Del Mar v.
PAGCOR games of chance or gambling extends to jai-alai
G.R. No. 138298 / November 29, 2000
NATURE Two consolidated
petitions concerning the franchise granted to
PAGCOR
PETITIONERS Raoul B. Del Mar
RESPONDENTS Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), Belle Jai-
Alai Corporation (BELLE),
Filipinas Gaming
Entertainment Totalizator Corporation
(FILGAME)
SUMMARY. PAGCOR requested legal advice
from the Secretary of Justice if it’s authorized
under its charter to operate jai-alai games (a
form of sport). The Secretary of Justice said that
PAGCOR has the authority; hence PAGCOR
has the power under its charter to operate.
Petitioner del Mar filed a petition for prohibition
preventing PAGCOR from managing jai-alai
since its illegal and devoid of any basis either
from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own
Charter. However, PAGCOR still entered in an
agreement with BELLE and FILGAME, hence,
del Mar filed a Petition for Certiorari
questioning the validity of the agreement.
Members of the House of Representative also
filed a petition stating that operation of
PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal because it is not
included in its scope. Respondents then
questioned the locus standi or legal standing of
petitioners filing as taxpayers and members of
the House of representatives. As stated by the
Court, they have legal standing to the case since
it affects public interest (involves taxes) and
affects the powers of the legislative.
DOCTRINE. Locus Standi or Legal Standing to
file a petition as taxpayers and member of the
House of Representatives
FACTS.
• PAGCOR requested for legal advice
from the Secretary of Justice as to whether or
not it is authorized by its Charter to operate and
manage jai-alai frontons in the country in
relation to Section 1 and 10 of P.D. No. 1869.
• The Secretary of Justice opined that the
authority of PAGCOR to operate and maintain
which is a form of sport or game played for bets
and that the Charter of PAGCOR amounts to a
legislative franchise for the purpose.
• On May 6, 1999, petitioner del Mar filed
a Petition for Prohibition to prevent PAGCOR
from managing and/or operating the jai-alai or
Basque pelota games on the ground that the act
is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either
from the Constitution or PAGCOR’s own
Charter.
• On June 17, 1999 however, PAGCOR
entered into an agreement with BELLE and
FILGAME wherein the latter parties would
provide all the required facilities and
requirements for the establishment and operation
of jai-alai.
• On August 10, 1999, del Mar then filed
a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari
questioning the validity of the agreement stating
that PAGCOR is without jurisdiction, authority,
legislative franchise, or authority to enter into
such agreement for the operation and
establishment of jai-alai games.
• A little earlier (July 1, 1999), Federico
S. Sandoval II and Michael T. Defensor filed a
Petition for Injunction. A Petition in Intervention
was filed by Juan Miguel Zubiri alleging that the
operation by PAGCOR of jai-alai is illegal
because it is not included in PAGCOR’s scope.
• Petitoners del Mar, Sandoval, Defensor,
and intervenor Zubiri are suing as taxpayers and
in their capacity as the members of the House of
Representatives.
• Respondent questions the locus standi or
the standing of the petitioners to file the petition
at bar as taxpayers and as legislators because the
operation of jai-alai does not involve the
disbursement of public funds.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON petitioners have a locus standi or legal
standing to file the petition – YES.
As stated by the Court, Respondent’s stance is
without an “oven ready” legal support. A party
suing as taxpayer must specifically prove that he
has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. In
essence, taxpayers are allowed to sue where
there is a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds, or that public money is being deflected to
any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek
to restrain respondent from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. The record shown under
their agreement is barren of evidence that the
operation and management of jai-alai by the
PAGCOR involves expenditure of public
money. The Court also holds that as members of
the House of Representatives, petitioners have
legal standing to file the petition at bar. The
operation of jai-alai constitutes an infringement
by PAGCOR of the legislature’s exclusive
power to grant franchise. Hence, powers of
Congress are being impared, so as the powers of
each of its members.
DECISION.
Petitioners have legal standing to file the petition
NOTES.
The states issue is only a “procedural issue”
questioning when can taxpayers file a suit.
The substantive issue concerns whether
PAGCOR’s legislative franchise includes the
right to manage and operate jai-alai. It was ruled
that PAGCOR DOES NOT HAVE THE RIGHT
to operate jai-alai because:
• It was not stated under its scope.
• In accordance with its historical
creation, there is a separate Executive Order
which controls the operating of Jai-Alai
(controlled by the Romualdezes) in Manila.
PACGOR’s franchise was never given a
franchise to operate jai-alai.
• Tax treatment between jai-alai
operations and gambling casinos are distinct
from each other.
• PAGCOR is engaged in the business
affected with public interest.
G.R No. 180016
April 29, 2014
Lito Corpuz vs People of the Philippines
Facts:
An information was filed against Lito
Corpuz for the crime of estafa, wherein said
Danilo Tangcoy is engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players, that on May 2,
1991 petitioner Lito Corpuz approached him and
offered to sell his jewelry pieces in a
commission basis in which Danilo Tangcoy
agreed. He then gave Lito Corpuz several
jewelries that has an aggregate value of P98,000
as evidence by a receipt. Both agreed that within
sixty days Lito Corpuz shall remit the proceeds
of the sale or if unsold shall return the same.
Lito Corpuz then promised to pay the value of
the said items.
On the information filed by Danilo Tangcoy it
was said that Lito corpuz with an intent to
defraud said Tangcoy misappropriated, misapply
and convert such jewelries into his personal
used. Herein, Lito Corpuz filed a not guilty plea
but the Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of
Tangcoy and sentenced Corpuz guilty of the
crime of estafa and to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment under the indeterminate sentence
law of 4yrs and 2mons to 14yrs and 8mons.
Lito Corpuz appealed to the Court of
Appeals where it denied the appeal and ruled the
same, Corpuz then appealed to the Supreme
Court by way of Certiorari.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the RTC and CA erred in
their ruling and that the punishment was harsh
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that indeed the
petitioner Lito Corpuz was guilty of the crime of
estafa. In its decision about the punishment the
Supreme Court stated that there seems to be a
perceived injustice brought by the range of
penalties, but the high court said that they
modify the penalties for that would constitute
judicial legislation and that such duty does not
belong to the court but to the legislature. Other
Justices has their own opinion as to the
punishment, some concurs with the ponente,
others invoked the art 5 of the RPC that in cases
of excessive penalties the court shall render the
proper decision and shall report to the chief
executive the reasons that such said act should
be made subject of legislation and without
suspending the sentence. Justice Carpio in his
dissenting opinion said that the first paragraph of
article 315 should be held unconstitutional as it
is against article 19(1) of the Constitution and the Philippine National Bank, is not a
that according to the universal declaration of
"loan" within the meaning of  section 35 of
human rights "torture, cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment should be ban", the Act No. 2747.
Philippines was one of the approving
State/community during the UDHR and
although is a non binding instrument, such ISSUE:
UDHR forms part of the Philippine law for it is
a generally accepted principle of international Whether or not the granting of a
law.
credit of P300,000 to the co-
PEOPLE vs. CONCEPCION, 44 Phil. 126 p a r t n e r s h i p " P u n o y Concepcion, S. en
C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of
FACTS:
the Philippine National Bank, a "loan"
Venancio Concepcion, President of the
within the meaning of section 35 of Act No.
Philippine National Bank and a member of the
2747.
Board thereof, authorized an extension of credit
in favor of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C.” to the HELD:
manager of the Aparri branch of the
The Supreme Court ruled in the
Philippine National Bank. "Puno y
affirmative. The "credit" of an individual
Concepcion, S. en C."was a co-partnership
means his ability to borrow money by virtue of
where Concepcion is a partner. Subsequently,
the confidence or trust reposed by a lender that
Concepcion was charged and found guilty in
he will pay what he may promise. A "loan"
the Court of First Instance of Cagayan
means the delivery by one party and the
with violation of section 35 of Act
receipt by the other,  party of a given sum of
No.2 7 4 7 .   S e c t i o n   3 5   o f   A c t   N o .   2
money, upon an agreement, express or implied,
747 provides that the National B
to repay the sum loaned, with or without
ank 
interest. The concession of a "credit" necessarily
s h a l l   n o t ,   d i r e c t l y   o r   indirectly, grant
involves the granting of "loans" up to the limit
loans to any of the members of the board of
of the amount fixed in the "credit,"
directors of the bank nor to agents of the
Tanada v. Yulo
branch banks. Counsel for the defense Case No. 288
No. 43575 (May 31, 1935)
argue that the documents of record do not
Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.11
prove that authority to make a loan was given,
FACTS:
but only show the concession of a credit. They
Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the
averred that the granting of a credit to the Gov. Gen. with the consent by the Philippine
Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas.
co-partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
Later in his service, he was transferred to Perez,
C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of Tayabas. He reached his 65 birthday on October
5, 1934, subsequent to the approval of Act No.
3899 which makes mandatory the retirement of
all justices who have reached 65 years of age at
the time said Act takes effect on January 1,
1933. The judge of First instance, acting upon
the directive of the Secretary of Respondent
Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding
office pursuant to Act No. 3899.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold
office.
2. W/N his transfer is considered a “new
transfer” and requires confirmation by
the Philippine Commission.
HELD:
No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as
Act No. 3899 clearly states that those who will
cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at the
time the Act takes effect, not thereafter.
Therefore, Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace
for life as long as he stays in good behavior or
does not become incapacitated.
No, his transfer is not a new appointment.
Hence, no confirmation is required as it is just
an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded on
original appointment.
HELD:
3. The natural and reasonable meaning of
the language used in Act No. 3899,
leaves room for no other deducting than
that a justice of the peace appointed
prior to the approval of the Act and who
completed sixty-five years of age on
September 13, 1934, subsequent to the
approval of the Act, which was on
November 16, 1931, and to the date
fixed for cessation from office which
was on January 1, 1933, is not affected
by the said Act.
A justice of the peace like the petitioner
who became sixty-five years of age on
October 5, 1934, was not included in a
law which required justice of the peace
sixty-five years of age to cease to hold
office on January 1, 1933.
2. It is to be deduced that according to
the United States Supreme Court, the
transfer simply amounted to an
enlargement or change of jurisdiction
grounded on the original appointment
and thus did not require a new
appointment. Whatever our view is
might have been to the contrary, it now
becomes our duty to follow the decision
of the higher court. It also seems evident
that a transfer as applied to officers
amounts merely to a change of position
or to another grade of service.
4. Endencia vs. David
5. On November 6, 2010
6. Separation of Powers
7. Saturnino David, the then Collector of
Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of
Justice Pastor Endencia’s and Justice
Fernando Jugo’s salary pursuant to Sec
13 of RA 590 which provides that “SEC.
13.   No salary wherever received by
any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as
exempt from the income tax, payment of
which is hereby declared not to be a
diminution of his compensation fixed by
the Constitution or by law.” According
to the brief of the Solicitor General on
behalf of appellant Collector of Internal
Revenue, our decision in the case of
Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not
received favorably by Congress, because
immediately after its promulgation,
Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.
To bring home his point, the Solicitor
General reproduces what he considers
the pertinent discussion in the Lower
House of House Bill No. 1127 which
became Republic Act No. 590.
8. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 13 of RA
590 is constitutional.
9. HELD: By legislative fiat as enunciated
in section 13, Republic Act No. 590,
Congress says that taxing the salary of a
judicial officer is not a decrease of
compensation. This is a clear example of
 interpretation or ascertainment of the
meaning of the phrase “which shall not
be diminished during their continuance
in office,” found in section 9, Article
VIII of the Constitution, referring to the
salaries of judicial officers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part
thereof by the Legislature is an invasion
of the well-defined and established
province and jurisdiction of the
Judiciary. “The rule is recognized
elsewhere that the legislature cannot
pass any declaratory act, or act
declaratory of what the law was before
its passage, so as to give it any binding
weight with the courts. A legislative
definition of a word as used in a statute
is not conclusive of its meaning as used
elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature
would be usurping a judicial function in
defining a term. ** The reason behind
the exemption in the Constitution, as
interpreted by the United States Federal
Supreme Court and this Court, is to
preserve the independence of the
Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal
but of the other courts, whose present
membership number more than 990
judicial officials. The independence of
the judges is of far greater importance
than any revenue that could come from
taxing their salaries.
10. In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine
laid down in the case of Perfecto vs.
Meer, supra, to the effect that the
collection of income tax on the salary of
a judicial officer is a diminution thereof
and so violates the Constitution. We
further hold that the interpretation and
application of the Constitution and of
statutes is within the exclusive province
and jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a law,
the Legislature may not legally provide
therein that it be interpreted in such a
way that it may not violate a
Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying
the hands of the courts in their task of
later interpreting said statute, especially
when the interpretation sought and
provided in said statute runs counter to a
previous interpretation already given in
a case by the highest court of the land.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs.
PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL SUR et. al.
G.R. No. 96700 November 19, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioner NAPOCOR is the owner of
real properties covering its hydroelectric power
plant complex situated in Saguiaran, Lanao del
Sur. Petitioner was assessed real estate taxes on
said properties amounting to more than P154
million covering the period from June 14, 1984
to December 31, 1989, allegedly because
petitioner's exemption from realty taxes had
been withdrawn by PD 1931. A demand letter
from respondent provincial treasurer was sent to
petitioner with a warning that unless the
obligation was settled, legal remedies would be
resorted to by the respondent province. Because
of the NAPOCOR’s failure to pay, the properties
were auctioned with the Province of Lanao del
Sur as the sole bidder.
NAPOCOR posits that it has never been
effectively deprived of its tax and duty
exemption privileges granted under statutes and
which, although temporarily withdrawn, were
just as quickly restored, such that at no time did
it lose its tax-exempt status. Hence, never did it
become liable for realty taxes, and therefore, the
subject properties were wrongfully levied upon
and sold at auction.
Anent its tax exempt status, NAPOCOR
cites Commonwealth Act No. 120, as amended,
and RA 6395, as amended, which grants its tax
and duty exemption privileges. CA 120, which
became effective in 1936, created the
NAPOCOR as a non-profit public corporation
wholly owned by the government of the
Republic of the Philippines tacked to undertake
the development of hydraulic power and the
production of power from other sources. In
1971, RA 6395 revised the charter of the
petitioner. Section 13 thereof, as amended by PD
938, exempted it from the payment of all forms latter never acquired any right to sell nor to
of taxes, duties, fees, imposts as well as costs purchase the said properties at auction.
and service fees.
Respondents contend, among others,
that PD 1177, which took effect on 1977 and
was issued for the formulation and
implementation of a national budget, repealed
the tax exemption privilege granted the
petitioner under RA 6395, by virtue of the PD's
general repealing clause, worded as “All laws,
decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations
or parts thereof which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Decree are hereby repealed
and/or modified accordingly.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not PD 1177 repealed the
tax exemption privilege granted the petitioner
under RA 6395.

HELD:
It cannot then be successfully argued
that petitioner's tax-exempt status was revoked
in 1977 by PD 1177. Besides, repeals by
implication are not favored, and will not be
decreed, unless it is manifest that the legislature
so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed
with deliberation and with full knowledge of all
existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable
to conclude that in passing a statute it was not
intended to interfere with or abrogate any former
law relating to same matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and
flowing necessarily from the language used,
unless the later act fully embraces the subject
matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the
earlier act is beyond peradventure removed.
Hence, every effort must be used to make all
acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction,
they can be reconciled, the later act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier.
As the statutes granting tax exemption privileges
were not sufficiently repealed, petitioner
remains to be exempt from payment of taxes,
hence, never became delinquent in the payment
of said taxes to respondent province, and the
Anent the tax exempt status of petitioner for the
period up to December 31, 1989, the following
are the relevant laws and resolutions:
(1) Commonwealth Act No. 120, which became
effective on November 3, 1936, created the
petitioner as a non-profit public corporation
wholly owned by the government of the
Republic of the Philippines tacked to undertake
the development of hydraulic power and the
production of power from other sources. 8
Section 13 thereof exempted it from the payment
of all forms of taxes, duties, fees, imposts as
well as costs and service fees including filing
fees, appeal bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any
court or administrative proceedings "to enable
the Corporation to pay its indebtedness and
obligations."
(2) Section 2 of Republic Act No. 358, which
took effect on June 4, 1949, exempted petitioner
"from all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, charges
and restrictions of the Republic of the
Philippines, its provinces, cities and
municipalities" in order to facilitate payment of
its indebtedness.
(3) Republic Act No. 6395, which took effect on
September 10, 1971, revised the charter of the
petitioner. To quote the Solicitor General:
Congress declared as a national policy the total
electrification of the Philippines through the
development of power from all sources to meet
the needs of industrial development and rural
electrification. The corporate existence of
NAPOCOR was extended to carry out this
policy, specifically to undertake the
development of hydroelectric generation of
power and the production of electricity from
nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as
the transmission of electric power on a
nationwide basis. And having been declared by
legislative fiat as a non-profit public corporation
with a responsibility of devoting all its returns
from its capital investment as well as excess
revenues from its operation for expansion,
petitioner was granted exemption from the
payment of all forms of taxes, duties, fees,
imposts and other charges by the government
and its instrumentalities. Thus, Section 13 of RA
6395 provides in detail such exemptions, to wit:
Sec. 13. Non-profit Character of the
Corporation; Exemption from All Taxes, Duties,
Fees, Imposts and Other Charges by
Government and Governmental
Instrumentalities. — The Corporation shall be
non-profit and shall devote all its returns from
its capital investments, as well as excess
revenues from its operation, for expansion. To
enable the Corporation to pay its indebtedness
and obligations and in furtherance and effective
implementation of the policy enunciated in
Section One of this Act, the Corporation is
hereby declared exempt:
(a) From the payment of all taxes, duties, fees,
imposts, charges, costs and service fees in any
court or administrative proceedings in which it
may be a party, restrictions and duties to the
Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities,
municipalities and other government agencies
and instrumentalities;
(b) From all income taxes, franchise taxes and
realty taxes to be paid to the National
Government, its provinces, cities, municipalities
and other government agencies and
instrumentalities;
(c) From all import duties, compensating taxes
and advanced sales tax, and wharfage fees on
import of foreign goods required for its
operations' and projects; and
(d) From all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, and all
other charges imposed by the Republic of the
Philippines, its provinces, cities, municipalities
and other government agencies and
instrumentalities on all petroleum products used
by the Corporation in the generation,
transmission, utilization, and sale of electric
power. (emphasis supplied).
(4) On January 22, 1974, Presidential Decree
No. 380 amended Section 13, paragraphs (a) and
(d), of RA 6395 by specifying, among others,
the exemption of petitioner from taxes, duties,
fees, imposts and other charges imposed,
"directly or indirectly", on all petroleum
products used by petitioner in its operations.
(5) On June 1, 1974, Presidential Decree No.
464, also known as the Real Property Tax Code,
was enacted into law. Section 40(a) thereof
provides:
Sec. 40. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. —
The exemption shall be as follows:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
and any government-owned corporation so
exempt by its charter; . . .
(6) On August 24, 1975, Presidential Decree No.
776 was promulgated, creating the Fiscal
Incentives Review Board (FIRB). Among other
things, the Board was tasked as follows:
Sec. 2. A Fiscal Incentives Review Board is
hereby created for the purpose of determining
what subsidies and tax exemptions should be
modified, withdrawn, revoked or suspended,
which shall be composed of the following
officials:
Chairman — Secretary of Finance
Members — Secretary of Industry
— Director General of the National
Economic and Development Authority
— Commissioner of Internal Revenue
— Commissioner of Customs
The Board may recommend to the President of
the Philippines and for reasons of compatibility
with the declared economic policy, the
withdrawal, modification, revocation or
suspension of the enforceability of any of the
above-cited statutory subsidies or tax exemption
grants, except those granted by the Constitution.
To attain its objectives, the Board may require
the assistance of any appropriate government
agency or entity. The Board shall meet once a
month, or oftener at the call of the Secretary of
Finance.
(7) Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 938,
dated May 27, 1976, further amended the
aforestated provisions of Section 13 of RA 6395
by integrating the various tax exemptions therein
into a general exemption from "all forms of
taxes, duties," etc. under one paragraph, making
said on Section 13 read as follows:
Sec. 13. Non-profit Character of the
Corporation; Exemption from All Taxes, Duties,
Fees, Imposts and Other Charges by the
Government and Government Instrumentalities.
— The Corporation shall be non-profit and shall
devote all its returns from its capital investment
as well as excess revenues from its operation for
expansion. To enable the Corporation to pay its
indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance
and effective implementation of the policy
enunciated in Section One of this Act, the
Corporation, including its subsidiaries, is hereby
declared exempt from the payment of all forms
of taxes, duties, fees, imposts as well as costs
and service fees including filing fees, appeal
bonds, supersedeas bonds, in any court or
administrative proceedings. (Emphasis
supplied).
8 On June 11, 1984, Presidential Decree No.
1931, in its Section 2 withdrew all tax
exemption privileges granted to government-
owned or controlled corporations. However,
Section 2 thereof provided:
The President of the Philippines and/or the
Minister of Finance, upon the recommendation
of the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB) . .
. is hereby empowered to restore, partially or
totally, the exemptions withdrawn by Section 1 .
..
(9) Pursuant to Sec. 2 of PD 1931, on February
7, 1985, the FIRB issued Resolution No. 10-85 9
restoring petitioner's tax and duty exemption
privileges enjoyed by it under CA 120 as
amended, effective from June 11, 1984 up to
June 30, 1985. And, subsequently, FIRB
Resolution No. 1-86 10 extended the said tax
and duty exemption privileges of petitioner from
July 1, 1985 onwards indefinitely.
(10) On December 17, 1986, President Corazon
Aquino promulgated Executive Order No. 93
effective March 10, 1987, once again
withdrawing all tax and duty incentives of
government and private entities. But Section 2
thereof gave FIRB the authority to "restore tax
and/or duty exemptions withdrawn hereunder."
(11) On June 24, 1987, the FIRB issued
Resolution No. 17-87 11 once again restoring
petitioner's tax and duty exemption privileges,
effective as of March 10, 1987 (the effectivity
date of E.O. 93).
(12) Finally, in a Memorandum dated October 5,
1987 addressed to the Chairman, FIRB, then
Acting Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
Jr. confirmed and approved, by authority of the
President, FIRB Resolution No. 17-87.
The Issues
The main issue in this petition is whether or not
respondent province and provincial officials can
validly and lawfully assess real property taxes
for the period June 14, 1984 to December 31,
1989 against, and thereafter sell at public
auction, the subject properties of petitioner to
effect collection of alleged deficiencies in the
payment of such taxes.
The preliminary but pivotal issue however is
whether or not petitioner has ceased to enjoy its
tax and duty exemption privileges, including its
exemption from payment of real property taxes.
The Court's Ruling
Preliminary Issue: Valid Restoration of Tax
Exemptions
Although Section 1 of PD 1931 withdrew all tax
exemptions presumably including those of
petitioner, Section 2 thereof authorized and
empowered the President and/or the Minister of
Finance to restore the same to deserving entities.
In order to reinstate the petitioner's tax
exemptions, Hon. De Roda, Jr., in his concurrent
capacities as Acting Minister of Finance and as
Acting Chairman of FIRB, signed FIRB
Resolution No. 10-85 which was made effective
as of June 11, 1984, the promulgation date of PD
1931, until June 30, 1985. On the other hand, by
virtue of FIRB Resolution No. 1-86, Hon. Virata
fully restored the tax exemption as of July 1,
1985, to continue for an indefinite period. He
also signed the same in his dual capacities as
Minister of Finance and as Chairman of the
FIRB. The resolution specifically provided that:
2. The NPC as a government corporation is
exempt from the real property tax on land and
improvements owned by it . . . pursuant to the
provisions of Section 40 (a) of the Real Property
Tax Code, as amended.
While EO 93 again withdrew the tax exemption
of petitioner, through its Section 1, as follows:
Sec. 1. The provisions of any general or special
law to the contrary notwithstanding, all tax and
duty incentives granted to government and
private entities are hereby withdrawn, except:
xxx xxx xxx
f) those approved by the President upon the
recommendation of the Fiscal Incentives Review
Board.
nevertheless, it also stated:
Sec. 2. The Fiscal Incentives Review Board
created under PD 776, as amended, is hereby
authorized to:
(a) restore tax and/or duty exemptions
withdrawn hereunder in whole or in part;
(b) revise the scope and coverage of tax and/or
duty exemption that may be restored;
(c) impose conditions for the restoration of tax
and/or duty exemption;
(d) prescribe the date or period of effectivity of
the restoration of tax and/or duty exemption;
(e) formulate and submit to the President for
approval, a complete system for the grant of
subsidies to deserving beneficiaries, in lieu of or
in combination with the restoration of tax and
duty exemptions or preferential treatment in
taxation, indicating the source of funding
therefor, eligible beneficiaries and the terms and
conditions for the grant thereof, taking into
consideration the international commitments of
the Philippines and the necessary precautions
such that the grant of subsidies does not become
the basis for countervailing action. (emphasis
supplied)
Pursuant thereto, FIRB Resolution No. 17-87
restored the tax exemption privileges of the
petitioner effective March 10, 1987. Again, the
resolution was signed by De Roda, Jr. in his dual
capacities as Acting Secretary of Finance and as
Chairman, FIRB. This resolution was confirmed
and approved by then Acting Executive
Secretary Macaraig, by the authority of the
President.
Considering the entire chain of events, it is clear
that petitioner's tax exemptions for the period in
question (1984-1989) had effectively been
preserved intact by virtue of their restoration
through FIRB resolutions.
Respondents however vigorously argue that the
FIRB, through the above-mentioned resolutions,
arrogated unto itself the power to restore tax
exemptions which it never possessed under PD
776 and EO 93. Respondents insist that FIRB
effectively exercised not merely the power to
recommend exemptions but the very authority to
grant the same, which was lodged in the
Minister of Finance and the President. As proof
of this, it did not secure any recommendation
from any other body or office. Instead, one and
the same individual recommended — in his
capacity as FIRB chairman — and then
approved — in his capacity as Minister of
Finance — the grant of the exemption. For this
reason, FIRB Resolution Nos. 10-85 and 1-86
were held by this Court in the Albay case to be
null and void:
. . . , the FIRB, under its charter, Presidential
Decree No. 776, had been empowered merely to
"recommend" tax exemptions. By itself, it could
not have validly prescribed exemptions or
restore taxability. Hence, as of June 11, 1984
(promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 1931),
NAPOCOR had ceased to enjoy tax exemption
privileges. 13
Such arguments are no longer tenable. Albay has
since been modified and superseded by Maceda
vs. Macaraig, Jr., 14 where this Court En Banc
expressly ruled that FIRB Resolution Nos. 10-85
and 1-86 are valid:
. . . FIRB Resolution Nos. 10-85 and 1-86 . . .
were issued in compliance with the requirement
of Section 2, P.D. No. 1931, whereby the FIRB
should make the recommendation subject to the
approval of "the President of the Philippines
and/or the Minister of Finance." While said
Resolutions do not appear to have been
approved by the President, they were
nevertheless approved by the Minister of
Finance who is also duly authorized to approve
the same. In fact it was the Minister of Finance
who signed and promulgated said resolutions.
The observation of Mr. Justice Sarmiento in the
dissenting opinion that FIRB Resolution Nos.
10-85 and 1-86 which were promulgated by then
Acting Minister of Finance Alfredo de Roda, Jr.
and Minister of Finance Cesar E. A. Virata, as
Chairman of FIRB, respectively, should be
separately approved by said Minister of Finance
as required by P.D. 1931 is, a superfluity. An
examination of the said resolutions . . . show that
the said officials signed said resolutions in the
dual capacity of Chairman of FIRB and Minister
of Finance.
Mr. Justice Sarmiento also makes reference to
the case National Power Corporation vs.
Province of Albay, wherein the Court observed
that under P.D. No. 776 the power of the FIRB
was only recommendatory and requires the
approval of the President to be valid. Thus, in
said case the Court held that FIRB Resolutions
Nos. 10-85 and 1-86 not having been approved
by the President were not valid and effective
while the validity of FIRB (Resolution No.) 17-
87 was upheld as it was duly approved by the
Office of the President on October 5, 1987.
However, under Section 2 of P.D. No. 1931 of
June 11, 1984, hereinabove reproduced, which
amended P.D. No. 776, it is clearly provided for
that such FIRB resolution, may be approved by
the "President of the Philippines and/or the
Minister of Finance." To repeat, as FIRB
Resolutions Nos. 10-85 and 1-86 were duly
approved by the Minister of Finance, hence they
are valid and effective. To this extent, this
decision modifies or supersedes the Court's
earlier decision in Albay afore-referred to.
(emphasis supplied)
There can thus be no question that petitioner's
tax exemptions withdrawn by PD 1931 were
validly restored by FIRB Resolutions Nos. 10-85
and 1-86. Again withdrawn by EO 93, they were
once more restored by FIRB Resolution No. 17-
87, effective as of March 10, 1987. Moreover,
this Court, in the same case of Maceda
vs.Macaraig, Jr., reaffirmed the determination in
Albay that EO 93 along with PDs 776 and were
1931 were all valid, and that FIRB Resolution
No. 17-87 and the tax exemptions restored
thereunder were "valid and effective." 15 The
Court in Maceda also held —
True it is that the then Secretary of Justice in
Opinion No. 77, dated August 6, 1977 was of
the view that the powers conferred upon the
FIRB by Sections 2(a), (b), (c) and (d) of
Executive Order No. 93 constitute undue
delegation of legislative power and is therefore
unconstitutional. However, he was overruled by
the respondent Executive Secretary in a letter to
the Secretary of Finance dated March 30, 1989.
The Executive Secretary, by authority of the
President, has the power to modify, alter or
reverse the construction of a statute given by a
department secretary.
and laid emphasis on the fact that EO 93
constituted a valid delegation of legislative
power to the FIRB, thus: 16
The latest in our jurisprudence indicates that
delegation of legislative power has become the
rule and its non-delegation the exception. The
reason is the increasing complexity of modern
life and many technical fields of governmental
functions as in matters pertaining to tax
exemptions. This is coupled by the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with
the many problems demanding its attention. The
growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that
the legislature cannot be expected reasonably to
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation
has become necessary. To many of the problems
attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let
alone the interest and the time, to provide the
required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
The inescapable conclusion is that the tax
exemption privileges of petitioner had been
validly restored and preserved by said FIRB
resolutions.
In passing, since we have delved into Maceda
(which happens to involve indirect taxes), we
also make mention of the fact that one of the key
issues raised in the dissenting opinions (in
Maceda) was the fact that the ultimate
beneficiaries of that ponencia's affirmance of the
tax-exempt status of the National Power
Corporation would have been the oil companies,
to which the NPC would assign whatever tax
refund or credit it became entitled to as a result
of such ponencia, and not the NPC itself, nor the
government or the public. In fact, it was even
anticipated by Mr. Justice Sarmiento in his
dissent that the majority ruling in Maceda would
set a precedent not only for the oil companies
but also for the NPC's other suppliers, importers
and contractors. In contrast, the instant case
involvesdirect — taxes — real property taxes —
and any tax exemption with respect thereto will
obviously not be transmissible nor beneficial to
any other entity but only to petitioner NPC and,
rightfully, the electricity-consuming public.
Respondents further contend that PD 1177,
which was issued for the formulation and
implementation of a national budget, repealed
the tax exemption privilege granted the
petitioner under RA 6395, by virtue of the PD's
general repealing clause, worded as follows: 17
(A)ll laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and
regulations or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Decree
are hereby repealed and/or modified
accordingly.
This argument is likewise bereft of merit. It will
be noted from the foregoing chronological
presentation that Section 10 of PD 938 amended
Section 13 of RA 6395, the petitioner's charter,
by converting the various tax exemptions therein
into a general exemption from all forms of taxes,
direct and indirect. This state of exemption from
taxes subsisted even with the enactment of PD
1931 in 1984. It cannot then be successfully
argued that petitioner's tax-exempt status was
revoked in 1977 by PD 1177. Besides, this Court
has consistently held that "(r)epeals by
implication are not favored, and will not be
decreed, unless it is manifest that the legislature
so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed
with deliberation and with full knowledge of all
existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable
to conclude that in passing a statute it was not
intended to interfere with or abrogate any former
law relating to same matter, unless the
repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and
flowing necessarily from the language used,
unless the later act fully embraces the subject
matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the
earlier act is beyond peradventure removed.
Hence, every effort must be used to make all
acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction,
they can be reconciled, the later act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier." 18
Main Issue: Subject Properties
Exempt From Realty Taxes
Aside from the FIRB Resolutions above
discussed, there is yet another cogent reason
why the properties in question are not subject to
realty tax. Section 40 (a) of the Real Property
Tax Code, PD 464, as amended, expressly
exempts them from such tax. Said section
provides:
Exemptions from Real Property Tax. — The
exemption shall be as follows:
(a) Real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions
and any government-owned corporation so
exempt by its charter. Provided, however, that
this exemption shall not apply to real property of
the abovenamed entities the beneficial use of
which has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person.
xxx xxx xxx
The exemption is not only legally defensible, but
also logically unassailable. The properties in
question comprise the site of the entire Agus II
Hydroelectric Power Plant Complex, which
generates and supplies relatively cheap
electricity to the island of Mindanao. These are
government properties, wholly owned by
petitioner and devoted directly and solely for
public service and utilized in the implementation
of the state policy of bringing about the total
electrification of the country at the least cost to
the public, through the development of power
from all sources to meet the needs of industrial
development and rural electrification. It can be
noted, from RA 6395, PD 380 and PD 938, that
petitioner's non-profit character has been
maintained throughout its existence, and that
petitioner is mandated to devote all its returns
from capital investment and excess revenues
from operations to its expansion.19 On account
thereof, and to enable petitioner to pay its
indebtedness and obligations and in furtherance
of the state policy on electrification and power
generation, petitioner has always been exempted
from taxes.
Consequently, the assessment and levy on (as
well as the sale of) the properties of petitioner by
respondents were null and void for having been
in made in violation of Section 10 of P.D. 938
and Section 40 (a) of the Real Property Tax
Code.
At this juncture, we hasten to point out that the
foregoing ruling is solely with respect to the
purported realty tax liabilities of petitioner for
the period from June 14, 1984 to December 31,
1989. We shall not, in this Decision, rule upon
the effect (if any) of Republic Act No. 7160,
otherwise) known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, upon petitioner's tax-exempt
status; we merely make mention of the fact that
the exemption claimed by petitioner is partly
based on PD 464 which, though repealed by the
Local Government Code in its paragraph (c),
Section 534, Title Four of Book IV, 20 was still
good law during the period the exemption was
being claimed in the instant case. 21
Case Digest
Sec. DPWH VS TECSON 700 SCRA 243
Facts:
This is a petition before the court of appeals on
RTC decision. Respondent Heracleo and
Ramona Tecson are co-owners of a parcel of
land in Malolos Bulacan to which their
properties was taken by the govt sometime 1940
but without the necessary expropriation
proceedings for the use of McArthur Highway
construction. Later in the year 1994 the
respondents claimed for the payment of the land
based on the fair market value, yet this was
opposed by the petitioner DPWH Sec. Conteras
as they offered the subject land at the rate of
0.70 per sqm per resolution of Provincial
Appraisal Committee, based on 1940 market
value. Unsatisfied by the offer respondents
demanded for the return of the property or
payment of compensation at the current fair
market value which is 1,500.
Further, contentions of the petitioner to dismiss
the complaint on the grounds:
1. That the suit is against the state which may
not be sued without proper consent
2. That the case has already prescribed
Issue: W/N the contentions of the petitioner on
the case are noteworthy
Held:
1. Respondents claimed for the recovery of the
damages is indeed a suit against the state from
which prior waiver of immunity is required, the
Court of Appeals ruled that state immunity from
the suit is not applicable because the recovery of
compensation is the only relief and denial of
such will cause injustice to the landowner
pursuant to 1987 Constitution Art. III Section. 9
“ private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation”
2. Prescription and laches are no longer proper
issues, since it was not raised in pre-trial order
nor considered in the adjudication of the RTC.
The court held that while disparity on the
outdated valuation of the property of the state
may appear inequitable to the respondents it is
equally true as well that they remiss in guarding
against the cruel effects of belated claim thus
just compensation shall be fixed not as of the
time of payment but at the time of taking that is
1940.
Paras v. Comelec (Resolution) GR 123169,
4 November 1996 (264 SCRA 49) En Banc,
Francisco (p): 14 concurring
Facts: Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong
Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the 1994 barangay election. A petition for
his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay, which was
approved by the Comelec. Petition signing was
scheduled on 14 October 1995, where at least
29.30% of the registered voters signed the
petition, well above the 25% requirement
provided by law. The Comelec also set the recall
election on 13 November 1995, but which was
deferred to 16 December 1995 due to the
petitioner’s opposition. To prevent the holding
of the recall election, petitioner filed before the
RTC Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction
(Special Proceeding Civil Action 2254-AF),
with the trial court issuing a restraining order.
After conducting a summary hearing, the trial
court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the
petition and required petitioner and his counsel
to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay
recall election was without Comelec approval.
In a resolution dated 5 January 1996, the
Comelec, for the third time, re-scheduled the
recall election on 13 January 1996; hence, the
instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer
for injunction. The petitioner contends that no
recall can take place within one year preceding a
regular local election, the Sangguniang Kabataan
elections slated on the first Monday of May
1996. He cited Associated Labor Union v.
Letrondo-Montejo to support the argument, the
Court in which case considered the SK election
as a regular local election.
Issue: Whether the Sangguniang Kabataan
election is to be construed as a regular local
election in a recall proceeding
Held: It is a rule in statutory construction that
every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of
the statute must be considered together with the
other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. Further, the spirit,
rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute must be read
according to its spirit and intent. The too literal
interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which
the Court cannot countenance. A too-literal
reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its
purpose and defeat the intention of its authors.
That intention is usually found not in “the letter
that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth”. In the
present case, Paragraph (b) of Section 74
construed together with paragraph (a) merely
designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election. The
Sangguniang Kabataan elections cannot be
considered a regular election, as this would
render inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code. It would be more in keeping
with the intent of the recall provision of the
Code to construe regular local election as one
referring to an election where the office held by
the local elective official sought to be recalled
will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
The Supreme Court, however, has to dismiss the
petition for having become moot and academic,
as the next regular elections involving the
barangay office concerned were seven months
away. Thus, the Temporary Restraining Order
issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall
election, was made permanent.
Co v. CA
G.R. No. 100776 (October 28, 1993)
FACTS:
Petitioner delivered to the salvaging
firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn
against the Associated Citizens’ Bank, postdated
November 30, 1983. The check was deposited
on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days
later, the tersely-stated reason given by the bank
being: “CLOSED ACCOUNT.” A criminal
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company
against Petitioner. At the time of the issuance of
the check, the delivery of a “rubber” or
“bouncing” check as a guarantee for an
obligation was not
considered a punishable offense, an official
promulgation made in a Circular of the Ministry
of Justice.
ISSUE:
W/N Petitioner is criminally liable.
HELD:
No. According to them, Que v. People
should not be applied retroactively in accordance
with the prospectivity principle of judicial
rulings and the operative fact doctrine. The
decision in Que should not be given retroactive
effect to the prejudice of Co and others similarly
situated who relied on the opinion of the
Secretary of
Justice.
Lazatin vs. Desierto 
FACTS:
The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of
the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
Complaint-Affidavit charging petitioners
(Lazatin) with Illegal Use of Public
Funds.         
 A preliminary investigation was conducted
and it was recommened that 14 counts each
of Malversation of Public Funds and
violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019
should be filed against the petitioners. 
Resolution was approved by the
Ombudsman; hence, 28 Informations were
filed before the Sandiganbayan.
 Petitioner Lazatin and his co-petitioners then
filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which
motions were granted by the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan also ordered the
prosecution to re-evaluate the cases against
petitioners. 
The Office of the Special Prosecutor(OSP)
submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution
which recommended the dismissal of the
cases against petitioners for lack or
insufficiency of evidence. 
The Ombudsman ordered the Office of the
Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP
Resolution.  In a Memorandum, the OLA
recommended that the OSP Resolution be
disapproved and the OSP be directed to that giving prosecutorial powers to the
proceed with the trial of the cases against Ombudsman is in accordance with the
petitioners.  The Ombudsman adopted the Constitution as paragraph 8, Section 13,
OLA Memorandum, thereby disapproving Article XI provides that the Ombudsman
the OSP Resolution and ordering the shall “exercise such other functions or duties
prosecution of the subject cases.  The cases as may be provided by law.”   
were then returned to the Sandiganbayan for
continuation of criminal proceedings.          The constitutionality of Section 3 of
R.A. No. 6770, which subsumed the OSP 
Petitioners filed the instant petition. under the Office of the Ombudsman, was
likewise upheld by the Court in Acop.  It
Petitioners argue that the Ombudsman had was explained, thus:
no authority to overturn the OSP's
Resolution dismissing the cases against          x  x  x  Section 7 of
petitioners because, under Section 13, Article XI expressly
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the provides that the then
Ombudsman is clothed only with the existing Tanodbayan, to
power to watch, investigate and be henceforth known as
recommend the filing of proper cases the Office of the Special
against erring officials, but it was not Prosecutor, “shall
granted the power to prosecute.  They continue to function and
point out that under the Constitution, the exercise its powers as
power to prosecute belongs to the OSP, now or hereafter may be
which was intended by the framers to be a provided by law, except
separate and distinct entity from the Office of those conferred on the
the Ombudsman.   Petitioners conclude that, Office of the Ombudsman
as provided by the Constitution, the OSP created under this
being a separate and distinct entity, the Constitution.”  The
Ombudsman should have no power and underscored phrase
authority over the OSP.  Thus, petitioners evidently refers to the
maintain that R.A. No. 6770 (The Tanodbayan's powers
Ombudsman Act of 1989), which made the under  P.D. No. 1630 or
OSP an organic component of the Office of subsequent amendatory
the Ombudsman, should be struck down for legislation.  It follows
being unconstitutional.  then that Congress may
remove any of the
The Court finds the petition Tanodbayan's/Special
unmeritorious. Prosecutor's powers
under P.D. No. 1630 or
         Petitioners' attack against the grant it other powers,
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6770 is stale.   It except those powers
has long been settled that the provisions of conferred by the
R.A. No. 6770 granting the Office of the Constitution on the
Ombudsman prosecutorial powers and Office of the
placing the OSP under said office have no Ombudsman.
constitutional infirmity.  The issue of
whether said provisions of R.A. No. 6770              Pursuing the
violated the Constitution had been fully present line of reasoning,
dissected as far back as 1995 in Acop v. when one considers that
Office of the Ombudsman : The Court held by express mandate of
 paragraph 8, Section 13,
Article XI of the
Constitution, the
Ombudsman may
“exercise such other
powers or perform
functions or duties as may
be provided by law,” it is
indubitable then that
Congress has the power to
place the Office of the
Special Prosecutor under
the Office of the
Ombudsman.  In the same
vein, Congress may
remove some of the
powers granted to the
Tanodbayan by P.D. No.
1630 and transfer them to
the Ombudsman; or grant
the Office of the Special
Prosecutor such other
powers and functions and
duties as Congress may
deem fit and wise.  This
Congress did through the
passage of R.A. No.
6770. 
          The foregoing ruling of the Court has
been reiterated in Camanag v. Guerrero. 
More recently, in Office of the Ombudsman
v. Valera, the Court, basing its ratio
decidendi on its ruling in Acop and
Camanag, declared that the OSP is “merely
a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control, and upon
authority of the Ombudsman” and ruled
that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to
preventively suspend is lodged only with the
Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman.  The
Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of
the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A.
No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution
was also made the foundation for the decision
in Perez v. Sandiganbayan,  where it was
held that the power to prosecute carries with
it the power to authorize the filing of
informations, which power had not been
delegated to the OSP.   It is, therefore,
beyond cavil that under the Constitution,
Congress was not proscribed from legislating
the grant of additional powers to the
Ombudsman or placing the OSP under the
Office of the Ombudsman. 
ISSUE:        
        W/n the Court's ruling on the
constitutionality of the provisions of R.A.
No. 6770 should be revisited and the
principle of stare decisis be set aside.         
RULING:
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta
movere (to adhere to precedents and not to
unsettle things which are established) is
embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial
decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or
the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal
system of the
Philippines. 
It was further explained in Fermin v.
People as follows:
          The doctrine of stare
decisis enjoins adherence to
judicial precedents.  It
requires courts in a country
to follow the rule
established in a decision of
the Supreme Court thereof. 
That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be
followed in subsequent
cases by all courts in the
land.  The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the
principle that once a
question of law has been
examined and decided, it
should be deemed settled
 and closed to further facts are
argument.  substantially the
same, even
In Chinese Young Men's Christian Association though the
of the Philippine Islands v. Remington Steel parties may be
Corporation, the Court expounded on the different.   It
importance of the foregoing doctrine, stating proceeds from
that: the first principle
of justice that,
         The doctrine of stare absent any
decisis is one of policy powerful
grounded on the necessity for countervailing
securing certainty and stability considerations,
of judicial decisions, thus: like cases ought
to be decided
T alike.  Thus,
ime and again, where the same
the court has held questions relating
that it is a very to the same event
desirable and have been put
necessary forward by the
judicial practice parties similarly
that when a court situated as in a
has laid down a previous case
principle of law litigated and
as applicable to a decided by a
certain state of competent court,
facts, it will the rule of stare
adhere to that decisis is a bar
principle and to any attempt
apply it to all to relitigate the
future cases in same issue.  
which the facts
are substantially          The doctrine has assumed such value in
the same.   Stare our judicial system that the Court has ruled
decisis et non that “[a]bandonment thereof must be based
quieta movere.  only on strong and compelling reasons,
Stand by the otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability
decisions and which is expected from this Court would be
disturb not what immeasurably affected and the public's
is settled.  Stare confidence in the stability of the solemn
decisis simply pronouncements diminished.” Verily, only upon
means that for showing that circumstances attendant in a
the sake of particular case override the great benefits
certainty, a derived by our judicial system from the doctrine
conclusion of stare decisis, can the courts be justified in
reached in one setting aside the same.
case should be
applied to those          In this case, petitioners have not shown
that follow if the any strong, compelling reason to convince the
Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should
not be applied to this case.  They have not
successfully demonstrated how or why it
would be grave abuse of discretion for the
Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred
by law with the power of control and
supervision over the OSP,  to disapprove or
overturn any resolution issued by the latter.  plans for bombing more particularly that which
The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. 
Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs.
Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.
G.R. No. 171396 03 May 2006
Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
OVERVIEW:
This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for
certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing
Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General
Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave
abuse of discretion.
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued
PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency
invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987
Constitution. On the same day, she also issued
GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry
out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent
the lawless violence by invoking Section 4,
Article 2 of the same. She did so citing the
following bases:
The elements of the elements of the Extreme
Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are
now in alliance threatening to bring down the
President;
Being magnified by the media, said acts are
adversely affecting the economy thus
representing clear and present danger to the
safety and integrity of the State
A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via
PP1021. It must be noted that before the said
proclamations, the following course of events
ensued:
February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a
document entitled “Oplan Hackle I” detailing the
was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in
Baguio City which the President was to attend.
February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a
communist safehouse where 2 flash disks
containing information that “Magdalo’s D-Day
would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th
Anniversary of Edsa I.”
February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao
intercepted information that members of the
PNP-SAF were planning to defect. Also, it was
discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col.
Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP
chain of command for a movement against the
Arroyo administration. The two were later taken
into custody by Gen. Senga. However,
statements were being released from the CPP-
NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-
Arroyo groups within the police and military.
The bombing of telecommunication towers and
cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.
The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as
follows:
Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the
cancellation of programs and activities for the
20th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation
of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal
of the said groups and warrantless arrest of
petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.
Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante
offices and confiscation of news stories and
various documents
Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran
(Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985
warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on
the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et.
al.
The petitioners assail that various rights stated in
Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been
violated, thus the case at hand.
ISSUES:
Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the
petitions moot and academic;
Whether the Court may review the factual bases
of PP1017 on the petitioners’ contention that the
said proclamation has none of it;
Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are
unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly
violates the right of the people against
unreasonable search and seizures, the right
against warrantless arrest, the freedom of
speech, of expression, of the press, and to
peaceably assemble.
HELD:
The court held that President Arroyo’s issuance
of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions
moot and academic. During the eight days that
PP 1017 was operative, the police officers
committed illegal acts implementing it. There is
no question that the issues being raised affect the
public’s interest involving as they do the
people’s basic rights to freedom of expression,
of assembly and of the press. An otherwise
moot case may still be decided “provided that
the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or
damaged as a direct result of its issuance”
(Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is
applicable in the present case.
Yes, the Court may do so. As to how the Court
may inquire into the President’s exercise of
power, it must be proven that the President did
not act arbitrarily. It is incumbent upon the
petitioner to show that the President’s decision is
totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot
undertake an independent investigation beyond
the pleadings. This, however, was something
that the petitioners failed to prove.
Since there is no law defining “acts of
terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under
G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine
what acts constitute terrorism, without
restrictions. Certainly, the effects which may be
implicated by such violate the due process
clause of the Constitution. Thus, the “acts of
terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is
unconstitutional. The plain import of the
language of the Constitution provides that
searches, seizures and arrests are normally
unreasonable without a search warrant or
warrant of arrest. A warrantless arrest shall only
be done if the offense is committed in one’s
presence or it has just been committed based on
personal knowledge – both of which are not
present in David’s warrantless arrest. This being
done during the dispersal and arrest of the
members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the
right of the people to peaceably assemble. The
wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a
blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom
of assembly is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the State
has a right to prevent.” Revocation of such
permits may only be done after due notice and
hearing. In the Daily Tribune case, the search
and seizure of materials for publication, the
stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The
Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning
of government officials to media are plain
censorship. It is that officious functionary of the
repressive government who tells the citizen that
he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no
more. When in implementing its provisions,
pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the
police committed acts which violate the citizens’
rights under the Constitution, the Court has to
declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.
Emmanuel Pelaez Vs. Auditor-General (1965)
This is a special civil action for a writ of
prohibition with preliminary injunction
instituted by Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice
President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,
against the Auditor General, to restrain him, as
well as his representatives and agents, from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in implementation of the EOs issued by the
President creating 33 municipalities and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities.
FACTS:
In 1964, the President, pursuant to Section 68 of
the Revised Administrative Code issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to
129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are
null and void on the ground that said Section 68
has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act
No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power.
When RA 2370 (The Barrio Charter) provides
that barrios may "not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed"
except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of
a majority of the voters in the areas affected"
and the "recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities.
Section 68 of RAC, which said EOs are based,
provides that the President may define or divide
the boundary or boundaries of any province,
sub-province, municipality, municipal district
XXX as the public welfare may require
provided, that the authorization of the Congress
of the Philippines shall first be obtained.
Petitioner argues that the President under the
new law cannot create a barrio, how much more
of a municipality which is composed of several
barrios.
Respondent answered that a new municipality
can be created without creating new barrios,
such as, by placing old barrios under the
jurisdiction of the new municipality. This
answer however overlooks on the main import
of the petitioners argument, which questions the
President’s authority to create municipalities.
Respondent alleges that the power of the
President to create municipalities under this
section does not amount to an undue delegation
of legislative power, relying upon Municipality
of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binañgonan.
ISSUE:
WON the President has the legislative authority
to issue the EOs creating municipalities.
DECISION:
The Court declared the EOs null and void. The
Auditor General permanently restrained from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in implementation of said EOs or any
disbursement by the created municipalities.
RATIO:
The Court said that the respondent’s argument
based on Cardona vs. Binangonan is untenable
because the case do not involve a creation of
municipality but a transfer of municipality.
The authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. It is strictly a
legislative function. The power to fix such
common boundary, in order to avoid or settle
conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative
nature in the adoption of means and ways to
carry into effect the law creating said
municipalities.
Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the Government the power to fill in
the details in the execution, enforcement or
administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation
of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself — it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate.
(b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to
which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Without the aforementioned standard, there
would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has
acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority. Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon
himself the power, not only to make the law, but
worse, to adopt measures inconsistent with the
end sought to be attained by the Act of
Congress, thus nullifying the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks
and balances, and, consequently, undermining
the very foundation of our Republican system.
The Court said that Section 68 of the RAC does
not meet these well settled requirements for a
valid delegation of the power to fix the details in
the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate
any policy to be carried out or implemented by
the President.
It can be noted that the executive orders in
question were issued after the legislative bills
for the creation of the municipalities involved in
this case had failed to pass Congress. A better
proof of the fact that the issuance of said
executive orders entails the exercise of purely
legislative functions can hardly be given.
Victorias Milling Company Inc., vs Social
Security Commission
G.R. No. L-16704
March 17, 1962
On October 15, 1958, the Social Security
Commission issued its Circular No. 22.
Effective November 1, 1958, all Employers in
computing the premiums due the System, will
take into consideration and include in the
Employee's remuneration all bonuses and
overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other
media of remuneration. All these will comprise
the Employee's remuneration or earnings, upon
which the 3-1/2% and 2-1/2% contributions will
be based, up to a maximum of P500 for any one
month.
The petitioner alleged that the Circular is
contradictory to Cir. No. 7 expressly excluding
overtime and bonus in the computation of the
monthly premium contributions. It also
questioned the validity of the said circular for it
was not approved by the Pres. and not published
in the Official Gazette.
On the other hand, the respondent averred that
the circular need not be approved by the Pres nor
published in the OG for it was only a mere
administrative interpretation of the statute, a
mere statement of general policy or opinion as
how the law should be construed.
ISSUE: Whether or not overtime and bonus
should be excluded in the computation of
monthly premium contributions?
HELD: In the amendatory law, nowhere in its
provision states that the bonuses and overtimes
are excluded. The SSC, who has the duty to
enforce the law, only gave a mere interpretation
or understanding of the law. It did not add any
duty or detail that was not already in the
amended law.
The express elimination among the exemptions
excluded in the old law, of all bonuses,
allowances and overtime pay in the
determination of the "compensation" paid to
employees makes it imperative that such
bonuses and overtime pay must now be included
in the employee's remuneration in pursuance of
the amendatory law.
While it is true that terms or words are to be
interpreted in accordance with their well-
accepted meaning in law, nevertheless, when
such term or word is specifically defined in a
particular law, such interpretation must be
adopted in enforcing that particular law, for it
cannot be gainsaid that a particular phrase or
term may have one meaning for one purpose and
another meaning for some other purpose.
By virtue of this express substantial change in
the phraseology of the law, whatever prior
executive or judicial construction may have been
given to the phrase in question should give way
to the clear mandate of the new law.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY VS SOUTHWING
HEAVY INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. NO. 164171. FEBRUARY 20, 2006
FACTS:
On December 12, 2002, President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order 156
entitled "Providing for a comprehensive
industrial policy and directions for the motor
vehicle development program and its
implementing guidelines." The said provision
prohibits the importation of all types of used
motor vehicles in the country including the
Subic Bay Freeport, or the Freeport Zone,
subject to a few exceptions. Consequently, three
separate actions for declaratory relief were filed
by Southwing Heavy Industries Inc., Subic
Integrated Macro Ventures Corp, and Motor
Vehicle Importers Association of Subic Bay
Freeport Inc. praying that judgment be rendered
declaring Article 2, Section3.1 of the EO 156
unconstitutional and illegal.
The RTC rendered a summary judgment
declaring that Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative
power vested by the Constitution with Congress
and that the proviso is contrary to the mandate of
Republic Act 7227(RA7227) or the Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992
which allows the free flow of goods and capital
within the Freeport.
Appeal in the CA was denied.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Executive Order banning the
importation of used vehicles through the Free
Trade Zone is valid.
HELD:
NO. EO 156, exceeded the scope of its
application by extending the prohibition on the
importation of used cars to the Freeport, which
RA 7227, considers to some extent, a foreign
territory. The domestic industry which the EO
seeks to protect is actually the "customs
territory" which is defined under the Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 7227 which
states: "the portion of the Philippines outside the
Subic Bay Freeport where the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines and other
national tariff and customs laws are in force and
effect."
DIOSDADO LAGCAO, DOROTEO
LAGCAO and
URSULA LAGCAO, Petitioners
vs.
JUDGE GENEROSA G. LABRA and CITY
OF CEBU, Respondents
G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004
Facts:
The Province of Cebu donated 210 lots to the
City of Cebu. But then, in late 1965, the 210
lots, including Lot 1029, reverted to the
Province of Cebu. Consequently, the province
tried to annul the sale of Lot 1029 by the City of
Cebu to the petitioners. This prompted the latter
to sue the province for specific performance and
damages in the then Court of First Instance.
The court a quo ruled in favor of petitioners and
ordered the Province of Cebu to execute the final
deed of sale in favor of petitioners. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.  government units the power to expropriate.
After acquiring title, petitioners tried to take
possession of the lot only to discover that it was
already occupied by squatters. Thus petitioners
instituted ejectment proceedings against the
squatters. The Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) ordering the squatters to vacate the lot.
On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC’s
decision and issued a writ of execution and order
of demolition.
However, when the demolition order was about
to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin
Garcia wrote two lettersto the MTCC, requesting
the deferment of the demolition on the ground
that the City was still looking for a relocation
site for the squatters. Acting on the mayor’s
request, the MTCC issued two orders
suspending the demolition. Unfortunately for
petitioners, during the suspension period, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City
passed a resolution which identified Lot 1029 as
a socialized housing site pursuant to RA 7279.
Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for
declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for
being unconstitutional.
Issue:
WON the Ordinance No. 1843 is
unconstitutional as it sanctions the expropriation
of their property for the purpose of selling it to
the squatters, an endeavor contrary to the
concept of “public use” contemplated in the
Constitution.
Ruling:
Under Section 48 of RA 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code of 1991, local
legislative power shall be exercised by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the city. The
legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod
in the exercise of its lawmaking authority are
denominated ordinances.
Local government units have no inherent power
of eminent domain and can exercise it only when
expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue
of RA 7160, Congress conferred upon local
Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the
expropriation of petitioners’ lot was enacted by
the SP of Cebu City to provide socialized
housing for the homeless and low-income
residents of the City.
However, while we recognize that housing is
one of the most serious social problems of the
country, local government units do not possess
unbridled authority to exercise their power of
eminent domain in seeking solutions to this
problem.
There are two legal provisions which limit the
exercise of this power: (1) no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws; and (2) private
property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation. Thus, the exercise by
local government units of the power of eminent
domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA
7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise
must comply with the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws.
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255,
August 14, 1997
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the
validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code. Petitioners, who are members of the
House of Representatives, charged that there is
violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated
so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of
Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference
committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill. The bicameral committee
submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an
interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of
quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared
the presence of a quorum. The interpellation
then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyo’s
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee
report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair
declared: “There being none, approved.” At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep.
Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr.
Speaker?” The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were
talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep.
Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority
Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
President of the Senate and certified by the
respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law
by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the rules of
the House
Held:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly
permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the
pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no
concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of nullifying the act
taken if the requisite number of members has
agreed to a particular measure. But this is
subject to qualification. Where the construction
to be given to a rule affects person other than
members of the legislative body, the question
presented is necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to question in a case
where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are
involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of
internal procedure of the House with which the
Court should not be concerned. The claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that Rep.
Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of
quorum had already been defeated, as the roll
call established the existence of a quorum. The
question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly
especially when the quorum is obviously present
for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.
Abakada Guro v. Ermita
G.R. No. 168056, July 5, 2005
J. Puno En Banc
Facts:
Motions for Reconsideration filed by petitioners,
ABAKADA Guro party List Officer and et al.,
insist that the bicameral conference committee
should not even have acted on the no pass-on
provisions since there is no disagreement
between House Bill Nos. 3705 and 3555 on the
one hand, and Senate Bill No. 1950 on the other,
with regard to the no pass-on provision for the
sale of service for power generation because
both the Senate and the House were in
agreement that the VAT burden for the sale of
such service shall not be passed on to the end-
consumer. As to the no pass-on provision for
sale of petroleum products, petitioners argue that
the fact that the presence of such a no pass-on
provision in the House version and the absence
thereof in the Senate Bill means there is no
conflict because “a House provision cannot be in
conflict with something that does not exist.”
Escudero, et. al., also contend that Republic Act
No. 9337 grossly violates the constitutional
imperative on exclusive origination of revenue
bills under Section 24 of Article VI of the
Constitution when the Senate introduced
amendments not connected with VAT.
Petitioners Escudero, et al., also reiterate that
R.A. No. 9337’s stand- by authority to the
Executive to increase the VAT rate, especially
on account of the recommendatory power
granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power. They
submit that the recommendatory power given to
the Secretary of Finance in regard to the
occurrence of either of two events using the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a benchmark
necessarily and inherently required extended
analysis and evaluation, as well as policy
making.
Petitioners also reiterate their argument that the
input tax is a property or a property right.
Petitioners also contend that even if the right to
credit the input VAT is merely a statutory
privilege, it has already evolved into a vested
right that the State cannot remove.
Issue:
Whether or not the R.A. No. 9337 or the Vat
Reform Act is constitutional?
Held:
The Court is not persuaded. Article VI, Section
24 of the Constitution provides that All
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of
local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
The Court reiterates that in making his
recommendation to the President on the
existence of either of the two conditions, the
Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter
ego of the President or even her subordinate. He
is acting as the agent of the legislative
department, to determine and declare the event
upon which its expressed will is to take effect.
The Secretary of Finance becomes the means or
tool by which legislative policy is determined
and implemented, considering that he possesses
all the facilities to gather data and information
and has a much broader perspective to properly
evaluate them. His function is to gather and
collate statistical data and other pertinent
information and verify if any of the two
conditions laid out by Congress is present.
In the same breath, the Court reiterates its
finding that it is not a property or a property
right, and a VAT-registered person’s entitlement
to the creditable input tax is a mere statutory
privilege. As the Court stated in its Decision, the
right to credit the input tax is a mere creation of
law. More importantly, the assailed provisions
of R.A. No. 9337 already involve legislative
policy and wisdom. So long as there is a public
end for which R.A. No. 9337 was passed, the
means through which such end shall be
accomplished is for the legislature to choose so
long as it is within constitutional bounds.
The Motions for Reconsideration are hereby
DENIED WITH FINALITY. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court is LIFTED.
Remman Enterprises, Inc. and Chamber of Real
Estate and Builder’s Association v.
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate
Service and Professional Regulation
Commission
G.R. No. 197676 | February 4, 2014
VILLARAMA, JR., J.
The Court will not declare a statute as
unconstitutional when its regulation is an
unavoidable consequence of a reasonable
regulatory measure.
FACTS

This case involves a petition for review under
Rule 45 on the subject of the Real Estate Service
Act of the Philippines.
• R.A. 9646 (Real Estate Service Act of the
Philippines) was passed.
• Its purpose is to professionalize the real estate
service sector under regulatory scheme of
licensing, registration and supervision of real
estate service practitioners.
• The supervision was likewise lodged under the
authority of the Professional Regulatory
Commission (PRC).
• The law required that companies providing real
estate services must transact with the employ
of duly licensed real estate brokers.
• Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the
law, alleging that it violates the due process
clause
and infringes the ownership rights of real
estate developers enshrined in Art. 428 of the
Civil
Code. Furthermore, they claim that it violates
the equal protection clause as owners of private
properties are allowed to sell their properties
without the need of a licensed real estate broker.
• The provisions in question are –
o Section 29. Prohibition Against the
Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service.
o Section 32. Corporate Practice of the
Real Estate Service.
• The RTC denied the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
ISSUES AND HOLDING
1. Whether the assailed provisions are in
violation of the due process clause, particularly
substantive due process. No.
• The requirements for substantive due
process are –
1. Lawful government purpose; and
2. Reasonable means necessary for the
accomplishment of the lawful purpose.
• The lawful purpose of R.A. 9646 is to
professionalize the real estate service and
increase its standards.
§ The law recognizes the role of real
estate practitioners in spearheading the
continuous flow of capital, in
boosting investor confidence, and in promoting
national progress.
• The requirement of employing a duly
licensed real estate broker for transactions is
reasonable as it merely regulates the
conduct of business, and does not curtail the
exercise of petitioners’ ownership rights.
Government of the Philippine Islands vs
HSBC (1938)
G.R. No. 44257 | 1938-11-22
Subject: One-Subject, One-Bill Rule; The
requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a reasonable
and not a technical construction; The subject of
Act No. 4007 is embraced in the title; The
banking business, being affected with public
interest, is a legitimate subject of police power
by the state
Facts:
The present action involves the constitutionality
of section 11 of Act No. 4007 entitled "An Act to
Reorganize the Departments, Bureaus and
Offices of the Insular Government, and for other
purposes” which reads as follows:
"Sec. 11. The provisions of existing law to the
contrary notwithstanding, the total annual
expenses of the Bureau of Banking shall be
reimbursed annually to the Government by
assessment levied upon all banking institutions
subject to inspection by the Bank Commissioner.
The proportion of expenses of the Bureau of
Banking to be assessed against each such
banking institution shall be the same as the
proportion which its average total assets bear to
the average total assets of all such banking
institutions during the year in which the
expenses were incurred."
The Government of the Philippines (appellant)
brought an action in the lower court to determine
the liability of the appellees under the above
provision.
The appellees, which are banking institutions
doing business in this country, demurred to the
complaint upon the ground that it did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action
since the statutory provision relied upon by the
appellant was unconstitutional. Specifically,
appellees contend that the subject matter
contained in Section 11 is not embraced in the
title of the Act, in violation of Section 3 of the
Jones Law which requires that the subject of an
act shall be expressed in its title.
The lower court struck down the provision as
unconstitutional. Hence, the present petition by
the Government.
Held:
One-Subject, One-Bill Rule
1.  Section 3 of the Jones Law provides:
"That no bill which may be enacted into law
shall embrace more than one subject, and that
subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill."
2.  The purposes of these constitutional
provisions have been summarized as follows:
(a) to prevent 'log rolling' legislation
refers to the practice to include in the same bill
wholly unrelated provisions, with the view of
combining in favor of the bill the supporters of
each, and thus securing the passage of several
measures, no one of which could succeed on its
own merits.
(b) to prevent surprise, or fraud, in the
legislature by means of provisions in bills of
which the titles give no intimation;
to defer the practice of enacting laws under false
and misleading titles, thereby concealing from
the members of the legislature, and from the
people, the true nature of the laws so enacted.
(c) to apprise the people of the subject of
legislation under consideration.
The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. 
3.  We must give the constitutional provision a
reasonable construction and effect. All that can
reasonably be required is that the title shall not
be made to cover legislation incongruous in
itself, and which by no fair intendment can be
considered as having a necessary or proper
connection.
4.  The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. It is
sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general object which a
statute seeks to effect, without expressing each
and every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishing of that object.
Mere details need not be set forth.
5.  The title need not be an abstract or index
of the act. The requirement is satisfied if thelaw
has but one general object, and that is clearly
expressed in the title. It is enough if the body of
the Act is germane to the title."
The subject of Act No. 4007 is embraced in
the title
6.  The title of Act No. 4007 is: "An Act to
reorganize the departments, bureaus and offices
of the Insular Government, and for other
purposes." At the time of the passage of this Act,
the Bureau of Banking was already in existence
as one of the bureaus of the Insular Government.
It seems clear therefore that that bureau is
embraced in that title. On the other hand, the
contents of section 11 are germane to and
connected with the organization and
maintenance of said bureau.
The banking business, being affected with
public interest, is a legitimate subject of
police power by the state
7.  It is now beyond question that the banking
business is so affected with a public interest as
to justify its regulation and control under the
police power of the state. Since banks are
indispensable agencies through which the
industry, trade and commerce of all civilized
countries and communities are carried on, the
business which they transact, though for private
profit, is of a preeminently public nature, and is
therefore universally recognized as a proper
subject of legislative regulation under the police
power of the state. The legislature may establish
such reasonable and general regulations of
banking institutions as may be essential to the
public safety, and provide for the enforcement of
such regulations by a board or bureau supported
by moderate assessments upon those engaging in
the banking business.
8.  However, while section 11 of Act No. 4007 is
constitutional, it does not apply to the National
City Bank of New York, on e of the appellees
herein. The National City Bank of New York,
being an agency of the United States, is not
subject to taxation by the Philippine
Government except as permitted by Act of
Congress. The form of taxation imposed under
section 11 of Act No. 4007 was not permitted by
any act of Congress.
LINDASAN vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later,
RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the
Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur," was passed. Lidasan came to
know later on that barrios Togaig and Madalum
just mentioned are within the municipality of
Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan,
Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, and
Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del
Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of
Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.] Pursuant
to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish
precints for voter registration in the said
territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that
RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional
because it did not clearly indicate in its title that
it in creating Dianaton, it would be including in
the territory thereof barrios from Cotabato.
 
ISSUE: 
Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which
includes barrios located in another province -
Cotabato - to be spared from attack planted upon
the constitutional mandate that "No bill which
may be enacted into law shall embrace more
than one subject which shall be expressed in the
title of the bill?
 
HELD: 
The baneful effect of the defective title here
presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such
title did not inform the members of Congress as
to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise
the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in
Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself
that part of their territory is being taken away
from their towns and province and added to the
adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the
public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected by the bill that
even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it
only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice
of his own province. These are the pressures
which heavily weigh against the constitutionality
of RA 4790.
Cordero v. Hon. Cabatuando
Case No. 81
G.R. No. L-14542 (October 31, 1962)
Chapter I, Page 12, Footnote No.47
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 1199 is the Agricultural
Tenancy Act of the Philippines.
Section 54 of this act expressed that indigent
tenants should be represented by Public
Defendant of Department of Labor. Congress
then amended this in Republic Act No. 2263:
“An Act Amending Certain Sections of Republic
Act No. 1199.” Section 19 of the amendatory act
says that mediation of tenancy disputes falls
under authority of Secretary of Justice. Section
20 also provides that indigent tenants shall be
represented by trial attorney of the Tenancy
Mediation Commission.
ISSUE:
W/N Sections 19 and 20 of Rep. Act No. 2263 is
unconstitutional because of the constitutional
provision that “No bill which may be enacted
into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
HELD:
Sections 19 and 20 are constitutional.
The constitutional requirement is complied with
as long the law has a single general subject,
which is the Agricultural Tenancy Act, and the
amendatory provisions no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent
with or foreign to the general subject, will be
regarded as valid. Constitutional provisions
relating to subject matter and titles of statutes
should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede proper legislation.
FLORENCIO EUGENIO, doing business
under the name E & S Delta Village vs
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB) AND
PROSPERO PALMIANO
G.R. No. 109404, January 22, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Facts:
Prospero Palmiano on installment basis from
Eugenio, the petitioner, and his co-
owner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the
E & S Delta Village in Quezon City. He started
to default on amortization payments beginning
May 1975 due to the petitioner’s non-
development of the said lots. Further, the
petitioner sold one of the two lots to Rodolfo
and Adelina Relevo upon Palmiano’s cease of
payment.
Eugenio then filed a petition to set aside the
decision of the respondent which affirmed the
order of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board to “immediately refund to
the complainant-appellant Prospero Palmiano all
payments made thereon, plus interests computed
at legal rates from date of receipt hereof until
fully paid." Petitioner avers that the Executive
Secretary erred in applying P.D. 957 and in
concluding that the non-development of the E &
S Delta Village justified private respondent's
non-payment of his amortizations. Further, the
petitioner avers that inasmuch as the land
purchase agreements were entered into in 1972,
prior to the effectivity of P.D. 957 in 1976, said
law cannot govern the transaction.
Issue:
WON Executive Secretary Drilon showed a
grave abuse in discretion when he applied P.D.
957 and concluded that the non-development of
the E & S Delta Village justified private
respondent's non-payment of his amortizations.
Held:
The respondent Executive Secretary did not
abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be
given retroactive effect so as to cover even those
contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976
given that the intent of the law, as culled from its
preamble and from the situation, circumstances
and conditions it sought to remedy, must be
enforced. Moreover, the preamble of the law
clearly expresses that the law’s intent is to
protect helpless citizens who may fall prey to the
manipulations and machinations of
"unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers," suggesting that to remedy the said
alarming situations, P.D. 957 should operate
retrospectively even upon contracts already in
existence at the time of its enactment.
 • Lastly, there is a substantial distinction
between real estate developers and owners of

private who want to sell their private

property.

§ Unlike individuals or entities having

isolated transactions over their own

property, real estate developers sell lots,

houses and condominium units in the

ordinary course of business, a business

which is highly regulated by the State

to ensure the health and safety of home

and lot buyers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. RTC

decision AFFIRMED and UPHELD.