G.R. No. 210233 A notice to file brief was then sent by the CA to Atty. Ferdinand S. Alberca (Atty.

Alberca), Special Counsel of the OSG, Legal Division, DENR, Region VII, Banilad,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, Mandaue City, and was received on December 1, 2009.   It appears, however, that no
9

vs. brief was filed, hence, the CA, in its Resolution dated May 6, 2011, dismissed the
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES RODOLFO SY AND BELEN SY, LOLITA SY, Republic's appeal "for failure x x x to file the required brief within the time provided by the
and SPOUSES TEODORICO AND LEAH ADARNA, Respondents. Rules of Court."   A copy of the said resolution was received by the DENR Region VII-
10

Legal Division on May 17, 2011. 11 On May 19, 2011, a copy of the resolution was
DECISION transmitted by the DENR Region VII-Legal Division to the OSG, who filed a motion for
reconsideration on June 1, 2011.  12

REYES, J.:
In its Resolution   dated September 14, 2011, the CA granted the OSG's motion and
13

reinstated the appeal, to wit:

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
1

the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02458, to wit:
(1) Resolution  dated July 5, 2012, which dismissed the Republic of the Philippines'
2 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Republic] is hereby ORDERED to file its
(Republic) appeal for failure to file brief; (2) Resolution  dated August 20, 2013, declaring
3 Appellant's Brief within forty-five (45) days from notice to which the [respondents] may
its July 5, 2012 Resolution final and executory; and (3) the Entry of Judgment  dated
4 file their Appellee's Brief within forty-five (45) days from receipt of the brief of the
August 21, 2012. [Republic]. The [Republic] may file its Appellant's Reply Brief within twenty (20) days
from receipt of the Appellee's Brief.
Facts
SO ORDERED.  14

On March 29, 1988, the Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
instituted an action for the cancellation of miscellaneous sales patents and the The DENR Region VII-Legal Division was, again, furnished a copy of the resolution but
corresponding certificates of title issued to the spouses Rodolfo Sy and Belen Sy, and the OSG was not.  15

Lolita Sy (respondents), and the reversion of the lands covered by them to the public
domain on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation. 5 Subsequently, the CA issued its Resolution dated July 5, 2012, dismissing the appeal
on account of the Republic's failure to file brief.  There being no reconsideration
1âwphi1

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 21, rendered judgment in favor of
the respondents on October 10, 2007.  Its decision provides for the following dispositive
6 entry of judgment was made on August 21, 2012. A year after, the CA
portion:
WHEREFORE, all considered, the Court finds preponderance of evidence decisively in
favor of the [respondents], for which reason the regularity and validity of the patents and
corresponding titles in question are upheld and the complaint is therefore DISMISSED,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 7
interposed by the Republic, the dismissal of the appeal became final and executory and
issued Resolution dated August 20, 2013, declaring its Resolution dated July 5, 2012
as having attained finality on August 21, 2012.
The OSG was not furnished with a copy of the CA Resolutions dated September 14,
2011, July 5, 2012 and August 20, 2013, and the Entry of Judgment dated August 21,
2012. It was only when the Regional Executive Director of the DENR Region VII sent its
1st Indorsement dated September 27, 2013 that the OSG was apprised of the
subsequent

incidents. 
16

The RTC decision was received on November 14, 2007 by Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) Region VII-Legal Division, which was the OSG's
deputized special counsel, while the OSG received its copy on April 1, 2008. The In this petition, the OSG maintains that -
Republic, through the deputized legal counsel, subsequently filed a notice of appeal on
November 23, 2007, which was given due course by the RTC in its order dated THE [CA] GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL OF
December 4, 2007. 8 THE REPUBLIC ALTHOUGH THE OSG WAS NOT NOTIFIED OF THE RESOLUTION
GRANTING THE MOTION TO REINSTATE THE APPEAL AND GIVING THE
REPUBLIC A NEW PERIOD OF FORTY-FIVE DAYS TO FILE ITS BRIEF.  17
The OSG argues that, being the Republic's statutory counsel, it should have been
furnished with the CA's resolution reinstating its appeal, not the DENR Region VII-Legal
Division. Consequently, there was a violation of the Republic's right to due process and
the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring the reglementary period within
which to file its appellant's brief had lapsed.
18
The respondents' counsel, on the other hand, sought excuse from filing a comment due
to the refusal of the heirs of Leah Adarna to cooperate with him. 19
Ruling of the Court
The petition must be granted.
It is undisputed that it was the OSG who initiated Civil Case No. CEB-6785 for
cancellation of miscellaneous sales patents and the corresponding certificates of title
issued to the respondents.  As such, it is the counsel of record and remains to be so until
20
the culmination of the case. More importantly, Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically empowers the OSG to "[r]epresent
the Government in the Supreme Court and the [CA] in all criminal proceedings x x x
and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party." Section
35(5), meanwhile, provides that the OSG shall "[r]epresent the Government in all land
registration and related proceedings." The CA was, in fact, well aware of this. In its
Resolution dated September 14, 2011 reinstating the Republic's appeal, the CA
recognized the role of the OSG as the principal counsel in the appellate proceedings, viz:
A closer scrutiny of the records of the case reveals that the Notice to File Brief was sent
to and received by [Atty. Alberca], Special Counsel of the OSG, Legal Division, DENR,
Region VII, Banilad, Mandaue City on December 01, 2009 as evidenced by the Registry
Return Receipt.
Mindful of the provision in Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III of the Administrative Code
of 1987 which provides for the powers and functions of the [OSG] which is the official
counsel for government agencies in cases before this Court, to wit:
xxxx 21
It is therefore rather peculiar that the CA failed to furnish the OSG with a copy of its
Resolution dated September 14, 2011, and even continued to neglect to furnish the OSG
with copies of all its subsequent resolutions. Instead, it kept sending them to Atty.
Alberca of the DENR Region VII- Legal Division. While the OSG may have deputized the
DENR Region VII-Legal Division to assist it in the performance of its functions, it has not
totally relinquished its position as counsel for the Republic. The deputized counsel is no
more than the "surrogate" of the Solicitor General in any particular proceeding and the
latter remains the principal counsel entitled to be furnished copies of all court orders,
notices, and decisions. Hence, any court order and decision sent to the deputy,
acting as an agentof the Solicitor General, is not binding until it is actually
received by the Solicitor General. 22
It must be stressed that "[t]he essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard,
logically preconditioned on prior notice, before judgment is rendered."  "Notice and
23
hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an enforceable judgment, and
together with the tribunal having jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the
constitutional requirement of due process of law."  "Even the Republic as a litigant is
24
entitled to this constitutional right, in the same manner and to the same extent that this
right is guaranteed to private litigants. "
25
Consequently, it is clear that the issuance of CA Resolutions dated July 5, 2012 and
August 20, 2013, and the Entry of Judgment dated August 21, 2012 was tainted with
grave abuse of discretion. In Republic of the Philippines v. Heirs of Evaristo
Tiotioen,  the Court even emphatically ruled that "the belated filing of an appeal by the
26
State, or even its failure to file an opposition, in a land registration case because of the
mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents does not deprive the government of
its right to appeal from a judgment of the court."27
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated July 5, 2012 and
August 20, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 02458 are
hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the Republic of the Philippines' appeal
is REINSTATED. Moreover, the Entry of Judgment dated August 21, 2012
is ORDERED stricken off from its Book of Entries of Judgment.
Let this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for continuation of the appellate
proceedings.
SO ORDERED
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in
December of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he
sought to accomplish said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila
on the ground that, being an alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko
then brought the case to the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila by
means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment sustaining the refusal of the
register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien
under our Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion
to withdraw the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made
to the ruling laid down by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not
pass upon a constitutional question if its judgment may be made to rest upon other
grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in this reasoning. It cannot be denied
that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to decide this case upon the
merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we have to render
any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to avoid
a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the
appeal only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion
should be, or should not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now
to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court
to grant a withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the
motion for withdrawal was filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but
the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being prepared. The
motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever, and the Solicitor General was
agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the
Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all
transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one
of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case
which had been maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the
Solicitor General. If we grant the withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-
appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the
decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was pending
before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the withdrawal
of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now
immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should
allow interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its
constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after
having reached a clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is,
we may still allow our conviction to be silenced, and the constitutional mandate to be
ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences that might be brought upon
the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be taken full advantage
of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never
come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no
interest but to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of
deeds venture to disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to
voice its conviction in a future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of
today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a
number of days and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion
withdrawing the appeal. We are thus confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with
our duty, the constitutional question becomes unavoidable. We shall then proceed to
decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. — Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain,
water, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing
right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the Government
established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or
lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable
 for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water "power" in which
cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language,
embraces all lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a
permanent and fundamental policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural
resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this provision, with reference to lands of the
public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber and mineral lands, it means
that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups, namely,
agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the
circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic
classification existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the
term "public agricultural lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical
meaning that was well-known to the members of the Constitutional Convention who were
mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this
Court said that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of
July 1, 1902, which phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act
(No. 926), means "those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for
timber lands." This definition has been followed in long line of decisions of this Court.
(See Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593; Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines,
40 Phil., 10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are
neither mineral nor timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In
Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be
converted into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason,
where land is not mining or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included
within the classification of agricultural land, not because it is actually used for the
purposes of agriculture, but because it was originally agricultural and may again
become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act of Congress contains
only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect to building
lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural,
the test is not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to
cultivation for agricultural purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that
at the time the Constitution was adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in
our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural, mineral, and timber, and that the term
"public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those lands that were not timber
or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed, therefore, that
what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the
Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical;
and where such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it
is presumed that its framers and the people who ratified it have used such
expressions in accordance with their technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p.
683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1 Law. ed., 648;
Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein
shall be given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they
possessed, at the time of the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word
has acquired a fixed, technical meaning in legal and constitutional history, it will
be presumed to have been employed in that sense in a written Constitution.
(McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E, 581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially
construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature
as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used,
the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be
construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used,
although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the words. (II
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of
the Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in
conformity with a legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution.
Well known is the rule that "where the Legislature has revised a statute after a
Constitution has been adopted, such a revision is to be regarded as a legislative
construction that the statute so revised conforms to the Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.)
Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly revised the Public Land
Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60 thereof permit
the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations controlled
by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are
considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may
be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable
public lands" which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are
classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This
simply means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular
meaning. Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces
all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in
section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for
purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or actually
devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial;
industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or
disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive
indication of their character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the
Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of
Public Land Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for
industrial or residential puposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is
completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation. And,
again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of the
public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to
aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be
valid while the land is used for the purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new
Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional limitation, and this again is another
legislative construction that the term "public agricultural land" includes land for residence
purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the
Executive Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose
Abad Santos, in answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural
lands' in section 1 of Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to
include residential, commercial, and industrial lands for purposes of their disposition,"
rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public
domain in the Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic
classification adopted since the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
known as the Philippine Bill. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the
Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands' and, therefore, acquired a
technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the Philippines in the
leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the phrase
'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which
are neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our
Supreme Court in many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must
have to be included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither
timber nor mineral, of necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands
are agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62
N.W., 524; Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is
the susceptibility of the land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary
farming methods which determines whether it is agricultural or not
(State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).
Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of
land, which may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be
sold to him if he intends to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who
later became the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a
member of the cabinet of the late President Quezon who actively participated in the
drafting of the constitutional provision under consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the
Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the Quezon administration was
reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmeña administration, and it was firmly
maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government — judicial, legislative
and executive — have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified
into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception
of public agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural
lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose
conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated
by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of
aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it
reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural
resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation
of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as
above indicated, section 5 is intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in
section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same
purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom
the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under section 1
are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the
subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of
"agricultural land" to aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential
lots, the same technical meaning should be attached to "agricultural land under section
5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a word or phrase repeated in a statute will
bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears." (II
Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference between "agricultural
land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But such
difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in
both sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is
the nature or class of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its
citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo
Sison, then Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain
may be considered as agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership
cannot be so considered. No reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a
distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced for such a discriminatory view,
particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an
integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain.
Specially is this so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public
residential lots would become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to
private residential lots. Indeed, the prohibition as to private residential lands will
eventually become more important, for time will come when, in view of the constant
disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost all, if not all, the
residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership"
were used and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly
into "no private agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word
"agricultural" introduced in the second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning
of the word "land" to land actually used for agricultural purposes. The implication is not
accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose than to clarify
concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first draft, unqualified by the
word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands, and since
under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the
same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in
harmony with section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as
under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that
may become private are agricultural lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of
the first draft can have no other meaning than "private agricultural land." And thus the
change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to make its subject matter more
specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that could have arisen
from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots
or lands not strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and
possess not only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and
whole towns and cities," and that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of
any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools,
health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields, and a host of
other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." (Solicitor
General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit of the Constitution
is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the
Constitution and which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization
and Preservation of Lands and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional
Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and other natural resources constitute the
exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should, therefore, be preserved for those
under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity." (2 Aruego, Framing of
the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the Committee on
Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in
connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens
from the privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a
necessary part of the Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of
preserving the Philippines for the Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was
the speech of Delegate Montilla who said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands
and natural resources it is to be understood that our God-given birthright should be one
hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural resources are immovables and
as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the lack of possession
of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will
come when we shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a
mockery, for what kind of independence are we going to have if a part of our country is
not in our hands but in those of foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says
that since the opening days of the Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and
dominating objectives was the conservation and nationalization of the natural resources
of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified
by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now members of this Court,
namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice Hontiveros. And,
indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even operate
a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to
own a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of
the National Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are
referring again to Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the
Public Land Act No. 2874 sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire
private only by way of reciprocity. Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this
Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or
partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act; to
corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized therefor by their
charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands
the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or
permanent improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own
citizens, only in the manner and to the extent specified in such laws, and while
the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the
former Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree,
or any other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard
to public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination
that were actually or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in
any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or
associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to
corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may
authorize them to do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine
Legislature, to citizens of the countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the
Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or
alienate land or pemanent improvements thereon or any interest therein, as to
their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the extent specified in such
laws, and while the same are in force, but not thereafter: Provided, however, That
this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason
of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts,
nor to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence
purposes, while used for such purposes: Provided, further, That in the event of
the ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in
the last preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire the same
under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall
be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within
the precise period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to
the Government in the contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private
lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no
private land which had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two
sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that
no private land could be transferred to aliens except "upon express authorization by the
Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold,
lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the
right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the Constitution and
Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as follows:
SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this
Act, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or transferred, except to persons, corporations, associations, or
partnerships who may acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to
corporations organized in the Philippines authorized thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any
previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law
formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively
of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except
to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public
domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose
charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall
not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary
succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided,
further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and improvements
mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred by
judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to
acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or
associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so
capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall
revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No.
2874, the only difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted
to aliens is completely stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute
policy contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the
alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens, grants them no right of reciprocity. This
legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for prominent members of the
National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the Constitutional
Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by
one of the means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant
case under the provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had
been formerly of the public domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We
are deciding the instant case under section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is
more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien
of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its origin might have
been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which
allows mortgage of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a
qualification consisting of expressly prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of
such real property as a consequence of the mortgage. This prohibition makes no
distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are
residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private lands of any kind
in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative interpretation of
the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private residential
lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have
been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also
permissible under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that
such sale is forbidden by the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the
legislative measure intended to clarify that mortgage is not within the constitutional
prohibition.
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are
construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect
of our construction is to preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning
sites where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the
Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity.
We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution
from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is
temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not
forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our
fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private
or public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is
affirmed, without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinion
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be
remembered by future generations always with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure
of the highest tribunal of the land to do its duty in this case would have amounted to a
national disaster. We would have refused to share the responsibility of causing it by,
wittingly or unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act as tools in a conspiracy to sabotage the
most important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our people, the land which
destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent abode of our race for unending
generations. We who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave long and
ramifying dendriform lines of descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse they
may fling at us should the day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their
fatherland, because in the crucial moment of our history , when the vision of judicial
statemanship demanded on us the resolution and boldness to affirm and withhold the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have prefered heroic defeat to
inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of our
convictions for truth, for justice, for racial survival. We are happy to record that this
Supreme Court turned an impending failure to a glorious success, saving our people
from a looming catastrophe.
On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was
submitted for our decision. The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of
Tayabas on January 17, 1940, when an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of China, applied for title
and registration of a parcel of land located in the residential district of Guinayangan,
Tayabas, with a house thereon. The Director of Lands opposed the application, one of
the main grounds being that "the applicant, being a Chinese, is not qualified to acquire
public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the Constitution."
On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The
Director of Lands appealed. In the brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta,
afterwards Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and now Secretary of Justice, and
Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo, appellant made only two assignments of
error, although both raised but one question, the legal one stated in the first assignment
of error as follows:
 The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor
of the applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the
Chinese Republic.
The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose
A. Santos — who, while Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom
at the hands of the Japanese — addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting the same theory as the one advanced by the
Director of Lands. The same legal question raised by appellant is discussed, not only in
the brief for the appellee, but also in the briefs of the several amici curiae allowed by the
Supreme Court to appear in the case.
As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court
since July of 1941, that is, six years ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War
broke out in December, 1941. After the Supreme Court was recognized in the middle of
1945, it was found that the case was among those which were destroyed in February,
1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila. The case had to be reconstituted upon
motion of the office of the Solicitor General, filed with this Court on January 14, 1946, in
which it was also prayed that, after being reconstituted, the case be submitted for final
adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for decision on July 3, 1946.
After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the
case, especially on the legal question as to whether an alien may, under the Constitution,
acquire private urban lands. An overwhelming majority answered no. But when the
decision was promulgated on August 31, 1946, a majority resolved to ignore the
question, notwithstanding our efforts to have the question, which is vital, pressing and
far-reaching, decided once and for all, to dispel definitely the uncertainty gnawing the
conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be alone in expressing in unmistakable
terms our opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. The
constitutional question was by-passed by the majority because they were of opinion that
it was not necessary to be decided, notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only
legal question upon which appellant Director of Lands relied in his appeal, and the
question has been almost exhaustively argued in four printed briefs filed by the parties
and the amici curiae. Assurance was, nevertheless, given that in the next case in which
the same constitutional question is raised, the majority shall make known their stand on
the question.
The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3,
1947. Again, we deliberated on the constitutional question for several days.
On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the
constitutional question was decided against petitioner. The majority was also
overwhelming. There were eight of us, more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court. Only
three Justices dissented.
While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must
have leaked out. On July 10, 1947, appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his
appeal, for the evident purpose of preventing the rendering of the majority decision,
which would settle once and for all the all-important constitutional question as to whether
aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines.
Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor
General's office gave its conformity to the withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising
assent was given without expressing any ground at all. Would the Supreme Court permit
itself to be cheated of its decision voted since February 24, 1947?
Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied,
that is, whether this Court should abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance
with the result of the vote taken on February 24, 1947, as if, after more than six years
during which the question has been submitted for the decision of the highest tribunal of
the land, the same has failed to form a definite opinion.
After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros,
Mr. Justice Padilla and and Mr. Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal.
Those who voted to deny the motion were Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Pablo,
ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr. Justice Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-
5. The deadlock resulting from the tie should have the effect of denying the motion, as
provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that "where the Court in banc is equally
divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied."
And we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be promulgated.
Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to
give him the opportunity of casting his vote on the question, although we insisted that it
was unnecessary. Days later, when all the members of the Court were already present, a
new vote was taken. Mr. Justice Briones voted for the denial of the motion, and his vote
would have resulted, as must be expected, in 6 votes for the denial against 5 for
granting. But the final result was different. Seven votes were cast for granting the motion
and only four were cast for its denial.
But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the
occasion of the registration by the register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two
aliens, a heated public polemic flared up in one section of the press, followed by
controversial speeches, broadcast by radio, and culminating in the issuance on August
12, 1947, of Circular No. 128 of the Secretary of Justice which reads as follows:
TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read
as follows:
5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any
individual, corporation, or association for a period not exceeding five years,
renewable for another five years, may be accepted for registration. (Section 1,
Republic Act No. 138.)
"(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or
other classes of urban lands, or any right, title or interest therein is transferred,
assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not an enemy national, may be
registered. Such classes of land are not deemed included within the purview of
the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII of the Constitution against the
acquisition or holding of "private agricultural land" by those who are not qualified
to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in conformity with Opinion
No. 284, series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the practice
consistently followed for nearly ten years since the Constitution took effect on
November 15, 1935.
"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States on July 4,
1946, in pursuance of the so-called Parity Amendment to the Constitution,
citizens of the United States and corporations or associations owned or
controlled by such citizens are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the
Philippines and corporations or associations owned or controlled by such are
deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or
associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the acquisition
of all classes of lands in the Philippines, whether of private ownership or
pertaining to the public domain."
ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as
follows:
Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or
an interest therein, is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not
enemy national, may be entered in the primary entry book; but, the registration of
said deeds or other documents shall be denied — unless and/or until otherwise
specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court — and the
party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of
the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The denial of registration of shall be predicated upon the
prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, the former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No. 615.
The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and
the final result of long and tense deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the
following resolution adopted on August 29, 1947:
In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already
submitted for decision, the appellant filed a motion to withdraw his appeal with
the conformity of the adverse party. After full discussion of the matter specially in
relation to the Court's discretion (Rule 52, section 4, and Rule 58), Mr. Justice
Paras, Mr. Justice Hilado, Mr. Justice Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr.
Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Feria, Mr,.
Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to deny it. A
redeliberation was consequently had, with the same result. Thereupon Mr.
Justice Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to sit and break the
tie; but in view of the latter's absence due to illness and petition for retirement,
the Court by a vote of seven to three did not approve the proposition. Therefore,
under Rule 56, section 2, the motion to withdraw is considered denied.
Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of
overruling the previous vote of seven against four in favor of the motion to
withdraw.
Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the
controversy. He has voted once on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still
a member of the Court and, on a moment's notice, can be present at any session
of the Court. Last month, when all the members were present, the votes on the
motion stood 7 to 4. Now, in the absence of one member, on reconsideration,
another changed his vote resulting in a tie. Section 2 of Rule 56 requires that all
efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the inability of the
majority to agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to
participate in the resolution of the motion for withdrawal. I hold it to be
fundamental and necessary that the votes of all the members be taken in cases
like this.
Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of
facts, that when the petition to withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution
of this Court two days after this petition was filed, five justices voted to grant and
 five others voted to deny, and expressed the opinion that since then, according to
the rules, the petition should have been considered denied. Said first vote took
place many days before the one alluded to by Mr. Justice Padilla.
Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted
upon with the result that 5 were granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones
was absent and it was decided to wait for him. Some time later, the same subject
was deliberated upon and a new voting was had, on which occasion all the 11
justices were present. The voting stood 7 for allowing the dismissal of the appeal
and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones expressed the
intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these dissents were filed, about
one month afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was brought up
again and re-voted upon; the result was 5 to 5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was
ill but might have been able to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence,
was absent. As the voting thus stood, Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have
changed its result unless he changed his mind, a fact of which no one is aware.
My opinion is that since there was no formal motion for reconsideration nor a
previous notice that this matter would be taken up once more, and since Mr.
Justice Hontiveros had every reason to believe that the matter was over as far as
he was concerned, this Justice's vote in the penultimate voting should, if he was
not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be counted in favor of the vote
for the allowance of the motion to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not
have been denied on grounds of pure technicality never invoked before. I
counted that the proceeding was arbitrary and illegal.
The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not
participate in that last two votings and why it became unnecessary to wait for him any
further to attend the sessions of the Court and to cast his vote on the question.
Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of
appeal, alleging that it became moot in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of
Justice in circular No. 128, thus giving us a hint that the latter, wittingly or unwittingly, had
the effect of trying to take away from the Supreme Court the decision of an important
constitutional question, submitted to us in a pending litigation. We denied the motion for
reconsideration. We did not want to entertain any obstruction to the promulgation of our
decision.
If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the
official actuations of this Supreme Court, it should have been known by the whole world
that since July, 1946, that is, more than a year ago, the opinion of the members of this
Court had already been crystallized to the effect that under the Constitution, aliens are
forbidded from acquiring urban lands in the Philippines, and it must have known that in
this case a great majority had voted in that sense on February 24, 1947.
The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without
jeopardizing public interest. The uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled
without further delay. While the doubt among the people as to what is the correct answer
to the question remains to be dissipated, there will be uneasiness, undermining public
morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This Supreme Tribunal, by
overwhelming majority, already knows what the correct answer is, and should not
withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with which the ancient families
of the Eumolpides and Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of
Delphus must speak so that the people may know for their guidance what destiny has in
store for them.
The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should
remain as one of the most cherished treasures of our people and transmitted by
inheritance to unending generations of our race, is not a new one. The long chain of
land-grabbing invasions, conquests, depredations, and colonial imperialism recorded in
the darkest and bloodiest pages of history from the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in
the plains of old Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the
invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of Hernan Cortes and Pizarro, the
achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch,
French and German colonial empires, had many of its iron links forged in our soil since
Magellan, the greatest navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his
daring enterprises, with his life at the hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.
Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an
unrelentless struggle to defend the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts
of foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. First came the Spanish encomenderos and
other gratuitous concessioners who were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas
of land. Immediately came the friars and other religious corporations who,
notwithstanding their sacred vow of poverty, felt their greed whetted by the bountiful
opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment. Taking advantage of the
uncontrollable religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of
obedience, resignation, humility, and credulity of a people who, after conversion to
Catholicism, embraced with tacit faith all its tenets and practiced them with the loyalty
and fidelity of persons still immune from the disappointments and bitterness caused by
the vices of modern civilization, the foreign religious orders set aside all compunction to
acquire by foul means many large estates. Through the practice of confession and other
means of moral intimidation, mostly based on the eternal tortures of hell, they were able
to obtain by donation or by will the lands of many simple and credulous Catholics who, in
order to conquer the eternal bliss of heaven, renounced all their property in favor of
religious orders and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently
religious purposes, leaving in destitute their decendants and relatives. Thus big religious
landed estates were formed, and under the system unbearable iniquities were
committed. The case of the family of Rizal is just an index of the situation, which, under
the moral leadership of the hero, finally drove our people into a national revolution not
only against the Spanish sovereignty under which the social cancer had grown to
unlimited proportions.
Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it
their duty to insert in the fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the
national patrimony, the wisdom of which cannot be disputed in a world divided into
nations and nationalities. In the same way that scientists and technicians resorted to
radar, sonars, thermistors and other long range detection devices to stave off far-away
enemy attacks in war, said Delegates set the guarantees to ward off open inroads or
devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means of insuring racial safety and
survival.
When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees
might not be needed and our people may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our
inescapable devoir, as the ultimate guardians of the Constitution, never to neglect the
enforcement of its provisions whenever our action is called upon in a case, like the one
now before us.
One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is,
in its very words, that it "shall conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That
mandate is addressed to all departments and branches of our government, without
excluding this Supreme Court. To make more specific the mandate, Article XIII has been
inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural resources of the country are reserved
to Filipino citizens. Our land is the most important of our natural resources. That land
should be kept in the hands of our people until, by constitutional amendment, they should
decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by hereditary succession — the only
exception allowed by the Constitution — no foreigner may by any means acquire any
land, any kind of land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment
prevailing in the Constitutional Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the great
majority of the Delegates, that was the dominating thought that was intended to be
expressed in the great document, that was what the Committee on Style — the drafter of
the final text — has written in the Constitution, and that was what was solemnly ratified in
the plebiscite by our people, who then were rankling by the sore spot of illegally
Japanized Davao.
The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this
case cannot be overemphasized. If we should decide this question after many
urban lots have been transferred to and registered in the name of alien
purchasers, a situation may be created in which it will be hard to nullify the
transfers and the nullification may create complications and problems highly
distasteful to solve. The Georgia case is an objective lesson upon which we can
mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless P. Curtiss, Jr.
entitled "Lions Under the Throne," we quote the following:
It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases.
Fletcher vs. Peck, in 1810, is the stock example. That was the first case in which
the Court held a state statute void. It involved a national scandal. The 1795
legislature of Georgia sold its western lands, most of Alabama and Mississippi, to
speculators. Perhaps it was the greatest real estate steal in our history. The
purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next legislature repealed the
statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the land companies had
completed the deal and unloaded. By that time, and increasingly soon
afterwards, more and more people had bought, and their title was in issue.
Eleven million of the acres had been bought for eleven cents an acre by leading
citizens of Boston. How could they clear their title? Alexander Hamilton gave an
opinion, that the repeal of the grant was void under the Constitution as an
impairment of the obligation of a contract.
But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of
Anhirst, New Hampshire, had bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of
Boston. He sued Peck, and he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it was a friendly
suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He told Cranch that the Court was reluctant to
decide the case "as it appeared manifestly made up for the purpose of getting the
Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so reports in his diary. Yet Marshall
decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The fact that
Marshall rendered an opinion, under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one
of the finest proofs of his greatness. A weaker man than John Marshall, and one
less wise and courageous, would have dismissed the appeal." That may be, but it
was the act of a stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been able to
overcome its judicial diffidence on state occasions.
We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of
Georgia and due to legal technicalities the people were unable to recover the stolen
property. But in the case of Georgia, the lands had fallen into American hands and
although the scandal was of gigantic proportions, no national disaster ensued. In our
case if our lands should fall into foreign hands, although there may not be any scandal at
all, the catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates to our Constitutional
Convention will surely be in no remote offing.
We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to
acquire the ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as
consequence, all acquisitions made in contravention of the prohibitions since the
fundamental law became effective are null and void per se and ab initio. As all public
officials have sworn, and are duty bound, to obey and defend the Constitution, all those
who, by their functions, are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid down and
interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts so that any and all
violations which may have taken place should be corrected.
We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko,
not being a Filipino citizen, could not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot
here in question, the sale made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate, Inc. being null and
void ab initio, and that the lower court acted correctly in rendering the appealed decision,
which we affirm.
HILADO, J., concurring:
Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor
General in behalf of appellee, indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of
another department, I ultimately voted to grant the motion after the matter was finally
deliberated and voted upon. But the votes of the ten Justices participating were evenly
divided, and under Rule 52, section 4, in relation, with Rule 56, section 2, the motion was
denied. The resolution to deny was adopted in the exercise of the court's discretion
under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which it has discretion to deny the withdrawal of the
appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the withdrawal, when
appellee's brief has been filed. Under the principle that where the necessary number
have concurred in an opinion or resolution, the decision or determination rendered is the
decision or determination of the court (2 C.J.S., 296), the resolution denying the motion
to withdraw the appeal was the resolution of the court. Pursuant to Rule 56, section 2,
where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion, such a motion "shall be denied." As
a necessary consequence, the court as to decide the case upon the merits.
After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a
government like ours that I have always been, I think that under the circumstances it is
well for all concerned that the Court should go ahead and decide the constitutional
question presented. The very doctrine that the three coordinate, co-equal and
independent departments should be maintained supreme in their respective legitimate
spheres, makes it at once the right and duty of each to defend and uphold its own
peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and confidence in each department
must be striven for and kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of that
confidence will in the same measure take away from the very usefulness of the
respective department to the people. For this reason, I believe that we should avert and
avoid any tendency in this direction with respect to this Court.
I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the
Secretary of Justice, was issued in good faith. But at the same time, that declaration in
sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, which was already amended, to the
effect that private residential, commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands "are
not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article
XIII, of the Constitution", made at a time when the self-same question was pending
decision of this Court, gives rise to the serious danger that should this Court refrain from
deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional mandate, the
people may see in such an attitude an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty,
peculiarly its own, to decide a question of such a momentous transcedence, in view of an
opinion, given in advance of its own decision, by an officer of another department. This
will naturally detract in no small degree from public respect and confidence towards the
highest Court of land. Of course, none of us — the other governmental departments
included — would desire such a situation to ensue.
I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the
constitutional question here presented, namely, "whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land." (Opinion, p. 2) Leases of residential lands, or
acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or building thereon, for example, are not
covered by the decision.
With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably
written by the Chief Justice, I have signed said decision.
BRIONES, M., conforme:
Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e puede añadir ni quitar nada,
tal es su acabada y compacta elaboracion. Escribo, sin embargo, esta opinion separada
nada mas que para unas observaciones, particularmente sobre ciertas fases
extraordinarias de este asunto harto singular y extraordinario.
I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto, despues de
laboriosas deliberaciones este asunto se puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de
este año, confirmandose la sentencia apelada por una buena mayoria. En algunos
comentarios adelantados por cierta parte de la prensa — impaciencia que solo puede
hallar explicacion en un nervioso y excesivo celo en la vigilancia de los intereses
publicos, maxime tratandose, como se trata, de la conservacion del patrimonio nacional
— se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha demorado la promulgacion de la sentencia,
habiendose votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del año.
A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien considerados los hechos se vera
que no ha habido demora en el presente caso, mucho menos una demora desusada,
alarmante, que autorice y justifique una critica contra los metodos de trabajo de esta
corte. El curso seguido por el asunto ha sido normal, bajo las circunstancias. En
realidad, no yan en esta Corte ahora, sino aun en el pasado, antes de la guerra, hubo
mas lentitud en casos no tan dificiles ni tan complicados como el que nos ocupa, en que
las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la densidad constitucional y juridica de
las que se discuten en el presente caso. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde el 24 de
Febrero en que se voto finalmente el asunto hasta el 1.0 de Abril en que comenzaron las
vacaciones judiciales, no habian transcurrido mas que 34 dias; y cuando se reanudaron
formalmente las sesiones de esta Corte en Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas
extraordinario — incidente que practicamente vino a impedir, a paralizar la pronta
promulgacion de la sentencia. Me refiero a la mocion que el 10 de Julio persentaron los
abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para retirar su apelacion. Lo sorpredente de
esta mocion es que viene redactada escuetamente, sin explicar el por que de la retirada,
ni expresar ningun fundamento. Pero lo mas sorpredente todavia es la conformidad
dada por el Procurador General, tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente.
Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que
hayan sido arguidos con tanta energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte apelante
como este que nos ocupa. Los abogados del apelante no solo presentaron un alegato
concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino que cuando se llamo a vista el asunto informaron
verbalmente ante esta Corte argumentando vigorosa y extensamente sobre el caso. El
Procurador General, por su parte, ha presentado un alegato igualmente denso, de 31
paginas, en que se discuten acabadamente, hasta el punto maximo de saturacion y
agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion constitutional objeto de este
asunto. Tambien informo el Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte,
entablando fuerte lid con los abogados del apelante.
Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la
promulgacion de la sentencia, pues trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para
resolver la cuestion, dividiendose casi por igual los miembros de la Corte sobre si debia
o no permitirse la retirada. Habia unanimidad en que bajo la regla 52, seccion 4, del
Reglamento de los Tribunales teniamos absoluta discrecion para conceder o denegar la
mocion, toda vez que los alegatos estaban sometidos desde hacia tiempo, el asunto
estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y promulgacion de la decision juntamente
con las disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos Magistrados opinaban que la discrecion debia
ejercitarse en favor de la retirada en virtud de la practica de evitar la aplicacion de la
Constitucion a la solucion de un litigio siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra
manera. (Entre los Magistrados que pensaban de esta manera se incluian algunos que
en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es
decir, creian que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros la adquisicion a titulo
dominical de todo genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares residenciales,
comerciales e industriales.) Pero otros Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan
avanzado en que se hallaba el asunto los dictados del interes publico y de la sana
discrecion requerian imperiosamente que la cuestion se atacase y decidiese
frontalmente; que si una mayoria de esta Corte estaba convencida, como al parecer lo
estaba, de que existia esa interdiccion constitucional contra la facultad adquisitiva de los
extranjeros, nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos a dar pleno y positivo cumplimiento a
la Constitucion al presentarse la primera oportunidad; que el meollo del asunto, la
lis mota era eso — la interdiccion constitucional — ; por tanto, no habia otra manera de
decidirlo mas que aplicando la Constitucion; obrar de otra manera seria desercion,
abandono de un deber jurado.
Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y
sorprendente todavia que la retirada no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita
conformidad del Procurador General; algo asi como si de un cielo sereno, sin nubes,
cayera de pronto un bolido en medio de nosotros, en medio de la Corte: me refiero a la
circular num. 128 del Secretario de Justicia expedida el 12 de Agosto proximo pasado,
esto es, 32 dias despues de presentada la mocion de retirada de la apelacion. Esa
circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su texto se copia integramente en la
concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo excusado de transcibirla in
toto. En breves terminos, la circular reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 del mismo
Departamento de Justicia de fecha 25 de Agosto, 1945, y levanta la prohibicion o
interdiccion sobre el registro e inscripcion en el registro de la propiedad de las
"escrituras o documentos en virtud de los cuales terrenos privados residencias,
comerciales, industriales u otras clases de terrenos urbanos, o cualquier derecho, titulo
o interes en ellos, se transfieren, ceden o gravan a un extranjero que no es nacional
enemigo." En otras palabras, el Secretario de Justicia, por medio de esta circular dejaba
sin efecto la prohibicion contenida en lacircular num. 14 del mismo Departamento — la
prohibicion que precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que tenemos ante
Nos — y authorizaba y ordenaba a todoslos Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para
que inscribiesen las escrituras o documentos de venta, hipoteca o cualquier otro
gravamen a favor de extranjeros, siempre que no se tratase de terrenos publicos o de
"terrenos privados agricolas," es decir, siempre que los terrenos objeto de la escritura
fuesen "residenciales, comerciales e industriales."
La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no
es un simple tropo, no esuna mera imagen retorica; refleja una verdadera realidad.Esa
circular, al derogar la prohibicion decretada en elparrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 —
prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho, es precisamente el objeto del presente asunto —
venia practicamente a escamotear la cuestion discutida, lacuestion sub
judice sustrayendola de la jurisdiccion de lostribunales. Dicho crudamente, el
Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras manos, delas manos
de esta Corte, anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor
inmediatos a su resolucionmediante la correspondiente autorizacion a los
Registradoresde Titulos.
A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la
apelacion consentida insolitamentepor el Procurador General. ¿ Para que esperar
ladecision de la Corte Suprema que acaso podria ser adversa? ¿ No estaba ya esa
circular bajo la cual podian registrarseahora la ventas de terrenos residenciales,
comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por eso no es extraño quelos abogados del
apelante Krivenko, en su mocion de 1.0 de Septiembre, 1947, pidiendo la
reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la apelacion, dijeran
porprimera vez como fundamento que la cuestion ya era simplemente academica
("question is now moot") en vista deesa circular y de la conformidad del Procurador
Generalcon la retirada de la apelacion. He aqui las propias palabras de la mocion del
apelante Krivenko:
 In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1947,
which amends Circular No. 14 by expressly authorizing the registration of the
sale of urban lands to aliens, and in view of the fact that the Solicitor General has
joined in the motion for withdrawal of the appeal, there is no longer a controversy
between the parties and the question is now moot. For this reason the court no
longer has jurisdiction to act on the case.1
Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose
en el camino de los tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice, es que ello no
tieneprecedentes, que yo sepa, en los anales de la administracionde justicia en Filipinas
en cerca de medio siglo que llevamosde existencia bajo un gobierno constitucional y
sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los llamados dias del Imperio, cuando la
soberania americana era mas propensa a manejar el baston grueso y afirmar
vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento de
Justicia o a alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el ejercicio ordenado por los
tribunales de sujurisdiccion y competencia. Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en
las esfersas del Poder Ejecutivo — tradicioninviolada e inviolable — maxime en el
Departamento de Justicia y en la Fiscalia General, el inhibirse de expresar
algunaopinion sobre un asunto ya sometido a los tribunales, excepto cuando venian
llamados a hacerlo, en representaciondel gobierno, en los tramites de un litigio, civil o
criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. Fuera deestos casos, la
inhibicion era tradicionalmente absoluta,observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad
de un rito.Y la razon era muy sencilla: hamas se queria estorbar nientorpecer la funcion
de los tribunales de justicia, loscuales, bajo la carta organica y las leyes, tenian
absolutoderecho a actuar con maximo desembarazo, libres de todaingerencia extraña.
Esto se hizo bajo la Ley Cooper; estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se hizo bajo la
Ley Tydings-McDuffie, la ley organica del Commonwealth. Creo que el pueblo filipino
tiene derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno de la Republica, que es suyo,
que es de su propia hechura. ¡ No faltaba mas que los hombres de su propia raza le
nieguen lo que no le negaron gobernantesde otra raza!
No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las
oficinas y dependenciasque caen bajo su jurisdiccion, entre ellas las varias oficinasde
registro de la propiedad en Manila y en las provincias.Tampoco se niega la facultad que
tiene dicho Departamentopara expedir circulares, ya de caracter puramente
administrativo,ya de caracter semijudicial, dando instrucciones,vgr., a los registradores
acerca de como deben desempenarsus funciones. De hecho la circular num. 14 de 25
deAgosto, 1945, es de esta ultima naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena a los
registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de propiedad inmueble
aextranjeros, asi sean terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales. Pero la facultad
llega solo hasta alli; fuerade esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y
exclusivamentejudicial. Cuando una determinada circular del Departamentoa los
registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio ante los tribunales, ora por
fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por razones meramente legales, ya no esel
Departamento el que tiene que determinar o resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete
en absoluto a los tribunalesde justicia. Asi lo dispone terminantemente el articulo200 del
Codigo Administrativo. Segun este articulo, elasunto o disputa debe elevarse en forma
de consulta a la Sala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila.La ley no
confiere ninguna facultad al Departamento deJusticia para enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Y
cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme con la decision de la SalaCuarta, ella puede
alzarse de la sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. He aqui el texto integro del articulo
200 del Codigo Administrativo:
SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First
Instance at Manila. — When the register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the
proper step to be taken or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed,
mortgage, or other instrument presented for registration or where any party in
interest does not agree with the register of deeds with reference to any such
matter, the question shall be referred to the judge of the fourth branch of the
Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on the certificate of the
register of deeds stating the question upon which he is in doubt or upon the
suggestion in writing of the party in interest; and thereupon said judge, upon
consideration of the matter as shown by the record certified to him, and in case of
registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made.
Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento su escritura de
compraventa al Registrador de laPropiedad de Manila. Este denego la inscripcion
solicitadaen virtud de la prohibicion contenida en la circular num.14. ¿ Que hizo Krivenko
entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal Departamento de Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron
susabogados entonces fue presentar una demanda el 23 de Noviembre, 1945, contra el
Registrador de Titulos ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de
Manila,numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num. 1289; ycuando esta Sala
decidio el asunto confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la
apelacionque estamos considerando. Tan elemental es esto que enla misma circular
num. 14 se dice que la prohibicion quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo
contrario. He aqui la fraseologia pertinente de dicha circularnum. 14:
. . . the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied, — unless
and /or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a
competent court — and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so
that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions
of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code.
La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision
(interference) en sus funciones esde lo mas peculiar. Tenemos en el Reglamento de
losTribunales algunas disposiciones que proveen sancion pordesacato para ciertos
actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones judiciales.2 Pero se preguntara
naturalmente;son aplicables estas disposiciones cuando la intromisionprocede de un
ramo del poder ejecutivo, el cual, como sesabe, en la mecanica de los poderes del
Estado, es — usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado con el poder judicial,maxime si
esa intromision se ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede
imaginarse la situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive angustiosa enque esta
Corte ha quedado colocada con motivo de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose
a chocar con otropoder del Estado. En casos recientes en que estaban envueltos otros
poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa suposicion constitucional, prefirio adoptar una
actitud deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si bienhay que hacer constar
que con la fuerte disidencia dealgunos Magistrados, entre ellos el opinante.3 Tenemos,
portanto, un caso de verdadera intromision en que siendo, porlo menos, dudosa la
facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por desacato de acuerdo con el
Reglamento delos Tribunales, le queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar su
excepcion sin ambages ni eufemismos contrala intromision, y reafirmar con todo vigor,
con toda firmezasu independencia.
Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada
de la apelacion, por dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador General estaba conformecon
dicha retirada; (b) para evitar la resolucion delpunto constitucional envuelto, en virtud de
la practica,segun se dice, de soslayar toda cuestion constitucionalsiempre que se pueda.
Respecto de la primera razon serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General es libre de
entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un asunto en que interviene,pero es evidente que
su accion no ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio de la discrecion que le confierela
regla, 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales,que reza como sigue:
Rule 52, SEC. 4 — An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before
the filing of appelle's brief. After that brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed
by the court in its discretion. . . . (Las cursivas son nuestras.)
Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o
disconformidad de una delas partes. Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es
masabsoluta e imperativa alli donde el litigio versa sobre unamateria queno afecta solo a
un interes privado, sino quees de interes publico, como el caso presente en que el
Procurador General ha transigido no sobre un asunto suyopersonal o de un cliente
particular, sino de un cliente demucha mayor monta y significacion — el pueblo filipino
— ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo, parte, vitalisima del patrimonio
nacional que nuestro pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion.
Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion
para no tener queresolver la cuestion constitucional disputada, bastara decirque la
practica, prinsipio o doctrina que se invoca, llevaconsigo una salvedad o cualificacion y
es que el litigio se pueda resolver de otra mañera. ¿ Podemos soslayar elpunto
constitucional discutido en el pleito que nos ocupa? ¿ Podemos decidirlo bajo otra ratio
decidendi, esto es, queno sea la constitucionalidad o inconstitucionalidad de laventa del
inmueble al apelante Krivenko, en virtud desucondicion de extranjero? Indudablemente
que no: la lis mota, la unica, es la misma constitucionalidad de la compraventa de que se
trata. Para decidir si al recurrido apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la Ciudad de
Manila,le asiste o no razon para denegar la inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y
apelante, Krivenko, la unica disposicionlegal que se puede aplicar es el articulo XIII,
seccion 5, dela Constitucion de Filipinas, invocado por el Registrador como defensa e
inserto en el parrafo 5 de la circular num.14 como fundamento de la prohibicion o
interdiccion contrael registro de las ventas de terreno a extranjeros. Nohay otra ley para
el caso.
El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., No. 3 pag. 866), que se
cita en unade las disidencias, es completamente diferente. Es verdadque alli se planteo
tambien la cuestion constitucional de quese trata, por cierto que el que lo planteaba en
nombre delGobierno era el actual Secretario de Justicia que entoncesera Procurador
General, y lo pleantaba en un sentido absolumente concorde con la circular num. 14.
Pero esta Corte, con la disidencia de algunos Magistrados, opto porsoslayar el punot
constitucional denegando el registro solicitadopor Oh Cho, por fundamento de que bajo
la LeyNo. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los extranjerosestan excluidos de
dichos terrenos; es decir, que el terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno publico.
¿ Podemos hacer la misma evasion en el presente caso, acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874
o a cualquier otra ley? Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte,
muchomenos los disidentes, consideran el terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno
publico. Luego todos los caminosestan bloqueados para nosotros, menos el camino
constitucional.Luego el segundo fundamento alegado paracubrir la evasiva tambien
debe descartarse totalmente.
Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente
asunto, puesto que puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no remoto,y
en efecto se cita el caso de Rellosa contra Gaw Chee Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que
los alegatos de ambas partesya estan sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente de
decision.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en favor de la evasiva,en primer lugar,
porque cuando se le somete el deber de iraveriguando en su Escribania si hay casos de
igual naturaleza, sino que los casos se someten por orden de prelaciony prioridad de
tiempo a medida que esten preparados paracaso debe decidirse por sus propios
meritos y conforme ala ley pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao
practica que se invoca no dice: "hay qoe soslayar la cuestionconstitucional siempre que
se pueda resolver de otra manera, reservando dicha cuestion constitucional
para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del mismo caso. De otro modono seria un
simple soslayo legal, sino que seria unsub terfugio impropio, indebido, ilegal. En el
presente caso no ha habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se insinua;desde luego
no mayor prisa que en otros asuntos. Elcurso, el ritmo de los tramites ha sido normal; en
realidad,si ha habido algo, ha sido un poco de parsimonia, lentitud.
¿ Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido pronunciamento de nuestro
veredicto sobre la formidablecuestion constitucional debatida, por lo menos, tan pronto
como fuese posible? ¿ Habia alguna razon de interespublico para justificar una evasiva?
Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario, nuestro deber ineludible, imperioso,era formular
y promulgar inmediatamente ese veredicto. Lo debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo
debiamos, sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y conveniencia de todos — del pueblo
filipino y de los extranjeros residentes o quetuvieren voluntad de residir o negociar en
estas Islas. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de lugar, podriaorientarse sin
zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre. Tantonacionales como extranjeros sabrian donde
invertir sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta Corte una provee
la interdiccion de que se trata. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este
asuntoen Febrero de este año (8 contra 3); la tuvimos cuandodespues de laboriosas
deliberaciones quedo denegada lamocion de retirada de la mayoria haya cambiado de
opinionsobre el fondo de la cuestion; la tenemos ahora naturalmente.Por tanto, nada
hace falta ya para que se de lasenal de "luz verde" a la promulgacion de la
sentencia.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia, desidia. Es mas: seriaabandono de un deber
jurado, como digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte Suprema naturalmente
npha de permitir que se la pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su puesto
privilegiado de vigia, de centinela avanzado de la Constitucion.
No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de
sostener y poner en vigor,o de suplir una deficiencia en la Constitucion," o que
segobierno, como se insinua en una de las disidencias. Nohay tal cosa. El principio de la
supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni mucho menos un ademan de inmodestiao
arrogancia, sino que es una parte vital de nuestrasinstutuciones, una condicion
peculiarisima de nuestro sistema de gobierno en que la judicatura, como uno de lostres
poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade disponer de los asuntos
judiciales. Con respecto a losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad
exclusivano solo se infiere del principio de la supremacia judicial, sino que, como ya se
ha dicho en otra parte de esta concurrencia,se halla especificamente estutuida en el
articulo 200del Codigo Administrativo transcrito arriba. Este articuloconfiere jurisdiccion
exclusiva a los tribunales de justiciapara decidir las cuestiones sobre registro, y esto lo
ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de Justicia en su circularnum. 14 al referir tales
cuestiones a la determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos de duda o litigio.
Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria denego la retirada de la
apelacion no tanto para resolver el asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos, como
paraenrvar los efectos de la circular num. !28 del Departamentode Justicia, pues
Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces su pleito no en virtud de una
sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta trasera abierta por esacircular. Tampoco
hay tal cosa. Ya repetidas veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia votado
muchoantes de que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que mascorrectamente podria decirse
es que antes de la expedicion deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones de
interespublico aconsejaban que se denegase la retirada de la apelacion y se diese fin al
asunto mediante una sentencia enel fondo, despues de la expidicion esas razones
quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion es sencilla: nuestra aquiescenciaa la reirada
hubiera podico interpretarse entoncescomo que nuestra jurisdiccion. Es mas: hubiera
podidointerpretarse como una abyecta rendicion en la pugna porsostener los fueros de
cada ramo coigual y coordinado del gobierno.
Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la
apelacion equivale "a asumir queel solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan
confabulado con el Departamento de Justicia no solopara ingerirse en las funciones de
esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el patrimonio nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes
inconcebible. La corte presume que todos han obradode buena fe, de acuerdo con los
dictados de su conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la apelacion por
razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin consideracion a losmotivos de nadie.
Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue
excluido de la votacion queculmino en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode
la retirada de la apelacion, a tenor de la regla 56, seccion2, Reglamento de los
Tribunales. El Magistrado Hontiverosno estaba presente en la sesion por estar
enfermo;pero estaban presentes 10 Magistrados, es decir, mas queel numero necesario
para formar quorum y para despacharlos asuntos. La rueda de la justicia en la Corte
Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia de uno o dosmiembros, siempre que
hubiese quorum. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas deliberaciones.
Ningun Magistrado Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros.
Ningun Magistrado pidio que se leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se
conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion, no obstante la ausencia del Sr.
Hontiveros. En efecto, se hace la votaciony resulta un empate, es decir, 5 contra 5. De
acuerdo conla regla 56, quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada. ¿Donde
esta, pues, la "ilegalidad", donde la"arbitrariedad"?
Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion,la misma en que ya
se alegaba como ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era simplemente academica
(moot question) por la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada y por la
circular num. !28 del Departamento de Justicia. Tampoco estaba presente el Sr.
Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la cual fue de nuevo denegada.Pregunto otra vez:
¿donde esta la "arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr. Hontiveros no
pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo? ¿Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia por
eso? Conviene, sin embargo, hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la cuestion el Sr.
Hontiverosera uno de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la confirmacion de la
sentencia apelada, es decir, en favor delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los
extrajerosde la propiedad de bienes raices en Filipinas.
II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. Todos los angulos y fases de
la misma estanacabadamente tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare, por
tanto, a hacer unas cuantas observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica legal, y otra sobre
historia nacionalcontemporanea, aprovachando en este ultimo respectomis
reminiscencias y mi experiencia como humilde miembroque fui de la Asamblea
Constituyente que redacto y arobola Constitucion de Filipinas.
Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola"
(agricultural) usada enel articulo XIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion. He aqui eltexto
completo de la seccion:
SEC. 5. — Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land
shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
¿Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e
industriales? Tal es lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que si; los disidentesdicen que
no.
Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata
debe interpretarse como untodo homogeneo, simetrico. En otras palabras, los
cocablosalli empleados deben interpretarse en el sentido de quetienen un mismo
significado. Es absurdo pensar o suponerque en el texto de una ley, sobre todo dentro
del estrechomarco de un articulo, un vocablo tenga dos o mas significadosdistintos, a
menos que la misma ley asi to diga expresamente. Lapresuncion es que el legislador
sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales.
Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes — laprimera, que trata de los terrenos
agricolas de dominiopublico, y la segunda, que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o
partuculares.
La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los
terrenos publicos enel Estado y disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde
ciudadanos filipinos, o de corporaciones o asociacionesen que el 60 por ciento del
cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales ciudadanos. En secciones se emplea
literalmentela frase "public agricultural land."
La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the
Congress may determine bylaw the size of private agricultural land which
individuals,coporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subjectto rights existing
prior to the enactment of such law"4 ;y la seccion 5 es la que queda transcrita mas arriba
y esobjeto del presente litigio. En ambas secciones se emplealiteralmente la frase
"private agricultural land."
No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera
parte comprende terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales; lo admitenlos
mismos abogados del apelante y los Sres. Magistradosdisidentes. Y ¿por que lo
admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion se define la palabra "agricultural" aplicadaa
terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir solaresresidenciales, comerciales e
industriales? Indudablementeque no, porque en ninguna parte de la Constitucion se
datal definicion. Lo admiten porque en esta jurisdicciontenemos una serie consistente de
sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia firmamente establecidala
doctrina de que la palabra "agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados
Unidos de 1902 (LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos publicos comprendey
abarca solares residenciales, comerciales, industriales yqualquier otra clase de terrenos,
excepto forestales yminerales.5 Es decir, que se aplica a la actual Constitucion
deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica, tradicional, embebidaen nuestra jurisprudencia de
cerca de medio siglo.
Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo
XIII tiene talsignificado — y lo tiene porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente — ¿por
que esa misma palabra empleada en lasegunda parte, unas cuantas lineas mas
adelante, no hade tener el mismo significado? ¿Da acaso la Constitucionuna definicion
de la palabra "agricultural" cuandose refiere a terreno privado? ¿Donde esta esa
definicion? ¿O es que se pretende que la diferenciacion opera no envirtud de la palabra
"agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o "private", segun que se trate de
terrenopublico o privado?
Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural"
aplicada a terreno privadoun significado distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico,
lo hubiese hecho constar asi expresamente en elmismo texto de la Constitucion Si,
como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no definir la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a
terreno poblico porque contaba para ello con ladefinicion clasica establecida en la
jurisprudencia, cuandola misma Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con relaciona
terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion, esto es, aplicar la definicion
de la jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno — el publico y el privado. Pensarde otra
manera podria ser ofensivo, insultante; podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea
estaba compuestade miembros ignorantes, desconocederos de las reglas
elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion legislativa.
Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu.
Tambien me cupo elhonor de partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete — elcomite
encargado finalmente de redactar la ponencia dela Constitucion. No digo que aquella
Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios, pero indudablemente no era inferiora ninguna
otra de su tipo en cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli habia un plantel de buenos
abogados,algunos versados y especialistas en derecho constitucional.Alli estaba el
Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr. Rafael Palma; alli estaba el propio
Presidentede la Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos prestigios de su
reconocida cultura juridica y humanista; alli estaba tambien el Dr. Jose P. Laurel,
considerado comouna de las primeras autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en
nuestro pais. En el Comite de Siete o dePonencia figuraban el actual Presidente de
Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el ex-Senador de Cebu Hon. Filemon Sotto;el Hon. Vicente
Singson Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la primera Asemblea Filipina, ex-miembro de
la Comisionde FIlipinas, ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de Gabinete;el ex-Magistrado de la
Corte Suprema Hon. NorbertoRomualdez; el actual Secretario de Hacienda Hon.
MiguelCuaderno; y el ex-Decano del Colegio de Artes Liberalesde la Universidad de
Filipinas, Hon. Conrado Benitez.
No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera
redactarse el texto de un articuloenque un vocablo — el vocablo "agricultural" — tuviera
dosacepciones diferentes: una, aplicada a terrenos publicos;y otra, aplicada a terrenos
privados. Menos se concibeque, si fuese esta la intencion, se incurriese en una
comisionimperdonable: la omision de una definicion especifica, diferenciadora, que
evitase caos y confusion en la mente delos abogados y del publico. Teniendo en cuenta
la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la Asemblea Constituyentey de sus liders,
lo mas logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no diferenciarsu
aplicacion entre terrenos publicos y privados, lo hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla
manifiesta intencion dedejar enteramente la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una
sola comun definicin — la establecida en la jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de
Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares (supra); es decir, que la palabra
"agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien solaresresidenciales,
comerciales, e industriales.
A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout
the statute, unless a different intention appears. . . . Where words have been
long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed to have a
certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of
construction requires that the words used in such statute should be construed
according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that
sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Stat.
Construction, p. 758.)
Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra
"agricultural" referente aterreno particular, dando a entendar con su silencio
queendosaba la definicion al diccionario o a la usanza popular.La suposicion es
igualmente insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se entrega la definicion a la
jurisprudencia,y por que en otro al diccionario, o al habla popular?Aparte de que los
miembros y dirigentes de la AsembleaConstituyente sabian muy bien que esto causaria
unatremenda confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel lenguaje popular, ofrecen
apoyo seguro para una fiely autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con
definiciones especificas y casuisticas, todavia ofrecedudas a veces ¿como no el lexico
vulgar, con su infinitavariedad de matices e idiotismos?
Ahora mismo ¿no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una perplejidad? ¿Hay acaso
uniformidad en la definicionde lo que es un terreno privado agricola? No; cadacual lo
define a su manera. Uno de los disidentesel Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su definicion
de la palabra "agricultural " del Diccionario Internacional de Webster que dice . . . "of or
pertaining to agricultural connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as the agricultural class;
agricultural implements, wages etc." Tambien hacereferncia el mismo Magistrado al
concepto popular. Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice que "the termprivate
agricultural land means lands privately owneddevoted to cultivation, to the raising of
agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado Sr Paras no da ninguna definicion;da por definida la
palabra "agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular.
Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta.
Segun ellos, "land spoken of as `agricultural' naturally refers to land not only susceptible
of agricultural or cultivation but more valuable for such than for another purpose, say
residential,commercial or educational. . . . The criterion is notmere susceptibility of
conversion into a farm but its greater value when devoted to one or the other purpose."
Demode que, segun esta definicion, lo que determina la calidaddel terreno es su valor
relativo, segun que se dedique alcultivo, o a residencia, o al comercio, o a la
industria.Los autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el hecho de
que en las afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos immensos que desde tiempo
inmemorial se handedicado a la agricultura, pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones
multiplicandose su valor en mil por cientosi no mas. De hecho esos terrenos son
agricolas; comoque todavia se ven alli los pilapiles y ciertas partes estancultivadas; pero
en virtud de su mayor valor para residencia,comercio e industria se les aquiere colocar
fuera dela prohibicion constitucional. En verdad, el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico y
convencional, y denota cuanincierta y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar latesis
del apelante y de los que le sostienen.
Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del
concepto popular y de losdiccionarios, asi sean los mejores y mas cientificamente
elaborados ¿que normas claras, concretas y definitivasde diferenciacion podrian
establecerse? ¿Podrian trazarsefronteras inconfundibles entre lo que es agricola y lo
quees residencial, comercial e industrial? ¿Podria hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese
arbitraria? Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de diferenciacion es lanaturaleza
urbana o rural del terreno; se considera comoresidencial, comercial e industrial todo lo
que esta dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero ¿resolveria esto la dificultad?
Proporcionaria un patron exacto, cientifico,no arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro de
una ciudado poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo muy bien el
Magistrado Sr. Willard en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los
inconvenientes de la adopcion de este criterio es que es tanvago e indeterminado, que
seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla practica. ¿Que terrenos son agricolas por naturaleza? l
mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato presentado en este asunto, dice: 'La montaña mas
pedregosa y el suelo mas pobre son susceptible de cultivo mediante la mano del
hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur. Fil.,183). Y Luego el Sr. Willard añade las
siguietes observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare
solucion del asunto que nos ocupa, a saber:
. . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los
limites de cualquier ciudad. Hay dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la parte
densamente poblada de lamisma, una granja experimental. Esta es por su
naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta, en la misma ciudad, hay una gran
extension de terreno denominado Camp Wallace, destinada a sports. El terreno
que circuda los muros de la ciudad de Manila, situado entre estos y el paseo del
Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene muchas hectareas de extension y es de
naturaleza agricola. La Luneta misma podria en cualquier tiempo destinarse al
cultivo.
La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno
industrial. En este respectoes preciso tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee
que ser necesariamente urbano; en realidad,la tendencia moderna es a situar las
industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas zonas rurales. Verbigracia; anpredor de la
famosa cascada de Maria Cristina en Lanao existen grandes extensiones de terreno
agricola, algunasde propiedad particular. Cuando, se industrialice aquellaformidable
fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster ¿que normas segfuras se podrian
establecer para poner envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada
enajenandosetierras agricolas de propiedad privada a favorde extranjeros, ya sean
individuos, ya sean corporacioneso asociaciones, so pretexto de ser industriales?
Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron
haber tenido la idea deque el articulo XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago
e indeterminado que llama el Sr. Willard. Es mas logico pensar que el criterio que ellos
tenian enla mente era el criterio establicido en la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto
clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno y otros asuntos concomitantes citados — criterio mas
frime, mas seguro, menos expuesto a confusion y arbitrariedad, y sobre todo, "que
ofrece menos inconvenientes", parafraseando otra vez al Magistrado Sr. Willard, (supra,
p. 185).
Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la Constitucion, dispone que "el
Congreso puedo determinarpor ley l;a eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola
que los individous, corporaciones o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto a los
derechos existentes antes de la aprobacion de dicha ley." Si seinterpretase que la frase
"private agricultural land" noincluye terrenos residenciales, comerciales e
industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian excluidas de la facultad
reguladora concedida por la Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha seccion 3.
Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueños de todoslos terrenos de una
ciudad; no habria limite a las adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos
residenciales,comerciales e industriles. Esto parece absurdo, peroseria obligada
consecuencia de la tesis sustentada por elapelante.
Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII
durante las deliberacionesde la Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de
Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio no figuraba el adjetivo "agricola"en la seccion 5,
diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas trade se añadio la palabra calificativa
agricola—"private agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir quela adicion de la palabra
"agricultural" debio de ser poralgun motivo y este no podia ser mas que el de que
sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e industriales, limitandose el
precepto a los propia o estrictamenteagricolas.
La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra
"agricultural" en estecaso equivale a excuir los terrenos residenciales, comercialese
industriales, por la sencilla razon de que la Constitucion no solo no define lo que
es residencial comercial e industrial, comercial e industrial. En cambio ya hemosvisto
que la palabra "agricultral" tiene una significaciontradicionalmente bien establecida en
nuestra jurisprudenciay en nuestro vocabulario juridico: incluye no solo
terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien residencialescomerciales e
industriales. Se admite por todo elmundo que la palabra tiene tal significacion en el
articuloXIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea terreno publico. Ahora
bien; ¿que diferencia hay, despuesde todo, entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea
a la calidad de agricola, absolutamente ninguna.Uno no es mas menois agricola que el
otro. La unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad, al titulo dominical — en que el uno es
del Estado y el otro es de un particular.
En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica,subjetiva — en que
vulgarmente hablando pareceque los conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se
repelen.No se debe menospreciar la influencia del vulgo en algunascosas; en la misma
literatura el vulgo juega su papel; digasi no la formacion popular del romancero. Pero es
indudable que cietas cosas estan por encima del conceptovulgar — una de estae la
interpretacion de la leyes, lahermeneutica legal. Esto no es exagerar la importancia de la
tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las cosasensu verdadero lugar. La
interpretacion de la ley es unafuncion de minoria — los abogados. Si no fuera asi
paraque los abogados? ¿Y para que las escuelas de dercho,y para que los exmenes,
cada vez mas rigidos, para de purar el alma de la toga, que dijo un gran abogado
español?6 Asi que cuando decimos que el precepto constitucional en cuestion debe
interpretatarse tecnicamente, a la luz de la jurisprudencia, por ser ello el metodo mas
seguro para hallar la verdad judicial, no importa que ello repugne al concepto vulgar a
simple vista, no ponemos,en realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino que propugnamos
una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida.
Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que
en la tamizacion delprecepto se añadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private
land" en vez de dejarlas solas sin cualificacion.Algunos diran que fue por razon de
simentria para hacer"pendant diran que fue por razon de simetria para hacer"pendant"
con la frase "public agricultural land" puestamas arriba. Pero esto np tiene ninguna
importancia. Loimportante es saber que la añadidura, tal como esta jurisdiccion, de la
palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. Eso es todo; lo demas creo que es puro
bizantinis mo.
III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente
para ver de inquirir la motivacion y finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos
ocupapuede ayudar grandemente y arrojar no poca luz en lainterpretacion de la letra y
espiritu de dicho precepto.Este genero de inquisicion es perfectamente propio y
permisible en hermeneutica constitucional, y se ha hechosiempre, segun las majores
autoridades sobre la materia. Cooley, en su authorizado tratado sobre Limitaciones
Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este efectolo sigiuente:
When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied,
or the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be
proper to examine the proceedings of the convention which framed the
instrument. Where the proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision,
the aid will be valuable and satisfactory; but where the question is one of abstract
meaning, it will be difficult to derive from this source much reliable assistance in
interpretation. (1 Cooley on Constitutional Limitations [8th ed.], p. 142.)
¿Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general
sobre el problema capitalismo de los terrenos naturales? ¿Cual era la
tendenciapredominante entre los Delegados? Y ¿como era tambienel giro de la opinion,
del sentimiento publico es decir comoera el pulso del pueblo mismo del cual la
Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que organo e interprete?
Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. El
tono predomionante entodos ellos era un fuerte, profundo nacionalismo. Tanto dentro
como fuera de la Asamblea Constituyente era evidente, acusado, el afan unanime y
decidido de conservar el patrimonio nacional no solo para las presentes generaciones
filipinas, sino tambien para la posteridad. Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de
todos un significadocategorio e indubitable; significion de si es dedominio publico o
privado. Muestras tipicas y representativas de este tono pecular y dominantes de la
ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m,anifestaciones que constanen el diario de serines
has en el curso de los debateso en el proceso de la redaccion del proyecto
constitucionalpor Delegados de palabra autorizadam bien por su significacion personal
bein por el papel particula que desempeñaban en las treas constituyentes. Por ejemplo
el Delegado Montilla por Negros Occidental, conspicuo representante del agro, usando
del privilegio de madia horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte:
. . . Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe
entenderse que nuetro patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por 100 en
manos filipinas. Tierras y recursos naturales son inm,uebles y como tales
pueden compararse con los organos vitales del cuerpo de una persona: la falta
de posesion de los mismo puede caussar la muete instantannea o el
abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de Sesiones Asamblea Constituyente, inedita,
"Framing of the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592 Libro del Profesor Aruego).
Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar
entre propiedad publica y privada.
El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del
comte de agricultura de la Asamblea que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas
palabras:
La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos
agricolas y de poder se dueños de propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una
parte necesaria de las leyes de terrenos publicos de Filipinas para mantener
firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los filipos' (Diario de Sesiones, id.; Libro
de Aruego, supra, pag. 593.)
Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de
Recursos Naturales de la Asamblea Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa
generricamente sin cualificacion de publica o privada. Dice el Comite:
Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la
herencia exclusiva de la nacion filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser conservados para
aquellos que se halian bajo la autoridad soberana de esa nacion y para su
posteridad. (Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 595.)
La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la
Asamblea Constituyente. Sus mienbros que todavia viven recordaran l;a infinita
paciencia, el esmero de orfe breria con que se trabajo el preambulo de la Constitucion.
Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a un rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas
resultans es la labor benedictina una de las gemas redel patrimonio nacional. He aqui el
preambulo:
The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene Providence,in order to establish a
government that shall enbody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony
of the nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themslves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and
democracy, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con
respecto a la tierre y recursosnaturales es de facil explicacion. Estabamos
escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el Commonwealth, sino tambien para la
republica que advendria despues de10 años. Querianos, puesd asegurar firmemente las
basesde nuestra nacionalidad. ¿Que cosa major para ello quebildar por los cuatro
costrados el cuerpo dela mnacion delcual — parodiando al Delegado Montilla — la tierra
y losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte
instantanea o el abreviamiento dela vida?
Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en
cuenta las cirucmstancias.Nos debamos perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion
geografica,asi como tambien de nuestras limitaciones demograficas.Se trataba, por
ciento de una conciencia agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante. Estabamos
roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas — centenares de milliones — economica y
biologicamente agresivas, avidad de desbordarsepor tadas partes, poir las areas del
Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales. China, Japon-Japon, sobretodo que
estaba entonces en el apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y militarista.
Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada rutilante de Samurrai,el pavoroso
problema de Davao, donde, por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la
tierra, instituyendos alli una especie de Japon en miniatura, con todaslas amenasas y
peligros que ello implicaba para la integridadde nuestra existancia nacional. Como que
Davaoya se llamaba popular y sarcasticamente Davaoko, entragica rima con Manchuko.
Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. Texas,
Mejico, Cuba y otraspaises del Mar Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban,
como una terrible maldicion el error de susgobernantes al permitir la enajenacion del
suelo a extranjeros.
Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas, los Delegados a la
Constituyente se haciancargo tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de, por lo
menos,vincular el apatrimonio nacional, entre otras cosas la tierra, en manos de los
filipinos.
Que de extraño habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se
aprobase un articulo rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion y
finalidad, como ya se ha dicho, era triple: (a)consetvar el patrimonio nacional para las
presentes yfuturas generaciones filipinas; (b) vincular, por lo menos,la propiedad de la
tierra y de los recursos naturales en manos filipinas como la mejor manera de mantener
elequilibrio de un sistema economico dominado principalmente por extranjeros en virtud
de su tecnica (know-how) superior y de su abudancia de capitales: (c) prefictos y
complicaciones internacionales.
No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos
residenciales comercialese industrial, pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban
de conseguir y los peligros quie se trataban de evitar con la politica de nacionalizacion y
conservacionrezaban tanto para una clase de terrenos como para otra. ¿Por que se iba
a temer, verbigracia, el dominio extranjero sobre un terreno estrictamente, agricola,
sujeto a cultivo, y no sobre el terreno en que estuviera instalada unaformidable industria
o fabrica?
Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea
Constituyente que, noobstante el natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor
de los americanos., a estos no se les concedioningun privilegio en relacion con la tierra y
demas recusosnaturales, sino que se les coloco en el mismo plano que alos otros
extranjeros. Como que ha habido necesidad deuna reforma constitucional — la llmada
reforma sobre laparidad — para equipararlos a los filipinos.
The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is
opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the
words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be
adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the
latter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act. While the
intention of the legislature must be ascertained from the words used to express it,
the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should not be sacrificed
to a literal interpretation of such words. (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction, pp.
721, 722.)
IV. — Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc
extranjeros de la propiedadsobre terrenos residenciales e industriales,porque ello
imposibilitaria toda accion legislativa en sentidocontrario para el caso de que el
Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que semejante interdiccio debialevantarse. Se
dice que es majes y mas conveniente dejaresta cuestion en manos del Congreso para
que haya maselasticidad en las soluciones de los diferentes problemassobre la tierra.
Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por
excelencia. Solamenteel pueblo puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso,
ni mucho menos los tribunales, pueden disponerde ese patrimonio. Lo mas que puede
hecer el Congreso es proponer una reforma constitucional mediante los votosde tres
cuartas (3/4) de sus miembros; y el pueblo tienela ultima palabra que se expresara en
una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto.
El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria una economia mal
entendida. Si no se escatiman gastos para celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente
¿como ha del pueblo en un asunto tan vital como es la disposicion del patrimonio
nacional, base de su mismaexistencia? para reformar la Constitucion, apoyado portres
cuartas (3/4) del Congreso, por lo menos.
En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es, e
interpretarse en la forma como lo interpretamos en nuestra decision.
Se confirma la sentencia.
PARAS, J., dissenting:
Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines." The important question that arises is whether private
residential land is included in the terms "private agricultural land."
There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, quoted in the
majority opinion, lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, timber,or
mineral. There can be no doubt, also, that public lands suitable or actually used for
residential purposes, must of necessity come under any of the three classes.
But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of
the approval of the Constitution, have the same classification? An affirmative answer will
lead to the conclusion — which is at once absurd and anomalous — that private timber
and mineral lands may be transferred or assigned to aliens by a mode other than
hereditary succession. It is, however, contended that timber and mineral lands can never
be private, and reliance is placed on section 1, Article XIII, of the Constitution providing
that "all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain . . . belong to the
State," and limiting the alienation of natural resources only to public agricultural land. The
contention is obviously untenable. This constitutional provision, far from stating that all
timber and mineral lands existing at the time of its approval belong to the State, merely
proclaims ownership by the Government of all such lands as are then of the public
domain; and although, after the approval of the Constitution, no public timber or mineral
land may be alienated, it does not follow that timber or mineral lands theretofore already
of private ownership also became part of the public domain. We have held, quite
recently, that lands in the possession of occupants and their predecessors in interest
since time immemorial do not belong to the Government, for such possession justifies
the presumption that said lands had been private properties even before the Spanish
conquest. (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect to the
pronouncement in Cariño vs. Insular Government (212 U.S., 446; 53 Law. ed., 594), that
it could not be supposed that "every native who had not a paper title is a trespasser." It is
easy to imagine that some of such lands may be timber or mineral. However, if there are
absolutely no private timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber
or mineral lands, why did the framers of the Constitution bother about speaking of
"private agricultural land" in sections 3 and 5 of Article XIII, and merely of "lands" in
section 4?
SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land
which individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subject to
rights existing prior to the enactmentof such law.
SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the
expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals.
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall
be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land
which individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subbject to rights
existing prior to the enactment of such law, and under section 4 it may authorize, upon
payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots
and conveyed at cost to individuals. The latter section clearly negatives the idea that
private lands can only be agricultural. If the exclusive classification of public lands
contained in section 1 is held applicable to private lands, and , as we have shown, there
may be private timber and mineral lands, there would be neither sense nor justification in
authorizing the Congress to determine the size of private agricultural land only, and in
not extending the prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands.
In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of
public lands, and the term "agricultural" appearing in section 5 was used as it is
commonly understood, namely, as denoting lands devoted to agricultural. In other words,
residential or urban lots are not embraced within the inhibition established in said
provision. It is noteworthy that the original draft referred merely to "private land." This
certainty would have been comprehensive enough to included any kind of land. The
insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore significant. If the Constitution prohibits
the alienation to foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can ever be
enacted with a view to permitting limited areas of land for residential, commercial, or
industrial use, and said prohibition may readily affect any effort towards the attainment of
rapid progress in Philippine economy. On the other hand, should any danger arise from
the absence of such constitutional prohibition, a law may be passed to remedy the
situation, thereby enabling the Government to adopt such elastic policy as may from time
to time be necessary, unhampered by any inconveniences or difficulties in amending the
Constitution. The power of expropriation is, furthermore, a handy safeguard against
undersirable effects of unrestricted alienation to, or ownership by, aliens of urban
properties. The majority argue that the original draft in which the more general terms
"private land" was used, was amended in the same that the adjective "agricultural" was
inserted in order merely "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties" and because, as
under section 1, timber and mineral lands can never be private, "the prohibition to
transfer the same, would be superfluous." In answer, it may be stated that section 4 of
Article XIII, referring to the right of expropriation, uses "lands" without any qualification,
and it is logical to believe that the use was made knowingly in contradistinctions with the
limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3 and 5. Following the line of reasoning
of the majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be expropriated is
not only private agricultural land but also private timber and mineral lands, as well, of
course, as private residential lands. This of course tears apart the majority's contention
that there cannot be any private timber or mineral land.
Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in mind that no less than
Honorable Filemon Sotto, Chairman of the Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional
Convention, in supporting section 3 of the Article XIII, explained that the same refers to
agricultural land, and not to urban properties, and such explanation is somewhat
confirmed by the statement of another member of the Convention (delegate Sevilla) to
the effect that said section "is discriminatory and unjust with regard to the agriculturists."
Sr. SOTTO (F) Señor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el
fondo de esta cuestion al parecer inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo
haya metido tanto en la sesion de ayer como en la de hoy? Que hay de misterios
en el fondo de este problem, para que politicos del volumen del caballero por
Iloilo y del caballero por Batangas, tomen con gran interes una macion para
reconsiderar lo acordado ayer? Voy a ser frio, señores. Parece que es meyor
tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. He prestado atencion,
como siempre suelo hacer a todos los argumentos aqui en contra del precepto
contenido en el draft y a favor ahora de la reconsideracion y siento decir lo
siguiente; todos son argumentos muy buenos a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble
Nacional se haya reunido, sera la ocasion de ver si procede o no expropiar
terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao existentes despues. En el presente, yo
me limito a invitar la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que el procepto no
tome las medidas necesarias en tiempo oportuno, cuando el problema del
latifundismo se haya presentado con caracterres tales que el beinestar, interes y
orden publico lo requieran. Permitame la Convencion que lo discuta en globo las
dos pates del articulo 9. Hay tal engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho
precepto, hay tral eslabon en una u otra parte que es imposible, que es dificil
que quitaramos deslindes si nos limitasemos a considerar una sola parte. La
primera parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar el limite maximo de propiedad
agricola que los ciudadanos particulares puede tener. Parece que es un punto
que ha pasado desapercibido. No se trata aqui ahora de propiedades urbanas,
sino de propiedades agricolas, y es por la razon de que con mucha especialidad
en las regiones agricolas, en las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo se
extiende con facilidad, y desde alli los pequeños propietariou precisamente para
ahogarles y para intilizarles. Esta pues, a salvo completamente la cuestion de
las propiedades urbans. Cietos grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes que con
pretexto de tener cietos eficios, que en realidad no necesitan de tales extensos
solares para su existencia ni para su mantenimineto, puedan dormir transquilos.
No Vamos contra esas propiedades. Por una causa o por otra el pasado nos
legardo ese lastre doloroso. Pero la region agricola, la region menos explotada
por nuetro pueblo, la region que necesitamos si queremos vivir cuenta propia la
region que es el mayor incentivo no para solo para los grandes capitalistas de
fuera merece todos los ciudados del gobierno.
Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad
con la primera. Una vez demostrado ante la Lehgislatura, una vez convencida la
Asamblea Nacional de que existe un latifundismo y que este laitifundismo puede
producir males e esta produciendo daños a la comunidad, es cuando entonces la
Legislatura puede acordar la expropiacion de los latifundios. Donde esta el mal
que los opositores a este es un postulado que todos conocen. Bien, voy a admitir
para los propositos del argumento que hoy no existen laifundios, y si los
opostores al precepto quieren mas vamos a convenir en que no existrian en el
futuro. Pues, entonces, donde este el temor de que el hijo de tal no pueda recibir
la herencia de cual? Por lo demas el ejemplo repetidas veces presentado ayer
yhoy en cuanto al herdero y al causahabiente no es completamente exacto.
Vamos a suponer que efectivamente un padre de familia posee un numero tal de
hectareas de terreno, superior o exedente a lo que fija la ley. Creen los
Caballeros, creen los opositorees al precepto que la Legislatura, la Asamblea
Nacional va a ser tan imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente disponga por ley
que aquella porcion excedente del terreno que ha de recibir un hijo de su padre
no podra poseerlo, no podra tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero.
Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La asamblea Nacional sabe que
no puede dictar leyes o medidas imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el plazo, fijara la
proporcion de acuedo con las circunstancias del tiempo entonces en que
vivamos. Es posible que ahora un numero determinado de hectereas sea
excesivo; es posible que por desenvolvimientos economics del paius ese numero
de hectareas puede ser elevado o reducido. Es por esto porque el Comite
precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas
presamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas, prefireindo
dejar a la sabiduria, a la prudencia, al patriotismo y a la justicia de la Asambela
Nacional el fijar ese numero.
Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero;
se hablqa de que no podra revender las propieedades. Pero, Caballeros de la
Convencion, caballeros opositores del precepto; si la Legislatura, si la
AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de que el gobierno no puede hecer una
exporpiacion, va a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional dictara una ley autorizando la
expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio cuando este convencida, primero, de que la
existencia de ese latifundio es amenazante para el publico; y segundo, cuando la
asamblea Nacional este convencida de que el gobierno esta disposicion para
disponer la expropiacion.
Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo autorizar,fijar los limites, ni
macho menos es malo autorizar a la Legislatura para dictar leyes de
expropiacion.
Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito
esta mañana — y digo con exito porque he oidoalgunos aplausos — se ha
mentado la posibilidad de que los comunistas hagan un issue de esta disposicion
que existe en el draft; podran los comunistas pedir los votos del electorado para
ser elloslos que dicten las leyes fijando el limite del terreno y ordenen la
expropriacion? ¡Que argumento mas bonito si tuviera base! Lo mas natural, creo
yo, es que el pueblo, el electorado, al ver queno es una Asamblea Constituyente
comunista la que ha puestoesta disposicion, otorgue sus votors a esta misma
Asamblea Nacional, o a esos condidatos no comunistas. ¿Quien esta en
disposicion de terminar mejor una obra aquel que trazado y puesto los primeros
pilares, o aquel que viene de gorra al final de la obra para decir: "Aqui estoy
poner el tejado?"
Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como
este, pretendamos ligarla a los votos de los comulites de terreno; no ha de venir
porque nosotros fijemos loslimites de terreno; no ha de venir porque prohibamos
los latifundiosmediante expropiacion forzosa, no; ha de venir precisamentepor
causa de los grandes propietarios de terreno, y ha de venir,queramoslo o no,
porque el mundo esta evolucionando y se va aconvencer de que la vida no es
solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos , porque Dios no la dio, con la
libertad, el aire, la luz,la tierra para vivir (Grandes Aplausosz), y por algo se ha
dichoque en los comienzos de la vida himana debio haber sido fusilado,matado,
a aquel primero que puso un cerco a un pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a
propiedad.
Por estas razones, señor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para
terminar, voy a dar fin a mi discurso agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech of
Delegate Sotto.)
I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by limiting private individuals
to holding and acquiring lands, private agricultural lands . . . is discriminatory and
unjust with regard to the agriculturists. Why not, Mr. President, extend this
provision also to those who are engaged in commerce and industries? Both
elements amass wealth. If the purpose of the Committee, Mr. President, is to
distribute the wealth in such a manner that it will no breed discontent, I see no
reason for the discrimination against the agricultural. In view of these reasons,
Mr. President, I do not want to speak further and I submit this amendment
because many reasons have been given already yesterday and this morning.
(Speech of Delegate Sevilla.)
Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on the observation that
section 3 of Article XIII does not embrace private urban lands. There is of course every
reason to believe that the sense in which the terms "private agricultural lands" were
employed in section 3 must be the same as that in section 5, if consistency is to be
attributed to the framers of the Constitution.
We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by
Delegate Ledesma to the effect that "the exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring
public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land
Laws," and of the statement of Delegate Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization
of our lands and natural resources," because (1) the remarks of Delegate Ledesma
expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and the terms "real estate" must
undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the preceding words "public agricultural lands",
under the principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must have in mind
purely "agricultural" lands, sicne he was the Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural
Development and his speech was made in connection with the national policy on
agricultural lands; (3) the general nature of the explanations of both Delegate Ledesma
and Delegate Montilla, cannot control the more specific clarification of Delegate Sotto
that agricultural lands in section 3 do not include urban propeties. Neither are we bound
to give reater force to the view (apparently based on mere mental recollections) of the
Justices who were members of the Constitutional Convention than tot he specific
recorded manifestation of Delegate Sotto.
The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the
majority, is surely not controlling, because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands"
and, secondly, in that case it was expressly held that the phrase "agricultural land" as
used in Act No. 926 "means those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber
or mineral lands," — the definition held to be found in section 13 of the Act of Congress
of July 1, 1902.
We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase
"agricultural public lands," and after a carefully consideration of the question we
are satisfied that the only definition which exists in said act is the definition
 adopted by the court below. Section 13 says that the Government shall "make
rules and regulations for the lease, sale or other disposition of the public lands
other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds that is the only definition that
can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the phrase
"agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands accquired
from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. (Mapa vs. Insular Government,
10 Phil., 182.)
The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141,
enected after the approval of the Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners
of "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act," (section 122)
or "land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain." (Section 123.)
They hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly implemented
by said Act." The majority have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition
contained in said sections refer to lands originally acquired under said sections referto
land originally acqured under said Act or otherlegal provisions lands, which of course do
not include lands not originally of the public domain. The lands that may be acquired
under Act No. 141 necessarily have to be public agricultural lands, since they are the
only kinds that are subject to alienation or disposition under the Constitution. Hence,
even if they become private, said lands retained their original agricultural character and
may not therefore be alienated to foreigners. It is only in this sense, I think, that act No.
141 seeks to carry out and implement the constitutional objective. In the case before us,
however, there is no pretense that the land bought by the appellant was originally
acquired under said Act or other legal provisions contemplated therein.
The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24
of the Public Land Act No. 2874 aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for
industrial or residential purposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to acquire such kind of lands is
completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuanceof the Constitutional limitation," and
that "prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of the Public Land Act No.2874, land of
the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to
aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be
valid while the land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of the
Constitution speaks of "public agricultural lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act
No. 141, enacted after the approval of the Constitution, has to limit the alienation of its
subject matter (public agricultural land, which includes public residential or industrial
land) to Filipino citizens. But it is not correct to consider said Act as a legislation on, or a
limitation against, the right of aliens to acquire residential land that was already of private
ownership prior to the approval of the Constitution.
The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the
Government — Judicial, Legislative and Executive — have always maintained that lands
of the public domain are classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that
agricultural lands include residential lots," is rather misleading and not inconsistent, with
our position. While the construction mistakenly invoked by the majority refers exclusively
to lands of the public domain, our view is that private residential lands are not embraced
within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. Let us particularize
in somewhat chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading case
of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, only held that agricultural public lands are
those public lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. The
opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 15, 1939, quoted in the majority opinion,
limited itself in affirming that "residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the
public domain . . . must be classified as agricultural." Indeed, the limited scope of said
opinion is clearly pointed out in the following subsequent opinion of the Secretary of
Justice dated September 25, 1941, expressly hoding that "in cases involving the
prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or
assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are
not agricultural lands is applicable."
This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding
the request of the Register of Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to
whether Opinion No. 130, dated July 15, 1939, of this Department quoted in its
Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941, holding among others, that the phrase
"public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XIII (formerly article XII) of the
Constitution of the Philippines, includes residential, commercial or industrial lots
for purposes of their disposition, amends or supersedeas a decision or order of
the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered
pursuant to section 200 of the Administrative Code which holds that a residential
lot is not an agricultural land, and therefore, the prohibition in section 5, Article
XIII (formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines does not apply.
There is no conflict between the two opinions.
Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines,
speaks of public agricultural lands while section 5 of the same article treats
of private agricultural lands. A holding, therefore, that a residential lot is not
private agricultural land within the meaning of that phrase as found in section 5 of
Article XIII (formerly Article XII) does not conflict with an opinion that residential,
commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are included within
the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1, Article XIII (formerly
Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the prohibition
in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment
of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not
agricultural lands is applicable. In cases involving the prohibition in section 1 of
 Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding disposition in favor of, and exploitation,
development or utilization by foreigners of public agricultural lands, the opinion
that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain are
included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in said section 1 of the
Article XIII (formerly Article XII) governs.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its
restriction against transfers in favor of alien to public agricultural lands or to lands
originally acquired under said Act or other legal provisions formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands. On November 29, 1943, the Court of Appeals
rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First rendered a decision affirming that
of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was held that private
residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G. R.
No. 29.) During theJapanese occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of the
Philippines contained an almost verbatim reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII;
and the then National Assembly passed an Act providing that "no natural or juridical
person who is not a Filipino citizen shall acquire directly or indirectly any title to private
lands (which are not agricultural lands) including buildings and other improvements
thereon or leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal succession of proper cases,
unless authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines." (Off. Gaz., Vol. I,
p. 497, February,1944.) It is true that the Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to have
rendered an opinion on the matter, but it cannot have any persuasive force because it
merely suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department pending judicial
determination of the question. Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular
adopting in effect the opinion of his Department rendered in1941. Last but not least,
since the approval of the Constitution, numerous transactions involving transfers of
private residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered without any opposition
on the part of the Government. It will thus be seen that, contrary to what the majority
believe, our Government has constantly adopted the view that private residential lands
do not fall under the limitation contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not
permit myself to be blinded by any sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to
such a degree as to attribute to any of its provisions a construction not justified by or
beyond what the plain written words purport to convey. We need not express any
unnecessary concern over the possibility that entire towns and cities may come to the
hands of aliens, as long as we have faith in our independence and in our power to supply
any deficiency in the Constitution either by its amendment or by Congressional action.
There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the
appellant, with the conformity of the appellee, had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the
appeal and the same should have been granted outright. In Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan (p.
122, ante),decided only a few days ago, we reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court
should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid unless such question is raised by the the parties, and that when it is raised, if the
record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, that
course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a
case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words,
a court will always avoid a constitutional question, if possible. In the present case, that
course of action was not only possible but absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for
withdrawal had been opposed by the appellee, there might be some reasons for its
denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52 which provides that after the filing of appellee's
brief, "the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its discretion." At any rate, this
discretion should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal where a constitutional
question will thereby be avoided.
In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr.
Justice Tuason) that led to teh denial of the motion for withdrawal. During the
deliberation in which all the eleven members were present, seven voted to allow and four
to deny. Subsequently, without any previous notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was
absent, the matter was again submitted to a vote, and one Justice (who previously was
in favor of the withdrawal) reversed his stand, with the result that the votes were five to
five. This result was officially released and the motion denied under the technicality
provided in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to observe that Mr.
Justice Hontiveros, who was still a member of the Court and could have attended the
later deliberation, if notified and requested, previously voted for the granting of the
motion. The real explanation for excluding Mr. Justice Hontiveros, against my objection,
and for the reversal of the vote of one Justice who originally was in favor of the
withdrawal is found in the confession made in the majority opinion to the effect that the
circular of the Department of Justice instructing all registers of deeds to accept for
registration transfers of residential lots to aliens, was an "interference with the regular
and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions," and that "if we grant
the withdrawal, the result is that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his
case, not by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of
Justice issued while this case was pending before this Court." The zealousness thus
shown in denying the motion for wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of course is
another way of assuming that the petitioner-appellant and the Solicitor General had
connived with the Department of Justice in a scheme not only to interfere with the
functions of this Court but to dispose of the national patrimony in favor of aliens.
In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the
Department of Justice to issue any circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject,
and the corollary right of the appellant to take advantage thereof. What is most
regrettable is the implication that the Department of Justice, as a part of the Executive
Department, cannot be as patriotic and able as this Court in defending the Constitution. If
the circular in question is objectionable, the same can be said of the opinion of the
Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the registration of transfers of private
residential lots in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the case
of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands (43 Off. Gaz., 866), wherin according to the appellant,
the only question raised was whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and
register it in his name," and notwithstanding the fact that in said case the appealed
decision was in favor of the alien applicant and that, as hereinbefore stated, the Court of
Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd in 1943 a decision holding that
private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution. And yet this Court, failing to consider said opinion as an "interference,"
chose to evade the only issue raised by the appellant and squarely met by the appellee
in the Oh Cho case which already required a decision on the constitutional question
resolved in the case at bar against, so to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other
words, the majority did not allow the withdrawal of the present appeal not so much as to
dispose of it on the merits, but to annul the circular of the Department of Justice which is,
needless to say, not involved in this case. I cannot accept the shallow excuse of the
majority that the denial of the motion for withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our
indifference of today might signify a permanent offense to the Constitution," because it
carries the rather immodest implication that this Court has a monopoly of the virtue of
upholding and enforcing, or supplying any deficiency in, the Constitution. Indeed, the
fallacy of the impliation is made glaring when Senator Franscisco lost no time in
introducing a bill that would clarify the constitutional provision in question in the sense
desired by the majority. Upon the other hand, the majority should not worry about the
remoteness of the opportunity that will enable this Court to pass upon this constitutional
question, because we can take advance notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee
Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345), in which the parties have already presented. But even
disregarding said case, I am sure that, in view of the recent newspaper discussion which
naturally reached the length and breadth of the country, there will be those who will
dispute their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the constitutional
prohibition.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional
prohibition. Both parties having agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no
obligation to hold forth on the issue. It is not our mission to give advice to other person
who might be interested to give advice to other persons who might be interested to know
the validity or invalidity of their sales or purchases. That is the work of lawyers and
juriscounsults.
There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the
constitutional problem. It must be remembered that the other departments of the
Government are not prevented from passing on constitutional question arising in the
exercise of their official powers. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 101.) This
Tribunal was not established, nor is it expected to play the role of an overseer to
supervise the other Government departments, with the obligation to seize any
opportunity to correct what we may believe to be erroneous application of the
constitutional mandate. I cannot agree to the suggestion that the way the incumbent
Secretary of Justice has interpreted the fundamental law, no case will ever arise before
the court, because the registers of deeds under his command, will transfer on thier books
all sales to aliens. It is easy to perceive several probabilities: (1) a new secretary may
entertain opposite views; (2) parties legally affected — like heirs or or creditors of the
seller — may wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens, invoking the constitutional
inhibition. Then, in a truly contested case, with opposing litigants actively arguing their
sides we shall be in a position to do full justice. It is not enough that briefs — as in this
case — have been filed; it is desirable, perhaps essential, to make sure that in a motion
for reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention shall be invited to points
inadequately touched or improperly considered.
It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter.
Those sales will be subject to the final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted
litigation. To spell necessity out of the existence of such conveyances, might amount to
begging the issue with the assumption that such transfers are obviously barred by the
Organic Law. And yet sales to foreigners of residential lots have taken place since our
Constitution was approved in 1935, and no one questioned their validity in Court until
nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese authorities had shown distaste for such
transfers.
The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and
reflect upon the conflicting politico-economic philosophies of those who advocate
national isolation against international cooperation, and vice-versa. We could also delve
into several aspects necessarily involved, to wit:
(a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose
of landowners at the time of its adoption; or whether it merely affected the rights of those
who should become landowners after the approval of the Constitution;7
(b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and
commitments in the United Nations Organization, and upon our treaty-making
negotiations with other nations of the worlds; and
(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the
treaties between the United States and Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to
acquire residential lots in places under the jurisdiction of the United States? If so, did our
Constitution have the effect of modifying such treaty during the existence of the
Commonwealth Government?
The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as
requested by the parties, and for withholding of any ruling on the constitutional
prohibition. However, I am now ready to cast my vote. I am convinced that the organic
law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are popularly understood — not including
residential, commercial, industrial or urban lots. This belief is founded on the reasons
ably expounded by Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuason. I am
particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted interpretation of the prohibition, if
erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation amplifying
it; whereas a liberal and wide application, if erroneous, would need the cumbersome and
highly expensive process of a constitutional amendment.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership
suitable or intended for residence may be alienated or sold to an alien.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used
for residence is included in the term "private agricultural land" and comes within the
prohibition of the Constitution. In support of the opinion that lands of private ownership
suitable for residence are included in the term "private agricultural land" and cannot be
alienated or sold to aliens, the majority invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa vs.
Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), which holds that urban lands of the public domain
are included in the term "public agricultural land." But the opinion of the majority
overlooks the fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in
the term "public agricultural land" was due to the classification made by the Congress of
the United States in the Act of 1 July 1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In
said Act, lands of the public domain were classified into agricultural, timber and mineral.
The only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain were those belonging to the
first class. Hence a parcel of land of the public domain suitable for residence, which was
neither timber nor mineral, could not be disposed of or alienated unless classified as
public agricultural land. The susceptibility of a residential lot of the public domain of being
cultivated is not the real reason for the inclusion of such lot in the classification of public
agricultural land, for there are lands, such as foreshore lands, which would hardly be
susceptible of cultivation (Ibañez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167-
168), and yet the same come under the classification of public agricultural land. The fact,
therefore, that parcels of land of the public domain suitable for residence are included in
the classification of public agricultural land, is not a safe guide or index of what the
framers of the Constitution intended to mean by the term "private agricultural land." It is
contrary to the rules of statutory construction to attach technical meaning to terms or
phrases that have a common or ordinary meaning as understood by he average citizen.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in
force was Act No. 2874. Under this Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the
United States and corporations or associations described in section 23 thereof, and
citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same
right to acquire the public land as to their own citizens, could acquire by purchase
agricultural land of the public domain (section 23, Act No. 2874). This was the general
rule. There was an exception. Section 24of the Act provides:
No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in
the last preceding section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of
any other denomination or classification, not used for industrial or residence
purposes, that is at the time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the
public domain, or any permanent improvement thereon, or any real right on such
land and improvement: Provided, however, That persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships which at the date upon which this Act shall take
effect, hold agricultural public lands or land of any other denomination not used
for industrial or residence purposes, that belonged originally, really or
presumptively, to the public domain, or permanent improvements on such lands,
or a real right upon such lands and improvements, having acquired the same
under the laws and regulations in force at the date of such acquisition, shall be
authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons, corporations,
associations, or partnerships were qualified under the last preceding section; but
they shall not encumber, convey, or alienate the same to persons, corporations,
associations or partnerships not included in section twenty-three of this Act,
except by reason of hereditary succession, duly legalized and acknowledged by
competent Courts. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential,
commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, provides:
Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case
may be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or
lease public lands for agricultural purposes. . . . Provided further, That any
person, corporation, association, or partnership disqualified from purchasing
public land for agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act, may
purchase or lease land included under this title suitable for industrial or residence
purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such land issued
for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 121 of the Act provides:
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former
Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any
 other provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to
public lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination
that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in
any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be
encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or
associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this
Act; . . . Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly
acknowledged and legalized by competent Courts, nor to lands and
improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used
for such purposes: . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public
domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes,
could be acquired by aliens disqualified from acquiring by purchase or lease public
agricultural lands (sections 24, 57, 121, Act No. 2874). The delegates to the Constituent
Assembly were familiar with the provisions of the Public Land Act referred to. The
prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified persons, corporations or
associations did not apply to "lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or
residence purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the provisions of Act No.
926, the first Public Land Act, lots for townsites could be acquired by any person
irrespective of citizenship, pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. In spite of the
nationalistic spirit that pervades all the provisions of Act No. 2874, the Philippine
Legislature did not deem it necessary to exclude aliens from acquiring and owning lands
of the public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It adopted the policy of
excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain not "suitable for
residential, commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes," which, together with
timber, mineral and private agricultural lands, constitute the mainstay of the nation. Act
No. 2874 was in force for nearly sixteen years — from 1919 to 1935. There is nothing
recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter
which would have justified a departure from the policy theretofore adopted.
If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could
acquire by purchase or lease lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor
mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, how can it be presumed that the
framers of the Constitution intended to exclude such aliens from acquiring by purchase
private lands suitable for industrial or residence purposes? If pursuant to the law in force
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, lands of the public domain and
improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes were not
included in the prohibition found in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason for
believing that the framers of the Constitution, who were familiar with the law then in
force, did not have the intention of applying the prohibition contained in section 5, Article
XIII, of the Constitution to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for
residence, there being nothing recorded in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent
Assembly regarding the matter which, as above stated, would have justified a departure
from the policy then existing. If the term "private agricultural land" comprehends lands of
private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, as held by the majority,
there was no need of implementing a self-executory prohibition found in the Constitution.
The prohibition to alienate such lands found in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 is a clear indication and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution does not
apply to lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence. The term
"private agricultural land" means privately owned lands devoted to cultivation, to the
raising of agricultural products, and does not include urban lands of private ownership
suitable for industrial or residence purposes. The use of the adjective "agricultural" has
the effect of excluding all other private lands that are not agricultural. Timber and mineral
ands are not, however, included among the excluded, because these lands could not
and can never become private lands. From the land grants known
as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under the Royal
Decrees of 25 June 1880 and 13 February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the
Jones Law, Act No. 2874, the Constitution, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, timber and
mineral lands have always been excluded from alienation. The repeal by sections 23, 60,
123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the exception provided for in sections 24, 57, 121
of Act No. 2874, did not change the meaning of the term "private agricultural land," as
intended by the framers of the Constitution and understood by the people that adopted it.
The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the
refusal of the Register of Deeds of Manila to record the sale of the private land for
residence purposes to the appellant who is an alien.
There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be
recorded by the appellant — whether it is one of those described in section 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141; or a private land that had never been a part of the public
domain (Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S., 449; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43
Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the latter, the prohibition of section 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 does not apply. If it is the former, section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, which
providesthat —
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous
Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in
force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively
of the public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except
to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public
domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines whose
charters authorize them to do so: . . .
is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned
section unconstitutional, for it violates section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August
1916, commonly known as the Jones Law (Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883).
Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, following the rule laid down in the aforecited
case, must also be declared unconstitutional, for it violates section 21 (1), Article VI, of
the Constitution, which is exactly the same as the one infringed upon by section 121 of
Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law may not be passed by Congress to prohibit
alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it must avoid
offending against the constitutional provision referred to above.
Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in
considering the merits of the case, despite the withdrawal of the appeal by the
appellants, consented to by the appellee. If discretion was to be exercised, this Court did
not exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally avoid passing upon constitutional
questions if the case where such questions are raised may be decided on other grounds.
Courts of last resort do not express their opinion on a consitutional question except when
it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36 Phil., 116,
120; Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of the
provisions of the Constitution is no exclusive of the courts. The other coordinate
branches of the government may interpret such provisions acting on matters coming
within their jurisdiction. And although such interpretation is only persuasive and not
binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be deprived of such power. Of course,
the final say on what is the correct interpretation of a constitutional provision must come
from and be made by this Court in an appropriate action submitted to it for decision. The
correct interpretation of a constitutional provision is that which gives effect to the intent of
its framers and primarily to the understanding of such provision by the poeple that
adopted it. This Court is only an interpreter of the instrument which embodies what its
framers had in mind and especially what the people understood it to be when they
adopted it. The eagerness of this Court to express its opinion on the constitutional
provision involved in this case, notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal, is
unusualf or a Court of last resort. It seems as if it were afraid to be deprived by the other
coordinate branches of the government of its prerogative to pass upon the constitutional
question herein involved. If all the members of the Court were unanimous in the
interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny, that eagerness might be
justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree to the interpretation placed
upon such provision, that eagerness becomes recklessness. The interpretation thus
placed by the majority of the Court upon the constitutional provision referred to will be
binding upon the other coordinate branches of the government. If, in the course of time,
such opinion should turn out to be erroneous and against the welfare of the country,an
amendment to the Constitution — a costly process — would have to be proposed and
adopted. But, if the Court had granted the motion for the withdrawal of the appeal, it
would not have to express its opinion upon the constitutional provision in question. It
would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act according to their
wisdom, foresight and patriotism. They, too, possess those qualities and virtues. These
are not of the exclusive possession of the members of this Court. The end sought to be
accomplished by the decision of this Court may be carried out by the enactment of a law.
And if the law should turn out to be against the well-being of the people, its amendment
or repeal would not be as costly a process as a constitutional amendment.
In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by
the appellant and consented to by the appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion,
that, for the reasons hereinbefore set forth, the judgment under review should be
reversed.
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it
says, "the Constitution as we see it and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn
mandate of the Constitution, we cannot compromise it even in the name of equity." We
wish deep in our heart that we were given the light to see as the majority do and could
share their opinion. As it is, we perceive things the other way around. As we see it, the
decision by-passed what according to our humble understanding is the plain intent of the
Constitution and groped out of its way in search of the ideal result. The denial by this
Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor General gave his
conformity collides with the professed sorrow that the decision cannot be helped.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:
5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural
land" as used in this section? Before answering the question, it is convenient to refresh
our memory of the pertinent rule in the interpretation of constitutions as expounded in
decisions of courts of last resort and by law authors.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must
be a construed so to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it.
This intention is to be sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning
of the words employed is to be taken as expressing it, except in cases where the
assumption would lead to absurdity, ambiguity, or contradiction. Black on
Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.)
 Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious,
and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify,
or enlarge it. Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties,
for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning,
or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are
instruments of a practical nature founded on the common business of human life
adapted to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common
understandings. The people make them, the people adopt them, the people must
be supposed to read them with the help of common sense, and cannot be
presumed to admit in them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary gloss. (1
Story, Const. sec. 451.)
Marshall , Ch. J., says:
The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be
understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended
what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1, 188; 6 Law. ed., 23).
Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions
afford no basis for construction where the intent to adopt such provisions is
expressed in clear and unmistakable terms. Nor can construction read into the
provisions of a constitution some unexpressed general policy or spirit, supposed
to underline and pervade the instrument and to render it consonant to the genius
of the institutions of the state. The courts are not at liberty to declare an act void
because they deem it opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. (12 C.J., 702-703.)
There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor
does a literal interpretation of the words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority
opinion, the phrase has no technical meaning, and the same could not have been used
in any sense other than that in which it is understood by the men in the street.
That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all
lands proceed from the sovereign. And, that lands of private ownership are known as
agricultural, residential, commercial and industrial, is another truth which no one can
successfully dispute. In prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural land to aliens, the
Constitution, by necessary implication, authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private
property. The express mention of one thing excludes all others of the same kind.
Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of
elimination we can see what lands do not fall within the purview of the constitutional
inhibition. Webster's New international Dictionary defines this word as "of or pertaining to
agriculture connected with, or engaged in, tillage; as, the agricultural class; agricultural
implements, wages, etc." According to this definition and according to the popular
conception of the word, lands in cities and towns intended or used for buildings or other
kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural lands. They are either
residential, commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings, communities are divided
into residential, commercial and industrial sections. It would be extremely out of the
ordinary, not to say ridiculous, to imagine that the Constitutional Convention considered
a lot on the Escolta with its improvement as agricultural land.
If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision
under consideration will dispel all doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the
framers of the Constitution as properties that may be assigned to foreigners.
Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the
statement that the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other
natural resources in its report recommended the incorporation into the Constitution of the
following provision:
SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership
shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands; and the Government shall regulate the transfer
or assignment of land now owned by persons, or corporations,or associations not
qualified under the provisions of this Constitution to acquire or hold lands in the
Philippine Islands.
In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-
committee of seven embodied the following provision which had been recommended in
the reports of the committee on agricultural development, national defense, industry, and
nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources:
SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership
shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines.
But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a
revised draft of the articleo n General Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had
been prepared by the committee in consultation with President Quezon. The revised
draft as it touches private lands provides as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership
shall be transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands, of the public
 domain in the Philippine Islands. (2 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
Aruego, 595-599.)
The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final
form with sligh alteration in the phraseology.
It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven
in its first draft of the Constitution all proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino
citizens of any land of private ownership without regard to its nature or use, but that the
last mentioned sub-committee later amended that proposal by putting the word
"agricultural" before the word "land." What are we to conclude from this modification? Its
self-evident purpose was to confine the prohibition to agricultural lands, allowing the
ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not partake of agricultural character. The
insertion of the word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby eliminating any
possibility that its implication was not comprehended.
In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the
conclusions in this Court's decision are erroneous either because the premises are
wrong or because the conclusions do not follow the premises.
According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to
change the scope of the provision. It says that "the wording of the first draft was
amended for no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties."
If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a
better way of messing up and obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. If
the purpose was "to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties," the insertion of the word
"agricultural" before the word "land" produced the exact opposite of the result which the
change was expected to accomplish — as witness the present sharp and bitter
controversy which would not have arisen had they let well enough alone.
But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word
"agricultural" into the final draft as "merely one of words" is utterly unsupported by
evidence, by the text of the Constitution, or by sound principles of construction. There is
absolutely no warrant or the statement that the Constitutional Convention, which was
guided by wise men, men of ability and experience in different fields of endeavor, used
the termafter mature deliberation and reflection and after consultation with the President,
without intending to give it its natural signification and connotation. "We are not at liberty
to presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it, did not
understand the force of language." (People vs. Rathbone, 32 N.Y.S., 108.) The
Constitution will be scanned in vain for any reasonable indication that its authors made
the change with intention that it should not operate according to the rules of grammar
and the ordinary process of drawing logical inferences. The theory is against the
presumption, based on human experience, that the framers of a constitution "have
expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding with the immense
importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication." (1
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 128, 129.) "As men, whose intention require
no concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the
ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and
the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural
sense and to have intended what they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.)
When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as
originally proposed, the prohibition was changed to private agricultural lands, the
average man's faculty of reasoning tells him that other lands may be acquired. The
elementary rules of speech with which men of average intelligence, and, above all, the
members of the Constitutional Assembly were familiar, inform us that the object of a
descriptive adjective is to specify a thing as distinct from another. It is from this process
of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius stems; a familiar rule of
interpretation often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural reason.
If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are
they? Timber land or mineral land, or both? As the decision itself says these lands are
not susceptible of private ownership, the answer can only be residential, commercial,
industrial or other lands that are not agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable and
profitable to the owners as residential, commercial or industrial than if he devotes it to the
cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be decided according to the value of the
property, its size, and other attending circumstances.
The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are
suitable for home building are considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that
private residential, commercial or industrial lands should be considered also agricultural
lands. The Court says that "what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in
mind when they drafted the Constitution was this well-known classification (timber,
mineral and agricultural) and its technical meaning then prevailing."
As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this
assumption. The classification of public lands was used for one purpose not
contemplated in the classification of private lands. At the outset, it should be distinctively
made clear that it was this Court's previous decisions and not an Act of Congress which
declared that public lands which were not forest or mineral were agricultural lands. Little
reflection on the background of this Court's decisions and the nature of the question
presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments which came up for
construction, will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of
public lands.
In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for
the very simple and manifest reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups
of public lands — agricultural — can find their way into the hands of private persons.
Forest lands and mineral lands are preserved by the State for itself and for posterity.
Granting what is possible, that there are here and there forest lands and mineral lands to
which private persons have obtained patents or titles, it would be pointless to suppose
that such properties are the ones which section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution wants
to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The majority themselves will not
admit that the Constitution which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows
the conveyance of private forests and mines.
In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a
different object in view. Classification of public lands was and is made for purposes of
administration; for the purpose principally of segregating lands that may be sold from
lands that should be conserved. The Act of July 1, 1902, of the United States Congress
designated what lands of the public domain might be alienated and what should be kept
by the State. Public lands are divided into three classes to the end that natural resources
may be used without waste. Subject to some exceptions and limitation, agricultural lands
may be disposed of by the Government. Preservation of forest and mineral lands was
and is a dominant preoccupation. These are important parts of the country's natural
resources. Private non-agricultural land does not come within the category of natural
resources. Natural resources are defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials
supplied or produced by nature. The United States Congress evinced very little if any
concern with private lands.
It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States
above mentioned was an organic law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public
lands. It was enacted by a Congress whose members were not closely familiar with local
conditions affecting lands. Under the circumstances, it was natural that the Congress
employed "words in a comprehensive sense as expressive of general ideas rather than
of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions. "The United States Congress was
content with laying down a broad outline governing the administration, exploitation, and
disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out by the local
authorities and courts entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation of the law.
It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status
of scattered small parcels of public lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor
agricultural, and with which the Congress had not bothered itself to mention separately or
specifically. This Court, forced by nature of its duty to decide legal controversies, ruled
that public lands that were fit for residential purposes, public swamps and other public
lands that were neither forest nor mineral, were to be regarded as agricultural lands. In
other words, there was an apparent void, often inevitable in a law or constitution, and this
Court merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say that agricultural
lands and residential lands are the same or alike in their character and use. It merely
said that for the purpose of judging their alienability, residential, commercial or industrial
lands should be brought under the class of agricultural lands.
On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with
a different aim. This Court is not now confronted with any problem for which there is no
specific provision, such as faced it when the question of determining the character of
public residential land came up for decision. This Court is not called to rule whether a
private residential land is forest, mineral or agricultural. This Court is not, in regard to
private lands, in the position where it found itself with reference to public lands,
compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call public residential lands,
agricultural lands. When it comes to determining the character of private non-agricultural
lands, the Court's task is not to compare it with forests, mines and agricultural lands, to
see which of these bears the closest resembrance to the land in question. Since there
are no private timber nor mineral lands, and if there were, they could not be transferred
to foreigners, and since the object of section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution is
radically at variance withthat of the laws covering public lands, we have to have different
standards of comparison and have to look of the intent of this constitutional provision
from a different angle and perspective. When a private non-agricultural land demands to
know where it stands, we do not acquire, is it mineral, forest or agricultural? We only ask,
is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is within the inhibition of section 5 of Article XIII.
The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land.
Stripped of the special considerations which dictated the classification of public lands into
three general groups, there is no alternative but to take the term "agricultural land" in its
natural and popular signification; and thus regarded, it imports a distinct connotation
which involves no absurdity and no contradiction between different parts of the organic
law. Its meaning is that agricultural land is specified in section 5 of Article XIII to
differentiate it from lands that are used or are more suitable for purposes other than
agriculture.
It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on
constitutional law, Justice Story and Professor Cooley:
"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense
wherever it occurs in a constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be
observed in applying an arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well observed; `It
does not follow, either logically or grammatically, that because a word is found in one
connection in the Constitution with a definite sense, therefore the same is to be adopted
in every other connection in which it occurs. This would be to suppose that the framers
weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and not whole clauses
and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been more
common than to subject the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of
ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having
found in the Constitution a word used in some sense which falls in with their favorite
theory of interpreting it, have made that the standard by which to measure its use in
every other part of the instrument. They have thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of
Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too large for their purposes, and
extending it, when it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to the most unnatural
shapes, and crippled where they have sought only to adjust its proportions according to
their own opinions? And he gives many instances where, in the National Constitution, it
is very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule
may be sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but slight, and it must readily
give way to a different intent appearing in the instrument." (1 Cooley's Constitutional
Limitations, 8th ed., 135.)
As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical
meaning and that the Constitution has employed them in that sense, it can only be
accepted in reference to public lands. If a technical import has been affixed to the term, it
can not be extended to private lands if we are not to be led to an absurdity and if we are
avoid the charge that we are resorting to subtle and ingenious refinement to force from
the Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While in the construction of a
constitution words must be given the technical meaning which they have acquired, the
rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be supposed to
have had in view in adopting them." To give an example. "When the constitution speaks
of an ex post facto law, it means a law technically known by that designation; the
meaning of the phrase having become definite in the history of constitutional law, and
being so familiar to the people that it is not necessary to employ language of a more
popular character to designate it." In reality, this is not a departure from the general rule
that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to the popular mind, "for the
technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood, because that is the
sense fixed upon the words in legal and constitutional history where they have been
employed for the protection of popular rights." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th
ed., 132-133.) Viewed from this angle, "agricultural land" does not possess the quality of
a technical term. Even as applied to public lands, and even among lawyers and judges,
how many are familiar with the decisions of this Court which hold that public swamps and
public lands more appropriate for buildings and other structures than for agriculture are
agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully said of members of the Constitutional
Assembly.
The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of
interpretation. The sentiments expressed in those speeches, like the first drafts of section
5 of Article XIII, may have reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the first stages of
the deliberation or down to its close. If they were, those sentiments were relaxed and not
given full sway for reasons on which we need not speculate. Speeches in support of a
project can be a valuable criterion for judging the intention of a law or constitution only if
no changes were afterward affected. If anything, the change in section 5 of Article XIII
wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute nationalization of all
lands, without exception, offers itself as the best proof that to the framers of the
Constitution the change was not "merely one of words" but represented something real
and substantial. Firm and resolute convictions are expressed in a document in strong,
unequivocal and unqualified language. This is specially true when the instrument is a
constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of human writings, always carefully drawn,
and calculated for permanent endurance."
The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence
which says that one of the principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the
Constitution is "that lands, minerals, forests and other natural resources constitute the
exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation." In underlying the word lands the Court wants to
insinuate that all lands without exceptions are included. This is nothing to be enthusiastic
over. It is hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which the statement expresses more than the
truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of expression." It is an expression that "lies but
does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men, and every one
knows we don't.
The decision says:
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or
disposable public lands" which are the same as "public agricultural lands" under
the Constitution, are classified into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial
and for other purposes. This simply means that the term "public agricultural
lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general
meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber
nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation
or disposition, into lands that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to
cultivation for agricultural purposes; lands that are residential; commercial;
industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made
alienable or disposable under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino
Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their character as public agricultural lands
under said statute and under the Constitution."
If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing
passage, my humble opinion is that there is no logical connection between the premise
and the conclusion. What to me seems clearly to emerge from it is that Commonwealth
Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that Court's theory, actually pulls down its case which
it has built upon the foundation of parallel classification of public and private lands into
forest, mineral and agricultural lands, and the inexistence of such things as residential,
industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted that Act No. 141, section 9, classifies
disposable lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc. And these are
lands of the public domain.
The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included
in Article XIII, which is entitled "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no
ground for treating public lands and private lands on the same footing. The inference
should rather be the exact reverse. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, are
natural resources. But residential, commercial, and industrial lands, as we have seen,
are not natural resources either in the sense these words convey to the popular mind or
as defined in the dictionary. This fact may have been one factor which prompted the
elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the prohibition, along with
reasons, of foreign policy, economics and politics.
From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not
derive any comfort unless we cling to the serious argument that as public lands go so go
private lands. In that opinion the question propounded was whether a piece of public land
which was more profitable as a homesite might not be sold and considered as
agricultural. The illustrious Secretary answered yes, which was correct. But the
classification of private lands was not directly or indirectly involved. It is the opinion of the
present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the construction placed by the law-
officer of the government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as the
majority say but which I doubt, as representing the true intent of the instrument, this
Court, if it is to be consistent, should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor
General's attitude as interested counsel for the government in a judicial action is — as
the decision also suggests but which, I think, is still more incorrect both in theory and in
practice — then this Court should have given heed to the motion for withdrawal of the
present appeal, which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in line presumably
with the opinion of the head of his department.
The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in
the hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves
who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens." It reasons that "it would
certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all,
they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the
hands of Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No. 141 should banish this fear.
These sections, quoted and relied upon in the majority opinion, prevent private lands that
have been acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien possession in
fee simple. Without this law, the fear would be well-founded if we adopt the majority's
theory, which we precisely reject, that agricultural and residential lands are synonymous,
be they public or private. The fear would not materialize under our theory, that only lands
which are not agricultural may be owned by persons other than FIlipino citizens.
Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation
of section 5 of Article XIII. Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally
acquired in any manner under its provisions or under the provisions of any previous law,
ordinace, royal order, royal decree, or any other law formerly enforced in the Philippines
with regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute eloquent testimony that in the minds of the
legislature, whose interpretation the majority correctly say should be looked to as
authoritative, the Constitution did not carry such prohibition. For if the Constitution
already barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the provisions of
sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 would have been superfluous.
The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may
not even operate a small jeepney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that
neither is he allowed to own a piece of land." There is no similitude between owning a lot
for a home or a factory or a store and operating a jeepney for hire. It is not the ownership
of a jeepney that is forbidden; it is the use of it for public service that is not allowed. A
foreigner is not barred from owning the costliest motor cars, steamships or airplanes in
any number, for his private use or that of his friends and relatives. He can not use a
jeepney for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to Filipino nationals,
and the operation of a jeepney happens to be within this policy. The use of a jeepney for
hire maybe insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that performs a vital
function in the country's economic life, closely associated with its advancing civilization,
supplying needs so fundamental for communal living and for the development of the
country's economy, that the government finds need of subjecting them to some measure
of control and the Constitution deems it necessary to limit their operation by Filipino
citizens. The importance of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or minimized
just as a vote for public office by a single foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug
of the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the political complexion or
scene of the nation.
This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the
term `private agricultural lands' is to be construed as not including residential lots or
lands of similar nature, the result will be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not
only residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions and whole towns
and cities, and that they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for
building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and
vacation resorts, markets, golf — courses, playgrounds, airfields and a host of other uses
and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." Arguments like this
have no place where there is no ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not
at liberty to disregard a provision that is clear and certain simply because its enforcement
would work inconvenience or hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results.
Courts have nothing to do with inconvenience or consequences. This role is founded on
sound principles of constitutional government and is so well known as to make citations
of authorities presumptuous.
Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the
Solicitor General dread, we should not overlook the fact that there is the Congress
standing guard to curtail or stop such excesses or abuses if and when the menace
should show its head. The fact that the Constitution has not prohibited, as we contend,
the transfer of private non-agricultural lands to aliens does not prevent the Congress
from passing legislation to regulate or prohibit such transfer, to define the size of private
lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to specify the uses for which lands may
be dedicated, in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries, vacation
resorts, markets, golf-courses, cemeteries. The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as
to exclude foreigners from entering the country or settling here. If I may be permitted to
guess, the alteration in the original draft of section 5 of Article XIII may have been
prompted precisely by the thought that it is the better policy to leave to the political
departments of the Government the regulation or absolute prohibition of all land
ownership by foreigners, as the changed, changing and ever-changing conditions
demand. The Commonwealth Legislature did that with respect to lands that were
originally public lands, through Commonwealth Act No. 141, and the Legislative
Assembly during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all private lands,
as Mr. Justice Paras has pointed out. In the present Congress, at least two bills have
been introduced proposing Congressional legislation in the same direction. All of which is
an infallible sign that the Constitution does not carry such prohibition, in the opinion of
three legislatures, an opinion which, we entirely agree with the majority, should be given
serious consideration by the courts (if needed there were any doubt), both as a matter of
policy, and also because it may be presumed to represent the true intent of the
instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In truth, the decision lays special emphasis on the fact that
"many members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. 141) had
been members of the Constitutional Convention." May I add that Senator Francisco, who
is the author of one of the bills I have referred to, in the Senate, was a leading, active
and influential member of the Constitutional Convention?
 CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, Petitioners, v. COURT OF
APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO
CATANIAG, Respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The factual findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, may
no longer be reviewed and reversed by this Court in a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The transfer of an interest in a piece of land to an
alien may no longer be assailed on constitutional grounds after the entire parcel
has been sold to a qualified citizen.
The Case
These familiar and long-settled doctrines are applied by this Court in denying this
petition under Rule 45 to set aside the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in
CA-GR CV No. 37829 promulgated on September 14, 1993, the dispositive
portion of which states:[3]
WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing, the Decision of the court below dated
March 10, 1992 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit is AFFIRMED without
pronouncement as to costs.
The Facts
The factual antecedents, as narrated by Respondent Court, are not disputed by
the parties. We reproduce them in part, as follows:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real
properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee
[herein private respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant
appellee [also herein private respondent] David Rey Guzman, both of whom are
also American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim
(Annex A-Complaint), assigning[,] transferring and conveying to David Rey all
her rights, titles and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of
them inherited from Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, x x x situated in
Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT No. T-170514 was cancelled
and TCT No. T-120259 was issued in the name of appellee David Rey Guzman.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendant-
appellee [also herein private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT No.
T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in the latters
name.[4]
Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and
validity of the two conveyances -- between Helen Guzman and David Rey
Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag -- and claiming ownership
thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621[5]of the Civil
Code.
In its decision[6] dated March 10, 1992,[7] the trial court dismissed the
complaint. It ruled that Helen Guzmans waiver of her inheritance in favor of her
son was not contrary to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to
an alien, since the purpose of the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey
Guzman to dispose of their properties in accordance with the Constitution and the
laws of the Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that
the subject land was urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right
of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.
The Halilis sought a reversal from the Court of Appeals which, however, denied
their appeal. Respondent Court affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that
the subject land was urban. Citing Tejido vs. Zamacoma[8] and Yap vs.
Grageda,[9] it further held that, although the transfer of the land to David Rey
may have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more
point in allowing herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed on
to and was thus already owned by a qualified person.
Hence, this petition.[10]
Issues
The petition submits the following assignment of errors:
x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals -
1. Erred in affirming the conclusion of the trial court that the land in question is
urban, not rural
2. Erred in denying petitioners right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil
Code
3. Having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her son
David Rey Guzman illegal, erred in not declaring the same null and void[.][11]
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: The Land Is Urban;
Thus, No Right of Redemption
The first two errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated -- the
determination of the first being a prerequisite to the resolution of the second --
shall be discussed together.
Subject Land Is Urban
Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a
rule, is not reviewable by this Court.[12] Basic and long-settled is the doctrine
that findings of fact of a trial judge, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding upon the Supreme Court. This admits of only a few exceptions, such as
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual findings is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the findings of the appellate court go
beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the parties to
the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will
justify a different conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of facts; when the
findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which
they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence or are contradicted by
evidence on record.[13]
The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited exceptions. In fact, the
conclusion of the trial court -- that the subject property is urban land -- is based
on clear and convincing evidence, as shown in its decision which disposed thus:
x x x As observed by the court, almost all the roadsides along the national
ghighway [sic] of Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, are lined up with residential,
commercial or industrial establishments. Lined up along the Bagbaguin Road are
factories of feeds, woodcrafts [sic] and garments, commercial stores for tires,
upholstery materials, feeds supply and spare parts. Located therein likewise were
the Pepsi-Cola Warehouse, the Cruz Hospital, three gasoline stations, apartment
buildings for commercial purposes and construction firms. There is no doubt,
therefore, that the community is a commercial area thriving in business activities.
Only a short portion of said road [is] vacant. It is to be noted that in the Tax
Declaration in the name of Helen Meyers Guzman[,] the subject land is termed
agricultural[,] while in the letter addressed to defendant Emiliano Cataniag, dated
October 3, 1991, the Land Regulatory Board attested that the subject property is
commercial and the trend of development along the road is commercial. The
Boards classification is based on the present condition of the property and the
community thereat. Said classification is far more later [sic] than the tax
declaration.[14]
No Ground to Invoke Right of Redemption
In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have
indeed no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the
land sought to be redeemed is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits
of no ambiguity in construction:
ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of
redemption when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed
one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land.
xxx xxx xxx
Under this article, both lands -- that sought to be redeemed and the adjacent lot
belonging to the person exercising the right of redemption -- must be rural. If
one or both are urban, the right cannot be invoked.[15] The purpose of this
provision which is limited in scope to rural lands not exceeding one hectare, is to
favor agricultural development.[16] The subject land not being rural and,
therefore, not agricultural, this purpose would not be served if petitioners are
granted the right of redemption under Art. 1621. Plainly, under the
circumstances, they cannot invoke it.
Second Issue: Sale to Cataniag Valid
Neither do we find any reversible error in the appellate courts holding that the
sale of the subject land to Private Respondent Cataniag renders moot any
question on the constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen Guzman to
her son David Rey.
True, Helen Guzmans deed of quitclaim -- in which she assigned, transferred and
conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property she
had inherited from her husband -- collided with the Constitution, Article XII,
Section 7 of which provides:
SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
The landmark case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds[17] settled the issue as to
who are qualified (and disqualified) to own public as well as private lands in the
Philippines. Following a long discourse maintaining that the public agricultural
lands mentioned in Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include
residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court then stated:
Under section 1 of Article XIII [now Sec. 2, Art. XII] of the Constitution, natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,
and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino
citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens
themselves who may alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly
to prevent this result that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as
follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may
be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands
of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 [now Sec. 7] is
intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1 [now Sec.
2]. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same
purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons
against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 [now Sec. 7] are the very
same persons who under section 1 [now Sec. 2] are disqualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. And the subject matter of both
sections is the same, namely, the non transferability of agricultural land to aliens.
x x x[18]
The Krivenko rule was recently reiterated in Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals,
[19] which involves a sale of land to a Chinese citizen. The Court said:
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the
capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be
transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire
lands of the public domain (II Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines
439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the
disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of all lands of the public
domain and other natural resources of the Philippines for Filipino citizens or
corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which was owned by
Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified
from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from
acquiring private lands.[20]
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of
the public domain, except only by way of legal succession.[21]
But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a
qualified Filipino citizen? This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is consistent
that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a
citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.[22]
Thus, in United Church Board of World Ministries vs. Sebastian,[23] in which an
alien resident who owned properties in the Philippines devised to an American
non-stock corporation part of his shares of stock in a Filipino corporation that
owned a tract of land in Davao del Norte, the Court sustained the invalidity of
such legacy. However, upon proof that ownership of the American corporation
has passed on to a 100 percent Filipino corporation, the Court ruled that the
defect in the will was rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property.
The present case is similar to De Castro vs. Tan.[24] In that case, a residential
lot was sold to a Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children executed an
extrajudicial settlement, whereby said lot was allotted to one of his sons who
became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not allow the original vendor to have
the sale annulled and to recover the property, for the reason that the land has
since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally
qualified to own land.

Likewise, in the cases of Sarsosa vs. Cuenco,[25] Godinez vs. Pak Luen,

[26] Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap[27] and Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan,[28] which
similarly involved the sale of land to an alien who thereafter sold the same to a
Filipino citizen, the Court again applied the rule that the subsequent sale can no
longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer.

The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus:

x x x [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban
lands, as construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nations
lands for future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be
thwarted but achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens
who became Filipino citizens by naturalization.[29]

Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent

Cataniag, a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed.
The objective of the constitutional provision -- to keep our land in Filipino hands
-- has been served.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is

AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 195670               December 3, 2012 d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21307, containing an area of 45
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, sq.m.
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent. By way of inheritance:

DECISION e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567,
containing an area of 2,635 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
1  f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575,
CoLlli assailing the October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the
2  3  containing an area of 360 sq.m. (the area that appertains to the conjugal
court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940, which affirmed the February 28, 2007 partnership is 24 sq.m.).7

Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 in Civil Case
4 

No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains of Willem In defense, respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential
8 

Beumer (petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties
forming part of the said property regime. during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal money to purchase
Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way
The Factual Antecedents of inheritance. She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to
9 

the fact that she purchased Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After money. Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of the petition for dissolution as
10 

several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their well as payment for attorney’s fees and litigation expenses. 11

marriage in the Decision dated November 10, 2000 on the basis of the former’s
5 

psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code. During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the
name of respondent, these properties were acquired with the money he received from
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership dated
6  the Dutch government as his disability benefit since respondent did not have sufficient
12 

December 14, 2000 praying for the distribution of the following described properties income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted
claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of their marriage, to wit: before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family
Code, hence, invalid. 13

By Purchase:
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots
came exclusively from her personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the
as well as products from Avon, Triumph and Tupperware. She further asserted that after
14 

Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846,

she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred to their second
containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.), including a residential house
house and brought along with him certain personal properties, consisting of drills, a
constructed thereon.
welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment
have a total cost of P500,000.00. 15

b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing
an area of 806 sq.m., including a residential house constructed thereon.
The RTC Ruling
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision,
an area of 756 sq.m.
dissolving the parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to
respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner
as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned
by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains between petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent Avelina Amores
considering the fact that their marriage was previously annulled by Branch 32 of this
Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 22846, 21974,
21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared paraphernal properties of
respondent Avelina Amores due to the fact that while these real properties were acquired
by onerous title during their marital union, Willem Beumer, being a foreigner, is not
allowed by law to acquire any private land in the Philippines, except through inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which
were brought out by Willem from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be
exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974
and 22846 are hereby declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent
since these were acquired during their marital union and since there is no prohibition on
foreigners from owning buildings and residential units. Petitioner and respondent are,
thereby, directed to subject this court for approval their project of partition on the two
houses aforementioned.
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of respondent for
attorney’s fees considering the well settled doctrine that there should be no premium on
the right to litigate. The prayer for moral damages are likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 16
It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845
and 4, petitioner could not have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as
petitioner still attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his knowledge of the
constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands. This was made
17 
evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show that the subject
parcels of land were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein
respondent. Petitioner’s plea for reimbursement for the amount he had paid to purchase
18 
the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not having come
to court with clean hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTC’s award of Lots 1,
2142, 5845 and 4 in favor of respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase
the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds and that they were registered in
the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against foreign
ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of what he
had paid in the purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of his
estranged ex-wife. 19
On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision affirming in toto the judgment
20 
rendered by the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that
petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in
the Philippines." Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for reimbursement.
21 
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the
CA Decision due to the following error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE
PETITIONER’S ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT
OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF THE
REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE. (Emphasis supplied)
22 
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of
Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller the Court had already denied a
23 
claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted by
a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena Buenaventura
Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity
where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
prohibition against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined under Section 7,
24 
Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred
or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited
constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he
25 
and respondent registered the subject properties in the latter’s name. Clearly,
26 
petitioner’s actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition.
On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the
Muller ruling and accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must
do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely
stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity. Thus, a litigant may be
denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable,
unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful. 27
In this case, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source of the funds used to
designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case,
the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto
doctrine. It may be unfair and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem
verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said
properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The
objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant,
sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however,
that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in general principles of policy, which
the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the
plaintiff." (Citations omitted)
34 

purchase the subject parcels of land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to
have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign
purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to
28  citizenship. Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens
35 

acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as
petitioner has come before the Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from
seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to
and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against
foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built
thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly
declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the
purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony and it is this policy which
36 

petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue the Court is duty-bound to protect.
of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-established that equity as a rule will follow the
law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009
be done directly. Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and
29  Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary
30  01940 are AFFIRMED.
thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have the subject
31 

properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had spent for the SO ORDERED
purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an
32 

unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.

Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust
enrichment. As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking
33 

monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision
on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:

Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other
means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him. 1âwphi1

The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER

DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of
another). An action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been
 [G.R. NO. 156364 : September 25, 2008] The Contract to Sell between petitioner and respondent provides as follows:

JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, Petitioner v. PR BUILDERS, INC., Respondent. Section 3. TITLE AND OWNERSHIP OF UNIT

RESOLUTION A. Upon full payment by the BUYER of the purchase price stipulated in Section 2
hereof, x x x, the SELLER shall deliver to the BUYER the Deed of Absolute
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Sale conveying its rights, interests and title to the UNIT and to the
common areas appurtenant to such UNIT, and the
This resolves petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. corresponding Condominium Certificate of Title in the SELLER's name; x x x

On September 3, 2007, the Court rendered a Decision1 in the present case, the b. The Seller shall register with the proper Registry of Deeds, the Master Deed
dispositive portion of which reads: with the Declaration of Restrictions and other documents and shall immediately
comply with all requirements of Republic Act No. 4726 (The Condominium
Act) and Presidential Decree No. 957 (Regulating the Sale of Subdivision Lots
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30,
and Condominiums, Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof). It is hereby
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981 is REVERSED and SET
understood that all title, rights and interest so conveyed shall be subject to
ASIDE. The Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y.
the provisions of the Condominium Act, the Master Deed with Declaration of
Aquino and Director Belen G. Ceniza in HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 is
Restrictions, the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws and the Rules and
declared NULL and VOID. HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza are directed
Regulations of the Condominium Corporation, zoning regulations and such other
to issue the corresponding certificates of sale in favor of the winning bidder, Holly
restrictions on the use of the property as annotated on the title or may be
Properties Realty Corporation. Petitioner is ordered to return to respondent
imposed by any government agency or instrumentality having jurisdiction
the amount of P2,125,540.00, without interest, in excess of the proceeds
thereon.4 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
of the auction sale delivered to petitioner. After the finality of herein
judgment, the amount of P2,125,540.00 shall earn 6% interest until fully paid.
Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act,
foreign nationals can own Philippine real estate through the purchase of
SO ORDERED.2 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
condominium units or townhouses constituted under the Condominium principle
with Condominium Certificates of Title. Section 5 of R.A. No. 4726 states:
Petitioner filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration3 insofar as he was
ordered to return to respondent the amount of P2,125,540.00 in excess of the
SECTION 5. Any transfer or conveyance of a unit or an apartment, office or store
proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner. Petitioner contends that the
or other space therein, shall include the transfer or conveyance of the undivided
Contract to Sell between petitioner and respondent involved a condominium unit
interest in the common areas or, in a proper case, the membership or
and did not violate the Constitutional proscription against ownership of land by
shareholdings in the condominium corporation; Provided, however, That where
aliens. He argues that the contract to sell will not transfer to the buyer ownership
the common areas in the condominium project are held by the owners of
of the land on which the unit is situated; thus, the buyer will not get a transfer
separate units as co-owners thereof, no condominium unit therein shall be
certificate of title but merely a Condominium Certificate of Title as evidence of
conveyed or transferred to persons other than Filipino citizens or corporations at
ownership; a perusal of the contract will show that what the buyer acquires is the
least 60% of the capital stock of which belong to Filipino citizens, except in cases
seller's title and rights to and interests in the unit and the common areas.
of hereditary succession. Where the common areas in a condominium
project are held by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a unit
Despite receipt of this Court's Resolution dated February 6, 2008, respondent shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of the appurtenant membership
failed to file a comment on the subject motion. or stockholding in the corporation will cause the alien interest in such
corporation to exceed the limits imposed by existing laws. (Emphasis
The Motion for Partial Reconsideration is impressed with merit. supplied)cralawlibrary
The law provides that no condominium unit can be sold without at the same time
selling the corresponding amount of rights, shares or other interests in the
condominium management body, the Condominium Corporation; and no one can
buy shares in a Condominium Corporation without at the same time buying a
condominium unit. It expressly allows foreigners to acquire condominium units
and shares in condominium corporations up to not more than 40% of the total
and outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation. Under
this set up, the ownership of the land is legally separated from the unit itself. The
land is owned by a Condominium Corporation and the unit owner is simply a
member in this Condominium Corporation.5 As long as 60% of the members of
this Condominium Corporation are Filipino, the remaining members can be
foreigners.

Considering that the rights and liabilities of the parties under the Contract to Sell
is covered by the Condominium Act wherein petitioner as unit owner was simply a
member of the Condominium Corporation and the land remained owned by
respondent, then the constitutional proscription against aliens owning real
property does not apply to the present case. There being no circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition, the Court's pronouncements on the invalidity of the
Contract of Sale should be set aside.

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration is GRANTED. Accordingly,

the Decision dated September 3, 2007 of the Court is MODIFIED by deleting the
order to petitioner to return to respondent the amount of P2,125,540.00 in
excess of the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. L-6776             May 21, 1955
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
UNG SIU SI TEMPLE, respondent-appellant.
Alejo F. Candido for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Querube C. Makalintal and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for
appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
The Register of Deeds for the province of Rizal refused to accept for record a deed of
donation executed in due form on January 22, 1953, by Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen,
conveying a parcel of residential land, in Caloocan, Rizal, known as lot No. 2, block 48-
D, PSD-4212, G.L.R.O. Record No. 11267, in favor of the unregistered religious
organization "Ung Siu Si Temple", operating through three trustees all of Chinese
nationality. The donation was duly accepted by Yu Juan, of Chinese nationality, founder
and deaconess of the Temple, acting in representation and in behalf of the latter and its
trustees.
The refusal of the Registrar was elevated en Consultato the IVth Branch of the Court of
First Instance of Manila. On March 14, 1953, the Court upheld the action of the Rizal
Register of Deeds, saying:
The question raised by the Register of Deeds in the above transcribed consulta is
whether a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in favor of a religious
organization whose founder, trustees and administrator are Chinese citizens
should be registered or not.
It appearing from the record of the Consulta that UNG SIU SI TEMPLE is a
religious organization whose deaconess, founder, trustees and administrator are
all Chinese citizens, this Court is of the opinion and so hold that in view of the
provisions of the sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution of the
Philippines limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital stock of which
is owned by such citizens adopted after the enactment of said Act No. 271, and
the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Krivenko vs. the Register of
Deeds of Manila, the deed of donation in question should not be admitted for
admitted for registration. (Printed Rec. App. pp 17-18).
Not satisfied with the ruling of the Court of First Instance, counsel for the donee Uy Siu Si
Temple has appealed to this Court, claiming: (1) that the acquisition of the land in
question, for religious purposes, is authorized and permitted by Act No. 271 of the old
Philippine Commission, providing as follows:
SECTION 1. It shall be lawful for all religious associations, of whatever sort or
denomination, whether incorporated in the Philippine Islands or in the name of
other country, or not incorporated at all, to hold land in the Philippine Islands
upon which to build churches, parsonages, or educational or charitable
institutions.
SEC. 2. Such religious institutions, if not incorporated, shall hold the land in the
name of three Trustees for the use of such associations; . . .. (Printed Rec. App.
p. 5.)
and (2) that the refusal of the Register of Deeds violates the freedom of religion clause of
our Constitution [Art. III, Sec. 1(7)].
We are of the opinion that the Court below has correctly held that in view of the absolute
terms of section 5, Title XIII, of the Constitution, the provisions of Act No. 271 of the old
Philippine Commission must be deemed repealed since the Constitution was enacted, in
so far as incompatible therewith. In providing that, —
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines,
the Constitution makes no exception in favor of religious associations. Neither is there
any such saving found in sections 1 and 2 of Article XIII, restricting the acquisition of
public agricultural lands and other natural resources to "corporations or associations at
least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens" (of the
Philippines).
The fact that the appellant religious organization has no capital stock does not suffice to
escape the Constitutional inhibition, since it is admitted that its members are of foreign
nationality. The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that
corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural
resources shall be controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that
in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of
Filipino citizens.
To permit religious associations controlled by non-Filipinos to acquire agricultural lands
would be to drive the opening wedge to revive alien religious land holdings in this
country. We can not ignore the historical fact that complaints against land holdings of
that kind were among the factors that sparked the revolution of 1896.

As to the complaint that the disqualification under article XIII is violative of the freedom of
religion guaranteed by Article III of the Constitution, we are by no means convinced (nor
has it been shown) that land tenure is indispensable to the free exercise and enjoyment
of religious profession or worship; or that one may not worship the Deity according to the
dictates of his own conscience unless upon land held in fee simple.

The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

 ALFRED FRITZ FRENZEL, Petitioner, vs. EDERLINA P. CATITO, Respondent.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
53485 which affirmed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 14,
in Civil Case No. 17,817 dismissing the petitioner's complaint, and the resolution of the
Court of Appeals denying his motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
The Antecedents 3
As gleaned from the evidence of the petitioner, the case at bar stemmed from the
following factual backdrop:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen of German descent. He is an electrical
engineer by profession, but worked as a pilot with the New Guinea Airlines. He arrived in
the Philippines in 1974, started engaging in business in the country two years thereafter,
and married Teresita Santos, a Filipino citizen. In 1981, Alfred and Teresita separated from
bed and board without obtaining a divorce.
Sometime in February 1983, Alfred arrived in Sydney, Australia for a vacation. He went to
King's Cross, a night spot in Sydney, for a massage where he met Ederlina Catito, a
Filipina and a native of Bajada, Davao City. Unknown to Alfred, she resided for a time in
Germany and was married to Klaus Muller, a German national. She left Germany and tried
her luck in Sydney, Australia, where she found employment as a masseuse in the King's
Cross nightclub. She was fluent in German, and Alfred enjoyed talking with her. The two
saw each other again; this time Ederlina ended up staying in Alfred's hotel for three days.
Alfred gave Ederlina sums of money for her services.4
Alfred was so enamored with Ederlina that he persuaded her to stop working at King's
Cross, return to the Philippines, and engage in a wholesome business of her own. He also
proposed that they meet in Manila, to which she assented. Alfred gave her money for her
plane fare to the Philippines. Within two weeks of Ederlina's arrival in Manila, Alfred joined
her. Alfred reiterated his proposal for Ederlina to stay in the Philippines and engage in
business, even offering to finance her business venture. Ederlina was delighted at the idea
and proposed to put up a beauty parlor. Alfred happily agreed.
Alfred told Ederlina that he was married but that he was eager to divorce his wife in
Australia. Alfred proposed marriage to Ederlina, but she replied that they should wait a
little bit longer.
Ederlina found a building at No. 444 M.H. del Pilar corner Arquiza Street, Ermita, Manila,
owned by one Atty. Jose Hidalgo who offered to convey his rights over the property for
P18,000.00. Alfred and Ederlina accepted the offer. Ederlina put up a beauty parlor on the
property under the business name Edorial Beauty Salon, and had it registered with the
Department of Trade and Industry under her name. Alfred paid Atty. Hidalgo P20,000.00
for his right over the property and gave P300,000.00 to Ederlina for the purchase of
equipment and furniture for the parlor. As Ederlina was going to Germany, she executed a
special power of attorney on December 13, 19835 appointing her brother, Aser Catito, as
her attorney-in-fact in managing the beauty parlor business. She stated in the said deed
that she was married to Klaus Muller. Alfred went back to Papua New Guinea to resume his
work as a pilot.
When Alfred returned to the Philippines, he visited Ederlina in her Manila residence and
found it unsuitable for her. He decided to purchase a house and lot owned by Victoria
Binuya Steckel in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 218429 for US$20,000.00. Since Alfred knew that as an alien he was disqualified
from owning lands in the Philippines, he agreed that only Ederlina's name would appear in
the deed of sale as the buyer of the property, as well as in the title covering the same.
After all, he was planning to marry Ederlina and he believed that after their marriage, the
two of them would jointly own the property. On January 23, 1984, a Contract to Sell was
entered into between Victoria Binuya Steckel as the vendor and Ederlina as the sole
vendee. Alfred signed therein as a witness.6 Victoria received from Alfred, for and in behalf
of Ederlina, the amount of US$10,000.00 as partial payment, for which Victoria issued a
receipt.7 When Victoria executed the deed of absolute sale over the property on March 6,
1984,8 she received from Alfred, for and in behalf of Ederlina, the amount of
US$10,000.00 as final and full payment. Victoria likewise issued a receipt for the said
amount.9 After Victoria had vacated the property, Ederlina moved into her new house.
When she left for Germany to visit Klaus, she had her father Narciso Catito and her two
sisters occupy the property.
Alfred decided to stay in the Philippines for good and live with Ederlina. He returned to
Australia and sold his fiber glass pleasure boat to John Reid for $7,500.00 on May 4,
1984.10 He also sold his television and video business in Papua New Guinea for
K135,000.00 to Tekeraoi Pty. Ltd.11 He had his personal properties shipped to the
Philippines and stored at No. 14 Fernandez Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
The proceeds of the sale were deposited in Alfred's account with the Hong Kong Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC), Kowloon Branch under Bank Account No. 018-2-
807016.12 When Alfred was in Papua New Guinea selling his other properties, the bank
sent telegraphic letters updating him of his account.13 Several checks were credited to his
HSBC bank account from Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation, Westpac Bank of
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited and Westpac Bank-PNG-Limited. Alfred
also had a peso savings account with HSBC, Manila, under Savings Account No. 01-725-
183-01.14
Once, when Alfred and Ederlina were in Hong Kong, they opened another account with
HSBC, Kowloon, this time in the name of Ederlina, under Savings Account No. 018-0-
807950.15 Alfred transferred his deposits in Savings Account No. 018-2-807016 with the
said bank to this new account. Ederlina also opened a savings account with the Bank of
America Kowloon Main Office under Account No. 30069016.16
On July 28, 1984, while Alfred was in Papua New Guinea, he received a Letter dated
December 7, 1983 from Klaus Muller who was then residing in Berlin, Germany. Klaus
informed Alfred that he and Ederlina had been married on October 16, 1978 and had a
blissful married life until Alfred intruded therein. Klaus stated that he knew of Alfred and
Ederlina's amorous relationship, and discovered the same sometime in November 1983
when he arrived in Manila. He also begged Alfred to leave Ederlina alone and to return her
to him, saying that Alfred could not possibly build his future on his (Klaus') misfortune.17
Alfred had occasion to talk to Sally MacCarron, a close friend of Ederlina. He inquired if
there was any truth to Klaus' statements and Sally confirmed that Klaus was married to
Ederlina. When Alfred confronted Ederlina, she admitted that she and Klaus were, indeed,
married. But she assured Alfred that she would divorce Klaus. Alfred was appeased. He
agreed to continue the amorous relationship and wait for the outcome of Ederlina's
petition for divorce. After all, he intended to marry her. He retained the services of
Rechtsanwaltin Banzhaf with offices in Berlin, as her counsel who informed her of the
progress of the proceedings.18 Alfred paid for the services of the lawyer.
In the meantime, Alfred decided to purchase another house and lot, owned by Rodolfo
Morelos covered by TCT No. 92456 located in Peña Street, Bajada, Davao City.19 Alfred
again agreed to have the deed of sale made out in the name of Ederlina. On September 7,
1984, Rodolfo Morelos executed a deed of absolute sale over the said property in favor of
Ederlina as the sole vendee for the amount of P80,000.00.20 Alfred paid US$12,500.00 for
the property.
Alfred purchased another parcel of land from one Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo,
located in Moncado, Babak, Davao, covered by TCT No. 35251. Alfred once more agreed
for the name of Ederlina to appear as the sole vendee in the deed of sale. On December
31, 1984, Atty. Camporedondo executed a deed of sale over the property for P65,000.00
in favor of Ederlina as the sole vendee.21 Alfred, through Ederlina, paid the lot at the cost
of P33,682.00 and US$7,000.00, respectively, for which the vendor signed receipts.22 On
August 14, 1985, TCT No. 47246 was issued to Ederlina as the sole owner of the said
property.23
Meanwhile, Ederlina deposited on December 27, 1985, the total amount of US$250,000
with the HSBC Kowloon under Joint Deposit Account No. 018-462341-145.24
The couple decided to put up a beach resort on a four-hectare land in Camudmud, Babak,
Davao, owned by spouses Enrique and Rosela Serrano. Alfred purchased the property from
the spouses for P90,000.00, and the latter issued a receipt therefor.25 A draftsman
commissioned by the couple submitted a sketch of the beach resort.26 Beach houses were
forthwith constructed on a portion of the property and were eventually rented out by
Ederlina's father, Narciso Catito. The rentals were collected by Narciso, while Ederlina kept
the proceeds of the sale of copra from the coconut trees in the property. By this time,
Alfred had already spent P200,000.00 for the purchase, construction and upkeep of the
property.
Ederlina often wrote letters to her family informing them of her life with Alfred. In a Letter
dated January 21, 1985, she wrote about how Alfred had financed the purchases of some
real properties, the establishment of her beauty parlor business, and her petition to
divorce Klaus.27
Because Ederlina was preoccupied with her business in Manila, she executed on July 8,
1985, two special powers of attorney28 appointing Alfred as attorney-in-fact to receive in
her behalf the title and the deed of sale over the property sold by the spouses Enrique
Serrano.
In the meantime, Ederlina's petition for divorce was denied because Klaus opposed the
same. A second petition filed by her met the same fate. Klaus wanted half of all the
properties owned by Ederlina in the Philippines before he would agree to a divorce. Worse,
Klaus threatened to file a bigamy case against Ederlina.29
Alfred proposed the creation of a partnership to Ederlina, or as an alternative, the
establishment of a corporation, with Ederlina owning 30% of the equity thereof. She
initially agreed to put up a corporation and contacted Atty. Armando Dominguez to
prepare the necessary documents. Ederlina changed her mind at the last minute when she
was advised to insist on claiming ownership over the properties acquired by them during
their coverture.
Alfred and Ederlina's relationship started deteriorating. Ederlina had not been able to
secure a divorce from Klaus. The latter could charge her for bigamy and could even
involve Alfred, who himself was still married. To avoid complications, Alfred decided to live
separately from Ederlina and cut off all contacts with her. In one of her letters to Alfred,
Ederlina complained that he had ruined her life. She admitted that the money used for the
purchase of the properties in Davao were his. She offered to convey the properties deeded
to her by Atty. Mardoecheo Camporedondo and Rodolfo Morelos, asking Alfred to prepare
her affidavit for the said purpose and send it to her for her signature.30 The last straw for
Alfred came on September 2, 1985, when someone smashed the front and rear
windshields of Alfred's car and damaged the windows. Alfred thereafter executed an
affidavit-complaint charging Ederlina and Sally MacCarron with malicious mischief.31
On October 15, 1985, Alfred wrote to Ederlina's father, complaining that Ederlina had
taken all his life savings and because of this, he was virtually penniless. He further
accused the Catito family of acquiring for themselves the properties he had purchased with
his own money. He demanded the return of all the amounts that Ederlina and her family
had "stolen" and turn over all the properties acquired by him and Ederlina during their
coverture.32
Shortly thereafter, Alfred filed a Complaint33 dated October 28, 1985, against Ederlina,
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, for recovery of real and personal properties
located in Quezon City and Manila. In his complaint, Alfred alleged, inter alia, that
Ederlina, without his knowledge and consent, managed to transfer funds from their joint
account in HSBC Hong Kong, to her own account with the same bank. Using the said
funds, Ederlina was able to purchase the properties subject of the complaints. He also
alleged that the beauty parlor in Ermita was established with his own funds, and that the
Quezon City property was likewise acquired by him with his personal funds.34
Ederlina failed to file her answer and was declared in default. Alfred adduced his
evidence ex parte.
In the meantime, on November 7, 1985, Alfred also filed a complaint35 against Ederlina
with the Regional Trial Court, Davao City, for specific performance, declaration of
ownership of real and personal properties, sum of money, and damages. He alleged, inter
alia, in his complaint:
4. That during the period of their common-law relationship, plaintiff solely through his own
efforts and resources acquired in the Philippines real and personal properties valued more
or less at P724,000.00; The defendant's common-law wife or live-in partner did not
contribute anything financially to the acquisition of the said real and personal properties.
These properties are as follows:
I. Real Properties
a. TCT No. T-92456 located at Bajada, Davao City, consisting of 286 square meters, (with
residential house) registered in the name of the original title owner Rodolfo M. Morelos but
already fully paid by plaintiff. Valued at P342,000.00;
b. TCT No. T-47246 (with residential house) located at Babak, Samal, Davao, consisting of
600 square meters, registered in the name of Ederlina Catito, with the Register of Deeds
of Tagum, Davao del Norte valued at P144,000.00;
c. A parcel of agricultural land located at Camudmud, Babak, Samal, Davao del Norte,
consisting of 4.2936 hectares purchased from Enrique Serrano and Rosela B. Serrano.
Already paid in full by plaintiff. Valued at P228,608.32;
II. Personal Properties:
a. Furniture valued at P10,000.00.
...
5. That defendant made no contribution at all to the acquisition, of the above-mentioned
properties as all the monies (sic) used in acquiring said properties belonged solely to
plaintiff;36
Alfred prayed that after hearing, judgment be rendered in his favor:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be
rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering the defendant to execute the corresponding deeds of transfer and/or
conveyances in favor of plaintiff over those real and personal properties enumerated in
Paragraph 4 of this complaint;
b) Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiff all the above real and personal
properties or their money value, which are in defendant's name and custody because
these were acquired solely with plaintiffs money and resources during the duration of the
common-law relationship between plaintiff and defendant, the description of which are as
follows:
(1) TCT No. T-92456 (with residential house) located at Bajada, Davao City, consisting of
286 square meters, registered in the name of the original title owner Rodolfo Morelos but
already fully paid by plaintiff. Valued at P342,000.00;
(2) TCT No. T-47246 (with residential house) located at Babak, Samal, Davao, consisting
of 600 square meters, registered in the name of Ederlina Catito, with the Register of
Deeds of Tagum, Davao del Norte, valued at P144,000.00;
(3) A parcel of agricultural land located at Camudmud, Babak, Samal, Davao del Norte,
consisting of 4.2936 hectares purchased from Enrique Serrano and Rosela B. Serrano.
Already fully paid by plaintiff. Valued at P228,608.32;
c) Declaring the plaintiff to be the sole and absolute owner of the above-mentioned real
and personal properties;
d) Awarding moral damages to plaintiff in an amount deemed reasonable by the trial
court;
e) To reimburse plaintiff the sum of P12,000.00 as attorney's fees for having compelled
the plaintiff to litigate;
f) To reimburse plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 incurred as litigation expenses also for
having compelled the plaintiff to litigate; and
g) To pay the costs of this suit;
Plaintiff prays other reliefs just and equitable in the premises.37
In her answer, Ederlina denied all the material allegations in the complaint, insisting that
she acquired the said properties with her personal funds, and as such, Alfred had no right
to the same. She alleged that the deeds of sale, the receipts, and certificates of titles of
the subject properties were all made out in her name.38 By way of special and affirmative
defense, she alleged that Alfred had no cause of action against her. She interposed
counterclaims against the petitioner.39
In the meantime, the petitioner filed a Complaint dated August 25, 1987, against the "(1) Mamya automatic camera
HSBC in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City40 for recovery of bank deposits and
damages.41 He prayed that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in his favor, (1) 12 inch "Sonny" T.V. set, colored with remote control.
thus:
(1) Micro oven
WHEREFORE, plaintiff respectfully prays that the Honorable Court adjudge defendant
bank, upon hearing the evidence that the parties might present, to pay plaintiff:
(1) Electric fan (tall, adjustable stand)

1. ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED AND THIRTY U.S. DOLLARS
(1) Office safe with (2) drawers and safe
AND NINETY EIGHT CENTS (US$126,230.98) plus legal interests, either of Hong Kong or
of the Philippines, from 20 December 1984 up to the date of execution or satisfaction of
judgment, as actual damages or in restoration of plaintiffs lost dollar savings; (1) Electric Washing Machine

2. The same amount in (1) above as moral damages; (1) Office desk and chair

3. Attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to TWENTY FIVE PER CENT (25%) of (1) and (1) Double bed suits
(2) above;
(1) Mirror/dresser
4. Litigation expenses in the amount equivalent to TEN PER CENT (10%) of the amount in
(1) above; and (1) Heavy duty voice/working mechanic

5. For such other reliefs as are just and equitable under the circumstances.42 (1) "Sony" Beta-Movie camera

On April 28, 1986, the RTC of Quezon City rendered its decision in Civil Case No. Q-46350, (1) Suitcase with personal belongings
in favor of Alfred, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
(1) Cardboard box with belongings
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant
to perform the following: (1) Guitar Amplifier

(1) To execute a document waiving her claim to the house and lot in No. 14 Fernandez St.,
San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City in favor of plaintiff or to return to the plaintiff the
acquisition cost of the same in the amount of $20,000.00, or to sell the said property and
turn over the proceeds thereof to the plaintiff;
(2) To deliver to the plaintiff the rights of ownership and management of the beauty parlor
located at 444 Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila, including the equipment and fixtures therein;
(3) To account for the earnings of rental of the house and lot in No. 14 Fernandez St., San
Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City, as well as the earnings in the beauty parlor at 444
Arquiza St., Ermita, Manila and turn over one-half of the net earnings of both properties to
the plaintiff;
(4) To surrender or return to the plaintiff the personal properties of the latter left in the
house at San Francisco Del Monte, to wit:
(1) Hanger with men's suit (white)."
To return to the plaintiff, (1) Hi-Fi Stereo equipment left at 444 Arquiza Street, Ermita,
Manila, as well as the Fronte Suzuki car.
(4) To account for the monies (sic) deposited with the joint account of the plaintiff and
defendant (Account No. 018-0-807950); and to restore to the plaintiff all the monies (sic)
spent by the defendant without proper authority;
(5) To pay the amount of P5,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.43
However, after due proceedings in the RTC of Davao City, in Civil Case No. 17,817, the
trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1995 in favor of Ederlina, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court cannot give due course to the complaint and hereby orders its
dismissal. The counterclaims of the defendant are likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED.44
The trial court ruled that based on documentary evidence, the purchaser of the three
parcels of land subject of the complaint was Ederlina. The court further stated that even if
Alfred was the buyer of the properties; he had no cause of action against Ederlina for the
recovery of the same because as an alien, he was disqualified from acquiring and owning
lands in the Philippines. The sale of the three parcels of land to the petitioner was null and
void ab initio. Applying the pari delicto doctrine, the petitioner was precluded from
recovering the properties from the respondent.
Alfred appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals45 in which the petitioner posited the
view that although he prayed in his complaint in the court a quo that he be declared the
owner of the three parcels of land, he had no intention of owning the same permanently.
His principal intention therein was to be declared the transient owner for the purpose of
selling the properties at public auction, ultimately enabling him to recover the money he
had spent for the purchase thereof.
On March 8, 2000, the CA rendered a decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.
The appellate court ruled that the petitioner knowingly violated the Constitution; hence,
was barred from recovering the money used in the purchase of the three parcels of land.
It held that to allow the petitioner to recover the money used for the purchase of the
properties would embolden aliens to violate the Constitution, and defeat, rather than
enhance, the public policy.46
Hence, the petition at bar.
The petitioner assails the decision of the court contending that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE OF IN PARI
DELICTO IN THE INSTANT CASE BECAUSE BY THE FACTS AS NARRATED IN THE DECISION
IT IS APPARENT THAT THE PARTIES ARE NOT EQUALLY GUILTY BUT RATHER IT WAS THE
RESPONDENT WHO EMPLOYED FRAUD AS WHEN SHE DID NOT INFORM PETITIONER THAT
SHE WAS ALREADY MARRIED TO ANOTHER GERMAN NATIONAL AND WITHOUT SUCH
FRAUDULENT DESIGN PETITIONER COULD NOT HAVE PARTED WITH HIS MONEY FOR THE
PURCHASE OF THE PROPERTIES.47
and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE INTENTION OF
THE PETITIONER IS NOT TO OWN REAL PROPERTIES IN THE PHILIPPINES BUT TO SELL
THEM AT PUBLIC AUCTION TO BE ABLE TO RECOVER HIS MONEY USED IN PURCHASING
THEM.48
Since the assignment of errors are intertwined with each other, the Court shall resolve the
same simultaneously.
The petitioner contends that he purchased the three parcels of land subject of his
complaint because of his desire to marry the respondent, and not to violate the Philippine
Constitution. He was, however, deceived by the respondent when the latter failed to
disclose her previous marriage to Klaus Muller. It cannot, thus, be said that he and the
respondent are "equally guilty;" as such, the pari delicto doctrine is not applicable to him.
He acted in good faith, on the advice of the respondent's uncle, Atty. Mardoecheo
Camporedondo. There is no evidence on record that he was aware of the constitutional
prohibition against aliens acquiring real property in the Philippines when he purchased the
real properties subject of his complaint with his own funds. The transactions were not
illegal per se but merely prohibited, and under Article 1416 of the New Civil Code, he is
entitled to recover the money used for the purchase of the properties. At any rate, the
petitioner avers, he filed his complaint in the court a quo merely for the purpose of having
him declared as the owner of the properties, to enable him to sell the same at public
auction. Applying by analogy Republic Act No. 13349 as amended by Rep. Act No. 4381 and
Rep. Act No. 4882, the proceeds of the sale would be remitted to him, by way of refund
for the money he used to purchase the said properties. To bar the petitioner from
recovering the subject properties, or at the very least, the money used for the purchase
thereof, is to allow the respondent to enrich herself at the expense of the petitioner in
violation of Article 22 of the New Civil Code.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution provides, as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands in the
public domain.50
Lands of the public domain, which include private lands, may be transferred or conveyed
only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire or hold private lands or lands of the
public domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they have also been disqualified from
acquiring private lands.51
Even if, as claimed by the petitioner, the sales in question were entered into by him as the
real vendee, the said transactions are in violation of the Constitution; hence, are null and
void ab initio.52 A contract that violates the Constitution and the law, is null and void and
vests no rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at all.53 The
petitioner, being a party to an illegal contract, cannot come into a court of law and ask to
have his illegal objective carried out. One who loses his money or property by knowingly
engaging in a contract or transaction which involves his own moral turpitude may not
maintain an action for his losses. To him who moves in deliberation and premeditation, the
law is unyielding.54 The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them.55 Under Article 1412 of the New Civil Code, the
petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the
money he had spent for the purchase thereof.56 Equity as a rule will follow the law and will
not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.57 Where the wrong of one party equals that of the other, the defendant is in the
stronger position . . . it signifies that in such a situation, neither a court of equity nor a
court of law will administer a remedy.58 The rule is expressed. in the maxims: EX DOLO
ORITUR ACTIO and IN PARI DELICTO POTIOR EST CONDITIO DEFENDENTIS.59
The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the constitutional proscription, nor claim that he
acted in good faith, let alone assert that he is less guilty than the respondent. The
petitioner is charged with knowledge of the constitutional prohibition.60 As can be gleaned
from the decision of the trial court, the petitioner was fully aware that he was disqualified
from acquiring and owning lands under Philippine law even before he purchased the
properties in question; and, to skirt the constitutional prohibition, the petitioner had the
deed of sale placed under the respondent's name as the sole vendee thereof:
Such being the case, the plaintiff is subject to the constitutional restrictions governing the
acquisition of real properties in the Philippines by aliens.
From the plaintiff's complaint before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 84, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-46350 he alleged:
x x x "That on account that foreigners are not allowed by the Philippine laws to acquire
real properties in their name as in the case of my vendor Miss Victoria Vinuya (sic)
although married to a foreigner, we agreed and I consented in having the title to subject
property placed in defendant's name alone although I paid for the whole price out of my
own exclusive funds." (paragraph IV, Exhibit "W.")
and his testimony before this Court which is hereby quoted:
ATTY. ABARQUEZ:
Q.         In whose name the said house and lot placed, by the way, where is his house and
lot located?
A.         In 14 Fernandez St., San Francisco, del Monte, Manila.
Q.         In whose name was the house placed?
A.         Ederlina Catito because I was informed being not a Filipino, I cannot own the
property. (tsn, p. 11, August 27, 1986).
xxx - xxx - xxx
COURT:
Q.         So you understand that you are a foreigner that you cannot buy land in the
Philippines?
A.         That is correct but as she would eventually be my wife that would be owned by us
later on. (tsn, p. 5, September 3, 1986)
xxx - xxx - xxx
Q.         What happened after that?
A.         She said you foreigner you are using Filipinos to buy property.
Q.         And what did you answer?
A:         I said thank you very much for the property I bought because I gave you a lot of
money (tsn., p. 14, ibid).
It is evident that the plaintiff was fully aware that as a non-citizen of the Philippines, he
was disqualified from validly purchasing any land within the country.61
The petitioner's claim that he acquired the subject properties because of his desire to
marry the respondent, believing that both of them would thereafter jointly own the said
properties, is belied by his own evidence. It is merely an afterthought to salvage a lost
cause. The petitioner admitted on cross-examination that he was all along legally married
to Teresita Santos Frenzel, while he was having an amorous relationship with the
respondent:
ATTY. YAP:
Q         When you were asked to identify yourself on direct examination you claimed
before this Honorable Court that your status is that of being married, do you confirm that?
A         Yes, sir.
Q         To whom are you married?
A         To a Filipina, since 1976.
Q         Would you tell us who is that particular person you are married since 1976?
A         Teresita Santos Frenzel.
Q         Where is she now?
A         In Australia.
Q         Is this not the person of Teresita Frenzel who became an Australian citizen?
A         I am not sure, since 1981 we were separated.
Q         You were only separated, in fact, but not legally separated?
A         Thru my counsel in Australia I filed a separation case.
Q         As of the present you are not legally divorce[d]?
A         I am still legally married.62
The respondent was herself married to Klaus Muller, a German citizen. Thus, the petitioner
and the respondent could not lawfully join in wedlock. The evidence on record shows that
the petitioner in fact knew of the respondent's marriage to another man, but nonetheless
purchased the subject properties under the name of the respondent and paid the purchase
prices therefor. Even if it is assumed gratia arguendi that the respondent and the
petitioner were capacitated to marry, the petitioner is still disqualified to own the
properties in tandem with the respondent.63
The petitioner cannot find solace in Article 1416 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 1416. When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the
prohibition by the law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy
is thereby enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered.64
The provision applies only to those contracts which are merely prohibited, in order to
benefit private interests. It does not apply to contracts void ab initio. The sales of three
parcels of land in favor of the petitioner who is a foreigner is illegal per se. The
transactions are void ab initio because they were entered into in violation of the
Constitution. Thus, to allow the petitioner to recover the properties or the money used in
the purchase of the parcels of land would be subversive of public policy.
Neither may the petitioner find solace in Rep. Act No. 133, as amended by Rep. Act No.
4882, which reads:
SEC. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, private real property may be
mortgaged in favor of any individual, corporation, or association, but the mortgagee or his
successor-in-interest, if disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines, shall not take possession of the mortgaged property during the existence of
the mortgage and shall not take possession of mortgaged property except after default
and for the sole purpose of foreclosure, receivership, enforcement or other proceedings
and in no case for a period of more than five years from actual possession and shall not
bid or take part in any sale of such real property in case of foreclosure: Provided, That said
mortgagee or successor-in-interest may take possession of said property after default in
accordance with the prescribed judicial procedures for foreclosure and receivership and in
no case exceeding five years from actual possession.65
From the evidence on record, the three parcels of land subject of the complaint were not
mortgaged to the petitioner by the owners thereof but were sold to the respondent as the
vendee, albeit with the use of the petitioner's personal funds.
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.66
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO
PROTEST" (No person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action
for recovery of what has been paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in
rem verso.67 This provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by
the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. 68 It may be unfair and
unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties,
or from recovering the money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated
in the early case of Holman vs. Johnson:69 "The objection that a contract is immoral or
illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth
of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it
is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of,
contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff."
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 74833             January 21, 1991
THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioner.
Benjamin I. Fernandez for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman)
to annul — for lack of consent on his part — the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a
residential lot and building to Estelita Padilla, also a Filipino.
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but
have been separated since February 15,1981. 1
On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by
Armando Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon (at No.
7 Neptune Street, Gordon Heights, Olongapo City) in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of
legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk.
8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City . . ."  Thomas Cheesman, although aware of
2
the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife.3
Thereafter—and again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any
protest by him—tax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name
only of Criselda Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and
administration of said property, leasing it to tenants. 4
On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the
knowledge or consent of Thomas Cheesman.  The deed described Criselda as
5
being" . . . of legal age, married to an American citizen,. . ."
6
Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of
First Instance at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for
the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without
his knowledge and consent.  An answer was filed in the names of both defendants,
7
alleging that (1) the property sold was paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda
with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own separate money"); (2) Thomas
Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest or right of
ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith. 8
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed upon certain facts which were
subsequently set out in a pre-trial Order dated October 22, 1981,  as follows:
9
1. Both parties recognize the existence of the Deed of Sale over the residential
house located at No. 7 Granada St., Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, which was
acquired from Armando Altares on June 4, 1974 and sold by defendant Criselda
Cheesman to Estelita Padilla on July 12, 1981; and
2. That the transaction regarding the transfer of their property took place during
the existence of their marriage as the couple were married on December 4, 1970
and the questioned property was acquired sometime on June 4,1974.
The action resulted in a judgment dated June 24, 1982,  declaring void ab initio the sale
10
executed by Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita M. Padilla, and ordering the delivery
of the property to Thomas Cheesman as administrator of the conjugal partnership
property, and the payment to him of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation. 11
The judgment was however set aside as regards Estelita Padilla on a petition for relief
filed by the latter, grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had
seriously impaired her right to present her case adequately.  "After the petition for relief
12
from judgment was given due course," according to petitioner, "a new judge presided
over the case." 13
Estelita Padilla filed a supplemental pleading on December 20, 1982 as her own answer
to the complaint, and a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 1983. Although there
was initial opposition by Thomas Cheesman to the motion, the parties ultimately agreed
on the rendition by the court of a summary judgment after entering into a stipulation of
facts, at the hearing of the motion on June 21, 1983, the stipulation being of the following
tenor:14
(1) that the property in question was bought during the existence of the marriage
between the plaintiff and the defendant Criselda P. Cheesman;
 (2) that the property bought during the marriage was registered in the name of
Criselda Cheesman and that the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights
executed by the former owner-vendor Armando Altares in favor of Criselda
Cheesman made no mention of the plaintiff;
(3) that the property, subject of the proceedings, was sold by defendant Criselda
Cheesman in favor of the other defendant Estelita M. Padilla, without the written
consent of the plaintiff.
Obviously upon the theory that no genuine issue existed any longer and there was hence
no need of a trial, the parties having in fact submitted, as also stipulated, their respective
memoranda each praying for a favorable verdict, the Trial Court  rendered a "Summary
15
Judgment" dated August 3, 1982 declaring "the sale executed by . . . Criselda Cheesman
in favor of . . . Estelita Padilla to be valid," dismissing Thomas Cheesman's complaint
and ordering him "to immediately turn over the possession of the house and lot subject of
. . . (the) case to . . . Estelita Padilla . . ."
16
The Trial Court found that —
1) the evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption in
Article 160 of the Civil Code—that all property of the marriage belongs to the
conjugal partnership "unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife"—and that the immovable in question was in truth
Criselda's paraphernal property;
2) that moreover, said legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply "inasmuch
as the husband-plaintiff is an American citizen and therefore disqualified under
the Constitution to acquire and own real properties; and
3) that the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge
of her husband "had led . . . Estelita Padilla to believe that the properties were
the exclusive properties of Criselda Cheesman and on the faith of such a belief
she bought the properties from her and for value," and therefore, Thomas
Cheesman was, under Article 1473 of the Civil Code, estopped to impugn the
transfer to Estelita Padilla.
Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. There he assailed the
Trial Court acts (1) of granting Estelita Padilla's petition for relief, and its resolution of
matters not subject of said petition; (2) of declaring valid the sale to Estelita Padilla
despite the lack of consent thereto by him, and the presumption of the conjugal character
of the property in question pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code; (3) of disregarding
the judgment of June 24, 1982 which, not having been set aside as against Criselda
Cheesman, continued to be binding on her; and (4) of making findings of fact not
supported by evidence. All of these contentions were found to be without merit by the
Appellate Tribunal which, on January 7, 1986, promulgated a decision (erroneously
denominated, "Report")  affirming the "Summary Judgment complained of," "having
17
found no reversible error" therein.
Once more, Thomas Cheesman availed of the remedy of appeal, this time to this Court.
Here, he argues that it was reversible error for the Intermediate Appellate Court —
1) to find that the presumption that the property in question is conjugal in accordance
with Article 160 had been satisfactorily overcome by Estelita Padilla; 18
2) to rule that Estelita Padilla was a purchaser of said property in good faith, it appearing:
a) that the deed by which the property was conveyed to Criselda
Cheesman described her as "married to Thomas C. Cheesman," as well
as the deed by which the property was later conveyed to Estelita Padilla
by Criselda Cheesman also described her as "married to an American
citizen," and both said descriptions had thus "placed Estelita on
knowledge of the conjugal nature of the property;" and
b) that furthermore, Estelita had admitted to stating in the deed by which
she acquired the property a price much lower than that actually paid "in
order to avoid payment of more obligation to the government;" 19
3) to decline to declare that the evidence did not warrant the grant of Estelita Padilla's
petition for relief on the ground of "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence;" 20
4) to hold that Thomas Cheesman had waived his objection to Estelita's petition for relief
by failing to appeal from the order granting the same;
5) to accord to Estelita Padilla a relief other than that she had specifically prayed for in
her petition for relief, ie., "the restoration of the purchase price which Estelita allegedly
paid to Criselda;"  and
21
6) to fail to declare that Thomas Cheesman's citizenship is not a bar to his action to
recover the lot and house for the conjugal partnership. 22
Such conclusions as that (1) fraud, mistake or excusable negligence existed in the
premises justifying relief to Estelita Padilla under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, or (2)
that Criselda Cheesman had used money she had brought into her marriage to Thomas
Cheesman to purchase the lot and house in question, or (3) that Estelita Padilla believed
in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the exclusive owner of the property that she
(Estelita) intended to and did in fact buy—derived from the evidence adduced by the
parties, the facts set out in the pleadings or otherwise appearing on record—are
conclusions or findings of fact. As distinguished from a question of law—which exists
"when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" —
"there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the
falsehood of alleged facts;"  or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the
23
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy
of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation; to each other and to the whole and
the probabilities of the situation." 24
Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a
petition for the review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to this
Court.  As everyone knows or ought to know, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is
25
limited to reviewing errors of law, accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the
lower court upon its own assessment of the evidence.  The creation of the Court of
26
Appeals was precisely intended to take away from the Supreme Court the work of
examining the evidence, and confine its task to the determination of questions which do
not call for the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of
witnesses.  The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the Court
27
of Appeals is, to be sure, subject to certain exceptions,  none of which however obtains
28
in the case at bar.
It is noteworthy that both the Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court reached
the same conclusions on the three (3) factual matters above set forth, after assessment
of the evidence and determination of the probative value thereof. Both Courts found that
the facts on record adequately proved fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which
Estelita Padilla's rights had been substantially impaired; that the funds used by Criselda
Cheesman was money she had earned and saved prior to her marriage to Thomas
Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith that Criselda Cheesman
was the sole owner of the property in question. Consequently, these determinations of
fact will not be here disturbed, this Court having been cited to no reason for doing so.
These considerations dispose of the first three (3) points that petitioner Cheesman seeks
to make in his appeal.  They also make unnecessary an extended discussion of the other
1âwphi1
issues raised by him. As to them, it should suffice to restate certain fundamental
propositions.
An order of a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) granting a petition for
relief under Rule 38 is interlocutory and is not appealable. Hence, the failure of the party
who opposed the petition to appeal from said order, or his participation in the
proceedings subsequently had, cannot be construed as a waiver of his objection to the
petition for relief so as to preclude his raising the same question on appeal from the
judgment on the merits of the main case. Such a party need not repeat his objections to
the petition for relief, or perform any act thereafter (e.g., take formal exception) in order
to preserve his right to question the same eventually, on appeal, it being sufficient for this
purpose that he has made of record "the action which he desires the court to take or his
objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor."
29
Again, the prayer in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is not necessarily
the same prayer in the petitioner's complaint, answer or other basic pleading. This should
be obvious. Equally obvious is that once a petition for relief is granted and the judgment
subject thereof set aside, and further proceedings are thereafter had, the Court in its
judgment on the merits may properly grant the relief sought in the petitioner's basic
pleadings, although different from that stated in his petition for relief.
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain."  Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with knowledge of this
30
prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased
by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that
purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and
clandestinely, he knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and
void.  In any event, he had and has no capacity or personality to question the
31
subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is
merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To
sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional prohibition.
If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its
transfer or disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the
property cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and
overturned. But even if it were a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the
acquisition, the considerations just set out militate, on high constitutional grounds,
against his recovering and holding the property so acquired or any part thereof. And
whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the money used for
the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal
funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic
exercise. An equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good
faith, both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own
conduct had led her to believe the property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife,
freely disposable by her without his consent or intervention. An innocent buyer for value,
she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase, particularly as against
Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter and spirit of
the Constitution itself.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERE