4SCDE1920 CIV1 Delson Case Digests (Persons & Family Relations) PDF

EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS
Effectivity of Laws
PUBLICATION OF ALL STATUTES IS A CONDITION FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY
1. Tañada v. Tuvera
G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986
Fernan, J.
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration/clarification of the April 24, 1985 decision of the SC, which affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of the presidential decrees and ordered the publication of all
unpublished presidential issuance which are of general application.
Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which
are not, that publication means complete publication, and that the publication must be made in the Official
Gazette. The Solicitor General claimed that the clause “unless it is otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the
Civil Code meant that the publication required was not always imperative, and that publication, when
necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE:
Is publication an indispensable condition for the effectivity of all laws?
HELD:
Yes, the publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of all laws.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.” The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. It is not correct to say that
under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The reason is that such omission
would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to
govern it.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
In this case, the SC ruled that pursuant to such requirement, the following shall be published, as a condition
for their effectivity: all presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or directly
conferred by the Constitution, the charter of a city even if it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place, and circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be
published. On the other hand, interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published.
Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.
Hence, all laws shall be published in full to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication or
on another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
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Effectivity of Laws
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED
2. De Roy v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 80718, January 29, 1988
Cortes, J.
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for certiorari which seeks to reverse the decision of the CA denying Feliza De
Roy’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
The RTC found De Roy, petitioner, guilty of gross negligence and awarded damages to the heirs of Marissa
Bernal. The decision of the RTC was affirmed by the CA. De Roy filed filed a motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration. The CA denied the motion.
De Roy contends that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for extension
of time. She avers that the ruling in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v. CA, where the Court held the 15-
day period for appealing or filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended, is not applicable to the
case at bar. This is due to the non-publication of the said decision in the official Gazette as of the time of
the promulgation of the decision of the CA.
ISSUE:
Is the publication of a Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette necessary for its effectivity?
HELD:
No, the publication of an SC decision is not necessary for its effectivity. There is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition
to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast
of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
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Effectivity of Laws
CIRCULARS WHICH PRESCRIBE A PENALTY MUST BE PUBLISHED BEFORE BECOMING

EFFECTIVE
3. People v. Que Po Lay

G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954
Montemayor, J.
FACTS:
Que Po Lay is appealing the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating
Central Bank Circular 20 in connection with section 34 of RA 265, sentencing him to 6 months imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P1,000.
Petitioner Que Po Lay failed to sell the $7000 in his possession to Central Bank through its agents within
one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular no. 20.
Petitioner Que Po Lay contends that Circular No 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act
or omission imputed to him, and that consequently the circular had no force and effect; that Commonwealth
Act No. 638 and Act 2930 both require the circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order
or notice of general applicability.
The Solicitor General opposes the contention stating that the laws in question do not require such
publication.
ISSUE:
Is the publication of Circular No. 20 necessary for its effectivity?
HELD:
Yes, the publication of Circular No. 20 necessary. Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides
that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of
the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the
new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided.
It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the
implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled
jurisprudence. Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central
Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective,
this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and its penalties.
In the case at bar, Circular No. 20 was published about 3 months after Que Po Lay’s conviction of its
violation. Thus, said circular has no legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette.
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Effectivity of Laws
INTERNAL RULES OR REGULATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED
4. National Power Corporation v. Pinatubo Commercial

G.R. No. 176006, March 26, 2010
Corona, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) assails the RTC resolution denying its motion for
reconsideration, finding two items of NPC Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional.
NPC Circular No. 99-75 set the guidelines in the "disposal of scrap aluminum conductor steel-reinforced or
ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC installations and to generate
additional income for NPC." Items 3 and 3.1 of the circular provided for the qualification of its bidders. NPC
published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of its scrap ACR cables.
Respondent Pinatubo Commercial (Pinatubo) submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC, but was
subsequently denied.
Respondent Pinatubo filed a petition before the RTC for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75 as it
violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the constitution because it was not published. The
RTC upheld Pinatubo’s position and declared items 3 and 3.1 unconstitutional.
Petitioner NPC insists that there was no need to publish the circular since it was not of general application.
It was addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely the disposal committees, heads of
offices, regional and all other officials involved in the disposition of ACSRs.
ISSUE:
Does NPC Circular No. 99-75 have to be published for its effectivity?
HELD:
No, NPC Circular No. 99-75 does not have to be published. In the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, the SC held
that interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal rule or
regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued by
the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to
qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the responsibilities of the different NPC personnel
in the disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and award of scrap ACSRS. These guidelines were addressed to
the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the
rights of the public in general or of any other person not involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected
individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly and incidentally.
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Effectivity of Laws
IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE SENATE TO PUBLISH THE RULES FOR ITS LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
IN EACH CONGRESS
5. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
Leonardo-De Castro, J.
FACTS:
At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, assailing the show cause letter and contempt order issued
by respondents against petitioner Romulo Neri, former Director General of the NEDA.
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review and arbitrate a hotly,
even acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Court’s co-equal branches of government. On September
26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11) hours on
matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the “NBN Project”), a project awarded by the
Department of Transportation and Communications (“DOTC”) to Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (“ZTE”). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) Chairman
Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (“President Arroyo”) of the bribery attempt
and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and
petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege.” To be specific, petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo
followed up the NBN Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she
directed him to approve it.
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioner’s answers to these three questions by requiring
him to appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioner’s
testimony on the ground of executive privilege.
The senate thereafter issued a show cause order, unsatisfied with the reply, therefore, issued an Order
citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms
until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order. Denied. Petition for certiorari
and Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) granted by
the Supreme Court.
Respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
(the “Rules”) are beyond the reach of the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Does the Senate have to publish its republish its Rules?
HELD:
Yes, the language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights
of person appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise
make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until
they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
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If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the
next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings
conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of
witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect
the rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders
and proceedings are considered valid and effective
We do not believe that respondent Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they
wish. This is especially true here where what is involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that the
Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest
stake in the proper observance of the Rules.
On the nature of the Senate as a “continuing body,” this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly,
there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is “continuing”, as it is not dissolved as an entity with
each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-
day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it.
Motion for Reconsideration Denied
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Effectivity of Laws
SINCE RULES OF THE HOUSE OR THE SENATE THAT AFFECT ONLY THEIR MEMBERS ARE
INTERNAL TO THE HOUSE OR SENATE, SUCH RULES NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED, UNLESS SUCH
RULES EXPRESSLY PROVIDE FOR THEIR PUBLICATION BEFORE THE RULES CAN TAKE EFFECT
6. Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the Whole

G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Senator Panfilo Lacson delivered a privilege speech entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!" In his privilege
speech, Senator Lacson called attention to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations
Act, particularly the ₱200 million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue
Extension including the Right-of-Way, and another ₱200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road
including said right of way. Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted two hearings. On both
hearings, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole.
Petitioners particularly contended that the Senate Committee on the Whole violated the due process clause
of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, despite its
own provision, requiring publication for its effectivity.
Respondent argues that the published Rules of the Ethics Committee governs both the Ethics Committee
and the Senate Committee of the Whole; thus there is no consequent need to publish the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole.
ISSUE:
Is publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole required for their effectivity?
HELD:
Yes, the publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is necessary to be effective.
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the
House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need
not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules can take effect.
Hence, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published
before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication
of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their
publication. The majority of the members of the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole, and the publication requirement which they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority.
Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics
Committee had already been published in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole expressly require publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due
process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are
affected.
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Effectivity of Laws
THE PUBLICATION, AS FURTHER HELD IN TAÑADA, MUST BE OF THE FULL TEXT OF THE LAW
SINCE THE PURPOSE OF PUBLICATION IS TO INFORM THE PUBLIC OF THE CONTENTS OF THE
LAW. MERE REFERENCING THE NUMBER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE, ITS TITLE OR
WHEREABOUTS AND ITS SUPPOSED DATE OF EFFECTIVITY WOULD NOT SATISFY THE
PUBLICATION REQUIREMENT
7. Conjuangco, Jr. v. Republic

G.R. No. 180705, November 27, 2012
Velasco, Jr., J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review under Rule 45, the petitioners seek to annul a portion of the Partial Summary
Judgment, as affirmed in a Resolution, both rendered by the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan, in relation to the Court’s ruling as to ill-gotten cases, detailed the parties’
manifestations, pleadings, and evidence that were found to be without substantial controversy. Among these
was an Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of Coconut Farmers of the
Philippines (The Agreement) was made and entered into between Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., petitioner-seller
herein, and the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) as the buyer. The Agreement was admitted by
defendants to have been made part and described in Section 1 of PD 755 as The Agreement executed by
the PCA. This was incorporated into Section 1 of PD 755 by reference. The Sandiganbayan also found that
the Court took judicial notice that PD 755 was published in the Official Gazette, but that the text of the The
Agreement was not so published with PD 755.
Consequently, by virtue of the same, Cojuangco Jr claims ownership of some UCPB shares subject of this
case, which he holds solely on the basis of two agreements, one being The Agreement herein. He argues
that The Agreement was incorporated by reference, and should thus be considered as having the status of
law.
The Sandiganbayan, however, posits that The Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction
between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
May the agreement between the PCA and Eduardo Cojuangco Jr. be accorded the status of law?
HELD:
No, The Agreement cannot be accorded the status of a law for the lack of requisite publication.
It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in Section 1 of P.D.
755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it is well-settled that laws must be
published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law.
The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of publication
is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the presidential decree, its
title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement.
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755 did
not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was acopy thereof attached
to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said Agreement the status of a law.
Consequently, We join the Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be
treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil
Code.
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Effectivity of Laws
SENATE RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION MUST BE

PUBLISHED DESPITE ABSENCE OF ANY AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES
PUBLICATION OF SENATE RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF

LEGISLATION IS NOT A SUFFICIENT FORM OF PUBLICATION
8. Garcillano v. House of Representatives

G.R. No. 170338, December 23, 2008
Nachura, J.
FACTS:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the SC, seeking to bar the Senate of the 14th Congress
from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry as regards the “Hello, Garci” controversy during the 2004
presidential elections.
Petitioners, Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, argued that the said legislative inquiry should be
stopped and prohibited as it violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution. They are
worried by the continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse
constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation,
especially that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation was not duly
published when the Congress first opened their session and upon the inception of the legislative inquiries.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the
rules have never been amended since 1995. They averred that the rules have been published in 1995 and
2006 in newspapers of general circulation, and the same are published in booklet form available to anyone
for free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page. However, they admitted that there
was no publication of the said rules at the onset of the 14th Congress, where the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007.
ISSUES:
1. Is there a need to publish the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
despite the absence of any amendments therein?
2. Is the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation at the
Senate’s internet web page a sufficient form of publication?
HELD:
1. Yes, there is a need to publish the Senate Rules of Procedure despite the absence of any amendments
therein.
The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and
unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more,
that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails over any custom,
practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
In this case, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the Constitution, use
its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries
in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
2. No, the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation at the
Senate’s internet web page is not a sufficient form of publication.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
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equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes
the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
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Prospective Application of Laws
PENAL LAWS FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED SHOULD HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION
9. Valeroso v. People
G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008
Reyes, R.T., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari on the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the
ruling of the RTC, finding petitioner Sr. Inspector Jerry Valeroso liable for illegal possession of firearms.
On July 10, 1996, the Central Police District served a warrant of arrest to Valeroso in a case of kidnapping
with ransom. In the course of the arrest, the police found an unlicensed firearm with live ammunition in his
possession. He was then charged with illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866.
In 1998, the trial court convicted Valeroso of the crime charged and imposed a penalty of prision correccional
for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and a fine of P15,000, pursuant to
R.A. No. 8294, which amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997. When petitioner appealed to the CA, the
appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty imposed.
ISSUE:
Is the retroactive application of R.A. No 8294, which amended P.D. No. 1866, valid taking into consideration
that P.D. No. 1866 was the governing law at the time the petitioner committed the offense?
HELD:
Yes, the retroactive application of R.A. No. 8294 is valid.
In this case, P.D. No. 1866 was the governing law at the time Valeroso committed and was charged for
illegal possession of firearms. P.D. No. 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua for the said offense. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July
6, 1997, during the pendency of the case with the trial court.
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of an
ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused.
According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very
principles on which the right of the State to punish and the commination * of the penalty are based, and
regards it not as an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict
justice."
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to
the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period
from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866.
Therefore, as R.A. 8294 is favorable to the accused, its provisions warrant retroactive application.
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AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, LAWS MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
10. Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President

G.R. No. 104528, January 18, 1996
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
The present case is a petition challenging the Decision of the Office of the President of the Philippines,
which affirmed the decision of the Housing and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB) ruling that petitioner
Philippine National Bank (PNB) may collect from private respondents only the remaining amortizations the
latter had to pay pursuant to land purchase agreements with Marikina Village, Inc., pursuant to the
retroactive application of P.D. No. 957.
Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc.,
Notwithstanding the said land purchase agreements, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots to PNB.
Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents duly complied with their obligations as lot buyers and
constructed their houses on the lots in question. Subsequently, the Marikina Village defaulted and PNB
foreclosed on the mortgage. As highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.
Private respondents then filed suits with the HLURB Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs
(OAALA). It ruled that PNB, without prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina Village, may collect only the
remaining amortizations from private respondents and cannot compel them to pay all over again for the lots
they had already bought from said subdivision developer.
In this petition to the SC, petitioner bank argues that the Office of the President erred in applying P.D. No.
957 because said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was executed on
December 18, 1975.
ISSUE:
Is P.D. No. 957 applicable retroactively to real estate mortgage executed prior to its enactment?
HELD:
Yes, P.D. No. 957 is applicable retroactively to real estate mortgage executed prior to its enactment.
Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code, "laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary
is provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real
estate mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent must be given
effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved.
While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred
from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers.
As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it
is obvious that the law — as an instrument of social justice — must favor the weak. Indeed, the petitioner
Bank had at its disposal vast resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and
therefore is presumed to have conducted the usual "due diligence" checking and ascertained (whether thru
ocular inspection or other modes of investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy of
the property offered as collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had been built on by
small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to discover the attempt
of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It was precisely in order to deal with
this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very essence and intendment being to provide a
protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed
"unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers." The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and
from the situation, circumstances and condition it sought to remedy, must be enforced.
Hence, in order to deal with this kind of situation and to protect the rights of helpless citizens against
unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers, P.D. No. 957 should apply retroactively to transactions
made prior to its enactment.
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RULINGS, CIRCULARS, RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF

INTERNAL REVENUE HAVE NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION IF TO APPLY THEM WOULD
PREJUDICE THE TAXPAYER
11. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc.

G.R. No. 168129, April 24, 2007
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
FACTS:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner seeks to reverse the decision of the
CA affirming the CTA Resolution which cancelled the 1996 and 1997 deficiency VAT assessment against
respondent corporation.
In 1987, the VAT Law took effect. Upon inquiry by the respondent whether the services it provides are
exempt from the payment of the VAT, the petitioner issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that Philhealth,
as a provider of medical services, is exempt from the VAT coverage. Thereafter, in January 1998, the
National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 became effective, substantially adopting the provisions of the VAT
and E-VAT Laws. In 1999, the BIR sent the respondent an assessment notice for deficiency VAT and
documentary stamp taxes for taxable years 1996 and 1997. The respondent questioned the assessment by
filing a protest. Petitioner did not take any action on respondent’s protests, thus, respondent filed a petition
for review with the CTA.
The CTA declared VAT Ruling 231-88 void, and ordered respondent to pay the deficiency VAT for taxable
years 1996-1997. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CTA granted, holding that
the revocation of the subject VAT Ruling cannot be applied retroactively as it would unduly prejudice the
respondent.
ISSUE:
Should the revocation of the subject VAT Ruling be applied prospectively as the contrary would unduly
prejudice the taxpayer?
HELD:
Yes, the revocation of VAT Ruling 231-888 should be applied prospectively as the contrary would unduly
prejudice the taxpayer.
Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended, provides that rulings, circulars, rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive application if to apply them
would prejudice the taxpayer. The exceptions to this rule are: (1) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates
or omits material facts from his return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from
the facts on which the ruling is based, or (3) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
In this case, the SC held that although the respondent is declared to be subject to VAT, the revocation by
the CTA in its 2003 Resolution of the 1988 VAT Ruling cannot be given retroactive application because it
would prejudice the respondent. The respondent’s reliance on the Ruling was premised on good faith.
Moreover, the SC held that the exceptions to the rule that rulings issued by the Commissioner shall have
no retroactive application if to apply them would prejudice the taxpayer are not present in the facts of the
case.
Hence, the revocation of VAT Ruling 231-888 issued by the CIR in 1988 cannot be applied retroactively as
it would unduly prejudice the respondent who have relied on such Ruling in good faith.
13
BIR CIRCULARS OR RULINGS HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT WHERE THEIR APPLICATION

WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO TAXPAYERS
12. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals

G.R. No. L-52306, October 12, 1981
Melencio-Herrera, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the respondent court’s Decision affirming the assessment of
the CIR deficiency withholding income tax against petitioner.
The petitioner is engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign
corporations not engaged in trade or business with the Philippines, for which petitioner paid rentals after
withholding income tax of 30% of one-half of the film rentals, as provided under Section 24 (b) of the National
Revenue Code. The provision was implemented through Circular No. V-334. Pursuant to the foregoing,
petitioner dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR the amount of 30% of one-half of the film rentals paid
by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. The last year that
petitioner withheld taxes pursuant to the foregoing Circular was in 1968. Thereafter, RA 5431 amended
Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from
“such amount” referring to rents, etc. to “gross income.” The foregoing was implemented by Circular No. 4-
71, which also revoked Circular No. V-334, holding that the latter was “erroneous for lack of legal basis”
because “the tax therein prescribed should be based on gross income without deduction whatever” On the
basis of the new circular, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued against petitioner an assessment
and demand of deficiency withholding income tax on remitted film rentals for the period of 1965 to 1968.
Petitioner requested for a reconsideration and withdrawal of the assessment, but the Commissioner, without
acting thereon, issued a warrant of distraint and levy over petitioner’s real and personal properties. Hence,
the petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA.
ISSUE:
Can Circular No. 4-71 be applied retroactively so as to make petitioner liable for deficiency withholding
income tax for the period when Circular No. V-334 was controlling
HELD:
No, Circular No. 4-71 cannot be applied retroactively so as to make petitioner liable for deficiency
withholding income tax for the period of 1965-1968, when the Circular controlling at that time was Circular
No. V-334.
Section 327 of the Tax Code provides that any revocation, modification, or reversal of and of the rules and
regulations or any of the rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall
not be given retroactive application if the relocation, modification, or reversal will be prejudicial to the
taxpayers, except in the following cases: (a) where the taxpayer deliberately mis-states or omits material
facts from his return or any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue: (b) where the
facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the facts on
which the ruling is based; or (c) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no retroactive application
where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. In this case, the prejudice to petitioner of the
retroactive application of Memorandum Circular No. 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or
three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334.
The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three
years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. Petitioner was no longer in a position to withhold
taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and no longer had any
control over them when the new Circular was issued. And in so far as the enumerated exceptions are
concerned, admittedly, petitioner does not fall under any of them.
Hence, Circular No. 4-71 cannot be applied retroactively because to do so would unduly prejudice petitioner,
who relied in good faith and religiously complied with no less than a Circular issued by the highest official
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
14
Waiver of Rights
WHERE ONE LACKS KNOWLEDGE OF A RIGHT, THERE IS NO BASIS UPON WHICH WAIVER OF IT
CAN REST
13. D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner is seeking the reversal of the decision of the CA affirming the RTC decision which ordered it to
pay damages to the private respondent.
Jose A. Juego was a construction worker of petitioner corporation. While he was working at the elevator
core of the 14th floor of the Renaissance Tower, the hanging platform he was on fell and crushed him to
death. The police report disclosed that the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of
the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a
safety lock.
Thereafter, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed a complaint for damages against the petitioner. Petitioner
raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund,
thereby precluding her from claiming damages under the Civil Code. The RTC rendered a decision in favor
of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto, finding the petitioner
corporation negligent.
ISSUE:
Is the private responded precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code because of her prior
availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund?
HELD:
No. The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election
is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud
by the other party. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. It is an act of understanding that presupposes that
a party has knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party
claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time actual or constructive
knowledge of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where
one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material
fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact.
As a general rule a claimant has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by
the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tort fees or for higher
damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. An exception to said rule is where a
claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for damages
under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first
remedy. The choice of the first remedy based on ignorance or on a mistake of fact nullifies the choice as it
was not an intelligent choice.
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private respondent
was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance
Fund. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception. The CA further held that not
only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well because she testified that she
only reached elementary school and did not know what damages could be recovered from the death of her
husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover from the Civil Code more than from the ECC.
15
Hence, the respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code as she made a
waiver by election under a clear mistake of fact and without knowledge of her rights.
16
Waiver of Rights
STIPULATION WHEREBY STUDENT CANNOT TRANSFER TO ANOTHER SCHOOL WITHOUT

REFUNDING SCHOLARSHIP CASH NULL AND VOID
14. Cui v. Arellano University

G.R. No. L-15127, May 30, 1961
Concepcion, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by Emeterio Cui (Cui) from a decision of the Court of First Instance absolving Arellano
University (Arellano) from the former’s complaint for insufficiency of proof.
Cui was enrolled at the College of Law at Arellano, where his uncle was the Dean. When his uncle left
Arellano to become a Dean of Abad Santos University (Abad Santos), Cui then enrolled for the last semester
of his fourth year in Abad Santos. Cui, during the time he was studying in Arellano was awarded scholarship
grants for scholastic merit. After graduating law from Abad Santos, Cui applied to take the bar examination.
To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in Arellano. The latter refused
until after Cui paid back the sum corresponding to the scholarship grants awarded to him. Before the grant
of scholarship was awarded, Cui was made to sign a contract wherein he “waive his right to transfer to
another school without having refunded to Arellano the equivalent of his scholarship cash.”
The Bureau of Private Schools upheld the position of Cui to secure the transcript without being required to
refund the scholarship grants. Arellano still refused to issue the transcripts and reiterated that the contract
signed by Cui is valid and binding. Cui, to get hold of the transcripts paid under protest and subsequently
brought action for recovery of said amount.
ISSUE:
Was the “waiver of right to transfer to another school without refunding the equivalent of his scholarships in
cash” as stipulated in the contract valid?
HELD:
No, the waiver of right stipulated in the contract is not valid as it is against public policy.
In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent
with sound policy and good morals, or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The policy
enunciated in the Director of Private Schools’ Memorandum No. 33, s. 1949 is sound policy stating that
scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its
prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to
increase the business potential of an educational institution. Thus, conceived it is not only inconsistent with
sound policy but also good morals. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them
in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation.
Scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value
but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien.
Thus, the waiver for being against public policy, Arellano must return the amount paid by Cui with interest.
17
Waiver of Rights
FOR BEING IMBUED WITH PUBLIC POLICY, POSTING AND PUBLICATION REQUIREMENTS
MANDATED BY ACT NO. 3135 MAY NOT BE WAIVED
15. Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno Productions, Inc.

G.R. No. 139479, December 27, 2002
Austria-Martinez, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which set aside the foreclosure proceedings and auction sale of
Nepomuceno Productions Inc. (NPI) properties.
PNB granted NPI a P4 Million credit line secured by mortgages on NPI’s properties. The credit line was later
increased to P7.5 Million. NPI defaulted thus PNB sought foreclosure of the mortgaged properties. The
auction sale was re-scheduled several times without need of republication of the notice of sale pursuant to
“Agreement to Postpone Sale” prepared by PNB and signed by both parties.
NPI filed an action for annulment of foreclosure and sale contending that the same is null and void for lack
of publication. The RTC ordered the annulment of the proceedings on the ground that there was lack of
publication of the notice of sale, which was later affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
May parties to the mortgage validly waive the posting and publication requirements mandated by Act No.
3135?
HELD:
No, parties to the mortgage have absolutely no right to waive the posting and publication requirements of
Act No. 3135.
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution
may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative
and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public
interest may be waived.
The principal object of a notice of sale in a foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify the mortgagor
as to inform the public generally of the nature and condition of the property to be sold, and of the time, place,
and terms of the sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly,
the statutory requirements of posting and publication are mandated, not for the mortgagor's benefit, but for
the public or third persons. As such, it is imbued with public policy considerations and any waiver thereon
would be inconsistent with the intent and letter of Act No. 3135.
Thus, statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly
complied with and no waiver to such by the parties can be validly made.
18
Repeal of Laws
THE SAME SECTION IN THE OLD LAW NOT BEING RESTATED NOR RE-ENACTED IN THE NEW
LAW WOULD NOT AMOUNT TO IMPLIED REPEAL
16. Mecano v. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992
Campos, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Antonio Mecano (Mecano) seeking to nullify the decision of the
Commission on Audit (COA) denying his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code (RAC), as amended.
Mecano is a Director II on the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis.
He requested reimbursement for his medical expenses on the ground that he is entitled to
the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC. The then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre Bello III opined
that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987 (AC of 1987). Mecano
then re-submitted his claim with the copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin
Drilon stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its
entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter."
Upon indorsement, COA denied Mecano’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC has been
repealed by the AC, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the AC.
ISSUE:
Did the Administrative Code of 1987 repeal or abrogate Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code?
HELD:
No, the Administrative Code of 1987 did not repeal or abrogated Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its
number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. Repeal by implication
proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. The intention to repeal
must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same
from the time of the first enactment. There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where
provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the
extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers
the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier
law.
Here, as to the first category, comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover
nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old
Code which are not found in the new Code, such as claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, among
others. As to the second category, according to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what
appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration,
organization and procedure.
Repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes. Thus, Section 699 of the RAC not being repealed, COA was ordered to
give due course to Mecano’s claim for benefits.
19
Judicial Decisions Form Part of the Law of the Land
THE RULE THAT A NEW DOCTRINE ABROGATING AN OLD RULE SHOULD OPERATE
PROSPECTIVELY ONLY HOLDS MORE TRUE IN THE APPLICATION OF PENAL LAWS
17. People v. Licera

G.R. No. L-39990, July 22, 1975
Castro, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14, 1968 of the
Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and
sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years.
In December 11, 1961, Rafael Licera was granted authority by a governor to possess a Winchester rifle as
a peace officer. On December 3, 1965, a criminal charge for illegal possession of Winchester rifle was filed
against Licera. The municipal court convicted him of the said crime. On appeal to the CFI, Licera alleges
that the MTC should have relied on the ruling enunciated in the case of People vs Macarandang (decided
in 1959) exempting peace officers from the requirement relating to firearms. MTC relied on the ruling in
People vs Mapa (decided in 1967) stating that Sec 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no
exemptions from the requirements relating to firearms including a peace officer.
ISSUE:
Should the ruling enunciated in People in Macarandang be applied in the case as it is the doctrine prevailing
at the time of alleged criminal act?
HELD:
YES. The ruling in People vs Macarandang should be applied.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not
laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon
a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or
interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to
carry into effect.
At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for possession
of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule — the
Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code — formed part of our jurisprudence
and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967.
Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate prospectively only
and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted
on the faith thereof.
Therefore, applying the People vs Macarandang ruling, Licera should be acquitted.
20
Duty of Judges
THE IGNORANCE OF THE COURT OR HIS LACK OF KNOWLEDGE REGARDING THE LAW
APPLICABLE TO A CASE SUBMITTED TO HIM FOR DECISION ARE NOT REASONS FOR THE
COURT TO DISMISS THE CASE WITHOUT DECIDING ON THE ISSUE THEREIN
18. Chu Jan v. Bernas

G.R. No. 10010, August 1, 1916
Araullo, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by Chu Jan before the SC, challenging the decision of RTC dismissing his appeal of the
MTC’s ruling declaring the parties’ cock match draw.
Chu Jan, petitioner and Lucio Bernas, defendant, were the owners of the fighting cocks engaged in a match
in the Municipality of Tabaco, Albay. Each of the said persons had put up a wager of P160. The referee
declared defendant’s cock as the winner. Petitioner, then, filed a complaint asking that his rooster be
declared the winner. The justice of peace ruled that the bout was a draw. Petitioner filed an appeal. The
Judge dismissed the appeal governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he does not know
where to find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights of
the plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning cockfights.
ISSUE:
Can a judge dismiss a case appealed to him on the ground that he does not know the law on the subject
and where to find the same?
HELD:
No. The judge cannot dismiss a case submitted to him for decision on the ground that he does not know
the law on the subject and where to find the same.
The Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be
observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
In this case, the Court held that ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable
to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain
matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find the
law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings
by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing
that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, Therefore the judgment and the order
appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, are reversed and the record of the proceedings shall be remanded
to the court from whence they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law.
Therefore, the judge was incorrect in dismissing the appeal filed to him because he does not know the law
governing cockfights and the referees thereof.
21
Doubtful Statutes
IN THE CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION OF A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE – A PRESIDENTIAL

DECREE IN THESE CASES – THE PRIMARY RULE IS TO SEARCH FOR AND DETERMINE THE
INTENT AND SPIRIT OF THE LAW
19. People v. Purisima

G.R. No. L-42050-66, November 20, 1978
Muñoz-Palma, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review filed by the People of the Philippines assailing the acts of 3 RTCs in quashing
the information charging the accused with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of PD No. 9 on
the ground that the information failed to state the essential element.
The trial courts concurred with the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the offense charged
is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed
or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection,
or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder. RTC Judges in construing the law relied on the
"Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country pursuant to
Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that
subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and public disorder mentioned in
Proclamation 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly
weapons.
Petitioner averred that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person carries outside his residence
any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation. He added preamble of
a statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or
confer powers, or cure inherent defects in the statute, that the explanatory note or enacting clause of the
decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such
explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance of the decree.
ISSUE:
Should the Whereas clauses of the law be considered in the determination of the intent of the law?
HELD:
YES. The RTCs are correct in taking into consideration the Whereas clauses of the law to determine the
intent of the same.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated
part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory construction. For taken in the abstract,
a word or phrase might easily convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident
when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general
provision may have a limited application if read together with other provisions."
The acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result of Proclamation 1081 and General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D.
9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons. The court held that the offense carries two elements: first, the
carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool
or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of,
or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or
public disorder.
Therefore, the RTCs are correct in quashing the information because the assailed act does not come within
the purview of the intent of the law.
22
Customs
ACTS, NOT DESTRUCTIVE AND WHICH RIPENED INTO CUSTOM, CANNOT BE HELD TO BE
THEMSELVES UNREASONABLE OR IMPRUDENT
20. Martinez v. Van Buskirk

G.R. No. L-5691, December 27, 1910
Moreland, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the court below finding the defendant guilty of negligence.
The plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata along the left-hand side of the street, when
a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant, William Van Buskirk, came along the street in the opposite
direction at a great speed, and ran into the carromata occupied by said plaintiff with her child and overturned
it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata
itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.
Van Buskirk presented evidence to the effect that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the
time the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. For the
purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered, the defendant’s cochero tied the driving lines of the horses
to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside the wagon to unload the forage. The driver
of which cracked a whip and made some other noise, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery
wagon and they ran away. The driver was thrown out from the wagon and was unable to stop the horses
resulting to a collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding.
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle and
tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the horses several years
and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all that time, of leaving them in the
condition in which they were left on the day of the accident; that they had never run away up to that time
and there had been, therefore, no accident due to such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in
unloading the merchandise in the manner described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero
who delivered merchandise of the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the
defendant on the day in question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
ISSUE:
Is the cochero of the defendant negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in
this case?
HELD:
No. The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or
imprudent. Acts, the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore,
been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be
themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed, the very reason why they have been permitted by society
is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial. Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most
ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act
once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which that was
then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they
were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been productive of accidents
or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years without
objection.
23
Customs
A CUSTOM MUST BE PROVED AS A FACT, ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE
21. Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales

G.R. No. 55960, November 24, 1988
Cortes, J.
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving behind real and
personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00 more or less. The respondents filed a petition
for the grant of letters of administration. They alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy
Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him. The petition was opposed by petitioners
who alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China;
(b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee.
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that she does not
have a marriage certicate because the practice during that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal
of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into an agreement
with the parents of her husband; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a written document
is exchanged just between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter;
that she does not know as to the whereabouts of that document, because she and Sy Kiat were married for
46 years already and the document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now.
The probate court ruled in favor of the oppositors. On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
declaring that the respondents are the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many
years; and the petitioners as the acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese
wife Yao Kee, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven
to be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China.
Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom was
conclusively proven.
ISSUE:
Is the validity of the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and customs on
marriage conclusive?
HELD:
No. Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as
a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state
that "a local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact" (Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 [1907]).
The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of
China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or
custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no
showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or
custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
24
Computation of Period and Time
A YEAR IS COMPOSED OF 12 CALENDAR MONTHS; THE NUMBER OF DAYS IS IRRELEVANT
22. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.

G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007
Corona, J.
FACTS:
This is petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which
applied Article 13 of the Civil Code in the computation of the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229
of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims.
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the
refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. According to Yap, because respondent suffered
losses, it was not liable for income taxes. Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax
and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR.
On May 13, 1999, Revenue Officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional documents
to support its claim. Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed
a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals. On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition
as it was led beyond the two-year prescriptive period for ling a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit under
Section 229 of the NIRC. The CTA found that respondent led its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998.
Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date. The tax court applied Article 13 of the
Civil Code. Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for
the ling of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's
petition, which was led 731 days after respondent led its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the
reglementary period.
The respondent appealed to the CA which reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA. It ruled that
Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the CA,
the rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a leap year.
ISSUE:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in applying Article 13 of the Civil Code in the computation of the two-year
prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims?
HELD:
No. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent
to 365 days. In National Marketing Corp. v. Tecson, the Supreme Court ruled that a year is equivalent to
365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. However, in 1987, EO 292 or the
Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides that a "Year"
shall be understood to be twelve calendar months and the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil
Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, the Supreme Court hold that Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation
of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the two-year
prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return 34 on April 14, 1998)
consisted of 24 calendar months. Respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of
the 24th calendar month from the day respondent led its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the
reglementary period.
25
Civil Laws
ALIENS MAY OBTAIN DIVORCES ABROAD, WHICH MAY BE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES,
PROVIDED THEY ARE VALID ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONAL LAW
23. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn before the Supreme Court assailing
the denial of her Motion to Dismiss.
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen while private respondent, Richard Upton, is a US citizen. They were married
in Hongkong in 1972, and they subsequently obtained a divorce decree in Nevada, USA in 1982. Upton
filed a suit against petitioner, stating that petitioner's business in Manila forms part of their conjugal property,
thus asking the court that private respondent be declared with right to manage the same. Petitioner moved
to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court where Upton had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property". The RTC denied the motion on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
Petitioner contends that private respondent is estopped from claiming a right on the conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings that they had no community of property.
Private respondent avers that the divorce decreed in Nevada is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the
same being contrary to local law and public policy.
ISSUE:
Is the divorce decree obtained by an alien abroad valid and binding in the Philippines even if it is contrary
to local law and public policy?
HELD:
Yes, the said divorce decree obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
26
Civil Laws
AFTER A DIVORCE HAS BEEN DECREED, THE INNOCENT SPOUSE NO LONGER HAS THE RIGHT
TO INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE OFFENDERS
24. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of
the order of the lower court denying petitioner’s motion to quash.
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to private respondent Erich Geiling, a
German national, in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner before the Schoneberg Local Court in Germany which subsequently
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses in 1986.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery
against petitioner before the RTC of Manila alleging that she had affairs with two different men while their
marriage subsisted. Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction to
try and decide the charge of adultery which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio, since
the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree prior to the filing of the criminal complaint.
ISSUE:
May an alien file a complaint for adultery after obtaining a divorce decree abroad?
HELD:
No. After a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings
against the offenders.
The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce
for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said
respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor
marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of
introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation
of our law on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance
of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations
of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
27
Civil Laws
IF THE FOREIGNER OBTAINS A VALID FOREIGN DIVORCE, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL HAVE
THE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW
25. San Luis v. San Luis

G.R. No. 133743, February 6, 2007
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Felicisimo San Luis contracted three marriages during his lifetime. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit,
with whom he had six children. Virginia died. His second marriage was with Merry Lee Corwin with whom
he had a son. However, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family
Court in Hawaii which issued a Divorce Decree. His third marriage was with respondent Felicidad
Sagalongos. They had no children but they lived together from the time of their marriage until Felicisimo’s
death.
Felicidad later sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s
estate through a petition for letters of administration. Petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the Felicisimo’s
children by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Felicidad has no legal personality
to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death,
was still legally married to Merry Lee.
The trial court held that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute
divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind
Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
May a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad validly remarry?
HELD:
Yes. If the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case
involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article
26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the
parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be obtainable.
Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of
any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains
bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.
28
Civil Laws
IF ONE IS NO LONGER A FILIPINO CITIZEN AT THE TIME OF DIVORCE, HE COULD VERY WELL
LOSE HIS RIGHT TO INHERIT FROM THE SPOUSE
26. Quita v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998
Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
Fe D. Quita and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. On 23
July 1954 Fe obtained a final judgment of divorce in San Francisco, California, USA. Three weeks thereafter,
she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in
the USA, she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. Blandina Dandan, claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and her children opposed the petition for letters of administration filed by Lino Inciong. Ruperto T.
Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened. Petitioner moved for
the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of his estate. RTC disregarded the
divorce between petitioner and Arturo as it is not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction. Only
petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo.
ISSUE:
Was the petitioner still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in
the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried
HELD:
It would depend on her citizenship at the time of divorce. (Case is remanded to the court of origin). Petitioner
contends that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained. Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish
her citizenship. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the
ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision she stressed
that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. that aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. The trial court did not grant
private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both
petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines." It maintained that their
divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We
deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court
was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt
persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must
have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the
time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to
inherit from Arturo.
29
Civil Laws
MATTERS BEARING UPON THE EXECUTION, INTERPRETATION AND VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT

ARE DETERMINED BY THE LAW OF THE PLACE WHERE THE CONTRACT IS MADE
27. Government v. Frank

G.R. No. L-2935, March 23, 1909
Johnson, J.
FACTS:
The case seeks a reversal of the judgment of the lower court finding George Frank liable for sum of money
after a breach of contract of service as stenographer.
In 1903, in Chicago, USA, the defendant entered into a contract for a period of two years with the plaintiff
for which the former is hired as a stenographer. The parties agreed to a salary of 1,200 dollars per year and
in addition, payment of expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago to Manila, and the one-
half salary during said period of travel. However, in 1904, the defendant left the service of the plaintiff and
refused to make a further compliance with the terms of the contract.
The plaintiff commenced an action in the CFI of the city of Manila to recover from the defendant the amount
the plaintiff claimed had been paid to the defendant as expenses incurred in traveling from Chicago to
Manila, and as half salary for the period consumed in travel. The defendant alleged in his special defense
that he was a minor and therefore the contract could not be enforced against him. The plaintiff claims that,
by reason of the fact that, under the laws of the Philippine Islands at the time the contract was made, male
persons in said Islands did not reach their majority until they had attained the age of 23 years, hence, he
was not liable under said contract, contending that the laws of the Philippine Islands governed.
ISSUE:
Is the contention of the defendant that he was a minor when he entered into the contract tenable?
HELD:
NO. The defendant being fully qualified to enter into the contract at the place and time the contract was
made, he cannot plead infancy as a defense at the place where the contract is being enforced. The record
discloses that, at the time the contract was entered into in the State of Illinois, he was an adult under the
laws of that State and had full authority to contract. It is not disputed—upon the contrary the fact is
admitted—that at the time and place of the making of the contract in question the defendant had full capacity
to make the same. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation
and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters
connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters
respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations,
depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.
30
Civil Laws
THE RECOGNITION OF RENVOI THEORY IMPLIES THAT THE RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
ARE TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS INCORPORATING THE ORDINARY/INTERNAL LAW OF THE
FOREIGN STATE AND ITS RULES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
28. Aznar v. Garcia

G.R. No. L-16749, January 31, 1963
Labrador, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a decision of the CFI Davao approving among other things the final accounts of the
executor to deliver to Maria Lucy Christensen her legacy, and declaring her entitled to the residue of the
property. This is in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen, a
national of California and domiciled in the Philippines.
Edward E. Christensen executed a will in Manila declaring Maria Lucy Christensen as his sole heir. The will
also provides a devise of 3,600 in favor of Maria Helen Christensen, and stating among others that Maria
Helen Christensen is not related to him. Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by
Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural
child. The legal grounds of the opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the
Philippines, and (b) that the distribution is contrary to law in so far as it denies to Helen Christensen, her
legitime.
The court ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will
are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the absolute right to
dispose of his property in the way he desires.
ISSUE:
Is the will of Edward E. Christensen governed by the law of his national law (law of California)?
HELD:
NO. Applying the renvoi Ruling, the will of Edward E. Christensen is governed by the law of his domicile,
the Philippines.
The laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another
for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. If we must enforce the law of California, then we must enforce the
law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof, i.e., apply the internal law for residents
therein, and its conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad. The national law mentioned in Article 16 of
our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes
the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the
law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar.
The court of the domicile cannot and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth
between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of
the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
31
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
PRINCIPLE OF ABUSE OF RIGHT: A PERSON SHOULD NOT USE HIS RIGHT UNJUSTLY OR
CONTRARY TO HONESTY AND GOOD FAITH, OTHERWISE HE OPENS HIMSELF TO LIABILITY
29. Uypitching v. Quiamco

G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006
Corona, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso approached Ernesto Quiamco, respondent, to amicably settle the civil
aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They surrendered to him a motorcycle
with the photocopy of its certificate of registration. No original copy of the certificate was given. It turned out
later that the said motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching
Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation managed by petitioner Atty. Ernesto Uypitching. To secure its
payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to the petitioner corporation and when Gabutero could no longer
pay, Davalan assumed the obligation. However, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and
told petitioner corporation’s collector that the motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent’s men."
Nine years later, petitioner, accompanied by policemen, went to respondent’s business establishment,
where the motorcycle was parked in an open space, to recover it. The leader of the police team talked to
the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While the police team leader and the clerk were talking,
petitioner paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle." Unable to find the respondent, the policemen, on petitioner’s instruction
and over the clerk’s objection, took the motorcycle.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
against respondent. The complaint was dismissed. Respondent, then, filed an action for damages against
petitioners. The RTC ruled that petitioner should be liable since he was motivated with malice and ill will
when he called respondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless criminal
complaint. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition. Petitioners claimed that they should
not be held liable for petitioner corporation’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the
mortgaged vehicle as its right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default.
ISSUE:
Should petitioners be held liable for damages despite the claim that their action is merely exercise of their
right as seller-mortgagee to foreclose mortgage in case of default?
HELD:
Yes, petitioners should be held liable. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary
to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent's
establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or
court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed
a slanderous statement. No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching,
blatantly disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent.
Petitioners' acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human
relations.
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides that “every person
must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his
due, and observe honesty and good faith”. Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right,"
prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise
he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as
a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not
be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages
to the injured party will attach.
32
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only attended
by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the
defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly
prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded
complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to
prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to
embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to
the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence,
petitioners should indemnify him.
33
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
WHEN A RIGHT IS EXERCISED IN A MANNER NOT CONFORMING WITH THE NORMS IN ARTICLE
19 AND RESULTS IN DAMAGE, A LEGAL WRONG IS COMMITTED AND WRONGDOER MUST BE
HELD RESPONSIBLE
30. Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989
Cortes, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals finding the petitioners
liable for damages.
Restituto Tobias, private respondent, was an employee of Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. (Globe
Mackay), petitioner, as its purchasing agent and administrative assistant. Tobias later allegedly discovered
and reported to his immediate supervisor and to Herbert Hendry, Executive Vice-President and General
Manager of Globe Mackay anomalies in the company regarding fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions. Thereafter, Hendry confronted Tobias stating that the latter, as the number one suspect,
should have one week forced leave. When Tobias reported for work after the forced leave, Hendry called
him a “crook” and a “swindler.” He was also asked to take a lie-detector test and the specimen of his
handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in
the anomalies. The police investigators, however, cleared Tobias from the said anomalies. Later, petitioners
filed criminal complaints for Estafa which were all dismissed by the fiscal. Tobias was also terminated by
petitioners from his employment. In addition, when Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone
Company (RETELCO), petitioner Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter
stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Eventually, Tobias filed a civil case
for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The RTC
and CA held petitioners liable for damages.
Petitioners contended that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to
dismiss private respondent. On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners'
abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the petitioners
must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.
ISSUE:
Should petitioners be held liable for damages for the imputation of guilt and harassment during the
investigations despite its claim of lawful exercise of its right to dismiss employee?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners should be held liable for damages.
Article 19 of the Civil Code is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights. It sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of
one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their
exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for
the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for
damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. Article 20 of the Civil Code pertains to
damage arising from a violation of law; while Article 21 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
morals, good customs or public policy. Article 21 was adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes,
which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material
and moral injury."
Here, the imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgressed the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already
34
ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which
the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer
is liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly
failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover
damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
35
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
WANT OF CARE TO THE CONSCIOUS DISREGARD OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS COUPLED WITH A

CONSCIOUS KNOWLEDGE OF THE CAUSE NATURALLY CALCULATED TO PRODUCE THEM
WOULD MAKE THE ERRING PARTY LIABLE
31. University of the East v. Jader

G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45.
Romeo Jader, respondent, sued University of the East (UE) for damages for the moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights he suffered when
he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. Jader alleged that
he got an incomplete grade in Practice Court 1. He took the removals examination for said subject but he
was belatedly informed that it was a 5, failing mark. The graduation ceremony invitation
included his name as one of the candidates but the invitation had a footnote that the list is tentative and still
subject to the completion of requirements. Jader attended the ceremony, he marched with his parents, was
given a symbolic diploma, took pictures, tendered a blow-out attended by neighbors, friends, and relatives,
took a leave of absence without pay from work, and enrolled at a pre-bar review class. Petitioner denied
liability arguing mainly that it never led Jader to believe that he completed the requirements for an LLB
degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students.
The RTC held UE liable for actual damages and attorney’s fees. The CA affirmed the decision but in addition
granted moral damages. Hence, this petition.
UE contended that it has no liability to Jader, considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the
alleged damages arose out of his (Jader’s) own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned
the result of his removal examination.
ISSUES:
1. May a university be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had
satisfied all the requirements for graduation?
2. Is Jader entitled to moral damages?
HELD:
1. Yes. UE may be held liable. Considering that the institution of learning involved herein is a university
which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more
specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code. Educational
institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to
inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons
who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages. Want of care to the conscious
disregard of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to
produce them would make the erring party liable.
Here, UE ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of its obligation to inform
Jader of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself for the bar exams
since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an L.L.B. graduate. It failed to act
seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student’s grades at any time because a student has to comply
with certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar.
Petitioner’s liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and
in misleading the latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. Petitioner cannot
pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of information
to Respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss occurred
must bear it. The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of right,
even when the act is not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one’s acts can make him liable for damages for
injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be
36
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and
in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
2. No, Jader is not entitled to moral damages. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for
himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a
senior law student, respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs,
specifically those pertaining to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these, SC failed to see how
respondent could have suffered untold embarrassment. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure
to take the bar, he brought this upon himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including
his school records, before preparing himself for the bar examination. Due to his own negligence, Jader
cannot be entitled of moral damages.
37
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
BAD FAITH IS PRESUMED IF THERE IS FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS
OF THE LAW THAT PREJUDICES/INJURES ANOTHER
32. Manila Electric Company v. Spouses Ramos

G.R. No. 195145, February 10, 2016
Brion, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming the RTC ordering Manila
Electric Company (MERALCO) to restore the electric power connection of Spouses Sulpicio and Patricia
Ramos (respondents).
Spouses Ramos are registered customers of petitioner Meralco. Meralco's service inspector inspected the
respondents' electrical facilities and found an outside connection attached to their electric meter. The service
inspector traced the connection, an illegal one, to the residence and appliances of Nieves. Due to the
discovery of the illegal connection, the service inspector disconnected the respondents' electric services on
the same day without the knowledge of the respondents as they were not at home and their house was
closed at the time. The RTC ordered MERALCO to reconnect respondent’s electric service and the award
of damages. The CA affirmed the RTC’s order and denied MERALCO’s motion for reconsideration. Hence,
this petition.
MERALCO argues that under R.A. 7832, it had the right and authority to immediately disconnect the electric
service of the respondents after they were caught in flagrante delicto using a tampered electrical installation.
They argue that the discovery of an outside connection attached to their electric meter does not give
MERALCO the right to automatically disconnect their electric service as the law provides certain mandatory
requirements that should be observed before a disconnection could be effected. They claim that MERALCO
failed to comply with these statutory requirements.
ISSUE:
Does MERALCO have the right to immediately disconnect the electric service of the respondents upon
discovery of an outside connection attached to their electric meter?
HELD:
No, Meralco has no right to do so.
The distribution of electricity is a basic necessity that is imbued with public interest. Its provider is considered
as a public utility subject to the strict regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power. Failure to
comply with these regulations gives rise to the presumption of bad faith or abuse of right. Nevertheless, the
State also recognizes that electricity is the property of the service provider. R.A. 7832 was enacted by
Congress to afford electric service providers multiple remedies to protect themselves from electricity
pilferage. These remedies include the immediate disconnection of the electric service of an erring customer,
criminal prosecution, and the imposition of surcharges. However, the service provider must avail of any or
all of these remedies within legal bounds, in strict compliance with the requirements and/or conditions set
forth by law. Additionally, Section 6 of R.A. 7832 affords a private electric utility the right and authority to
immediately disconnect the electric service of a consumer who has been caught in flagrante delicto doing
any of the acts covered by Section 4 (a). However, the law clearly states that the disconnection may only
be done after serving a written notice or warning to the consumer.
To reiterate, R.A. 7832 has two requisites for an electric service provider to be authorized to disconnect its
customer's electric service on the basis of alleged electricity pilferage: first, an officer of the law or an
authorized ERB representative must be present during the inspection of the electric facilities; and second,
even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity and the customer is caught in flagrante delicto
committing the acts under Section 4 (a), the customer must still be given due notice prior to the
disconnection.
After a thorough examination of the records of the case, we find no proof that MERALCO complied with
these two requirements under R.A. 7832. MERALCO never even alleged in its submissions that an ERB
representative or an officer of the law was present during the inspection of the respondents' electric meter.
38
Also, it did not claim that the respondents were ever notified beforehand of the impending disconnection of
their electric service.
In view of MERALCO's failure to comply with the strict requirements under Sections 4 and 6 of R.A. No.
7832, we hold that MERALCO had no authority to immediately disconnect the respondents' electric service.
As a result, the immediate disconnection of the respondents' electric service is presumed to be in bad faith.
39
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
GOOD FAITH IS PRESUMED, AND HE WHO ALLEGES BAD FAITH HAS THE DUTY TO PROVE THE
SAME
33. Heirs of Nala v. Artemio Cabansag

G.R. No. 161188, June 13, 2008
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the CA Decision dismissing Nala's
appeal from the RTC decision that ordered them to pay damages to Cabansag.
Artemio Cabansag filed a complaint for damages against Purisima Nala and Atty. Alexander del Prado.
According to Cabansag, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses Eugenio Gomez, Jr. and
Felisa Duyan Gomez. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez
spouses. He received a demand letter from Atty. del Prado, in behalf of Nala, asking for the payment of
rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is owned by Nala, failing which
criminal and civil actions will be filed against him. Thereafter, another demand letter was sent to Cabansag.
Atty. del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely acting in behalf
of his client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership. The RTC ruled in favor of the respondent
and the CA affirmed the decision with modification. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners argue that their predecessor-in-interest had every right to protect and assert her interests over
the property. Nala had no knowledge that the property was sold by spouses Gomez to respondent when
the demand letters were sent.
ISSUE:
Do the demand letters sent by Atty. Del Prado, on behalf of Nala, give rise to an action for damages on the
part of the receiver Cabansag?
HELD:
No. Sending of demand letters by itself does not connote bad faith.
Based on the allegations in respondent's complaint, it may be gathered that the basis for his claim for
damages is Article 19 of the Civil Code. The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed
not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. When a right is exercised
in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another,
a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though
by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some
illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when
he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse. There is an abuse
of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring another. The exercise of a right
must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to injure another. In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of
rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is
exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is
presumed, and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Bad faith, on the other hand, does
not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and
conscious doing of a wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes
of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. del Prado,
acted in bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground
for Nala's actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that
respondent was illegally occupying the same. Therefore, in the absence of bad faith in sending demand
letters, Cabansag cannot recover damages.
40
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
THE EXERCISE OF A LEGAL RIGHT OR DUTY IN GOOD FAITH AND WITH NO INTENTION TO
PREJUDICE OR INJURE ANOTHER WILL NOT GIVE RISE TO AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES
34. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes

G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko) and Ruby Lim
assail the Decision CA reversing the Decision of RTC that dismissed Reyes’ complaint.
Roberto Reyes, also known as Amay Bisaya alleged that while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel
Nikko, he was spotted by his friend, Dr. Violeta Filart. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a birthday party of
the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka, and that she will vouch for him. However, while lining up at
the buffet table, Ruby Lim (Executive Secretary for Hotel Nikko) saw Reyes. Ms. Lim then requested a Ms.
Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. Mr. Reyes, however, lingered prompting Ms.
Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave. When Reyes went to a corner
and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindi ho kayo dapat nandito. Pero total
nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo.”
She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise,
he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.
Reyes filed a complaint for damages based on Article 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code. Lim and Hotel Nikko
contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as
respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the
process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
ISSUE:
Does Ms. Lim’s treatment to Reyes give rise for an action for damages against the latter and the hotel based
on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code?
HELD:
No. Reyes has no cause of action to file a complaint for damages.
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to
ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim
having been in the hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be
emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed
incredible.
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot
be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her
employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea
for all human hurts and social grievances. Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." The object of this article,
therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but
also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent
to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages
is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of
law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article
21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2)
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to
41
injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have
suffered through Ms. Lim's exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith,
must be his to bear alone.
42
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
IN EVERY SITUATION OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA, THEREFORE, THE INJURED PERSON

ALONE BEARS THE CONSEQUENCES
35. Spouses Carbonell v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.

G.R. No. 178467, April 26, 2017
Bersamin, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners, Sps. Carbonell assailed the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision by the RTC
dismissing the petitioners’ complaint, an action for damages, for its lack of merit.
The petitioners initiated against the respondent an action for damages, alleging that they had experienced
emotional shock, mental anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment during their trip to
Thailand because of the respondent's release to them of five US$ 100 bills that later on turned out to be
counterfeit. Upon their return to the Philippines, they had confronted the manager of the respondent's
Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had released to
them were genuine inasmuch as the bills had come from the head office. In order to put the issue to rest,
the counsel of the petitioners had submitted the subject US$ 100 bills to the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP) for examination. The BSP had certified that the bills were near perfect genuine notes. Respondent’s
representatives reiterated their sympathy and regret over the troublesome experience that the petitioners
had encountered, and offered to reinstate US$500 in their dollar account, and, in addition, to underwrite a
round-trip all-expense-paid trip to Hong Kong. Unsatisfied with such offer, petitioners demanded moral
damages of ₱10 Million and exemplary damages.
The petitioners argue that the respondent was liable for failing to observe the diligence required from it by
not doing an act from which the material damage had resulted by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution
in the performance of its duties. Hence, the respondent was guilty of gross negligence, misrepresentation
and bad faith amounting to fraud.
ISSUE:
Was the respondent bank liable to petitioners for the damages that they have suffered due to its issuance
of the subject bills?
HELD:
No, the respondent bank is not liable to petitioners. In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore,
the injured person alone bears the consequences because the law affords no remedy for damages resulting
from an act that does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
The CA and the RTC both found that the respondent had exercised the diligence required by law in
observing the standard operating procedure, in taking the necessary precautions for handling the US dollar
bills in question. It is thus significant that the BSP certified that the falsity of the US dollar notes in question,
which were "near perfect genuine notes," could be detected only with extreme difficulty even with the
exercise of due diligence. The respondent even formally apologized to them and even offered to reinstate
the USD$500.00 in their account as well as to give them the all-expense-paid round trip ticket to Hong Kong
as means to assuage their inconvenience.
Hence, although the petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the counterfeit US
dollar bills, the respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper protocols and procedure in handling
the US dollar bills involved, did not violate any legal duty towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence
nor remiss in its exercise of the degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its obligation as a
banking institution, the latter was not liable for damages. Given the situation being one of damnum absque
injuria, they could not be compensated for the damage sustained.
43
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT IN ITSELF AND ACTIONABLE WRONG
36. Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-14628, September 30, 1960
Concepcion, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by Certiorari filed by the petitioner, from the CA decision modifying the CFI decision by
increasing the amount of actual, moral, and compensatory damages.
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu and petitioner, who
was 10 years younger, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged. She gave up teaching
and became an insurance underwriter. Intimacy developed between her and the petitioner since one
evening in 1953 where they had sexual intercourse after coming from the movies on board a vessel where
petitioner was the apprentice pilot. Soledad told petitioner she was pregnant whereupon he promised to
marry her. The child was born on June 17, 1954. Subsequently on July 24, 1954, petitioner married one
Romanita Perez. Complainant, along with her child, brought an action against petitioner for damages for
breach of promise to marry. The trial court decided in favor of the complainant. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Are moral damages recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry?
HELD:
No, moral damages based on breach of promise to marry are not recoverable under our laws.
That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus v.
Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States and in England has shown
that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm suit in many of the
American States.
In the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of
promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable.
The CA’s finding that the petitioner’s seduction power was the cause of Soledad’s yielding to his sexual
desires and finding him guilty of seduction thus, awarding the latter moral damages cannot be appreciated.
We find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is 10 years
younger than Soledad, but also because of the CFI’s finding that the latter surrendered herself to petitioner
because of she was overwhelmed by her love for him.
Hence, petitioner’s breach of his promise to marry Soledad is not actionable, and the award of moral
damages by the CA is improper.
44
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
MERE BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG; BUT TO FORMALLY

SET A WEDDING AND GO THROUGH ALL THE ABOVE-DESCRIBED PREPARATION AND
PUBLICITY, ONLY TO WALK OUT OF IT WHEN THE MATRIMONY IS ABOUT TO BE SOLEMNIZED,
IS QUITE DIFFERENT
37. Wassmer v. Velez

G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
Bengzon, J.P., J.
FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellee Beatriz P. Wassmer (Wassmer) and defendant-appellany Francisco X. Velez (Velez),
following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set September 1954 as the big day. In
August 1954, Wassmer and Velez applied for a license to contract marriage, which was subsequently
issued. Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's
trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the
maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal
showers were given and gifts received. And then, on September 2, 1954, Velez, who was then 28 years
old, simply left a note for Wassmer stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He
enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff:
"Nothing changed rest assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Sued by Wassmer for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Judgment was rendered
ordering Velez to pay Wassmer damages.
Velez asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. He argues that there is no provision in the Civil Code
authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. As provided in a number of cases ruled by the Court,
the mere breach of a promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
ISSUE:
Was the breach of Velez in his promise to marry Wassmer constitute an actionable wrong provided that the
wedding was formally set and elaborate preparations for the same were made?
HELD:
Yes, Velez is liable to Wassmer for damages. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may
be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.”
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. To formally set a wedding and go through all
the above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which Vekez
must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.
45
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
FRAUD AND DECEIT BEHIND BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY ENTITLES THE PLAINTIFF TO
RECOVER DAMAGES
38. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
Davide, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Private respondent was a 22-year old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner was an Iranian citizen and was an exchange student
taking a medical course in Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. The petitioner courted the respondent and
proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. They agreed to
get married after the end of the semester. Petitioner then visited the respondent’s parents in Pangasinan to
secure their approval to the marriage. Later, petitioner forced the private respondent to live with him in the
Lozano Apartments. Private respondent was a virgin before they started living together. A week before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change. Petitioner maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of which, she sustained injuries. Petitioner repudiated the marriage
agreement and asked respondent not to live with him anymore after a confrontation with a representative
of the barangay captain which happened a day before the filing of the complaint. Moreover, petitioner was
already married to someone living in Bacolod. Hence, private respondent seeks for a judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of the private respondent based on Article 21 of the Civil Code. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence, this appeal by Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Was the petitioner’s breach of promise to marry contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy so as
to entitle private respondent to the award of damages?
HELD:
Yes, the petitioner’s breach of promise to marry private respondent is contrary to morals, good customs,
and public policy; thus, the latter is entitled to damages.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. This
notwithstanding, Article 21 of the CIvil Code is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto
him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was
only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent
to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to
marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which
followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood
to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was
likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage."
Hence, for petitioner’s fraudulent and deceptive promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is entitled
to the award of damages.
46
HUMAN RELATIONS
Arts. 19-21
DAMAGES CAN BE RECOVERED BY THE FAMILY IF THE INJURY IS CAUSED IN A MANNER

CONTRARY TO MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
39. Pe v. Pe
G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
Bautista Angelo, J.
FACTS:
The petitioners are parents, brothers and sister of Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance, Lolita was
24 years old and unmarried. The respondent is a married man and worked as an agent of the La Perla Cigar
and Cigarette Factory. They stayed in the same town. The respondent frequented the house of Lolita on
the pretext that he wanted to teach her how to pray the rosary. They fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine trysts. The rumors about their love affairs reached Lolita’s parents and the
respondent was forbidden from further seeing Lolita. Their love affair continued nonetheless. Lolita later
disappeared from their residence. Her family found a handwritten note from the defendant to Lolita regarding
the date of their meeting.
The trial court did not consider the complaint as actionable because of the petitioners’ failure to prove that
the respondent deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection.
ISSUE:
Are the petitioners entitled to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages based on
Article 21 of the Civil Code for the acts of the respondent?
HELD:
Yes, the petitioners are entitled to recover damages for the acts of respondent.
Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that: “Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.”
In this case, there is no doubt that the claim of petitioners for damages is based on the fact that respondent,
being a married man, carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing the petitioners injury in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win
Lolita's affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, through an ingenious scheme
or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that
defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the
rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's family who was allowed free access because he
was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with
each other and conducted clandestine love affairs. No other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of
events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the
affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and
her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
Hence, petitioners are entitled to the award of damages because the respondent has committed an injury
to the former in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21
of the New Civil Code.
47
HUMAN RELATIONS
Unjust Enrichment
THERE IS NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN RESPONDENT OBTAINED INSURANCE COVERAGE

FOR THE MORTGAGED VEHICLE AS THE PETITIONER SPOUSES HAD ALREADY OBTAINED THE
REQUIRED INSURANCE COVERAGE
40. Spouses Villalva v. RCBC Savings Bank

G.R. No. 165661, August 28, 2006
Puno, J.
FACTS:
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 before the SC which seeks to reverse the decision of the
CA ordering Spouses Mario & Corazon Villalva (spouses) to pay Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation
Saving Bank (RCBC) P3,583.50 and issued a writ of replevin for the mortgaged vehicle.
Petitioner spouses issued forty-eight (48) checks to cover installment payments for a '93 Toyota Corolla
which were secured by a Deed of Chattel Mortgage. Under the Deed, the spouses were to insure the vehicle
against loss or damage by accident, theft and fire, and endorse and deliver the policies to the mortgagor.
The promissory notes and chattel mortgage are ultimately assigned and encashed by RCBC. The evidence
shows that the spouses procured the necessary insurance. They however failed to timely deliver the same
to respondent until much later. As a consequence, RCBC had the mortgaged vehicle insured in the
meantime. The insurance policy obtained by RCBC was later cancelled due to the insurance policy secured
by the Spouses. The premium paid by respondent exceeded the reimbursed amount paid by insurer.
RCBC demanded that the spouses surrender the mortgaged vehicle within five days from notice by reason
of unpaid obligations on the promissory notes and mortgage. The petitioner spouses ignored the demand
letter and asserted that they insured the mortgaged vehicle in compliance with the Deed of Chattel
Mortgage. The MTC ruled in favor of the spouses. Such was affirmed by the RTC, but subsequently
reversed by the CA. RCBC contends that to set aside its decision would result in the unjust enrichment of
the petitioners on the ground that its payment of insurance premiums on behalf of the petitioners unjustly
enriched the latter.
ISSUE:
Is the mortgagee who obtained insurance policy but did not deliver said policy to the mortgagor as required
by the terms of a chattel mortgage unjustly enriched when the mortgagor paid for the premiums to obtain
insurance policy covering the same chattel and the same period?
HELD:
NO. He is not unjustly enriched since the spouses were able to secure the necessary insurance and only
delayed the furnishing thereof to RCBC.
Enrichment consists of every patrimonial, physical or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money.
It may also take the form of avoidance of expenses and other indispensable reductions in the patrimony of
a person. It may also include the prevention of a loss or injury. In the case at bar, petitioner spouses were
not enriched when respondent obtained insurance coverage for the mortgaged vehicle as the petitioner
spouses had already obtained the required insurance coverage for the vehicle.
Hence, the mortgagee who obtained insurance policy but did not deliver said policy to the mortgagor as
required by the terms of a chattel mortgage is not unjustly enriched when the mortgagor paid for the
premiums to obtain insurance policy covering the same chattel and the same period.
48
HUMAN RELATIONS
Unjust Enrichment
MONEY RECEIVED WITHOUT A VALID GROUND OR JUSTIFICATION MUST BE RETURNED UNDER

THE PRINCIPLE OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
41. Loria v. Muñoz, Jr.

G.R. No. 187240, October 15, 2014
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the CA’s decision, ordering petitioner
Carlos A. Loria to return to respondent Ludolfo Munoz the amount of P2,000,000 with actual damages.
In his complaint, Muñoz alleged that he was engaged in construction business. Loria visited Munoz in his
office and invited him to advance P2,000.00 for a subcontract of a river-dredging project in Guinobatan.
Loria represented that he would make arrangements such that Sunwest Construction and Development
Corporation, (Sunwaest) would turn out to be the lowest bidder for the project. Sunwest in turn, would
subcontract 20% or P10,000,000.00 worth of the project to Muñoz.
The project to dredge the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan was subjected to public
bidding. The project was awarded to Sunwest as the lowest bidder. Sunwest allegedly finished dredging the
Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers without subcontracting Muñoz. With the project allegedly finished,
Muñoz demanded Loria to return his P2,000,000.00. Loria, however, did not return the money.
Loria argued that the Munoz has no cause of action against him. Contrary to the claim of Munoz, he followed-
up on the approval of the project with the DPWH as agreed upon. He was therefore, entitiled to
representation expenses.
ISSUE:
Is Loria is liable to return the sum of ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz?
HELD:
Yes, Loria must return Munoz’s ₱2,000,000.00 under the principle of unjust enrichment. Under Article 22 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, "Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him." There is unjust enrichment "when a person unjustly retains a benefit
to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience.
The principle of unjust enrichment has two conditions. First, a person must have been benefited without a
real or valid basis or justification. Second, the benefit was derived at another person’s expense or damage.
In this case, Loria received ₱2,000,000.00 from Muñoz for a subcontract of a government project to dredge
the Masarawag and San Francisco Rivers in Guinobatan, Albay. However, contrary to the parties’
agreement, Muñoz was not subcontracted for the project. Nevertheless, Loria retained the ₱2,000,000.00.
Thus, Loria was unjustly enriched. He retained Muñoz’s money without valid basis or justification. Under
Article 22 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Loria must return the ₱2,000,000.00 to Muñoz.
49
HUMAN RELATIONS
Unjust Enrichment
AN ACCION IN REM VERSO DOES NOT APPLY IF THE ACTION IS PROSCRIBED BY THE
CONSTITUTION OR BY THE APPLICATION OF THE IN PARI DELICTO DOCTRINE
42. Frenzel v. Catito

G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
The petition stems from a CA decision affirming the decision of the RTC, ruling that petitioner Alfred Fritz
Frenzel violated the Constitution thus barring him from recovering the money used in the purchase of parcels
of land allegedly taken by respondent Ederlina Catito and her family.
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel, an Australian citizen of German descent, proposed marriage to Ederlina
Catito, a Filipina married to a German national. He bought her numerous properties such as parcels of land
in Quezon City and Davao City. Knowing that alien ownership of real properties in the Philippines is
prohibited, he agreed that only Ederlina’s name would appear in the deed of sale as buyer of the property.
While staying abroad, Alfred received a letter from Ederlina’s husband begging him to leave his wife alone.
To avoid such event , Alfred decided to live separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her. In
1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlina’s father complaining that Ederlina had taken all his life savings and because
of this, he was virtually penniless. He further accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the
properties he had purchased with his own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina
and her family had stolen and turn over all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their
coverture.
The RTC dismissed his complaint, stating that Frenzel is disqualified to own properties in the country, being
an alien. Petitioner argued that the properties in question were purchased using his personal funds, hence,
he is entitled to recovery.
ISSUE:
Can the petitioner recover the money used in purchasing the several properties?
HELD:
No, futile is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads: Art. 22. Every person who
through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of
something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. An action
for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso.
This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the
application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion
in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but,
as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The objection that a contract is immoral
or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant.
It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of
policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the
plaintiff."
50
HUMAN RELATIONS
Respect for Other’s Privacy, Personality, Etc.
A PARENT IS LIABLE FOR ALIENATION OF AFFECTIONS RESULTING FROM HIS OWN MALICIOUS
CONDUCT, AS WHERE HE WRONGFULLY ENTICES HIS SON OR DAUGHTER TO LEAVE HIS OR
HER SPOUSE, BUT HE IS NOT LIABLE UNLESS HE ACTS MALICIOUSLY
43. Tenchavez v. Escaño

G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
The case is an appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Cebu denying the claim of petitioner Pastor
Tenchavez for legal separation with his estranged wife Vicenta Escano, and P1,000,000 in damages against
Vicenta and her parents, Dr. Mamerto and Mena Escano.
Vicenta scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry, exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez in 1948 before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was held unknown to
Vicenta’s parents. Upon learning of the same, Dr. Mamerta and Mena Escano, were against it being
clandestinely celebrated contrary to tradition and proposed of a re-celebration of the marriage before the
church. One day, however, a letter was sent to Mamerto informing him that Pastor is having an affair with
another woman. Vicenta, upon learning of the same, refused to live with Pastor and the spouses became
estranged.
Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against
Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.” A decree
of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in open court by the said tribunal.
Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining
her husband, and alienating her affections. asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages.
Vicenta’s parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for
moral damages.
ISSUE:
Are Vicenta’s parents are liable for having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband?
HELD:
No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original
suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age,
she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so
doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy
motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
51
HUMAN RELATIONS
AN ADVERTISMENT MISREPRESENTING A HOUSE BELONGING TO ANOTHER MISTAKENLY AND

UNNECESSARILY EXPOSES THE PRIVATE LIFE OF A PERSON; THUS, PUNISHABLE UNDER
ARTICLE 26
44. St. Louis Realty Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-46061, November 14, 1984
Aquino, J.
FACTS:
This case is an appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of the CA and the TC awarding recovery of
damages to respondent Conrado J. Aramil whose house was mistakenly misrepresented by petitioner Saint
Louis Realty Corporation in a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times.
St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio, but without permission
of Doctor Aramil, in the issue of the Sunday Times an advertisement with the heading "WHERE THE HEART
IS". Below that heading was the photograph of the residence of Doctor Aramil and the Arcadio family where
it was portrayed that the house of Doctor Aramil belonged to the latter. Doctor Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist
and a member of the faculty of the U. E. Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital, noticed the mistake and
wrote a letter of protest on the same day to St. Louis Realty. The letter was received by Ernesto Magtoto,
an officer of St. Louis Realty in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. He
contacted Doctor Aramil and offered his apologies. However, no rectification or apology was published.
Aramil's counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000. In it
answer, St. Louis Realty claimed that there was an honest mistake and that if Aramil so desired, rectification
would be published in the Manila Times. It published in the issue of the Manila Times a new advertisement
with the Arcadio family and their real house. But it did not publish any apology to Doctor Aramil and an
explanation of the error. Aramil filed his complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in the issue of
the Manila Times a “NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION".
In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided
in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It argues that the case is not covered by Article 26.
ISSUE:
Does the wrongful advertisement violate the privacy of private respondent, thus entitling him to damages?
HELD:
Yes, the private respondent is entitled to damages as the wrongful advertisement violated his privacy.
The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code.
Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by
Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.
St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a
widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology
and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification “.
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression
that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private
life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.
52
HUMAN RELATIONS
ARTICLE 26 GRANTS CAUSE OF ACTION THOUGH NOT CONSTITUTING CRIMINAL OFFENSE
45. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009
Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the CA in the
case entitled "Sansio Philippines, Inc., et al. v. Hon. Romulo SG. Villanueva, et al."
An Affidavit of Complaint for violation of B.P. 22 was filed by respondent Emma J. Datuin (Datuin), as
Officer-in-Charge of the Accounts Receivables Department, and upon authority of petitioner Sansio
Philippines, Inc. (Sansio), against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio) and one Vito Belarmino, as
proprietors of Alvi Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the
numerous appliances bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address stated in the complaint was
incorrect, Gregorio was unable to controvert the charges against her. she was indicted for three (3) counts
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The MeTC issued a warrant for her arrest, and it was served upon her by the
armed operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC) in Quezon City while she
was visiting her husband and their two (2) daughters at their city residence. Gregorio was brought to the
PARAC-DILG Office where she was detained but released in the afternoon when her husband posted a
bond. Gregorio filed a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not
have issued the bounced checks, as certified by the branch manager of the Philippine National Bank,
Sorsogon Branch. The B.P. Blg. 22 cases were dismissed.
Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio and Datuin .Sansio and Datuin filed a Motion to
Dismisson the ground that the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed
to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Is the civil suit filed by Gregorio based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution?
HELD:
It is based on quasi-delict.
Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of
breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal
dignity; (2) right to personal security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to
privacy; and (6) right to peace of mind.
It appears that Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the identity
of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was
compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the
opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was not able
to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg.
22. Although she was never found at No. 76 Peñaranda St., Legaspi City, the office address of Alvi
Marketing as stated in the criminal complaint, Gregorio was conveniently arrested by armed operatives of
the PARAC-DILG at her city residence at 78 K-2 St., Kamuning, Quezon City, while visiting her family. She
suffered embarrassment and humiliation over her sudden arrest and detention and she had to spend time,
effort, and money to clear her tarnished name and reputation, considering that she had held several
honorable positions in different organizations and offices in the public service, particularly her being a
Kagawad in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest. There exists no contractual relation between Gregorio and
Sansio. On the other hand, Gregorio is prosecuting Sansio, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, for its
vicarious liability, as employer, arising from the act or omission of its employee Datuin.
53
HUMAN RELATIONS
Unfair Competition
WHAT LAW PROHIBITS IS NOT COMPETITION PER SE BUT UNFAIR COMPETITION
46. Willaware Products Corp. v. Jesichris Manufacturing Corp.

G.R. No. 195549, September 3, 2014
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set
aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) and the RTC in awarding damages in favor of respondent
Jesichris Manufacturing Corporation against petitioner Willaware Products Corporation.
Respondent Jesichris Manufacturing Company filed a complaint for damages for unfair competition with
prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin petitioner Willaware Products Corporation from manufacturing and
distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of respondent. Jesichris further alleged that in
view of the physical proximity of Willaware’s office to Jesichris’ office, and in view of the fact that some of
the Jesichris’ employees had transferred to Willaware, Willaware had developed familiarity with their
products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts. Jesichris discovered that Willaware had been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and
colors but was selling these products at a lower price as Jesichris plastic-made automotive parts and to the
same customers. It was futher alleged that Willaware deliberately copied their products all of which acts
constitute unfair competition.
Willaware claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made automotive parts are mere
reproductions of original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms to the specifications
of the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace.
ISSUE:
Did the petitioner commit acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
Yes, the petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition.
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial
enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or high-handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage." From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se
but the use of unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to
engage in business or to earn a livingIn order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two
characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which
are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise
unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other
unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the
matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means.
Here, both characteristics are present. First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged
in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly
"contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed respondent’s former employees,
deliberately copied respondent’s products and even went to the extent of selling these products to
respondent’s customers. Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake
of profit to himself, but regardless of loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business
so that later on he can take advantage of the effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong.
54
HUMAN RELATIONS
Independent Civil Actions
ALTHOUGH PUBLIC OFFICERS OR EMPLOYEES ARE ENTITLED TO EXERCISE AND PERFORM

THEIR DUTIES AS WHAT RULES AND LAWS PROVIDE, THEY ARE PRECLUDED FROM TRAMPLING
THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION
47. Aberca v. Ver

G.R. No. L-69866, April 15, 1988
Yap, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for certiorari before the SC, petitioners Rogelio Aberca et al. (Petitioners) seeks to annul and
set aside the order and resolution dismissing their complaint of damages against respondent members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) for violation of human rights.
Petitioners claim that General Fabian Ver ordered Task Force Makabansa (TFM) of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) “to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground
houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila.” Due to said
order, TFM members raided several homes of the petitioners without the proper judicial warrants; that the
petitioners were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that they were denied visits of
relatives and lawyers, and also other acts which violated their Constitutional rights and civil liberties.
Petitioners sought actual/compensatory damages from the acts of the TFM. Petitioners based their cause
of action for damages under Art. 32 of the Civil Code.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss claiming that (a) the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended against petitioners; and (b) they are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of
their official duties. According to them, since they are members of the AFP, their primary duty is to safeguard
public safety and order. That the Constitution no less provides that the President may call them to “prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof.”
ISSUE:
Are public officers exempted from liability when, during the performance of their official duties, they violate
Constitutional rights or liberties of an individual?
HELD:
No, public officers are still required to uphold the rights and liberties of an individual in the performance of
their functions.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in
damages for violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not
exempt the respondents from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute. In
addition, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioner’s right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of their constitutional rights.
The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest. What is suspended is merely the right of
the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speed means of
obtaining his liberty.
Moreover, Art. 1146 of the Civil Code provides that “when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff
or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the
exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the
plaintiff, the same must be brought within one year.
There is no doubt military authorities have the duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the
left or of the right, or within or without, seeking to destroy our subvert our democratic institutions and imperil
their very existence. But, in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be
observed, otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel.
Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus suspends petitioners’ right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not
55
and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents’
confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their
right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and
inhuman treatment.
56
HUMAN RELATIONS
AS RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE OR CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE IS NOT ONE OF THE THREE CRIMES

MENTIONED IN ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE, THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES THAT MAY BE INSTITUTED IN CONNECTION WITH SAID OFFENSE
48. Corpus v. Paje

G.R. No. L-26737, July 31, 1969
Capistrano, J.
FACTS:
This is a direct appeal on questions of law from order of the Rizal CFI dismissing the complaint of petitioner
on the ground that the action for quasi-delict has prescribed.
Petitioner’s husband, Clemente Marcia was involved in a car accident when the jeep driven by him collided
with a passenger bus of respondent, resulting in the former’s death and in physical injuries to two other
persons.
Respondents were charged with homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for
damages. Respondent Felardo Paje, was found guilty and convicted of the crime charged in the information.
While respondent appealed the judgment of conviction in the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed a separate
civil action for damages based upon the criminal act of reckless imprudence against respondents. The Court
of Appeals reversed the judgement in the criminal case and acquitting respondent after finding that the
reckless imprudence charged against him did not exist, and that the collision was a case of pure accident.
During the pretrial of the civil case, respondents asked the court to rule on their special defense that
petitioners’ cause of action based upon a quasi-delict had prescribed considering that the complaint was
brought four years and eleven months after the collision and that according to Art. 1144 of the Civil Code
and action based upon a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years.
The lower court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that their action was based upon a quasi-
delict and that it had prescribed.
ISSUE:
Is the filing of an independent and separate civil action for damages an available remedy for reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence cases?
HELD:
No, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with reckless
imprudence or criminal negligence cases.
Criminal negligence, that is, reckless imprudence, is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of
the Civil Code which authorizes the institution of an independent civil action, that is, of an entirely separate
and distinct civil action for damages, which shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution and
shall be proved only by a preponderance of evidence. Said article mentions only the crimes of defamation,
fraud (estafa) and physical injuries.
As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not one of the three crimes mentioned in Article 33 of the
Civil Code, there is no independent civil action for damages that may be instituted in connection with said
offense. Hence, homicide through reckless imprudence or criminal negligence comes under the general
rule that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal action is a bar to his civil liability based upon the same
criminal act notwithstanding that the injured party reserved his right to institute a separate civil action. In the
language of the Rules of Court (Rule 111, Sec. 3) the extinction of the criminal action by acquittal of the
defendant on the ground that the criminal act charged against him did not exist, necessarily extinguished
also the civil action for damages based upon the same act.
57
HUMAN RELATIONS
IN CASES OF DEFAMATION, FRAUD OR PHYSICAL INJURIES, A CIVIL ACTION MAY BE FILED

INDEPENDENTLY OF THE CRIMINAL ACTION, EVEN IF THERE HAS BEEN NO RESERVATION MADE
BY THE INJURED PARTY
49. Madeja v. Caro

G.R. No. L-51183, December 21, 1983
Abad Santos, J.
FACTS:
This petition seeks to set aside the order of respondent judge granting the motion to dismiss of private
respondent in the civil case for damages under Art. 33
Petitioner’s husband died after being treated for an appendectomy by private respondent. A criminal charge
of homicide through reckless imprudence was filed against private respondent. The information of the
criminal complaint also states that: “The offended party (petitioner) is reserving her right to file a separate
civil action for damages. While the criminal case was still pending, petitioner filed an action for damages
against private respondent, alleging that her husband died of gross negligence of private respondent.
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss, invoking Sec. 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court stating
that: “criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in a criminal action.”
Respondent Judge granted the motion to dismiss, claiming that the civil action for damages may be
instituted only after the final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.
ISSUE:
Is the filing of an independent and separate civil action for damages an available remedy for homicide
through reckless imprudence?
HELD:
Yes, the filing of an independent and separate civil action for damages is an available remedy.
Sec. 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33 and 2177 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, Article 33 of the Civil Code provides that in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical
injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought
by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves
his right to institute it separately. Article 33, however, creates an exception to this rule when the offense is
defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the
criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article
makes such reservation
Note: The term “physical injuries” should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical
injuries, because the terms used with the latter are general terms. The Code of Commission recommended
that the civil action for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law.
If the intent has been to establish a civil action for bodily harm received by the complainant similar to the
civil action for assault and battery, as the Code Commission states, the civil action should like whether the
offense committed is that of physical injuries, or frustrated homicide, or attempted homicide or even death.”
58
HUMAN RELATIONS
ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE ASSUMES A DEFAMATION, FRAUD, OR PHYSICAL INJURIES

INTENTIONALLY COMMITTED
50. Bonite v. Zosa

G.R. No. L-33772, June 20, 1988
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
The case is a Petition for review on certiorari of the order of the CFI filed by herein petitioners, Heirs of
Florencio Bonite, against private respondent Eligio Abamonga, dismissing the complaint for damages, and
the order denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of aforesaid order.
Florencio Bonite was working as "caminero" when he was hit by a truck driven by private respondent, as a
result of which, Bonite died on that same day. Consequently, the surviving heirs of the deceased filed a
criminal complaint for Homicide through Reckless Imprudence against the private respondent. After trial,
the court rendered a decision acquitting accused for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Subsequently, petitioners filed an action for recovery of damages against the same
accused on account of the death of Florencio Bonite. However, the court a quo dismissed the complaint for
damages, ruling that since there was no reservation of the right to file an independent civil action and that
having been represented by a private prosecutor in the criminal case, the acquittal operated as res judicata.
Private respondent avers that Article 33 (not Article 29) of the Civil Code applies to the case as the latter is
not applicable to offenses arising from tortious acts.
ISSUE:
Does Article 33, which grants the right for independent civil action for damages on account of physical
injuries, apply to offenses arising out of criminal negligence?
HELD:
No. Article 33 of the Civil Code assumes a defamation, fraud, or physical injuries intentionally committed.
The death of the deceased in the case at bar was alleged to be the result of criminal negligence, i.e., not
inflicted with malice. Criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code consists in the
execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. Thus,
the law penalizes the negligent or reckless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty. As reckless imprudence or criminal negligence is not
mentioned in Article 33, no independent civil action for damages arising from reckless imprudence or
criminal negligence may be instituted under said article.
In regard to private respondent’s claim that the specific provision applicable in the case at bar is Article 33
of the Civil Code 9 (and not Article 29), because the latter is not applicable to criminal offenses proceeding
from a tortious act, we find the same to be devoid of merit. It is important to note that Article 29 of the Civil
Code does not state that the right to file an independent civil action for damages (under said article) can be
availed of only in offenses not arising from a tortious act. The only requisite set forth therein for the exercise
of the right to file a civil action for damages is that the accused must have been acquitted in the criminal
action based on reasonable doubt. It is a well-known main in statutory construction that where the law does
not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish
Therefore, Article 33 of the Civil Code is not applicable to the case at bar.
59
HUMAN RELATIONS
Prejudicial Question
THERE IS NO PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHERE ONE CASE IS ADMINISTRATIVE AND THE OTHER
IS CIVIL
51. Te v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals, denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC on the ground of
prejudicial question.
Petitioner Arthur Te and private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites. Later on, while his
marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a second marriage with a certain
Julieta Santella (Santella).
On the basis of a complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent, an information charging petitioner with
bigamy was filed with the RTC. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed in the RTC an action for the annulment
of his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry her. Private respondent
also filed with the PRC an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of their
respective engineering licenses on the grounds of immorality. With respect to petitioner, she added that
petitioner committed an act of falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was still
single.
Petitioner filed with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), a motion to suspend the
proceedings in view of the pendency of the civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent
and criminal case for bigamy. The Board denied the same motion. The petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals where the Court ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the proceedings on
the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law. Respondent court likewise held that no prejudicial
question existed since the action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action
involved is a civil case.
ISSUES:
1. Does a prejudicial question exist between the civil case of annulment of marriage and criminal case of
bigamy?
2. Does a prejudicial question exist between the civil case of annulment of marriage and the administrative
case?
HELD:
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend
the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised
in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale
behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.
1. No. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because
all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the
second marriage is contracted.
The pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent did not give rise
to a prejudicial question which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy
since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage was, under the law, still valid and
subsisting.
2. No. Neither did the filing of said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative
proceedings before the PRC Board. The concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a criminal case.
60
We have previously ruled that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the
other is civil.
Furthermore, Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative proceedings before it shall not
be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving
the same facts as the administrative case:
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another
judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the
administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of
the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall
render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.
61
HUMAN RELATIONS
ACTION FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, EVEN IF PENDING IN THE HLURB, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY, RAISES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
52. San Miguel Properties v. Perez

G.R. No. 166836, September 04, 2013
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner purchased in 1992 and 1993 from B.F. Homes, Inc., then represented by Atty. Florencio B.
Orendain (Orendain) as its duly authorized rehabilitation receiver appointed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), 130 residential lots situated in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque, containing a total
area of 44,345 square meters for the aggregate price of P106,248,000.00. The transactions were embodied
in three separate deeds of sale. The TCTs covering the lots bought under the first and second deeds were
fully delivered to petitioner, but 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41 parcels of land with a total area of 15,565
square meters purchased under the third deed of sale, executed in April 1993 and for which petitioner paid
the full price of P39,122,627.00, were not delivered to them.
On its part, BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for parcels of land purchased
under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time
of the transactions after being meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. on May
17, 1989 pursuant to an order from the SEC. BF Homes refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands.
Thus, on August 15, 2000, San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas City (OCP Las Piñas) charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with
non-delivery of titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of Presidential Decree No. 957.
At the same time, petitioner sued BF Homes for specific performance in the HLURB, praying to compel BF
Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
ISSUE:
Is the pending administrative case in the HLURB a ground to suspend a criminal prosecution on the ground
of prejudicial question?
HELD:
YES, it is a ground to suspend criminal prosecution on the ground of prejudicial question.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal
case.
In this case, contrary to the petitioner’s submission that there could be no prejudicial question to speak of
because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific
performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings
determining the charge for the criminal violation of PD 957. This is true simply because the action for specific
performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB.
62
HUMAN RELATIONS
ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF SECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF VITIATED CONSENT IS

DEEMED A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A BIGAMY CASE
53. Zapanta v. Montesa

G.R. No. L-14534, February 28, 1962
Dizon, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition filed by petitioner Merardo L. Zapanta against the respondent Hon. Agustin
P. Montesa, Judge of the CFI of Bulacan, to enjoin the latter from proceeding with the Criminal Case for
bigamy pending the final determination of the Civil Case for annulment of marriage.
Upon complaint filed by respondent Olimpia A. Yco, an information for Bigamy was filed by respondent
Provincial Fiscal against petitioner alleging that the latter, having previously married one Estrella Guarin,
and without said marriage having been dissolved, contracted a second marriage with said complainant.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed in the Court of First Instance a Civil Case against respondent Olimpia A.
Yco for the annulment of their marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. Respondent Yco,
as defendant in said case, filed a motion to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause
of action, but the same was denied. Petitioner, in turn, filed a motion in the criminal case to suspend
proceedings therein, on the ground that the determination of the issue involved in the civil case was a
prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion as well as petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner filed the present action.
ISSUE:
Is the pendency of a petition for the annulment of the second marriage, on the ground that consent was
obtained through duress, force and intimidation, a prejudicial question in the prosecution for the crime of
bigamy?
HELD:
Yes. A prejudicial question as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of
the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal The prejudicial question
— we further said — must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same
must be lodged in another court These requisites are present in the case at bar.
Should the question for annulment of the second marriage pending in the Court of First Instance prosper
on the ground that, according to the evidence, petitioner's consent thereto was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation, it is obvious that his act was involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for
the crime of bigamy with which he was charged. Thus, the issue involved in the action for the annulment of
the second marriage is determinative of petitioner's guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy.
In the case of People v. Aragon, we held that if the defendant in a case for bigamy claims that the first
marriage is void and the right to decide such validity is vested in another court, the civil action for annulment
must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed. There is no reason not to apply the same
rule when the contention of the accused is that the second marriage is void on the ground that he entered
into it because of duress, force and intimidation.
63
HUMAN RELATIONS
NO JUDICIAL DECREE IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH INVALIDITY OF NULL AND VOID

MARRIAGES
54. People v. Aragon

G.R. No. L-10016, February 28, 1957
Labrador, J.
FACTS:
This is an Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding appellant guilty of bigamy.
Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea in Cebu. While his marriage with Maria
Gorrea was subsisting, the accused under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage
with Maria Faicol in Iloilo City. The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, who was
then an employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in
the said office. After the said marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. As the
accused was then a traveling salesman, he commuted between Iloilo where he maintained Maria Faicol,
and Cebu where he maintained his first wife. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City. After Maria Gorrea’s death,
the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu, where she worked as a teacher-nurse. It would seem that the
accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu, for Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes
because of physical maltreatment in the hands of the accused. Thereafter, the accused sent Maria Faicol
to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused
contracted a third marriage with a certain Jesusa C. Maglasang.
The accused admitted having contracted marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang in Sibonga, Cebu. Although
the accused made an attempt to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the Court, however, believes
that the attempt is futile for the fact of the said second marriage was fully established not only by the
certificate of the said marriage, but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and of Eulogio Giroy, one of the
sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol.
The Court of First Instance of Cebu held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613
authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, defendant
could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to
Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at
the instance of the latter.
ISSUE:
Is the third marriage of the accused valid notwithstanding the lack of judicial decree nullifying the former
void marriage?
HELD:
YES, the third marriage is valid.
The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its
performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annullable marriages.
In this case, the action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife whose marriage with Rosima
was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the
last marriage was a valid one and prosecution against Rosima for contracting marriage cannot prosper.
64
HUMAN RELATIONS
ABSENCE OF MARRIAGE CEREMONY AND MERE PRIVATE ACT OF SIGNING A MARRIAGE

CONTRACT BEAR NO LEGAL EFFECT, THUS, THE CONTRACT OF MARRIAGE IS NULL
55. Morigo v. People

G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) holding Petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contact for a while but after receiving
a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Barrete went back to Canada for work, and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which
was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration
of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and
moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner
contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE:
Should Morigo file a Declaration for the Nullity of Marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in order
to be free from the bigamy case?
HELD:
No, Declaration for Nullity of Marriage is not needed in the instant case considering that the first marriage
was void ab initio makes Morigo acquitted in the Bigamy case.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing
officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act
of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial
declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid
marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of
nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an
accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is
done. Under the circumstances of the present case, the SC held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.
65
HUMAN RELATIONS
THE FINALITY OF THE JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF PETITIONER’S SECOND

MARRIAGE DOES NOT IMPEDE THE FILING OF A CRIMINAL CHARGE FOR BIGAMY AGAINST HIM
56. Capili v. People

G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) to remand the Bigamy case of the Petitioner to the trial court for
further proceedings.
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City. Petitioner
thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili;
(2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy;
and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a
prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of
the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage
contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning. Thereafter, the
petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal
case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private
respondent had already been declared void by the RTC. RTC granted the Manifestation of the Peitioner.
However, the CA reversed the RTC decision and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceeding.
ISSUE:
Is the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy?
HELD:
No, the accused may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage
was celebrated.
It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear then that the
crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second marriage with private
respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of petitioner's second marriage does not
impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes
the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
66
HUMAN RELATIONS
THE SUBSEQUENT JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY DOES NOT RETROACT TO THE DATE OF THE CELEBRATION OF
THE MARRIAGE
57. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
This is an instant petition for review filed by Petitioner Tenebro assailing the decisions of the RTC and CA
on the case of Bigamy filed against him by Leticia Ancajas.
Petitioner in this case contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November
10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with
Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted
yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas. When Ancajas learned of this third marriage,
she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea
of "not guilty". During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes from 1984-1988, with
whom he sired two children. However, he denied that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other,
claiming that no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he signed a
marriage contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a
seaman. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify from the Civil Register in Manila whether
there was any marriage at all between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage. The
petitioner further argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential
requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.
ISSUE:
Does the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which
is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroact to the
date on which the second marriage was celebrated.
HELD:
No, the declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date on which the second marriage was celebrated.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, invoking Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely
no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. As a second or subsequent marriage
contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to
Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is
not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity.
67
HUMAN RELATIONS
ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP, A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IN A CASE FOR VIOLATION OF ANTI-

SQUATTING LAW
58. Apa v. Fernandez

G.R. No. 112381, March 20, 1995
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent Judge Fernandez of the RTC
Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners’ oral motion for the suspension of their arraignment in Criminal Case
No. 012489 entitled “People of the Philippines v. Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa, and Leonilo Jacalan,” as well
as their motion for consideration.
On February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapu-Lapu City, Philippines, herein petitioners conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with one another, without the knowledge and consent of the owner,
ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the said owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her real property situated in Agus. The
petitioners thereby constructed their respective residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, which
acts of the said accused have deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land, to her damage and
prejudice because despite repeated demands the said accused failed and refused, as they still fail and
refuse to vacate the premises above-mentioned.
Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was a prejudicial question
pending resolution concerning the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B. In that case, petitioners seek a declaration
of the nullity of TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among them and
private respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990
by petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed against them.
ISSUE:
Is the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, which was pending in Civil Case No. 2247-L a prejudicial
question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
HELD:
YES, the question of ownership of the subject lot is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
The resolution of the question of ownership would necessarily be determinative of petitioners’ criminal
liability for squatting. A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of
the issue or issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial questions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but
to private respondent and against the latter’s will. Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot
3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in
Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapu-Lapu City. The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be
determinative of petitioners’ criminal liability for squatting.
68
PERSONS
Natural Persons
AN UNBORN CHILD IS GIVEN BY LAW A PROVISIONAL PERSONALITY OF ITS OWN FOR ALL
PURPOSES FAVORABLE TO IT
59. Quimiguing v. Icao

G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970
Reyes, J.
FACTS:
Carmen Quisumbing filed a complaint for support against defendant Icao. In her complaint, she alleged that
they were neighbors and had close and confidential relations. Despite Icao being married, he succeeded in
having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent and
as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop
studying. Hence, she claimed support per month, damages and attorneys fees.
After trial on the merits, the trial judge dismissed the complaint upon motion of defendant for lack of cause
of action, that is, the complaint did not allege that the child had been born.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had
later given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was
allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action.
Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
ISSUE:
Does an unborn child have a right to receive support?
HELD:
Yes. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn
child, therefore, has a right to support from it progenitors, particularly of the defendant-appellee (whose
paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en
ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed
by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition
of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).
It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn,"
violates Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291.
It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for ail purposes that
are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article"
(i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso,
however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article
40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.
Plaintiff had a cause of action for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for
failure to state a cause of action was doubly in error.
69
PERSONS
Natural Persons
NO ACTION FOR DAMAGES COULD BE INSTITUTED ON BEHALF OF THE UNBORN CHILD
60. Geluz v. CA
G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari bringing up for review the question whether the husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same.
Nita Villanueva became pregnant with her present husband, Oscar Lazo before they were legally married.
Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parents, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage with the Lazo, she again became pregnant. As
she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by Geluz. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant and again aborted a two-
month old foetus, employing the services of petitioner Geluz. All throughout this time, Lazo was in the
province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his
consent to, the abortion.
When Geluz learned of the third and last abortion, he filed a complaint against Geluz for damages on
behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received. The trial court granted the complaint and
awarded damages.
ISSUE:
Can damages be recovered by the parents on behalf of an unborn child who was aborted on account of the
injuries it suffered?
HELD:
No, no transmission to anyone can take place as the child lacked juridical personality due to its pre-natal
death.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its
pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality
(or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional
personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because
that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should
be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article".
In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and is generally held that recovery cannot be
had for the death of an unborn child.
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased,
his right to life and physical integrity. They would normally be limited to moral damages i.e. on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations and
exemplary damages. But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found
any basis for an award of moral damages.
70
PERSONS
Juridical Persons
THE ESTATE OF A DECEDENT IS IN LAW REGARDED AS A PERSON AND MAY PROSECUTE AN

UNFINISHED ACTION OF THE DECEDENT TO ITS FINAL CONCLUSION
61. Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Fragante

G.R. No. L-770, April 27, 1948
Hilado, J.
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) from the Public Service Commission
(PCS) to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal. Unfortunately, while the application
was still pending, he died. Petitioner opposed the application on the ground that the application should be
denied since the applicant Pedro Fragante already died. Nonetheless, a certificate of public convenience
was still issued to Pedro Fragante’s Intestate Estate, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special
or Judicial Administrator, to maintain and operate an ice plant in the San Juan and to sell the ice produced
from said plant. The PCS ruled that “the original applicant Pedro 0. Fragante was a Filipino citizen at the
time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service."
Petitioner files the present petition assailing the granting of the CPC to the estate of Fragrante. Petiioner
contends that the estate of Fragrante cannot represent him in the case then pending before the commission
since the PCS Law allows only Filipino citizen to be granted the certificate.
ISSUES:
1. Is the estate of a decedent considered as a ‘person” in law?
2. May the estate of a deceased person substitute and represent the decedent in an unfinished action for
an application of a certificate of public convenience?
3. Is a certificate of public convenience property?
HELD:
1. Yes. The estate of a decedent is a person in legal contemplation of law.
It is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly,
that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. In this
jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as
having legal personality independent of the heirs. The underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for
certain purposes, the estate of a deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations
of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.
Hence, we hold that within the framework of the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragante should be
considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate
which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the
fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one involved
in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the
prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. An injustice would ensue from the opposite course.
2. Yes. If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that
right. Fragrante had invested in the ice plant in question with P35,000 and with his other properties and
business, he would certainly have been financially able to maintain and operate said plant had he not died.
The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its final conclusion was one which
by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for such
a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied the application,
although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financial ability
of the estate to maintain and operate the ice plant.
The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel
of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or
administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors,
71
devisees, or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in
the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of
the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be
empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.
3. Yes. A certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an
asset". Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying
with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial
administrator after his death.
72
PERSONS
Citizenship
AN ALIEN WOMAN MARRYING A FILIPNO BECOMES IPSO FACTO A FILIPINA PROVIDED SHE IS
NOT DISQUALIFIED TO BE A CITIZEN UNDER SECTION 4 OF CA 473
62. Mo Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration

G.R. No. L-21289, October 4, 1971
Barredo, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal on the decision of CFI which dismissed the petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction
against the Commissioner of Immigration. The petition seeks to restrain the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and
deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so.
On February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. She
stated she was a Chinese and that she desired to take a trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle
for a month. She was permitted to stay for a month. Upon her arrival, Cheng filed a bond to undertake that
Lau Yuen Yueng would depart on or before the expiration of her authorized period to stay in the country.
On January 1962, she contracted marriage with Mo Ya Lim Yao an alleged Filipino citizen. It was admitted
that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could
not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except
one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
Petitioner, Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen
(not being disqualified to become such by naturalization) contends that she became a Filipino citizen by
virtue of her marriage to Mo Ya Lim Yao. Respondent contends that the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen
to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien wife must possess all
the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the
disqualifications.
ISSUE:
Can Lau Yuen Yueng claim Filipino citizenship by virtue of her marriage with a Filipino?
HELD:
Yes. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo
the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an
applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a
naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the
wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
Hence, Lau Yuen Yueng became a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Mo Ya Lim Yao, a
Filipino citizen as of January 25, 1962.
73
PERSONS
Citizenship
DENIAL OF APPLICATION FOR DERIVATIVE NATURALIZATION NOT A BAR FOR APPLICATION

FOR JUDICIAL NATURALIZATION
63. Republic v. Batuigas

G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC
granting the Petition for Naturalization of Batuigas.
Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. Azucena alleged in her
petition that she has all the qualifications required under Sec. 2 and none of the disqualifications in CA 473.
The OSG filed its Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative trade, which the RTC later denied. Neither the OSG nor the Provincial
Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing, hence Azucena moved that evidence be presented ex-
parte, which the RTC granted. The RTC found that Azucena has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to be admitted as citizen of the Philippines. The OSG appealed the decision to the CA
alleging that Azucena failed to comply with the income requirement and the ex-parte presentation of
evidence violates CA 473 as the law mandated a public hearing. The CA dismissed the OSG’s appeal. The
CA found that Azucena’s financial condition permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in
accordance with the prevailing standard of living and consistent with the demands of human dignity. The
CA also held that the RTC complied with the law requiring notice to the OSG of its scheduled hearing.
ISSUE:
Did Azucena fail to comply with CA 473 as to the income and public hearing requirement?
HELD:
No. Azucena complied with the income and public hearing requirement.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire citizenship through judicial or administrative naturalization. A third
option called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to a Filipino is found under
Sec. 15 of CA 473 which provides that “any woman who is now married to a citizen of the Philippines and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
The choice of what option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant. In this
case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact that her
application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her from
seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It is to be remembered that her application at the CID
was denied not because she was found to be disqualified, but because her husband’s citizenship was not
proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial naturalization proceeding,
for the courts to determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on
regular judicial naturalization proceedings.
On the submitted evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any disqualification under Sec.
4, CA 473. The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena, however the OSG failed
to appear prompting the RTC to order the ex-parte presentation of evidence. The OSG was notified of the
ex-parte proceeding but despite notice, again failed to appear. Hence, Azucena, for complying with all the
requirements should be granted the Filipino Citizenship.
74
PERSONS
Citizenship
IT IS NOT ONLY THE LAW ITSELF (PD 725) WHICH IS TO BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT, BUT
EVEN THE REPATRIATION GRANTED UNDER SAID LAW
64. Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections

G.R. Nos. 120295 & 123755, June 28, 1996
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and
annul a Resolution of the Comelec, First Division and another Resolution of the Comelec en banc denying
Lee's motion for reconsideration.
On March 20, 1995, Juan Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the office of Governor of
Sorsogon in the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, Raul Lee, filed a petition praying that Frivaldo be
disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the
Philippines, and that his COC be canceled. The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of
the election returns and Frivaldo obtained the highest votes. However, at 8:30 pm of June 30, Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. On July 6, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition, praying for the
annulment of the June 30 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30 at
2:00 pm, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after his petition for repatriation under
P.D. 725 had been granted. The proclamation of Lee as Governor is annulled by Comelec Divisionp]
because Lee did not garner the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation. Lee’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Comelec en banc.
Lee contends that the alleged repatriation of Frivaldo was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive
as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him to hold the Office of Governor.
ISSUE:
Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal, thus seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify
him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office of Governor?
HELD:
Yes, the repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
Under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is
provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or
REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS. A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it
creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in our laws. Said statute
also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their
Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship", because prior to the promulgation
of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of
naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine citizenship under
the simplified procedure of repatriation.
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen,
nevertheless, it is not only the law itself (P.D. 725) which is to be given retroactive effect, but even the
repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to be deemed to have retroacted to the
date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it was
the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events -- i.e., situations and
transactions existing even before the law came into being -- in order to benefit the greatest number of former
Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the constitutionally guaranteed right of
citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all the
more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and
transactions subsequent to the passage of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June
30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application.
75
PERSONS
Citizenship
UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, THERE IS DISTINCTION BETWEEN DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE; FOR
PURPOSES OF POLITICAL LAW, RESIDENCE IS USED SYNONYMOUSLY WITH DOMICILE
65. Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification
with the Comelec alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his
petition, he contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one-year residency requirement for
candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in her Voter
Registration Record and in her COC. Petitioner then filed an Amended/Corrected COC, changing the entry
"seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. The Second Division of the
COMELEC, came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification; 2) striking
off petitioner's Corrected/Amended COC of; and 3) canceling her original COC. Comelec en banc denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First
District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to
the SC for relief.
ISSUE:
Is petitioner a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time
of the May 9, 1995 elections?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner is a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "for the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong v. Republic this court took the
concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or
physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is
the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between
residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the
resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his
purpose is established it is residence. For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are
dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what
has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously
with domicile.
Petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover,
while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew
up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the
country for various reasons. It cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by
operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is
a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage
cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.
76
Thus, the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim
of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
77
MARRIAGE
Authority of Solemnizing Officer
WHERE A JUDGE SOLEMNIZES A MARRIAGE OUTSIDE HIS COURT'S JURISDICTION, IT MAY NOT
AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE BUT A MERE IRREGULARITY
66. Navarro v. Domagtoy

A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996
Romero, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case against Judge Domagtoy based on the ground of gross misconduct as well
as inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside his court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at
the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional
area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
Judge Domagtoy maintains that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not
violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.|
ISSUE:
Does the respondent judge possess authority to solemnize marriage outside of his jurisdiction?
HELD:
Yes, the venue of the marriage ceremony does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in
the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3)
upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either
Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request
presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge.
Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under
Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within
the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage
ceremony and does not alter or qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage. A priest who is commissioned and
allowed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese
or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the
entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction,
there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.
Hence, the venue of the marriage ceremony does not alter or qualify the authority of judges. The marriage
is valid, however, the official is subjected to administrative liability.
78
MARRIAGE
Valid Marriage License
THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE RENDERS THE MARRIAGE NULL AND VOID
67. Kho v. Republic

G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for Certiorari, petitioner Racquel G. Kho challenges the decision of the CA that reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC which ruled in petitioner Racquel G. Kho’s favour in an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage.
Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner Racquel G. Kho parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon, now deceased, then clerk in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange
and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the intended marriage between petitioner
Racquel G. Kho supposedly to take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the public
from witnessing the marriage ceremony. The marriage was celebrated at around 3:00am of June 1, 1972.
After 25 years of marriage, petitioner filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage.
Petitioner argues that he has never gone to the office of the Local Civil Registrar to apply for marriage
license and had not seen much less signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement
of a marriage license. Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a Certification issued by the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and respondent with
respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972. On the other hand, respondent argues that both
petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil registrar and secured a marriage license
which they presented before their marriage was solemnized.
RTC granted the petition. however it was reversed by the CA on the ground of ethical considerations as
well as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage with
respondent.
ISSUE:
Was there a lack of marriage license that would render the marriage between the petitioner and respondent
null and void?
HELD:
YES, the absence of marriage license would render the marriage null and void.
The Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the
former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the subject marriage license.
The SC held in various cases that for a marriage to be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such
marriage license was issued to the parties.
Therefore, as the marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
79
MARRIAGE
THE FALSITY OF THE ALLEGATION IN THE SWORN AFFIDAVIT RELATING TO THE 5-YEAR PERIOD
UNDER ARTICLE 76 IS NOT A MERE IRREGULARITY
68. Republic v. Dayot

G.R. Nos. 175581 & 179474, March 28, 2008
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of two consolidated cases filed by the Republic of the Philippines
and Felisa Tecson-Dayot (Felisa).
On 24 November 1986 Respondent Jose Dayot and petitioner Felisa Tecson-Dayot were married at the
Pasay City Hall. The marriage was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of a marriage license,
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had
attained the age of maturity, and that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years.
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. According
to Jose, he was introduced to Felisa in 1986. He came to live as a boarder in Felisa’s house. Three weeks
later, he accompanied Felicia upon her request to the Pasay city hall to claim a package sent to the latter
by her brother. At the Pasay City Hall, Jose was asked to sign three folded pieces of paper. They were told
that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to
do so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother
who had learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the
man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage
with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisa’s house.
It was also established during trial that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time
they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.
Jose argued that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between
the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and Felisa had lived as husband and
wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud. His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under
Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal
condition that the man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by
him and Felisa was false.
Felisa denied Jose’s allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but
that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.
ISSUE:
Was the marriage between Jose and Felicia not exempted under Art 76 and therefore null and void for lack
of marriage of license?
HELD:
YES. The failure of Jose and Felisa to meet the requirements under Art 76 did not exempt them from
obtaining a marriage license before they could marry, hence, their marriage is null and void.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as
it is plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have
80
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in
no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading
of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of
cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article
76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory
requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also
prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person
authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage
shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the
contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started
living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.
The falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation,
which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot
be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a
mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
Therefore, the marriage was celebrated without a marriage license since Jose and Felicia failed to meet the
legal requirements under Art. 76.
81
MARRIAGE
THE 5-YEAR PERIOD SHOULD BE THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE DAY OF THE
MARRIAGE AND IT SHOULD BE A PERIOD OF COHABITATION CHARACTERIZED BY EXCLUSIVITY
69. Niñal v. Bayadog

G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review grounded on a pure question of law, seeking to reverse the ruling of the
RTC of Cebu City in not holding the marriage between Pepito Ninal and Norma Badayog null and void for
lack of marriage license.
Pepito Niñal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8
months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without
any marriage license. In lieu thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986
stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. After their father's death in 1997, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma on the ground of absence of a marriage license.
The lower court dismissed the petition ruling that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and
void their father's marriage to respondent before his death.
ISSUE:
Did the cohabitation of Ninal and Bayadog satisfied the requirement under Art 76 of the Family Code to be
exempt from procuring a valid marriage license?
HELD:
No.
This 5-year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period
of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity — meaning no third party was involved at anytime within the 5
years and continuity — that is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed
without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five
years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to have common law
relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully with their spouse.
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondent's marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with
each other as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepito's first
marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed.
Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
respondent had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature
of a perfect union that is valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage
contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when he started cohabiting with respondent. It is
immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been separated in fact from his lawful
spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of the filial companionship
between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as being one as
"husband and wife".
82
MARRIAGE
PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY ACCORDED TO A MARRIAGE LICENSE DISAPPEARS THE

MOMENT THE MARRIAGE DOCUMENTS DO NOT APPEAR REGULAR ON ITS FACE
70. Office of the Court Administrator v. Necessario

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, April 2, 2013 (Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
This is an administrative case stemming from alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in
several branches of the MTCC and RTC of Cebu City. A memorandum from the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) revealed that certain package fees were offered to interested parties by “fixers” or
“facilitators” for instant marriages.
In 2007, an audit team created by OCA proceed to Cebu City to investigate four branches of the MTCC
therein. Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit team. The
team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under
Article 34 of the Family Code. The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized
marriages than the number of marriage certificates in the courts’ custody. There is also an unusual number
of marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and Liloan, Cebu. There
were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses obtained on the same day.
The OCA recommended the dismissal of the respondent judges and some court employees, and the
suspension or admonition of others. In their Comments and/or Answers, the parties raised the following
defenses: (1) presumption of regularity regarding the documents presented to by contracting parties; (2)
there is nothing wrong with solemnizing marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license and
with the fact that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of the parties resided;
(3) it is the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents submitted by the parties, thus, there is the
presumption of the regularity of the licenses issued. As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes
there is nothing wrong with the fact that these are pro forma. The OCA found Judge Anatalio S. Necessario,
and three other magistrates guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty.
ISSUE:
Is the ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license beyond the scope of the duty of a solemnizing
officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the contrary?
HELD:
No. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license
disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face. In People v. Jansen, this
Court held that: “…the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license
has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is
that the license has been issued by the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of
the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the
requirements of law. However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas, that "the presumption of regularity
of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty."
The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the
irregularity of the issuance. First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if
the requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character. Most of these
documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related
to the parties’ place of residence. These included indistinguishable features such as the font, font size, and
ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage certificate and marriage license. Judges Necessario,
Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit
a certificate of legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. They should have been diligent in
scrutinizing the documents required for the marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been
prevented in the qualifications of parties to contract marriage.
83
MARRIAGE
ABSENCE OF SUCH MARRIAGE LICENSE MUST BE APPARENT ON THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT
71. Diaz-Salgado v. Anson

G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016
Reyes, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the CA decision which
affirmed the RTC decision, finding the marriage between Luis Anson, respondent, and the late Severina De
Asis valid.
Luis filed a civil complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and Gerard Salgado, petitioners, along with Maria
Luisa Anson-Maya and Gaston Maya. Luis alleged that he and the late Severina were married in a civil
ceremony on December 28, 1966, before the effectivity of the Family Code. Prior to the celebration of their
marriage, Severina gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa, while Jo-Ann is Severina’s daughter from a
previous relationship. Severina transferred properties in favor of Jo-Ann without Luis’ knowledge and
consent. When Severina died, Maria Luisa executed a deed of extra-judicial settlement, adjudicating herself
as Severina’s sole heir.
Luis claimed that because of these acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal properties and
of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. To prove his marriage with Severina, Luis presented a
certified true copy of his marriage contract with Severina.
Petitioners disputed the validity of Luis and Severina's marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license.
No marriage license number was indicated in the marriage contract and it also appears therein that no
marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer as the marriage is of an exceptional character
under Article 77 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license?
HELD:
Yes, the marriage is void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license.
To be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence
of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a
certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the parties.
Under Article 77 of the old Civil Code, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance
of marriage license if the parties to the religious ceremony are already married to each other in accordance
with law (civil marriage) and the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in nature. In this case, Luis and
Severina were not married to each other prior to the civil ceremony officiated on December 28, 1966 – the
only date of marriage appearing on the records. Thus, this marriage is not of an exceptional character and
a marriage license is required for Luis and Severina's marriage to be valid.
Considering that the absence of the marriage license is apparent on the marriage contract itself, with a false
statement therein that the marriage is of an exceptional character, and no proof to the contrary was
presented, there is no other plausible conclusion other than that the marriage between Luis and Severina
was celebrated without a valid marriage license and is thus, void ab initio.
84
MARRIAGE
Non-Essential/Non-Formal Requirements
SINCE THE DUE EXECUTION AND THE LOSS OF THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT WERE CLEARLY
SHOWN BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED, SECONDARY EVIDENCE — TESTIMONIAL AND
DOCUMENTARY — MAY BE ADMITTED TO PROVE THE FACT OF MARRIAGE
72. Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 135216, August 19, 1999
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
The case at bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the ruling of the RTC declaring the so called "reconstructed marriage contract"
excluded under the best evidence rule, and therefore declaring said evidence spurious and non-existent.
Petitioner claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed Special
Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed Marriage Contract between
herself and the deceased. Pedro Pilapil on the other hand, claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo.
Pilapil contends that the marriage between Dr. Alfredo Jacob and petitioner was void ab initio, because
there was neither a marriage license nor a marriage ceremony. Petitioner claims that the marriage between
her and Alfredo was solemnized by one Msgr. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She
could not however present the original copy of the Marriage Contract explaining that it was given by Msgr.
Yllana to Mr. Centenera for registration; thus she presented a reconstructed Marriage Contract as
secondary evidence.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage between the plaintiff-appellant and deceased Alfredo Jacob valid?
HELD:
Yes, the marriage is valid. Regarding the contention the marriage was void ab initio because of the lack of
a marriage license, it has been established that Dr. Jacob and petitioner lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years. An affidavit to this effect was executed by Dr. Jacob and petitioner. Clearly then, the
marriage was exceptional in character and did not require a marriage license under Article 76 of the Civil
Code, the marriage taking placing prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.
As regards the loss of the marriage certificate, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties
themselves, by the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the parties; or
even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the execution thereof. The Court has also held
that "the loss may be shown by any person who knows the fact of its loss, or by anyone who has made, in
the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers of
similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been
unable to find it; or who has made any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument has indeed been lost."
Hence, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during the
marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by
the testimony and the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as well as by petitioner's own
declaration in court. These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and
the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence —
testimonial and documentary — may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
85
MARRIAGE
Foreign Marriages
A FILIPINO CITIZEN HAS THE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW AFTER
INITIATING A DIVORCE PROCEEDING ABROAD AND OBTAINING A FAVORABLE JUDGMENT
AGAINST HIS OR HER ALIEN SPOUSE WHO IS CAPACITATED TO REMARRY
73. Republic v. Manalo

G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and set aside the
Resolution of the CA holding that that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code) is
applicable even if it was the petitioner who filed for divorce against her Japanese husband because the
decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry.
Marelyn Manalo was previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named Yoshino Minoro.
A case for divorce was filed by the petitioner Manalo in Japan. A divorce decree was later issued by the
Japanese Court. Manalo filed a petition for cancellation of entry of marriage in the civil registry of San Juan,
Metro Manila, by virtue of a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese court and that she be allowed to
return and use her maiden surname, Manalo.
The trial court denied the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should
not be recognized. It held that Article 15 of the Civil Code "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a
divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad. The CA overturned the RTC decision, holding that
Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree they obtained makes the latter no longer married to the
former, capacitating him to remarry. The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Is a Filipino citizen who has obtained a valid divorce decree abroad capacitated to remarry through the
application of Article 26 of the Family Code?
HELD:
Yes, a Filipino citizen has such a capacity.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the
one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether
the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. Whether the Filipino spouse
initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and
capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively
be without a husband or wife.
86
MARRIAGE
Foreign Marriages
OUR COURTS DO NOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS AND JUDGMENTS; HENCE,
LIKE ANY OTHER FACTS, BOTH THE DIVORCE DECREE AND THE NATIONAL LAW OF THE ALIEN
MUST BE ALLEGED AND PROVEN ACCORDING TO OUR LAW ON EVIDENCE
74. Garcia v. Recio

G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
In a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify order of the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City declaring the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and Rederick A. Recio
solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as dissolved and both parties can now remarry under
existing and applicable laws to any and/or both parties.
Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal. They lived as
husband and wife in Australia. However, a divorce decree was issued by the Australian family court,
dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha.
Recio became an Australian citizen and married Garcia in Cabanatuan City. They eventually lived
separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal
assets were divided in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Garcia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy claiming that she
learned only in November 1997 of Recio’s marriage with Samson. The trial court held that the first marriage
of respondent was ipso facto terminated by the divorce decree obtained in Australia, thus capacitating him
to contract a second marriage.
ISSUE:
Is the divorce decree alone – obtained by respondent in Australia – ipso facto terminated his first marriage
to Editha Samson, thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the petitioner?
HELD:
No, a divorce decree alone is insufficient to terminate the first marriage in this case. Our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence.
Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between
two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made.
Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." Therefore, before a foreign divorce
decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
87
MARRIAGE
Foreign Marriages
PARAGRAPH 2 OF ARTICLE 26 SHOULD BE INTERPRETED TO INCLUDE CASES INVOLVING

PARTIES WHO, AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE MARRIAGE WERE FILIPINO CITIZENS,
BUT LATER ON, ONE OF THEM BECOMES NATURALIZED AS A FOREIGN CITIZEN AND OBTAINS
A DIVORCE DECREE
75. Republic v. Orbecido

G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review, where the Solicitor General assails the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur where the court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido
III is capacitated to remarry.
Cipriano Orbecido III, respondent, married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City and had 2 children. The wife went to the United States to work. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, obtained a
divorce decree and married another man.
Orbecido filed a petition for authority to remarry under the Article 26 (2) of the Family Code. No opposition
was filed. Finding merit in the petition, the lower court granted the same. The Republic, through the OSG,
sought reconsideration, arguing that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or
for legal separation. For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he
is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Is the divorce decree acquired by a Filipino naturalized as an American in the United States, valid and
binding in the Philippines?
HELD:
Yes, the divorce decree is valid and the respondent can remarry. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be
interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage. In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application
of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but
their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino
spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted as to the claim of Orbecido that
his wife was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly
upon respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
88
MARRIAGE
Foreign Marriages
ALIENS MAY OBTAIN DIVORCES ABROAD, WHICH MAY BE RECOGNIZED IN THE PHILIPPINES,
PROVIDED THEY ARE VALID ACCORDING TO THEIR NATIONAL LAW
76. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985
FACTS:
This is Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, where petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the
Orders issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order.
Petitioner Alicia Reyes Van Dorn, citizen of the Philippines and private respondent Richard Upton, citizen
of the United States, were married on 1972 at Hongkong. On 1982, they got divorced in Nevada, United
States; and the petitioner remarried to Theodore Van Dorn. On July 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit
against petitioner, asking that the petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of her business in Ermita,
Manila, and be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case
on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceeding
before Nevada Court where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved is located in the
Philippines, that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. Respondent avers that Divorce Decree
abroad cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Is the foreign divorce valid and binding in the Philippines?
HELD:
Yes, the divorce is valid and binding. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce
in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
89
MARRIAGE
Foreign Marriages
ARTICLE 26(2) DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE NATURALIZED SPOUSE PROCURED THE DIVORCE
PRIOR TO NATURALIZATION
77. Republic v. Iyoy

G.R. No. 152577, September 21, 2005
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Rule 45 Petition praying for reversal of CA decision which declared the marriage between Crasus Iyoy and
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Family Code Article 36.
Spouses were married on December 16, 1961 and had five children. After their marriage, Crasus discovered
that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the US leaving
all their children with her husband. A year after, Crasus received a letter from her requesting his signature
on the enclosed divorce papers, which he disregarded. Fely got married to an American and had a child.
She continued to live with her American family and had openly used the surname of her American husband
both in the Philippines and the U.S.
Before the SC, the Republic argues that abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent’s wife do not
per se constitute psychological incapacity.
ISSUES:
1. Was the declaration of the marriage as null and void ab initio based on Family Code Article 36 correct?
2. Is the Family Code Article 26 paragraph 2 applicable in the case at bar?
3. Can the Solicitor General intervene, on behalf of the Republic, in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriage?
HELD:
1. No, the totality of evidence presented by respondent failed miserably to establish the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife. The oft-quoted cases of Santos v. CA, Republic v. Molina and Marcos
v. Marcos provides for guidelines to be used in psychological incapacity cases. The only substantial
evidence presented by respondent before the RTC was his testimony, which can easily be put into question
for being self-serving, in the absence of any corroborating evidence.
2. No, it is not applicable. The said provision refers to a special situation wherein one of the married couples
is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By its plain and literal interpretation, it cannot be
applied to the instant case because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
3. Yes, the Solicitor General can intervene. The intent of the law is to ensure the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind
that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land, then his intervention
could only serve and contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than to thwart it.
90
MARRIAGE
Foreign Marriages
A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC IS NOT APPLICABLE IN A PETITION TO RECOGNIZE FOREIGN JUDGMENT

WHERE ONE OF THE PARTIES IS A FOREIGNER
78. Fujiki v. Marinay

G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
The instant case is a direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the RTC, through a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 on a pure question of law.
The marriage between petitioner Fujiki and respondent Marinay did not sit well with the former’s parents.
As a consequence thereof, petitioner could not bring respondent to Japan where he resides. They eventually
lost contact with each other. Despite the fact that their marriage was not dissolved, Marinay wed another
Japanese - Shinichi Maekara. The couple wed in Quezon City. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan but in
this marriage the latter allegedly suffered physical abuses from the latter. Marinay left Maekara and started
to contact Fujiki. The two were able to reestablish their relationship. Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the latter’s marriage with Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Thereafter, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)”. It was prayed therein - (1) that the judgment of the Japanese Family Court
be recognized, (2) that the bigamous marriage be declared void ab initio and (3) for the RTC to direct the
Local Civil Registrar to annotate the foreign judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse the same to the National Statistics Office.
The RTC dismissed the petition for being in gross violation of Sections 2 and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
(Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages). Under
Section 2, it is provided that only the husband and wife can file the said petition. The RTC ruled that only
Maekara and Marinay can file the petition and not Fujiki.
ISSUE:
Is A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applicable in a petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment proper?
HELD:
No. Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. To
hold that it is applicable would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions. This will
litigate the case anew thus defeating the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments which seeks to limit
repetitive litigation on claims and issues. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, the Supreme Court held
that the rule in the A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only husband and wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy. For Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as fact under the Rules of Court.
The RTC is ordered to reinstate the case for further proceedings.
91
MARRIAGE
Foreign Marriages
ONLY THE FILIPINO SPOUSE CAN INVOKE THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE
79. Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas

G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Brion, J.
FACTS:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision of the RTC of Laoag City, elevated via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding and when he returned to
the Philippines, he was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Gerbert
returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce and the divorce decree took effect a month later.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, the
NSO informed Gerbert that to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized
by a competent Philippine court. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce
and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition to Gerbert’s
petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself.
The RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.
ISSUE:
Can the alien spouse claim a right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code?
HELD:
NO, the alien spouse cannot claim a right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse." The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered
as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry.
The RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
However, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree.
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been
duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert.
Therefore, petition for certiorari is granted. The Court remands the case to the RTC to determine whether
the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
92
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
TO BE CONVICTED OF BIGAMY, THE SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE MUST HAVE ALL THE
ESSENTIAL REQUISITES FOR VALIDITY
80. Santiago v. People

G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS:
Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution of
the CA in. The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the RTC in a criminal case convicting her of bigamy.
Four months after the solemnization of their marriage, Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced an
Information for bigamy. Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, asked petitioner
to marry him. Petitioner, who was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997. Petitioner
knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 and that after six months of courtship, she married him. As
a matter of defense, Santiago avers that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, the second marriage of
Santos to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued that their marriage
was void due to the lack of a marriage license.
She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage
license, because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five
years. The evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less
than four years. Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to
their marriage. It appears that the two of them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that
they had actually cohabited for at least five years before they married each other.
ISSUE:
Should the validity of the second marriage be first proven in order for one to be convicted of bigamy?
HELD:
YES, the validity of the second marriage should first be proven.
Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent
marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity. If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the
marriage, he or she can do it as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper
of the criminal case. In this case, petitioner has consistently questioned below the validity of her marriage
to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without the essential requisite of a marriage license are
void ab initio.
However, the Court cannot countenance petitioner’s illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same
breath, adjudge her innocent of the crime. For the Court to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity
of marriage. It will be the height of absurdity for the Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape
criminal conviction.
Therefore, Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision CA is affirmed. Petitioner Leonila G.
Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice.
93
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE NOT A GROUND FOR

DISMISSAL OF THE CRIMINAL CASE FOR BIGAMY
81. Capili v. People

G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the Decision and Resolution
of CA, finding the petitioner James Walter Capili guilty of bigamy.
Petitioner, James Walter Zapili was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig. During the
subsistence of his lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili and without said marriage having been legally
dissolved or annulled, he contracted a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo. Petitioner thereafter filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the
second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the
marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency
of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the
instant criminal case.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of
the second marriage between James and Shirley on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by
the husband during the lifetime of the legal wife is void from the beginning. Thereafter, James filed his
Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against
him on the ground that the second marriage between him and private respondent had already been declared
void by the RTC of Antipolo. RTC of Pasig City granted petitioner’s Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC’s decision.
James contends that the case for bigamy should be dismissed pursuant to the decision rendered by RTC
of Antipolo nullifying the second marriage between James and Shirley. The oppositor stated, among others,
that the issues raised in the civil case are not similar or intimately related to the issue in this bigamy case
and that the resolution of the issues in said civil case would not determine whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
ISSUE:
Is the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage a ground for dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy?
HELD:
No, it is not a ground for dismissal of the bigamy case.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, it appears that all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information was
filed on June 28, 2004. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. The outcome of the
civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private complainant had no bearing upon the
determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required
for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage
is contracted.
Therefore, the subsequent declaration of nullity of the marriage is not a ground for dismissal of the crime
for bigamy.
94
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
SUBSEQUENT DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY NOT A GROUND FOR ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN A
CRIMINAL CASE FOR BIGAMY
82. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 150758, February 18, 2004
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking the reversal of the Decision of the CA
finding the petitioner Veronico Tenebro guilty of bigamy.
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and
Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro
informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking this
previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that
he was going to cohabit with Villareyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage,
this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the RTC of Cebu City. When Ancajas
learned of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner.
In a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Petitioner argues that the declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator
that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which the
second marriage was celebrated. He prays that he be acquitted based on such ground.
On November 10, 1997, the RTC of Lapu-lapu City rendered a decision finding the accused guilty of the
crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Is the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity a
ground for acquittal of the accused in a criminal case for bigamy?
HELD:
No, it is not a ground for acquittal of the accused in a criminal case for bigamy.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings".
In this case, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the
subsistence of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. Although the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date
of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant
to note that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived or born
before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is therefore a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise
would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
Therefore, the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not a ground for acquittal of the accused in a criminal case for bigamy.
95
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
BIGAMY IS CONSUMNATED AT THE MOMENT OF THE CELEBRATION OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE

NOTWITHSTANDING THE NULLITY OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
83. Montañez v. Cipriano

G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the order of the RTC which dismissed
the Information for Bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano.
On April 8, 1976, respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano married Socrates Flores. On January 24, 1983,
during the subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. In 2001, respondent
filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground
of the latter’s psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. In 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa,
declared the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void.
On the following year, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage,
filed with the MTC of San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent. Cipriano filed a
motion to quash the information, alleging that her first marriage was already declared void ab initio in 2003.
Thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio in 1983. The RTC ruled in
favor of the respondent, holding that both marriages were contracted during the effectivity of the Civil Code,
hence, no judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a subsequent
marriage is needed under Article 40 of the Family Code.
The prosecution argued that the crime of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed
her petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of contracting a second marriage which
appears to be valid, while the first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or declared void
by the court.
ISSUE:
Is the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment of the Family Code, a valid defense for a
charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage?
HELD:
NO. Respondent is still liable for bigamy. The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has
been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity.
The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. In this case, it appears
that when respondent contracted a second marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates
celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been annulled or declared void by a
competent authority. Thus, all the elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information.
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA33 is not applicable, since the declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage came after the filing of the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered
before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
96
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
THE PRESENT SPOUSE MUST HAVE WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF THAT THE PRIOR SPOUSE WAS
ALREADY DEAD
84. Republic v. Tampus

G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision and the Resolution rendered by the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) declaring respondent's spouse,
Dante L. Del Mundo, as presumptively dead.
Respondent Nilda B. Tampus was married to Dante L. Del Mundo on November 29, 1975. Three days
thereafter, or on December 2, 1975, Dante, a member of the AFP, left respondent, and went to Jolo, Sulu
where he was assigned. The couple had no children. Since then, Nilda heard no news from Dante. She
tried everything to locate him, but her efforts proved futile. On April 14, 2009, she filed before the RTC a
petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage, alleging that after the lapse
of thirty-three (33) years without any kind of communication from him, she firmly believes that he is already
dead.
ISSUE:
Will the mere lapse of thirty-three years without any communication, warrant the declaration of presumptive
death for purpose of remarriage?
HELD:
NO. Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded belief that
the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 4119 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code),
there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death: (1) that the absent spouse
has been missing for four (4) consecutive years, or two (2) consecutive years if the disappearance occurred
where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391 of the Civil Code; (2) that
the present spouse wishes to remarry; (3) that the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead; and (4) that the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The "well-founded belief in the absentee's death requires the present spouse to prove that his/her belief
was the result of diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse and that based on these efforts
and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It
necessitates exertion of active effort, not a passive one.
In this case, Nilda testified that after Dante's disappearance, she tried to locate him by making inquiries with
his parents, relatives, and neighbors as to his whereabouts, but unfortunately, they also did not know where
to find him. Other than making said inquiries, however, Nilda made no further efforts to find her husband.
She could have called or proceeded to the AFP headquarters to request information about her husband,
but failed to do so. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP itself in finding him.
Considering her own pronouncement that Dante was sent by the AFP on a combat mission to Jolo, Sulu at
the time of his disappearance, she could have inquired from the AFP on the status of the said mission, or
from the members of the AFP who were assigned thereto. To the Court's mind, therefore, Nilda failed to
actively look for her missing husband, and her purported earnest efforts to find him by asking Dante's
parents, relatives, and friends did not satisfy the strict standard and degree of diligence required to create
a "well-founded belief” of his death.
97
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
THE "WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF" REQUISITE UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE REQUIRES
EXERTION OF ACTIVE EFFORT, NOT A MERE PASSIVE ONE
85. Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr.

G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision of the CA, dismissing the Petition for Certiorari
filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
Herein respondent Jose B. Sareñogon, Jr. (Jose) filed a Petition for the Declaration of Presumptive Death
of his wife, Netchie.
Jose testified that they lived together as husband and wife for one month only because he left to work as a
seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper and that, thereafter, he had no idea about
her whereabouts. Upon his return, he asked Netchie’s relatives but they told him that they also did not know
where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the
Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
Jose's testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie's aunt, Consuelo
Sande.
The Republic claims that Jose's alleged efforts in locating Netchie did not engender or generate a well-
founded belief that the latter is probably dead.
ISSUE:
Did Jose's efforts engender a well-founded belief that Netchie is probably dead?
HELD:
No, Jose's efforts did not engender a well-founded belief that Netchie is probably dead.
Article 41 of the Family Code pertinently provides that:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for
four consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was
already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth
in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient. xxx
In Republic v. Cantor, we further held that: “The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief."
xxx It depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. It requires exertion of active effort, not a
mere passive one.”
Thus, the Court stresses that the degree of diligence and reasonable search required by law is not met
(1) when there is failure to present the persons from whom the present spouse allegedly made inquiries
especially the absent spouse's relatives, neighbors, and friends,
(2) when there is failure to report the missing spouse's purported disappearance or death to the police
or mass media, and
(3) when the present spouse's evidence might or would only show that the absent spouse chose not
to communicate, but not necessarily that the latter was indeed dead.
Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he allegedly saw or met in the
course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he prove that he sought the
assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did he show that he undertook
a thorough, determined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years.
Hence, Jose's efforts did not engender a well-founded belief that Netchie is probably dead.
98
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
A DECLARATION OF THE ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS NOW EXPLICITLY REQUIRED

UNDER ARTICLE 40, EITHER AS A CAUSE OF ACTION OR A GROUND FOR DEFENSE
86. Domingo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993
Romero, J.
FACTS:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of discretion in
the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
and separation of property.
Private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against petitioner Roberto Domingo.
She prayed that she be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties she purchased at the time
of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper management and administration of
the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that their marriage being void ab initio (bigamous marriage),
the petition for the declaration of its nullity is superfluous and unnecessary. Petitioner submits that such
petition is required only for purposes of remarriage.
ISSUE:
Should a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage be filed only for purposes of remarriage?
HELD:
No. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

"ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void." (n)
Petitioner’s misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely" was in
fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
"Dean Gupit commented that the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for purposes of
remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say
"on the basis only of a final judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely"
instead of "only," which the Committee approved."
Moreover, the Court stresses that the Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of
nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them.
Private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the necessary
consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion
that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose
is baseless.
99
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
THE REQUIREMENT OF A JUDICIAL DECREE FOR THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE DOES NOT APPLY
TO MARRIAGES CELEBRATED UNDER THE CIVIL CODE
87. Castillo v. De Leon-Castillo

G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016
Sereno, C.J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner assails the decision of the CA reversing
and setting aside the RTC’s decision upholding the validity of the parties’ marriage.
Respondent Lea P. De Leon-Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). Subsequently, respondent
married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato). Afterwards, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting
marriage to Bautista. Another petition was then lodged in the RTC by respondent to declare her first
marriage with Bautista void, on the ground of absence of a marriage license. The RTC ruled in her favor.
The RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground
that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The CA reversed and set aside the
RTC’s decision and upheld the validity of the parties’ marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since
Lea’s marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were
celebrated, and not the Family Code. As the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage, the second marriage should be upheld.
Petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of the
fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at
the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and subsisting.
ISSUE:
Is a judicial declaration for the nullity of the first marriage a requirement for contracting a subsequent
marriage, both marriages having been celebrated prior to the effectivity of the Family Code?
HELD:
Yes. As this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero and Ty v. Court of Appeals, the requirement of a judicial
decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. Here, the law in force
at the time Lea contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born
while the Civil Code was in effect i.e., in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case
using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80, 81, 82 and 83 (first
paragraph); and those on voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph), 85 and 86.
Moreover, the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do
so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children.
The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of
her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial
as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
100
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENT OF A JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE

PRIOR TO A SECOND MARRIAGE APPLIES TO MARRIAGES CELEBRATED UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE
88. Montañez v. Cipriano

G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review under Rule 45, petitioner assails the order of the RTC dismissing the information for
bigamy filed against respondent Lourdes Cipriano
Respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates). During the subsistence of the former marriage, respondent
then married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio). Respondent thereafter filed with the RTC a Petition for the
Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The RTC
declared the marriage of respondent with Socrates null and void.
Petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed with the MTC a
complaint for bigamy against respondent, of which an information was later filed with the RTC. Before her
arraignment, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash alleging that her marriage with Socrates
had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more marriage to speak of prior to her
marriage to Silverio.
The RTC granted the same, ruling that at the time the accused had contracted a second marriage, the
existing law (Civil Code) did not require a judicial declaration of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to
contracting a subsequent marriage. It further ruled that the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent’s
marriage is tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage never existed at all, and for
this reason, her act in contracting a second marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Respondent argued that that Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given any retroactive effect because
this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a completely void prior
marriage.
ISSUE:
Can Art 40 of the Family Code requiring Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage as a condition for a
second marriage, be given retroactive effect, the two marriages having been contracted under the Civil
Code?
HELD:
Yes. As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article
40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code
itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested
or acquired rights." The Court went on to explain, thus: The fact that procedural statutes may somehow
affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he
is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws.
However in this case, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his
cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the
Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the first.
101
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
A SECOND MARRIAGE WITHOUT JUDICIAL DECLARATION IS BIGAMOUS REGARDLESS OF THE

EVIDENCE OF NULLITY OF FIRST MARRIAGE
89. Vitangcol v. People

G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Norberto Abella Vitangcol assails the decision of CA and
RTC for convicting him for the crime of bigamy.
In 1994, Norberto married Alice Eduardo. After some time, Alice eventually discovered that Norberto was
previously married to a certain Gina Gaerlan on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract
registered with the NSO. Alice thus filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presents as evidence a
Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that the Office has no record
of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife, Gina, and furthers that with no proof
of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish
the legality of his first marriage.
ISSUE:
Does a person who subsequently contract a second marriage without a judicial declaration nullity of previous
marriage guilty of bigamy?
HELD:
Yes, such person is guilty of bigamy. Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a
judicial declaration of nullity of their first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the
judicial declaration, they are guilty of bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage.
For an accused to be convicted of this crime, the prosecution must prove all of the following elements: [first,]
that the offender has been legally married; [second,] that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; [third,] that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and [lastly,] that the second or
subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Assuming without conceding that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license,
petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void. Nor was his
first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code. The second element of the crime
of bigamy is, therefore, present in this case.
The third element of bigamy is likewise present in this case. Petitioner admitted that he subsequently
married Alice G. Eduardo on December 4, 1994. As for the last element of bigamy, that the subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity, it is presumed. The crime of bigamy was consummated
when petitioner subsequently married Alice without his first marriage to Gina having been judicially declared
void.
Thus, with all the elements of bigamy present in this case, petitioner was correctly convicted of bigamy.
102
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
THE DECLARATION IN THE INSTANT CASE OF NULLITY OF THE PREVIOUS MARRIAGE OF THE
DECEASED AND PETITIONER DOES NOT VALIDATE THE SECOND MARRIAGE OF THE DECEASED
WITH RESPONDENT
90. Cariño v. Cariño

G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
In a Petition for Review on Certiorari, petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño prays that the decision of CA and
RTC be set aside, directing her to pay half of the amount, which was paid to her in the form of death benefits,
to respondent Susan Yee Carino.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first with petitioner Susan
Nicdao Cariño, and the second was with respondent Susan Yee Cariño. He passed away in 1992, under
the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial expenses. The two Susans filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies.
Yee thus filed for collection of half the money acquired by Nicdao as “death benefits.” She admitted that her
marriage with the SPO4 took place without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and the deceased, but claims that became aware of the previous marriage only at the
funeral of the deceased. She furthers that respondent that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license.
ISSUE:
Is the subsequent marriage valid even without judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the premise that
the previous marriage is void ab initio?
HELD:
No, the subsequent marriage is void because it is bigamous. Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased is declared void ab initio, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the “death benefits” under
scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code,
for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage,
though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also
be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and
petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan
Yee. The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring
the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan
Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
103
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
ARTICLE 40, WHICH IS A RULE OF PROCEDURE, SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
91. Jarillo v. People

G.R. No.164435, June 29, 2010
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of a Decision of the SC affirming Petitioner Victoria Jarillo’s Conviction
for Bigamy.
Petitioner argues that since petitioner’s marriages were entered into before the effectivity of the Family
Code, then the applicable law is Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of the
Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void before a person may
contract a subsequent marriage.
ISSUE:
Should Art. 40 of the Family Code apply retroactively?
HELD:
Yes. In Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said
“Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights.”
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of
a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right
may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
The Court pointed out the danger of not enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code in Marbella-
Bobis v. Bobis: “Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family
Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite – usually the
marriage license – and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity
of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provision on bigamy”.
104
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
ARTICLE 40 IS APPLICABLE TO REMARRIAGES ENTERED INTO AFTER THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE

FAMILY CODE REGARDLESS OF THE DATE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE
92. Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, March 29, 1995
Quiason, J.
FACTS:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against Judge
Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together in Makati.
One day, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw Respondent Francisco Brillantes sleeping on his
(complainant’s) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting with
De Castro. Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five
children.
Respondent denies having been married to Ongkiko. He alleges that when he and Ongkiko got married on
April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Respondent claims that
when he married De Castro on December 4, 1991, he believed that he was single because his first marriage
was solemnized without a license.
Complainant filed a complaint for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against respondent.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering
that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the
second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Should Art. 40 of the Family Code apply retroactively?
HELD:
Under the Family Code Article 40, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage
before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering
that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the
second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988
regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said Article is
given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure.
Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of
a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right
may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
105
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
"PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY" SHOULD REFER TO NO LESS THAN A MENTAL (NOT PHYSICAL)

INCAPACITY THAT CAUSES A PARTY TO BE TRULY INCOGNITIVE OF THE BASIC MARITAL
COVENANTS THAT CONCOMITANTLY MUST BE ASSUMED AND DISCHARGED BY THE PARTIES
TO THE MARRIAGE
93. Santos v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995
Vitug, J.
FACTS:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the CA’s decision in affirming the decision of the RTC,
denying petitioner Leouel Santos’ petition to declare his marriage with Julia Bedia-Santos a nullity based on
her psychological incapacity.
On May 1988, Julia left for the United States of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called him for the first time and promised to return
upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989, but she never did return. When Leouel got a chance to go
to USA, he desperately tried to locate and get in touch with Julia, but to no avail. Having failed to get Julia
to come home, Leouel filed with the RTC a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for more
than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into
married life.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in dismissing the case for lack of merit?
HELD:
No, the CA is correct in dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Thus, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards required to
decree a nullity of marriage. Hence, the petition should be dismissed.
106
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
MOLINA DOCTRINE; PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY AS A GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF

NULLITY OF MARRIAGE; GUIDELINES FOR THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY
CODE
94. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina

G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
On appeal is the CA’s decision affirming in toto the RTC’s decision declaring the marriage of respondent
Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina as void by reason of psychological incapacity.
Roridel O. Molina filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina alleging
that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and
a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends; that he depended on his parents
for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances; that when Reynaldo
was relieved of his job in Manila, Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that Reynaldo left
and abandoned Roridel and their child; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable
of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some
individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to
have their marriage declared null and void.
The Solicitor General insists that CA erred in the application of the concept of 'psychological incapacity' to
the facts of the case, explaining that the appealed Decision tended “to establish in effect the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world, which is anathema to our culture.”
ISSUE:
Was the CA correct in declaring the marriage void due to psychological incapacity of Reynaldo Molina?
HELD:
No, the CA incorrectly ruled in declaring the marriage void.
The following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby
handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically
or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained
in the decision; (3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage; (4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5)
Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage; (6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same
Code in regard to parents and their children; (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts; and (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state.
In the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity.
It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.
Hence, the marriage remains valid.
107
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, AS A GROUND FOR DECLARING THE NULLITY OF A MARRIAGE,

MAY BE ESTABLISHED BY THE TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED; THERE IS NO
REQUIREMENT, HOWEVER, THAT THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE EXAMINED BY A PHYSICIAN
OR A PSYCHOLOGIST AS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON FOR SUCH DECLARATION
95. Marcos v. Marcos

G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of the CA in declaring the marriage of Brenda and
Wilson Marcos as valid which was earlier declared as null and void by the RTC by reason of psychological
incapacity.
Due to Wilson’s failure to engage in any gainful employment after the downfall of the Marcos Regime where
they served as military officers, the spouses would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and
beat Brenda. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict
physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus,
for several times during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living
separately. Brenda submitted as evidence the testimonies of herself, her sister, their common children and
the social worker.
The RTC found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly because
of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda and their children.
While CA held that psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of the evidence
presented.
ISSUE:
Has psychological incapacity been established by the totality of evidence presented?
HELD:
Yes, psychological incapacity had not been established by the totality of evidence presented.
The totality of the evidence presented in the present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the
common children, petitioner's sister and the social worker -- was not enough to sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment,
the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is
absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and
was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this period that he became
intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and even left the family home.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a
party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid down the procedural
requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has not faithfully observed them. Thus, the
marriage is valid.
108
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
THE PRESENTATION OF ANY FORM OF MEDICAL OR PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THE

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, HOWEVER, DID NOT MEAN THAT THE SAME WOULD HAVE
AUTOMATICALLY ENSURED THE GRANTING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
OF MARRIAGE
96. Castillo v. Republic

G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017
Peralta, J.
FACTS
Herein petitioner elevated the case to the SC after the CA reversed the declaration of nullity of her marriage
with the respondent, which the RTC granted.
Petitioner Mirasol and Respondent Felipe met and fell in love through their parents who were close friends
and business partners. They almost broke up when Felipe maintained relations with an ex-girlfriend, but
they still reconciled and eventually got married in 1984, with two kids. However, after thirteen years of
marriage, Felipe started dating other women and refused to financially support their children.
The circumstances then prompted Mirasol to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC,
presenting the evaluation report of clinical psychologist Montefalcon as evidence of psychological incapacity
of Felipe to fulfill essential marital obligations. However, Montefalcon admitted that she based her evaluation
report merely on indirect information gathered from Mirasol and her witnesses, without personally
interviewing Felipe or any independent witness with knowledge of his upbringing.
ISSUE
Did the RTC correctly declare nullity of marriage between Mirasol and Felipe based on Montefalcon’s
evaluation report?
HELD
No, the RTC is incorrect in declaring the nullity of the marriage.
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological evidence to show the psychological incapacity,
however, did not mean that the same would have automatically ensured the granting of the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try,
must always base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings.
The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the psychological evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal
of the RTC's decision would reveal that there was no assessment of the veracity of such allegations, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the pieces of evidence presented. Also, there were no factual
findings which can serve as bases for its conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity.
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity. The
probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but
rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her
criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is founded.
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on the juridical antecedence, gravity and
incurability of Felipe's personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that she evaluated respondent's
psychological condition indirectly from the information gathered from Mirasol and her witness.
109
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
SENSELESS AND PROTRACTED REFUSAL TO HAVE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE IS EQUIVALENT TO

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
97. Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 119190, January 16,1997
Torres, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of
the trial court which declares the marriage between Chi Ming Tsoi and his wife VOID.
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant. There, they slept together on the same bed
in the same room for the first night of their married life. Contrary to the expectations of the plaintiff, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the
defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. There was
no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third
and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week
as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. They stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. She claims, that she did not even see
her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that
everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he
caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to
have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So
he stopped.
It was medically proven that both the spouses are physically capable of sexual intercourse.
ISSUE:
Was the alleged refusal of the petitioner to have sex with his wife for 10 months in marriage constitutes
psychological incapacity?
HELD:
Yes, prolonged refusal to have sexual intercourse with a spouse is a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage." Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
110
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
NO AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ON NULLITY ON THE GROUND OF

98. Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 127358, March 31, 2005
Azcuna, J.
FACTS:
This is a consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari filed by the petitioner in
different resolutions of the Court of Appeals concerning the damages, support and custody of the child
awarded.
These cases involve a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage, which was filed by petitioner Noel
Buenaventura on July 12, 1992, on the ground of the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife, Isabel
Singh Buenaventura, herein respondent. After respondent filed her answer, petitioner, with leave of court,
amended his petition by stating that both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential obligations of marriage. In response, respondent filed an amended answer denying the
allegation that she was psychologically incapacitated.
The trial court then granted the petition for the declaration of nullity, declared the marriage null and void ab
initio. It ordered the plaintiff to pay defendant moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos and
exemplary damages of 1 million pesos with 6% interest from the date of this decision, the liquidation of the
assets of the conjugal partnership property.
ISSUES:
1. Did the CA err in awarding moral and exemplary damages by reason of the non-performance of martial
obligations on the ground of psychological incapacity.
2. Did the CA err in considering conjugal partnership of gains as the spouse’s property regime for
liquidation purposes?
HELD:
1. Yes, CA erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages.
Psychological incapacity has been defined, thus:
...no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage....
By declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral damages on
the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not on the mere act
of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately and with malice by a
party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet willfully concealed the same. It is contradictory to
characterize acts as a product of psychological incapacity, and hence beyond the control of the party
because of an innate inability, while at the same time considering the same set of acts as willful|||.No such
evidence appears to have been adduced in this case. Thus, the award for moral damages and exemplary
damages is not proper.
2. Yes, the property regime is not conjugal partnership of property but of equal co-ownership under Article
147 of the Family Code. Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage,
the provisions of Article 50 in relation to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case may be, do not apply.
Rather, the general rule applies, which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property
regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
111
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
THE PRESUMPTION IS ALWAYS IN FAVOR OF THE VALIDITY OF MARRIAGE (SEMPER

PRAESUMITUR PRO MATRIMONIO)
99. Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco

G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01 July
2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City, dated 31 January
2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by respondent herein Judge
Manuel Siayngco.
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites
on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that they could not
have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel filed for
the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that
all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him which
was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she incessantly complained about
almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly parents; that she showed no respect or
regard at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she
cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give him moral support and
encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage, rooted in her deep-seated
resentment.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their conjugal home
in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could be free to marry his
paramour; that it was respondent Manuel who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she
supported respondent Manuel in all his endeavors despite his philandering.
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE:
Is the totality of the evidence presented enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against
respondent and Manuel?
HELD:
No. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. In
the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and
obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling nature (especially with respect to his salary),
and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from
complying with the essential obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were
already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Thus, from the totality of the
evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcos’s life and have
perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other,
with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
112
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
A PERSON WHO IS AFFLICTED WITH DEPENDENT PERSONALITY DISORDER, CANNOT ASSUME

THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS; ALTHOUGH ON A DIFFERENT PLANE, THE SAME MAY
ALSO BE SAID OF THE RESPONDENT, WHO IS AFFLICTED WITH ANTISOCIAL PERSONALITY
DISORDER
100. Ngo Te v. Yu-Te

G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009
Nachura, J.
FACTS:
This a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the Decision of the CA.
Petitioner Edward Ngo Te first got a glimpse of respondent Rowena Yu-Te in a gathering organized by the
Filipino-Chinese association in their college. Around three months after their first meeting, Rowena asked
Edward that they elope. At first, he refused, bickering that he was young and jobless. Her persistence,
however, made him relent. Thus, they left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing their travel
money and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
However, Edward’s ₱80,000.00 lasted for only a month. And they could not find a job. They decided to go
back to Manila, where Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to his parents’ home. As his
family was abroad, and Rowena kept on telephoning him, threatening him that she would commit suicide,
Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place. He was then 25 years old, and she, 20. Rowena
suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live on their own. Edward talked to his father
he told that he will be disinherited and insisted that Edward must go home. In June 1996, Edward was able
to talk to Rowena. Unmoved by his persistence that they should live with his parents, she said that it was
better for them to live separate lives. They then parted ways.
Edward eventually filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowen before the RTC on the basis
of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The trial court rendered its Decision declaring the marriage of the
parties null and void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage void on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated?
HELD:
Yes, both parties are afflicted with personality disorders—to repeat, dependent personality disorder for
petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for respondent. The seriousness of the
diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this case, finds as decisive the
psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the marriage of the parties is null
and void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity. We further consider that the trial court, which
had a first-hand view of the witnesses’ deportment, arrived at the same conclusion.
Indeed, petitioner, who is afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is
unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important
decisions (such as where to live), tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has
difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from
other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being
abandoned. The seriousness of the diagnosis and the gravity of the disorders considered, the Court, in this
case, finds as decisive the psychological evaluation made by the expert witness; and, thus, rules that the
marriage of the parties is null and void on ground of both parties’ psychological incapacity.
113
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
THE INTENT OF THE LAW HAS BEEN TO CONFINE THE MEANING OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS
101. Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador

G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010
Brion, J.
FACTS:
On May 23, 1973, the petitioner and the respondent contracted marriage in a ceremony officiated by
Reverend Juanito Reyes at a church in Tondo, Manila. The petitioner’s family was apprehensive about this
marriage because of the nature of the respondent’s work and because she came from a broken family. Out
of their union, the petitioner and the respondent.
On March 1, 2001, the petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with the respondent, under Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended. He alleged that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and
irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house
for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; did not take care of their sick child; consulted a witch
doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities. The
petitioner likewise claimed that the respondent refused to have sex with him since 1993 because she
became "very close" to a male tenant in their house. In fact, he discovered their love notes to each other,
and caught them inside his room several times.
During the trial, aside from his testimony, the petitioner also presented a certified true copy of their marriage
contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac.which found both Enrique and
Erlinda to be psychologically incapacitated and that Erlinda is suffering from a Personality Disorder (Mixed
Personality Disorder). She has been having this disorder since her adolescence. There is no definite
treatment for this disorder. She is deemed psychologically incapacitated to perform the obligations of
marriage.
ISSUES:
Is there basis to nullify the petitioner’s marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity
to comply with the essential marital obligations?
HELD:
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit and hold that no sufficient basis exists to annul the marriage,
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code and its related jurisprudence.
The totality of evidence presented failed to establish the respondent’s psychological incapacity
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides
that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization." It introduced the concept of psychological
incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage, although this concept eludes exact definition.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." It must be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
Under these established guidelines, we find the totality of the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to prove the
respondent’s psychological incapacity.
We glean from these exchanges the petitioner’s theory that the respondent’s psychological incapacity is
premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant
114
personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness.These acts, in our view, do not rise
to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty,"
if not outright "refusal" or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some
marriages. The intent of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personality disorders – existing at the time of the marriage – clearly demonstrating an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. psychological illness that must
have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to
assume
In addition, The Court finds that Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report fell short in proving that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. We emphasize that
Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of
his Report for the respondent to "undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent." Dr. Patac
relied only on the information fed by the petitioner, the parties’ second child, Emmanuel, and household
helper. Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his Report
can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioner’s own psychological condition (as he was, in fact,
declared by Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage), the same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent’s condition. The methodology employed simply
cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder.
Interestingly, Dr. Patac’s Psychiatric Evaluation Report highlighted only the respondent’s negative
behavioral traits without balancing them with her other qualities. The allegations of infidelity and insinuations
of promiscuity, as well as the claim that the respondent refused to engage in sexual intercourse since 1993,
of course, came from the petitioner, but these claims were not proven. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti
that these accusations were true, the Psychiatric Evaluation Report did not indicate that unfaithfulness or
promiscuousness were traits that antedated or existed at the time of marriage. Likewise, the accusation that
the respondent abandoned her sick child which eventually led to the latter’s death appears to be an
exaggerated claim in the absence of any specifics and corroboration. On the other hand, the petitioner’s
own questionable traits – his flirtatious nature before marriage and his admission that he inflicted physical
harm on the respondent every time he got jealous – were not pursued. From this perspective, the Psychiatric
Evaluation Report appears to be no more than a one-sided diagnosis against the respondent that we cannot
consider a reliable basis to conclusively establish the root cause and the degree of seriousness of her
condition.
The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the
conclusion that the respondent’s personality disorder had "no definite treatment." It did not discuss the
concept of mixed personality disorder, i.e., its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show
how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that
the respondent’s condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the
Psychiatric Evaluation Report’s failure to support its findings and conclusions with any factual basis. It simply
enumerated the respondent’s perceived behavioral defects, and then associated these traits with mixed
personality disorder. We find it unfortunate that Dr. Patac himself was not called on the witness stand to
expound on the findings and conclusions he made in his Psychiatric Evaluation Report. It would have aided
petitioner’s cause had he called Dr. Patac to testify.
115
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
OBSSESSIVE COMPULSIVE PERSONALITY DISORDER DOES NOT EQUATE TO PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY ABSENT THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CONDITIONS PRESRIBED BY
JURISPRUDENCE
102. Republic v. Romero

G.R. No. 209180, February 24, 2016
Perlas-Bernabe, J.
FACTS:
The case before the court are consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the
CA, which affirmed the RTC of Quezon City in declaraing the marriage of Reghis Romero (Reghis) and
Olivia Lagman (Lagman) void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Reghis and Olivia were married6 on 1972. The couple first met in Baguio City in 1971 when Reghis helped
Olivia and her family who were stranded along Kennon Road. Since then, Reghis developed a closeness
with Olivia’s family, especially with the latter’s parents who tried to play matchmakers for Reghis and Olivia.
In the desire to please Olivia’s parents, Reghis courted Olivia and, eventually, they became sweethearts.
Reghis was still a student at the time, determined to finish his studies and provide for the financial needs of
his siblings and parents. Thus, less than a year into their relationship, Reghis tried to break-up with Olivia
because he felt that her demanding attitude would prevent him from reaching his personal and family goals.
Olivia, however, refused to end their relationship and insisted on staying with Reghis at the latter’s dormitory
overnight. Reghis declined and, instead, made arrangements with his friends so that Olivia could sleep in a
female dormitory. The next day, Reghis brought Olivia home and while nothing happened between them
the previous night, Olivia’s parents believed that they had eloped and planned for them to get married.
Reghis initially objected to the planned marriage as he was unemployed and still unprepared. However,
Olivia’s parents assured him that they would shoulder all expenses and would support them until they are
financially able. As Olivia’s parents had treated him with nothing but kindness, Reghis agreed.
The couple experienced a turbulent and tumultuous marriage, often having violent fights and jealous fits.
They became even more estranged when Reghis secured a job as a medical representative and became
engrossed in his career and focused on supporting his parents and siblings. As a result, he spent little time
with his family, causing Olivia to complain that Reghis failed to be a real husband to her. He also added that
Olivia is in a relationship with a certain Eddie Garcia (Mr. Garcia) but he (Reghis) has no ill-feelings towards
Mr. Garcia, as he and Olivia have been separated for a long time. In 1986, the couple parted ways.
In 1998, Reghis filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing his psychological incapacity to
comply with his essential marital obligations. He presented Dr. Valentina Nicdao-Basilio (Dr. Basilio), a
clinical psychologist, who submitted a Psychological Evaluation Report dated and testified that Reghis
suffered from Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD). According to Dr. Basilio, Reghis’
behavioral disorder gave him a strong obsession for whatever endeavour he chooses, such as his work, to
the exclusion of other responsibilities and duties such as those pertaining to his roles as father and husband.
Dr. Basilio surmised that Reghis’ OCPD was the root of the couple’s disagreements and that the same is
incurable, explaining too that Reghis was an unwilling groom as marriage was farthest from his mind at the
time and, as such, felt cheated into marriage.
The Republic filed a petition for review on certiorari, arguing that Reghis has not established that his alleged
psycholigcal incapacity is grave, has juridical antecedence and incurable. Morevoer, the psychological
report submitted had no factual basis to support that Reghis is suffering from OCPD.
ISSUE:
Is the Obssesive Compulsive Personality Disorder (OCPD) of Reghis sufficient to warrant nullity of his
marriage with Lagman on the ground psycholigical incpacity?
HELD:
No. It has consistently been held that psychological incapacity, as a ground to nullify a marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It must
be a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
116
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. To warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage, the
psychological incapacity must: (a) be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) have juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and (c) be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the
party involved.
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court finds that the foregoing requirements do not
concur. 1As aptly pointed out by the petitioners, Reghis’ testimony shows that he was able to comply with
his marital obligations which, therefore, negates the existence of a grave and serious psychological
incapacity on his part. Reghis admitted that he and Olivia lived together as husband and wife under one
roof for fourteen (14) years and both of them contributed in purchasing their own house in Parañaque City.
Reghis also fulfilled his duty to support and take care of his family, as he categorically stated that he loves
their children and that he was a good provider to them. That he married Olivia not out of love, but out of
reverence for the latter’s parents, does not mean that Reghis is psychologically incapacitated in the context
of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Moreover, the OCPD which Reghis allegedly suffered from was not shown to have juridical antecedence.
Other than Dr. Basilio’s conclusion that Reghis’ "behavioral disorder x x x existed even prior to the marriage
or even during his adolescent years,"52 no specific behavior or habits during his adolescent years were
shown which would explain his behavior during his marriage with Olivia. Simply put, Dr. Basilio’s medical
report did not establish that Reghis’ incapacity existed long before he entered into marriage.
In like manner, Dr. Basilio simply concluded that Reghis’ disorder is incurable but failed to explain how she
came to such conclusion. Based on the appreciation of the RTC, Dr. Basilio did not discuss the concept of
OCPD, its classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, and failed to show how and to what extent the
respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that Reghis’ condition had no
definite treatment or is incurable. To the Court’s mind, this is a glaring deficiency that should have prompted
the RTC and the CA to be more circumspect and critical in the assessment and appreciation of Dr. Basilio’s
testimony.
117
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
SEXUAL INFIDELITY PER SE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF THE FAMILY CODE; MERE SHOWING OF "IRRECONCILABLE
DIFFERENCES" AND "CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES" IN NO WISE CONSTITUTES
103. Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco

G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Juanita and Manuel married in 1973. They adopted a boy in 1977 because they could not have a child of
their own. After 24 years of marriage, Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of
psychological incapacity of Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over
domineering, aggressive, unstable and selfish attitude towards him; that she showed no respect or regard
at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the MTC; that she did not give him moral
support and encouragement for his professional advancement. In her defense, Juanita insisted that they
were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until Manuel wanted
to have a child and started having extra-marital affairs which he had admitted to her.
During the trial, Manuel presented expert witness Dr. Valentina Garcia who concluded that both Manuel and
Juanita have shown their psychological incapacity. Dr. Garcia’s evaluation showed that (1) Manuel is unable
to comply with his marital obligation of fidelity and (2) the root cause of Juanita’s behavior is her in-laws’
disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her husband’s philandering, admitted
no less by him, and her inability to conceive. Dr. Eduardo Maaba, an expert witness who conducted a
psychiatric evaluation on Juanita, found the latter to be psychologically capacitated to comply with her basic
and essential obligations of marriage.
The RTC denied the petition of Manuel holding that the asserted psychological incapacity of Juanita is not
preponderantly supported in evidence. The CA reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Was the totality of evidence presented enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against
Manuel and/or Juanita?
HELD:
No. The totality of evidence presented is not enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity.
Sexual infidelity per se does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. It must be shown that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered
personality which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state
and not merely due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. Manuel failed to prove that
his wife’s lack of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her
controlling nature are grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. In fact, Dr. Maaba reported that Juanita was
psychologically capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage. The
psychological report of Dr. Garcia clearly shows that the root cause of petitioner Juanita’s behavior is
traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required by law – but from her experiences during
the marriage.
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, the SC have perceived therefrom a simple
case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently
falling out of love and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void
marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
118
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
BEFORE THE PROMULGATION OF THE MOLINA GUIDELINES, NEITHER THE FAMILY CODE NOR
JURISPRUDENCE MANDATED THAT THE INCURABILITY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
BE ESTABLISHED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
104. Antonio v. Reyes

G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision and Resolution of the CA reversing the
judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of petitioner and respondent, null and void.
Antonio filed a petition to have his marriage to Reyes declared null and void under Art. 36 of FC. Petitioner
claimed that respondent is psychologically incapacitated because she is a pathological liar (lies to other
people about her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events). In support of this, Antonio
presented Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist, and Dr. Lopez, a clinical psychologist, who stated that respondent’s
persistent and constant jealousy and lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological and that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations. In opposing the petition,
respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the other lies
attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that the totality of the
evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her part. In addition,
respondent presented Dr. Reyes, a psychiatrist, who testified that respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated.
RTC granted the petition and held that respondent is psychologically incapacitated because of her fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabling her to live in a world of make-believe. CA
reversed the decision of RTC despite being informed by Antonio of the rulings by the Catholic Tribunals
declaring their marriage null and void. CA held that the totality of evidence presented was insufficient to
establish Reyes’ psychological incapacity. Furthermore, the requirements in Republic v. CA had not been
satisfied noting that it did not appear certain that respondent’s condition was incurable.
ISSUE:
Was the totality of evidence presented enough to sustain respondent’s psychological incapacity?
HELD:
Yes. Totality of evidence is sufficient to show that respondent is psychologically incapacitated.
The SC held that the present case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines. To wit:
(1) Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his spouse by
presenting witnesses who corroborated his allegations on his wife’s behavior;
(2) The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial court’s decision.
(3) Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of and even
before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from fictitious characters well
before she married petitioner;
(4) The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between fantasy and reality would
similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond, much less its psychic meaning, and
the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including parenting;
(5) Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced by Articles
68 to 71 of the Family Code. As noted by the trial court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological
liar would be able to commit to the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and
respect;
(6) The CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the marriage of the parties was
annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed this detail totally inconsequential
as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the
matter to its attention. Such deliberate ignorance is in contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations
119
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts;
(7) The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity be shown to
be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It is to be noted that the petitioner’s expert witnesses
testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision on 10 August 1995. These events
transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made explicit the requirement that the
psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Santos v. CA
did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that "psychological incapacity is
incurable,"and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese
of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized "by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability." However, in formulating the doctrinal rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos
omitted any reference to incurability as a characteristic of psychological incapacity.
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its own ruling
that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable. Certainly, Santos did
not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be established in an action for
declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the time of the trial of this case and the
subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that required a medical finding of incurability. Such
requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time when this case was on appellate review, or after the
reception of evidence. Thus, it should not be made to apply in the case at bar. Considering that the totality
of evidence presented is sufficient, the petition is hereby granted. The marriage of the parties is declared
null and void.
120
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO AMOUNT TO PSYCHOLOGICAL

INCAPACITY IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF THAT IT PREVENTED THE OFFENDING SPOUSE FROM
COMPLYING WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE
105. Matudan v. Republic

G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016
Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:
Nicolas Matudan and Marilyn were married and had four children. Marilyn left to work abroad and from then
on lost contact with her. Twenty-three years later, Nicolas filed a Petition of Nullity of Marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity for consistently neglecting and failing to provide for her family with necessary
emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance. Upon personal accounts of Nicolas, Dr. Tayag, a
Clinical Psychologist, found that Marilyn has Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits and
such condition is grave, permanent and incurable. It was found that such illness was characterized by
juridical antecedence as the same already existed before they got married, having been in existence since
her childhood years.
The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the Marilyn’s abandonment of the marriage and family is
not in itself equivalent to psychological incapacity. Petitioner argues that contrary to the CA's findings, he
was able to prove Marilyn's psychological incapacity which is rooted in Dr. Tayag's diagnosis that she was
suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which existed even before their marriage, and continued to
subsist thereafter; that her illness is grave, serious, incurable, and permanent as to render her incapable of
assuming her marriage obligations. On appeal, the CA affirmed. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Is Marilyn’s Narcissistic Personality Disorder enough to prove her psychological incapacity to assume
marital obligations?
HELD:
No. 'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should
refer to no less than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. Psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thus, the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the party would
be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
As ruled by the lower court, We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and
comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented the
respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of
the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage.
Neither did it explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was
really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus,
we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the respondent suffered
'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
incurable' -is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and
portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as
a fair gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect
to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's psychological
condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
121
VOID MARRIAGES
Grounds
FINAL JUDGMENT DENYING A PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY ON THE GROUND OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY BARS A SUBSEQUENT PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY
ON THE GROUND OF MARRIAGE LICENSE
106. Mallion v. Alcantara

G.R. No. 141528, October 31,2006
Azcuna, J.
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 raising a question of law as to whether a previous
final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a
subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license.
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the RTC seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Editha Alcantara
on the ground of psychological incapacity. After trial on the merits, the trial court denied the petition upon
finding that petitioner failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is seeking.
After finality of such decision, petitioner subsequently filled another petition of nullity of marriage, this time
on the ground of lack of valid marriage license. Alcantara filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that of res
judicata.
The RTC granted the respondent’s motion to dismiss. On appeal, Malion argued that while the relief prayed
for in the two cases was the same, that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause
of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because
the operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were
different. Petitioner countered the same, stating that the ground for the second petition is a matter that could
have been raised in the first civil case.
ISSUE:
Does a final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity
bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of marriage license?
HELD:
YES. Res judicata in its concept as “conclusiveness of judgment” or otherwise rule of auter action pendant
requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a
court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits;
and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties, of subject matter, and of
causes of action.
Petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by him seeking the declaration of nullity of his
marriage are anchored on separate causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition
which was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different from the evidence
necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on the purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause
of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner has
the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon
which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essentially split the various
aspects of the pivotal issue that holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status
of petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid
celebration of the same took place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In the previous Civil case,
however, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license
which petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that
parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims or
demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all
other matters that could have been adjudged in that case.
122
VOID MARRIAGES
Action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
IN CASES WHERE THERE IS NO MARRIAGE THAT TOOK PLACE A PETITION FOR CANCELLATION
UNDER RULE 108 MAY BE UNDERTAKEN TO CHANGE CIVIL STATUS
107. Republic v. Olaybar

G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
Peralta, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 are the RTC Decision. The assailed decision granted
respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while
the assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR)
as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend however, she discovered that she was
already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She denied having contracted said marriage
and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer;
and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage
contract does not belong to respondent.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that granting
the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring
the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUE:
Can the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding?
HELD:
Yes, in view of the circumstances in this case, a petition under Rule 108 may be undertaken to change
one’s civil status.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia, the Court has ruled that "even substantial errors
in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established
and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding." Thus,
as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding
to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of marriage.
Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was
not even aware of such existence. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the
validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been
given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Therefore, this is not a case of nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the
correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of
the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way,
declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
123
VOID MARRIAGES
Action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
VOID MARRIAGES CELEBRATED DURING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE CIVIL CODE MAY BE
QUESTIONED EVEN AFTER THE DEATH OF EITHER PARTY
108. Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen

G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45, assailing the Decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals in affirming the Order of the Regional Trial Court.
Respondent Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes)
is the common-law wife and daughter of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo). Elise filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration of Eliseo’s Estate. Petitioner Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
allegedly married, opposed the petition.
Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
ISSUE:
May Elise impugn the validity of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia in a Petition of Letters of Administration?
HELD:
Yes, Elise may impugn the validity of the marriage.
It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in
effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog applicable to the
case at hand (Making the marriage not covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). In Niñal, the Court allowed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage after the death of their father. In a void marriage, it was
though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party may attack
the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage. There is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father.
The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally
by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in
the case at bar. Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity
of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not
extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine
whether or not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.
The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less
than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by the officiating priest.
Consequently, in the absence of any showing that the marriage between Amelia and Filipito at the time
Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the marriage between
Amelia and the decedent Eliseo is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
124
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Grounds
THAT THE PREGNANCY IS READILY APPARENT CANNOT BE SUSTAINED AS A DEFENSE IN AN

ANNULMENT CASE BASED ON FRAUD (CONCEALMENT OF PREGNANCY) AS THERE WAS
EVIDENCE THAT THE WOMAN IS NATURALLY PLUMP
109. Aquino v. Delizo

G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960
Gutierrez David, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of CA affirming the RTC which dismissed petitioner's
complaint for annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita Delizo.
Petitioner Fernando Aquino and respondent Conchita Delizo were married. Sometime in April 1955, or about
four months after their marriage, Conchita gave birth to a child. Thus, on September 1955, Fernando filed
a complaint for the annulment of his marriage to Conchita on the ground of fraud alleging that at the time of
their marriage, Conchita concealed from him the fact that she was pregnant by another man. In her Answer,
Conchita claimed that the child was conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and Fernando. Both the
CFI of Rizal and the Appellate Court dismissed the petition. Before the CA, petitioner prayed for
reconsideration, or if denied, for the case to be remanded to lower court for new trial. The following annexes
were attached
1) Affidavit of Fernando’s brother (Cesar) saying that he was the father of Conchita’s first born, and
that he and Conchita hid her pregnancy from Fernando
2) Affidavit of Albert Powell that Cesar and Conchita lived together as husband and wife before the
marriage of Fernando and Conchita
3) Affidavit of Conchita admitting her concealment
4) Birth Certificates of three children conceived by Cesar and Conchita; and
5)Photos of Conchita’s natural plumpness from 1952 to November 1954.
As both Conchita and the fiscal failed to file an answer, and stating that it "does not believe the veracity of
the contents of the motion and its annexes", the CA denied the motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Was Fernando’s complaint for annulment properly dismissed on the basis that fraud was unsubstantiated
by the evidence of the case?
HELD:
No, the case should be remanded to the trial court for a new trial, as prayed by Fernando.
Under the Civil Code (Art. 85 (4) in relation to Art. 86 (3)), the concealment by the wife of the fact that at the
time of marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment.
In this case, the Court did not really rule on whether the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant
may be annulled on the ground of fraud. The Court only emphasized that at the time the two entered into
the marriage, defendant Conchita was alleged to be only four months pregnant. At that stage, there is no
assurance that her pregnancy is readily apparent to the plaintiff especially since according to the petitioner,
Conchita was “naturally plump”. The Court also cited that according to medical authorities “only on the 6th
month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus,
making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent. Therefore, it was possible that at the
time of the marriage, defendant Fernando did not suspect that his wife was already pregnant. The fact of
pregnancy could have been successfully concealed from him by his wife if she were only five months
pregnant but not if she were already in her 7th month pregnancy.
Thus, the SC held that, in its opinion, the evidence sought to be introduced at a new trial, taken together
with what has already been adduced would be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged by the plaintiff. The
case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.
125
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Grounds
NON-DISCLOSURE OF A HUSBAND’S PRE-MARITAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ANOTHER WOMAN IS

NOT ONE OF THE ENUMERATED CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE A GROUND FOR
ANNULMENT BASED ON FRAUD
110. Anaya v. Palaroan

G.R. No. L-27930, November 26, 1970
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
This is an Appeal from an order of dismissal, issued motu proprio by the Juvenile & Domestic Relations
Court, Manila, of a complaint for annulment of marriage filed by Fernando Palaroan.
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan got married on December 4, 1953. On January 7, 1954, Palaroan
filed an action for annulment (Civil Case No. 21589) on the ground that his consent was obtained through
force and intimidation. This complaint was dismissed: the validity of their marriage was upheld, and Aurora’s
counterclaim was granted. While the negotiations for the amount of the counterclaim was underway,
Fernando revealed to Aurora that, several months prior to their marriage, he had a premarital relationship
with a close relative of his. This “non-divulgement,” Aurora alleged, “definitely wrecked their marriage.”
Furthermore, Aurora alleged that Fernando had “pretended to shower her with love and affection” when he
was courting her, but only intended to marry Aurora so that he could evade marrying his close relative, from
whose family he was receiving threats forcing him to marry her. She also alleged that since he had not
married her out of love, he had never intended to perform the marital duties and obligations and had even
covertly made up his mind against living with her. Finally, she alleged that he had courted a third girl with
whom he later cohabited and had several children. Thus, Aurora now prays for the annulment of her
marriage with Fernando on the ground of fraud in obtaining her consent.
Fernando, in his answer, denied having had pre-marital relationship with a close relative. He averred that
under no circumstance would he live with Aurora, as he had escaped from her and from her relatives the
day following their marriage on December 4, 1953. He denied having committed any fraud against her. He
set up the defenses of lack of cause of action and estoppel, for her having prayed in Civil Case No. 21589
for the validity of the marriage and her having enjoyed the support that had been granted her. The trial court
held that Aurora’s allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient to invalidate her marriage. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Is the non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman a ground
for annulment of marriage?
HELD:
No, the non-disclosure of pre-marital relationship does not constitute fraud as a vice of consent in marriage
under the Civil Code (now Article 46 in relation to Article 45 of the Family Code)
According to Article 85(4) of the Civil Code, fraud is a vice of consent on marriage, and thus one of the
grounds for annulment of marriage. However, the only kinds of fraud accepted by law to dissolve a marriage
are the ones stated in Article 86.
Following said article, the non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital relationship with another woman is not
one of the enumerated circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further
excluded by the last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to . . .
chastity" shall give ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure
of premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage
she entered into an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker’s intent
being plain, the Court’s duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
Therefore, the trial court’s order must be affirmed, dismissing the complaint for annulment of marriage.
126
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Grounds
IMPOTENCY IS NOT STERILITY, BUT THE PHYSICAL INABILITY TO HAVE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE
111. Menciano v. San Jose

G.R. No. L-1967, May 28, 1951
Jugo, J.
FACTS:
In the course of the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose,
Matilde Menciano filed a motion for declaration of heirs, alleging that she is the widow of the deceased
Faustino Neri San Jose, to whom she was married on September 28, 1944. Before the marriage they lived
together as husband and wife, there having been no impediment to their marriage. She further alleged that
as a result of their cohabitation before the marriage the child Carlo Magno Neri was born on March 9, 1940
and was later baptized, said child having enjoyed the status of a recognized natural child; that their second
child Faustino Neri, Jr., was born on April 24, 1945; and that Carlo Magno Neri was legitimized by the
subsequent matrimony of his parents and Faustino Neri, Jr., is a legitimate child born in lawful wedlock.
Paz Neri San Jose, then executrix of the estate of the deceased Faustino Neri San Jose, and Rodolfo
Pelaez, designated universal heir in the will of the deceased, in their answer, alleged among others that the
deceased was impotent and congenitally sterile, the same as his brothers and sister Conchita, who had no
children therefore it would have been impossible for him to have fathered the children. To prove potency,
Matilde presented, among others, the statement of Dr. Antonio Garcia that in the past, in order to get a
specimen of the semen of the deceased Faustino Neri for examination as to its contents of spermatozoa,
Faustino, following the doctor's advice, used a rubber sac, commonly called "condom", and a woman.
ISSUE:
Was the deceased Faustino Neri impotent during his cohabitation with Matilde Menciano? How does this
affect the legitimacy claim of Faustino Neri, Jr.?
HELD:
No, Faustino Neri is not impotent for lack of sufficient proof. As a necessary conclusion, the child Faustino
Neri, Jr., is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased Faustino Neri with Matilde
Menciano in lawful wedlock.
Impotency being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of potency.
Impotency is not synonymous with sterility. Impotency is the physical inability to have sexual intercourse; it
is different from sterility. Impotence is the inability on the part of the male organ of copulation to perform its
proper function. Impotence applies only to disorders affecting the functions of the organ of copulation, while
sterility applies only to lack of fertility in the reproductive elements of either sex.
In this case, the best evidence that the deceased was potent is the statement of Dr. Antonio Garcia that in
order to get a specimen of the semen of the deceased Faustino Neri for examination as to its contents of
spermatozoa, Faustino, following the doctor's advice, used a rubber sac, commonly called "condom", and
a woman. The fact that the deceased was able to produce the specimen by said means shows conclusively
that he was potent.
The presumption of potency not having overthrown, the necessary conclusion is that the child Faustino Neri,
Jr., is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of the deceased Faustino Neri with Matilde Menciano
in lawful wedlock.
Note: The legitimacy of Carlo Magno Neri was not ruled upon by the SC. The SC noted that Carlo Magno
Neri was born on March 9, 1940, that is, before the marriage. Both the deceased Faustino and Matilde
Menciano were free to marry without any legal impediment. However, the trial court declared that Carlo
Magno Neri has not been acknowledged as a natural child and, consequently, cannot be legitimized by the
subsequent marriage of his parents. The SC cannot review this finding because the plaintiffs did not appeal.
127
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Action for Annulment of Marriage
A STRICT APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 48 AND 60 WILL NOT APPLY IF IT IS CRYSTAL CLEAR THAT
EVERY STAGE OF THE LITIGATION WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A NO-HOLDS BARRED CONTEST
AND NOT BY COLLUSION
112. Tuason v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116607, April 10,1996
Puno, J.
FACTS:
Maria Victoria Tuason filed with the Regional Trial Court a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of
her marriage to petitioner Emilio R. Tuason. Maria Victoria alleged that (1) Emilio was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations which became manifest
afterward and resulted in violent fights wherein he inflicted physical injuries against him (2) he used
prohibited drugs, was apprehended by the authorities and sentenced to a one-year suspended penalty and
has not been rehabilitated (3) he was a womanizer and cohabited with three women in succession thereby
leaving the conjugal home (3) he became a spendthrift and abused his administration of conjugal
partnership. Emilio denied the charges. Trial eventually commenced and thereafter their marriage was
clerically annulled by the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimonial which was affirmed by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal in 1986. In 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of private
respondent's marriage to petitioner and awarding custody of the children to private respondent. No appeal
was taken from the decision. Emilio filed a "Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and
Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties”. A petition for relief from judgment was filed by Victoria
and was denied.
ISSUES:
1. Is a petition for relief from judgment warranted under the circumstances of the case?
2. What is the role of prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment cases?
HELD:
1. No, the decision annulling petitioner's marriage to private respondent had already become final and
executory when petitioner failed to appeal during the reglementary period.
A petition for relief from judgment is governed by Rule 38, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court which
provides:
Sec. 2. Petition to Court of First Instance for relief from judgment or other proceeding thereof. — When a
judgment or order is entered, or any other proceeding is taken, against a party in a Court of First Instance
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court and in the
same cause praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside.
The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal
therefrom is negligence which is not excusable, he was not denied due process. Notice sent to counsel is
binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting
in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment valid.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy; it is allowed only in exception cases where there
is no other available or adequate remedy. Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence;
otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru inexcusable
negligence.
2. The role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal in annulment of marriage and legal separation proceedings
is to determine whether collusion exists between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
suppressed or fabricated. Petitioner's vehement opposition to the annulment proceedings negates the
conclusion that collusion existed between the parties. There is no allegation by the petitioner that evidence
was suppressed or fabricated by any of the parties. Under these circumstances, we are convinced that the
non-intervention of a prosecuting attorney to assure lack of collusion between the contending parties is not
fatal to the validity of the proceedings in the trial court.
128
The facts in the case at bar do not call for the strict application of Articles 48 and 60 of the Family Code. For
one, petitioner was not declared in default by the trial court for failure to answer. Petitioner filed his answer
to the complaint and contested the cause of action alleged by private respondent. He actively participated
in the proceedings below by filing several pleadings and cross-examining the witnesses of private
respondent. It is crystal clear that every stage of the litigation was characterized by a no-holds barred contest
and not by collusion.
129
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
Effect of Termination of Marriage
THE PRESUMPTION OF CUSTODY IN FAVOR OF THE MOTHER UNDER ARTICLE 213 OF THE
FAMILY CODE NO LONGER APPLIES IF THE CHILD IS OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE
113. Espiritu v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 115640, March 15,1995
Melo, J.
FACTS:
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City. In 1977, Teresita left
for Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later. In
1984, Reynaldo was sent by his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania as
its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then began to maintain a common law relationship of husband
and wife. On 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born and on 1987, while they were on a brief
vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their return to the US, their second
child, was born and given the name Reginald Vince.
The relationship deteriorated until they decided to separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo
for the break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand,
contended that Teresita was a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture instead of
attending to household expenses. Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. She
claims, however, that she spent a lot of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant touch
with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because his assignment in Pittsburgh was not
yet completed, he was sent back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children with his sister,
co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for
bigamy against her and she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the bigamy case
was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994. Teresita, decided to return to the Philippines and filed
the petition for a writ of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody over the children, thus
starting the whole proceedings now reaching this Court.
The trial court dismissed the petition for habeas corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over
Rosalind and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental authority over them but with rights of
visitation to be agreed upon by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
The Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on
weekends to Reynaldo.
ISSUE:
Who between the husband and the wife shall be entitled to the custody over their children?
HELD:
The husband, Reynaldo was granted the custody.
Both Rosalind and Reginald are now over seven years of age. Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed
the testimony of the various witnesses that while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered into an illicit
relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right in their house. The record shows that the daughter Rosalind
suffered emotional disturbance caused by the traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a
boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita who left the conjugal home and the
children, bound for California. Rosalind, the child was found suffering from emotional shock caused by her
mother's infidelity.
Not only are the children over seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the illicit or immoral
activities of the mother had already caused emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to
130
conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention her conviction for the crime of bigamy,
which from the records appears to have become final.
Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From all indications,
Reynaldo is a fit person, in fact, he has been trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and
care which the mother is not in a position to extend. Thus meeting the two requirements found in the first
paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said article
no longer applies as the children are over seven years. Assuming that the presumption should have
persuasive value for children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years mentioned in the statute,
there are compelling reasons and relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The children
understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother and have been affected in their emotional growth
by her behavior.
131
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
BECAUSE OF ITS PROVISIONAL NATURE, THE COURT NEED NOT DELVE FULLY ON THE MERITS
OF THE PETITION FOR NULLITY OF MARRIAGE BEFORE THE PARTIES CAN BE AFFORDED OF
SUPPORT PENDETE LITE PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF THE DECREE
114. Lim-Lua v. Lua

G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the petitioner Susan Lim- Lua (Susan) seeking
to set aside the decision of the CA dismissing her petition for contempt against respondent Danilo Lua
(Danilo) and ordering the deduction of all the expenses from the support in arrears.
Susan filed an action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Danilo, with a prayer for support pendente
lite for herself and their two children (Angelli and Daniel). After hearing, the RTC granted the support and
ordered Danilo to pay the amount of the support. On appeal, the CA reduced the amount. Danilo complied
with the order of the CA and deducted from the amount of support in arrears the advances given by him to
his children and to Susan. Susan then moved for the issuance of a writ of execution which was granted by
the RTC. For Danilo’s failure to pay the support in arrears pendente lite, Susan filed an action for contempt
against Danilo. The CA dismissed the petition for contempt and ordered the deduction of the purchase and
maintenance of the two cars, and the other advances which inured to the benefit of Susan and their two
children.
Susan argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have allowed the deduction of the value of the
two cars and their maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not indispensable to
the sustenance of the family or in keeping them alive. Danilo, on the other hand, contends that disallowing
the subject deductions would result in unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for the same obligation twice.
ISSUE:
Should all the expenses incurred by Danilo to the benefit of the children and Susan be deducted from the
support in arrears?
HELD:
Yes, the expenses made by Danilo may be deducted from the support in arrears, but must only pertain to
those enumerated under the Family Code. Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal separation, and at any time during
the proceeding, the court, motu proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian or
designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the merits of the case
before it can settle an application for this relief. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or
other documentary evidence appearing in the record.
In this case, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by Danilo to be credited against the
accrued support pendente lite. The value of two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus
their maintenance cost, travel expenses, purchases of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing)
should have been disallowed, as these bear no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite.
The deductions should be limited to those basic needs and expenses considered by the trial and appellate
courts.
Hence, the petition was partly granted. Only the medical expenses of Susan, the Dental expenses and the
credit card purchases of their children were allowed to be deducted from the support pendente lite.
132
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
IN CASE OF INCAPACITY TO PROVIDE SUPPORT BY THE FORMER SPOUSES AFTER A

DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, THE SAME SHALL BE PROVIDED BY PERSONS
OBLIGED TO GIVE SUPPORT UNDER THE FAMILY CODE
115. Mangonon v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
This a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming the order of the RTC granting
support pendente lite to Rebecca (Rica) and Regina (Rina) Delgado.
Petitioner Ma. Belen Mangonon (Petitioner) filed on behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina (twins),
a Petition for Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite. At the time
of their marriage Petitioner was only 21 y/o while respondent Federico Delgado (Federico) was only 19 y/o.
As the marriage was not solemnized without the required consent, the marriage was annulled. Within seven
months after the annulment, Petitioner gave birth to the twins. Petitioner averred that demands were made
upon Federico and the latter’s father, respondent Francisco, for general support and for the payment of the
required college education of the twins. These demands, however, remained unheeded.
Petitioner alleged that the twins are her legitimate daughters by Federico since the twins were born within
seven months from the date of the annulment of their marriage. As legitimate children and grandchildren,
the twins are entitled to general and educational support under the Family Code (FC). Francisco argues
that Petitioner and Federico should be the ones to provide the support needed by their twin daughters
pursuant to Article 199 of the FC.
ISSUE:
Is Francisco liable for support of his twin granddaughters?
HELD:
Yes, Francisco could be held liable for the support of his grandchildren due to the inability of the latter’s
parents to give support.
Article 199 of the Family Code states that “[w]henever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the
liability shall devolve upon the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The
descendants in the nearest degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and
sisters.”
The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However, the
more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those who
are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so. After the hearings conducted as well as
the evidence presented, Petitioner was able to establish, by prima facie proof, the filiation of her twin
daughters to private respondents. Hence, petitioner and Federico are primarily charged to support their
children’s college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support
should be borne by Francisco. Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next
immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their
parents.
Therefore, the Court held Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and
Rina as support pendente lite. As established by petitioner, Francisco has the financial resources to pay
this amount given his various business endeavors.
133
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
THE SEPARATION OF THE PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES IS ONE OF THE NECESSARY

CONSEQUENCES OF THE JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
116. Domingo v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993
Romero, J.
FACTS:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court’s ruling, upholding to dismiss the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of properties.
Delia Avera alleged that she and Roberto got married on November 29, 1976, however she learned of
Roberto’s previous marriage to Emerlina dela Paz due to a bigamy case filed by the latter sometime 1983.
She bought several real and personal properties amounting to P350,000 out of her personal earnings, and
Robert was the possessor and administrator thereof.
During her one-month vacation she learned that Roberto disposed of several of her properties without her
knowledge or consent. She delegated his brother-in-law Moises Avera to be her attorney-in-fact. However,
Roberto refused to turn over the possession and administration of the properties to Moises. In 1991, Deliia
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property in RTC of Pasig against Robert
Domingo. The petition prayed the marriage be declared null and void, and for Delia to be declared the sole
and exclusive owner of all the properties acquired at the time of their void marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss for no cause of action stating that the marriage is void, hence no need
for a declaration of its nullity. Judge Austria denied the motion to dismiss, stating that the question on the
spouses’ properties is an issue that may be determined only after trial on the merits. The CA, Citing Articles
48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, held that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage may be raised together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their
properties.
Hence, petitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari and mandamus. Petitioner contended that an
ordinary civil action instituted for the purpose is necessary in order for the spouses’ properties to be
separated.
ISSUE:
Is an ordinary civil action necessary for a spouse to recover his exclusive properties, a petition for absolute
nullity of marriage notwithstanding?
HELD:
No. when a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shalll provide
for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated
in previous judicial proceedings." Other specific effects are stated in Art. 43 of the Family Code.
Based on such provisions respondent’s ultimate prayer for separation of property will simply be one of the
necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner's
suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for
that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of
marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing
them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought
is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties.
134
LEGAL SEPARATION
Grounds
PRIOR CONVICTION FOR THE CRIME OF CONCUBINAGE IS NOT INDISPENSIBLE FOR A PETITION
FOR LEGAL SEPARATION TO PROSPER
117. Gandionco v. Peñaranda

G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987
Padilla, J.
FACTS:
The case is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to annul the order of respondent Judge denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend hearings for legal separation in view of a pending criminal case for
concubinage.
Private respondent Teresita Gandioco, the legal wife of the petitioner, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Misamis Oriental, presided over by respondent Judge Penarada, a complaint against petitioner for legal
separation, on the ground of concubinage. Subsequently, private respondent also filed with the Municipal
Trial Court, General Santos City, a complaint against petitioner for concubinage, A motion to suspend
hearing of the case of Legal Separation was filed by petitioner Gandioco in line with the pending criminal
case, which was denied by respondent Judge.
In his petition, Gandionco anchored his claim on the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that
after a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action from the same offense should be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered. The civil action for legal separation, grounded as it is on concubinage, it is petitioner's position
that such civil action arises from, or is inextricably tied to the criminal action for concubinage, so that all
proceedings related to legal separation will have to be suspended to await conviction or acquittal for
concubinage in the criminal case.
ISSUE:
Is the conviction of the guilty spouse for the crime of concubinage necessary before an action for legal
separation could prosper?
HELD:
No. A decree of legal separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence in the action for legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary. The guilt of the spouse by final judgment is not a requirement. To this end, the doctrine
in Francisco v. Tayao 4 has been modified, as that case was decided under Act. No. 2710, when absolute
divorce was then allowed and had for its grounds the same grounds for legal separation under the New Civil
Code, with the requirement, under such former law, that the guilt of defendant spouses had to be established
by final judgment in a criminal action. That requirement has not been reproduced or adopted by the framers
of the present Civil Code, and the omission has been uniformly accepted as a modification of the stringent
rule in Francisco v. Tayao.
135
LEGAL SEPARATION
Grounds
ARTICLE 55(1) IS PRESENT WHERE THE RESPONDENT, ON SEVERAL INSTANCES, DISPLAYED

VIOLENT TEMPER AGAINST PETITIONER AND THEIR CHILDREN
118. Ong v. Ong

G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner seeking the reversal of the Decision and
Resolution of CA which affirmed the Decision of RTC granting the petition for legal separation filed by
respondent.
William Ong and Lucita Ong have been married for more than 20 years when Lucita filed a complaint for
Legal separation under Article 55 (1) of the Family Code. Lucita claimed that soon after three years of
marriage, she and William quarreled almost every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her;
William would shout invectives at her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her,
pull her hair, bang her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand.
William would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his belt.
Lucita’s statements were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom Lucita
consulted the day after she left her conjugal home regarding her injuries. William denies the allegations
except for the quarrels between him and Lucita. The RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation
which the CA affirmed in toto.
William argues that the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control and ownership
of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; the testimonies of Lucita and her witnesses are tainted
with relationship and fraud; and since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by
abandoning the family, no decree of legal separation should be issued in her favour following Art. 56 (4) of
the Family Code. Respondent asserts that issues raised by petitioner are factual and SC is not a tier of facts
and when findings of RTC are affirmed by CA they are conclusive.
ISSUE:
Should Lucita Ong be granted a Decree of Legal Separation?
HELD:
Yes. Respondent should be granted the decree of legal separation.
The claim of William that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case is for her family to take control of the
conjugal properties is hard to believe. Lucita left because of her husband’s repeated physical violence and
grossly abusive conduct. She can derive no personal gain from pushing for the financial interests of her
family at the expense of her marriage of 20 years and the companionship of her husband and children. The
assessment of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having had
the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying. On the second point
of argument, relationship alone is not reason enough to discredit and label a witness’s testimony as biased
and unworthy of credence. Thus, considering the detailed and straightforward testimonies given by Linda
Lim and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, the Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias. The last
argument is also without merit. William argues that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal
separation should not be granted, following Art. 56 (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal
separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment
referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year. As it was
established that Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment
contemplated by the said provision.
Therefore, the petition of William Ong is denied for lack of merit and Lucita should be granted a Decree of
Legal Separation under Article 55 (1) of the Family Code which provides: “A petition for legal separation
may be filed on any of the following grounds: (1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of petitioner” were adequately proven.
136
LEGAL SEPARATION
Action for Legal Separation
ARTICLE 103 THE CIVIL CODE (NOW ARTICLE 58 OF THE FAMILY CODE) IS NOT AN ABSOLUTE
BAR TO THE HEARING MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION PRIOR TO THE EXPIRATION OF
THE SIX-MONTH PERIOD
119. Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta, Jr.

G.R. No. L-34132, July 29, 1972
Fernando, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the order of Judge Cipriano Vamenta, Jr., granting the motion to
suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction.
Petitioner Lucy Somosa-Ramos filed a case against her husband Clemente Ramos for legal separation, on
concubinage and an attempt by him against her life. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction for the return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property,
then under the administration and management of respondent Clemente. There was an opposition to the
hearing of such a motion based on Article 103 of the Civil Code which reads: "An action for legal separation
shall in no case be tried before six months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition." It was further
manifested by Clemente in a pleading that if the motion asking for preliminary mandatory injunction were
heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Respondent Judge
granted the motion of Clemente to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary
injunction.
ISSUE:
Is Article 103 of the Civil Code (Article 58 of FC) an absolute bar to the hearing of a motion for preliminary
injunction prior to the expiration of the six-month period?
HELD:
No, the court may act on a on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction.
Article 104 of the Civil Code reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse shall
be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband shall
continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another
to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian
and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of
the court." There would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective
property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may even be
appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership.
The absolute limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties
may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is all the more reason for
this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom she accused of concubinage
and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to
be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not specifically denied by him.
Therefore, the plea of petitioner for a writ of certiorari is granted, and the order of respondent Court
suspending the hearing on the petition for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is set aside. Respondent
Judge is directed to proceed without delay to hear the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction.
137
LEGAL SEPARATION
THE ACT OF THE WIFE IN LEAVING THE HUSBAND DUE TO THE LATTER’S ABUSIVE CONDUCT
DOES NOT AMOUNT TO ABANDONMENT UNDER ARTICLE 55, WHICH REQUIRES THAT IT BE
DONE WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE CAUSE AND FOR MORE THAN ONE YEAR
120. Ong v. Ong

G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
FACTS:
In this Petition for Review, petitioner is seeking the reversal of the Decision of the CA which affirmed the
RTC Decision granting the petition for legal separation filed by respondent.
Petitioner and respondent have been married for more than 20 years when the latter filed a complaint for
Legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. Respondent alleged that since their third year of
marriage, her husband subjected her to physical violence like slapping, kicking, pulling her hair, and banging
her head against the concrete wall and had likewise been violent towards their three children. He would
scold them using his belt buckle to beat them. One day, petitioner hit respondent on several different parts
of her body, pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house, which she did. Lucita’s statements
about William’s abusive behavior were corroborated by her sister Linda Lim. Dr. Vicente Elinzan whom
Lucita consulted the day after she left her conjugal home also testified about her injuries. Hence, Lucita filed
a complaint for legal separation on the ground of physical violence and grossly abusive conduct. William
contends that Lucita abandoned the family, thus, the decree of legal separation should be denied because
they have both given grounds for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Did the act of Lucita in leaving William constitute abandonment as a ground for legal separation such that
both Lucita and William have given grounds for legal separation, hence, the petition for legal separation
should be denied?
HELD:
No, Lucia’s act did not constitute abandonment so the petition for legal separation should be granted.
Following Article 56 (4) of the Family Code, when both parties have given ground for legal separation, the
petition for the same should be denied. However, as a ground for legal separation, the abandonment
referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more than one year.
The argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should
not be granted, following Article 56 (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be
denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation is without merit. It was established that
Lucita left William due to his abusive conduct, thus, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated
but the aforementioned provision.
The fact of physical violence and grossly abusive conduct having been established, the petition for legal
separation should be granted.
138
LEGAL SEPARATION
CONDONATION IS THE FORGIVENESS OF A MARITAL OFFENSE CONSTITUTING A GROUND FOR

LEGAL SEPARATION
121. Bugayong v. Ginez

G.R. No. 10033, December 28, 1956
Felix, J.
FACTS:
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy was married with Leonila Ginez on August 1949 at
Pangasinan while on furlough leave. Immediately after the marriage, they lived with the sisters of Bugayong
in said municipality before he went back to duty. The couple came to an agreement that Ginez would stay
with his sisters who later moved in Manila. On or about July 1951, she left the dwelling of the sisters-in-law
and informed her husband by letter that she had gone to Pangasinan to reside with her mother and later on
moved to Dagupan to study in a local college.
Petitioner then began receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco, (plaintiff’s sister-in-law) and some from
anonymous writers, which were not produced at the hearing, informing him of alleged acts of infidelity of his
wife. He admitted that his wife informed him by letter that a certain Eliong kissed her. All these
communications, prompted him in October 1951 to seek the advice of the Navy Chaplain who asked him to
consult with the navy legal department.
In August 1952, Bugayong went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife. They met in the house of the
defendant’s godmother. They proceeded to the house of Pedro, cousin of the plaintiff where they stayed for
1 day and 1 night as husband and wife. The next day, they slept together in their own house. He tried to
verify with Leonila the truth on the information he received but instead of answering, she merely packed up
and left which he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity. He then filed a complaint for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Was there condonation between Bugayong and Ginez that may serve as a ground for dismissal of the
action?
HELD:
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A single
voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation and
where the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
Furthermore, Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that the legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage.
139
LEGAL SEPARATION
CONDONATION LIES IN THE WIFE’S ASSUMPTION THAT SHE REALLY BELIEVED HER HUSBAND
IS GUIILTY OF CONCUBINAGE
122. Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman

G.R. No. 196842, October 9, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS:
This case is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Ombudsman and
Order, which directed the tiling of an Information for Concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal
Code against petitioner Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego (Alfredo).
Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) and Alfredo were married in 1975 and their union was blessed with two sons. An
opportunity to work as nurse in New York City, United States of America (US) opened up for Rosa.
Meanwhile, Rosa continued to spend her annual vacation in Davao City.
In 1997, Rosa learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was living at their conjugal home. At that time, Rosa
gave Alfredo the benefit of the doubt. The relationship between Alfredo and Sia ended and Alfredo next
took up an affair with Julie de Leon (de Leon). In October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredo’s extra-
marital relationships. As a result, Rosa and son Alfred forthwith flew to Davao City without informing Alfredo
of their impending return, and gathered and consolidated information on her husband’s sexual affairs. Rosa
filed a complaint for: (1) Concubinage under Article 334 of the RPC; (2) violation of Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children; and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of the RPC, before the Office of the
Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo, with designation Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital,
Apokon, Tagum City. Alfredo denied all accusations against him. The Ombudsman, ultimately, found
probable cause to indict only Alfredo and Sia of Concubinage.
Alfredo argues that Rosa cannot institute the criminal prosecution since she had pardoned his concubinage,
having admitted to knowing of his womanizing and yet continuing with their relationship as demonstrated in
Rosa’s annual visits to him in Davao City.
ISSUE:
Should the act of Rosa of annually visiting Alfredo in Davao City despite her knowledge of his womanizing
be construed as condonation of the concubinage?
HELD:
No. Old jurisprudence has held that the cynosure in the question of whether the wife condoned the
concubinage lies in the wife’s "line of conduct under the assumption that she really believed [her husband]
guilty of concubinage:" Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal
separation or, as stated in I Bouver's Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the ‘conditional forgiveness or
remission, by a husband or wife of a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed.’
Indeed, Rosa’s admission was that she believed her husband had stopped womanizing, not that she had
knowledge of Alfredo’s specific acts of concubinage with Sia and de Leon, specifically keeping them in the
conjugal dwelling. This admission set against the specific acts of concubinage listed in Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code does not amount to condonation. Their continued cohabitation as husband and wife
construed from Rosa’s annual visits to Davao City is not acquiescence to Alfredo’s relations with his
concubines. The Court finds nothing in the record which can be construed as pardon or condonation. It is
true that the offended party has to a considerable extent been patient with her husband's shortcomings, but
that seems to have been due to his promises of improvement; nowhere does it appear that she has
consented to her husband's immorality or that she has acquiesced in his relations with his concubine.
140
LEGAL SEPARATION
ACTION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION IS PURELY PERSONAL; DEATH OF ONE PARTY CAUSES THE
DEATH OF THE ACTION ITSELF
123. Sy v. Eufemio
G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
This case is a petition for review by certiorari of an order of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, dismissing civil case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as the
action itself.
Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging
that they were married civilly and canonically in the year 1934. They had lived together as husband and wife
continuously until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. The couple had no child but they acquired
properties during their marriage. On or about March 1949, she discovered her husband cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which, among
others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
Eufemio S. Eufemio counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O.
Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law and
customs, with Go Hiok.
However, before the trial could be completed, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31 May
1969. Respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on two grounds,
namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article
102 of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Does the death of the plaintiff Carmen Lapuz O. Lapuz Sy before final decree, in an action for legal
separation, abate the action?
HELD:
Yes. An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. Being personal in character,
it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis
moritur cum persona.
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved
because these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without
the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are
merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
141
LEGAL SEPARATION
Effects of Decree of Legal Separation
WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION IS PROPER TO ENJOIN A SPOUSE FROM INTERFERING WITH

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES PENDING A SUIT FOR LEGAL
SEPARATION
124. Sabalones v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 106169, February 14, 1994
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Samson Sabalones assails the Order issued by the respondent court in enjoining the
petitioner from interfering with the administration of his and spouse Remedios Sabalones’ properties.
As member of diplomatic service assigned to different countries, petitioner Sabalones left to his wife,
Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15 years. He
retired as ambassador in 1985 and came back to the Philippines, but not to his wife and children.
Four years later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot in Greenhills, San Juan.
He claimed that he was 68 years old, sick and living alone without any income, and that his share of the
proceeds of the sale to defray the prohibitive cost of his hospitalization and medical treatment. In her answer,
opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the house in
Greenhills was occupied by her and their 6 kids, and that they were depending for their support on the
rentals from another conjugal property (building and lot in Forbes Park). Remedios asked the court to grant
legal separation and order the liquidation of their conjugal properties, with forfeiture of her husband’s share
because of his adultery.
The lower court decreed the legal separation of the spouses on the ground that petitioner contracted a
bigamous marriage, thus explaining why Sabalones did not return to respondent. Pending appeal,
respondent wife filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioner from
interfering with the administration of their properties, which was subsequently granted. The petitioner now
assails this order, arguing that since the law provides for a joint administration of the conjugal properties by
the husband and wife, no injunctive relief can be issued against one or the other because no right will be
violated.
ISSUE:
Is a writ of preliminary injunction proper to enjoin a spouse from interfering with the administration of the
conjugal properties pending appeal in a legal separation case?
HELD:
Yes. The law does indeed grant to the spouses joint administration over the conjugal properties as clearly
provided in the above-cited Article 124 of the Family Code. However, Article 61, also above quoted, states
that after a petition for legal separation has been filed, the trial court shall, in the absence of a written
agreement between the couple, appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to act as the
administrator.
While it is true that no formal designation of the administrator has been made, such designation was implicit
in the decision of the trial court denying the petitioner any share in the conjugal properties (and thus also
disqualifying him as administrator thereof). That designation was in effect approved by the Court of Appeals
when it issued in favor of the respondent wife the preliminary injunction now under challenge.
The Court notes that the wife has been administering the subject properties for almost nineteen years now,
apparently without complaint on the part of the petitioner. He has not alleged, much less shown, that her
administration has caused prejudice to the conjugal partnership. What he merely suggests is that the lease
of the Forbes Park property could be renewed on better terms, or he should at least be given his share of
the rentals.
Hence, the Court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her administration. It was also correct,
taking into account the evidence adduced at the hearing, in enjoining the petitioner from interfering with his
wife's administration pending resolution of the appeal.
142
LEGAL SEPARATION
IN LEGAL SEPARATION, IT IS THE ONLY THE NET PROFITS AND NOT THE SHARE OF THE
OFFENDING SPOUSE IN THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP THAT IS FORFEITED IN FAVOR OF THE
COMMON CHILDREN
125. Siochi v. Gozon

G.R. No. 169900, March 18, 2010
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of two separate petitions for review under Rule 45, assailing the CA decision granting
Winifred Gozon the right to dispose of the share of her father in the conjugal partnership, the latter being
the offending spouse in a legal separation case.
This case involves a 30,000 sq.m. parcel of land (property) registered in the name of "Alfredo Gozon
(Alfredo), married to Elvira Gozon (Elvira). Elvira filed with the RTC Cavite a petition for legal separation
against her husband Alfredo Gozon. Pending the case, Alfredo and Mario Siochi, herein petitioner, entered
into Agreement of Buy and Sell involving their conjugal property for the price of 18 million pesos. Mario paid
the partial payment of the said price and he took the possession of the property. When the Court granted
the legal separation of Elvira and Mario, their property was dissolved and liquidated. Being the offending
spouse, Alfredo is deprived of his share in the net profits and the same is awarded to their child Winifred R.
Gozon whose custody is awarded to Elvira.
On Oct, 26, 1994 Alfredo sold the same property to Inter Dimensional Realty Inc. (IDRI) for 18 million pesos
under a special power of attorney executed in his favor by Winnifred. IDRI paid it in full. The said transaction
prompted Mario to file a complaint with RTC of Malabon for specific performance and damages, annulment
of donation and sale, with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction and/or temporary restraining
order.
The RTC held that the agreement of Alfredo and Mario is null and void, as the written consent of Elvira
Gozon for her property rights to the undivided one-half share in the conjugal property was absent in the said
sale, and that, Gozon’s one-half undivided share has been forfeited in favor of his daughter, Winifred Gozon,
by virtue of the decision in the legal separation case. The CA then granted Winifred the option to whether
or not to dispose of her undivided share in the subject land.
On appeal, Mario raised that agreement should be treated as a continuing offer which may be perfected by
the acceptance of the other spouse before the offer is withdrawn. Since Elvira’s conduct signified her
acquiescence to the sale, Mario prays for the Court to direct Alfredo and Elvira to execute a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property upon his payment of ₱9 million to Elvira.
ISSUE:
Is the share of Alfredo in the conjugal partnership, properly forfeited in favor of Winifred in the case for legal
separation?
HELD:
No. Among the effects of the decree of legal separation is that the conjugal partnership is dissolved and
liquidated and the offending spouse would have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership.
It is only Alfredo’s share in the net profits which is forfeited in favor of Winifred. Article 102(4) of the Family
Code provides that "[f]or purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in accordance with Article
43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market value of the
community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution." Clearly, what is forfeited in favor of Winifred is not Alfredo’s share in the conjugal partnership
property but merely in the net profits of the conjugal partnership property.
143
LEGAL SEPARATION
A PARTIAL VOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY MADE BY THE SPOUSES PENDING THE

PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE MAY BE ALLOWED
THE CRIME OF ADULTERY DOES NOT CARRY THE ACCESSORY PENALTY OF CIVIL
INTERDICTION WHICH DEPRIVES THE PERSON OF THE RIGHTS TO MANAGE HER PROPERTY
AND TO DISPOSE OF SUCH PROPERTY INTER VIVOS
126. Maquilan v. Maquilan

G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007
FACTS:
Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of
which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner
discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted
the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latter’s paramour. Consequently,
both the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crime charged and were sentenced to
suffer an imprisonment.
Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15, 2001 with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, imputing psychological incapacity on the
part of the petitioner.
During the pre-trial of the said case, petitioner and private respondent entered into a COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT. The said Compromise Agreement was given judicial imprimatur by the respondent judge in
the assailed Judgment On Compromise Agreement, which was erroneously dated January 2, 2002.
However, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion dated January 15, 2002, praying for the repudiation of the
Compromise Agreement and the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the
respondent judge on the grounds that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of
the consequential effects of the Compromise Agreement.
The respondent Judge in the assailed Order dated January 21, 2002, denied the aforementioned Omnibus
Motion.
Displeased, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order, but the same was denied
ISSUE:
Is the partial voluntary separation of property made by the spouses pending the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage valid?
HELD:
YES. Article 43 of the Family Code referring to Article 42 is inapplicable in this case. Article 2035 of the Civil
Code is also clearly inapplicable. The Compromise Agreement partially divided the properties of the
conjugal partnership of gains between the parties and does not deal with the validity of a marriage or legal
separation. It is not among those that are expressly prohibited by Article 2035.
Moreover, the contention that the Compromise Agreement is tantamount to a circumvention of the law
prohibiting the guilty spouse from sharing in the conjugal properties is misplaced. Existing law and
jurisprudence do not impose such disqualification.
Under Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient
cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved
is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even if the
proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still pending. However, the Court must stress that
this voluntary separation of property is subject to the rights of all creditors of the conjugal partnership of
gains and other persons with pecuniary interest pursuant to Article 136 of the Family Code
144
Petitioner’s claim that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence of the participation
of the provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation made during the pendency of the case is
also void. The proceedings pertaining to the Compromise Agreement involved the conjugal properties of
the spouses. The settlement had no relation to the questions surrounding the validity of their marriage. Nor
did the settlement amount to a collusion between the parties. Truly, the purpose of the active participation
of the Public Prosecutor or the Solicitor General is to ensure that the interest of the State is represented
and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion
between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. While the appearances of the Solicitor
General and/or the Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require their appearance
does not per se nullify the Compromise Agreement.
Furthermore, the conviction of adultery does not carry the accessory of civil interdiction. Under Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for adultery is prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods. Article 333 should be read with Article 43 of the same Code. It is clear, therefore, and as correctly
held by the CA, that the crime of adultery does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdiction which
deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos.
Lastly, neither could it be said that the petitioner was not intelligently and judiciously informed of the
consequential effects of the compromise agreement, and that, on this basis, he may repudiate the
Compromise Agreement. The argument of the petitioner that he was not duly informed by his previous
counsel about the legal effects of the voluntary settlement is not convincing. Mistake or vitiation of consent,
as now claimed by the petitioner as his basis for repudiating the settlement, could hardly be said to be
evident.
145
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife
MARRIAGE CREATES AN OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE HUSBAND TO SUPPORT HIS WIFE
127. Goitia v. Campos-Rueda

G.R. No. 11263, November 2, 1916
Trent, J.
FACTS:
The parties were legally married in Manila and immediately thereafter established their residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home
of her parents.
A month into their marriage, defendant demanded from the plaintiff that she perform unchaste and lascivious
acts on his genital organs. The plaintiff spurned the obscene, continued demands of the defendant and
refused to perform any act other than legal and valid cohabitation. The defendant became frustrated with
plaintiff wife and thus resorted to maltreat her by word and deed. The maltreatment of the defendant
husband became too much for the plaintiff wife that she had no choice but to leave the conjugal abode and
take refuge in the home of her parents.
ISSUE:
May the wife compel her husband for support outside of the conjugal domicile?
HELD:
Yes. Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation to give support shall cease. The
failure of the wife to live with her husband is not one of them. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation
on the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is founded not so much on the express or
implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the
enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to terminate
it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate
maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal
sense of the term, but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate
of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of
the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife and indulges in the habit of
assaulting her. The pro tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is not an impeachment
of that public policy by which marriage is regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only as such separation is tolerated as a
means of preserving the public peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect whatever
impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
146
COURTS CANNOT COMPEL ONE OF THE SPOUSES TO COHABIT WITH, AND RENDER CONJUGAL
RIGHTS, TO THE OTHER
128. Arroyo v. Vasquez De Arroyo

G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
Street, J.
FACTS:
In the year 1910, Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock
by marriage. They have lived together as man and wife until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from
their common home with the intention of living separate from her husband. Despite all efforts had been
made by the husband, the wife refused to resume marital relations prompting the former to initiate this action
to compel the latter to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. For her part, the
defendant averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel
treatment on the part of her husband. The lower court ruled in favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live
apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff
should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the trial of the
case. The plaintiff thereupon appealed to the Supreme Court. The plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal
rights. He filed a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal
home and live with him as a wife according to the precepts of law and morality
ISSUE:
Can the courts issue a preliminary mandatory injunction to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with and
render conjugal rights to the other?
HELD:
No. If a preliminary mandatory injunction is entered and the defendant should refuse to obey it, she would
be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she and, so far as the present writer is aware, the question is
raised for the first time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for the court to make such an order. It is
not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with,
and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled,
an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But the Court is disinclined to sanction the doctrine
that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely
personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel
the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of these countries where the court of justice
have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is
extremely questionable.
The Court is therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and
absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the
complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself
without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return. Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from,
in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo
has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is.
147
ESSENTIAL OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPOS IS TO INQUIRE IN ALL
MANNER OF INVOLUNTARY RESTRAINT, AND TO RELIEVE A PERSON THEREFROM IF SUCH
RESTRAINT IS ILLEGAL
129. Ilusorio v. Bildner

G.R Nos. 139789 & 139808, May 12, 2000
Pardo, J.
FACTS:
On July 11, 1942, Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted matrimony and lived together for a
period of thirty (30) years. In 1972, they separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Out of their
marriage, the spouses had six (6) children. On December 30, 1997, upon Ilusorio’s arrival from the United
States, he stayed with Erlinda for about five (5) months in Antipolo City. Ilusorio is about 86 years of age
possessed of extensive property valued at millions of pesos. The children, alleged that during this time, their
mother gave Ilusorio an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an antidepressant drug prescribed
by his doctor in New York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Ilusorio’s health deteriorated. On May 31, 1998, after
attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Ilusorio did not return to Antipolo City and instead lived at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. On March 11, 1999, Erlinda filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Ilusorio. She alleged that respondents refused petitioner’s
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Ilusorio from returning to Antipolo City. The petition
was denied for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
ISSUE:
Can a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?
HELD:
No. To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of lawyer Ilusorio’s
liberty that would justify the issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or
under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated.
The CA observed that lawyer Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not
to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. The CA also observed that he was of sound
and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. Being of sound
mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on
his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of
his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Ilusorio. He made it clear before the
CA that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent
any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
148
FAILURE TO PERFORM MARITAL OBLIGATIONS IS ACTIONABLE BY WAY OF DAMAGES
130. Tenchavez v. Escaño

G.R. No. L-19671, November 29, 1965
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
The case is a direct appeal from the judgment of the CFI of Cebu, denying the claim of plaintiff Pastor
Tenchavez for legal separtion with damages against his wife, Vicenta Escano. Vicenta Escaño (Vicenta),
27 years of age exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez (Pastor), 32 years of age, before a
Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was duly registered. The parents of Vicenta were
disgusted because of the scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke. They were advised by a
priest to “recelebrate” what was allegedly an invalid marriage. Such did not happen, as a letter detailing an
amorous relationship between Pastor and another woman was brought to the possession of Vicenta.
As a result, Vicdnta continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. In 1948,
they were estranged, as Vicenta had gone to Misamis Occidental to escape from the scandal that her
marriage. In 1950, without informing her husband, Vicenta left for the United States and filed for a divorce
against the plaintiff in Nevada, which granted the same. She then married an American and was naturalized
as a citizen. Years after, Tenchavez initiated proceedings against Vicenta F. Escaño and her parents. The
court did not decree a legal separation but freed plaintiff from supporing his wife and to acquire properties
to the exclusion Vicenta. The plaintiff appealed, assigning as error in not holding Vicenta liable for damages
and dismissing the complaint.
ISSUE:
Can Vicenta be held liable for damages in her desertion of Pastor?
HELD:
Yes. It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of absolute
divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the Second Judicial District Court of
Washoe County, State of Nevada, on grounds of "extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." At the time
the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. She was then
subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Here flows as a necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second
marriage are not entitled to recognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be
declared to be existent and undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties,
and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through
her fault, for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity.
149
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE
Marriage Settlement
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS CANNOT BE MODIFIED AFTER MARRIAGE
131. Pana v. Heirs of Juanite

G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012
Abad, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Efren Pana (Efren) challenges the ruling of the CA in upholding the propriety of levy and execution
on the conjugal properties where one of the spouses has been found guilty of a crime and ordered to pay
civil indemnities to the victims’ heirs.
Melecia Pana (Melecia) was found guilty for the murder of Jose Juanite (Juanite) and was ordered to pay
civil indemnity and damages. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of Juanite, the RTC ordered the
issuance of a writ resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of Efren and Melicia. The
spouses filed a motion to quash claiming that the properties levied upon were conjugal assets, not
paraphernal assets of Melecia.
Efren claims that his marriage with Melecia falls under the regime of conjugal property of gains, not the
system of absolute community of property, since they were married prior to the enactment of the Family
Code and that they did not execute any prenuptial agreement. Hence, under the law on Conjugal Property
of Gains in the Civil Code, such properties should not be levied upon.
The heirs of Juanite do not dispute that it was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which governed the
marriage, nonetheless they insist that it is ACP that applies to Efren and Melecia as Art. 94 of the FC
provides for its retroactivity in so far as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights. Since both spouses are
still alive, no vested rights have been acquired by each over the properties of the community, hence the
property regime was converted into ACP. Therefore, the liabilities imposed on the accused-spouse may
properly be charged against the community.
ISSUES:
Did the transitory provision of the Family Code operate to convert CPG into ACP amounting to a modification
of the marriage settlement?
HELD:
No, it did not. Pursuant to Art. 76 of the FC, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage
between Efren and Melecia who were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the
celebration of that marriage.
Post-marriage modification of such settlements can take place only where: (a) the absolute community or
conjugal partnership was dissolved and liquidated upon a decree of legal separation; (b) the spouses who
were legally separated reconciled and agreed to revive their former property regime;(c) judicial separation
of property had been had on the ground that a spouse abandons the other without just cause or fails to
comply with his obligations to the family;(d) there was judicial separation of property under Article 135; (e)
the spouses jointly filed a petition for the voluntary dissolution of their absolute community or conjugal
partnership of gains. None of these circumstances exists in the case of Efren and Melecia. Hence, the
transitory provision did not convert the regime of CPG into ACP.
To automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the Civil Code into
absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code took effect would be to impair their acquired
or vested rights to such separate properties.
150
Donations by Reason of Marriage
EXPRESS ACCEPTANCE IS NOT NECESSARY FOR THE VALIDITY OF DONATIONS PROPTER

NUPTIAS
132. Valencia v. Locquiao

G.R. No. 12213, October 3, 2003
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
A petition for review under Rule 45 is seeking to annul the CA joint Decision and Resolution in two
consolidated cases involving an action for annulment of title and an action for ejectment, concerning the
same parcel of land in Urdaneta, Pangasinan.
Herminigildo and Raymunda Locquiao executed a deed of donation propter nuptias in favor of their son,
Benito, and his prospective bride, Tomasa Mara, herein respondents, which includes that land in question.
The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their marriage was inscribed at the
back of O.C.T. No. 18383. Respondents registered the land. Respondents allowed petitioner Romana
Valencia and took possession and cultivated the subject land. When respondent Romana's husband got
sick her daughter petitioner Constancia Valencia took possession of the land.
Respondent Benito filed an ejectment case with the MTC of Urdaneta, Pangasinan. The MTC ruled in favor
of Benito. Petitioners countered with a Complaint for the annulment of Transfer Certificate alleging that the
donation did not observe the form required by law since there was no written acceptance on the document
itself or in a separate public instrument.
Petitioners elevated the 2 decisions with the CA which affirmed the assailed decisions of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Is an express or implied acceptance of donation by the donee required?
HELD:
No. Acceptance is not necessary for the validity of such gift. Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter
nuptias must be made in a public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically described.
However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that "acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such
gifts". Therefore, the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem with compliance
with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract are applicable thereto and not
later statutes, unless the latter are specifically intended to have retroactive effect. Consequently, it is the
Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias was executed in 1944 and the
New Civil Code took effect only on August 30, 1950. Nevertheless, even if the provisions of the New Civil
Code were to be applied, the case of the petitioners would collapse just the same. As
Article 129 of the New Civil Code provides that express acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of
these donations." Thus, implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias is sufficient.
151
Donation between the Spouses During the Marriage
BAN ON DONATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE APPLIES TO COMMON-LAW

RELATIONSHIP
133. Matabuena v. Cervantes

G.R. No. L-2877, March 31, 1971
Fernando, J.
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law spouse,
herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years after the deed
of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died.
Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral relative
of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her
in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon.
The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time
when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE:
Does the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage apply to a common-law relationship?
HELD:
Yes. The court ruled that the ban of donation between spouses applies to a common-law relationship. While
Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses during marriage, policy
consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality requires that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura v. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is to prohibit donations in
favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and
influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living
together as husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials.
However, the lack of validity of the donation of Felix Matabuena to Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily
result to plaintiff having exclusive rights to the disputed property. Because Petronila and Felix Matabuena
were legally married before Felix died, Petronila is his widow. Hence, she is entitled to 1/2 of the property
of the deceased. The other half would be given to Felix Matabuena’s sister, Cornelia Matabuena.
152
PROHIBITION ON DONATION BETWEEN THE SPOUSES DURING THE MARRIAGE APPLY TO

COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIPS
134. Arcaba v. Vda. de Batocael

G.R. No. 146683, November 22, 2001
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the RTC,
declaring as void a deed of donation inter vivos executed by the late Francisco T. Comille in favor of the
petitioner.
Francisco Comille and his wife Zosima Montallana became the registered owners of Lot No. 437-A. After
the death of Zosima, Francisco asked his niece Leticia Bellosillo, the latter's cousin, Luzviminda Paghacian,
and petitioner Cirila Arcaba, then a widow, to take care of his house, as well as the store inside. A few
months before his death, Francisco executed an instrument denominated "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos,"
in which he ceded a portion of Lot 437-A together with his house, to Cirila, who accepted the donation in
the same instrument. Francisco left the larger portion of 268 square meters in his name.
Respondents, who are the decedent's nephews and nieces and his heirs by intestate succession, alleged
that Cirila was the common-law wife of Francisco and the donation inter vivos made by Francisco in her
favor is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
1. Is the petitioner a common-law wife of the late Francisco Comille?
2. Did the CA correctly apply Art. 87 of the Family Code?
HELD:
1. Yes. In Bitangcor v. Tan, the term "cohabitation" or "living together as husband and wife" means not only
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse. Cohabitation, of course, means more
than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested
in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is public assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation,
and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such. Secret
meetings or nights clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has considered as sufficient proof
of common-law relationship the stipulations between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the
existence of legitimate children. Cirila admitted that she and Francisco resided under one roof for a long
time, It is very possible that the two consummated their relationship, since Cirila gave Francisco therapeutic
massage and Leticia said they slept in the same bedroom. At the very least, their public conduct indicated
that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and patient, but that of exclusive partners akin to husband
and wife.
2. Yes. Having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and Francisco lived together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in
favor of Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code.
153
TRANSFER OF PROPERTIES BETWEEN SPOUSES CANNOT BE ATTACKED BY PARTIES WHO DO

NOT BEAR ANY RELATION WTH THE SPOUSES
135. Harding v. Commercial Union Assurance Co.

G.R. No. L-12707, August 10, 1918
Fisher, J.
FACTS:
This was an action by plaintiffs to recover from defendant the sum of P3,000 and interest, alleged to be due
under the terms of a policy of insurance. The trial court gave plaintiffs judgment for the amount demanded,
with interest and costs, and from that decision the defendant appeals.
The plaintiff Mrs. Henry E. Harding was the owner of a Studebaker automobile, in consideration of the
payment to the defendant of the premium of P150, by said plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding, with the consent
of her husband, the defendant by its duly authorized agent, Smith, Bell & Company, made its policy of
insurance in writing upon said automobile was set forth in said policy to be P3,000. On March 24, 1916,
said automobile was totally destroyed by fire; that the loss thereby to plaintiffs was the sum of P3,000; that
thereafter, within the period mentioned in the said policy of insurance, the plaintiff, Mrs. Henry E. Harding,
furnished the defendant the proofs of her said loss and interest, and otherwise performed all the conditions
of said policy on her part, and that the defendant has not paid said loss nor any part thereof, although due
demand was made upon defendant therefor.
Appellant contends that Mrs. Harding was not the owner of the automobile at the time of the issuance of the
policy, and, therefore, had no insurable interest in it. The court below found that the automobile was given
to plaintiff by her husband shortly after the issuance of the policy here in question. Appellant does not dispute
the correctness of this finding, but contends that the gift was void, citing article 1334 of the Civil Code which
provides that "All gifts between spouses during the marriage shall be void. Moderate gifts which the spouses
bestow on each other on festive days of the family are not included in this rule."
ISSUE:
Is the appellants contention correct that Mrs. Harding had no insurable interest since the gift was void under
the old civil code which provides that, that "All gifts between spouses during the marriage shall be void.
Moderate gifts which the spouses bestow on each other on festive days of the family are not included in this
rule."
HELD:
No. As provided in the case of Cook v. McMicking the Court held that, the appellants are not in a position
to challenge the validity of the transfer, if it may be called such. They bore absolutely no relation to the
parties to the transfer at the time it occurred and had no rights or interests inchoate, present, remote, or
otherwise, in the property in question at the time the transfer occurred. Although certain transfers from
husband to wife or from wife to husband are prohibited in the article referred to, such prohibition can be
taken advantage of only by persons who bear such a relation to the parties making the transfer or to the
property itself that such transfer interferes with their rights or interests. Unless such a relationship appears
the transfer cannot be attacked. Furthermore, even assuming that defendant might have invoked article
1334 as a defense, the burden would be upon it to show that the gift in question does not fall within the
exception therein established. We cannot say, as a matter of law, that the gift of an automobile by a husband
to his wife is not a moderate one. Whether it is or is not would depend upon the circumstances of the parties,
as to which nothing is disclosed by the record.
154
Absolute Community of Property
PROPERTY BROUGHT INTO THE MARRIAGE FORM PART OF THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
REGARDLESS OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION MADE BY THE SPOUSES FOR THE PURCHASE OF
SUCH PROPERTY PRIOR TO MARRIAGE
136. Nobleza v. Nuega

G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
Respondent Shirley Nuega and her partner Rogelio purchased a residential lot sometime in 1989, prior to
their marriage in 1990. Shirley alleges that it was purchased through her exclusive funds while working
abroad as a domestic helper. Upon learning that Rogelio brought home another woman which the former
also introduces as his wife, Shirley filed a case for Concubinage and Legal Separation and Liquidation of
Property with the RTC. Despite the pendency of the case and Shirley appraising interested buyers not to
deal with Rogelio because of a pending case filed against the latter, Rogelio still sold the property to
petitioner Josefina Nobleza without respondent’s consent.
Meanwhile, the RTC granted the petition for legal separation and enjoined Rogelio from selling,
encumbering or in any way disposing or alienating any of their community property including the subject
house and lot before the required liquidation. Respondent then filed a complaint for Rescission of Sale and
Recovery of Property against petitioner before the RTC which was granted. The CA subsequently affirmed
the RTC’s ruling. Hence, this petition before the SC where Nobleza alleges that she is a buyer in good faith
as the property’s TCT only bears Rogelio’s name as owner.
ISSUE:
1. Is the subject property part of the community property despite being bought with respondent’s exclusive
funds?
2. Is the sale made by Rogelio to Josefina Nobleza valid? If not, who is liable for reimbursement of the
purchase price to the seller?
HELD:
1. The property is part of the community property. Actual contribution is not relevant in determining whether
a piece of property is community property for the law itself defines what constitutes community property.
The community property shall consist of all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration
of the marriage or acquired thereafter. The only exceptions are: (1) those excluded from the absolute
community by the Family Code; and (2) those excluded by the marriage settlement. The subject property
does not fall under any of the exclusions provided in Article 92 of the Family Code, it therefore forms part of
the absolute community property of Shirley and Rogelio. Regardless of their respective contribution to its
acquisition before their marriage, and despite the fact that only Rogelio's name appears in the TCT as
owner, the property is owned jointly by the spouses Shirley and Rogelio. Citing Quiao v. Quiao, the SC held
whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage, and those acquired during the marriage (except
those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code) form the common mass of the couple's properties.
2. The sale is void pursuant to Article 96 of the Family Code as the sale was made without the consent of
the other spouse or authority of the court. Under Art. 96, in the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the common properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence
of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. Finally, Under Article 94 of
the Family Code, the absolute community of property shall only be "liable for x x x [d]ebts and obligations
contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited x x x.". There being no evidence on record that the amount received by Rogelio redounded to the
benefit of the family, respondent cannot be made to reimburse any amount to petitioner.
155
SPECIAL POWER OF ATTORNEY EXECUTED BY A SPOUSE CONSTITUTES AS ACCEPTANCE

PERFECTING THE CONTINUING OFFER CONTEMPLATED UNDER ARTICLES 96 AND 124 OF THE
FAMILY CODE
137. Flores v. Spouses Lindo, Jr.

G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
In order to obtain a loan from petitioner Arturo Flores, respondent Lindo executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage covering a property owned in common by the latter and her spouse Enrico. Edna also signed a
promissory note and the Deed for herself and Enrico as his attorney-in-fact on October 31, 1995. However,
the Special Power of Attorney executed by Enrico was dated November 4, 1995.
Edna issued check for the payment of the loan which were all dishonored for insufficiency of funds prompting
petitioner to file a Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage.
ISSUE:
Is the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage executed by Edna on the common property without her spouse’s initial
consent valid considering that a(n) SPA was subsequently executed by said spouse?
HELD:
The Deed is valid. Article 124 of the Family Code provides: x x x These powers do not include disposition
or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of
such authority or consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October
1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the
acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the
parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.
156
ABSOLUTE CESSATION OF MARITAL RELATIONS, DUTIES AND RIGHTS, WITH THE INTENTION OF
PERPETUAL SEPARATION IS NECESSARY TO CONSTITUTE ABANDONMENT
138. De La Cruz v. De La Cruz

G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968
Castro, J.
FACTS:
This is an Appeal from the RTC's Decision ordering separation and division of the conjugal assets of
Spouses Severino and Estrella de la Cruz. The appellee Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint before the
RTC alleging that her husband, the appellant Severino de la Cruz, abandoned her and mismanaged their
conjugal partnership properties, thus, warranting division of the conjugal assets. The appellant Severino de
la Cruz and appellee Estrella de la Cruz were married in Bacolod City on February 1, 1938. During their
coverture they acquired seven parcels of land and engaged in varied business ventures.
In her complaint, appellee Estrella de la Cruz alleged that her husband appellant Severino de la Cruz has
abandoned her and their children, to live in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez.
The appellant Severino de la Cruz, for his part, denied having abandoned his wife and children, but admitted
that he started to live separately from his wife. His intention was only to teach her wife a lesson as she was
quarrelsome and extremely jealous of every woman. In fact, his wife and children continued to draw
allowances from his office of a total ranging from P1,200 to P1,500 a month.
ISSUE:
Does the mere physical absence of the husband from the conjugal home constitute abandonment?
HELD:
No, physical absence of the husband from the conjugal home does not constitute abandonment.
The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion.
Giving to the word "abandoned", as used in Article 178, the meaning drawn from the definitions above
reproduced, it seems rather clear that to constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband, there must be
absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation
Here, appellant continued to give support to his family despite his absence from the conjugal home. This
fact is admitted by the complainant, although she minimized the amount of support given, saying that it was
only P500 monthly. The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to his wife and children negates
any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights.
Therefore, absolute cessation of marital relations, duties and rights, with the intention of perpetual
separation is necessary to constitute abandonment.
157
Conjugal Partnership of Gains
PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION BY BOTH PARTIES IS REQUIRED, OTHERWISE THERE IS NO

CO-OWNERSHIP AND NO PRESUMPTION OF EQUAL SHARING
139. Villanueva v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari, petitioner seeks the reversal of the Court of Appeals’ Decision
dismissing petitioners’ appeal of the RTC Decision. Eusebia Napisa Retuya filed a complaint before the trial
court against her husband Nicolas Retuya, petitioners Pacita Villanueva, and Nicolas’ son with Pacita,
Procopio Villanueva (. Eusebia sought the reconveyance from petitioners Nicolas and Pacita of several
properties, claiming the subject properties are her conjugal properties with Nicolas.
From the time petitioner Pacita started living in concubinage with Nicolas, she has no occupation, she had
no properties of her own from which she could derive income. When Nicolas suffered a stroke and cannot
talk anymore, petitioner Procopio Villanueva, one of Nicolas’ illegitimate children has been receiving the
income of these properties.
Petitioners argue that since Nicolas and Pacita were already cohabiting when the lot was acquired, it cannot
be deemed conjugal property of Nicolas and Eusebia.
ISSUE:
Does the property acquired by live-in partners automatically become co-owned by them in proportion to
their contribution?
HELD:
No, property acquired by live-in partners does not automatically become co-owned by them in proportion to
their contribution.
A reading of Article 148 readily shows that there must be proof of "actual joint contribution" by both the live-
in partners before the property becomes co-owned by them in proportion to their contribution. The
presumption of equality of contribution arises only in the absence of proof of their proportionate
contributions, subject to the condition that actual joint contribution is proven first. Simply put, proof of actual
contribution by both parties is required; otherwise there is no co-ownership and no presumption of equal
sharing.
Here, Petitioners failed to show proof of actual contribution by Pacita in the acquisition of Lot No. 152.
Therefore, property acquired by live-in partners does not automatically become co-owned by them in
proportion to their contribution.
158
PROCEEDS OF AN INSURANCE POLICY FORMS PART OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
140. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Posadas, Jr.

G.R. No. L-34583, October 22, 1931
Villa-Real, J.
FACTS:
Plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze, widow of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, is of legal age, a
native of Manila, Philippine Islands, and is and was at all times hereinafter mentioned a resident of Germany,
and at the time of the death of her husband, the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, she was actually residing
and living in Germany. Adolphe died on February 2, 1928. Among the personal property of the deceased
was found life-insurance policy No. 194538 issued at Manila, Philippine Islands, on January 14, 1913, for
the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila branch, a foreign corporation
duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of Canada, and duly authorized to transact
business in the Philippine Islands. Herein defendant imposed an inheritance tax upon the transmission of
the proceeds of the policy in question in the sum of P20,150 from the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar
Schuetze to the sole heir of the deceased, or the plaintiff herein, which inheritance tax amounted to the sum
of P1,209. The plaintiff argued that such amount is part of the community property and is therefore not
subject to inheritance tax
ISSUE:
Is the amount of the insurance policy paraphernal or community property?
HELD:
With the exception of the premium for the first year covering the period from January 14, 1913 to January
14, 1914, all the money used for paying the premiums, i. e., from the second year, or January 16, 1914, or
when the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano, until his death
on February 2, 1929, is conjugal property inasmuch as it does not appear to have exclusively belonged to
him or to his wife (art. 1407, Civil Code). As the sum of P20,150 here in controversy is a product of such
premium it must also be deemed community property, because it was acquired for a valuable consideration,
during said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's marriage with Rosario Gelano at the expense of the common fund
(art. 1401, No. 1, Civil Code), except for the small part corresponding to the first premium paid with the
deceased's own money.
In his Commentaries on the Civil Code, volume 9, page 589, second edition, Manresa treats of life insurance
in the following terms, to wit:
The amount of the policy represents the premiums to be paid, and the right to it arises the moment the
contract is perfected, for at the moment the power of disposing of it may be exercised, and if death
occurs payment may be demanded. It is therefore something acquired for a valuable consideration
during the marriage, though the period of its fulfillment, depend upon the death of one of the spouses,
which terminates the partnership. So considered, the question may be said to be decided by articles
1396 and 1401: if the premiums are paid with the exclusive property of husband or wife, the policy
belongs to the owner; if with conjugal property, or if the money cannot be proved as coming from one
or the other of the spouses, the policy is community property.
159
THAT ALL PROPERTIES OF THE MARRIAGE BELONG TO CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS A

DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION
141. Jocson v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-55322, February 16, 1989
Medialdea, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Moises Jocson and respondent Agustina Jocson-Vasquez are the only surviving offsprings of the
spouses Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, while respondent Ernesto Vasquez is the husband of
Agustina. Alejandra Poblete predeceased her husband without her intestate estate being settled.
Subsequently, Emilio Jocson also died intestate on April 1, 1972.
The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his
lifetime purportedly conveying, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of
his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner claimed that the
properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell.
ISSUE:
Do the properties in question form part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses and therefore cannot be
a valid subject of contract of sale?
HELD:
No. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. However,
in the case of Cobb-Perez v. Hon. Gregorio Lantin (G.R. No. L-22320, May 22, 1968), the Supreme Court
held that the party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was
acquired during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.
It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first
present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra
Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that
the properties were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that
the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are
two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already
existing (See Torela v. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were acquired by Emilio
Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which
explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married to the latter.
160
PROPERTIES BELONG TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF THE MARRIAGE WHERE, DURING

ITS SUBSISTENCE, FULL OWNERSHIP WAS ACQUIRED
142. Jovellanos v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
On September 2, 1955, Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a contract denominated as a Lease
and Conditional Sale agreement over a parcel of land in Quezon City Community Development Project,
including a bungalow thereon. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he
had three children, the petitioners herein. Leonor Dizon died on January 2, 1959. On May 30, 1967, Daniel
married private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos with whom he begot two children, her herein
corespondents. On December 18, 1971, petitioner Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and, at the behest
of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises. On January 8, 1975, with the
lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on
the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow
thereon. On September 8, 1985, Daniel Jovellanos died. Herein respondents contend that the property
forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second marriage while petitioners contend that the property
was acquired during the subsistence of the 1st marriage pursuant to the Lease and Conditional Sale
Agreement.
ISSUE:
Is the lot and bungalow covered by the lease and conditional sale agreement a conjugal property of the
second marriage of the late Daniel Jovellanos?
HELD:
Yes. The right of Daniel Jovellanos to the property under the contract with Philamlife was merely an inchoate
and expectant right which would ripen into a vested right only upon his acquisition of ownership, which was
contingent upon his full payment of the rentals and compliance with all his contractual obligations
thereunder. He consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount hence,
although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8,
1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor.
Prior to the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in 1975 by Philamlife, the right of Daniel Jovellanos to
the property under the contract with Philamlife was merely an inchoate and expectant right which would
ripen into a vested right only upon his acquisition of ownership which was contingent upon his full payment
of the rentals and compliance with all his contractual obligations thereunder. A vested right is an immediate
fixed right of present and future enjoyment. It is to be distinguished from a right that is expectant or
contingent. It is a right which is fixed, unalterable, absolute, complete and unconditional to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency. Thus, for a
property right to be vested, there must be a transition from the potential or contingent to the actual, and the
proprietary interest must have attached to a thing; it must have become fixed or established and is no longer
open to doubt or controversy.
As stated, since the Deed of Absolute Sale was only executed in 1975, it is only then that full ownership
was vested to Daniel Jovellanos. Since, as early as 1967, Daniel was already married to Annette Jovellanos,
the property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his second wife.
161
PROPERTY PURCHASED PARTLY WITH PARAPHERNAL FUNDS AND PARTLY WITH CONJUGAL
FUNDS BELONGS TO BOTH PATRIMONIES IN COMMON, IN PROPORTION TO THE
CONTRIBUTIONS OF EACH
143. Castillo, Jr. v. Pasco

G.R. No. L-16857, May 29, 1964
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
In October 1931, Marcelo Castillo, Sr., being a widower, married Macaria Pasco, a widow who had survived
two previous husbands. On December 22, 1932, Gabriel Gonzales, as co-owners of the litigated fishpond,
executed a deed of sale, conveying said property to the spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco for
the sum of P6,000, payable in three installments: P1,000 upon execution of the deed, P2,000 on January
25, 1933, without interest; and P3,000 within one year thereafter, with 11% interest from February 1, 1933,
but extendible for another year. On April 3, 1933, Marcelo Castillo, Sr. died. The two installments, totalling
P5,000, of the price of the fishpond were paid with conjugal funds, unlike the first installment of P1,000 that
was paid exclusively with money belonging to the wife Macaria Pasco. Against the contention of petitioners-
appellants that the fishpond thus bought should be considered conjugal for its having been acquired during
coverture, the Court of Appeals declared it to be paraphernal, because it was purchased with exclusive
funds of the wife, Macaria Pasco.
ISSUE:
Should the fishpond be considered conjugal property of spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco?
HELD:
Yes. Under the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, the applicable law in 1932, the property acquired for onerous
consideration during the marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property depending on the source of
the funds employed for its acquisition. Thus, Article 1396 of said Code provided: “ART. 1396. The following
is separate property of either spouse: xxx 4. That bought with money belonging exclusively to the wife or to
the husband.” On the other hand, Article 1401 prescribed that: “ART. 1401. To the conjugal property belong:
1. Property acquired for valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund,
whether the acquisition 'is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only."
As the litigated fishpond was purchased partly with paraphernal funds and partly with money of the conjugal
partnership, justice requires that the property be held to belong to both patrimonies in common, in proportion
to the contributions of each to the total purchase price of P6,000. An undivided one-sixth (1/6) should be
deemed paraphernal, and the remaining five-sixths (5/6ths) held property of the con-jugal partnership of
spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco.
The payment by the widow, after her husband's death, of the mortgage debt due to Dr. Pasco, the assignee
of the original mortgagee , Dr. Nicanor Jacinto, does not result in increasing her share in the property in
question but in creating a lien in her favor over the undivided share of the conjugal partnership, for the
repayment of the amount she has advanced, should it be ultimately shown that the money thus delivered to
the creditor was exclusively owned by her.
162
TRUSTEE OBLIGED TO CONVEY PROPERTY TO RIGHTFUL OWNER
144. Magallon v. Montejo

G.R. No. 73733, December 16, 1986
Narvasa, J.
FACTS:
The plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin Lacerna and his wife, Eustaquia Pichan, who
died in 1953, asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her conjugal partnership with
Lacerna. They instituted a case against Lacerna to compel partition of a parcel of land to which said
defendant had perfected a claim by homestead. While said defendant denied having contracted marriage
with Pichan — although he admitted living with her without benefit of marriage until she allegedly abandoned
him — as well as paternity of two of the plaintiffs who, he claimed, were fathered by other men, the trial
court gave his denials no credence. Said court, found that Lacerna had in fact been married to Eustaquia,
and that the plaintiffs were his children with her. The trial court further found that Martin had begun working
the homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. Hence,
the plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them.
Lacerna appealed to the Immediate Appellate Court, which affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Meanwhile, the said land, subject of Homestead Patent No. 148869, was finally registered under OCT No.
P-11568 only on November 22, 1978 while the appeal was pending. The OCT was issued in the name of
“Martin Lacerna xxx, married to Epifania Magallon…” On November 26, 1985, respondent Judge then
issued an alias writ of execution in favor of private respondents commanding the provincial sheriff to compel
the defendant Martin Lacerna to divide and partition the property. Lacerna and petitioner filed with the trial
court a “Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution,” alleging that the property was the conjugal property
of Lacerna and hers, when in fact the property should have been in the name of Lacerna and Pichan as
spouses and therefore belonged to their conjugal partnership. Said motion was denied, as also was a motion
for reconsideration of the order of denial. Hence, this petition seeking to annul the writ of execution.
ISSUE:
Is the property part of the conjugal property of Lacerna and Pichan?
HELD:
Yes. The land in question, which rightfully pertained to the conjugal partnership of Martin Lacerna and
Eustaquia Pichan, the plaintiff's mother, and should have been titled in the names of said spouses, was,
through fraud or mistake, registered in the names of Lacerna and petitioner, as a mere mistress. In such a
situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with an implied, or a constructive, trust for the party
rightfully entitled thereto. Petitioner, as the trustee of a constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to the
private respondents that part of the land in question to which she now claims an ostensible title, said portion
rightfully pertaining to the respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal partnership with
Lacerna.
It is evident that the petitioner relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the land
carries her name as the "wife" of the owner named therein, Lacerna. As already observed, such entry on
the certificate of title has been established by evidence no longer disputable as resulting from a mistake if,
indeed, it was not procured through fraud. Moreover, on the authority of Litam v. Rivera and Stuart v. Yatco,
the phrase "married to Epifania Magallon" written after the name of Lacerna in said certificate of title is
merely, descriptive of the civil status of Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not necessarily prove that
the land is "conjugal" property of Lacerna and petitioner herein.
Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160 of the (Old) Civil Code that property
acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no proof of her alleged
marriage to Lacerna except that which arises by implication from the aforestated entry in the certificate of
title and for the far more compelling reason that the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been
perfected during Lacerna's marriage to Pichan, mother of the private respondents.
163
MERE CONSTRUCTION OF A BUILDING FROM COMMON FUNDS DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY

CONVEY OWNERSHIP OF THE WIFE’S LAND TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
145. Vda. de Padilla v. Vda. de Padilla

G.R. No. L-48137, October 4, 1943
Bocobo, J.
FACTS:
Narciso A. Padilla and Concepcion Paterno were married on December 12, 1912. The husband, who was
a medical student, contributed a small capital to the conjugal partnership at the time of the marriage. The
wife brought to the marriage considerable property--real estate, jewelry, and cash. Practically all of the
conjugal partnership property came from the fruits of the paraphernal property. The conjugal partnership
lasted twenty-one years, the husband having died on February 12, 1934. (The wife also died during the
pendency of this appeal, but in this decision she is referred to as if still living.) The common fortune,
consisting of real and personal property, is fairly large.
The husband, who left no children, executed a will giving his whole estate to his mother, Isabel Bibby Vda.
de Padilla, appellant herein. The property included in the inventory is appraised at P261,000. Seven pieces
of real estate are in controversy in this case. The remaining ten real properties left by the deceased husband
admittedly pertain to the conjugal partnership. Meanwhile, in order that his property may be divided
according to his last will and testament, it is necessary first to liquidate the conjugal partnership. It was in
connection with such liquidation that the widow, Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, commenced the
instant proceedings by filing a petition wherein she prayed, inter alia, that her paraphernal property be
segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her together with the corresponding
reimbursements and indemnities; that she be given one-half of the conjugal partnership property; and that
her usufructuary right over one-half of the portion pertaining to the heir instituted in the will be recognized.
CFI Manila rendered judgment declaring certain pieces of real estate (including the land on which a building
was erected) and jewelry as well as certain sums of money to be paraphernal, and ordering the same to be
delivered to petitioner. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Does petitioner’s land as paraphernal property on which a building was erected out of conjugal funds, form
part of the conjugal property?
HELD:
No. The ownership of the land is retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The mere construction of a building from common funds does not
automatically convey the ownership of the wife's land to the conjugal partnership. Such a mode of using the
land, namely, by erecting a building thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of usufruct pertaining to the
conjugal partnership over the wife's land. As Manresa says, "la sociedad de gananciales es realmente la
usufructuaria de los bienes privativos de cada conyuge." (Comment on art. 1404.) In consequence of this
usufructuary right, the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any rent during the occupation of the wife's
land because if the lot were leased to a third person, instead of being occupied by the new construction
from partnership funds, the rent from the third person would belong to the conjugal partnership. Therefore,
before payment of the value of the land is made from common funds, inasmuch as the owner of the land is
the wife, all the increase or decrease in its value must be for her benefit or loss. And when may she demand
payment? Not until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership because up to that time, it is neither necessary
nor appropriate to transfer to the partnership the dominion over the land, which is lawfully held in usufruct
by the conjugal partnership during the marriage.
164
HE WHO SEEKS INDEMINITY FOR DAMAGES RESULTING FROM DEPRIVATION OF A WIFE’S

DOMESTIC SERVICES, MUST PROVE SUCH SERVICES
146. Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co.

G.R. No. L-39587, March 24, 1934
Villa-Real, J.
FACTS:
The plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius has, for many years, been a well-known and reputed journalist, author and
photographer. Some of his works have been translated into various languages. He utilized the linguistic
ability of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, who translated his articles and books, furthermore, she acted as his
secretary. In one fine day, the plaintiff, his wife Sonja Maria Lilius, and his 4-year old daughter left Manila in
their Studebaker car driven by the said plaintiff on a sight-seeing trip. Unfortunately, they were involved in
an accident with defendant company’s train and struck the plaintiff's car right in the center. The plaintiff with
his wife and child suffered unjuries. The court adjudged that the accident was due to the negligence of the
defendant company for not giving sufficient warning to passers-by.
Plaintiff apart from receiving amounts to indemnify the damages incurred by his family also seeks to recover
the sum of P2500 for the loss of what is called Anglo-Saxon common law “consortium” of his wife, that is
“her services, society and conjugal companionship” as a result of the personal injuries, which she had
received from the accident.
ISSUE:
Can the husband claim for the damages for the loss of alleged domestic services of the wife?
HELD:
No. Under the law and the doctrine of this court, one of the husband's rights is to count on his wife's
assistance. This assistance comprises the management of the home and the performance of household
duties, including the care and education of the children and attention to the husband. When the wife's
mission was circumscribed to the home, it was not difficult to assume, by virtue of the marriage alone, that
she performed all the said tasks and her physical incapacity always redounded to the husband's prejudice
inasmuch as it deprived him of her assistance. Today, however, women are demanding greater civil rights
and are aspiring to become more engaged in society. Marriage has ceased to create the presumption that
a woman complies with the duties to her husband and children, which the law imposes upon her, and he
who seeks to collect indemnity for damages resulting from deprivation of her domestic services must prove
such services. In the case under consideration, apart from the services of his wife Sonja Maria Lilius as
translator and secretary, the value of which has not been proven, the plaintiff has not presented any
evidence showing the existence of domestic services and their nature, rendered by her prior to the accident,
in order that it may serve as a basis in estimating their value. Furthermore, inasmuch as a wife's domestic
assistance and conjugal companionship are purely personal and voluntary acts which neither of the spouses
may be compelled to render.
Therefore, it is necessary for the party claiming indemnity for the loss of such services to prove that the
person obliged to render them had done so before he was injured and that he would be willing to continue
rendering them had he not been prevented from so doing.
165
WIFE’S DECISION TO DISMISS A CASE IS BINDING UPON THE HUSBAND ONLY IF HE OR SHE IS
THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST
147. Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.

G.R. No. L-28589, February 29, 1972
Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
Spouses Zulueta and ther daughter were passengers aboard a PANAM plane, from Honolulu to Manila, the
first leg of which was Wake Island. Platintiff Mr. Zulueta was prohibited from boarding the plane but his wife
and daughter were permitted to continue the flight. When platintiff Mr. Zulueta finally arrived in Manila, he
demanded from defendant PANAM to reimburse them in the sum of P1,505,502.85 for damages but
defendant PANAM refused to do so. A case was filed for damages and the lower court ruled that plaintiff
Mr. Zulueta is entitled to the moral and exemplary damages for breach of contract for deliberately leaving
one of its passengers. Mrs. Zulueta, however filed a motion alleging that she had, for more than 2 years,
been actually living separately from her husband, and that she had decided to settle the case separately
with PANAM and to dismiss the case insofar as she is concerned.
Plaintiff Mr. Zulueta opposed said motion on the ground that the case at bar is one for damages for breach
of a contract of carriage, as husband and administrator of the conjugal partnership, with the funds for such
flight which the PANAM had been paid under said contract. More so, that the plaintiffs filed the action as a
family and the lower court had awarded damages to them. Lastly, that although Mr. and Mrs. Zulueta had
been living separately but without judicial approval and Mrs. Zulueta may not, therefore, binds the conjugal
partnership or settles this case separately.
ISSUE:
May the wife, who allegedly have been living separately from the husband, settle a case be to be dismissed
if she is not the real party-in-interest?
HELD:
No. Indeed, "the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent, except in cases
provided by law," and it has not been shown that this is one of the cases so provided. Article 113 of our Civil
Code, pursuant to which "the husband must be joined in all suits by or against the wife, except: (2) If they
have in fact been separated for at least one year" which is relied upon by PANAM does not warrant the
conclusion drawn therefrom by the latter. Obviously the suit contemplated in subdivision (2) of said Article
113 is one in which the wife is the real party — either plaintiff or defendant in interest, and, in which, without
being so, the husband must be joined as a party, by reason only of his relation of affinity with her.
Said provision cannot possibly apply to a case, like the one at bar, in which the husband is the main party
in interest, both as the person principally grieved and as administrator of the conjugal partnership. Moreover,
he having acted in this capacity in entering into the contract of carriage with PANAM and paid the amount
due to the latter, under the contract, with funds of conjugal partnership, the damages recoverable for breach
of such contract belongs to said partnership.
Therefore, the wife’s decision to dismiss a case is binding upon the husband only if he or she is the real
party-in-interest.
166
PRESUMPTION THAT IMPROVEMENT BELONGS TO THE SPOUSE WHO OWNS THE EXCLUSIVE
PROPERTY
148. Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 74577, December 4, 1990
Narvasa, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review from the judgment of the then Intermediate Appellate Court, affirmed the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court dismissing the complaint of Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo
Aranas.
Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria Comorro, inherited a land (Lot 13-C) from his father. He died on April
20, 1973 and her wife on July 16, 1971, with no children. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modesto’s illegitimate
children, borrowed P18,000 from Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as collateral Lot 13-C. The Loan Agreement
with Real Estate Mortgage was signed by Raymundo Aranas, a relative, as a witness. Dorothea and
Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage and thereafter Bernas
acquired the land as the highest bidder. Bernas consolidated his ownership over Lot 13-C after the
mortgagors failed to redeem the same. A month after consolidation, Consolacion and Raymundo Aranas
filed a complaint against Jesus and Remedios Bernas and prayed that they be declared co-owners of the
land, on the ground of alleged discovery of Victoria Comorro’s will allegedly bequeathing all of her shares
to the conjugal partnership to them. The RTC dismissed the complaint and declared Jesus and Remedios
Bernas as the legal owners of the disputed property.
ISSUE:
Did Consolacion acquire any right over the improvements on Lot 13-C by virtue of Victoria Camorro’s last
will and testament?
HELD:
No, Consolacion did not acquire any right over the improvements. The Civil Code says that improvements,
"whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements
from the partnership or through the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal
partnership," and buildings "constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on land
belonging to one of the 'spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be
reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same." Proof, therefore, is needful of the time of the making or
construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used therefor, in order to determine the
character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. No
such proof was presented or proferred by Consolacion Villanueva or anyone else. What is certain is that
the land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto Aranas and that where,
as here, property is registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely
the property was acquired, the presumption is that it belongs exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore
possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in character. Hence, Victoria Camorro could not have
bequeathed to Consolacion the improvements, which are conjugal in character.
167
INCOME DUE TO WIDOW DURING PERIOD OF ADMINISTRATION
149. Vda. De Padilla v. Paterno

G.R. No. L-8748, December 26, 1961
Reyes, J.B.L., J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the order of the probate court special proceeding for the settlement of the testate
estate of Narciso A. Padilla.
Narciso A. Padilla died, leaving a childless widow, Concepcion Paterno. His last will, which was probated in
due course, instituted his mother, Ysabel Bibby Vda. De Padilla, as universal heiress. In the proceeding for
the settlement of his estate, his widow moved for delivery of her paraphernal property together with some
reimbursements and indemnities and for one-half of the conjugal partnership property The heiress opposed
such claims. The court declared certain personal and real properties as paraphernal. Other realties,
although originally paraphernal, were considered part of the conjugal assets because of buildings erected
thereon, but reimbursement of their value was directed. The court ordered the appointment of
commissioners to estimate the amount to be reimbursed and divide the conjugal property. In 1943,
Concepcion Paterno died and was survived by her testate heirs and legatees. In 1943, the buildings
constructed by the partnership on two lots were destroyed by fire during the battle of liberation of Manila,
as declared by the Rufino Report (report of the board of commissioners). The RTC approved the majority
of the commissioner’s report except that he declared Lot No. 50 on Juan Luna Street as conjugal. Vda. De
Padilla submitted an accounting of the credit balances of the estate for the years 1951-1953 but objected
to the accounting of the fruits of the properties declared as paraphernal on the ground that their income
belonged to the conjugal estate.
ISSUE:
Does the income of the properties declared as paraphernal belong to the conjugal partnership property?
HELD:
No. as sole owner of those properties that never became conjugal because the conjugal improvements
thereon were destroyed before they could be paid for to the widow (i.e., the Arquiza and Juan Luna
properties), as well as Lot No. 6-B on Camba Street, the outer portion of the Martin Ocampo lot, and the
Callejon de la Fe property, that never ceased to be paraphernal because there were paraphernal buildings
thereon at the time of the termination of the conjugal partnership, the widow Concepcion Paterno is also the
sole owner of all their income that accrued during their administration by the executrix-appellant until they
were finally delivered to the estate of the deceased Concepcion Paterno on December 7, 1953; minus of
course, the administration expenses incurred by Vda. De Padilla with respect to these paraphernal
properties. A recommendation by a board of commissioners appointed to execute a decision of the court, if
approved by the trial court, and, later, by the Supreme Court, becomes part of the “law of the case”, and,
as such, is binding, conclusive and irrevocable.
168
OBLIGATIONS CONTRACTED BY ONE OF THE SPOUSES WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER
SPOUSE MUST REDOUND TO THE BENEFIT OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IN ORDER TO BE
CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
150. BA Finance Corp. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-61464, May 28, 1998
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review seeking to set aside the decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC
which dismissed the complaint of petitioner and ordering it to pay damages on the basis of counterclaim.
Private respondent Augusto Yulo secured a loan from the petitioner as evidenced by a promissory note he
signed in his own behalf and as representative of the A & L Industries. Respondent Augusto presented an
alleged special power of attorney executed by his wife Lily Yulo, who manages A & L Industries and under
whose name the said business is registered, purportedly authorizing Augusto to procure the loan and sign
the promissory note. About two months prior to the loan, however, Augusto had already left Lily and their
children and had abandoned their conjugal home. Private respondent Lily filed her answer with
counterclaim, alleging that although Augusta and she are husband and wife, the former had abandoned her
and their children 5 months before the filing of the complaint; that they were already separated when the
promissory note was executed; that her signature in the special power of attorney was forged because she
had never authorized Augusto Yulo in any capacity to transact any business for and in behalf of A & L
Industries, which is owned by her as a single proprietor, that she never got a single centavo from the
proceeds of the loan mentioned in the promissory note.
Petitioner contends that A&L Insdustries is presumed to be part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses
hence could be liable for obligations contracted by Auguso Yulo as administrator of partnernship. Lily Yulo
however contends that A&L Industries is owned by her as a single proprietor.
ISSUE:
Does A & L Industries form part of the conjugal partnership of Spouses Yulo and thus could be held liable
for the obligations contracted by Augusto Yulo, as administrator of the partnership?
HELD:
NO. A&L Industries is presumed to be a part of conjugal partnership but it cannot be held liable for
obligations contracted by Augusto Yulo.
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under that provision is liable only for such "debts
and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." There must be the
requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
There is no dispute that A & L Industries was established during the marriage of Augusta and Lily Yulo and
therefore the same is presumed conjugal and the fact that it was registered in the name of only one of the
spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation
contracted by the husband must have redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article
161 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the obligation which the petitioner is seeking to enforce against
the conjugal property managed by the private respondent Lily Yulo was undoubtedly contracted by Augusto
Yulo for his own benefit because at the time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family
and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf
of A & L Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly, to make A & L Industries liable now for
the said loan would be unjust and contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code. Moreover, it would
negate the plain object of the additional requirement in the present Civil Code that a debt contracted by the
husband to bind a conjugal partnership must redound to its benefit. That is still another provision indicative
of the solicitude and tender regard that the law manifests for the family as a unit. Its interest is paramount;
its welfare uppermost in the minds of the codifiers and legislators.
Hence, A&L Industries cannot be liable for obligations contracted by Augusto Yulo because it did not
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
169
IN ACTING AS A GUARANTOR OR SURETY FOR A THIRD PARTY, A SPOUSE DOES NOT ACT FOR
THE BENEFIT OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
151. Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Mar Tierra Corp.

G.R. No. 143382, November 29, 2006
Corona, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA affirming in toto the decision of
RTC holding respondent corporation and Martinez jointly and severally liable against petitioner.
Mar Tierra Corporation, through its president, Wilfrido C. Martinez, applied for a credit accommodation with
petitioner Security Bank and Trust Company. Petitioner approved the application and entered into a credit
line agreement with respondent corporation. It was secured by an indemnity agreement executed by
individual respondents Wilfrido C. Martinez, among others, who bound themselves jointly and severally with
respondent corporation for the payment of the loan. Unable to collect the balance of the loan, petitioner filed
a complaint for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment against respondent corporation
and individual respondents. The in 1982, RTC issued a writ of attachment on all real and personal properties
of respondent corporation and Martinez. As a consequence, the conjugal house and lot of the spouses
Wilfrido and Josefina Martinez was levied on. In 1994, RTC rendered its decision holding respondent
corporation Martinez jointly and severally liable to petitioner It, however, found that the obligation contracted
by individual respondent Martinez did not redound to the benefit of his family, hence, it ordered the lifting of
the attachment on the conjugal house and lot of the spouses Martinez. This was affirmed by CA.
Petitioner contends that RTC and CA were wrong in ruling that the conjugal partnership of the Martinez
spouses could not be held liable for the obligation incurred by individual respondent Martinez.
ISSUE:
Can the conjugal partnership of the Martinez spouses be held liable for the obligation incurred by individual
respondent Martinez?
HELD:
NO. The conjugal partnership could not be held liable for the obligation of Martinez.
In acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband does not act for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership as the benefit is clearly intended for a third party. If the husband himself is the principal obligor
in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money and services to be used in or for his own business or
profession, the transaction falls within the term "obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership." In
other words, where the husband contracts an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal
presumption that such obligation redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, if
the money or services are given to another person or entity and the husband acted only as a surety or
guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption
is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to establish the benefit redounding to the
conjugal partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit received by it, the conjugal partnership
cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party.
In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent corporation,
was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement) under which
individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent corporation was similarly
for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership of the spouses
Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.
Thus, the conjugal partnership of the spouses cannot be held liable for the obligation of Martinez which did
not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
170
ONE SPOUSE MAY SEPARATELY BRING AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF CREDIT WITHOUT THE
NECESSITY OF JOINING THE OTHER SPOUSE
152. Carandang v. De Guzman

G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of CA affirming the decision of RTC
rendering petitioners Spouses Carandang jointly and severally liable for their loan to Quirino de Guzman.
Quirino de Guzman and Spouses Carandang are stockholders as well as corporate officers of Mabuhay
Broadcasting System (MBS). Eventually, the capital stock of MBS was increased. De Guzman claims that
part of the payment for these increased subscriptions were paid by him and thus sent a demand letter to
Spouses Carandang for the payment of said total amount. The spouses Carandang refused to pay the
amount. De Guzman then filed his complaint seeking to recover the ₱336,375 together with damages. RTC
rendered in favor of De Guzman and CA affirmed the decision.
On petition for review on certiorari, Spouses Carandang argues that, since 3 of the 4 checks used to pay
their stock subscriptions were issued in the name of Milagros de Guzman, the latter should be considered
an indispensable party. Being such, the spouses Carandang claim, the failure to join Mrs. de Guzman as a
party-plaintiff should cause the dismissal of the action.
ISSUE:
Are both spouses de Guzman indispensable parties to an action involving credit in favor of the conjugal
partnership?
HELD:
NO. One spouse alone may bring an action involving credit in favor of the conjugal partnership.
The joint account of spouses Quirino de Guzman and Milagros de Guzman from which the 4 checks were
drawn is part of their conjugal property and under both the Civil Code and the Family Code the husband
alone may institute an action for the recovery or protection of the spouses’ conjugal property. Quirino and
Milagros were married before the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988. As they did not execute
any marriage settlement, the regime of conjugal partnership of gains govern their property relations. All
property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or
registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Credits are personal properties, acquired during the time the loan or other credit transaction was executed.
Therefore, credits loaned during the time of the marriage are presumed to be conjugal property.
Consequently, assuming that the four checks created a debt for which the spouses Carandang are liable,
such credits are presumed to be conjugal property. There being no evidence to the contrary, such
presumption subsists. As such, Quirino de Guzman, being a co-owner of specific partnership property, is
certainly a real party in interest. Dismissal on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, by reason that
the suit was allegedly not brought by a real party in interest, is therefore unwarranted.
In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "a partner is a co-owner with the other
partners of specific partnership property." Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds
used to finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners’ stock subscriptions, and with the presumption
that the credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman
co-owners of the alleged credit. Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman
may separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In a co-ownership, co-owners may bring actions for
the recovery of co-owned property without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs
because the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-
owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
171
PROPERTY PURCHASED BY SPOUSES DURING THE EXISTENCE OF THEIR MARRIAGE IS

PRESUMED TO BE CONJUGAL IN NATURE
153. Spouses Go v. Yamane

G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006
Panganiban, C.J.
FACTS:
Spouses Go filed a Petition for Review under Rule 45 challenging the CA Decision nullifying the sale of a
lot located at Baguio City, registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, wife of Leonardo Yamane. The
subject property was levied to satisfy a lien. Yamane filed a Third-Party Claim to stop the public auction on
the ground that the subject property is conjugal property and, therefore, should not be held answerable for
the personal obligation of the Pucay sisters. However, the Sheriff proceeded with the auction sale and was
sold to Spouses Go as highest bidder. No redemption was made on time and thereby transferring to
Spouses Go. RTC, in its final order held that the subject parcel of land was the paraphernal property of the
late Muriel Pucay Yamane -- spouse of respondent -- and was not their conjugal property. On Appeal, CA
reversed the RTC and found that property acquired during marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless the
exclusive funds of one spouse are shown to have been used for the purpose, as it was sufficiently
established by the TCT and deed of sale - both indicating that Muriel Pucay Yamane was "married to
Leonardo Yamane" and by the testimony of the previous owner, Eugene Pucay. Sps. Go’s failed to establish
that Muriel used her exclusive funds to acquire the land in question. Hence, the CA concluded that the
contested land was conjugal property.
ISSUE:
Is the property purchased by spouses during the existence of their marriage presumed to be conjugal in
nature?
HELD:
Yes. Since the property was acquired before the effectivity of the family code, conjugal partnership of gains
is the operative regime of property relations. The CA committed no error in declaring that the parcel of land
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Spouses Muriel and Leonardo Yamane. They acquired it from
Eugene Pucay on February 27, 1967, or specifically during the marriage. We then follow the rule that proof
of the acquisition of the subject property during a marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption
operative. It is clear enough that the presently disputed piece of land pertains to the conjugal partnership.
Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Therefore,
as a conditio sine qua non for the operation of this article in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who
invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.
172
ALL PROPERTIES ACQUIRED DURING THE MARRIAGE ARE PRESUMED TO BELONG TO THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
154. Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Spouses, through a Rule 45 petition, seek to reverse the CA decision setting aside the RTC’s
ruling of nullifying the attachment of 100,000 shares of stocks of the Citycorp under the name of Alfredo
Ching in order to effect the execution of a debt judgment in favor of Allied Bank. Philippine Blooming Mills
executed a promisory note and continuing guaranty with the ABC binding Ching together with two other
officials, to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations. PBMCI defaulted,
Allied Bank applied for a writ of preliminary attachment to collect payment. When RTC granted the writ
PBMCI was then under rehabilitation and suspended payments to all claims. Deputy Sheriff of the trial court
levied on the attachment the 100,000 common shares of Citycorp stocks in Ching’s name. Ching opposed
its attachment but RTC ruled in favor of Allied Bank. The wife, Encarnacion Ching, opposed the levy on
attachment and alleged that the 100,000 shares of stock was acquired during their marriage out of conjugal
funds after the Citycorp Investment Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness
covered by the continuing guaranty/comprehensive suretyship contract executed by petitioner Alfredo Ching
for the account of PBMCI did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. RTC eventually lifted
the preliminary attachment on the said shares of stocks. CA, on appeal by Allied Bank, reversed the RTC
ruling rationing that the presumption in Article 160 of the New Civil Code shall not apply where, as in this
case, the petitioner-spouses failed to prove the source of the money used to acquire the shares of stock. It
held that the levied shares of stocks belonged to Alfredo Ching, as evidenced by the fact that the said shares
were registered in the corporate books of Citycorp solely under his name.
ISSUES:
1. Did Encarnacion Ching properly interpose her relief that shares of stock, being conjugal in nature, not
liable for a guaranty or suretyship agreement?
2. Are the shares of stock, as part of the conjugal property of the spouse, exempted from the preliminary
attachment?
HELD:
1. Yes. The petitioner-wife filed her motion to set aside the levy on attachment of the shares of stocks in the
name of petitioner-husband as said shares of stocks were conjugal in nature; hence, not liable for the
account of her husband under his continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement with the PBMCI. The
petitioner-wife had the right to file the motion for said relief.
2. Yes. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides that all the properties acquired during the marriage are
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband, or to the wife. It is not even necessary to prove that the properties were acquired with funds of the
partnership. As long as the parties acquired the properties during the marriage, they are presumed to be
conjugal in nature. The evidence adduced by the petitioners in the RTC is that the 100,000 shares of stocks
in the Citycorp Investment Philippines were issued to and registered in its corporate books in the name of
the petitioner-husband when the said corporation was incorporated on May 14, 1979. This was done during
the subsistence of the marriage of the petitioner-spouses. Therefore, the shares of stocks are presumed to
be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners.
173
THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS BENEFITED WHEN A

SPOUSE ENTERS INTO A CONTRACT OF SURETY
155. Borlongan, Jr. v. BDO Unibank, Inc.

G.R. No. 218540, April 05, 2017
Velasco Jr., J.
FACTS:
In a motion for reconsideration dated October 5, 2015 by Eliseo Borlongan, Jr (Eliseo) to the denial of his
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 before the Supreme Court ruling that Eliseo is not a stranger
who can initiate an action independent from the case where the attachment and execution sale were
ordered.
Eliseo and his wife Carmelita acquired a real property covered by TCT NO. 0421. When they procured a
copy of said TCT they were surprised that an execution sale was annotated on their title. Allegedly, the
execution sale was a result of the unpaid obligation of Carmelita arising from alleged surety agreements
she signed with the bank.
Eliseo alleged in his Complaint that the subject property is a family home that belongs to the conjugal
partnership of gains he established with his wife. He further averred that the alleged surety agreements
upon which the attachment of the property was anchored were signed by his wife without his consent and
did not redound to benefit their family.
ISSUE:
Can the property be executed because the benefit received redounded to the family?
HELD:
No. In Spouses Ching v. Court of Appeals, we elucidated that there is no presumption that the conjugal
partnership is benefited when a spouse enters into a contract of surety, holding thusly:
No presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited.
The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the conjugal partnership.
It is not apparent from the records of this case that BDO had established the benefit to the conjugal
partnership flowing from the surety agreement allegedly signed by Carmelita.
Therefore, the property cannot be executed.
174
DEBTS, FINES, AND PECUNIARY INDEMNITIES CONTRACTED BY THE HUSBAND OR THE WIFE
BEFORE THE MARRIAGE ARE NOT CHARGEABLE TO THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
156. Lacson v. Diaz

G.R. No. L-19346, May 31,1965
Barrera, J.
FACTS:
In connection with a final decision rendered by the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case
No. 5790 (Soledad L. Lacson, et al. v. Abelardo G. Diaz), sentencing therein defendant Diaz to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P97,532.93 with legal interest thereon from July 1, 1960 until fully paid, plus a sum
equivalent to 25% of the total amount as attorney's fees, the court issued a writ of execution on August 1,
1961.
On August 7, 1961, the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental sent to the manager of Talisay-Silay Milling
Company, wherein defendant Diaz was employed, a notice to garnish one-third of his monthly salary and
of any other personal properties belonging to said defendant, to cover the total amount of P132,718.30.
Diaz filed a motion to quash the writ of execution and to lift the notice of garnishment arguing that the claim
arose out of a contract entered into by him during his first marriage therefore the same cannot be enforced
against his salaries which form part of the conjugal properties of the second marriage.
ISSUE:
Can a claim arising from a first marriage be enforced salaries forming part of a second marriage?
HELD:
As a general rule, debts contracted by the husband or the wife before the marriage, as well as fines and
pecuniary indemnities imposed thereon, are not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. However, such
obligations may be enforced against the conjugal assets if the responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of
the New Civil Code have already been covered, and that the obligor has no exclusive property or the same
is insufficient.
In the instant case, although it is not controverted that there is due and owing the plaintiffs-appellees a
certain sum of money from the appellant-debtor — a personal obligation yet, it has not been established
that the latter does not have properties of his own or that the same are not adequate to satisfy appellees'
claim. Furthermore, there is no showing that the responsibilities named in Article 161 of the new Civil Code
have already been covered in order that the personal obligation of the husband may be made chargeable
against the properties of the second marriage.
Hence, the salary of Diaz comprising the conjugal property in his second marriage cannot be garnished.
175
WHEN THE CIVIL CODE STILL WAS STILL THE OPERATIVE LAW ON MARRIAGES, THE
PRESUMPTION, ABSENT ANY EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY, WAS THAT THEY WERE MARRIED
UNDER THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
157. Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr.

G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012
Abad, J.
FACTS:
The prosecution accused petitioner Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others of murderbefore the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City. The said RTC rendered a consolidated decision acquitting Efren
of the charge for insufficiency of evidence but finding Melecia and another person guilty as charged and
sentenced them to the penalty of death. The RTC ordered those found guilty to pay each of the heirs of the
victims, jointly and severally, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 each as moral damages, and
P150,000.00 actual damages.Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, on March 12, 2002
the RTC ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties registered in the names of
Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy and a notice of sale on execution 8 were issued.
On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and his wife Melecia filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming
that the levied properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.9 On September 16, 2002
the RTC denied the motion. The spouses moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same on March
6, 2003.
ISSUE:
Did lower courts err in holding that the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be levied and
executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the murder case?
HELD:
Yes. While it is true that the personal stakes of each spouse in their conjugal assets are inchoate or unclear
prior to the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of gains and, therefore, none of them can be said to have
acquired vested rights in specific assets, it is evident that Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to
reach back and automatically convert into absolute community of property relation all conjugal partnerships
of gains that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial agreements. The Family Code itself
provides in Article 76 that marriage settlements cannot be modified except prior to marriage. Clearly,
therefore, the conjugal partnership of gains that governed the marriage between Efren and Melecia who
were married prior to 1988 cannot be modified except before the celebration of that marriage.
What is clear is that Efren and Melecia were married when the Civil Code was still the operative law on
marriages. The presumption, absent any evidence to the contrary, is that they were married under the
regime of the conjugal partnership of gains.
The provisions of this Chapter [on the Conjugal Partnership of Gains] shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in
Article 256.
Consequently, the Court must refer to the Family Code provisions in deciding whether or not the conjugal
properties of Efren and Melecia may be held to answer for the civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in the
murder case. It is Article 122.
176
INDEBTEDNESS OF THE SPOUSE INCURRED WITHOUT CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE IS NOT
CHARGEABLE TO THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY
158. Spouses Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 70082, August 19, 1991
Fernan, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
affirming in toto the decision of the lower court on the nature of the properties of Romarico Henson.
Private respondent Romarico Henson is married to Katrina Pineda. They have three children but even during
the early years of their marriage, Romarico and Katrina had been most of the time living separately. During
the marriage, Romarico bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father with money borrowed from an
officemate.
Meanwhile, in Hongkong sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered into an agreement with Anita Chan
whereby the latter consigned to Katrina pieces of jewelry for sale. When Katrina failed to return the pieces
of jewelry within the 20-day period agreed upon, Anita Chan demanded payment of their value. A check
was subsequently issued which was dishonoured, leading Anita to file an estafa case. The Court however,
declared that Katrina's liability was not criminal but civil in nature as no estafa was committed by the
issuance of the check in payment of a pre-existing obligation. In view of said decision, Anita Chan and her
husband Ricky Wong filed against Katrina and her husband Romarico Henson, an action for collection of a
sum of money also in the same branch of the aforesaid court. After trial, the court promulgated a decisions
in favor of the Wongs. It ordered Katrina and Romarico Henson to pay. A writ of execution was thereafter
issued on four lots all in the name of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson.
Romarico filed an action for the annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 2224 as well as the writ of
execution, levy on execution and the auction sale therein in the same Court of First Instance.
Romarico alleged that he had nothing to do with the business transactions of Katrina as he did not authorize
her to enter into such transactions; and that the properties levied on execution and sold at public auction by
the sheriff were his capital properties and therefore, as to him, all the proceedings had in the case were null
and void.
Petitioners contend that the properties are conjugal in nature and are properly chargeable for the liability of
Katrina.
ISSUE:
Is the liability of Katrina chargeable to the conjugal partnership?
HELD:
No, the liability of Katrina is not chargeable to the conjugal properties.
The conjugal nature of the properties notwithstanding, Katrina's indebtedness may not be paid for with them
her obligation not having been shown by the petitioners to be one of the charges against the conjugal
partnership. In addition to the fact that her rights over the properties are merely inchoate prior to the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the consent of her husband and her authority to incur such
indebtedness had not been alleged in the complaint and proven at the trial
Further, a wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she purchases things necessary for the support
of the family or when she borrows money for the purpose of purchasing things necessary for the support of
the family if the husband fails to deliver the proper sum; when the administration of the conjugal partnership
is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband and when the wife gives moderate donations for
charity. Having failed to establish that any of these circumstances occurred, the Wongs may not bind the
conjugal assets to answer for Katrina's personal obligation to them.
177
HOSPITALIZATION EXPENSES FOR ONE SPOUSE IS CHARGEABLE TO THE CONJUGAL

PROPERTY
159. Costuna v. Domondon

G.R. No. 82753, December 19, 1989
Sarmiento, J.
FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal and setting of the decision* of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court. The Spouses Costuna during their marriage acquired
three parcels of land all of which are registered in the name of Amadeo Costuna. On November 8,1976,
Amadeo executed his last will and testament.
Sometime in November, 1977, Amadeo sustained third degree burns on his legs for which he was treated
at various hospitals. While already ill. relatives of Amadeo requested that he be brought to Samar as there
were documents that needed his signature pertaining to his Samar properties. Since then, Amadeo was
never returned to the petitioner and stayed with his sister. Amadeo filed an action for partition before the
then Juvenile Domestic and Relations Court. Failing to get the petitioner's consent to the desired partition
notwithstanding repeated demands therefor, Amadeo was constrained to execute a deed of sale over the
one-half (1/2) undetermined portion of the conjugal property, without his wife's consent, in favor of Laureana
Domondon. With Amadeo's death, the wife filed a case for probate. Claiming pro indiviso one half (1/2)
share over the earlier mentioned three lots by virtue of the deed of sale executed in her favor by Amadeo,
the respondent opposed the allowance of the will. Consequently, an action to compel the petitioner to give
her conformity to the deed of sale executed by her husband in favor of the respondent was instituted by the
latter in the RTC of Quezon City which decided in favor of plaintiff Laureana Domondon and ordered the
defendant Estela Costuna to affix her signature on the deed of sale.
The petitioner submits that the deed of sale executed by Amadeo in favor of private respondent over his
undetermined one-half (1/2) share in the conjugal partnership is invalid as the element of consent (her
consent) is wanting and that Amadeo's hospital and medical expenses should not be chargeable against
the conjugal partnership as Amadeo by his own free will deserted and abandoned her and their conjugal
home when he opted to live with his relatives.
The private respondent on the other claims that the deed of sale is valid, notwithstanding the absence of
consent, because the disposition of the one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the conjugal partnership
properties was intended to generate funds to cover Amadeo's hospital and medical expenses.
ISSUE:
Is the sale to Domondon by Amadeo without the consent of his wife valid?
HELD:
Yes. The sale to Domondon by Amadeo is valid.
Notably, what was sold by Amadeo without the petitioner's consent was only an undetermined one-half (1/2)
share in the community properties. He left intact that other undetermined 1/2 share which should belong to
the petitioner. And the reason for the sale was, as correctly found by the trial court and Court of Appeals,
for Amadeo's hospitalization and medication. It was therefore Amadeo's understandable human spirit to live
longer that induced him to execute the deed of sale without the consent of the petitioner. The question of
whether or not Amadeo's hospital and medical expenses are chargeable to the conjugal partnership is
answered in the affirmative and finds firm support in Art. 161 of the Civil Code, which provides inter alia:
The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the partnership.
The benefit required by this article need not be quantified into pesos or square meters of real property. It is
enough that the transaction would result to some discernible advantage or good to the conjugal partnership,
directly or indirectly. Thus, the health and well-being of both or either of the spouses would undeniably
redound to the benefit of their conjugal partnership.
178
THE CONSENT OF THE OTHER SPOUSE IN A DISPOSITION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY MAYBE

EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
160. Pelayo v. Perez

G.R. No.141323, June 8, 2005
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA),
which reversed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denying petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration.
David Pelayo (Pelayo) by a Deed of Absolute Sale conveyed to Melki Perez (Perez) two parcels of
agricultural land (the lots). Loreza Pelayo (Loreza), wife of Pelayo, and another one whose signature is
illegible witnessed the execution of the deed. Loreza, however, signed only on the third page in the space
provided for witnesses on account of which Perez' application for registration of the deed with the Office of
the Register of Deeds in Tagum, Davao was denied. Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign on the first and
second pages of the deed but she refused, hence, he instituted the instant complaint for specific
performance against her and her husband Pelayo (defendants).
Defendant Pelayo claims that the deed was without his wife Loreza's consent, hence, in light of Art. 166 of
the Civil Code: Article 166. Unless the wife has been declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is
under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife's consent. Respondent maintains that the CA correctly
held in its assailed Decision that there was consideration for the contract and that Lorenza is deemed to
have given her consent to the deed of sale.
ISSUE:
Is the sale valid without the wife’s signature on the 1st and 2nd page?
HELD:
Yes, the sale is valid even without the wife’s signature of on the 1st and 2nd page.
We agree with the CA ruling that petitioner Lorenza, by affixing her signature to the Deed of Sale on the
space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the contract of sale.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be express or implied. A
wife's consent to the husband's disposition of conjugal property does not always have to be explicit or set
forth in any particular document, so long as it is shown by acts of the wife that such consent or approval
was indeed given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza
signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document point to
the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal property and consented to the sale.
Petitioners do not deny that Lorenza Pelayo was present during the execution of the deed of sale as her
signature appears thereon. Neither do they claim that Lorenza Pelayo had no knowledge whatsoever about
the contents of the subject document. Thus, it is quite certain that she knew of the sale of their conjugal
property between her husband and respondent. Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both
of the New Civil Code, which was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed,
the lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract void ab
initio but merely voidable.
By affixing her signature on the deed of sale, she, in effect, signified her consent to the disposition of their
conjugal property thus making the sale valid.
179
THE RULES ON PARTNERSHIP UNDER THE CIVIL CODE APPLIES SUPPLETORILY TO THE RULES
ON CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS UNDER THE FAMILY CODE
161. Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo

G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank filed a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the Decision
of the CA, which affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC in favor of respondent Miguela Dailo,
nullifying the sale of the conjugal property by Marcelino Dailo to petitioner.
Marcelino and Miguela were married on August 8, 1967. Thereafter, they purchased a house and lot located
at Brgy. San Francisco, San Pablo City, but the Deed of Absolute Sale was named in favor of Marcelino
alone. On December 1, 1993, Marcelino executed a real estate mortgage on the subject property in favor
of petitioner to secure a loan from the latter. The mortgage was without the knowledge of Miguela. The loan
matured but still remained outstanding, prompting petitioner to foreclose the subject property, where it won
as the highest bidder and was issued a Certificate of Sale.
In filing for the nullification of the real estate mortgage and sale of the subject property to petitioner,
respondent argued that the she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property,
which was conjugal in nature. Petitioner countered that Art. 124 of the Family Code should be construed in
relation to Art.493 of the Civil Code, wherein the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the coownership.
ISSUE:
Should the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino Dailo on the subject property be upheld valid as to
his undivided share by applying the rules of co-ownership in relation to Art. 124 of the Family Code
HELD:
No, the mortgage pertaining to Marcelino Dailo’s undividee share cannot be upheld as valid by applying the
rules of co-ownership.
Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner,
the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict
with what is expressly determined in the chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in
their marriage settlements.
In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one
renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband
who contracted the sale. There is no legal basis to construe Article 493 of the Civil Code as an exception to
Article 124 of the Family Code. The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of
respondent and the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. even in a suppletory manner. Article 124 does not qualify with
respect to the share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the
rule on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish.
Hence, the mortgage constituted by the late Marcelino on the subject property is null and void, even if it only
pertains to his undivided share.
180
THE RULES ON SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS GOVERNING ARTICLE 124 OF THE FAMILY
CODE DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE SPOUSE IS INCOMPETENT TO GIVE CONSENT
162. Uy v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 109557, November 29, 2000
Pardo, J.
FACTS:
Petitioners Spouses Uy and Gilda Jardeleza filed an appeal via certiorari from the decision of the CA, which
reversed the decision of the RTC, granting Gilda the authority to dispose their conjugal property in view of
the comatose condition of her husband Ernesto Jardeleza, despite opposition from their son, private
respondent Teodoro Jardeleza.
Ernesto suffered a stroke or cerebrovascular accident, which left him in a comatose or semi-comatose
condition, without motor and mental faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. Due to his
incapacity and that his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses were piling up, petitioner Gilda filed
a special proceeding, pursuant to Art. 124 of the Family Code, in relation to the rules on summary
proceedings sanctioned under Art. 253 of the same Code, regarding the declaration of incapacity of Ernesto,
assumption of sole powers of administration of conjugal properties, and the authorization to sell the same,
specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements.
Private respondent opposed the proceedings maintaining that the petition filed by Gilda was essentially a
petition for guardianship of the person and properties of Ernesto. As such, it cannot be prosecuted in
accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings set out in Article 253 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
May petitioner Gilda, in view of the comatose condition of husband Ernesto, assume sole powers of
administration of the conjugal property via summary judicial proceeding under Article 124 of the Family
Code?
HELD:
No, Gilda cannot assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal partnership by way of summary
judicial proceedings.
In regular manner, the rules on summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code govern the
proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code. The situation contemplated is one where the spouse is
absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained. Such
rules do not apply to cases where the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give
consent. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court.
In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse “is an incompetent” who was in comatose or semi-
comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental faculties, and
with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. Even assuming that the rules of summary judicial proceedings under
the Family Code may apply to the wife's administration of the conjugal property, the law provides that the
wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and duties as a guardian under the
Rules of Court. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the
conjugal property must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians
under Rule 95, 1964 Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code.
Therefore, summary judicial proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code for the administration of the
conjugal property is not the proper remedy to be availed of when the non-consenting spouse is incapacitated
or incompetent to give consent.
181
CONSENT OF BOTH SPOUSES REQUIRED TO DISPOSE CONJUGAL PROPERTY
163. Jader-Manalo v. Camaisa

G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
In an appeal before the SC, petitioner challenges the dismissal by the CA of the complaint for specific
performance on the ground that for lack of the necessary consent of the wife, the contract to sell entered
into by the parties was not perfected.
Petitioner Thelma A. Jader-Manalo, negotiated for the purchase by installment of properties conjugally
owned by the respondent-spouses Edilberto Camaisa and Norma Camaisa. Edilberto assured Thelma that
his wife consented to the sale. A contract to sell was signed and given to Edilberto for the formal affixing of
his wife’s signature. After some time however, Thelma was informed that the spouses are backing out
because they needed spot cash for the full amount of the consideration. Norma refused to sign the contract,
prompting petitioner to file a complaint for specific performance and damages.
Respondents argue that the contract to sell was void for lack of Norma’s written consent to the disposition
of the subject conjugal properties. Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that since respondent Norma
unjustly refuses to affix her signatures to the contracts to sell, court authorization under Article 124 of the
Family Code is warranted.
ISSUE:
Are the contract to sell between petitioner and respondent spouses already perfected, even without both
husband and wife’s consent?
HELD:
No, the contract to sell was not perfected. The properties subject of the contracts in this case were conjugal,
hence, for the contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur.
Respondent Norma Camaisa admittedly did not give her written consent to the sale. Even granting that
respondent Norma actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the subject properties, which she
denied, her written consent to the sale is required by law for its validity. Significantly, petitioner herself admits
that Norma refused to sign the contracts to sell. Respondent Norma may have been aware of the
negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties. However, being merely aware of a transaction is not
consent.
Petitioner alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the
matter may be brought to court which will give such authority if the same is warranted by the circumstances.
However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the
spouse who does not give consent is incapacitated.
In this case, petitioner failed to allege and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give her
consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wife's incapacity, court authorization cannot
be sought. Therefore, consent of both spouses required to dispose conjugal property.
182
CONSENT OF BOTH SPOUSES REQUIRED TO DISPOSE CONJUGAL PROPERTY, OTHERWISE

CONTRACT ENTERED INTO IS VOID AND CANNOT BE RATIFIED
164. Spouses Guiang v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
In this appeal before the SC, petitioner-spouses challenges the decision of the CA declaring void the sale
of a conjugal property for lack of consent of one of the seller-spouses.
Respondent Gilda Copuz is legally married to Jodie Copuz. They acquired a lot. Half of the lot was sold to
petitioners Sps. Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. Sps. Copuz built their house on the remaining half of the
lot. Sometime thereafter, Gilda wento to Manila to look for work. Unknown to her, Jodie sold the remaining
half to Sps. Guiang through a “Deed of Transfer of Rights”. Upon returning from Manila, Gilda filed a
complaint to declare the transfer void. In the meantime, an amicable settlement was reached allowing Gilda
and her children to remain in the house free of charge up to a certain period, during which the petitioners
will not file a case for trespassing.
Petitioners insist that the absence of private respondent's consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under
Article 1390 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, petitioners aver that the contract, despite being voidable, was
duly ratified by the contending parties through the "amicable settlement" they executed.
ISSUES:
1. Is the contract entered into without the consent of one of the spouses void?
2. Is the contract entered into without the consent of Jodie ratified by a subsequent amicable settlement?
HELD:
1. Yes. The Contract is void. The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2, refers to
contracts visited by vices of consent, i .e., contracts which were entered into by a person whose consent
was obtained and vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. In this instance,
private respondent's consent to the contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or absent.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of Article 124 of the Family Code.
The nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the absence of private respondent's consent. To constitute
a valid contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) cause, (2) object,
and (3) consent, the last element being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
2. No, it cannot be ratified. Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. Neither can the
"amicable settlement" be considered a continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties,
following the last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is clear: after the sale, petitioners
filed a complaint for trespassing against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities secured
an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement,
however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of such a continuing
offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the
imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
Therefore, without the consent of both spouses, the contract is void and cannot be ratified.
183
SHARE OF THE GUILTY SPOUSE FROM THE NET PROFITS IS FORFEITED
165. Quiao v. Quiao

G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012
Reyes, J.
FACTS:
Spouses Rita and Brigido Quiao were married on January 6, 1977, the Civil Code was the operative law at
that time. On October 26, 2000 Rita Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner
Brigido Quiao (Brigido). The RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation of the parties and
awarded the custody of the three minor children in favor of Rita who is the innocent spouse. The said court
further held that the remaining properties of the parties shall be divided equally among them subject to the
legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of Php 45,740. Brigido’s share,
however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the common children.
The trial court further established that the spouses have no separate properties when they married, it only
identified their conjugal properties.
Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal. Rita filed a motion for execution which the trial
court granted.
After more than 9 months, Brigido filed before the RTC a motion for Clarification asking the RTC to define
the term “Net Profits Earned.” The RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFITS EARNED’ denotes “the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of each of the spouses
and the debts.” The order further held that after determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be
forfeited in favor of the common children because of the offending spouse does not have any right to any
share of the net profits earned, pursuant to Articles 62 no.2 and 43 no. 2 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Does the dissolution and the consequent liquidation of the common properties of the husband and wife by
virtue of the decree of legal separation is governed by Art. 129 of the Family Code?
HELD:
Yes. Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the present case since the parties’ property relation is
governed by the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains. The couple was married
during the effectivity of the Civil Code and since they did not agree on a marriage settlement, the property
relations between the petitioner and the respondent is the system of relative community or conjugal
partnership of gains. And since at the time of the dissolution of the parties’ marriage the operative law is
already the Family Code, the same applies in the present case and the applicable law in so far as the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership assets and liabilities is concerned is Art. 129 of the Family Code.
Ordinarily, the benefit received by a spouse from the conjugal partnership during the marriage is returned
in equal amount to the assets of the conjugal partnership, and if the community is enriched at the expense
of the separate properties of either spouse, a restitution of the value of such properties to their respective
owners shall be made. However, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have
no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. Furthermore, since the trial court found the
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children, pursuant to article 63(2) of the Family Code. There’s no separate property which may be
accounted for the guilty party’s favor.
184
CO-OWNER SPOUSE CAN SELL HIS INTEREST IN CPG
166. Domingo v. Sps. Molina

G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
Brion, J.
FACTS:
In June 15, 1951, the Spouses Anastacio and Flora Domingo who were married before the Family Code’s
effectivity on August 3, 1988, bought a property in Camiling, Tarlac, consisting of a one-half undivided
portion over an 18,164 sqm. parcel of land. During his lifetime, Anastacio borrowed money from the spouses
Molina. 10 years after Flora’s death, Anastacio sold his interest over the land to the spouses Molina to
answer for his debts, it was annotated at the OCT of the subject property. Anastacio died in 1986, while the
sale was registered on 1995.
In 1999, Melecio, one of the children of Spouses Domingo filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title and
Recovery of Ownership against the Spouses Molina on the ground that the subject property was given only
as a collateral for the money borrowed, and that Anastacio could not have validly sold the interest over the
subject propery without Flora’s consent, as Flora was already dead at the time of the sale. He also asserts
that he occupied the subject property from the time of Anastacio’s death up to the time he filed for the
Complaint.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case because Melecio failed to establish his claim that Anastacio
did not sell the property to the Spouses Molina and that Anastacio could dispose of conjugal property without
Flora’s consent since the sale was necessary to answer for conjugal liabilities.
The CA affirmed the RTC ruling and further held that Flora’s death is immaterial because Anastacio only
sold his rights, excluding Flora’s interest, over the lot to the spouses Molina and explained that there is no
prohibition against the sale by the widower of real property formerly belonging to the conjugal partnership
of gains.
ISSUE:
Was the sale of a conjugal property to the spouses Molina without Flora’s consent is valid and legal?
HELD:
Yes. Anastacio and Flora’s conjugal partnership was dissolved upon Flora’s death. Article 130 of the Family
Code provides that any disposition involving the conjugal property without prior liquidation of the partnership
shall be void, this rule does not apply since the provisions of the Family code shall be “without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.”
An implied co-ownership among Flora’s heirs governed the conjugal properties pending liquidation and
partition. Thus Anastacio, as co-owner, cannot claim title to any specific portion of the conjugal properties
without an actual partition being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Nonetheless, Anastacio
had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest in the subject property. Consequenlty,
Anastacio’s sale to the spouses Molina without the consent of the other co-owners was not totally void, for
Anastacio’s rights or a portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred, making the spouses Molina a
co-owner of the subject† property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. Hence, the spouses Molina became
co-owners of the subject property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest.
Melecio’s recourse as a co-owner of the conjugal properties, including the subject property, Is an action for
partition under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court.
185
IN CASE OF INSOLVENCY OR INSUFFICIENCY OF THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP, THE SPOUSES

ARE NOT SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR DEBTS THEREOF UNLESS EXPRESSLY SPECIFIED
167. Philippine National Bank v. Quintos

G.R. No. L-22383, October 6, 1924
Villamor, J.
FACTS:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration upon the initial decision of the SC which affirmed the judgment of the
lower court imposing solidary liability for the payment of the conjugal partnership debts upon private
respondents Margarita Quintos and Angel Ansalso, in default of sufficient partnership properties.
Philippine National Bank granted the defendants a credit to the amount of P31,284, and to secure the
payment thereof, as well as the interest and costs, the defendants mortgaged and pledged to the bank
certain certificates of one hundred fifty-eight shares of stock of the Bank of the Philippine Islands of the
nominal value of P200 each. Later on, a certificate of fifty shares and another of forty were substituted by
others of 10 and 30 shares, respectively. Besides these shares, the defendants delivered to the bank, as
additional securities, fifty shares of stock of the "Compañia Naviera" of the nominal value of P100 each;
eighty shares of stock of the Davao Agriculture and Commercial Company of P100 each, and 10 second
liberty bonds. These bonds were sold by the plaintiff bank on or before August 19, 1922, having realized
the sum of P2,360 from the sale thereof.
The defendants discuss in the first place the nature of the obligation sued on, maintaining that the same is
not of a solidary nature because, say they, there is nothing in it that expressly determines said character,
and therefore it binds only those who have contacted the same to the extent of their share in said obligation
ISSUE:
Are the spouses solidarily liable with their separate properties for the payment of the debts of the partnership
in default of properties of the conjugal partnership?
HELD:
No, the spouses are not solidarily liable with their own properties for the payment of partnership debts in
case the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover for such.
The legal provisions about conjugal partnership, contained in Chapter 5, Title 3, Book 4, of the Civil Code,
do not give an adequate answer as to the liability of the spouses with respect to the debts of the partnership.
In order to be solved, it requires a resort to the rule on the contract of partnership, prescribed in Article 1698,
which provides that the partners are not solidarily liable with respect to the debt of the partnership, and none
can bind the others by a personal act, if they have not given him any power therefor. As Manresa says,
there is no legal provision imposing such burden upon him, and because the same is not only not authorized
by the contract of partnership, but is contrary to the nature thereof, for gain being the consideration of the
obligation, the latter cannot be extended beyond the interest that the partner may have therein which is
proportional to his share.
Taking into account that the contract of pledge signed by the defendants does not show that they have
contracted a solidary obligation, the properties given as pledge being insufficient, the properties of the
conjugal partnership of the defendants are liable for the debt to the plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are
jointly liable for the payment thereof.
Hence, in default of conjugal partnership properties, there can be no corresponding solidary liability between
the spouses for the payment of partnership debts absent any express determination thereof.
186
Unions without Marriage or under a Void Marriage
THE PROPERTY RELATIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE PERIOD OF COHABITATION EVEN IN
A VOID MARRIAGE REGARDLESS OF THE CAUSE IS GOVERNED BY THE PROVISIONS OF
ARTICLE 147 OR ARTICLE 148
168. Valdez v. Regional Trial Court

G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
Vitug, J.
FACTS:
The petition for review bewails, purely on a question of law, an alleged error committed by the Regional
Trial Court considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by
both parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares.
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married and begotten during the marriage five children. Valdez
sought the declaration of nullity of the marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court
granted the petition and ordered that the petitioner and the respondent to start proceedings on the liquidation
of their common properties as defined by Article 147 of the Family Code, and to comply with the provisions
of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same code, within thirty (30) days from notice of this decision.
Petitioner avers that the court a quo has failed to apply the correct law that should govern the disposition of
a family dwelling in a situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio because of psychological
incapacity on the part of either or both of the parties to the contract.
ISSUE:
Are properties acquired during the union prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint
efforts?
HELD:
Yes, any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts.
In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code. Under this
property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and industry shall be governed by
the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of the property
shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party's "efforts consisted in the care and
maintenance of the family household."
In considering that Article 147 of the Family Code explicitly provides that the property acquired by both
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be owned by them in equal shares, plaintiff and defendant will
own their "family home" and all their properties for that matter in equal shares.
Thus, spouses of void marriages, the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the provisions of the Family
Code shall govern.
187
LIQUIDATION, PARTITION, AND DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTIES’ PROPERTIES IS NOT REQUIRED

BEFORE A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE MAY ISSUE FOR MARRIAGES
DECLARED VOID UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE
169. Diño v. Diño

G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review assailing the Decision and the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas
City ruling that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) started living together in 1984 until they
decided to separate in 1994. In 1996, petitioner and respondent decided to live together again and got
married. In 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent, citing
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court granted the petition and
declared the marriage void ab initio, dissolved the regime of absolute community of property and ruled that
a Decree of Absolute Nullity Of Marriage shall only be issued upon compliance with Article[s] 50 and 51 of
the Family Code. Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration which the trial court partially granted
and modified the decision by ruling that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Null Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (the Rule) does not apply to Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Is liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties required before a decree of absolute nullity
of marriage may issue under Article 147 of the Family Code?
HELD:
No, liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties is not required before a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage may issue under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code. It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule
applies only to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45 of the Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting
for the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code and
not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in common by petitioner
and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. The Court ruled that the property relations of parties in a
void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code. The rules on co-ownership apply and the properties of the spouses should be liquidated in
accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition
may be made by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to
liquidate the properties of the spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Therefore, a decree of absolute nullity of marriage may issue under Article 147 of the Family Code even
without liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties.
188
FAILURE TO PROVE ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION OF THE PARTY UNDER ARTICLE 148 OF THE
FAMILY CODE NEGATES CO-OWNERSHIP AND PRESUMPTION OF EQUAL SHARES
170. Agapay v. Palang

G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997
Romero, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals declaring the ownership of two parcels
of land acquired during the cohabitation of petitioner and private respondent's legitimate spouse as
belonging to private respondents.
Miguel Palang and respondent Carlina Vallesterol got married in 1949 and begot their only child, Herminia
Palang. Miguel and Carlina separated de facto. In 1973, the then sixty-three-year-old Miguel contracted his
second marriage with nineteen-year-old Erlinda Agapay, herein petitioner. Two months before said
marriage, Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of agricultural land. Consequently, a TCT covering
said rice land was issued in their names. A house and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as
the sole vendee for which a TCT covering said property was later issued in her name. In 1979, Miguel and
Erlinda were convicted of Concubinage upon Carlina's complaint. Two years later, Miguel died.
Private respondents sought to get back the riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel
during his cohabitation with petitioner. Petitioner contended that the house and lot is her sole property,
having bought the same with her own money. Petitioner tried to establish by her testimony that she is
engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari store.
ISSUE:
Does the presumption of co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code apply if actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry of the party is not proved?
HELD:
No, the presumption of co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code will not apply if actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry of the party is not proved.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article
147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry.
In the case at bar, Erlinda failed to persuade the court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject
riceland. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of conveyance, she was only around twenty years of age
and Miguel Palang was already sixty-four and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her
youthfulness, it is unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the
purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same. As to the claim that the riceland was
bought two months before Miguel and Erlinda actually cohabited, the court ruled that since the precise date
when they commenced their adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, the court cannot state
definitively that the riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even
assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of co-ownership would still
apply, and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.
With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00 when she was only 22
years old. The testimony of the notary public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals
that Miguel Palang provided the money for the purchase price and directed that Erlinda's name alone be
placed as the vendee. The transaction was a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was clearly
void and inexistent by express provision of law because it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage at the time of the donation, under Article 739 of the Civil Code. Moreover, Article 87 of the
Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations between spouses now applies to
189
donations between persons living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.
Therefore, the riceland should, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals, revert to the conjugal partnership
property of the deceased Miguel and private respondent Carlina Palang.
190
RULES ON CO-OWNERSHIP APPLY TO PROPERTIES ACQUIRED IN VOID MARRIAGES OR BY

COMMON LAW MARRIAGE IF ACQUIRED BY EITHER OR BOTH THROUGH THEIR WORK OR
INDUSTRY OR THEIR WAGES AND SALARIES
171. Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. v. Teodoro

G.R. No. L-20530, June 29, 1967
Makalintal, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Manila Surety filed a Petition for Certiorari against the CA Decision enjoining respondent
provincial sheriff of Rizal from selling at public auction the properties in question for the satisfaction of the
judgment debt of Jose Corominas, Jr. The Sheriff Rizal went to the residence of Teodoro, his 2n d spouse
(void as the Divorce with 1s t wife of Corominas under Nevada State Law invalid), and levied upon some
personal properties. Herein petitioner argues that said properties, claimed by respondent Teodoro to be
hers exclusively, pertain to the co-ownership established between her and Jose Corominas, Jr., pursuant
to Article 144 of the Civil Code, and consequently may be levied upon on execution for the satisfaction of
the latter’s judgment debt.
ISSUE:
Can an execution be issued against properties claimed by Teodoro as her exclusive property separate from
that of Coromiras?
HELD:
No. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. Corominas’ 1s t marriage not
being validly dissolved, his subsequent marriage to Teodoro is thus bigamous and void. While Article 144
speaks, inter alia, of a void marriage without any qualification, the Court of Appeals declined to apply it in
this case on two grounds: (1) the subsisting marriage of Corominas to Sonia Lizares constitutes an
impediment to a valid marriage between him and respondent Trinidad Teodoro, which impediment,
according to a number of decisions of the Supreme Court, precludes the establishment of a co-ownership
under said article, and (2) the funds used by said respondent in acquiring the properties in question were
"fruits of her paraphernal investments” which accrued before her marriage to Corominas.
The particular properties involved here, which were admittedly acquired by respondent Teodoro, cannot be
deemed to belong to a co-ownership. In other words they were not acquired by either or both of the partners
in the void marriage through their work or industry or their wages and salaries, and hence cannot be the
subject of co-ownership under Article 144. Therefore, they remain respondent’s exclusive properties,
beyond the reach of execution to satisfy the judgment debt of Corominas.
191
THE PROVISIONS OF THE FAMILY CODE MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT WITHOUT
PREJUDICE TO VESTED RIGHTS
172. Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corp.

G.R. No.151967, February 16, 2005
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed and
set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court and the Resolution of the CA denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
Josefina Castillo was only 24 years old when she and Eduardo G. Francisco were married on January 1983.
A little more than a year and seven months thereafter, the Imus Rural Bank, Inc. (Imus Bank) executed a
deed of absolute sale for P320,000.00 in favor of Josefina Castillo Francisco, married to Eduardo Francisco,
covering two parcels of residential land with a house thereon. The Register of Deeds made of record an
Affidavit of Waiver executed by Eduardo where he declared that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter
purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings, and that he
was waiving whatever claims he had over the property.
Eduardo, bought 7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00 from Master Iron Works & Construction
Corporation (MIWCC) but failed to pay for the same. MIWCC filed a complaint against him for the return of
the said commodities, or the value thereof. The decision became final and executory. For the payment of
the balance, the sheriff issued a Notice of Levy with respect to the two parcels of land. Josefina executed
an Affidavit of Third Party Claim over the two parcels of land in which she claimed that they were her
paraphernal property, and that her husband Eduardo had no proprietary right or interest over them as
evidenced by his affidavit of waiver.
Josefina later filed a petition to annul her marriage to on the ground that when they were married Eduardo
was already married to one Carmelita Carpio. Josefina declared that during her marriage to Eduardo, she
acquired sad lots, through the help of her sisters and brother, and that Eduardo had no participation
whatsoever in the said acquisition. The RTC rendered judgment declaring the marriage between Josefina
and Eduardo as null and void for being bigamous.
ISSUE:
Is the subject property the conjugal property of Josefina Castillo and Eduardo Francisco?
HELD:
Yes, the subject property is conjugal property.
The Family Code has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the New Civil Code by expressly regulating in Article
148 the property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Under Article 256 of the
Family Code, the law can be applied retroactively if it does not prejudice vested or acquired rights. The
petitioner failed to prove that she had any vested right over the property in question. Since the subject
property was acquired during the subsistence of the marriage of Eduardo and Carmelita, under normal
circumstances, the same should be presumed to be conjugal property. Article 105 of the Family Code of
the Philippines provides that the Code shall apply to conjugal partnership established before the code took
effect, without prejudice to vested rights already acquired under the New Civil Code or other laws.
According to Article 148, a co-ownership may ensue in case of cohabitation where, for instance, one party
has a pre-existing valid marriage provided that the parents prove their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry and only to the extent of their proportionate interest thereon. However, in this case,
petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed such money. Other than her own
bare testimony, there is nothing in the record to support claim that the funds she used came from her mother
and sister. It is also noted that she married at the age of 24, which renders it doubtful if she had enough
funds to purchase the subject lots. The later claim that she borrowed from her mother and sister was not
supported by any evidence. She did not even mention their names and sources of income of their mother.
192
PROOF OF ACTUAL CONTRIBUTION IS REQUIRED UNDER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE
173. Atienza v. De Castro

G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006
Garcia, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari on the decision of the CA which reversed the decision of the RTC
declaring that the contested property was owned by petitioner Lupo Atienza and respondent Yolanda De
Castro in common and ordering its partition.
Sometime in 1983, petitioner Atienza hired the services of respondent De Castro as accountant. In the
course of time, the relationship between them became intimate and they eventually lived together in
consortium. Out of their union, two children were born. Their relationship eventually turned sour and as a
result of their separation, Atienza filed a complaint against De Castro for the judicial partition between them
of a parcel of land with improvements located in Makati City.
Atienza avers that the property in question was acquired by De Castro using his exclusive funds and that
title thereto was transferred in De Castro's name without his knowledge and consent. He further countered
that pursuant to Article 144 of the Family Code, he has no burden to prove that he contributed to the
acquisition of the subject property because he is deemed a co-owner thereof. Atienza also contends that
under Article 484 of Civil Code, as long as the property was acquired by either or both of them during their
extramarital union, such property would be legally owned by them in common and governed by the rules on
co-ownership. On the other hand, De Castro argues that she acquired the same property using her exclusive
funds and that evidence on record preponderate that she purchased the disputed property in her own name
with her own money.
ISSUE:
Is Atienza deemed to be a co-owner of the subject property and is no longer required to prove that he
contributed to the acquisition thereof pursuant to Article 144 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
No, Atienza cannot be deemed a co-owner of the subject property absent proof of actual contribution in its
acquisition.
Although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was intended precisely
to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. In Article 148 of the Family Code, the regime of limited
co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other,
but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the
proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their
contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because petitioner Atienza
was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with the respondent. Their property
regime, therefore, is governed by the said provision. Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both
of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required. Petitioner’s
claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail to substantiate
his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents pertaining to its
purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent.
Thus, in failing to present proof on his actual contribution, Atienza cannot be regarded as a co-owner of the
subject property and is deemed to belong solely to respondent De Castro.
193
THE FAMILY
Mandatory Prior Recourse to Compromise
A SISTER-IN-LAW OR BROTHER-IN-LAW IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PHRASE “MEMBERS OF THE

FAMILY” UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE
174. Martinez v. Martinez

G.R. No. 162084, June 28, 2005
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the CA which set aside and reversed the decision
of the RTC, affirming the decision of the MTC rendered in favor of petitioner Spouses Martinez for the
ejectment of private respondent Rodolfo Martinez.
The spouses Daniel Martinez, Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land
namely, Lots 18-B-2-A, 18-B-2-B and 18-B-2-C. On March 6, 1993 Daniel, Sr. executed a Last Will and
Testament directing the subdivision of the property and bequeathed the three lots to each of his sons,
namely, Rodolfo, Manolo and Daniel, Jr.; Manolo was designated as the administrator of the estate. Daniel,
Sr. passed away after suffering a stroke. Thereafter, Rodolfo found a deed of sale purportedly signed by his
father on September 15, 1996, where the latter appears to have sold Lot 18-B-2 to Manolo and his wife
Lucila. The spouses Manolo and Lucila Martinez wrote Rodolfo, demanding that he vacate the property.
Rodolfo ignored the letter and refused to do so. This prompted the said spouses to file a complaint for
unlawful detainer against Rodolfo in the MTC of Manila.
In his Answer, Rodolfo, invoking Article 151 of the Family Code alleged, inter alia, that the complaint failed
to state a condition precedent, namely, that earnest efforts for an amicable settlement of the matter between
the parties had been exerted, but that none was reached.
ISSUE:
Can a sister-in-law be deemed as a member of the family in relation to Article 151 of the Family Code
HELD:
No, a sister in law cannot be deemed included in the phrase “members of the family” under Article 151 of
the Family Code.
Said provision must be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule. It is necessary that every
effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the
family and it is known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than between
strangers. The phrase "members of the family" must be construed in relation to Article 150 of the Family
Code. Hence, a sister-in-law or brother-in-law is not included in the enumeration.
In the case at bar, petitioner Lucila Martinez, the respondent's sister-in-law, was one of the plaintiffs in the
MTC. The petitioner is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the
respondent. The decision of the CA that the petitioners were mandated to comply with Article 151 of the
Family code and that they failed to do so is erroneous.
Therefore, there was no need for the parties to comply with the provisions of Article 151 of the Family Code
on the ground that the phrase “members of the family” do not include a sister-in-law.
194
THE FAMILY
Mandatory Prior Recourse to Compromise
A SISTER-IN-LAW OR BROTHER-IN-LAW IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PHRASE “MEMBERS OF THE

FAMILY” UNDER ARTICLE 151 OF THE FAMILY CODE
175. Gayon v. Gayon

G.R. No. L-28394, November 26, 1970
Concepcion, C.J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal taken by plaintiff Pedro Gayon from an order of the CFI of Iloilo dismissing his complaint
praying for the consolidation of ownership of the property sold by respondent Spouses Gayon to his
predecessor-in-interest.
Pedro Gayon filed said complaint against the spouses Silvestre Gayon and Genoveva de Gayon, alleging
substantially that, on October 1, 1952, said spouses executed a deed whereby they sold to Pedro Gelera,
for the sum of P500.00, a parcel of unregistered land therein described, subject to redemption within five
(5) years; that said right of redemption had not been exercised, despite the expiration of the period therefor;
that said Pedro Gelera and his wife Estelita Damaso had, by virtue of a deed of sale sold the aforementioned
land to plaintiff Pedro Gayon. Pedro Gayon prays that an order be issued in plaintiff’s favor for the
consolidation of ownership in and to the aforementioned property.
In her answer to the complaint, Mrs. Gayon alleged that, being a brother of the deceased Silvestre Gayon,
plaintiff Pedro "did not exert efforts for the amicable settlement of the case" before filing his complaint.
ISSUE:
Can a sister-in-law be deemed a member of the family in relation to Article 222 of the Civil Code (now Article
151 of the Family Code)
HELD:
No, a sister in law cannot be deemed included in the phrase “members of the family” under Article 222 of
the Civil Code (now Article 151 of the Family Code).
The impediment arising from this provision applies to suits "filed or maintained between members of the
same family." This phrase, "members of the same family," should, however, be construed in the light of Art.
217 of the same Code (now Article 150 of the Family Code).
Mrs. Gayon is plaintiff’s sister-in-law, whereas her children are his nephews and/or nieces. Inasmuch as
none of them is included in the enumeration contained in said Art. 217 — which should be construed strictly,
it being an exception to the general rule — and Silvestre Gayon must necessarily be excluded as party in
the case at bar, it follows that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff’s failure
to seek a compromise before filing the complaint does not bar the same.
Therefore, there was no need for the parties to comply with the said provisions on the ground that the phrase
“members of the family” do not include a sister-in-law.
195
THE FAMILY
Family Home
ARTICLE 153 OF THE FAMILY CODE DOES NOT HAVE RETROACTIVE EFFECT
176. Manacop v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 97898, August 11, 1997
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Manacop which seeks to reverse the ruling of the CA
denying Manacop’s motion for reconsideration.
The CA, in dismissing the MR, found that both the debt incurred by Manacop and the judgement based on
the compromise agreement preceded the effectivity of the Family Code, which is August 3, 1988.
Manacop argues that the CA misapplied the doctrine in Modequillo since there was no need for him to
constitute his house and lot as a family home for it to be treated as such since he was and still is a resident
of the same property from the time it was levied upon and up to this moment.
ISSUE:
May a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment issued before the effectivity of the Family Code
be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home under the provision of said Code?
HELD:
Yes, such writ of execution may be executed on a house and lot constituted as a family home.
All existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes
and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home.
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153 of
the Family Code. Article 153 of the Family Code does not have retroactive effect. Prior to August 3, 1988,
the procedure mandated by the Civil Code had to be followed for a family home to be constituted as such,
either judicially or extrajudicially. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the
Code and his property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
196
THE FAMILY
Family Home
FAMILY HOME NOT YET CONSTITUTED AT THE TIME THE DEBT WAS INCURRED IS NOT EXEMPT
FROM EXECUTION
177. Taneo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No.108532, March 9, 1999
Kapunan, J.
FACTS:
As a result of a judgment in a civil case in favor of Private Respondent Abdon Gilig, Petitioner Taneo’s
properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount. The properties were sold at public auction and after
Taneo’s failure to redeem the same, a final deed of conveyancce was executed. To forestall such
conveyance, petitioners filed an action to declare the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the
land. The RTC dismissed the complaint. The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo
constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco Vacalares, as the family home. The
instrument constituting the family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money judgment
against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24, 1964. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the decision.
Petitioners aver that the house which their father constituted as their family home is exempt from execution,
invoking the benefits accorded to the family home under Family Code.
ISSUE:
Is the family home constituted after the money judgment against the petitioner exempt from execution?
HELD:
No, the family home is not exempt from execution.
A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his family. It is said, however, that the family home is a
real right, which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and
the land on which it is situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by creditors except in
certain specials cases.
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may be constituted judicial and extrajudicially, the
former by the filing of the petition and with the approval of the proper court, and the latter by the recording
of a public instrument in the proper registry of property declaring the establishment of the family home. The
operative act then which created the family home extrajudicially was the registration in the Registry of
Property of the declaration prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code. Under the Family Code,
however, registration was no longer necessary Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home
is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is occupied in the family.
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article has a retroactive
effect such that all existing family residences, petitioner's included, are deemed to have been constituted
as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth,
are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988. Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V
thereof have retroactive effect. It simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity
of the Family Code are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to
a family home under the Family Code. The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil Code
where registration of the declaration of a family home is a prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain
instances where the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or attachment. Article 243
reads: “The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment,
except: xx (2) For debts incurred before the declaration was recorded in the Registry of Property.”
At that time when the "debt" was incurred, the family home was not yet constituted or even registered.
Clearly, petitioners' alleged family home, as constituted by their father is not exempt as it falls under the
exception of Article 243 (2).
197
THE FAMILY
Family Home
A FAMILY HOME IS DEEMED CONSTITUTED ON A HOUSE AND LOT FROM THE TIME IT WAS
OCCUPIED AS A FAMILY RESIDENCE AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER THE FAMILY CODE
178. Modequillo v. Breva

G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
Gancayco, J.
FACTS:
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied, pursuant to a judgement by the Court of Appeals, a parcel of residential
land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 600 square meters with a market
value of P34,550.00 and assessed value of P7,570.00 per its tax declaration, and a parcel of agricultural
land located at Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00
and assessed value of P9,650.00 per its tax declaration, both of which are registered in the name of Jose
Modequillo.
A motion to quash the levy of execution was filed by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the
residential land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles
152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment
debt sought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those enumerated under
Article 155 of the Family Code. In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the motion. A
motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on September
2, 1988. Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Is the property in Poblacion Malalag a family home, thus exempt from execution?
HELD:
NO.
Pursuant to Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house and
lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to constitute the same judicially or
extrajudicially as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the premises, it is, therefore, a
family home as contemplated by law. Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to protect
their interest before extending credit to the spouses or head of the family who owns the home.In the present
case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by operation of law only under Article 153 of
the Family Code. It is deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988
being a leap year).
Further, Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family
Code, are considered family homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive
effect.
Although considered a family home, the debt or liability which was the basis of the judgment arose or was
incurred at the time of the vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment arising therefrom
was rendered by the appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the Family
Code.
198
THE FAMILY
Family Home
THREE REQUISITES MUST CONCUR BEFORE A MINOR BENEFICIARY IS ENTITLED TO THE

BENEFITS OF ARTICLE 159: (1) THE RELATIONSHIP ENUMERATED IN ARTICLE 154 OF THE
FAMILY CODE; (2) THEY LIVE IN THE FAMILY HOME, AND (3) THEY ARE DEPENDENT FOR LEGAL
SUPPORT UPON THE HEAD OF THE FAMILY
179. Patricio v. Dario III

G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:
This case stems from a petition for partition of an inherited parcel of land with residential house, the said
property belonged to the decedent Marcelino V. Dario who died intestate. He was survived by his wife,
petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private respondent Marcelino G.
Dario III. Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino
V. Dario. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private respondent of their intention to
partition the subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the
property.
The trial court ruled in favor of partition. However, the appellate court reversed the ruling noting that the
family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary
thereof. The heirs could not partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private respondent, Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary
of the family home.
ISSUE:
Is a minor grandson of the decedent who lives in a family home considered beneficiary thereof in so far as
it will have the effect of prohibiting the partition of the said family home?
HELD:
NO. Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159: (1) the
relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home, and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried
person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters,
whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term "descendants" contemplates all descendants
of the person or persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it must necessarily
include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses who constitute a family home.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the
benefits derived from Art. 159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of private
respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario, has been living in the family home since
1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot demand support from his paternal
grandmother if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily
on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV's parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head
of his immediate family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the
parents, especially the father, and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from his grandmother, but from his father.
Thus, despite residing in the family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario, Marcelino
Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary contemplated under Article 154 because he did
not fulfill the third requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is his father whom
he is dependent on legal support, and who must now establish his own family home separate and distinct
from that of his parents, being of legal age. With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the
subject property.
199
THE FAMILY
Family Home
THE FAMILY HOME IS EXEMPT FROM EXECUTION AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE
153 OF THE FAMILY CODE
180. Eulogio v. Bell

G.R. No. 186322, July 08, 2015
Sereno C.J.
FACTS:
The case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which granted the Petition
for Certiorari filed by respondents and enjoined the execution sale of their family home.
The siblings are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-
Bell. They sought the annulment of the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-square-
meter residential house and lot in favor of herein petitioner, the Eulogios, as well as the cancellation of the
title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the Deed.
The RTC granted respondents' prayers, but declared Spouses Bell liable to petitioners in the amount of P
1,000,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum. CA affirmed. Spouses Bell later brought the case to this Court
to question their liability to petitioners in the amount of P 1,000,000.00 plus interest. The Court, however,
dismissed. The RTC then issued a Writ of Execution, as a result of which respondents' property was levied
on execution. Upon motion by respondents, the trial court ordered the lifting of the writ of execution on the
ground that the property was a family home.
Petitioners then filed a Motion of the lifting of the writ of execution. Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code,
they posited that the current market value of the property exceeded the statutory limit of P 300,000
considering that it was located in a commercial area, and that Sps. Bell had even sold it to them for P
1,000,000.00. The trial court ruled that the present value exceeded the statutory limit, thus, it then ordered
the execution sale of the subject family home. The CA reversed the ruling of the trial court noting that the
basis of the valuation of a family home under Article 160 is its actual value at the time of its constitution and
not the market/present value; therefore, the trial court's order was contrary to law.
ISSUE:
Is the basis of the valuation of a family home under Article 160 its actual value at the time of its constitution
and not the market/present value?
HELD:
NO, the respondents' family home cannot be sold on execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as expressly provided for in Article 153 of the
Family Code. The family home cannot be seized by creditors except in special cases.
The exemption of the family home from execution, forced sale or attachment is limited to P 300,000 in urban
areas and P 200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted by law. Any subsequent
improvement or enlargement of the family home by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its
beneficiaries will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment provided the following conditions
obtain: (a) the actual value of the property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall below
the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement does not result in an increase in its value
exceeding the statutory limit. Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of forced sale, and any amount
above the statutory limit is applicable to the obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
To warrant the execution sale of respondents' family home under Article 160, petitioners needed to establish
these facts: (1) there was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from voluntary
improvements on the property introduced by the persons constituting... the family home, its owners or any
of its beneficiaries; and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed under Article 157.
During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged - much less proven - by petitioners. The
sole evidence presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already determined with finality that
the contract was null, and that the actual transaction was an equitable mortgage.
200
PATERNITY AND FILIATION
Legitimate Children
THE LAW ITSELF ESTABLISHES THE LEGITIMACY OF CHILDREN CONCEIVED OR BORN DURING
THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARENTS
181. De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon

G.R. No. 142877, October 02, 2001
Vitug, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the decision of the RTC, after the case
is remanded by the CA, in dismissing the complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of the
petitioners, for lack of cause of action and for being improper for the reason that the declaration of heirship
could only be made in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners were seeking the establishment of
a status or a right.
Danilo and Carolina De Jesus got married on 1964, it was during this marriage that petitioners Jacqueline
and Jinkie De Jesus were born on 1979 and 1982, respectively. On 1991, in a notarized document, Juan
G. Dizon acknowledged the petitioners as his own illegitimate children with Carolina. Thereafter, Dizon died
intestate leaving behind considerable assets including shares of stock in various corporations. It was on the
strength of his notarized acknowledgment that petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and
Accounting in the RTC. A motion to dismiss was filed by the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the
decedent, including the corporation of which the deceased was a stockholder.
Petitioners maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the decedent in an authentic
writing is in itself sufficient to establish their status as such and does not require a separate action of judicial
approval. On the other hand, respondents initially argued that the complaint, even while denominated as
being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the legitimate
children of the spouses Danilo and Carolina to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina and deceased
Juan Dizon. They also submit that the issue of legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition
and accounting but must be brought up in a direct action addressing the issue
ISSUE:
Can the petitioners be recognized as illegitimate children of the deceased Juan Dizon and entitled to inherit
from him?
HELD:
No, the petitioners cannot be recognized as illegitimate children of the deceased Juan Dizon. The
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in
exceptional instances the latter's heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. Thus, it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of
the husband can be rejected. There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that children born in
wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is
physical impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse is not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper cases
Article 171, of the Family Code, the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally
feasible and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents. The
certificates of live birth would also identify Danilo as being their father. Succinctly, in an attempt to establish
their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as
being children of Danilo and Carolina. This step cannot be aptly done because the law itself establishes the
legitimacy of children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The rule that the written
acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to
the decedent couldn’t be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether
petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate off springs of the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated
201
without an action having been first been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo
and Carolina born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of
legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct
suit specifically brought for that purpose. Therefore, petitioners are the legitimate of Danilo and cannot be
recognized as illegitimate children of the deceased Juan Dizon.
202
Legitimate Children
CHILDREN BORN IN WEDLOCK ARE LEGITIMATE
182. Social Security System v. Aguas

G.R. No. 165546, February 27, 2006
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA declaring that the petitioners are
entitled to the SSS benefits accruing from the death of Pablo Aguas. Pablo Aguas is a member and
pensioner of the SSS. After his death, the surviving spouse, Rosanna Aguas, filed a claim with SSS for
death benefits, which also indicates that his minor child, Jeylnn, survives him. Her claim for monthly pension
was settled. However, SSS received a sworn letter from Pablo’s sister, Leticia, alleging Pablo had no legal
children with Rosanna but the latter had several children with Romeo Dela Pena with whom she is living
with and dependent for support. As a result, the SSS suspended the payment of the monthly pension. The
respondents Rosanna and Jeylnn, joined by Janet Aguas who also claimed to be the child of deceased filed
a claim for the Restoration/Payment of Pensions with the Social Security Commission (SSC). The SSC
ruled that they are not entitled to the claims. As for Jeylnn, even if Pablo as her father signed her birth
certificate, she is not a legitimate child based on her baptismal certificate in the name of Jenelyn that she
was the daughter of Rosanna and Romeo. As for Janet, SSC relied on Leticia’s testimony that Pablo and
Rosanna only adopted her.
Petitioner maintains that Janet and Jeylnn are not entitled to the pension because based on the evidence
on record, particularly the testimonies of the witnesses, they are not the legitimate children of Pablo and
Janet. On the other hand, respondents contend that Janet and Jeylnn’s legitimacy may be impugned only
on the grounds stated in Article 166 of the Family Code, none of which were proven.
ISSUE:
Is JeyInn entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo?
HELD:
Yes, Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS Benefits.
Under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate. In the case of De Jesus v. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon it was held that there is
perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. Indeed, impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.
In the present case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime.
Hence, Jeylnn's status as a legitimate child of Pablo can no longer be contested. The presumption that
Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablo's signature, which was verified
from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth certificate signed by the father is a competent
evidence of paternity. The presumption of legitimacy under Article 164, however, cannot extend to Janet
because her date of birth was not substantially proven. Such presumption may be availed only upon
convincing proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child's parents were legally married and that
his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. It should be noted that
respondents likewise submitted a photocopy of Janet's alleged birth certificate. However, the Court cannot
give said birth certificate the same probative weight as Jeylnn's because it was not verified in any way by
the civil register. It stands as a mere photocopy, without probative weight. Unlike Jeylnn, there was no
confirmation by the civil register of the fact of Janet's birth on the date stated in the certificate. In any case,
a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. Here, the witnesses were
unanimous in saying that Janet was not the real child but merely adopted by Rosanna and Pablo. As for
Rosanna, while she is the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary
since she failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him
for support even if they were already living separately. Therefore, only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death
benefits accruing from the death of Pablo, as it was established that she is his legitimate child.
203
Legitimate Children
A CHILD WHO IS CONCEIVED OR BORN DURING THE MARRIAGE OF HIS PARENTS IS LEGITIMATE
183. Concepcion v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005
Corona, J.
FACTS:
Concepcion and Almonte were married in 1989. Almost a year later, Almonte gave birth to Jose Gerardo.
On 1991, Concepcion filed a petition to have his marriage to Almonte annulled on the ground of bigamy. He
alleged that Almonte was married to Gopiao since 1980, which marriage was never annulled. Almonte
averred that her marriage to Gopiao was a sham and that she never lived with him at all.
Trial Court ruled that Almonte’s marriage to Gopiao was valid and subsisting when she married Concepcion
and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It also declared that Jose Gerardo to be an
illegitimate child as a result. Almonte was awarded the custody while Concepcion was granted visitation
rights. Almonte filed an MR but the trial court denied the same.
Almonte elevated the case to CA which affirmed the RTC’s ruling. Almonte moved for reconsideration where
CA reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Almonte by Gerardo but by
Gopiao during her first marriage. Concepcion moved for reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE:
Did the CA correctly rule that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of Mario Gopiao and not of petitioner Gerardo
Concepcion hence depriving Concepcion of the right to impugn the legitimacy of the child and demand
visitation right?
HELD:
Yes. CA was correct in ruling that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child on Gopiao. Article 164 of the Family
Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. In the case
at bar, Almonte was legitimately married to Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born. Therefore, the
child Jose Gerardo - under the law - is the legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between
Almonte and Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the illegitimate child of the void and non-existent 'marriage'
between Almonte and Concepcion.
Furthermore, Concepcion cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child. Impugning the legitimacy of a child is
a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Concepcion has no standing in
law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Almonte’s husband Gopiao or, in a proper case, his heirs,
who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Since the marriage of Concepcion
and Almonte was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any
right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The fact that both Concepcion and Almonte admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was
immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was illegitimate. If the Court were to validate
that stipulation, then it would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration against the
legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of filiation of the child by persons other than her husband.
An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or
conceived within a valid marriage. Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the status and
filiation of a child. Otherwise, the child will be at the mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness. As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father
Gopiao and Almonte. Hence, Concepcion cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes
of the law, not related to him in any way. There being no such parent-child relationship between them,
Concepcion also has no legally demandable right to visit Jose Gerardo.
204
Legitimate Children
DEATH OF THE PETITIONER DOES NOT IPSO FACTO NEGATE THE APPLICATION OF DNA
TESTING FOR AS LONG AS THERE EXIST APPROPRIATE BIOLOGICAL SAMPLES OF HIS DNA
184. Estate of Ong v. Diaz

G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Jinky Diaz was married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in 1993. From 1994 to 1998, Jinky and
Rogelio Ong cohabited and lived together. From this live-in relationship, Joanne Diaz was conceived.
Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs
– recognizing the child as his. In 1998, Rogelio abandoned Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting
Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child. Rogelio failed and refused to give support for
the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus a complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer
for support pending litigation was filed by Joanne against Rogelio before RTC.
RTC ordered defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child and to provide plaintiff with a monthly
support. The child is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy.
A judgment was later rendered declaring Joanne to be the illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio with plaintiff
Jinky. The Order of this Court awarding support pendente lite was affirmed. Rogelio filed an MR which was
denied for lack of merit then appealed to CA. During the pendency of the case, Rogelio died, hence, Rogelio
was substituted by the Estate of Rogelio Ong. CA granted the appeal. The case was remanded to the court
a quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the
purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz. Petitioner filed an MR which was
denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Did CA err in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer feasible due to the
death of Rogelio?
HELD:
No. The New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The death of the petitioner does
not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples
of his DNA. The term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a person’s body, even
if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body
fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as
enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown
the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA
testing. And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v. Umanito, this
Court held: "in case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to."
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their existence.
The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer for such
ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have
repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity
to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
205
Legitimate Children
ARTICLES 164, 166, 170 AND 171 OF THE FAMILY CODE DO NOT CONTEMPLATE A SITUATION
WHERE A CHILD IS ALLEGED NOT TO BE THE CHILD OF NATURE OR BIOLOGICAL CHILD OF A
CERTAIN COUPLE
185. Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
Puno, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the CA reversing the Decision of the RTC declaring petitioner
Marissa Badua as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian.
The fight for administration of Vicente’s estate ensued when private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and
Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente’s sister and nephew, respectively) instituted a Special Proceeding before
the RTC praying for the issuance of letters of administration of Vicente’s estate in favor of private respondent
Feodor Aguilar.
Petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and
capable of administering his estate. Petitioner submitted documentary evidence, among others: (1) her
Certificate of Live Birth; (2) Baptismal Certificate; She also testified that the said spouses reared and
continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, private respondents tried to prove,
mostly thru testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child during their marriage.
The trial court decided in favor of the petitioner by relying on 166 and 170 of the Family Code. However, the
CA reversed the decision of the RTC and held that it erred in applying Articles 166 and 171 of the Family
Code.
ISSUE:
Should Art. 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code apply in this case where the heirs of the late Vicente
are not contending that petitioner is not Vicente’s child by Isabel but rather that petitioner was not born to
Vicente and Isabel?
HELD:
No. A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the
instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain couple.
Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his
wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said child by proving: (1)
it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of the
300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2) that for biological or other scientific reasons,
the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination,
the written authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this reading as they speak of the prescriptive
period within which the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
child.
206
Legitimate Children
THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD CANNOT BE CONTESTED BY WAY OF DEFENSE OR AS A

COLLATERAL ISSUE IN ANOTHER ACTION FOR A DIFFERENT PURPOSE
186. Geronimo v. Santos

G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88650 promulgated on January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively, which affirmed
the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8. Both courts a quo ruled
that the subject document titled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman is null and void.
Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for
annulment of document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano
Geronimo who are the brothers of her father for executing a document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman declaring themselves as the only heirs of Rufino and Caridad.
In the same proceeding Karen alleges that she is the only child of the deceased spouses. And that by virtue
of intestacy, should inherit the properties. Karen adduced evidence of her filiation. The petitioners on the
other hand contend that the deceased spouses never had a child. Moreover, the issue of filiation cannot be
made collaterally, i.e. it must be instituted in a proceeding directed for that purpose.
ISSUE:
Can the issue of legitimacy be instituted in a separate proceeding?
HELD:
Yes. As ruled in the case of Tison v. Court of Appeals: The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by
way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. "The presumption of
legitimacy in the Family Code xxx actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally.
However, this procedural rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy - or illegitimacy - of a child
is at issue. This situation does not obtain in the case at bar.
In the instant case, the filiation of a child - herein respondent - is not at issue. Petitioner does not claim that
respondent is not the legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino and his wife Caridad. What petitioner
alleges is that respondent is not the child of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at all. He proffers
this allegation in his Amended Answer before the trial court by way of defense that respondent is not an heir
to his brother Rufino. When petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased spouses Rufino
and Caridad in the proceedings below, jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct in admitting and
ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent - even if such proof is similar to the evidence admissible
under the second paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not being a direct action to prove
one's filiation.
207
Legitimate Children
LEGITIMATE CHILD IS A PROPER PARTY IN THE PROCEEDINGS FOR CANCELLATION OF BIRTH

CERTIFICATE
187. Babiera v. Catotal

G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA decision declaring the Certificate
of Birth of respondent Teofista Guinto as null and void ab initio.
Presentacion B. Catotal filed with the RTC a petition for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista
Babiera in the Civil Registry of Iligan City. Petitioner asserted that she is the only surviving child of the late
spouses Babiera, and that on September 20, 1996, the housemaid’s baby girl was delivered in the house
of the spouses without their knowledge whose birth certificate was simulated indicating that she was the
child of the spouses. Petitioner asserted that the birth certificate of Teofista is void ab initio, as it was
simulated and contained false entries since the child is made to appear as the legitimate child of the late
spouses when she is not. The certificate is signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the supposed mother.
Further, the family name BABIERA is false and unlawful because her correct family name is GUINTO, her
mother being single. Likewise, it is clinically and medically impossible for the supposed parents to bear a
child in 1956 because Hermogena was already 54 years old, and Eugenio was already 65 years old. The
void and simulated birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the hereditary rights of petitioner who
inherited the estate, hence, she prayed that the certificate of birth be declared void, invalid and ineffective.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant
petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code being an attack against the legitimacy of the child, and
that the action already prescribed, citing Article 170 of the FC. The trial court denied the motionto dismiss
and granted the petition of petitioner Catotal.
ISSUES:
1. Does the petitioner have legal standing to initiate an action questioning the legitimacy of the
respondent?
2. Is the prescriptive period under Art. 170 of the FC applicable in case at bar?
HELD:
1. Yes, petitioner has the requisite standing to initiate the present action because the interest of respondent
in the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition concerning the properties inherited by
respondent from her parents. Because her inheritance rights are adversely affected, the legitimate child of
such mother is a proper party in the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate. Moreover, Article
171 of the Family Code is not applicable in this case as it only applies to instances in which the father
impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision presupposes that the child was the undisputed
offspring of the mother. Here, the prayer is not to declare that petitioner is an illegitimate child of Hermogena,
but to establish that the former is not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not impugn
petitioner's filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there is no blood relation to
impugn in the first place.
2. No, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of the Family Code does not apply. The present action
involves the cancellation of Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her legitimacy. A birth certificate may be
ordered cancelled upon adequate proof that it is fictitious. Here, the certificate shows that the mother was
already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar
nor by the supposed mother. Verily, the action to nullify the Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it
was allegedly void ab initio.
208
Legitimate Children
FILIATION OR PATERNITY MAY BE PROVED THROUGH DNA TESTING
188. Agustin v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005
Corona, J.
FACTS:
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner assails the denial of the motion to dismiss respondent’s
complaint for support, and the directive for the parties to submit to DNA paternity testing.
Respondents Fe and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martin’s alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel L.
Agustin, for support before the RTC of Quezon City. They alleged that Arnel impregnated Fe who gave birth
to their child out of wedlock. Arnel purportedly signed the birth certificate as the father who also shouldered
the hospital expenses. However, he later denied having fathered the child and refused requests for support
despite his adequate financial capacity. In 2002, Fe and Martin sued Arnel for support. On the other hand,
petitioner Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly ended in
1998, long before Martin’s conception. Arnel learned that Fe told people that he impregnated her but he
refused to acknowledge the child. However, despite vehemently denying having sired Martin, he expressed
willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case.
Fe and Martin, then, moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing. Arnel opposed and invoked his constitutional right against self-incrimination and right
to privacy. He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action, considering the forged
signature on the birth certificate and that, under the law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not
recognized by the putative father. Such motion was denied.
ISSUE:
1. Did the complaint convert the action for support into one for recognition?
2. Did the Court violate petitioner’s constitutional right against self-incrimination and right to privacy when
it directed the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing?
HELD:
1. No, the complaint did not convert the action for support into one for recognition but merely allowed the
respondents to prove their cause of action against petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the
documentary evidence of acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively
integrated an action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance with
jurisprudence. Whether or not respondent Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the
determination of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately
related the main issues in both cases are. The declaration of filiation is entirely appropriate to these
proceedings.
2. No, the Court did not violate the rights of petitioner since because the kernel of the right against self-
incrimination is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right is simply against
the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt and does not apply where
the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence. Likewise, the right
to privacy is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service
and the common good. Further, in case proof of filiation or paternity is unlikely to be satisfactorily established
or difficult to be obtained, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent, may be resorted to. A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing v Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong
weight of DNA testing.
209
Legitimate Children
A LEGITIMATE CHILD IS A PRODUCT OF, AND, THEREFORE, IMPLIES A VALID AND LAWFUL
MARRIAGE
189. Angeles v. Maglaya

G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005
Garcia, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Aleli Angeles Maglaya filed a petition for letters of administration and her appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Francisco M. Angeles (Francisco, hereinafter). Petitioner Belen
Maglaya opposed the basic petition and prayed that she, instead of respondent, be made the administratrix
of Francisco's estate. In support of her opposition and plea, petitioner alleged having married Francisco on
August 7, 1948 before Judge Lucio M. Tianco of the Municipal Court of Rizal, a union which was ratified
two (2) months later in religious rites at the Our Lady of Grace Parish in Caloocan City, and that Francisco
represented in their marriage contract that he was single at that time. Petitioner also averred that respondent
could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco's legitimate daughter,
the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Pressing on, petitioner further alleged that
respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, has not
presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to
prove such union.
ISSUE:
Is the respondent the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles and Genoveva Mercado?
HELD:
No. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the
element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of
the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage
of the parents are legitimate." A party in whose favor the legal presumption exists may rely on and invoke
such legal presumption to establish a fact in issue. He need not introduce evidence to prove that fact. For,
a presumption is prima facie proof of the fact presumed. However, it cannot be over-emphasized, that while
a fact thus prima facie established by legal presumption shall, unless overthrown, stand as proved, the
presumption of legitimacy under Article 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing proof
of the factual basis therefor.
There is absolutely no proof of the decedent's marriage to respondent's mother, Genoveva Mercado. To
stress, no marriage certificate or marriage contract — doubtless the best evidence of Francisco's and
Genoveva's marriage, if one had been solemnized — was offered in evidence. We can concede, because
Article 172 of the Family Code appears to say so, that the legitimate filiation of a child can be established
by any of the modes therein defined even without direct evidence of the marriage of his/her supposed
parents. Said Article 172 reads: The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: 1.
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or 2. An admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the
absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: 1. The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or 2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws. The Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation
is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was signed by the attending physician who certified to having
attended the birth of a child. Such certificate, albeit considered a public record of a private document is
evidence only of the fact of birth of a child. Jurisprudence teaches that a birth certificate, to be considered
as validating proof of paternity and as an instrument of recognition, must be signed by the father and mother
jointly, or by the mother alone if the father refuses. To be sure, very little comfort is provided by petitioner’s
birth certificate and even her marriage contract as these documents were not signed by Francisco. Equally
inconsequential are petitioner’s school records which all these lacked the signatures of both Francisco and
Genoveva. Having failed to prove such fact, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the
legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado.
210
Action to Claim Filiation
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IS NOW ALSO ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIMED FILIATION BY

"ANY OTHER MEANS ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND SPECIAL LAWS”
190. Salas v. Matusalem

G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
Villarama, Jr., J.
FACTS:
During her pregnancy, Annabelle (respondent) was provided by Narciso Salas (petitioner) with an apartment
at a rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for. Narciso provided her with a household help with a salary of
P1,500.00 a month. He also provided her a monthly food allowance of P1,500.00. Narciso was with
Annabelle at the hospital while the latter was in labor, "walking" her around and massaging her belly. Narciso
brought home Christian Paulo to the rented apartment after Annabelle's discharge from the hospital. People
living in the same apartment units were witnesses to Narciso's delight to father a son at his age which was
his "look alike". It was only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him Christian Paulo that
Narciso withdrew his support to him and his mother.
The trial court ruled that petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo and ordering him to give monthly
support. CA affirmed the trial court and enunciated that testimony of Annabelle aside from having been
corroborated by Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment which Narciso rented, was never rebutted on
record. Narciso did not present any evidence, verbal or documentary, to repudiate plaintiff's evidence.
ISSUE:
Was the filiation of Christian Paulo Salas duly established?
HELD:
No. An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws," like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in
which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Reviewing the records, we find the totality of respondent's evidence insufficient to establish that petitioner
is the father of Christian Paulo.
However, the testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances of the birth of Christian Paulo,
petitioner's financial support while respondent lived in Murillo's apartment and his regular visits to her at the
said apartment, though replete with details, do not approximate the "overwhelming evidence, documentary
and testimonial".
Therefore, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by themselves are not competent proof
of paternity and the totality of respondent's evidence failed to establish Christian Paulo's filiation to petitioner.
211
ARTICLE 283 CONTAINS A BLANKET PROVISION "ANY OTHER EVIDENCE OR PROOF" PERMITS
HEARSAY AND REPUTATION EVIDENCE TO PROVE ILLEGIIMATE FILIATION
191. Ilano v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994
Nocon, J.
FACTS:
In May 1963, Ruth Elynia Mabanglo, niece of Leoncia, lived with Leoncia and petitioner. She accompanied
her aunt when she started having labor pains in the morning of December 30, 1963. Petitioner arrived after
five o'clock in the afternoon. When the nurse came to inquire about the child, Leoncia was still unconscious
so it was from Artemio Ilano (petitioner) that the nurse sought the information. Inasmuch as it was already
past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning for his signature.
However, he left an instruction to give the birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as he was leaving
early the following morning.
During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the
father of Merciditas. When Merciditas was in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her
Report Card for the fourth and fifth grading periods as her parent. When petitioner ran as a candidate in the
Provincial Board of Cavite, he gave Leoncia his picture with the following dedication: "To Nene, with best
regards, Temiong."
After weighing the contradictory testimonies and evidence of the parties the trial court was not fully satisfied
that petitioner is the father of Merciditas. However, on appeal the CA reversed the decision of the trial court
and declared the respondent as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child of defendant.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in declaring respondent as the duly acknowledge and recognized illegitimate child of
defendant?
HELD:
No. Although in order that the birth certificate may constitute a voluntary recognition, it must be signed by
the father. An equivocal act, such as signing under the caption "parent" in the report card, is not sufficient.
Merciditas has never been to the family home of petitioner at Imus, Cavite; nor introduced to his family; nor
brought around town by him, treated as his child, introduced to other people as his child, led people to
believe that she was part of his family. However, private respondent's evidence to establish her filiation with
and the paternity of petitioner is too overwhelming to be ignored or brushed aside by the highly improbable
and fatally flawed testimony of Melencio and the inherently weak denials of petitioner. It is error for the court
a quo to not likewise consider the evidence as sufficient to establish that plaintiff was in continuous
possession of status of a child in view of the denial by appellee of his paternity, and there is no clear and
sufficient evidence that the support was really given to plaintiff's mother. The last paragraph of Article 283
contains a blanket provision that practically covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs. "Any
other evidence or proof" that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render unnecessary the other
paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory recognition is not
sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph.
This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to
illegitimate filiation. Therefore, as a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the
spurious child of petitioner, she is entitled to support.
212
DNA TESTING IS A VALID PROBATIVE TOOL IN DETERMINING FILIATION
192. Herrera v. Alba

G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
On 14 May 1998, then 13-year-old respondent, Rosendo Alba, represented by his mother Armi Alba, filed
before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against petitioner. But the
latter denied that he is the biological father of respondent and that he had any physical contact with
respondent’s mother. Prompting respondent to file a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to
abbreviate the proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C.
Halos, Ph.D., an Associate Professor at De La Salle University teaching Cell Biology, who described DNA
paternity testing and asserted that the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. But
petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE:
Is DNA test a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation?
HELD:
YES. DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to claim his
or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the facilities of
modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits established by
the law, rules, and jurisprudence.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a person’s entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells
and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a person’s DNA profile
can determine his identity. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable
regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and child,
it is possible to determine which half of the child’s DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must
have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged father’s profile is then examined to ascertain
whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types in the child. If the man’s DNA
types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is
not excluded as the father. The DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity should be
conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of W is less than 99.9%, the results of the DNA analysis should
be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of W is 99.9% or higher, then there is refutable
presumption of paternity.
213
IN A CRIME OF RAPE, THE PRESUMPTION AS TO THE FILIATION OF THE CHILD BEGOTTEN AS A

RESULT THEREOF MAY BE IMPUGNED ONLY DUE TO PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO HAVE
SEXUAL INTERCOURSE DUE TO IMPOTENCE OR SERIOUS ILLNESS
193. People v. Malapo

G.R. No. 123115, August 15, 1998
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
Amalia Trinidad, a pseudoretardate who is deprived of intellectual stimulations which explains her lag in
cognitive development, was alone at home, cooking, at around 9:30 in the morning in September 1991
when accused Nixon Malapo entered their house. Upon seeing accused, she tried to run away, but Malapo
caught her hand and brought her to the dining room, caused her to fall on the floor, covered her mouth, and
forcibly removed her short pants and undergarment. Then lay on top of her, and forced his sexual organ
into her private part, causing lacerations and bleeding in her vagina. Amalia said she tried to punch the
accused and remove his hand from her mouth, but he was too strong for her. After having sexual intercourse
with amalia, accused left a warning that he would kill her if she reported the incident to Mrs. No or to anyone
else. Initially, she refused to tell anyone about this but later on told Mrs. No's cousin, Bernardita Marquinez,
that she had been raped by accused. As a result thereof, she has become pregnant and delivered a baby
at the Iriga City Puericulture Center. Accused alleged that Amalia failed to identify him three times. He
further argues that if Amalia had been raped in September of 1991, she could not have been delivered of
her baby on May 18, 1992 — As, according to Exhibit 1-A, the baby was a full term baby, it is unlikely,
unbelievable, that same baby was the fruit of the alleged rape perpetrated sometime in September 1991,
because from September 15, 1991 (assuming that the rape took place on September 15, 1991, there being
no evidence as to when in September 1991 the rape took place) to May 18, 1992 when the baby was born,
is a period of only eight (8) months and three (3) days, contrary to the Certificate (Exh. 1 and 1-A) that the
baby was full term when delivered.
ISSUE:
May the presumption that Amalia's child was begotten as a result of her having been raped on September
1991 be impugned by the evidence of the baby’s full term delivery?
HELD:
NO. It can be inferred that conception occurred at or about the time that accused-appellant is alleged to
have committed the crime, i.e., within 120 days from the commission of the offense in September
1991. Pursuant to Art. 166 of the Family Code, accused-appellant can overcome the presumption that
Amalia's child was begotten as a result of her having been raped in September 1991 only if he can show
either that it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse because of impotence or serious
illness which absolutely prevents him from having sexual intercourse or that Amalia had sexual intercourse
with another man. However, he has not shown either of these. The testimony of Amalia, as corroborated by
Nenita No and Bernardita Marquinez, leaves no doubt in our mind that accused-appellant is the father of
the child. Therefore, in accordance with Art. 345 of the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellant should be
ordered to pay support. A textbook on pediatrics states that "Infants delivered before the thirty-seventh week
of gestation with a birth weight of less than 2,500 grams (American) or 2,275 grams (Filipino) are considered
premature." An infant can therefore be considered a full-term baby if it weighs more than 2,275 grams even
if it is born before the thirty-seventh week which is less than 9.3 months. Since according to the medical
certificate (Exh. 1) Amalia's baby weighed 2.4 kilograms or 2,400 grams, it was a full-term baby even if it
was born before the normal gestation period.
Art. 176 of the Family Code confers parental authority over illegitimate children on the mother, and likewise
provides for their entitlement to support in conformity with the Family Code. As such, there is no further
need for the prohibition against acknowledgment of the offspring by an offender who is married which would
vest parental authority in him. Therefore, under Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code, the offender in a
rape case who is married can only be sentenced to indemnify the victim and support the offspring, if there
be any.
214
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IS ALLOWED TO ESTABLISH HIS CLAIMED FILIATION BY ANY OTHER

MEANS ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND SPECIAL LAWS
194. Mendoza v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991
Cruz, J.
FACTS:
Private respondent Teopista Tunacao claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but
the latter denied her claim and denied it to his dying day. Thus, the trial court dismissed respondent’s
complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. Now the
issue is before the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Herein private respondent, alleged that she was born to Brigida Toring and defendant Casimiro Mendoza.
Amplifying on her complaint, Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was
Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She also testified on the financial doles made by Casimiro to Brigida
Toring, the hiring of Teopista's husband to drive the passenger truck of Casimiro, who later sold the vehicle
and gave the proceeds of the sale to Teopista and her husband, the permission he gave her son, Lolito
Tufiacao, to build a house on his land after he found that the latter was living on a rented lot, and, no less
remarkably, the joint savings account Casimiro opened with Teopista.
Two other witnesses testified for Teopista who are both relatives of Casimiro. Gaudencio Mendoza said he
was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used to work with him. Isaac Mendoza
testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother,
and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him
ISSUE:
Was Teopista able to establish her claim of filiation based on the foregoing facts?
HELD:
YES, respondent has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be
recognized as such. An illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to Article 172 and 175 of the Family Code, or
"by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to Article 283 of the Civil Code.
Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name
has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of
witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the ROC.
In this case, it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree. His testimony was that
he was informed by his father Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own
mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.
Such acts or declarations may be received in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule because "it is
the best the nature of the case admits and because greater evils are apprehended from the rejection of
such proof than from its admission. The ff. requisites that have to be complied with before the act or
declaration regarding pedigree may be admitted in evidence:
1. The declarant is dead or unable to testify.
2. The pedigree must be in issue.
3. The declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in issue.
4. The declaration must be made before the controversy arose.
5. The relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by
evidence other than such declaration.
All the above requisites are present in the case at bar. The persons who made the declarations about the
pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both
dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity
of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The
declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between
215
her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by
evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio
Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.
216
GROUNDS FOR IMPUGNING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE CHILD MAY ONLY BE INVOKED BY THE
HUSBAND OR BY HEIRS IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES
195. Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao

G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002
De Leon, Jr., J.
FACTS:
As alleged by petitioner, Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from Ramon M. Yulo
for more than ten (10) years at the time of the institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the
late William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of William’s untimely demise on December 2, 1975. They lived
together in the company of Corazon’s two (2) children from her subsisting marriage.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During
her three (3) day stay at the hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born baby,
William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food and clothing were paid under the account of
William Liyao. William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his good looking son and had
their pictures taken together. During one of William's birthday, he expressly acknowledged Billy as his son
in the presence of his friends. Since birth, Billy had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status of a recognized and/or acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt acts.
William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and other material needs.
On November 29,1976, a year after the death of William Liyao, William Liyao Jr., represented by his mother
Corazon G. Garcia, filed a Civil Action in RTC of Pasig for compulsory recognition as "the illegitimate child
of the late William Liyao" against herein respondents.
Respondents (heirs/children of William Liyao from his subsisting marriage) refute the claim that William
Liyao Jr. is the illegitimate son of their father, William Liyao. They alleged that their parents were legally
married and had never been separated.
RTC declared the minor William Liyao Jr. as the illegitimate son of the deceased William Liyao and ordered
defendants(herein respondents) to recognize and acknowledge the minor as a compulsory heir of the
deceased and be entitled to all successional rights. CA reversed RTC's ruling.
ISSUE:
May petitioner impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father, William
Liyao?
HELD:
NO. The petitioner could not impugn his own legitimacy. While physical impossibility for the husband to
have sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears
emphasis that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the Civil
Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his heirs under the conditions set forth under
Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband,
or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal
and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal
that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy.
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time
petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived
during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however,
is not conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of
the New Civil Code provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the marriage, and
before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to
be legitimate.
217
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical impossibility of the
husband having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which
preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
It is therefore clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G. Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then
minor, herein petitioner, to compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as the
illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage
is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. We cannot allow petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the
clear mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional circumstances, his heirs, could impugn
the legitimacy of a child born in a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his own
filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the
status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged paramour.
On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the
husband who successfully defeated the presumption.
218
FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILD CAN BE ESTABLISHED BY AN ADMISSION IN A PRIVATE

HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT BY THE PARENT CONCERNED AND DULY SUPPORTED BY AN
ARRAY OF EVIDENCE
196. Verceles v. Posada

G.R. No. 159785, April 27, 2007
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada, a young lass from Pandacan Catanduanes, worked in petitioner
Teofisto Verceles' office, the mayor of Pandacan, as a casual employee by offer of Verceles. One of her
tasks was following-up barangay road and maintenance projects. On December 22, 1986, on orders of
petitioner, she went to Virac, Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangay projects. That same day, she
went to Catanduanes Hotel on instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress of her
mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs because he said he wanted the briefing done at the
restaurant at the upper floor. Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in, and suddenly
embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also
claimed he could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She succumbed to his advances.
She kept the incident to herself.
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she said she wrote petitioner that she
feared she was pregnant. In another letter, she told him she was pregnant. In a handwritten letter dated
February 4, 1987, he replied that should she become pregnant even unexpectedly, he would have no regret,
because he love her and they shall have common responsibility over it.
In court, she identified petitioner’s penmanship which she claims she was familiar with as an employee in
his office. Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters sent to her by petitioner, two of which were in
his letterhead as mayor of Pandacan. She also presented the pictures petitioner gave her of his youth and
as a public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at the back.
Clarissa avers that petitioner, aware of her pregnancy, handed her a letter and P2,000 pocket money to go
to Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA review course or look for a job. When her
parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father fetched her and brought her back to Pandan.
On September 23, 1987, she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac,
Catanduanes against petitioner
RTC: rendered judgment in favor of respondents and against the petitioner and ordering the latter to pay a
monthly support to Verna Aiza Posada as he was proved to be the natural father of Verna as shown by the
exhibits and testimonies
CA: affirmed RTC's decision.
Petitioner asserts that the fact of paternity and filiation of Verna Aiza Posada has not been duly established
or proved in the proceedings; and that the issue of filiation should be resolved in a direct and not a collateral
action. Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza Posada as father and that it was
respondent Clarissa who placed his name on the birth certificate as father without his consent. He further
contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not admissions of paternity but mere expressions
of concern and advice.
ISSUE:
1. Can paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages with support pendente lite?
2. Was the filiation of Verna Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner proven?
HELD:
219
1. Yes. A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its caption states "Damages coupled
with Support Pendente Lite," Clarissa’s averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer of a job, his
amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for
support for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity. We have held that the due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action
is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself
a voluntary recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial approval.
2. Yes. The letters of petitioner are declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired Verna
Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias in these letters, the similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis
the annotation at the back of petitioner’s fading photograph as a youth is unmistakable. Even an
inexperienced eye will come to the conclusion that they were all written by one and the same person,
petitioner, as found by the courts a quo. We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted his affair
with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between them, and his giving her money during her pregnancy.
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for establishing filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed
by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based
on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten instruments of petitioner which establish
Verna Aiza’s filiation under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of evidence presented
by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence
that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioner’s illegitimate child. Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence
presented, he himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are telling. Well-settled is the rule
that denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which merit
no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.
Thus, all things considered, Verna Aiza is petitioner’s illegitimate child.
220
ADOPTION
Adoption
ADOPTED ILLEGITIMATE CHILD MAY USE AS MIDDLE NAME THE SURNAME OF BIOLOGICAL
MOTHER
197. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner, Honorato Catindig, filed this petition to question the ruling of the trial court in not letting the
adopted child use the surname of her biological mother as her middle name.
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He
alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma
Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that he is now
a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be
changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his
surname. The trial court found the petition meritorious but declared that the name of the child be
STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. This prompted petitioner to file a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration. He was praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name. However, the trial court countered that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name. Petitioner
contends that there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only
one adopting parent; that it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the
mother; that the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; that adoption is for the benefit and
best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; and that
her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the OSG, agrees with the petitioner.
ISSUE:
May an illegitimate child use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently
adopted by her natural father?
HELD:
YES. As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may
use. The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), in case there is identity
of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which case, the middle name or the
mother’s surname shall be added. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee
may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent
on the matter.
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters."
Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly allows, as a matter of right and
obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption.
Looking at it, the modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of
paternity and filiation, but also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed,
confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with social and moral
responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child. Being a legitimate child by
virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate
child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother,
as discussed above.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie,
to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
221
ADOPTION
Adoption
PETITION FOR ADOPTION SHOULD BE FILED BY HUSBAND AND WIFE JOINTLY
198. In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim
G.R. Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on certiorari, petitioner, Monina Lim, seeks to set aside the RTC ruling which
dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P.
Lim.
Petitioner was married to Primo Lim. Having no children, petitioner and her husband simulated the birth of
Michelle and Michael to make it appear that they were the children’s parents. They reared and cared for the
children. Unfortunately during 1998, Primo Lim died. Two years after his death, petitioner married one Angel
Olario, an American citizen. Thereafter, petitioner then decided to adopt the children by availing the amnesty
given under RA 8552 to those who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, petitioner filed separate petitions for
the adoption of Michelle and Michael before the RTC. During such time, Michelle was already 25 years old
and married while Michael was 18 years and 7 months old. Olario, Michael, and Michelle and her husband
executed an Affidavit of Consent to signify their assent. The RTC dismissed the petition due to the fact that
petitioner did not file the petition jointly with her new husband.
Petitioner argues that mere consent of her husband would suffice and that the adoptees are already
emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority.
ISSUE:
Can the petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt?
HELD:
No. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had already remarried.
She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no other recourse
but to affirm the trial court’s decision denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads: “…Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases…” The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child
which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the
petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial court
was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall under any of the
three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children
of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And
third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other. The fact that Olario gave his consent
to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that
Olario must comply being an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA
8552.
Therefore, it is mandatory for a husband and wife to file a petition for adoption jointly as a general rule.
222
SUPPORT
Support
SUPPORT MUST BE GIVEN BY MORE REMOTE RELATIVES IF THOSE PRIMARILY LIABLE ARE
UNABLE TO DO SO
199. Mangonon v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125041, June 30,2006
Chico-Nazario, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for
Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati. With
Federico Delgado, her first husband, and Francisco Delgado, Federico’s father, as respondents. Petitioner
and her second husband cannot afford the amount of expenses for the education and support of the
daughters therefore seek support from respondents who are known to be financially well-off. Rica and Rina
were born 7 months after the annulment of the marriage between Belen and Federico. Petitioner claims that
the daughters are Federico’s legitimate children therefore are entitled to general and educational support
by virtue of the Family Code. Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek support pendente lite
from private respondents - who are millionaires with extensive assets both here and abroad - in view of the
imminent opening of classes, the possibility of a protracted litigation, and Rica and Rina’s lack of financial
means to pursue their college education.
Francisco in his answer stated that the daughters are not the legitimate children of Federico due to the
abscense of the latter’s signature in their birth certificates. Federico states that he does not have the financial
means to support the daughters. The trial court directed respondents to provide a monthly support
(pendente lite) of P5,000.00 each or a total of P10,000.00 for the education of both daughters. This decision
was appealed by the petitioner to the CA which affirmed the order of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Are the daughters entitled to support from the respondents?
HELD:
Yes. The obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely related to the recipient. However,
the more remote relatives may be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove that those
who are called upon to provide support do not have the means to do so.There being prima facie evidence
showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and respondent
Federico are primarily charged to support their children’s college education. In view however of their
incapacities, the obligation to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco.
Under Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica and
Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents. It having been established
that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters ’education, he, in lieu of
petitioner and respondent Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
223
SUPPORT
Support
A SPOUSE IS NOT OBLIGED TO LIVE WITH THE OTHER SPOUSE GUILTY OF INFIDELITY THUS
ENTITLED TO SEPARATE MAINTENANCE
200. Dadivas de Villanueva v. Villanueva

G.R. No. L-29959, December 3, 1929
Street, J.
FACTS:
The plaintiff, Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva, was married to the defendant, Rafael Villanueva, on July 16,
1905, in the City of Manila, where the pair have since resided. To them have been born three children. This
action was instituted for the purpose of obtaining separate maintenance and custody of the two younger
minor children. The grounds on which separate maintenance is sought infidelity and cruelty.
For a period of ten years the husband is guilty of repeated acts of infidelity with several women. Petitioner
protests the conduct of the husband but maintained marital relations for the good of the family. But ultimately
due to the illicit relations of the husband as well as the brutality exhibited by him towards the petitioner, the
latter left the conjugal home and established a separate home with their two younger children.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to support in the form of separate maintenance?
HELD:
Yes. The proof with respect to the charge of cruelty shows that the defendant has not infrequently treated
the plaintiff roughly and that he has at times directed abusive words to her and challenged her to carry her
troubles into court. The proof in support of this charge does not in our opinion establish a case for separate
maintenance, without relation to the graver charge of conjugal infidelity; and if the case depended, for its
solution, upon cruelty alone, the case could doubtless be affirmed, in conformity with the doctrine stated in
Arroyo v. Vazquez de Arroyo (42 Phil. 54), where the charges of cruelty were found to be unproved or
insufficient. In that case, however, we were able to record the fact that neither of the spouses had at any
time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, and that neither had, so far as the proof showed, even given just cause
to the other to suspect illicit relations with any person.
The law is not so unreasonable as to require a wife to live in marital relations with a husband whose incurable
propensity towards other women makes common habitation with him unbearable. Deeply rooted instincts
of human nature sanction the separation in such case, and the law is not so unreasonable as to require as
acquiescence on the part of the injured party which is beyond the capacity of nature. In order to entitle a
wife to maintain a separate home and to require separate maintenance from her husband it is not necessary
that the husband should bring a concubine into the marital domicile. Perverse and illicit relations with women
outside of the marital establishment are enough. As was said by Justice Moreland in Goitia v. Campos
Rueda (35 Phil., 252, 262), a husband cannot, by his own wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to
support his wife imposed by law; and where a husband by wrongful, illegal, and unbearable conduct, drives
his wife from the domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to abrogate the law
applicable to the marital relations and repudiate his duties thereunder.
In the case before us repeated acts of conjugal infidelity on the part of the husband are proved, and he
appears to be a recurrent, if not an incurable offender against the sanctity of the marriage tie. Therefore,
this gives the wife an undeniable right to relief.
224
SUPPORT
Support
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME OF ADULTERY NECESSARILY FORFEITS THE RIGHT OF THE

SPOUSE FOR SUPPORT
201. Quintana v. Lerma

G.R. No. L-7426, February 5, 1913
Goddard, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for a sum of money due upon a contract between
the plaintiff wife and defendant husband for support.
Evidence shows that parties were lawfully married in 1901. However, in February of 1905, the parties
entered into a written agreement of separation whereby each renounced certain rights as against the other
and divided the conjugal property between them. The agreement also indicated the undertaking of the
defendant husband to pay the plaintiff wife within the first three days of each month the sum of P20 for her
support and maintenance. As a consequence of the defendant husband’s nonpayment, the wife was
prompted to file an action for support.
The defendant set up as a special defense that the wife had forfeited her right to support by committing
adultery. The court ordered that such allegation be stricken out of record for the reason that under the
provision of Article 152 of the Civil Code the commission of adultery is not recognized as a ground upon
which the obligation to support ceases. Despite the plaintiff’s amendment of her complaint, the defendant
husband still raised the very same defense in his answer.
ISSUE:
Is the lower court correct when it refused to recognize the defense of the defendant or to permit any evidence
to be introduced in support thereof?
HELD:
No, the lower court is not correct when it refused to recognize the defense of the husband that the
commission of adultery operates to forfeit the wife’s claim for support every month.
The court ruled that the special defense of adultery set up by the defendant in his answer both to the original
and the amended complaint is a good defense, and if properly proved and sustained will defeat the action.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial, with instructions to
permit the interposition of the special defense of adultery and such amendments of the complaint and
answer as may be necessary to carry this judgment into effect.
Thus, the commission of the crime of adultery may be considered as a proper ground for the forfeiture of
the plaintiff wife’s support from her husband.
225
SUPPORT
Support
CIVIL STATUS OR JURIDICAL RELATION IS THE BASIS FOR THE ACTION OF SUPPORT IN ALL
CASES ENUMERATED UNDER ARTICLE 143 OF THE FAMILY CODE
202. Francisco v. Zandueta

G.R. No. L-437494, August 9, 1935
Goddard, J.
FACTS:
Respondent Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, aged two years, through his natural mother and guardian ad
litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support against the herein petitioner in the CFI of Manila. The
petitioner, as defendant in that case, alleged as a special defense that he never acknowledged and could
not have acknowledged the plaintiff as his son; that he was not present at the baptism of the plaintiff and
that he was married at the time it is alleged that the plaintiff was born. Notwithstanding the denial of paternity,
the respondent judge issued the subject order obliging petitioner to give support.
Petitioner then moved for a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the civil status of the plaintiff was
placed in issue by the pleadings which presupposes that the plaintiff has no right to monthly support from
the defendant until his status as a child of the latter is finally determined in his favor. It was denied. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
Is it necessary for respondent Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco to prove his civil status as the son of petitioner
to successfully claim for support?
HELD:
Yes. Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to support each other: (1) Husband and
wife, (2) legitimate ascendants and descendants, (3) parents and acknowledged natural children and the
legitimate descendants of the latter, (4) parents and illegitimate children not having the legal status of natural
children and (5) brothers and sisters. In all these cases it is the civil status or the juridical relation which is
the basis of the action for support. Thus, in the case of Yangco v. Rohde, the court pronounced that there
is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of alimony or support to a person who claims to be a
spouse until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause.
In the present case, the action for support is brought by a minor, through his guardian ad litem, who alleges
that he is the son of the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil status as such son. His
alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be taken for granted upon the point in
issue The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil status, from which the right to support is derived,
being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an authoritative declaration has
been made as to the existence of the cause. Hence, the court erred in granting the order ordering petitioner
to pay the respondent Francisco the sum of P30, or any other amount as monthly support, pendente lite.
226
SUPPORT
Support
GENERALLY, ADVANCES MADE BY A STRANGER FOR THE SUPPORT OF ANOTHER ARE

RECOVERABLE FROM THE PERSON BOUND TO GIVE THE SAME
203. Ramirez v. Redfern

G.R. No. L-26062, December 31, 1926
Malcolm, J.
FACTS:
This case is an appeal brought by plaintiffs-appellants, Jose V. Ramirez and his wife, Eloisa de Marcaida,
assailing the decision of trial judge Harvey absolving the defendant-appellee, J.R. Redfern, from the
demands of plaintiffs for the advances they made for the support and maintenance of defendant’s wife.
Ramirez and Redfern are brothers-in-law. In 1908, Redfern brought his wife and three minor children to
England. In 1909, he left them there and returned to the Philippines. From 1910 until 1922, Redfern provided
his wife funds for her expenses. In 1920, while still in England, Mrs. Redfern obtained from Ramirez the
sum of £600 and an additional £185. Mrs. Redfern did not use this money until she returned in Manila in
1922. Ramirez also advanced P875 when Mrs. Redfern returned in Manila. During those period, Mr. Redfern
continuously furnished his wife P300 monthly for her support and one child. The trial judge decided in favor
of the defendant ruling that the money sought to be recovered were delivered to defendant’s wife without
his knowledge or consent and there was no necessity for it. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Were the amounts of £600, £185, and P875 given by plaintiffs to defendant’s wife considered as advances
for her support and maintenance, thus, recoverable from the defendant?
HELD:
NO, the amount of £600, £185, and P875 given by plaintiffs to defendant’s wife are not advances for her
support and maintenance, therefore, not recoverable from the defendant.
Article 1894 of the Civil Code provides: “When without the knowledge of the person who is bound to give
support to a dependent, a stranger supplies it, the latter shall be entitled to recover the same from the
former, unless it appears that he gave it out of charity, and without the expectation of recovering it." For one
to recover under said Article 1894, it must be alleged and proved, first, that support has been furnished to
a dependent of one bound to give support but who fails to do so; second, that the support was supplied
without the knowledge of the person charged with the duty. The negative qualification is when the support
is given without the expectation of recovering it. The first requirement contemplates that the husband and
wife are mutually bound to support each other. By support is understood all that is necessary for food,
shelter, clothing and medical attendance, according to the social standing of the family. Parents are also
required to bring up and educate their children.
In this case, the wife accepted assistance from another, when it is not shown that she had ever made any
complaint to her husband or any of his agents with regard to her allowance. It is clear that the defendant
was amply providing for his wife and children in London. As to the £600 first advanced to Mrs. Redfern, this
was not primarily for support because she retained it for some time before using it. With the combined facts
and law, it may be conceded that Mr. and Mrs. Ramirez gave money out of charity. The third requisite of
the law is also taken out of consideration since Mr. Redfern is the first to acknowledge that the money was
handed to his wife. In addition, there is a failure of proof as to the first essential the second essential of the
law.
Therefore, the alleged advances made by the plaintiffs in favour of defendant’s wife are not recoverable.
227
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental Authority
ONLY IN CASE OF DEATH, ABSENCE, OR UNSUITABILITY OF PARENTS MAY SUBSTITUTE

PARENTAL AUTHORITY BE EXERCISED BY GRANDPARENTS
204. Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995
Romero, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review asking to overturn the decision of CA granting custody of a six-year old child to
his maternal grandparents, the private respondents Spouses Bedia, and not to his father, the petitioner
Leouel Santos, Sr.
On June 1987, the union of petitioner, an army lieutenant, with respondents ’daughter, a nurse, beget only
one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. The petitioner and his wife agreed that the temporary custody of the child be
given to the private respondents who paid for the hospital bills and subsequent support of the boy because
the petitioner could not afford to do so. In 1988, the boy’s mother left for the US. In 1990, petitioner went to
the house of the private respondents, then, through deceit petitioner abducted the boy. Private respondents
filed a petition for the care, custody, and control of the minor. RTC awarded the custody to the grandparents.
CA affirmed RTC’s decision in toto.
Petitioner contends that private respondents failed to show that he is an unfit or unsuitable father, therefore
substitute parental authority granted to the grandparents in Article 214 of the Family Code is inappropriate.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that although the law recognizes the right of a parent to his
child’s custody, the primary consideration should be the happiness and welfare of the latter. By
demonstrating their love and affection to the child since infancy, they claim to be in the best position to
promote the child’s welfare.
ISSUE:
Should the father of the child be awarded with the custody of the minor?
HELD:
YES, the father of the child should be awarded with the custody of the minor.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise of parental authority. Parental authority
and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by
law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental
authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship, and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in
a document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. The law vests on the
father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of absence or
death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the
parents' death, absence or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
In this case, the mother of the minor is working in the United States while the father, petitioner, is present.
The considerations of the Court of Appeals are insufficient to defeat petitioner’s parental authority and the
concomitant right to have custody over the minor, particularly since he has not been shown to be an
unsuitable and unfit parent. Private respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. The latter's wealth is not a
deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that at the present time, petitioner is in no position to
support the boy. The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private respondents as grandparents
should not be seen as incompatible with petitioner' right to custody over the child as a father.
Therefore, the custody of the minor should be awarded to the father.
228
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental Authority
RIGHT TO THE CUSTODY OF THE CHILD IS INHERENT IN PARENTHOOD
205. Sagala-Eslao v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997
Torres, Jr., J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review, petitioner Teresita Sagala-Eslao seeks the reversal of the CA’s decision, which
affirmed the RTC’s judgment granting the petition of respondent Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye to recover the
custody of her minor daughter from her mother-in-law, Teresita Sagala-Eslao.
Respondent and Reynaldo Eslao were married. Out of their marriage, they begot two children, Leslie and
Angelica. For a meantime, the care and custody of Leslie was entrusted to the respondent’s mother, while
Angelica stayed with her parents at the petitioner’s house. When Reynaldo died, the respondent intended
to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga. But the petitioner prevailed upon the respondent to entrust the
custody of Angelica to the former reasoning out that her son just died and needed the company of the child
to assuage her grief over the loss of her late son. The respondent then returned to her mother’s house in
Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie. Later on, the respondent remarried and migrated to the USA to
join her husband. When the respondent returned to the Philippines, she informed the petitioner about her
desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband expressed his willingness to
adopt Leslie and Angelica. The petitioner resisted the idea and explained that the child was entrusted to her
when she was ten days old and accused the respondent of having abandoned Angelica. The respondent
instituted an action to recover the custody of Angelica. The RTC found the petition meritorious. On appeal,
the CA affirmed in full the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner argues that she is deserving to take care of Angelica and that the CA erred in finding that there
was no abandonment committed by respondent.
ISSUE:
Did the private respondent abandon Angelica to the care and custody of petitioner?
HELD:
No, the private respondent did not abandon her minor child.
In Santos, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, the SC ruled that parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and
may not be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law. The right attached to parental
authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan institution. When a parent entrusts the
custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is given is merely
temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. Even if a definite
renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same.
Hence, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave
to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental
authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution which do not appear in the case at bar.
229
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental Authority
SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL AUTHORITY CAN ONLY BE EXERCISED IN CASE OF PARENTS ’DEATH,

ABSENCE OR UNSUITABILITY
206. Vancil v. Belmes

G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Bonifacia P. Vancil which seeks to reverse the
decision of the CA appointing the respondent Helen G. Belmes as legal guardian over the persons and
estate of minors Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil, Jr.
The petitioner is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the United States of America who
died in the said country. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his
common-law wife, respondent Belmes. Petitioner commenced before the RTC a guardianship proceedings
over the persons and properties of the then 6-year-old Valerie and 2-year-old Vincent. It is claimed that the
minors have an estate consisting of proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits with probable value
of P100,000. The petitioner was appointed as the legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate
of Valerie and Vincent. Thereafter, the respondent submitted an opposition with a motion for the Removal
of Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of
and exercising parental authority over the subject minors. The trial court denied the said motion. On appeal,
the CA rendered its assailed decision reversing the RTC.
Petitioner contends that she is more qualified as guardian of the minors and that the CA gravely erred in
ruling that the preferential right of a parent to be appointed guardian over the persons and estate of the
minors is absolute. In a Manifestation/Motion, the respondent stated that her daughter Valerie already
turned eighteen. Thus, the SC resolves only the issue of guardianship over the person and estate of Vincent.
ISSUE:
Is the respondent, being the natural mother of the Vincent, has the preferential right over that of petitioner
to be his guardian?
HELD:
Yes, the respondent has the preferential right to be Vincent’s guardian. This ruling finds support in Article
211 of the Family Code which provides: "Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."
Pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, the petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise
substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that
respondent is very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner
has to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner,
however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian
of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that
her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no
longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.
Hence, the appealed Decision if affirmed by the SC with modification in the sense that Valerie, who has
attained age of majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of respondent Belmes.
230
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental Authority
ASCERTAINING THE WELFARE AND BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
207. Espiritu v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
Melo, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review before the SC which seeks to review the decision of CA in reversing the ruling
of trial court in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus and in suspending Teresita’s parental authority
over Rosalind and Reginald and declaring Reynaldo to have the sole parental authority over them.
At Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding began with a
common law relationship. Their relationship gave birth to Rosalind, their daughter who was born on August
16, 1986. When they were on vacation in the Philippines, they got married and upon returning to the United
States, their second child Reginald Vince was born. On January 12, 1988, their relationship went sour and
they decided to separate some time in 1990. Instead of giving their marriage a chance as allegedly pleaded
by Reynaldo, Teresita left him and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo brought their children
home to the Philippines but he was sent back by his company to Pittsburg. He had to leave his children with
his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug. Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children
because she was afraid of being arrested since Reynaldo had filed a criminal case for bigamy against her.
In 1992, she returned to the Philippines and filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus to gain custody over
her children. Trial Court dismissed the petition and suspended Teresita’s parental authority over her
children. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the rulling of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Should Teresita be granted parental authority over their children?
HELD:
No. Teresita should not be granted parental authority over their children.
Article 213 of the Family Code provides:

“In case of separation of their parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially the choice of the child over
seven years of age unless the parent chosen is unfit.”
The task of choosing the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial function to be
determined by a simple determination of the age of a minor child. Whether a child is under or even seven
years of age, the paramount criterion must always be the child’s best interest.
In ascertaining the welfare and best interest of the child, courts are mandated by the Family Code to take
into account all relevant considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law presumes that the
mother is the best custodian. The presumption is strong but it is not conclusive as it can be overcome by
“compelling reasons”. If a child is over seven, his choice is paramount but, again, the court is not bound by
that choice. In its discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award custody to the other
parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit under the circumstances.
231
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental Authority
BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR CAN OVERRIDE PROCEDURAL RULES
208. Luna v. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-68374, June 18, 1985
Concepcion, Jr. J.
FACTS:
This is a review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent appellate court in case entitled “Horacio Luna
et al., petitioners, versus Hon. Roque Tamayo etc., et al, respondents,” which affirmed an order denying a
motion to restrain the execution of a final judgment rendered in a habeas corpus case.
Two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley Salumbides, subject of this child custody case, on April
7, 1975, her parents Ma. Lourdes and Sixto Salumbides gave her to the petitioners Horacio and Liberty
Luna, a childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with love and affection and
brought her up as their very own. A few months before September 1980, the Lunas decided to take Shirley
abroad and show her Disneyland and other places of interest in America but when the petitioners asked for
the respondents ’written consent to the child’s application for a U.S. visa, the respondents refused to give
it. As a result, the petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left with the private respondents upon
the latter’s request. When the petitioners returned, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley
to another school and they refused to return Shirley to them. Neither did they allow her to visit the petitioners.
Petitioners filed a petition for habeas corpus against the private respondents to produce the person of
Shirley and deliver her to their care and custody. After the filing of an answer and due hearing, a decision
was rendered declaring the petitioners entitled to the child’s custody and forthwith granted the writ prayed
for. Upon appeal, the decision was reversed by the CA and a writ of execution was issued to return Shirley
to her biological parents. However, testimony of the child shows that she would rather stay with the Luna
couple. She even made pronouncements that she will kill herself if she will be taken by her biological
parents.
ISSUE:
Should the procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of appellate
courts in child custody cases prevail over above the desire and preference of the child.
HELD:
No. Procedural rules will not prevail. It is well-settled doctrine that when a judgment of a higher court is
returned to the lower court, the only function of the latter court is ministerial one of issuing the order of
execution. However, the child’s manifestation to the trial court that she would kill herself or run away from
home if she should be forced to live with the private respondent is a supervening event that would justify
cancellation of the execution of the final decision rendered by the CA.
Article 363 of the Civil Code provides that in all questions relating to the care, custody, education, and
property of the children, the latter’s welfare is paramount. This means that the best interest of the child can
override procedural rules even the rights of parents to the custody of their children. Since, in this case, the
very life and existence of the minor is at stake and the child is in an age when she can exercise an intelligent
choice, the courts can do no less than respect, enforce, and give meaning and substance to that choice and
uphold her right to live in an atmosphere conducive to her physical, moral, and intellectual development.
232
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental Authority
SEXUAL PREFERENCE OR MORAL LAXITY ALONE DOES NOT PROVE PARENTAL NEGLECT OR
INCOMPETENCE
209. Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto

G.R. Nos. 154994 & 156254, June 28, 2005
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
These are 2 consolidated petitions, first a Petition for Review under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Joycelyn
Pablo-Gualberto (Joycelyn) assailing the decision of the CA granting the custody of their child to respondent
Crisanto Gualberto (Crisanto). The second is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Crisanto
charging the CA with grave abuse of discretion for denying his Motion for Partial Consideration.
A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage to Joycelyn was filed by Crisanto. Along with the petition is
an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of their 4-year-old child, Rafaello (child). Crisanto alleged that
Joycelyn took away their child with her from their conjugal home and his school when she decided to
abandon Crisanto. At first, the RTC awarded the custody of the child to Crisanto. Through Joycelyn’s motion
to lift the award of custody pendente lite of the child, the RTC reversed its order and awarded the custody
of the child to Joycelyn stating that child is barely four years old.
Crisanto filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari charging the RTC with grave abuse of discretion The
CA ruled partly in Crisanto’s favor and that the Order awarding provisional custody to the father should
prevail because the RTC did not resolve the correct incident in the later Order. Nevertheless, the CA
stressed that the RTC was not precluded from considering and resolving Joycelyn’s Motion to lift the award
of custody pendente lite to Crisanto, as that Motion had yet to be properly considered and ruled upon.
However, it directed that the child be turned over to him until the issue was resolved. Crisanto argues that
Joycelyn is unfit to take care of their son due to Joycelyn’s alleged lesbian relations; hence for compelling
reason he must be awarded custody of the child. While Joycelyn insists that under Art 213 of the Family
Code her minor child cannot be separated from her. Hence, these Petitions.
ISSUE:
Who between the father and the mother should have custody over their child?
HELD:
The mother should have the custody over their child. There is express statutory recognition that, as a
general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding custody of children under the age of seven. The caveat
in Article 213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court finds cause to order otherwise.
The so-called “tender-age presumption” under Article 213 of the Family Code may be overcome only by
compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to have custody
of her children in one or more of the following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction with a communicable
disease.
Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of
custody. But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove parental neglect or incompetence. To
deprive the wife of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral lapses have had an adverse
effect on the welfare of the child or have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper parental
care.
Therefore, it is not enough for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must also
demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship with a person of the same sex in the presence
of their son or under circumstances not conducive to the child’s proper moral development. Such a fact has
not been shown here. There is no evidence that the son was exposed to the mother’s alleged sexual
proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.
233
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental Authority
LAW EXPLICITLY CONFERS TO THE MOTHER SOLE PARENTAL AUTHORITY OVER AN

ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
210. Briones v. Miguel

G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 2004
Panganiban, J.
FACTS:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 filed by petitioner Joey Briones (Joey) which seeks to reverse
and set aside the Decision and Resolution of the CA granting custody over the child Michael Kevin PIneda
(child) until he reaches 10 years of age to respondent Loreta Miguel (Loreta).
The child is the llegitimate son of Joey with respondent Loreta who is now married to a Japanese national.
Joey in his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus against respondent alleges that he caused the child to be
brought to the Philippines so that he could take care of him and send him to school. It was when the
respondents Maricel and Francisca Miguel came to his house and requested that they be allowed to bring
the child in a mall and promised to bring him back. However, they did not. He exerted reasonable efforts to
find his child, but to no avail. Thus, he was constrained to file a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondents to obtain custody of his minor child. Joey prays that the custody of his son be given to him as
his biological father and as he has demonstrated his capability to support and educate him. In her comment,
Loreta denies the allegation and that she was the one who brought the child to the Philippines and she was
the same person who took the child when she returned to the PH wherein Joey agreed and consented. She
further alleged that Joey was deported from Japan and has not been gainfully employed since the time he
arrived in the PH and that Joy was maintaining an illicit affair until his deportation.
The CA awarded the custody of the child to his mother, Loreta and Joy was granted visitorial rights.
ISSUE:
Who should have custody of the child?
HELD:
The law explicitly confers to the mother sole parental authority over an illegitimate child; it follows that only
if she defaults can the father assume custody and authority over the minor. Having been born outside a
valid marriage, the minor is deemed an illegitimate child of petitioner and Respondent Loreta. Article 176 of
the Family Code of the Philippines explicitly provides that “illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code.” This is the rule regardless of whether the father admits paternity. Ordering him to give support to,
but not custody of, the child. Not to be ignored in Article 213 of the Family Code is the caveat that, generally,
no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, except when the court finds cause
to order otherwise. Only the most compelling of reasons, such as the mother’s unfitness to exercise sole
parental authority, shall justify her deprivation of parental authority and the award of custody to someone
else.
Bearing in mind the welfare and the best interest of the minor as the controlling factor, we hold that the CA
did not err in awarding care, custody, and control of the child to Respondent Loreta. There is no showing at
all that she is unfit to take charge of him. Even when the parents are estranged and their affection for each
other is lost, their attachment to and feeling for their offspring remain unchanged. Neither the law nor the
courts allow this affinity to suffer, absent any real, grave or imminent threat to the well being of the child.
234
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
Parental Authority
THE ACT OR OMISSION CONSIDERED AS NEGLIGENT MUST BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
INJURY FOR LIABILITY UNDER ARTICLE 219 OF THE FAMILY CODE
211. St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos

G.R. No.143363, February 6, 2002
Pardo, J.
FACTS:
In this appeal via certiorari, St. Mary’s Academy (hereinafter referred to as petitioner) seeks reversal of the
decision of the CA that affirmed the RTC decision finding the petitioner school liable for the accident.
From 13 to 20 February 1995, Appellant St. Mary's Academy of Dipolog CityPetitioner school conducted an
enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. The said drive includes the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. On the fateful
day, Sherwin, along with other high school students, were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant
Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven
by James Daniel II who was then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove
the jeep in a reckless manner and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of
the injuries he sustained from the accident. The Regional Trial Court held the appellant liable for damages.
On appeal, Court of Appeals promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages but otherwise affirming
the decision a quo, in toto. Upon filing a motion for reconsideration, the same was denied. Hence, this
appeal.
ISSUE:
Should petitioner be held liable in view of its special parental authority over the driver-student?
HELD:
No, petitioner should not be held liable in view of its special parental authority over the driver-student.
Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2)
the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility
applies to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
Thus, such authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and
students outside the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Article 219
of the Family Code, if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are
principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
while under their supervision, instruction, or custody.
However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent
was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence, must have a causal connection to
the accident. In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate
cause of the accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep.
Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel II but the mechanical defect in
the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the
proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of
James Daniel II. Hence, the respondents ’reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that “those given the
authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages
caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor” was unfounded.
235
SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW
Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law
DECISION DECLARING PRESUMPTIVE DEATH IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY
212. Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino

G.R. No.160258, January 19, 2005
Garcia, J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, the Republic of the Philippines seeks reversal of the CA decision
which affirmed the decision of the RTC granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death filed by
Gloria Bermudez-Lorino, respondent.
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino and her husband were married on June 12, 1987. Out of this marriage,
she begot three (3) children. Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband was a
habitual drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with friends to
the extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work. Because of her husband's violent character, Gloria
found it safer to leave him behind and decided to go back to her parents together with her children. In order
to support the children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad. From the time of her physical separation from
her husband in 1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him,
or with any of his relatives.
On August 14, 2000, Gloria filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal
under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code, among others,
alleging that after nine (9) years after she left her husband, there was absolutely no news about him and
she believes that he is already dead and is now seeking through this petition for a Court declaration that
her husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of remarriage.
The Regional Trial Court granted the same. Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory.
Republic of the Philippines appealed. Acting thereon, the RTC denied the Republic's appeal and accordingly
affirmed the appealed RTC decision. Thus, petitioner Republic directly went to this Court via the instant
recourse under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Is a decision on a petition for declaration for presumptive death a proper subject of appeal?
HELD:
No, a decision on a petition for declaration for presumptive death is not a proper subject of appeal.
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to
perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247,
Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the
RTC to give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case
to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law, is
immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria v. Comelec,11 "the right to appeal is not a natural
right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by express mandate of Article
247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are
"immediately final and executory", the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The
Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death, should not be
treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory it becomes immutable
and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the highest
court of the land
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY
LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered by these rules, to wit:
236
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all cases
provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules. Judge Elizabeth Balquin-Reyes of RTC, Branch 75,
San Mateo, Rizal duly complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rendering judgment within
ninety (90) days after the formal offer of evidence by therein petitioner, Gloria Bermudez-Lorino.
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within which to
perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of Section 247,
Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory". It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the
RTC to give due course to the Republic's appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case
to the Court of Appeals. An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express
provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs Comelec, 11 "the right to
appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by
express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings
in Family Law are "immediately final and executory", the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties
therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death,
should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of November 7, 2001.
237
FUNERALS
Funerals
ARTICLE 305 OF THE CIVIL CODE, IN RELATION TO WHAT IS NOW ARTICLE 199 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, SPECIFIES THE PERSONS WHO HAVE THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO MAKE FUNERAL
ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DECEASED
213. Valino v. Adriano

G.R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014
Mendoza, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to reverse the ruling of the CA, which modified the
decision of the RTC, ordering the exhumation of the remains of the deceased and its transfer at their family
plot at Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City. The respondents of the case are Rosario
Adriano, who is the legal wife of the deceased Atty. Adriano Adriano, and their six legitimate children. The
petitioner, Fe Valino, is the deceased common law partner.
The deceased and respondent were legally married; however, their relationship turned sour which led to
their separation in fact. Years later, the deceased and petitioner fell in love and lived as husband and wife.
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died. Since respondents were abroad, petitioner shouldered the funeral and burial
expenses. Respondent, after learning of the death of her husband, immediately called petitioner and
requested to delay the interment for a few days so that they could attend it. The request was denied and
the remains were buried at the mausoleum of the family of Valino at the Manila Memorial Park.
Feeling aggrieved, respondents filed this case for damages and for exhumation and transfer of the deceased
remains at their family plot at Holy Cross Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City. In defence,
petitioner claimed that respondent has been separated from the deceased for more that 20 years. Further,
the deceased orally declared that it was his last wish to be buried at petitioner’s family mausoleum.
ISSUE:
Does respondent, as the legal wife of the deceased Atty. Adriano, have the right and duty to make the
funeral arrangements?
HELD:
YES, respondent as the legal wife has the right and duty to make the funeral arrangements. Article 305 of
the Civil Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have
the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for the deceased.
Under these provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements to the members of the family to the exclusion of one’s common law partner. Even if assuming,
ex gratia argumenti, that Atty. Adriano truly wished to be buried in the Valino family plot at the Manila
Memorial Park, the result remains the same. It should be remembered that the wishes of the decedent with
respect to his funeral are not absolute. As Dr. Tolentino wrote, the dispositions or wishes of the deceased
in relation to his funeral must not be contrary to law.
Hence, the wishes of the deceased with respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305 of the Civil Code in
relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, and subject the same to those charged with the right and duty to
make the proper arrangements to bury the remains of their loved-one.
238
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
Cancellation or Correction of Entries
FOR INTERSEX INDIVIDUALS, WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT WHERE THE PERSON IS
BIOLOGICALLY OR NATURALLY INTERSEX THE DETERMINING FACTOR IN HIS GENDER
CLASSIFICATION WOULD BE WHAT THE INDIVIDUAL, LIKE RESPONDENT, HAVING REACHED THE
AGE OF MAJORITY, WITH GOOD REASON THINKS OF HIS/HER SEX
214. Republic v. Cagandahan

G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to modify the decision of the RTC
which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by respondent Cagandahan and
ordered the prayed changes in the latter’s birth certificate. The Republic, through the OSG, is the petitioner
while Jennifer Cagandahan is the respondent.
Respondent filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna to have the gender be changed from female to male and her first name from Jennifer to
Jeff. In her petition, she alleged that when she born, she was registered as female in the Certificate of Live
Birth. However, while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to
have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both
male and female characteristics. To support her claim, she presented the expert testimony of Dr. Sionzon.
He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs – female and male. He testified that
this condition is very rare and is permanent.
The OSG filed an opposition contending that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth
certificate and the claimed medical certification does not make respondent male. In contrast, respondent
argues that he is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex or gender, likewise the changed is allowed under Rule 108.
ISSUE:
May the entries in respondent’s birth certificate regarding his sex be changed on the ground of his medical
condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff”.
HELD:
YES, the entries on respondent’s birth certificate may be corrected or changed. In the instant case, if we
determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the
respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subject’s birth certificate entry is in order.
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither
consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. For intersex
individuals, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining
factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of
majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Here, respondent has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or
interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. In
the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately
private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical
treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.
Therefore, it is only proper to grant the petition and order the change of respondent’s birth certificate of his
sex to female to male, and change of name from “Jennifer” to Jeff”.
239
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
Cancellation or Correction of Entries
NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO SEX ON THE
GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
215. Silverio v. Republic

G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007
Corona, J.
FACTS:
This petition is filed by Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio after the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision granting the petition for certiorari filed by the Republic thru OSG setting aside the decision of the
trial court granting the petition for change of first name and sex in his birth certificate.
Petitioner Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate. His name
was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth while his sex was registered
as "male." Petitioner alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and
acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a
man's body, he underwent sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was
in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
In granting the petition of the Republic, CA ruled that there is no law allowing the change of either name or
sex in the certificate of birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. On the contrary, Petitioner
essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407
to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048. Petitioner believes that
after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes
sought.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner entitled to change his first name and gender in his certificate of live birth by reason of sex
reassignment surgery?
HELD:
No, petitioner is not entitled to change his first name and gender in his certificate of live birth by reason of
sex reassignment surgery. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are
controlled by statutes. Petitioner's basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment.
He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through
surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one's legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioner's first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil
registry and the public interest.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time
of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician
or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a person's sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable. Hence, the petition for the change of petitioner’s first name and sex in his birth certificate
by reason of sex reassignment surgery must fail.
240
SURNAME
Change of Surname
THE OBLIGATION OF AN ADOPTED CHILD TO USE THE SURNAME OF THE ADOPTER DOES NOT
PROHIBIT A PETITION TO CHANGE SURNAMES ON VALID GROUNDS; REMOVAL OF IMPRESSION
OF ALIENAGE IS A VALID GROUND TO CHANGE NAME
216. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Wong

G.R. No. 97906, May 21,1992
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner seeks to set aside the judgment of the CA which affirmed
the decision of the RTC granting the petition of Maximo Wong to change his name.
Maximo Wong (“Maximo”) is a Muslim Filipino. At birth, he was given the name Maximo Alcala Jr. by his
natural parents. He carried this name until he and his sister were adopted by the childless spouses Wong.
The Wongs brought up the children as their own and showered their adopted children with parental love. In
conformity with law, the children bore the surname of their adoptive parents.
When Maximo was 22 years old, he filed a petition to change his name back to “Maximo Alcala Jr.”. He
alleged that his use of the surname “Wong” embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends,
as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry. He sought to erase the implication of alien nationality as this
brought ridicule and hampered his business and social life. He also had the consent of his adoptive mother.
His adoptive father had, by then, passed away. The trial court granted the petition which the Court of
Appeals affirmed over the objections of the Solicitor General. Hence this appeal.
The Solicitor General, among others, contends that reversion cannot be allowed as Articles 341 and 365 of
the Civil Code require adopted children to use the surname of their adopter because failure to do so would
give the impression that he/she has not severed his/her filial relation with his/her natural parents. Finally,
the petition evinces a “crass ingratitude” to the memory of Maximo's adoptive father.
Maximo responds that he complied with the law, carrying his adoptive father's name until emancipation.
Now that he is of age, he has the right to change his surname when there are valid grounds therefor. He
also reiterates that his adoptive mother consents to the change as she understands his predicament.
ISSUE:
May an adopted child use the surname of his/her natural parents on the ground that the adopter's name,
being foreign, invites discrimination and ridicule?
HELD:
Yes, an adopted child may use the surname of his/her natural parents if the adopter's name, being foreign,
invites discrimination and ridicule. An adopted child's right and obligation to use of the adopter's surname
is but an incident of adoption rather than its object. A change of name does not define or effect a change in
one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. Maximo's legal status as an
adopted child will not change even if he changes his surname.
Moreover, the law gives any person the right to seek permission from the State, through appropriate judicial
proceedings, to change his/her name upon a showing of compelling reasons therefor. There is no reason
to deny this right to adopted persons. In this regard, one of the grounds for change of name held by the
Supreme Court as valid is “A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all
in good faith and without prejudicing anybody.” (citing Uy v. Republic, 1965)
Maximo established, through his own testimony corroborated by his adoptive mother, that his surname
“Wong” caused him embarrassment and ridicule among his Muslim friends and family. His name gave the
impression of alienage which caused him to be despised by the community. His business suffers as the
community does not believe that he is a Muslim. There is also no showing that his petition is attended by
fraud. Finally, rather than crass ingratitude, the fact that Maximo first secured the permission of his adoptive
mother shows profound respect and reverence expected of a dutiful child.
Hence, the appeal is denied. The lower courts are affirmed.
241
SURNAME
Change of Surname
A CHANGE OF NAME IS A PRIVILEGE AND NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT
217. Gan v. Republic

G.R. No. 207147, September 14, 2016
Reyes, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside
the Decision issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) reversing and setting aside the RTC Orders granting the
petition for change of name filed by petitioner Emelita Basilio Gan.
Petitioner Gan was born in 1956 out of wedlock to Pia Gan, her father who is a Chinese national, and
Consolacion Basilio, her mother who is a Filipino citizen. Petitioner filed a Petition for correction of name
seeking to change the full name indicated in her birth certificate from "Emelita Basilio" to "Emelita Basilio
Gan" claiming that she had been using the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all her records. Said petition was
later amended to a petition for change of name which contained substantially the same allegations where
petitioner merely stated that she was born out of wedlock.
The respondent alleged that the petitioner, who is an illegitimate child, failed to adduce evidence that she
was duly recognized by her father, which would have allowed her to use the surname of her father. The CA
opined that pursuant to Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, the petitioner,
as an illegitimate child, may only use the surname of her mother; she may only use the surname of her
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by her father. The CA pointed out that the petitioner
has not adduced any evidence showing that her father had recognized her as his illegitimate child and, thus,
she may not use the surname of her father. Meanwhile, the Ppetitioner maintains that the RTC correctly
granted her petition since she only sought to have her name indicated in her birth certificate changed to
avoid confusion as regards to her personal records. She insists that her failure to present evidence that her
father recognized her as his illegitimate child is immaterial; a change of name is reasonable and warranted,
if it is necessary to avoid confusion.
ISSUE:
Is the petitioner, who is an illegitimate child entitled to use the surname of his father without adducing
evidence that she was duly recognized by the latter?
HELD:
No, petitioner, who is an illegitimate child is not entitled to use the surname of her father without adducing
evidence that she was duly recognized by the latter.
A change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right; a proper and reasonable cause must exist before
a person may be authorized to change his name. In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the
question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound discretion of the court. What is involved is not
a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful of the consequent results in the event of
its grant and with the sole prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the courts.
The reason cited by the petitioner in support of her petition for change of name, i.e., that she has been using
the name "Emelita Basilio Gan" in all of her records, is not a sufficient or proper justification to allow her
petition. In Alfon vs Republic of the Philippones, the Court allowed the petitioner therein to use the surname
of her mother since Art. 364 of the Civil Code used the word “principally” and not “exclusivelu” and, hence,
there is no legal obstacle is a legitimate child should choose to use the mother’s surname to which he or
she is legally entitled.
In contrast, Articles 366 and 368 of the Civil Code do not give to an illegitimate child or a natural child not
acknowledged by the father the option to use the surname of the father. Thus, the petitioner cannot insist
that she is allowed to use the surname of her father.
When the petitioner was born in 1956, prior to the enactment and effectivity of the Family Code, the pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code then regarding the petitioner's use of surname provide: Article 366. A natural
242
child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only
one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the recognizing parent. Article 368.
Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother. In her amended petition
for change of name, the petitioner merely stated that she was born out of wedlock; she did not state whether
her parents, at the time of her birth, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, which
would make her a natural child pursuant to Article 269 of the Civil Code. If, at the time of the petitioner's
birth, either of her parents had an impediment to marry the other, she may only bear the surname of her
mother pursuant to Article 368 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, she may use the surname of her father provided
that she was acknowledged by her father. However, the petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would
show that she indeed was duly acknowledged by his father. Hence, the petition for change of name is
denied.
243
SURNAME
Change of Surname
ACKNOWLEDGED ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO USE THE SURNAME OF

THEIR ILLEGITIMATE FATHER
218. Grande v. Antonio

G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
Velasco, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 wherein petitioner Grace Grande assails the decision of the
CA and RTC ordering the change of her minor children’s surname to that of the children’s illegitimate father,
respondent Patricio Antonio, pursuant to the latter’s recognition of filiation.
For a period of time, respondent Antonio and petitioner Grande lived together as husband and wife despite
the fact that Antonio was already married to someone else. Their illicit relationship produced two sons which
were not expressly recognized by the respondent as his own in their birth certificates in the Civil Registry.
When they separated, Grande left for the US with her two children prompting Antonio to file a petition for
judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his children’s
surname as “Antonio.” His petition was appended by a notarized deed of voluntary recognition of paternity.
However, Grande contends that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255
is couched in a permissive language and may not be invoked by a father to compel the use of his surname
by his illegitimate children without the consent of their mother.
ISSUE:
Did respondent Antonio have the right to compel his illegitimate children to use his surname upon his
recognition of their filiation?
HELD:
NO, a father cannot compel his illegitimate children to use his surname upon recognition of their filiation.
The general rule under Article 176 of the Family Code is that that an illegitimate child shall use the surname
of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized
by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child
may use the surname of the father. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The
word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion upon the illegitimate children.
Respondent’s position that the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
Article 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or
not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right
to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Hence, acknowledged illegitimate children cannot be compelled to use the surname of their illegitimate
father.
244
SURNAME
Change of Surname
CHANGE OF THE SURNAME OF THE ADOPTEE AS A RESULT OF THE ADOPTION DOES NOT
EXTEND TO CHANGE OF THE FIRST NAME ABSENT LEGAL GROUNDS THEREFOR
219. Republic v. Hernandez

G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996
Regalado, J.
FACTS:
This in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 wherein petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenges the
order of the RTC approving private respondent Spouses Van and Regina Munson’s adoption of Kevin Earl
Bartolome Moran and the change of his first name to “Aaron Joseph.”
In their petition for the adoption of the subject minor, Spouses Munson prayed for the change of his first
name to “Aaron Joseph”, the name in which he was baptized and by which he has been called by his
adoptive family, relatives and friends since he arrived at private respondent’s residence.
Petitioner Republic opposed the inclusion of the relief of change of name in the same petition for adoption
contending that what the law allows is the change of surname of the adoptee to conform with that of the
adopter and not the change of the given name which should be instituted under Rule 103. On the other
hand, Spouses Munson assert that upon the grant of adoption, the subject minor adoptee ipso facto
assumed a new identification and designation, that is, Aaron Joseph which was the name given to him
during the baptismal rites.
ISSUE:
Did the grant of adoption give private respondent spouses the right to change the adoptee’s first name on
the ground that such name is the one in which he is known since he came to live with them and in which he
was baptized?
HELD:
NO, adoption did not confer upon the adopters the right to change the adopted child’s first or given name
absent any of the grounds justifying said change as provided under the law. The creation of an adoptive
relationship does not confer upon the adopter a license to change the adoptee's registered Christian or first
name. While the right of a natural parent to name the child is recognized, guaranteed and protected under
the law, the so-called right of an adoptive parent to re-name an adopted child by virtue or as a consequence
of adoption, even for the most noble intentions and moving supplications, is unheard of in law and
consequently cannot be favorably considered. The only way that the name of person can be changed legally
is through a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court and he must show proper
and reasonable cause or any convincing reason which may justify such change.
A petition for change of name grounded on the fact that one was baptized by another name has been denied
inasmuch as the use of baptismal names is not sanctioned. Neither does the fact that the petitioner has
been using a different name and has become known by it constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally
authorize a change of name.
Thus, the change of the surname of the adoptee as a result of the adoption does not extend to change of
the first name absent legal grounds therefor.
245
SURNAME
Change of Surname
CONVENIENCE IS NOT A GROUD TO SUPPORT A PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME
220. In Re: Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005
Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not
yet married to each other. When they subsequently got married on they executed a deed of legitimation of
their son, changing his name from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang. But, because the
parents wanted to stay in Singpore for a long time, the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was requested
to be changed to Julian Lin Wang, because the parents believed that they will be discriminated against
because of his current registered name which carries a middle name, and in Singapore middle names or
the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name.
This was denied by the RTC. Ruling that the change sought is merely for the convenience of the child. Since
the State has an interest in the name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the convenience of the
bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code, legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of
the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should now be taken from petitioner Julian,
considering that he is still a minor. Hence the present petition unde Rule 45.
ISSUE:
Is dropping the middle name of a minor child on the ground of convenience proper?
HELD:
Yes. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be ‘proper and reasonable cause ’for
which the change is sought. To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some
proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name. In this case, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience.
However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and
convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion
and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change
of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion
when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the
value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights
under our laws.
246
SURNAME
Change of Surname
A CHANGE OF NAME IS NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT BUT OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION, TO BE

EXERCISED IN THE LIGHT OF THE REASONS ADDUCED AND THE CONSEQUENCES THAT WILL
FOLLOW
221. Republic v. Cagandahan

G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking areversal of the RTC decision which
granted the petition for correction of entries filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan, respondent
Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the RTC Branch 33 of Siniloanof, Laguna a Petition for Correction of
Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from “Jennifer B. Cagandahan” to “Jeff Cagandahan” and her gender
from “female” to “male.” She alleged that while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics
and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus
afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have
clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that
she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has
stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests
and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Dr. Sionzon issued a
medical certificate stating that respondent's condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop
normally and she has two sex organs - female and male.
The lower court decided in respondent’s favor but the OSG appealed before the SC invoking that the same
was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the
local civil registrar.OSG contends that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court does not allow change of sex or
gender in the birth certificate and respondent’s claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make
her a male. Respondent countered that he is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to
be corrected to reflect his true sex/ gender. the local civil registrar was furnished a copy of the petition and
that she substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Was the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female
to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff,"
under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court proper?
HELD:
Yes, the correction of entries in the respondent’s birth certificate on the ground of Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia is properES.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex
as variations which should not be subject to outright denial. Based on medical testimony and scientific
development, a change in the subject's birth certificate entry is in order. Ultimately, we are of the view that
where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would
be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent's development to reveal more fully his
male characteristics.
As for respondent's change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a
matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the
consequences that will follow. The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondent's
change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name.
Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
247
SURNAME
Change of Surname
A PERSON’S FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT
222. Silverio v. Republic

G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
Corona, J.
FACTS:
In this petition, Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner), assails the CA
decision which overturned the RTC ruling which granted his petition for change of name.
On November 26, 2002, petitioner petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change
of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in RTC Manila. His name was registered as “Rommel Jacinto
Dantes Silverio” in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as “male.” He further
alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, “anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female” and
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. His attempts to transform himself to a
“woman” culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok,
Thailand. From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought
to have his name in his birth certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,” and his sex from “male”
to “female.”
Petitioner claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to
413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.RTC granted the petition,
ruling based on equity, that “petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and
should not be taken against him” and that “no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody” if the
petition were to be granted. Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the CA. CA reversed the decision of the
RTC based on lack of legal basis.
ISSUE:
May the petitioner successfully petition for a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to
reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?
HELD:
No, sex reassignment is not one of the grounds provided by law for changing name.
RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: 1) petitioner finds the first
name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; 2) The
new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been
publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or 3) The change will avoid confusion.
From these grounds, it can be gleaned that RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground
of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s name for his declared purpose
may only create grave complications. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege,
any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Moreover, no law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that “No entry in the civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.” For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his
body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as
to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Neither may entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the ground of equity. If the
legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his
name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in
turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
248
SURNAME
Rules on What to Use
A PETITION TO CHANGE THE NAME OF AN INFANT SHOULD BE GRANTED ONLY WHERE TO DO SO

IS CLEARLY FOR THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD
223. Calderon v. Republic

G.R. No. L-18127, April 5, 1967
Zaldivar, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao granting the petition.
Gertrudes Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural guardian, Corazon Adolfo
Calderdon, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes Josefina
del Prado" be changed to "Getrudes Josefina Calderon." It is alleged that the petitioner is an illegitimate
child, born on March 17, 1956, out of a bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon
Adolfo; that the surname "Del Prado" which the petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of
which she has become the subject of unfair comments; that the surname which the petitioner carries would
constitute a handicap in her life in later years, and would give cause for constant irritation in her social
relations with other people; that petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo
C. Calderon; and that it is the desire of the petitioner to have her surname changed from "Del Prado" to
"Calderon "which is the surname of her foster father, the husband of her mother.
The Provincial Fiscal of Davao, representing the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to the petition upon
the ground that the change of surname of the petition is unwarranted, considering that said petitioner was
born out of a bigamous marriage and as such she has the status of an acknowledged natural child by legal
fiction and under the law she should bear the surname of her father Manuel del Prado; and that the change
of the surname of the petitioner would be prejudicial to her rights and interest.
ISSUE:
Should the petition for change of name be allowed?
HELD:
Yes, the change of name should be allowed as it will redound to the best interest of the child.
A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly
for the best interest of the child. When the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she had in mind
what she believed was for the best interest of her child considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon
is the one supporting the child and that he is agreeable to the child's using his surname. The mother had
considered the generous attitude of her husband as an opportunity for her to promote the personality, and
enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a stigma of illegitimacy which her child
would continue to bear if her surname is that of her illegitimate father.
The Solicitor General seems to support the idea that since the petitioner has the misfortune of being born
illegitimate, she must bear that stigma of illegitimacy as long as she lives. That idea should not be
countenanced. Justice dictates that every person be allowed to avail of any opportunity to improve his social
standing as long as in so doing he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of the State or of other
people.
“While it is true that the Code provides that a natural child by legal fiction as the petitioner herein shall
principally enjoy the surname of the father, yet, this does not mean that such child is prohibited by law, from
taking another surname with the latter’s consent and for justifiable reasons." If under the law a legitimate
child may secure a change of his name through judicial proceedings, upon a showing of a "proper and
reasonable cause", We do not see any reason why a natural child cannot do the same. The purpose of the
law in allowing a change of name, as contemplated by the provisions of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, is
to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to promote his interests. We are satisfied that
the facts and circumstances as borne out by the record amply justify the change of the surname of the
petitioner, as ordered by the lower court. We have held that the matter whether to grant or deny a petition
for a change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court, and in the present case We believe that the
court a quo has exercised its discretion in a judicious way when it granted the petition.
249
SURNAME
CHANGE OF NAME SHOULD BE DISALLOWED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PROPOSED
CHANGE OF NAME WOULD IN GREAT PROBABILITY CAUSE PREJUDICE OR FUTURE MISCHIEF
TO THE FAMILY WHOSE SURNAME IT IS THAT IS INVOLVED OR TO THE COMMUNITY IN GENERAL
224. Llaneta v. Agrava

G.R. No. L-32054, May 15, 1974
Castro, J.
FACTS:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the denial by the respondent Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, in its special proceeding H-00237, of the petition for change of name, of Teresita Llaneta.
Teresita's mother, Atanacia Llaneta, was once married to Serafin Ferrer with whom she had but one child.
After the death of Ferrer, Lllaneta had relations with another man, of which Teresita was born. Teresita was
raised in the household of the Ferrer's, using the surname of Ferrer in all her dealings and throughout her
schooling. When she was about twenty years old, she applied for a copy of her birth certificate. It was then
that she discovered that her registered surname is Llaneta — not Ferrer — and that she is the illegitimate
child of Atanacia and an unknown father. Teresita petitioned the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for
change of her name from Llaneta to Llaneta Ferrer.
Judge Agrava denied the petition based on the prior decisions of the Supreme Court holding that such
change of name should be disallowed as it would give the false impression of family relationship.
ISSUE:
Should the change of name be allowed?
HELD:
Yes, the change of name should be allowed.
The principle relied on by the lower court remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of
name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is
involved or to the community in general. In the case at bar, however, the late Serafin Ferrer's widowed
mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and Ruben, have come forward in earnest
support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding has not elicited the slightest opposition from
the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer. Clearances from various Government agencies show
that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has
an interest in the name borne by every citizen within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no
opposition at the trial after a searching cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. Whether the late
Serafin Ferrer, who died some five years before Teresita was born, would have consented or objected to
her use of his surname is open to speculation. One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess
the right of action to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her.
Thus, the petition of Teresita Llaneta for change of her name to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer should be allowed.
250
SURNAME
AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD, UPON ADOPTION BY HER NATURAL FATHER, MAY USE THE SURNAME
OF HER NATURAL MOTHER AS HER MIDDLE NAME
225. In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia

G.R. No. 148311, March 31, 2005
FACTS:
In a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration of the adoption proceeding of minor illegitimate child
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The petitioner prayed that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname of her natural mother (Garcia) as her middle name. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration holding that there is now law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname
of his biological mother as his middle name. Hence, the petition raising the issue whether an illegitimate
child may use the surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of
adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there
is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of
the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit
and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig
or Garcia families
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should
be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for the following reasons: First,
it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural mother because under Article
189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion
and needless hardship in the future, her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained. Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows. Last, it is customary for every
Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has been
recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial
or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name,
if any, will be before the surname of the mother
ISSUE:
Can an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name?
HELD:
YES. As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as "An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may
use.
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all
intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided
by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her
father and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil
Code and Family Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.
251
SURNAME
ONCE A MARRIED WOMAN OPTED TO ADOPT HER HUSBAND’S SURNAME IN HER PASSPORT,
SHE MAY NOT REVERT TO THE USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME, EXCEPT IN THE CASES
ENUMERATED IN SECTION 5(D) OF RA 8239
226. Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs

G.R. No. 169202, March 5, 2010
Carpio, J.
FACTS:
In a petition for review on the decision made by the Court of Appeals and the Office of the President.
Petitioner Maria Virginia Remo a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine Passport was then expiring
applied for the renewal of her passport with the DFA office in Chicago, Illinois, USA with a request to revert
to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
The DFA denied the petition cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not obligatory for a married woman
to use her husband’s name. Use of maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the married name
has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport
Act of 1996 clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is,
only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remo’s case does not meet
any of these conditions.
The Office of the President dismissed the appeal and ruled that Sec 5 of RA 8239 or the Philippine Passport
Act of 1996 offers no leeway for any other interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment or
declaration of marriage may a married woman revert to her maiden name for passport purposes.
The Court of Appeals also denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President.
ISSUE:
Can the petitioner who originally used her husband’s surname in her expired passport can revert to the use
of her maiden name in the replacement passport despite the subsistence of her marriage?
HELD:
NO. The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable provision in this case is Section
5(d). The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, argues that
the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of RA 8239 "limits the instances when a married woman may be
allowed to revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport." These instances are death of husband,
divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage.
However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husband’s surname in her passport, she may not revert
to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances
are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since petitioner’s marriage
to her husband subsists, she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise
stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance
of the marriage.
252
SURNAME
USURPATION OF NAME UNDER ARTICLE 377 OF THE CIVIL CODE IMPLIES SOME INJURY TO THE
INTERESTS OF THE OWNER OF THE NAME
227. Dapar v. Biascan

G.R. No. 141880, September 27, 2004
Callejo, Sr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 which seeks to assail the decision of the CA reversing
the decision of RTC granting damages in favor of respondent Gloria Biascan.
Respondents Gloria Lozano Biascan and Mario Biascan are legally married. From 1977 to 1981, respondent
Mario worked in Saudi Arabia as an overseas contract worker. While working in Saudia Arabia, he met
Zenaida Dapar. Their meeting ripened into an intimate relationship. Zenaida and Mario cohabited when they
went back to the Philippines. In 1985, a contract to sell was executed by and between State Land Investment
Corporation and “Sps. Mario Biascan/&Zenaida D. Biascan” over a parcel of land. A Deed of Sale was
executed in favor of “Sps. Mario Biascan and Zenaida D. Biascan” as vendees. This prompted respondent
Gloria to file a complaint against Zenaida for annulment of title, reconveyance, and damages. She asserted,
among others, that petitioner’s use of surname “Biascan” is a usurpation of surname under Article 377 of
the Civil Code, and as such, she is entitled to recover damages from defendant.
ISSUE:
Did petitioner usurp the surname “Biascan” which would entitle respondent Gloria to damages?
HELD:
No, petitioner did not usurp the surname “Biascan”. The usurpation of name under Article 377 of the Civil
Code implies some injury to the interests of the owner of the name. It consists in the possibility of confusion
of identity between the owner and the usurper, and exists when a person designates himself by another
name. The elements are as follows: (1) there is an actual use of another’s name by the defendant; (2) the
use is unauthorized; and (3) the use of another’s name is to designate personality or identify a person.
None of the foregoing exist in the case at bar. Respondent Gloria Biascan did not claim that the petitioner
ever attempted to impersonate her. In fact, the trial court found that respondent Mario Biascan allowed the
petitioner to use his surname. The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof coupled
with the representation that one is the lawful wife, the usurpation of the wife’s status, which gives rise to an
action for damages. Accordingly, Zenaida Dapar cannot be held liable for damages for the use thereof.
253
ABSENCE
Presumption of Death
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE MUST BE

FOR THE PURPOSE OF REMARRIAGE
A PETITION WHOSE SOLE OBJECTIVE IS TO DECLARE A PERSON PRESUMPTIVELY DEAD UNDER

THE CIVIL CODE IS NOT A VIABLE SUIT IN OUR JURISDICTION
228. Tadeo-Matias v. Republic

G.R. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
Velasco Jr., J.
FACTS:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the CA which reversed the
decision of the RTC declaring Wilfredo N. Matias presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
Petitioner Estrellita Tadeo-Matias’s husband, Wilfredo N. Matias, was a member of the Philippine
Constabulary and was missing since 1979. In order to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638, petitioner
files a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of her husband before the RTC.
ISSUE:
Was the petition for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code the proper
remedy in order to claim for the benefits under P.D. No. 1638?
HELD:
NO, petition for declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not the proper
remedy. A reading of Article 41 of the Family Code shows that the presumption of death established therein
is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage under the said law.
Here, petitioner was forthright that she was not seeking the declaration of the presumptive death of Wilfredo
as a prerequisite for remarriage. In her petition for the declaration of presumptive death, petitioner stated
that the same was filed “not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the benefit under P.D. No. 1638 as
amended.” Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive death was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage, petitioner was clearly relying on the presumption of death under either Article 390 or 391 of the
Civil Code as the basis of her petition. Since the petition filed by the petitioner merely seeks the declaration
of presumptive death of Wilfredo under the Civil Code, the petition should have been dismissed outright.
This is because, in our jurisdiction, a petition whose sole objective is to have a person declared
presumptively dead under the Civil Code is not regarded as a valid suit and no court has any authority to
take cognizance of the same.
Article 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence that allow a court or a tribunal to
presume that a person is dead upon the establishment of certain facts. Since Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action brought exclusively to declare presumptively dead
under either of said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. In such
actions, there would be no actual rights to be enforced, no wrong to be remedied nor status to be
established.
254

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EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS

PUBLICATION OF ALL STATUTES IS A CONDITION FOR THEIR EFFECTIVITY

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED

2. De Roy v. Court of Appeals

CIRCULARS WHICH PRESCRIBE A PENALTY MUST BE PUBLISHED BEFORE BECOMING

3. People v. Que Po Lay

INTERNAL RULES OR REGULATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES NEED NOT BE PUBLISHED

4. National Power Corporation v. Pinatubo Commercial

5. Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:

Motion for Reconsideration Denied

6. Pimentel v. Senate Committee of the Whole

7. Conjuangco, Jr. v. Republic

SENATE RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF LEGISLATION MUST BE

PUBLICATION OF SENATE RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING INQUIRIES IN AID OF

8. Garcillano v. House of Representatives

PENAL LAWS FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED SHOULD HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE, LAWS MAY BE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT

10. Philippine National Bank v. Office of the President

RULINGS, CIRCULARS, RULES AND REGULATIONS PROMULGATED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF

11. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc.

BIR CIRCULARS OR RULINGS HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT WHERE THEIR APPLICATION

12. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals

13. D.M. Consunji, Inc. v. Court of Appeals

STIPULATION WHEREBY STUDENT CANNOT TRANSFER TO ANOTHER SCHOOL WITHOUT

14. Cui v. Arellano University

15. Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno Productions, Inc.

16. Mecano v. Commission on Audit

17. People v. Licera

Therefore, applying the People vs Macarandang ruling, Licera should be acquitted.

18. Chu Jan v. Bernas

IN THE CONSTRUCTION OR INTERPRETATION OF A LEGISLATIVE MEASURE – A PRESIDENTIAL

19. People v. Purisima

20. Martinez v. Van Buskirk

A CUSTOM MUST BE PROVED AS A FACT, ACCORDING TO THE RULES OF EVIDENCE

21. Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales

A YEAR IS COMPOSED OF 12 CALENDAR MONTHS; THE NUMBER OF DAYS IS IRRELEVANT

22. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Primetown Property Group, Inc.

23. Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.

24. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera

25. San Luis v. San Luis

26. Quita v. Court of Appeals

MATTERS BEARING UPON THE EXECUTION, INTERPRETATION AND VALIDITY OF A CONTRACT

27. Government v. Frank

28. Aznar v. Garcia

29. Uypitching v. Quiamco

30. Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals

WANT OF CARE TO THE CONSCIOUS DISREGARD OF CIVIL OBLIGATIONS COUPLED WITH A

31. University of the East v. Jader

32. Manila Electric Company v. Spouses Ramos

33. Heirs of Nala v. Artemio Cabansag

34. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes

IN EVERY SITUATION OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA, THEREFORE, THE INJURED PERSON

35. Spouses Carbonell v. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co.

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT IN ITSELF AND ACTIONABLE WRONG

36. Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals

MERE BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY IS NOT AN ACTIONABLE WRONG; BUT TO FORMALLY

37. Wassmer v. Velez

38. Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals

DAMAGES CAN BE RECOVERED BY THE FAMILY IF THE INJURY IS CAUSED IN A MANNER

THERE IS NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT WHEN RESPONDENT OBTAINED INSURANCE COVERAGE

40. Spouses Villalva v. RCBC Savings Bank

MONEY RECEIVED WITHOUT A VALID GROUND OR JUSTIFICATION MUST BE RETURNED UNDER