regi-
ment the argument using definite descriptions, as here.
5.6.1 All applicants will get a job.

Jean is an applicant.
Jean is the first child of Dominique and Henri.
So, some first child will get a job.
1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Gx)
2. Aj
3. (∃x)[Fxdh ∙ (∀y)(Fydh ⊃ y=x) ∙ x=j]
/ (∃x){(∃y)(∃z)[Fxyz ∙ (∀w)(Fwyz ⊃ w=x)] ∙ Gx}
But, as I said, invoking functions will make the derivation simpler. Let’s use a func-
tion ‘f(x, y)’ for ‘the first child of x and y’ to regiment the third premise and conclu-
sion; the result is at 5.7.19. Notice how quickly and easily the derivation follows.
5.7.19 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Gx)
2. Aj
3. j=f(d, h) / (∃x)(∃y)Gf(x, y)
4. Aj ⊃ Gj 1, UI
5. Gj 4, 2, MP
6. Gf(d, h) 5, 3, IDi
7. (∃y)Gf(d, y) 6, EG
8. (∃x)(∃y)Gf(x, y) 7, EG
QED
5.7.20 contains a derivation that uses some composition of functions. Note that ‘B’
is a two-place predicate, taking as arguments a variable and a functor term with a vari-
able argument in the first premise, and taking as arguments two functor terms, each
with variable arguments, in the conclusion.
5.7.20 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ Bxf(x)]
2. (∃x)Af(x) / (∃x)Bf(x)f(f(x))
3. Af(a) 2, EI to “a”
4. Af(a) ⊃ Bf(a)f(f(a)) 1, UI to “f(a)”
5. Bf(a)f(f(a)) 4, 3, MP
6. (∃x)Bf(x)f(f(x)) 5, EG
QED
In the short derivation 5.7.21, we instantiate to a two-place function, f(x, g(x)), one
of whose arguments is itself a function. Since none of the arguments of any of the
functions in 5.7.21 are constants, UG is permissible at line 3.
5.7.21 1. (∀x)∼Cx / (∀x)∼Cf(f(x), x)
2. ∼Cf(x, g(x)) 1, UI
3. (∀x)∼Cf(x, g(x)) 2, UG
QED
5.7.22 derives the conclusion of an argument that uses concepts from number the-
ory in which functions play an important role.
5.7.22 1. If the product of a pair of numbers is odd, then the
product of the successors of those numbers is even.
2. Seven and three are odd numbers.
3. The product of seven and three is odd.
So, the product of the successors of seven and three
is even.
1. (∀x)(∀y){(Nx ∙ Ny) ⊃ [Of(x, y) ⊃ Ef(f(x), f(y))]}
2. Os ∙ Ns ∙ Ot ∙ Nt
3. Of(s, t) / Ef(f(s), f(t))
4. (∀y){(Ns ∙ Ny) ⊃ [Of(s, y) ⊃ Ef(f(s), f(y))]} 1, UI
5. (Ns ∙ Nt) ⊃ [Of(s, t) ⊃ Ef(f(s), f(t))] 4, UI
6. Ns ∙ Nt 2, Simp
7. Of(s, t) ⊃ Ef(f(s), f(t)) 5, 6, MP
8. Ef(f(s), f(t)) 7, 3, MP
QED
Summary
The derivation system we use with FF is basically the same as the one we use with
F; you mainly have to be careful to obey the guidelines about altering functional
structure.
We have come to the end of our main technical work. Still, there are many
further logical languages and systems, discussions of some of which are available as
supplements to this book.
KEEP IN MIND
The restrictions on instantiation and generalization rules for constants and variables are
the same whether the singular terms are simple or complex.
A complex singular term acts like a variable if there are any variables in any of its
argument places, or those of any of its embedded functions. Otherwise, it acts like
a constant.
You may increase functional structure when using universal rules (UI or UG), but you may
not decrease it.
You may decrease functional structure when using existential rules (EI or EG), but you
may not increase it.
If you change the functional structure of a wff, you must change it uniformly throughout.
EXERCISES 5.7a
1. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ Af (x)]
2. Aa
3. f (a)=b / Ab
2. 1. (∀x)[Bx ≡ Bg(x)]
2. (∀x)g(x)=f (x, x)
3. Ba / Bf(a,a)
3. 1. (∀x)[Px ≡ Pf (x)]
2. f (a)=f (b)
3. Pa / Pb
4. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ Pf (x)]
2. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Px)
3. Qa / Pf (a)
5. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[f(x, z)=y ⊃ f(y, z)=x]
2. f (a, b)=c
3. Pc ∙ Pa / (∃x)[Pf (a, x) ∙ Pf (c, x)]
6. 1. (∀x)Hf(x)
2. a=f (b) ∙ b=f (c)
3. (∀x)(Hx ⊃ ∼Ix) / a=f (f (c)) ∙ ∼Ia
7. 1. (∀x)(∀y)f (x, y)=f (y, x)
2. a=f (b, c)
3. b=f (c, a)
4. a≠b
5. Pa ∙ Pb / (∃x)(∃y)(∃z)[Pf (x, z) ∙ Pf (y, z) ∙ x≠y]
8. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[f (x)=f (y) ⊃ x=y]
2. f (a)=g(c, d)
3. f (b)=g(c, e)
4. d=e / a=b
9. 1. (∀x)[Pf (x) ⊃ (Qx ≡ Rx)]
2. Pa ∙ Qf(a)
3. (∀x)f (f (x))=x / Rf(f(f(a)))
10. 1. Pa ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠a) ⊃ Qax]
2. (∀x)(∀y)[x=f (y) ⊃ x≠y]
3. Pb ∙ b=f(a) / Qab
11. 1. f(a, b)=c

2. (∀x)[(∃y)f(a, x)=y ⊃ Px]
3. (∀x){Px ⊃ [Qc ∙ g(x)=c]} / (∃x){Px ∙ (∃y)[Q y ∙ g(x)=y]}
12. 1. (∀x)[Bf(x) ⊃ (Cx ∙ Df(f(x)))]
2. (∃x)Bf(f(x))
3. (∃x)Cf(x) ⊃ (∀x)Ex / (∃x)[Df(f(f(x))) ∙ Ef(f(f(x)))]
13. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[(Fx ∙ Fy) ⊃ Gf(x, y)]
2. (∀x)(∀y)[Gf(x, y) ≡ Gf(x, x)]
3. (∀x)[Gx ⊃ Gf(x)]
4. Fa ∙ Fb / Gf(f(a, a))
14. 1. (∀x)(∀y){Pf(x, y) ⊃ [(Px ∙ Py) ∨ (Qx ∙ Q y)]}
2. (∀x)Pf(x, f(f(x)))
3. (∃x)∼Qx / (∃x)Pf(f(a))
15. 1. Pa ∙ (∀x)[f(x)=a ⊃ Px]
2. (∀x)(∀y)[(Qxb ∙ Q yb) ⊃ x=y]
3. f(b)=c
4. Qab ∙ Qcb / Pb
16. 1. (∃x){Px ∙ Qx ∙ (∃y)[Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y ∙ Pf(x)f(y)]}
2. (∀x)(∀y)[Pxy ⊃ (Rx ∙ Ry)]
3. (∀x)[Rf(x) ⊃ Rx] / (∃x){Rx ∙ Rf(x) ∙ (∃y)[Ry ∙ Rf(y) ∙ x≠y]}
17. 1. (∀x){[Px ∙ (∃y)(Py ∙ Fxy)] ⊃ (∀z)[(Pz ∙ Fxz) ⊃ z=x]}
2. (∀x)[Px ⊃ Pf(x)]
3. Pa ∙ Faf(a) / ∼(∃x)[Px ∙ Fax ∙ x≠f(a)]
18. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[(Pxy ∙ Qxy) ⊃ ∼f(x)=y]
2. (∀x)(∀y)[Qxy ≡ Qxf(y)]
3. f(a)=b ∙ f(b)=a
4. Pab / ∼Qaa
19. 1. (∀x)(∀y){Qf(x, y) ⊃ [(Px ∙ Q y) ∨ (Py ∙ Qx)]}
2. (∀x)[Px ⊃ Qf(x)]
3. (∀x)Qf(x, f(x))
4. ∼Pa / Qa ∙ Pf(a)
20. 1. (∃x)(∃y){Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y ∙ f(x)=y ∙ (∀z)(∀w){[Pz ∙ Qz ∙ Pw ∙
Qw ∙ z≠w ∙ f(z)=w] ⊃ (z=x ∙ w=y)}}
2. Pa ∙ Qa ∙ Pb ∙ Qb ∙ a≠b ∙ f(a)=b ∙ Sa ∙ Sb
3. Pc ∙ Pd ∙ f(c)=d ∙ ∼Sc ∙ ∼Sd ∙ c≠d / ∼(Qc ∙ Qd)
EXERCISES 5.7b
Translate each of the following arguments into FF. Then,
derive the conclusion using our rules of inference.
1. If something is your father, then you are its child. Pavel has no children. So,
Pavel is not the father of Andres. (a: Andres; p: Pavel; f(x): the father of x; Cxy:
x is the child of y)
2. No number is equal to its successor. One and two are numbers, and two is the
successor of one. So, one is not two. (a: one; b: two; f(x): the successor of x;
Nx: x is a number)
3. The brother of Amanda and Amanda are children of Nancy. Peter’s mother is
a woman named Nancy. Something is your mother if, and only if, it is a woman
and you are her child. So, Amanda and Peter share a mother. (a: Amanda; n:
Nancy; p: Peter; f(x): the mother of x; Wx: x is a woman; Bxy: x is a brother of
Amanda; Cxy: x is a child of y)
4. Anyone is happy on any day if, and only if, they are unhappy on the following
day. Joyce is a person who will be happy in three days. Today is a day, and the day
after any day is a day. So, Joyce won’t be happy in two days. (j: Joyce; t: today;
f(x): the day after x; Dx: x is a day; Px: x is a person; Hxy: x is happy on day y)
5. Anyone who completes a task is proud on the following day. Friday is the day
that the person Emma completed the task of her logic homework. Saturday is
the day after Friday. So, Emma is proud on Saturday. (a: Friday; b: Saturday; e:
Emma; l: Emma’s logic homework; f(x): the day after x; Dx: x is a day; Px: x is a
person; Tx: x is a task; Cxyz: x completes y on day z)
6. The product of two and any odd is even. The sum of two and any odd is odd.
Seven is odd. So, the product of two and the sum of two and seven is even. (a:
two; b: seven; f(x, y): the product of x and y; g(x, y): the sum of x and y; Ex: x is
even; Ox: x is odd)
7. One, two, and four are distinct numbers. The positive square root of four is two.
Two is the sum of one and itself. So, the positive square root of some number is
the sum of some other number and itself. (a: one; b: two; c: four; f(x): the posi-
tive square root of x; f(x, y): the sum of x and y; Nx: x is a number)
8. One, two, and four are distinct numbers. The sum of two and the sum of one
and one is four. Two is the sum of one and itself. So, some number is the sum of
the sum of some other number with itself and the sum of the latter number with
itself again. (a: one; b: two; c: four; f(x, y): the sum of x and y; Nx: x is a number)
9. Exactly one number is the sum of itself and itself. Zero is the sum of itself and
itself. The number one is the successor of the number zero, and no number is its
own successor. So, one is not the sum of itself and itself. (a: zero; b: one; f(x):
the successor of x; f(x, y): the sum of x and y; Nx: x is a number)
10. Exactly two numbers are the products of themselves with themselves. The prod-
uct of a number and itself is its square. The square of zero is zero. The square of
one is one. Zero, one, and five are distinct numbers. So, the square of five is not
five. (a: zero; b: one; c: five; f(x): the square of x; g(x, y): the product of x and y;
Nx: x is a number)
KEY TERMS
argument, 5.6 IDs, 5.5

atomic formula, 5.2 n-tuple, 5.2
definite description, 5.4 n-tuple of singular terms, 5.6
dyadic predicates, 5.1 narrow scope of a quantifier, 5.1
functional structure, 5.7 polyadic predicates, 5.1
functor, 5.6 relational predicates, 5.1
functor term, 5.6 triadic predicates, 5.1
IDi, 5.5 wide scope of a quantifier, 5.1
IDr, 5.5
Appendix A: Fallacies
and Argumentation
This book is dedicated to distinguishing good deductive arguments from bad ones.
To that end, in the first five chapters, I discuss not only the rules for valid inferences,
but also ways to identify invalid inferences and construct counterexamples. Given
any argument of our main formal languages, PL, M, and F, we should be able to show
either that it is valid or invalid.
In ordinary discourse, though, the concepts of argument and validity range far be-
yond their applications to our formal languages and deductive reasoning. Many argu-
ments are not deductive, including those we see every day in the news, in advertising,
in science, and in our personal conversations. Compliance with the formal, deductive
methods of this book is important, perhaps even necessary, for good reasoning. But
there is much more to be said about good argumentation generally.
The logic of non-deductive arguments is not as clean as that of the deductive logic
of this book. There are, in principle, no categorical formal rules for distinguishing
good inductive arguments from poor ones, which we can call, most broadly, fallacies.
For reasons partly rooted in the problems of induction identified by Hume, there is
no formal criterion for valid induction. No comprehensive set of rules is available for
identifying good informal reasoning. No list of rules suffices to show us how to avoid
all fallacies.
Still, we can identify some poor patterns of reasoning and pick out some general
principles for distinguishing good informal inferences from bad ones. Indeed, there
is a long history of philosophers trying to develop such principles. Aristotle identified
many fallacies, especially in On Sophistical Refutations, Prior Analytics, and On Rheto-
ric; his work continues to influence contemporary research. Other important histori-
cal figures in advancing the understanding of fallacies include Antoine Arnauld and
Pierre Nicole, in their seventeenth-century Port-Royal Logic, and John Stuart Mill,
in his nineteenth-century A System of Logic. All of these works identified patterns of
arguments or dialogue to be avoided in discourse that is not purely deductive.
Attention to the fecund tools of formal logic in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries largely eclipsed research on fallacies, inductive reasoning, and
401
4 0 2 A P P E N DIX A
informal logic, even as greater attention was being paid to the methods of science,
especially to the related notions of confirmation and explanation. Through most of
the twentieth century, logicians paid little attention to inductive or informal fallacies,
and logic books mainly mentioned them in passing.
Still, beginning perhaps with Hamblin’s Fallacies in 1970, and with the develop-
ment of an academic society devoted to the study of informal logic, research on
non-deductive argument, especially informal fallacies, has recently burgeoned. In
parallel, philosophers have paid increasing attention to probabilistic reasoning and
details of the methods of the hard and social sciences. One result is that many con-
temporary logic books now split their attention between formal, deductive methods
and informal, inductive ones. Moreover, contemporary research on cognitive biases
has produced work related to the traditional study of fallacies. There are many ways
to infer badly.
This book is focused on formal, deductive methods, leaving the mountain of work
on informal logic and natural reasoning to other sources. But in the perhaps lamen-
table tradition of lip service to informal logic, this section is devoted to identifying
and describing some general fallacies of reasoning, both formal and informal. There
are many competing ways of classifying fallacies and distinguishing among them. I’ll
start by distinguishing between formal fallacies, as ones that are defects in the struc-
ture of an argument, and informal fallacies, as ones that are, generally, defects in the
content, and so perhaps not really logical fallacies, in the sense in which we have been
using ‘logic’.
FORMAL FALLACIES
One aspect of many fallacies, which some philosophers take to be essential to any
fallacy, is their shallow similarity to legitimate, even deductively valid, inferences.
This similarity is especially apparent in some formal fallacies, especially when they
are presented abstractly, like rules of inference. In §3.1, we saw two formal fallacies
that have traditional names: affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent.
AFA.1 α⊃β
β / α Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent
AFA.2 α ⊃ β
~α / ~β Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent
Inferences of these forms are categorically fallacious, since the premises can be true
while the consequent is false, as we saw in §3.1. Of course, it is possible to provide sub-
stitution instances on which the conclusions are true. But we define ‘validity’ so that
any form that allows for true premises and a false conclusion is invalid.
Other formal fallacies include the fallacy of the undistributed middle, AFA.3,
which is similar in appearance to some rules of Aristotelian logic, or syllogism, a logi-
cal theory superseded by, and mainly derivable from, our work in predicate logic.
F A L L A C I E S A N D A R G UM E N T A T I O N 4 0 3
AFA.3 All α are γ.

All β are γ.
So all α are β.
In its abstract form, the fallaciousness of AFA.3 may be subtle or difficult to see.
The similarity of AFA.3 to a valid form like AFA.4, which Aristotle called Barbara as
a mnemonic, helps obscure the problem.
AFA.4 All α are β.
All β are γ.
So all α are γ.
Substitution instances make the distinction more obvious. For AFA.3, we can use,
‘All cows are mammals; all whales are mammals; so all cows are whales’. The conclu-
sion clearly does not follow. For AFA.4, we can use, ‘All cows are mammals. All mam-
mals birth their young. So all cows birth their young.’
Such formal fallacies are easy to discover using the tools in the chapters 1–5. They
will all be invalid, and so we can show them invalid using truth tables, for proposition-
ally invalid arguments like AFA.1 and AFA.2, or the method of finite universes, for
quantificationally invalid arguments like AFA.3, which we can render as AFA.5.
AFA.5 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)
(∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) / (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
We can see the counterexample to AFA.5 in a one-membered domain in which ‘Pa’
is true, ‘Ra’ is true, and ‘Qa’ is false. A formal version of the valid syllogism Barbara,
AFA.6, is easily provable in M or F, using UI (twice), HS, and UG.
AFA.6 (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx)
(∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) / (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)
The methods for discovering, labeling, and categorizing informal fallacies are more
complicated and less categorical.
INFORMAL FALLACIES
Consider the argument AFA.7, which Descartes presents in his letter of dedication to
the Meditations on First Philosophy.
AFA.7 We must believe in God’s existence because it is taught in the Holy
Scriptures, and, conversely, we must believe the Holy Scriptures
because they have come from God (Descartes, AT VII.2, CSM II.3).
In the ensuing discussion, Descartes points out two characteristics of the argu-
ment. First, whether one accepts the argument or not depends on one’s background
beliefs. For theists like Descartes, such an argument is acceptable. But nonbelievers
will judge it to be fallaciously circular. Indeed, though Descartes does not say so ex-
plicitly, such a fallacy has a traditional Latin name, petitio principii, and is also known
as begging the question, or just circular reasoning.
Today, circular reasoning is widely understood to be fallacious, even though it is

tricky to develop general principles about why it is fallacious. We can easily character-
ize circular arguments as those in which one assumes in the premises what is to be
proven in the conclusion. The argument AFA.8 is easily seen to be circular.
AFA.8 All twenty-first century presidents of the United States attended
Ivy League universities.
Barack Obama was a president of the United States in the twenty-
first century.
So, Obama attended an Ivy League university.
To see the circularity of AFA.8, just observe that one should not accept the first
premise if one does not already accept the conclusion. The argument concludes what
it has already assumed.
Notice that all of the valid formal inferences of this book are circular in this way.
Any deductively valid argument concludes only claims that are, either implicitly or
explicitly, already contained in the premises. Whatever error, or fallacy, is found in
circular reasoning is one that extends to all of deductive logic. Or, in the other direc-
tion, since deductive logic is not itself in error, there are limits to the ways in which
circular reasoning may be fallacious.
Indeed, a similar claim might be justly asserted of most, or even all, informal fal-
lacies. We can identify certain patterns of reasoning that are, in many instances, falla-
cious. But they are often related to patterns of reasoning that are not fallacious. There
thus continue to be important debates among philosophers of inductive reasoning
about the nature and extent of fallacies.
Still, it is traditional and sometimes useful to identify some potentially fallacious
patterns of reasoning, noting that particular cases are up for discussion and debate.
Perhaps the least contentious way to do so is to look at some general categories of fal-
lacies. Among the most important are the ones in the list at AFA.9, which structures
the rest of this section.
AFA.9 Irrelevant premises
Unwarranted or weak premises
Causal fallacies
Ambiguity
IRRELEVANT PREMISES
Many arguments in our day-to-day conversations are not nearly as tight as most of
the arguments in this textbook. In the valid inferences of this book, I usually provide
just the right premises to derive the conclusion. In politics, philosophy, and ordinary
conversation, people tend to speak or argue more freely, often mistakenly omitting
key premises or offering irrelevant reasons for their conclusions. Arguments missing
a premise are called enthymemes; they are easily remedied by the addition of what
was omitted. Arguments with irrelevant premises may be called non sequiturs, since
the conclusions don’t follow, either deductively or informally.
We can identify several different kinds of irrelevant premises. Advertisers often
seem to commit the fallacy of appeal to unreliably authority when they present the
endorsement of a product from a famous person. Athletes, movie stars, and other ce-
lebrities are often used to sell products, even if their authority about those products
is minimal. A football player, say, usually has no particular expertise about the nutri-
tional value or the taste of a breakfast cereal, or the reliability of a car. Expertise in one
domain, acting, say, does not automatically transfer to another domain, like evaluat-
ing a medication. The premise of a person’s authority in some area is not relevant to
the truth of a claim in another area.
Still, many product endorsements can be seen not as arguments for the quality of
a product, but as lending the product a certain quality by association with a celeb-
rity. Since many people, either consciously or unconsciously, idolize celebrities, a
celebrity’s endorsement of a product can be a compelling reason to buy or approve of
the product. And, of course, many celebrities are experts about some of the products
they endorse: a model’s endorsement of a skin care product or a basketball player’s
endorsement of a sneaker may well be based on reliable expertise.
So appeals to authority can be challenging to evaluate. Given the vastness and de-
tail of human knowledge, all of us need to defer to authorities: to doctors about our
health, to physicists about the structure of the universe, to mechanics about our cars.
A biology professor’s assertion about the structure of a phylum is a good reason to be-
lieve that the phylum is structured as she says. A biology professor’s assertions about
the development of a fetus in the womb might be similarly reliable. But if a biology
professor were to make assertions about the morality of abortion, say, we might ques-
tion whether her expertise extends to ethical domains.
Even if someone is not reliably expert in an area, that is not a cause to dismiss a
claim made in that area by that person. We should not rule out an assertion because
of the ignorance or even bias of a speaker. But neither should we use their authority in
other areas as an argument for the claim.
More broadly, we commit the so-called ad hominem (to the person) fallacy when
we accept or deny a claim on the basis of the person who makes it. An ad populum
fallacy is an appeal to a group sentiment, accepting or denying a claim because of oth-
ers’ beliefs about the claim. Nationalists may appeal to their views about a country’s
values in order to court voters: this is what it means to be an American, or French, or
Chinese. Advertisers often tout the popularity of a product as a reason to buy it. While
a product’s popularity may be justified by its effectiveness or utility, it is no guarantee
that you should buy it. Appeals to tradition are similar. In the United States, we of-
ten hear that rights to bear weapons are grounded in the Second Amendment to the
Constitution, though the difference between the kinds of weapons available now and
those that were available at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted may undermine
the importance of that tradition.
Appeals to emotion can similarly distract a conversation from central theses. It is

difficult to focus on arguments in an appropriately objective and detached way when
the subject is close to our hearts or gets our emotions up. Discussions of important
issues in our society, like racism, campus rape, or weapons ownership, can be hard
enough without the distractions of appeals to emotion or fear. When we depict our
opponents in a debate as evil, when we distort facts to convince our audience that the
choices they make are more dangerous than they are, we distort our conversation. It
is often easy to depict our political debates as between good and evil. Cynical politi-
cians sometimes take advantage of voters’ emotions when discussing challenging or
incendiary topics. But good policy tends to be rooted in careful evaluations rather
than emotional appeals.
The so-called straw man fallacy misrepresents someone’s view in order to refute
it more easily. The first step in perhaps all good philosophical discourse is charitable
interpretation of others’ views. But charitable interpretation is often difficult, and it
is sometimes more convenient, if irresponsible, to discuss views that are easily dis-
missed or refuted than ones that are more complicated and subtle. Imagine respond-
ing to a proposal at a university for new undergraduate distribution requirements
with the complaint that students have a right to choose their own courses. By depict-
ing those who favor new course requirements as people who believe that students
have no right to choose their courses, one distracts the conversation from the core
questions about the proposal.
Advertisements often show competitor’s products (or facsimiles of them) as infe-
rior, as having flaws that they may not really have. Understood as an argument for a
product, such advertisements may commit a straw man fallacy.
Like many fallacies, it is easier to avoid committing the straw man fallacy when
talking with people you trust than when discussing something written. In person,
you can ask whether your interpretation of what someone believes is correct before
evaluating the claim. If you have interpreted incorrectly, the premises you ascribe to
someone are likely to be irrelevant to their conclusion.
UNWARRANTED OR WEAK PREMISES

In arguments that commit fallacies of irrelevant premises, the conclusions do not
follow from the premises, either deductively or inductively. In arguments that com-
mit fallacies of unwarranted premises, the conclusions may follow, in some narrow
sense, from the premises, but the premises themselves require further discussion or
justification.
The fallacy of false dilemma looks like a disjunctive syllogism up close: either we
legalize all drugs or the government is violating your constitutional rights to liberty.
Or, either we keep marijuana illegal or everyone will be stoned all of the time and
society will crumble. One branch of the dilemma is clearly undesirable (no one wants
to lose our liberties; no one wants society to fall apart). But there might be subtler
positions in between the two branches. I might be neither with you nor against you,
but somewhere in between.
Begging the question (or petitio principii, or circular argument), a classic example
of which we saw in the scriptural circle from Descartes at the beginning of this sec-
tion, may be seen as a fallacy of unwarranted premises. Neither the truth of scripture
nor the existence of God is warranted from inside of the small circle. Of course, one
might have independent reasons to believe in God or the truth of scripture, or one
may not. But the premises in the circular argument themselves are insufficient.
An ordinary example of begging the question is an argument for someone’s, or
something’s, trustworthiness. You can ask the person (or, say, the crystal ball) whether
s/he is trustworthy, but you are unlikely to get any information that will assuage your
concerns, unless the person presents evidence apart from their assurances. The crys-
tal ball’s assurances that you should believe what it says are no assurances at all.
Some results in philosophy suggest that some sorts of circular reasoning, and thus
begging the question, are unavoidable. According to philosophers who are sometimes
called atomists, certain fundamental or basic propositions (perhaps the claim from
Augustine and Descartes that I exist whenever I am thinking, perhaps the claim that
one and one are two, perhaps our current sense perceptions) are known incorrigibly;
other beliefs are derived from the basic ones. In contrast to the claims of atomists,
holists argue that no belief is fundamental. Any belief requires a host of other beliefs
in order even to make sense. For the holist, the argument for any claim can never
be traced back to fundamental, incorrigible premises. All reasoning is, at root, circu-
lar. Still, whether atomism or holism is true, small circles like the scriptural or trust
circles seem clearly fallacious.
Like begging the question, the slippery slope fallacy is closely related to some le-
gitimate reasoning patterns. In its most offensive instances, users of the slippery slope
fallacy argue against a small change by insisting that it will lead to larger, repugnant
changes: if we limit sales of assault rifles, then the government will start to limit all
guns, and repress the people, and take away all of our rights until we are nothing but
slaves. While pretty much everyone agrees that we must be aware of unjust extensions
of governmental intrusion into our lives, not every federal restriction is an enslave-
ment of the people. Such slippery slope arguments often involve appeals to fear, as we
cringe from the loss of important freedoms.
Still, as the famous poem by Pastor Martin Niemöller points out, we must be vigi-
lant about the consequences of any of our actions.
First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a Socialist.
Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a Trade Unionist.
Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a Jew.
Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.
To determine whether the use is of an argument that invokes a slippery slope is

fallacious, one thus has to balance attention on the particular first step with a long
view about the increasing likelihood of further steps along the slope. Legalization of
marijuana was long opposed by those who did not believe that marijuana was harm-
ful, but who did believe that its legalization would lead to greater accessibility of more
harmful drugs. With many states decriminalizing marijuana, or even legalizing it, it
will be interesting to see whether such fears are warranted or not, whether such argu-
ments are fallacious or not.
One of the guiding principles of the formal derivations of this book, especially in
chapters 4 and 5, is the avoidance of the fallacy of hasty generalization. This fallacy
can come in many forms. In derivations in M or F, we never UG over a constant or
EI to a variable. These restrictions ensure that we avoid inferring that everything has
some property on the premise that something does; we can’t deduce that everyone is
polite from the claim that Suzy is.
In scientific contexts, one generalizes hastily when one lacks sufficient grounds for
a general conclusion, when one’s data does not support it. We will examine such infer-
ences, akin to those with weak premises, in more depth in the next section.
CAUSAL FALLACIES
Smoking causes cancer. It does not cause cancer in quite the same way that throwing
a stone off a cliff causes it to fall into the sea below. In the latter, simple case, the causa-
tion is nearly categorical. A strong wind or errant arm angle might alter the trajectory
of the stone, but it feels like we can almost see the workings of the physical laws, espe-
cially of gravity, in some cases.
Other causal relationships, like the connection between smoking and cancer, are
more complicated. The time between an action and its effect may be distant, and the
connection between the cause and the effect is not without exception. Not everyone
who smokes gets lung cancer, and even those who do may appear healthy for a long
time. Similarly, the effects of carbon emissions on climate change have been more
difficult to see than the falling stone off of the cliff. It is sometimes difficult on a blus-
tery day to believe the warnings we hear about global warming. The proper inferences
require detailed understandings of statistical principles and the relevant data. Such
research is essentially scientific, and failure to understand and respect good scientific
practice underlies lots of fallacious reasoning.
One error, common when using statistics and science more generally, is to make an
induction on too few cases, often by using a sample size that is too small, by neglect-
ing to randomize one’s sample effectively, or by using an unrepresentative sample.
Such errors are essentially hasty generalizations.
A similar error is called post hoc ergo propter hoc (after this, so caused by this). It
often darkens before a storm, but the storm is not caused by the darkness. There are
causal connections among events and phenomena, and there are accidental correla-
tions. It is, in large part, the business of science to distinguish them.
One slogan invoked to help people avoid such fallacious inferences is the claim that
correlation does not entail causation. Often, phenomena that are related have no di-
rect causal connection. A snowstorm might cause schools to close and milk deliveries
to be delayed. But the closed schools don’t cause the delays in the deliveries, nor the
reverse. Those two events are collateral effects of a common cause, and so their cor-
relation need not indicate any causal relationship between them.
More importantly, effects may correlate without even having a common cause.
An amusing website, Spurious Correlations (http://www.tylervigen.com/spurious
-correlations) shows that many unrelated events can be correlated, even with statisti-
cal significance: the number of people who drowned by falling into a pool correlates
with the number of films Nicolas Cage appeared in, between 1999 and 2009; total
revenue generated by arcades correlates with computer science doctorates awarded
in the United States over the same period.
Humans are notoriously bad at applying mathematics. One might categorize sta-
tistical and other mathematical errors among the causal fallacies. One commits the
gambler’s fallacy when one’s expectation for a random event increases over trials
in which the event does not occur: thinking that a particular roll of the dice is more
likely since it hasn’t been rolled lately, say. The likelihood of flipping an ideal fair coin
and getting heads is one-half, no matter how many tails in a row have come up.
Many people misunderstand statistics and make decisions, even important life de-
cisions, on such ill-informed and ill-understood grounds. Indeed, some philosophers
and psychologists call people fundamentally irrational because of our failings to apply
mathematics well, and for other cognitive biases, including framing, or anchoring,
when one’s first impressions distract us from what should be more overwhelming sub-
sequent evidence. People are especially bad at understanding and applying statistics,
especially concepts like regression toward the mean and the importance of sample
size. Research into human cognitive limitations and biases is legion these days; work
by Daniel Kahneman is especially engaging and enlightening.
AMBIGUITY
As we have seen throughout the book, a central advantage of formal languages is their
relative lack of ambiguity, especially when compared to natural languages. A word,
phrase, or sentence is ambiguous when it has multiple meanings. ‘Bear’ is ambiguous
between a verb meaning ‘carry’ and a noun for an ursine animal; ‘visiting relatives can
be annoying’ is an ambiguous sentence.
Fallacies of ambiguity often arise from using words in different ways in different
parts of a sentence. For example, one might deny the existence of a past or future,
even in thought, since to think of the past or future, one has to make it present. Such
an argument commits the fallacy of equivocation. I sometimes ask my students to

analyze the argument AFA.10.
AFA.10 God is love.
Love is blind.
Ray Charles is blind.
So, Ray Charles is God.
The argument has the surface appearance of a legitimate inference; one can imag-
ine a series of hypothetical syllogisms to the conclusion. The ambiguity in each prem-
ise debars the inference.
To commit the fallacies of composition and division, one attributes a property to
the whole what is the property of the parts (composition) or vice versa (division). One
can make a terrible meal with delicious ingredients; the inference from the excellence
of ingredients to the quality of the meal may be fallacious. And, as most people with
small apartments in large cities know, one cannot infer from the size of a city that
everything in it is big. The unofficial slogan that everything is bigger in Texas may be
seen as committing a fallacy of division.
Fallacies of complex questions can be amusing: Where did you hide the money
you stole? Have you stopped cheating on exams? There are no good direct answers to
such questions, since they presuppose a claim that may well be (and I hope it is!) false.
SUMMARY
We have identified some of the most common fallacies, grouping them into the cat-
egories of irrelevant premises, unwarranted or weak premises, causal fallacies, and
ambiguity:
ad hominem false dilemma
ad populum gambler’s fallacy
anchoring, or framing hasty generalization, or induction on too few
begging the question cases
complex questions post hoc ergo propter hoc
composition slippery slope
division straw man
emotion tradition
unreliably authority
wFallacies are sometimes committed intentionally, in order to manipulate consumers
or voters, say. The best way to avoid being subject to such manipulation is to learn to
read and consume in a critical way, to question claims of politicians and advertisers,
to look at good research and facts, and to learn how to use and understand statistics,
especially concepts such as statistical significance, confidence intervals, and regres-
sion to the mean (among others).
You may also worry about how to avoid committing fallacies in your own argu-
ments and conversations. Most fallacies are, in some ways, close to justifiable patterns
of reasoning. For example, while the gambler’s fallacy is clearly an error in statistical
reasoning, there are cases in which the longer one waits, the more likely what one is
waiting for will arrive, as in waiting for a bus or an elevator. Learning more mathemat-
ics, especially more statistics, and embracing the mathematics of daily life is a good
step toward avoiding some errant reasoning.
To avoid fallacies of suppressed premises, ask yourself whether the argument is
missing some important information. To avoid fallacies of unwarranted premises,
you can ask whether each assumption or reason given in an argument is itself justi-
fied or justifiable. Focus also on the relevance of each premise to its conclusion. For
ambiguity, look at the grammar of an argument and the meanings of its terms. And
to avoid causal fallacies, make sure to consider alternative explanations of any event.
Adjudicating between alternative explanations can be tricky work, sometimes requir-
ing deep scientific understanding. But the work of the logician is mainly just to ensure
that the structure of an argument explanation is legitimate, to verify that the form of
scientific work is acceptable.
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND WRITING

1. Discuss the presence of informal fallacies in ordinary discourse. Fallacies like
the ones discussed in this section are easy to attribute to politicians and adver-
tisers. Present specific examples. Sometimes, such folks are truly committing
fallacies. At other times, a charitable interpretation might reveal a reasonable
inference underlying an inference that might be described as a fallacy. Strive
for a balanced assessment of your examples.
2. Some research on fallacies analyzes them as dialogical or dialectical, failures of
communication. Does such an interpretation attribute more or less fallacious
reasoning to people? Is such an analysis accurate? See especially the work of
Hamblin and Walton.
3. Discuss a particular fallacy in depth. Why is it a fallacy? What reasonable pat-
tern of inference might lead people to commit such a fallacy? Begging the ques-
tion, ad hominem, and slippery slope are good choices, and Walton’s work on
them is a good place to start. For a more historical perspective, Aristotle and
Arnauld and Nicole are fecund sources.
4. Lewis Carroll was a mathematician named Charles Dodgson who studied and
wrote about logic. His work is often informed by jokes about faulty inferences,
and Through the Looking Glass is full of interesting fallacies, especially in chap-
ter 6, “Humpty Dumpty.” Discuss Carroll’s uses of faulty inferences and their
effects in his writing.
5. What is the difference between formal and informal fallacies? Compare the
work of the first five chapters on invalid inferences with the fallacies of this
section.
SUGGESTED READINGS
Aristotle. Prior Analytics, Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric. In The Complete Works of Aristo-
tle, edited by Jonathan Barnes, 39–113, 278–314, 2152–2269. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984. The three best sources in Aristotle for discussions of reasoning,
fallacious and legitimate.
Arnauld, Antoine, and Pierre Nicole. Logic, or the Art of Thinking, 5th ed. Translated and ed-
ited by Jill Vance Buroker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1683) 1996. Incom-
parably influential in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and even nineteenth centuries, this
book, also known as the Port-Royal Logic, has received renewed attention in recent years.
It is heavily influenced by Descartes and is perhaps the most important discussion of rea-
soning between Aristotle’s and Kant’s.
Carroll, Lewis. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass. New York:
Signet Classic, (1872, 1960) 2000. Carroll’s amusing uses of logical fallacies are manifest
in Through the Looking Glass. His work on logic is an interesting perspective on the last
days of pre-Fregean logic; his two books Symbolic Logic and Game of Logic are available
together from Dover.
Hamblin, C. L. Fallacies. London: Methuen, 1970. Hamblin emphasizes the dialectical na-
ture of reasoning and criticizes some treatments of fallacies for failing to recognize the
broader contexts. The book contains a useful discussion of Aristotle’s work.
Hansen, Hans. “Fallacies.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Stan-
ford University, Summer 2015. plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/fallacies/.
Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011. An
engaging, readable, and recently influential overview of the work of Kahneman’s long
and impressive career as a Nobel Prize winning economist studying human reasoning.
For more strictly academic work, see Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,
edited by Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982).
Walton, Douglas. A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacies. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1995. Walton’s work is highly influential in the contemporary world of informal logic, and
he invokes some formal tools for explication. See also his book-length treatments Begging
the Question (New York: Greenwood, 1991); Slippery Slope Arguments (Oxford: Claren-
don Press, 1992); and Ad Hominem Arguments (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1998).
In addition to the above sources, many standard logic textbooks, especially textbooks
for informal logic or critical reasoning, have extended discussion of logical fallacies.
Appendix B: The Logical
Equivalence of the Rules
of Equivalence
→ ~α ∙ ~β
De Morgan’s Laws: ~(α ∨ β) ←
~ (α ∨ β) ~ α ∙ ~ β
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
→ ~α ∨ ~β
De Morgan’s Laws: ~(α ∙ β) ←
~ (α ∙ β) ~ α ∨ ~ β
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
41 3
4 1 4 A P P E N DIX B
→ (α ∨ β) ∨ γ
Association: α ∨ (β ∨ γ) ←
α ∨ (β ∨ γ) (α ∨ β) ∨ γ
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
→ (α ∙ β) ∙ γ
Association: α ∙ (β ∙ γ) ←
α ∙ (β ∙ γ) (α ∙ β) ∙ γ
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
T H E L O G I C A L E QUIV A L E N C E O F T H E R U L E S O F E QUIV A L E N C E 4 1 5
→ (α ∨ β) ∙ (α ∨ γ)
Distribution: α ∨ (β ∙ γ) ←
α ∨ (β ∙ γ) (α ∨ β) ∙ (α ∨ γ)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
→ (α ∙ β) ∨ (α ∙ γ)
Distribution: α ∙ (β ∨ γ) ←
α ∙ (β ∨ γ) (α ∙ β) ∨ (α ∙ γ)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
→ ~β ⊃ ~α
Contraposition: α ⊃ β ←
α ⊃ β ~ β ⊃ ~ α
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
→ ~α ∨ β
Material Implication: α ⊃ β ←
α ⊃ β ~ α ∨ β
1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0
→ (α ⊃ β) ∙ (β ⊃ α)
Material Equivalence: α ≡ β ←
α ≡ β (α ⊃ β) ∙ (β ⊃ α)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
T H E L O G I C A L E QUIV A L E N C E O F T H E R U L E S O F E QUIV A L E N C E 4 1 7
→ (α ∙ β) ∨ (~α ∙ ~β)
Material Equivalence: α ≡ β ←
α ≡ β (α ∙ β) ∨ (~ α ∙ ~ β)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
→ α ⊃ (β ⊃ γ)
Exportation: (α ∙ β) ⊃ γ ←
(α ∙ β) ⊃ γ α ⊃ (β ⊃ γ)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
→ α ∨ α Tautology: α ←
Tautology: α ← → α ∙α
α ∨ α α ∙ α
1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
→ ~α ≡ β
Biconditional De Morgan’s Law (BDM): ~(α ≡ β) ←
~ (α ≡ β) ~ α ≡ β
0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
→ ~α ≡ ~β
Biconditional Inversion (BInver): α ≡ β ←
α ≡ β ~ α ≡ ~ β
1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0
Summary of Rules and Terms
Names of Languages
PL: propositional logic
M: monadic (first-order) predicate logic
F: full (first-order) Predicate Logic
FF: full (first-order) predicate logic with functors
Symbols
~, or tilde, is used to represent negation. (2.1)
∙, or dot, is used to represent conjunction. (2.1)
∨, or vel, is used to represent disjunction. (2.1)
⊃, or horseshoe, is used to represent material implication. (2.1)
≡, or triple bar, is used to represent biconditionals. (2.1)
→ is a metalogical symbol used to show the equivalence of two different forms
←
of wffs. (3.3)
∃ is the existential quantifier. (4.1)
∀ is the universal quantifier. (4.1)
ℱ is a metalogical symbol for a formula. (4.4)
= is the identity relation; α=β is shorthand for formulas using an identity relation
Iαβ. (5.4)
Abbreviations for Rules

Add: addition (3.2)
Assoc: association (3.3)
BAssoc: biconditional association (3.6)
BCom: biconditional commutativity (3.6)
BDM: biconditional De Morgan’s law (3.6)
BHS: biconditional hypothetical syllogism (3.6)
BInver: biconditional inversion (3.6)
BMP: biconditional modus ponens (3.6)
BMT: biconditional modus tollens (3.6)
CD: constructive dilemma (3.2)
Com: commutativity (3.3)
Conj: conjunction (3.2)
Cont: contraposition (3.4)
41 9
4 2 0 S u m m ar y of R u les an d T er m s
Dist: distribution (3.3)

DM: De Morgan’s laws (3.3)
DN: double negation (3.3)
DS: disjunctive syllogism (3.1)
EG: existential generalization (4.4)
EI: existential instantiation (4.4)
Equiv: material equivalence (3.4)
Exp: exportation (3.4)
HS: hypothetical syllogism (3.1)
IDi: identity, indiscernibility of identicals (5.5)
IDr: identity, reflexivity (5.5)
IDs: identity, symmetry (5.5)
Impl: material implication (3.4)
MP: modus ponens (3.1)
MT: modus tollens (3.1)
QE: quantifier exchange (4.5)
Simp: simplification (3.2)
Taut: tautology (3.4)
UG: universal generalization (4.4)
UI: universal instantiation (4.4)
Solutions to Selected Exercises
EXERCISES 1.4
5. P1. The faster you go, the quicker you get to your C. When public affairs are directed by an aristocracy,
destination. the national pride takes a reserved, haughty and in-
P2. As you go faster, time itself becomes compressed. dependent form.
P3. But it is not possible to go so fast that you get there
30. P1. I have a clear and distinct understanding of my
before you started.
mind, independent of my body.
C. Local timelines are temporally ordered.
P2. I have a clear and distinct understanding of my
10. P1. Rulers define ‘justice’ as simply making a profit body, independent of my mind.
from the people. P3. Whatever I can clearly and distinctly conceive of as
P2. Unjust men come off best in business. separate, can be separated by God, and so are really
P3. Just men refuse to bend the rules. distinct.
C. Just men get less and are despised by their own C. My mind is distinct from my body.
friends.
15. P1. The greatest danger to liberty is the omnipotence EXERCISES 1.5
of the majority. 5. Invalid 30. Invalid
P2. A democratic power is never likely to perish for lack 10. Valid, unsound 35. Valid, soundness is up
of strength or resources, but it may fall because of 15. Valid, unsound for debate
the misdirection of this strength and the abuse of 20. Invalid 40. Invalid
resources. 25. Valid, unsound
C. If liberty is lost, it will be due to an oppression of
minorities, which may drive them to an appeal to EXERCISES 2.1a
arms. 5. Antecedent: Gita’s financial aid comes through.
20. P1. Reading challenges a person more than any other Consequent: Gita plays lacrosse.
task of the day. 10. Antecedent: Percy rounds up volunteers.
P2. It requires the type of training that athletes un- Consequent: Orlando organizes peer tutoring.
dergo, and with the same life-long dedication. 15. Antecedent: Thoreau pays his taxes.
P3. Books must be read as deliberately and reservedly Consequent: Emerson bails out Thoreau.
as they were written. 20. Antecedent: Singer is a utilitarian.
C. To read well, as in, to read books in a true spirit, is a Consequent: No one else is.
noble exercise.
25. P1. In aristocratic countries, great families have enor- EXERCISES 2.1b
mous privileges, which their pride rests on. 5. M ∙ A
P2. They consider these privileges as a natural right 10. P ⊃ (C ∙ F)
ingrained in their being, and thus their feeling of 15. (C ∙ P) ≡ ~T
superiority is a peaceful one. 20. M ⊃ (P ∙ W)
P3. They have no reason to boast of the prerogatives 25. (H ∨ T) ∙ (A ∨ R)
which everyone grants to them without question. 30. (T ∨ ~S) ∙ C
421
4 2 2 S ol u t i ons to S electe d E x erc i ses
EXERCISES 2.1c EXERCISES 2.1d

1. D ∙ E 1. If Willa teaches in a middle school, then she teaches
E ⊃ S either English or history.
H /S∙H 6. If Marjorie is a philosophy professor who teaches logic,
then Suneel majors in philosophy.
6. ~(B ⊃ J)
11. If Carolina has a garden, then she plants vegetables and
M ⊃ J
flowers.
M ∨ A /A
11. F
EXERCISES 2.2
T
5. No 20. No
(F ∙ T) ⊃ K /K∙T
10. No 25. Yes, ⊃
16. F ⊃ (L ∙ W) 15. No
M ∙ F
W ⊃ B /B
EXERCISES 2.3a
21. U ⊃ R 4. True 16. True
R ⊃ ~V 8. False 20. False
U /V⊃A 12. True
26. G ≡ V
~V EXERCISES 2.3b
F ⊃ G / ~F 4. False 16. True
8. True 20. True
31. Z ≡ (G ∨ C)
12. Unknown
Z ∙ U
L ∙ ~C /G
EXERCISES 2.3c
36. S ∨ N
4. True 16. False
N ⊃ K
8. True 20. True
K ⊃ S /S
12. True
41. (K ∙ A) ⊃ D
K ∨ H
~H /A⊃D
EXERCISES 2.4
5. 10.
E E ≡ ~ E M N ~ (M ∨ N) ≡ N
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
S ol u t i ons to S electe d E x erc i ses 4 2 3
15.
S T (S ∙ ~ T) ∨ (T ⊃ S)
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
20.
A B (A ≡ ~ B) ⊃ [(B ∨ ~ B) ∙ A]
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
25.
P Q R (P ⊃ Q) ∨ [R ≡ (~ Q ∙ P)]
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0
30.
U V W [U ⊃ (V ⊃ W)] ∙ (V ∨ W)
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0
1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
35.
A B C D ~ (A ⊃ B) ∙ (C ∨ D)
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
40.
M N O P [(~ M ∙ N) ∨ (O ⊃ P)] ≡ M
1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
EXERCISES 2.5a EXERCISES 2.5b

5. Tautologous 30. Contingent 5. Logically equivalent 20. Inconsistent
10. Contingent 35. Contradictory 10. Contradictory 25. Contradictory
15. Tautologous 40. Contingent 15. Consistent 30. Contradictory
20. Contradictory 45. Contingent
25. Contingent
EXERCISES 2.6 10. 1. P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)

5. Invalid; counterexample when C is true and D is false 2. ~(Q ∙ R)
10. Invalid; counterexample when P is true and Q is either 3. P ∨ (S ≡ T) /S≡T
true or false 4. ~P 1, 2, MT
15. Invalid; counterexample when R is false, S is false 5. S ≡ T 3, 4, DS
20. Valid QED
25. Valid 15. 1. R ⊃ S
30. Invalid; counterexample when G is false, H is true, I is 2. S ⊃ (T ∨ U)
true 3. R
35. Valid 4. ~T /U
40. Valid 5. R ⊃ (T ∨ U) 1, 2, HS
6. T ∨ U 3, 5, MP
EXERCISES 2.7a 7. U 4, 6, DS
5 Valid QED
10. Invalid; counterexample when V is true, W is true, X is 20. 1. (P ≡ R) ∨ (Q ⊃ ~R)
false, Y is false, and Z is true 2. (P ≡ R) ⊃ S
15. Invalid; counterexample when N is false, O is false, P is 3. Q
false, Q is false, R is true 4. ~S / ~R
20. Valid 5. ~(P ≡ R) 2, 4, MT
25. Invalid; counterexample when S is true, T is true, U is 6. Q ⊃ ~R 1, 5, DS
false, V is true, W is false 7. ~R 6, 3, MP
30. Valid QED
35. Invalid; counterexample when Q is false, R is true, S is
25. 1. Q ⊃ (~R ⊃ S)
true, T is true, U is false, V is false, W is false
2. T ∨ Q
40. Invalid; counterexample when E is true, F is false, G is
3. ~T
true, H is false
4. R ⊃ T /S
45. Invalid; counterexample when A is false, B is false, C is
5. Q 2, 3, DS
true, D is false, E is false
6. ~R ⊃ S 1, 5, MP
7. ~R 3, 4, MT
EXERCISES 2.7b 8. S 6, 7, MP
5. Consistent; consistent valuation when A is false, B is QED
false, C is true, D is true, E is false, F is true 30. 1. C ⊃ (D ≡ ~E)
10. Inconsistent 2. (D ≡ ~E) ⊃ (B ∨ A)
15. Inconsistent 3. C ⊃ ~B
20. Inconsistent 4. C /A
25. Consistent; consistent valuation when L is true, M is 5. C ⊃ (B ∨ A) 1, 2, HS
true, N is true, O is true, P is false 6. B ∨ A 4, 5, MP
30. Consistent; consistent valuation when J is true, K is true, 7. ~B 3, 4, MP
L is false, M is false, N is true 8. A 6, 7, DS
35. Inconsistent QED
40. Consistent; consistent valuation when I is true, J is false,
K is false, L is true, M is false, N is true 35. 1. (P ⊃ Q ) ⊃ (R ∨ S)
2. ~R ⊃ (~R ⊃ Q )
3. P ⊃ ~R
EXERCISES 3.1a 4. P /S
5. 1. (I ∙ L) ⊃ (K ∨ J) 5. ~R 3, 4, MP
2. I ∙ L 6. ~R ⊃ Q 2, 5, MP
3. ~K /J 7. P ⊃ Q 3, 6, HS
4. K ∨ J 1, 2, MP 8. R ∨ S 1, 7, MP
5. J 3, 4, DS 9. S 8, 5, DS
QED QED
40. 1. P ⊃ [~(Q ⊃ R) ⊃ (Q ∨ ~R)] 12. 1. G ⊃ H

2. (Q ⊃ R) ∨ P 2. H ⊃ (M ∨ C)
3. (Q ⊃ R) ⊃ T 3. (M ∨ C) ⊃ D
4. ~T 4. ~D / ~G
5. ~Q / ~R 5. ~(M ∨ C) 3, 4, MT
6. ~(Q ⊃ R) 3, 4, MT 6. ~H 2, 5, MT
7. P 2, 6, DS 7. ~G 1, 6, MT
8. ~(Q ⊃ R) ⊃ (Q ∨ ~R) 1, 7, MP QED
9. Q ∨ ~R 8, 6, MP
10. ~R 9, 5, DS 16. 1. N ∨ ~A
QED 2. C ∨ ~E
3. C ⊃ ~L
4. ~~L
EXERCISES 3.1b: TR ANSLATIONS 5. ~N
4. 1. J ⊃ K 6. ~A ⊃ (~E ⊃ B) /B
2. K ⊃ L 7. ~A 1, 5, DS
3. ~L / ~J 8. ~E ⊃ B 6, 7, MP
8. 1. H ⊃ Y 9. ~C 3, 4, MT
2. Y ⊃ Z 10. ~E 2, 9, DS
3. W ∨ H 11. B 8, 10, MP
4. W ⊃ T QED
5. ~T /Z
12. 1. G ⊃ H
2. H ⊃ (M ∨ C) EXERCISES 3.2a
3. (M ∨ C) ⊃ D 4. Invalid 16. MP
4. ~D / ~G 8. MP 20. Add
12. Simp
16. 1. N ∨ ~A
2. C ∨ ~E
3. C ⊃ ~L EXERCISES 3.2b
4. ~~L 5. 1. I ∨ J
5. ~N 2. ~I ∙ K /J∨L
6. ~A ⊃ (~E ⊃ B) /B 3. ~I 2, Simp
4. J 1, 3, DS
EXERCISES 3.1b: DERIVATIONS 5. J ∨ L 4, Add
4. 1. J ⊃ K QED
2. K ⊃ L
3. ~L / ~J 10. 1. (P ≡ Q ) ⊃ R
4. J ⊃ L 1, 2, HS 2. Q ∨ ~R
5. ~J 3, 4, MT 3. ~Q
QED 4. ~P ⊃ (P ≡ Q ) / ~~P
5. ~R 2, 3, DS
8. 1. H ⊃ Y 6. ~(P ≡ Q ) 1, 5, MT
2. Y ⊃ Z 7. ~~P 4, 6, MT
3. W ∨ H QED
4. W ⊃ T
5. ~T /Z 15. 1. ~P ⊃ Q
6. ~W 4, 5, MT 2. ~Q ⊃ R
7. H 3, 6, DS 3. (~P ∨ ~Q ) ∙ S /Q∨R
8. Y 1, 7, MP 4. ~P ∨ ~Q 3, Simp
9. Z 2, 8, MP 5. Q ∨ R 1, 2, 4, CD
QED QED
20. 1. M ⊃ N 8. 1. X ⊃ Y
2. O ⊃ P 2. Y ⊃ Z
3. M ∙ Q /N∨P 3. W ∨ X
4. M 3, Simp 4. ~W ∙ Y / Z ∙ ~W
5. M ∨ O 4, Add
6. N ∨ P 1, 2, 5, CD 12. 1. D ∨ F
QED 2. D ⊃ ~B
3. ~~B / F ∙ ~D
25. 1. O ⊃ Q
2. Q ⊃ P 16. 1. S ⊃ E
3. P ⊃ (R ∙ S) 2. E ⊃ ~B
4. O /R∙S 3. E ⊃ ~A
5. O ⊃ P 1, 2, HS 4. S ∨ E / ~B ∨ ~A
6. P 5, 4, MP
7. R ∙ S 3, 6, MP
QED
30. 1. (~P ∨ Q ) ⊃ (S ⊃ T) EXERCISES 3.2c: DERIVATIONS

2. P ⊃ T 4. 1. T ⊃ U
3. ~T / ~S 2. V ∨ ~U
4. ~P 2, 3, MT 3. ~V / ~T ∨ W
5. ~P ∨ Q 4, Add 4. ~U 2, 3, DS
6. S ⊃ T 1, 5, MP 5. ~T 1, 4, MT
7. ~S 6, 3, MT 6. ~T ∨ W 5, Add
QED QED
35. 1. R ⊃ S 8. 1. X ⊃ Y
2. S ⊃ (T ⊃ U) 2. Y ⊃ Z
3. R 3. W ∨ X
4. U ⊃ R /T⊃R 4. ~W ∙ Y / Z ∙ ~W
5. R ⊃ (T ⊃ U) 1, 2, HS 5. ~W 4, Simp
6. T ⊃ U 5, 3, MP 6. X 3, 5, DS
7. T ⊃ R 6, 4, HS 7. X ⊃ Z 1, 2, HS
QED 8. Z 6, 7, MP
9. Z ∙ ~W 5, 8, Conj
40. 1. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) QED
2. S ⊃ (T ⊃ U)
3. W ⊃ X 12. 1. D ∨ F
4. ~(Q ⊃ R) 2. D ⊃ ~B
5. P ∨ S 3. ~~B / F ∙ ~D
6. T ∨ W /U∨X 4. ~D 2, 3, MT
7. (Q ⊃ R) ∨ (T ⊃ U) 1, 2, 5, CD 5. F 1, 4, DS
8. T ⊃ U 7, 4, DS 6. F ∙ ~D 5, 4, Conj
9. U ∨ X 8, 3, 6, CD QED
QED
16. 1. S ⊃ E
2. E ⊃ ~B
3. E ⊃ ~A
EXERCISES 3.2c: TR ANSLATIONS 4. S ∨ E / ~B ∨ ~A
4. 1. T ⊃ U 5. S ⊃ ~B 1, 2, HS
2. V ∨ ~U 6. ~B ∨ ~A 5, 3, 4, CD
3. ~V / ~T ∨ W QED
EXERCISES 3.3a 30. 1. E ∨ (F ∨ G)

5. 1. R ∨ B 2. ~(~~G ∨ ~H)
2. B ⊃ M 3. [(E ∨ F) ∙ ~G] ⊃ A /A
3. R ⊃ D 4. ~(G ∨ ~H) 2, DN
4. ~M /D 5. ~G ∙ ~~H 4, DM
5. ~B 2, 4, MT 6. ~G 5, Simp
6. B ∨ R 1, Com 7. (E ∨ F) ∨ G 1, Assoc
7. R 6, 5, DS 8. G ∨ (E ∨ F) 7, Com
8. D 3, 7, MP 9. E ∨ F 8, 6, DS
QED 10. (E ∨ F) ∙ ~G 9, 6, Conj
11. A 3, 10, MP
10. 1. A ⊃ (C ∨ B)
QED
2. ~C ∙ A
3. B ⊃ D /D 35. 1. A ⊃ B
4. A ∙ ~C 2, Com 2. ~[(C ∙ D) ∨ (C ∙ B)]
5. A 4, Simp 3. C ∙ E / ~A
6. C ∨ B 1, 5, MP 4. ~(C ∙ D) ∙ ~(C ∙ B) 2, DM
7. ~C 2, Simp 5. ~(C ∙ B) ∙ ~(C ∙ D) 4, Com
8. B 6, 7, DS 6. ~(C ∙ B) 5, Simp
9. D 3, 8, MP 7. ~C ∨ ~B 6, DM
QED 8. C 3, Simp
15. 1. P ∨ (Q ∙ R) 9. ~~C 8, DN
2. P ⊃ S 10. ~B 7, 9, DS
3. R ⊃ T /S∨T 11. ~A 1, 10, MT
4. (P ∨ Q ) ∙ (P ∨ R) 1, Dist QED
5. (P ∨ R) ∙ (P ∨ Q ) 4, Com
40. 1. (O ∙ P) ⊃ (Q ∙ R)
6. P ∨ R 5, Simp
2. P ⊃ ~Q
7. S ∨ T 2, 3, 6, CD
3. O ⊃ ~R
QED
4. P ∨ O / ~P ∨ ~O
20. 1. ~(E ∨ F) ⊃ D 5. ~Q ∨ ~R 2, 3, 4, CD
2. ~~G ∙ ~F 6. ~(Q ∙ R) 5, DM
3. E ⊃ ~G /D 7. ~(O ∙ P) 1, 6, MT
4. ~~G 2, Simp 8. ~O ∨ ~P 7, DM
5. ~E 3, 4, MT 9. ~P ∨ ~O 8, Com
6. ~F ∙ ~~G 2, Com QED
7. ~F 6, Simp
8. ~E ∙ ~F 5, 7, Conj
9. ~(E ∨ F) 8, DM
10. D 1, 9, MP EXERCISES 3.3b: TR ANSLATIONS
QED 4. 1. ~[P ∨ (Q ∙ R)]
25. 1. [T ∙ (U ∨ V)] ⊃ W 2. ~Q ⊃ S
2. W ⊃ ~X 3. ~R ⊃ T /S∨T
3. Y ∙ X / ~(T ∙ U) ∙ ~(T ∙ V)
4. [T ∙ (U ∨ V)] ⊃ ~X 1, 2, HS 8. 1. ~(K ∙ L) ⊃ M
5. X ∙ Y 3, Com 2. M ⊃ N
6. X 5, Simp 3. ~[(O ∙ P) ∨ N] /L
7. ~~X 6, DN 12. 1. (S ≡ C) ∨ P
8. ~[T ∙ (U ∨ V)] 4, 7, MT 2. ~(I ∨ P) /S≡C
9. ~T ∨ ~(U ∨ V) 8, DM
10. ~T ∨ (~U ∙ ~V) 9, DM 16. 1. (S ∨ C) ∨ (I ∨ N)
11. (~T ∨ ~U) ∙ (~T ∨ ~V) 10, Dist 2. (S ∨ C) ⊃ U
12. ~(T ∙ U) ∙ ~(T ∙ V) 11, DM 3. I ⊃ C
QED 4. ~U / ~(U ∨ ~N)
EXERCISES 3.3b: DERIVATIONS 25. Assoc

4. 1. ~[P ∨ (Q ∙ R)] 30. Does not follow; counterexample when P and Q are true
2. ~Q ⊃ S and R is false
3. ~R ⊃ T /S∨T
4. ~P ∙ ~(Q ∙ R) 1, DM EXERCISES 3.4b
5. ~P ∙ (~Q ∨ ~R) 4, DM 5. 1. G ∨ H
6. (~Q ∨ ~R) ∙ ~P 5, Com 2. ~I ∙ ( J ∙ ~G) / H ∨ ~I
7. ~Q ∨ ~R 6, Simp 3. (~I ∙ J) ∙ ~G 2, Assoc
8. S ∨ T 2, 3, 7, CD 4. ~G ∙ (~I ∙ J) 3, Com
QED 5. ~G 4, Simp
8. 1. ~(K ∙ L) ⊃ M 6. H 1, 5, DS
2. M ⊃ N 7. H ∨ ~I 6, Add
3. ~[(O ∙ P) ∨ N] /L QED
4. ~(O ∙ P) ∙ ~N 3, DM 10. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ R
5. ~N ∙ ~(O ∙ P) 4, Com 2. (P ∙ S) ∨ (P ∙ T) /Q⊃R
6. ~N 5, Simp 3. P ∙ (S ∨ T) 2, Dist
7. ~(K ∙ L) ⊃ N 1, 2, HS 4. P 3, Simp
8. ~~(K ∙ L) 6, 7, MT 5. P ⊃ (Q ⊃ R) 1, Exp
9. K ∙ L 8, DN 6. Q ⊃ R 5, 4, MP
10. L ∙ K 9, Com QED
11. L 10, Simp
QED 15. 1. P ⊃ (~Q ⊃ R)
2. ~(R ∨ S) /P⊃Q
12. 1. (S ≡ C) ∨ P 3. ~R ∙ ~S 2, DM
2. ~(I ∨ P) /S≡C 4. ~R 3, Simp
3. ~I ∙ ~P 2, DM 5. (P ∙ ~Q ) ⊃ R 1, Exp
4. ~P ∙ ~I 3, Com 6. ~(P ∙ ~Q ) 5, 4, MT
5. ~P 4, Simp 7. ~P ∨ ~~Q 6, DM
6. P ∨ (S ≡ C) 1, Com 8. ~P ∨ Q 7, DN
7. S ≡ C 6, 5, DS 9. P ⊃ Q 8, Impl
QED QED
16. 1. (S ∨ C) ∨ (I ∨ N) 20. 1. P ≡ ~Q
2. (S ∨ C) ⊃ U 2. P ∨ R
3. I ⊃ C 3. Q /R
4. ~U / ~(U ∨ ~N) 4. (P ⊃ ~Q ) ∙ (~Q ⊃ P) 1, Equiv
5. ~(S ∨ C) 2, 4, MT 5. P ⊃ ~Q 4, Simp
6. ~S ∙ ~C 5, DM 6. ~~Q 3, DN
7. ~C ∙ ~S 6, Com 7. ~P 5, 6, MT
8. ~C 7, Simp 8. R 2, 7, DS
9. ~I 3, 8, MT QED
10. I ∨ N 1, 5, DS
11. N 10, 9, DS 25. 1. Q ⊃ R
12. ~U ∙ N 4, 11, Conj 2. R ⊃ (S ⊃ T) / ~T ⊃ (S ⊃ ~Q )
13. ~U ∙ ~~N 12, DN 3. Q ⊃ (S ⊃ T) 1, 2, HS
14. ~(U ∨ ~N) 13, DM 4. (Q ∙ S) ⊃ T 3, Exp
QED 5. ~(Q ∙ S) ∨ T 4, Impl
6. (~Q ∨ ~S) ∨ T 5, DM
7. (~S ∨ ~Q ) ∨ T 6, Com
EXERCISES 3.4a 8. T ∨ (~S ∨ ~Q ) 7, Com
5. DN 9. ~~T ∨ (~S ∨ ~Q ) 8, DN
10. Does not immediately follow, though valid 10. ~T ⊃ (~S ∨~Q ) 9, Impl
15. Does not immediately follow, though valid 11. ~T ⊃ (S ⊃ ~Q ) 10, Impl
20. Exp QED
30. 1. ~P ∨ Q 12. 1. C ≡ ~F
2. R ⊃ ~Q 2. (~C ∙ Z) ⊃ D
3. R ∨ ~S 3. F /Z⊃D
4. ~T ⊃ S /P⊃T
5. P ⊃ Q 1, Impl 16. 1. (M ∙ R) ∨ ~H
6. ~~Q ⊃ ~R 2, Cont 2. (~M ∙ R) ∨ H
7. Q ⊃ ~R 6, DN 3. ~(H ≡ M) ∨ R /R
8. P ⊃ ~R 5, 7, HS
9. ~~R ∨ ~S 3, DN
10. ~R ⊃ ~S 9, Impl EXERCISES 3.4c: DERIVATIONS
11. P ⊃ ~S 8, 10, HS 4. 1. C ≡ D
12. ~S ⊃ ~~T 4, Cont 2. (D ∙ E) ∙ F /C
13. ~S ⊃ T 12, DN 3. (C ⊃ D) ∙ (D ⊃ C) 1, Equiv
14. P ⊃ T 11, 13, HS 4. (D ⊃ C) ∙ (C ⊃ D) 3, Com
QED 5. D ⊃ C 4, Simp
35. 1. T ⊃ (U ⊃ V) 6. D ∙ (E ∙ F) 2, Assoc
2. Q ⊃ (R ⊃ V) 7. D 6, Simp
3. (T ∙ U) ∨ (Q ∙ R) /V 8. C 5, 7, MP
4. (T ∙ U) ⊃ V 1. Exp QED
5. (Q ∙ R) ⊃ V 2, Exp
6. V ∨ V 4, 5, 3, CD 8. 1. F ∨ L
7. V 6, Taut 2. C ∨ ~F /C∨L
QED 3. ~~F ∨ L 1, DN
4. ~F ⊃ L 3, Impl
40. 1. ~(P ≡ ~Q ) 5. ~~C ∨ ~F 2, DN
2. P ⊃ R 6. ~C ⊃ ~F 5, Impl
3. Q ∨ R /R 7. ~C ⊃ L 6, 4, HS
4. ~[(P ∙ ~Q ) ∨ (~P ∙ ~~Q )] 1,Equiv 8. ~~C ∨ L 7, Impl
5. ~(P ∙ ~Q ) ∙ ~(~P ∙ ~~Q ) 4, DM 9. C ∨ L 8, DN
6. ~(~P ∙ ~~Q ) ∙ ~(P ∙ ~Q ) 5, Com QED
7. ~(~P ∙ ~~Q ) 6, Simp
8. ~~P ∨ ~~~Q 7, DM 12. 1. C ≡ ~F
9. ~~P ∨ ~Q 8, DN 2. (~C ∙ Z) ⊃ D
10. ~P ⊃ ~Q 9, Impl 3. F /Z⊃D
11. Q ⊃ P 10, Cont 4. ~C ⊃ (Z ⊃ D) 2, Exp
12. Q ⊃ R 11, 2, HS 5. (C ⊃ ~F) ∙ (~F ⊃ C) 1, Equiv
13. R ∨ Q 3, Com 6. C ⊃ ~F 5, Simp
14. ~~R ∨ Q 13, DN 7. ~~F 3, DN
15. ~R ⊃ Q 14, Impl 8. ~C 6, 7, MT
16. ~R ⊃ R 15, 12, HS 9. Z ⊃ D 4, 8, MP
17. ~~R ∨ R 16, Impl QED
18. R ∨ R 17, DN
19. R 18, Taut 16. 1. (M ∙ R) ∨ ~H
QED 2. (~M ∙ R) ∨ H
3. ~(H ≡ M) ∨ R /R
4. ~H ∨ (M ∙ R) 1, Com
EXERCISES 3.4c: TR ANSLATIONS 5. (~H ∨ M) ∙ (~H ∨ R) 4, Dist
4. 1. C ≡ D
6. ~H ∨ M 5, Simp
2. (D ∙ E) ∙ F /C
7. H ⊃ M 6, Impl
8. 1. F ∨ L 8. H ∨ (~M ∙ R) 2, Com
2. C ∨ ~F /C∨L 9. (H ∨ ~M) ∙ (H ∨ R) 8, Dist
10. H ∨ ~M 9, Simp 20. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ (R ∨ S) / ~R ⊃ [(Q ∙ P) ⊃ S]

11. ~M ∨ H 10, Com 2. ~(R ∨ S) ⊃ ~(P ∙ Q ) 1, Cont
12. M ⊃ H 11, Impl 3. (~R ∙ ~S) ⊃ ~(P ∙ Q ) 2, DM
13. (H ⊃ M) ∙ (M ⊃ H) 7, 12, Conj 4. ~R ⊃ [~S ⊃ ~(P ∙ Q )] 3, Exp
14. H ≡ M 13, Equiv 5. ~R ⊃ [(P ∙ Q ) ⊃ S] 4, Cont
15. ~~(H ≡ M) 14, DN 6. ~R ⊃ [(Q ∙ P) ⊃ S] 5, Com
16. R 3, 15, DS QED
QED
25. 1. P ⊃ Q
2. P ⊃ R
3. (Q ∙ R) ⊃ ~S / ~P ∨ ~S
EXERCISES 3.5a
4. ~P ∨ Q 1, Impl
5. 1. ~(P ⊃ Q )
5. ~P ∨ R 2, Impl
2. ~(R ⊃ S) / ~(Q ∨ S)
6. (~P ∨ Q ) ∙ (~P ∨ R) 4, 5, Conj
3. ~(~P ∨ Q ) 1, Impl
7. ~P ∨ (Q ∙ R) 6, Dist
4. ~~P ∙ ~Q 3, DM
8. P ⊃ (Q ∙ R) 7, Impl
5. ~(~R ∨ S) 2, Impl
9. P ⊃ ~S 8, 3, HS
6. ~~R ∙ ~S 5, DM
10. ~P ∨ ~S 9, Impl
7. ~Q ∙ ~~P 4, Com
QED
8. ~Q 7, Simp
9. ~S ∙ ~~R 6, Com
30. 1. (J ⊃ J) ⊃ (K ⊃ K)
10. ~S 9, Simp
2. (K ⊃ L) ⊃ ( J ⊃ J) /K⊃K
11. ~Q ∙ ~S 8, 10, Conj
3. (K ⊃ L) ⊃ (K ⊃ K) 2, 1, HS
12. ~(Q ∨ S) 11, DM
4. ~(K ⊃ L) ∨ (K ⊃ K) 3, Impl
QED
5. ~(K ⊃ L) ∨ (~K ∨ K) 4, Impl
10. 1. N ⊃ (O ∙ P) 6. ~(~K ∨ L) ∨ (~K ∨ K) 5, Impl
2. ~N ⊃ Q / ~O ⊃ Q 7. (~~K ∙ ~L) ∨ (~K ∨ K) 6, Impl
3. ~N ∨ (O ∙ P) 1, Impl 8. (K ∙ ~L) ∨ (~K ∨ K) 7, DN
4. (~N ∨ O) ∙ (~N ∨ P) 3, Dist 9. (~K ∨ K) ∨ (K ∙ ~L) 8, Com
5. ~N ∨ O 4, Simp 10. [(~K ∨ K) ∨ K] ∙ [(~K ∨ K) ∨ ~L] 9, Dist
6. N ⊃ O 5, Impl 11. (~K ∨ K) ∨ K 10, Simp
7. ~O ⊃ ~N 6, Cont 12. ~K ∨ (K ∨ K) 11, Assoc
8. ~O ⊃ Q 7, 2, HS 13. ~K ∨ K 12, Taut
QED 14. K ⊃ K 13, Impl
QED
15. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ⊃ (R ⊃ S)
2. Q ∙ R / ~S ⊃ ~P
3. (Q ∙ P) ⊃ (R ⊃ S) 1, Com
4. Q ⊃ [P ⊃ (R ⊃ S)] 3, Exp EXERCISES 3.5b: TR ANSLATIONS
5. Q 2, Simp 4. 1. (X ⊃ Y) ⊃ Z
6. P ⊃ (R ⊃ S) 4, 5, MP 2. Z ⊃ W /W∨X
7. P ⊃ (~S ⊃ ~R) 6, Cont
8. (P ∙ ~S) ⊃ ~R 7, Exp 8. 1. (~G ⊃ G) ⊃ (M ⊃ ~M)
9. R ∙ Q 2, Com 2. G / ~M
10. R 9, Simp
11. ~~R 10, DN 12. 1. ~P ⊃ (W ⊃ E)
12. ~(P ∙ ~S) 8, 11, MT 2. (W ∙ R) ∨ (W ∙ T) / ~P ⊃ E
13. ~P ∨ ~~S 12, DM
14. ~~S ∨ ~P 13, Com 16. 1. G ⊃ M
15. ~S ⊃ ~P 14, Impl 2. G ⊃ F
QED 3. (~G ⊃ ~M) ∨ ~F / G ≡ (M ∙ F)
EXERCISES 3.5b: DERIVATIONS 4. I ∙ (L ∨ M) 3, Dist

4. 1. (X ⊃ Y) ⊃ Z 5. I 4, Simp
2. Z ⊃ W /W∨X 6. I ⊃ J 1, Impl
3. (X ⊃ Y) ⊃ W 1, 2, HS 7. J 6, 5, MP
4. ~(X ⊃ Y) ∨ W 3, Impl 8. K 2, 7, BMP
5. ~(~X ∨ Y) ∨ W 4, Impl QED
6. (~~X ∙ ~Y) ∨ W 5, DM 4. 1. D ≡ E
7. (X ∙ ~Y) ∨ W 6, DN 2. (E ∨ F) ⊃ G
8. W ∨ (X ∙ ~Y) 7, Com 3. ~(G ∨ H) / ~D
9. (W ∨ X) ∙ (W ∨ ~Y) 8, Dist 4. ~G ∙ ~H 3, DM
10. W ∨ X 9, Simp 5. ~G 4, Simp
QED 6. ~(E ∨ F) 2, 5, MT
8. 1. (~G ⊃ G) ⊃ (M ⊃ ~M) 7. ~E ∙ ~F 6, DM
2. G / ~M 8. ~E 7, Simp
3. G ∨ G 2, Taut (or Add) 9. E ≡ D 1, BCom
4. ~~G ∨ G 3, DN 10. ~D 9, 8, BMT
5. ~G ⊃ G 4, Impl QED
6. M ⊃ ~M 1, 5, MP 7. 1. (P ≡ Q ) ∨ ~P /P⊃Q
7. ~M ∨ ~M 6, Impl 2. [(P ⊃ Q ) ∙ (Q ⊃ P)] ∨ ~P 1, Equiv
8. ~M 7, Taut 3. ~P ∨ [(P ⊃ Q ) ∙ (Q ⊃ P)] 2, Com
QED 4. [~P ∨ (P ⊃ Q )] ∙ [~P ∨ (Q ⊃ P)] 3, Dist
12. 1. ~P ⊃ (W ⊃ E) 5. ~P ∨ (P ⊃ Q ) 4, Simp
2. (W ∙ R) ∨ (W ∙ T) / ~P ⊃ E 6. ~P ∨ (~P ∨ Q ) 5, Impl
3. W ∙ (R ∨ T) 2, Dist 7. (~P ∨ ~P) ∨ Q 6, Assoc
4. W 3, Simp 8. ~P ∨ Q 7, Taut
5. (~P ∙ W) ⊃ E 1, Exp 9. P ⊃ Q 8, Impl
6. (W ∙ ~P) ⊃ E 5, Com QED
7. W ⊃ (~P ⊃ E) 6, Exp
8. ~P ⊃ E 7, 4, MP
EXERCISES 3.6b
QED
5. 1. M ≡ (N ≡ O)
16. 1. G ⊃ M 2. ~O / ~M ≡ N
2. G ⊃ F 3. (M ≡ N) ≡ O 1, BAssoc
3. (~G ⊃ ~M) ∨ ~F / G ≡ (M ∙ F) 4. O ≡ (M ≡ N) 3, BCom
4. ~G ∨ M 1, Impl 5. ~(M ≡ N) 4, BMT
5. ~G ∨ F 2, Impl 6. ~M ≡ N 5, BDM
6. (~G ∨ M) ∙ (~G ∨ F) 4, 5, Conj QED
7. ~G ∨ (M ∙ F) 6, Dist 10. 1. (G ≡ H) ⊃ H
8. G ⊃ (M ∙ F) 7, Impl 2. ~H /G
9. (~~G ∨ ~M) ∨ ~F 3, Impl 3. ~(G ≡ H) 1, 2, MT
10. (G ∨ ~M) ∨ ~F 9, DN 4. ~G ≡ H 3, BDM
11. G ∨ (~M ∨ ~F) 10, Assoc 5. H ≡ ~G 4, BCom
12. (~M ∨ ~F) ∨ G 11, Com 6. ~~G 5, 2, BMT
13. ~(M ∙ F) ∨ G 12, DM 7. G 6, DN
14. (M ∙ F) ⊃ G 13, Impl QED
15. [G ⊃ (M ∙ F)] ∙ [(M ∙ F) ⊃ G] 8, 14, Conj
16. G ≡ (M ∙ F) 15, Equiv 15. 1. ~P ≡ (Q ∙ R)
QED 2. ~Q /P
3. ~Q ∨ ~R 2, Add
4. ~(Q ∙ R) 3, DM
EXERCISES 3.6a 5. (Q ∙ R) ≡ ~P 1, BCom
2. 1. ~I ∨ J 6. ~~P 4, 5, BMT
2. J ≡ K 7. P 6, DN
3. (I ∙ L) ∨ (I ∙ M) /K QED
20. 1. D ≡ (E ∙ F) 40. 1. P ≡ (Q ∨ R)
2. ~F / ~D 2. R ≡ S
3. ~F ∨ ~E 2, Add 3. Q ⊃ R /P≡S
4. ~(F ∙ E) 3, DM 4. [P ⊃ (Q ∨ R)] ∙ [(Q ∨ R) ⊃ P] 1, Equiv
5. ~(E ∙ F) 4, Com 5. P ⊃ (Q ∨ R) 4, Simp
6. (E ∙ F) ≡ D 1, BCom 6. ~P ∨ (Q ∨ R) 5, Impl
7. ~D 6, 7, BMT 7. ~P ∨ (R ∨ Q ) 6, Com
QED 8. (~P ∨ R) ∨ Q 7, Assoc
25. 1. (P ∙ Q ) ≡ R 9. (~P ∨ ~~R) ∨ Q 8, DN
2. P ≡ S 10. ~(P ∙ ~R) ∨ Q 9, DM
3. R /S∙Q 11. (P ∙ ~R) ⊃ Q 10, Impl
4. R ≡ (P ∙ Q ) 1, BCom 12. (P ∙ ~R) ⊃ R 11, 3, HS
5. P ∙ Q 4, 3, BMP 13. ~(P ∙ ~R) ∨ R 12, Impl
6. P 5, Simp 14. (~P ∨ ~~R) ∨ R 13, DM
7. S 2, 6, BMP 15. (~P ∨ R) ∨ R 14, DN
8. Q ∙ P 5, Com 16. ~P ∨ (R ∨ R) 15, Assoc
9. Q 8, Simp 17. ~P ∨ R 16, Taut
10. S ∙ Q 7, 9, Conj 18. P ⊃ R 17, Impl
QED 19. [(Q ∨ R) ⊃ P] ∙ [P ⊃ (Q ∨ R)] 4, Com
20. (Q ∨ R) ⊃ P 19, Simp
30. 1. P ≡ Q 21. ~(Q ∨ R) ∨ P 20, Impl
2. ~Q ≡ R 22. (~Q ∙ ~R) ∨ P 21, DM
3. R ≡ P /S 23. P ∨ (~Q ∙ ~R) 22, Com
4. ~Q ≡ P 2, 3, BHS 24. (P ∨ ~Q ) ∙ (P ∨ ~R) 23, Dist
5. ~~Q ≡ ~P 4, BInver 25. (P ∨ ~R) ∙ (P ∨ ~Q ) 24, Com
6. Q ≡ ~P 5, DN 26. P ∨ ~R 25, Simp
7. P ≡ ~P 1, 6, BHS 27. ~R ∨ P 26, Com
8. (P ∙ ~P) ∨ (~P ∙ ~~P) 7, Equiv 28. R ⊃ P 27, Impl
9. (P ∙ ~P) ∨ (~P ∙ P) 8, DN 29. (P ⊃ R) ∙ (R ⊃ P) 18, 28, Conj
10. (P ∙ ~P) ∨ (P ∙ ~P) 9, Com 30. P ≡ R 29, Equiv
11. P ∙ ~P 10, Taut 31. P ≡ S 30, 2, BHS
12. P 11, Simp QED
13. P ∨ S 12, Add
14. ~P ∙ P 11, Com
15. ~P 14, Simp EXERCISES 3.6c: TR ANSLATIONS
16. S 13, 15, DS 4. 1. (G ⊃ D) ≡ (B ∨ ~H)
QED 2. ~(H ⊃ B) / G ∙ ~D
35. 1. P ≡ (Q ∙ ~R) 8. 1. H ≡ (G ∨ O)
2. ~S ≡ P 2. ~H ≡ D / G ⊃ ~D
3. S ∙ ~R /Q≡R 12. 1. (P ≡ ~E) ≡ L
4. S 3, Simp 2. P ⊃ ~E
5. ~~S 4, DN 3. ~P ⊃ E /L
6. ~P 2, 5, BMT
16. 1. (C ≡ M) ⊃ ~I
7. ~(Q ∙ ~R) 1, 6, BMT
2. ~I ⊃ S
8. ~Q ∨ ~~R 7, DM
3. S ⊃ A
9. ~Q ∨ R 8, DN
4. ~A ∨ I
10. Q ⊃ R 9, Impl
5. ~C /M
11. ~R ∙ S 3, Com
12. ~R 11, Simp
13. ~R ∨ Q 12, Add EXERCISES 3.6c: DERIVATIONS
14. R ⊃ Q 13, Impl 4. 1. (G ⊃ D) ≡ (B ∨ ~H)
15. (Q ⊃ R) ∙ (R ⊃ Q ) 10, 14, Conj 2. ~(H ⊃ B) / G ∙ ~D
16. Q ≡ R 15, Equiv 3. ~(~H ∨ B) 2, Impl
QED 4. ~(B ∨ ~H) 3, Com
5. (B ∨ ~H) ≡ (G ⊃ D) 1, BCom EXERCISES 3.7a

6. ~(G ⊃ D) 5, 4, BMT 5. 1. L ⊃ M
7. ~(~G ∨ D) 6, Impl 2. L ⊃ N
8. ~~G ∙ ~D 7, DM 3. (M ∙ N) ⊃ O /L⊃O
9. G ∙ ~D 8, DN 4. L ACP
QED 5. M 1, 4, MP
8. 1. H ≡ (G ∨ O) 6. N 2, 4, MP
2. ~H ≡ D / G ⊃ ~D 7. M ∙ N 5, 6, Conj
3. ~~H ≡ ~D 2, BInver 8. O 3, 7, MP
4. H ≡ ~D 3, DN 9. L ⊃ O 4–8, CP
5. ~D ≡ H 4, BCom QED
6. ~D ≡ (G ∨ O) 5, 1, BHS 10. 1. ~(I ∨ ~K)
7. [~D ⊃ (G ∨ O)] ∙ [(G ∨ O) ⊃ ~D] 6, Equiv 2. L ⊃ J / (I ∨ L) ⊃ (K ∙ J)
8. [(G ∨ O) ⊃ ~D] ∙ [~D ⊃ (G ∨ O)] 7, Com 3. I ∨ L ACP
9. (G ∨ O) ⊃ ~D 8, Simp 4. ~I ∙ ~~K 1, DM
10. ~(G ∨ O) ∨ ~D 9, Impl 5. ~I ∙ K 4, DN
11. (~G ∙ ~O) ∨ ~D 10, DM 6. ~I 5, Simp
12. ~D ∨ (~G ∙ ~O) 11, Com 7. L 3, 6, DS
13. (~D ∨ ~G) ∙ (~D ∨ ~O) 12, Dist 8. J 2, 7, MP
14. ~D ∨ ~G 13, Simp 9. K ∙ ~I 5, Com
15. ~G ∨ ~D 14, Com 10. K 9, Simp
16. G ⊃ ~D 15, Impl 11. K ∙ J 8, 10, Conj
QED 12. (I ∨ L) ⊃ (K ∙ J) 3–11, CP
12. 1. (P ≡ ~E) ≡ L QED
2. P ⊃ ~E 15. 1. D ≡ E
3. ~P ⊃ E /L 2. F ∨ D / ~E ⊃ F
4. ~E ⊃ ~~P 3, Cont 3. ~E ACP
5. ~E ⊃ P 4, DN 4. E ≡ D 1, BCom
6. (P ⊃ ~E) ∙ (~E ⊃ P) 2, 5, Conj 5. ~D 4, 3, BMT
7. P ≡ ~E 6, Equiv 6. D ∨ F 2, Com
8. L 1, 7, BMP 7. F 6, 5, DS
QED 8. ~E ⊃ F 3–7, CP
16. 1. (C ≡ M) ⊃ ~I QED
2. ~I ⊃ S 20. 1. A ⊃ [(D ∨ B) ⊃ C] / A ⊃ (D ⊃ C)
3. S ⊃ A 2. A ACP
4. ~A ∨ I 3. D ACP
5. ~C /M 4. (D ∨ B) ⊃ C 1, 2, MP
6. ~I ⊃ A 2, 3, HS 5. D ∨ B 3, Add
7. A ⊃ I 4, Impl 6. C 4, 5, MP
8. ~I ⊃ I 6, 7, HS 7. D ⊃ C 3–6, CP
9. ~~I ∨ I 8, Impl 8. A ⊃ (D ⊃ C) 2–7, CP
10. ~~I ∨ ~~I 9, DN QED
11. ~~I 10, Taut
12. ~(C ≡ M) 1, 11, MT
13. ~C ≡ M 12, BDM
14. M 13, 5, BMP
QED
25. 1. M ⊃ (~K ∨ N) 35. 1. A ⊃ (~B ∨ C)

2. N ⊃ L 2. ~A ⊃ (B ∨ C)
3. M ∨ (K ∙ ~L) / M ≡ (K ⊃ L) 3. C ⊃ ~C / ~(A ≡ B)
4. M ACP 4. ~C ∨ ~C 3, Impl
5. ~K ∨ N 1, 4, MP 5. ~C 4, Taut
6. K ACP 6. ~A ACP
7. ~~K 6, DN 7. B ∨ C 2, 6, MP
8. N 5, 7, DS 8. C ∨ B 7, Com
9. L 2, 8, MP 9. B 8, 5, DS
10. K ⊃ L 6–9, CP 10. ~A ⊃ B 6–9, CP
11. M ⊃ (K ⊃ L) 4–10, CP 11. B ACP
12. K ⊃ L ACP 12. ~~B 11, DN
13. ~K ∨ L 12, Impl 13. ~~B ∙ ~C 12, 5, Conj
14. M ∨ (~~K ∙ ~L) 3, DN 14. ~(~B ∨ C) 13, DM
15. M ∨ ~(~K ∨ L) 14, DM 15. ~A 1, 14, MT
16. ~(~K ∨ L) ∨ M 15, Com 16. B ⊃ ~A 11–15, CP
17. ~~(~K ∨ L) 13, DN 17. (~A ⊃ B) ∙ (B ⊃ ~A) 10, 16, Conj
18. M 16, 17, DS 18. ~A ≡ B 17, Equiv
19. (K ⊃ L) ⊃ M 12–18, CP 19. ~(A ≡ B) 18, BDM
20. [M ⊃ (K ⊃ L)] ∙ [(K ⊃ L) ⊃ M] 11, 19, Conj QED
21. M ≡ (K ⊃ L) 20, Equiv 40. 1. J ≡ (L ∨ M)
QED 2. (M ∨ J) ≡ N
30. 1. (X ⊃ Y) ⊃ Z 3. (L ⊃ N) ⊃ (K ≡ ~K) / L ≡ (N ∨ K)
2. (~X ∨ Y) ≡ (A ∨ B) 4. L ACP
3. ~B ⊃ (D ⊃ A) / ~Z ⊃ ~D 5. L ∨ M 4, Add
4. ~Z ACP 6. (L ∨ M) ≡ J 1, BCom
5. ~(X ⊃ Y) 1, 4, MT 7. J 6, 5, BMP
6. ~(~X ∨ Y) 5, Impl 8. J ∨ M 7, Add
7. ~(A ∨ B) 2, 6, BMT 9. M ∨ J 8, Com
8. ~A ∙ ~B 7, DM 10. N 2, 9, BMP
9. ~B ∙ ~A 8, Com 11. N ∨ K 10, Add
10. ~B 9, Simp 12. L ⊃ (N ∨ K) 4–11, CP
11. D ⊃ A 3, 10, MP 13. K ACP
12. ~A 8, Simp 14. K ⊃ K 13, CP
13. ~D 11, 12, MT 15. ~K ∨ K 14, Impl
14. ~Z ⊃ ~D 4–13, CP 16. ~~(~K ∨ K) 15, DN
QED 17. ~(~~K ∙ ~K) 16, DM
18. ~(K ∙ ~K) 18, DN
19. ~(~K ∙ ~~K) 17, Com
20. ~(K ∙ ~K) ∙ ~(~K ∙ ~~K) 18, 19, Conj
21. ~[(K ∙ ~K) ∨ (~K ∙ ~~K)] 20, DM
22. ~(K ≡ ~K) 21, Equiv
23. ~(L ⊃ N) 3, 22, MT
24. ~(~L ∨ N) 23, Impl
25. ~~L ∙ ~N 24, DM
26. L ∙ ~N 25, DN
27. L 26, Simp
28. L ∨ ~(N ∨ K) 27, Add
29. ~(N ∨ K) ∨ L 28, Com
30. (N ∨ K) ⊃ L 29, Impl
31. [L ⊃ (N ∨ K)] ∙ [(N ∨ K) ⊃ L] 12, 30, Conj
32. L ≡ (N ∨ K) 31, Equiv
QED
EXERCISES 3.7b: TR ANSLATIONS 16. 1. ~S ⊃ (A ∙ ~D)

4. 1. ~F ⊃ G / (E ∙ ~G) ⊃ (F ∨ H) 2. (U ∙ F) ⊃ D
3. P ⊃ ~S
8. 1. J ⊃ ~L
4. (U ∙ F) ∨ P /S≡D
2. L ∨ K
5. S ACP
3. (K ∨ M) ⊃ J /J≡K
6. ~~S 5, DN
12. 1. (P ⊃ R) ⊃ ~Q 7. ~P 3, 6, MT
2. P ⊃ A 8. P ∨ (U ∙ F) 4, Com
3. ~R ⊃ ~A / ~Q 9. U ∙ F 8, 7, DS
16. 1. ~S ⊃ (A ∙ ~D) 10. D 2, 9, MP
2. (U ∙ F) ⊃ D 11. S ⊃ D 5–10, CP
3. P ⊃ ~S 12. D ACP
4. (U ∙ F) ∨ P / S ≡ D 13. ~~D 12, DN
14. ~~D ∨ ~A 13, Add
15. ~A ∨ ~~D 14, Com
EXERCISES 3.7b: DERIVATIONS 16. ~(A ∙ ~D) 15, DM
4. 1. ~F ⊃ G / (E ∙ ~G) ⊃ (F ∨ H) 17. ~~S 1, 16, MT
2. E ∙ ~G ACP 18. S 17, DN
3. ~G ∙ E 2, Com 19. D ⊃ S 12–18, CP
4. ~G 3, Simp 20. (S ⊃ D) ∙(D ⊃ S) 11, 19, Conj
5. ~~F 1, 4, MT 21. S ≡ D 20 Equiv
6. F 5, DN QED
7. F ∨ H 6, Add
8. (E ∙ ~G) ⊃ (F ∨ H) 2–7, CP
QED EXERCISES 3.8a
1. (~A ⊃ B) ⊃ (~B ⊃ A) or [(~A ⊃ B) ∙ ~B] ⊃ A
8. 1. J ⊃ ~L 5. [K ∙ (~L ∨ M)] ⊃ [(L ⊃ ~K) ⊃ M]
2. L ∨ K 10. [(F ⊃ G) ∙ (H ⊃ F)] ⊃ [(H ∙ I) ⊃ (~G ⊃ I)]
3. (K ∨ M) ⊃ J /J≡K
4. J ACP
5. ~L 1, 4, MP EXERCISES 3.8b
6. K 2, 5, DS 5. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ∨ (R ∨ S) ACP
7. J ⊃ K 4–6, CP 2. (Q ∨ P) ∨ (R ∨ S) 1, Com
8. K ACP 3. (Q ∨ P) ∨ (S ∨ R) 2, Com
9. K ∨ M 8, Add 4. Q ∨ [(P ∨ S) ∨ R] 3, Assoc
10. J 3, 9, MP 5. Q ∨ [R ∨ (P ∨ S)] 4, Com
11. K ⊃ J 8–10, CP 6. (Q ∨ R) ∨ (P ∨ S) 5, Assoc
12. (J ⊃ K) ∙ (K ⊃ J) 7, 11, Conj 7. (R ∨ Q ) ∨ (P ∨ S) 6, Com
13. J ≡ K 12, Equiv 8. (R ∨ Q ) ∨ (S ∨ P) 7, Com
QED 9. [(P ∨ Q ) ∨ (R ∨ S)] ⊃ [(R ∨ Q ) ∨ (S ∨ P)] 1–8, CP
QED
12. 1. (P ⊃ R) ⊃ ~Q
2. P ⊃ A 10. 1. ~[P ≡ (Q ∙ R)] ACP
3. ~R ⊃ ~A / ~Q 2. ~P ≡ (Q ∙ R) 1, BDM
4. A ⊃ R 3, Cont 3. [~P ⊃ (Q ∙ R)] ∙ [(Q ∙ R) ⊃ ~P]
5. P ⊃ R 2, 4, HS 2, Equiv
6. ~Q 1, 5, MP 4. ~P ⊃ (Q ∙ R) 3, Simp
QED 5. ~P ACP
6. Q ∙ R 4, 5, MP
7. Q 6, Simp
8. ~P ⊃ Q 5–7, CP
9. ~[P ≡ (Q ∙ R)] ⊃ (~P ⊃ Q ) 1–8, CP
QED
15. 1. P ≡ ~Q ACP 10. 1. ~(G ⊃ H) ⊃ ~F

2. (P ⊃ ~Q ) ∙ (~Q ⊃ P) 1, Equiv 2. G ∙ (F ∨ H) /H
3. P ⊃ ~Q 2, Simp 3. (F ∨ H) ∙ G 2, Com
4. ~P ∨ ~Q 3, Impl 4. F ∨ H 3, Simp
5. ~(P ∙ Q ) 4, DM 5. H ∨ F 4, Com
6. (P ≡ ~Q ) ⊃ ~(P ∙ Q ) 1–5, CP 6. ~H AIP
QED 7. F 5, 6, DS
8. ~~F 7, DN
20. 1. (P ⊃ Q ) ∙ (P ⊃ R) ACP
9. ~~(G ⊃ H) 1, 8, MT
2. S ⊃ P ACP
10. G ⊃ H 9, DN
3. S ACP
11. G 2, Simp
4. P 2, 3, MP
12. H 10, 11, MP
5. P ⊃ Q 1, Simp
13. H ∙ ~H 12, 6, Conj
6. Q 5, 4, MP
14. ~~H 6–13, IP
7. (P ⊃ R) ∙ (P ⊃ Q )
15. H 14, DN
1, Com
QED
8. P ⊃ R 7, Simp
9. R 8, 4, MP 15. 1. S ⊃ T
10. Q ∙ R 6, 9, Conj 2. S ∨ (~R ∙ U) /R⊃T
11. S ⊃ (Q ∙ R) 3–10, CP 3. R ACP
12. (S ⊃ P) ⊃ [S ⊃ (Q ∙ R)] 2–11, CP 4. ~T AIP
13. [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ (P ⊃ R)] ⊃ {(S ⊃ P) ⊃ [S ⊃ (Q ∙ R)]} 5. ~S 1, 4, MT
1–12, CP 6. (S ∨ ~R) ∙ (S ∨ U) 2, Dist
QED 7. S ∨ ~R 6, Simp
8. ~R 5, 7, DS
25. 1. (P ⊃ Q ) ∙ (R ⊃ S) ACP
9. R ∙ ~R 3, 8, Conj
2. ~Q ∨ ~S ACP
10. ~~T 4–9, IP
3. P ⊃ Q 1, Simp
11. T 10, DN
4. ~Q ⊃ ~P 3, Cont
12. R ⊃ T 3–11, CP
5. (R ⊃ S) ∙ (P ⊃ Q ) 1, Com
QED
6. R ⊃ S 5, Simp
7. ~S ⊃ ~R 6, Cont 20. 1. W ≡ (X ∙ Z)
8. ~P ∨ ~R 4, 7, 2, CD 2. ~(~X ∙ ~W) /Z⊃W
9. (~Q ∨ ~S) ⊃ (~P ∨ ~R) 2–8, CP 3. ~~X ∨ ~~W 2, DM
10. [(P ⊃ Q) ∙ (R ⊃ S)] ⊃ [(~Q ∨ ~S) ⊃ (~P ∨ ~R)] 4. Z ACP
1–9, CP 5. ~W AIP
QED 6. ~~W ∨ ~~X 3, Com
7. ~~~W 5, DN
EXERCISES 3.9a 8. ~~X 6, 7, DS
5. 1. A ∨ ~B 9. ~(X ∙ Z) 1, 5, BMT
2. (B ∨ C) ⊃ ~A / ~B 10. ~X ∨ ~Z 10, DM
3. B AIP 11. ~Z 10, 8, DS
4. ~~B 3, DN 12. Z ∙ ~Z 4, 11, Conj
5. ~B ∨ A 1, Com 13. ~~W 5–12, IP
6. A 5, 4, DS 14. W 13, DN
7. ~~A 6, DN ` 15. Z ⊃ W 4–14, CP
8. ~(B ∨ C) 2, 7, MT QED
9. ~B ∙ ~C 8, DM
10. ~B 9, Simp
11. B ∙ ~B 3, 10, Conj
12. ~B 3–11, IP
QED
25. 1. K ⊃ (L ∙ I) 35. 1. ~(R ∙ U) ⊃ T

2. ~(J ⊃ M) 2. [R ⊃ ~(S ∙ ~Q )] ⊃ ~T / R ∙ (S ∨ U)
3. L ⊃ (~K ∨ ~I) / ~[ J ⊃ (M ∨ K)] 3. ~R AIP
4. ~(~J ∨ M) 2, Impl 4. ~R ∨ ~U 3, Add
5. ~~J ∙ ~M 4, DM 5. ~(R ∙ U) 4, DM
6. J ∙ ~M 5, DN 6. T 1, 5, MP
7. J ⊃ (M ∨ K) AIP 7. ~~T 6, DN
8. J 6, Simp 8. ~[R ⊃ ~(S ∙ ~Q )] 2, 7, MT
9. M ∨ K 7, 8, MP 9. ~[~R ∨ ~(S ∙ ~Q )] 8, Impl
10. ~M ∙ J 6, Com 10. ~~R ∙ ~~(S ∙ ~Q ) 9, DM
11. ~M 10, Simp 11. ~~R 10, Simp
12. K 9, 11, DS 12. ~R ∙ ~~R 3, 11, Conj
13. L ∙ I 1, 12, MP 13. ~~R 3–12, IP
14. L 13, Simp 14. R 13, DN
15. ~K ∨ ~I 3, 14, MP 15. ~(S ∨ U) AIP
16. ~~K 12, DN 16. ~S ∙ ~U 15, DM
17. ~I 15, 16, DS 17. ~U ∙ ~S 16, Com
18. I ∙ L 13, Com 18. ~U 17, Simp
19. I 18, Simp 19. ~U ∨ ~R 18, Add
20. I ∙ ~I 19, 17, Conj 20. ~R ∨ ~U 19, Com
21. ~[ J ⊃ (M ∨ K)] 7–20, IP 21. ~(R ∙ U) 20, DM
QED 22. T 1, 21, MP
23. ~~T 22, DN
30. 1. A ≡ ~(B ∨ C)
24. ~[R ⊃ ~(S ∙ ~Q )] 2, 23, MT
2. (D ∨ E) ⊃ ~C
25. ~[~R ∨ ~(S ∙ ~Q )] 24, Impl
3. ~(A ∙ D) /D⊃B
26. ~~R ∙ ~~(S ∙ ~Q ) 25, DM
4. D ACP
27. ~~(S ∙ ~Q ) ∙ ~~R 26, Com
5. D ∨ E 4, Add
28. ~~(S ∙ ~Q ) 27, Simp
6. ~C 2, 5 MP
29. S ∙ ~Q 28, DN
7. ~B AIP
30. S 29, Simp
8. ~B ∙ ~C 6, 7, Conj
31. ~S 16, Simp
9. ~(B ∨ C) 8, DM
32. S ∙ ~S 30, 31, Conj
10. ~(B ∨ C) ≡ A 1, BCom
33. ~~(S ∨ U) 15–32, IP
11. A 10, 9, BMP
34. S ∨ U 33, DN
12. A ∙ D 11, 4, Conj
35. R ∙ (S ∨ U) 14, 34, Conj
13. (A ∙ D) ∙ ~(A ∙ D)
QED
12, 3, Conj
14. ~~B 7–13, IP
15. B 14, DN
16. D ⊃ B 4–15, CP
QED
40. 1. V ⊃ (T ∙ ~W) 8. 1. T ⊃ ~R
2. (T ⊃ W) ⊃ (~X ∨ ~Y) 2. ~(S ∨ V)
3. ~[~(V ∨ Y) ∨ ~(V ∨ X)] / ~(T ⊃ W) 3. T ∙ (U ∨ ~R) / ~(R ∨ S)
4. T ⊃ W AIP 4. R ∨ S AIP
5. ~X ∨ ~Y 2, 4, MP 5. ~~R ∨ S 4, DN
6. ~~(V ∨ Y) ∙ ~~(V ∨ X) 3, DM 6. ~R ⊃ S 5, Impl
7. (V ∨ Y) ∙ ~~(V ∨ X) 6, DN 7. T ⊃ S 1, 6, HS
8. (V ∨ Y) ∙ (V ∨ X) 7, DN 8. ~S ∙ ~V 2, DM
9. V ∨ (Y ∙ X) 8, Dist 9. ~S 8, Simp
10. ~Y ∨ ~X 5, Com 10. (T ∙ U) ∨ (T ∙ ~R) 3, Dist
11. ~(Y ∙ X) 10, DM 11. ~T 7, 9, MT
12. (Y ∙ X) ∨ V 9, Com 12. ~T ∨ ~U 11, Add
13. V 12, 11, DS 13. ~(T ∙ U) 12, DM
14. T ∙ ~W 1, 13, MP 14. T ∙ ~R 10, 13, DS
15. ~W ∙ T 14, Com 15. ~R ∙ T 14, Com
16. ~W 15, Simp 16. ~R 15, Simp
17. T 14, Simp 17. S 4, 16, DS
18. W 4, 17, MP 18. ~S ∙ S 9, 17, Conj
19. W ∙ ~W 18, 16, Conj 19. ~(R ∨ S) 4–18, IP
20. ~(T ⊃ W) 4–19, IP QED
QED 12. 1. ~A ⊃ M
2. ~A ⊃ ~E
EXERCISES 3.9b: TR ANSLATIONS 3. E ∨ P
4. 1. (X ∨ Y) ⊃ V 4. ~P ∨ ~M /A
2. W ⊃ ~V / W ⊃ ~X 5. ~A AIP
8 . 1. T ⊃ ~R 6. M 1, 5, MP
2. ~(S ∨ V) 7. ~E 2, 5, MP
3. T ∙ (U ∨ ~R) / ~(R ∨ S) 8. P 3, 7, DS
9. ~~P 8, DN
12. 1. ~A ⊃ M 10. ~M 4, 9, DS
2. ~A ⊃ ~E 11. M ∙ ~M 6, 10, Conj
3. E ∨ P 12. ~~A 5–11, IP
4. ~P ∨ ~M /A 13. A 12, DN
16. 1. R ⊃ (S ∨ C) QED
2. A ⊃ (I ∨ ~C) 16. 1. R ⊃ (S ∨ C)
3. ~I ⊃ ~S / (R ∙ ~I) ⊃ ~A 2. A ⊃ (I ∨ ~C)
3. ~I ⊃ ~S / (R ∙ ~I) ⊃ ~A
EXERCISES 3.9b: DERIVATIONS 4. R ∙ ~I ACP
4. 1. (X ∨ Y) ⊃ V 5. R 4, Simp
2. W ⊃ ~V / W ⊃ ~X 6. S ∨ C 1, 5, MP
3. W ACP 7. ~I ∙ R 4, Com
4. X AIP 8. ~I 7, Simp
5. X ∨ Y 4, Add 9. ~S 3, 8, MP
6. V 1, 5, MP 10. C 6, 9, DS
7. ~~V 6, DN 11. A AIP
8. ~W 2, 7, MT 12. I ∨ ~C 2, 11, MP
9. W ∙ ~W 3, 8, Conj 13. ~C 12, 8, DS
10. ~X 4–9, IP 14. C ∙ ~C 10, 13, Conj
11. W ⊃ ~X 3–10, CP 15. ~A 11–14, IP
QED 16. (R ∙ ~I) ⊃ ~A 4–15, CP
QED
EXERCISES 3.9c 20. 1. ∼{[(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ (R ∙ ∼S)] ∨ [(Q ∙ S) ∨

1. 1. ∼(∼P ∨ ∼Q ) ACP (∼P ∨ ∼R)]} AIP
2. ∼ ∼P ∙ ∼ ∼ Q 1, DM 2. ∼[(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ (R ∙ ∼S)] ∙ ∼[(Q ∙ S) ∨
3. ∼ ∼P 2, Simp (∼P ∨ ∼R)] 1, DM
4. P 3, DN 3. ∼[(Q ∙ S) ∨ (∼P ∨ ∼R)] ∙ ∼[(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨
5. ∼(∼ P ∨ ∼Q ) ⊃ P 1–4, CP (R ∙ ∼S)] 2, Com
QED 4. ∼[(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ (R ∙ ∼S)] 2, Simp
5. ∼[(Q ∙ S) ∨ (∼P ∨ ∼R)] 3, Simp
5. 1. ~[A ∨ (B ∨ ~A)] AIP
6. ∼(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∙ ∼(R ∙ ∼S) 4, DM
2. ~A ∙ ~(B ∨ ~A) 1, DM
7. ∼(R ∙ ∼S) ∙ ∼(P ∙ ∼Q ) 6, Com
3. ~(B ∨ ~A) ∙ ~A 2, Com
8. ∼(Q ∙ S) ∙ ∼(∼P ∨ ∼R) 5, DM
4. ~(B ∨ ~A) 3, Simp
9. ∼(∼P ∨ ∼R) ∙ ∼(Q ∙ S) 8, Com
5. ~B ∙ ~~A 4, DM
10. ∼(P ∙ ∼Q ) 6, Simp
6. ~~A ∙ ~B 5, Com
11. ∼(R ∙ ∼S) 7, Simp
7. ~~A 6, Simp
12. ∼(Q ∙ S) 8, Simp
8. ~A 2, Simp
13. ∼(∼P ∨ ∼R) 9, Simp
9. ~A ∙ ~~A 8, 7, Conj
14. ∼ ∼ P ∙ ∼ ∼R 13, DM
10. ~~[A ∨ (B ∨ ~A)] 1–9, IP
15. ∼P ∨ ∼ ∼ Q 10, DM
11. A ∨ (B ∨ ~A) 10, DN
16. ∼ ∼P 14, Simp
QED
17. ∼ ∼ Q 15, 16, DS
10. 1. J ACP 18. ∼Q ∨ ∼S 12, DM
2. J ∨ ( J ∙ K) 1, Add 19. ∼S 18, 17, DS
3. J ⊃ [J ∨ ( J ∙ K)] 1–2, CP 20. ∼R ∨ ∼ ∼S 11, DM
4. J ∨ ( J ∙ K) ACP 21. ∼ ∼ R ∙ ∼ ∼P 14, Com
5. ( J ∨ J) ∙ ( J ∨ K) 4, Dist 22. ∼ ∼ R 21, Simp
6. J ∨ J 5, Simp 23. ∼ ∼ S 20, 22, DS
7. J 6, Taut 24. ∼S ∙ ∼ ∼S 19, 23, Conj
8. [ J ∨ ( J ∙ K)] ⊃ J 4–7, CP 25. ∼ ∼ [(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨ (R ∙ ∼S)] ∨ [(Q ∙ S) ∨ (∼P ∨ ∼R)]
9. { J ⊃ [ J ∨ ( J ∙ K)]} ∙ {[ J ∨ ( J ∙ K)] ⊃ J} 3, 8, Conj 1–24, IP
10. J ≡ [ J ∨ ( J ∙ K)] 9, Equiv 26. [(P ∙ ∼Q ) ∨(R ∙ ∼S)] ∨ [(Q ∙ S) ∨ (∼P ∨ ∼R)]
QED 25, DN
15. 1. ∼[(G ⊃ H) ∨ (∼G ⊃ H)] AIP QED
2. ∼(G ⊃ H) ∙ ∼(∼G ⊃ H) 1, DM
3. ∼(G ⊃ H) 2, Simp EXERCISES 3.10a
4. ∼(∼ G ∨ H) 3, Impl 1. Invalid. Counterexample when A is true, B is false, C is
5. ∼ ∼G ∙ ∼H 4, DM true, and D is true.
6. ∼(∼G ⊃ H) ∙ ∼(G ⊃ H) 2, Com 5. Invalid. Counterexample when P is true, Q is false, R is
7. ∼(∼G ⊃ H) 6, Simp false, S and is true.
8. ∼(∼ ∼ G ∨ H) 7, Impl
10. 1. Z ≡ ~X
9. ∼ ∼ ∼ G ∙ ∼H 8, DM
2. ~X ∨ Y
10. ∼ ∼ G 5, Simp
3. W ∙ ~Y /Z∙W
11. ∼ ∼ ∼G 9, Simp
4. ~Y ∙ W 3, Com
12. ∼ ∼ G ∙ ∼ ∼ ∼ G 10, 11, Conj
5. ~Y 4, Simp
13. ∼ ∼[(G ⊃ H) ∨ (∼G ⊃ H)] 1–12, IP
6. Y ∨ ~X 2, Com
14. (G ⊃ H) ∨ (∼G ⊃ H) 13, DN
7. ~X 6, 5, DS
QED
8. ~X ≡ Z 1, BCom
9. Z 8, 7, BMP
10. W 3, Simp
11. Z ∙ W 9, 10, Conj
QED
15. Invalid. Counterexample when all propositions are false. 13. (∀x){[Px ∙ (Fx ∙ Ix)] ⊃ Sx}
20. Invalid. Counterexample when K is true, L is false, M is 17. (∃x)[Cx ∙ (Wx ∙ ~Ex)]
false, and N is true. 21. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Wx) ∙ (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Wx)
25. 1. ~Z ⊃ Y 25. (∃x)[(Ax ∙ Lx) ∙ Gx]
2. Z ⊃ ~X 29. ~Gt ≡ (∃x)[(Px ∙ Cx) ∙ ~Gx]
3. X ∨ ~Z 33. Et ∙ (Pt ∙ Nt)
4. Y ⊃ A 38. (∀x)[(Nx ∙ Px) ⊃ Ox] ⊃ (∀x)[(Nx ∙ Px) ⊃ ~Ex]
5. X ⊃ ~A / ~X 43. (∀x)[(Ax ∙ Hx) ⊃ Mx]
6. ~~X ∨ ~Z 3, DN 47. (∃x)(Gx ∙ Mx) ∙ (∃x)(Cx ∙ Mx)
7. ~X ⊃ ~Z 6, Impl 51. (∀x)[(Rx ∙ Px) ⊃ Sx]
8. Z ⊃ ~Z 2, 7, HS 55. (∃x)[(Mx ∙ Sx) ∙ (Cx ∙ ~Rx)]
9. ~Z ∨ ~Z 8, Impl 59. (∀x)[(Ex ∙ Ax) ⊃ Ox]
10. ~Z 9, Taut 64. (∀x)[Ex ⊃ (~Ax ⊃ Rx)] or (∀x)[(Ex ∙ ~Ax) ⊃ Rx]
11. Y 1, 10, MP 69. (∃x)[(Ex ∙ Px) ∙ Hx]
12. A 4, 11, MP 73. (∃x)[(Hx ∙ Px) ∙ Nx] ∨ (∀x)(Nx ⊃ ~Hx)
13. ~~A 12, DN 77. (Bh ∙ Eh) ∙ ~(Bs ∨ Es)
14. ~X 5, 13, MT 81. (Bs ∙ Es) ⊃ [~Sh ∙ (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Bx)]
QED 85. (∀x)[(Lx ∙ Px) ⊃ ~Dx]
89. (∀x)[(Mx ∙ Ox) ⊃ Cx] ∨ (∃x)[(Mx ∙ Ox) ∙ Dx]
93. (Dk ∙ Kk) ∙ ~(Dm ∨ Km)
EXERCISES 3.10b 97. (∀x)(Ux ⊃ Cx) ⊃ (∀x)(Kx ⊃ Dx)
1. 1. G ∨ G ACP
2. G 1, Taut
3. (G ∨ G) ⊃ G 1–2, CP EXERCISES 4.2b
QED 1. All athletes are brawny. Malik and Ned are athletes. So,
Malik and Ned are brawny.
5. False valuation when A and B are false. 5. All athletes are either brawny or champions. Gita is an
10. False valuation when J is true, L is false, and M is false. athlete, but she isn’t brawny. So, Gita is a champion.
15. 1. (P ∨ Q ) ∙ ~P ACP 10. Everything is brawny, and either an athlete or a cham-
2. P ∨ Q 1, Simp pion. If Ned is a champion, then everything is neither
3. ~P ∙ (P ∨ Q ) 1, Com an athlete nor brawny. Nothing is a champion. So Ned is
4. ~P 3, Simp not a champion.
5. Q 2, 4, DS
6. Q ⊃ R ACP EXERCISES 4.3
7. R 6, 5, MP 5. a) Px
8. (Q ⊃ R) ⊃ R 6–7, CP b) Only the x in Px is bound
9. [(P ∨ Q ) ∙ ~P] ⊃ [(Q ⊃ R) ⊃ R] 1–8, CP c) The x in Qx unbound
QED d) Open
20. False valuation when A is false, B is true, and C is false. e) ⊃
25. False valuation when W is false, X is true, Y is false, and 10. a) There are no quantifiers
Z is true. b) There are no bound variables
c) There are no unbound variables
d) Closed
EXERCISES 4.1a EXERCISES 4.1b e) ⊃
1. Ta 1. (∀x)(Cx ⊃ Dx)
15. a) (∀x): (Px ∙ Q y) ⊃ (∃y)[(Ry ⊃ Sy) ∙ Tx], Px ∙
5. Cs 5. (∃x)(Px ∙ Wx)
Q y, Px, Q y, (∃y)[(Ry ⊃ Sy) ∙ Tx], (Ry ⊃ Sy) ∙ Tx,
10. Bl ∨ Bm 10. (∃x)(Px ∙ Sx)
Ry ⊃ Sy, Ry, Sy, Tx; (∃y): (Ry ⊃ Sy) ∙ Tx, Ry ⊃ Sy,
15. Ch ≡ Iw 15. (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Cx)
Ry, Sy, Tx
b) (∀x): Both x’s are bound; (∃y): The y’s in Ry and
EXERCISES 4.2a Sy are bound.
1. (∃x)[(Px ∙ Fx) ∙ Sx] c) The y in Q y is unbound
5. (∀x)[Fx ⊃ ~(Ox ∙ Px)] or ~(∃x)[Fx ∙ (Ox ∙ Px)] d) Open
9. (∃x)(Px ∙ Fx) e) (∀x)
EXERCISES 4.4a 11. Ba ≡ Fa 1, UI

5. 1. (∀x)Hx ∨ Ja 12. Fa 11, 10, BMP
2. (∀x)[(~Jx ∙ Ix) ∨ (~Jx ∙ Kx)] / (∀x)Hx 13. (∃x)Fx 12, EG
3. Ja ∨ (∀x)Hx 1, Com QED
4. (~Ja ∙ Ia) ∨ (~Ja ∙ Ka) 2, UI 30. 1. (∃x)Ax ⊃ (∀x)Cx
5. ~Ja ∙ (Ia ∨ Ka) 4, Dist 2. (∀x)(~Bx ⊃ Dx)
6. ~Ja 5, Simp 3. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Ax)
7. (∀x)Hx 3, 6, DS 4. (∃x)~(Dx ∨ ~Cx) / (∀x)Cx
QED 5. ~(Da ∨ ~Ca) 4, EI
10. 1. (∀x)[Gx ⊃ (Hx ∨ Ix)] 6. ~Ba ⊃ Da 2, UI
2. (∃x)(Gx ∙ ~Ix) / (∃x)(Gx ∙ Hx) 7. Ba ⊃ Aa 3, UI
3. Ga ∙ ~Ia 2, EI 8. ~Da ⊃ ~~Ba 6, Cont
4. Ga 3, Simp 9. ~Da ⊃ Ba 8, DN
5. Ga ⊃ (Ha ∨ Ia) 1, UI 10. ~Da ∙ ~~Ca 5, DM
6. Ha ∨ Ia 5, 4, MP 11. ~Da 10, Simp
7. ~Ia ∙ Ga 3, Com 12. ~Da ⊃ Aa 7, 9, HS
8. ~Ia 7, Simp 13. Aa 11, 12, MP
9. Ia ∨ Ha 6, Com 14. (∃x)Ax 13, EG
10. Ha 9, 8, DS 15. (∀x)Cx 1, 14, MP
11. Ga ∙ Ha 4, 10, Conj QED
12. (∃x)(Gx ∙ Hx) 11, EG 35. 1. (∀x)(Lx ⊃ ~Nx) ∙ (∀x)(~Mx ⊃ ~Ox)
QED 2. (∀x)~(~Nx ∙ ~Ox) / (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Mx)
3. (∀x)(~~Nx ∨ ~~Ox) 2, DM
15. 1. (∃x)(Fx ∙ Hx) ≡ Gb
4. (∀x)(~~Nx ∨ Ox) 3, DN
2. Gb / Fa
5. (∀x)(~Nx ⊃ Ox) 4, Impl
3. Gb ≡ (∃x)(Fx ∙ Hx) 1, BCom
6. ~Ny ⊃ Oy 5, UI
4. (∃x)(Fx ∙ Hx)] 3, 2, BMP
7. (∀x)(Lx ⊃ ~Nx) 1, Simp
5. Fa ∙ Ha 6, EI
8. Ly ⊃ ~Ny 7, UI
6. Fa 7, Simp
9. Ly ⊃ Oy 8, 6, HS
QED
10. (∀x)(~Mx ⊃ ~Ox) ∙ (∀x)(Lx ⊃ ~Nx) 1, Com
20. 1. (∀x)(Lx ≡ Nx) 11. (∀x)(~Mx ⊃ ~Ox) 10, Simp
2. (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Mx) 12. ~My ⊃ ~Oy 11, UI
3. (∀x)~(Mx ∨ Ox) / (∃x)~Lx 13. Oy ⊃ My 12, Cont
4. La ≡ Na 1, UI 14. Ly ⊃ My 9, 13, HS
5. Na ⊃ Ma 2, UI 15. (∀x)(Lx ⊃ Mx) 14, UG
6. ~(Ma ∨ Oa) 3, UI QED
7. (La ⊃ Na) ∙ (Na ⊃ La) 4, Equiv 40. 1. (∀x)Tx ⊃ [(∀x)(Qx ∨ Sx) ⊃ (∀x)Rx]
8. La ⊃ Na 7, Simp 2. (∀x)~(Tx ⊃ ~Sx) / (∃x)Rx
9. La ⊃ Ma 5, 8, HS 3. ~(Tx ⊃ ~Sx) 2, UI
10. ~Ma ∙ ~Oa 6, DM 4. ~(~Tx ∨ ~Sx) 3, Impl
11. ~Ma 10, Simp 5. ~~Tx ∙ ~~Sx 4, DM
12. ~La 9, 11, MT 6. Tx ∙ Sx 5, DN, DN
13. (∃x)~Lx 12, EG 7. Tx 6, Simp
QED 8. (∀x)Tx 7, UG
25. 1. (∀x)(Bx ≡ Fx) 9. (∀x)(Qx ∨ Sx) ⊃ (∀x)Rx 1, 8, MP
2. (∃x)~(~Gx ∨ Cx) 10. Sx ∙ Tx 6, Com
3. (∀x)(~Bx ⊃ Cx) / (∃x)Fx 11. Sx 10, Simp
4. ~(~Ga ∨ Ca) 2, EI 12. Sx ∨ Qx 11, Add
5. ~~Ga ∙ ~Ca 4, DM 13. Qx ∨ Sx 12, Com
6. ~Ca ∙ ~~Ga 5, Com 14. (∀x)(Qx ∨ Sx) 13, UG
7. ~Ca 6, Simp 15. (∀x)Rx 9, 14, MP
8. ~Ba ⊃ Ca 3, UI 16. Ra 15, UI
9. ~~Ba 8, 7, MT 17. (∃x)Rx 16, EG
10. Ba 9, DN QED
EXERCISES 4.4b: TR ANSLATIONS

4. 1. (∃x)[Px ∙ (Mx ∨ Sx)]
2. (∀x)(Px ≡ ~Cx)
3. (∀x)(Sx ⊃ Cx) / (∃x)(Px ∙ Mx)
8 . 1. (∃x)[(Px ∙ Cx) ∙ ~Gx]
2. (∃x)[(Px ∙ Cx) ∙ Wx]
3. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Wx) ⊃ Gx] / (∃x)(Px ∙ Gx) ∙ (∃x)(Px ∙ ~Gx)
12. 1. (∃x)(Ux ∨ Kx)
2. (∀x)(Ux ⊃ Cx)
3. (∀x)(Kx ⊃ Dx)
4. (∃x)(Cx ∨ Dx) ⊃ (∃x)Mx / (∃x)Mx
16. 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Ex) ⊃ (∃x)(Px ∙ Nx)
2. (∃x)(Px ∙ Hx)
3. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Hx ≡ Ex)]
4. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Nx) ⊃ Sx] / (∃x)Sx
EXERCISES 4.4b: DERIVATIONS
4. 1. (∃x)[Px ∙ (Mx ∨ Sx)]
2. (∀x)(Px ≡ ~Cx)
3. (∀x)(Sx ⊃ Cx) / (∃x)(Px ∙ Mx)
4. Pa ∙ (Ma ∨ Sa) 1, EI
5. Pa 4, Simp
6. Pa ≡ ~Ca 2, UI
7. ~Ca 6, 5, BMP
8. Sa ⊃ Ca 3, UI
9. ~Sa 8, 7, MT
10. (Ma ∨ Sa) ∙ Pa 4, Com
11. Ma ∨ Sa 10, Simp
12. Sa ∨ Ma 11, Com
13. Ma 12, 9, DS
14. Pa ∙ Ma 5, 13, Conj
15. (∃x)(Px ∙ Mx) 14, EG
QED
8 . 1. (∃x)[(Px ∙ Cx) ∙ ~Gx]
2. (∃x)[(Px ∙ Cx) ∙ Wx]
3. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Wx) ⊃ Gx] / (∃x)(Px ∙ Gx) ∙ (∃x)(Px ∙ ~Gx)
4. (Pa ∙ Ca) ∙ ~Ga 1, EI
5. ~Ga ∙ (Pa ∙ Ca) 4, Com
6. (~Ga ∙ Pa) ∙ Ca 5, Assoc
7. ~Ga ∙ Pa 6, Simp
8. Pa ∙ ~Ga 7, Com
9. (∃x)(Px ∙ ~Gx) 8, EG
10. (Pb ∙ Cb) ∙ Wb 2, EI
11. Wb ∙ (Pb ∙ Cb) 10, Com
12. (Wb ∙ Pb) ∙ Cb 11, Assoc
13. Wb ∙ Pb 12, Simp
14. Pb ∙ Wb 13, Com
15. Pb 14, Simp
16. (Pb ∙ Wb) ⊃ Gb 3, UI
17. Gb 16, 14, MP
18. Pb ∙ Gb 15, 17, Conj
19. (∃x)(Px ∙ Gx) 18, EG
20. (∃x)(Px ∙ Gx) ∙ (∃x)(Px ∙ ~Gx) 19, 9, Conj
QED
12. 1. (∃x)(Ux ∨ Kx) 9. Da 7, Simp

2. (∀x)(Ux ⊃ Cx) 10. Ea 8, 9, MP
3. (∀x)(Kx ⊃ Dx) 11. ~Fa ∙ Da 7, Com
4. (∃x)(Cx ∨ Dx) ⊃ (∃x)Mx / (∃x)Mx 12. ~Fa 11, Simp
5. Ua ∨ Ka 1, EI 13. Ea ∙ ~Fa 10, 12, Conj
6. Ua ⊃ Ca 2, UI 14. (∃x)(Ex ∙ ~Fx) 13, EG
7. Ka ⊃ Da 3, UI QED
8. Ca ∨ Da 6, 7, 5, CD
10. 1. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx) ⊃ (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Cx)
9. (∃x)(Cx ∨ Dx) 8, EG
2. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ~Cx) / (∃x)(Ax ∙ ~Bx)
10. (∃x)Mx 4, 9, MP
3. (∃x)(~~Ax ∙ ~Cx) 2, DN
QED
4. (∃x)~(~Ax ∨ Cx) 3, DM
16. 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Ex) ⊃ (∃x)(Px ∙ Nx) 5. (∃x)~(Ax ⊃ Cx) 4, Impl
2. (∃x)(Px ∙ Hx) 6. ~(∀x)(Ax ⊃ Cx) 5, QE
3. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Hx ≡ Ex)] 7. ~(∀x)(Ax ⊃ Bx) 1, 6, MT
4. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Nx) ⊃ Sx] / (∃x)Sx 8. (∃x)~(Ax ⊃ Bx) 7, QE
5. Pa ∙ Ha 2, EI 9. (∃x)~(~Ax ∨ Bx) 8, Impl
6. Pa 5, Simp 10. (∃x)(~~Ax ∙ ~Bx) 9, DM
7. Pa ⊃ (Ha ≡ Ea) 3, UI 11. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ~Bx) 10, DN
8. Ha ≡ Ea 7, 6, MP QED
9. Ha ∙ Pa 5, Com
10. Ha 9, Simp 15. 1. (∀x)(Ax ∨ Bx)
11. Ea 8, 10, BMP 2. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Dx)
12. Pa ∙ Ea 6, 11, Conj 3. ~(∀x)(Bx ∙ ~Cx) / (∃y)(Dy ∨ Cy)
13. (∃x)(Px ∙ Ex) 12, EG 4. (∃x)~(Bx ∙ ~Cx) 3, QE
14. (∃x)(Px ∙ Nx) 1, 13, MP 5. ~(Ba ∙ ~Ca) 4, EI
15. Pb ∙ Nb 14, EI 6. Aa ∨ Ba 1, UI
16. (Pb ∙ Nb) ⊃ Sb 4, UI 7. Aa ⊃ Da 2, UI
17. Sb 16, 15, MP 8. ~Ba ∨ ~~Ca 5, DM
18. (∃x)Sx 17, EG 9. ~Ba ∨ Ca 8, DN
QED 10. Ba ⊃ Ca 9, Impl
11. Da ∨ Ca 7, 10, 6, CD
12. (∃y)(Dy ∨ Cy) 11, EG
EXERCISES 4.4c QED
1. Line 3 instantiates an existential claim to a variable. This
argument is valid; the conclusion could be properly de- 20. 1. (∀x)(Tx ≡ ~Vx)
rived by using a constant instead of a variable in lines 2. (∃x)Vx
3–9. 3. ~(∀x)Tx ⊃ (∃x)Wx / (∃x)Wx
5. Line 10 universally generalizes over the constant ‘a’ at 4. Vh 2, EI
line 9. UG may only be used on a variable. Though the 5. Th ≡ ~Vh 1, UI
derivation is ingenious, this argument is invalid. 6. ~Vh ≡ Th 5, BCom
10. Like in exercise 2, line 3 existentially instantiates to a 7. ~~Vh 4, DN
constant which appears earlier in the derivation. This 8. ~Th 6, 7, BMT
argument is invalid. 9. (∃x)~Tx 8, EG
10. ~(∀x)Tx 9, QE
11. (∃x)Wx 3, 10, MP
EXERCISES 4.5a QED
5. 1. (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Ex)
2. ~(∀x)(Dx ⊃ Fx) / (∃x)(Ex ∙ ~Fx) 25. 1. ~(∃x)[Ex ∙ (Fx ∨ Gx)]
3. (∃x)~(Dx ⊃ Fx) 2, QE 2. (∀x)[Hx ⊃ (Ex ∙ Gx)]
4. (∃x)~(~Dx ∨ Fx) 3, Impl 3. (∃x)[~Hx ⊃ (Ix ∨ Jx)] / (∃x)(~Ix ⊃ Jx)
5. (∃x)(~~Dx ∙ ~Fx) 4, DM 4. ~Ha ⊃ (Ia ∨ Ja) 3, EI
6. (∃x)(Dx ∙ ~Fx) 5, DN 5. (∀x)~[Ex ∙ (Fx ∨ Gx)] 1, QE
7. Da ∙ ~Fa 6, EI 6. ~[Ea ∙ (Fa ∨ Ga)] 5, UI
8. Da ⊃ Ea 1, UI 7. Ha ⊃ (Ea ∙ Ga) 2, UI
8. ~Ea ∨ ~(Fa ∨ Ga) 6, DM 35. 1. (∃x)(Mx ∙ ~Nx) ⊃ (∀x)(Ox ∨ Px)

9. ~Ea ∨ (~Fa ∙ ~Ga) 8, DM 2. ~(∀x)(~Nx ⊃ Ox)
10. (~Ea ∨ ~Fa) ∙ (~Ea ∨ ~Ga) 9, Dist 3. ~(∃x)Px / ~(∀y)My
11. (~Ea ∨ ~Ga) ∙ (~Ea ∨ ~Fa) 10, Com 4. (∃x)~(~Nx ⊃ Ox) 2, QE
12. ~Ea ∨ ~Ga 11, Simp 5. ~(~Na ⊃ Oa) 4, EI
13. ~(Ea ∙ Ga) 12, DM 6. ~(~~Na ∨ Oa) 5, Impl
14. ~Ha 7, 13, MT 7. ~(Na ∨ Oa) 6, DN
15. Ia ∨ Ja 4, 14, MP 8. ~Na ∙ ~Oa 7, DM
16. ~~Ia ∨ Ja 15, DN 9. ~Oa ∙ ~Na 8, Com
17. ~Ia ⊃ Ja 16, Impl 10. ~Oa 9, Simp
18. (∃x)(~Ix ⊃ Jx) 17, EG 11. (∀x)~Px 3, QE
QED 12. ~Pa 11, UI
30. 1. (∃x)Px ≡ (∀x)(Qx ⊃ ~Rx) 13. ~Oa ∙ ~Pa 10, 12, Conj
2. (∃x)[Qx ∙ (Rx ∨ Sx)] 14. ~(Oa ∨ Pa) 13, DM
3. ~(∃x)Sx / (∀x)~Px 15. (∃x)~(Ox ∨ Px) 14, EG
4. (∀x)~Sx 3, QE 16. ~(∀x)(Ox ∨ Px) 15, QE
5. Qa ∙ (Ra ∨ Sa) 2, EI 17. ~(∃x)(Mx ∙ ~Nx) 1, 16, MT
6. (Ra ∨ Sa) ∙ Qa 5, Com 18. (∀x)~(Mx ∙ ~Nx) 17, QE
7. Ra ∨ Sa 6, Simp 19. ~(Ma ∙ ~Na) 18, UI
8. Sa ∨ Ra 7, Com 20. ~Ma ∨ ~~Na 19, DM
9. ~Sa 4, UI 21. ~~Na ∨ ~Ma 20, Com
10. Ra 8, 9, DS 22. Na ∨ ~Ma 21, DN
11. Qa 5, Simp 23. ~Na 8, Simp
12. Qa ∙ Ra 11, 10, Conj 24. ~Ma 22, 23, DS
13. (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rx) 12, EG 25. (∃y)~My 24, EG
14. ~(∀x)~(Qx ∙ Rx) 13, QE 26. ~(∀y)My 25, QE
15. ~(∀x)(~Qx ∨ ~Rx) 14, DM QED
16. ~(∀x)(Qx ⊃ ~Rx) 15, Impl
17. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ ~Rx) ≡ (∃x)Px 1, BCom
18. ~(∃x)Px 17, 16, BMT
19. (∀x)~Px 18, QE
QED
40. 1. (∀x)[Ex ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx)]

2. ~(∃x)[Ex ∙ (Fx ∙ Gx)]
3. (∀x)(Hx ⊃ Ex) / (∀x){Hx ⊃ [(Fx ∨ Gx) ∙ ~(Fx ∙ Gx)]}
4. (∀x)~[Ex ∙ (Fx ∙ Gx)] 2, QE
5. (∀x)[~Ex ∨ ~(Fx ∙ Gx)] 4, DM
6. (∀x)[Ex ⊃ ~(Fx ∙ Gx)] 5, Impl
7. Hx ⊃ Ex 3, UI
8. Ex ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx) 1, UI
9. Hx ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx) 7, 8, HS
10. Ex ⊃ ~(Fx ∙ Gx) 6, UI
11. Hx ⊃ ~(Fx ∙ Gx) 7, 10, HS
12. [Hx ⊃ (Fx ∨ Gx)] ∙ [Hx ⊃ ~(Fx ∙ Gx)] 9, 11, Conj
13. [~Hx ∨ (Fx ∨ Gx)] ∙ [Hx ⊃ ~(Fx ∙ Gx)] 12, Impl
14. [~Hx ∨ (Fx ∨ Gx)] ∙ [~Hx ∨ ~(Fx ∙ Gx)] 13, Impl
15. ~Hx ∨ [(Fx ∨ Gx) ∙ ~(Fx ∙ Gx)] 14, Dist
16. Hx ⊃ [(Fx ∨ Gx) ∙ ~(Fx ∙ Gx)] 15, Impl
17. (∀x){Hx ⊃ [(Fx ∨ Gx) ∙ ~(Fx ∙ Gx)]} 16, UG
QED

4. 1. (∃x)[(Px ∙ Cx) ∙ ~Kx]
2. (∀x)[(Px ∙ ~Kx) ⊃ Ux]
3. ~(∃x)[(Px ∙ Ux) ∙ ~Fx) / (∃x)[(Px ∙ Cx) ⊃ Fx]
8. 1. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ ~Hx)
2. ~(∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Ax)
3. ~(∀x)[Rx ⊃ (Fx ∨ Wx)] / ~(∀x)[(Ax ∙ ~Hx) ⊃ (Fx ∨ Wx)]
12. 1. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Sx) ⊃ (∃x)(Bx ∙ Ax)
2. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Mx)
3. ~(∃x)(Mx ∙ ~Sx)
4. ~(∃x)(Ax ∙ ~Ix) / (∃x)(Bx ∙ Ix)
16. 1. (∀x)[Ex ⊃ (Ax ∨ ~Mx)]
2. ~(∃x)[(Ex ∙ Ax) ∙ Fx]
3. ~(∃x)[(Ex ∙ ~Mx) ∙ Cx] / ~(∃x)[Ex ∙ (Fx ∙ Cx)]

4. 1. (∃x)[(Px ∙ Cx) ∙ ~Kx] 12. ~Ke 11, Simp
2. (∀x)[(Px ∙ ~Kx) ⊃ Ux] 13. Pe ∙ ~Ke 10, 12, Conj
3. ~(∃x)[(Px ∙ Ux) ∙ ~Fx] / (∃x)[(Px ∙ Cx) ∙ Fx] 14. (Pe ∙ ~Ke) ⊃ Ue 2, UI
4. (∀x)~[(Px ∙ Ux) ∙ ~Fx] 3, QE 15. Ue 14, 13, MP
5. (∀x)[~(Px ∙ Ux) ∨ ~~Fx] 4, DM 16. Pe ∙ Ue 10, 15, Conj
6. (∀x)[~(Px ∙ Ux) ∨ Fx] 5, DN 17. (Pe ∙ Ue) ⊃ Fe 7, UI
7. (∀x)[(Px ∙ Ux) ⊃ Fx] 6, Impl 18. Fe 17, 16, MP
8. (Pe ∙ Ce) ∙ ~Ke 1, EI 19. (Pe ∙ Ce) ∙ Fe 9, 18, Conj
9. Pe ∙ Ce 8, Simp 20. (∃x)[(Px ∙ Cx) ∙ Fx] 19, EG
10. Pe 9, Simp QED
11. ~Ke ∙ (Pe ∙ Ce) 8, Com
8. 1. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ ~Hx)
2. ~(∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Ax)
3. ~(∀x)[Rx ⊃ (Fx ∨ Wx)] / ~(∀x)[(Ax ∙ ~Hx) ⊃ (Fx ∨ Wx)]
4. (∃x)~[Rx ⊃ (Fx ∨ Wx)] 3, QE
5. (∃x)~[~Rx ∨ (Fx ∨ Wx)] 4, Impl
6. (∃x)[~~Rx ∙ ~(Fx ∨ Wx)] 5, DM
7. (∃x)[Rx ∙ ~(Fx ∨ Wx)] 6, DN
8. (∀x)~(Rx ∙ ~Ax) 2, QE
9. (∀x)(~Rx ∨ ~~Ax) 8, DM
10. (∀x)(~Rx ∨ Ax) 9, DN
11. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Ax) 10, Impl
12. Rj ∙ ~(Fj ∨ Wj) 7, EI
13. Rj 12, Simp
14. Rj ⊃ ~Hj 1, UI
15. ~Hj 14, 13, MP
16. Rj ⊃ Aj 11, UI
17. Aj 16, 13, MP
18. Aj ∙ ~Hj 17, 15, Conj
19. ~(Fj ∨ Wj) ∙ Rj 12, Com
20. ~(Fj ∨ Wj) 19, Simp
21. (Aj ∙ ~Hj) ∙ ~(Fj ∨ Wj) 18, 20, Conj
22. (∃x)[(Ax ∙ ~Hx) ∙ ~(Fx ∨ Wx)] 21, EG
23. (∃x)[~~(Ax ∙ ~Hx) ∙ ~(Fx ∨ Wx)] 22, DN
24. (∃x)~[~(Ax ∙ ~Hx) ∨ (Fx ∨ Wx)] 23, DM 23. Cx ⊃ [(Ex ∙ Ex) ⊃ Ax] 22, Exp
25. (∃x)~[(Ax ∙ ~Hx) ⊃ (Fx ∨ Wx)] 24, Impl 24. Cx ⊃ (Ex ⊃ Ax) 23, Taut
26. ~(∀x)[(Ax ∙ ~Hx) ⊃ (Fx ∨ Wx)] 25, QE 25. (Cx ∙ Ex) ⊃ Ax 24, Exp
QED 26. (Ex ∙ Ax) ⊃ ~Fx 6, UI
27. (Ax ∙ Ex) ⊃ ~Fx 26, Com
12. 1. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Sx) ⊃ (∃x)(Bx ∙ Ax) 28. Ax ⊃ (Ex ⊃ ~Fx) 27, Exp
2. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Mx) 29. (Cx ∙ Ex) ⊃ (Ex ⊃ ~Fx) 25, 28, HS
3. ~(∃x)(Mx ∙ ~Sx) 30. Cx ⊃ [Ex ⊃ (Ex ⊃ ~Fx)] 29, Exp
4. ~(∃x)(Ax ∙ ~Ix) / (∃x)(Bx ∙ Ix) 31. Cx ⊃ [(Ex ∙ Ex) ⊃ ~Fx] 30, Exp
5. (∀x)~(Mx ∙ ~Sx) 3, QE 32. Cx ⊃ (Ex ⊃ ~Fx) 31, Taut
6. (∀x)(~Mx ∨ ~~Sx) 5, DM 33. (Cx ∙ Ex) ⊃ ~Fx 32, Exp
7. (∀x)(~Mx ∨ Sx) 6, DN 34. (Ex ∙ Cx) ⊃ ~Fx 33, Com
8. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Sx) 7, Impl 35. Ex ⊃ (Cx ⊃ ~Fx) 34, Exp
9. Mx ⊃ Sx 8, UI 36. Ex ⊃ (~Cx ∨ ~Fx) 35, Impl
10. Bx ⊃ Mx 2, UI 37. Ex ⊃ ~(Cx ∙ Fx) 36, DM
11. Bx ⊃ Sx 10, 9, HS 38. ~Ex ∨ ~(Cx ∙ Fx) 37, Impl
12. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Sx) 11, UG 39. ~[Ex ∙ (Cx ∙ Fx)] 38, DM
13. (∃x)(Bx ∙ Ax) 1, 12, MP 40. (∀x)~[Ex ∙ (Cx ∙ Fx)] 39, UG
14. (∀x)~(Ax ∙ ~Ix) 4, QE 41. ~(∃x)[Ex ∙ (Cx ∙ Fx)] 40, QE
15. (∀x)(~Ax ∨ ~~Ix) 14, DM QED
16. (∀x)(~Ax ∨ Ix) 15, DN
17. (∀x)(Ax ⊃ Ix) 16, Impl
18. Ba ∙ Aa 13, EI EXERCISES 4.6a
19. Aa ∙ Ba 18, Com 5. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Qx ∙ Rx)]
20. Aa 19, Simp 2. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Sx) / (∀x)(Px ⊃ Sx)
21. Aa ⊃ Ia 17, UI 3. Px ACP
22. Ia 21, 20, MP 4. Px ⊃ (Qx ∙ Rx) 1, UI
23. Ba 18, Simp 5. Qx ∙ Rx 4, 3, MP
24. Ba ∙ Ia 23, 22, Conj 6. Qx 5, Simp
25. (∃x)(Bx ∙ Ix) 24, EG 7. Qx ⊃ Sx 2, UI
QED 8. Sx 7, 6, MP
9. Px ⊃ Sx 3–8, CP
16. 1. (∀x)[Ex ⊃ (Ax ∨ ~Mx)] 10. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Sx) 9, UG
2. ~(∃x)[(Ex ∙ Ax) ∙ Fx] QED
3. ~(∃x)[(Ex ∙ ~Mx) ∙ Cx] / ~(∃x)[Ex ∙ (Fx ∙ Cx)]
10. 1. (∀x)(Gx ⊃ Hx)
4. (∀x)~[(Ex ∙ Ax) ∙ Fx] 2, QE
2. ~(∃x)(Ix ∙ ~Gx)
5. (∀x)[~(Ex ∙ Ax) ∨ ~Fx] 4, DM
3. (∀x)(~Hx ⊃ Ix) / (∀x)Hx
6. (∀x)[(Ex ∙ Ax) ⊃ ~Fx] 5, Impl
4. (∃x)~Hx AIP
7. (∀x)~[(Ex ∙ ~Mx) ∙ Cx] 3, QE
5. ~Ha 4, EI
8. (∀x)[~(Ex ∙ ~Mx) ∨ ~Cx] 7, DM
6. Ga ⊃ Ha 1, UI
9. (∀x)[(Ex ∙ ~Mx) ⊃ ~Cx] 8, Impl
7. ~Ga 6, 5, MT
10. Ex ⊃ (Ax ∨ ~Mx) 1, UI
8. (∀x)~(Ix ∙ ~Gx) 2, QE
11. Ex ⊃ (~Mx ∨ Ax) 10, Com
9. ~(Ia ∙ ~Ga) 8, UI
12. Ex ⊃ (Mx ⊃ Ax) 11, Impl
10. ~Ia ∨ ~~Ga 9, DM
13. (Ex ∙ Mx) ⊃ Ax 12, Exp
11. ~~Ga ∨ ~Ia 10, Com
14. (Mx ∙ Ex) ⊃ Ax 13, Com
12. Ga ∨ ~Ia 11, DN
15. Mx ⊃ (Ex ⊃ Ax) 14, Exp
13. ~Ia 12, 7, DS
16. (Ex ∙ ~Mx) ⊃ ~Cx 9, UI
14. ~Ha ⊃ Ia 3, UI
17. Ex ⊃ (~Mx ⊃ ~Cx) 16, Exp
15. ~~Ha 14, 13, MT
18. Ex ⊃ (Cx ⊃ Mx) 17, Cont
16. ~Ha ∙ ~~Ha 5, 15, Conj
19. (Ex ∙ Cx) ⊃ Mx 18, Exp
17. ~(∃x)~Hx 4–16, IP
20. (Ex ∙ Cx) ⊃ (Ex ⊃ Ax) 19, 15, HS
18. (∀x)Hx 17, QE
21. (Cx ∙ Ex) ⊃ (Ex ⊃ Ax) 20, Com
QED
22. Cx ⊃ [Ex ⊃ (Ex ⊃ Ax)] 21, Exp
15. 1. (∀x)[(Fx ∨ Gx) ⊃ Ix] 30. 1. ~(∃x)(Dx ∙ ~Ex)

2. (∀x)[(Ix ∙ Ex) ⊃ Gx] / (∀x)[Ex ⊃ (Fx ⊃ Gx)] 2. (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Gx)
3. Ex ∙ Fx ACP 3. ~(∃x)(Gx ∙ Ex) / ~(∃x)(Dx ∙ Fx)
4. (Fx ∨ Hx) ⊃ Ix 1, UI 4. (∀x)~(Dx ∙ ~Ex) 1, QE
5. Fx ∙ Ex 3, Com 5. (∀x)(~Dx ∨ ~~Ex) 4, DM
6. Fx 5, Simp 6. (∀x)(~Dx ∨ Ex) 5, DN
7. Fx ∨ Hx 6, Add 7. (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Ex) 6, Impl
8. Ix 4, 7, MP 8. (∀x)~(Gx ∙ Ex) 3, QE
9. (Ix ∙ Ex) ⊃ Gx 2, UI 9. (∀x)(~Gx ∨ ~Ex) 8, DM
10. Ex 3, Simp 10. (∀x)(Gx ⊃ ~Ex) 9, Impl
11. Ix ∙ Ex 8, 10, Conj 11. (∃x)(Dx ∙ Fx) AIP
12. Gx 9, 11, MP 12. Dn ∙ Fn 11, EI
13. (Ex ∙ Fx) ⊃ Gx 3–12, CP 13. Dn 12, Simp
14. Ex ⊃ (Fx ⊃ Gx) 13, Exp 14. Dn ⊃ En 7, UI
15. (∀x)[Ex ⊃ (Fx ⊃ Gx)] 14, UG 15. En 14, 13, MP
QED 16. ~~En 15, DN
17. Gn ⊃ ~En 10, UI
20. 1. (∃x)Ax ⊃ ~(∀x)Bx
18. ~Gn 17, 16, MT
2. (∃x)Cx ⊃ (∀x)Bx
19. Fn ∙ Dn 12, Com
3. (∀x)Ax ∨ (∀x)~Cx / ~(∃x)Cx
20. Fn 19, Simp
4. (∃x)Cx AIP
21. Fn ⊃ Gn 2, UI
5. (∀x)Bx 2, 4, MP
22. Gn 21, 20, MP
6. ~~(∀x)Bx 5, DN
23. Gn ∙ ~Gn 22, 18, Conj
7. ~(∃x)Ax 1, 6, MT
24. ~(∃x)(Dx ∙ Fx) 11–23, IP
8. (∀x)~Ax 7, QE
QED
9. ~(∀x)~Cx 4, QE
10. (∀x)~Cx ∨ (∀x)Ax 3, Com 35. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Qx ⊃ ~Rx)]
11. (∀x)Ax 10, 9, DS 2. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Sx ⊃ ~Rx)]
12. Aa 11, UI 3. (∀x)(Qx ∨ Sx) / (∀x)(Px ⊃ ~Rx)
13. ~Aa 8, UI 4. Px ACP
14. Aa ∙ ~Aa 12, 13, Conj 5. Px ⊃ (Qx ⊃ ~Rx) 1, UI
15. ~(∃x)Cx 4–14, IP 6. Qx ⊃ ~Rx 5, 4, MP
QED 7. Px ⊃ (Sx ⊃ ~Rx) 2, UI
8. Sx ⊃ ~Rx 7, 4, MP
25. 1. (∀x)[Fx ⊃ (Dx ∙ ~Ex)]
9. Qx ∨ Sx 3, UI
2. (∀x)(Fx ⊃ Hx)
10. ~Rx ∨ ~Rx 6, 8, 9, CD
3. (∃x)Fx / ~(∀x)(Dx ⊃ Ex) ∨ (∃x)[Fx ∙ (Gx ∙ Hx)]
11. ~Rx 10, Taut
4. Fa 3, EI
12. Px ⊃ ~Rx 4–11, CP
5. Fa ⊃ Ha 2, UI
13. (∀x)(Px ⊃ ~Rx) 12, UG
6. Ha 5, 4, MP
QED
7. Fa ⊃ (Da ∙ ~Ea) 1, UI
8. Da ∙ ~Ea 7, 4, MP
9. ~Ea ∙ Da 8, Com
10. ~Ea 9, Simp
11. (∀x)(Dx ⊃ Ex) AIP
12. Da ⊃ Ea 11, UI
13. Da 8, Simp
14. Ea 12, 13, MP
15. Ea ∙ ~Ea 14, 10, Conj
16. ~(∀x)(Dx ⊃ Ex) 11–15, IP
17. ~(∀x)(Dx ⊃ Ex) ∨ (∃x)[Fx ∙ (Gx ∙ Hx)] 16, Add
QED
40. 1. ~(∃x)[(Kx ∙ Lx) ∙ (Mx ≡ Nx)]

2. (∀x){Kx ⊃ [Ox ∨ (Px ⊃ Qx)]}
3. (∀x)[(Lx ∙ Mx) ⊃ Px]
4. (∀x)[Nx ∨ (Kx ∙ ~Qx)] / (∀x)[Lx ⊃ (Nx ∨ Ox)]
5. Lx ACP
6. (∀x)~[(Kx ∙ Lx) ∙ (Mx ≡ Nx)] 1, QE
7. ~[(Kx ∙ Lx) ∙ (Mx ≡ Nx)] 6, UI
8. ~(Kx ∙ Lx) ∨ ~(Mx ≡ Nx) 7, DM
9. (Kx ∙ Lx) ⊃ ~(Mx ≡ Nx) 8, Impl
10. Kx ⊃ [Ox ∨ (Px ⊃ Qx)] 2, UI
11. (Lx ∙ Mx) ⊃ Px 3, UI
12. Nx ∨ (Kx ∙ ~Qx) 4, UI
13. ~(Nx ∨ Ox) AIP
14. ~Nx ∙ ~Ox 13, DM
15. ~Nx 14, Simp
16. Kx ∙ ~Qx 12, 15, DS
17. Kx 16, Simp
18. Kx ∙ Lx 17, 5, Conj
19. ~(Mx ≡ Nx) 9, 18, MP
20. ~(Nx ≡ Mx) 19, BCom
21. ~Nx ≡ Mx 20, BDM
22. Mx 21, 15, BMP
23. Lx ∙ Mx 5, 22, Conj
24. Px 11, 23, MP
25. ~Qx ∙ Kx 16, Com
26. ~Qx 25, Simp
27. Px ∙ ~Qx 24, 26, Conj
28. ~~Px ∙ ~Qx 27, DN
29. ~(~Px ∨ Qx) 28, DM
30. ~(Px ⊃ Qx) 29, Impl
31. ~Ox ∙ ~Nx 29, Com
32. ~Ox 31, Simp
33. ~Ox ∙ ~(Px ⊃ Qx) 32, 30, Conj
34. ~[Ox ∨ (Px ⊃ Qx)] 33, DM
35. ~Kx 10, 34, MT
36. Kx ∙ ~Kx 17, 35, Conj
37. ~~(Nx ∨ Ox) 13–36, IP
38. Nx ∨ Ox 37, DN
39. Lx ⊃ (Nx ∨ Ox) 5–38, CP
40. (∀x)[Lx ⊃ (Nx ∨ Ox)] 39, UG
QED

4. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Cx ∨ Tx)]
2. (∀x)(~Tx ≡ Ex) / (∃x)(Px ∙ ~Cx) ⊃ (∃x)~Ex
8 . 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (~Bx ∨ ~Tx)] / (∀x)(Px ⊃ Bx) ⊃ [(∃x)Px ⊃ ~(∀x)Tx]
12. 1. (∀x)(Sx ∨ Ax)
2. (∃x)(~Sx ∙ Fx) / (∃x)(Ax ∙ Fx)
16. 1. (∀x)[Ix ⊃ (Ex ∨ Tx)]
2. (∃x)(Ix ∙ ~Ex)
3. (∀x)[Tx ⊃ (~Kx ⊃ Ex)] / ~(∀x)~Kx
EXERCISES 4.6b: DERIVATIONS 16. 1. (∀x)[Ix ⊃ (Ex ∨ Tx)]

4. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (Cx ∨ Tx)] 2. (∃x)(Ix ∙ ~Ex)
2. (∀x)(~Tx ≡ Ex) / (∃x)(Px ∙ ~Cx) ⊃ (∃x)~Ex 3. (∀x)[Tx ⊃ (~Kx ⊃ Ex)] / ~(∀x)~Kx
3. (∃x)(Px ∙ ~Cx) ACP 4. Id ∙ ~Ed 2, EI
4. Po ∙ ~Co 3, EI 5. Id 4, Simp
5. Po 4, Simp 6. Id ⊃ (Ed ∨ Td) 1, UI
6. Po ⊃ (Co ∨ To) 1, UI 7. Ed ∨ Td 6, 5, MP
7. Co ∨ To 6, 5, MP 8. ~Ed ∙ Id 4, Com
8. ~Co ∙ Po 4, Com 9. ~Ed 8, Simp
9. ~Co 8, Simp 10. Td 7, 9, DS
10. To 7, 9, DS 11. Td ⊃ (~Kd ⊃ Ed) 3, UI
11. ~To ≡ Eo 2, UI 12. ~Kd ⊃ Ed 11, 10, MP
12. ~~To 10, DN 13. ~~Kd 12, 9, MT
13. ~Eo 11, 12, BMT 14. (∃x)~~Kx 13, EG
14. (∃x)~Ex 13, EG 15. ~(∀x)~Kx 14, QE
15. (∃x)(Px ∙ ~Cx) ⊃ (∃x)~Ex 3–14, CP QED
QED
8 . 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (~Bx ∨ ~Tx)] EXERCISES 4.6c
/ (∀x)(Px ⊃ Bx) ⊃ [(∃x)Px ⊃ ~(∀x)Tx] 1. 1. ~(∀y)[Fy ⊃ (∃x)Fx] AIP
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Bx) ACP 2. (∃y)~[Fy ⊃ (∃x)Fx] 1, QE
3. (∃x)Px ACP 3. (∃y)~[~Fy ∨ (∃x)Fx] 2, Impl
4. Pr 3, EI 4. (∃y)[~~Fy ∙ ~(∃x)Fx] 3, DM
5. Pr ⊃ Br 2, UI 5. (∃y)[Fy ∙ ~(∃x)Fx] 4, DN
6. Br 5, 4, MP 6. Fa ∙ ~(∃x)Fx 5, EI
7. Pr ⊃ (~Br ∨ ~Tr) 1, UI 7. Fa 6, Simp
8. ~Br ∨ ~Tr 7, 4,MP 8. ~(∃x)Fx ∙ Fa 6, Com
9. ~~Br 6, DN 9. ~(∃x)Fx 8, Simp
10. ~Tr 8, 9, DS 10. (∃x)Fx 7, EG
11. (∃x)~Tx 10, EG 11. (∃x)Fx ∙ ~(∃x)Fx 10, 9, Conj
12. ~(∀x)Tx 11, QE 12. ~~(∀y)[Fy ⊃ (∃x)Fx] 1–11, IP
13. (∃x)Px ⊃ ~(∀x)Tx 3–12, CP 13. (∀y)[Fy ⊃ (∃x)Fx] 12, DN
14. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Bx) ⊃ [(∃x)Px ⊃ ~(∀x)Tx] 2–13, CP QED
QED 5. 1. (∀x)Bx ACP
12. 1. (∀x)(Sx ∨ Ax) 2. Ba 1, UI
2. (∃x)(~Sx ∙ Fx) / (∃x)(Ax ∙ Fx) 3. (∃x)Bx 2, EG
3. ~Sa ∙ Fa 2, EI 4. (∀x)Bx ⊃ (∃x)Bx 1–3, CP
4. ~Sa 3, Simp QED
5. Sa ∨ Aa 1, UI
6. Aa 5, 4, DS
7. Fa ∙ ~Sa 3, Com
8. Fa 7, Simp
9. Aa ∙ Fa 6, 8, Conj
10. (∃x)(Ax ∙ Fx) 9, EG
QED
10. 1. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) ACP

2. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) ACP
3. Pa ∙ Qa 1, EI
4. Qa ∙ Pa 3, Com
5. Qa 4, Simp
6. Qa ⊃ Ra 2, UI
7. Ra 6, 5, MP
8. Pa 3, Simp
9. Pa ∙ Ra 8, 7, Conj
10. (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx) 9, EG
11. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) ⊃ (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx) 2–10, CP
12. (∃x)(Px ∙ Qx) ⊃ [(∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) ⊃ (∃x)(Px ∙ Rx)] 1–11, CP
QED
15. 1. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx) ∙ ~(∃x)(Ox ∙ Nx) ACP
2. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx) 1, Simp
3. ~(∃x)(Ox ∙ Nx) ∙ (∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx) 1, Com
4. ~(∃x)(Ox ∙ Nx) 3, Simp
5. (∀x)~(Ox ∙ Nx) 4, QE
6. (∀x)(~Ox ∨ ~Nx) 5, DM
7. (∀x)(Ox ⊃ ~Nx) 6, Impl
8. Mx ⊃ Nx 2, UI
9. Ox ⊃ ~Nx 7, UI
10. ~~Nx ⊃ ~Ox 9, Cont
11. Nx ⊃ ~Ox 10, DN
12. Mx ⊃ ~Ox 8, 11, HS
13. ~Mx ∨ ~Ox 12, Impl
14. ~(Mx ∙ Ox) 13, DM
15. (∀x)~(Mx ∙ Ox) 14, UG
16. ~(∃x)(Mx ∙ Ox) 15, QE
17. [(∀x)(Mx ⊃ Nx) ∙ ~(∃x)(Ox ∙ Nx)] ⊃ ~(∃x)(Mx ∙ Ox) 1–16, CP
QED
20. 1. (∃x)(Ka ∙ Lx) ACP EXERCISES 4.7b

2. ~[Ka ∙ (∃x)Lx] AIP 1. Suppose that ‘(∃x)Ax ∨ (∀x)~Ax’ is not a logical truth.
3. ~Ka ∨ ~(∃x)Lx 2, DM Then there is some interpretation on which both ‘(∃x)
4. Ka ∙ Lb 1, EI Ax’ and ‘(∀x)~Ax’ are false. On that interpretation,
5. Ka 4, Simp there will be no object in the domain in the set assigned
6. ~~Ka 5, DN to ‘Ax’, in order to make the first disjunct false; the set
7. ~(∃x)Lx 3, 6, DS will be empty. But in that case, there is no way to make
8. (∀x)~Lx 7, QE the second disjunct false, since no object in the domain
9. ~Lb 8, UI will be in the set assigned to ‘Ax’. Thus, on any interpre-
10. Lb ∙ Ka 4, Com tation, at least one of the disjuncts has to be true.
11. Lb 10, Simp
12. Lb ∙ ~Lb 11, 9, Conj EXERCISES 4.8a
13. ~~[Ka ∙ (∃x)Lx] 2–12, IP 5. Counterexample in a one-member domain in which:
14. Ka ∙ (∃x)Lx 13, DN Pa: true
15. (∃x)(Ka ∙ Lx) ⊃[Ka ∙ (∃x)Lx] 1–14, CP Qa: true
16. Ka ∙ (∃x)Lx ACP Ra: true
17. ~(∃x)(Ka ∙ Lx) AIP Sa: false
18. (∀x)~(Ka ∙ Lx) 17, QE 10. Counterexample in a two-member domain in which:
19. ~(Ka ∙ Lx) 18, UI Da: true Db: true
20. ~Ka ∨ ~Lx 19, DM Ea: true Eb: false
21. Ka 16, Simp Ga: false Gb: true
22. ~~Ka 21, DN 15. Counterexample in a two-member domain in which:
23. ~Lx 20, 22, DS Ra: false Rb: false
24. (∀x)~Lx 23, UG Sa: true Sb: false
25. ~(∃x)Lx 24, QE Ta: true Tb: false
26. (∃x)Lx ∙ Ka 16, Com 20. Counterexample in a two-member domain in which:
27. (∃x)Lx 26, Simp Oa: true Ob: false
28. (∃x)Lx ∙ ~(∃x)Lx Pa: false Pb: true
27, 25, Conj Qa: false Qb: true
29. ~~(∃x)(Ka ∙ Lx) 17–28, IP Ra: true Rb: false
30. (∃x)(Ka ∙ Lx) 29, DN 25. Counterexample in a two-member domain in which:
31. [Ka ∙ (∃x)Lx] ⊃ (∃x)(Ka ∙ Lx) 16–30, CP Da: true Db: true
32. {(∃x)(Ka ∙ Lx) ⊃ [Ka ∙ (∃x)Lx]} ∙ Ea: false Eb: true
{[Ka ∙ (∃x)Lx] ⊃ (∃x)(Ka ∙ Lx)} 15, 31, Conj Fa: true Fb: false
33. (∃x)(Ka ∙ Lx) ≡ [Ka ∙ (∃x)Lx] 32, Equiv Ga: false Gb: true
QED 30. Counterexample in a three-member domain in which:
Ea: true Eb: true Ec: false
EXERCISES 4.7a. Fa: true Fb: false Fc: true
Note: This solution is just a sample; many alternatives are pos- Ga: true Gb: false Gc: true
sible. 35. Counterexample in a three-member domain in which:
1. Domain: {Numbers} Fa: true Fb: false Fc: true
a: two Ga: true Gb: true Gc: false
b: one-third Ha: true Hb: false Hc: false
Px: x is a natural number 40. Counterexample in a four-member domain in which:
Qx: x is a rational number Ea: false Eb: true Ec: true Ed: false
Two is a natural number, but one-third is not. Fa: false Fb: true Fc: false Fd: true
Two and one-third are both rational numbers. Ga: false Gb: true Gc: true Gd: true
All natural numbers are rationals. Ha: false Hb: true Hc: true Hd: true
Something is both not a natural number and not a ra
tional number.
E XERCISES 4.8b 16. 1. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) ≡ (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx)

3. Counterexample in a two-member domain in which: 2. (∃x)(Px ∙ ~Qx)
Pa: true Pb: false 3. (∀x)(~Sx ⊃ Rx) / (∃x)(Qx ∙ Sx)
Qa: true Qb: true 4. ~(∀x)~(Px ∙ ~Qx) 2, QE
Ra: true Rb: false 5. ~(∀x)(~Px ∨ ~~Qx) 4, DM
6. Counterexample in a two-member domain in which: 6. ~(∀x)(~Px ∨ Qx) 5, DN
Pa: true Pb: true 7. ~(∀x)(Px ⊃ Qx) 6, Impl
Qa: false Qb: true 8. ~(∀x)(Qx ⊃ Rx) 1, 7, BMT
9. (∃x)~(Qx ⊃ Rx) 8, QE
EXERCISES 4.8c 10. ~(Qm ⊃ Rm) 9, EI
4. Invalid. Counterexample in a one-member domain in 11. ~(~Qm ∨ Rm) 10, Impl
which: 12. ~~Qm ∙ ~Rm 11, DM
Da: false 13. Qm ∙ ~Rm 12, DN
Ea: true 14. Qm 13, Simp
Fa: false 15. ~Rm ∙ Qm 13, Com
Ga: true 16. ~Rm 15, Simp
17. ~Sm ⊃ Rm 3, UI
8. 1. (∀x)[Px ≡ (Qx ∨ Rx)] 18. ~~Sm 17, 16, MT
2. (∀x)(Rx ≡ Sx) 19. Sm 18, DN
3. (∃x)(Sx ∙ Tx) / (∃x)(Px ∙ Tx) 20. Qm ∙ Sm 14, 19, Conj
4. Sa ∙ Ta 3, EI 21. (∃x)(Qx ∙ Sx) 20, EG
5. Sa 4, Simp QED
6. Ra ≡ Sa 2, UI
7. Sa ≡ Ra 5, BCom 20. Invalid. Counterexample in a three-member domain in
8. Ra 7, 5, BMP which:
9. Pa ≡ (Qa ∨ Ra) 1, UI Aa: true Ab: false Ac: true
10. (Qa ∨ Ra) ≡ Pa 9, BCom Ba: true Bb: true Bc: false
11. Ra ∨ Qa 8, Add Ca: false Bc: false Cc: false
12. Qa ∨ Ra 11, Com Da: false Dc: false Dc: true
13. Pa 10, 12, BMP
14. Ta ∙ Sa 4, Com EXERCISES 4.8d
15. Ta 14, Simp 4. False valuation in a two-member domain in which:
16. Pa ∙ Ta 13, 15, Conj Da: true
17. (∃x)(Px ∙ Tx) 16, EG Db: false
QED 8. 1. (∃x)(Ix ∙ ~Jx) ACP
12. 1. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ~Bx) ⊃ (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx) 2. ~(∀x)~(Ix ∙ ~Jx) 1, QE
/ (∃x)Ax ⊃ ~(∀x)~Bx 3. ~(∀x)(~Ix ∨ ~~Jx) 2, DM
2. (∃x)Ax ACP 4. ~(∀x)(Ix ⊃ ~~Jx) 3, Impl
3. (∀x)~Bx AIP 5. ~(∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx) 4, DN
4. Aa 2, EI 6. (∃x)(Ix ∙ ~Jx) ⊃ ~(∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx) 1–5, CP
5. ~Ba 3, UI 7. ~(∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx) ACP
6. Aa ∙ ~Ba 4, 5, Conj 8. (∃x)~(Ix ⊃ Jx) 7, QE
7. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ~Bx) 6, EG 9. (∃x)~(~Ix ∨ Jx) 8, Impl
8. (∃x)(Ax ∙ Bx) 1, 7, MP 10. (∃x)(~~Ix ∙ ~Jx) 9, DM
9. Ab ∙ Bb 8, EI 11. (∃x)(Ix ∙ ~Jx) 10, DN
10. Bb ∙ Ab 9, Com 12. ~(∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx) ⊃ (∃x)(Ix ∙ ~Jx) 7–11, CP
11. Bb 10, Simp 13. [(∃x)(Ix ∙ ~Jx) ⊃ ~(∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx)] ∙
12. ~Bb 3, UI ~(∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx) ⊃ (∃x)(Ix ∙ ~Jx) 6, 12, Conj
13. Bb ∙ ~Bb 11, 12, Conj 14. (∃x)(Ix ∙ ~Jx) ≡ ~(∀x)(Ix ⊃ Jx) 13, Equiv
14. ~(∀x)~Bx 3–13, IP QED
15. (∃x)Ax ⊃ ~(∀x)~Bx 2–14, CP
QED
12. 1. (∀x)[Xx ⊃ ~(Yx ∨ Zx)] ACP 16. False valuation in a one-member domain in
2. (∃x)(Xx ∙ Yx) AIP which:
3. Xd ∙ Yd 2, EI Ia: true
4. Xd ⊃ ~(Yd ∨ Zd) 1, UI Ja: false
5. Xd 3, Simp Ka: false
6. ~(Yd ∨ Zd) 4, 5, MP
7. ~Yd ∙ ~Zd 6, DM
8. ~Yd 7, Simp
9. Yd ∙ Xd 3, Com
10. Yd 9, Simp
11. Yd ∙ ~Yd 10, 8, Conj
12. ~(∃x)(Xx ∙ Yx) 2–11, IP
13. (∀x)[Xx ⊃ ~(Yx ∨ Zx)] ⊃ ~(∃x)(Xx ∙ Yx) 1–12, CP
QED
20. 1. ~{[(∀x)(Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Sx)] ∨ [(∃x)(~Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(~Rx ∙ ~Sx)]} AIP
2. ~[(∀x)(Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Sx)] ∙ ~[(∃x)(~Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(~Rx ∙ ~Sx)] 1, DM
3. ~[(∀x)(Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Sx)] 3, Simp
4. ~(∀x)(Rx ∙ Sx) ∙ ~(∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Sx) 3, DM
5. ~(∀x)(Rx ∙ Sx) 4, Simp
6. (∃x)~(Rx ∙ Sx) 5, QE
7. (∃x)(~Rx ∨ ~Sx) 6, DM
8. ~Ra ∨ ~Sa 7, EI
9. Ra ⊃ ~Sa 8, Impl
10. ~(∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Sx) ∙ ~(∀x)(Rx ∙ Sx) 4, Com
11. ~(∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Sx) 10, Simp
12. (∀x)~(Rx ∙ ~Sx) 11, QE
13. ~(Ra ∙ ~Sa) 12, UI
14. ~Ra ∨ ~~Sa 13, DM
15. Ra ⊃ ~~Sa 14, Impl
16. Ra ⊃ Sa 15, DN
17. ~Sa ⊃ ~Ra 16, Cont
18. Ra ⊃ ~Ra 9, 17, HS
19. ~Ra ∨ ~Ra 18, Impl
20. ~Ra 19, Taut
21. ~[(∃x)(~Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(~Rx ∙ ~Sx)] ∙ ~[(∀x)(Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Sx)] 2, Com
22. ~[(∃x)(~Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(~Rx ∙ ~Sx)] 21, Simp
23. ~(∃x)(~Rx ∙ Sx) ∙ ~(∃x)(~Rx ∙ ~Sx) 22, DM
24. ~(∃x)(~Rx ∙ Sx) 23, Simp
25. (∀x)~(~Rx ∙ Sx) 24, QE
26. ~(~Ra ∙ Sa) 25, UI
27. ~~Ra ∨ ~Sa 26, DM
28. ~~~Ra 20, DN
29. ~Sa 27, 28, DS
30. ~(∃x)(~Rx ∙ ~Sx) ∙ ~(∃x)(~Rx ∙ Sx) 23, Com
31. ~(∃x)(~Rx ∙ ~Sx) 30, Simp
32. (∀x)~(~Rx ∙ ~Sx) 31, QE
33. ~(~Ra ∙ ~Sa) 32, UI
34. ~Ra ∙ ~Sa 20, 29, Conj
35. (~Ra ∙ ~Sa) ∙ ~(~Ra ∙ ~Sa) 34, 33, Conj
36. ~~{[(∀x)(Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Sx)] ∨ [(∃x)(~Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(~Rx ∙ ~Sx)]} 1–35, IP
37. [(∀x)(Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(Rx ∙ ~Sx)] ∨ [(∃x)(~Rx ∙ Sx) ∨ (∃x)(~Rx ∙ ~Sx)] 36, DN
QED
EXERCISES 5.1a 10. There is a counterexample in a two-member domain.

1. (∀x)(Rx ⊃ Lxb) Expansion: [Aa ⊃ (Baa ∨ Bab)] ∙ [Ab ⊃ (Bba ∨
6. (∀x)[Rx ⊃ (∃y)(My ∙ Lxy)] Bbb)] / [(Baa ∨ Bba) ⊃ Ca] ∙ [(Bab ∨
11. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∀y)(Sy ⊃ Mxy)] Bbb) ⊃ Cb] / Aa ∨ Ab // Ca ∙ Cb
16. (∀x)(Gx ⊃ ~Mxx) Counterexample:
21. (∀x)[Rx ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Hxy)] Aa: true Baa: false
26. (∃x)[Rx ∙ (∀y)(Dy ⊃ ~Hxy)] Ab: false Bab: true
31. (∀x)[Sx ⊃ (∃y)Mxy] Ca: false Bba: false
36. (∀x){Mxl ⊃ [(∃y)(Cyp ∙ Txy) ∨ (∃y)(Cym ∙ Txy)]} Cb: true Bbb: true
41. Iocm 15. There is a counterexample in a two-member domain.
46. (∃x)(Px ∙ Ioxm) Expansion: {[(Da ⊃ Faa) ∙ (Db ⊃ Fba)] ∙ [(Ea ⊃
51. (∃x){Px ∙ (∃y)[Oy ∙ (∃z)(Hz ∙ Dxyz)]} Faa) ∙ (Eb ⊃ Fba)]} ∨ {[(Da ⊃ Fab) ∙
56. (∃x){Px ∙ (∃y){Oy ∙ (∀z)[(Bz ∙ Hz) ⊃ Dxyz]}} (Db ⊃ Fbb)] ∙ [(Ea ⊃ Fab) ∙ (Eb ⊃ Fbb)]}
61. (∀x)[(Bx ∙ Wax) ⊃ Rjx] / (Da ∨ Ea) ∨ (Db ∨ Eb) // Faa ∙ Fbb
66. (∃x){Sx ∙ (∀y){[(By ∙ Iy) ∙ Way] ⊃ Rxy}} Counterexample:
71. (∃x){Tx ∙ (∃y){Jy ∙ (∃z)[(Ez ∙ Pz) ∙ Txyz]}} Da: true Faa: false
76. (∀x){(Tx ∙ Ex) ⊃ ~(∃x)[Cx ∙ (∃z)(Hz ∙ Txyz)]} Db: false Fab: true
81. Amd ∙ Amb Ea: false Fba: true
86. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rxm) ∙ (∃x)(Px ∙ Axb) Eb: false Fbb: true
91. (Bpc ∙ Bps) ∙ (~Bac ∙ ~Bas) 20. There is a counterexample in a three-member domain.
96. (∀x)(Px ⊃ ~Bxc) ∙ ~Dpc Expansion: {Ga ⊃ [(Ga ∙ Iaa) ∨ (Gb ∙ Iab) ∨ (Gc ∙
101. Ccd ∙ Ced Iac)]} ∙ {Gb ⊃ [(Ga ∙ Iba) ∨ (Gb ∙
106. (Ced ∙ Ied) ⊃ (Ccd ∙ Icd) Ibb) ∨ (Gc ∙ Ibc)]} ∙ {Gc ⊃ [(Ga ∙
111. Vt ∙ [(Cb ∙ Cm) ∙ Bbtm] Ica) ∨ (Gb ∙ Icb) ∨ (Gc ∙ Icc)]} /
116. Vc ∙ ~Bbcm {Ha ⊃ [(Ha ∙ Iaa) ∨ (Hb ∙ Iab) ∨ (Hc ∙
121. (∃x)[Ex ∙ (∃y)(Ry ∙ Wxy)] Iac)]} ∙ {Hb ⊃ [(Ha ∙ Iba) ∨ (Hb ∙
126. (∀x){(Cx ∙ Rx) ⊃ (∀y)[(By ∙ Ey) ⊃ ~Wxy]} Ibb) ∨ (Hc ∙ Ibc)]} ∙ {Hc ⊃ [(Ha ∙
132. (∃x){Ax ∙ ~Px ∙ (∀y)[(Ay ∙ Py) ⊃ Hxy]} Ica) ∨ (Hb ∙ Icb) ∨ (Hc ∙ Icc)]} /
136. (∀x){(Ax ∙ Lx) ⊃ (∃y)[(Ay ∙ Hyx) ∙ Byx]} (Ga ∙ Ha) ∨ (Gb ∙ Hb) ∨ (Gc ∙ Hc) //
141. (∃x)(Mx ∙ Sxx) Iaa ∨ (Iab ∙ Iba) ∨ (Iac ∙ Ica) ∨ Ibb
146. (∃x){(Mx ∙ Fx) ∙(∃y)[(Ty ∙ By) ∙ Syx]} ∨ (Ibc ∙ Icb) ∨ Icc
Counterexample:
Ga: true Ha: true Iaa: false Iba: true Ica: false
EXERCISES 5.1b
Gb: true Hb: true Iab: false Ibb: false Icb: true
4. Everything comes to those who wait.
Gc: true Hc: true Iac: true Ibc: false Icc: false
8. A person is judged by the company (s)he keeps.
12. Nothing ventured, nothing gained. EXERCISES 5.3a
5. 1. (∀x)[Lx ⊃ (∃y)Mxy]
EXERCISES 5.2a 2. (∀y)~May / ~La
Solutions will vary widely. 3. La ⊃ (∃y)May 1, UI
For each set, make sure that each sentence is true on your pro- 4. ~(∃y)May 2, QE
posed interpretation. 5. ~La 3, 4, MT
QED
EXERCISES 5.2b 10. 1. (∃x)[Qx ∨ (∃y)(Ry ∙ Pxy)]
5. There is a counterexample in a two-member domain. 2. ~(∃x)(Sx ∨ Qx) / (∃z)(∃y)(Ry ∙ Pzy)
Expansion: ( Ja ⊃ Kaa) ∙ [( Ja ∙ Jb) ⊃ (Kaa ∙ Kba)] ∙ 3. Qa ∨ (∃y)(Ry ∙ Pay) 1, EI
( Jb ⊃ Kba) / Jb // Kba 4. (∀x)~(Sx ∨ Qx) 2, QE
Counterexample: 5. ~(Sa ∨ Qa) 4, UI
Ja: false Kaa: true 6. ~Sa ∙ ~Qa 5, DM
Jb: true Kba: false 7. ~Qa ∙ ~Sa 6, Com
8. ~Qa 7, Simp
9. (∃y)(Ry ∙ Pay) 3, 8, DS
10. (∃z)(∃ y)(Ry ∙ Pzy) 9, EG
QED
15. 1. (∀x)[Ax ⊃ (∃y)(Cy ∙ Dxy)] 30. 1. (∀x){Ax ⊃ (∃y)[By ∙ (∀z)(~Cz ∙ Dzxy)]}

2. (∀x)(∀y)(Dxy ⊃ By) / (∀x)Ax ⊃ (∃y)(By ∙ Cy) 2. ~(∀x)(Ax ⊃ Cx) / (∃x)(∃ y)Dxxy
3. (∀x)Ax ACP 3. (∃x)~(Ax ⊃ Cx) 2, QE
4. Ax 3, UI 4. (∃x)~(~Ax ∨ Cx) 3, Impl
5. Ax ⊃ (∃y)(Cy ∙ Dxy) 1, UI 5. (∃x)(~~Ax ∙ ~Cx) 4, DM
6. (∃y)(Cy ∙ Dxy) 5, 4, MP 6. (∃x)(Ax ∙ ~Cx) 5, DN
7. Ca ∙ Dxa 6, EI 7. Aa ∙ ~Ca 6, EI
8. Dxa ∙ Ca 7, Com 8. Aa 7, Simp
9. Dxa 8, Simp 9. Aa ⊃ (∃y)[By ∙ (∀z)(~Cz ∙ Dzay)] 1, UI
10. (∀y)(Dxy ⊃ By) 2, UI 10. (∃y)[By ∙ (∀z)(~Cz ∙ Dzay)] 9, 8, MP
11. Dxa ⊃ Ba 10, UI 11. Bb ∙ (∀z)(~Cz ∙ Dzab) 10, EI
12. Ba 11, 9, MP 12. (∀z)(~Cz ∙ Dzab) ∙ Bb 11, Com
13. Ca 7, Simp 13. (∀z)(~Cz ∙ Dzab) 12, Simp
14. Ba ∙ Ca 12, 13, Conj 14. ~Ca ∙ Daab 13, UI
15. (∃y)(By ∙ Cy) 14, EG 15. Daab ∙ ~Ca 14, Com
16. (∀x)Ax ⊃ (∃y)(By ∙ Cy) 3–15, CP 16. Daab 15, Simp
QED 17. (∃y)Daay 16, EG
18. (∃x)(∃y)Dxxy 17, EG
20. 1. (∀x)[(Fx ∙ Hx) ⊃ (∀y)(Gy ∙ Ixy)]
QED
2. (∃x)[ Jx ∙ (∀y)(Gy ⊃ ~Ixy)] / ~(∀z)(Fz ∙ Hz)
3. Ja ∙ (∀y)(Gy ⊃ ~Iay) 2, EI 35. 1. (∀x)[(Bx ⊃ Ax) ⊃ (∃y)(Cy ∙ Dxy)]
4. (∀y)(Gy ⊃ ~Iay) ∙ Ja 3, Com 2. (∀x)[(∀y)~Dxy ∨ Ex]
5. (∀y)(Gy ⊃ ~Iay) 4, Simp 3. (∃x)Ex ⊃ ~(∃x)Cx / (∀x)Bx
6. Gy ⊃ ~Iay 5, UI 4. (∃x)~Bx AIP
7. ~Gy ∨ ~Iay 6, Impl 5. ~Ba 4, EI
8. ~(Gy ∙ Iay) 7, DM 6. ~Ba ∨ Aa 5, Add
9. (∃y)~(Gy ∙ Iay) 8, EG 7. Ba ⊃ Aa 6, Impl
10. ~(∀y)(Gy ∙ Iay) 9, QE 8. (Ba ⊃ Aa) ⊃ (∃y)(Cy ∙ Day) 1, UI
11. (Fa ∙ Ha) ⊃ (∀y)(Gy ∙ Iay) 1, UI 9. (∃y)(Cy ∙ Day) 8, 7, MP
12. ~(Fa ∙ Ha) 10, 11, MT 10. Cb ∙ Dab 9, EI
13. (∃z)~(Fz ∙ Hz) 12, EG 11. Cb 10, Simp
14. ~(∀z)(Fz ∙ Hz) 13, QE 12. (∃x)Cx 11, EG
QED 13. ~~(∃x)Cx 12, DN
14. ~(∃x)Ex 3, 13, MT
25. 1. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ ~Ox) ⊃ (∃y)Ny
15. (∀x)~Ea 14, QE
2. (∀y)[Ny ⊃ (∃z)(Pz ∙ Q yz)]
16. ~Ea 15, UI
3. ~(∃x)(Mx ∙ Ox) / (∃x)[Nx ∙ (∃y)Qxy]
17. (∀y)~Day ∨ Ea 2, UI
4. (∀x)~(Mx ∙ Ox) 3, QE
18. Ea ∨ (∀y)~Day 17, Com
5. (∀x)(~Mx ∨ ~Ox) 4, DM
19. (∀y)~Day 18, 16, DS
6. (∀x)(Mx ⊃ ~Ox) 5, Impl
20. ~Dab 19, UI
7. (∃y)Ny 1, 6, MP
21. Dab ∙ Cb 10, Com
8. Na 7, EI
22. Dab 21, Simp
9. Na ⊃ (∃z)(Pz ∙ Qaz) 2, UI
23. Dab ∙ ~Dab 22, 20, Conj
10. (∃z)(Pz ∙ Qaz) 9, 8, MP
24. ~(∃x)~Bx 4–23, IP
11. Pb ∙ Qab 10, EI
25. (∀x)Bx 24, QE
12. Qab ∙ Pb 11, Com
QED
13. Qab 12, Simp
14. (∃y)Qay 13, EG
15. Na ∙ (∃y)Qay 8, 14, Conj
16. (∃x)[Nx ∙ (∃y)Qxy] 15, EG
QED
40. 1. (∀x){ Jx ⊃ (∀y)[My ⊃ (∀z)(Lz ⊃ Kxyz)]}

2. (∃x)(∃y)[Mx ∙ (Jy ∙ Nxy)]
3. ~(∀x)(Lx ⊃ Ox) / (∃x){Mx ∙ (∃y)[Nxy ∙ (∃z)(~Oz ∙ Kyxz)]}
4. (∃x)~(Lx ⊃ Ox) 3, QE
5. ~(La ⊃ Oa) 4, EI
6. ~(~La ∨ Oa) 5, Impl
7. ~~La ∙ ~Oa 6, DM
8. ~~La 7, Simp
9. La 8, DN
10. (∃y)[Mb ∙ (Jy ∙ Nby)] 2, EI
11. Mb ∙ (Jc ∙ Nbc) 10, EI
12. Mb 11, Simp
13. (Jc ∙ Nbc) ∙Mb 11, Com
14. Jc ∙ Nbc 13, Simp
15. Jc 14, Simp
16. Nbc ∙ Jc 14, Com
17. Nbc 16, Simp
18. Jc ⊃ (∀y)[My ⊃ (∀z)(Lz ⊃ Kcyz)] 1, UI
19. (∀y)[My ⊃ (∀z)(Lz ⊃ Kcyz)] 18, 15, MP
20. Mb ⊃ (∀z)(Lz ⊃ Kcbz) 19, UI
21. (∀z)(Lz ⊃ Kcbz) 20, 12, MP
22. La ⊃ Kcba 21, UI
23. Kcba 22, 9, MP
24. ~Oa ∙ ~~La 7, Com
25. ~Oa 24, Simp
26. ~Oa ∙ Kcba 25, 23, Conj
27. (∃z)(~Oz ∙ Kcbz) 26, EG
28. Nbc ∙ (∃z)(~Oz ∙ Kcbz) 17, 27, Conj
29. (∃y)[Nby ∙ (∃z)(~Oz ∙ Kybz)] 28, EG
30. Mb ∙ (∃y)[Nby ∙ (∃z)(~Oz ∙ Kybz)] 12, 29, Conj
31. (∃x){Mx ∙ (∃y)[Nxy ∙ (∃z)(~Oz ∙ Kyxz)]} 30, EG
QED
EXERCISES 5.3b: TR ANSLATIONS EXERCISES 5.3b: DERIVATIONS

4. 1. (∃x)[Bx ∙ (∃y)(Sy ∙ Baxy)] 4. 1. (∃x)[Bx ∙ (∃y)(Sy ∙ Baxy)]
2. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Fx) 2. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Fx)
3. Rac / (∃x){Rxc ∙ (∃y)[Fy ∙ (∃z)(Sz ∙ Bxyz)]} 3. Rac / (∃x){Rxc ∙ (∃y)[Fy ∙ (∃z)(Sz ∙ Bxyz)]}
4. Bb ∙ (∃y)(Sy ∙ Baby) 1, EI
8. 1. (∀x)[(Ex ∨ Qx) ⊃ (∃y)Tyx]
5. Bb 4, Simp
2. (∀x){(Mx ∨ Px) ⊃ [Ex ∨ (∃y)Uyx]}
6. Bb ⊃ Fb 2, UI
3. ~(∀x)(Ex ∨ ~Mx) ∙ (∀x)Qx
7. Fb 6, 5, MP
/ (∃x){Qx ∙ [(∃y)Tyx ∙ (∃y)Uyx]}
8. (∃y)(Sy ∙ Baby) ∙ Bb 4, Com
12. 1. (∀x){Ax ⊃ (∀y)[(Ay ∙ Cxy) ⊃ Mxy]} 9. (∃y)(Sy ∙ Baby) 8, Simp
2. (Ai ∙ Ap) ∙ Cpi 10. Sd ∙ Babd 9, EI
3. Mpi ⊃ ~Sa / ~Sa 11. (∃z)(Sz ∙ Babz) 10, EG
16. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){[(Wx ∙ Wy) ∙ Wz] ⊃ 12. Fb ∙ (∃z)(Sz ∙ Babz) 7, 11, Conj
[(Ixy ∙ Iyz) ⊃ Ixz]} 13. (∃y)[Fy ∙ (∃z)(Sz ∙ Bayz)] 12, EG
2. [(Dg ∙ Dl) ∙ Dr] ∙ [(Wpg ∙ Wpl) ∙ Wpr] 14. Rac ∙ (∃y)[Fy ∙ (∃z)(Sz ∙ Bayz)] 3, 13, Conj
3. (∀x)(Wpx ⊃ Wx) 15. (∃x){Rxc ∙ (∃y)[Fy ∙ (∃z)(Sz ∙ Bxyz)]} 14, EG
4. Igl ∙ Irg / Irl QED
8. 1. (∀x)[(Ex ∨ Qx) ⊃ (∃y)Tyx] 22. (∃y)Tya 21, 20, MP

2. (∀x){(Mx ∨ Px) ⊃ [Ex ∨ (∃y)Uyx]} 23. (∃y)Tya ∙ (∃y)Uya 22, 15, Conj
3. ~(∀x)(Ex ∨ ~Mx) ∙ (∀x)Qx 24. Qa ∙ [(∃y)Tya ∙ (∃y)Uya] 18, 23, Conj
/ (∃x){Qx ∙ [(∃y)Tyx ∙ (∃y)Uyx]} 25. (∃x){Qx ∙ [(∃y)Tyx ∙ (∃y)Uyx]} 24, EG
4. ~(∀x)(Ex ∨ ~Mx) 3, Simp QED
5. (∃x)~(Ex ∨ ~Mx) 4, QE
6. (∃x)(~Ex ∙ ~~Mx) 5, DM 12. 1. (∀x){Ax ⊃ (∀y)[(Ay ∙ Cxy) ⊃ Mxy]}
7. (∃x)(~Ex ∙ Mx) 6, DN 2. (Ai ∙ Ap) ∙ Cpi
8. ~Ea ∙ Ma 7, EI 3. Mpi ⊃ ~Sa / ~Sa
9. Ma ∙ ~Ea 8, Com 4. Ap ⊃ (∀y)[(Ay ∙ Cpy) ⊃ Mpy] 1, UI
10. Ma 9, Simp 5. Ai ∙ Ap 2, Simp
11. Ma ∨ Pa 10, Add 6. Ap ∙ Ai 5, Com
12. (Ma ∨ Pa) ⊃ [Ea ∨ (∃y)Uya] 2, UI 7. Ap 6, Simp
13. Ea ∨ (∃y)Uya 12, 11, MP 8. (∀y)[(Ay ∙ Cpy) ⊃ Mpy] 4, 7, MP
14. ~Ea 8, Simp 9. (Ai ∙ Cpi) ⊃ Mpi 8, UI
15. (∃y)Uya 13, 14, DS 10. Ai 5, Simp
16. (∀x)Qx ∙ ~(∀x)(Ex ∨ ~Mx) 3, Com 11. Cpi ∙ (Ai ∙ Ap) 2, Com
17. (∀x)Qx 16, Simp 12. Cpi 11, Simp
18. Qa 17, UI 13. Ai ∙ Cpi 10, 12, Conj
19. Qa ∨ Ea 18, Add 14. Mpi 9, 13, MP
20. Ea ∨ Qa 19, Com 15. ~Sa 3, 14, MP
21. (Ea ∨ Qa) ⊃ (∃y)Tya 1, UI QED
16. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){[(Wx ∙ Wy) ∙ Wz] ⊃ [(Ixy ∙ Iyz) ⊃ Ixz]}

2. [(Dg ∙ Dl) ∙ Dr] ∙ [(Wpg ∙ Wpl) ∙ Wpr]
3. (∀x)(Wpx ⊃ Wx)
4. Igl ∙ Irg / Irl
5. (∀y)(∀z){[(Wr ∙ Wy) ∙ Wz] ⊃ [(Iry ∙ Iyz) ⊃ Irz]} 1, UI
6. (∀z){[(Wr ∙ Wg) ∙ Wz] ⊃ [(Irg ∙ Igz) ⊃ Irz]} 5, UI
7. [(Wr ∙ Wg) ∙ Wl] ⊃ [(Irg ∙ Igl) ⊃ Irl] 6, UI
8. [(Wpg ∙ Wpl) ∙ Wpr] ∙ [(Dg ∙ Dl) ∙ Dr] 2, Com
9. (Wpg ∙ Wpl) ∙ Wpr 8, Simp
10. Wpg ∙ Wpl 9, Simp
11. Wpg 10, Simp
12. Wpl ∙ Wpg 10, Com
13. Wpl 12, Simp
14. Wpr ∙ (Wpg ∙ Wpl) 9, Com
15. Wpr 14, Simp
16. Wpg ⊃ Wg 3, UI
17. Wg 16, 11, MP
18. Wpl ⊃ Wl 3, UI
19. Wl 18, 13, MP
20. Wpr ⊃ Wr 3, UI
21. Wr 20, 15, MP
22. Wr ∙ Wg 21, 17, Conj
23. (Wr ∙ Wg) ∙ Wl 22, 19, Conj
24. (Irg ∙ Igl) ⊃ Irl 7, 23, MP
25. Irg ∙ Igl 4, Com
26. Irl 24, 25, MP
QED
EXERCISES 5.3c
1. 1. (∀x)(∀y)Axy ACP
2. (∀y)Aay 1, UI
3. Aab 2, UI
4. (∃y)Aay 3, EG
5. (∃x)(∃y)Axy 4, EG
6. (∀x)(∀y)Axy ⊃ (∃x)(∃y)Axy 1–5, CP
QED
5. 1. (∃x)Exx ACP
2. Egg 1, EI
3. (∃y)Egy 2, EG
4. (∃x)(∃y)Exy 3, EG
5. (∃x)Exx ⊃ (∃x)(∃y)Exy 1–4, CP
QED
10. 1. ~[(∃x)(∀y)( Jxy ∙ ~Jyx) ∨ (∀x)(∃y)( Jxy ⊃ Jyx)] AIP
2. ~(∃x)(∀y)( Jxy ∙ ~Jyx) ∙ ~(∀x)(∃y)(Jxy ⊃ Jyx) 1, DM
3. ~(∃x)(∀y)( Jxy ∙ ~Jyx) 2, Simp
4. ~(∀x)(∃y)( Jxy ⊃ Jyx) ∙ ~(∃x)(∀y)( Jxy ∙ ~Jyx) 2, Com
5. ~(∀x)(∃y)( Jxy ⊃ Jyx) 4, Simp
6. (∃x)~(∃y)( Jxy ⊃ Jyx) 5, QE
7. (∃x)(∀y)~( Jxy ⊃ Jyx) 6, QE
8. (∀y)~( Jay ⊃ Jya) 7, EI
9. (∀y)~(~Jay ∨ Jya) 8, Impl
10. (∀y)(~~Jay ∙ ~Jya) 9, DM
11. (∀y)( Jay ∙ ~Jya) 10, DN
12. (∀x)~(∀y)( Jxy ∙ ~Jyx) 3, QE
13. (∀x)(∃y)~( Jxy ∙ ~Jyx) 12, QE
14. (∀x)(∃y)(~Jxy ∨ ~~Jyx) 13, DM
15. (∀x)(∃y)(~Jxy ∨ Jyx) 14, DN
16. (∀x)(∃y)(Jxy ⊃ Jyx) 15, Impl
17. (∃y)(Jay ⊃ Jya) 16, UI
18. Jab ⊃ Jba 17, EI
19. Jab ∙ ~Jba 11, UI
20. Jab 19, Simp
21. Jba 18, 20, MP
22. ~Jba ∙ Jab 19, Com
23. ~Jba 22, Simp
24. Jba ∙ ~Jba 21, 23, Conj
25. ~~[(∃x)(∀y)( Jxy ∙ ~Jyx) ∨ (∀x)(∃y)( Jxy ⊃ Jyx)] 1–24, IP
26. (∃x)(∀y)( Jxy ∙ ~Jyx) ∨ (∀x)(∃y)(Jxy ⊃ Jyx) 25, DN
QED
15. 1. ~{(∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] ∨ (∃x)(∀y)[Px ∙ ~(Q y ∙ Rxy)]} AIP

2. ~(∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] ∙ ~(∃x)(∀y)[Px ∙ ~(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 1, DM
3. ~(∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 3, Simp
4. (∃x)~[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 3, QE
5. (∃x)~[~Px ∨ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 4, Impl
6. (∃x)[~~Px ∙ ~(∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 5, DM
7. (∃x)[Px ∙ ~(∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 6, DN
8. Pa ∙ ~(∃y)(Q y ∙ Ray) 7, EI
9. Pa 8, Simp
10. ~(∃y)(Q y ∙ Ray) ∙Pa 8, Com
11. ~(∃y)(Q y ∙ Ray) 10, Simp
12. (∀y)~(Q y ∙ Ray) 11, QE
13. (∀y)(~Q y ∨ ~Ray) 12, DM
14. (∀y)(Q y ⊃ ~Ray) 13, Impl
15. ~(∃x)(∀y)[Px ∙ ~(Q y ∙ Rxy)] ∙ ~(∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 2, Com
16. ~(∃x)(∀y)[Px ∙ ~(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 15, Simp
17. (∀x)~(∀y)[Px ∙ ~(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 16, QE
18. (∀x)(∃y)~[Px ∙ ~(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 17, QE
19. (∀x)(∃y)[~Px ∨ ~~(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 18, DM
20. (∀x)(∃y)[Px ⊃ ~~(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 19, Impl
21. (∀x)(∃y)[Px ⊃ (Q y ∙ Rxy)] 20, DN
22. (∃y)[Pa ⊃ (Q y ∙ Ray)] 21, UI
23. Pa ⊃ (Qb ∙ Rab) 22, EI
24. Qb ∙ Rab 23, 9, MP
25. Qb ⊃ ~Rab 14, UI
26. Qb 24, Simp
27. ~Rab 25, 26, MP
28. Rab ∙ Qb 24, Com
29. Rab 28, Simp
30. Rab ∙ ~Rb 29, 27, Conj
31. ~~(∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] ∨ (∃x)(∀y)[Px ∙ ~(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 1–30, IP
32. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(Q y ∙ Rxy)] ∨ (∃x)(∀y)[Px ∙ ~(Q y ∙ Rxy)] 31, DN
QED
EXERCISES 5.3d 8. Pgx ⊃ Pxg 7, UI

5. Invalid. There is a counterexample in a one-member 9. Pxg 8, 6, MP
domain. 10. (∀y)Pyg 9, UG
Expansion: Pa ⊃ (Pa ∙ Qaa) / Pa ⊃ ~Ra / 11. Q g 3, Simp
Ra ⊃ (Ra ⊃ ~Qaa) 12. Q g ∙ (∀y)Pyg 11, 10, Conj
Counterexample: 13. (∃x)[Qx ∙ (∀y)Pyx] 12, EG
Pa: false QED
Ra: true 15. Invalid. There is a counterexample in a three-member
Qaa: true domain.
10. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(Pxy ⊃ Pyx) Expansion: (Paa ⊃ Paa) ∙ (Pab ⊃ Pba) ∙ (Pac ⊃ Pca) ∙
2. (∃x)[Qx ∙ (∀y)Pxy] / (∃x)[Qx ∙ (∀y)Pyx] (Pba ⊃ Pab) ∙ (Pbb ⊃ Pbb) ∙ (Pbc ⊃ Pcb)
3. Q g ∙ (∀y)Pgy 2, EI ∙ (Pca ⊃ Pac) ∙ (Pcb ⊃ Pbc) ∙ (Pcc ⊃ Pcc)
4. (∀y)Pgy ∙ Q g 3, Com Counterexample:
5. (∀y)Pgy 4, Simp Paa: true Pab: true Pac: false
6. Pgx 5, UI Pba: true Pbb: true Pbc: true
7. (∀y)(Pgy ⊃ Pyg) 1, UI Pca: false Pcb: true Pcc: true
20. 1. (∀x)(∀y)(Pxy ⊃ Pyx) 13. Rac 12, Simp

2. (∀x)[Qx ⊃ (∃y)(Sy ∙ Rxy)] 14. Qc ∙ Rac 11, 13, Conj
3. (∀x)(Sx ⊃ Qx) 15. (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rax) 14, EG
4. Qa ∙ Pba / (∃x)(Qx ∙ Pxb) ∙ (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rax) 16. Pba ∙ Qa 4, Com
5. Qa 4, Simp 17. Pba 16, Simp
6. Qa ⊃ (∃y)(Sy ∙ Ray) 2, UI 18. (∀y)(Pby ⊃ Pyb) 1, UI
7. (∃y)(Sy ∙ Ray) 6, 5, MP 19. Pba ⊃ Pab 18, UI
8. Sc ∙ Rac 7, EI 20. Pab 19, 17, MP
9. Sc 8, Simp 21. Qa ∙ Pab 5, 20, Conj
10. Sc ⊃ Qc 3, UI 22. (∃x)(Qx ∙ Pxb) 21, EG
11. Qc 10, 9, MP 23. (∃x)(Qx ∙ Pxb) ∙ (∃x)(Qx ∙ Rax) 22, 15, Conj
12. Rac ∙ Sc 8, Com QED
EXERCISES 5.4
1. (∃x)(∃y)(Sx ∙ Sy ∙ x≠y)
5. (∃x){Sx ∙ Px ∙ Dx ∙ (∀y)[(Sy ∙ Py ∙ Dy) ⊃ y=x]}
9. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Sx ∙ Axr ∙ Exs ∙ Sy ∙ Ayr ∙ Eys ∙ Sz ∙ Azr ∙ Ezs) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
13. (∃x)(∃y)(∃z){Sx ∙ Axr ∙ Sy ∙ Ayr ∙ Sz ∙ Azr ∙ Exs ∙ Eys ∙ Ezs ∙ x≠y ∙ x≠z ∙ y≠z ∙ (∀w)[(Sw ∙ Awr ∙ Ews) ⊃ (w=x ∨ w=y ∨ w=z)]}
17. (∃x)(Dx ∙ Tcx) ∙ (∀x)[(∃y)(Dy ∙ Txy) ⊃ x=c]
21. Df ∙ Tcf ∙ (∀x)[(Dx ∙ Tcx ∙ x≠f) ⊃ Bfx]
25. (∃x)(∃y)(Wx ∙ Lxh ∙ Wy ∙ Lyh ∙ x≠y)
29. Wf ∙ Ifc ∙ (∀x)[(Wx ∙ Ixc ∙ x≠f) ⊃ Sfx]
33. (∃x){(Cx ∙ Bx) ∙ (∀y)[(Cy ∙ By) ⊃ y=x] ∙ x=n}
37. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){[Fxn ∙ Fyn ∙ Fzn ∙ (∃w)(Aw ∙ Hxw ∙ Bwg) ∙ (∃w)(Aw ∙ Hyw ∙ Bwg) ∙ (∃w)(Aw ∙ Hzw ∙ Bwg)] ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)}
41. (∃x)(∃y)(Bx ∙ Ixp ∙ By ∙ Iyp ∙ x≠y)
45. Bn ∙ ~Tnp ∙ (∀x)[(Bx ∙ x≠n) ⊃ Txp]
49. Sa ∙ Ial ∙ (∀x)[(Sx ∙ Ixl ∙ x≠a) ⊃ Bax]
53. Sa ∙ Ial ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ Wtx) ⊃ ~Rax)] ∙ (∀x)[(Sx ∙ Ixl ∙ x≠a) ⊃ (∃y)(Py ∙ Wty ∙ Rxy)]
57. (∀x)(∀y)[(Lx ∙ Bxg ∙ Ly ∙ Byg) ⊃ y=x]
61. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z){(Lx ∙ Dxp ∙ Ly ∙ Dyp ∙ Lz ∙ Dzp) ⊃ [(x=g ∨ x=s) ∙ (y=g ∨ y=s) ∙ (z=g ∨ z=s)]}
65. (∃x)(∃y)(∃z){Mx ∙ Ix ∙ My ∙ Iy ∙ Mz ∙ Iz ∙ x≠y ∙ y≠z ∙ x≠z ∙ (∀w)[(Mw ∙ Iw) ⊃ (w=x ∨ w=y ∨ w=z)]}
69. Mk ∙ Ix ∙ (∀x)[(Mx ⊃ x≠k) ⊃ ~Ix]
74. (∃x)(∃y)(Dx ∙ Dy ∙ Rx ∙ Ry ∙ ~Fx ∙ ~Fy ∙ x≠y)
77. Pd ∙ Ld ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠d) ⊃ ~Lx]
81. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Dx ∙ Kx ∙ Dy ∙ Ky ∙ Dz ∙ Kz) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
85. (∃x){Dx ∙ Gx ∙ (∀y)[(Dy ∙ Gy) ⊃ y=x] ∙ Kx}
EXERCISES 5.5a
5. 1. Dkm ∙ (∀x)(Dkx ⊃ x=m)
2. Dab
3. Fb ∙ ~Fm / a≠k
4. (∀x)(Dkx ⊃ x=m) ∙ Dkm 1, Com
5. (∀x)(Dkx ⊃ x=m) 4, Simp
6. a=k AIP
7. Dkb 2, 6, IDi
8. Dkb ⊃ b=m 5, UI
9. b=m 8, 7, MP
10. Fb 3, Simp
11. Fm 10, 9, IDi
12. ~Fm ∙ Fb 3, Com
13. ~Fm 12, Simp
14. Fm ∙ ~Fm 11, 13, Conj
15. a≠k 6–14, IP
QED
10. 1. (∃x){Px ∙ Qx ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y) ⊃ Axy]}

2. (∀x)(∀y)(Axy ⊃ Byx) / (∃x){Px ∙ Qx ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y) ⊃ Byx]}
3. Pa ∙ Qa ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y) ⊃ Aay] 1, EI
4. (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y) ⊃ Aay] 3, Simp
5. (Py ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y) ⊃ Aay 4, UI
6. (∀y)(Aay ⊃ Bya) 2, UI
7. Aay ⊃ Bya 6, UI
8. (Py ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y) ⊃ Bya 5, 7, HS
9. (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y) ⊃ Bya] 8, UG
10. Pa ∙ Qa 3, Simp
11. Pa ∙ Qa ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y) ⊃ Bya] 10, 9, Conj
12. (∃x){Px ∙ Qx ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y) ⊃ Byx]} 11, EG
QED
15. 1. (∃x){Px ∙ Qx ∙ (∀y)[(Py ∙ Q y) ⊃ y=x]}
2. (∃x){Rx ∙ Qx ∙ (∀y)[(Ry ∙ Q y) ⊃ y=x]}
3. (∀x)(Px ≡ ~Rx) / (∃x)(∃y)(Qx • Q y • x≠y)
6. Pa ∙ Qa ∙ (∀y)[(Py • Q y) ⊃ y=a] 1, EI
7. Rb ∙ Qb ∙ (∀y)[(Ry • Q y) ⊃ y=b] 2, EI
8. Qa 6, Simp
9. Qb 7, Simp
10. Rb 7, Simp
11 Pa 6, Simp
12. Pa ≡ ~Ra 3, UI
13. ~Ra 12, 11, BMP
14. a=b AIP
15. ~Rb 13, 14, IDi
16. Rb ∙ ~Rb 10, 15, Conj
17. a≠b 14–16, IP
18. Qa ∙ Qb ∙ a≠b 8, 9, 17, Conj
19. (∃y)(Qa ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y) 18, EG
20. (∃x)(∃y)(Qx ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y) 19, EG
QED
20. 1. (∃x)(∃y)(Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y)

2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Rx)
3. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Qx ∙ Rx ∙ Q y ∙ Ry ∙ Qz ∙ Rz) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
/ (∃x)(∃y){Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Pz ∙ Qz) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
4. (∃y)(Pa ∙ Qa ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y) 1, EI
5. Pa ∙ Qa ∙ Pb ∙ Qb ∙ a≠b 4, EI
6. Pa 5, Simp
7. Pa ⊃ Ra 2, UI
8. Ra 7, 6, MP
9. Pb 5, Simp
10. Pb ⊃ Rb 2, UI
11. Rb 10, 9, MP
12. Pz ∙ Qz ACP
13. Pz ⊃ Rz 2, UI
14. Pz 12, Simp
15. Rz 13, 14, MP
16. Qa 5, Simp
17. Qb 5, Simp
18. Qz 12, Simp
19. Qa ∙ Ra ∙ Qb ∙ Rb ∙ Qz ∙ Rz 16, 8, 17, 11, 18, 15, Conj
20. (∀y)(∀z)[(Qa ∙ Ra ∙ Q y ∙ Ry ∙ Qz ∙ Rz) ⊃ (a=y ∨ a=z ∨ y=z)] 3, UI
21. (∀z)[(Qa ∙ Ra ∙ Qb ∙ Rb ∙ Qz ∙ Rz) ⊃ (a=b ∨ a=z ∨ b=z)] 20, UI
22. (Qa ∙ Ra ∙ Qb ∙ Rb ∙ Qz ∙ Rz) ⊃ (a=b ∨ a=z ∨ b=z) 21, UI
23. a=b ∨ a=z ∨ b=z 22, 19, MP
24. a≠b 5, Simp
25. a=z ∨ b=z 23, 24, DS
26. z=a ∨ z=b 25, IDs
27. (Pz ∙ Qz) ⊃(z=a ∨ z=b) 12–26, CP
28. (∀z)[(Pz ∙ Qz) ⊃ (z=a ∨ z=b)] 27, UG
29. Pa ∙ Qa ∙ Pb ∙ Qb ∙ a≠b ∙ (∀z)[(Pz ∙ Qz) ⊃ (z=a ∨ z=b)] 5, 28, Conj
30. (∃y){Pa ∙ Qa ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Pz ∙ Qz) ⊃ (z=a ∨ z=y)]} 29, EG
31. (∃x)(∃y){Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Pz ∙ Qz) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]} 30, EG
QED
25. 1. (∃x)(∃y)(Ax ∙ Cx ∙ Ay ∙ Cy ∙ x≠y)

2. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(Cx ∙ Cy ∙ Cz) ⊃ (x=y ∨ x=z ∨ y=z)]
3. (∃x)(Bx ∙ ~Ax) / ~(∀x)(Bx ⊃ Cx)
4. (∃y)(Aa ∙ Ca ∙ Ay ∙ Cy ∙ a≠y) 1, EI
5. Aa ∙ Ca ∙ Ab ∙ Cb ∙ a≠b 4, EI
6. Bc ∙ ~Ac 3, EI
7. (∀x)(Bx ⊃ Cx) AIP
8. Bc ⊃ Cc 7, UI
9. Bc 6, Simp
10. Cc 8, 9, MP
11. Ca 5, Simp
12. Cb 5, Simp
13. Ca ∙ Cb 11, 12, Conj
14. Ca ∙ Cb ∙ Cc 13, 10, Conj
15. (∀y)(∀z)[(Ca ∙ Cy ∙ Cz) ⊃ (a=y ∨ a=z ∨ y=z)] 2, UI
16. (∀z)[(Ca ∙ Cb ∙ Cz) ⊃ (a=b ∨ a=z ∨ b=z)] 15, UI
17. (Ca ∙ Cb ∙ Cc) ⊃ (a=b ∨ a=c ∨ b=c) 16, UI
18. a=b ∨ a=c ∨ b=c 17, 14, MP
19. a≠b 5, Simp
20. a=c ∨ b=c 18, 19, DS
21. a=c AIP
22. Aa 5, Simp
23. Ac 22, 21, IDi
24. ~Ac 6, Simp
25. Ac ∙ ~Ac 23, 24, Conj
26. a≠c 21–25, IP
27. b=c 20, 26, DS
28. Ab 5, Simp
29. Ac 28, 27, IDi
30. ~Ac 6, Simp
31. Ac ∙ ~Ac 29, 30, Conj
32. ~(∀x)(Bx ⊃ Cx) 7–31, IP
QED
30. 1. Ma ∙ ~Pa ∙ Mb ∙ ~Pb ∙ (∀x)[(Mx ∙ x≠a ∙ x≠b) ⊃ Px]

2. Qb ∙ (∀x)[(Mx ∙ Qx) ⊃ x=b]
3. (∀x){Mx ⊃ [~(Qx ∨ Px) ≡ Rx]}
4. a≠b / (∃x){Mx ∙ Rx ∙ (∀y)[(My ∙ Ry) ⊃ y=x]}
5. Ma ⊃ [~(Qa ∨ Pa) ≡ Ra] 3, UI
6. Ma 1, Simp
7. ~(Qa ∨ Pa) ≡ Ra 5, 6, MP
8. (∀x)[(Mx ∙ Qx) ⊃ x=b] 2, Simp
9. (Ma ∙ Qa) ⊃ a=b 8, UI
10. ~(Ma ∙ Qa) 9, 4, MT
11. ~Ma ∨ ~Qa 10, DM
12. ~~Ma 6, DN
13. ~Qa 11, 12, DS
14. ~Pa 1, Simp
15. ~Qa ∙ ~Pa 13, 14, Conj
16. ~(Qa ∨ Pa) 15, DM
17. Ra 7, 16, BMP
18. Ma ∙ Ra 6, 17, Conj
19. ~(∀y)[(My ∙ Ry) ⊃ y=a] AIP
20. (∃y)~[(My ∙ Ry) ⊃ y=a] 19, QE
21. ~[(Mc ∙ Rc) ⊃ c=a] 20, EI
22. ~[~(Mc ∙ Rc) ∨ c=a] 21, Impl
23. ~~(Mc ∙ Rc) ∙ c≠a 22, DM
24. Mc ∙ Rc ∙ c≠a 23, DN
25. Mc ⊃ [~(Qc ∨ Pc) ≡ Rc] 3, UI
26. Mc 24, Simp
27. ~(Qc ∨ Pc) ≡ Rc 25, 26, MP
28. R c ≡ ~(Qc ∨ Pc) 27, BCom
29. Rc 24, Simp
30. ~(Qc ∨ Pc) 28, 29, BMP
31. ~Qc ∙ ~Pc 30, DM
32. (∀x)[(Mx ∙ x≠a ∙ x≠b) ⊃ Px] 1, Simp
33. (Mc ∙ c≠a ∙ c≠b) ⊃ Pc 32, UI
34. ~Pc 31, Simp
35. ~(Mc ∙ c≠a ∙ c≠b) 33, 34, MT
36. ~Mc ∨ ~c≠a ∨ ~c≠b 35, DM
37. ~Mc ∨ c=a ∨ ~c≠b 36, DM
38. ~Mc ∨ c=a ∨ c=b 37, DN
39. ~~Mc 26, DN
40. c=a ∨ c=b 38, 39, DS
41. c≠a 24, Simp
42. c=b 40, 41, DS
43. Qb 2, Simp
44. b=c 42, IDs
45. Qc 43, 44, IDi
46. ~Qc 31, Simp
50. Qc ∙ ~Qc 45, 46, Conj
47. ~~(∀y)[(My ∙ Ry) ⊃ y=a] 19–47, IP
48. (∀y)[(My ∙ Ry) ⊃ y=a] 48, DN
49. Ma ∙ Ra ∙ (∀y)[(My ∙ Ry) ⊃ y=a] 18, 49, Conj
50. (∃x){Mx ∙ Rx ∙ (∀y)[(My ∙ Ry) ⊃ y=x]} 50, EG
QED

4. 1. Rk ∙ Tk ∙ (∀x)[(Rx ∙ Tx ∙ x≠k) ⊃ Fkx]
2. Rp ∙ Tp
3. k≠p / Fkp
8. 1. Er ∙ ~Pr ∙ (∀x)[(Ex ∙ x≠r) ⊃ Px]
2. Ej ∙ Pj ∙ (∀x)[(Ex ∙ Px) ⊃ x=j] / (∃x)(∃y){(Ex ∙ Ey ∙ x≠y) ∙ (∀z)[Ez ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
12. 1. Pp ∙ ~Mp ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠p) ⊃ Mx]
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Ax)
3. Pg ∙ g≠p / (∃x)(Mx ∙ Ax) ∙ (∃x)~(Mx ∙ Ax)
16. 1. (∀x)(∀y){(Px ∙ Py ∙ x≠y) ⊃ (∃z){(Lz ∙ Czx ∙ Czy ∙ (∀w)[(Lw ∙ Cwx ∙ Cwy) ⊃ w=z]}}
2. Pa ∙ Pb ∙ a≠b
3. Cla ∙ Clb
4. Ll ∙ Lm ∙ l≠m / ~(Cma ∙ Cmb)

4. 1. Rk ∙ Tk ∙ (∀x)[(Rx ∙ Tx ∙ x≠k) ⊃ Fkx]
2. Rp ∙ Tp
3. k≠p / Fkp
4. (∀x)[(Rx ∙ Tx ∙ x≠k) ⊃ Fkx] 1, Simp
5. (Rp ∙ Tp ∙ p≠k) ⊃ Fkp 4, UI
6. p≠k 3, IDs
7. Rp ∙ Tp ∙ p≠k 2, 6, Conj
8. Fkp 5, 7, MP
QED
8. 1. Er ∙ ~Pr ∙ (∀x)[(Ex ∙ x≠r) ⊃ Px]

2. Ej ∙ Pj ∙ (∀x)[(Ex ∙ Px) ⊃ x=j] / (∃x)(∃y){(Ex ∙ Ey ∙ x≠y) ∙ (∀z)[Ez ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
3. Er 1, Simp
4. Ej 2, Simp
5. ~(∀z)[Ez ⊃ (z=r ∨ z=j)] AIP
6. (∃z)~[Ez ⊃ (z=r ∨ z=j)] 5, QE
7. ~[Ea ⊃ (a=r ∨ a=j)] 6, EI
8. ~[~Ea ∨ a=r ∨ a=j] 7, Impl
9. ~~Ea ∙ a≠r ∙ a≠j 8, DM
10. Ea ∙ a≠r ∙ a≠j 9, DN
11. (∀x)[(Ex ∙ x≠r) ⊃ Px] 1, Simp
12. (Ea ∙ a≠r) ⊃ Pa 11, UI
13. Ea ∙ a≠r 10, Simp
14. Pa 12, 13, MP
15. (∀x)[(Ex ∙ Px) ⊃ x=j] 2, Simp
16. (Ea ∙ Pa) ⊃ a=j 15, UI
17. Ea 13, Simp
18. Ea ∙ Pa 14, 17, Conj
19. a=j 16, 18, MP
20. a≠j 10, Simp
21. a=j ∙ a≠j 19, 20, Conj
22. ~~(∀z)[Ez ⊃ (z=r ∨ z=j)] 5–21, IP
23. (∀z)[Ez ⊃ (z=r ∨ z=j)] 22, DN
24. r=j AIP
25. ~Pr 1, Simp
26. ~Pj 25, 24, IDi
27. Pj 2, Simp
28. Pj ∙ ~Pj 27, 26, Conj
29. r≠j 24–28, IP
30. Er ∙ Ej 3, 4, Conj
31. Er ∙ Ej ∙ r≠j 30, 29, Conj
32. Er ∙ Ej ∙ r≠j ∙ (∀z)[Ez ⊃ (z=r ∨ z=j)] 31, 23, Conj
33. (∃y){Er ∙ Ey ∙ r≠y ∙ (∀z)[Ez ⊃ (z=r ∨ z=y)]} 32, EG
34. (∃x)(∃ y){(Ex ∙ Ey ∙ x≠y) ∙ (∀z)[Ez ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]} 33, EG
QED
12. 1. Pp ∙ ~Mp ∙ (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠p) ⊃ Mx]
2. (∀x)(Px ⊃ Ax)
3. Pg ∙ g≠p / (∃x)(Mx ∙ Ax) ∙ (∃x)~(Mx ∙ Ax)
4. ~Mp 1, Simp
5. ~Mp ∨ ~Ap 4, Add
6. ~(Mp ∙ Ap) 5, DM
7. (∃x)~(Mx ∙ Ax) 6, EG
8. Pg 3, Simp
9. Pg ⊃ Ag 2, UI
10. Ag 9, 8, MP
11. (∀x)[(Px ∙ x≠p) ⊃ Mx] 1, Simp
12. (Pg ∙ g≠p) ⊃ Mg 11, UI
13. Mg 12, 3, MP
14. Mg ∙ Ag 13, 10, Conj
15. (∃x)(Mx ∙ Ax) 14, EG
16. (∃x)(Mx ∙ Ax) ∙ (∃x)~(Mx ∙ Ax) 15, 7, Conj
QED
16. 1. (∀x)(∀y){(Px ∙ Py ∙ x≠y) ⊃ (∃z){(Lz ∙ Czx ∙ Czy ∙ (∀w)[(Lw ∙ Cwx ∙ Cwy) ⊃ w=z]}}
2. Pa ∙ Pb ∙ a≠b
3. Cla ∙ Clb
4. Ll ∙ Lm ∙ l≠m / ~(Cma ∙ Cmb)
5. (∀y){(Pa ∙ Py ∙ a≠y) ⊃ (∃z){(Lz ∙ Cza ∙ Czy ∙ (∀w)[(Lw ∙ Cwa ∙ Cwy) ⊃ w=z]}} 1, UI
6. (Pa ∙ Pb ∙ a≠b) ⊃ (∃z){(Lz ∙ Cza ∙ Czb ∙ (∀w)[(Lw ∙ Cwa ∙ Cwb) ⊃ w=z]} 5, UI
7. (∃z){(Lz ∙ Cza ∙ Czb ∙ (∀w)[(Lw ∙ Cwa ∙ Cwb) ⊃ w=z]} 6, 2, MP
8. Lr ∙ Cra ∙ Crb ∙ (∀w)[(Lw ∙ Cwa ∙ Cwb) ⊃ w=r] 7, EI
9. (∀w)[(Lw ∙ Cwa ∙ Cwb) ⊃ w=r] 8, Simp
10. (Ll ∙ Cla ∙ Clb) ⊃ l=r 9, UI
11. Ll 4, Simp
12. Ll ∙ Cla ∙ Clb 11, 3, Conj
13. l=r 10, 12, MP
14. Cma ∙ Cmb AIP
15. Lm 4, Simp
16. Lm ∙ Cma ∙ Cmb 15, 14, Conj
17. (Lm ∙ Cma ∙ Cmb) ⊃ m=r 9, UI
18. m=r 17, 16, MP
19. r=l 13, IDs
20. m=l 18, 19, IDi
21. l≠m 4, Simp
22. l=m 20, IDs
23. l=m ∙ l≠m 22, 21, Conj
24. ~(Cma ∙ Cmb) 14–23, IP
QED
EXERCISES 5.5c
1. 1. ~(∀x)(∀y)(x=y ≡ y=x) AIP
2. (∃x)~(∀y)(x=y ≡ y=x) 1, QE
3. (∃x)(∃y)~(x=y ≡ y=x) 2, QE
4. (∃x)(∃y)(~x=y ≡ y=x) 3, BDM
5. (∃x)(∃y)(~x=y ≡ x=y) 4, IDs
6. (∃y)(~a=y ≡ a=y) 5, EI
7. ~a=b ≡ a=b 6, EI
8. (~a=b ∙ a=b) ∨ (~~a=b ∙ ~a=b) 7, Equiv
9. (a=b ∙ ~a=b) ∨ (~~a=b ∙ ~a=b) 8, Com
10. (a=b ∙ ~a=b) ∨ (a=b ∙ ~a=b) 9, DN
11. a=b ∙ ~a=b 10, Taut
12. ~~(∀x)(∀y)(x=y ≡ y=x) 1–11, IP
13. (∀x)(∀y)(x=y ≡ y=x) 12, DN
QED
5. 1. x=y ∙ x=z ACP
2. x=y 1, Simp
3. x=z 1, Simp
4. z=y 2, 3, IDi
5. y=z 4, IDs
6. (x=y ∙ x=z) ⊃ y=z 1–5, CP
7. (∀z)[(x=y ∙ x=z) ⊃ y=z] 6, UG
8. (∀y)(∀z)[(x=y ∙ x=z) ⊃ y=z] 7, UG
9. (∀x)(∀y)(∀z)[(x=y ∙ x=z) ⊃ y=z] 8, UG
QED
10. 1. (∀x)(Pax ⊃ x=b) ACP

2. ~[(∃y)Pay ⊃ Pab] AIP
~[~(∃y)Pay ∨ Pab]
3. 2, Impl
~~(∃y)Pay ∙ ~Pab
4. 3, DM
5. (∃y)Pay ∙ ~Pab 4, DN
6. (∃y)Pay 5, Simp
7. Pac 6, EI
8. Pac ⊃ c=b 1, UI
9. c=b 8, 7, MP
10. Pab 7, 9, IDi
11. ~Pab 5, Simp
12. Pab ∙ ~Pab 10, 11, Conj
13. ~~[(∃y)Pay ⊃ Pab] 2–12, IP
14. (∃y)Pay ⊃ Pab 13, DN
15. (∀x)(Pax ⊃ x=b) ⊃ [(∃y)Pay ⊃ Pab] 1–14, CP
QED
EXERCISES 5.6 8. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[f(x)=f(y) ⊃ x=y]

1. Tmf(m) 2. f(a)=g(c, d)
5. (∃x)[Sxm ∙ (∀y)(Sym ⊃ y=x) ∙ Txg(f(m)) ∙ Txg(g(m))] 3. f(b)=g(c, e)
9. Nt ∙ Pt ∙ Ng(t) ∙ Pg(t) 4. d=e / a=b
13. (∀x)(∀y)[(Nx ∙ Ex ∙ Ny ∙ Ey) ⊃ Ef(x, y)] 5. f(a)=g(c, e) 2, 4, IDi
18. Gf(f(a)) ∙ Pf(f(a)) ∙ Pa 6. g(c, e)=f(b) 3, IDs
21. (∀x){Px ⊃ (∃y)[Sy ∙ f(y)=x]} 7. f(a)=f(b) 5, 6, IDi
25. f(p)=t ∙ f(p)≠ e 8. (∀y)[f(a)=f(y) ⊃ a=y] 1, UI
29. Pp ∙ Pq ∙ {f (p, q)=e ⊃ [f(p)=e ∨ f(q)=e]} 9. f(a)=f(b) ⊃ a=b 8, UI
33. Pf(b,h) 10. a=b 9, 7, MP
37. (∀x)[Px ⊃ (∃y)(∃z)Mf(x)f(x, y)] QED
EXERCISES 5.7a
4. 1. (∀x)[Px ⊃ Pf(x)]
2. (∀x)(Qx ⊃ Px) 12. 1. (∀x)[(Bf(x) ⊃ (Cx ∙ Df(f(x)))]
3. Qa / Pf(a) 2. (∃x)Bf(f(x))
4. Qa ⊃ Pa 2, UI 3. (∃x)Cf(x) ⊃ (∀x)Ex / (∃x)[Df(f(f(x))) ∙ Ef(f(f(x)))]
5. Pa 4, 3, MP 4. Bf(f(a)) 2, EI
6. Pa ⊃ Pf(a) 1, UI 5. B(f(f(a)) ⊃ [Cf(a) ∙ Df(f(f(a)))] 1, UI
7. Pf(a) 6, 5, MP 6. Cf(a) ∙ Df(f(f(a))) 5, 4, MP
QED 7. Cf(a) 6, Simp
8. (∃x)Cf(x) 7, EG
9. (∀x)Ex 3, 8, MP
10. Ef(f(f(a))) 9, UI
11. Df(f(f(a))) 6, Simp
12. Df(f(f(a))) ∙ Ef(f(f(a))) 11, 10, Conj
13. (∃x)[Df(f(f(x))) ∙ Ef(f(f(x)))] 12, EG
QED
16. 1. (∃x){Px ∙ Qx ∙ (∃y)[Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y ∙ Pf(x)f(y)]}

2. (∀x)(∀y)[Pxy ⊃ (Rx ∙ Ry)]
3. (∀x)[Rf(x) ⊃ Rx] / (∃x){Rx ∙ Rf(x) ∙ (∃y)[Ry ∙ Rf(y) ∙ x≠y]}
4. Pa ∙ Qa ∙ (∃y)[Py ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y ∙ Pf(a)f(y)] 1, EI
5. (∃y)[Py ∙ Q y ∙ a≠y ∙ Pf(a)f(y)] 4, Simp
6. Pb ∙ Qb ∙ a≠b ∙ Pf(a)f(b) 5, EI
7. Pf(a)f(b) 6, Simp
8. (∀y){Pf(a)y ⊃ [Rf(a) ∙ Ry]} 2, UI
9. Pf(a)f(b) ⊃ [Rf(a) ∙ Rf(b)] 8, UI
10. Rf(a) ∙ Rf(b) 9, 7, MP
11. Rf(a) 10, Simp
12. Rf(a) ⊃ Ra 3, UI
13. Ra 12, 11, MP
14. Rf(b) 10, Simp
15. Rf(b) ⊃ Rb 3, UI
16. Rb 15, 14, MP
17. a≠b 6, Simp
18. Rb ∙ Rf(b) ∙ a≠b 16, 14, 17, Conj
19. (∃y)[Ry ∙ Rf(y) ∙ a≠y] 18, EG
20. Ra ∙ Rf(a) ∙ (∃y)[Ry ∙ Rf(y) ∙ a≠y] 13, 11, 19, Conj
21. (∃x){Rx ∙ Rf(x) ∙ (∃y)[Ry ∙ Rf(y) ∙ x≠y]} 20, EG
QED
20. 1. (∃x)(∃ y){Px ∙ Qx ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ x≠y ∙ f(x)=y ∙ (∀z)(∀w){[Pz ∙ Qz ∙ Pw ∙ Qw ∙ z≠w ∙ f(z)=w] ⊃ (z=x ∙ w=y)}}
2. Pa ∙ Qa ∙ Pb ∙ Qb ∙ a≠b ∙ f(a)=b ∙ Sa ∙ Sb
3. Pc ∙ Pd ∙ f(c)=d ∙ ~Sc ∙ ~Sd ∙ c≠d / ~(Qc ∙ Qd)
4. (∃y){Pm ∙ Qm ∙ Py ∙ Q y ∙ m≠y ∙ f(m)=y ∙ (∀z)(∀w){[Pz ∙ Qz ∙ Pw ∙ Qw ∙ z≠w ∙ f(z)=w] ⊃ (z=m ∙ w=y)}} 1, EI
5. Pm ∙ Qm ∙ Pn ∙ Qn ∙ m≠n ∙ f(m)=n ∙ (∀z)(∀w){[Pz ∙ Qz ∙ Pw ∙ Qw ∙ z≠w ∙ f(z)=w] ⊃ (z=m ∙ w=n)} 4, EI
6. (∀z)(∀w){[Pz ∙ Qz ∙ Pw ∙ Qw ∙ z≠w ∙ f(z)=w] ⊃ (z=m ∙ w=n)} 5, Simp
7. Qc ∙ Qd AIP
8. Pc ∙ Pd ∙ f(c)=d 3, Simp
9. c≠d 3, Simp
10. Pc ∙ Pd ∙ f(c)=d ∙ Qc ∙ Qd ∙ c≠d 8, 7, 9, Conj
11. Pc ∙ Qc ∙ Pd ∙ Qd ∙ c≠d ∙ f(c)=d 10, Com
12. (∀w){[Pc ∙ Qc ∙ Pw ∙ Qw ∙ c≠w ∙ f(c)=w] ⊃ (c=m ∙ w=n)} 6, UI
13. [Pc ∙ Qc ∙ Pd ∙ Qd ∙ c≠d ∙ f(c)=d] ⊃ (c=m ∙ d=n) 12, UI
14. c=m ∙ d=n 13, 11, MP
15. Pa ∙ Qa ∙ Pb ∙ Qb ∙ a≠b ∙ f(a)=b 2, Simp
16. (∀w){[Pa ∙ Qa ∙ Pw ∙ Qw ∙ a≠w ∙ f(a)=w] ⊃ (a=m ∙ w=n)} 6, UI
17. [Pa ∙ Qa ∙ Pb ∙ Qb ∙ a≠b ∙ f(a)=b] ⊃ (a=m ∙ b=n) 16, UI
18. a=m ∙ b=n 17, 15, MP
19. Sa 2, Simp
20. a=m 18, Simp
21. Sm 19, 20, IDi
22. ~Sc 3, Simp
23. c=m 14, Simp
24. ~Sm 22, 23, IDi
25. Sm ∙ ~Sm 21, 24, Conj
26. ~(Qc ∙ Qd) 7–25, IP
QED

1. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[f(x)=y ⊃ Cxy]
2. (∀x)~Cxp / ~f(a)=p
5. 1. (∀x){Px ⊃ (∀y){Dy ⊃ [(∃z)(Tz ∙ Cxzy) ⊃ Pxf(y)]}}
2. Pe ∙ Da ∙ Tl ∙ Cela
3. Db ∙ f(a)=b / Peb
10. 1. (∃x)(∃y){Nx ∙ Ny ∙ x=g(x, x) ∙ y=g(y, y) ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z)[(Nz ∙ z=g(z, z) ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)]}
2. (∀x)g(x, x)=f(x)
3. f(a)=a
4. f(b)=b
5. Na ∙ Nb ∙ Nc ∙ a≠b ∙ a≠ c ∙ b≠c / f(c)≠ c

1. 1. (∀x)(∀y)[f(x)=y ⊃ Cxy]
2. (∀x)~Cxp / ~f(a)=p
3. f(a)=p AIP
4. (∀y)[f(a)=y ⊃ Cay] 1, UI
5. f(a)=p ⊃ Cap 4, UI
6. Cap 5, 3, MP
7. ~Cap 2, UI
8. Cap ∙ ~Cap 6, 7, Conj
9. ~f(a)=p 3–8, IP
QED
5. 1. (∀x){Px ⊃ (∀y){Dy ⊃ [(∃z)(Tz ∙ Cxzy) ⊃ Pxf(y)]}}
2. Pe ∙ Da ∙ Tl ∙ Cela
3. Db ∙ f(a)=b / Peb
4. Pe ⊃ (∀y){Dy ⊃ [(∃z)(Tz ∙ Cezy) ⊃ Pef(y)]} 1, UI
5. Pe 2, Simp
6. (∀y){Dy ⊃ [(∃z)(Tz ∙ Cezy) ⊃ Pef(y)]} 4, 5, MP
7. Da 2, Simp
8. Da ⊃ [(∃z)(Tz ∙ Ceza) ⊃ Pef(a)] 6, UI
9. (∃z)(Tz ∙ Ceza) ⊃ Pef(a) 8, 7, MP
10. Tl ∙ Cela 2, Simp
11. (∃z)(Tz ∙ Ceza) 10, EG
12. Pef(a) 9, 11, MP
13. f(a)=b 3, Simp
14. Peb 12, 13, IDi
QED
10. 1. (∃x)(∃y){Nx ∙ Ny ∙ x=g(x, x) ∙ y=g(y, y) ∙ x≠y ∙ (∀z){[Nz ∙ z=g(z, z)] ⊃ (z=x ∨ z=y)}}
2. (∀x)g(x, x)=f(x)
3. f(a)=a
4. f(b)=b
5. Na ∙ Nb ∙ Nc ∙ a≠b ∙ a≠c ∙ b≠c / f(c)≠ c
6. (∃y){No ∙ Ny ∙ o=g(o, o) ∙ y=g(y, y) ∙ o≠y ∙ (∀z){[Nz ∙ z=g(z, z)] ⊃ (z=o ∨ z=y)}} 1, EI
7. No ∙ Np ∙ o=g(o, o) ∙ p=g(p, p) ∙ o≠p ∙ (∀z){[Nz ∙ z=g(z, z)] ⊃ (z=o ∨ z=p)} 6, EI
8. (∀z){[Nz ∙ z=g(z, z)] ⊃ (z=o ∨ z=p)} 7, Simp
9. g(a, a)=f(a) 2, UI
10. g(a, a)=a 9, 3, IDi
11. Na 5, Simp
12. a=g(a, a) 10, IDs
13. Na ∙ a=g(a, a) 11, 12, Conj
14. [Na ∙ a=g(a, a)] ⊃ (a=o ∨ a=p) 8, UI
15. a=o ∨ a=p 14, 13, MP
16. g(b, b)=f(b) 2, UI
17. g(b, b)=b 16, 4, IDi
18. Nb 5, Simp
19. Nb ∙ g(b, b)=b 18, 17, Conj
20. [Nb ∙ b=g(b, b)] ⊃ (b=o ∨ b=p) 8, UI
21. b=o ∨ b=p 20, 19, MP
22. f(c)=c AIP
23. g(c, c)=f(c) 2, UI
24. g(c, c)=c 23, 22, IDi
25. Nc 5, Simp
26. c=g(c, c) 24, IDs
27. Nc ∙ c=g(c, c) 25, 26, Conj
28. [Nc ∙ c=g(c, c)] ⊃ (c=o ∨ c=p) 8, UI
29. c=o ∨ c=p 28, 27, MP
30. c=o AIP
31. a≠c 5, Simp
32. a≠o 31, 30, IDi
33. a=p 15, 32, DS
34. a≠b 5, Simp
35. p≠b 34, 33, IDi
36. b≠p 35, IDs
37. b=p ∨ b=o 21, Com
38. b=o 37, 36, DS
39. o=c 30, IDs
40. b=c 38, 39, IDi
41. b≠c 5, Simp
42. b=c ∙ b≠c 40, 41, Conj
43. c≠o 30–42, IP
44. c=p 29, 43, DS
45. a≠c 5, Simp
46. a≠p 45, 44, IDi
47. a=p ∨ a=o 15, Com
48. a=o 47, 46, DS
49. a≠b 5, Simp
50. o≠b 49, 48, IDi
51. b≠o 50, IDs
52. b=p 21, 51 DS
53. p=b 52, IDs
54. c=b 44, 53, IDi
55. b=c 54, IDs
56. b≠c 5, Simp
57. b=c ∙ b≠c 55, 56, Conj
58. f(c)≠c 22–57, IP
QED
Glossary/Index
addition (Add) A rule of inference of PL, arithmetic, Peano axioms for, 385–386 material conditional and, 106–107
124–125, 127 Arnauld, Antoine, 401 method for proving biconditional con-
ad hominem, 405 association (Assoc) Rules of equivalence clusion, 178
ad populum, 405 of PL, 136, 140, 414 proof strategies, 204
ambiguity, 29, 409–410 atomic formula The simplest type of propositional logic, 164–169
anchoring, 409 formula of a language rules of equivalence, 168, 169
antecedent In a conditional, the formula An atomic formula of F is an n-placed rules of inference, 166, 168
that precedes the ⊃ is called the predicate followed by n singular truth table for, 51
antecedent, 27 terms, 329 biconditional association (BAssoc) A
exercises, 31–32 An atomic formula of M is formed by rule of equivalence of PL that allows
simplifying, 157–158 a predicate followed by a singular you to regroup propositions with
anyone A term that indicates a quantifier, term, 235 two biconditionals, 166, 167, 169
but which should be distinguished An atomic formula of PL is a single biconditional commutativity (BCom)
from ‘anything’, 221 capital letter, 44 A rule of equivalence of PL that
anything A term that indicates a quanti- attribute A grammatical predicate. Attri- allows you to switch the order of
fier, and which may be existential or butes may be simple (as ‘are happy’ formulas around a biconditional,
universal, 215 in ‘Some philosophers are happy’) 166, 168
appeals to emotion, 406 and be regimented as a single predi- biconditional De Morgan’s law (BDM)
appeals to tradition, 405 cate. They may be complex (as ‘is a A rule of equivalence of PL. When
appeal to unreliable authority, 405 big, strong, blue ox’ in ‘Babe is a big, bringing a negation inside parenthe-
argument Collections of propositions, strong, blue ox’) and regimented ses with BDM, make sure to negate
called premises, together with a using multiple predicates, 220 only the formula on the left side of
claim, called the conclusion, that the Aurelius, Marcus, 13 the biconditional, 166, 167, 168
premises are intended to support or Ayer, A. J., 12, 15 biconditional inversion (BInver) A rule
establish, 9 of equivalence of PL. To use BInver,
exercises for determining validity of, basic truth table For a logical operator, negate both sides of the bicondi-
98–102 defines the operator by showing the tional, but do not switch their posi-
logic and, 1–3 truth value of the operation, given tions, 166, 167, 169
and numbered premise-conclusion any possible distribution of truth val- biconditional hypothetical syllogism
form, 29–30 ues of the component premises, 47 (BHS) A rule of inference of PL,
premise-conclusion form, 12–16 begging the question, 403, 407 and works just like ordinary hypo-
translating into propositional logic, Begriffsschrift (Frege), 4, 8 thetical syllogism, 166, 167, 168
34–41 Berkeley, George, 15 biconditional modus ponens (BMP)
valid and invalid, 77–81 biconditional A complex proposition, A rule of inference of PL, parallel
validity and soundness, 16–18 most notably used to represent ‘if to modus ponens, but used when
argumentation. See fallacies and and only if ’ claims, 28–29 the major premise has a bicondi-
argumentation deriving conclusions using rules of tional, rather than a conditional,
Aristotle, 5, 8, 14, 20, 299, 401 inference and equivalence, 169–174 166, 168
475
4 7 6 G L O S S A R Y / I N D E X
biconditional modus tollens (BMT) we use material implication to repre- constant In predicate logic, a singular
A rule of inference of PL. Unlike sent conditionals, 26–28 term that stands for a specific object;
modus tollens, use BMT when you combining, 158 a, b, c, . . . u are used as constants in
have the negation of the term which making conditionals, 156 M and F. In FF, f, g, and h are used
comes before the biconditional in negated, 157 as functors, 213
the major premise, 166, 168 proof strategies, 204 invalidity in M, 284–285
binary operators Logical operators that simplifying antecedents and conse- constructive dilemma (CD) A rule of
relate or connect two propositions, 24 quents, 157–158 inference of PL, 126–127, 128
bivalent logic In a bivalent logic every switching antecedents of nested, 157 contingencies A contingency is a propo-
statement is either true or false, and conditional proof One of three deriva- sition that is true in some rows of a
not both, 46 tion methods. In a conditional proof, truth table and false in others, 69
bound variable A bound variable is at- we indent, assuming the antecedent contradictions Contradiction is used in
tached, or related, to the quantifier of a desired conditional, derive the three different ways in this book:
that binds it. A variable is bound by consequent of our desired condi- A single proposition that is false in
a quantifier when it is in the scope of tional within the indented sequence, every row of its truth table is a con-
the quantifier and they share a vari- and discharge our assumption by tradiction, 69
able, 234 concluding the conditional: if the Two propositions with opposite truth
first line of the sequence, then the values in all rows of the truth table
Cantor, Georg, 6, 7 last line of the sequence, 175 are contradictory, 72
Carroll, Lewis, 411 common error when deriving logical In derivations, a contradiction is any
causal fallacies, 408–409 truths, 186–187 wff of the form α • ~α, 159
charity, principle of, 301–304 derivations in predicate logic with CP, contraposition (Cont) A rule of equiva-
Chrysippus, 5 264–265 lence of PL, 146, 150, 416
circular reasoning, 403 deriving conclusions using, 179–183 Copernicus, Nicolaus, 13
closed sentence A closed sentence has no exercises in deriving logical truths, counterexample A counterexample to an
free variables, 213, 234 190–191 argument is a valuation that makes
commutativity (Com) Rules of equiva- method of, 175 the premises true and the conclusion
lence of PL, 137–138, 140 nested sequence, 177 false, 78
complete system of inference One in propositional logic, 174–179
which every valid argument and conjunction A complex proposition, Darwin, Charles, 13
every logical truth is provable, 114 consisting of two conjuncts. We use Dedekind, Richard, 385
complex formula One that is not atomic, 44 conjuncts to represent many propo- definite descriptions A definite descrip-
complex proposition One that is not sitions that contain ‘and’, 25 tion picks out an object by using a
atomic, 47 proof strategies, 204 descriptive phrase beginning with
truth values of, 51–54 truth table for, 48 ‘the’, as in ‘the person who . . . ,’ or
with unknown truth values, 54–56 conjunction (Conj) A rule of inference ‘the thing that . . .’, 360
complex questions, 410 of PL, 124–125, 127 identity predicate, 360–361
composition, 410 consequent In a conditional, the formula translation with function, 381
compositionality The principle that the that follows the ⊃ is called the con- De Morgan, Augustus, 9
meaning of a complex sentence is sequent, 27 De Morgan’s laws (DM) Rules of equiva-
determined by the meanings of its exercises, 31–32 lence of PL, 135–136, 140, 413, 418.
component part, 23 simplifying, 157–158 See also biconditional De Morgan’s
Comte, Auguste, 15 consistent propositions Two or more law (BDM)
conclusion A proposition in an argument propositions that are true in at least derivation A sequence of formulas, every
that is supposed to follow from the one common row of their truth member of which is an assumed
premises, 9 tables are consistent, 72 premise or follows from earlier for-
separating premises from, 9–12 method of indirect truth tables for, 93 mulas in the sequence according to
conditional A complex claim, often in an consistent valuation A consistent valua- specified rules, 113, 197
‘if . . . then . . .’ form, that consists of tion is an assignment of truth values converting into logical truths, 187–189
an antecedent (the claim that fol- to atomic propositions that makes a exercises for deriving conclusions of
lows the ‘if ’) and a consequent (the set of propositions all true, 90 arguments, 160–164
claim that follows the ‘then’). In PL, exercises determining, 102–104 in F (full first-order logic), 337–343
G L O S S A R Y / I N D E X 4 7 7
functional structure and, 390–394 Erasmus, Desiderius, 13 restriction on UG (universal general-

with functors, 394–396 Euclidean geometry ization), 338–339
identity predicate, 370–375 fifth postulate, 7 semantics of, 328–331, 334
in M (formal language of monadic four axioms, 6 showing invalidity by counterexam-
predicate logic), 238–246 everyone A term that indicates a quanti- ples, 336–337
practice with, 156–160 fier, but which should distinguished syntax of, 328–331
in predicate logic with conditional from ‘everything’, 221 Fallacies (Hamblin), 402
proof, 264–265 exactly, identity predicates, 358–359 fallacies and argumentation, 401–411
in predicate logic with indirect proof, except, identity statements, 353–354 causal fallacies, 408–409
265–266 excluded middle The law of the excluded formal fallacies, 402–403
three methods, 197 middle is that any claim of the form informal fallacies, 403–404
using rules in, 117–118 α ∨ ~α is a tautology, a logical truth irrelevant premises, 404–406
derivation method Methods are direct of PL, 186, 196 research and writing, 411–412
proof, conditional proof and indirect existential generalization (EG) The rule summary, 410–411
proof, 174, 197 of inference in predicate logic that unwarranted or weak premises,
Descartes, René, 5, 16, 20, 403 allows us to put an existential quan- 406–408
direct proof Our standard derivation tifier onto a formula, 241, 246 false dilemma, 406
method. In a direct proof, every line existential instantiation (EI) A rule FF (full first-order predicate logic with
of a derivation is either a premise or of inference in predicate logic that functors), 383, 387, 396
follows from the premises using the allows us to remove an existential exercises deriving conclusions,
rules of inference or equivalence, quantifier from a formula, 242, 246 397–398
174, 178 existential quantifiers Used to regiment exercises translating arguments into,
disjunction A complex proposition, terms including ‘something’, ‘at least 399–400
often used to represent ‘or’ claims, one’, and ‘there exists’, 214 exercises translating into, 387–390
that is made of two disjuncts, putting on the, 241 formation rules for wffs of, 384
25–26 taking off the, 241–243 Peano axioms for arithmetic in,
proof strategies, 204 explosion A property of classical systems 385–386
truth table for, 49 of inference like the ones of this semantics for, 384–385
disjunctive syllogism (DS) A rule of book: any statement follows from a translations into, 385–386
inference of PL, 116, 120 contradiction, 159 translation with functions, 380–387
distribution (Dist) Rules of equivalence exportation (Exp) A rule of equivalence vocabulary of, 383–384
of PL, 136–137, 140, 415 of PL, 148–149, 150, 417 Field, Hartry, 14
division, 410 finite universes The method of finite
Dodgson, Charles, 411 F (full first-order predicate logic), 312, universes is a semantic method that
domain of interpretation A set of ob- 315 can produce counterexamples to
jects to which we apply the theory. accidental binding, 339–340 arguments in predicate logic, 281
To interpret, or model, a theory of constructing models for theories, formal fallacies, 402–403
predicate logic, we first choose a 335–336 formal theory A set of sentences of a
domain of interpretation, 275 derivations in, 337–343 formal language, 184
domain of quantification. See domain of deriving conclusions of arguments, formation rules The aspects of syntax
interpretation 344–346 that specify how to combine the
double negation (DN) A rule of equiva- deriving logical truths of, 348–349 vocabulary of a language into well-
lence of PL, 138, 140 exercises determining validity, formed formulas, 44
dyadic predicates Dyadic predicates 349–350 for wffs of PL, 44–45
are followed by two singular terms, exercises in translating arguments into for wffs of M, 235–236
310 propositions of, 346–348 for wffs of F, 328–331
formation rules for wffs of, 328–331 for wffs of FF, 384
Einstein, Albert, 13 invalidity in, 331–334 framing, 409
enthymemes, 12, 404 logical truths, 342–343 free variable A free variable is not bound
Epicurus of Samos, 13 methods for indirect proofs, 341 by any quantifier, 234
equivalence. See rules of equivalence overlapping quantifiers, 340 Frege, Gottlob, 4, 8–9, 356
equivocation, 410 power of F, 316 Freud, Sigmund, 16
4 7 8 G L O S S A R Y / I N D E X
functional structure A functional simple identity claims, 353 inference. See rules of inference
structure reflects the complexity superlatives, 355 informal fallacies, 403–404
of a functor term or of the n-tuple syntax for, 352 interpretation An interpretation of
of singular terms in a functor term. translation of, 351–362 a formal language describes the
The functional structure increases identity rules (IDi, IDr and IDs) Three meanings or truth conditions of its
with the number of embedded func- rules governing the identity relation, components. For M, we interpret
tions, 390 352, 370–375 constants, predicates, quantifiers,
derivations and, 390–394 identity theory, 351–352, 380 and the propositional operators,
functor A functor is a symbol used to IDi The indiscernibility of identicals, 274
represent a function. In FF, we use f, also known as Leibniz’s law: if invalid argument, 78
g, and h as functors, 382 α=β, then any wff containing α invalidity
derivations with, 394–396 may be exchanged for a wff in PL (propositional logic), 77-83
functor terms A functor term is a functor containing β in the same places, in M (monadic predicate logic),
followed by an n-tuple of singular 370, 371, 375 280–292
terms in brackets, 383 IDr The reflexive property of identity, in F (full first-order logic), 331–334
α=α, for any singular term α, 370, generating counterexamples to show,
gambler’s fallacy, 409 375 292–298
Gentzen, Gerhard, 8 IDs The symmetry property of identity: irrelevant premises, 404–406
Gödel, Kurt, 8 α=β ← → β=α, for any singular

terms, 370, 375 Jaskowski, Stanislaw, 8
hasty generalization A logical fallacy. inconsistent pair In an inconsistent pair justification A justification in a deriva-
In inductive logic, it is sometimes of propositions, there is no row of tion includes the line numbers and
called induction on too few cases. the truth table in which both state- rule that allows the inference at ev-
Instantiation and generalization ments are true; there is no consistent ery step after the premises, 118
rules for deductive logic are de- valuation, 73
signed to avoid hasty generalization indented sequence An indented se- Kahneman, Daniel, 409
by preventing universal generaliza- quence is a series of lines in a deri- Kant, Immanuel, 5–6, 9, 20
tion from existential premises, 240, vation that do not follow from the
408 premises directly, but only with a languages, logic and, 3–5
Hegel, G. W. F., 5, 14, 20 further assumption, indicated on the law of the excluded middle. See excluded
Hilbert, David, 8 first line of the sequence, 175 middle
Hume, David, 5, 16 indirect proof or reductio ad absurdum, Leibniz, G. W., 6, 15, 370
hypothetical syllogism (HS) A rule of One of three derivation methods. Leibniz’s law, 352, 370
inference of PL, 117, 120 In an indirect proof, we assume the Locke, John, 5
opposite of a desired conclusion, logic
identity predicate indenting to note the assumption, defining, 1–3
‘at least’ and ‘at most’, 356–358 and find a contradiction, some fallacies and argumentation, 401–411
conventions for derivations with statement of the form α • ~α. Then, and languages, 3–5
dropped brackets, 372–375 we discharge our assumption, unin- See also three-valued logics
definite descriptions, 360–362 denting, writing the negation of the logical equivalence Two or more propo-
derivations, 370–375 first line of the assumption in the sitions are logically equivalent when
deriving logical truths of, 380 first line of the indented sequence, they have the same truth conditions,
‘exactly’, 358–359 191 in other words, they have the same
‘except’ and ‘only’, 353–354 derivations in predicate logic with IP, truth values in every row of their
exercises deriving conclusions, 265–266 truth tables, 70
376–378 deriving conclusions of arguments us- logically equivalent ( ← → ) is a metal-

exercises translating arguments using, ing, 198–203 ogical symbol used for “is logically
378–380 method for, 192–193 equivalent to”, 135
exercises translating into first-order indirect truth tables, 83–97 logical truths Logical truths are proposi-
logic, 363–369 consistency and method of, 90–97 tions which are true on any interpre-
identity symbol, ‘=’, 352, 362 method for consistency, 93 tation. For PL, the logical truths are
introducing identity theory, 351–352 method for testing validity, 85 tautologies. Given the completeness
rules, 352, 370–375 induction on too few cases, 408 of PL, M, and F, they are definable
G L O S S A R Y / I N D E X 4 7 9
semantically or proof-theoretically. steps to interpret theory of M, 279 negation A complex proposition used
They can be proved with no prem- syntax for M, 233–237 for denying a proposition. The tilde,
ises, 68, 277 things and people, 220–221 used to represent negation, is the
common error in using conditional translation exercises, 225–232, 237– only unary logical operator in PL, 24
proof to derive, 186–187 238, 250–251, 271–272 proof strategies, 204
conditional and indirect proofs in F, translation using M, 219–225, of quantified formulas, 291
342–343 229–305 statement entailing its own, 159
converting ordinary derivations into, universally quantified formulas and truth table for, 47–48
187–189 existential import, 299 neither Neither is ‘not either’, and is usu-
exercises in determining, 204 vocabulary of M, 233–235 ally represented as the negation of a
invalidity in M, 289–290 main operator The last operator added disjunction, and should be carefully
in propositional logic (PL), 184–189 to a wff according to the formation distinguished from ‘not both’, 26
semantic arguments, 277–278 rules is called the main operator, 44 nested sequence A nested sequence
material conditional. See material arises from an assumption within
M The formal language of monadic predi- implication another assumption, 177
cate logic, 214 material equivalence (Equiv) A rule of new constant A new constant is one that
adjectives, 223–224 equivalence of PL, 147–148, 150, does not appear in either any earlier
‘and’s and ‘or’s and universally quanti- 416, 417 line of the argument or the desired
fied formulas, 299–301 material implication A complex proposi- conclusion, 242
appendices of derivations, 306–308 tion consisting of an antecedent and Newton, Isaac, 6
conditional and indirect proof in M, a consequent, Nicole, Pierre, 401
263–268 biconditional and, 106–107 Niemöller, Martin, 407
constants, 284–285 often used to represent ‘if . . . then..’ Nietzsche, Friedrich, 20
constructing models of theories, statements, 26–28 non sequiturs, 405
279–280 truth table for, 50–51 no one A term that indicates a quantifier,
derivations in M, 238–246 material implication (Impl) A rule of but which should be distinguished
deriving logical truths of M, 273 equivalence of PL, 146–147, 150, 416 from ‘nothing’, 221
domains of one member, 281–283 mathematics not both Not both is usually represented
domains of three or more members, logic and, 2 as the negation of a conjunction, and
285–288 Peano axioms for, 385 should be carefully distinguished
domains of two members, 283–284 Meditations on First Philosophy (Des- from ‘neither’, 26
exercises in deriving conclusions, cartes), 403 n-tuple An n-tuple is a set with structure
247–249, 268–271 metalogic, 71 used to describe an n-place relation.
expanding vocabulary, 236 method of finite universes The method Also, ‘n-tuple’ is a general term for
finding errors in illicit inferences, of finite universes is a semantic pairs, triples, quadruples, and so
252–254 method that can produce counter- on, 329
formation rules for wffs of M, examples to arguments in predicate n-tuple of singular terms An n-tuple of
235–236 logic, 281 singular terms is an ordered series of
invalidity in M, 280–292 Mill, John Stuart, 16, 401 singular terms (constants, variables
logical truths of, 267, 289–290 model A model of a theory is an interpre- or functor terms), 383
negations of quantified formulas, 291 tation on which all of the sentences
only, 221–223 of the theory are true, 277 only Only is a term that often indicates a
overlapping quantifiers, 290–291 modus ponens (MP) A rule of inference quantifier. Sentences with ‘only’ may
propositions whose main operator is of PL, 114–115, 119 be related to sentences using ‘all’,
not a quantifier, 288–289 modus tollens (MT) A rule of inference 221–223
propositions with more than one quan- of PL, 115–116, 120 identity statements, 353–354
tifier, 223 monadic predicate logic Predicate logic open sentence An open sentence has at
quantified sentences with more than in which the predicates take only least one free variable, 213, 234
two predicates, 220 one singular term, 213 operators Logical operators are tools for
quantifier exchange, 254–258 manipulating and combining propo-
quantifiers, domains and charity, narrow scope of quantifier A quanti- sitions or terms. They are defined by
301–304 fier’s scope is narrower the fewer their basic truth tables, 22
semantics for, 273–279 subformulas it contains, 314 negation of, 24
4 8 0 G L O S S A R Y / I N D E X
Peano, Giuseppe, 385 quantifiers. In this book, M, F, and instantiating the same quantifier twice,
Peano axioms, arithmetic, 385–386 FF are all predicate logics, 213 244–245
Peirce, Charles Sanders, 8 languages of, 217 instantiation and generalization rules,
petitio principii, 403 quantifiers, 214–215 243–244
PL The language of propositional logic singular terms and predicates, 213–214 narrower scope, 314
used in this book; the term is also premise-conclusion form, arguments and overlapping, 290–291
used to refer to the system of deduc- numbered, 29–30 putting on the existential, 241
tion used with that language, 4, 22, premises A proposition in an argument putting on the universal, 239–241
27, 29–30 on which the conclusion is based or quantified sentences with two predi-
the biconditional, 106–107, 164–169 should follow, 9 cates, 216–217
conditional proof, 174–179 separating from conclusions, 9–12 taking off the existential, 241–243
inclusive and exclusive disjunction, problem of empty reference, 355 taking off the universal, 238–239
107–108 proof A derivation, or proof, is a sequence translation in M, 301–304
indirect proof, 191–198 of formulas, every member of which universal, 215
indirect truth tables, 83–97 is an assumed premise or follows wider scope, 314
interpreting sentences of, 42–43 from earlier formulas in the se- quantifier exchange (QE) A rule of
logical equivalence and translation, quence according to specified rules, replacement in predicate logic in
105–106 113, 197 which quantifiers may be switched,
logical truths, 184–189, 204–205 strategies, 204 along with surrounding negations,
material conditional, 106–107 proof theory Proof theory is the study 255–256
modus ponens (MP), 114–115 of axioms (if any) and rules of infer- exercise in translating arguments,
modus tollens (MT), 115–116 ence for a formal theory, 274 261–263
notes on translation with PL, 105–111 proposition A statement, often expressed exercises deriving conclusions,
practice with derivations, 156–160 by a sentence, 9 258–261
proof strategies, 204 classifying, 68–74 rules for removing and replacing quan-
rules of equivalence, 135–140, classifying exercises, 74–75 tifiers, 254–256
146–150 consistent, 72 transformations permitted by,
rules of inference, 113–120, 124–128 contingencies, 69 256–258
semantics of, 46–57 contradictions, 69 Quine, W. V., 14
syntax of PL, 43–45 contradictory, 72
translating argument into, 34–41 exercises determining consistency of, reductio ad absurdum. See indirect proof
translating sentences, 32–34 102–104 regimentation A regimentation of an ar-
truth tables, 59–67 inconsistent pairs, 73 gument helps reveal its logical struc-
“unless” and exclusive disjunction, logical equivalence, 70 ture, either by putting the argument
108–111 tautology, 68 into numbered premise–conclusion
valid and invalid arguments, 77–81, valuation, 73 form, or by translating the argument
205–207 propositional logic (PL). See PL into a formal language, 9
Plato, 13, 20, 33 Putnam, Hilary, 13 relational predicates Relational predi-
Playfair, John, 7 cates or polyadic predicates are
polyadic predicates. See relational QED An acronym for the Latin “Quod followed by more than one singular
predicates erat demonstrandum,” or “that term, 310
Port-Royal Logic (Arnauld and Nicole), which was required to be shown,” exercises translating formulas into
401 and is used as a logician’s punctuation English sentences, 327
post hoc ergo propter hoc, 408 mark, to indicate the end of a deriva- exercises translating into predicate
predicate A predicate is an upper–case tion, to show that it is finished, 118 logic, 317–326
letter that precedes a singular term quantifier In predicate logic, operators people and things and using, 313
in predicate logic. Predicates stand that work with variables to stand for quantifier’s scope, 314
for properties, 213 terms like ‘something’, ‘everything’, quantifiers with, 312–313
quantified sentences with two predi- ‘nothing’, and ‘anything’. They may translation using, 310–317
cates, 216–217 be existential (∃) or universal (∀), religion. See philosophy of religion
predicate logic A language that includes 214 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 14, 15
predicates, singular terms, and existential, 214 rules, governing identity, 352, 370–375
G L O S S A R Y / I N D E X 4 8 1
rules of equivalence A pair of logically disjunctive syllogism (DS), 116, 120 identity theory, 351
equivalent statement forms that exercises identifying, 128–129 interpretations, satisfaction and mod-
allows the replacement of wffs in a existential generalization (EG), 241, els, 274–277
derivation with logically equivalent 246 logical truth, 277–278
wffs. In contrast to a rule of infer- existential instantiation (EI), 242, semantics for M (monadic language),
ence, it may be used on whole lines 246 273–279
or on parts of lines, 135 hypothetical syllogism (HS), 117, 120 set An unordered collection of objects,
appendix on logical equivalence of, modus ponens (MP), 114–115, 119 275
413–418 modus tollens (MT), 115–116, 120 simplification (Simp) A rule of inference
association (Assoc), 136, 140, 414 rules of equivalence and, 139 of PL, 125–126, 127
biconditional association (BAssoc), simplification, 125–126, 127 singular terms In all predicate
166, 167, 168 universal generalization (UG), 240, logics, singular terms are
biconditional commutativity (BCom), 246 lower–case letters that follow
166, 168 universal instantiation (UI), 239, 246 predicates. They may be constants
biconditional De Morgan’s law (BDM), using in derivations, 117–118 (a, b, c, . . . , u) or variables (v, w, x, y,
166, 167, 168, 418 Russell, Bertrand, 360–361 z). In FF, f, g, and h are used as func-
biconditional inversion (BInver), 166, tors, 213
167, 169, 418 satisfy An object satisfies a predicate predicates and, 213–214
commutativity (Com), 137–138, 140 if it is in the set that interprets slippery slope, 407
contraposition (Cont), 146, 150, 416 that predicate. An existentially Smith, Adam, 14
De Morgan’s laws (DM), 135–136, quantified sentence is satisfied if, someone A term that indicates a quanti-
140, 413 and only if, it is satisfied by fier, but which should be distin-
deriving conclusions of arguments us- some object in the domain; a uni- guished from ‘something’, 220
ing, 140–144, 152–156 versally quantified sentence is sound argument A valid argument is
distribution (Dist), 136–137, 140, 415 satisfied if, and only if, it is sound if, and only if, all of its prem-
double negation (DN), 138, 140 satisfied by all objects in the do- ises are true, 17
exportation (Exp), 148–149, 150, 417 main, 277 sound system of inference In a sound
material equivalence (Equiv), 147–148, Schopenhauer, Arthur, 16 system of inference or theory, every
150, 416, 417 scope The scope of an operator is the provable argument is semantically
material implication (Impl), 146–147, range of its application. Scopes may valid; every provable proposition is
150, 416 be wider or narrower; they can be logically true, 114
quantifier exchange (QE), 255–258 increased in extent by the use of sound theory. See sound system of
rules of inference and, 139 punctuation, 233 inference
tautology (Taut), 149, 150, 418 wide and narrow, 314 soundness, 114
rules of inference A rule of inference is scope of an assumption Every line of an exercises, 19–21
used to justify steps in a derivation. indented sequence of a derivation validity and, 17–18
It may be used on whole lines only, that begins with the assumption. straw man, 406
in contrast with a rule of equiva- Nested indented sequences are subformula A formula that is part of an-
lence, which may be used on parts of within the scopes of multiple as- other formula, 235
lines as well, 114 sumptions, 264 subject A subject of a sentence is what is
addition (Add), 124–125, 127 scope of a negation The scope of a nega- discussed; it may be regimented in
biconditional hypothetical syllogism tion is whatever directly follows the predicate logic by one or more predi-
(BHS), 166, 167, 168 tilde, 233 cates, 220
biconditional modus ponens (BMP), scope of a quantifier The scope of a subset A subset of a set is a collection, all
166, 168 quantifier is whatever formula im- of whose members are in the larger
biconditional modus tollens (BMT), mediately follows the quantifier, set, 275
166, 168 233 substitution instance The substitution
conjunction, 124–125, 127 semantics The semantics of a formal instance of a rule is a set of wffs of
constructive dilemma (CD), 126–127, language are the rules for interpret- PL that match the form of the rule,
128 ing the symbols and formulas of the 115
deriving conclusions of arguments us- language, 46 superlatives, identity predicate, 355
ing, 129–134, 140–144, 152–156 for FF, 384–385 syllogism, 402
4 8 2 G L O S S A R Y / I N D E X
syntax The syntax of a logical language is proposition, in other words, their represented as a conditional in
the definition of its vocabulary and truth conditions, 59 which the antecedent is negated,
rules for making formulas, 43 constructing exercises, 74–77 25, 26
of PL, 43–45 constructing for propositions with any exclusive disjunction and, 108–111
of M, 233–237 number of variables, 66 truth table for, 108–110
of F, 328–331 determining the size of, 60–66 unsound A valid argument is unsound
identity statements, 352 determining validity of, 81–83 when at least one of its premises is
system of inference A collection of rules eight-row, 63–65 false, 17
(of inference or equivalence) used exercises, 67–68 unwarranted premises, 406–408
with a logical language. Many sys- four-row, 61–63
tems of inference include axioms, indirect, 83–97 valid argument An argument is valid
though PL and M use no axioms, method for constructing, 59 when the conclusion is a logical con-
and F has only one, 113 method for testing validity, 78 sequence of the premises. In propo-
A System of Logic (Mill), 401 truth values Interpretations of proposi- sitional logic, a valid argument has
tions. In bivalent logic, we use two no row of its truth table in which the
Tarski, Alfred, 8 truth values, true and false. Other log- premises are true and the conclusion
tautology A tautology is a proposition ics, including ones with three or more is false. An invalid argument has at
that is true in every row of its truth truth values, are possible. The truth least one counterexample, 17, 78
table, 68, 415 value of a complex proposition is the validity
tautology (Taut) A rule of equivalence of truth value of its main operator, 46, 47 determining, 205–207
PL, 149, 150, 418 of complex expression, 57–59 exercises, 19–21, 207–209
terms, 419–420 of complex propositions, 51–54 method of indirect truth tables to test,
theorems A sentence of a theory. In logic, complex propositions with unknown, 85
the theorems are also called logical 54–56 method of truth tables to test, 78
truths, 184 and soundness, 17–18
theory A set of sentences, called theo- unary operator A logical operator that valuation A valuation is an assignment
rems, 184 applies to a single proposition, 24 of truth values to simple component
Thoreau, Henry David, 13, 15 universal generalization (UG) The rule propositions, 73
Tocqueville, Alexis de, 14, 15 of inference in predicate logic that variables In predicate logic, a singular
translation, 29 allows us to put a universal quanti- term which may be bound by a
logical equivalence and, 105–106 fier onto a formula, 240, 246 quantifier; v, w, x, y, z are used as
notes on, with M, 299–305 restriction on, in F, 338–339 variables, 213
notes on, with PL, 105–111 universal instantiation (UI) The rule von Clausewitz, Carl, 14
triadic predicates Triadic predicates are of inference in predicate logic that
followed by three singular terms, allows us to take off a universal weak premises, 406–408
310 quantifier, 239, 246 wff A well-formed formula of a formal
truth functions universal quantifier The symbol used to language, 43
biconditional, 51 regiment terms including ‘all’ and exercises, 45–46
conjunction, 48 ‘everything’, 215 formation rules for wffs of F, 328–331
disjunction, 49 ‘and’s and ‘or’s, 299–301 formation rules for wffs of M, 235–236
material implication, 50–51 formulas, 299–301 formation rules of PL, 44–45
negation, 47–48 putting on the, 239–241 wide scope of quantifier A quantifier’s
semantics of PL, 46–57 taking off the, 238–239 scope is wider the more subformulas
truth tables A truth table summarizes unless Ordinarily represented as a it contains, 314
the possible truth values of a disjunction, but may also be Williams, William Carlos, 316, 328

Russell Marcus Formal Logic

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Russell Marcus Formal Logic

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Introduction to Formal Logic

Introduction to Formal Logic

The question of logic is: Does the conclusion

New York Oxford

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© 2018 by Oxford University Press

For titles covered by Section 112 of the US Higher Education

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Marcus, Russell, 1966– author.

Chapter 1: Introducing Logic 1

Chapter 2: Propositional Logic: Syntax and Semantics 22

2.1: Logical Operators and Translation 22

Chapter 3: Inference in Propositional Logic 113

3.5: Practice with Derivations 156

Chapter 4: Monadic Predicate Logic 212

Chapter 5: Full First-Order Logic 310

Appendix A: Fallacies and Argumentation 401

WHY THIS LOGIC BOOK?

Exercises asking students to determine whether an argument is valid or

INTRODUCTION TO FORMAL LOGIC OR INTRODUCTION TO

USING INTRODUCTION TO FORMAL LOGIC

STUDENT AND INSTRUCTOR RESOURCES

■■ PowerPoint Lecture Outlines to assist the instructor in leading class-

Aeon Skoble, Bridgewater State University

1.1: DEFINING ‘LOGIC’

Returning to the definitions of ‘logic’ and ‘argument’, notice that in contrast to

1.2: LOGIC AND LANGUAGES

M Monadic (first-order) predicate logic

My advice to students who have difficulty with the computational or mathematical

1.3: A SHORT HISTORY OF LOGIC

We shall be rendering a service to reason should we succeed in discovering

consequence were being flouted. Mathematicians and philosophers began to think

1.4: SEPARATING PREMISES FROM CONCLUSIONS

Here are some premise and conclusion indicators:

Premise Indicators Conclusion Indicators

1.5: VALIDITY AND SOUNDNESS

1.5.3 P1. All mathematicians make calculations.

1.5.6 You will get either rice or beans.

1. Archaeologists are anthropologists. Anthropologists are social scientists. It fol-

argument, 1.4 proposition, 1.4 unsound argument, 1.5

2.1: LOGICAL OPERATORS AND TRANSLATION

Material Implication (the Conditional)

is a necessary condition for given that

Translation and Ambiguity

Arguments and Numbered Premise-Conclusion Form

1. If Abhishek studies religion, then Bima majors in sociology.

1. Andre likes basketball. (A)

D: Descartes defended libertarian free will.

A: Annas wrote on Aristotle and friendship.

friendship and Sim compares Aristotle and Confucius, if Sorabji works on

F: Foot developed the trolley problem.

F: Freire is a liberation theologist.

Gutiérrez is not influenced by Lascasianism. So, Freire is not a liberation

Goldman is a reliabilist, then Chisholm is not a foundationalist. Goldman is a

reference theorist; still, Searle is a descriptivist. Searle being a descriptivist is a

K: Kant defended cosmopolitan right.

A: Willa teaches English.

G: Suneel majors in philosophy.

M: Carolina plants vegetables.

2.2: SYNTA X OF PL: WFFS AND MAIN OPERATORS

As I mentioned in the previous section, I use commas and semicolons in English

1. C ⊃ D ∙ E 11. [(Q ⊃ R) ∨(S ∨ ∼T)] ≡ (T ∙ Q ∨ R)