Gov’t of the Philippine Islands v.

Monde de Piedad

HELD/RULING

On change sovereignty
- Laws which are political in nature are inoperative
- Municipal laws will remain or will continue in force (regulates private and domestic
rights)
- Sovereignty remains even if there’s a change of occupants. It will remain in the royal
decree or in legislature.

On Parens Patriae
- The legislature or government acting as parens patriae has the authority to distribute
the donations from the Spanish Dominions as the responsibility was transferred by them
to the government. Parens patriae means “acting as a guardian of the rights of the
people who need protection”
- Chancelor Kent “The legislature or gov’t of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to
enforce all charities of a public nature, by virtue of its general superintending authority
over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it.”
- Supreme Court of US in Mormon vs US “This prerogative of parens partiae is inherent in
the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or in
the legislature, often necessary to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the
prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.”

Cabanas v. Pilapil

HELD/RULING

1. Article 320 and 321 or the Civil Code provides that “The father, or in his absence the
mother, is the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the child under parental
authority.” It is apparent that the insurance proceeds must belong to the beneficiary, or
in this case to the mother of the beneficiary as she is still a minor.

Even if it were a question of policy, the conclusion will remain unaltered. What is paramount for
the Supreme Court is the welfare of the child.

2. The appeal is also supported by another cogent consideration. It is buttressed by its

adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting as parens
patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor
to accord priority to his best interest.
Co Kim Cham v. Valdez Tan Keh

HELD/RULING

Whether the governments established under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines were good and valid?

It is legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive, and judicial department of a de facto government are good and valid.

There are several kinds of de facto government, and the governments under the Philippine
Executive Commission are of second kind. Which is established and maintained by military
forces who invade and occupy a territory of the of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
denominated a government of paramount force.

(1) That its existence is maintained by active military power within the territories, and
against the rightful authority of an established and lawful government;
(2) That while it exist it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who,
by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force…..

Laurel v. Misa (EFFECT OF CHANGE OF SOVEREIGNTY)

HELD/RULING:

The argument is that when he was arrested (May 1945), Article 125 of the RPC was in force, and
petitioner could have asked for release after six hours and, therefore, C.A. No. 682 that takes
away that right is an ex post facto law, retroactive, and fundamentally objectionable.

-Article 125 was in force but not as to him. In the proclamation of General Douglas McArthur,
he states that laws in Commonwealth were revived upon its liberation from the Japanese; but
subject to his reservation to hold active collaborationist in restraint “for duration of war”. So,
persons apprehended under that directive, for treasonable collaboration, could not necessarily
invoke the benefits of article 125.

Ruffy v. Chief of Staff

HELD/RULING:

"In G. R. No. L-409, Anastacio Laurel vs. Eriberto Misa, etc., the Court, acting on the petition for
habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on the theory that a Filipino citizen who
adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation cannot
be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by article 114 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the reason (1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the
Philippines and, consequently, the correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then
suspended; and (2) that there was a change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the
proclamation of the Philippine Republic:

On Sovereignty:
-The citizens owe an absolute and permanent allegiance which consists in the obligation of
fidelity and obedience to his government or sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent
should not be confused with the qualified and temporary allegiance which of foreigner owes
to the government or sovereign of the territory wherein he resides.

Considering that the absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory
occupied by the enemy to their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed
by the enemy occupation, because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is
not transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must
necessarily remain vested in the legitimate government.

that what may be suspended is the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and
government of the territory occupied by the enemy passes temporarily to the occupant; that
the subsistence of the sovereignty of the legitimate government in a territory occupied by the
military forces of the enemy during the war, 'although the former is in fact prevented from
exercising the supremacy over them' is one of the 'rules of international law of our times'; (II
Oppenheim, 6th Lauterpach ed., 1944, p. 482), recognized, by necessary implication, in articles
23, 44, 45, and 52 of Hague Regulation; and that, as a corollary of the conclusion that the
sovereignty itself is not suspended and subsists during the enemy occupation, the allegiance of
the inhabitants to their legitimate government or sovereign subsists, and therefore there is no
such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on which the whole fabric of the
petitioner's contention rests.

Considering that, as a corollary of the suspension of the exercise of rights of sovereignty by the
legitimate government in the territory occupied by the enemy military forces, because the
authority of the legitimate power to govern has passed into the hands of the occupant (Article
43, Hague Regulations), the political laws which prescribe the reciprocal rights, duties and
obligation of government and citizens, are suspended or in abeyance during military occupation
(Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra), for the only reason that as they exclusively
bear relation to the ousted legitimate government, they are inoperative or not applicable to the
government established by the occupant; that the crimes against national security, such as
treason and espionage, inciting to war, correspondence with hostile country, flight to enemy's
country, as well as those against public order, such as rebellion, sedition, and disloyalty, illegal
possession of firearms, which are of political complexion because they bear relation to, and are
penalized by our Revised Penal Code as crimes against the legitimate government, are also
suspended or become inapplicable as against the occupant, because they can not be committed
against the latter (Peralta 1.S. Director of Prisons, supra); and that, while the offenses against
public order to be preserved by the legitimate government were inapplicable as offenses
against the invader for the reason above stated, unless adopted by him, were also ill operative
as against the ousted government for the latter was not responsible for the preservation of the
public order in the occupied territory, yet article 114 of the said Revised Penal Code, was
applicable to treason committed against the national security of the legitimate government,
because the inhabitants of the occupied territory were still bound by their allegiance to the
latter during the enemy occupation. L-409 (Resolution), [January 30, 1947], 77 PHIL 856-906)

On laws
Considering that, although the military occupant is enjoined to respect or continue in force,
unless absolutely prevented by the circumstances, those laws that enforce public order and
regulate the social and commercial life of the country, he has, nevertheless, all the powers of a
de facto government and may, at his pleasure, either change the existing laws or make new
ones when the exigencies of the military service demand such action, that is, when it is
necessary for the occupier to do so for the control of the country and the protection of his
army, subject to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the Hague Regulations

On allegiance
-

People v. Gozo

Petitioner stands on quicksand when she would deny the applicability of the ordinance to her,
on the pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American
armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not thereby cease to be
Philippine territory, she would, in effect, seek to emasculate our sovereign rights by the
assertion that we cannot exercise therein administrative jurisdiction.

-There was a reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the
Philippines being independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire
domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are
supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies
must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal.
Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not thus, there is a diminution of it
sovereignty." 15 Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to
be admitted that any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its
sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in
character. That is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language
of Jellinek, 'is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal
self-determination and self-restriction.' A state then, if it chooses to, may refrain from the
exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." ||| (People v. Gozo, G.R. No. L-36409,
[October 26, 1973], 153 PHIL 216-226)

Then came this paragraph dealing with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted that
any state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights.
There may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the
concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of Jellinek, 'is the
property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity of legal self-determination
and self-restriction.

The words employed follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no
longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power
to participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory. If it does
so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an alien character. They
retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its jurisdiction may be
diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with the bases under lease to the American armed
forces by virtue of the military bases agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign
territory.

People v. Perfecto

HELD/RULING:

Whether article 256 is still in force?

-No. The Supreme Court held that Article 256 was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code
of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other representatives of the King
against free speech and action by Spanish subjects. However, we now have no Ministers of the
Crown or other persons in authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain.

-It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of territory the previous political
relations of the ceded region are totally abrogated. "Political" is here used to denominate the
laws regulating the relations sustained by the inhabitants to the sovereign.

Macariola v. Asuncion

HELD/RULING:

That respondent Judge violated Article 14, paragraphs 1 and 5 of the Code of Commerce

-although the aforestated provision is incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of
the commercial laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political law as
it regulates the relationship between the government and certain public officers and
employees, like justices and judges. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce partakes
more of the nature of an administrative law because it regulates the conduct of certain public
officers and employees with respect to engaging in business; hence, political in essence.

It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the Spanish Code of Commerce of
1885, took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888.
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United
States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed
to have been abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the
former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new
sovereign.

Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot
apply to the respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals.